2020

INTERPRETATION OF
STATUTES
‘Doctrine of beneficial
construction’

RAVI PRAKASH
CUSB1713125038
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I hereby take the opportunity to thank Dr. S.P Srivastava Sir, for his consent and
the inspiration that he radiates. His jovial behavior and ease making attitude
eased my tension and the initial doubts that I had about my potentialities. I also
want to thank my friends who helped me a lot in preparing this project. I have
also taken help from several books and websites for doing this. Ultimately, I
once again thank Dr. S.P Srivastava Sir, who made indelible impact on me
which shall go beyond the pages of this project a reflect in all my endeavors of
life.

Hoping Acceptance and Appreciation from you, I hereby submit this project.

RAVI PRAKASH

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction……………………………………………………………………3

• Interpretation of statutes

• Rules of interpreting statutes

The Beneficent rulealso called the Mischief or Hayden’s

rule…4

• Meaning and use

• History
• Traditional use of the Beneficent / mischief rule

• Modern use of the Beneficent Rule / mischief rule

• Advantages

• Disadvantages

Conclusion……………………………………………………………….8

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Introduction: -Interpretation of statues

In simple understanding legal document are drafted by the professional with the help of legal
word to create more value of the document which is not possible for a normal person to be
understand without having legal knowledge. So proper understanding of the legal document
for normal person quite difficult, in order to short this problem interpretation rules are
introduced.

Rules of interpreting statues: -

a. Literal rule is a rule used to interpreting statutes. This rule explains what the law is
rather than explaining what the law means. When interpreting a statute, the courts
generally applies the literal rule first before applying any other rules of interpretation.
In literal rule, the words in a statute are given its plain, ordinary, and literal meaning.
While applying the literal rule, the law is read word by word and without diverting
from its true meaning.
b. The Beneficent Rule or Mischief Rule or Heydon’s Rule: In this rule four things are
to be consider –i) What was the common law before the making of the Act.
ii) What was the Mischief and defect for which law did not provide.
iii)What remedy are available to cure damages. iv)The true reason of the remedy.
c. Rule of Reasonable Construction: Normally the word used in the statute have to be
construed in their ordinary, but in many cases judicial approach find that the simple
device of adopting the ordinary meaning of words does not meet the ends as a fair and
reasonable construction. It became necessary to have regard to the subject matter of
the statute. According to this rule, the word of the statute must be construed Ut res
magis valeat quam pareat, so as to give reasonable meaning to them.
d. Rule of Harmonious Construction: A statute must be read as a whole and one
provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provision in the same
Act. so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. Such construction has
the merit to avoid inconsistency between a section and other part of the statute.
e. Rule of Ejusdem Generies: According to this rule all the general word contain in the
statute may be construed with reference to the antecedent matter and the construction
may be narrowed down by treating them as applying to the things of the same kind as
those previously mentioned.

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The Beneficent rule also called the Mischief or Hayden’s rule

The mischief rule is one of three rules of statutory construction traditionally applied by
English courts. The other two are the “plain meaning rule” (also known as the “literal rule”
and the “golden rule.”)
The main aim of the rule is to determine the "mischief and defect" that the statute in question
has set out to remedy, and what ruling would effectively implement this remedy.
The rule was first laid out in a 16th century ruling of the Exchequer Court.

Meaning and use

Conway v Rimmer is a rule of construction that judges can apply in statutory interpretation in
order to discover Parliament's intention. In applying the rule, the court is essentially asking
the question: what was the "mischief" that the previous law did not cover, which Parliament
was seeking to remedy when it passed the law now being reviewed by the court?The
Mischief Rule is of narrower application than the golden rule or the plain meaning rule, in
that it can only be used to interpret a statute and, strictly speaking, only when the statute was
passed to remedy a defect in the common law.Legislative intent is determined by examining
secondary sources, such as committee reports, treatises, law review articles and
corresponding statutes.The application of this rule gives the judge more discretion than the
literal and the golden rule as it allows him to effectively decide on Parliament's intent. It can
be argued that this undermines Parliament's supremacy and is undemocratic as it takes law-
making decisions away from the legislature.The way in which the mischief rule can produce
more sensible outcomes than those that would result if the literal rule were applied is
illustrated by the ruling in Smith v Hughes [1960] 2 All E.R. 859. Under the Street Offences
Act [1959], it was a crime for prostitutes to "loiter or solicit in the street for the purposes of
prostitution". The defendants were calling to men in the street from balconies and tapping on
windows. They claimed they were not guilty as they were not in the "street." The judge
applied the mischief rule to come to the conclusion that they were guilty as the intention of
the Act was to cover the mischief of harassment from prostitutes.The construction of a statute
must not so strain the words so as include cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of
the language. Where the usual meaning of the words does not convey the object or intention
of the legislature, a more extended meaning may be attributed to them. If in a legislation, the
general object of which is to benefit a particular class of persons, anyprovision is ambiguous

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so that it is capable of two meanings, one of which would preserve the benefit and another
would take it away, the meanings, which preserves it, should be adopted. Ordinarily, the rule
of beneficent construction has been applied while construing welfare legislations or
provisions relating to weaker and stronger contracting parties.Beneficent construction means
an interpretation to promote public good and prevent misuse of power. An interpretation,
which promotes justice and equity, should be preferred. Although hardship is not a ground for
striking down legislation, but whenever possible, statute should be interpreted to avoid
possible hardship. Beneficial provisions are added for general betterment in social interest.
Courts should adopt a constructive approach so as not to exclude such provisions. Rather, the
Court should adopt such construction, which advances the policy of the legislation to extend
the benefit rather than one, which curtails the benefit. Beneficial statutes should not be
construed too restrictively. In case of doubt or two possible views the beneficial legislation is
to be interpreted in favour of beneficiaries.
The Karnataka High Court referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of All
India Reporter Karmachari Sangh v. All India Reporter, 1988 (2) LLN 540 and based its
logic on the beneficent rule of interpretation. In this judgement, the Supreme Court observed
that "the Act in question is a beneficial legislation which is enacted for the purpose of
improving the conditions of service of the employees of the newspaper establishment and
hence, if it is possible to have two opinions on the construction of the provision of the Act,
the one which advances the object of the Act and is in favour of the employees for whose
benefit the Act is passed, has to be accepted.
However, lately our Apex Court has completely metamorphosed this yardstick of worker-
oriented interpretation of industrial law in the case of State of UP v. Jai Bir Singh, 2005 (5)
SCCI where it has observed that "exploitation of workers and employees has to be checked.
Law and particularly industrial law need to be so interpreted as to ensure that neither the
employers nor the employees are in a position to dominate the other.
With due deference to their Lordships of the Karnataka High Court, it is now submitted that
the canon of beneficent rule of construction may not be available for aid in interpreting a
statute when the language of the provision is clear and unambiguous.

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History
The rule was first set out in Heydon's Case: -Ottery, a religious college, gave a tenancy in
a manor also called “Ottery” to a man (named in the case report simply as "Ware") and
his son, also referred to as Ware.The tenancy was established by copyhold, an ancient device
for giving a parcel of a manor to a tenant, usually in return for agricultural services, which
was something like a long-running lease with special privileges for each party. Ware and his
son held their copyhold to have for their lives, subject to the will of the lord and the custom
particular to that manor. The Wares’ copyhold was in a parcel also occupied by some tenants
at will. Later, the college then leased the same parcel to another man, named Heydon, for a
period of eighty years in return for rents equal to the traditional rent for the components of
the parcel.

Less than a year after the parcel had been leased to Heydon, Parliament enacted the Act of
Dissolution. The statute had the effect of dissolving many religious colleges, including Ottery
College, which lost its lands and rents to Henry VIII. However, a provision the Act kept in
force, for a term of life, any grants made more than a year prior to the enactment of the
statute. The Court of Exchequer found that the grant to the Wares was protected by the
relevant provision of the Act of Dissolution, but that the lease to Heydon was void.The ruling
was based on an important discussion of the relationship of a statute to the pre-existing
common law. The court concluded that the purpose of the statute was to cure a mischief
resulting from a defect in the common law. Therefore, the court concluded, the remedy of the
statute was limited to curing that defect. Judges are supposed to construe statutes by seeking
the true intent of the makers of the Act, which is presumed to be pro bono publico, or intent
for the public good.

Lord Coke described the process through which the court must interpret legislation.

“For the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial,
restrictive or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be discerned and considered:

1. What was the common law before the making of the Act?
2. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?
3. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth. And,
4. The true reason of the remedy;

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and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the
mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions
forcontinuance of the mischief, and pro private commodo, and to add force and life to the
cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico

Traditional use of the Beneficent / mischief rule

In the century in which it was created, and for some time thereafter, the mischief rule was
used in a legislative environment very different than the one which has prevailed in the past
two centuries. As Elmer Driedger notes, Sixteenth-century common law judges looked upon
statutes as a gloss upon the common law, even as an intrusion into their domain. Hence,
statutes were viewed from the point of view of their effect upon the common law, as adding
to it, subtracting from it or patching it up.Then also, in the time of ‘’Heydon’s Case’’, the
judges paid more attention to the “spirit” of the law than to the letter. Having found the
mischief, they proceeded to make mischief with the words of the statute. They remodelled the
statute, by taking things out and putting things in, in order to fit the “mischief” and “defect”
as they had found them.

Modern use of the Beneficent Rule / mischief rule

Modern courts continue to apply the rule in a more restricted manner, and generally with a
greater regard for the integrity of the statutes which they are interpreting. Driedger puts it this
way: To this day, ‘’Heydon’s Case’’ is frequently cited. The courts still look for the
“mischief” and “remedy”, but now use what they find as aids to discover the meaning of what
the legislature has said rather than to change it.”[5] Driedger goes on to argue that this
modern use of the mischief rule ought to be understood as one of the components of what he
characterized as the "modern" method of statutory construction, rather than a stand-alone rule
serving (as it formerly had), as an alternative to the methods of construction proposed by the
plain meaning rule and the golden rule.

Advantages
• The Law Commission sees it as a far more satisfactory way of interpreting acts as
opposed to the Golden or Literal rules.
• It usually avoids unjust or absurd results in sentencing
• It abides to parliament sovereignty.

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Disadvantages
• It is seen to be out of date as it has been in use since the 16th century, when common
law was the primary source of law and parliamentary supremacy was not established.
• It gives too much power to the unelected judiciary which is argued to be
undemocratic.
• In the 16th century, the judiciary would often draft acts on behalf of the king and were
therefore well qualified in what mischief the act was meant to remedy. This is not
often the case in modern legal systems.
• The rule can make the law uncertain, susceptible to the slippery slope.

Conclusion
The relevance of this theory of beneficent rule of interpretation has also become obsolete in
view of the fact that the economy of the world as well as India has under-gone a sea change
from an era of protectionism to liberalisation, from restricted domestic competition to
international competitiveness. It is therefore desirable in the scheme of things that we strike a
right balance between economic exigencies and social justice. If the industries are to live and
thrive, they must cut cost of production, but such liberal interpretation of provision of a
statute would only fasten an additional liability on the employers and would increase their
cost of production. It is therefore suggested that purposive rule of construction should be
applied in the instant case and that done, the leave encashment amount would definitely fall
short of basic wages. The beneficent rule of construction is to be discarded as a broken tool in
the instant case.“In relation to beneficent construction, the basic rules of interpretation are not
to be applied where
(i) the result would be re-legislation of a provision by addition, substitution or alteration
of words and violence would be done to the spirit of the provision;
(ii) where the words of a provision are capable of being given only one meaning; and
where there is no ambiguity in provision — where there is a doubt, however, the Court may
apply the rule of beneficent construction in order to advance the objectof the Act [see Shyam
Sunder v. Ram Kumar, (2001) 8 SCC 24; AIR 2001 SC 2472].
We are not unmindful that the golden rule of interpretation of a statute is that it should be
read liberally.”

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