VOL.

76, APRIL 29, 1977 543

Cruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

*
No. L-23749. April 29, 1977.

FAUSTINO CRUZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. J. M. TUASON

& COMPANY, INC., and GREGORIO ARANETA, INC.,
defendants-appellees.

Civil law; Statute of Frauds; The statute of frauds does not

apply to an alleged contract whereby one party agreed to deliver a
parcel of land to another in consideration of the latter’s acting as
intermediary to effect a compromise in a civil action.—In the
instant case, what appellant is trying to enforce is the delivery to
him of 3,000 square meters of land which he claims defendants
promised to do in consideration of his services as mediator or
intermediary in effecting a compromise of the civil action, Civil
Case No. 135, between the defendants and the Deudors. In no
sense may such alleged contract be considered as being a “sale of
real property or of any interest therein.” Indeed, not all dealings
involving interest in real property come under the Statute.
Moreover, appellant’s complaint clearly alleges that he

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION

544

544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

has already fulfilled his part of the bargain to induce the Deudors
to amicably settle their differences with defendants as, in fact, on
March 16, 1963, through his efforts, a compromise agreement
between these parties was approved by the court. In other words,
the agreement in question has already been partially
consummated, and is no longer merely executory. And it is
likewise a fundamental principle governing the application of the
Statute that the contract in dispute should be purely executory on
the part of both parties thereto.
Same; Quasi-contract; A presumed quasi-contract cannot
emerge as against one party when the subject matter thereof is
already covered by a contract with another party.—From the very
language of this provision, it is obvious that a presumed quasi-
contract cannot emerge as against one party when the subject
matter thereof is already covered by an existing contract with
another party. Predicated on the principle that no one should be
allowed to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another,
Article 2142 creates the legal fiction of a quasi-contract precisely
because of the absence of any actual agreement between the
parties concerned. Corollarily, if the one who claims having
enriched somebody has done so pursuant to a contract with a
third party, his cause of action should be against the latter, who
in turn may, if there is any ground therefor, seek relief against
the party benefited. It is essential that the act by which the
defendant is benefited must have voluntary and unilateral on the
part of the plaintiff. As one distinguished civilian puts it, “The act
is voluntary, because the actor in quasi-contracts is not bound by
any pre-existing obligation to act. It is unilateral, because it arises
from the sole will of the actor who is not previously bound by any
reciprocal or bilateral agreement. The reason why the law creates
a juridical relation and imposes certain obligations is to prevent a
situation where a person is able to benefit or take advantage of
such lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts at the expense of said
actor.” (Ambrosio Padilla, Civil Law, Vol. VI, p. 748, 1969 ed.) In
the case at bar, since appellant has a clearer and more direct
recourse against the Deudors with whom he had entered into an
agreement regarding the improvements and expenditures made
by him on the land of appellees, it cannot be said, in the sense
contemplated in Article 2142, that appellees have been enriched
at the expense of appellant.
Appeal; A pro forma motion for reconsideration does not
suspend running of the period for appeal.—We cannot see
anything in said motion for reconsideration that is substantially
different from the above oppositions and rejoinder he had
previously submitted and which the trial court had already
considered when it rendered its main order of dismissal.
Consequently, appellant’s motion for reconsideration did not
suspend his period for appeal.

545

VOL. 76, APRIL 29, 1977 545

 Cruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the order dated August 13, 1964 of the Court
of First Instance of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-7751,
Faustino Cruz vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and Gregorio
Araneta, Inc., dismissing the complaint of appellant Cruz
for the recovery of improvements he has made on appellees’
land and to compel appellees to convey to him 3,000 square
meters of land on three grounds: (1) failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action; (2) the cause of action
of plaintiff is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds;
and (3) the action of the plaintiff has already prescribed.
Actually, a perusal of plaintiff-appellant’s complaint
below shows that he alleged two separate causes of action,
namely: (1) that upon request of the Deudors (the family of
Telesforo Deudor who laid claim on the land in question on
the strength of an “information posesoria”) plaintiff made
permanent improvements valued at P30,400.00 on said
land having an area of more or less 20 quiñones and for
which he also incurred expenses in the amount of
P7,781.74, and since defendants-appellees are being
benefited by said improvements, he is entitled to
reimbursement from them of said amounts; and (2) that in
1952, defendants availed of plaintiff’s services as an
intermediary with the Deudors to work for the amicable
settlement of Civil Case No. Q-135, then pending also in
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, and involving
50 quinones of land, of which the 20 quinones
aforementioned form part, and notwithstanding his having
performed his services, as in fact, a compromise agreement
entered into on March 16, 1963 between the Deudors and
the defendants was approved by the court, the latter have
refused to convey to him the 3,000 square meters of land
occupied by him, (a part of the 20 quinones above) which
said defendants had promised to do “within ten years from
and after date of signing of the compromise agreement”, as
consideration for his services.
Within the period allowed by the rules, the defendants
filed separate motions to dismiss alleging three identical
grounds: (1) As regards the improvements made by
plaintiff, that the complaint states no cause of action, the
agreement regarding the same having been made by
plaintiff with the Deudors and not with the defendants,
hence the theory of plaintiff based on Article 2142 of the
Civil Code on unjust enrichment is

546
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

untenable; and (2) anent the alleged agreement about

plaintiff’s services as intermediary in consideration of
which, defendants promised to convey to him 3,000 square
meters of land, that the same is unenforceable under the
Statute of Frauds, there being nothing in writing about it,
and, in any event, (3) that the action of plaintiff to compel
such conveyance has already prescribed.
Plaintiff opposed the motion, insisting that Article 2142
of the Civil Code is applicable to his case; that the Statute
of Frauds cannot be invoked by defendants, not only
because Article 1403 of the Civil Code refers only to “sale of
real property or of an interest therein” and not to promises
to convey real property like the one supposedly promised by
defendants to him, but also because, he, the plaintiff has
already performed his part of the agreement, hence the
agreement has already been partly executed and not
merely executory within the contemplation of the Statute;
and that his action has not prescribed for the reason that
defendants had ten years to comply and only after the said
ten years did his cause of action accrue, that is, ten years
after March 16, 1963, the date of the approval of the
compromise agreement, and his complaint was filed on
January 24, 1964.
Ruling on the motion to dismiss, the trial court issued
the herein impugned order of August 13, 1964:

“In the motion, dated January 31, 1964, defendant Gregorio

Araneta, Inc. prayed that the complaint against it be dismissed on
the ground that (1) the claim on which the action is founded is
unenforceable under the provision of the Statute of Frauds; and
(2) the plaintiff’s action, if any has already prescribed. In the
other motion of February 11, 1964, defendant J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. sought the dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint on the
ground that it states no cause of action and on the identical
grounds stated in the motion to dismiss of defendant Gregorio
Araneta, Inc. The said motions are duly opposed by the plaintiff.
“From the allegations of the complaint, it appears that, by
virtue of an agreement arrived at in 1948 by the plaintiff and the
Deudors, the former assisted the latter in clearing, improving,
subdividing and selling the large tract of land consisting of 50
quinones covered by the information posesoria in the name of the
late Telesforo Deudor and incurred expenses, which are valued
approximately at P38,400.00 and P7,781.74, respectively; and, for
the reasons that said improvements are being used and enjoyed
by the defendants, the plaintiff is seeking the reimbursement for
the services and expenses stated above from the defendants.

547

VOL. 76, APRIL 29, 1977 547

Cruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

“Defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. claimed that, insofar as the

plaintiff’s claim for the reimbursement of the amounts of
P38,400.00 and P7,781.74 is concerned, it is not a privy to the
plaintiff’s agreement to assist the Deudors in improving the 50
quinones. On the other hand, the plaintiff countered that, by
holding and utilizing the improvements introduced by him, the
defendants are unjustly enriching and benefiting at the expense
of the plaintiff; and that said improvements constitute a lien or
charge on the property itself
“On the issue that the complaint insofar as it claims the
reimbursement for the services rendered and expenses incurred
by the plaintiff, states no cause of action, the Court is of the
opinion that the same is well-founded. It is found that the
defendants are not parties to the supposed express contract
entered into by and between the plaintiff and the Deudors for the
clearing and improvement of the 50 quinones. Furthermore in
order that the alleged improvement may be considered a lien or
charge on the property, the same should have been made in good
faith and under the mistake as to the title. The Court can take
judicial notice of the fact that the tract of land supposedly
improved by the plaintiff had been registered way back in 1914 in
the name of the predecessors-in-interest of defendant J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. This fact is confirmed in the decision rendered
by the Supreme Court on July 31, 1956 in Case G. R. No. L-5079
entitled ‘J. M. Tuason & Co. Inc. vs. Geronimo Santiago, et al’.
Such being the case, the plaintiff cannot claim good faith and
mistake as to the title of the land.
“On the issue of statute of fraud, the Court believes that same
is applicable to the instant case. The allegation in par. 12 of the
complaint states that the defendants promised and agreed to
cede, transfer and convey unto the plaintiff the 3,000 square
meters of land in consideration of certain services to be rendered
then. It is clear that the alleged agreement involves an interest in
real property. Under the provisions of Sec. 2(e) of Article 1403 of
the Civil Code, such agreement is not enforceable as it is not in
writing and subscribed by the party charged.
“On the issue of statute of limitations, the Court holds that the
plaintiff’s action has prescribed. It is alleged in par. 11 of the
complaint that, sometime in 1952, the defendants approached the
plaintiff to prevail upon the Deudors to enter into a compromise
agreement in Civil Case No. Q-135 and allied cases. Furthermore,
pars. 13 and 14 of the complaint alleged that the plaintiff acted as
emissary of both parties in conveying their respective proposals
and counter-proposals until the final settlement was effected on
March 16, 1953 and approved by the Court on April 11, 1953. In
the present action, which was instituted on January 24, 1964, the
plaintiff is seeking to enforce the supposed agreement entered
into between him and the defendants in 1952, which has already
prescribed.

548

548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

“WHEREFORE, the plaintiff’s complaint is hereby ordered

DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
“SO ORDERED.” (Pp. 65-69, Rec. on Appeal.)

On August 22, 1964, plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion for

reconsideration dated August 20, 1964 as follows:

“Plaintiff through undersigned counsel and to this Honorable

Court, respectfully moves to reconsider its Order bearing date of
13 August 1964, on the following grounds:

“I. THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES A SUFFICIENT

CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS IN SO
FAR AS PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM PAYMENT OF SERVICES
AND REIMBURSEMENT OF HIS EXPENSES, IS
CONCERNED;
“II. THAT REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM OVER THE
3,000 SQ. MS., THE SAME HAS NOT PRESCRIBED
AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NOT APPLICABLE
THERETO;

“A R G U M E N T

“Plaintiff’s complaint contains two (2) causes of action—the

first being an action for sum of money in the amount of P7,781.74
representing actual expenses and P38,400.00 as reasonable
compensation for services in improving the 50 quinones now in
the possession of defendants. The second cause of action deals
with the 3,000 sq. ms. which defendants have agreed to transfer
unto plaintiff for services rendered in effecting the compromise
between the Deudors and defendants;
“Under its order of August 3, 1964, this Honorable Court
dismissed the claim for sum of money on the ground that the
complaint does not state a cause of action against defendants. We
respectfully submit:

“1. THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES A SUFFICIENT

CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS IN SO
FAR AS PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR PAYMENT OF
SERVICES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF HIS
EXPENSES, IS CONCERNED.

“Said this Honorable Court (at p. 2, Order):

“O R D E R

xx      xx      xx

549

VOL. 76, APRIL 29, 1977 549

Cruz vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

“On the issue that the complaint, in so far as it claims the

reimbursement for the services rendered and expenses incurred
by the plaintiff, states no cause of action, the Court is of the
opinion that the same is well-founded. It is found that the
defendants are not parties to the supposed express contract
entered into by and between the plaintiff and the Deudors for the
clearing and improvement of the 50 quinones. Furthermore, in
order that the alleged improvement may be considered a lien or
charge on the property, the same should have been made in good
faith and under the mistake as to title. The Court can take
judicial notice of the fact that the tract of land supposedly
improved by the plaintiff had been registered way back in 1914 in
the name of the predecessors-in-interest of defendant J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. This fact is confirmed in the decision rendered
by the Supreme Court on July 31, 1956 in case G. R. No. L-5079
entitled ‘J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Geronimo Santiago, et al.’
Such being the case, the plaintiff cannot claim good faith and
mistake as to the title of the land.’
“The position of this Honorable Court (supra) is that the
complaint does not state a cause of action in so far as the claim for
services and expenses is concerned because the contract for the
improvement of the properties was solely between the Deudors
and plaintiff, and defendants are not privies to it. Now, plaintiff’s
theory is that defendants are nonetheless liable since they are
utilizing and enjoying the benefits of said improvements. Thus,
under paragraph 16 of the complaint, it is alleged:

‘(16) That the services and personal expenses of plaintiff mentioned in

paragraph 7 hereof were rendered and in fact paid by him to improve, as
they in fact resulted in considerable improvement of the 50 quinones, and
defendants being now in possession of and utilizing said improvements
should reimburse and pay plaintiff for such services and expenses.

“Plaintiff’s cause of action is premised inter alia, on the theory

of unjust enrichment under Article 2142 of the civil Code:

‘ART. 2142. Certain lawful voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the
juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be
unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.’

“In like vein, Article 19 of the same Code enjoins that:

‘ART. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith.’

550

550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

“We respectfully draw the attention of this Honorable Court to the

fact that ARTICLE 2142 (SUPRA) DEALS WITH QUASI-
CONTRACTS or situations WHERE THERE IS NO CONTRACT
BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE ACTION. Further, as we can
readily see from the title thereof (Title XVII), that the same bears
the designation ‘EXTRA CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS’ or
obligations which do not arise from contracts. While it is true that
there was no agreement between plaintiff and defendants herein
for the improvement of the 50 quinones, since the latter are
presently enjoying and utilizing the benefits brought about
through plaintiff’s labor and expenses, defendants should pay and
reimburse him therefor under the principle that ‘no one may
enrich himself at the expense of another.’ In this posture, the
complaint states a cause of action against the defendants.

“II. THAT REGARDING PLAINTIFFS CLAIM OVER THE

3,000 SQ. MS. THE SAME HAS NOT PRESCRIBED AND
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NOT APPLICABLE
THERETO.

“The Statute of Frauds

is CLEARLY inapplicable
to this case:

“At page 2 of this Honorable Court’s order dated 13 August

1964, the Court ruled as follows:

“O R D E R
 xx      xx      xx

‘On the issue of statute of fraud, the Court believes that same is
applicable to the instant case. The allegation in par. 12 of the complaint
states that the defendants promised and agree to cede, transfer and
convey unto the plaintiff, 3,000 square meters of land in consideration of
certain services to be rendered then. It is clear that the alleged
agreement involves an interest in real property. Under the provisions of
Sec. 2(e) of Article 1403 of the Civil Code, such agreement is not
enforceable as it is not in writing and subscribed by the party charged.’

“To bring this issue in sharper focus, we shall reproduce not

only paragraph 12 of the complaint but also the other pertinent
paragraphs therein contained. Paragraph 12 states thus:

551

VOL. 76, APRIL 29, 1977 551

Cruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

“C O M P L A I N T

xx      xx      xx

‘12). That plaintiff conferred with the aforesaid representatives

of defendants several times and on these occasions, the
latter promised and agreed to cede, transfer and convey
unto plaintiff the 3,000 sq. ms. (now known as Lots 16-B,
17 and 18) which plaintiff was then occupying and
continues to occupy as of this writing, for and in
consideration of the following conditions:

(a) That plaintiff succeed in convincing the DEUDORS to

enter into a compromise agreement and that such
agreement be actually entered into by and between the
DEUDORS and defendant companies;
(b) That as of date of signing the compromise agreement,
plaintiff shall be the owner of the 3,000 sq. ms. but the
documents evidencing his title over this property shall be
executed and delivered by defendants to plaintiff within
ten (10) years from and after date of signing of the
compromise agreement;
(c) That plaintiff shall, without any monetary expense of his
part, assist in clearing the 20 quinones of its occupants;

‘13). That in order to effect a compromise between the parties,

plaintiff not only as well acted as emissary of both parties
in conveying their respective proposals and counter-
proposals until plaintiff finally succeeded in convincing the
 DEUDORS to settle with defendants amicably. Thus, on
March 16, 1953, a Compromise Agreement was entered
into by and between the DEUDORS and the defendant
companies; and on April 11, 1953, this agreement was
approved by this Honorable Court;
‘14). That in order to comply with his other obligations under
his agreement with defendant companies, plaintiff had to
confer with the occupants of the property, exposing
himself to physical harm, convincing said occupants to
leave the premises and to refrain from resorting to
physical violence in resisting defendants’ demands to
vacate;

‘That plaintiff further assisted defendants’ employees in the actual

demolition and transfer of all the houses within the perimeter of
the 20 quinones until the end of 1955, when said area was totally
cleared and the houses transferred to another area designated by
the defendants as ‘Capt. Cruz Block’ in

552

552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

Masambong, Quezon City.’ (Pars. 12, 13 and 14. Complaint;

Italics Ours).
“From the foregoing, it is clear then that the agreement
between the parties mentioned in paragraph 12 (supra) of the
complaint has already been fully EXECUTED ON ONE PART,
namely by the plaintiff. Regarding the applicability of the statute
of frauds (Art. 1403, Civil Code), it has been uniformly held that
the statute of frauds IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO EXECUTORY
CONTRACTS BUT NOT WHERE THE CONTRACT HAS BEEN
PARTLY EXECUTED:

‘SAME ACTION TO ENFORCE.—The statute of frauds has been

uniformly interpreted to be applicable to executory and not to completed or
executed contracts. Performance of the contract takes it out of the
operation of the statute. xx xx.
The statute of frauds is not applicable to contracts which are either
totally or partially performed, on the theory that there is a wide field for
the commission of frauds in executory contracts which can only be
prevented by requiring them to be in writing, a fact which is reduced to a
minimum in executed contracts because the intention of the parties
becomes apparent by their execution and execution, in most cases,
concludes the right of the parties. x x x. The partial performance may be
proved by either documentary or oral evidence. (At pp. 564-565,
Tolentino’s Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, 1962 Ed.; Italics Ours).
 “Authorities in support of the foregoing rule are legion. Thus,
Mr. Justice Moran in his ‘Comments on the Rules of Court’, Vol.
III, 1974 Ed., at p. 167, states:

‘2. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO

EXECUTORY CONTRACTS: CONTRACTS WHICH ARE EITHER
TOTALLY OR PARTIALLY PERFORMED ARE WITHOUT THE
STATUTE. The statute of frauds is applicable only to executory contracts.
It is neither applicable to executed contracts nor to contracts partially
performed. The reason is simple. In executory contracts there is a wide
field for fraud because unless they be in writing there is no palpable
evidence of the intention of the contracting parties. The statute has been
enacted to prevent fraud. On the other hand the commission of fraud in
executed contracts is reduced to a minimum in executed contracts
because (1) the intention of the parties is made apparent by the execution
and (2) execution concludes, in most cases, the rights of the parties.’
(Italics Ours)

“Under paragraphs 13 and 14 of the complaint (supra) one can

readily see that the plaintiff has fulfilled ALL his obligations
under

553

VOL. 76, APRIL 29, 1977 553

Cruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

the agreement between him and defendants concerning the 3,000

sq. ms. over which the latter had agreed to execute the proper
documents of transfer. This fact is further projected in paragraph
15 of the complaint where plaintiff states;

‘15). That in or about the middle of 1963, after all the conditions stated in
paragraph 12 hereof had been fulfilled and fully complied with, plaintiff
demanded of said defendants that they execute the Deed of Conveyance
in his favor and deliver the title certificate in his name, over the 3,000 sq.
ms. but defendants failed and refused and continue to fail and refuse to
heed his demands.’ (Par. 15, Complaint; Italics Ours).

“In view of the foregoing, we respectfully submit that this

Honorable Court erred in holding that the statute of frauds is
applicable to plaintiff’s claim over the 3,000 sq. ms. There having
been full performance of the contract on plaintiff’s part, the same
takes this case out of the context of said statute.

Plaintiff’s Cause of
Action has NOT Pres
cribed:
 “With all due respect to this Honorable Court, we also submit
that the Court committed error in holding that this action has
prescribed:

“ORDER

x x      x x      x x

‘On the issue of the statute of limitations, the Court holds that the
plaintiff’s action has prescribed. It is alleged in par. II of the complaint
that, sometime in 1952, the defendants approached the plaintiff to
prevail upon the Deudors to enter into a compromise agreement in Civil
Case No. Q-135 and allied cases. Furthermore, pars. 13 and 14 of the
complaint alleged that plaintiff acted as emissary of both parties in
conveying their respective proposals and counter-proposals until the final
settlement was effected on March 16, 1953 and approved by the Court on
April 11, 1953. In the present action, which was instituted on January
24, 1964, the plaintiff is seeking to enforce the supposed agreement
entered into between him and the defendants in 1952, which has already
prescribed.’ (at p. 3, Order).

“The present action has not prescribed, especially when we

consider carefully the terms of the agreement between plaintiff
and

554

554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

the defendants. First, we must draw the attention of this

Honorable Court to the fact that this is an action to compel
defendants to execute a Deed of Conveyance over the 3,000 sq.
ms. subject of their agreement. In paragraph 12 of the complaint,
the terms and conditions of the contract between the parties are
spelled out. Paragraph 12 (b) of the complaint states:

‘(b) That as of date of signing the compromise agreement, plaintiff shall be

the owner of the 3,000 sq. ms. but the documents evidencing his title over
this property shall be executed and delivered by defendants to plaintiff
within ten (l0) years from and after date of signing of the compromise
agreement.’(Italics Ours).

“The compromise agreement between defendants and the

Deudors which was concluded through the efforts of plaintiff, was
signed on 16 March 1953. Therefore, the defendants had ten (10)
years from said date within which to execute the deed of
conveyance in favor of plaintiff over the 3,000 sq. ms. As long as
the 10 years period has not expired, plaintiff had no right to
compel defendants to execute the document and the latter were
under no obligation to do so. Now, this 10-year period elapsed on
March 16, 1963. THEN and ONLY THEN does plaintiff’s cause of
action against defendants accrue. Therefore, the period of
prescription began to run against plaintiff only on March 17, 1963.
Thus, under paragraph 15 of the complaint (supra) plaintiff made
demands upon defendants for the execution of the deed ‘in or
about the middle of 1963.’
“Since the contract now sought to be enforced was not reduced
to writing, plaintiff’s cause of action expires on March 16, 1969 or
six years from March 16, 1963 WHEN THE CAUSE OP ACTION
ACCRUED (Art. 1145, Civil Code).
“In this posture, we again respectfully submit that this
Honorable Court erred in holding that plaintiff’s action has
prescribed.

“PRAYER

“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Honorable

Court reconsider its Order dated August 13, 1964; and issue
another order denying the motions to dismiss of defendants G.
Araneta, Inc. and J. M. Tuason Co. Inc. for lack of merit.” (Pp. 70-
85, Record on Appeal.)

Defendants filed an opposition on the main ground that

“the arguments adduced by the plaintiff are merely
reiterations of his arguments contained in his Rejoinder to
Reply and Opposition, which have not only been refuted in
herein
555

VOL. 76, APRIL 29, 1977 555

Cruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Reply but already

passed upon by this Honorable Court.”
On September 7, 1964, the trial court denied the motion
for reconsiderations thus:

“After considering the plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of

August 20, 1964 and it appearing that the grounds relied upon in
said motion are mere repetition of those already resolved and
discussed by this Court in the order of August 13, 1964, the
instant motion is hereby denied and the findings and conclusions
arrived at by the Court in its order of August 13, 1964 are hereby
reiterated and affirmed.
“SO ORDERED.” (Page 90, Rec. on Appeal.)
Under date of September 24, 1964, plaintiff filed his record
on appeal.
In his brief, appellant poses and discusses the following
assignments of error:

“I. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING

THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND THAT
APPELLANTS CLAIM OVER THE 3,000 SQ. MS. IS
ALLEGEDLY UNENFORCEABLE UNDER THE
STATUTE OP FRAUDS;
“II. THAT THE COURT A QUO FURTHER COMMITTED
ERROR IN DISMISSING APPELLANTS COMPLAINT
ON THE GROUND THAT HIS CLAIM OVER THE 3,000
SQ. MS. IS ALLEGEDLY BARRED BY THE STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS; and
“III. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE
OF ACTION IN SO FAR AS APPELLANTS CLAIM FOR
REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES AND FOR
SERVICES RENDERED IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF
THE FIFTY (50) QUINONES, IS CONCERNED.

We agree with appellant that the Statute of Frauds was

erroneously applied by the trial court. It is elementary that
the Statute refers to specific kinds of transactions and that
it cannot apply to any that is not enumerated therein. And
the only agreements or contracts covered thereby are the
following:

“(1) Those entered into in the name of another person

by one who has been given no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his
powers;
“(2) Those do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as
set forth in this number. In the following cases an
agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable
by action, unless the same, or some note or

556

556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed

by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence,
therefore, of the agreement cannot be received
 without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its
contents:

(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be

performed within a year from the making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or
miscarriage of another;
(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage,
other than a mutual promise to marry;
(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or
things in action, at a price not less than five
hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept and receive
part of such goods and chattels, or the evidences, or
some of them, of such things in action, or pay at the
time some part of the purchase money; but when a
sale is made by auction and entry is made by the
auctioneer in his sales book, at the time of the sale,
of the amount and kind of property sold, terms of
sale, price, names of the purchasers and person on
whose account the sale is made, it is a sufficient
memorandum:
(e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period
than one year, or for the sale of real property or of
an interest therein:
(f) a representation as to the credit of a third person.

“(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving

consent to a contract. (Art. 1403, civil Code.)

In the instant case, what appellant is trying to enforce is

the delivery to him of 3,000 square meters of land which he
claims defendants promised to do in consideration of his
services as mediator or intermediary in effecting a
compromise of the civil action, Civil Case No. 135, between
the defendants and the Deudors. In no sense may such
alleged contract be considered as being a “sale of real
property or of any interest therein.” Indeed, not all dealings
involving interest in real property come under the Statute.
Moreover, appellant’s complaint clearly alleges that he
has already fulfilled his part of the bargains to induce the
Deudors to amicably settle their differences with
defendants as, in fact, on March 16, 1963, through his
efforts, a compromise agreement between these parties was
approved by the court. In other words, the agreement in
question has already been partially consummated, and is
no longer merely executory. And it is likewise a
fundamental principle governing the application of the
Statute that the contract in dispute should be purely
 557

VOL. 76, APRIL 29, 1977 557

Cruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

executory on the part of both parties thereto.

We cannot, however, escape taking judicial notice, in
relation to the compromise agreement relied upon by
appellant, that in several cases We have decided, We have
declared the same rescinded and of no effect. In J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bienvenido Sanvictores, 4 SCRA
123, the Court held:

“It is also worthy of note that the compromise between Deudors

and Tuason, upon which Sanvictores predicates his right to buy
the lot he occupies, has been validly rescinded and set aside, as
recognized by this Court in its decision in G.R. No. L-13768,
Deudor vs. Tuason, promulgated on May 30, 1961.”

We repeated this observation in J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

vs. Teodosio Macalindong, 6 SCRA 938. Thus, viewed from
what would be the ultimate conclusion of appellant’s case,
We entertain grave doubts as to whether or not he can
successfully maintain his alleged cause of action against
defendants, considering that the compromise agreement
that he invokes did not actually materialize and defendants
have not benefited therefrom, not to mention the
undisputed fact that, as pointed out by appellees,
appellant’s other attempt to secure the same 3,000 square
meters via the judicial enforcement of the compromise
agreement in which they were supposed to be reserved for
him has already been repudiated by the courts. (pp. 5-7.
Brief of Appellee Gregorio Araneta, Inc.)
As regards appellant’s third assignment of error, We
hold that the allegations in his complaint do not
sufficiently constitute a cause of action against defendants-
appellees. Appellant’s reliance on Article 2142 of Civil Code
is misplaced. Said article provides:

“Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the

juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be
unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.”

From the very language of this provision, it is obvious that

a presumed quasi-contract cannot emerge as against one
party when the subject matter thereof is already covered by
an existing contract with another party. Predicated on the
principle that no one should be allowed to unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another, Article 2142 creates the
legal fiction of a quasi-contract precisely because of the
absence of any actual agreement between the parties
concerned. Corollarily, if the one who claims having
enriched somebody has
558

558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

done so pursuant to a contract with a third party, his cause

of action should be against the latter, who in turn may, if
there is any ground therefore, seek relief against the party
benefited. It is essential that the act by which the
defendant is benefited must have been voluntary and
unilateral on the part of the plaintiff. As one distinguished
civilian puts it, “The act is voluntary, because the actor in
quasi-contracts is not bound by any pre-existing obligation
to act. It is unilateral, because it arises from the sole will of
the actor who is not previously bound by any reciprocal or
bilateral agreement. The reason why the law created a
juridical relations and imposes certain obligation is to
prevent a situation where a person is able to benefit or take
advantage of such lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts at
the expense of said actor.” (Ambrosio Padilla, Civil Law,
Vol. VI, p. 748, 1969 ed.) In the case at bar, since appellant
has a clearer and more direct recourse against the Deudors
with whom he had entered into an agreement regarding
the improvements and expenditures made by him on the
land of appellees, it cannot be said, in the sense
contemplated in Article 2142, that appellees have been
enriched at the expense of appellant.
In the ultimate, therefore, Our holding above that
appellant’s first two assignments of error are well taken
cannot save the day for him. Aside from his having no
cause of action against appellees, there is one plain error of
omission We have found in the order of the trial court
which is as good a ground as any other for Us to terminate
this case favorably to appellees. In said order which We
have quoted in full earlier in this opinion, the trial court
ruled that “the grounds relied upon in said motion are mere
repetitions of those already resolved and discussed by this
Court in the order of August 13, 1964”, an observation
which We fully share. Virtually, therefore, appellants’s
motion for reconsideration was ruled to be proforma.
Indeed, a cursory reading of the record on appeal reveals
that appellant’s motion for reconsideration above-quoted
contained exactly the same arguments and manner of
discussion as his February 6, 1964 “Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss” of defendant Gregorio Araneta, Inc. ((pp. 17-25,
Rec. on Appeal) as well as his February 17, 1964
“Opposition to Motion to Dismiss of Defendant J. M.
Tuason & Co.” (pp. 33-45, Rec. on Appeal) and his February
29, 1964 “Rejoinder to Reply of Defendant J. M. Tuason &
Co.”, (pp. 52-64, Rec. on Appeal)
559

VOL. 76, APRIL 29, 1977 559

Cruz vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.

We cannot see anything in said motion for reconsideration

that is substantially different from the above oppositions
and rejoinder he had previously submitted and which the
trial court had already considered when it rendered its
main order of dismissal. Consequently, appellant’s motion
for reconsideration did not suspend his period for appeal.
(Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo, 28 SCRA 890, 905-6.) And as
this point was covered by appellees’ “Opposition to Motion
for Reconsideration” (pp. 86-89), hence, within the frame of
the issues below, it is within the ambit of Our authority as
the Supreme Court to consider the same here even if it is
not discussed in the briefs of the parties. (Insular Life
Assurance Co:, Ltd. Employees Association-NATU vs.
Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. [Resolution en banc of
March 10, 1977 in G. R. No. L-25291).
Now, the impugned main order was issued on August
13, 1964, while the appeal was made on September 24,
1964 or 42 days later. Clearly, this is beyond the 30-day
reglementary period for appeal. Hence, the subject order of
dismissal was already final and executory when appellant
filed his appeal.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Faustino Cruz in this case
is dismissed. No costs.

     Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino and Martin,

JJ., concur.
     Concepcion Jr., JJ., did not take part.
          Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second
Division.

Case dismissed.

Notes.—The primordial aim of the law in laying down

the requisites regarding the application of the “Statute of
 Frauds” is to prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement
of obligations depending for their evidence upon the
unassisted memory of witnesses (Showemaker vs. La
Tondena, 68 Phil. 24). For the achievement of this purpose,
however, it does not attempt to make, or have the effect of
making, contracts invalid which have not been executed in
writing. It simply provides for the form or method by which
contracts coming within its terms may be proved. Such
contracts, if their only effect is that they are not in the form
required by the Statute of Frauds, are valid, the only
consequence being that no action can be proved unless the
requirement is complied with. In other words, the form
560

560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Quizon vs. Baltazar

required by the statute is for evidentiary purposes only.

Thus, if the parties permit a contract to be proved, without
objection as to the form of proof, it is then just as binding
as if the statute had been complied with. (Conlu vs.
Araneta, 15 Phil. 387; Gallemit vs. Tabiliran, 20 Phil. 241;
Kuenzle vs. Jiongco, 22 Phil. 111; Gomez vs. Salcedo, 26
SCRA 487; Magalona vs. Parayco, 59 Phil. 543).
The Statute of Frauds is not applicable to wills (Quinto
vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481) or to renunciation or partition of
inheritance, these transactions not being contracts of
conveyance (Barcelona vs. Barcelona, 53 O.G. 373). It has
also been held to have no application to an innominate
contract as where an interpreter rendered services for an
inconsiderable number of times (Perez vs. Pomar, 2 Phil.
682); to employment of an attorney or an authority to
employ an attorney (Tan Lua vs. O’Brien, 55 Phil. 53; or to
a condition upon which a deed is delivered in escrow (Ong
Chua vs. Carr, 53 Phil. 957).

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