EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-22797. September 22, 1966.]

TESTACY OF MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BLAS, ROSALINA SANTOS

(Executrix) , petitioner-appellee, v s . FLORA BLAS DE BUENAVENTURA
(Legatee) , oppositor-appellant.

Vicente J. Francisco for oppositor and appellant.

J.T. de los Santos and R.M. Caluag for petitioner and appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. PROBATE PROCEEDINGS; EFFECT OF TIMELY WITHDRAWAL OF

OPPOSITION TO THE PROBATE OF A WILL WHICH CONTAINS A "NO-CONTEST AND
FORFEITURE CLAUSE. — Where after realizing her mistake in contesting the will - a
mistake committed in good faith because grounded on strong doubts - appellant
withdrew her opposition and joined the appellee in the latter's petition for the probate
of the will, appellant must not now be penalized for rectifying her error. Said act of
withdrawing her opposition before she had rested her case contributed to the speedy
probate of the will. Since the withdrawal came before she had rested her case, it
precluded the defeat of the probate upon the strength of Flora's (appellant's) evidence.
Through said withdrawal, Flora conformed to the testatrix's wish that her dispositions
of her properties under the will be carried out. It follows that, taken as a whole, Flora's
actuations subserved rather than violated the testatrix's intention. She did not therefore
violate the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of the will.
2. SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS; FRUITS AND INCOME
OF PROPERTY INCLUDED IN A DEVISE OF SPECIFIC THING; RIGHT OF LEGATEE TO
RECOVER SUCH FRUITS AND INCOME ALTHOUGH NOT EXPRESSLY SOUGHT IN THE
PETITION. — Although in her petition for delivery of speci c legacy, appellant did not
expressly seek recovery of the fruits or rents of the property given to her in devise, she
should receive the said fruits or rents. Article 948 of the Civil Code provides that a
devise of a speci c thing includes its fruits and income accruing after the testator's
death. And Article 951 of the same Code provides that these fruits and income shall be
delivered with the thing devised. Furthermore, fruits or rents being, strictly speaking,
accessions (Article 441 and 442, Civil Code), Article 1166 of the Code, which provides
that the "obligation to give a determinate thing includes that of delivering all its
accessions and accessories, even though they may not have been mentioned," applies.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; INTEREST ON FRUITS AND INCOME; ORDER TO DELIVER
LEGACY OR DEVISE NECESSARY BEFORE THERE CAN BE DELAY. — Interest does not
run, unless stipulated, where there is yet no delay (Article 1169, 2209, Civil Code). In
settlement proceedings there is no delay on the part of the administratrix until after the
court orders her to make delivery of the legacy or devise (Ongpin vs. Rivera, 44 Phil.,
808). In the case at bar, the court a quo not having issued such an order, appellee has
not incurred in delay and is thus not liable for interest.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ASSERTION OF INTEREST ADVERSE TO THE TESTATRIX
REPRESENTED. — Appellee is not the proper party to contend that the rulings of this
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 Court in two nal decisions are to the effect that the properties therein litigated, which
allegedly included the property involved in the instant case, belonged to the testatrix
only to the extent of 65.38-2/3%, the rest being owned by her husband. Representing as
she does the testatrix, she cannot assert an interest adverse to that of the latter, even
when those to whom said interest pertains do not advance it.
5. ID.; WILL ADMITTED TO PROBATE; DUE EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY
DEEMED ESTABLISHED. — Where a will has already been admitted to probate, its due
execution and authenticity are deemed established for purposes of settlement
proceedings.

DECISION

BENGZON, J.P. , J : p

This is an appeal from two orders of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Special
Proceedings No. 2524 regarding the testacy of the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de
Blas.
On October 22, 1956, Rosalina Santos led a petition with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal for the probate of the last will allegedly executed on September 22,
1956 by the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas. 1 The nearest of kin of the
deceased were her brothers and a sister, nephews and nieces. Rosalina Santos,
petitioner-appellee herein, is one of said nieces. Among the legatees — or more
accurately, devisees — mentioned in the will is Flora Blas de Buenaventura. She is not
related by blood to the deceased.
Flora Blas de Buenaventura and Justo Garcia led on November 28, 1956 an
opposition to the probate of said will.
Among the grounds for the opposition of Flora Blas and Justo Garcia were that
the will was not executed in accordance with law; that undue and improper pressure
was exerted upon the testatrix Maxima Santos in the execution thereof; that the
signature of Maxima was secured through fraud; and that at the time of the execution
of the will Maxima was mentally incapable of making a will. 2
After the probate court had received the evidence for both the petitioner and
oppositors, but before the latter could close their evidence, Flora Blas on November 6,
1957 led a manifestation that she is withdrawing her opposition to the probate of the
will, quoted as follows:
"Oppositor FLORA BLAS BUENAVENTURA; assisted by her counsel, unto
this Honorable Court respectfully manifests:

"1. That she is hereby withdrawing her opposition to the petition for the
probate of the will of the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas;
"2. That being a legatee named in the will, to protect and preserve her
rights and interests, she hereby makes of record that she is joining the proponent
of said will for the legalization of the same."

Some circumstances leading to said withdrawal may be noted. Flora had to sell her
house for P5,000 to pay for stenographic notes of this case. Rosalina Santos thereafter
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 gave a party at the Manila Hotel, aimed at settling the case amicably. And there Atty.
Jose T. de los Santos — appellee's lawyer — took Flora aside and told her that he
learned she had sold her house, that it was a foolish thing to have done, and that for her
sake and her children's, she should withdraw her opposition and receive her legacy, so
that from its rent she could start a business.
The proceedings continued however as to the opposition of Justo Garcia.
On December 24, 1957, the court below issued an order allowing the probate of
the will. After the order had become nal and executory, Flora Blas on February 27,
1958, led a petition praying for the delivery to her of a shpond as a speci c devise in
her favor under Item No. 3, Clause No. 6, of the will. To this petition, in spite of apparent
understanding, Rosalina Santos led an opposition predicated on the ground that said
speci c devise in favor of Flora was forfeited in favor of the other residuary heirs,
pursuant to a provision of the will that should any of the heirs, devisees or legatees
contest or oppose its probate, the latter shall lose his or her right to receive any
inheritance or bene t under it, which shall be forfeited in favor of the other heirs,
devisees and legatees.
The pertinent provisions of the will, translated into English from Tagalog, reads
as follows:
"Fourteenth. — I request all my heirs, devisees and legatees to look after
each other, love and help one another and accept with thanks what I have
bequeathed to them, and treasure, love and cherish the same. Any one of them
who contests or opposes the probate of my will or the carrying out of its
provisions shall lose any right to receive any inheritance or bene t under my will,
and their inheritance or share shall pertain to the other heirs who have not
opposed." 3

This is known in Anglo-American jurisdiction as the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of

a will.
In its order of April 30, 1958, the court a quo sustained the theory that the "no-
contest and forfeiture" clause of the will was valid and had the effect of depriving Flora
of her devise in view of her previous opposition to its probate, which it held not justi ed
under the circumstances. Accordingly, it denied the motion for delivery of the speci c
devise, declaring the same forfeited in favor of the other residuary heirs. Flora's motion
for reconsideration, superseded by a subsequent amended motion to the same effect,
was denied by the probate court in its order dated March 7, 1959.
From the foregoing two orders of the trial court, Flora Blas interposed an appeal
to the Court of Appeals. Said Court, in its resolution of March 25, 1964, certi ed the
appeal to Us as calling for determination of questions purely of law.
This appeal raises two issues: (1) Did Flora's actuations, under the facts and
circumstances herein, amount to a violation of the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of
the will; and (2) Is the "no-contest and forfeiture" provision of the will valid?
Anent the second issue, the parties herein, relying mostly upon Spanish and
Anglo-American authorities, advance con icting theories. Petitioner-appellee argues
that the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause is a valid, legal and e cacious testamentary
condition. Against this position, however, the devisee-appellant maintains that such
provision in a will is null and void because it is contrary to public policy.
It is, however, the rst issue that We will now discuss. For this purpose, the point
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 to determine initially is whether or not appellant's ling of her opposition was justi ed
under the particular circumstances of the case; and then, whether or not a timely
withdrawal of said opposition had precluded violation of the "no contest and forfeiture
clause."
The court a quo's conclusion is that "there is no justi cation for her to oppose or
contest the probate of said will" because "from the evidence given by her and by her
witnesses during the pendency of the probate of the will . . ., it appears that Flora Blas
was aware of the true facts surrounding the execution of the will and of the mental
state of mind of the said testatrix at the time of the execution of the will in question,
and yet she has charged her benefactor, the late Maxima Santos, as not enjoying sound
mind when the latter executed her will on September 22, 1956", and that "there is no
proof to show that the said Flora Blas was in any manner related by blood to Maxima
Santos Vda. de Blas so that her contest of the said will cannot benefit her." 4

We disagree with the above conclusion of the lower court, which is not the
inference borne out by the facts and the evidence — both testimonial and documentary
— adduced in the case.
Appellant knew about the existence of another will executed earlier in 1953 in
which she stood to receive more — much more — than what is devised to her in the
1956 will. 5 Since 1953 up to the death of the testatrix, appellant did not fall out of the
good graces of the deceased. Their relationship stayed as close as ever. She did not
give any cause to alienate the deceased's affections. Why, then, the supposed change
of heart?
She was addressed as Flora Buendia in the will, 6 yet she has been using the
name Flora Blas as far as she could remember, apparently with the knowledge and
consent of the deceased. This is supported by her school records from grade school
up to first year pharmacy. Admittedly, it was the deceased who reared and spent for the
education of the appellant, and therefore she must have known that the latter was using
the family name Blas. If, indeed, the testatrix was not agreeable to such an
arrangement, why did she not take steps to correct the same? We can only conclude
that appellant's use of the family name Blas was with the acquiescence of the testatrix.
Why should she change her mind after all the years and speak of appellant in her will as
Flora Buendia instead of Flora Blas?
There was also the coincidence that the three attesting witnesses to the will, all
brothers, are likewise the lawyers of the executrix (who will receive the biggest single
share under the will) and compadres of the assistant executrix, while the notary public
is also a compadre of one of the attesting brothers-lawyers.
Furthermore, the nurse who attended to the deceased on September 22, 1956 —
the date when the will was supposedly typed and signed by the testatrix in her room at
the Manila Doctors Hospital — told the appellant that there was no one inside the
testatrix's room when she went to administer medications to the old woman at the
precise time when the attesting witnesses and the notary public testi ed they were
inside said room. The nurse admitted this likewise under oath (Tsn., June 10, 1957, p.
23).
But the most important single factor that should engender reasonable doubt as
to the physical and mental capacity of a person to execute a will, was the condition of
Maxima Blas as gleaned from the records of the case. She was an old woman more
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 than 86 years old who suffered from various ailments like rheumatoid arthritis, catarrh
of the eyes, jaundice, cirrhosis of the liver, anemia, edema of the lower legs and fracture
in the vertebrae. From August 1, 1956 to September 23, 1956 she received seven blood
transfusions, as follows: one on August 1; two on September 22 (the alleged date of
the execution of the will), with barely three hours intervening; one each on September
24, 25, 26 and 29, 1956. She was also given dextrose vinoclysis on September 22,
because she could not take food through the mouth; and on September 23, 1956 she
started to bleed by mouth, compelling her doctor to cancel her trip to the United States
scheduled for September 25, 1956. Several documents executed by her before the
alleged date of execution of the will, were no longer signed but merely thumbmarked by
her, 7 whereas the will appeared to have been signed.
It is di cult for Us to imagine that one situated and equally faced with the above
enumerated facts and circumstances as the appellant was, should keep her peace. She
had her doubts, and to resolve them she had to conduct inquiries and investigations.
Her ndings all the more strengthened her belief that there was something untoward
about the execution of the will. Thus, in her desire to know the truth and to protect her
rights, she opposed the probate of the will.
After all, had the contest been continued and the will held invalid on any of the
grounds provided by law for the disallowance of a will, 8 she would have contributed in
no small measure to the cause of the truth which the courts are duty-bound to
ascertain. The probate court would have been in a position to apply the proper legal
provisions which are for the greater interests of the testatrix — since all of them are
ordained to the idea that the truth of her last thoughts may be duly assured and
guaranteed.
Above all, the factor that preponderates in favor of appellant is that, after
realizing her mistake in contesting the will — a mistake committed in good faith
because grounded on strong doubts — she withdrew her opposition and joined the
appellee in the latter's petition for the probate of the will. She must not now be
penalized for rectifying her error. After all, the intentions of the testatrix had been
ful lled, her will had been admitted and allowed probate within a reasonably short
period, and the disposition of her property can now be effected.
It should be pointed out that, contrary to the translation accorded to Paragraph
Fourteen of the will, the testatrix enjoins not a mere contest or opposition to its
probate, but a contest or opposition to the probate of the will and the carrying out of its
provisions. This is so because the questioned clause speaks of "pagpapatibay at pag-
bibigay-bisa" instead of "pagpapatibay o pag-bibigay-bisa." 9 This furnishes a
signi cant index into the intention of the testatrix, namely, that she was more
concerned in insuring the carrying out of her testamentary provisions than in precluding
any contest or opposition to it. By the withdrawal of the contest which appellant
brought in good faith, no prejudice has been done to the intention of the testatrix. The
dispositions of her will can now be safely carried out.
The most that can be said, if at all, is that Flora Blas' actuations were also
impelled by some desire to gain. But who among the heirs can assume a posture of
innocence and cast the rst stone? None of them can safely claim that he is not thus
similarly motivated.
From the foregoing premises it cannot be said that Flora's actuations impaired
the true intention of the testatrix in regard to the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of
the will. Flora's act of withdrawing her opposition before she had rested her case
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 contributed to the speedy probate of the will. Since the withdrawal came before Flora
had rested her case, it precluded the defeat of the probate upon the strength of Flora's
evidence. Through said withdrawal, Flora conformed to the testatrix's wish that her
disposition of her properties under the will be carried out. It follows that, taken as a
whole, Flora's actuations subserved rather than violated the testatrix's intention.
There is, therefore, no further need to discuss the second issue on the validity of
a "no-contest and forfeiture" clause in this jurisdiction, since, at any rate, said clause
was not violated in this case.
Wherefore, the appealed orders dated April 30, 1958 and March 7, 1959 are
hereby reversed, and this case is remanded to the court a quo with the instruction that
appellant's devise under the will be forthwith delivered to her. No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Castro, JJ., concur.
Regala, J., took no part.

RESOLUTION AMENDING DECISION

November 29, 1966
BENGZON, J.P. , J : p

Flora Blas de Buenaventura, oppositor-appellant moved for reconsideration of

this Court's decision herein rendered on September 22, 1966 . Against this motion the
petitioner-appellee and executrix, Rosalina Santos, led an opposition. And appellant
filed a reply thereto.
Appellant-movant contends, rst, that she is entitled to and should be awarded,
not only the devised shpond, but all the fruits or rents of said property from the death
of the testatrix on October 5, 1956 up to the time said property will be delivered to her.
Appellant, it should be noted, did not expressly seek recovery of the fruits or rents in her
petition for delivery of speci c legacy (devise) led below. She started to mention also
the fruits or rents in her amended motion for reconsideration of the court a quo's denial
of said petition. And, thereafter, she has raised the point in her third assignment of error
in the present appeal.
This notwithstanding, We believe that appellant should receive the fruits and
rents of the property given to her in devise. The provisions of law regarding devised
properties are emphatic in stating that a devise of a specific thing includes its fruits
and income accruing after the testator's death, ordering that these shall be delivered
with the thing devised:
"Art. 948. If the legacy or devise is of a speci c and determinate thing
pertaining to the testator, the legatee or devisee acquires the ownership thereof
upon the death of the testator, as well as any growing fruits, or unborn offspring
of animals, or uncollected income; but not the income which was due and unpaid
before the latter's death.
"From the moment of the testator's death, the thing bequeathed shall be at
the risk of the legatee or devisee, who shall, therefore, bear its loss or
deterioration, and shall be bene ted by its increase or improvement, without
prejudice to the responsibility of the executor or administrator."

"Art. 951. The thing bequeathed shall be delivered with all its accessions
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 and accessories and in the condition in which it may be upon the death of the
testator." (Civil Code)

Furthermore, since fruits or rents are accessions (Arts. 441, 442, Civil Code),
strictly speaking, there was really no need to mention them in the petition or the
decision. Article 1166 of the Civil Code applies: "The obligation to give a determinate
thing includes that of delivering all its accessions and accessories, even though they
may not have been mentioned." To remove doubts on the matter, however, We here
expressly state that appellant is also entitled to, and appellee should deliver to her, the
fruits or rents of the devised shpond accruing after the testatrix's death. The precise
determination of the same, however, should be threshed out in the court below, before
which appellee must render an accounting.
Appellee, in this regard, would bring up in this proceedings and at this very late
stage, some new matters: that allegedly the testatrix owned only 65.38-2/3% of the
property devised, so that the fruits or rents pertaining to appellant should likewise be
only 65.38-2/3%. And in support of this, appellee refers to nal decisions of this Court
in two other cases, L-14070, "Maria Gervacio Blas, et al. vs. Rosalina Santos"
promulgated March 29, 1961, and L-19270, "Manuel Gervacio Blas, et al vs. Hon. Cecilia
Muñoz-Palma, et al." promulgated March 31, 1962. In said decisions, it is contended
that the rulings are to the effect that the properties therein litigated belonged to
Maxima Santos, the testatrix herein, only to the extent of 65.38-2/3%, the rest being
owned by her husband Simeon Blas, represented by the plaintiffs therein. The property
involved here is allegedly one of the properties litigated therein. The foregoing cannot
avail appellee herein. She is not the proper party to raise it, since she represents the
testatrix and not Simeon Blas or his heirs. For her to do so would in effect be to assert
an interest adverse to that of the testatrix, even when those to whom said alleged
interest pertains — Simeon Blas and his heirs — do not advance it.
As to appellee's reiterated contention that appellant had violated the no-contest
and forfeiture clause of the will, the same has already been su ciently discussed and
resolved in our decision. As therein stated, due to appellant's timely withdrawal of her
opposition to the probate of the will, it was as if there had been no opposition by her at
all, as far as the purpose underlying the afore-stated clause is concerned.
The next argument is on appellant's claim to interest upon the fruits or rents. The
rule is that interest does not run, unless stipulated, where there is yet no delay (Arts.
1169, 2209, Civil Code). And in settlement proceedings, there is no delay on the part of
the administratrix until after the court orders her to make delivery of the legacy or
devise (Ongpin v. Rivera, 44 Phil. 808). In this case, the court a quo not having issued
such an order, appellee has not incurred in delay and is thus not liable for interest.
Appellant-movant also prays for moral and exemplary damages and would rest
this claim upon fraud allegedly committed on two different occasions: First, in the
preparation of the will; and, second, during the supposed negotiations for the
withdrawal of her opposition preparatory for the delivery of her devise.
As to the rst, appellant would thereby be assailing the very basis of the right she
is asserting as devisee, for if the will was not a voluntary act of the testatrix as she
would contend, the devise in question would suffer the same defect. It should be
remembered also that the will has already been admitted to probate, so that its due
execution and authenticity are already deemed established for purposes of this
proceeding.
As to the second alleged occasion of fraud, We have on record only the parties'
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 allegations and denials, and the a davit of the devisee-claimant. Fraud being a serious
charge, it is di cult to see how the same can be sustained on so insu cient an
evidence. And moreover, this being a factual issue, We cannot consider the same, for
this appeal is con ned to questions purely of law. Appellant-movants prayer for moral
and exemplary damages, therefore, is hereby denied.
As to Attorney's fees, however, this Court, considering all the circumstances,
believes it reasonable and equitable to award under Article 2208, par. 11, of the Civil
Code, P5,000 in appellant's favor.
In view of the foregoing, the dispositive portion of the decision herein
promulgated on September 22, 1966 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed orders dated April 30, 1958 and March 7, 1959 are
hereby reversed and this case is remanded to the court a quo, with the instruction that
appellant's speci c devise under the will be forthwith delivered to her by appellee
executrix, will all the fruits or rents thereof accruing from the death of the testatrix on
October 5, 1956 until its delivery, and for this purpose said appellee executrix shall
render an accounting to the court a quo. Lastly, attorney's fee of P5,000 is hereby
awarded in appellant's favor against appellee. No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. She died on October 5, 1956, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., but was a resident of
Malabon, Rizal, at the time of her death.
2. Record on Appeal. pp. 6-9.
3. The Tagalog original is as follows:

"Ika-labing-apat. — Aking itinatagubilin na ang lahat ng aking pinamanahan ay

magtinginang mabuti, magmahalan at magdamayan sa isa't isa, at kanilang
tanggaping may pasasalamat ang sa kanila ay aking ipinamamana, at ito ay kanilang
pag-ingatan, mahalin at pagyamanin. Ang sinuman sa kanila na tumutol o
sumalangsang sa pag-papatibay at pag-bibigay-bisa sa testamento kong ito ay
mawawalan ng anumang karapatang tumanggap ng mana o anumang biyaya na aking
ipinagkaloob sa testamentong ito, at ang kanilang mana o kaparti ay mauuwi at
mapapagawi sa ibang mga pinamanahan ko na hindi nagsitutol."
4. Order of April 30, 1958; Record on Appeal, pp. 44-45.
5. This the executrix-appellee admits on page 174 of her brief wherein is stated that "the
shpond given to appellant in the revoked will of 1953 is bigger than that bequeathed to
her in the revocatory will of 1956.
6. Probated will dated September 22, 1956.
7. Two "pagare" documents on September 10, 1956 in favor of Maria Gervasio Blas
(Attached to record of case as Annexes A and B); a codicil on September 14, 1956 (Tsn,
December 24, 1956; pp. 29-30); a letter to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation on
September 18, 1956 (Annex B to Motion for Reconsideration).
8. Article 389, New Civil Code; Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.

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 9. Supra, p. 4.

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