Post Chernobyl

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Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 1988, volume 6, pages 289-310

Post-Chernobyl nuclear reactions in the USA

J H Johnson Jr
Department of Geography, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1524, USA
D J Zeigler
Department of Political Science and Geography, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA 23529-0088, USA
Received 1 June 1987; in revised form 16 December 1987

Abstract. This paper contains an assessment of the impact of the Chernobyl disaster on US
civilian and military nuclear programs. Specific attention is devoted to the major policy changes
sought by federal nuclear regulatory agencies, the US Congress, state and local governments
hosting nuclear installations, and the nuclear industry in the twelve-month period following
the April 1986 accident in the Soviet Ukraine.

1 Introduction
In the United States, the Chernobyl disaster renewed public concerns about the
safety and management of civilian nuclear reactors, elevated to the status of a
major political issue the questionable adequacy of off-site radiological emergency
planning for nuclear power plant accidents, and focused national attention on the
safety, management, and operation of the US government's nuclear weapons
production and assembly complexes. In this paper we assess the impact of the
Soviet disaster on US civilian and military nuclear programs. We focus specifically
on the major policy changes sought by federal nuclear regulatory agencies, the US
Congress, state and local governments hosting nuclear plants, and the nuclear
industry in the twelve-month period following the April 1986 accident in the
Soviet Ukraine. To set the context, we begin by presenting a brief history of
nuclear power development in the USA. The economic and sociopolitical climate
surrounding nuclear power immediately prior to the Chernobyl accident is highlighted.

2 US nuclear power development: a brief history


The social history of nuclear power in the USA has been violent and controversial
(Cook, 1982; Hohenemser et al, 1977; 1985). The use of nuclear power originated
in the atomic weapons program of World War 2, which culminated in the bombing
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The deaths and continuing human suffering which
resulted still loom large in the social memory of the American public (Erikson,
1982; Lifton, 1982; Thurlow, 1982). In the 1950s, the US government embarked
upon the 'Atoms for Peace' program designed to encourage and support the use of
nuclear power for civilian purposes, especially in the generation of electricity. It
was argued that, with nuclear power, unlimited electrical energy could be produced
at a price almost 'too cheap to meter'. [For a detailed discussion of the 'too cheap to
meter' cliche, see Atomic Industrial Forum (1987c).] However, almost from inception,
the civilian nuclear power program has been beset by financial, economic, regulatory,
managerial, and public acceptance problems, which have severely thwarted its
growth and development.
2.1 Growth and decline of the US civilian nuclear power program
Proponents projected in the early 1950s that nuclear power would supply the bulk
of US electrical energy by the year 2000. Although only thirteen reactor orders
290 J H Johnson Jr, D J Zeigler

were placed since the industry's beginning in 1953 to 1959 (an average of one per
year), the civilian program developed rapidly during the 1960s and 1970s, initially
in response to sharp increases in electricity demand and subsequently in response
to the Arab oil embargo. Between 1965 and 1978, public and private utilities in
the USA placed more than 200 reactor orders, an average of one per month
(table 1). It was clear by the early 1970s that federal energy policymakers viewed
commercial nuclear power development as one of the keys to the nation's goals of
energy independence and continued economic prosperity.
By the early 1980s, however, signs that the civilian nuclear power program was
in trouble were clearly apparent. The average leadtime for nuclear construction
(that is, the time that elapses between the issuance of a construction permit and
the issuance of an operating license) had increased from less than five years for
plants ordered during the 1960s to ten or more years for plants ordered during
the 1970s (OTA, 1983; see also Feinstein and Bauman, 1987). Nuclear construction
costs had skyrocketed from $ 1 5 0 - $ 3 0 0 per kWh for plants completed in the early
1970s to $1000-$3000 per kWh for units completed in the early 1980s, or by as
much as 900% (OTA, 1983). For individual plants the actual rate of increase
depended on, among other factors, the electricity generating capacity (MW),
manufacturer, and region of the country in which the unit was constructed. No
new reactor orders had been placed since 1978 and nearly half of the reactors
ordered during the construction boom of the 1960s and 1970s had been either
cancelled or indefinitely delayed (table 1). When the cancellations/deferrals were
announced, according to the US Office of Technology Assessment (OTA, 1983),
approximately $10 billion was tied up in investments at these sites and at least
$50 million per site had already been spent. By comparison, about fifty coal-fired
plants were also cancelled during this period, but both the number and the sunken
investment were much smaller than in the case of nuclear plants.
Thus, when the Chernobyl disaster occurred in April 1986, there were only
ninety-eight fully licensed and operating reactors in the US civilian nuclear power
program. With a total generating capacity of 84974 MW, these facilities accounted
for only 17% of the electricity produced in the USA during calendar year 1985, a
percentage well below nuclear power's projected contribution to the nation's 'energy
mix' by the mid-1980s and to its somewhat longer-range goal of energy independence
by the year 2000. Moreover, owing to the large sunken investments in cancelled
or deferred plants and to the massive cost overruns for completed units, the electricity
provided by the nuclear utilities was far from 'too cheap to meter'. It was estimated
in 1984 that the 'rate shock' of nuclear plants totalled $191 billion, a figure that
represents "the sudden increase in electric rates consumers have to pay above the
costs of electricity from coal or oil-fired plants" (Rudolph and Ridley, 1986a,
page 8). Utility bills increased by as much as 600% in some nuclear communities,

Table 1. Profile of US nuclear power development, 1953-1986 (source: Atomic Industrial


Forum, 1986a).
Time period Orders Cancellations Licenses Retirements
placed announced issued announced

1953-1959 13 0 2 0
1960-1969 88 0 20 6
1970-1979 153 57 58 2
1980-1985 0 54 31 4
1986-present 0 0 10 0
Total 254 111 121 12
Post-Chernobyl nuclear reactions In the USA 291

forcing consumers to cut back on their electricity usage and sparking rate hike
rebellions. Consumers used every avenue possible, including statewide referenda
and the courts, in an effort to prohibit nuclear utilities from passing on the costs
of cancelled and underutilized nuclear power plants (because of decreasing
electricity demand) (Rudolph and Ridley, 1986b; Woutat, 1987, page 1).
The following factors contributed to the nuclear industry's problems. The
utilities based their nuclear construction programs of the 1960s and 1970s on
inaccurate forecasts of future electricity demand. Instead of increasing as rapidly
as had been expected, the electric load grew at only 2.6% per year between 1973
and 1982, less than half the rate at which it had grown between 1960 and 1972,
7.1% per year. The need for new construction had been overestimated by 25% in
the last half of the 1970s and by 60% in the early 1980s (OTA, 1983, page 29).
Partly as a result of these miscalculations, some utilities deliberately delayed
construction of their nuclear plants, which partially explains the sharp increase in
average construction leadtime noted previously (Feinstein and Bauman, 1987).
Other utilities elected simply to cancel their units.
The nuclear construction boom also occurred during a period of both high general
inflation and overall poor performance of the stock market. Because much of the
funding for nuclear construction projects was obtained from external sources, high
interest rates on loans placed an enormous financial strain on some nuclear utilities
(OTA, 1983, page 46). This, in combination with decreasing electricity demand,
strongly influenced decisions to either cancel or defer construction indefinitely. For
those utilities which managed to complete their nuclear construction projects, high
interest rates were partly responsible for the massive cost overruns previously
noted.
In addition, the utilities attempted to build larger reactors without fully
understanding the technology. This inexperience, coupled with inattention to
quality control by both utility management and construction contractors, resulted in
the frequent discovery of construction flaws. The correction of these errors added
significantly to the cost of and the leadtime for nuclear construction. Furthermore,
the more complex reactor designs required more construction materials and
equipment. Not only did the costs of construction materials increase sharply
during the 1970s, but significant delays in delivery were not uncommon, which in
turn led to low worker-productivity (OTA, 1983, chapter 3).
An unpredictable regulatory process also contributed to the nuclear industry's
problems. During the 1970s, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued
and revised guidelines governing the construction and operation of civilian nuclear
power plants at an average rate of three per month (OTA, 1983, page 122). And
following both the Browns Ferry fire in 1975 and the Three Mile Island (TMI)
accident in 1979, the NRC issued several 'regulatory shocks'; that is, guidelines
were revised so that utilities were required to rework major portions of their
nuclear construction projects. For the typical plant, the safety upgrades ordered by
the NRC cost millions of dollars and significantly extended construction leadtime
(OTA, 1983, page 123).
Finally, nuclear power has faced steadily declining levels of public acceptance
since the early 1970s (Melber et al, 1977; Melber, 1983). Citizen support has
decreased in great measure because the federal government, while continuously
promoting nuclear power development, has failed to demonstrate that it can protect
the public from nuclear risks (Cook, 1982). The NRC, the federal agency
responsible for the civilian nuclear power program, is viewed by some as being
ineffectual at overseeing the siting, construction, management, and operation of
nuclear plants (Babbitt, 1986, page 5). Events contributing to this view have been
292 J H Johnson Jr, D J Zeigler

discussed in detail elsewhere (Johnson and Zeigler, 1983, page 389; see also papers
by Kirby and by Shelley et al, in this issue) and therefore will not be elaborated on
here. Suffice it to note that, as a result of public concerns about a wide range of
nuclear safety issues (such as the construction flaws mentioned above and the
adequacy of evacuation planning for reactor accidents, as discussed below), citizen
groups, and in several instances state and local governments, have become increasingly
active as intervenors in the licensing of nuclear power plants. As shown in a
subsequent section, public intervenor groups have managed to delay temporarily—
and in a couple of instances for quite lengthy periods—the licensing of civilian
nuclear power plants.
By the mid-1980s, the US civilian nuclear power program had entered a phase
of extreme uncertainty and the prospects for the future were at best bleak. Utilities
were hesitant to invest in additional nuclear-based generating capacity owing to
extreme uncertainties both in the regulatory process (OTA, 1983, pages 31-32),
and in forecasts of future electricity demand, which varied widely depending on
estimates of future population growth, the rate of household formation, industrial
growth, and conservation behavior. Of these two types of uncertainties, that due to
the regulatory process appears to be the most significant. Utility company executives
argue specifically that, under the current regulatory structure, investing in nuclear
construction projects is too risky for three reasons. First, utilities fear that an
accident could occur at an existing plant while construction of a new unit is under
way. As a consequence, they could be ordered by the NRC to retrofit the unit
with additional safety features, which may cost as much as the original construction
project. Second, because of the current political climate surrounding the issue of
nuclear power (especially the success of antinuclear groups in delaying the licensing
of recently completed nuclear projects), utilities are afraid of the possibility that,
after spending billions of dollars to construct a new plant, regulatory agencies may
refuse to allow the unit to begin commercial operation; or, if the unit is granted
an operating permit, that a statewide antinuclear referendum could force the plant
to be shut down. Third, utilities worry about the cost they could incur if a
disabling reactor accident were to occur once a new facility begins to operate.
Such an accident could severely damage both public health and the environment
and consequently cost billions of dollars. This is a major concern of utility
company executives because, under the existing regulations, nuclear liability
insurance covers only a fraction of the risks. The bulk of the costs of such an
accident therefore would have to be borne by utility company stockholders.
Because of these financial and political risks, by the late 1970s, utilities were far
more willing to invest in fossil fuel (particularly coal-fired) than in nuclear plants.
2.2 Efforts to revive the civilian nuclear power industry
One of the official policy positions of the Reagan Administration when it took
office in 1981 was that the retention of nuclear power was essential to material
energy security (Rudolph and Ridley, 1986a). In order to ensure a revival or
'second coming' of nuclear power in the 1990s, the Reagan Administration has
joined forces with the nuclear industry and together they have embarked on a
program which seeks to renew public support for nuclear power and Congressional
support for pronuclear regulatory reform (Rudolph and Ridley, 1986b). The nuclear
industry has invested millions of dollars in a massive pronuclear public education
program in an effort to gain citizen support for the construction of additional
nuclear-based generating capacity (Harding, 1983). In the industry's print and
electronic media advertisements, the emphasis is upon the environmental problems
(for example, acid rain) posed by continued use of fossil fuels to generate electricity,
Post-Chernobyl nuclear reactions in the USA 293

and frequently scare tactics are employed, such as threatening that the lights could
'go out' in some regions in the 1990s because oil and gas reserves are being
depleted so rapidly (Rudolph and Ridley, 1986a).
Concurrent with the nuclear industry's public education campaign, the Reagan
Administration has proposed legislation designed to: (a) streamline and stabilize
regulations governing the construction and operation of civilian nuclear power
plants; (b) limit public participation in the licensing process; (c) guarantee a six-
year construction period for nuclear projects; (d) establish a preconstruction
commitment by regulators to allow utilities to recover all reasonable construction
costs; and (e) increase insurance coverage for nuclear utilities under the
Price-Anderson Act of 1957 in order to minimize the financial risks associated
with a major reactor accident (Atomic Industrial Forum, 1986c, pages 7 - 8 ) . The
objective of the Reagan Administration's legislative proposals, of course, is to
create an atmosphere in which utilities would be more willing to invest in new
nuclear-based generating capacity (Atomic Industrial Forum, 1986d, pages 1-2).
Neither the nuclear industry's public education program nor the Reagan
Administration's push for pronuclear regulatory reform met with overwhelming
success in the pre-Chernobyl period. Since Chernobyl, however, both groups have
intensified their efforts to revive the nuclear option in the USA.

3 Public perceptions of nuclear risks since Chernobyl


Not unexpectedly, public opinion polls conducted in the immediate aftermath of
the Chernobyl accident detected an increased uneasiness about the risk of nuclear
power generation in the USA (table 2). In 1985, 44% of the American population
opposed nuclear generation of electricity and 40% favored it. In the days following
the Chernobyl accident the level of opposition increased to 49% and the level of
support fell to 34%. Nevertheless, at the national scale, these shifts in public
opinion are minor; with the passage of time there may be little actual shift in
nuclear sentiment, only the softening of hard-line support and the solidification of
the opposition. Supporters will find it easy to interpret the Chernobyl accident as
an aberration that could not happen in the United States. Opponents, on the other
hand, will find that the Chernobyl accident only affirms their belief that major
accidents with severe off-site consequences are possible. Entrenched attitudes about
Table 2. Public perceptions of nuclear risks before and after Chernobyl (source: from a poll
in Newsweek, 12 May 1986, page 30).
Pre-Chernobyl Post-Chernobyl

Do you personally favor or oppose nuclear generation of electricity ?


favor 40% 34%
oppose 44% 49%
don't know 16% 17%
Are you optimistic or pessimistic about our ability to run nuclear generating plants without serious
accidents ?
optimistic 55% 50%
pessimistic 35% 39%
don't know 10% 11%
Would you be against the construction of a nuclear power plant in this area—within five miles of
where you live ?
against 60% 70%
not against 33% 26%
no opinion 7% 4%
294 J H Johnson Jr, D J Zeigler

nuclear power seem to be difficult to change (Otway et al, 1978). At the same
time, however, polls taken in the period prior to the Three Mile Island accident
consistently showed a wide margin of support for nuclear power. Cambridge
Reports and the Harris polls both found that a fairly consistent majority of US
residents supported building more nuclear power plants in the USA (Mitchell,
1982, pages 2 6 - 2 7 ) . It is therefore apparent that over the past decade there has
been a gradual shift in public opinion, with the result that there are now more
people opposed to nuclear power than are in favor of it. That the Chernobyl
accident had only a modest impact on public attitudes probably reflects two facts:
first, opposition to nuclear power had already increased into the 40% range; second,
people had already factored into their risk analyses the likelihood of a major
power plant accident even before Chernobyl took place.
Among people who live in the vicinities of nuclear power stations, opposition to
nuclear power generation seems to be stronger. When a national sample was asked
following the Chernobyl accident whether they would be against the construction of
a nuclear power plant within five miles of their residence, 70% said they would be
opposed. Eight years earlier, in 1978, a Harris poll found that only 56% would
be opposed (Mitchell, 1982, page 33). On Long Island, New York, site of the
controversial Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, 6 3 % of those within 10 miles of
the plant and 48% of the entire Long Island population were found to be opponents
of nuclear power. However, 67% of the Long Island population are on record as
opposing the operation of the Shoreham plant by the utility company (SDA, 1987).
Likewise, 65% of the population within about 10 miles of the Seabrook Nuclear
Power Station in New Hampshire indicated that they did not favor the operation of
that plant (SDA, 1987).
Within the US scientific community Chernobyl had less immediate impact on
beliefs about nuclear power (Atomic Industrial Forum, 1986e, pages 3 - 4 ) . In a
random sample of scientists drawn from American Men and Women of Science, 66%
considered nuclear power plants in the USA to be safe and 7 1 % rated a Chernobyl-
style accident as impossible. In fact, the scientific community's assessment of
nuclear power safety has risen over the decade of the 1980s. Nevertheless, one
third of the 'experts' did not agree that US nuclear power plants were safe; that is
of little comfort to the US public at large and of less comfort to those who live in
nuclear host communities.

4 The civilian nuclear power program


4.1 Reactor safety issues
After the TMI incident in 1979, the NRC imposed a one year moratorium on the
licensing of new reactors. During this period, a number of investigations were
undertaken to assess the implications of the accident for the US civilian nuclear
power program (for example, Kemeny et al, 1979). However, no such step was
taken after the Chernobyl disaster. In fact, nuclear industry and NRC officials
quickly concluded that the Chernobyl disaster had little direct bearing on the safety
of US civilian nuclear power plants (Patterson, 1986). They argued specifically
that (Atomic Industrial Forum, 1986h, page 6):
"... the design and institutional differences between Chernobyl-type water-cooled
graphite reactors and U.S. light water nuclear power plants are so fundamental
that the Soviet accident does not challenge the process of design, operation, and
regulation of US nuclear reactors."
Nuclear industry and government experts contend that a similar accident could not
occur in this country because US plants are equipped with containment structures
and do not have 'positive reactivity coefficients'—a characteristic of Chernobyl-type
Post-Chernobyl nuclear reactions in the USA 295

graphite reactors that causes the nuclear reaction to increase as the production of
power increases (Atomic Industrial Forum, 1986h, page 6).
To underscore its view on the implications of Chernobyl, the NRC has pressed
ahead with the Reagan Adminstration's program to revive nuclear power in the
1990s. In the year after the Soviet disaster, the agency granted operating licenses
to ten new nuclear power plants (table 3), the largest number of issuances since
1973 - 74 (Atomic Industrial Forum, 1986c; 1986f). One of these plants, Duke Power
Company's Catawba 2, was licensed to operate within two weeks of the Chernobyl
accident. As a result of the dramatic increase in licensing activity, by the first
anniversary of the Chernobyl accident, the number of licensed reactors in the US
civilian nuclear program had increased by 10%, from 98 to 108; and total nuclear-
based generating capacity had growth from 84 979 MW to 95 936 MW, or by 12.9%.
The NRC has accelerated the licensing of new reactors despite evidence found
in the documents of the Atomic Energy Commission (released by a former Nuclear
Regulatory Commissioner) indicating that the Chernobyl Unit 4 was actually equipped
with safety systems and a containment resembling those found in some US civilian
plants. According to the Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS),
Chernobyl had two containment-like structures, a pressurized suppression system
consisting of a pool of water and designed to lower any buildup of steam pressure,
and, around the reactor, an atmosphere that was composed of inert nitrogen in
order to prevent a buildup of hydrogen (NIRS, 1986, page 3). NIRS (1986, page 4)
states further that "all of these features are similar to the systems used at all 39
GE [General Electric] reactors, as well as Westinghouse Ice Condensor containments,
which are presently in use or under construction at ten U.S. plants". The only
major difference between the Chernobyl Unit 4 and the 49 US reactors with
pressurized suppression containments (table 4) is that the Soviet reactor was not
equipped with a hydrogen igniter to "slowly burn off hydrogen before it can
accumulate in enough quantity to cause an explosion" (NIRS, 1986, page 6).
By continuing to issue new operating licenses, the NRC has also ignored several
reactor safety studies published since Chernobyl, which restate previous concerns
about potential deficiencies and vulnerabilities in US reactors that could contribute to
a major accident. In particular, these studies raise questions about (a) the extent to
Table 3. US civilian reactors licensed since Chernobyl as of 31 August 1987 (source: Atomic
Industrial Forum, 1986a).
Operating utility Plant name Site Reactor Net
manufacturer MW

Commonwealth Edison Co Braidwood 1 Braidwood, IL Westinghouse 1120


Commonwealth Edison Co Byron 2 Byron, IL Westinghouse 1120
Duke Power Co Catawba 2 Clover, SC Westinghouse 1145
Illinois Power Co Clinton 1 Clinton, IL General Electric 933
Public Service Electric Hope Creek 1 Lower Alloways General Electric 1067
and Gas Co Township, NJ
Niagara Mohawk Nine Mile Scriba, NY General Electric 1080
Power Co Point 2
Carolina Power and Shearon New Hill, NC Westinghouse 900
Light Co Harris 1
Arizona Public Palo Verde 3 Wintersburg, A Z Combustion 1270
Service Co Engineering
Cleveland Electric Perry 1 North Perry, OH General Electric 1205
Georgia Power Co Vogtle 1 Waynesboro, GA Westinghouse 1122
296 J H Johnson Jr, D J Zeigler

which some reactors (including at least one licensed since Chernobyl) can withstand
a major earthquake (Wald, 1987b); and (b) the extreme sensitivity of some units to
even small disturbances in operating conditions. In November 1986, for example, the
Table 4. US nuclear plants with pressurized suppression containments (source: updated from
MRS, 1986).

Plant name Site Reactor MW Status Containment


manuf.a

Browns Ferry 1 Decatur, AL GE 1065 Licensed Mark I


Browns Ferry 2 Decatur, AL GE 1065 Licensed Mark I
Browns Ferry 3 Decatur, AL GE 1065 Licensed Mark I
Brunswick 1 Southport, NC GE 821 Licensed Mark I
Brunswick 2 Southport, NC GE 821 Licensed Mark I
Catawba 1 Clover, SC W 1145 Licensed Ice Condensor
Catawba 2 Clover, SC W 145 Licensed Ice Condensor
Clinton 1 Clint, IL GE 950 Licensed Mark III
Cook 1 Bridgman, MI W 1030 Licensed Ice Condensor
Cook 2 Bridgman, MI W 1100 Licensed Ice Condensor
Cooper Brownsville, NE GE 778 Licensed Mark I
Dresden 2 Morris, IL GE 794 Licensed Mark I
Dresden 3 Morris, IL GE 794 Licensed Mark I
Duane Arnold Palo, IA GE 538 Licensed Mark I
Fermi 2 Newport, MI GE 1093 Licensed Mark I
Fitzpatrick Scriba, NY GE 821 Licensed Mark I
Grand Gulf 1 Port Gibson, MS GE 1250 Licensed Mark III
Grand Gulf 2 Port Gibson, MS GE 1250 Construction Mark III
Hatch 1 Baxley, GA GE 777 Licensed Mark I
Hatch 2 Baxley, GA GE 784 Licensed Mark I
Hope Creek 1 Salem, NJ GE 1067 Licensed Mark I
LaSalle 1 Seneca, IL GE 1078 Licensed Mark II
LaSalle 2 Seneca, IL GE 1078 Licensed Mark II
Limerick 1 Pottstown, PA GE 1055 Licensed Mark II
Limerick 2 Pottstown, PA GE 1055 Construction Mark II
McGuire 1 Cornelius, NC W 1180 Licensed Ice Condensor
McGuire 2 Cornelius, NC W 1180 Licensed Ice Condensor
Millstone 1 Waterford, CT GE 660 Licensed Mark I
Monticello Monticello, MN GE 545 Licensed Mark I
Nine Mile Pt 1 Scriba, NY GE 620 Licensed Mark I
Nine Mile Pt 2 Scriba, NY GE 1080 Licensed Mark II
Oyster Creek Toms River, NJ GE 650 Licensed Mark I
Peach Bottom 2 Peach Bottom, PA GE 1065 Licensed Mark I
Peach Bottom 3 Peach Bottom, PA GE 1065 Licensed Mark I
Perry 1 North Perry, OH GE 1205 Licensed Mark III
Perry 2 North Perry, OH GE 1205 Construction Mark III
Pilgrim 1 Plymouth, MA GE 655 Licensed Mark I
Quad Cities 1 Cordova, IL GE 789 Licensed Mark I
Quad Cities 2 Cordova, IL GE 789 Licensed Mark I
River Bend 1 St Francesville, LA GE 940 Licensed Mark III
Sequoyah 1 Daisy, TN W 1148 Licensed Ice Condensor
Sequoyah 2 Daisy, TN W 1148 Licensed Ice Condensor
Shoreham Brookhaven, NY GE 819 Licensed Mark II
Susquehanna 1 Berwick, PA GE 1065 Licensed Mark II
Susquehanna 2 Berwick, PA GE 1065 Licensed Mark II
Vermont Yankee Vernon, VT GE 514 Licensed Mark I
Watts Bar 1 Spring City, NT W 1177 Construction Ice Condensor
Watts Bar 2 Spring City, NT W 1177 Construction Ice Condensor
WPPSS 2 Richland, WA GE 1100 Licensed Mark II
Reactor manufacturers; GE General Electric; W Westinghouse.
Post-Chernobyl nuclear reactions In the USA 297

Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), an antinuclear group based in Washington, DC,


asked the NRC to close all US reactors designed by the Babcock-Wilcox Corporation
"until they could be made more safe" and to order public hearings to decide "what
should be done at the plants" (New York Times 11 February 1987, page A24). The
UCS characterized the Babcock-Wilcox reactor as highly unstable, the most
dangerous of all pressurized water reactors, and particularly vulnerable to loss of
electricity (and "likely to mislead plant operators when that happens"). To support
its shutdown request, the UCS presented plant performance data indicating that
since 1979 at least 30 accidents have occurred at the eight plants equipped with
Babcock-Wilcox reactors (table 5) and that one third of these events were rated as
"especially troubling" by the NRC. Despite its previous evaluations, however, the
NRC dismissed the concerns raised by UCS about the Babcock-Wilcox reactor as
being "generally out-of-date and concluded that there is no reason at all to close
the plants or to order hearings" (New York Times 11 February 1987, page A24).
By contrast, a former Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner has estimated that "there
is now a 45% chance of a core meltdown at one of the ... plants now in operation
in this country during the next 20 years" (Asselstine, 1986, page 5).
Despite the fact that the NRC has chosen to ignore or dismiss a range of
unresolved safety issues, several pieces of legislation, which aim to reduce the
probability of a severe nuclear power plant accident, have been introduced on the
floor of the US Senate and House of Representatives. Most of the legislative
proposals would amend existing legislation such as the Atomic Energy Act (AEA)
of 1954 and the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) of 1974 (table 6). The bills
which have been introduced specifically seek the:
(1) Establishment of an independent Nuclear Safety Board which would investigate
events at facilities, and events involving materials licensed or regulated by the
NRC. It would also review all regulatory practices of the NRC (H.R. 706 and
S. 14). An independent supervisory board has also been proposed for US government
nuclear facilities (H.R. 3123 and S. 1085).
(2) Establishment of an Office of the Inspector General within the NRC to be
responsible for implementing the highest nuclear safety standards. The Inspector
General would also review standards and procedures for all nuclear emergency
evacuation plans (S. 100), a topic discussed in greater detail below.
Table 5. US civilian reactors manufactured by Babcock-Wilcox Corporation (source: Atomic
Industrial Forum, 1986a).

Operating utility Plant name Site Net Commerical


MW operation

Toledo Edison Co Davis Bessie Oak Harbor, OH 860 November 1977


Sacramento Municipal Rancho Seco 1 Clay Station, CA 918 April 1975
Utility District
Arkansas Power and Arkansas One-1 Russellville, AK 850 December 1977
Light Co
Florida Power Crystal River 3 Crystal River, FL 850 March 1977
Corporation
GPU Nuclear Three Mile Island 1 Londonderry 800 September 1974
Corporation Township, PA
Duke Power Co Oconee 1 Seneca, SC 860 July 1973
Duke Power Co Oconee 2 Seneca, SC 860 September 1974
Duke Power Co Oconee 3 Seneca, SC 860 December 1974
298 J H Johnson Jr, D J Zeigler

Table 6. Selected bills introduced during 1987 in the US Congress since Chernobyl.

Bill Description Date


number introduced

H.R. 67 To provide state and local government approval of emergency 6 January


evacuation plans.
H.R. 499 To provide for state regulation of the radiological hazards of 7 January
production and utilization facilities.
H.R. 706 To amend the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) of 1974 to 27 January
create an independent Nuclear Safety Board.
H.R. 783 To require the Secretary of Energy to ensure the compliance of 27 January
certain operations of the Department of Energy with Federal
environmental standards.
H.R. 1135 To amend the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 to prohibit 19 February
the conversion of certain nuclear facilities from civilian nuclear
purposes to military purposes.
H.R. 1292 To amend the AEA of 1954 to prevent persons of poor character 25 February
from obtaining licenses to operate nuclear power plants.
H.R. 1414 To amend the Price-Anderson Provisions of the AEA of 1954 4 March
to extend and improve the procedures for liability and
indemnification for nuclear incidents.
H.R. 1570 To establish an emergency response program within the Nuclear 11 March
Regulatory Commission.
H.R. 2141 To amend the Price-Anderson Provisions of the AEA of 1954 23 April
to provide for unlimited liability in the event of an accident at a
nuclear power plant.
H.R. 2279 To amend the AEA of 1954 to clarify that no nuclear plant 5 May
should operate without assurance from the Federal government's
experts on emergency preparedness that the public health and
safety can and will be protected.
H.R. 3123 To create an independent supervisory board to ensure the safety 5 August
of US government nuclear facilities, to apply the provisions of
OSHA a to certain DOE nuclear facilities, to clarify the jurisdiction
and powers of government agencies dealing with nuclear wastes,
to ensure independent research on the effects of radiation on
human beings.
S. 14 To amend the ERA of 1974 to create an independent Nuclear 6 January
Safety Board.
S. 40 To amend the AEA of 1954 to clarify that no nuclear plant 6 January
should operate without assurance from the Federal government's
experts on emergency preparedness that the public health and
safety can and will be protected.
S. 44 To amend the AEA of 1954 to establish a comprehensive, 6 January
equitable, reliable, and efficient mechanism for full compensation
of the public in the event of an accident arising out of activities of
Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensees or undertaken pursuant
to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 involving nuclear
materials, and to reduce the likelihood of such an accident.
S. 100 To establish an Office of Inspector General in the Nuclear 6 January
Regulatory Commission.
S. 369 To amend the AEA of 1954 to require an emergency planning 21 January
and preparedness plan for an emergency planning zone of at
least ten miles in radius for each nuclear facility.
S. 408 To amend the AEA of 1954 to allow full participation by state 28 January
and local governments in the licensing process for nuclear power
facilities and to require that emergency planning extend to a
minimum of ten miles in radius around each nuclear power facility.
S. 843 To amend the Price-Anderson Provisions of the AEA of 1954 25 March
to extend and improve the procedures for the protection of the
public from nuclear incidents.
Post-Chernobyl nuclear reactions in the USA 299

Table 6. (continued).
Bill Description Date
number introduced

S. 1085 To create an independent supervisory board to ensure the safety of 23 April


the US governments nuclear facilities, to apply the provisions of
OSHA to certain DOE nuclear facilities, to clarify the jurisdiction
and powers of government agencies dealing with nuclear wastes,
to insure independent research on the effects of radiation on
human beings.
a
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

4.2 Management deficiencies


Post-accident analyses indicate that the Chernobyl disaster was precipitated by
operators who undertook an unauthorized and ill-conceived experiment which went
awry (Ahearne, 1987; Albright, 1986). Nuclear industry and NRC officials argue
that, because of the lack of any similarity between the graphite-moderated
Chernobyl-type reactor and the light-water reactors that make up the bulk of the
units in the USA, the most significant lesson learned from the Soviet disaster is
that human performance factors, such as inadequate operator training and other
management deficiencies, can compromise engineering safeguards and thereby
precipitate a major reactor accident (Chernobyl Report, 1986; Diamond, 1986;
Marbach, 1987). To support this stance, they note that (1) both the Chernobyl
disaster and the near catastrophic accident at the TMI plant in 1979 occurred at
night (when the operators may have been less attentative to their duties), and (2)
that in both instances the operators, because of poor training, failed to recognize
the nature of the reactor malfunctions, and implemented procedures that actually
exacerbated the crisis.
Since Chernobyl, the NRC and nuclear industry officials have taken at least two
steps to upgrade the management and operation of US civilian nuclear power plants.
The first program, sponsored by the nuclear industry, is called Utilitee. It is
designed "to encourage a standard of nuclear energy operations that goes further
than [existing] regulatory requirements" (New York Times 17 August 1986, page 10).
Under the program, the nuclear industry will begin to publish on a regular basis its
own institutional evaluation of nuclear power plant operations, "with the aim of
applying public pressure to nuclear utilities that drain public confidence in nuclear
energy by demonstrating unsatisfactory performance" (New York Times 17 August
1986, page 10). Prior to the institution of this program, performance evaluations
of nuclear reactors were conducted by the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations,
a nonprofit organization created by the nuclear industry in the aftermath of the
TMI accident. Their reports, however, were not distributed to the public, only to
nuclear utilities and the NRC. By releasing the reports to the public, the nuclear
industry hopes now to regain the public's confidence (Atomic Industrial Forum, 1986g).
The second attempt to upgrade the operation of US civilian reactors originated
in the NRC, which appears to have improved its policing of the management of
civilian nuclear power plants. In March of 1987, the NRC ordered the Philadelphia
Electric Company to shut down its Peach Bottom Plant, on the basis of reports
that operators on the night shift had been playing video games, reading novels, and
sleeping on the job over at least the previous five-month period (American Survey,
1987). The plant was ordered to close for several months until the NRC fully
investigated the utility's management problems. According to a Washington Post
editoral, the shutdown order "reflected the NRC's growing frustration with
300 J H Johnson Jr, D J Zeigler

Philadelphic Electric, which it had earlier suggested was neglecting the Peach Bottom
plant because it was pre-occupied with bringing new units at Limerick, PA, on
line" (Peterson, 1987, page A-l). Whether the NRC will continue to monitor
nuclear power plant management and operations closely is unclear as it has been
accused of not only applying the regulations in an inconsistent and unpredictable
manner, but also covering up managerial problems at nuclear power stations
(Marbach, 1987, page 59).
4.3 Emergency planning controversy
Licensees of civilian nuclear power plants in the USA are required to devise, in
conjunction with state and local governments, off-site emergency preparedness and
response plans "to ensure that adequate protective measure can and will be
undertaken in the event of a radiological emergency" (NRC, 1980, page 55402).
These plans must comply with prescribed federal guidelines established in the
aftermath of the TMI accident in 1979. Final approval is the joint responsibility
of the NRC and the US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The
regulations require licensees to develop off-site plans covering two emergency
planning zones (EPZs) around their plants: a ten-mile plume exposure pathway
zone and a fifty-mile ingestion exposure pathway zone (NRC/FEMA, 1980). The
NRC has determined, however, that detailed planning, encompassing a full range of
protective actions, including evacuation, is required only within the plume exposure
pathway zone because the "probability of large doses [of radiation] drops off
substantially at about 10 miles from the reactor" (Collins et al, 1978, page 1-37).
Planning for the 1 0 - 5 0 mile EPZ is limited to the identification of major exposure
pathways from contaminated food and water, "in large part because reactor safety
studies indicate that much of any particulate material in a radioactive plume would
have been deposited on the ground within about 50 miles of a facility" (NRC/FEMA,
1980, page 13).
Critics have argued, however, that off-site evacuation plans developed according
to the guidelines issued jointly by the NRC and FEMA are likely to be grossly
inadequate because they fail to address what Zeigler et al (1981), in their study of
local behavioral responses to the TMI accident, identified as the evacuation shadow
phenomenon: the tendency for an official evacuation advisory to cause departure
from a much larger area than was originally intended. An evacuation shadow
materializes wherever spontaneous evacuation covers a larger geographic area or a
larger number of people than that to which an evacuation advisory applied.
During the TMI crisis, the governor of Pennsylvania instructed pregnant women
and preschool children within five miles of the crippled reactor to evacuate, and
everyone else within ten miles to stay indoors. This protective action advisory
should have precipitated the evacuation of only about 3400 people. Post-accident
surveys reveal, however, that as many as 200000 people within a radius of twenty-
five miles of the crippled TMI reactor actually evacuated (Barnes et al, 1979;
Flynn, 1979). Not only was the gap between actual and expected behavior at TMI
much greater than one would have anticipated given the Governor's advisory, but
those who fled the area used self-selected rather than designated evacuation routes
and travelled greater distances away from the source of threat. The median distance
evacuated was found to be 85 miles in one study (Zeigler et al, 1981) and 100 miles
in another (Flynn, 1979). Spontaneous evacuation has been identified as a significant
problem (Chenault et al, 1979). Critics contend that, because the federal emergency
planning guidelines do not address the potential problem of spontaneous evacuation
(Johnson, 1984), off-site radiological emergency preparedness and response plans
are not workable or implementable. It has been noted specifically that, under the
Post-Chernobyl nuclear reactions in the USA 301

current guidelines, the traffic conditions that are likely to exist during a radiological
emergency cannot be adequately assessed. Consequently, evacuation time estimates
which licensees are required to devise for the ten-mile plume exposure pathway zone
will most likely be grossly inaccurate (Johnson, 1985).
In light of observed public behaviors during the TMI crisis, Suffolk County,
New York, in 1982 sponsored a social survey to ascertain how the residents of
Long Island are likely to behave in the event of an accident at the Long Island
Lighting Company's Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS), which is located
approximately sixty miles east of New York City on the north shore of the island
(SDA, 1982). Designed and conducted by a team of social and behavioral scientists,
the survey indicated that, depending on the severity of the accident, between one-
fourth (215 000 families) and nearly one-half (430000 families) of the households
on Long Island are likely to evacuate, casting an evacuation shadow extending in
excess of fifty miles from the plant (Johnson and Zeigler, 1983; Zeigler and
Johnson, 1984). On the basis of these survey results, Suffolk County government
officials concluded that the Shoreham plant should not be licensed because the
local population could not be evacuated in a timely manner if an accident were to
occur. To underscore its opposition to the licensing of the plant, Suffolk County
refused to cooperate with the Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) in the
development of an emergency plan and to lend police and fire support. Subsequently,
the Governor of the state of New York joined Suffolk County officials in opposing the
licensing of the Shoreham plant on the grounds that the geography of Long Island
and the limited transport network rendered evacuation extremely difficult, if not
impossible. Although construction was completed in 1982, the Shoreham plant has
not been granted an operating license because federal regulations stipulate that state
and local governments must cooperate with the utility company in the development
of approved off-site emergency plans if a plant is to be licensed.
In the USA, the Chernobyl disaster "brought highly focused attention to the issue
of evacuation planning" for civilian nuclear power plant accidents (Rudolph and
Ridley, 1986a, page 9). Most of the developments in this area have been strongly
influenced by the pre-Chernobyl Shoreham licensing controversy. In response to
Chernobyl, government officials in states and local communities hosting civilian
nuclear power plants have adopted one of three policy stances as explained below
(Oreskes, 1987).
(1) For at least two plants awaiting licensing (the Shoreham plant in New York, and
the Seabrook plant in New Hampshire) local and/or state authorities have voted to
'drop out' of the emergency planning process. In the aftermath of Chernobyl,
Nassau County joined neighboring Suffolk County in opposing the licensing of the
Shoreham plant. After Suffolk County refused in 1982 to participate in emergency
planning for Shoreham, LILCO proceeded to develop an off-site emergency response
plan in which utility company employees would perform those duties normally carried
out by local emergency personnel. To facilitate licensing of the plant, under the
emergency plan devised by LILCO, Nassau County officials had granted the utility
company permission to use one of its facilities, the Nassau County Coliseum, as a
reception and monitoring/decontamination center in the event of a Shoreham
accident. Following Chernobyl, however, the Nassau County Board of Supervisors
voted to bar the use of the Coliseum or any other county-owned facility in such an
emergency. Explaining the Board's decision, one of the supervisors said that they
"felt the winds of Chernobyl blowing" (Rudolph and Ridley, 1986a, page 15).
Similarly, seven of the seventeen towns in New Hampshire and three of the six
towns in Massachusetts which are within the ten-mile plume exposure pathway zone
refused to participate in emergency planning for an emergency at the Seabrook
302 J H Johnson Jr, D J Zeigler

plant, which is located in Seabrook, New Hampshire, approximately thirty-seven


miles north of Boston, Massachusetts. Subsequently, the Governor of Massachusetts
ruled that he would not approve any evacuation plan for the plant (Wessel, 1986).
Although protests against the Seabrook facility have been widespread since the
early 1970s and concerns about evacuation have been voiced since 1983, prior to
Chernobyl, the Governor "had suggested that he might approve an emergency plan
if a deal could be struck with the joint owners to either shut the plant down in the
summer months to protect the summer population at the beaches, or to build
seaside radiation shelters" (Rudloph and Ridley, 1986a, page 11). After careful
review and evaluation of the Chernobyl disaster, however, the Governor concluded
that "no plan could be made that would adequately protect public health and safety
in the event of a serious accident at Seabrook" (Rudolph and Ridley, 1986a, page 12).
Thus, not unlike the Shoreham plant, the Seabrook facility remains unlicensed, and
may remain so until the evacuation planning issue is resolved.
(2) The Chernobyl disaster prompted some state and local governments to withdraw
their support of previously approved emergency preparedness and response plans
for licensed nuclear power plants. In August 1986, for example, the Governor of
Ohio rescinded state approval of evacuation plans for the Davis Besse and Perry
nuclear plants. And the small town of Seneca, Illinois, dropped out of the plan for
the Lasalle plant, "following an Anticipated Transient without Scram incident there
about which the town was [not] informed for more than 14 hours" (NIRS, 1986,
page 6). By withdrawing their cooperation in the evacuation planning process, these
jurisdictions are in essence trying to close down the impacted nuclear power plants.
(3) A number of state and local jurisdictions have passed resolutions or otherwise
gone on record since Chernobyl requesting that the NRC expand the evacuation
planning zone around nuclear power plants. As the Soviets evacuated a thirty-
kilometer (eighteen miles) area, the petitions call for expanded evacuation zones
ranging anywhere from twenty miles to forty miles (NIRS, 1987). Maine's Attorney
General has made the NRC aware that his state wants the Commission to expand
both the plume exposure and ingestion exposure pathway zones, and to require
state approval of emergency plans before future construction begins. In Monroe
County, Michigan, where Detroit Edison's Fermi-2 plant is located, the Board of
Supervisors passed a resolution within a day of the Chernobyl disaster requesting
the NRC to institute a twenty-mile EPZ for that facility.
Public concerns about the adequacy of evacuation planning for nuclear power
plant accidents have never been regarded by the NRC as being serious (Johnson,
1984; 1985). Instead, with considerable assistance from the nuclear industry, the
NRC has sought ways to circumvent its own rules, and to prohibit state and local
governments from blocking the licensing of plants like Shoreham and Seabrook.
Even prior to the Chernobyl disaster, the NRC was considering a petition,
introduced by a nuclear utility, to amend the evacuation rules, which would reduce
the evacuation planning zone around civilian reactors from ten miles to only one
or two miles. If adopted, the proposed change would essentially 'rule out' local
communities that refused to participate in emergency planning. No action has been
taken as yet on this petition, pending the outcome of further study by NRC and of
public hearings on the utility company's basis for requesting the EPZ reduction.
In response to the withdrawal of public support for nuclear emergency evacuation
plans in the aftermath of the Soviet disaster, the NRC introduced its own petition
to amend the evacuation rules—the so-called 'realism doctrine'—which would empower
the Commission to presume that any noncooperating state and local authority
would, in fact, respond in an actual emergency and that, therefore, an operating
license should be granted. The proposed amendment is designed specifically to
Post-Chernobyl nuclear reactions in the USA 303

circumvent regulatory impediments which stand in the way of the NRC licensing
the multibillion dollar Shoreham and Seabrook plants (Boffey, 1987; Franklin,
1987b); but the proposed rule, if adopted, would also apply to licensed plants,
such as Davis Besse and Perry in Ohio, threatened by the possibility of being shut
down owing to the withdrawal of state support of emergency plans (Oreskes, 1987).
Among state and local government officials (Franklin, 1987a; 1987c) and some
members of the US Congress (Taylor, 1987), these proposals to amend the evacuation
rules are viewed as the most vivid examples of the NRC changing its rules to suit
the needs of the nuclear industry and to fulfill the Reagan Administration's mission
of reviving nuclear power (Oreskes, 1987). In response to the proposed rule changes,
especially the 'realism doctrine' (Atomic Industrial Forum, 1987b), a number of
bills were introduced in both houses of the US Congress after Chernobyl. The
purpose of these bills is to seek the following (see table 6):
(1) Retention of a minimum ten-mile emergency planning zone for evacuation
readiness. Assurances would be required that all persons (transients and permanent
residents) and communities would be protected in the event of a nuclear emergency
(for example, H.R. 67, H.R. 499, S. 40).
(2) Requirements that state and local governments fully participate in the licensing
process, and their assurance that approval of emergency plans and their intentions
to participate in them would guarantee public health and safety. Only with state
approval would licenses be issued for nuclear facilities to operate (for example,
H.R. 67, H.R. 499, S. 408).
(3) Requirement for an annual test of emergency evacuation plans around each
operating nuclear power facility. Unless FEMA finds these plans can assure public
health and safety, operating licenses would be suspended (for example, H.R. 499
and S. 100).
(4) Guarantee of state authority to establish and enforce standards for the protection
of public health and safety from radiological hazards arising from facilities located
in such states. State standards would have to be at least as stringent as federal
standards (for example, H.R. 499).

5 The military reactor program


Over the years the nation's system for producing nuclear materials for weapons has
been the subject of numerous reports citing poor maintenance and training practices,
threats to health, safety, and welfare of workers, and considerable environmental
pollution. It has been estimated that thousands of tons of nuclear materials have
been lost to the environment since the US government established its arms-linking
facilities in the 1950s and the 1960s; and that, even if production of weapons fuel
were to cease immediately, "the nation would face a bill running into the billions,
perhaps tens of billions, to stabilize vast amounts of leftover chemicals and nuclear
wastes" (Wald, 1986). Owing to inadequate pressure from the public and the US
Congress, the Department of Energy (DOE)—the federal agency responsible for
both regulating and managing the government's nuclear facilities—has traditionally
been unresponsive to reports of environmental contamination and other problems
associated with its system of nuclear weapons production and assembly. However,
the Chernobyl disaster focused national attention on and triggered independent
reviews of the management and operation of the government's aging nuclear weapons
assembly complexes (Albright et al, 1986) (figure 1).
Most of the attention, at least initially, centered on the DOE's Hanford Reserve
(in Washington state), which houses the N-reactor, the one facility in the USA most
similar to the Chernobyl reactor (Sullivan, 1986). Both reactors use graphite to
moderate the nuclear reaction, and neither is equipped with a dome-type containment
304 J H Johnson Jr, D J Zeigler

structure. Commissioned in 1963, the N-reactor is one of the oldest of the US


government's plutonium producing reactors. When the Chernobyl disaster occurred,
the N-reactor was producing about 20% of the nation's weapon grade plutonium.
As a result of modifications made in 1965, it was also supplying some civilian
electrical power to the local Washington Public Power Supply System (Stammer,
1986a).
As a result of strong public concern about the possibility of a Chernobyl-type
disaster, a panel of six outside consultants was commissioned to provide independent
assessments of the risks associated with the continued operation of the aging N-reactor.
Their reports criticized the DOE for failing (a) to act upon almost ninety
recommendations for safety improvements previously made by DOE in-house
reviews, and (b) to assess adequately the possibility of a catastrophic hydrogen gas
explosion similar to the one that occurred at Chernobyl, and to take steps to prevent
it. In reference to the latter criticism, Stammer (1986a, page 1) quotes one of the
consultants as stating that:
"The amount of hydrogen that could potentially be formed in the N-reactor is
greater than that at Chernobyl, over threefold greater than in a commercial
boiling-water reactor, and about 16-fold greater than in a commercial pressurized-
water reactor."
With respect to needed changes, the consultants endorsed all the findings of
previous reviews (which the DOE had summarily dismissed) and recommended,
among other changes to further improve safety, that a containment dome be
constructed over the N-reactor. Two of the consultants recommended that the
reactor be permanently shut down. The DOE rejected the latter recommendation,
however, arguing that "national security reasons do not allow the permanent shut
down of the reactor" (Stammer, 1986a, page 36). Agency officials elected instead
to close the facility for six months and spend $50 million to upgrade the reactor's
safety systems. A shutdown of this duration was not perceived to jeopardize

Figure 1. The US Government's nuclear weapons production and assembly complexes.


Post-Chernobyl nuclear reactions in the USA 305

defense programs or national security (Stammer, 1986a, page 36). Most of the
DOE's safety upgrades were aimed at minimizing the probability of a hydrogen gas
explosion (Wald, 1987a). The agency rejected the consultants' recommendation
that a containment dome be constructed over the facility on economic grounds,
arguing that the facility was twenty-five years old and would therefore have to be
decommissioned in the early 1990s.
The DOE had planned to restart the N-reactor in July 1987, but two US Senate
committees voted to withhold funding for additional plutonium production, stating
that the restart was unnecessary because the USA already had 25 000 operational
nuclear warheads and an estimated plutonium reserve of four-to-five million metric
tons (Stammer, 1987). Thus, the future of the N-reactor remains uncertain.
In the aftermath of Chernobyl, the DOE was also forced to reduce sharply
power at three of the four operating plutonium-producing reactors at its Savannah
River Complex (figure 1). (At the time of the Soviet accident, the fourth reactor
was shut down for maintenance.) Three separate inquiries—the first by a panel of
experts from the National Academy of Sciences, the second by the General Accounting
Office (GAO) (an agency of the US Congress), and the third by a private consulting
firm (Institute for Resources and Security Studies)—discovered inadequacies in the
emergency core-cooling systems of the Savannah River reactors, which could
potentially precipitate a core-melt accident. The National Academy of Sciences
panel concluded that the Savannah River reactors may have "operated for about
6 years at a higher power level than may have been safe ..." (Marshall, 1987,
page 1563). However, rather than terminate plutonium production at the complex
until the problem of the emergency core-cooling system could be investigated more
fully and corrected, the DOE ordered only a 26% reduction of power at the
reactors. This action was not taken immediately following the discovery of the
potential problem, but only after the consultants' findings were leaked to the
media. Commenting on the 26% power reduction, the panel from the National
Academy of Sciences stated that "we are not able to conclude with confidence that
significant core damage would be avoided if there were a severe loss of coolant
accident while the reactors are operating at the currently established power limits"
(Marshall, 1987, page 1563). In other words, the risks of a possible core-melt
accident at the Savannah River complex remains high because the DOE has not
taken appropriate steps to correct deficiencies in the reactors' emergency core-
cooling systems.
In addition to the technical problems inherent in the design of the government's
plutonium-producing reactors, post-Chernobyl inquiries also revealed that major
management problems exist at nearly all of the nuclear weapons assembly complexes
which are operated by private corporations under contractual agreements with the
DOE. In fact, in October 1986 the DOE was forced to shut down the two
plutonium-processing plants which exist alongside the N-reactor on the Hanford
Reservation after an internal audit conducted by the contractor, Rockwell
International, uncovered (Stammer, 1986b, page 3):
"... unauthorized shipping and receiving of nuclear materials, improper storage of
nuclear material that could lead to a 'criticality' incident, incomplete inventory
records, and undocumented design changes in equipment that could make
blueprints useless in responding to emergencies."
The DOE has responded to these and related management problems by replacing
the contractors at some of its facilities with new managers who are supposed to be
better skilled and possess a stronger commitment to worker and environmental safety.
For example, both the Fernald (Ohio) and Hanford (Washington) complexes are
now under new management (Wald, 1986, page 14) (figure 1).
306 J H Johnson Jr, D J Zeigler

However, nearly all of the independent investigations conducted since the Soviet
disaster have concluded that problems at DOE facilities cannot be attributed solely
to the management styles of previous contractors. They argue, instead, that the
problems arise because the DOE is both manager and self-regulator of the federal
government's nuclear projects; and that the agency historically has placed the
highest priority on production at the expense of accident prevention and environmental
safety. As one US Congressman put it (Stammer, 1986b, page 34):
"DOE is the largest, self-regulating agency in government. The same people
who produced all these dangerous wastes tell us that everything is OK from an
environment and health standing. It's a textbook case of the fox guarding the
hen house."
Several bills are pending in the US Congress which would "end the conflict
inherent in DOE's role as manager and self regulator of [federal] nuclear projects"
(Marshall, 1987, page 1564) (table 6). If all of the bills were enacted into law, the
NRC would take over the regulatory role, and the government's nuclear weapons
assembly complexes would be subject to the same operating rules as civilian
reactors; DOE projects would be required to comply with federal environmental
standards set forth in the Environmental Protection Act of 1974; the Environmental
Protection Agency would be responsible both for setting standards governing
radiation emissions from DOE facilities and for monitoring compliance with them;
and an independent commission would be appointed to monitor reactor safety
(H.R. 783).

6 Conclusions
Although the civilian nuclear power industry developed rapidly during the 1960s
and early 1970s, by the end of the decade signs that nuclear power was in serious
trouble were clearly evident. By the time of the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, there
were only ninety-eight licensed and operating commercial reactors in the USA and
a new reactor order had not been placed since the mid-1970s. The problems of
the nuclear industry originated in miscalculations of future energy demand, the
financial strain imposed on utilities by high interest rates and a sluggish stock
market, the frequent discovery of construction flaws caused as a result of poor
quality control, an unpredictable regulatory process, declining public support for
nuclear power, and declining confidence in the ability of public officials to protect
the public from the hazards of nuclear power.
During the 1980s two divergent courses of action have been pursued by those
who believe that the future of nuclear power in the USA must be clarified. On the
one hand, the Reagan Administration has found the growth of nuclear power in the
national energy mix to be essential to US security, and has proposed legislation
that would reinvigorate the nuclear power industry. The specifics of the legislation
sound almost as if they had been written by the utility companies themselves.
Both built their case for nuclear power on claims that its benefits far outweigh its
risks. In fact, since Chernobyl, both the federal government and the utilities have
tried to focus the debate over nuclear power on the need to emphasize national
interests rather than giving in to the parochial demands of states and localities
which host nuclear installations.
On the other hand, national public opinion polls have shown a turnaround since
1975, when a majority of people supported nuclear power. Today, opponents of
nuclear power outnumber supporters, though many polls show that neither group is
in the majority. When attention is focused on those states and localities which
host nuclear installations, antinuclear sentiment, arising chiefly out of concern for
safety, is much stronger. In fact, a number of states and localities have withdrawn
Post-Chernobyl nuclear reactions in the USA 307

their approval of, or their participation in, emergency planning for nuclear power
plant accidents. In addition, representatives from host states have introduced a
gamut of legislation in the US Congress, some designed to reduce the probability
of a nuclear power plant accident and others designed to guarantee state and local
participation in the emergency planning process.
As the US public watched the Chernobyl disaster unfold in April and May of
1986, they were challenged to consider the implications of Chernobyl for the US
experience. What Chernobyl added to the debate over nuclear power was an
awareness that the consequences of an accident could be severe and widespread;
Chernobyl became a demonstration of the catastrophic potential of a nuclear
accident. Just as Three Mile Island proved that nuclear accidents could happen,
Chernobyl proved that when they did, the results could be devastating. Perhaps for
this reason, much of the controversy since Chernobyl has shifted to the local areas
surrounding nuclear power plants and focused on the rights of states and municipal
jurisdictions to make decisions on public safety within the context of nuclear accidents.
The question that remains to be resolved is this: what level of government is in
the best position to assure public health and safety? Just as it is difficult for the
public to believe that large corporate entities such as utility companies are interested
in individual well-being, it also appears difficult to persuade the public that the
federal government, farthest removed from the individual, is as interested in individual
well-being as the state and local governments.
Only Chernobyl's location in the Soviet Union has tempered the impact which
it has had on US public opinion and policymaking. Nevertheless, reasoning by
analogy from Chernobyl to the USA, we may define two major impacts of the
accident. First, states and communities which host nuclear power plants have
become much more sensitive to the importance of safety measures and emergency
preparedness; concerns which are reflected in public opinion polls at the local
level, refusals by some states and localities to participate in emergency planning,
and legislation, as introduced in various statehouses and the US Congress, which
would exert the responsibility of the states for public protection. Second, because
the military N-reactor at Hanford, Washington, was closest in design to the Chernobyl
reactor, long overdue attention has been focused on the safety and environmental
impact of the military nuclear installations in the USA, and on the conflict of
interest that is inherent in the DOE's acting as both manager and self-regulator of
these installations. Before the incident at the Three Mile Island, off-site consequences
of nuclear power plant accidents, public safety concerns, and emergency nuclear
preparedness were subjects of neither public nor official discussion. Since Chernobyl,
not only should we discuss such issues, but we must also resolve them.
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Atomic Industrial Forum, 1986h, "Soviets sought to manage way around Chernobyl flaws"
INFO 216 6
Atomic Industrial Forum, 1987a, "Little Chernobyl impact seen on U.S. nuclear operations"
INFO 218 1
Atomic Industrial Forum, 1987b, "NRC staff wins support for new emergency rule" INFO
218 3
Atomic Industrial Forum, 1987c, "Update: Too cheap to meter?' Anatomy of a cliche"
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Chenault W W, Hilbert G D, Reichlin S D, 1979 Evacuation Planning in the TMI Accident
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC 20472)
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Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC)
NRC/FEMA, 1980 Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response
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Commission, Washington, DC 20555; and Federal Emergency Management Agency,
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page 47
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Accident at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant (Social Data Analysts Inc, Setauket, New York)
SDA, 1987 Behavior During a Radiological Emergency: Reactions of EPZ Residents to a Possible
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6 February, page 6
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Wald M L, 1987b, "A-plant quake survival questioned" New York Times 2 February, page B12
Wessel D, 1986, "Seabrook unit faces licensing hurdle as Dukakis rejects evacuation plans"
Wall Street Journal 22 September, page 7
Woutat D, 1987, "PUC staff wants PG&E to pay for 80% of Diablo" Los Angeles Times
15 May, part 4, page 1
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