MODULE 3

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

OWNERSHIP IN GENERAL

A. USE, POSSESSION, FRUITS AND DISPOSITION

1.) Perez vs. Evite (G.R. No. L-160003, March 29, 1961)

The adjudication of ownership does not include possession of the property where the actual possessor
has a valid right over the property enforceable even against the owner thereof.

This doctrine however, may not be invoked in instances where no such right may be appreciated in favor
of the possessor.

In the instant case, considering that appellants have no other claim to the possession of the property in
question, apart from their claim of ownership which was rejected by the lower court and consequently,
have no right to remain therein after such ownership was adjudged to appellee, the delivery of possession
of the land should be considered included in the adjudication. I

2.) Olego vs. Rebueno (G.R. No. L-39350, October 29, 1975)

The general rule is that the adjudication of ownership does not include the possession of the property.
The exception is that the adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of possession if the
defeated party has not shown any right to possess the land independently of his claim of ownership which
was rejected

3.) Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 138842, October 18, 2000)

The sale was simulated since there was lack of consideration. The ownership therefore never transferred
to Natividad. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the intention of Maximino, Sr. and Aurea to transfer the
subject properties to Natividad was present in order to escape payment of inheritance taxes.

4.) Spouses Flancia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146997, [April 26, 2005]

In a contract of sale, title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; in a
contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved by the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until
full payment of the purchase price

5.) Vda. de Bautista v. Marcos, G.R. No. L-17072, [October 31, 1961

The invalidity of the mortgage contract does not imply the concomitant invalidity of the collateral
agreement whereby possession of the land mortgaged was transferred to the mortgagee in usufruct, and
the latter, not having been aware of any flaw in her mode of acquisition, is a possessor in good faith
entitled to all the fruits received during the entire period of her possession in good faith |

|| 
B. DOCTRINE OF SELF-HELP

6.) German Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76216, 76217, [September
14, 1989]

The doctrine of self-help enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil Code. Such justification is unavailing
because the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession
which is absent in the case at bar. When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to
judicial process for the recovery of property.||| 

C. SURFACE RIGHTS TO LANDOWNER

7.) Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43938, L-44081 & L-44092, [April 15, 1988]

The owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the
airspace above it up to a reasonable height. The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible
and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical;
the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural

RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AND/ OR OWNERSHIP

A. ACTIONS AVAILABLE TO OWNER

I. RECOVERY OF PERSONAL PROPERTY

a.) Replevin

1.) Arabesque Industrial Phil., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101431 (Resolution), [December
14, 1992]

A writ of replevin cannot be properly directed against a lawful possessor of a chattel, and the matter of
ownership as well as incurring of additional lay day fees by the continued detention of the boat by PDEC
is therefore inconsequential.

2.) Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79021, [May 17, 1993]

Replevin does not lie because regardless of the validity or invalidity of the search warrant, the property
was effectively placed in custodia legis and, therefore, beyond the reach of a replevin suit. It would be
entirely different if the seizure was unlawful, in which case replevin may prosper.

II. RECOVERY OF REAL PROPERTY

A.) RECOVERY OF REAL PROPERTY

1.) Peralta-Labrador v. Bugarin, G.R. No. 165177, [August 25, 2005]

An action for forcible entry is a quieting process and the one year time bar for filing a suit is in pursuance
of the summary nature of the action. Thus, we have nullified proceedings in the MTCs when it improperly
assumed jurisdiction of a case in which the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession had
exceeded one year.
2.) Nuñez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 180542, [April 12, 2010]

While prior physical possession is, admittedly, an indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the
dearth of merit in petitioner's position is, however, evident from the principle that possession can be
acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's
will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.

3.) Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139442, [December 6, 2006]

An ejectment complaint based on possession by tolerance of the owner, like the Tan Te complaint, is a
specie of unlawful detainer cases.|||

Plaintiffs have acquiesced to defendant's possession and use of the premises. It has been held that a
person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand , failing which
a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.

4.) Spouses Ocampo v. Heirs of Dionisio, G.R. No. 191101, [October 1, 2014]

In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the only issue is possession in fact, or physical possession of
real property, independently of any claim of ownership that either party may put forth in his pleading.

If plaintiff can prove prior physical possession in himself, he may recover such possession even from the
owner, but, on the other hand, if he cannot prove such prior physical possession, he has no right of action
for forcible entry and detainer even if he should be the owner of the property.||| 

5.) Suarez v. Emboy, Jr., G.R. No. 187944, [March 12, 2014]

When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does
not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be
an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.||| 

B.) ACCION PUBLICIANA AND ACCION REIVINDICATORIA

1.) Bokingo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161739, May 4, 2006

What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana) and
from a reinvindicatory action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question
of possession de facto.||| 

2.)  Hilario v. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, [April 29, 2005]

An accion reivindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the recovery of possession over the real
property as owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the said ownership.

On the other hand, an accion publiciana is one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess. It is
also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause
of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.|||
3.) Vda. de Aguilar v. Spouses Alfaro, G.R. No. 164402, [July 5, 2010]

An accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. 19 It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the
accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.

4.) Bongato v. Spouses Malvar, G.R. No. 141614, [August 14, 2002]

After the lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion
publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right of possession or an accion reivindicatoria, which
is an action to recover ownership as well as possession.

Respondents should have presented their suit before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria, not before the MTCC in summary proceedings for forcible entry. Their cause of action for
forcible entry had prescribed already, and the MTCC had no more jurisdiction to hear and decide it.

5.) Encarnacion v. Amigo, G.R. No. 169793, [September 15, 2006]

Indeed the owners of the subject lot and were unlawfully deprived of their right of possession, they should
present their claim before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and
not before the metropolitan trial court in a summary proceeding for unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For
even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had
been in physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary
action for ejectment.||| 

6.) (Spouses Valdez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132424, [May 4, 2006]

When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does
not state how entry was affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be
an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.||| 

C. ACTION TO RECOVER IS BASED ON OWNERSHIP

1.) (Caro v. Sucaldito, G.R. No. 157536, [May 16, 2005

The petitioner is not the proper party to file an action for reconveyance that would result in the reversion
of the land to the government. The petitioner has no personality to "recover" the property as he has not
shown that he is the rightful owner thereof.||| 

2.) (Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 138971, [June 6, 2001], 411 PHIL
107-121)

In this regard, title to the property in the present case was no longer in the name of the allegedly
fraudulent heirs, but already in that of an innocent purchaser for value — the government.

The remedy of an owner alleged to have been prejudiced or fraudulently deprived of property that was
subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser for value is an action for damages against the person or
persons who perpetrated the fraud.

||| 
3.) (Gasataya v. Mabasa, G.R. No. 148147, [February 16, 2007]

Reconveyance is available not only to the legal owner of a property but also to the person  with a better
right than the person under whose name said property was erroneously registered.||| 

D. OTHER ACTIONS FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION

A. INJUNCTION

1.) Bokingo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161739, May 4, 2006

The respondent’s complaint has not sought to recover the possession or ownership of the subject land.
Rather, it is principally an action to enjoin petitioner Bokingo and his representatives from committing acts
that would tend to prevent the survey of the subject land. It cannot be said therefore that it is one of a
possessory action.

2.) Idolor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141853, [February 7, 2001]

Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an
injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be a right in
esse or the existence of a right to be protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is
a violation of such right.||| 

3.) Federated Realty Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127967

Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. The very
foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in
the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation and the prevention of
multiplicity of suits. Where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of
injunction should be refused.||| 

B. WRIT OF POSSESSION

1.) Vencilao v. Vano, G.R. No. L-25660, L-32065, L-33677, [February 23, 1990]

A writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a registration
case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during
the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree||| 

2.) Jetri Construction Corp. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 171687, [June 8, 2007]

Any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing
the issuance of a writ of possession. Regardless of whether or not there is a pending suit for annulment of
the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice of
course to the eventual outcome of the said case.

3.) A.G. Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111662, [October 23, 1997]

The issuance of a writ of possession is not a judgment on the merits.

A writ of possession complements the writ of execution only when the right of possession or ownership
has been validly determined in a case directly relating to either.

E. ACTION TO RECOVER

1.) Heirs of Vencilao, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123713, [April 1, 1998]

In order that an action to recover ownership of real property may prosper, the person who claims that he
has a better right to it must prove not only his ownership of the same but also satisfactorily prove the
identity thereof.|||

2.) (Heirs of Fabela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142546, [August 9, 2001]

Failure to prove his right of ownership will bar an action to recover the property; his right to recover must
be founded on positive title or right, and not merely on negative ones, such as the lack or insufficiency of
title on the part of the defendant. The possessor has a presumption of title, and unless the plaintiff proves
he has a better right, he cannot recover the property from the defendant."||| 

F. QUANTUM OF PROOF

1.) (Republic v. Carrasco, G.R. No. 143491, [December 6, 2006]

While tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute, at the
least, proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes not only manifests one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property, but also announces an adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties with an
intention to contribute needed revenues to the government. Such an act strengthens one's  bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership.||| 

2.) (Ramos-Balalio v. Ramos, G.R. No. 168464, [January 23, 2006]

Tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.||| 

3.) Spouses Azana v. Lumbo, G.R. No. 157593, [March 22, 2007]

It is enough to say that the evidence they presented cast doubt on the validity of their claim. Petitioners
failed to establish, by preponderance of evidence, the exact perimeters of the land which they claim as
their own.||| 

4.) Fule v. De Legare, G.R No. L-17951, [February 28, 1963]

Where there was nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the
property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the
Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently
defeat his right thereto. If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title
which the Torrens system seeks to insure would entirely be futile and nugatory.||| 
5.) (Spouses Rumarate v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 168222, [April 18, 2006]

A person in actual possession of a piece of land under claim of ownership may wait until his possession
is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, and that his undisturbed
possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine
the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title.

RIGHT OF ACCESSION

I. RIGHT OF ACCESSION WITH RESPECT TO IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

A. BUILDER/SOWER/PLANTER IN GOOD FAITH

i. Good Faith

1.) Rosales v. Castelltort, G.R. No. 157044, [October 5, 2005]

Appellants would have a right to retain the land on which they have built in good faith until they are
reimbursed the expenses incurred by them. This is so because the right to retain the improvements while
the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which it is
built, planted or sown.||| 

2.) J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Vda. de Lumanlan, G.R. No. L-23497, [April 26, 1968]

Lumanlan had chosen to ignore the Torrens title of Tuason & Co., Inc. and relied instead upon the
Deudors' claim of ownership perhaps because such course appeared to her as more advantageous;
hence, she has only herself to blame for the consequences now that the Deudors' claim has been
abandoned by the Deudors themselves, and cannot pretend good faith.||| 

3.) Quevada v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140798, [September 19, 2006]

Petitioner is not the owner of or claiming title to the land, but a mere tenant occupying only a portion of
the house on it under the lease contract between him and private respondent. No supporting evidence
was presented showing that petitioner's construction of the house was with the consent of the land's
previous owner, but good faith should be presumed, particularly since the lease relationship was open
and in plain view.||| 

4.) Spouses Macasaet v. Spouses Macasaet, G.R. Nos. 154391-92, [September 30, 2004]

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the
person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the
expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.

5.) Mores v. Yu-Go, G.R. No. 172292, [July 23, 2010]

Full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made
applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner
thereof. It does not apply where one's only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it
would always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property.||| 

6.) Spouses Del Campo v. Abesia, G.R. No. L-49219, [April 15, 1988]
Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on the land owned in
common for then he did not build, plant or sow upon land that exclusively belongs to another but of which
he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a third person under the circumstances, and the situation is
governed by the rules of co-ownership.||| 

7.) Boyer-Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100866, [July 14, 1992]

If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted or sown on the land of another
but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though
both had acted in good faith.||| 

8.) (Sarmiento v. Agana, G.R. No. 57288, [April 30, 1984], 214 PHIL 101-106)

The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the
possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453 (now Article 546).

The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article 361 (now Article 448), either to
pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot as respondents here
did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove
it from the land where it is erected.

He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay
for the same.||| 

ii. OPTIONS

a.) REASON FOR THE OPTION

1.) Ochoa v. Apeta, G.R. No. 146259, [September 13, 2007]

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the
person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the
expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.||| 

iii. RIGHT OF LANDOWNER TO REMOVE OR DEMOLISH IMPROVEMENT

1.) Rosales v. Castelltort, G.R. No. 157044, [October 5, 2005]

The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession,  i.e.,that
the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies with the
landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either
option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land.||

2.) (Depra v. Dumlao, G.R. No. L-57348, [May 16, 1985]

The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article 361 (now Article 448), either to
pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as respondents here
did refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove
it from the land where it erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his
land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
Iv. BUILDER’S/SOWER/PLANTER’S RIGHT TO RETAIN IMPROVEMENT

1.) ||| Spouses Nuguid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151815, [February 23, 2005]

The law aims to concentrate in one person the ownership of the land and the improvements thereon in
view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, it guards against unjust enrichment
insofar as the good-faith builder's improvements are concerned. The right of retention is considered as
one of the measures devised by the law for the protection of builders in good faith. Its object is to
guarantee full and prompt reimbursement as it permits the actual possessor to remain in possession while
he has not been reimbursed (by the person who defeated him in the case for possession of the property)
for those necessary expenses and useful improvements made by him on the thing possessed.

B.) BUILDER/PLANTER/SOWER IN BAD FAITH

i. INSTANCES OF BAD FAITH

1.) (Mindanao Academy v. Yap, G.R. Nos. L-17681 & L-17682 , [February 26, 1965]

Although the bad faith of one party neutralizes that of the other and hence as between themselves their
rights would be as if both of them had acted in good faith at the time of the transaction, this legal fiction of
the buyer's good faith ceased when the complaint against him was filed.|||

 A possessor in good faith cannot recover the value of a new building constructed after the filing of an
action for annulment of the sale of land on which it is constructed, thus rendering him a builder in bad faith
who is denied by law any right of reimbursement.||| 

2.) Lumungo v. Usman, G.R. No. L-25359, [September 28, 1968]

He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown
without right to indemnity.||| 

3.) (Santos v. Mojica, G.R. No. L-25450, [January 31, 1969], 136 PHIL 139-143)

A son in possession of a land, who built his house thereon after his predecessors-in-interest had been
summoned in an action for partition of the property, is a builder in bad faith that must lose his
improvement to the owners of the land without right to indemnity.||| 

B.) ALLUVION

1.) Office of the City Mayor of Parañaque City v. Ebio, G.R. No. 178411, [June 23, 2010]

It is explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part
of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it
may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property
must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to
acquisition through prescription by third persons.||| 
2.) Republic v. Heirs of Abrille, G.R. No. L-39248, [May 7, 1976], 162 PHIL 913-929)

The increased area in question, which is not a registered land but formerly a river bed, is so big as to give
allowance for a mere mistake in area of the original registration of the tracts of land of the defendant-
appellant formerly belonging to and registered in the name of their grandfather, Francisco Villa Abrille Lim
Juna.

In order to bring this increase in area, which the parties admitted to have been a former river bed of the
Davao River, under the operation and coverage of the Land Registration Law, Act 496, proceedings in
registrations of land title should have been filed instead of an ordinary approval of subdivision plan.

3.) (Grande v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-17652, [June 30, 1962],

An accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives such
accretion is covered by a Torrens title. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing; registration under the
Torrens system of that ownership is another.

4.) Ignacio v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-12958, [May 30, 1960]

Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part
of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coastguard service, the
Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as
increment thereof||.

5.) (Heirs of Navarro v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68166, [February 12, 1997]

If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the
alluvium should have been deposited on either or both of the eastern and western boundaries of
petitioners' own tract of land, not on the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay.
Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion, which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the
portion of claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank.||| 

QUIETING THE TITLE

A. ACTION TO QUIET THE TITLE

I. MEANING

1.) Heirs of Diaz v. Virata, G.R. No. 162037, [August 7, 2006]

An action for quieting of title is a remedy which may be availed of only when by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable
or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast on the complainant's title to real property or any interest
therein.||| 

II. REQUISITES
1.) .||Calacala v. Republic, G.R. No. 154415, [July 28, 2005]

Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must
be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy

2.) (Robles v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123509, [March 14, 2000]

It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property which is the subject matter of the action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that
is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff's title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.||| 

III. SUITOR

1.) Spouses Pingol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102909, [September 6, 1993]

The owner of real property who is in possession thereof may wait until his possession is invaded or his
title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. A person claiming title to real property, but not in
possession thereof, must act affirmatively and within the time provided by the statute. Possession is a
continuing right as is the right to defend such possession. So it has been determined that an owner of real
property in possession has a continuing right to invoke a court of equity to remove a cloud that is a
continuing menace to his title.|||