ADM. CASE No.

3319               June 8, 2000 Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in
July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2)
children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to
LESLIE UI, complainant, 
work with the law firm5 she was connected with, the woman who
vs.
represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her
ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating
with her.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against not illicit because they were married abroad and that after June
Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral 1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui's true civil status,
relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui. she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos
Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26
Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was
The relevant facts are: respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her
mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at exclusively from her parents' funds. 6 By way of counterclaim,
the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City 1 and as a result of respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million
their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed
Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case
December 1987, however, complainant found out that her against respondent.
husband. Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among
sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together at No. others, that respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was
527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. married to complainant and had children with her even at the
Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason
University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children
1982. with Carlos Ui.

Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated
respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at her office in Bar, complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and
the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the
wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the
she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however; that same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish
everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution dismissing
believed the representations of respondent and thought things the criminal complaint against respondent reads:
would turn out well from then on and that the illicit relationship
between her husband and respondent would come to an end.
Complainant's evidence had  prima facie established the
existence of the "illicit relationship" between the
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in
between her husband and respondent continued, and that December 1987. The same evidence however show that
sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up
Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.
respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent
to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail.
The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the
know later on that respondent had been employed by her "relationship" of respondents started and was discovered
husband in his company. by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and
respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam
Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila and
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, they, admittedly, continued to live together at their
was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant against conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter,
Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for
carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant's husband, From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that
Carlos Ui. In her Answer, 2 respondent averred that she met Carlos altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as complainant puts it,
Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a had been  prima facie established by complainant's
bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had evidence, this same evidence had failed to even  prima
children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had facie establish the "fact of respondent's cohabitation in
long been estranged. She stated that during one of their trips the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos
abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary
fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985 3 . Upon their return to and indispensable to at least create probable cause for
Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter the offense charged. The statement alone of
continued to live with his children in their Greenhills residence complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion
because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make the
gradually to know and accept the fact of his second marriage complainant's evidence thereto any better/stronger
before they would live together.4  (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).

In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by
Hawaii and she would only return occasionally to the Philippines to respondents in support of their respective positions on
update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her the matter support and bolster the foregoing
trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, she was confronted by a conclusion/recommendation.
woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui.
Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of
1
 WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that no compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage
the instant complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact
to establish probable cause for the offense charged. remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before
complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her
earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8 
stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he
was the person responsible for changing the date of the marriage
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present
of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same was evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.
dismissed9 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her
allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as
Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of the
husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang,
pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of respondent with
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light
colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same
complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the
Commission 10 wherein she charged respondent with making false garage, 19 does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner.
allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting They have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures
document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in were taken by a photographer from a private security agency and
the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the
respondent averred, among others, that she was married to respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of
Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by
Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to establish
of Marriage 11 duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy probable cause for the offense charged 20 and the dismissal of the
of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, appeal by the Department of Justice21 to bolster her argument
and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of
Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage between her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she
Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her
1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless,
Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos
allegation was because respondent wanted to impress upon the Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery
said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the of his true civil status, she parted ways with him.
wedlock. 12 It is the contention of complainant that such act
constitutes a violation of Articles 183 13 and 184 14 of the Revised
In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant
Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the
Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and
act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and
reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having
submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her
intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth
moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to
of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondent's
be a member of the Philippine Bar.
mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and
her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. 23 It was thus
Contempt), 15 respondent averred that she did not have the highly improbable that respondent, who was living with her
original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own
the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise
because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the
the marriage certificate in her possession. Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document containing
an intercalated date.
Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995 and
raised the lone issue of whether or not she has conducted herself In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum 24 , respondent stated
in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from that complainant miserably failed to show sufficient proof to
the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the
be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely: allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent
had knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant.
The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent man does not prove that such information was made known to
with the requirement of good moral character for the respondent.
practice of the legal profession; and

Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar

(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that Discipline submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding that:
respondent conducted herself in an immoral manner.

In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time

In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter
she who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because she represented himself to be single. The Commission does
did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon not find said claim too difficult to believe in the light of
learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties contemporary human experience.
with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to
doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a
bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so Almost always, when a married man courts a single
open in his courtship. 18  woman, he represents himself to be single, separated,
or without any firm commitment to another woman. The
reason therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent nature, single women prefer single men.
alleged that it was highly incredible for her to have knowingly
attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known
that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was
2
 The records will show that when respondent became If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission
aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral
the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all character is also a requisite for retaining membership in
contacts with him. When she returned to the Philippines the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be
in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral
Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
talked to each other because of the children whom he
was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral
to find any act on the part of respondent that can be integrity in addition to professional probity.
considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an
more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should
inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral
deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without
conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and
cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a
obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing
normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by
as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what
every single girl.
appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-
laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants
x x x           x x x          x x x disbarment.

Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct
Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated December 13, which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows
1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community." (7 C.J.S.
959). 26 
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children.
record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left
for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED him.
for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for
knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the
falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that
actuations of respondent are not only far from simple, they will
a repetition of the same will merit a more severe
have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal
penalty.
practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal
society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This
We agree with the findings aforequoted. permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public
faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility
and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have
The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent
the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by
would not have found herself in such a compromising situation
passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be
had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out
revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer
more about Carlos Ui's personal background prior to her intimate
violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for
involvement with him.
admission to the practice of law are:

Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused

a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
respondent's suspicion that something was amiss in her
relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing
b. a resident thereof; questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that
Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it
appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age; Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite
their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and
d. a person of good moral character; their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible
considering respondent's allegation that Carlos Ui was very open
in courting her.
e. he must show that no charges against him involving
moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court;
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that
respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs.
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui,
clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid
g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied) marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes
conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and
the opinion of good and respectable members of the
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to community. 27 Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary
admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so
character. More importantly, possession of good moral character corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled
must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the as to be reprehensible to a high degree. 28 
privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground
for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held —
3
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is
not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships . . . but
must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards." 29 Respondent's act of immediately distancing herself
from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just
that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no
intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the
legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary
deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers
only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence. 30 This, herein complainant miserably failed
to do.

On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by

respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to believe the
averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy
of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui.
For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal
bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is
difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case
at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated,
it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.

Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information

contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially so when
she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances
contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an
intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that
point cannot stand.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the

highest standards of morality.1avvphi1 The legal profession
exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to
safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts
constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of
the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent

Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby
DISMISSED.

However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to

her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an
altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that
a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition
of the same or similar offense in the future.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

4
SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997 The IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal
of the case and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's
oath.
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, 
vs.
SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent. We agree.

RESOLUTION Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971
because of the charge of gross immorality made by complainant.
To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his
ROMERO, J.:
sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not
fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa examinations.
petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied
admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed the
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality
1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful
warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal
attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before he could take his oath,
profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with
however, complainant filed the instant petition averring that
complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral
respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of
character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly
wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his
immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or
repeated promises to many her.
disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or
Victor F. Sevilla in June and July 1971. Respondent and disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree."6 It is a
complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral
they were both in their teens, they were steadies. Respondent indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the
even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen community.7
at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual
congress with respondent sometime in 1960. Their intimacy
We find the ruling in Arciga v.  Maniwang8 quite relevant because
yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964. 1 It
mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom
was after the child was born, complainant alleged, that
possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and
respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes the
devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so
bar examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent
corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of
allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage.
disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such
He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter's birthdays. Her
relationship a child was born out of wedlock.9
trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she
learned that respondent married another woman. Hence, this
petition. Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual
relations were evidently consensual. We do not find complainant's
assertions that she had been forced into sexual intercourse,
Upon complainant's motion, the Court authorized the taking of
credible. She continued to see and be respondent's girlfriend even
testimonies of witnesses by deposition in 1972. On February 18,
after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All
1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the
those years of amicable and intimate relations refute her
case citing  complainant's failure to comment on the motion of
allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with him.
Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to take
Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively
aforesaid testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her
pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who
comment required and that she remains interested in the
could be easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to
resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court
marry and settle permanently with another woman. We cannot
denied respondent's motion to dismiss.
castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for
marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to into because of love, not for any other reason.
dismiss on the ground of abandonment filed by respondent on
September 17, 1979.2 Respondent's third motion to dismiss was
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of
noted in the Court's Resolution dated September 15, 1982.3 In
revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. It
1988, respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a
is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems,
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-
perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be
1986, his active participation in civic organizations and good
admitted into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are
standing in the community as well as the length of time this case
ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented
has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a
from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor.
lawyer.4
During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion
attributed to him.10 Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer's
complaint for failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an oath.
unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to
take the lawyer's oath upon payment of the required fees.5
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as
Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.
when the Court, in response to complainant's opposition, resolved
to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court
SO ORDERED.
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

5
Narvasa, C.J., Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres Jr., JJ., are on leave. 2. Complainant Michael Barrios passed away sometime
in June 1997; and

3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot of a civil

case which was decided in respondent's favor (as
plaintiff in the said case). Respondent avers that as a
result of his moving for the execution of judgment in his
A.C. No. 4585             November 12, 2004 favor and the eviction of the family of herein
complainant Michael Barrios, the latter filed the present
administrative case.
MICHAEL P. BARRIOS, complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO P. MARTINEZ, respondent. In the meantime, on 11 September 1997, a certain Robert Visbal
of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Tacloban City submitted a
letter11 to the First Division Clerk of Court alleging that respondent
DECISION Martinez also stood charged in another estafa case before the
Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 9, as well as a civil
PER CURIAM: case involving the victims of the Doña Paz tragedy in 1987, for
which the Regional Trial Court of Basey, Samar, Branch 30
rendered a decision against him, his appeal thereto having been
This is a verified petition1 for disbarment filed against Atty. dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
Francisco Martinez for having been convicted by final judgment in
Criminal Case No. 6608 of a crime involving moral turpitude by
Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City.2  In the said Decision of Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of
Basey, Samar,12 it appears that herein respondent Atty. Martinez
offered his legal services to the victims of the Doña Paz tragedy
The dispositive portion of the same states: for free. However, when the plaintiff in the said civil case was
issued a check for P90,000 by Sulpicio Lines representing
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Francisco compensation for the deaths of his wife and two daughters, Atty.
Martinez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime for Martinez asked plaintiff to endorse said check, which was then
(sic) violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 charged in the deposited in the account of Dr. Martinez, Atty. Martinez's wife.
Information. He is imposed a penalty of one (1) year When plaintiff asked for his money, he was only able to recover a
imprisonment and fine double the amount of the check total of P30,000. Atty. Martinez claimed the remaining P60,000 as
which is EIGHT THOUSAND (8,000.00) PESOS, plus his attorney's fees. Holding that it was "absurd and totally
payment of the tax pursuant to Section 205 of the ridiculous that for a simple legal service … he would collect 2/3 of
Internal Revenue Code and costs against the accused.3  the money claim," the trial court ordered Atty. Martinez to pay the
plaintiff therein the amount of P60,000 with interest, P5,000 for
moral and exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
Complainant further submitted our Resolution dated 13 March
1996 and the Entry of Judgment from this Court dated 20 March
1996. Said trial court also made particular mention of Martinez's dilatory
tactics during the trial, citing fourteen (14) specific instances
thereof. Martinez's appeal from the above judgment was
On 03 July 1996, we required4 respondent to comment on said dismissed by the Court of Appeals for his failure to file his brief,
petition within ten (10) days from notice. On 17 February 1997, despite having been granted three thirty (30)-day extensions to
we issued a second resolution5 requiring him to show cause why do so.13 
no disciplinary action should be imposed on him for failure to
comply with our earlier Resolution, and to submit said Comment.
On 07 July 1997, we imposed a fine of P1,000 for respondent's On 16 June 1999, we referred14 the present case to the Integrated
failure to file said Comment and required him to comply with our Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
previous resolution within ten days. 6 On 27 April 1998, we fined recommendation.
respondent an additional P2,000 and required him to comply with
the resolution requiring his comment within ten days under pain The report15 of IBP Investigating Commissioner Winston D.
of imprisonment and arrest for a period of five (5) days or until Abuyuan stated in part that:
his compliance.7 Finally, on 03 February 1999, or almost three
years later, we declared respondent Martinez guilty of Contempt
under Rule 71, Sec. 3[b] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Several dates for the hearing of the case were scheduled
ordered his imprisonment until he complied with the aforesaid but none of the parties appeared before the
resolutions.8  Commission, until finally it was considered submitted for
resolution last 27 June 2002. On the same date
respondent filed a motion for the dismissal of the case
On 05 April 1999, the National Bureau of Investigation on the ground that the complainant died sometime in
reported9 that respondent was arrested in Tacloban City on 26 June 1997 and that dismissal is warranted because "the
March 1999, but was subsequently released after having shown case filed by him does not survive due to his demise; as
proof of compliance with the resolutions of 17 February 1997 and a matter of fact, it is extinguished upon his death."
27 April 1998 by remitting the amount of P2,000 and submitting
his long overdue Comment.
We disagree with respondent's contention.

In the said Comment dated 16 March 1999, respondent stated

10 

that: Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules

of Court, the Honorable Supreme Court or the IBP
may motu proprio initiate the proceedings when they
1. He failed to respond to our Resolution dated 17 perceive acts of lawyers which deserve sanctions or
February 1997 as he was at that time undergoing when their attention is called by any one and a probable
medical treatment at Camp Ruperto Kangleon in Palo, cause exists that an act has been perpetrated by a
Leyte; lawyer which requires disciplinary sanctions.

6
 As earlier cited, respondent lawyer's propensity to violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
disregard or ignore orders of the Honorable Supreme to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
Court for which he was fined twice, arrested and superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
imprisoned reflects an utter lack of good moral attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.
character.
In the present case, respondent has been found guilty and
Respondent's conviction of a crime involving moral convicted by final judgment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing
turpitude (estafa and/or violation of BP Blg. 22) clearly a worthless check in the amount of P8,000. The issue with which
shows his unfitness to protect the administration of we are now concerned is whether or not the said crime is one
justice and therefore justifies the imposition of sanctions involving moral turpitude. 22 
against him (see In re: Abesamis, 102 Phil. 1182; In re:
Jaramillo, 101 Phil. 323; In re: Vinzon, 19 SCRA 815;
Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary to
Medina vs. Bautista, 12 SCRA 1, People vs.
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."23 It involves "an act of
Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 Jan. 1990).
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
recommended that respondent Atty. Francisco P. woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
Martinez be disbarred and his name stricken out from morals."24 
the Roll of Attorneys immediately.
In People of the Philippines v. Atty. Fe Tuanda,25 where the erring
On 27 September 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed a lawyer was indefinitely suspended for having been convicted of
Resolution16 adopting and approving the report and three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, we held that conviction
recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner. by final judgment of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral
turpitude and stated:
On 03 December 2003, respondent Martinez filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation,17 in the instant case We should add that the crimes of which respondent was
alleging that: convicted also import deceit and violation of her
attorney's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility under both of which she was bound to
1. The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
"obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime
Investigating Commissioner is tantamount to a
involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant
deprivation of property without due process of law,
case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the
although admittedly the practice of law is a privilege;
exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it
certainly relates to and affects the good moral character
2. If respondent is given another chance to have his day of a person convicted of such offense…26 (emphasis
in court and allowed to adduce evidence, the supplied)
result/outcome would be entirely different from that
arrived at by the Investigating Commissioner; and
Over ten years later, we reiterated the above ruling in Villaber v.
Commission on Elections27 and disqualified a congressional
3. Respondent is now 71 years of age, and has served candidate for having been sentenced by final judgment for three
the judiciary in various capacities (from acting city judge counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in accordance with Sec. 12 of
to Municipal Judges League Leyte Chapter President) for the Omnibus Election Code, which states:
almost 17 years prior to resuming his law practice.
SEC. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been
On 14 January 2004, we required18 complainant to file a comment declared by competent authority insane or incompetent,
within ten days. On 16 February 2004, we received a or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
Manifestation and Motion19 from complainant's daughter, Diane insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he
Francis Barrios Latoja, alleging that they had not been furnished has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
with a copy of respondent's Motion, notwithstanding the fact that months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall
respondent ostensibly lives next door to complainant's family. be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office,
Required to Comment on 17 May 2004, respondent has until now unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
failed to do so. amnesty. (emphasis supplied)

The records show that respondent, indeed, failed to furnish a copy Enumerating the elements of that crime, we held that the act of a
of said Motion to herein complainant. The records also show that person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that
respondent was given several opportunities to present evidence he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the
by this Court20 as well as by the IBP.21 Indeed, he only has himself drawee bank for the check in full upon its presentment, is a
to blame, for he has failed to present his case despite several manifestation of moral turpitude. Notwithstanding therein
occasions to do so. It is now too late in the day for respondent to petitioner's averment that he was not a lawyer, we nevertheless
ask this court to receive his evidence. applied our ruling in People v. Tuanda, to the effect that

This court, moreover, is unwilling to exercise the same patience (A) conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, "imports
that it did when it waited for his comment on the original petition. deceit" and "certainly relates to and affects the good
At any rate, after a careful consideration of the records of the moral character of a person." [Indeed] the effects of the
instant case, we find the evidence on record sufficient to support issuance of a worthless check, as we held in the
the IBP's findings. landmark case of Lozano v. Martinez, through Justice
Pedro L. Yap, "transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches
Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the the interests of the community at large. The mischief it
Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross also an injury to the public" since the circulation of
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason valueless commercial papers "can very well pollute the
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
7
 channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking submit his Comment, until 16 March 1999, when he submitted
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and said Comment to secure his release from arrest, almost three
the public interest." Thus, paraphrasing Black's years had elapsed.
definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check
deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his
It is revealing that despite the unwarranted length of time it took
fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted
respondent to comply, his Comment consists of all of two pages, a
and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or
copy of which, it appears, he neglected to furnish
good morals.28 (emphasis supplied)
complainant.34 And while he claims to have been confined while
undergoing medical treatment at the time our Resolution of 17
In the recent case of Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,29 we stated February 1997 was issued, he merely reserved the submission of
that: a certification to that effect. Nor, indeed, was he able to offer any
explanation for his failure to submit his Comment from the time
we issued our first Resolution of 03 July 1996 until 16 March
(T)he issuance of checks which were later dishonored for
1999. In fact, said Comment alleged, merely, that the
having been drawn against a closed account indicates a
complainant, Michael Barrios, passed away sometime in June
lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed
1997, and imputed upon the latter unsupported ill-motives for
on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good
instituting the said Petition against him, which argument has
moral character as to render her unworthy of public
already been resolved squarely in the abovementioned IBP report.
confidence. [Cuizon v. Macalino, A.C. No. 4334, 07 July
2004] The issuance of a series of worthless checks also
shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful Moreover, the IBP report cited the failure of both parties to appear
to the deleterious effects of such act to the public before the Commission as the main reason for the long delay,
interest and public order. [Lao v. Medel, 405 SCRA 227] until the same was finally submitted for Resolution on 27 June
It also manifests a lawyer's low regard for her 2002. Respondent, therefore, squandered away seven years to
commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined "have his day in court and adduce evidence" in his behalf, which
her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image inaction also unduly delayed the court's prompt disposition of this
of the profession she should hold in high esteem. petition.
[Sanchez v. Somoso, A.C. No. 6061, 03 October 2003]
In Pajares v. Abad Santos,35 we reminded attorneys that "there
Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules
sufficient funds to cover the same constitutes such willful of Court [now Rule 7, Section 3] which provides that the signature
dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the public of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read
confidence in law and lawyers. And while "the general rule is that the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information
a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not
not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct interposed for delay, and expressly admonishes that for a willful
in his non-professional or private capacity, where, however, the violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary
misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so action.36 It is noteworthy that in the past, the Court has disciplined
gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and lawyers and judges for willful disregard of its orders to file
unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on comments or appellant's briefs, as a penalty for disobedience
him, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him thereof. 37 
from the office of attorney."30 
For the same reasons, we are disinclined to take respondent's old
The argument of respondent that to disbar him now is tantamount age and the fact that he served in the judiciary in various
to a deprivation of property without due process of law is also capacities in his favor. If at all, we hold respondent to a higher
untenable. As respondent himself admits, the practice of law is a standard for it, for a judge should be the embodiment of
privilege. The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is "to competence, integrity, and independence,38 and his conduct
protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who should be above reproach.39 The fact that respondent has chosen
exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable to engage in private practice does not mean he is now free to
and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose conduct himself in less honorable – or indeed in a less than
confidence."31 "A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in honorable – manner.
any sense a civil action where the complainant is plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a
no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.
privilege,40 demanding a high degree of good moral character, not
They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare,
only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a
and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
continuing requirement for the practice of law.41 Sadly, herein
ministrations of persons unfit to practice them."32 "Verily, lawyers
respondent falls short of the exacting standards expected of him
must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
as a vanguard of the legal profession.
bar, to the courts and to their clients. Their conduct must always
reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied
in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be
considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any disbarred from the practice of law. We agree.
professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor — or to be
unworthy to continue as officers of the Court."33  We come now to the matter of the penalty imposable in this case.
In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we upheld the imposition of
one year's suspension for non-payment of debt and issuance of
Nor are we inclined to look with favor upon respondent's plea that worthless checks, or a suspension of six months upon partial
if "given another chance to have his day in court and to adduce payment of the obligation.42 However, in these cases, for various
evidence, the result/outcome would be entirely different from that reasons, none of the issuances resulted in a conviction by the
arrived at." We note with displeasure the inordinate length of time erring lawyers for either estafa or B.P. Blg. 22. Thus, we held
respondent took in responding to our requirement to submit his therein that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross
Comment on the original petition to disbar him. These acts misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
constitute a willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, suspension from the practice of law.
which under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself a
cause sufficient for suspension or disbarment. Thus, from the time
we issued our first Resolution on 03 July 1996 requiring him to
8
In the instant case, however, herein respondent has been found In re Basa, 41 Phil. 275-76). As respondent's
guilty and stands convicted by final judgment of a crime involving guilt cannot now be questioned, his disbarment
moral turpitude. In People v. Tuanda, which is similar to this case is inevitable. (emphasis supplied)50 
in that both respondents were convicted for violation of B.P. Blg.
22 which we have held to be such a crime, we affirmed the order
6. In In Re: Attorney Jose Avanceña,51 the conditional
of suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of
pardon extended to the erring lawyer by the Chief
Appeals, until further orders.
Executive also failed to relieve him of the penalty of
disbarment imposed by this court.
However, in a long line of cases, some of which were decided
after Tuanda, we have held disbarment to be the appropriate
7. In In Re Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,52 a lawyer was
penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving
charged and found guilty of the crime of falsification of
moral turpitude. Thus:
public document for having prepared and notarized a
deed of sale of a parcel of land knowing that the
1. In In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. supposed affiant was an impostor and that the vendor
Narciso N. Jaramillo,43 we disbarred a lawyer convicted of had been dead for almost eight years. We ruled that
estafa without discussing the circumstances behind his disbarment follows as a consequence of a lawyer's
conviction. We held that: conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral
turpitude, and since the crime of falsification of public
document involves moral turpitude, we ordered
There is no question that the crime of estafa
respondent's name stricken off the roll of attorneys.
involves moral turpitude. The review of
respondent's conviction no longer rests upon
us. The judgment not only has become final 8. In Adelina T. Villanueva v. Atty. Teresita Sta.
but has been executed. No elaborate argument Ana,53 we upheld the recommendation of the IBP Board
is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of Governors to disbar a lawyer who had been convicted
of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of estafa through falsification of public documents,
of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his because she was "totally unfit to be a member of the
conviction, the respondent has proved himself legal profession."54 
unfit to protect the administration of justice.44 
9. In Victoriano P. Resurreccion v. Atty. Ciriaco C.
2. In In Re: Dalmacio De Los Angeles,45 a lawyer was Sayson,55 a lawyer was disbarred for having been
convicted of the crime of attempted bribery in a final convicted of estafa by final judgment for
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals. "And since misappropriating the funds of his client.
bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude
(7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428), this Court, much
In this case as well, we find disbarment to be the appropriate
as it sympathizes with the plight of respondent, is
penalty. "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
constrained to decree his disbarment as ordained by
sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and
Section 25 of Rule 127."46 
for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the
laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of
3. In Ledesma De Jesus-Paras v. Quinciano society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a
Vailoces,47 the erring lawyer acknowledged the execution pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements
of a document purporting to be a last will and of the body politic."56 
testament, which later turned out to be a forgery. He
was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez is hereby
of falsification of public document, which the Court held
dISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
to be a crime involving moral turpitude, said act being
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the
contrary to justice, honesty and good morals, and was
respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the
subsequently disbarred.
same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
4. In In Re: Disbarment Proceedings Against Atty. the country.
Diosdado Q. Gutierrez,48 Atty. Gutierrez was convicted
for murder. After serving a portion of the sentence, he
SO ORDERED.
was granted a conditional pardon by the President.
Holding that the pardon was not absolute and thus did
not reach the offense itself but merely remitted the
unexecuted portion of his term, the court nevertheless
disbarred him.

5. In In Re: Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon,49 Atty. Vinzon was

convicted of the crime of estafa for misappropriating the
amount of P7,000.00, and was subsequently disbarred.
We held thus:

Upon the other hand, and dealing now with the

merits of the case, there can be no question
that the term "moral turpitude" includes
everything which is done contrary to justice,
honesty, or good morals. In essence and in all
respects, estafa, no doubt, is a crime involving
moral turpitude because the act is
unquestionably against justice, honesty and
good morals (In re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No.
263, July 31, 1962; Bouvier's Law Dictionary;

9
A.C. No. 9115               September 17, 2014 However, on October 6, 2005, Bella filed a Manifestation with
Leave of Court to File Motion for Intervention,18praying that the
investigation of the charges against respondent continue in order
REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL, Complainant, 
to weed out erring members of the legal profession.19
vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY, Respondent.
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
RESOLUTION
On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Investigating Commissioner issuedhis Report and
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Recommendation,20 finding respondent guilty of serious
misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Roberto L. Professional Responsibility (Code), and, thus, recommended the
Uy (respondent) for unprofessional and unethical conduct, penalty of suspension for a period of six (6) months.21
stemming from a complaint filed by private complainant Rebecca
Marie Uy Yupangco-Nakpil (Rebecca), represented by her
On matters of procedure, the Investigating Commissioner opined
attorney-in-fact, Bella Asuncion Pollo (Bella).
that Rebecca’s motion to withdraw did notserve as a bar for the
further consideration and investigation ofthe administrative case
The Facts against respondent. As basis, he cites Section 5, Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court which provides that "[n]o investigation shall be
interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement,
Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the late compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of
Dra. Pacita Uy y Lim (Pacita). 1 She was adjudged as the sole and the complainant to prosecute the same." Separately, the
exclusive legal heir of Paci ta by virtue of an Order 2 dated August Investigating Commissioner denied the claim of forum shopping,
10, 1999 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34 noting that disciplinary cases are sui generis and may, therefore,
in SPEC. PROC. No. 95-7520 l (SP 95-75201). At the time of her proceed independently.22
death, Pacita was a stockholder in several corporations primarily
engaged in acquiring, developing, and leasing real properties,
namely, Uy Realty Company, Inc. (URCI), Jespajo Realty On the merits of the charge, the Investigating Commissioner
Corporation, Roberto L. Uy Realty and Development Corporation, observed that respondent lacked the good moral character
Jesus Uy Realty Corporation, Distelleria La Jarolina, Inc., and required from members of the Bar when the latter failed to
Pacita Lim Uy Realty, Inc.3 comply with the demands of Rebecca under the subject trust
agreement, not to mention his unworthy and deceitful acts of
mortgaging the subject property without the former’s consent. In
In her Complaint4 filed on May 9, 2005,5 Rebecca, through her fine, respondent was found guilty of serious misconduct in
attorney-in fact, Bella, averred that respondent, her alleged violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, for which the above-
illegitimate halfcousin,6 continuously failed and refused to comply stated penalty was recommended.23
with the court order in SP 95-75201 declaring her as the
successor-in-interest to all of Pacita’s properties, as well as her
requests for the accounting and delivery of the dividends and In a Resolution24 dated November 10, 2007, the IBP Board of
other proceeds or benefits coming from Pacita’s stockholdings in Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
the aforementioned corporations.7 She added that respondent Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation.
mortgaged a commercial property covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-133606 (subject property) in favor of Philippine
The Issue Before the Court
Savings Bank in the total amount of 54,000,000.00,8 despite an
existing Trust Agreement9 executed on October 15, 1993 (subject
Trust Agreement) wherein respondent, in his capacity as President The basic issue in this case is whether or not respondent should
of URCI, already recognized her to be the true and beneficial be held administratively liable.
owner of the same.10Accordingly, she demanded that respondent
return the said property by executing the corresponding deed of
The Court’s Ruling
conveyance in her favor together with an inventory and
accounting of all the proceeds therefrom, but to no avail. 11 In this
relation, Rebecca claimed that it was only on September 2, 2005 Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as itis applied to the members of
or after she had already instituted various legal actions and the legal profession, engraves an overriding prohibition against
remedies that respondent and URCIagreed to transfer the subject any form of misconduct, viz.:
property to her pursuant to a compromise agreement.12
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
In his Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,13 respondent denied THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
Rebecca’s allegations and raised the affirmative defenses of forum LEGAL PROCESSES.
shopping and prescription. He pointed out that Rebecca had filed
several cases raising the single issue on the correct interpretation
of the subject trust agreement. He also contended that the Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
parties’ transactions in this case were made way back in 1993 and immoral or deceitful conduct.
1995 without a complaint having been filed until Bella came into
the picture and instituted various suits covering the same The gravity of the misconduct – determinative as it is of the
issue.14 As such, he sought the dismissal of the complaint, and errant lawyer’s penalty – depends on the factual circumstances of
further prayed for the payment of moral damages and attorney’s each case.
fees by way of counterclaim.15

Here, the Court observes that the squabble which gave rise to the
On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to Withdraw present administrative case largely constitutes an internal affair,
Complaint16 in CBD Case No. 05-1484 for the reason that "the which had already been laid to rest by the parties. This is clearly
facts surrounding the same arose out of a misunderstanding and exhibited by Rebecca’s motion to withdraw filed in this case as
misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute."17 well as the compromise agreement forged in Civil Case No. 04-
108887 which involves the subject property’s alleged disposition
10
in violation of the subject trust agreement. As the Court sees it,
his failure to complywith the demands of Rebecca – which she
takes as an invocation of her rights under the subject trust
agreement – as well as respondent’s acts of mortgaging the
subject property without the former’s consent, sprung from his
own assertion of the rights he believed he had over the subject
property. The propriety of said courses of action eludes the
Court’s determination,for that matter had never been resolved on
its merits in view of the aforementioned settlement. Rebecca even
states in her motion to withdraw that the allegations she had
previously made arose out of a "misapprehension of the real facts
surrounding their dispute" and even adds that respondent "had
fully explained to [her] the real nature and extent of her
inheritance x x x toher entire satisfaction," leading her to state
that she is "now fully convinced that [her] complaint has no basis
in fact and in law."25 Accordingly, with the admitted misstatement
of facts, the observations of the Investigating Commissioner, as
adopted by the IBP, hardly hold water so as to support the finding
of "serious misconduct" which would warrant its recommended
penalty.1âwphi1

Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that respondent

committed some form of misconduct by, as admitted, mortgaging
the subject property, notwithstanding the apparent dispute over
the same. Regardless of the merits of his own claim, respondent
should have exhibited prudent restraint becoming of a legal
exemplar. He should not have exposed himself even to the
slightest risk of committing a property violation nor any action
which would endanger the Bar's reputation. Verily, members of
the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by
the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession.26 By no insignificant measure, respondent blemished
not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the
legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of the
exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and
justice. Although to a lesser extent as compared to what has been
ascribed by the IBP, the Court still holds respondent guilty of
violating Rule 1. 01, Canon 1 of the Code. Considering that this is
his first offense as well as the peculiar circumstances of this case,
the Court believes that a fine of ₱15,000.00 would suffice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is found GUILTY of

violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a FINE of
₱15,000.00 within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution.
Further, he is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's record in

this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Resolution be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all
the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

11
A.C. No. 6486             September 22, 2004 Balintawak. At that time, respondent was just a fourth year law
student. To make ends meet, complainant engaged in the buy and
sell business and relied on dole-outs from the respondent’s
EMMA T. DANTES, complainant, 
mother.
vs.
ATTY. CRISPIN G. DANTES, respondent.
Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante
and Daisy, who were born on February 20, 1980, 8October 14,
D E C I S I O N 
19819 and August 11, 1983,10 respectively. Complainant narrated
that their relationship was marred by frequent quarrels because of
PER CURIAM: respondent’s extra-marital affairs.11 Sometime in 1983, she
brought their children to her mother in Pampanga to enable her to
work because respondent had failed to provide adequate support.
Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one From 1986 to 2001, complainant worked abroad as a domestic
requirement remains constant in all the jurisdictions where the helper. 
practice of law is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that
he or she has "good moral character," and once he becomes a
lawyer he should always behave in accordance with the standard. Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and
In this jurisdiction too, good moral character is not only a respondent to live separately, complainant asseverated that she
condition precedent1 to the practice of law, but an unending was just compelled to work abroad to support their children.
requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer When she returned to the Philippines, she learned that respondent
is found guilty of grossly immoral conduct, he may be suspended was living with another woman. Respondent, then bluntly told
or disbarred.2 her, that he did not want to live with her anymore and that he
preferred his mistresses. 
In an Affidavit-Complaint3  dated June 6, 2001, filed with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Emma T. Dantes, sought Complainant presented documentary evidence consisting of the
the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the birth certificates of Ray Darwin, Darling, and Christian Dave,12 all
ground of immorality, abandonment, and violation of professional surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of respondent and his
ethics and law. The case was docketed as CBD Case No. 01-851.  paramour13 to prove the fact that respondent sired three
illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs with two different
women. Letters of complainant’s legitimate children likewise
Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent support the allegation that respondent is a womanizer.14
purportedly engaged in illicit relationships with two women, one
after the other, and had illegitimate children with them. From the
time respondent’s illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular In an Order  dated April 17, 2002,  respondent was deemed to
support to complainant and their children, thus forcing have waived his right to cross-examine complainant, after he
complainant to work abroad to provide for their children’s needs. failed to appear during the scheduled hearings despite due notice.
Complainant pointed out that these acts of respondent constitute He, however, submitted his Comment/Opposition to the
a violation of his lawyer’s oath and his moral and legal obligation Complainant’s Formal Offer of Evidence with Motion to Exclude
to be a role model to the community.  the Evidence from the Records of the Proceedings15  on August 1,
2002. 
On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued
an Order4 requiring respondent to submit his answer to Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent submitted a Motion
the Affidavit-Complaint. to Adopt Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism. Respondent’s
motion was denied because it was filed after the complainant had
already presented her evidence.16 Respondent was given a final
Respondent submitted his Answer5 on November 19, 2001. chance to present his evidence on July 11, 2003. Instead of
Though admitting the fact of marriage with the complainant and presenting evidence, respondent filed a Motion for
the birth of their children, respondent alleged that they have Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss, which was likewise denied
mutually agreed to separate eighteen (18) years before after for being a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Procedure of
complainant had abandoned him in their Balintawak residence and the Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent submitted
fled to San Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent claimed that when his Position Paper on August 4, 2003.
complainant returned after eighteen years, she insisted that she
be accommodated in the place where he and their children were
residing. Thus, he was forced to live alone in a rented apartment.  In respondent’s  Position Paper,17 he reiterated the allegations in
his Answer except that this time, he argued that in view of the
resolution of the complaint for support with alimony pendente
Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the best lite18  filed against him by the complainantbefore the Regional Trial
school he could afford and provided for their needs. He even Court (RTC) of Quezon City,19 the instant administrative case
bought two lots in Pampanga for his sons, Dandelo and Dante, should be dismissed for lack of merit. 
and gave complainant adequate financial support even after she
had abandoned him in 1983. 
On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of the
Bar Confidant its Report20 and Resolution No. XVI-2004-
Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order to 230 involving CBD Case No. 01-851.21 The IBP recommended that
force him to remit seventy percent (70%) of his monthly salary to the respondent be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
her. 

Except for the penalty, we find the above recommendation well-

Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation and hearings on taken.
the complaint. Complainant presented her evidence, both oral and
documentary,6 to support the allegations in her Affidavit-
Complaint.  The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was "Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
established that on January 19, 1979, complainant and dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
respondent were married7 and lived with the latter’s mother in
12
 "Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,32 that moral
and dignity of the legal profession, and support the delinquency which affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
activities of the Integrated Bar." continue as such, includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community as exemplified by
behavior which makes a mockery of the inviolable social
"Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
institution of marriage. 
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
profession." only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court
and as a member of the bar. 33 Where a lesser penalty, such as
The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from
temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired,
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
disbarment should never be decreed.34 However, in the present
Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so
case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its
willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the
power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty. 
opinion of good and respectable members of the community. 22 To
be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyer’s conduct must not
only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from
reprehensible to a high degree23 or committed under such the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common respondent’s record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the
sense of decency.24 same be served on the Integrated Bar of the 

In Barrientos vs. Daarol,25 we ruled that as officers of the court, Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must circulation to all courts in the country. 
also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.
SO ORDERED.
More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is
not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or
keeping mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid Davide, Jr., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-
those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an Morales*, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario**,
honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in JJ., concur.
its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but
should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The
requirement of good moral character is of much greater import,
as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of
legal learning. 

It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character

has three ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public;
(ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect
prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant
lawyers from themselves.26

Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only

upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal 

career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive

and honored fraternity.27 They may be suspended from the
practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains
to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.28

Undoubtedly, respondent’s acts of engaging in illicit relationships

with two different women during the subsistence of his marriage
to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct
warranting the imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainant’s
testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence,
sufficiently established respondent’s commission of marital
infidelity and immorality. Evidently, respondent had breached the
high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law
profession. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity.29

In Toledo vs. Toledo,30 we disbarred respondent for abandoning

his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne
him a child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,31 we ruled that
abandoning one’s wife and resuming carnal relations with a
paramour fall within that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows moral indifference to the opinion of
the good and respectable members of the community. 

13
A.C. No. 1512 January 29, 1993 That in the morning of August 20, 1973, respondent invited her,
with the consent of her father, to a party at the Lopez Skyroom;
that at 7:00 p.m. of that day respondent fetched her from her
VICTORIA BARRIENTOS, complainant, 
house and went to the Lopez Skyroom (pp. 119-121, tsn, id); that
vs.
at about 10:00 p.m. of that evening they left the party at the
TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL, respondent.
Lopez Skyroom, but before taking her home respondent invited
her for a joy ride and took her to the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog
RESOLUTION City; respondent parked the jeep by the beach where there were
no houses around; that in the course of their conversation inside
the jeep, respondent reiterated his promise to marry her and then
PER CURIAM: started caressing her downward and his hand kept on moving to
her panty and down to her private parts (pp. 121-122, tsn. id.);
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on August 20, 1975, that she then said: "What is this Trans?", but he answered: "Day,
complainant Victoria C. Barrientos seeks the disbarment of do not be afraid of me. I will marry you" and reminded her also
respondent Transfiguracion Daarol, ** a member of the Philippine that "anyway, December is very near, the month we have been
Bar, on grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. waiting for" ([p], 122, tsn, id.), then he pleaded, "Day, just give
this to me, do not be afraid" (ibid), and again reiterated his
promise and assurances, at the same time pulling down her
After respondent filed his answer (Rollo, p. 12), the Court panty; that she told him that she was afraid because they were
Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for not yet married, but because she loved him she finally agreed to
investigation, report and recommendation (Rollo, p. 18). have sexual intercourse with him at the back seat of the jeep;
that after the intercourse she wept and respondent again
As per recommendation of the Solicitor General and for the reiterated his promises and assurances not to worry because
convenience of the parties and their witnesses who were residing anyway he would marry her; and at about 12:00 midnight they
in the province of Zamboanga del Norte, the Provincial Fiscal of went home (pp.
said province was authorized to conduct the investigation and to 122-124, tsn, id.).
submit a report, together with transcripts of stenographic notes
and exhibits submitted by the parties, if any (Rollo, p. 20). After August 20, 1973, respondent continued to invite her to eat
outside usually at the Honeycomb Restaurant in Dipolog City
On November 9, 1987, the Office of the Solicitor General about twice or three times a week, after which he would take her
submitted its Report and Recommendation, viz.: to the airport where they would have sexual intercourse; that
they had this sexual intercourse from August to October 1973 at
the frequency of two or three times a week, and she consented to
Evidence of the complainant: all these things because she loved him and believed in all his
promises (pp. 125-127, tsn, id.).
. . . complainant Victoria Barrientos was single and a resident of
Bonifacio St., Dipolog City; that when she was still a teenager and Sometime in the middle part of September, 1973 complainant
first year in college she came to know respondent Transfiguracion noticed that her menstruation which usually occurred during the
Daarol in 1969 as he used to go to their house being a friend of second week of each month did not come; she waited until the
her sister Norma; that they also became friends, and she knew end of the month and still there was no menstruation; she
the respondent as being single and living alone in Galas, Dipolog submitted to a pregnancy test and the result was positive; she
City; that he was the General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte informed respondent and respondent suggested to have the fetus
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ZANECO) and subsequently transferred aborted but she objected and respondent did not insist;
his residence to the ZANECO compound at Laguna Blvd. at Del respondent then told her not to worry because they would get
Pilar St., Dipolog City (pp. 109-111, tsn, September 30, 1976). married within one month and he would talk to her parents about
their marriage (pp. 129-132, tsn, id.).
That on June 27, 1973, respondent came to their house and
asked her to be one of the usherettes in the Mason's convention On October 20, 1973, respondent came to complainant's house
in Sicayab, Dipolog City, from June 28 to 30, 1973 and, she told and talked to her parents about their marriage; it was agreed that
respondent to ask the permission of her parents, which the marriage would be celebrated in Manila so as not to create a
respondent did, and her father consented; that for three whole scandal as complainant was already pregnant; complainant and
days she served as usherette in the convention and respondent her mother left for Manila by boat on October 22, 1973 while
picked her up from her residence every morning and took her respondent would follow by plane; and they agreed to meet in
home from the convention site at the end of each day (pp. 112- Singalong, Manila, in the house of complainant's sister Delia who
114, tsn, id.). is married to Ernesto Serrano (pp. 132-135, tsn, id.).

That in the afternoon of July 1, 1973, respondent came to On October 26, 1973, when respondent came to see complainant
complainant's house and invited her for a joy ride with the and her mother at Singalong, Manila, respondent told them that
permission of her mother who was a former classmate of he could not marry complainant because he was already married
respondent; that respondent took her to Sicayab in his jeep and (p. 137, tsn, id.); complainant's mother got mad and said: "Trans,
then they strolled along the beach, and in the course of which so you fooled my daughter and why did you let us come here in
respondent proposed his love to her; that respondent told her Manila?" (p. 138, tsn, id.). Later on, however, respondent
that if she would accept him, he would marry her within six (6) reassured complainant not to worry because respondent had been
months from her acceptance; complainant told respondent that separated from his wife for 16 years and he would work for the
she would think it over first; that from then on respondent used annulment of his marriage and, subsequently marry complainant
to visit her in their house almost every night, and he kept on (p. 139, tsn, id.); respondent told complainant to deliver their
courting her and pressed her to make her decision on child in Manila and assured her of a monthly support of P250.00
respondent's proposal; that on July 7, 1973, she finally accepted (p. 140, tsn, id.); respondent returned to Dipolog City and
respondent's offer of love and respondent continued his usual actually sent the promised support; he came back to Manila in
visitations almost every night thereafter; they agreed to get January 1974 and went to see complainant; when asked about
married in December 1973 (pp. 115-119, tsn, id.). the annulment of his previous marriage, he told complainant that
it would soon be approved (pp. 141-142, tsn, id.); he came back
in February and in March 1974 and told complainant the same
14
thing (p. 142, tsn, id.); complainant wrote her mother to come to intercourse with him because of her love to him and he did not
Manila when she delivers the child, but her mother answered her resort to force, trickery, deceit or cajolery; and that the present
that she cannot come as nobody would be left in their house in case was filed against him by complainant because of his failure
Dipolog and instead suggested that complainant go to Cebu City to give the money to support complainant while in Cebu waiting
which is nearer; complainant went to Cebu City in April 1974 and, for the delivery of the child and, also to meet complainant's
her sister Norma took her to the Good Shepherd Convent at medical expenses when she went to Zamboanga City for medical
Banawa Hill; she delivered a baby girl on June 14, 1974 at the check-up (pp. 198-207, tsn, id.).
Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City; and the child was
registered as "Dureza Barrientos" (pp. 143-148, tsn, id.).
FINDING OF FACTS

In the last week of June 1974 complainant came to Dipolog City

From the evidence adduced by the parties, the following facts are
and tried to contact respondent by phone and, thru her brother,
not disputed:
but to no avail; as she was ashamed she just stayed in their
house; she got sick and her father sent her to Zamboanga City for
medical treatment; she came back after two weeks but still 1. That the complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single, a college
respondent did not come to see her (tsn. 48-150, tsn, id.); she student, and was about 20 years and 7 months old during the
consulted a lawyer and filed an administrative case against time (July-October 1975) of her relationship with respondent,
respondent with the National Electrification Administration; the having been born on December 23, 1952; while respondent
case was referred to the Zamboanga del Norte Electric Transfiguracion Daarol is married, General Manager of
Cooperative (ZANECO) and it was dismissed and thus she filed the Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative, and 41 years old at
present administrative case (pp. 150-151, tsn, id.). the time of the said relationship, having been born on August 6,
1932;
Evidence for the Respondent
2. That respondent is married to Romualda A. Sumaylo with
whom be has a son; that the marriage ceremony was solemnized
The evidence of the respondent consists of his sole testimony and
on September 24, 1955 at Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte by a
one exhibit, the birth certificate of the child (Exh. 1). Respondent
catholic priest, Rev. Fr. Anacleto Pellamo, Parish Priest thereat;
declared substantially as follows: that he was born on August 6,
and that said respondent had been separated from his wife for
1932 in Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte; that he married Romualda
about 16 years at the time of his relationship with complainant;
Sumaylo in Liloy in 1955; that he had a son who is now 20 years
old; that because of incompatibility he had been estranged from
his wife for 16 years; that in 1953 he was baptized as a moslem 3. That respondent had been known by the Barrientos family for
and thereby embraced the Islam Religion (pp. quite sometime, having been a former student of complainant's
173-180 tsn, Jan. 13, 1977); that he came to know complainant's father in 1952 and, a former classmate of complainant's mother
father since 1952 because he was his teacher; likewise he knew at the Andres Bonifacio College in Dipolog City; that he became
complainant's mother because they were former classmates in acquainted with complainant's sister, Norma in 1963 and
high school; that he became acquainted with complainant when eventually with her other sisters, Baby and Delia and, her brother,
he used to visit her sister, Norma, in their house; they gradually Boy, as he used to visit Norma at her residence; that he also
became friends and often talked with each other, and even talked befriended complainant and who became a close friend when he
about their personal problems; that he mentioned to her his being invited her, with her parents' consent, to be one of the usherettes
estranged from his wife; that with the consent of her parents he during the Masonic Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City from June
invited her to be one of the usherettes in the Masonic Convention 28 to 30, 1973, and he used to fetch her at her residence in the
in Sicayab, Dipolog City held on June 28-30, 1973 (pp. 185-192, morning and took her home from the convention site after each
tsn, id.); that the arrangement was for him to fetch her from her day's activities;
residence and take her home from the convention site; that it was
during this occasion that they became close to each other and
after the convention, he proposed his love to her on July 7, 1973; 4. That respondent courted complainant, and after a week of
that (sic) a week of courtship, she accepted his proposal and since courtship, complainant accepted respondent's love on July 7,
then he used to invite her (pp. 193-194, tsn, id.). 1973; that in the evening of August 20, 1973, complainant with
her parents' permission was respondent's partner during the
Chamber of Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom in the Dipolog
That in the evening of August 20, 1973, respondent invited City, and at about 10:00 o'clock that evening, they left the place
complainant to be his partner during the Chamber of Commerce but before going home, they went to the airport at Sicayab,
affair at the Lopez Skyroom; that at about 10:00 p.m. of that Dipolog City and parked the jeep at the beach, where there were
evening after the affair, complainant complained to him of a no houses around; that after the usual preliminaries, they
headache, so he decided to take her home but once inside the consummated the sexual act and at about midnight they went
jeep, she wanted to have a joy ride, so he drove around the city home; that after the first sexual act, respondent used to have joy
and proceeded to the airport; that when they were at the airport, ride with complainant which usually ended at the airport where
only two of them, they started the usual kisses and they were they used to make love twice or three times a week; that as a
carried by their passion; they forgot themselves and they made result of her intimate relations, complainant became pregnant;
love; that before midnight he took her home; that thereafter they
indulged in sexual intercourse many times whenever they went on
joy riding in the evening and ended up in the airport which was 5. That after a conference among respondent, complainant and
the only place they could be alone. complainant's parents, it was agreed that complainant would
deliver her child in Manila, where she went with her mother on
October 22, 1973 by boat, arriving in Manila on the 25th and,
That it was sometime in the later part of October 1973 that stayed with her brother-in-law Ernesto Serrano in Singalong,
complainant told him of her pregnancy; that they agreed that the Manila; that respondent visited her there on the 26th, 27th and
child be delivered in Manila to avoid scandal and respondent 28th of October 1973, and again in February and March 1974;
would take care of expenses; that during respondent's talk with that later on complainant decided to deliver the child in Cebu City
the parents of complainant regarding the latter's pregnancy, he in order to be nearer to Dipolog City, and she went there in April
told him he was married but estranged from his wife; that when 1974 and her sister took her to the Good Shepherd Convent at
complainant was already in Manila, she asked him if he was Banawa Hill, Cebu City; that on June 14, 1974, she delivered a
willing to marry her, he answered he could not marry again, baby girl at the Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City and,
otherwise, he would be charged with bigamy but he promised to named her "Dureza Barrientos"; that about the last week of June
file an annulment of his marriage as he had been separated from 1974 she went home to Dipolog City; that during her stay here in
his wife for 16 years; that complainant consented to have sexual Manila and later in Cebu City, the respondent defrayed some of
15
her expenses; that she filed an administrative case against been married in a civil ceremony, he could no longer validly enter
respondent with the National Electrification Administration; which into another civil ceremony without committing bigamy because
complaint, however, was dismissed; and then she instituted the the complainant is a christian (p. 242, tsn, January 13, 1977).
present disbarment proceedings against respondent. Consequently, if respondent knew, that notwithstanding his being
a moslem convert, he cannot marry complainant, then it was
grossly immoral for him to have sexual intercourse with
xxx xxx xxx
complainant because he knew the existence of a legal
impediment. Respondent may not, therefore, escape responsibility
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommend thru his dubious claim that he has embraced the Islam religion.
that after hearing, respondent Transfiguracion Daarol be disbarred (Rollo,
as a lawyer. (Rollo, pp. 28-51). p. 49).

After a thorough review of the case, the Court finds itself in full By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his
accord with the findings and recommendation of the Solicitor sexual desires, respondent Daarol has amply demonstrated his
General. moral delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar on the grounds of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) is in order. Good
From the records, it appears indubitable that complainant was moral character is a condition which precedes admission to the
never informed by respondent attorney of his real status as a Bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and is not dispensed with
married individual. The fact of his previous marriage was upon admission thereto. It is a continuing qualification which all
disclosed by respondent only after the complainant became lawyers must possess (People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 682 [1990];
pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepresented himself as being Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]), otherwise, a lawyer
eligible to re-marry for having been estranged from his wife for 16 may either be suspended or disbarred.
years and dangled a marriage proposal on the assurance that he
would work for the annulment of his first marriage. It was a
deception after all as it turned out that respondent never As we have held in Piatt v. Abordo  (58 Phil. 350 [1933], cited
bothered to annul said marriage. More importantly, respondent in Leda v. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]):
knew all along that the mere fact of separation alone is not a
ground for annulment of marriage and does not vest him legal
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good
capacity to contract another marriage.
character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
Interestingly enough. respondent lived alone in Dipolog City remaining in the practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No.
though his son, who was also studying in Dipolog City, lived 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As aptly put by Mr.
separately from him. He never introduced his son and went Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good character is an essential
around with friends as though he was never married much less qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the
had a child in the same locality. This circumstance alone belies attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is
respondent's claim that complainant and her family were aware of unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney,
his previous marriage at the very start of his courtship. The Court the court retains the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58
is therefore inclined to believe that respondent resorted to deceit Phil. 350 [1933]).
in the satisfaction of his sexual desires at the expense of the
gullible complainant. It is not in accordance with the nature of the
Only recently, another disbarment proceeding was resolved by
educated, cultured and respectable, which complainant's family is,
this Court against a lawyer who convinced a woman that her prior
her father being the Assistant Principal of the local public high
marriage to another man was null and void  ab initio and she was
school, to allow a daughter to have an affair with a married man.
still legally single and free to marry him (the lawyer), married her,
was supported by her in his studies, begot a child with her,
But what surprises this Court even more is the perverted sense of abandoned her and the child, and married another woman (Terre
respondent's moral values when he said that: "I see nothing vs. Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, July 3, 1992).
wrong with this relationship despite my being married." (TSN, p.
209, January 13, 1977; Rollo, p. 47) Worse, he even suggested
Here, respondent, already a married man and about 41 years old,
abortion. Truly, respondent's moral sense is so seriously impaired
proposed love and marriage to complainant, then still a 20-year-
that we cannot maintain his membership in the Bar. In Pangan v.
old minor, knowing that he did not have the required legal
Ramos  (107 SCRA 1 [1981]), we held that:
capacity. Respondent then succeeded in having carnal relations
with complainant by deception, made her pregnant, suggested
(E)ven his act in making love to another woman while his first abortion, breached his promise to marry her, and then deserted
wife is still alive and their marriage still valid and existing is her and the child. Respondent is therefore guilty of deceit and
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. Respondent grossly immoral conduct.
made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who
measure up to the exacting standards of mental and moral
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a fitness. Respondent having exhibited debased morality, the Court
Moslem convert and as such, could enter into multiple marriages is constrained to impose upon him the most severe disciplinary
and has inquired into the possibility of marrying complainant action — disbarment.
(Rollo, p. 15). As records indicate, however, his claim of having
embraced the Islam religion is not supported by any evidence
The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its
save that of his self-serving testimony. In this regard, we need
members the highest standard of morality. The members are, in
only to quote the finding of the Office of the Solicitor General, to
fact, enjoined to aid in guarding the Bar against the admission of
wit:
candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient either moral
character or education (In re Puno, 19 SCRA 439, [1967]; Pangan
When respondent was asked to marry complainant he said he vs. Ramos, 107 SCRA 1 [1981]).
could not because he was already married and would open him to
a charge of bigamy (p. 200, tsn, January 13, 1977). If he were a
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good
moslem convert entitled to four (4) wives, as he is now claiming,
moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
why did he not marry complainant? The answer is supplied by
character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest
respondent himself. He said while he was a moslem, but, having
16
moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of
the Bar and an officer of the Court is not only required to refrain
from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but
must also behave himself in such a manner as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting
those moral standards (Tolosa vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21, 26
[1989], citing Toledo vs. Toledo, 7 SCRA 757 [1963] and Royong
vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859 [1963]).

In brief, We find respondent Daarol morally delinquent and as

such, should not be allowed continued membership in the ancient
and learned profession of law (Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439
[1967]).

ACCORDINGLY, We find respondent Transfiguracion Daarol guilty

of grossly immoral conduct unworthy of being a member of the
Bar and is hereby ordered DISBARRED and his name stricken off
from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Resolution be
furnished to all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread on the
personal record of respondent Daarol.

SO ORDERED.

17
A.C. No. 266             April 27, 1963 dismiss filed on 28 August 1958 be first resolved or, that, should
it be denied, he be given a period of ten days within which to file
an answer; that upon receipt of his answer the case be returned
PAZ ARELLANO TOLEDO, complainant, 
to the Solicitor General for reception of his evidence pursuant to
vs.
Section 6, Rule 128; and that the hearing of the case set for 17
ATTY. JESUS B. TOLEDO, respondent.
September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning be held in
abeyance pending resolution of his motion. At the hearing of the
PADILLA, J.: case on 17 September 1958, counsel for the respondent appeared
and was given a period of 15 days within which to submit a
written memorandum in lieu of oral argument, and the Solicitor
This is a disbarment proceedings under Rule 128 of the Rules of General the same period of time from receipt of a copy of the
Court. respondent's memorandum within which to reply. On 22 October
1958, within the extension of time previously granted, the
On 9 July 1956 Paz Arellano Toledo filed in this Court a sworn respondent filed his memorandum and on 17 November 1958,
complaint in the form of a letter alleging that she is the wife of also within the extension of time previously granted, the Solicitor
Jesus B. Toledo, a member of the Bar;1 that they were married on General, his memorandum in reply.
27 December 1946 while he was still a second year student of
law; that she supported him and spent for his studies; that after Section 6, Rule 128, provides:
passing the bar examination and becoming a full-fledged member
of the Bar he abandoned her; that he is at present employed in
the Bureau of Mines2 and stationed at Cagayan de Oro City; and The evidence produced before the Solicitor General in
that he is cohabiting with another woman who had borne him his investigation may be considered, by the Supreme
three children. She prayed that the respondent be disbarred from Court in the final decision of the case, if the respondent
the practice of law. On 11, July 1956, this Court directed the had an opportunity to object and cross-examine. If in
respondent to answer the complaint within ten days from receipt the respondent's answer no statement is made as to any
of notice and a copy of the complaint.3The respondent mailed his intention of introducing additional evidence, the case
answer in the form of a letter, which was received in this Court on shall be set down for hearing, upon the filing of such
4, October 1956, averring that the complaint was not in due form answer or upon the expiration of the time to file the
because "It does not set out distinctly, clearly and concisely the same. (Emphasis supplied)
legal causes for the suspension or disbarment of a member of the
Philippine Bar as provided in the Rules of Court hence his "answer
The above-quoted rule in no uncertain terms requires the
could not be made in the logical sequence of a formal pleading;"
respondent in disbarment or suspension proceedings from the
that there seems to be an irregularity in the filing of the complaint
practice of law to file an answer to the complaint filed by the
because while the letter-complaint was dated 25, June 1956, and
Solicitor General after investigation and, should he desire to
received at the Docket Section of this Court on 2, July 1956, by
present evidence in his behalf, to expressly say so in the answer.
an employee whose initials are "A.L."4 It was subscribed and
Instead of doing what the rule requires, the respondent filed a
sworn to before a notary public on a later date, 5 July 1956; and
motion to dismiss without stating that he intended to present
the alleged information furnished by Esperanza D. Almonte that
evidence in his behalf, thereby waiving his right. The fact that at
the respondent was cohabiting with another woman who had
the close of the hearing conducted by the Solicitor General, he
borne him three children is not true because her very informant,
made of record his desire to present evidence in his behalf, is not
whose true name is Leoncia D. Almonte, executed an affidavit to
sufficient. The correct manner and proper time for him to make
the effect that the respondent was employed in the Bureau of
known his intention is by and in the answer seasonably filed in
Lands, not in the Bureau of Mines, and that the three children
this Court.
referred to by the complainant were the children of Mr. and Mrs.
Ruperto Ll. Jose, with whom the respondent was boarding.
Attached to his answer are the affidavit of Leoncia D. Almonte and The complainant testified as follows: On 27 December 1946 she, a
a copy of his answer to a complaint filed by the complainant with dentist by profession, and the respondent, then a second year law
the Director of Lands for abandonment and immorality. In 9 student, were married civilly in Camiling, Tarlac, by the Justice of
October 1956, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General the Peace (Exhibit A). For a period of two weeks after their
for investigation, report and recommendation and on 11 October wedding, they lived in the house of her parents at No. 76 General
1956 the record of the case was received by the Office of the del Pilar street in Camiling. After two weeks, the respondent went
Solicitor General. On 19 November 1956, 10 December 1956, 7, to Manila to resume his studies at the Far Eastern University, 5 and
8, 14, and 15 February 1957, 18 March 1957 and 5 August 1957, she remained in Camiling to practice her profession. While the
the office of the Solicitor General conducted hearings during which respondent was still studying, he either returned to Camiling once
the complainant presented her evidence both oral and a week or she came to Manila twice a week to visit with each
documentary and the respondent, who appeared in his own other. Sometimes the respondent stayed with her in Camiling for
behalf, cross-examined her witnesses. The respondent did not a week, and when she came to Manila to buy dental materials she
present evidence in his behalf but reserved the right to present it slept with him at his boarding house or at the house on Economia
under the provisions of Section 6, Rule 128. After finding that street where he on lived with his brother Cleto and Aniceto and
there is sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, on cousin Felisa Bacera, who cooked their meals for them. They were
24 July 1958 the Solicitor General filed a complaint in this Court in good terms until about three or four months before his
charging the respondent with abandonment of his wife and graduation. On the day of his graduation, he showed her
immorality for cohabiting with another woman by whom he has a indifference and humiliated and embarrassed her by calling her a
child, and praying that he be disbarred or suspended from the "provinciana" and telling her that she was a nuisance whenever
practice of law. On 30 July 1958 the Clerk of Court sent to the she came to see him. Nevertheless, being his wife, she continued
respondent by mail a copy of the complaint filed by the Solicitor to see him while he was reviewing for the bar examinations. She
General and directed him to answer the same within 15 days from specifically mentioned that three days before the last
receipt thereof, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 128. On 28 August examination, she came to see him. A week after the bar
1958 the respondent filed in this Court a motion to dismiss the examinations, she again came to see him. Since then they
complaint on the ground "that the charges contained therein are became actually separated and she never saw him again until the
not based on and supported by the facts and evidence adduced at hearing of the case. Through Mrs. Esperanza Almonte, she
the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General." learned that the respondent was employed in the Bureau of Lands
On 2 September 1958 this Court set the case for hearing on 17 and stationed at Cagayan de Oro City. The respondent never
September 1958 at 9:30 o'clock in the morning. On 13 September wrote to her and asked her to follow him at his place of work and
1958 the respondent filed a motion praying that his motion to she did not care to either.
18
Marina Payot gave the following testimony: From 28 February to 3 a woman of fair complexion. Comparing her (Corazon) to the
June 1955 she lived and worked as maid, laundress and cook for complainant, she said that the complainant was more beautiful
the respondent, his family composed of himself, Mrs. Corazon but Corazon was not ugly and that the latter had a nicer figure,
Toledo and their child in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The respondent because she was stouter and taller than the complainant. To find
and Corazon Toledo lived as husband and wife, and have a child out if it was another and not the respondent who lived with
named Angie who was less than a year old at the time she lived Corazon, the Solicitor asked her if she had not seen Teodoro
with them. The couple slept together in the same room with their Nieva, who lived with the respondent and Corazon in the same
daughter Angie and ate their meals together although sometimes house, kiss or embrace Corazon, and she replied that she had not.
Corazon ate alone when the respondent was out somewhere. The
respondent used to call Corazon "Honey" and Corazon used to call
Testing the credibility of Lino Domingo, the investigating Solicitor
the respondent "Jess". Corazon Toledo is not the same person as
asked him whether he was related to Claudio Arellano, brother of
the complainant.
the complainant, and Lino readily answered that he is his brother-
in-law and added that he (Lino) is the cousin of the wife of
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing Claudio. Asked if he had been asked by the complainant to testify
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable at the hearing, he frankly answered in the affirmative. Questioned
Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to as to the description of the respondent's paramour, the witness
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of stated that Corazon is fair in complexion, five feet tall; that she is
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët taller and fairer in complexion, more beautiful and has a nicer
figure than the complainant. 
Lino Domingo testified in the following manner: He is employed as
operator-mechanic in the Bureau of Public Highways in The testimony of these two witnesses are worthy of credence.
Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and has resided there since 1952. He Marina Payot is a simple girl of eighteen years, a mere maid,
knows the respondent because he headed a survey party that scant in education, and understands little English. She did not
surveyed public lands in Malaybalay for distribution to the even finish the sixth grade of the elementary course. The sharp
landless. Sometime in March 1955 he went to the respondent's and incisive questions propounded to her by the investigating
place of residence and office at Moreno street, where his friend Solicitor and the lengthy cross-examination to which she was
Mr. Nieva, an Ilocano, also resided to apply for a parcel of public subjected by the respondent himself would have revealed herself
land, and about ten times he went to the respondent's place of if she was lying. The apparent inconsistencies in her answers may
residence and office. Among those who lived with the respondent be attributed to her innocence and simple-mindedness and her
were Mrs. Corazon Toledo, Mr. Nieva, a maid and Mr. Abad (the failure to understand the questions propounded to her. Moreover,
latter only slept at the place whenever he was in town). He knew she could not be expected to remember the dates asked of her in
that Corazon Toledo, who is not the same person as Paz Arellano the same way that a person of more than average intelligence
Toledo, was the wife of the respondent. At the respondent's place would. Add to this the fact that she was subjected to a thorough
of residence and office, he saw a room where the respondent, examination by three lawyers and her confusion was
Corazon and a baby slept and where man's pajamas and shirts compounded. Lino Domingo's frank and ready answers to the
were hung. One day at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, while questions propounded by the Solicitor show sincerity and do not
the respondent and his (the witness') friend Mr. Abad were reveal any intention to pervert the truth. And even if his
repairing the front mudguard and seats of a station wagon behind testimony be discarded, still the testimony of Marina Payot stands
the respondent's place of residence and office, his friend Mr. Abad unrebutted.
introduced him to the respondent. He helped Abad place the seats
of the station wagon in their proper places and while he was
The annexes attached to the respondent's memorandum cannot
helping Abad, he heard the respondent address Corazon as
be taken into consideration for they were not properly introduced
"Mama" and ask her for money to buy cigarettes. His friends
in evidence during the investigation.
Nieva and Abad used to address Corazon as "Mrs. Toledo."

The respondent, by abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting

The respondent admits that he is married to the complainant (p.
with another woman who had borne him a child, has failed to
14, t.s.n.).The fact that he is cohabiting with another woman who
maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of
had borne him a child has been established by the testimony of
a member of the Bar.6
Marina Payot and Lino Domingo, whose sincerity and truthfulness
have been put to a severe and searching test by the investigating
Solicitor in the presence of the respondent who appeared in his THEREFORE, the respondent is disbarred from the practice of law.
own behalf and cross-examined the witnesses during the
investigation. Asked by the investigating Solicitor how she came
to testify at the investigation, or whether anybody taught or Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
coached her on what to testify or whether she testified because of Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
any promise of reward or consideration, Marina Payot without Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
hesitation and in a straight forward manner answered that the
complainant, Mr. Domingo and Mr. Reyes (the latter is the
complainant's counsel) spoke to her and told her to tell nothing
but the truth about the respondent's affair with his paramour in
Malaybalay; that nobody taught or coached her on what to testify
at the investigation; and that she was not promised anything by
way of reward or consideration or given money for testifying.
Going further in his investigation, the Solicitor asked the witness
how she was treated by the respondent to find out if she harbors
any ill-feeling or grudge against him and his alleged paramour,
which could be a motive for falsely testifying against them, and
she answered that she was well treated by the Toledos; that they
considered her a sister; that they paid regularly her salary of P15
a month; that they bought her a dress during the town fiesta on
May 15; that Corazon never scolded her for she was a woman of
few words, was kind and did not know how to get angry; and that
the reason she left them was because she just felt lonesome for
her parents. Further testing her credibility, the Solicitor asked
how the respondent's paramour looked, and she described her as
19
Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984 home (she allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and San Andres
Street) and her interference with his professional obligations. 
PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant, 
vs. The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General.
GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent.  He filed a complaint for disbarment against the respondent.
Obusan did not answer the complaint. He waived the presentation
of additional evidence. His lawyer did not file any memorandum. 
AQUINO, J.:

After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant

This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against
has sustained the burden of proof. She has proven his
her husband Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. on the ground of adultery or
abandonment of her and his adulterous relations with a married
grossly immoral conduct. He was admitted to the bar in 1968.
woman separated from her own husband. 

In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the

Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife
Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation, he became
that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one's
acquainted with Natividad Estabillo who represented to him that
wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a
she was a widow. They had carnal relations. He begot with her a
married woman, fails within "that conduct which is willful,
son who was born on November 27, 1972. He was named John
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to
Obusan (Exh. D). Generoso came to know that Natividad's
the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
marriage to Tony Garcia was subsisting or undissolved. 
community" (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga vs. Maniwang Adm. Case No.
1608, August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA 591). 
Four days  after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972,
Generoso, 33, married Preciosa, 37, in a civil ceremony. The
Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife
marriage was ratified in a religious ceremony held on December
and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. He
30,1972 (Exh. C and C-1) 
failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and
required of a member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil.
The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street, 768). 
Tondo, Manila for more than one year. In the evening of April 13,
1974, when his wife was out of the house, lawyer Obusan asked
WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off the
permission from his mother-in-law to leave the house and take a
Roll of Attorneys. 
vacation in his hometown, Daet, Camarines Norte. Since then, he
has never returned to the conjugal abode. 
SO ORDERED.
Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much
patient investigation and surveillance, she discovered that he was
living and cohabiting with Natividad in an apartment located at
85-A Felix Manalo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. He had brought his
car to that place. 

The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was
corroborated by Linda Delfin, their housemaid in 1974; Remedios
Bernal, a laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a plumber, their
neighbors staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. The three executed
the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and F, which were confirmed by their
testimonies. 

Romegil Q. Magana, a pook  leader, testified that Obusan

introduced himself as the head of the family (25-30 tsn Nov. 26,
1976). His name is at the head of the barangay list (Exh. E, G and
H). Nieves Cacnio the owner of the apartment, came to know
Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She Identified five photographs, Exhibits
I to I-D where respondent Obusan appeared as the man wearing
eyeglasses. 

Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was

terminated when he married Preciosa. He admitted that from time
to time he went to 85-A Felix Manalo Street but only for the
purpose of giving financial assistance to his son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer
Rogelio Panotes, the ninong of Jun-Jun, corroborated respondent's
testimony. 

He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the

plumber. He claims that they were paid witnesses. He declared
that he did not live with Natividad. He resided with his sister at
Cypress Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. 

On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave

the conjugal home because he could not endure the nagging of
his wife, their violent quarrels, her absences from the conjugal

20
A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992 present his evidence with a warning that should he fail once more
to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution.
Respondent did not appear on 2 October 1986. The Investigating
DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant, 
Solicitor accordingly considered respondent to have waived his
vs.
right to present evidence and declared the case submitted for
ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.
resolution. The parties were given time to submit their respective
memoranda. Complainant Dorothy did so on 8 December 1986.
PER CURIAM: Respondent Terre did not file his memorandum.

In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General
complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a submitted its "Report and Recommendation" to this Court. The
member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct," Report summarized the testimony of the complainant in the
consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with following manner:
another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage
with complainant remained subsisting.
Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness
stand and testified substantially as follows: she
The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the and respondent met for the first time in 1979
complaint. 1 Respondent successfully evaded five (5) attempts to as fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz
serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and of the complaint by City High School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she
moving from one place to another, such that he could not be was then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while
found nor reached in his alleged place of employment or respondent was single (id.); respondent was
residence. 2 On 24 April 1985, that is after three (3) years and a aware of her marital status (ibid, p. 14); it was
half, with still no answer from the respondent, the Court noted then that respondent started courting her but
respondent's success in evading service of the complaint and the nothing happened of the courtship (ibid, p.
Court's Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend 10); they [complainant and respondent]
respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from the practice of law until after moved to Manila were they respectively
he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against him" pursued their education, respondent as a law
in the instant student at the Lyceum University (tsn, July 7,
case. 3 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued
courting her, this time with more persistence
(ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would come
On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a of it since she was married but he [respondent]
Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order. In his Answer, explained to her that their marriage was
Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with void ab initio since she and her first husband
complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her were first cousins (ibid, p. 12); convinced by
representation that she was single; that he subsequently learned his explanation and having secured favorable
that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla advice from her mother and
sometime in 1968; that when he confronted Dorothy about her ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him
prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal residence; [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their
that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings with marriage license, despite her [complainant's]
Merlito A. Bercenilla and that the child she was then carrying (i.e., objection, he [respondent] wrote "single" as
Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in good faith her status explaining that since her marriage
that his marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he was void ab initio, there was no need to go to
contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem at Dasol, Pangasinan. 4 court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they
were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of
In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977
the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted that Jason was the (Exhibit A; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17); Jason
child of respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981
Certificate and physical resemblance to respondent. Dorothy (Exhibit B, tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 18); all
further explained that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at through their married state up to the time he
the PAFGH registered as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she [respondent] disappeared in 1981, complainant
had done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or supported respondent, in addition to the
injury to the fetus which happened to be in a difficult breech allowance the latter was getting from his
position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was unaware of
abandoned by respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and the reason for his disappearance until she
without means to pay for the medical and hospital bills arising by found out later that respondent married a
reason of her pregnancy. certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn,
July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she then filed a case
for abandonment of minor with the City Fiscal
The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the of Pasay City (ibid, p. 23) which was
Suspension Order and instead referred; by a Resolution dated 6 subsequently filed before Branch II of the City
January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case No.
for investigation, report and recommendation. 5 816159 (Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24);
she likewise filed a case for bigamy against
Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the respondent and Helina Malicdem with the office
Office of the Solicitor General. He set the case for hearing on 7 of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where
July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant a  prima facie case was found to exist (Exhibit
Dorothy appeared and presented her evidence ex parte, since E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally,
respondent did not so appear. 6 The Investigating Solicitor complainant filed an administrative case
scheduled and held another hearing on 19 August 1986, where he against respondent with the Commission on
put clarificatory questions to the complainant; respondent once Audit where he was employed, which case
again did not appear despite notice to do so. Complainant finally however was considered closed for being moot
offered her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set still and academic when respondent was considered
another hearing for 2 October 1986, notifying respondent to automatically separated from the service for
21
 having gone on absence without official leave In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there
(Exhibit F; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 28-29). 7 guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" because he made a dupe of
complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for
his schooling and other personal necessities while dangling before
There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre
her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he
and respondent Jordan Terre contracted marriage on 14 July 1977
had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while
before Judge Priscilla Mijares. There is further no dispute over the
continuing to demand money from complainant. . . . ." The Court
fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent Jordan Terre married Helina
held such acts "indicative of a character not worthy of a member
Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was
of the Bar." 13
entered into, respondent's prior marriage with complainant was
subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any judicial
declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan
respondent with complainant. Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to contract a second
marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre
after she had cared for him and supported him through law
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming
school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own
that he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage with
child; in contracting a second marriage with Helina Malicdem
complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio  and that no
while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was
action for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.
subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section
27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan sufficient basis for disbarment of respondent Jordan Terre. He was
Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place, respondent has not unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place. The Court will
rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which correct this error forthwith.
underscores the bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second
place, that pretended defense is the same argument by which he
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan
had inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage to
Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll of Attorneys. A
Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio  (Dorothy
copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of
and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was
respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant's Office. A copy of
free to contract a second marriage with the respondent.
this resolution shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have
Philippines and shall be circularized to all the courts of the land.
known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case
law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining
whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a SO ORDERED.
judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab
initio  is essential. 8 Even if we were to assume, arguendo  merely,
that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same
result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own
argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must
be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to
Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in
character.

That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply

flawed is shown by other circumstances. As noted, he convinced
the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and
void ab initio, that she was still legally single and free to marry
him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their
marriage, respondent went through law school while being
supported by complainant, with some assistance from
respondent's parents. After respondent had finished his law
course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned
the complainant without support and without the wherewithal for
delivering his own child safely in a hospital.

Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan

Terre, by his actions, "eloquently displayed, not only his unfitness
to remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to
uphold the purpose and responsibility of his gender" because
marriage is a basic social institution. 9

In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to

be allowed to take the oath as a member of the Bar and to sign
the Roll of Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio-
Herrera:

It is evident that respondent fails to meet the

standard of moral fitness for membership in
the legal profession. Whether the marriage was
a joke as respondent claims, or a trick played
on her as claimed by complainant, it does not
speak well of respondent's moral values.
Respondent had made a mockery of marriage,
a basic social institution which public policy
cherishes and protects (Article 216, Civil
Code). 11
22
A.M. No. 2697             April 19, 1991 been previously resolved in an Order dated October 1, 1982
issued by the Minister (now Secretary) of the Ministry (now
Department) of Agrarian Reform. In the said order, the allegation
ATTY. JOSE S. SANTOS, complainant, 
of immorality which was originally the content of an anonymous
vs.
letter-complaint was dismissed for being devoid of merit.
ATTY. CIPRIANO A. TAN, respondent.

The respondent, in turn, suggested that the real and actual

RESOLUTION
motive behind the said complaint was traceable to the strong
resentment harbored by the complainant against the former
PER CURIAM: whose services as Chief Trial Attorney of the said Ministry (now
Department) was extended even beyond his retirement age at the
request of the then Minister (now Secretary) Conrado F. Estrella.
Complainant Atty. Jose S. Santos instituted on November 20, The respondent contended that he and the complainant did not
1984 these disbarment proceedings against respondent Atty. see eye to eye with respect to the handling and prosecution of
Cipriano A. Tan for alleged gross misconduct. agrarian cases.8

Specifically, the complainant who was then Acting Director of the By way of a counter-complaint, the respondent charged the
Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance under the Ministry (now complainant with acts unbecoming of a lawyer and a member of
Department) of Agrarian Reform, charged the respondent with the Philippine Bar such as obtaining and utilizing confidential
having committed acts of immorality, falsification, and bigamy. documents without the necessary authorization, introducing a
falsified document as evidence in a court proceeding, and
In the said complaint, Atty. Santos stated that the respondent, executing an affidavit-complaint containing false statements. The
while employed as Trial Attorney IV, with the Judicial Cases respondent further assailed the complainant for filing the said
Division under the aforesaid Department, maintained amorous complaint based on inadmissible and unfounded charges.9
relationship with a married clerk, a certain Norma O. Pihid (nee
Olea), who was then directly under him. Eventually, the On March 25, 1985, the Court resolved to refer the said complaint
respondent got married to Norma O. Pihid on April 27, 1981 to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
before the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, purportedly recommendation.
in an attempt to cover up their illicit relations.1

The Report and Recommendation submitted by the Solicitor

The complainant, moreover, alleged that the respondent falsified General on February 23, 1990, in part, states:
his marriage contract with Norma O. Pihid by deliberately
misrepresenting himself as single, thus, deceiving the said mayor
into solemnizing the said marriage.2In the information sheet, x x x           x x x          x x x
however, prepared and filed by the respondent prior to his
employment, he clearly stated therein that he was married to one
A thorough review of the record of the case duly heard
Emilia Benito Tan and had begotten eight (8) children with the
before the Office of the Solicitor General in several
latter.3
protracted hearings, reveals the existence of a ground
for disbarment against respondent.
Consequently, the complainant likewise charged the respondent
with bigamy since it appears from the records of the Local Civil
Aside from claiming that the documents presented by
Registrar that he had previously contracted marriage with the said
complainant were allegedly unauthenticated, hearsay,
Emilia A. Benito on January 6, 1941. The complainant asserted
self-serving, and his defense of alibi at the time of the
that the said marriage continued to be valid and binding between
marriage on April 27, 1981, respondent has miserably
the said contracting parties when the respondent entered into a
failed in refuting the same and at the same time
subsequent manage with Norma O. Pihid on April 27, 1981.4
presenting strong evidence to convince the Solicitor
General of the falsity of the charges against him.
Finally, the complainant averred that the respondent's second
wife, Norma O. Pihid, gave birth to a child by the respondent on
On April 27, 1981 respondent claims that he was
November 21, 1981 at the Children's Medical Center in Quezon
attending a government case at the then CFI of
City, as evidenced by the birth certificate of the said child
Caloocan City (Exh. 9-A, rec.) while his alleged second
indicating his name to be Noel Olea Tan.5
wife was at the Court of Appeals on official business
(Exhs. 6 & 11 A, rec.).
On January 9, 1985, the Court acting on the said complaint for
disbarment required the respondent to submit his Answer.
There are serious doubts in entertaining the aforesaid
defense.
The respondent in an Answer dated February 28, 1985, denied
having married Norma O. Pihid on April 27, 1981 and having
A glance at the daily time records (Exhs. 9-A and 11-A,
fathered a child by the name of Noel Olea Tan, although he
rec.) reveals that both entries of respondent and Norma
admitted being married to Emilia A. Benito.6
Olea were indicated on the line covering April 26, 1981;
secondly, penmanship of the alleged entries for April 27,
As regards the charges of bigamy and falsification of official 1981 are the same; thirdly, the indicated time in's of
documents, the respondent argued that the same were issues respondent and Norma Olea were the same, i.e., 8:01
that were properly the subject of a criminal case filed by the a.m.; fourthly, probability that they were together is
complainant against him which was pending before the Regional high because they were both out of the office.
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch VI, and therefore raised a
prejudicial question in the present controversy.7
Assuming, arguendo, respondent's alibi that they were
married in Meycauayan, Bulacan, it was highly probable
Anent the charge of maintaining amorous relationship with Norma and possible for both to proceed to Meycauayan,
O. Pihid, the respondent contended that the same charge had Bulacan on April 27, 1981 since the places where they
23
 were allegedly then is [sic] not impossibly far from Whatever the alleged motives of the complainant are, the
Meycauayan Bulacan. respondent has failed to controvert and refute the charges made
by the former. Even granting arguendo that the complainant was
not well-motivated in instituting these disbarment proceedings,
Respondent even failed to specify the alleged
the same does not exculpate him from any liability resulting from
government case he was attending at the CFI of
his grossly immoral conduct.
Caloocan either by mentioning the title of the case or by
presenting other evidence aside from his self-serving
testimony. As regards the respondent's counter-complaint, the Solicitor
General in compliance with the Court's Resolution dated October
1, 1990, submitted his Supplemental Report and
With respect to the Birth Certificate (Exh. A) of
Recommendation on November 22, 1990, and found that the
respondent's alleged son, the former has not made a
charges against the complainant for acts unbecoming a member
categorical denial that Noel Olea Tan is NOT his son. He
of the Philippine Bar were all unsubstantiated. We agree with his
only argues that the birth certificate is not authentic.
findings and recommendation on this regard which state:
Evidence for complainant, however, shows that Exhibit
A-5 was presented to show the authenticity of the Birth
Certificate contrary to respondent's claim No misconduct has been committed by Atty. Santos
(pls. see Certification dated July 24, 1985 found at the contrary to Atty. Tan's accusations which will warrant
back of the Birth Certificate). Likewise, respondent has disciplinary action.1âwphi1 If at all, Atty. Tan's charges
not made any categorical denial of his amorous were merely in defense of the charges against him
relationship with Norma Olea despite the existence of his (immorality) which the Solicitor General has found to be
first marriage with Emilia Benito Tan. supported by the evidence. (cf.: Report and
Recommendation dated February 23, 1990, pp. 46-52,
Records-Adm. Cases)
For immorality to be a ground for disbarment, it must be
so gross, e.g., it is so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, it is
reprehensible to a high degree (Reyes v. Wong, 63 respectfully recommended that Atty. Tan's counter-
SCRA 667 [1975]). complaint against Atty. Santos be DISMISSED for being
unsubstantiated.11
The circumstances of the case definitely has put
respondent's moral character in doubt despite non- WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Cipriano A. Tan guilty of
conviction of the criminal case for bigamy against immoral conduct in disregard of the Code of Professional
respondent. The reputation of a lawyer must be such Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the active practice
that he be of good moral character during the of law for a period of one (1) year. The counter-complaint against
continuance of his practice and the exercise of the complainant Atty. Jose S. Santos is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
privilege. merit.

The findings are clear and convincing that respondent Let this Decision be spread upon the personal records of the
entered into a second marriage despite the existence of respondent and copies thereof furnished to all courts.
his first marriage and that he begot a child with the
second woman. Definitely, such factual findings have put
SO ORDERED.
serious doubt on respondent's moral character.
Respondent's main defense of alibi is rather too weak a
reason that he did not engage in an immoral act. As Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
earlier said, respondent has neither categorically denied Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grino-
that Norma Olea is his wife nor Noel Olea Tan is his son Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
with Norma.

It appears, however, that respondent has retired from

government service on March 27, 1983. He was sixty-
five (65) years old on September 16, 1982 (Exh. 13,
rec.), and therefore, e. the time of the rendition of this
report, respondent is now seventy two (72) years old.

Considering that respondent has retired and is in the

twilight of his life, disbarment would be too harsh a
penalty to impose on respondent. Suspension from the
practice of law would be proper for humanitarian
reasons if respondent is still actively engaged in
practice.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, it is

respectfully recommended that respondent be adjudged
guilty of immoral conduct, unbecoming of a lawyer, and
accordingly impose the penalty of one (1) year
suspension from the active practice of law.10

We agree with the said findings of the Solicitor General including

his favorable and compassionate consideration of the advanced
age of the respondent. Specifically, Rule 1.01 of Canon I of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

24
A.C. No. 9000               October 5, 2011 Responsibility and recommending that she be suspended from the
practice of law for one year. Commissioner De La Rama opined
that while respondent appears to be a co-owner of the property as
TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Complainant,
evidenced by an annotation on the back of TCT No. 2055 showing
vs.
that half of the property has been sold to her, it was evident that
ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA, Respondent.
she employed deceit and dishonest means to make complainant
believe, by virtue of the SPA, that she was duly authorized to sell
RESOLUTION the entire property.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.: On August 28, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner De La
Rama, Jr. in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-446:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by
complainant Tomas P. Tan, Jr. against respondent Atty. Haide B.
Vista-Gumba for gross unethical conduct. RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above entitled case, herein
The facts are as follows. made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
Complainant, a self-made businessman with a tailoring shop in the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s
Naga City, filed a verified Complaint1 against respondent, also a violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7 of the Code of
resident of Naga City, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Professional Responsibility and for her failure to submit verified
(IBP)-Camarines Sur Chapter. Pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph Answer and did not even participate in the mandatory conference,
3,2 Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, the Atty. Haide V. Gumba is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
said Chapter forwarded the complaint to the IBP Board of one (1) year. 11
Governors for proper disposition.
We agree with the findings and conclusion of the IBP, but find that
Complainant narrated that sometime in August 2000, respondent a reduction of the recommended penalty is called for, pursuant to
asked to be lent ₱ 350,000.00. Respondent assured him that she the principle that the appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer
would pay the principal plus 12% interest per annum after one depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
year. She likewise offered by way of security a 105-square-meter surrounding facts.121avvphi1
parcel of land located in Naga City, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 20553 and registered in her father’s name. Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may
Respondent showed complainant a Special Power of be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional
Attorney4 (SPA) executed by respondent’s parents, and verbally or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to
assured complainant that she was authorized to sell or encumber be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
the entire property. Complainant consulted one Atty. Raquel Payte demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an
and was assured that the documents provided by respondent officer of the court.13 Verily, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
were valid. Thus, complainant agreed to lend money to Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the
respondent. With the help of Atty. Payte, respondent executed in dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Lawyers are similarly
complainant’s favor an "open" Deed of Absolute Sale over the said required, under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code, not to
parcel of land, attaching thereto the SPA. Complainant was made engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful
to believe that if respondent fails to pay the full amount of the conduct.
loan with interest on due date, the deed of sale may be
registered. Accordingly, he gave the amount of ₱ 350,000.00 to
respondent. Here, respondent’s actions clearly show that she deceived
complainant into lending money to her through the use of
documents and false representations and taking advantage of her
Respondent, however, defaulted on her loan obligation and failed education and complainant’s ignorance in legal matters. As
to pay the same despite complainant’s repeated demands. Left manifested by complainant, he would have never granted the loan
with no recourse, complainant went to the Register of Deeds to to respondent were it not for respondent’s misrepresentation that
register the sale, only to find out that respondent deceived him she was authorized to sell the property and if respondent had not
since the SPA did not give respondent the power to sell the led him to believe that he could register the "open" deed of sale if
property but only empowered respondent to mortgage the she fails to pay the loan.14 By her misdeed, respondent has
property solely to banks. Complainant manifested that he had lent eroded not only complainant’s perception of the legal profession
money before to other people albeit for insignificant amounts, but but the public’s perception as well. Her actions constitute gross
this was the first time that he extended a loan to a lawyer and it misconduct for which she may be disciplined, following Section
bore disastrous results. He submitted that respondent committed 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, which
fraud and deceit or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. provides:

Upon being ordered by the IBP to answer the above allegations, SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Court, grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be
Responsive Pleading5 but no answer or comment was ever filed by disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
her before the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). Likewise, Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
the IBP-CBD allowed respondent to answer the Amended misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
Complaint subsequently filed by complainant but she did not file of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
any answer thereto.6 She also chose not to attend the mandatory violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
conference hearings set on July 18, 2006, June 13, 2007 and admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an
January 25, 2008 despite due notice. Thus, she was deemed to attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
have waived her right to participate in the proceedings. practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
On February 9, 2009, IBP Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. malpractice.
rendered his report7 finding respondent guilty of violating Canon
1, 8 Rule 1.019 and Canon 710 of the Code of Professional
25
xxxx

We further note that after filing a Motion for Extension of Time to

File a Responsive Pleading, respondent wantonly disregarded the
lawful orders of the IBP-CBD to file her answer and to appear for
the mandatory conferences despite due notice. Respondent should
bear in mind that she must acknowledge the orders of the IBP-
CBD in deference to its authority over her as a member of the
IBP.15

Complainant now asks that respondent be disbarred. We find,

however, that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to
discipline respondent. It is worth stressing that the power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution. Disbarment will be
imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as
an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser
penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be
decreed.16 In this case, the Court finds the penalty of suspension
more appropriate but finds the recommended penalty of
suspension for one year too severe. Considering the
circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a suspension of
six months is sufficient. After all, suspension is not primarily
intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public
and the legal profession.17

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Haide B. Vista-Gumba is found

administratively liable for grave misconduct. She is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS, effective
immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same or a
similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let notice of this Resolution be spread in respondent’s record as

an attorney in this Court, and notice thereof be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

26
A.C. No. 8261               March 11, 2015 thereto and the defendants’ willingness to similarly withdraw their
counterclaim.7
JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN and ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants,
vs. The complainants alleged that from the time of the issuance by
ATTY. FEDERICO S. TOLENTINO, JR., ATTY. RENATO G. the RTC of the order dated May 16, 2008, they could no longer
CUNANAN, ATTY. DANIEL F. VICTORIO, JR., and ATTY. locate or contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite making several phone
ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondents. calls and visits to his office; that they found out upon verification
at the Register of Deeds of Quezon City that new annotations
were made on TCT No. N-290546, specifically: (1) the annotation
x-----------------------x
of the letter-request appearing to be filed by Atty. Tolentino,
Jr.8 seeking the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and
A.C. No. 8725 the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546; and (2)
the annotation of the decision dated May 16, 2008 rendered in
Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 by the RTC, Branch 95, in Quezon City,
JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN and ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants, granting the complainants’ Motion to Withdraw Complaint; 9 and
vs. that a copy of the letter request dated June 30, 2008 addressed
ATTY. CONSTANTE P. CALUYA, JR. and ATTY. ELBERT T. to Atty. Quilala, Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City, disclosed that
QUILALA, Respondents. it was defendant Ramon Ricafort who had signed the letter.

DECISION Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the complainants filed an

appeal en consulta with the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
BERSAMIN, J.: docketed as Consulta No. 4707, assailing the unlawful cancellation
of their notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens
under primary entries PE-2742 and PE-3828-9, respectively. The
In this consolidated administrative case, complainants Jessie T. LRA set Consulta No. 4707 for hearing on March 30, 2009, and
Campugan and Robert C. Torres seek the disbarment of directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda and/or
respondents Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Daniel F. supporting documents on or beforesuch scheduled
Victorio, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and hearing.10 However, the records do not disclose whether Consulta
Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr. for allegedly falsifying a court order No. 4707 was already resolved, or remained pending at the LRA.
that became the basis for the cancellation of their annotation of
the notice ofadverse claim and the notice of lis pendens in the
Registry of Deeds in Quezon City. Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty. Victorio,
Jr. despite their having paid him for his professional services, the
complainants felt that said counsel had abandoned their case.
Antecedents They submitted that the cancellation of their notice of adverse
claim and their notice of lis pendens without a court order
Atty. Victorio, Jr. had replaced Atty. Edgardo Abad as counsel of specifically allowing such cancellation resulted from the
the complainants in a civil action they brought to seek the connivance and conspiracy between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty.
annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-290546 of Tolentino, Jr., and from the taking advantage of their positions as
the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the first week of January officials in the Registry of Deeds by respondents Atty. Quilala, the
2007 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City (Civil Case Chief Registrar, and Atty. Cunanan, the acting Registrar and
No. Q-07-59598). They impleaded as defendants Ramon and signatory of the new annotations. Thus, they claimed to be
Josefina Ricafort, Juliet Vargas and the Register of Deeds of thereby prejudiced.
Quezon City. They caused to be annotated on TCT No. N-290546
their affidavit of adverse claim, as well as the notice of lis On July 6, 2009, the Court required the respondents to comment
pendens.1 Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was the counsel of defendant on the verified complaint.11 Atty. Victorio, Jr. asserted in his
Ramon and Josefina Ricafort. Comment dated August 17, 200912 that complainant Robert Torres
had been actively involved in the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-
In their sworn complaint for disbarment dated April 23, 2009 07-59598, which included the mediation process; that the
(later docketed as A.C. No. 8261),2 the complainants narrated complainants, after having aggressively participated in the
that as the surviving children of the late Spouses Antonio and drafting of the amicable settlement, could not now claim that they
Nemesia Torres, they inherited upon the deaths of their parents a had been deceived into entering the agreement in the same way
residential lot located at No. 251 Boni Serrano Street, Murphy, that they could not feign ignorance of the conditions contained
Cubao, Quezon City registered under Transfer Certificate of Title therein; that he did not commit any abandonment as alleged, but
(TCT) No. RT-64333(35652) of the Register of Deeds of Quezon had performed in good faith his duties as the counsel for the
City;3 that on August 24, 2006, they discovered that TCT No. RT- complainants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that he should not be
64333(35652) had been unlawfully cancelled and replaced by TCT held responsible for their representation in other proceedings,
No. N-290546 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City under the such as that before the LRA, which required a separate
names of Ramon and Josefina Ricafort;4 and that, accordingly, engagement; and that the only payment he had received from the
they immediately caused the annotation of their affidavit of complainants were those for his appearance fees of ₱1,000.00 for
adverse claim on TCT No. N-290546. every hearing in the RTC.

It appears that the parties entered into an amicable settlement In his Comment dated August 24, 2009,13 Atty. Tolentino, Jr.
during the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 in order to end refuted the charge of conspiracy, stressing that he was not
their dispute,5 whereby the complainants agreed to sell the acquainted with the other respondents, except Atty. Victorio, Jr.
property and the proceeds thereof would be equally divided whom he had met during the hearings in Civil Case No. Q-07-
between the parties, and the complaint and counterclaim would 59598; that although he had notarized the letter request dated
be withdrawn respectively by the complainants (as the plaintiffs) June 30, 2008 of Ramon Ricafort to the Register of Deeds, he had
and the defendants. Pursuant to the terms of the amicable no knowledge about how said letter-request had been disposed of
settlement, Atty. Victorio, Jr. filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint by the Register of Deeds; and that the present complaint was the
dated February 26, 2008,6 which the RTC granted in its order second disbarment case filed by the complainants against him
dated May 16, 2008 upon noting the defendants’ lack of objection with no other motive except to harass and intimidate him.

27
Atty. Quilala stated in his Comment dated September 1, Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. – x x x
200914 that it was Atty. Caluya, Jr., another Deputy Register of
Deeds, who was the actual signing authority of the annotations
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately
that resulted in the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim
register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real
and the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. N-290546; that the
or personal property which complies with all the requisites for
cancellation of the annotations was undertaken in the regular
registration. He shall see to it that said instrument bears the
course of official duty and in the exercise of the ministerial duty of
proper documentary science stamps and that the same are
the Register of Deeds; that no irregularity occurred or was
properly canceled. If the instrument is not registrable, he shall
performed in the cancellation of the annotations; and that the
forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the present or of
Register of Deeds was impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598
such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason therefor, and
only as a nominal party, thereby discounting any involvement in
advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with
the proceedings in the case.
Section 117 of this Decree. (Emphasis supplied)

Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment.15

The aforementioned duty of the Register of Deeds is ministerial in
nature.21 A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or
As the result of Atty. Quilala’s allegation in his Comment in A.C. tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
No. 8261 that it had been Atty. Caluya, Jr.’s signature that manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without
appeared below the cancelled entries, the complainants filed regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety
another sworn disbarment complaint dated August 26, 2010 or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a
alleging that Atty. Caluya, Jr. had forged the signature of Atty. public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the
Cunanan.16 This disbarment complaint was docketed as A.C. No. duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary, not
8725, and was later on consolidated with A.C. No. 826117 because ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge
the complaints involved the same parties and rested on similar requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor the exercise
allegations against the respondents. of judgment.22

Atty. Quilala filed his Comment in A.C. No. 8725 to belie the In Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,23 the Court underscores
allegation of forgery and to reiterate the arguments he had made that registration is a merely ministerial act of the Register of
in A.C. No. 8261.18 On his part, Atty. Caluya, Jr. manifested that Deeds, explaining:
he adopted Atty. Quilala’s Comment.19
x x x [W]hether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to
Ruling harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a
court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to see
whether the documents sought to be registered conform with the
We dismiss the complaints for disbarment for being bereft of
formal and legal requirements for such documents.
merit.

In view of the foregoing, we find no abuse of authority or

Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may
irregularity committed by Atty. Quilala, Atty. Cunanan, and Atty.
be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional
Caluya, Jr. with respect to the cancellation of the notice of
or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to
adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No.
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
N-290546. Whether or not the RTC order dated May 16, 2008 or
demeanor, or whether his conduct renders him unworthy to
the letter-request dated June 30,2008 had been falsified,
continue as an officer of the Court.20 Verily, Canon 7 of the Code
fraudulent or invalid was not for them to determine inasmuch as
of Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all
their duty to examine documents presented for registration was
times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Lawyers
limited only to what appears on the face of the documents. If,
are similarly required under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code
upon their evaluation of the letter-request and the RTC order,
not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful
they found the same to be sufficient in law and to be in
conduct. Failure to observe these tenets of the Code of
conformity with existing requirements, it became obligatory for
Professional Responsibility exposes the lawyer to disciplinary
them to perform their ministerial duty without unnecessary
sanctions as provided in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
delay.24
Court, as amended, viz.:

Should they be aggrieved by said respondents’ performance of

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
duty, the complainants were not bereft of any remedy because
Court, grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be
they could challenge the performance of duty by bringing the
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
matter by way of consulta with the LRA, as provided by Section
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
11725 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. But, as enunciated in
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,26 it was ultimately within the
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
province of a court of competent jurisdiction to resolve issues
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
concerning the validity or invalidity of a document registered by
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an
the Register of Deeds.
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes The complainants charge Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr.
malpractice. with having conspired with each other to guarantee that the
parties in Civil Case No. Q-59598 would enter into the amicable
settlement, and then to cause the cancellation of the affidavit of
The complainants’ allegations of the respondents’ acts and
adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-
omissions are insufficient to establish any censurable conduct
290546. The complainants further fault Atty. Victorio, Jr. with
against them.
having abandoned their cause since the issuance of the RTC of its
order dated May 16, 2008. The complainants’ charges are devoid
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration of substance.
Decree) enumerates the general duties of the Register of Deeds,
as follows:
Although it is not necessary to prove a formal agreement in order
to establish conspiracy because conspiracy may be inferred from

28
the circumstances attending the commission of an act, it is WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the baseless disbarment
nonetheless essential that conspiracy be established by clear and complaints against Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Renato G.
convincing evidence.27 The complainants failed in this regard. Cunanan, Atty. Daniel F. Victoria, Jr., Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and
Outside of their bare assertions that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr.
Tolentino, Jr. had conspired with each other in order to cause the
dismissal of the complaint and then discharge of the annotations,
SO ORDERED.
they presented no evidence to support their allegation of
conspiracy. On the contrary, the records indicated their own
active participation in arriving at the amicable settlement with the LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Hence, they could not Associate Justice
now turn their backs on the amicable settlement that they had
themselves entered into.

Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr.
initiated and participated in the settlement of the case, there was
nothing wrong in their doing so. It was actually their obligation as
lawyers to do so, pursuant to Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, viz.:

RULE 1.04 – A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or

settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.1âwphi1

In fine, the presumption of the validity of the amicable settlement

of the complainants and the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-
59598 subsisted.28

Anent the complainants’ charge of abandonment against Atty.

Victorio, Jr., Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility are applicable, to wit:

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and

diligence.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to

him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.

Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status
of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the
client’s request for information.

There is no issue that the complainants engaged the services of

Atty. Victorio, Jr. as their counsel in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598.
Atty. Victorio, Jr. served as such counsel. With Atty. Victorio, Jr.
assistance, the complainants obtained a fair settlement consisting
in receiving half of the proceeds of the sale of the property in litis,
without any portion of the proceeds accruing to counsel as his
legal fees. The complainants did not competently and persuasively
show any unfaithfulness on the part of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as far as
their interest in the litigation was concerned. Hence, Atty.
Victorio, Jr. was not liable for abandonment.

Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the perceived inattention
to any other matters subsequent to the termination of Civil Case
No. Q-07-59598. Unless otherwise expressly stipulated between
them at any time during the engagement, the complainants had
no right to assume that Atty. Victorio, Jr.’s legal representation
was indefinite as to extend to his representation of them in the
LRA. The Law Profession did not burden its members with the
responsibility of indefinite service to the clients; hence, the
rendition of professional services depends on the agreement
between the attorney and the client. Atty. Victorio, Jr.’s alleged
failure to respond to the complainants’ calls or visits, or to provide
them with his whereabouts to enable them to have access to him
despite the termination of his engagement in Civil Case No. Q-07-
59598 did not equate to abandonment without the credible
showing that he continued to come under the professional
obligation towards them after the termination of Civil Case No. Q-
07-59598.

29
A.C. No. 6057             June 27, 2006 witness in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay.
Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the
Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due
PETER T. DONTON, Complainant, 
execution. 
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent. 
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the
matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
DECISION
investigation, report and recommendation.

CARPIO, J.:
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

The Case
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking
Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for serious misconduct part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition
and deliberate violation of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines."
Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code"). Commissioner San Juan recommended respondent’s suspension
from the practice of law for two years and the cancellation of his
commission as Notary Public.
The Facts

In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP

In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton Board of Governors adopted, with modification, the Report and
("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal complaint for estafa recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law
thru falsification of a public document4 against Duane O. Stier for six months.
("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the
notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement. 
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the
Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter- B8 of the Rules of Court.
charge for perjury5 against complainant. Respondent, in his
affidavit-complaint, stated that:
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
before the IBP. Respondent stated that he was already 76 years
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was old and would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his
prepared and notarized by me under the following pending cases. He also said that his practice of law is his only
circumstances: means of support for his family and his six minor children.

A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion
resident of a real property located at No. 33 Don Jose for reconsideration because the IBP had no more jurisdiction on
Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City. the case as the matter had already been referred to the Court.

B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. The Ruling of the Court

citizen and thereby disqualified to own real
property in his name – agreed that the property be
transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino. The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule
1.02 of the Code. 
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested
me to prepare several documents that would guarantee A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client
recognition of him being the actual owner of the which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to
property despite the transfer of title in the name of Mr. uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest
Donton. scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which
justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.10
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the
OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stier’s free By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S.
and undisturbed use of the property for his residence citizen, was disqualified from owning real property.11Yet, in his
and business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT motion for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused
was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier.
Mr. Donton.6 Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified
his act and transferred the title in complainant’s name. But
respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing several
Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the documents,13 including the Occupancy Agreement, that would
Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier, being a guarantee Stier’s recognition as the actual owner of the property
foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his name, despite its transfer in complainant’s name. In effect, respondent
constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional
Code. Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for prohibition against foreign ownership of lands14 by preparing said
advising Stier to do something in violation of law and assisting documents. 
Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.

Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he

In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized
complainant filed the disbarment case against him upon the the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign
instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to
Alentajan,7 because respondent refused to act as complainant’s
30
achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in
his office, for which he may be suspended.15

In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was

suspended from the practice of law for three years for preparing
an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage.
In In re: Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended
from the practice of law for one year for preparing a contract
which declared the spouses to be single again after nine years of
separation and allowed them to contract separately subsequent
marriages.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O.

Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the
practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this
Decision. 

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar

Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal record as an
attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of
Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.

31
G.R. No. 1203            May 15, 1903

In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL

from the practice of law.

Solicitor-General Araneta for Government.

W. A. Kincaid for defendant.

PER CURIAM:

Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause

in the Court of First Instance, in the city of Manila, on the 5th day
of February, 1903, why he should not be suspended as a member
of the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons:

First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro

Bellas Artes" Club, after he had been notified that the said
organization was made for the purpose of evading the law then in
force in said city; and,

Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes"

during the time of and after its organization, which organization
was known to him to be created for the purpose of evading the
law.

The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W.

A. Kincaid, made answer to these charges, denying the same, and
filed affidavits in answer thereto. After reading testimony given by
said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United States vs. H. D.
Terrell,1 wherein he was charged with estafa, and after reading
the said affidavits in his behalf, and hearing his counsel, the court
below found, and decided as a fact, that the charges aforesaid
made against Howard D. Terrell were true, and thereupon made
an order suspending him from his office as a lawyer in the
Philippine Islands, and directed the clerk of the court to transmit
to this court a certified copy of the order of suspension, as well as
a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based.

We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the

conclusion that they were such as to justify the court below in
arriving at the conclusion that the knowledge and acts of the
accused in connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas
Artes" Club were of such a nature and character as to warrant his
suspension from practice.

The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects,

for the purpose of violating or evading the laws against crime
constitutes such misconduct on the part of an attorney, an officer
of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his
office, and for which he may be removed or suspended. (Code of
Civil Procedure, sec. 21.) The assisting of a client in a scheme
which the attorney knows to be dishonest, or the conniving at a
violation of law, are acts which justify disbarment.

In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of

the United States, vs.  Terrell was acquitted on the charge
of estafa, and has not, therefore, been convicted of crime, and as
the acts with which he is charged in this proceeding, while
unprofessional and hence to be condemned, are not criminal in
their nature, we are of opinion that the ends of justice will be
served by the suspension of said Howard D. Terrell from the
practice of law in the Philippine Islands for the term of one year
from the 7th day of February, 1903.

It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be

suspended from the practice of law for a term of one year from
February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.

32
G.R. No. 159486-88               November 25, 2003 "b) A subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum be
issued to Justice Artemio Panganiban, Justice Antonio
Carpio, Justice Renato Corona, Secretary Angelo Reyes
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, 
of the Department of National Defense, Vice President
vs.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr.,
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN [SPECIAL DIVISION],
and Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. for them to testify
HON. MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO, HON. EDILBERTO
and bring whatever supporting documents they may
SANDOVAL, HON. TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
have in relation to their direct and indirect participation
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
in the proclamation of Vice President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo on January 20, 2001, as cited in the book of
RESOLUTION Justice Panganiban, including the material events that
led to that proclamation and the ruling/s in the Estrada
vs. Arroyo, supra.’ (Rollo, pp. 6-7.)
PER CURIAM:

"The ‘truth’ referred to in paragraph a) of the relief

On 23 September 2003, this Court issued its resolution in the sought in the motion of petitioner pertains to what he
above-numbered case; it read: claims should have been included in the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan; viz:
"The case for consideration has been brought to this Court via a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by ‘The request of the movant is simply for the Court to include in its
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, acting through his counsel Attorney Alan Joint Resolution the TRUTH of the acts of Chief Justice Davide, et
F. Paguia, against the Sandiganbayan, et al. The Petition prays – al., last January 20, 2001 in:

"1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the ‘a) going to EDSA 2;
members of the Honorable Court disqualify themselves
from hearing and deciding this petition;
‘b) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo
as President on the ground of ‘permanent disability’
"2. That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan even without proof of compliance with the corresponding
be vacated and set aside; and constitutional conditions, e.g., written declaration by
either the President or majority of his cabinet; and
"3. That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No.
26905 pending before the Sandiganbayan be dismissed ‘c) actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that
for lack of jurisdiction. same ground of permanent disability.

"Attorney Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, asserts that the ‘It is patently unreasonable for the Court to refuse to include
inhibition of the members of the Supreme Court from hearing the these material facts which are obviously undeniable. Besides, it is
petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial the only defense of President Estrada.’ (Petition, Rollo, pp. 13-
Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from participating in any 14.)
partisan political activity which proscription, according to him, the
justices have violated by attending the ‘EDSA 2 Rally’ and by
authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal "On 2 July 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued an order denying the
Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution. foregoing motion, as well as the motion to dismiss, filed by
Petitioner contends that the justices have thereby prejudged a petitioner. Forthwith, petitioner filed a ‘Mosyong
case that would assail the legality of the act taken by President Pangrekonsiderasyon’ of the foregoing order. According to
Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v. Attorney Paguia, during the hearing of his ‘Mosyong
Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a Pangrekonsiderasyon’ on 11 June 2003, the three justices of the
patent mockery of justice and due process. Special Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias
and partiality against his client. Thus, he averred, Presiding
Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario supposedly employed foul and
"Attorney Paguia first made his appearance for petitioner when he disrespectful language when she blurted out, ‘Magmumukha
filed an Omnibus Motion on 19 May 2003, before the naman kaming gago,’ (Rollo, p. 13.) and Justice Teresita
Sandiganbayan, asking that ‘the appointment of counsels de Leonardo-De Castro characterized the motion as insignificant even
officio (sic) be declared functus officio’ and that, being the now before the prosecution could file its comments or opposition
counsel de parte, he be notified of all subsequent proceedings in thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking in open court that to grant
Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending Estrada’s motion would result in chaos and disorder. (Ibid.)
therein. Finally, Attorney Paguia asked that all the foregoing Prompted by the alleged ‘bias and partial attitude’ of the
criminal cases against his client be dismissed. Sandiganbayan justices, Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a
motion for their disqualification. On 31 July 2003, petitioner
"During the hearing of the Omnibus Motion on 30 May 2003, received the two assailed resolutions, i.e., the resolution
petitioner presented to the court several portions of the book, (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 28 July 2003, denying
entitled ‘Reforming the Judiciary,’ written by Justice Artemio petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of 6 July 2003; viz:
Panganiban, to be part of the evidence for the defense. On 9 June
2003, petitioner filed a motion pleading, among other things, that ‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-movant Joseph
– Ejercito Estrada’s ‘Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon’ (Na tumutukoy
sa Joint Resolution ng Hulyo 2, 2003) dated July 6, 2003 is
"a) x x x President Estrada be granted the opportunity to DENIED for lack of merit.’ (Rollo, p. 37.)
prove the ‘truth’ of the statements contained in Justice
Artemio Panganiban’s book, ‘REFORMING THE "and the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 25 July
JUDICIARY,’ in relation to the prejudgment committed 2003, denying petitioner’s motion for disqualification of 14 July
by the Supreme Court justices against President Estrada 2003; viz:
in the subject case/s of Estrada v. Arroyo, 353 SCRA
452 and 356 SCRA 108; and,
33
‘WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court, for On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his compliance with
want of merit, hereby DENIES the Motion for Disqualification.’ the show-cause order. In a three-page pleading, Atty. Paguia, in
(Rollo, p. 48.) an obstinate display of defiance, repeated his earlier claim of
political partisanship against the members of the Court.
"The instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be
DISMISSED for gross insufficiency in substance and for utter lack Canon 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which Atty. Paguia
of merit. The Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of has tirelessly quoted to give some semblance of validity for his
discretion, an indispensable requirement to warrant a recourse to groundless attack on the Court and its members, provides -
the extraordinary relief of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. On the one hand, petitioner
"Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on
would disclaim the authority and jurisdiction of the members of
political questions. But to avoid suspicion of political partisanship,
this tribunal and, on the other hand, he would elevate the petition
a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party
now before it to challenge the two resolutions of the
funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate
Sandiganbayan. He denounces the decision as being a patent
in other partisan political activities."
mockery of justice and due process. Attorney Pagula went on to
state that-
Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines the term
"partisan political activities;" the law states:
‘The act of the public officer, if LAWFUL, is the act of the public
office.1awp++i1 But the act of the public officer, if UNLAWFUL, is
not the act of the public office. Consequently, the act of the "The term ‘election campaign’ or ‘partisan political activity’ refers
justices, if LAWFUL, is the act of the Supreme Court. But the act to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a
of the justices, if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the Supreme Court. particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall
It is submitted that the Decision in ESTRADA vs. ARROYO being include:
patently unlawful in view of Rule 5.10 of the CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, is not the act of the Supreme Court but is merely the
wrong or trespass of those individual Justices who falsely spoke "(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs,
and acted in the name of the Supreme Court. (Urbano vs. Chavez, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose
183 SCRA [347]). Furthermore, it would seem absurd to allow the of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for
Justices to use the name of the Supreme Court as a shield for or against a candidate;
their UNLAWFUL act.’ (Petition, Rollo, p. 11.)
"(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings,
"Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the
wrongness, soundness or unsoundness, of a decision of the Court purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
would be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction can campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate.
enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if
committed. (In Re Sotto, 82 Phil 595.) "(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries,
or holding interviews for or against the election of any
"The ruling in Estrada v. Arroyo, being a final judgment, has long candidate for public office;
put to end any question pertaining to the legality of the ascension
of Arroyo into the presidency. By reviving the issue on the validity "(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or
of the assumption of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the materials designed to support or oppose the election of
presidency, Attorney Paguia is vainly seeking to breathe life into any candidate; or
the carcass of a long dead issue.

"(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or

"Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of support for or against a candidate."
his client’s case within the judicial forum; indeed, he has repeated
his assault on the Court in both broadcast and print media. Rule
13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a It should be clear that the phrase "partisan political activities," in
member of the bar from making such public statements on any its statutory context, relates to acts designed to cause the success
pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a or the defeat of a particular candidate or candidates who have
party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked the fires of filed certificates of candidacy to a public office in an election. The
public dissension and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the taking of an oath of office by any incoming President of the
administration of justice. Republic before the Chief Justice of the Philippines is a traditional
official function of the Highest Magistrate. The assailed presence
of other justices of the Court at such an event could be no
"It is not the first time that Attorney Paguia has exhibited similar different from their appearance in such other official functions as
conduct towards the Supreme Court. In a letter, dated 30 June attending the Annual State of the Nation Address by the President
2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and of the Philippines before the Legislative Department.
Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, he has demanded, in a
clearly disguised form of forum shopping, for several advisory
opinions on matters pending before the Sandiganbayan. In a The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce
resolution, dated 08 July 2003, this Court has strongly warned criticism made by anyone against the Court for, if well-founded,
Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to desist can truly have constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it
from further making, directly or indirectly, similar submissions to will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our
this Court or to its Members. But, unmindful of the well-meant people’s faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have
admonition to him by the Court, Attorney Paguia appears to been privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.1âwphi1
persist on end.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, the lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to the
and the Court hereby orders Attorney Alan Paguia, counsel for courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar
petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, to SHOW CAUSE, within ten conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious
days from notice hereof, why he should not be sanctioned for motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority
conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court." of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in

34
seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of
justice.

The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate
of Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting
a member of the bar from making such public statements on a
case that may tend to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in ignoring the Court’s
well-meant admonition.

On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty.

Paguia wrote to say -

"What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estrada’s

right to due process of law? It renders the decision in Estrada vs.
Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair play were
not observed. There was no fair play since it appears that when
President Estrada filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide and his
fellow justices had already committed to the other party - GMA -
with a judgment already made and waiting to be formalized after
the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal
hearing. After the justices had authorized the proclamation of
GMA as president, can they be expected to voluntarily admit the
unconstitutionality of their own act?"

Unrelentingly, Atty. Paguia has continued to make public

statements of like nature.

The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary

sanction, to become mindful of his grave responsibilities as a
lawyer and as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has chosen
not to at all take heed.

WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely

suspended from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt
hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the
Court.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar

Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts of
the land through the Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.

35
A.C. No. 4497            September 26, 2001 4. Adm. Case No. 95 33,8 filed by respondent against Rosalia
Saburnido for violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Respondent
alleged that Rosalia Saburnido served as chairperson of the Board
MR. and MRS. VENUSTIANO G. SABURNIDO, complainants, 
of Election Inspectors during the 1995 elections despite being
vs.
related to a candidate for barangay councilor.
ATTY. FLORANTE E. MADROÑO,1 respondent.

At the time the present complaint was filed, the three actions filed
QUISUMBING, J.:
against Venustiano Saburnido had been dismissed while the case
against Rosalia Saburnido was still pending.
For our resolution is the administrative complaint2 for disbarment
of respondent, Atty. Florante E. Madroño filed by spouses
Complainants allege that respondent filed those cases against
Venustiano and Rosalia Saburdino. Complainants allege that
them in retaliation, since they had earlier filed administrative
respondent has been harassing them by filing numerous
cases against him that resulted in his dismissal from the judiciary.
complaints against them, in addition to committing acts of
Complainants assert that due to the complaints filed against
dishonesty. 
them, they suffered much moral, mental, physical, and financial
damage. They claim that their children had to stop going to school
Complainant Venustiano Saburnido is a member of the Philippine since the family funds were used up in attending to their cases.
National Police stationed at Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, while
his wife Rosalia is a public school teacher. Respondent is a former
For his part, respondent contends that the grounds mentioned in
judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Balingasag-Lagonglong,
the administrative cases in which he was dismissed and his
Misamis Oriental.
benefits forfeited did not constitute moral turpitude. Hence, he
could not be disbarred therefor. He then argues that none of the
Previous to this administrative case, complainants also filed three complaints he filed against complainants was manufactured. He
separate administrative cases against respondent. adds that he "was so unlucky that Saburnido was not
convicted."9 He claims that the complaint for serious irregularity
against Venustiano Saburnido was dismissed only because the
In A. M. No. MTJ-90-383,3 complainant Venustiano Saburnido filed latter was able to antedate an entry in the police blotter stating
charges of grave threats and acts unbecoming a member of the that his service firearm was lost. He also points out that
judiciary against respondent. Respondent was therein found guilty Venustiano was suspended when a prisoner escaped during his
of pointing a high-powered firearm at complainant, who was watch. As for his complaint against Rosalia Saburnido, respondent
unarmed at the time, during a heated altercation. Respondent contends that by mentioning this case in the present complaint,
was accordingly dismissed from the service with prejudice to Rosalia wants to deprive him of his right to call the attention of
reemployment in government but without forfeiture of retirement the proper authorities to a violation of the Election Code.
benefits.

In their reply, complainants reiterate their charge that the cases

Respondent was again administratively charged in the against them were meant only to harass them. In addition,
consolidated cases of Sealana-Abbu v. Judge Madroño, A.M. No. Rosalia Saburnido stressed that she served in the BEI in 1995
92-1-084-RTC and Sps. Saburnido v. Judge Madroño, A.M. No. only because the supposed chairperson was indisposed. She
MTJ-90-486.4 In the first case, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor stated that she told the other BEI members and the pollwatchers
Florencia Sealana-Abbu charged that respondent granted and that she was related to one candidate and that she would desist
reduced bail in a criminal case without prior notice to the from serving if anyone objected. Since nobody objected, she
prosecution. In the second case, the spouses Saburnido charged proceeded to dispense her duties as BEI chairperson. She added
that respondent, in whose court certain confiscated smuggled that her relative lost in that election while respondent's son won.
goods were deposited, allowed other persons to take the goods
but did not issue the corresponding memorandum receipts. Some
of the goods were lost while others were substituted with In a resolution dated May 22, 1996,10 we referred this matter to
damaged goods. Respondent was found guilty of both charges the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
and his retirement benefits were forfeited. report, and recommendation.

In the present case, the spouses Saburnido allege that respondent In its report submitted to this Court on October 16, 2000, the IBP
has been harassing them by filing numerous complaints against noted that respondent and his counsel failed to appear and
them, namely: present evidence in the hearing of the case set for January 26,
2000, despite notice. Thus, respondent was considered to have
waived his right to present evidence in his behalf during said
1. Adm. Case No. 90-0755,5 for serious irregularity, filed by hearing. Neither did respondent submit his memorandum as
respondent against Venustiano Saburnido. Respondent claimed directed by the IBP.
that Venustiano lent his service firearm to an acquaintance who
thereafter extorted money from public jeepney drivers while
posing as a member of the then Constabulary Highway Patrol After evaluating the evidence before it, the IBP concluded that
Group. complainants submitted convincing proof that respondent indeed
committed acts constituting gross misconduct that warrant the
imposition of administrative sanction. The IBP recommends that
2. Adm. Case No. 90-0758,6 for falsification, filed by respondent respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
against Venustiano Saburnido and two others. Respondent
averred that Venustiano, with the help of his co-respondents in
the case, inserted an entry in the police blotter regarding the loss We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to
of Venustiano's firearm. disagree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

3. Crim. Case No. 93-67,7 for evasion through negligence under A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or
Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code, filed by respondent against private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an
Venustiano Saburnido. Respondent alleged that Venustiano officer of the court.11 Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Saburnido, without permission from his superior, took into Responsibility commands all lawyers to at all times uphold the
custody a prisoner by final Judgment who thereafter escaped.
36
dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, in Rule
7.03, the Code provides:

RULE 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that

adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
be whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

Clearly, respondent's act of filing multiple complaints against

herein complainants reflects on his fitness to be a member of the
legal profession. His act evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly
undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another individual, as
complainants were instrumental in respondent's dismissal from
the judiciary. We see in respondent's tenacity in pursuing several
cases against complainants not the persistence of one who has
been grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying to
exact revenge. 

Respondent's action erodes rather than enhances public

perception of the legal profession. It constitutes gross misconduct
for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:

SECTION 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by

Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do.x x x 

Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. However, we find

that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline
respondent.

The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear

cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.12 While we will
not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will
also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to
accomplish the desired end.13 In this case, we find suspension to
be a sufficient sanction against respondent. Suspension, we may
add, is not primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means to
protect the public and the legal profession.14

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Florante E. Madroño is found

GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for one year with a WARNING that a repetition the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent's
suspension is effective upon his receipt of notice of this decision.
Let notice of this decision be spread in respondent's record as an
attorney in this Court, and notice of the same served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

37
A.C. No. 6672               September 4, 2009 1avvphi1

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.

(emphasis supplied)
R E S O L U T I O N 

Hence, this complaint.

CORONA, J.:

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and

This is a complaint for disbarment 1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card.7
Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment
of professional services. The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.8
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal
Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients2 to transfer legal
representation. Respondent promised them financial Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its
assistance3 and expeditious collection on their claims.4To induce report and recommendation,9 found that respondent had
them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating
them text messages.  Rule 8.0210 and other canons11of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against
soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court.
affidavit5 of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded
upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier
utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of penalty. 
₱50,000. Complainant also attached "respondent’s" calling card:6

We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of

Front respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.

The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by

respondent into complainant’s professional practice in violation of
Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct
violations of ethical rules.
LAW OFFFICE
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES to, including the manner by which a lawyer’s services are to be
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:

Fe Marie L. Labiano CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use
Paralegal only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts.

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of
Flr. Rm. M-01  law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not
Tel: 362-7820 advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.13 To
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del
Fax: (632) 362-7821 allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize
Pilar
Cel.: (0926) 2701719 the practice of law, degrade the profession in the public’s
Grace Park, Caloocan
City estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high
character of service to which every member of the bar is called.14

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

Back

RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act

designed primarily to solicit legal business. 

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the

SERVICES OFFERED: purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE disbarment.16
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT, Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH which provides:
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.

38
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, the purpose of obtaining employment.26 Thus, in this jurisdiction,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause. we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian
machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility
of the legal profession. 
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of
almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or
through an agent in order to gain employment) 17 as a measure to Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including
protect the community from barratry and champerty.18 violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients), the
sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy
slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the
incommensurate to its findings.
sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano
and referred to respondent’s office) to prove that respondent
indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals’ A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by
suits.  petitioner. A lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on
his character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers are only
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his
allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law
answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing. 
lists or use of simple professional cards.

Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent
could produce a more favorable result. (a) lawyer’s name;

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment (b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1
(c) address;

With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR,

(d) telephone number and
settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s
client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better
service, good result or reduced fees for his services.20 Again the (e) special branch of law practiced.28
Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers
in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s "referrals."
Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s connection to his Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial
office.21Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep assistance." The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who
into another’s legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of
8.02 of the CPR.  loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure
clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage
of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no
clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04: place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of
substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not
prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano’s calling
unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of
cards.
the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating
the client. Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The
period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this
only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to
resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium
severely.
for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the
client. 
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of
be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be
Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to
the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity
to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in SO ORDERED.
connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an
interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in
its outcome.23Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer
to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to
accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the
verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of
undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.24

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes

malpractice25 which calls for the exercise of the Court’s
disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants
serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for
39
G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994 work and that the termination of his employment was for a valid
cause, but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the
amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner, 
said termination of employment to the Department of Labor and
vs.
Employment as required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH
consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation
DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and JON DE YSASI, respondents.
vs.  National Labor Relations Commission, et al.2 On appeal to the
Fourth Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was
REGALADO, J.: affirmed in toto.3

The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for His motion for reconsideration4 of said decision having been
naught in this case, notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and denied for lack of merit,5 petitioner filed this petition presenting
filiation between the parties. It would indeed have been the better the following issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the
part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent had petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled
reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay
familial amity and with the grace of reciprocal concessions. Father and other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to
and son opted instead for judicial intervention despite the payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees
inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with distaste, because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these issues will
the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by private
with the same reasoned detachment accorded any judicial respondent, such as the exact date when petitioner ceased to
proceeding before it. function as farm administrator, the character of the pecuniary
amounts received by petitioner from private respondent, that is,
whether the same are in the nature of salaries or pensions, and
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by whether or not there was abandonment by petitioner of his
his father, herein private respondent, as farm administrator of functions as farm administrator.
Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in
April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as sales
manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor
operations manager of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His General recommended a modification of the decision of herein
employment as farm administrator was on a fixed salary, with public respondent sustaining the findings and conclusions of the
other allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone, Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84,6 for which
gasoline, medical and dental expenses. reason the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the
petition. In compliance with the Court's resolution of November
16, 1992,7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12, 1992 largely
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings of the
supervision of daily activities and operations of the sugarcane Executive Labor Arbiter.8
farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizing,
harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to
the hacienda  and attending to such other tasks as may be Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation
assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived of the labor arbiter is worth noting:
on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.
This case is truly unique. What makes this case
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to unique is the fact that because of the special
Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to work daily. He relationship of the parties and the nature of the
suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate action involved, this case could very well go
occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he down (in) the annals of the Commission as
underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a perhaps the first of its kind. For this case is an
deep sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which lasted over four action filed by an only son, his father's
months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, namesake, the only child and therefore the
he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for only heir against his own father.9
infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private
respondent took care of his medical expenses and petitioner
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records,
continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984,
two (2) observations were noted that may
without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's
justify why this labor case deserves special
salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an
considerations. First, most of the complaints
explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty.
that petitioner and private respondent had with
Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and legal
each other, were personal matters affecting
adviser, as well as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands,
father and son relationship. And secondly, if
however, were not acted upon.
any of the complaints pertain to their work,
they allow their personal relationship to come
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations in the way.10
Commission (NLRC, for brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No.
VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, docketed therein as RAB
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was
Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal dismissal
illegal because of want of just cause therefor and non-observance
with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
of the requirements of due process. He also charges the NLRC
payment of full back wages, thirteenth month pay for 1983,
with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the
consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as
executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct
attorney's fees.
the hearings thereof.

On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was

Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was
dismissed by the NLRC,1 holding that petitioner abandoned his
abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator,
40
thereby arming private respondent with a ground to terminate his from a disease by reason whereof the continued employment of
employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that it is the employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his
wrong for petitioner to question the factual findings of the co-employee's health, is also a ground for termination of his
executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as only questions of law may services provided he receives the prescribed separation pay. 16 On
be appealed for resolution by this Court. Furthermore, in seeking the other hand, it is well-settled that abandonment by an
the dismissal of the instant petition, private respondent faults employee of his work authorizes the employer to effect the
herein petitioner for failure to refer to the corresponding pages of former's dismissal from employment.17
the transcripts of stenographic notes, erroneously citing Sections
15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d], 
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which
public respondent gravely erred in affirming the decision of the
provide that want of page references to the records is a ground
executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner abandoned his
for dismissal of an appeal.
employment and was not illegally dismissed from such
employment. For want of substantial bases, in fact or 
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness
the Labor Code that technical rules of evidence prevailing in normally accorded to the factual findings of an administrative
courts of law and equity shall not be controlling, and that every agency, such as herein public respondent NLRC, 18 as even
and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively ascertain the decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by
facts in each case shall be availed of, without regard to law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. 19
technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of due process.
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the this point deserve acceptance:
decision in a case to be rendered by a judge, or a labor arbiter for
that matter, other than the one who conducted the hearing. The
It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from
fact that the judge who heard the case was not the judge who
October 1982 to December 1982, cannot be construed as
penned the decision does not impair the validity of the
abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse.
judgment,11 provided that he draws up his decision and resolution
Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal
with due care and makes certain that they truly and accurately
around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr.
reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of the facts
Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn,
of and evidence submitted in the case.12
Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).

Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor
This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by
Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio, who conducted the hearings therein
medical bills sent to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan,
from December 5, 1984 to July 11, 1985, and was later
January 22, 1987 at 49-50).
transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who
eventually decided the case, presents no procedural infirmity,
especially considering that there is a presumption of regularity in During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in
the performance of a public officer's functions, 13 which petitioner Bacolod City upon the instruction(s) of private respondent to
has not successfully rebutted. recuperate thereat and to handle only administrative matters of
the hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner is not really
obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor
Code relaxing the application of technical rules of procedure in
labor cases in the interest of due process, ever mindful of the xxx xxx xxx
long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure must be
interpreted to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we
cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to nitpick on After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special
trivial technicalities to boost his arguments. The strength of one's circumstances involved and basic human experience, petitioner's
position cannot be hinged on mere procedural niceties but on solid illness and strained family relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II
bases in law and jurisprudence. may be considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi
III's absence from work during the period of October 1982 to
December 1982. In any event, such absence does not warrant
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process outright dismissal without notice and hearing.
dictate that no worker shall be dismissed except for just and
authorized cause provided by law and after due process.14 Article
282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which an xxx xxx xxx
employer may validly terminate an employment, to wit: 
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an
the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection employee are as follows:
with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of
his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable
(d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the reason; and (2) clear intention to sever the employer-employee
person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or tie (Samson Alcantara, Reviewer in Labor and Social Legislation,
his duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes 1989 edition, p. 133).
analogous to the foregoing.
This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute
The employer may also terminate the services of any employee abandonment. In Dagupan Bus Company v.  NLRC  (191 SCRA
due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, 328), the Court rules that for abandonment to arise, there must
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of be a concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt act
operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing from which it may be inferred that the employee has no more
is for the purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the interest to work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative,
Labor Code, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Inc.  v.  NLRC  (184 SCRA 25), for abandonment to constitute a
Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a
before the intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his
corresponding separation pay rates provided by law.15Suffering employment. . . Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be

41
accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet
employee simply does not want to work anymore. uncertain of his son's intention of returning to work after his
confinement in the hospital, he kept petitioner on the payroll,
reported him as an employee of the haciendafor social security
There are significant indications in this case, that there is no
purposes, and paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated
abandonment. First, petitioner's absence and his decision to leave
deductions therefrom until the end of December, 1982. It was
his residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his illness
only in January, 1983 when he became convinced that petitioner
and strained family relations. Second he has some medical
would no longer return to work that he considered the latter to
certificates to show his frail health. Third, once able to work,
have abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer listed
petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private respondent
him as an employee. According to private respondent, whatever
of his intention to assume again his employment. Last, but not
amount of money was given to petitioner from that time until 
the least, he at once instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or
when he realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these are
mere gratuitous doles from a father to a son, and not salaries as,
indications that petitioner had no intention to abandon his
in fact, none of the usual deductions were made therefrom. It was
employment.20
only in April, 1984 that private respondent completely stopped
giving said pension or allowance when he was angered by what he
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of heard petitioner had been saying about sending him to jail.
petitioner's confinement in the hospital for his various afflictions
which required medical treatment. Neither can it be denied that
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo
private respondent was well aware of petitioner's state of health
Gomez taken on oral deposition regarding petitioner's alleged
as the former admittedly shouldered part of the medical and
statement to him, "(h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I
hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City
have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of
until he was fit to work again. The disagreement as to whether or
petitioner's intention to abandon his job. In addition to
not petitioner's ailments were so serious as to necessitate
insinuations of sinister motives on the part of petitioner in working
hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation is
at the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon
beside the point. The fact remains that on account of said
accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent takes the
illnesses, the details of which were amply substantiated by the
novel position that the agreement to support his son after the
attending physician,21 and as the records are bereft of any
latter abandoned the administration of the farm legally converts
suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner, there was
the initial abandonment to implied voluntary resignation.25
justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it
is clear, deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume employment
and not mere absence that is required to constitute abandonment As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent
as a valid ground for termination of employment.22 undoubtedly knew about petitioner's illness and even paid for his
hospital and other medical bills. The assertion regarding
abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao,
continued performance of various services related to the
petitioner unmistakably may be classified as a managerial
operations of the farm from May to the last quarter of 1983, his
employee23 to whom the law grants an amount of discretion in the
persistent inquiries from his father's accountant and legal adviser
discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner stated that "I
about the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued
assigned myself where I want to go,"24 he was simply being
since April, 1984, and his indication of having recovered and his
candid about what he could do within the sphere of his authority.
willingness and capability to resume his work at the farm as
His duties as farm administrator did not strictly require him to
expressed in a letter dated September 14, 1984. 26 With these,
keep regular hours or to be at the office premises at all times, or
petitioner contends that it is immaterial how the monthly
to be subjected to specific control from his employer in every
pecuniary amounts are designated, whether as salary, pension or
aspect of his work. What is essential only is that he runs the farm
allowance, with or without deductions, as he was entitled thereto
as efficiently and effectively as possible and, while petitioner may
in view of his continued service as farm administrator.27
definitely not qualify as a model employee, in this regard he
proved to be quite successful, as there was at least a showing of
increased production during the time that petitioner was in charge To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of
of farm operations. abandonment may justly be made there must be a concurrence of
two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over
sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second
petitioner during the years 1983 to 1984, this is because that was
element as the more determinative factor and being manifested
the period when petitioner was recuperating from illness and on
by some overt acts. Such intent we find dismally wanting in this
account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm
case.
operations were irregular and minimal, hence the supervision and
control exercisable by private respondent as employer was
necessarily limited. It goes without saying that the control It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being
contemplated refers only to matters relating to his functions as unsure of his son's plans of returning to work. The absence of
farm administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal petitioner from work since mid-1982, prolonged though it may
affairs and activities. have been, was not without valid causes of which private
respondent had full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him
to believe that petitioner was no longer returning to work, private
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his
respondent neither explains nor substantiates by any reasonable
duties as farm administrator, petitioner would be staying at the
basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.
house in the farm, there really was no explicit contractual
stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin
with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be
employment or that any transfer of residence would justify the given credence as even after January, 1983, when private
termination of his employment. That petitioner changed his respondent supposedly "became convinced" that petitioner would
residence should not be taken against him, as this is undeniably no longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform
among his basic rights, nor can such fact of transfer of services directly required by his position as farm administrator.
residence  per se be a valid ground to terminate an employer- These are duly and correspondingly evidenced by such acts as
employee relationship. picking up some farm machinery/equipment from G.A.
Machineries, Inc.,28 claiming and paying for additional farm
equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to
Bacolod through Zip Forwarders,29 getting the payment of the
42
additional cash advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 of withholding tax reports,34 as well as correspondence reporting
from Agrotex Commodities, Inc.,30 and remitting to private his full recovery and readiness to go back to work,35 and,
respondent through  specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal are
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work.
medicine and oil.31
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took Gomez, as witness for private respondent, ascribing statements to
care of, relate to the normal activities and operations of the farm. petitioner supposedly indicative of the latter's intention to
True, it is a father's prerogative to request or even command his abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of
child to run errands for him. In the present case, however, such deposition without the presence of petitioner's counsel, and
considering the nature of these transactions, as well as the the failure of private respondent to serve reasonably advance
property values and monetary sums involved, it is unlikely that notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby foreclosing his
private respondent would leave the matter to just anyone. opportunity to 
Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by someone who cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to
can be trusted or at least be held accountable therefor, and who serve notice thereof on the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of
is familiar with the terms, specifications and other details relative the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative Assistant Celestina G.
thereto, such as an employee. If indeed petitioner had abandoned Ovejera of said office.36 Fair play dictates that at such an
his job or was considered to have done so by private respondent, important stage of the proceedings, which involves the taking of
it would be awkward, or even out of place, to expect or to oblige testimony, both parties must be afforded equal opportunity to
petitioner to concern himself with matters relating to or expected examine and cross-examine a witness.
of him with respect to what would then be his past and
terminated employment. It is hard to imagine what further
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether
authority an employer can have over a dismissed employee so as
denominated as salary, pension, allowance or ex gratia handout,
to compel him to continue to perform work-related tasks:
there is no question as to petitioner's entitlement thereto
inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his capacity as
It is also significant that the special power of attorney32 executed  farm administrator. The change in description of said amounts
by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, contained in the pay slips or in the receipts prepared by private
specifically stating — respondent cannot be deemed to be determinative of petitioner's
employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances above
set out. Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of
xxx xxx xxx
allowances given by a parent out of concern for his child's welfare,
it is rather unusual that receipts therefor 37 should be necessary
That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a and required as if they were ordinary business expenditures.
resident of Hda. Manucao, hereinafter called and referred to as
PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill District, and a
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that
duly accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA
petitioner's alleged abandonment was converted into an implied
PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;
voluntary resignation on account of the father's agreement to
support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As we have
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with determined that no abandonment took place in this case, the
BIPA representing payment for all checks and papers to which I monthly sums received by petitioner, regardless of designation,
am entitled to (sic) as such planter-member; were in consideration for services rendered emanating from an
employer-employee relationship and were not of a character that
can qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty
That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these and solicitude. We are also hard put to imagine how abandonment
presents  can be impliedly converted into a voluntary resignation without
I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and any positive act on the part of the employee conveying a desire to
lawful ATTORNEY-IN-FACT terminate his employment. The very concept of resignation as a
ground for termination by the employee of his employment38 does
JON de YSASI III not square with the elements constitutive of abandonment.

whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a
and in my name, place and stead, my check/checks violation by private respondent of the due process requirements
aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given the under the Labor Code for want of notice and hearing. 39 Private
power and authority to sign for me and in my name, place and respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V
stead, the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said check/checks. of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot to cases where the employer seeks to terminate the services of an
cash the said check/checks, but to turn the same over to me for employee on any of the grounds enumerated under Article 282 of
my proper disposition. the Labor Code, but not to the situation obtaining in this case
where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any
ground since it was petitioner who allegedly abandoned his
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my  employment.40
Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the
receipts therefor.
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to
labor cases are set out in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
That I further request that my said check/checks be made a Implementing the Labor Code in this wise:
"CROSSED CHECK".

Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss

xxx xxx xxx a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular
acts or omission(s) constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In
remained in force even after petitioner's employment was cases of abandonment of work, notice shall be served at the
supposed to have been terminated by reason of abandonment. worker's last known address.
Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for an explanation
regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits, 33 the issuance xxx xxx xxx
43
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation
allegations as stated against him in the notice of dismissal within v.  NLRC, 170 SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts
a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer is: once an employee is dismissed for just cause, he must not be
shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to rewarded 
defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to
desires. observe procedural due process. The public policy behind this is
that, it may encourage the employee to do even worse and render
a mockery of the rules of discipline required to be observed.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately
However, the employer must be penalized for his infraction of due
notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating
process. In the present case, however, not only was petitioner
clearly the reasons therefor.
dismissed without due process, but his dismissal is without just
cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment because he has
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. — Any decision taken by the a justifiable excuse.43
employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to
contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in
with the Regional Branch of the Commission.
disregarding the mandatory provisions of Article 279 of the Labor
Code which entitles an illegally dismissed employee to
xxx xxx xxx reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the
imposition of the penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent for
violation of the due process requirements. Private respondent, for
Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The employer shall submit a his part, maintains that there was error in imposing the fine
monthly report to the Regional Office having jurisdiction over the because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit the
place of work at all dismissals effected by him during the month, employer's report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional
specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers, the office, as required under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of
reasons for their dismissal, the dates of commencement and the implementing rules, and not the failure to serve notice upon
termination of employment, the positions last held by them and the employee sought to be dismissed by the employer.
such other information as may be required by the Ministry for
policy guidance and statistical purposes.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no
uncertain terms the right of every worker to security of
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no tenure.44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory
question that petitioner was denied his right to due process since mandates, the Labor Code spells out the relief available to an
he was never given any notice about his impending dismissal and employee in case of its denial:
the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be heard. Even as
private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory
twin requirements of procedural due process in this particular Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment,
case, he in effect admits that no notice was served by him on the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee
petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the certification issued on except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
Department of Labor that no notice of termination of the reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
employment of petitioner was submitted thereto.41 and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits of their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of actual
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it reinstatement.
nonetheless cannot be denied that notice still had to be served
upon the employee sought to be dismissed, as the second
sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with
explicitly requires service thereof at the employee's last known full back wages in the absence of just cause for dismissal.45 The
address, by way of substantial compliance. While it is conceded Court, however, on numerous occasions has tempered the rigid
that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an employee, application of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that in
especially when there is just cause therefor, the requirements of some cases certain events may have transpired as would militate
due process cannot be lightly taken. The law does not against the practicability of granting the relief thereunder
countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or prerogative provided, and declares that where there are strained relations
when it has the effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee between the employer and the employee, payment of back wages
of security of tenure in favor of the employee.42 and severance pay may be awarded instead of
reinstatement,46 and more particularly when managerial
employees are concerned.47 Thus, where reinstatement is no
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on longer possible, it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed
the Wenphil case, the Solicitor General rejoins as follows: employee be given his fair and just share of what the law accords
him.48
The Labor Arbiter held thus:
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor
While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his General's ratiocination, to wit:
defense of implied resignation and/or abandonment, records
somehow showed that he failed to notify the Department of  As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from
Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic) work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
aba(n)donment as required by BP 130. And for this failure, the rights and to his backwages computed from the time his
other requisite for a valid termination by an employer was not compensation was withheld up to the time of his reinstatement.
complied with. This however, would not work to invalidate the (Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement
otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for dismissal. The Company, Inc.  vs.  NLRC, 173 SCRA 192, this Honorable Court
validity of the cause of dismissal must be upheld at all times held that when it comes to reinstatement, differences should be
provided however that sanctions must be imposed on the made between managers and the ordinary workingmen. The
respondent for his failure to observe the notice on due process Court concluded that a company which no longer trusts its
requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80587). (Decision managers cannot operate freely in a competitive and profitable
Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C" Petition), . . . manner. The NLRC should know the difference between managers
and ordinary workingmen. It cannot imprudently order the

44
reinstatement of managers with the same ease and liberality as The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed
that of rank and file workers who had been terminated. Similarly, by the records, sorely disappoints the Court and invites reproof.
a reinstatement may not be appropriate or feasible in case of Both counsel may well be reminded that their ethical duty as
antipathy or antagonism between the parties (Morales, vs. NLRC, lawyers to represent their clients with 
188 SCRA 295). zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective
causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not more
importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal
In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be
conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of
reinstated as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The
the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their
present relationship of petitioner and private respondent (is) so
clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a
strained that a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer
lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever
relationship is hardly possible.49
possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often
called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for
arguing that his dismissal from employment was attended by bad concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso
faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or was contrary to of technicality in the conduct of litigation.56
morals, good customs or public policy. He further prays for
exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly
unjust dismissal by other employers.
provides that "(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end
or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement." On
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was
awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the
anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social court. The records do not show that they took pains to initiate
humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their
or omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges
thereof.50 Exemplary damages, under Article 2229, are imposed could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they may
by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. They are clients.
not recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to the court to
decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.51
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled
this regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert
the past allowing recovery of moral damages where the dismissal all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute
of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or within his jurisdiction."57 If he ever did so, or at least entertained
constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, 52 and of controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.
exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a wanton,
oppressive or malevolent manner.53 We do not feel, however, that
One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish
an award of the damages prayed for in this petition would be
having been obliged to make. The task of resolving cases
proper even if, seemingly, the facts of the case justify their
involving disputes among members of a family leaves a bad taste
allowance. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where
in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful
moral and exemplary damages were awarded, the dismissed
and enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations. While
employees were genuinely without fault and were undoubtedly
we are convinced that we have adjudicated the legal issues herein
victims of the erring employers' capricious exercise of power.
squarely on the bases of law and
jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are saddened by the
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private thought that we may have failed to bring about the reconciliation
respondent can equally be faulted for fanning the flames which of the father and son who figured as parties to this dispute, and
gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this controversy, instead that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly
of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate contribute to the breaking, instead of the strengthening, of
claims. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with familial bonds. In fine, neither of the parties herein actually
mutual antagonism and the undeniable enmity between them emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore, that
negates the likelihood that either of them acted in good faith. It is with the impartial exposition and extended explanation of their
apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the respective rights in this decision, the parties may eventually see
other. For this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their differences on
damages can rightfully be awarded to petitioner. more convivial terms.

On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations
following recommendation of the Solicitor General: Commission is hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED
to pay petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3)
years, without qualification or deduction,58 and, in lieu of
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for
modified. There was no voluntary abandonment in this case every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being
because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his absence, or considered as one (1) whole year.
such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice
and hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty of illegal
dismissal. He should be ordered to pay backwages for a period SO ORDERED.
not exceeding three years from date of dismissal. And in lieu of
reinstatement, petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.
to one (1) month('s) salary for every year of service, a fraction of
six months being considered as one (1) year in accordance with
recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all
claims for damages should be dismissed, for both parties are
equally at fault.54

45
46
G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975 While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the
restraining order was being fought in the Quezon City court, the
Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court
VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners, 
under date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116, praying for a
vs.
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF
the writ of possession. This Court found no merit in the petition
APPEALS, respondents.
and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3, 1966;
reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1966. The respondents
CASTRO, J.: then filed on August 2, 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying
for the same preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals also
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been dismissed the petition. The respondents then appealed to this
commuting to this Court for more than a decade. Court (L-27140).1äwphï1.ñët  We dismissed the petition in a
minute resolution on February 8, 1967.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson
filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago in the Court of First The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals
Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case where they filed another petition for certiorari  and prohibition with
27251). In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The said court gave
ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite sums of due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction.
money. Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court, in Ago After hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive portion of
vs. Castañeda, L-14066, affirmed the judgment. After remand, which reads:
the trial court issued on August 25, 1961 a writ of execution for
the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of execution but
his motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction
lots located in Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised them for from enforcement of the writ of possession on
auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago moved to stop the auction and ejectment from the one-half share in the
sale, failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu
of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made permanent
appealed. On January 31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of pending decision on the merits in Civil Case
Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice No. Q-7986 and ordering respondent Court to
attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986
sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution "to save his family on the merits without unnecessary delay. No
house and lot;" his motions were denied, and the sheriff sold the pronouncement as to costs.
house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest bidders, the
petitioners Castañeda and Henson. Ago failed to redeem, and on
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castañeda and
April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor
Henson filed the present petition for review of the aforesaid
of the vendees Castañeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the
decision.
Court of First Instance of Manila  issued a writ of possession to the
properties.
1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere
with the orders of a co-equal court can apply in the case at bar.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife,
The Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued the writ of
Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court
possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal
of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to annul the
court, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City as the latter
sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon
lifted the restraining order it had previously issued against the
which judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suit was
enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession; it is the
his personal obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share
Court of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the
in their conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon
writ.
and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the
satisfaction of the judgment. They alleged in their complaint that
wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit, that the 2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al.,1 where the wife was a
judgment was rendered and the writ of execution was issued only party in one case and the husband was a party in another case
against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a party to and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld, the petitioners
her husband's venture in the logging business which failed and would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin
resulted in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the conjugal judgment against her husband for which their conjugal properties
partnership. would be answerable. The case invoked is not at par with the
present case. In Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted
for the protection of the common interest of the spouses; in the
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte  writ
present case, the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership
of preliminary injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register
benefited from the husband's business venture.
of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City, from registering the
latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents'
certificates of title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and 3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of
from carrying out any writ of possession. A situation thus arose Appeals held that a writ of possession may not issue until the
where what the Manila court had ordered to be done, the Quezon claim of a third person to half-interest in the property is adversely
City  court countermanded. On November 1, 1965, however, the determined, the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu
latter court lifted the preliminary injunction it had previously Ago was a "stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband. The
issued, and the Register of deeds of Quezon City cancelled the assumption is of course obviously wrong, for, besides living with
respondents' certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of her husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance of his business
the petitioners. But enforcement of the writ of possession was that failed, of the relevant cases in which he got embroiled, and of
again thwarted as the Quezon City court again issued a temporary the auction sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties.
restraining order which it later lifted but then re-restored. On May Even then, the ruling in Omnas  is not that a writ of possession
3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third time, lifted the may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely
restraining order. determined, but that the writ of possession being a complement
of the writ of execution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the
latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the
47
interval between the judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of of the petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of
possession, the rights of third parties to the property sold have counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist
supervened. The ruling in Omnas  is clearly inapplicable in the execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one
present case, for, here, there has been no change in the court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court).
ownership of the properties or of any interest therein from the
time the writ of execution was issued up to the time writ of
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel
possession was issued, and even up to the present.
who,

4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes

far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for
P. San Diego) that it is much too late in the day for the
those who seek justice, have tried to use them
respondents Agos to raise the question that part of the property is
to subvert the very ends of justice.6
unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that
(1) a wife is normally privy to her husband's activities; (2) the
levy was made and the properties advertised for auction sale in Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his
1961; (3) she lives in the very properties in question; (4) her exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has
husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the properties allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a
were sold at auction in 1963; (6) her husband had thrice predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a
attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the
from enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff executed the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of
deed of final sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem; truth and moral justice.
(8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that the conjugal properties
could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his family house and
lot" in his efforts to prevent execution; and (9) it was only on May A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with
2, 1964 when he and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of candour and honesty his client's cause must be
the sheriff's sale upon the issue that the wife's share in the encouraged and is to be commended; what we
properties cannot be levied upon on the ground that she was not do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's
a party to the logging business and not a party to the replevin insistence despite the patent futility of his
suit. The spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise the issue in client's position, as in the case at bar.
the various proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did not;
laches now effectively bars them from raising it. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client,
ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained merit of his case. If he finds that his client's
length of time, to do that which, by exercising cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden
due diligence, could or should have been done duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a submit, rather than traverse the
right within a reasonable time, warranting a incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it whims and caprices of his client, and temper
either has abandoned it or declined to assert his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's
it.2 oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior
to his duty to his client; its primacy is
indisputable.7
5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from
two fatal infirmities.
7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts
for purposes other than to seek justice, and in order to obviate
(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and further delay in the disposition of the case below which might
ejectment from the one-half share in the properties involved again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end,
belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-share is not in esse, but is we have motu proprio  examined the record of civil case Q-7986
merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, constituting (the mother case of the present case). We find that
neither legal nor equitable estate, and will ripen into title when
only upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be assets of
the community.3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled rule (a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years
that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and ago) but trial on the merits has not even started;
which may never arise.4
(b) after the defendants Castañedas had filed their answer with a
(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint
impossibility, of its enforcement. The Ago spouses admittedly live where they impleaded new parties-defendants;
together in the same house5 which is conjugal property. By the
Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from the (c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos
house, but the decision under review would prevent the ejectment filed a motion to admit an amended supplemental complaint,
of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be vacated by which impleads an additional new party-defendant (no action has
Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The yet been taken on this motion);
absurdity does not stop here; the decision would actually separate
husband and wife, prevent them from living together, and in
effect divide their conjugal properties during coverture and before (d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted
the dissolution of the conjugal union. supplemental complaint; and

6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the (e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20,
annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary 1974, grants an extension to the suspension of time to file
justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of answer. (Expediente, p. 815)
their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the
respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint,
misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to supplemental complaint and amended supplemental complaint are
thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice all untenable, for the reasons hereunder stated. The Complaint
48
Upon the  first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied Upon the  first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of
upon conjugal properties of the spouses Ago despite the fact that the complaint, the defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution
the judgment to be satisfied was personal only to Pastor Ago, and of the preliminary injunction, in conspiracy and with gross bad
the business venture that he entered into, which resulted in the faith and evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs, caused
replevin suit, did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal the registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause
partnership. The issue here, which is whether or not the wife's more damage, the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife
inchoate share in the conjugal property is leviable, is the same two of the parcels of land in question; that the purchasers
issue that we have already resolved, as barred by laches, in acquired the properties in bad faith; that the defendants
striking down the decision of the Court of Appeals granting mortgaged the two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking
preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which was Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his wife also
herein-before quoted. This ruling applies as well to the first cause mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial
of action of the complaint. Bank; and that the bank also acted in bad faith.

Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January The second cause of action  consists of an allegation of additional
5, 1959 the Castañedas and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias  writ damages caused by the defendants' bad faith in entering into the
of seizure, seized and took possession of certain machineries, aforesaid agreements and transactions.
depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their damage in the sum
of P256,000 up to May 5, 1964. This second cause of action fails
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
to state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order
of seizure is invalid or illegal.
The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the
supplemental complaint, which is, the inclusion of a paragraph
It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the
averring that, still to cause damage and prejudice to the plaintiffs,
conjugal properties was irregular, illegal and unlawful because the
Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of land
sheriff did not require the Castañeda spouses to pay or liquidate
they had previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them
the sum of P141,750 (the amount for which they bought the
also in bad faith, while Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson in
properties at the auction sale) despite the fact that there was
bad faith sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and
annotated at the back of the certificates of title a mortgage of
Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith and with
P75,000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank; moreover, the
knowledge that the properties are the subject of a pending
sheriff sold the properties for P141,750 despite the pendency of L-
litigation.
19718 where Pastor Ago contested the amount of P99,877.08 out
of the judgment value of P172,923.37 in civil case 27251; and
because of said acts, the Agos suffered P174,877.08 in damages. Discussion on The Causes of Action
of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no
obligation to require payment of the purchase price in the auction
sale because "when the purchaser is the judgment creditor, and Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause
no third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay the amount of action of the supplemental complaint and the amended
of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of his judgment." (Sec. supplemental complaint, the validity of the cause of action would
23, Rule 39, Rules of Court) depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original
complaint, for, the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their
rights of ownership and possession of the properties by reason of
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the
the agreements subsequently entered into by the Castañedas and
vendees Castañedas but did not affect the sheriff's sale; the
their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are valid. The reverse is
cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the Agoo.
also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground
that the conjugal properties could not be levied upon, then the
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos, but, we have
out of the amount of the judgment was dismissed by this Court on already indicated that the issue in the first cause of action of the
January 31, 1966. original complaint is barred by laches, and it must therefore follow
that the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and
the amended supplemental complaint is also barred.
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause
of action and is moreover barred by prior judgment.
For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining
cause of action in the supplemental complaint and the amended
The  fourth cause of action  pertains to moral damages allegedly
supplemental complaint.
suffered by the Agos on account of the acts complained of in the
preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause of action derives
its life from the preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review
baseless, the said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail. is set aside. Civil case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the re-filing of the
petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent action. Treble
The Counterclaim
costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu
Ago, which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castañedas aver that the a copy of this decision be made a part of the personal file of Atty.
action was unfounded and as a consequence of its filing they were Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court.
compelled to retain the services of counsel for not less than
P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
enjoining the transfer of titles and possession of the properties to
the Castañedas, they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the
properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such deprived use Teehankee, J., is on leave.
being 20% annually of their actual value; and that the filing of the
unfounded action besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth
of which is for the court to assess.

The Supplemental Complaint

49
50
 Canon 2 Provide Efficient and Convenient Legal Services

Not to Reject The Cause of the Defenseless or Oppressed – Rule

2.01

GUIDELINES ON LEGAL AID GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE

ESTABLISHMENT
AND OPERATION OF LEGAL AID OFFICES IN ALL CHAPTERS
OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

ARTICLE I
(Section 1 to 5)

PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY

SECTION. 1. Public service. – Legal Aid is not a matter of charity.

It is a means for the correction of social imbalances that may and
often do lead to injustice, for which reason it is a public
responsibility of the Bar. The spirit of public service should,
therefore, underlie all legal aid offices. The same should be so
administered as to give maximum possible assistance to indigent
and deserving members of the community in all cases, matters
and situations in which legal aid may be necessary to forestall an
injustice.

51
52
A.C. No. 6252             October 5, 2004 residence certificates on the documents they notarized, or have
entries in their notarial register for these documents. 
JONAR SANTIAGO, complainant, 
vs. As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required
Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN, respondent. by Section 3 of Rule 1129 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had the
option to comply or not with the certification. To nullify the
DECISION
Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-bound to bring the
said noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor conducting
PANGANIBAN, J.: the preliminary investigation. 

Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent
performance of their duties, which are impressed with public argued that lawyers could testify on behalf of their clients "on
interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential
solemnities and requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will to the ends of justice." Complainant charged respondent’s clients
not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to those who with attempted murder. Respondent averred that since they were
violate it or neglect observance thereof. in his house when the alleged crime occurred, "his testimony is
very essential to the ends of justice."
The Case and the Facts
Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened
and harassed his clients after the hearing of their case by the
Before us is a verified Complaint1 filed by Jonar Santiago, an provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent requested
employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), the assistance of the Cabanatuan City Police the following day,
for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was January 5, 2001, which was the next scheduled hearing, to avoid
filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the a repetition of the incident and to allay the fears of his clients. In
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It support of his allegations, he submitted Certifications10 from the
charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or other gross Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint Affidavit 11 of the two police
misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule 1382 of the Rules of officers who had assisted them.
Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03 3, Canon 54,
and Canons 12.075 and 12.08 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other
purpose than to harass him, because he was the counsel of
Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the latter
In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid before the ombudsman and the BJMP against complainant.
Jr. summarized the allegations of the complainant in this wise:

After receipt of respondent’s Answer, the CBD, through

"x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the case for hearing on
among others, that Respondent in notarizing several June 5, 2001, at two o’clock in the afternoon. Notices 12 of the
documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: hearing were sent to the parties by registered mail. On the
a)make the proper notation regarding the cedula or scheduled date and time of the hearing, only complainant
community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the appeared. Respondent was unable to do so, apparently because
details of the notarized documents in the notarial he had received the Notice only on June 8, 2001.13 The hearing
register; and c) make and execute the certification and was reset to July 3, 2001 at two o’clock in the afternoon.
enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had
notarized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code. On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply 14 to
the verified Answer of respondent. The latter’s Rejoinder was
received by the CBD on July 13, 2001.15 It also received
"Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed complainant’s Letter-Request16 to dispense with the hearings.
an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same as Accordingly, it granted that request in its Order17 dated July 24,
evidence in the case wherein he was actively 2001, issued through Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby
representing his client. Finally, Complainant alleges that directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within
on a certain date, Respondent accompanied by several fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after which the case was to
persons waited for Complainant after the hearing and be deemed submitted for resolution. 
after confronting the latter disarmed him of his sidearm
and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled
threats."6 The CBD received complainant’s Memorandum18 on September 26,
2001. Respondent did not file any.
On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of
the CBD,7 Atty. Rafanan filed his verified Answer.8He admitted The IBP’s Recommendation
having administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were
attached to the verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued
non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and
Resolution No. XVI-2003-17219 approving and adopting the
the Counter-affidavits was allowed.
Investigating Commissioner’s Report that respondent had violated
specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a
He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only certification, the entry of such certification in the notarial register,
to documents acknowledged by a notary public and was not and the indication of the affiant’s residence certificate. The IBP
mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts Board of Governors found his excuse for the violations
and other government offices. He pointed out that in the latter, unacceptable. It modified, however, the recommendation 20 of the
the affidavits, which were sworn to before government investigating commissioner by increasing the fine to "₱3,000 with
prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence certificates of a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a
the affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija -- heavier penalty." 
some of whom were older practitioners -- indicate the affiants’
53
The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the appalling and inexcusable that he did away with the basics of
Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being
CPR -- were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.  swayed by the bad example of others is not an acceptable
justification for breaking the law. 
The Court’s Ruling
We note further that the documents attached to the verified
Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit of respondent’s clients
We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses’
Affidavits relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted
Respondent’s Administrative Liability murder, filed by complainant’s brother against the
aforementioned clients. These documents became the basis of the
present Complaint. 
Violation of the Notarial Law

As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner,

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly
notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to requires respondent as notary -- in the absence of any fiscal,
every document acknowledged before them has presented the state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer
proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence the oath -- to "certify that he has personally examined the
tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
such certification.21 They are also required to maintain and keep a understood their affidavits." Respondent failed to do so with
notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the
them; and to "give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or belief that -- as counsel for the affiants -- he was not required to
acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one comply with the certification requirement. 
in [their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages of
[their] register, on which the same is recorded."22 Failure to
perform these duties would result in the revocation of their It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey
commission as notaries public.23 the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal
processes.26 They are expected to be in the forefront in the
observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and
considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and
attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into jurisprudence.27 It is imperative that they be conversant with
their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such
requirements.  duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and
diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they
In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos, 24 the Court explained the value and may become susceptible to committing mistakes. 
meaning of notarization as follows:
Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is
"The importance attached to the act of notarization placed upon them by reason of their solemn oath to obey the
cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an laws.28 No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse or
empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with justification for their failure to adhere to the provisions of the law.
substantive public interest, such that only those who are In this case, the excuse given by respondent exhibited his clear
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Notarization converts a private document into a public and the importance of his office as a notary public. 
document thus making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainant’s plea to disbar
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be
credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and exercised with great caution.29 Disbarment will be imposed as a
the public at large must be able to rely upon the penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the
appended to a private instrument."  court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can
accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be
For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the decreed.30Considering the nature of the infraction and the absence
solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in their of deceit on the part of respondent, we believe that the penalty
performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. recommended by the IBP Board of Governors is a sufficient
They are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of disciplinary measure in this case.
their duties,25 which are dictated by public policy and are
impressed with public interest.  Lawyer as Witness for Client

It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has Complainant further faults respondent for executing before
readily admitted -- that he violated the Notarial Law by failing to Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an affidavit corroborating the
enter in the documents notations of the residence certificate, as defense of alibi proffered by respondent’s clients, allegedly in
well as the entry number and the pages of the notarial registry.  violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: "A lawyer shall avoid testifying
in behalf of his client." 
Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those
requirements is not mandatory for affidavits relative to cases Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:
pending before the courts and government agencies. He points to
similar practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija. 
"Rule 12.08 – A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of
his client, except:
We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief
that the requirements do not apply to affidavits is patently
irrelevant. No law dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire,
the Notarial Law makes no qualification or exception. It is
54
 a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in
authentication or custody of an instrument and which lawyers give their testimonies during the trial. In this
the like; instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary
investigation which, as such, was merely inquisitorial.37 Not being
a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary investigation has
b) on substantial matters, in cases where his
the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent persons against
testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in
hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions; protecting them
which event he must, during his testimony,
from open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble as
entrust the trial of the case to another
well as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the
counsel."
State from useless and expensive prosecutions. 38 The
investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be
Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from followed by the trial proper. 
being a witness,31 except only in certain cases pertaining to
privileged communication arising from an attorney-client
Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind
relationship.32
respondent to refrain from accepting employment in any matter in
which he knows or has reason to believe that he may be an
The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers essential witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in future
by the task of dissociating their relation to their clients as cases in which his testimony may become essential to serve the
witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell "ends of justice," the canons of the profession require him to
the facts as they recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases. 
partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the cause of
others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of
No Proof of Harassment
a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question
is one of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who
testify for their clients.  The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered
insulting words and veiled threats is not supported by evidence.
Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot
"Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and
be equated with liability.39 It is not the self-serving claim of
witness for the client will provoke unkind criticism and leave many
complainant but the version of respondent that is more credible,
people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer because they
considering that the latter’s allegations are corroborated by the
cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. The people will have a
Affidavits of the police officers and the Certifications of the
plausible reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are against
Cabanatuan City Police.
the lawyer’s client, they will have an opportunity, not likely to be
neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his
own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating
and is looked upon as partial and untruthful."33 the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby FINED ₱3,000 with a warning that
similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely. 
Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being
witnesses and at the same time counsels for a cause, the
preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, SO ORDERED.
unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to
withdraw from active management of the case.34

Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit

executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, we cannot
hastily make him administratively liable for the following reasons: 

First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every

remedy and defense that is authorized by law for the
benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in
which the latter’s life and liberty are at stake.35 It is the
fundamental right of the accused to be afforded full
opportunity to rebut the charges against them. They are
entitled to suggest all those reasonable doubts that may
arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure
that if they are convicted, such conviction is according to
law. 

Having undertaken the defense of the accused,

respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected to
spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong
conviction. He had the duty to present -- by all fair and
honorable means -- every defense and mitigating
circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that his
clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or property,
except by due process of law.36

The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for

the defense of his clients, since it pointed out the fact that on the
alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his
residence and could not have possibly committed the crime
charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does
not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of
its contents. 
55
A.C. No. 5299               August 19, 2003 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section
27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of
law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator
acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was
and Chief, Public Information Office, Complainant, 
noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.7 
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration,8 which was denied by the IBP in Resolution No.
x-----------------------x
XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029 

G.R. No. 157053               August 19, 2003

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as
G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,  versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan,
vs. Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL Respondents." This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299
G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court per the Court’s Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, Respondents.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required
to manifest whether or not they were willing to submit the case
RESOLUTION for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.10 Complainant filed his
Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting
any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records
thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper,
Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-
MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667."1  2002-606.

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published read:
telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She
spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty.
Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided designed primarily to solicit legal business.
the case will not involve separation of property or custody of
children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of
Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any
P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the
false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
case and the other half after a decision thereon has been
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications
rendered.
or legal services.

Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
Public Information Office revealed that similar advertisements
were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila
Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.2  SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity
any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty.
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his
is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority
of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the
to do so.
Rules of Court.3 

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but
business.12 It is a profession in which duty to public service, not
argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited
money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily
acts; that the time has come to change our views about the
meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a
prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the
capital that necessarily yields profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood
public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer
should be a secondary consideration.14 The duty to public service
advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising;
and to the administration of justice should be the primary
and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal
be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all
interests or what they owe to themselves. 15 The following
the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling
elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:
that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not
contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is
dignified.4  1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a
by-product, and in which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money;
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation. 5 On June 29, 2002, the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-
306,6 finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01
56
 2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted.
administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of
integrity and reliability; the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being
for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics
business methods of advertising and encroachment on supplied)
their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.16 
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T.
There is no question that respondent committed the acts SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of
complained of. He himself admits that he caused the publication the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27
of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for the Court’s indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is
the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no offense will be dealt with more severely.
intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer,
he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney
issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper. 17 Ten months later,
and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.18 Such acts of respondent are a
deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Court’s authority.
SO ORDERED.
What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in
advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage
Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not
only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still
considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of
permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective
clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months
from the time of the filing of the case,19 he in fact encourages
people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would
have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether

proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in
a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the
lawyer and to the bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the
name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address
and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals
bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of
calling cards is now acceptable.21 Publication in reputable law lists,
in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by
the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise
allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:22 

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a

statement of the lawyer’s name and the names of his professional
associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission
to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees
and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices;
posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;
membership and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the
fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for
that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a
paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not
properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a
daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may
a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the
conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or
likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity
or standing of the profession.

57
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993 in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State
Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme
Court on June 7, 1977.
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, 
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent. Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the
issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3)
R E SO L U T I O N
Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers'
Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the
REGALADO, J.: Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas
(FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the
controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and associations readily responded and extended their valuable
desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with
as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to appreciation and gratitude.
perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession
other than those allowed by law." The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether
or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as whether the same can properly be the subject of the
follows: advertisements herein complained of.

Annex A Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this

case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder
SECRET MARRIAGE? excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
P560.00 for a valid marriage. aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN xxx xxx xxx
Ave., Mla.

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which

Annex B respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-
GUAM DIVORCE. vis "legal services", common sense would
readily dictate that the same are essentially
without substantial distinction. For who could
DON PARKINSON deny that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in need of
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam basic institutional services from government or
Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to non-government agencies like birth, marriage,
Friday during office hours. property, or business registration, obtaining
documents like clearance, passports, local or
foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration
Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to xxx xxx xxx
Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
does not wish to make issue with respondent's
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP
nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; has made its position manifest, to wit, that it
522-2041; 521-0767 strongly opposes the view espoused by
respondent (to the effect that today it is alright
to advertise one's legal services).
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above
reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain
the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of terms its opposition to respondent's act of
the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said establishing a "legal clinic" and of
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as concomitantly advertising the same through
hereinbefore quoted. newspaper publications.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of The IBP would therefore invoke the
publication of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that it administrative supervision of this Honorable
is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal Court to perpetually restrain respondent from
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern undertaking highly unethical activities in the
computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues field of law practice as aforedescribed.4
that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the
act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly  xxx xxx xxx
58
 A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Article 1. Marriage is special contract of
gives the impression that respondent permanent union between a man and
corporation is being operated by lawyers and woman entered into accordance with law
that it renders legal services. for the establishment of conjugal and family
life.  It is the foundation of the family and
an inviolable social institution  whose
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it
nature, consequences, and incidents are
offers legal services to the public, the
governed by law and not subject to
advertisements in question give the impression
stipulation, except that marriage
that respondent is offering legal services. The
settlements may fix the property relation
Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as
during the marriage within the limits
earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is)
provided by this Code.
the effect that the advertisements have on the
reading public.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is
obvious that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos
The impression created by the advertisements
can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated
in question can be traced, first of all, to the
in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a
very name being used by respondent — "The
divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or
Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is
serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very
respectfully submitted connotes the rendering
least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal
of legal services for legal problems, just like a
practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are
medical clinic connotes medical services for
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright
medical problems. More importantly, the term
malpractice.
"Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term
medical clinic connotes doctors.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or
abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as
or at lessening confidence in the legal
published in the advertisements subject of the
system.
present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of
justice, which all the more reinforces the
impression that it is being operated by In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that
members of the bar and that it offers legal advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the
services. In addition, the advertisements in Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with
question appear with a picture and name of a the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to
person being represented as a lawyer from address those planning a "secret marriage," if not
Guam, and this practically removes whatever suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special
doubt may still remain as to the nature of the contract of permanent union," the inviolable social
service or services being offered. institution," which is how the Family Code describes
marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and
inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely
to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is
offering "legal support services" as claimed by it, or
suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a
whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively
marriage license.
engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary
to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal
support services," as the respondent would have it. The If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it
advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the can readily be concluded that the above impressions one
minds of the reading public that legal services are being may gather from the advertisements in question are
offered by lawyers, whether true or not. accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example
alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it
can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the
committed 
performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with
and public policy.
impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine
courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the committed.
advertisements in question are only meant to inform the
general public of the services being offered by it. Said
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support
advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce,
services" respondent offers do not constitute legal services
and any law student ought to know that under the Family
as commonly understood, the advertisements in question
Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is
give the impression that respondent corporation is being
recognized, and that is:
operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as
earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is
Article 26. . . . that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader,
members of the bar themselves are encouraging or
inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse xxx xxx xxx
shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine Law.
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be
enjoined from causing the publication of the
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code advertisements in question, or any other advertisements
(defines) a marriage as follows: similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should
59
 be prohibited from further performing or offering some of of such practice may be considered, the corporation's
the services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each
offering such services to the public in general. and every provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules of Court.5
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized
legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and 2. Philippine Bar Association:
retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for
gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit
xxx xxx xxx.
the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead
encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business
by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice
of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such of law but engaged in giving legal support services to
business. lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with
the use of modern computers and electronic machines"
(pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably,
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at
respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under
bar can be better performed by specialists in other fields,
the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting
such as computer experts, who by reason of their having
employment for its enumerated services fall within the
devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot
realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the
fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar.
regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent
To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal
to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to
profession will deny the profession of the great benefits
stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial
and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer
advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don
using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using
Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its
a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held
not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as
public. Technological development in the profession may to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and
be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin,
prevention of illegal practice. Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in
allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded
services are made available exclusively to members of the by a corporation  employing competent lawyers to practice
Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which
technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the
more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is
which service may be offered to the public in general and an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the
which should be made available exclusively to members of public cannot ventilate any grievance
the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the
further proceedings because of the factual considerations limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly
involved. admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to
the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent
It must be emphasized, however, that some of
uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who
respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright, such
act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law
as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad
is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor
of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and
can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is
void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be
a personal right limited to persons who have qualified
prohibited from simply disseminating information
themselves under the law. It follows that not only
regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in
respondent but also all the persons who are acting for
the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized
respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law
to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal
practice.6
under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of
rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be
consulted before deciding on which course of action to 3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer
without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to
practice of law.
the issues stated herein, are wit:

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
be directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear
and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to
practice law or perform legal services. 2. Such practice is unauthorized;

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be 3. The advertisements complained of are not only
ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral; and
himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being
clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any
adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. 4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress
Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its
advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance
60
 unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, A perusal of the questioned advertisements of
misleading and immoral advertising. Respondent, however, seems to give the impression that
information regarding validity of marriages, divorce,
annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions,
xxx xxx xxx
declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment,
which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name — The
law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the
services" to answers, litigants and the general public as impression again that Respondent will or can cure the
enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) legal problems brought to them. Assuming that
of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it
Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated also gives the misleading impression that there are
above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court. doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are
involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory
services on Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very
regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret admissions of its President and majority stockholder, Atty.
marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main
particularly on visa related problems, immigration purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned
problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such "Starweek" article."9
other related laws.
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Its advertised services unmistakably require the
application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles and
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly
procedures related thereto, the legal advices based
advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain
thereon and which activities call for legal training,
which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are)
knowledge and experience.
illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility
of lawyers in this country.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited
Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely and
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an
are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as
advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in
"the practice of law."7
bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could
work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which
4. U.P.  Women Lawyers' Circle: is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560
for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by
paramount consideration should be given to the protection officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ
of the general public from the danger of being exploited by an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not
unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the necessary.
practice of law.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to
rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain
bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and from qualified practitioners legal services for their
pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such
to practice law. as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot)
justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such
jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice, there act could become justifiable.
are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal We submit further that these advertisements that seem to
with the general public as such. While it may now be the project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in
opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly
standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not reprehensible.
exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable
Court may decide to make measures to protect the
general public from being exploited by those who may be It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how
dealing with the general public in the guise of being they could go about having a secret marriage here, when
"paralegals" without being qualified to do so. it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice
on divorce, where in this country there is none, except
under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines.
In the same manner, the general public should also be It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it
protected from the dangers which may be brought about falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which
by advertising of legal services. While it appears that by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals
lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of should not be done.
Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in
the instant case that legal services are being advertised
not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme
Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by
public from falling prey to those who advertise legal circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and
services without being qualified to offer such services. 8 offenses of this character justify permanent elimination
from the Bar. 10

61
 6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados: whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise
as to the law defining his client's obligations to his employees, to
guide his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client
xxx xxx xxx
along the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the
practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me.
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and
law, such as management consultancy firms or travel psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which
agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building
services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead the limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The
to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does
practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add
the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed
independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar,
of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare
unlawful practice of law. program, he drew employees' wills.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the
effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective
regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the
conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and
consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under
as a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend, do discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the
not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here,
that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have however, there may be an exception where the business turns on
considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers
Our knowledge of the law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a
conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to
are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally assess the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the
possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a
particular business or profession. A good example is the architect, lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an
who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a
codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should
and specification in harmony with the law. This is not practicing not handle it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here,
law. since the situation is not presented by the proofs.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, Defendant also appears to represent the employer before
replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations administrative agencies of the federal government, especially
expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An
decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority
law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of
charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal question parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without
is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem. power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency
admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom. party the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other
representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther
engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work,
building code and the like, then an architect who performed this defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even
function would probably be considered to be trespassing on arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d
territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp.
relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed 154-156.).
a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is
not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations 1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person
experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge
and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided
employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate that:
special responsibility in employee matters to a management
group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such
matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More (a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a
recently, consultants like the defendants have the same service major non-legal problem;.
that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized to members of the bar; .
profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our
leading universities. The court should be very cautious about
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of
information.
conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of
men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to
do so, or that the technical education given by our schools cannot All these must be considered in relation to the work for
be used by the graduates in their business. any particular client as a whole.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should

consider his work for any particular client or customer, as a

62
 1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific
the Code of Professional Responsibility succintly states the problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce,
rule of conduct: separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and
should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another
profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of
law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a 1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are
lawyer or in another capacity. "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not
controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving
legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to
of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA
render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition).
submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the
Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like
judicious disposition of this case.
securing a marriage license, and making arrangements
with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of
law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that xxx xxx xxx
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it
may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-
can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion)
lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services
that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles
2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on secret.
divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See
Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable.
materials may not constitute of law. The business is
The second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily
similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys
related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation
materials on the subject and determines on the subject
that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services",
and determines by himself what courses of action to take.
and not legal services, are available." 11

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of
purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may
law" becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues
apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and
raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized
clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial
practice of law.
construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down
general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which of the term, some of which we now take into account.
publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as
requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge,
a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the
perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession.
forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation
service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to
the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship
with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court.
confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal
client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured,
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer
general advice on common problems, and does not purport to
give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law
designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's generally engages in three principal types of professional activity:
publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents
particular situation — in their publication and sale of the kits, such requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary
publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which
law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the statute to possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty,
the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction and property according to law, in order to assist in proper
against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation
agreement any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as
law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers with
judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case
any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation
does fully support, however, the finding that for the change of regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct
$75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who
course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute,
might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal
remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary
documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct
constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the
63
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the complex situations. These customary functions of an
doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to determine attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus: the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the
order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
Black defines "practice of law" as:
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part
which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that
application of legal principles and technique to serve the these manifold customary functions be performed by
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
taken for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court. and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case
(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of
193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent,
law when he: as advertised, constitute "practice of law."

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said
their right under the law, or appears in a representative proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the
capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or services it has been offering, to wit:
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready
or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers,
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the
which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
the extensive use of computers and modern information
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
technology in the gathering, processing, storage,
representative capacity, engages in the business of
transmission and reproduction of information and
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while
communication, such as computerized legal research;
so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search;
practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley
evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a
and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
case; fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen
in need of basic institutional services from government or
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property,
v.  Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated: or business registrations; educational or employment
records or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or information about laws of other countries that they may
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws
and other papers incident to actions and special that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the
proceedings, the management of such actions and foreign country, and other matters that do not involve
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, representation of clients in court; designing and installing
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient
and all action taken for them in matters connected with management of law offices, corporate legal departments,
the law incorporation services, assessment and courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or
condemnation services contemplating an appearance administering legal services. 20
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in While some of the services being offered by respondent
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship corporation merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow,
have been held to constitute law practice, as do the such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of
work done involves the determination by the trained legal research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. exception to the general rule.
p. 262, 263).
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such
small part of work performed outside of any court and function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this
large variety of subjects and the preparation and Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for
execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it
of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called
these transactions may have no direct connection with paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the
court proceedings, they are always subject to become intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and what its advertisements represent and for the which services it
affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely
64
within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate
corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the
as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
advice, contract drafting and so forth. lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being
published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The offered by private respondent which constitute practice of law
Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in
operations of respondent corporation was given by its own accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is
"proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales: in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and
what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain
as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose
Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the
"specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law
Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law.
These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals,
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom
counsellors and attorneys.
respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. The
doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to,
the trend in the medical field toward specialization, it the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so
caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for
law firms. members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions
required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are
allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when
acquired through education and study, have been recognized by
they come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's what
the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science
doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's
entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the
bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe
rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the
you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate,
construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The
too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's
justification for excluding from the practice of law those not
referred to one of our specialists. 
admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from
competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable
surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little
disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing control.27
a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken
care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position
or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a
that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an
while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-
occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this
patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but
common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or
legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment"
are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As
died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit
admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities there
millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a
which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while
specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and
there are none in the Philippines. 28As the concept of the
arrears which would need to be put in order, and your
"paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States,
relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer
standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general
her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be
public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed
properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there
by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the
were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then
Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973).
you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the
Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants.
problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to
There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with
support the case. 21
their own code of professional ethics, such as the National
Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its Association. 29
services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged
in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited
renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory
acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As
prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be
pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice
published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of
another or to render legal services, but such allowable services
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations
WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main granting permission therefor. 30
purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for

65
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in between a normal by-product of able service and the
the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person who unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person
prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to
into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of
the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to
encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and
which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad
remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to
categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those
practice law in the state. 32
which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements,

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in
lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct
making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data.
dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is
"Such data must not be misleading and may include only a
not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission
services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return
and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices;
for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of
posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;
the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional
membership and offices in bar associations and committees
Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the
advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing
fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to
addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has
names of clients regularly represented." 42
been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's
position, and all other like self-laudation. 36 The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for
that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a
paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating
properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a
the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a
daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may
manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The
a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of
management or contents of which are calculated or likely to
legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that
deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or
the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of
standing of the profession. 43
The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved
in the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted.
advertising or solicitation. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of
the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes
in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He
flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from under a designation of special branch of law. 44
the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides
among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid
advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as
corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the
a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and
same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of
not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his
the above-mentioned exceptions.
profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them
to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of
temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money- Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable
worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule
young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a
This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability
character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.). upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the
fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is
provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best
Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned
the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated
as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient
therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is
service to a client as well as to the community has a way of
implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show
publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a
that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked
normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A
by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons
good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate
expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the
it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference
prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

66
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar
Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the
public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was
found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to
these characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our
legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve
to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the
legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under
attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point
in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative,
even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level
of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all
efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal
profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer,

subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in
allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who
is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The
Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby
reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt
with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or

illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was
created should be passed upon and determined, we are
constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect
since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the
present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is,
of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined,
albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the
present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot
be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country.
This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising,
cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by

respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor General
who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after
due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the
grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative
misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is
referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be
necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN

herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing
the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form
which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A"
and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or
indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law
or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies
of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the
Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,

Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ.,
concur

67
March 23, 1929 I would request you kind favor to transmit this
information to your barrio people in any of
your meetings or social gatherings so that they
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
may be informed of my desire to live and to
serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and
MALCOLM, J.: notary public. If the people in your locality
have not as yet contracted the services of
other lawyers in connection with the
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a registration of their land titles, I would be
member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that previous to willing to handle the work in court and would
the last general elections he made use of a card written in charge only three pesos for every registration.
Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:

Yours respectfully,
LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public (Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER Attorney 
Province of Isabela Notary Public.

(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the
for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office; can applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the Code of Civil
renew lost documents of your animals; can make your application Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of
and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine
of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act No. 2828
although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or against by adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of
you. Come or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
offers free consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor.) through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."

The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of
addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in
written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows: 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27
and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide:
ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most
worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a
MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is
you of the approaching date for our induction the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
into office as member of the Provincial Board, professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be
that is on the 16th of next month. Before my forced, but must be the outcome of character and
induction into office I should be very glad to conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple
hear your suggestions or recommendations for business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local
the good of the province in general and for custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per
your barrio in particular. You can come to my se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or
house at any time here in Echague, to submit advertisements, or by personal communications or
to me any kind of suggestion or interview not warranted by personal relations, is
recommendation as you may desire. unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure
business by indirection through touters of any kind,
I also inform you that despite my membership whether allied real estate firms or trust companies
in the Board I will have my residence here in advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or
Echague. I will attend the session of the Board offering retainers in exchange for executorships or
of Ilagan, but will come back home on the trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect
following day here in Echague to live and serve advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring
with you as a lawyer and notary public. Despite newspaper comments concerning the manner of their
my election as member of the Provincial Board, conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like
and notary public. In case you cannot see me self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of
at home on any week day, I assure you that our high calling, and are intolerable.
you can always find me there on every
Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive 28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH
any work regarding preparations of documents AGENTS. — It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer
of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties
to before me as notary public even on of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so.
Sundays. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional,
but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to
I would like you all to be informed of this hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and
matter for the reason that some people are in inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or
the belief that my residence as member of the to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for
Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then personal injuries or those having any other grounds of
be disqualified to exercise my profession as action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ
lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward
case and I would make it clear that I am free directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the
to exercise my profession as formerly and that bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate
I will have my residence here in Echague. policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital
68
 attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise of
giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the
criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others,
to seek his professional services. A duty to the public
and to the profession devolves upon every member of
the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the
part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to
the end that the offender may be disbarred.

Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and

quarrels between individuals was a crime at the common law, and
one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an
attorney was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same
evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the
instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional.
The reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover.
The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not
seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do
so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53
Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625; People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L.
R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)

It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly

practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the
honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that
profession. It works against the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless
litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined
citizens.

The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for

disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly understood.

Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the

admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of having
solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons.
Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon
the action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal of
Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the Attorney-
General in the oral presentation of the case, suggests that the
respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action should
go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of
this character of which unfortunately the respondent's is only one.
The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify
permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating,
circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are, first,
his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts,
second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his
promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A modest
period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring
attorney. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is
reached in view of the considerations which have influenced the
court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance and
should, therefore, not be taken as indicating that future
convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by
disbarment.

In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the

court is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby
suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period
of one month from April 1, 1929,

Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

Separate Opinions

OSTRAND, J., dissenting:

I dissent. Under the circumstances of the case a reprimand would

have been sufficient punishment.

69
Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985

ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant 
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA.
GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA,
JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M.
NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE
A. CURAMMENG, JR., respondents.

Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.

Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for

respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his

1980 verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and
nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker &
McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois. 

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A.

Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains
the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the
release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E.
Gabriel, a client. 

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied

any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be
informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and
if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law
office." Not having received any reply, he filed the instant
complaint. 

We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot
practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker &
McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in
Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around
the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the
Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero &
Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie. 

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the

firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that
being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of
the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and
others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3,
respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie
is not authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo,
Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law

under the firm name Baker & McKenzie. 

SO ORDERED.

70
A.M. No. P-99-1292 February 26, 1999 went back to court "fuming mad" because of the alleged
unreasonableness of the court in issuing the injunction.
JULIETA BORROMEO SAMONTE, complainant, 
vs. Respondent Gatdula claims that thereafter complainant returned
ATTY. ROLANDO R. GATDULA, Branch Clerk of to his office, and informed him that she wanted to change counsel
Court, respondent. and that a friend of hers recommended the Law Firm of "Baligod,
Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera," at the same time
showing a calling card, and asking if he could handle her case.
RESOLUTION
Respondent refused as he was not connected with the law firm,
although he was invited to join but he choose to remain in the
GONZAGA-REYES, J.: judiciary. Complainant returned to court a few days later and told
him that if he cannot convince the judge to recall the writ of
preliminary injunction, she will file an administrative case against
The complaint filed by Julieta Borremeo Samonte charges Rolando respondent and the judge. The threat was repeated but the
R. Gatdula, RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City with grave misconduct respondent refused to be pressured. Meanwhile, the
consisting in the alleged engaging in the private practice of law Complainant's Motion to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary
which is in conflict with his official functions as Branch Clerk of Injunction was denied. Respondent Gatdula claims that the
Court. complainant must have filed this administrative charge because of
her frustration in procuring the ejectment of the defendant lessee
Complainant alleges that she is the authorized representative of from the premises. Respondent prays for the dismissal of the
her sister Flor Borromeo de Leon, the plaintiff, in Civil Case No. complainant against him.
37-14552 for ejectment, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 37. A typographical error was committed in The case was referred to Executive Judge Estrella Estrada, RTC,
the complaint which stated that the address of defendant is No. Quezon City, for investigation, report and recommendation.
63-C instead of 63-B, P. Tuazon Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City. The
mistake was rectified by the filing of an amended complaint which
was admitted by the Court. A decision was rendered in favor of In her report, Judge Estrada states that the case was set for
the plaintiff who subsequently filed a motion for execution. hearing three times, on September 7, 1997, on September 17,
Complainant, however, was surprised to receive a temporary and on September 24, 1997, but neither complainant nor her
restraining order signed by Judge Prudencio Castillo of Branch counsel appeared, despite due notice. The return of service of the
220, RTC, Quezon City, where Atty. Rolando Gatdula is the Branch Order setting the last hearing stated that complainant is still
Clerk Court, enjoining the execution of the decision of the abroad. There being no definite time conveyed to the court for the
Metropolitan Trial Court. Complainant alleges that the issuance of return of the complainant, the investigating Judge proceeded with
the temporary restraining order was hasty and irregular as she the investigation by "conducting searching question" upon
was never notified of the application for preliminary injunction. respondent based on the allegations in the complaint, and asked
for the record of Civil Case No. Q-96-28187 for evaluation. The
case was set for hearing for the last time on October 22, 1997, to
Complainant further alleges that when she went to Branch 220, give complainant a last chance to appear, but there was again no
RTC, Quezon City, to inquire about the reason for the issuance of appearance despite notice.
the temporary restraining order, respondent Atty. Rolando
Gatdula, blamed her lawyer for writing the wrong address in the
complaint for ejectment, and told her that if she wanted the The respondent testified in his own behalf to affirm the
execution to proceed, she should change her lawyer and retain statements in his Comment, and submitted documentary evidence
the law office of respondent, at the same time giving his calling consisting mainly of the pleadings in MTC Civil Case No. 37-
card with the name "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and 14552, and in RTC Civil Case No. Q-9628187 to show that the
Celera" with office at Rm. 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., questioned orders of the court were not improperly issued.
Cubao, Quezon City; otherwise she will not be able to eject the
defendant Dave Knope. Complainant told respondent that she
The investigating judge made the following findings:
could not decide because she was only representing her sister. To
her consternation, the RTC Branch 220 issued an order granting
the preliminary injunction as threatened by the respondent For failure of the complainant to appear at the several
despite the fact that the MTC, Brach 37 had issued an Order hearings despite notice, she failed to substantiate her
directing the execution of the Decision in Civil Case No. 37-14552. allegations in the complaint, particularly that herein
respondent gave her his calling card and tried to convince
her to change her lawyer. This being the case, it cannot be
Asked to comment, respondent Atty. Gatdula recited the
established with certainty that respondent indeed gave her
antecedents in the ejectment case and the issuance of the
his calling card even convinced her to change her lawyer.
restraining order by the Regional Trial Court, and claimed that
Moreover, as borne by the records of the Civil Case No. Q-
contrary to complainant Samonte's allegation that she was not
96-28187, complainant was duly notified of all the
notified of the raffle and the hearing, the Notice of Hearing on the
proceedings leading to the issuance of the TRO and the
motion for the issuance of a Temporary Retraining Order was duly
subsequent orders of Judge Prudencio Altre Castillo, Jr. of
served upon the parties, and that the application for injunctive
RTC, Branch 220. Complainant's lack of interest in
relief was heard before the temporary restraining order was
prosecuting this administrative case could be an indication
issued. The preliminary injunction was also set for hearing on
that her filing of the charge against the respondent is only
August 7, 1996.
intended to harass the respondent for her failure to obtain
a favorable decision from the Court.
The respondent's version of the incident is that sometime before
the hearing of the motion for the issuance of the temporary
However, based on the record of this administrative case,
restraining order, complainant Samonte went to court "very mad"
the calling card attached as Annex "B" of the
because of the issuance of the order stopping the execution of the
complainant's affidavit dated September 25, 1996
decision in the ejectment case. Respondent tried to calm her
allegedly given by respondent to complainant would show
down, and assured her that the restraining order was only
that the name of herein respondent was indeed include in
temporary and that the application for preliminary injunction
the BALIGOD, GATDULA, TACARDON, DIMAILIG & CELERA
would still be heard. Later the Regional Trial Court granted the
LAW OFFICES. While respondent denied having assumed
application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The complainant
71
 any position in said office, the fact remains that his name Time and again this Court has said that the conduct and behavior
is included therein which may therefore tend to show that of every one connected with an office charged with the
he has dealings with said office. Thus, while he may not be dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest
actually and directly employed with the firm, the fact that clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
his name appears on the calling card as partner in the responsibility. His conduct, at all times must only be characterized
Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig & Celera Law Offices by propriety and decorum but above all else must be above
give the impression that he is connected therein and may suspicion. 3
constitute an act of solicitation and private practice which
is declared unlawful under Republic Act. No. 6713. It is to
WHEREFORE, respondent Rolando R. Gatdula. Branch Clerk of
be noted, however, that complainant failed to establish by
Court, RTC, Branch 220, Quezon City is hereby reprimanded for
convincing evidence that respondent actually offered to
engaging in the private practice of law with the warning that a
her the services of their law office. Thus, the violation
repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely. He
committed by respondent in having his name
is further ordered to cause the exclusion of his name in the firm
included/retained in the calling card may only be
name of any office engaged in the private practice of law.
considered as a minor infraction for which he must also be
administratively sanctioned.
SO ORDERED.
and recommended that Atty. Gatdula be admonished and
censured for the minor infraction he has committed.

Finding: We agree with the investigating judge that the

respondent is guilty of an infraction. The complainant by her
failure to appear at the hearings, failed to substantiate her
allegation that it was the respondent who gave her calling card
"Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera Law Offices" and
that he tried to convince her to change counsels. We find
however, that while the respondent vehemently denies the
complainant's allegations, he does not deny that his name
appears on the calling card attached to the complaint, which
admittedly came into the hands of the complainant. The
respondent testified before the Investigating Judge as follows:

Q: How about your statement that you even gave

her a calling card of the "Baligod, Gatdula, Pardo,
Dimailig and Celera law Offices at Room 220
Mariwasa building?

A: I vehemently deny the allegation of the

complainant that I gave her a calling card. I was
surprised when she presented (it) to me during
one of her follow-ups of the case before the court.
She told me that a friend of hers recommended
such firm and she found out that my name is
included in that firm. I told her that I have not
assumed any position in the law firm. And I am
with the Judiciary since I passed the bar. It is
impossible for me to enter an appearance as her
counsel in the very same court where I am the
Branch Clerk of Court.

The above explanation tendered by the Respondent is an

admission that it is his name appears on the calling
card, a permissible form of advertising or solicitation of
legal services. 1 Respondent does not claim that the
calling card was printed without his knowledge or
consent, and the calling card 2 carries his name primarily
and the name "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and
Celera with address at 220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora
Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City" in the left corner. The card
clearly gives the impression that he is connected with
the said law firm. The inclusion/retention of his name in
the professional card constitutes an act of solicitation
which violates Section 7 sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic Act
No. 6713, otherwise known as "Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for the Public Officials and Employees"
which declares it unlawful for a public official or
employee to, among others:

(2) Engage in the private practice of their

profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with official functions.

72
 [B.M. 850.  October 2, 2001] Rule 3. COMPLIANCE PERIOD
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
RESOLUTION
ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING SECTION 1. Initial compliance period. -- The initial
LEGAL EDUCATION compliance period shall begin not later than three (3) months
FOR MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE from the adoption of these Rules. Except for the initial compliance
PHILIPPINES period for members admitted or readmitted after the
establishment of the program, all compliance periods shall be for
thirty-six (36) months and shall begin the day after the end of the
Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal previous compliance period.
Education (MCLE) for members of the Integrated Bar of the
SEC. 2. Compliance Groups. -- Members of the IBP not
Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the
exempt from the MCLE requirement shall be divided into three (3)
Philippine Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by the
compliance groups, namely:
Supreme Court Committee on Legal Education, the Court hereby
resolves to approve, as it hereby approves, the following Revised (a)            Compliance group 1. -- Members in the
Rules for proper implementation: National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila are
assigned to Compliance Group 1.

(b)            Compliance group 2. -- Members in Luzon

Rule 1. PURPOSE outside NCR are assigned to Compliance Group 2.

(c)            Compliance group 3. -- Members in Visayas

and Mindanao are assigned to Compliance Group
SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. - Continuing legal
3.
education is required of members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal
abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the education activity wherever it may be available to earn credit unit
profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law. toward compliance with the MCLE requirement.

SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or

readmitted after establishment of the program. - Members
Rule 2. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the
program shall be assigned to the appropriate Compliance Group
based on their Chapter membership on the date of admission or
readmission.
SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. - Within two (2)
months from the approval of these Rules by the Supreme Court The initial compliance period after admission or readmission
En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted and shall shall begin on the first day of the month of admission or
commence the implementation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal readmission and shall end on the same day as that of all other
Education (MCLE) program in accordance with these Rules. members in the same Compliance Group.
SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE. - Members of (a)            Where four (4) months or less remain of
the IBP not exempt under Rule 7 shall complete every three (3) the initial compliance period after admission or
years at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education readmission, the member is not required to comply
activities approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours: with the program requirement for the initial
compliance.
(a)            At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to
legal ethics equivalent to six (6) credit units. (b)            Where more than four (4) months remain
of the initial compliance period after admission or
(b)            At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to
readmission, the member shall be required to
trial and pretrial skills equivalent to four (4) credit
complete a number of hours of approved
units.
continuing legal education activities equal to the
(c)            At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to number of months remaining in the compliance
alternative dispute resolution equivalent to five (5) period in which the member is admitted or
credit units. readmitted. Such member shall be required to
complete a number of hours of education in legal
(d)            At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to ethics in proportion to the number of months
updates on substantive and procedural laws, and remaining in the compliance period. Fractions of
jurisprudence equivalent to nine (9) credit units. hours shall be rounded up to the next whole
number.
(e)            At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to
legal writing and oral advocacy equivalent to four
(4) credit units.
Rule 4. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS(CU)
(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to
international law and international conventions
equivalent to two (2) credit units.
SECTION 1. Guidelines. - CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT
(g)            The remaining six (6) hours shall be TO CREDIT HOURS. CREDIT UNITS measure compliance with the
devoted to such subjects as may be prescribed by MCLE requirement under the Rules, based on the category of the
the MCLE Committee equivalent to six (6) credit lawyer’s participation in the MCLE activity. The following are the
units. guidelines for computing credit units and the supporting
documents required therefor:

73
 (a)            Attending approved education activities like
PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY CREDIT SUPPORTING
seminars, conferences, conventions, symposia, in-
UNITS DOCUMENTS
house education programs, workshops, dialogues
1.                SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, or round table discussion.
IN-HOUSE EDUCATION PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES,
(b)            Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned
ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED PROVIDERS UNDER
panelist, reactor, commentator, resource speaker,
RULE 7 AND OTHER RELATED RULES
moderator, coordinator or facilitator in approved
1.1 PARTICIPANT/ 1 CU PER CERTIFICATE OF education activities.
ATTENDEE HOUR OF ATTENDANCE WITH
(c)            Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a
ATTENDANC NUMBER OF HOURS
bar review class.
E
SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units. - Non-
1.2 LECTURER FULL CU PHOTOCOPY OF participatory credit units may be claimed per compliance period
  RESOURCE FOR THE PLAQUE OR for:
  SPEAKER SUBJECT SPONSOR’S
PER CERTIFICATION (a)            Preparing, as an author or co-author,
COMPLIANC written materials published or accepted for
E PERIOD  publication, e.g., in the form of an article, chapter,
book, or book review which contribute to the legal
1.3 PANELIST/REACTOR 1/2 OF CU CERTIFICATION education of the author member, which were not
COMMENTATOR/ FOR THE FROM SPONSORING prepared in the ordinary course of the member’s
MODERATOR/ SUBJECT ORGANIZATION practice or employment.
COORDINATOR/ PER
FACILITATOR COMPLIANC (b)            Editing a law book, law journal or legal
E PERIOD newsletter.

2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW

2.1 LAW BOOK OF NOT FULL CU PUBLISHED BOOK

LESS THAN 100 PAGES FOR THE Rule 6. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS (CH)
SUBJECT
PER
COMPLIANC SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. -- Credit hours are
E PERIOD computed based on actual time spent in an education activity in
hours to the nearest one-quarter hour reported in decimals.
2.2 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE PUBLISHED BOOK
CU OF WITH PROOF AS
AUTHORSHI EDITOR
P Rule 7. EXEMPTIONS
CATEGORY

2.3 RESEARCH PAPER 1/2 OF CU DULY CERTIFIED/

INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/ FOR THE PUBLISHED SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE. -- The
CREATIVE PROJECT SUBJECT TECHNICAL following members of the Bar are exempt from the MCLE
PER REPORT/PAPER requirement:
COMPLIANC
E PERIOD (a)            The President and the Vice President of the
Philippines, and the Secretaries and
2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE OF AT 1/2 OF CU PUBLISHED ARTICLE Undersecretaries of Executive Departments;
LEAST TEN (10) PAGES FOR THE
SUBJECT (b)            Senators and Members of the House of
PER Representatives;
COMPLIANC
(c)            The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of
E PERIOD
the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired
2.5 LEGAL NEWSLETTER/ 1 CU PER PUBLISHED members of the judiciary, incumbent members of
LAW JOURNAL EDITOR ISSUE NEWSLETTER/JOURN the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court
AL lawyers covered by the Philippine Judicial Academy
program of continuing judicial education;
2.6 PROFESSORIAL CHAIR/ FULL CU CERTIFICATION OF
(d)            The Chief State Counsel, Chief State
BAR REVIEW LECTURE LAW FOR THE LAW DEAN OR BAR
Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the
TEACHING/ SUBJECT REVIEW DIRECTOR
Department of Justice;
PER
COMPLIANC (e)            The Solicitor General and the Assistant
E PERIOD Solicitors General;

(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and

Assistant Government Corporate Counsel;
Rule 5. CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS (g)            The Chairmen and Members of the
Constitutional Commissions;

SECTION 1. Classes of Credit units. -- Credit units are either (h)            The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy
participatory or non-participatory. Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman and the
Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
SEC. 2. Claim for participatory credit units. -- Participatory Ombudsman;
credit units may be claimed for:
74
 (i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi- (e)            In-house education activities must be
judicial functions; scheduled at a time and location so as to be free
from interruption like telephone calls and other
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of distractions.
law who have teaching experience for at least ten
(10) years in accredited law schools;

(k)            The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and

Rule 9. ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS
members of the Corps of Professors and
Professorial Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial
Academy; and
SECTION 1. Accreditation  of providers.  -- Accreditation of
(l) Governors and Mayors. providers shall be done by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE. - The SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation of providers.  - Any
following Members of the Bar are likewise exempt: person or group may be accredited as a provider for a term of two
(2) years, which may be renewed, upon written application. All
(a)            Those who are not in law practice, private providers of continuing legal education activities, including in-
or public. house providers, are eligible to be accredited providers.
Application for accreditation shall:
(b)            Those who have retired from law practice
with the approval of the IBP Board of Governors. (a)            Be submitted on a form provided by the
MCLE Committee;
SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of
requirement -A member may file a verified request setting forth (b)            Contain all information requested in the
good cause for exemption (such as physical disability, illness, post form;
graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from
compliance with or modification of any of the requirements, (c)            Be accompanied by the appropriate
including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance with approval fee.
a procedure to be established by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 3. Requirements of all providers.  -- All approved
SEC. 4. Change of status. - The compliance period shall accredited providers shall agree to the following:
begin on the first day of the month in which a member ceases to
be exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on (a)            An official record verifying the attendance
the same day as that of all other members in the same at the activity shall be maintained by the provider
Compliance Group. for at least four (4) years after the completion
date. The provider shall include the member on the
SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. - Applications for exemption official record of attendance only if the member’s
from or modification of the MCLE requirement shall be under oath signature was obtained at the time of attendance
and supported by documents. at the activity. The official record of attendance
shall contain the member’s name and number in
the Roll of Attorneys and shall identify the time,
date, location, subject matter, and length of the
Rule 8. STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF education activity. A copy of such record shall be
EDUCATION ACTIVITIES furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.

(b)            The provider shall certify that:

SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program.  - Subject to the
implementing regulations that may be adopted by the MCLE (1)          This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE
Committee, continuing legal education program may be granted COMMITTEE in the amount of ________ hours of which ______
approval in either of two (2) ways: (1) the provider of the activity hours will apply in (legal ethics, etc.), as appropriate to the
is an accredited provider and certifies that the activity meets the content of the activity;
criteria of Section 2 of this Rule; and (2) the provider is
specifically mandated by law to provide continuing legal
(2)          The activity conforms to the standards for approved
education.
education activities prescribed by these Rules and such
SEC. 2. Standards for all education activities.  - All regulations as may be prescribed by the MCLE COMMITTEE.
continuing legal education activities must meet the following
standards: (c)            The provider shall issue a record or certificate to
all participants identifying the time, date, location,
(a)            The activity shall have significant current
subject matter and length of the activity.
intellectual or practical content.

(b)            The activity shall constitute an organized (d)            The provider shall allow in-person observation of
program of learning related to legal subjects and all approved continuing legal education activity by THE
the legal profession, including cross profession MCLE COMMITTEE, members of the IBP Board of
activities (e.g., accounting-tax or medical-legal) Governors, or designees of the Committee and IBP staff
that enhance legal skills or the ability to practice Board for purposes of monitoring compliance with these
law, as well as subjects in legal writing and oral Rules.
advocacy.

(c)            The activity shall be conducted by a (e)            The provider shall indicate in promotional

provider with adequate professional experience. materials, the nature of the activity, the time devoted to
each topic and identity of the instructors. The provider
(d)            Where the activity is more than one (1) shall make available to each participant a copy of THE
hour in length, substantive written materials must MCLE COMMITTEE-approved Education Activity
be distributed to all participants. Such materials Evaluation Form.
must be distributed at or before the time the
activity is offered.
75
 (f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education sixty (60) days from receipt of non-compliance
Activity Evaluation Forms for a period of not less than notice;
one (1) year after the activity, copy furnished the MCLE
COMMITTEE. (e)            Failure to pay non-compliance fee within
the prescribed period;

(g)            Any person or group who conducts an (f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the
unauthorized activity under this program or issues a foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade
spurious certificate in violation of these Rules shall be compliance with the MCLE requirements.
subject to appropriate sanctions.
SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain
compliance.  -Members failing to comply will receive a Non-
SEC. 4. Renewal of provider accreditation.  - The Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will be given
accreditation of a provider may be renewed every two (2) years. sixty (60) days from the date of notification to file a response
It may be denied if the provider fails to comply with any of the clarifying the deficiency or otherwise showing compliance with the
requirements of these Rules or fails to provide satisfactory requirements. Such notice shall contain the following language
education activities for the preceding period. near the beginning of the notice in capital letters:
SEC. 5. Revocation of provider accreditation. -- the
accreditation of any provider referred to in Rule 9 may be revoked IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF
by a majority vote of the MCLE Committee, after notice and COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT
hearing and for good cause. DATE 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF NOTICE), YOU SHALL BE
LISTED AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE
PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS
ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE
Rule 10. FEE FOR APPROVAL OF ACTIVITY AND MCLE COMMITTEE.
ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDER
Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-
Compliance Notice may use this period to attain the
SECTION 1. Payment of fees.  - Application for approval of adequate number of credit units for compliance. Credit units
an education activity or accreditation as a provider requires earned during this period may only be counted toward
payment of the appropriate fee as provided in the Schedule of compliance with the prior compliance period requirement
MCLE Fees. unless units in excess of the requirement are earned, in
which case the excess may be counted toward meeting the
current compliance period requirement.

Rule 11. GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

Rule 13. CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE

SECTION 1. Compliance card. -- Each member shall secure
from the MCLE Committee a Compliance Card before the end of
his compliance period. He shall complete the card by attesting SECTION 1. Non-compliance fee.  -- A member who, for
under oath that he has complied with the education requirement whatever reason, is in non-compliance at the end of the
or that he is exempt, specifying the nature of the exemption. compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee.
Such Compliance Card must be returned to the Committee not
later than the day after the end of the member's compliance SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member.  -- A member who
period. fails to comply with the requirements after the sixty (60) day
period for compliance has expired, shall be listed as a delinquent
SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. -- Each member of the IBP upon the recommendation of the MCLE
member shall maintain sufficient record of compliance or Committee. The investigation of a member for non-compliance
exemption, copy furnished the MCLE Committee. The record shall be conducted by the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline as a
required to be provided to the members by the provider pursuant fact-finding arm of the MCLE Committee.
to Section 3(c) of Rule 9 should be a sufficient record of
attendance at a participatory activity. A record of non- SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee.  -- Membership fees
participatory activity shall also be maintained by the member, as shall continue to accrue at the active rate against a member
referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5. during the period he/she is listed as a delinquent member.

Rule 12. NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES Rule 14. REINSTATEMENT

SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance.  - The SECTION 1. Process.  -- The involuntary listing as a
following shall constitute non-compliance: delinquent member shall be terminated when the member
provides proof of compliance with the MCLE requirement,
(a)            Failure to complete the education including payment of non-compliance fee. A member may attain
requirement within the compliance period; the necessary credit units to meet the requirement for the period
of non-compliance during the period the member is on inactive
(b)            Failure to provide attestation of compliance status. These credit units may not be counted toward meeting the
or exemption; current compliance period requirement. Credit units earned during
the period of non-compliance in excess of the number needed to
(c)            Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of
satisfy the prior compliance period requirement may be counted
compliance (including evidence of exempt status)
toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.
within the prescribed period;
SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an administrative
(d)            Failure to satisfy the education requirement
process.  - The termination of listing as a delinquent member is
and furnish evidence of such compliance within
76
administrative in nature AND it shall be made by the MCLE
Committee.

Rule. 15. COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY CONTINUING

LEGAL EDUCATION

SECTION 1. Composition.  - The MCLE Committee shall be

composed of five (5) members, namely, a retired Justice of the
Supreme Court as Chair, and four (4) members respectively
nominated by the IBP, the Philippine Judicial Academy, a law
center designated by the Supreme Court and associations of law
schools and/or law professors.

The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity

and integrity. They shall be appointed by the Supreme Court for a
term of three (3) years and shall receive such compensation as
may be determined by the Court.

SEC. 2. Duty of committee.  - The MCLE Committee shall

administer and adopt such implementing rules as may be
necessary subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. It shall,
in consultation with the IBP Board of Governors, prescribe a
schedule of MCLE fees with the approval of the Supreme Court.

SEC. 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee.  - Subject to approval

by the Supreme Court, the MCLE Committee shall employ such
staff as may be necessary to perform the record-keeping,
auditing, reporting, approval and other necessary functions.

SEC. 4. Submission of annual budget.  - The MCLE

Committee shall submit to the Supreme Court for approval, an
annual budget [for a subsidy] to establish, operate and maintain
the MCLE Program.

This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of

September 2000, following its publication in two (2) newspapers
of general circulation in the Philippines.

Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02

October 2001.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza,

Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De
Leon, Jr.,  and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ.,  concur.
Kapunan, J.,  on official leave.

77
Republic Act No. 6713             February 20, 1989 shall at all times uphold the Constitution and put loyalty to
country above loyalty to persons or party.
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL
STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, TO (h) Simple living. - Public officials and employees and their
UPHOLD THE TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC families shall lead modest lives appropriate to their positions and
OFFICE BEING A PUBLIC TRUST, GRANTING INCENTIVES income. They shall not indulge in extravagant or ostentatious
AND REWARDS FOR EXEMPLARY SERVICE, ENUMERATING display of wealth in any form.
PROHIBITED ACTS AND TRANSACTIONS AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR OTHER
(B) The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive measures to
PURPOSES
promote (1) observance of these standards including the
dissemination of information programs and workshops authorizing
Section 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. - merit increases beyond regular progression steps, to a limited
(A) Every public official and employee shall observe the following number of employees recognized by their office colleagues to be
as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and execution outstanding in their observance of ethical standards; and (2)
of official duties: continuing research and experimentation on measures which
provide positive motivation to public officials and employees in
raising the general level of observance of these standards.
(a) Commitment to public interest. - Public officials and
employees shall always uphold the public interest over and above
personal interest. All government resources and powers of their
respective offices must be employed and used efficiently,
effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to avoid
wastage in public funds and revenues.

(b) Professionalism. - Public officials and employees shall perform

and discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall enter public
service with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. They shall
endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as
dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.

(c) Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall

remain true to the people at all times. They must act with
justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone,
especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times
respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public
order, public safety and public interest. They shall not dispense or
extend undue favors on account of their office to their relatives
whether by consanguinity or affinity except with respect to
appointments of such relatives to positions considered strictly
confidential or as members of their personal staff whose terms
are coterminous with theirs.

(d) Political neutrality. - Public officials and employees shall

provide service to everyone without unfair discrimination and
regardless of party affiliation or preference.

(e) Responsiveness to the public. - Public officials and employees

shall extend prompt, courteous, and adequate service to the
public. Unless otherwise provided by law or when required by the
public interest, public officials and employees shall provide
information of their policies and procedures in clear and
understandable language, ensure openness of information, public
consultations and hearings whenever appropriate, encourage
suggestions, simplify and systematize policy, rules and
procedures, avoid red tape and develop an understanding and
appreciation of the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the
country, especially in the depressed rural and urban areas.

(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - Public officials and employees

shall at all times be loyal to the Republic and to the Filipino
people, promote the use of locally produced goods, resources and
technology and encourage appreciation and pride of country and
people. They shall endeavor to maintain and defend Philippine
sovereignty against foreign intrusion.

(g) Commitment to democracy. - Public officials and employees

shall commit themselves to the democratic way of life and values,
maintain the principle of public accountability, and manifest by
deeds the supremacy of civilian authority over the military. They

78
79
A.C. No. 3056               August 16, 1991 the latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and send money
for a round trip plane ticket for him.
FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant, 
vs. The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of
ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON respondent. P2,000) was sent to respondent through his niece.

PER CURIAM:p Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to
plane fare, respondent imposed additional registration
requirements. Fed up with the respondent's extortionate tactics,
This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case
the complainant wrote him a letter on May 20, 1987 challenging
which complainant Attorney Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel
him to act on all pending applications for registration of V & G
for V & G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for short), filed
within twenty-four (24) hours.
against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City, for the latter's irregular actuations with regard to
the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the
Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision. The transfer of 163 certificates of title to the GSIS on the uniform
present complaint charges the respondent with the following ground that the deeds of absolute sale with assignment were
offenses: ambiguous as to parties and subject matter. On May 26, 1987,
Attorney Collantes moved for a reconsideration of said denial,
stressing that:
1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests
and without sufficient justification, to act within
reasonable time (sic) the registration of 163 Deeds of ... since the year 1973 continuously up to December
Absolute Sale with Assignment and the eventual 1986 for a period of nearly fifteen (15) years or for a
issuance and transfer of the corresponding 163 transfer sum total of more than 2,000 same set of documents
certificates of titles to the GSIS, for the purpose of which have been repeatedly and uniformly registered in
obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit from the the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City
person or persons interested therein. under Attys. Modesto Garcia and Pablo Amascual Jr., it
is only during the incumbency of Atty. Vicente C.
Renomeron, that the very same documents of the same
2. Conduct unbecoming of public official.
tenor have been refused or denied registration ... (p. 15,
Rollo.)
3. Dishonesty.
On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to
4. Extortion. the Administrator, National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration Authority
[LRA]). In a Resolution dated July 27,1987 (Consulta No. 1579),
5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for the NLTDRA ruled that the questioned documents were
himself in connection with pending official transaction registrable. Heedless of the NLTDRA's opinion, respondent
before him. continued to sit on V & Gs 163 deeds of sale with assignment.

6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with
Government through manifest partiality, evident bad the NLTDRA on June 4, 1987 administrative charges (docketed as
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Adm. Case No. 87-15), against respondent Register of Deeds.

7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p. 10, Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G.
Rollo.) Bonifacio directed respondent to explain in writing why no
administrative disciplinary action should be taken against him.
As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the Respondent was further asked whether he would submit his case
respondent Register of Deeds to register some 163 deeds of sale on the basis of his answer, or be heard in a formal investigation.
with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G
mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. There was no action from In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges
the respondent. of extortion and of directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit
for himself in connection with the official transactions awaiting his
Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to action.
approve or deny registration of the uniform deeds of absolute sale
with assignment. Still no action except to require V & G to submit Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator
proof of real estate tax payment and to clarify certain details Bonifacio to hear Attorney Collantes' charges against him,
about the transactions. Attorney Renomeron waived his right to a formal investigation.
Both parties submitted the case for resolution based on the
Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, pleadings.
respondent Renomeron suspended the registration of the
documents pending compliance by V & G with a certain "special The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended
arrangement" between them, which was that V & G should dropping the charges of: (1) dishonesty; (2) causing undue injury
provide him with a weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to to a party through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu inexcusable negligence; and (3) gross ignorance of the law and
thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon City house and lot by V procedure. He opined that the charge of neglecting or refusing, in
& G or GSIS representatives. spite repeated requests and without sufficient justification, to act
within a reasonable time on the registration of the documents
On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he involved, in order to extort some pecuniary or material benefit
would act favorably on the 163 registrable documents of V & G if from the interested party, absorbed the charges of conduct
unbecoming of a public official, extortion, and directly receiving
80
some pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the
pending official transactions before him. respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined
by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official. The answer
is yes, for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a
Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA
violation of his oath as a lawyer.
Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio on February 22, 1988,
recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez that the
respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People
reprimanded to act with dispatch on documents presented to him vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes upon every lawyer the duty
for registration; and (3) be warned that a repetition of similar to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a
infraction will be dealt with more severely. source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his
suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics,
Ruben E. Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).
After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoñez found
respondent guilty of grave misconduct.
As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
Our study and consideration of the records of the case
indicate that ample evidence supports the Investigating A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar
Officer's findings that the respondent committed grave which is designed to impress upon him his
misconduct. responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the
court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility
of assisting the courts in the proper. fair, speedy, and
The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the
efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the
documents presented to him for registration and,
court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that
notwithstanding representations by the parties
in his every exertion the only criterion he that truth and
interested for expeditious action on the said documents,
justice triumph. This discipline is what as given the law
he continued with his inaction.
profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted
place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix
The records indicate that the respondent eventually Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-
formally denied the registration of the documents speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual
involved; that he himself elevated the question on the honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary
registrability of the said documents to Administrator responsibility— all of which, throughout the centuries,
Bonifacio after he formally denied the registration have been compendiously described as moral character.
thereof, that the Administrator then resolved in favor of
the registrability of the said documents in question; and
Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate
that, such resolution of the Administrator
to public service of the highest order.1âwphi1 A lawyer
notwithstanding, the respondent still refused the
is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is
registration thereof but demanded from the parties
clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and
interested the submission of additional requirements not
ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of
adverted to in his previous denial.
the quest of truth and justice, for which he has sworn to
be a fearless crusader. (Apostacy in the Legal
x x x           x x x          x x x Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790; emphasis supplied.)

In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in
the respondent claims that he neither touched nor government service in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon
received the money sent to him, on record remains 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
uncontroverted the circumstance that his niece, Ms. de Officials requires public officials and employees to process
la Cruz, retrieved from him the amount of P800.00 documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d]
earlier sent to him as plane fare, not in the original and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or
denomination of P100.00 bills but in P50.00 bills. The material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their
respondent had ample opportunity to clarify or to office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of
countervail this related incident in his letter dated 5 monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be
September 1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but he never affected by the functions of their office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and
did so. [d]), the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule
1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any man's
... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103).
new in office cannot serve to mitigate his liability. His
being so should have motivated him to be more aware
of applicable laws, rules and regulations and should have A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
prompted him to do his best in the discharge of his reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
duties. (pp. 17-18, Rollo.) whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Rule
7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.)
Secretary Ordoñez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino
that Renomeron be dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of
leave credits and retirement benefits, and with prejudice to re- This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent,
employment in the government service, effective immediately. honorable, and reliable" may practice the profession of law
(Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue
"only the highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court
As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).
Philippines, by Adm. Order No. 165 dated May 3, 1990, dismissed
the respondent from the government service (pp. 1419, Rollo).
The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron
committed as a public official have demonstrated his unfitness to
Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron practice the high and noble calling of the law (Bautista vs. Judge
in the NLTDRA, Attorney Collantes also filed in this Court on June
16, 1987, a disbarment complaint against said respondent.
81
Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an
Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269). He should therefore be disbarred. antedated receipt because one of her daughters asked her to
account for the ₱5,000 she had previously given the respondent
for safekeeping.12 Because the complainant was a friend, he
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C.
agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15, 1992.13
Renomeron be disbarred from the practice of law in the
Philippines, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys
On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO.14 A few
months later or in September 1994, the complainant again asked
SO ORDERED.
respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as
he was now a private practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare
A.C. No. 6788August 23, 2007 (Formerly, CBD 382) the complaint. However, he was unable to finalize it as he lost
contact with the complainant.15
DIANA RAMOS, Complainant, 
vs. Recommendation of the IBP
ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, Respondent.
Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
RESOLUTION of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where the complaint
was filed, received evidence from the parties. On November 22,
2004, the CBD submitted its report and recommendation to the
PER CURIAM: IBP Board of Governors.16

This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension1 against Atty. The CBD noted that the receipt17 was issued on July 15, 1992
Jose R. Imbang for multiple violations of the Code of Professional when respondent was still with the PAO.18 It also noted that
Responsibility. respondent described the complainant as a shrewd
businesswoman and that respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer.
The Complaint For these reasons, the complainant would not have accepted a
spurious receipt nor would respondent have issued one. The CBD
rejected respondent's claim that he issued the receipt to
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of accommodate a friend's request.19 It found respondent guilty of
respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions violating the prohibitions on government lawyers from accepting
against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos.2 She gave private cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than their
respondent ₱8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a salaries.20 The CBD concluded that respondent violated the
receipt for ₱5,000 only.3 following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed immoral or deceitful conduct.
her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He
would then come out after several hours to inform her that the
hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled.4 This happened six Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property
times and for each "appearance" in court, respondent charged her collected or received for or from a client.
₱350.
Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became he knows or should know that he is not qualified to render.
suspicious. She personally inquired about the status of her cases However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his
in the trial courts of Biñan and San Pedro, Laguna. She was client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against the competent on the matter.
Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public
Attorney's Office (PAO).5 Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice
of law for three years and ordered him to immediately return to
Respondent's Defense the complainant the amount of ₱5,000 which was substantiated
by the receipt.21

According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the

government service from the very start. In fact, he first met the The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of
complainant when he was still a district attorney in the Citizen's the CBD that respondent violated Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of
Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of Biñan, Laguna and the Code of Professional Responsibility. It, however, modified the
was assigned as counsel for the complainant's daughter.6 CBD's recommendation with regard to the restitution of ₱5,000 by
imposing interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in case
of respondent's failure to return the total amount, an additional
In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action suspension of six months.22
for damages against the Jovellanoses.7 Because he was with the
PAO and aware that the complainant was not an indigent, he
declined.8 Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult The Court's Ruling
Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who was a private practitioner. 9 Atty.
Ungson, however, did not accept the complainant's case as she We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.
was unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed
upon.10Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant
allegedly remained adamant. She insisted on suing the Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and
Jovellanoses. Afraid that she "might spend" the cash on hand, the integrity.23 More specifically, lawyers in government service are
complainant asked respondent to keep the ₱5,000 while she expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are
raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee.11 subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar
but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public
service.24

82
Government employees are expected to devote themselves Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private
completely to public service. For this reason, the private practice cases and accepting attorney's fees, respondent also
of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to
Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides: file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place
he should not have done), respondent also led the complainant to
believe that he really filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions.  -- In addition to acts
even made it appear that the cases were being tried and asked
and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in
the complainant to pay his "appearance fees" for hearings that
the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute
never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.31
employee and are hereby declared unlawful:

Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good

x x x           x x x          x x x
moral character required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a
public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust
public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not: and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the
dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a
x x x           x x x          x x x keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social
responsibility, higher than his brethren in private
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized practice.321avvphi1
by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not
conflict with their official function.25 There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of
violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the
for they are expected to devote themselves full-time to the work complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held
of their respective offices. the amount in trust for the complainant (such as an amount
delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in
favor of the client)33 nor was it given to him for a specific purpose
In this instance, respondent received ₱5,000 from the (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail
complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was bond).34 Nevertheless, respondent should return the ₱5,000 as he,
still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client a government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not
establishes an attorney-client relationship.26Respondent's allowed to accept them.35
admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the
receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship
between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating
that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a the lawyer’s oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01
government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
private practice of profession. hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name
is ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered
to return to complainant the amount of ₱5,000 with interest at the
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of legal rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of
attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the purpose of providing this resolution.
free legal assistance to indigent litigants.27 Section 14(3), Chapter
5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant and notice of the
Sec. 14. xxx same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in the country.
extending free legal assistance to indigent persons in criminal,
civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.28 SO ORDERED.

As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's

fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent with the
office's mission.29 Respondent violated the prohibition against
accepting legal fees other than his salary.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Canon 1. — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws

of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.

Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.30 This undertaking

includes the observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions
blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the
complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in consideration
of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance of
the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private
practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the
complainant's counsel.

83
G.R. No. 109870 December 1, 1995 2. During that period, I controlled an effective
majority of the voting shares of stock of CDCP.
EDILBERTO M. CUENCA, petitioner, 
vs. 3. Sometime in 1974, upon my initiative, CDCP
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE together with its affiliated companies,
PHILIPPINES, respondents. organized a number of wholly-owned service
corporations. One of these was Ultra
International Trading Corporation, whose
RESOLUTION
purpose was to serve and supply the needs of
CDCP and its other subsidiaries with lower
FRANCISCO, J.: value goods and using Ultra's financial
resources.
After his petition for review of the Court of Appeals'
judgment1 affirming his conviction for violation of the "Trust 4. The directors in Ultra Corporation were
Receipts Law" (Presidential Decree No. 115) was denied by this nominees of CDCP, and received the
Court in a Resolution dated February 9, 1994,2petitioner filed on instructions directly from me and or Mr. Pedro
July 6, 1994 a pleading entitled "SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL Valdez, Chairman of CDCP.
WITH MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL"3 setting forth, in relation to the motion for new trial:
5. From Ultra's inception, my brother, Mr.
Edilberto M. Cuenca was appointed President
6. The Motion for New Trial shall be grounded on and Chief Executive Officer. On March, 1979, I
newly discovered evidence and excusible (sic) instructed Ultra through my brother, Mr.
negligence, and shall be supported by affidavits of: Edilberto Cuenca to purchase for CDCP various
steel materials. These materials were received
by CDCP and are covered by the trust receipts
(i) an officer of private complainant which are the subject of this case.
corporation who will exculpate petitioner;

6. In 1980, CDCP suffered cashflow problems,

(ii) an admission against interest by a and consciously omitted payment to Ultra for
former officer of the owner of Ultra the delivery of the said steel materials. As a
Corporation (the Corporation that employed nominee of CDCP, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca
petitioner), which actually exercised control merely acted as agent for CDCP. As such,
over the affairs of Ultra; and CDCP provided him with the guarantees
needed to persuade China Bank to issue the
(iii) the petitioner wherein he will assert said trust receipts. On the basis of such
innocence for the first time and explain why guarantees, along with informal assurances
he was unable to do so earlier. issued by CDCP to China Bank that the
transactions of Ultra were undertaken for and
on behalf of CDCP and CDCP Mining
The Court in its July 27, 1994 Resolution, 4 among other Corporation, Ultra was able to obtain credit
things, granted the substitution but denied the motion facilities, among which included the trust
for leave to file motion for new trial, "the petition having receipts subject of this case.
been already denied on February 9, 1994."

7. However, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca had no

Notwithstanding, petitioner on August 8, 1994 filed a "MOTION TO power to cause the payment of said trust
ADMIT ATTACHED MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL",5 and a receipts because the common Treasurer and
"MANIFESTATION AND SECOND MOTION TO ADMIT" on August controller of both CDCP and Ultra, Ms. Nora
17, 1994.  The Court thereafter required the Solicitor General to
6
Vinluan, acted under my control and I did not
comment on said motion and manifestation within ten (10) days allow her to make the appropriate payments.
from notice, in a Resolution dated September 7, 1994.7

8. To my knowledge, CDCP has not paid Ultra

In the Comment filed after three (3) extensions of time were the amounts corresponding to the materials
given by the Court,8 the Solicitor General himself recommends covered by the trust receipts subject of this
that petitioner be entitled to a new trial, proceeding from the case.
same impression that a certain Rodolfo Cuenca's (petitioner's
brother) sworn statement is an admission against interest which
may ultimately exonerate petitioner from criminal liability. The full 9. By the time final demand to pay on the trust
text of Mr. Rodolfo Cuenca's "Affidavit"9 reads: receipts were (sic) served in 1984, Mr.
Edilberto Cuenca was no longer president of
Ultra Corporation and could not have possibly
RODOLFO M. CUENCA, Filipino, of legal age, cause (sic) Ultra Corporation to pay.
with the residence at Urdaneta Village, Makati,
Metro Manila, after being duly sworn and (sic)
state that: 10. I have executed this affidavit in order to
accept personal responsibility for the trust
receipts subject of this case and to exculpate
1. During the years 1967 until February 1983, Mr. Edilberto Cuenca of the criminal charges
I was the President and Chief Executive Officer which he has asked this Honorable Court to
of Construction Development Corporation of review.
the Philippines (CDCP).

84
 11. Accordingly, I also undertake to pay the entertain a motion for new trial on the ground
civil obligations arising from the subject trust of newly discovered evidence, for only
receipts. questions of fact are involved therein.

(Sgd.) the rule now appears to have been relaxed, if not

RODOLFO M. CUENCA abandoned, in subsequent cases like "Helmuth, Jr. v.
Affiant People"11 and "People v. Amparado".12

And the Solicitor General had this to say: In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside technicalities and
despite the opposition of the Solicitor General, granted new trial
to the convicted accused concerned on the basis of proposed
Ordinarily, it is too late at this stage to ask for
testimonies or affidavits of persons which the Court considered as
a new trial.
newly discovered and probably sufficient evidence to reverse the
judgment of conviction. Being similarly circumstanced, there is no
However, the sworn statement of Rodolfo nagging reason why herein petitioner should be denied the same
Cuenca is a declaration against his own benefit. It becomes all the more plausible under the
interests under Section 38, Rule 130, Revised circumstances considering that the "People" does not raise any
Rules of Court and it casts doubt on the objection to a new trial, for which reason the Solicitor General
culpability of his brother Edilberto Cuenca, the ought to be specially commended for displaying once again such
petitioner. Hence, the alleged confession of statesmanlike gesture of impartiality. The Solicitor General's finest
guilt should be given a hard look by the Court. hour, indeed.

The People is inclined to allow petitioner to WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion For New Trial is hereby
establish the genuineness and due execution of GRANTED. Let the case be RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the
his brother's affidavit in the interest of justice court of origin for reception of petitioner's evidence.
and fair play.
SO ORDERED.
Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, prosecutors who
represent the People of the Philippines in a
criminal case are not duty bound to seek
conviction of the accused but to see that
justice is done. Said Rule 6.01 of Canon 6
states:

Canon 6 — These canons shall apply to

lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks.

Rule 6.01 — The primary duty of a lawyer

engaged in public prosecution is not to
convict but to see that justice is done. The
suppression of facts or the concealment of
witnesses capable of establishing the
innocence of the accused is highly
reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary
action. (Emphasis supplied.)

The above duty is well founded on the

instruction of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935)
that prosecutors represent a sovereign "whose
obligation to govern impartially is compelling
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done  (Time to Rein in the Prosecution,
by Atty. Bruce Fein, published on p. 11, The
Lawyers Review, July 31, 1994). (Emphasis
supplied.)10

Although in "Goduco v. CA" (14 SCRA 282 [1965]) decided some

twenty (20) years ago, this Court ruled that it is not authorized to
entertain a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial predicated
on allegedly newly discovered evidence the rationale of which
being:

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

conclusive as to the facts, and cannot be
reviewed by the Supreme Court. Accordingly,
in an appeal by certiorari  to the Supreme
Court, the latter has no jurisdiction to
85
A.C. No. 4018             March 8, 2005 On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case,
complainant is now before us, seeking the disbarment of
respondent. Complainant claims that it has become obvious that
OMAR P. ALI, Complainant, 
respondent had "proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with
vs.
the duties of an attorney"8 and that he poses a "serious threat to
ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.
the integrity of the legal profession."9

DECISION
In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing
irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the
PER CURIAM: Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law10 and jurisprudence
support his stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register
of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land
This is a verified petition for disbarment1 filed against Atty. Mosib registration on the basis only of the documents presented by the
Ali Bubong for having been found guilty of grave misconduct while applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the
holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City. documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion,
hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.
It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the
administrative case earlier filed by complainant against Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the
respondent. In said case, which was initially investigated by the dismissal of criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Squatting
Land Registration Authority (LRA), complainant charged Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the latter's
respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of co-defendants. Respondent explains that his participation in said
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of case was a result of the two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the
Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah,2 Ambobae Bauduli Datu, investigating prosecutor who required him to produce the various
Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola land titles involved in said dispute. He further claims that the
Bauduli Datu; and manipulating the criminal complaint filed dismissal of said criminal case by the Secretary of Justice was
against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the based solely on the evidence presented by the parties.
Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali Complainant's allegation, therefore, that he influenced the
Datus are relatives of respondent.3 outcome of the case is totally unjustified.

The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995,11 this Court referred
The investigating officer, Enrique Basa, absolved respondent of all this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
the charges brought against him, thus: investigation, report, and recommendation. Acting on this
resolution, the IBP commenced the investigation of this
It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C.
not only failed to prove his case but that he has no case Fernandez issued the following order relative to the transfer of
at all against respondent Mosib Ali Bubong. Wherefore, venue of this case. The pertinent portion of this order provides:
premises considered, it is respectfully recommended
that the complaint against respondent be dismissed for ORDER
lack of merit and evidence.4

When this case was called for hearing, both complainant

The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for and respondent appeared.
review and in a report dated 08 September 1992, then Secretary
of Justice Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges of
illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents. He, The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are
however, found respondent guilty of grave misconduct for his willing to have the reception of evidence vis-à-vis this
imprudent issuance of TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the case be done in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the
criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted president of the local IBP Chapter. Both parties agreed.
against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter's co-accused. As a Accordingly, transmit the records of this case to the
result of this finding, Secretary Drilon recommended respondent's Director for Bar Discipline for appropriate action.12
dismissal from service.
On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a
On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued resolution approving Commissioner Fernandez's recommendation
Administrative Order No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion for the transfer of venue of this administrative case and directed
reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering respondent's dismissal the Western Mindanao Region governor to designate the local IBP
from government service. Respondent subsequently questioned chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report, and
said administrative order before this Court through a petition recommendation.13The IBP Resolution states:
for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition5 claiming that the Office
of the President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to
Resolution No. XII-96-153
remove him from office. He also insisted that respondents6 in that
Adm. Case No. 4018
petition violated the laws on security of tenure and that
Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong
respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA
committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his
authority to resolve the administrative complaint against him RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of
(herein respondent). Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of
Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the Western
Mindanao Region Governor George C. Jabido to
In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the
designate the local IBP Chapter concerned to conduct
petition "for failure on the part of petitioner to sufficiently show
the investigation, report and recommendation.
that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the questioned order."7Respondent thereafter filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied with finality in our Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director
Resolution of 15 November 1994. for Bar Discipline, wrote a letter dated 23 October 1996 addressed
to Governor George C. Jabido, President of IBP Cotabato Chapter
86
requesting the latter to receive the evidence in this case and to On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S.
submit his recommendation and recommendation as directed by Castillo, Chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for
the IBP Board of Governors.14 Mindanao, to reevaluate the report and recommendation
submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter. This directive had the
approval of the IBP Board of Governors through its Resolution No.
In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato
XIV-2001-271 issued on 30 June 2001, to wit:
Chapter15 informed the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
that the investigating panel16 had sent notices to both
complainant and respondent for a series of hearings but RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director
respondent consistently ignored said notices. The IBP Cotabato Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the
Chapter concluded its report by recommending that respondent above-entitled case and direct the CBD Mindanao to
be suspended from the practice of law for five years. conduct an investigation, re-evaluation, report and
recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of
notice.25
On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998
praying for the transmittal of the records of this case to the
Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter of the IBP pursuant to Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death
Resolution No. XII-96-153 as well as Commissioner Fernandez's of her father, Omar P. Ali, complainant in this case. According to
Order dated 23 February 1996. her, her father passed away on 12 June 2002 and that in interest
of peace and Islamic brotherhood, she was requesting the
withdrawal of this case.26
Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating
panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter to comment on respondent's
motion.17 Complying with this directive, the panel expressed no Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking
opposition to respondent's motion for the transmittal of the the IBP CBD to direct the chairman of the Commission on Bar
records of this case to IBP Marawi City. 18 On 25 September 1998, Discipline for Mindanao to designate and authorize the IBP Marawi
Commissioner Fernandez ordered the referral of this case to IBP City-Lanao del Sur Chapter to conduct an investigation of this
Marawi City for the reception of respondent's evidence. 19 This case.27 This motion was effectively denied by Atty. Pedro S.
order of referral, however, was set aside by the IBP Board of Castillo in an Order dated 19 July 2002.28 According to Atty.
Governors in its Resolution No. XIII-98-268 issued on 4 December Castillo – 
1998. Said resolution provides:
After going over the voluminous records of the case,
RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor with special attention made on the report of the IBP
C. Fernandez for the transmittal of the case records of Cotabato City Chapter, the Complaint and the Counter-
the above-entitled case to Marawi City, rather he is Affidavit of respondent, the undersigned sees no need
directed to re-evaluate the recommendation submitted for any further investigation, to be able to make a re-
by Cotabato Chapter and report the same to the Board evaluation and recommendation on the Report of the IBP
of Governors.20 Chapter of Cotabato City.

Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of
filed on 08 October 1998 a motion praying that the Marawi City, Zamboanga del Norte is hereby denied. The
recommendation of the IBP Cotabato Chapter be stricken from the undersigned will submit his Report to the Commission on
records.21 Respondent insists that the investigating panel Bar Discipline, IBP National Office within ten (10) days
constituted by said IBP chapter did not have the authority to from date hereof.
conduct the investigation of this case since IBP Resolution XII-96-
153 and Commissioner Fernandez's Order of 23 February 1996
In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in
clearly vested IBP Marawi City with the power to investigate this
toto  the findings and conclusion of IBP Cotabato Chapter
case. Moreover, he claims that he was never notified of any
ratiocinating as follows:
hearing by the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter
thereby depriving him of his right to due process.
The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the
Decision by the Office of the President in Administrative
Complainant opposed22 this motion arguing that respondent is
Case No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein
guilty of laches. According to complainant, the report and
respondent was found guilty of Grave Misconduct in:
recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter expressly
states that respondent was duly notified of the hearings
conducted by the investigating panel yet despite these, a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-
respondent did nothing to defend himself. He also claims that 2821; and,
respondent did not even bother to submit his position paper when
he was directed to do so. Further, as respondent is a member of
IBP Marawi City Chapter, complainant maintains that the presence b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for
of bias in favor of respondent is possible. Finally, complainant violation of the anti-squatting law.
contends that to refer the matter to IBP Marawi City would only
entail a duplication of the process which had already been And penalized with dismissal from the service, as
completed by IBP Cotabato Chapter. Register of Deeds of Marawi City. In the Comment filed
by respondent in the instant Adminsitrative Case, his
In an Order dated 15 October 1999,23 Commissioner Fernandez defense is good faith in the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-
directed IBP Cotabato Chapter to submit proofs that notices for 2821 and a denial of the charge of manipulating the
the hearings conducted by the investigating panel as well as for criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law,
the submission of the position paper were duly received by which by the way, was filed against respondent's
respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty. Jabido, a member of the relatives. Going over the Decision of the Office of the
IBP Cotabato Chapter investigating panel, furnished Commissioner President in Administrative Case No. 41, the
Fernandez with a copy of the panel's order dated 4 August undersigned finds substantial evidence were taken into
1997.24Attached to said order was Registry Receipt No. 3663 account and fully explained, before the Decision therein
issued by the local post office. On the lower portion of the registry was rendered. In other words, the finding of Grave
receipt was a handwritten notation reading "Atty. Mosib A. Misconduct on the part of respondent by the Office of
Bubong." the President was fully supported by evidence and as

87
 such carries a very strong weight in considering the … [A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to
professional misconduct of respondent in the present refrain from any act or omission which might tend to
case. lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government, she must also uphold the dignity of the
legal profession at all times and observe a high standard
In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no
of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in
reason for amending or disturbing the Report and
government service is a keeper of the public faith and is
Recommendation of the IBP Chapter of South
burdened with high degree of social responsibility,
Cotabato.29
perhaps higher than her brethren in private
practice.36 (Emphasis supplied)
In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved, with modification, the afore-
In the case at bar, respondent's grave misconduct, as established
quoted Report and Recommendation of Atty. Castillo. The
by the Office of the President and subsequently affirmed by this
modification pertained solely to the period of suspension from the
Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking
practice of law which should be imposed on respondent – whereas
advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City
Atty. Castillo concurred in the earlier recommendation of IBP
and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land
Cotabato Chapter for a five-year suspension, the IBP Board of
registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly
Governors found a two-year suspension to be proper.
demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a
civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule
On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this
Reconsideration with the IBP which the latter denied as by that matter. It reads:
time, the matter had already been endorsed to this Court.30
Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall not
The issue thus posed for this Court's resolution is whether use his public position to promote or advance his private
respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public
while he was in the employ of the government. We resolve this duties.
question in the affirmative.
Respondent's conduct manifestly undermined the people's
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to confidence in the public office he used to occupy and cast doubt
a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his
fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than
governing the conduct of lawyers "shall apply to lawyers in the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.
government service in the discharge of their official tasks." Thus,
where a lawyer's misconduct as a government official is of such
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainant's
nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral
daughter, requesting for the withdrawal of this case, we cannot
delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar
possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this nature
on such grounds.31 Although the general rule is that a lawyer who
cannot be "interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance,
holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of
settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or
the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he
failure of the complainant to prosecute the same." 37 As we have
may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct
previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty.
constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal
Orlando A. Rayos:38
profession.32

… A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed

Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C.
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
Renomeron,33 we ordered the disbarment of respondent on the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of
ground of his dismissal from government service because of grave
the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit
misconduct. Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we
and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This
declared –
rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment
[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant
which is designed to impress upon him his is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and
court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility afford no redress for private grievance. They are
of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare.
efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving
court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that courts of justice from the official ministration of persons
in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to
justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. court. The complainant or the person who called the
From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, attention of the court to the attorney's alleged
are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may
strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility – all of have in the proper administrative of justice.39
which, throughout the centuries, have been
compendiously described as moral character.34
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby
DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the
Dasig,35 this Court found sufficient basis to disbar respondent respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the
therein for gross misconduct perpetrated while she was the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on
Officer-in-Charge of Legal Services of the Commission on Higher the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
Education. As we had explained in that case –  the country.

SO ORDERED.
88
89
A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC               December 7, 2010 promptings, the rights to the land were transferred to Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez.
JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant, 
vs. In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent. respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of nullifying the
conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
The complainant claimed that the respondent wanted the rights
DECISION
over the land transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay
Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this regard
BRION, J.: executed an "Assurance" where he stated that he was the lawyer
of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court
Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga (respondent) filed by Mr. Jovito The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01
S. Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged of violating
Rule 6.02,1 Rule 6.032 and Rule 1.013of the Code of Professional
The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful
Responsibility for representing conflicting interests. 
conduct considering his knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The
Factual Background complainant averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona
fide resident of the proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an
award. Thus, the approval of his sales application by the
In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering Committee on Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of
a parcel of land situated in Barangay Lower Bicutan in the Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119. 
Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject land) was previously part
of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and declared open
for disposition pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476,4 issued on The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section
January 7, 1986, and Proclamation No. 172,5 issued on October 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
16, 1987.  Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he
engaged in the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition
period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph
To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards. 
issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, creating a
Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and
make a recommendation on the applications to purchase the lands In his Comment,7 the respondent claimed that the present
declared open for disposition. The Committee on Awards was complaint is the third malicious charge filed against him by the
headed by the Director of Lands and the respondent was one of complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial and
the Committee members, in his official capacity as the Bar Council when he was nominated as an Associate Justice of the
Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the Supreme Court; the second complaint is now pending with the
respondent’s district includes the areas covered by the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of Section 3(e) and
proclamations. (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. 

The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02 With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a
different version of the antecedent events. 
In the complaint,6 the complainant claimed that the respondent
abused his position as Congressman and as a member of the The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over
Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the the subject land and he later conveyed these rights to Joseph
complainant’s sales application because of his personal interest Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel Olazo’s rights over the subject land and
over the subject land. The complainant alleged that the the transfer of his rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly
respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over the recognized by the Secretary of the DENR before whom the conflict
complainant’s father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the of rights over the subject land (between Miguel Olazo and Joseph
complainant’s sales application and claim the subject land for Jeffrey Rodriguez, on one hand, and the complainant on the other
himself. The complainant also alleged that the respondent hand) was brought. In its decision, the DENR found Joseph Jeffrey
prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates, sums of Rodriguez a qualified applicant, and his application over the
money as payment of the latter’s alleged rights over the subject subject land was given due course. The respondent emphasized
land. The complainant further claimed that the respondent that the DENR decision is now final and executory. It was affirmed
brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land between Miguel by the Office of the President, by the Court of Appeals and by the
Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the Supreme Court.
respondent’s deceased wife.
The respondent also advanced the following defenses:
As a result of the respondent’s abuse of his official functions, the
complainant’s sales application was denied. The conveyance of
(1) He denied the complainant’s allegation that Miguel
rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were
Olazo told him (complainant) that the respondent had
subsequently given due course by the Department of Environment
been orchestrating to get the subject land. The
and Natural Resources (DENR). 
respondent argued that this allegation was without
corroboration and was debunked by the affidavits of
The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03 Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo, the complainant’s
sister.
The second charge involves another parcel of land within the
proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel Olazo, the complainant’s (2) He denied the complainant’s allegation that he
brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded offered the complainant ₱50,000.00 for the subject land
Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to and that he (the respondent) had exerted undue
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the respondent’s pressure and influence on Miguel Olazo to claim the

90
 rights over the subject land. The respondent also denied discharge of his duties as a government official.9 He may be
that he had an inordinate interest in the subject land. disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar only when his
misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.10
(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing
as a witness in Miguel Olazo’s affidavit where the latter The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the
asserted his rights over the subject land. The affidavit respondent’s actions constitute a breach of the standard ethical
merely attested to the truth. conduct – first, while the respondent was still an elective public
official and a member of the Committee on Awards; and second,
when he was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who
(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins
represented a client before the office he was previously connected
and that the latter decided to sell his rights over the
with. 
subject land for the medical treatment of his heart
condition and the illness of his daughter, Francisca
Olazo. The respondent insisted that the money he After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties
extended to them was a form of loan.  and their respective pieces of evidence, we resolve to dismiss the
administrative complaint.
(5) The respondent’s participation in the transaction
between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez Accountability of a government lawyer in public office
involved the payment of the loan that the respondent
extended to Miguel Olazo. 
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the
continuing standard of ethical conduct to be observed by
(6) Manuel’s belated and secondhand allegation in his government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In
Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, addition to the standard of conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713
regarding what his father told him, cannot prevail over for government employees, a lawyer in the government service is
his earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay with Francisca Olazo, obliged to observe the standard of conduct under the Code of
dated August 2, 1997. In the said Sinumpaang Professional Responsibility. 
Salaysay, Manuel categorically asserted that his father
Miguel Olazo, not the complainant, was the farmer-
Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded
beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his agreement to the
upon lawyers in the government service is more exacting than the
transfer of rights (Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng
standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the
Karapatan) in favor of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, and the
government service are subject to constant public scrutiny under
withdrawal of his father’s application to give way to
norms of public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s application. 
of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the interest
of the public; their private activities should not interfere with the
(7) The complainant’s allegation that the respondent had discharge of their official functions.11
pressured and influenced Miguel Olazo to sell the subject
land was not sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and
The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of
corroboration. The DENR decision was clear that the
Professional Responsibility. It imposes the following restrictions in
complainant had no rights over the subject land.
the conduct of a government lawyer:

The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code

A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public
of Professional Responsibility. He alleged that during his third
position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the
term as Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting
latter to interfere with his public duties.
applications of the complainant, Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez were not included in the agenda for deliberation of the
Committee on Awards. Rather, their conflicting claims and their The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her
respective supporting documents were before the Office of the public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance
Regional Director, NCR of the DENR. This office ruled over the private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his
conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000. This ruling became the or her public duties. We previously held that the restriction
basis of the decision of the Secretary of the DENR.  extends to all government lawyers who use their public offices to
promote their private interests.12
Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility since the provision applies In Huyssen v. Gutierrez,13 we defined promotion of private
to lawyers in the government service who are allowed by law to interest to include soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in
engage in private law practice and to those who, though any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may
prohibited from engaging in the practice of law, have friends, be affected by the functions of his or her office. In Ali v.
former associates and relatives who are in the active practice of Bubong,14 we recognized that private interest is not limited to
law.8 In this regard, the respondent had already completed his direct interest, but extends to advancing the interest of relatives.
third term in Congress and his stint in the Committee on Awards We also ruled that private interest interferes with public duty
when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on May 24, 1999.  when the respondent uses the office and his or her knowledge of
the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives.15
Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since he did In Vitriolo v. Dasig,16 we found the act of the respondent (an
not intervene in the disposition of the conflicting applications of official of the Commission on Higher Education) of extorting
the complainant and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because the money from persons with applications or requests pending before
applications were not submitted to the Committee on Awards her office to be a serious breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code of
when he was still a member. Professional Responsibility.17 We reached the same conclusion in
Huyssen, where we found the respondent (an employee of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of
The Court’s Ruling
the Code of Professional Responsibility, based on the evidence
showing that he demanded money from the complainant who had
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be a pending application for visas before his office.18
disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the

91
Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano 19 we found the respondent (a Court Olazo corroborated the respondent’s claim that the sums of
Attorney of this Court) liable for violating Rule 6.02 of the Code of money he extended to her and Miguel Olazo were loans used for
Professional Responsibility, after considering the evidence their medical treatment. Miguel Olazo, in his Sinumpaang
showing that he demanded and received money from the Salaysay dated May 25, 2003, asserted that some of the money
complainant who had a pending case before this Court.  borrowed from the respondent was used for his medical treatment
and hospitalization expenses. 
Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the
absence of any concrete proof that the respondent abused his The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the
position as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on respondent’s claim that the latter’s involvement was limited to
Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of being paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo.
Professional Responsibility. According to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo
agreed that a portion of the loan would be directly paid by Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent and the amount paid would
First, the records do not clearly show if the complainant’s sales
be considered as part of the purchase price of the subject land.26
application was ever brought before the Committee on Awards. By
the complaint’s own account, the complainant filed a sales
application in March 1990 before the Land Management Bureau. It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the
By 1996, the complainant’s sales application was pending before documentary evidence, specifically the dates when the sums of
the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR due to the money were extended by the respondent – on February 21, 1995,
conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph September 2, 1995 and October 17, 1995, and the date when the
Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that it was only on August 2, Deed of Conveyance27 over the subject land was executed or on
2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR October 25, 1995, showed that the sums of money were extended
rendered its decision, or after the term of the respondent’s prior to the transfer of rights over the subject land. These pieces
elective public office and membership to the Committee on of evidence are consistent with the respondent’s allegation that
Awards, which expired in 1997.  Miguel Olazo decided to sell his rights over the subject land to pay
the loans he obtained from the respondent and, also, to finance
his continuing medical treatment. 
These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any
way promote, advance or use his private interests in the
discharge of his official duties. To repeat, since the sales Private practice of law after separation from public office
application was not brought before the Committee on Awards
when the respondent was still a member, no sufficient basis exists
As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized
to conclude that he used his position to obtain personal benefits.
practice of law after his separation from the government service,
We note in this regard that the denial of the complainant’s sales
the complainant presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated
application over the subject land was made by the DENR, not by
January 20, 2000, of Manuel and the document entitled
the Committee on Awards. 
"Assurance" where the respondent legally represented Ramon Lee
and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces
Second, the complainant’s allegation that the respondent of evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that there was a
"orchestrated" the efforts to get the subject land does not specify violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
how the orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the
records is the uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel
In Cayetano v. Monsod,28 we defined the practice of law as any
Olazo, dated May 25, 2003,20 categorically stating that the
activity, in and out of court, that requires the application of law,
respondent had no interest in the subject land, and neither was
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover,
he a contracting party in the transfer of his rights over the subject
we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform those
land. In the absence of any specific charge, Olazo’s disclaimer is
acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is
the nearest relevant statement on the respondent’s alleged
to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or
participation, and we find it to be in the respondent’s favor.
service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. 

Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the

Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be
complainant presented to support his claim that the respondent
correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03 of the Code of
exerted undue pressure and influence over his father (namely:
Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on
the letter, dated June 22, 1996, to the DENR Regional Director-
government lawyers to engage in private practice after their
NCR;21 the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 12, 1996;22 and the
separation from the service. 
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 199623), do not contain any
reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the
respondent over Miguel Olazo. The documents merely showed Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:
that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots
(covered by the proclaimed areas) surveyed. They also showed
that the respondent merely acted as a witness in the Sinumpaang Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to
Salaysay dated July 17, 1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts acts and
that may be rendered by one relative to another, and do not show
how the respondent could have influenced the decision of Miguel omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Olazo to contest the complainant’s sales application. At the same Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
time, we cannot give any credit to the Sinumpaang Salaysay, prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only hearsay but employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
are contrary to what Miguel Olazo states on the record. We note
that Manuel had no personal knowledge, other than what Miguel
Olazo told him, of the force allegedly exerted by the respondent xxxx
against Miguel Olazo. 
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. –
In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
explanation - backed by corroborating evidence - of the nature of
the transaction in which he gave the various sums of money to xxxx
Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo in the year 1995. In her
affidavits dated May 25, 200324 and July 21, 2010,25 Francisca

92
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless his nephew was not a qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice Jeffrey Rodriguez’s qualifications to apply for a sales application
will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; x x over lots covered by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in
x the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the decision dated
April 3, 2004,34 when the DENR gave due course to his sales
application over the subject land. We are, at this point, bound by
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1)
this finding. 
year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public
office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the
professional concerned cannot practice his profession in As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed
connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, by the Office of the President, the Court of Appeals 35 and, finally,
in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply. the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in
G.R. No. 173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed the petition for
review on certiorari filed by the complainant after finding, among
As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the
others, that no reversible error was committed by the Court of
private practice of their profession during their incumbency.29 By
Appeals in its decision.36
way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice
of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the
private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of
and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the burden
his or her official functions.30 The last paragraph of Section 7 rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and
provides an exception to the exception. In case of lawyers satisfactory proof for the Court to exercise its disciplinary
separated from the government service who are covered under powers.37 The respondent generally is under no obligation to
subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prove his/her defense,38 until the burden shifts to him/her
prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any because of what the complainant has proven. Where no case has
matter before the office he used to be with. in the first place been proven, nothing has to be rebutted in
defense.39
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this
restriction and prohibits lawyers, after leaving the government With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case
service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with against the respondent for the complainant’s failure to prove by
any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. clear and convincing evidence that the former committed
The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional unethical infractions warranting the exercise of the Court’s
Responsibility is the term "intervene" which we previously disciplinary power.
interpreted to include an act of a person who has the power to
influence the proceedings.31 Otherwise stated, to fall within the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the
ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
administrative case for violation of Rule 6.02, Rule 6.03 and Rule
respondent must have accepted engagement or employment in a
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against
matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously
retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack
exercised power to influence the outcome of the
of merit. 
proceedings.1avvphi1

SO ORDERED.
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the
respondent previously interfered with the sales application
covering Manuel’s land when the former was still a member of the
Committee on Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently
establish that the respondent was engaged in the practice of law.
At face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was
limited only in the preparation of a single document. In Borja, Sr.
v. Sulyap, Inc.,32we specifically described private practice of law
as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a
lawyer. 

In any event, even granting that respondent’s act fell within the
definition of practice of law, the available pieces of evidence are
insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before
the Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to
be presented before it. These are matters for the complainant to
prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard
against the respondent’s favor. 

Violation of Rule 1.01

Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral

or deceitful conduct. From the above discussion, we already
struck down the complainant’s allegation that respondent engaged
in an unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer
for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the
Committee on Awards.

We find that a similar treatment should be given to the

complainant’s claim that the respondent violated paragraph
4(1)33 of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales
application of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that

93
Republic Act No. 6713             February 20, 1989

AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL

STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, TO
UPHOLD THE TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC
OFFICE BEING A PUBLIC TRUST, GRANTING INCENTIVES
AND REWARDS FOR EXEMPLARY SERVICE, ENUMERATING
PROHIBITED ACTS AND TRANSACTIONS AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts

and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in
the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. -

Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:

(1) Own, control, manage or accept employment as

officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent,
trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated,
supervised or licensed by their office unless expressly
allowed by law;

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession

unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided,
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with
their official functions; or

(3) Recommend any person to any position in a private

enterprise which has a regular or pending official
transaction with their office.

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1)

year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public
office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the
professional concerned cannot practice his profession in
connection with any matter before the office he used to be with,
in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

94
 REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019

ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts

or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law,
the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept

employment in a private enterprise which has pending official
business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year
after its termination.

95
A.C. No. 6707             March 24, 2006 introduced to me at my office at the Bureau of
Immigration with a big problem concerning their stay in
the Philippines, herself and three sons, one of which is
GISELA HUYSSEN, Complainant, 
already of major age while the two others were still
vs.
minors then. Their problem was the fact that since they
ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.
have been staying in the Philippines for almost ten (10)
years as holders of missionary visas (9G) they could no
DECISION longer extend their said status as under the law and
related polic[i]es of the government, missionary visa
holders could only remain as such for ten (10) years
PER CURIAM: after which they could no longer extend their said status
and have to leave the country.
This treats of a Complaint1 for Disbarment filed by Gisela Huyssen
against respondent Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez. b) Studying their case and being U.S. Citizen (sic), I
advised them that they better secure a permanent visa
Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was still under Section 3 of the Philippine Immigration Law
connected with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), otherwise known as Quota Visa and thereafter, provided
she and her three sons, who are all American citizens, applied for them with list of the requirements in obtaining the said
Philippine Visas under Section 13[g] of the Immigration Law. visa, one of which is that the applicant must have a
Respondent told complainant that in order that their visa $40,000 deposited in the bank. I also inform that her
applications will be favorably acted upon by the BID they needed son Marcus Huyssen, who was already of major age, has
to deposit a certain sum of money for a period of one year which to have the same amount of show money separate of
could be withdrawn after one year. Believing that the deposit was her money as he would be issued separate visa, while
indeed required by law, complainant deposited with respondent on her two minor children would be included as her
six different occasions from April 1995 to April 1996 the total dependents in her said visa application. I advised them
amount of US$20,000. Respondent prepared receipts/vouchers as to get a lawyer (sic), complainant further requested me
proofs that he received the amounts deposited by the complainant to refer to her to a lawyer to work for their application,
but refused to give her copies of official receipts despite her which I did and contacted the late Atty. Mendoza, an
demands. After one year, complainant demanded from Immigration lawyer, to do the job for the complainant
respondent the return of US$20,000 who assured her that said and her family.
amount would be returned. When respondent failed to return the
sum deposited, the World Mission for Jesus (of which complainant c) The application was filed, processed and followed-up
was a member) sent a demand letter to respondent for the by the said Atty. Mendoza until the same was finished
immediate return of the money. In a letter dated 1 March 1999, and the corresponding permanent visa were obtained by
respondent promised to release the amount not later than 9 the complainant and her family. Her son Marcus Huyssen
March 1999. Failing to comply with his promise, the World Mission was given an independent permanent visa while the
for Jesus sent another demand letter. In response thereto, other two were made as dependents of the complainant.
respondent sent complainant a letter dated 19 March 1999 In between the processing of the papers and becoming
explaining the alleged reasons for the delay in the release of very close to the complainant, I became the
deposited amount. He enclosed two blank checks postdated to 6 intermediary between complainant and their counsel so
April and 20 April 1999 and authorized complainant to fill in the much that every amount that the latter would request
amounts. When complainant deposited the postdated checks on for whatever purpose was coursed through me which
their due dates, the same were dishonored because respondent request were then transmitted to the complainant and
had stopped payment on the same. Thereafter, respondent, in his every amount of money given by the complainant to
letter to complainant dated 25 April 1999, explained the reasons their counsel were coursed thru me which is the very
for stopping payment on the checks, and gave complainant five reason why my signature appears in the vouchers
postdated checks with the assurance that said checks would be attached in the complaint-affidavit;
honored. Complainant deposited the five postdated checks on
their due dates but they were all dishonored for having been
drawn against insufficient funds or payment thereon was ordered d) That as time goes by, I noticed that the amount
stopped by respondent. After respondent made several unfulfilled appeared to be huge for services of a lawyer that I
promises to return the deposited amount, complainant referred myself began to wonder why and, to satisfy my
the matter to a lawyer who sent two demand letters to curiosity, I met Atty. Mendoza and inquired from him
respondent. The demand letters remained unheeded. regarding the matter and the following facts were
revealed to me:
Thus, a complaint2 for disbarment was filed by complainant in the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the 1) That what was used by the complainant as
Philippines (IBP).  her show money from the bank is not really
her money but money of World Mission for
Jesus, which therefore is a serious violation of
On 15 November 2000, Victor C. Fernandez, Director for Bar the Immigration Law as there was a
Discipline, required3 respondent to submit his answer within 15 misrepresentation. This fact was confirmed
days from receipt thereof. later when the said entity sent their demand
letter to the undersigned affiant and which is
In his Counter-Affidavit dated 2 July 2001,4 respondent denied the attached to the complaint-affidavit;
allegations in the complaint claiming that having never physically
received the money mentioned in the complaint, he could not 2) That worst, the same amount used by the
have appropriated or pocketed the same. He said the amount was complainant, was the very same amount used
used as payment for services rendered for obtaining the by her son Marcus Huyssen, in obtaining his
permanent visas in the Philippines. Respondent explained thus:  separate permanent visa. These acts of the
complainant and her son could have been a
a) Through a close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor and ground for deportation and likewise constitute
likewise a friend of the complainant, the latter was criminal offense under the Immigration Law

96
 and the Revised Penal Code. These could have and his letter dated 19 March 1999 (Annex L of Complaint) where
been the possible reason why complainant was he stated thus: 
made to pay for quite huge amount.
"I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the
e) That after they have secured their visas, complainant amount deposited by your good self in connection with the
and her family became very close to undersigned and procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family. It
my family that I was even invited to their residence might take some more time before the Bureau could release the
several times; refund as some other pertinent papers are being still compiled are
being looked at the files of the late Commissioner Verceles, who
approved your visa and who died of heart attack. Anyway, I am
f) However after three years, complainant demanded the
sure that everything would be fine later as all the documents
return of their money given and surprisingly they want
needed are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay."
to recover the same from me. By twist of fate, Atty.
Mendoza is no longer around, he died sometime 1997;
From the above letters, respondent makes it appear that the
US$20,000 was officially deposited with the Bureau of
g) That it is unfortunate that the real facts of the matter
Immigration and Deportation. However, if this is true, how come
is now being hidden and that the amount of money is
only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued by respondent to
now being sought to be recovered from me;
complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and official
receipts therefore were never issued by the said Bureau? Also,
h) That the fact is I signed the vouchers and being a why would respondent issue his personal checks to cover the
lawyer I know the consequences of having signed the return of the money to complainant if said amount was really
same and therefore I had to answer for it and pay. I officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration? All these
tried to raised the fund needed but up to the present my actions of respondent point to the inescapable conclusion that
standby loan application has not been released and was respondent received the money from complainant and
informed that the same would only be forthcoming appropriated the same for his personal use. It should also be
second week of August. The same should have been noted that respondent has failed to establish that the "late Atty.
released last March but was aborted due to prevalent Mendoza" referred to in his Counter-Affidavit really exists. There
condition. The amount to be paid, according to the is not one correspondence from Atty. Mendoza regarding the visa
complainant has now become doubled plus attorney’s application of complainant and his family, and complainant has
fees of P200,000.00. also testified that she never met this Atty. Mendoza referred to by
respondent. 
Complainant submitted her evidence on 4 September 2002 and
April 2003, and filed her Formal Offer of Evidence on 25 August Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by
2003.  taking advantage of his position with the Board of Special Inquiry
of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, makes it more
reprehensible as it has caused damage to the reputation and
On several occasions, the complaint was set for reception of integrity of said office. It is submitted that respondent has
respondent’s evidence but the scheduled hearings (11 settings) violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
were all reset at the instance of the respondent who was allegedly Responsibility which reads: 
out of the country to attend to his client’s needs. Reception of
respondent’s evidence was scheduled for the last time on 28
September 2004 and again respondent failed to appear, despite "A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public
due notice and without just cause.  position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the
latter to interfere with his public duties." 
On 5 November 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V.
San Juan submitted her report5 recommending the disbarment of On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of Governors approved6 the
respondent. She justified her recommendation in this manner:  Investigating Commissioner’s report with modification, thus:

At the outset it should be noted that there is no question that RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and
respondent received the amount of US$20,000 from complainant, APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of
as respondent himself admitted that he signed the vouchers the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
(Annexes A to F of complainant) showing his receipt of said made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
amount from complainant. Respondent however claims that he did recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
not appropriate the same for himself but that he delivered the applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent’s violation
said amount to a certain Atty. Mendoza. This defense raised by of Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
respondent is untenable considering the documentary evidence Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of
submitted by complainant. On record is the 1 March 1999 letter of law and ordered to return the amount with legal interest from
respondent addressed to the World Mission for Jesus (Annex H of receipt of the money until payment. This case shall be referred to
Complaint) where he stated thus:  the Office of the Ombudsman for prosecution for violation of Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice
for appropriate administrative action.
"I really understand your feelings on the delay of the release of
the deposit but I repeat, nobody really intended that the thing
would happen that way. Many events were the causes of the said We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should
delay particularly the death of then Commissioner L. Verceles, be severely sanctioned.
whose sudden death prevented us the needed papers for the
immediate release. It was only from compiling all on the first
We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government
week of January this year, that all the said papers were
service in the discharge of their official task have more
recovered, hence, the process of the release just started though
restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral
some important papers were already finished as early as the last
integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds
quarter of last year. We are just going through the normal
a responsible public office.7
standard operating procedure and there is no day since January
that I do not make any follow – ups on the progress of the same."
It is undisputed that respondent admitted8 having received the
US$20,000 from complainant as shown by his signatures in the
97
petty cash vouchers9 and receipts10 he prepared, on the false Anyway, let me apologize for all these troubles. You are aware
representation that that it was needed in complainant’s that I have done my very best for the early return of your money
application for visa with the BID. Respondent denied he but the return is becoming bleak as I was informed that there are
misappropriated the said amount and interposed the defense that still papers lacking. When I stopped the payment of the checks I
he delivered it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted issued, I was of the impression that everything is fine, but it is
complainant and children in their application for visa in the not. I guess it is time for me to accept the fact that I really have
BID.11 Such defense remains unsubstantiated as he failed to to personally return the money out of my own. The issue should
submit evidence on the matter. While he claims that Atty. stop at my end. This is the truth that I must face. It may hurt me
Mendoza already died, he did not present the death certificate of financially but it would set me free from worries and anxieties.
said Atty. Mendoza. Worse, the action of respondent in shifting
the blame to someone who has been naturally silenced by fate, is
I have arranged for a loan from money lenders and was able to
not only impudent but downright ignominious. When the integrity
secure one last Saturday the releases of which are on the
of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he
following:
deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence against him.12 He must show proof that he
still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all May 4, 1999- 200,000
times is expected of him. In the case at bar, respondent clearly
fell short of his duty. Records show that even though he was
given the opportunity to answer the charges and controvert the May 11, 1999 -200,000
evidence against him in a formal investigation, he failed, without
any plausible reason, to appear several times whenever the case May 20, 1999-200,000
was set for reception of his evidence despite due notice.

June 4, 1999-200,000
The defense of denial proferred by respondent is, thus, not
convincing. It is settled that denial is inherently a weak defense.
To be believed, it must be buttressed by a strong evidence of I have given my property (lot situated in the province) as my
non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and collateral.
is with nil evidentiary value. 
I am therefore putting an end to this trouble. I am issuing four
When respondent issued the postdated checks as his moral checks which I assure you will be sufficiently funded on their due
obligation, he indirectly admitted the charge. Such admissions dates by reason of my aforestated loans. Just bear with me for
were also apparent in the following letters of respondent to the last time, if any of these checks, is returned, don’t call me
complainant: anymore. Just file the necessary action against me, I just had to
put an end to this matter and look forward. x x x

1) Letter13 dated 01 March 1992, pertinent portion of which reads:

4) Letter16 dated 12 May 1999, which reads:

Be that as it may, may I assure you for the last time that the said
deposit is forthcoming, the latest of which is 09 March 1999. The other day I deposited the amount of P289,000 to the bank to
Should it not be released on said date, I understand to pay the cover the first check I issued. In fact I stopped all payments to all
same to you out of my personal money on said date. No more other checks that are becoming due to some of my creditors to
reasons and no more alibis. Send somebody here at the office on give preference to the check I issued to you.
that day and the amount would be given to you wether (sic) from
the Bureau or from my own personal money. This morning when I went to the Bank, I learned that the bank
instead of returning the other checks I requested for stop
2) Letter14 dated 19 March 1999, reads in part: payment - instead honored them and mistakenly returned your
check. This was a very big surprise to me and discouragement for
I know it would really upset you.
I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the
amount deposited by your goodself in connection with the
procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family. In view of this I thought of sending you the amount of P200,000
in cash which I initially plan to withdraw from the Bank. However,
I could not entrust the same amount to the bearer nor can I bring
It might take some more time before the Bureau could release the the same to your place considering that its quite a big amount. I
refund as some other pertinent papers are still being compiled am just sending a check for you to immediately deposit today and
and are being looked at the files of the late Commissioner I was assured by the bank that it would be honored this time. 
Verceles, who approved your visa and who died of heart attack.
Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later as all the
documents needed are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of
delay. appropriating the money of another. As correctly observed by the
Investigating Commissioner, respondent would not have issued
his personal checks if said amount were officially deposited with
xxxx the BID. This is an admission of misconduct. 

As you would see, I have to pay you in peso. I have issued you 2 Respondent’s act of asking money from complainant in
checks, one dated April 6, 1999 and the other one dated April 20, consideration of the latter’s pending application for visas is
1999. I leave the amount vacant because I would want you to fill violative of Rule 1.0117 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
them up on their due dates the peso equivalent to $10,000 which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or
respectively. This is to be sure that the peso equivalent of participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts.
your P20,000 would be well exchanged. I have postdated them to Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 18 of the Code
enable me to raise some more pesos to cover the whole amount which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their
but don’t worry as the Lord had already provided me the means.  private interest. Promotion of private interest includes soliciting
gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring
3) Letter15 dated 25 April 1999 provides: the approval of his office or which may be affected by the
functions of his office.19 Respondent’s conduct in office betrays the
integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers,
98
especially from one occupying a high public office. A lawyer in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that
public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any of
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
the citizenry in government; he must also uphold the dignity of misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction
the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of of a crime involving moral turpitude ; (6) violation of the lawyer’s
honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren in without authority to do so.27
private practice.
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,28 we ordered the disbarment of a
In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to camouflage his lawyer who, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services,
misdeed, he went on committing another by issuing several Commission on Higher Education, demanded sums of money as
worthless checks, thereby compounding his case. consideration for the approval of applications and requests
awaiting action by her office. In Lim v. Barcelona,29 we also
disbarred a senior lawyer of the National Labor Relations
In a recent case, we have held that the issuance of worthless
Commission, who was caught by the National Bureau of
checks constitutes gross misconduct,20 as the effect "transcends
Investigation in the act of receiving and counting money extorted
the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
from a certain person. 
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large.
The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder,
but also an injury to the public since the circulation of valueless Respondent’s acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent
commercial papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and with the need to maintain the high standards of the Bar and thus
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent
welfare of society and the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing deserves the ultimate penalty of expulsion from the esteemed
Black’s definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check brotherhood of lawyers.30
deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men
or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of
WHEREFORE, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from
right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals."21
the practice of law and ordered to return the amount he received
from the complainant with legal interest from his receipt of the
Consequently, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a money until payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of
check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not the Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft
have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for
payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is also a appropriate administrative action. Let copies of this Decision be
manifestation of moral turpitude.22 furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution
to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for
Respondent’s acts are more despicable. Not only did he
dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
misappropriate the money of complainant; worse, he had the gall
to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued
checks to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to SO ORDERED.
continue, being a member of the bar.

Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a

noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon
those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally.
A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his
dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach. He must faithfully perform
his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A
violation of the high standards of the legal profession subjects the
lawyer to administrative sanctions which includes suspension and
disbarment.23 More importantly, possession of good moral
character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment
of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a
ground for the revocation of such privilege.24

Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against

lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring individual
lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of
lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose
utter disregard of their lawyer’s oath have proven them unfit to
continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the
bar.25 These pronouncement gain practical significance in the case
at bar considering that respondent was a former member of the
Board of Special Inquiry of the BID. It bears stressing also that
government lawyers who are public servants owe fidelity to the
public service, a public trust. As such, government lawyers should
be more sensitive to their professional obligations as their
disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public
eye.26

As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably

failed to cope with the strict demands and high standards of the
legal profession. 
99
A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995 In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case
was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for
investigation, report and recommendation.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO, respondent. During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered
that respondent was previously fined by this Court in the amount
of P1,000.00 in connection with G.R. No. 94456 entitled "Milagros
RESOLUTION
Ong Siy vs. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, et al." for forum shopping,
where respondent appeared as counsel for petitioner Milagros Ong
BIDIN, J.: Siy "through the law firm of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and Associates."

In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent
Philippine National Bank charged respondent Atty. Telesforo S. were fully substantiated. Respondent's averment that the law firm
Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset Management Group handling the case of the Almeda spouses is not a partnership
of complainant bank with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the deserves scant consideration in the light of the attestation of
Code of Professional Responsibility, thus: complainant's counsel, Atty. Pedro Singson, that in one of the
hearings of the Almeda spouses' case, respondent attended the
same with his partner Atty. Ferrer, and although he did not enter
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government his appearance, he was practically dictating to Atty. Ferrer what
service, accept engagement or employment in to say and argue before the court. Furthermore, during the
connection with any matter in which he had hearing of the application for a writ of injunction in the same case,
intervened while in said service. respondent impliedly admitted being the partner of Atty. Ferrer,
when it was made of record that respondent was working in the
by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with same office as Atty. Ferrer.
complainant bank in which respondent during his employment
with aforesaid bank, had intervened. Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the
firm is true, it is in itself a violation of the Code of Professional
Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the client’s secrets and
he participated in arranging the sale of steel sheets (denominated confidential records and information are exposed to the other
as Lots 54-M and 55-M) in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for P200,000. lawyers and staff members at all times.
He even "noted" the gate passes issued by his subordinate, Mr.
Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part
of the steel sheets from the DMC Man Division Compound. When a of respondent to devise ways and means to attract as clients
civil action arose out of this transaction between Mrs. Ong Siy and former borrowers of complainant bank since he was in the best
complainant bank before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, position to see the legal weaknesses of his former employer, a
Branch 146, respondent who had since left the employ of convincing factor for the said clients to seek his professional
complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong service. In sum, the IBP saw a deliberate sacrifice by respondent
Siy. of his ethics in consideration of the money he expected to earn.

Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from
administrative case filed by complainant bank against his former the practice of law for 3 years.
subordinate Emmanuel Elefan, for grave misconduct and
dishonesty, respondent appeared as counsel for Elefan only to be
later disqualified by the Civil Service Commission. The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP
had, on October 4, 1994, submitted to this Court its Report and
recommendation in this case, respondent filed a Motion for
Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of Reconsideration dated October 25, 1994 of the recommendation
complainant’s Asset Management Group, he intervened in the contained in the said Report with the IBP Board of Governors. On
handling of the loan account of the spouses Ponciano and Eufemia December 12, 1994, respondent also filed another "Motion to Set
Almeda with complainant bank by writing demand letters to the Hearing" before this Court, the aforesaid Motion for
couple. When a civil action ensued between complainant bank and Reconsideration. In resolving this case, the Court took into
the Almeda spouses as a result of this loan account, the latter consideration the aforesaid pleadings. 
were represented by the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo &
Associates" of which respondent is one of the Senior Partners.
In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion
appropriate to emphasize the paramount importance of avoiding
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he the representation of conflicting interests. In the similar case
appeared as counsel for Mrs. Ong Siy but only with respect to the of  Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95 SCRA 24
execution pending appeal of the RTC decision. He alleged that he [1980]) where a former Legal Officer and Legal Prosecutor of
did not participate in the litigation of the case before the trial PARGO who participated in the investigation of the Anti-Graft case
court. With respect to the case of the Almeda spouses, against Mayor Pablo Cuneta later on acted as counsel for the said
respondent alleged that he never appeared as counsel for them. Mayor in the same anti-graft case, this Court, citing  Nombrado
He contended that while the law firm "Cedo Ferrer, Maynigo & vs. Hernandez  (26 SCRA 13 119681) ruled:
Associates" is designated as counsel of record, the case is actually
handled only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer. Respondent averred that he
did not enter into a general partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we
nor with the other lawyers named therein. They are only using the find no reason to disagree with him, that even
aforesaid name to designate a law firm maintained by lawyers, if respondent did not use against his client any
who although not partners, maintain one office as well as one information or evidence acquired by him as
clerical and supporting staff. Each one of them handles their own counsel it cannot be denied that he did become
cases independently and individually receives the revenues privy to information regarding the ownership of
therefrom which are not shared among them. the parcel of land which was later litigated in
the forcible entry case, for it was the dispute
over the land that triggered the mauling
100
 incident which gave rise to the criminal action
for physical injuries. This Court's remarks
inHilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 571, are apropos:

"Communications between attorney and client

are, in a great number of litigations, a
complicated affair, consisting of entangled
relevant and irrelevant, secret and well-known
facts. In the complexity of what is said in the
course of dealings between an attorney and
client, inquiry of the nature suggested would
lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial,
of other matters that might only further
prejudice the complainant's cause."

Whatever may be said as to whether or not

respondent utilized against his former client
information given to him in a professional
capacity, the mere fact of their previous
relationship should have precluded him from
appearing as counsel for the other side in the
forcible entry case. In the case of Hilado vs.
David, supra, this Tribunal further said:

Hence the necessity of setting the existence of

the bare relationship of attorney and client as
the yardstick for testing incompatibility of
interests. This stern rule is designed not alone
to prevent the dishonest practitioner from
fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the
honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of
unprofessional practice. . . . It is founded on
principles of public policy, of good taste. As has
been said in another case, the question is not
necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but
as to whether the attorney has adhered to
proper professional standard. With these
thoughts in mind, it behooves attorney, like
Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the
client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double dealing.
Only thus can litigants. be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is
of paramount importance in the administration
of justice.

The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal

force and effect to respondent in the case at bar. Having been an
executive of complainant bank, respondent now seeks to litigate
as counsel for the opposite side, a case against his former
employer involving a transaction which he formerly handled while
still an employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting
interests, to wit:

It is unprofessional to represent conflicting

interests, except by express conflicting consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a
lawyer represents conflicting interest when, in
behalf on one client, it is his duty to contend
for that which duty to another client requires
him to oppose.

ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY.

TELESFORO S. CEDO from the practice of law for THREE (3)
YEARS, effective immediately.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines and all courts in Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.

101