G.R. No. 133382. March 9, 2000.

]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
EFREN MENDOZA y SALVADOR, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Efren Mendoza was charged before the Regional Trial
Court of Daet, Camarines Norte with murder for the
killing of Anchito A. Nano. He entered a plea of not
guilty. After trial in due course, the court a quo
rendered a judgment finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court rejected
his plea of self-defense, holding that his claim was
debunked by the prosecution witnesses' testimonies,
which were more credible. In this appeal before the
Supreme Court, the appellant admitted having hacked
to death the victim, but vigorously insisted that he did
so to defend himself, his family and his home. CSaHDT

The Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction,

with modification as to the penalty. He was sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of
prision mayor, minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal, maximum. The Court
appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender in his favor.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; SELF-
DEFENSE; REQUISITES. — Because the accused raises
self-defense and defense of a relative, it is incumbent
upon him to prove the presence of the following
requisites: unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim, lack of sufficient provocation on his part, and
reasonable necessity of the means he used to repel
the aggression. It is settled that the accused who
invokes self-defense or defense of a relative must
present clear and convincing evidence. Such person
cannot rely on the weakness of the prosecution, for
even if it is weak, it cannot be disbelieved because the
former has admitted the killing.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF
WITNESSES; FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE
ACCORDED GREAT RESPECT. — The well-settled rule is
that the trial court's findings on the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great
weight and respect, in the absence of any clear
showing that some facts or circumstances of weight or
substance which could have affected the result of the
case have been overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied. Appellant failed to present any reason
why this Court should reverse or modify the court a
quo's ruling.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES;
TREACHERY; DEFINED AND CONSTRUED. — The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of
the person attacked. Treachery exists when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its
execution, without risk arising from the defense which
the offended party might make.
4. ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; VOLUNTARY
SURRENDER; REQUISITES. — To establish the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the
following three requisites must be shown: (a) the
offender has not been actually arrested; (b) the
offender surrenders himself to a person in authority
or the latter's agent; and (c) the surrender is voluntary.
The defense must show intent to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities, either because of
an acknowledgment of guilt or because of a wish to
spare them the trouble and the expense concomitant
to the search and the capture of the accused.
5. ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE; DISTINGUISHED
FROM A GENERIC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE. —
The court a quo failed to appreciate the distinction
between a generic aggravating circumstance and a
qualifying one. A qualifying circumstance changes the
nature of the crime. A generic aggravating
circumstance, on the other hand, does not affect the
designation of the crime; it merely provides for the
imposition of the prescribed penalty in its maximum
period. Thus, while a generic aggravating
circumstance may be offset by a mitigating
circumstance, a qualifying circumstance may not.
Treachery in the present case is a qualifying, not a
generic aggravating circumstance. Its presence served
to characterized the killing as murder; it cannot at the
same time be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance to warrant the imposition of the
maximum penalty. Thus, it cannot offset voluntary
surrender.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; PROPER PENALTY; CASE
AT BAR. — When the crime was committed on July 14,
1993, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal,
in its maximum period, to death. At the time, however,
RA 7659 which reimposed the death penalty was not
yet in effect. In any event, the presence of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender impels
the imposition of the minimum period of the
applicable penalty, reclusion temporal (maximum).
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant
should be sentenced to prision mayor in its maximum
period to reclusion temporal also in its maximum
period.
7. ID.; ID.; CIVIL INDEMNITY; INCREASED INDEMNITY
AVAILABLE ONLY TO RAPE VICTIMS. — Citing People
vs. Victor, G.R. No. 127903, pp. 15-16, July 9, 1998, per
curiam, the solicitor general argues that the civil
indemnity should be raised from P50,000 to P75,000.
This is erroneous. In the said case, the Court held that
"starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is
committed or effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty is
authorized by the present amended law, the
indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased
amount of not less than P75,000.00." Obviously, that
ruling, which involved rape and imposed the death
penalty, cannot apply to the present case. Hence,
consistent with current jurisprudence, the Court
affirms the award of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J : p

True, a father and husband has the duty and the right
to defend himself, his family and his home. However,
in order to successfully invoke self-defense and
defense of relative, he must prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, the concurrence of three
elements, the most important of which is unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. Absent unlawful
aggression, these defenses collapse and the accused
must be convicted. cdphil

The Case
Efren Mendoza y Salvador was charged with murder
for the July 14, 1993 killing of Anchito A. Nano. Before
the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, an
Information 1 was filed against him on September 9,
1993, alleging as follows:
"That on or about 7:30 o' clock [o]n the evening of
July 14, 1993, at Brgy. Manlucugan,
[M]unicipality of Vinzons, [P]rovince of
Camarines Norte, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, assault, attack and
hack with a bolo one ANCHITO A. NANO,
thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple
hacking wounds, which were the proximate
cause of his instantaneous death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
victim.

"CONTRARY TO LAW." 2

During his arraignment on October 22, 1993,

appellant, with the assistance of Atty. Leo Intia,
entered a plea of not guilty. 3 On November 6, 1997,
after trial in due course, the court a quo rendered its
assailed nine-page Decision, 4 the dispositive portion
of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court
hereby finds the accused, Efren Mendoza
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code. The mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender will not affect the
penalty imposed since it is offset by the
aggravating circumstance of treachery.
Wherefore, he is hereby ordered to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and
to pay the heirs of the deceased the
following:

a) P50,000.00 as death indemnity; and

b) P30,000.00 as moral damages.

"The bond posted for the provisional liberty of said

accused is hereby CANCELLED.

"SO ORDERED." 5
Hence, this appeal. 6
The Facts
The Version of the Prosecution
In the People's Brief, 7 the Office of the Solicitor
General presented the following statement of facts:
"At around 7:00 p.m. of July 14, 1993, in Barangay
Manlucugan, Vinzons, Camarines Norte,
Anchito Nano and Marianito Rafael passed
by appellant's house and asked for a drink
from appellant's wife, Emily Mendoza.
Anchito began talking with Emily and they
were about four arms-length from
Marianito when appellant suddenly
appeared. Appellant hacked Anchito on the
nape, which prompted Marianito to flee
out of fear for his life. (TSN, March 9, 1993,
pp. 10-14).

"Brgy. Kagawad Pedro Saman, together with

Ernesto Cribe and Trinidad delos Santos,
arrived later at the scene of the crime.
Kagawad Saman discovered Anchito in a
kneeling position already dead. He also
found (3) three hack wounds on the nape
and two (2) hack wounds at the back of
Anchito's body (TSN, March 10, 1997, pp. 7
and 18).
"At around 9:00 p.m. of that day, Trinidad delos
Santos reported the hacking incident to the
sub-station of Aguit-it, Vinzons. SPO2
Silverio Rafael proceeded to the crime
scene and saw Anchito's body still in a
kneeling position with hack wounds at the
back of the neck and body (TSN, May 31,
1994, p. 5).

"SPO4 Rafael asked the people present who was

the perpetrator of the crime. The Barangay
officials led by Kgwd. Saman and Kgwd.
Cribe informed Rafael that the perpetrator
was appellant Efren Mendoza. SPO4 Rafael
later observed that the appellant's house
was in total disarray and he surmised that
things might have been taken in a hurry.
He also noted that there was no weapon
anywhere near the victim's body (Ibid., pp.
12-14 and 17).

"Later that night, appellant surrendered to Senior

Police Officer Leonardo Almadrones who
promptly turned him over to Chief
Investigator Joel Guinto for the requisite
investigation. During investigation,
appellant claimed that Anchito ransacked
 his house and hacked his seven (7) year old
son Ernie Mendoza (TSN, July 1, 1994, p. 5).
cdtai

"Two days later, appellant's wife and son went to

the Vinzon's police station to blotter Ernie
Mendoza's wound. Investigator Guinto
interviewed Ernie Mendoza and concluded
that Ernie's wound was made by somebody
other than the victim since the said wound
was not deep enough. Also, when he
questioned the child about the wound, the
latter answered that when he woke up, he
already had a wound. Investigator Guinto
later filed the present charge against
appellant after the victim's common-law
wife brought several witnesses who each
executed their corresponding sworn
affidavits." (Ibid., pp. 7 & 11)." 8

The Version of the Defense

The defense presented six witnesses: Appellant Efren
Mendoza, his wife Emily and his son Ernie; Bayani
Aguilar; Dr. Gaudencio Albano and Carmen Herico. In
his Brief, 9 appellant summarized the defense
witnesses' testimonies as follows:
"EMILY MENDOZA, wife of appellant, testified that
at around 7:00 o' clock in the evening, the
victim Anchito Nano and his companion
Marianito Rafael arrived at their house and
upon arrival, Anchito Nano destroyed the
two (2) windows of their house. She saw
afterwards that her son, Ernie Mendoza,
was hacked by Anchito Nano while the
former was peeping thru the destroyed
window. She shouted for help and
appellant, her husband, responded to her
call and saw Anchito Nano who was about
to attack her husband, but was hacked first
by the latter. Marianito Rafael who was just
watching subsequently fled from the place
of the incident. She brought her son first to
the faith healer for immediate treatment
and the following morning to the Provincial
Hospital for medical treatment. She
learned later that her husband went to
Vinzons Municipal Hall and surrendered
voluntarily to the police authority on the
same day of July 14, 1993. (TSN, December
8, 1994, pp. 3-11).

"EFREN MENDOZA, accused-appellant, testified that

on July 14, 1993, at around 7:30 in [the]
 evening, he was at the comfort room 20
about meters away from their house when
he heard his wife shouting for help. He ran
immediately towards the direction of their
house and saw Anchito Nano destroying
the lock of their window[;] hence he looked
for a piece of wood but found a bolo
instead. He later heard his son shout,
"Ama, tinaga ako." He approached Anchito
Nano to prevent him from entering their
house but the latter tried to hack him. He
was able to deliver a hacking blow ahead of
the victim on the right side of the neck.
Thereafter, he immediately went to the
Municipal Hall of Vinzons and surrendered
voluntarily to the police authority (TSN,
March 27, 1995, pp. 3-8).

"ERNIE MENDOZA, appellant's son, testified that on

July 14, 1993, at around 7:30 in the evening,
he noticed that somebody was hacking
their house, hence, he peeped through the
window and saw Anchito Nano who hacked
him on the head, thereby resulting [in]
los[s] of consciousness while his mother
[kept] on shouting for help. He was
brought first to a quack doctor for
immediate treatment and the following
 morning, to the provincial hospital where
he was treated by Dr. Albano for the head
injury he sustained.

"BAYANI AGUILAR, police chief of Vinzons PNP

testified that he issued a certification on
August 3, 1993 about the voluntary
surrender of appellant Efren Mendoza and
another certification regarding one in the
report made by Emily Mendoza relative to
the hacking of his son by Anchito Nano
which happened on July 14, 1993 at about
7:30 in the evening at their house (TSN,
November 7, 1995, pp. 2-4).

"DR. GAUDENCIO ALBANO, the attending doctor

who treated appellant's son testified that
he treated Ernie Mendoza who suffered a
wound laceration four (4) cm. long at the
middle of the head which could have been
caused by a blunt object. (TSN, July 31,
1996, pp. 4-6).

"CARMEN HERICO testified that on July 14, 1993, at

around 7:30 in the evening, she heard her
daughter, Emily Mendoza shouting for
 help, hence she ran towards her daughter's
house and they met halfway along the
road. They proceeded back to her
daughter's house and she saw the fallen
window. She and her daughter,
subsequently proceeded to the house of
Pedro Saman, a barangay kagawad and
informed the latter about the incident.
(TSN, October 22, 1996, pp. 3, 5-6)." 10

Trial Court's Ruling

The court a quo rejected appellant's plea of self-
defense, ratiocinating as follows:
"To bolster his claim of self-defense, accused Efren
Mendoza declared: when he heard the
shouts for help of his wife, immediately he
ran towards their house and saw the victim
destroying their house. There, he heard his
son [shout], "Ama, tinaga ako." He
immediately approached the victim in
order to prevent him from entering the
house. He delivered the first blow by
hacking the victim, hitting the victim at the
right side of the neck, alleging that the
victim, when they were facing each other,
hacked the accused first.
"Indeed, a man's house is his castle. He has the
right to protect it. He may repel force by
force in defense of person, habitation or
property against anyone who manifestly
intends or endeavors by violence or
surprise to commit a felony. But these
circumstances surrounding the incident
negates the allegations of the accused's
self-defense. First, there is an eyewitness
on the part of the prosecution, that the
accused suddenly attacked and hacked the
victim outside the house (tsn., March 9,
1994, pp. 12-13). Secondly, the physical
evidence of the number, location and
severity of the [hack] and incised wounds
found on the body of the victim affirmed
by the medical findings contained in the
autopsy report that all the hack wounds
[came] from the back of the victim's body
(tsn., Feb. 4, 1994, p. 7), and the pictures
presented in court (Exhibits "C" to "C-4") all
indicate that the victim was hacked from
behind. Clearly, accused's act was no
longer one of self-preservation, but a
determined effort to kill his victim." 11

Holding that appellant's claim was debunked by the

prosecution witnesses' testimonies which were more
credible, the trial court explained:
"Kagawad Pedro Saman was among the first
persons who saw the vicinity of the
incident. He noticed that the victim was not
carrying any weapon or knife or a piece of
wood and the house was in good condition
(tsn, March 10, 1994, p. 14). It was
corroborated by SPO4 Silverio Rafael that
there was indeed no weapon within the
vicinity where the corpse of the victim was
found (tsn, May 31, 1994, p. 17) The
allegations of the accused that the victim
was the aggressor who hacked him first is
contrary to human nature. There was no
altercation, warning or even a challenge
that [would] enable the victim to be
aggressor. The aggression must be real, or
at least, imminent and not merely
imaginary. The aggressor's intent must be
ostensibly revealed by his hostile attitude
and other external acts constituting a real,
material, unlawful aggression. A threat,
even if made with a weapon or the belief
that a person was about to be attacked, is
not sufficient. It is necessary that the intent
be ostensibly revealed by an act of
aggression or by some external acts
showing the commencement of actual,
material, unlawful aggression. This court
 finds that [since] the accused was not in
imminent danger of death or great bodily
harm, an attempt to defend himself by
means which appeared unreasonable by
using a long bolo is unjustifiable. Hence,
the self-defense foisted by the accused is
not well-founded, but an alibi to exonerate
him from the offense he committed." 12

The Alleged Errors

In his Brief, appellant assails (1) the trial court's
rejection of his plea of defense of relative and (2) its
characterization of the crime committed. Thus, he
submits: prLL

"I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE

THEORY OF DEFENSE OF RELATIVE
ESPOUSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE
SUPPORTING THE SAME.

II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
AS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION." 13

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious. The mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender should be
appreciated in appellant's favor.
First Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Relative
The appellant admits to having hacked Anchito Nano,
but vigorously insists that he did so to defend himself,
his family and his home.
Mendoza recounts that on that fateful night, he was
relieving himself in their comfort room situated about
twenty meters outside their house, when he heard his
wife's frantic pleas for help. He immediately rushed to
their house and saw Nano destroying their windows.
The former looked for something with which to arm
himself and found a bolo. He recalls that at this point,
he heard his son shout, "Ama, tinaga ako!" Thereafter,
he approached Nano to prevent him from entering
the house. The latter allegedly faced him and was
about to strike him with a bolo, but the former was
able to parry the blow, quickly retaliate and hit him on
the neck. 14
Requisites of Self-Defense
and Defense of Relative
Because the accused raises self-defense and defense
of a relative, it is incumbent upon him to prove the
presence of the following requisites: unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim, lack of sufficient
provocation on his part, and reasonable necessity of
the means he used to repel the aggression. 15 It is
settled that the accused who invokes self-defense or
defense of a relative must present clear and
convincing evidence. Such person cannot rely on the
weakness of the prosecution, for even if it is weak, it
cannot be disbelieved because the former has
admitted the killing. 16
Unlawful Aggression
Not Proven
We find that the appellant was not able to prove the
all-important first requisite — unlawful aggression on
the part of Anchito Nano. Mendoza contends that it
was the latter who started the aggression by acting in
a manner that was threatening and dangerous to the
former and his family, wreaking havoc on his house
and, in the process, injuring his seven-year-old son.
Appellant likewise avers that Nano was about to strike
him when the former, acting instinctively, delivered
the fatal blows to the latter.
 
Emily and Ernie Mendoza, appellant's wife and son,
corroborated this assertion. They testified that the
deceased had started the fracas and caused the
wound on Ernie's head. To further prove this claim,
the defense presented Dr. Gaudencio Albano, Ernie's
attending physician, who testified that the boy had
suffered a laceration, four centimeters long at the
middle of the head, which could have been caused by
a blunt object. 17
Despite this corroboration, however, several
circumstances belie appellant's claim of self-defense
and defense of a relative. First, investigators found the
deceased in a kneeling position with five wounds —
three on the nape, and two at the back. Thus, the
nature and the location of such wounds debunked
appellant's claim that Nano was about to attack him.
Second, the bolo which Nano had allegedly used in his
attack was not found within the vicinity of the crime
scene and was not presented in court. This point was
established by SPO4 Silverio Rafael's testimony 18 and
the photographs 19 depicting the actual crime scene.
Third, granting that Ernie Mendoza was injured, the
appellant and his witnesses were not able to prove
adequately that such injury was caused by Nano,
because there were inconsistencies and
improbabilities in their testimonies. Ernie claimed that
he had lost consciousness after being struck with a
bolo by Nano. 20 However, appellant asserts that he
heard his child cry, "Ama, tinaga ako!" while the
former was about to subdue the assailant. Moreover,
appellant admits that he did not see Nano hit his son.
Likewise, the testimonies of Carmen Herico (Emily's
mother) and Pedro Saman regarding the
circumstances after the hacking incident negated
Emily's claim that she had rushed her wounded son to
the faith healer. Herico went to her daughter's house
after hearing the latter's cries for help, but the former
did not see anything except a fallen window. 21 Surely,
she would have noticed if her grandchild was injured.
Pedro Saman, the barangay kagawad summoned by
Herico, also testified that appellant's children were in
the house when he arrived at the crime scene, 22 but
he did not mention anything about an injured child.
In any event, the trial court disbelieved the
testimonies of the defense witnesses. The well-settled
rule is that the trial court's findings on the credibility
of witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great
weight and respect, in the absence of any clear
showing that some facts or circumstances of weight or
substance which could have affected the result of the
case have been overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied. 23 Appellant failed to present any reason
why this Court should reverse or modify the court a
quo's ruling.
In all, the totality of the evidence presented by the
appellant was not sufficient to prove that it was Nano
who had started the fracas, and that the former was
just acting to defend himself, his family and his home.
Second Issue:
Crime and Punishment
We agree with the trial court that the killing of Anchito
Nano was qualified by treachery, as alleged in the
Information. The essence of treachery is the sudden
and unexpected attack, without the slightest
provocation on the part of the person attacked. 24
Treachery exists when the offender commits any of
the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and especially to insure its execution, without
risk arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. 25
In the present case, the victim's lack of awareness of
the attack can be gleaned from the nature, the
number and the location of his wounds. Furthermore,
the testimony of Marianito Rafael, against whom no ill
motive was imputed by the appellant, likewise
established this fact. The former testified:Cdpr

"Q You mean to say that you were present when he

was hacked?
A Yes, sir.

Q In what place was he hacked?

xxx xxx xxx

A Near the house of Efren Mendoza.

Q Why were you there? . . .

A Because I asked for water from Emily Mendoza.

Q And Anchito Nano was also there?

xxx xxx xxx

A We were together.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You mean to say that after you had a drink, Efren

Mendoza came?
A He came out suddenly.

Q . . . [W]here did he come from?

A He came from outside of the house.

Q What did [he] do upon arriving, if any, this Efren

Mendoza?

A He suddenly hacked.

Q Who?

A Anchito Nano.

xxx xxx xxx

Q How many times was Anchito Nano hacked by

Efren Mendoza, if you know?
A I only saw once, I ran away after seeing the first
hack." 26

Voluntary Surrender
Appellant argues that the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender should be appreciated in his
favor, because he immediately went to the Municipal
Hall and surrendered to the police on the night of the
incident.
We agree. To establish this mitigating circumstance,
the following three requisites must be shown: (a) the
offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the
offender surrenders himself to a person in authority
or the latter's agent; and (c) the surrender is voluntary.
27 The defense must show intent to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities, either because of
an acknowledgment of guilt or because of a wish to
spare them the trouble and the expense concomitant
to the search and the capture of the accused. 28
In this case, all these requisites were proven.
Appellant's assertion that he surrendered was
corroborated by Chief Inspector Bayani Aguilar,
Vinzons chief of police, who issued a Certification that
"one Efren Mendoza . . . voluntarily surrendered [to]
this station, including his bolo . . . which was used to
hack 3 times a certain Yoyoy Nano . . . ." 29 Contrary to
the submission of the solicitor general, 30 the
surrender of appellant was unconditional. He readily
admitted that he had hacked the victim and
subsequently put himself under police custody.
Furthermore, we hold that the trial court erred in
ruling that voluntary surrender was "offset by the
aggravating circumstance of treachery." 31 The court a
quo failed to appreciate the distinction between a
generic aggravating circumstance and a qualifying
one.
A qualifying circumstance changes the nature of the
crime. A generic aggravating circumstance, on the
other hand, does not affect the designation of the
crime; it merely provides for the imposition of the
prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Thus, while
a generic aggravating circumstance may be offset by a
mitigating circumstance, a qualifying circumstance
may not. 32
Treachery in the present case is a qualifying, not a
generic aggravating circumstance. Its presence served
to characterize the killing as murder; it cannot at the
same time be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance to warrant the imposition of the
maximum penalty. Thus, it cannot offset voluntary
surrender.
The Proper Penalty
When the crime was committed on July 14, 1993, the
penalty for murder was reclusion temporal, in its
maximum period, to death. 33 At the time, however, RA
7659 which reimposed the death penalty was not yet
in effect. In any event, the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender impels the
imposition of the minimum period of the applicable
penalty, 34 reclusion temporal (maximum). Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 35 appellant should
be sentenced to prision mayor in its maximum period
to reclusion temporal also in its maximum period. cdrep

Civil Indemnity
Citing People v. Victor, 36 the solicitor general argues
that the civil indemnity should be raised from P50,000
to P75,000. This is erroneous. In the said case, the
Court held that "starting with the case at bar, if the
crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by
any of the circumstances under which the death
penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the
indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased
amount of not less than P75,000.00." Obviously, that
ruling, which involved rape and imposed the death
penalty, cannot apply to the present case. Hence,
consistent with current jurisprudence, 37 we affirm
the award of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto.
Likewise, we affirm the award of moral damages in
the sum of P30,000 for the anguish and the wounded
feelings suffered by the victim's heirs, which were duly
proven.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional
Trial Court is AFFIRMED with the modification that
appellant is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor
(maximum) to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal (maximum). All other awards are
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
(People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 133382, [March 9,
|||

2000], 384 PHIL 436-454)