Overview of FNS policies and institutional framework

4.1. Between change and continuity in FNS policies

4.1.1. Ethiopia: Towards a long-term and a social vision of FNS

The first comprehensive food security strategy was developed in 1996, and
The 1996 food security strategy was revised in 2002 when the government launched the new
National Food Security Program (FSP) to address the underlying sources of chronic and
transitory food insecurity, at both national and household level.

An in-depth study was undertaken in 2003 by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development (MoARD), and the bilateral and multi-lateral development partners of Ethiopia
to develop the “New Coalition for Food Security in Ethiopia”. The key interventions
designed to attain household food security over a five-year period since 2003 included:
voluntary resettlement program; safety net program (incl. building community assets); and
building household assets through on farm and off farm activities (Haan et al., 2006). The
coalition promised to enable five million food insecure inhabitants to become food secure and
to improve the food security of an additional ten million people. Inhabitants in drought-prone
and degraded areas were also assisted to move to areas that are under-utilized and more
suitable for agricultural activities under the voluntary resettlement program (EAS, 2013).

The food security strategy was revised again in 2006, around three main components:
Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), Household Asset Building Program (HABP)
and Complementary Community Investment Program (CCI). The objective was to
provide support in cash and in-kind to population living in identified food insecure Woredas
(i.e. districts) (EAS, 2013). In exchange for the support, majority of the recipients were
engaged in public work programs (roads, a forestation, and rehabilitation of degraded lands).
The 2006 version also contains nutrition interventions for acutely malnourished children and
mothers (EAS, 2013).

The PSNP at the heart of FNS-related policies

The Ethiopian government’s commitments to agricultural development and food security are
demonstrated in its third five-year development plan (2010-2015) known as the Growth and
Transformation Plan (GTP). Two main programs are specific to food security:
- The Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) provides multi-annual predictable transfers, such
as food, cash or a combination of both, to chronically food insecure households. Food/cash
transfers are a means to help survive food deficit periods, meet basic food requirements, prevent
asset depletion and build productive assets at the community level (SC-UK, 2009; USAID,
2012). The PSNP is a very large program, with over 7.7 million beneficiaries in close to 60% of
the country (318 woredas both from highland and some pastoral areas) (Furtado and Hobson,
2011). Over the last five years

- The Household Asset Building Program (HABP) aims to spur graduation from PSNP
by helping chronically vulnerable populations build resiliency through improved risk
management and building up household assets. The ambition is to graduate 80% of PSNP
beneficiaries by 2014 (USAID, 2011Recent presentation by Hoddinott (2014) indicates that since
2005 approximately 500,000 beneficiaries have been graduated from the PSNP.

The successes of PSNP have been widely recognized. Household food security has improved
while assets have been protected (mainly from reduced distress sales of livestock). The
program has also assisted in transforming rural livelihoods (again via increased growth in
livestock holdings) and improving the use of health and education services, potable water,
rural feeder roads, and has helped more than 269,000 households to be food self-sufficient
(Furtado and Hobson, 2011).
In addition, Ethiopia has launched a number of agricultural development and food security
programs over the past decade, including the following:
- Agricultural Growth Program (AGP) seeks to increase agricultural productivity and
market access for key crop and livestock products, and leveraging the potentiality of
productive highland areas. This five-year program launched in 2011 marks the renewed
interest for agriculture in the FNS agenda of donors. It is expected to assist small and
medium farmers to get better livelihoods, and quality life through provision of enhanced
agricultural extension services, infrastructure, market opportunities, and linkages
enclosed by agro-enterprises and/or cooperatives (MoARD, 2013).

The New Social Protection Policy: based on previous experiences and lessons learned, a
new progressive and comprehensive social protection policy had been drafted in 2012,
but it still awaits approval.
- The Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector (DRMFSS) has been established
in 2008 for the coordination and leadership of the Disaster Risk Management Policy, whose
objective is to reduce risks and minimize the impacts of disasters through a comprehensive and
integrated disaster risk management system.
- The National Nutrition Strategy: after a long period of limited attention to nutrition issues, a
National Nutrition Strategy (NNS) was formulated during 2005/06, and again in February 2008.
This first ever NNS is based on the conceptual framework of the causes of child malnutrition
presenting the immediate, underlying, and basic causes of malnutrition (SC-UK, 2009). It brings
together the various isolated and uncoordinated interventions into one comprehensive sector-
wide approach, thereby breaking with the traditional food-biased approach which considered
food security as the primary means to achieve nutritional security.
5. Difficulties of policies to address FNS multidimensionality
The previous sections have shown that FNS policy documents and institutional frameworks
are predominantly shaped by the agricultural sector and do not really reflect the
multidimensionality of FNS challenges. This Section aims to explain why the
multidimensionality of FNS is so hard to be addressed in a well-balanced way in FNS policy
documents and institutional frameworks.
5.1. Limits of intersectoral coordination in FNS institutions
Despite the creation of several inter-ministerial bodies for food security aimed at ensuring the
involvement of all relevant sectors, including health/nutrition, effective intersectoral
coordination appears limited. The discussions in these bodies tend to be primarily led by
short-term and agricultural concerns. FNS-related sectors are also inclined to develop their
own agenda and institutional frameworks, leading to parallel dynamics in agriculture, social
and nutrition sectors rather than integrated dynamics as the FNS concept would suggest.

5.1.1. Historical predominance of short-term over long-term concerns

PSNP as a bridge between short-term and long-term concerns in Ethiopia
In Ethiopia, the capacity of the PSNP to bridge and correct the imbalance between
humanitarian and development assistance is one of the major successes reported for the
PSNP. With respect to transitory food insecurity as a result of shocks, extra funding comes
from PSNP’s Contingency Budget and when that is exhausted, the Risk Financing
Mechanism (RFM) is used. The RFM allows the PSNP to scale up in times of crisis and to
reduce the timeline for humanitarian response by temporarily extending support to current
PSNP clients and new clients with transitory needs (Hobson and Campbell, 2012).
The launch of the PSNP has also led to institutional reform aiming at better articulation of
short-term and long-term responses through safety nets and disaster risk management. The
MoARD was restructured to bring safety net and disaster response into a single structure
along with regular agricultural and food security programs. Responsibilities for disaster risk
management moved from an independent agency at the ministry level to the MoARD (see
Figure 11). This restructuring has brought significant benefits, as it acknowledges the
relationship between improvements in agriculture and disasters, and builds on the capacity of
the safety net provided by the PSNP for scaling up during emergency situations.

5.1.2. Parallel institutional frameworks for social and nutrition concerns

In Ethiopia, although the PSNP brought a social perspective of food security through its
cash/food-based transfers to all chronically food insecure rural people, this social perspective
remains poorly reflected in the FNS institutional framework. The PSNP tried to form joint
inter-ministerial committee that consists of representatives from the ministries of finance
&development, health, water, trade, and industry, but representatives from the social action
bodies are under-represented.

Parallel agenda on nutrition

In Ethiopia, nutrition was relatively neglected until recent momentum. The PSNP was
nutrition-neutral as it did not integrate nutrition-sensitive livelihoods programs. Today, as for
food security, the nutrition institutional framework includes intersectoral bodies aiming at
dealing with the multidimensional nature of nutrition. Hence, two similar and parallel
institutional architectures were built. In addition, difficulties to mainstream nutrition into
sectoral interventions and to coordinate nutrition-sensitive interventions were reported.
The Federal Ministry of Health (FMoH) is responsible for direct nutrition interventions
(especially in care, feeding, health services, and water, sanitation and hygiene, etc.) as well as
multisectoral coordination. It has, therefore, to work with other sectors to mainstream
nutrition into sectoral policies and programs. A horizontal inter-ministerial coordination
committee named National Nutrition Coordination Body (NNCB) has been created since
2008 in this perspective (EAS, 2013). Eight relevant government ministries12 signed a MoU
to form this national nutrition coordination body, which also includes representatives of donor
communities, private sector, and academia and research institutes, such as the Ethiopian
Health and Nutrition Research Institute (EHNRI) (Figure 13).
The function of the NNCB is to ensure that the activities of any sector that serve to reduce
malnutrition are done in a complementary and timely fashion with those activities carried out
by other sectors. However, a recent study by the Ethiopian Academy of Sciences indicates
that the NNCB has carried out limited tasks as compared to its terms of reference. It only met
a few times on an ad hoc basis. There is a lack of incentives for the sectors to integrate
nutrition and nutrition is, therefore, still entrenched as a health issue. One major challenge is
to advocate nutrition at forums with higher decision-making bodies involved, such as the
national parliament, MoFED and Office of the PM (EAS, 2013). It is also recommended to
find a permanent home-base for the coordination of nutrition interventions. A National
Nutrition Coordination Council (NNCC) could be established under the chairmanship of the
Office of the PM with the Minister of Health serving as vice chair with the mandate to
implement the NNS and subsequently the NNP. Its officially designated secretariat could be
the EHNRI or another designated body (EAS, 2013). The opinion survey reveals how the
institutional anchorage of nutrition is a controversial
issue. For some respondents, the NNP was revised in 2013 in the way that reflected the
multifaced and multisectoral nature of nutritional problems, making any institutional reform
unnecessary. The policy clearly indicated what each sector should do and how sectoral efforts
should be coordinated at different level (i.e. federal to kebele13) with the aim to strengthen the
coordination (both horizontally and vertically) among implicated actors.
The divergences of views on the most appropriate institutional framework for nutrition partly
address also those on how best to deal with malnutrition. Some respondents support nutritious
food whereas others claim that these interventions reinforce the dependency syndrome. Or
some respondents support tablet-based micro-nutrient interventions while others believe that
nutrition should be agriculture-led (via production of fruits & vegetables, school gardens,
mobilisation of agricultural extension agents in Home Economics Department, etc.). Finally,
it has been reported that although the FMoH helps increase awareness of nutrition,
interventions tend to be biased towards tablet-based micro-nutrient supplements.
5.2. Path dependency around the agricultural sector
This Section argues that historical actors involved in food security generally support an
agriculture-oriented vision of FNS, which corresponds to the initial framing of food security.
They are also the predominant actors in the FNS policy-making processes and the steering of
FNS institutions. These historical actors comprise officials from the ministry of Agriculture,
donors and NGOs responsible for agricultural development interventions. Farmers are also
much more represented in FNS policy making than consumers. The reason is not that farmers
are more vocal than consumers, but farmers are the most food insecure and they are also
more structured, through farmer organisations, whereas consumers associations are rather new
and weak. Alternative visions focusing more on urban, social or nutritional issues are, thus,
more difficult to be heard in these processes and institutions. This illustrates quite well path
dependency around agricultural framings and actors.
5.2.1. Predominance of an agricultural vision of FNS
In Ethiopia, the opinion survey with aid actors showed that food insecurity is generally
viewed as a rural phenomenon, though food insecurity becoming an urban phenomenon. The
government of Ethiopia is certainly sympathetic to the rural and farmer issues because it has
had a long experience relationship since their rebel time. This relationship continued in some
formal way once they assumed power. Food security programs are generally implemented in
rural areas, but many in the aid actors support alternative visions of FNS. They claim that
there is a need to go beyond the existing programs focused largely on supply-side constraints,
and to address long-term institutional and structural problems.
Some respondents, for instance, claim existing policies overlook the problem of high
population growth/pressure and land tenure regime-related problem, with the land
fragmentation discouraging rural-urban migration and diversification of rural livelihoods.
Other respondents noted the lack of focus on pastoral regions or reported high food insecurity
in urban areas, such as Addis Abeba and Dire Dawa. These alternative voices are not
adequately heard for the moment, although it has been noted that the government and donors
recently agreed to launch food security programs in urban areas, such as Addis Ababa.

5.3. Importance of high-level commitment and policy entrepreneurs

High-level commitments and leadership, as well as the role played by some individual actors
can be highlighted as important factors in the evolution of FNS policies. These factors seem
also important for the success of FNS policies.
In Ethiopia, the political willingness at senior government level – combined with donors’
flexibility and willingness to revise their fragmented response to chronic food security –is
considered as determining in the success of the PSNP (Furtado and Hobson, 2011; Berhanu,
2011). The government demonstrated its commitment in forging stronger links between
emergency response, longer-term development, and setting up the National Food Security
Council and other institutional frameworks. Here, high-level commitments and the new set-up
of institutions go together. In a context where the history of the country was marked by a
number of tragic famines, the government has taken the FNS issue seriously. This high-level
political commitment is also reflected in the establishment of MoU and ToR with donors, and
the close work of the MoARD with the PM. In addition, donors were flexible to pull and
coordinate their resources and technical knowhow from one unified management unit
administered and managed by government structures.

6. The role of development partners

Development partners strongly contribute to FNS policies, both in their definition as they
work closely with the government and in their implementation through significant funding.
This contribution takes many forms (participation in policy-making, institutional framework,
technical assistance, advocacy, co-management of food security stocks, etc.) and varies
according to national governance contexts. The analysis of some policy decisions shows the
complexity of relations between aid and national actors. This Section tries to analyse the role
of development partners in the FNS policy design. To what extent development partners
contribute to the shift in FNS policies introduced by the PSNP in Ethiopia? To what extent
development partners play a role in the form of continuity of FNS policies in Burkina Faso?
6.1. Participation in FNS policy-making
As Ethiopia is one of the largest regular recipients of food and non-food aid (in financial
terms), the engagement of donors in the national food and nutrition programs is certainly
significant. In fact, most of Ethiopia’s FNS policies are supported by a range of donors,
whose strategy is derived largely from the country strategy, which in turn is developed with
their participation in the policy-making process. At the same time, the strong government
ownership and leadership is frequently reported as a key feature of policy-making process in
Ethiopia (Furtado and Hobson, 2011).
Regarding the PSNP, the development partners (mainly donors in the Ethiopian context)
played a key role in its definition through changes they have brought through their vision of
FNS and the design of their interventions. Prior to the formal launch of multi-annual cashbased
transfers programs, some aid actors, such as the German Technical Agency (GTZ), the
Netherlands Embassy, and Save the Children (UK), have already moved towards this
direction (World Bank, 2004b; cited by Walker D.J. and Wandschneider T., 2005).

The PSNP was developed partly based on field experience of some donors, as the
government intended to scale-up their approach through the cash-based transfers. The PSNP
emerged from the New Coalition for Food Security (NCFS) in which Ethiopia’s major
donors, such as the World Bank, USAID, DFID and EU, played significant roles (World
Bank, 2011). In general, from its outset, PSNP is considered as a joint program of Ethiopia’s
government and its development partners.
In addition, institutional coordination between government and donors is at the heart of the
PSNP. Donors work with the government through their Donors Assistance Group (DAG) and
form various joint committees (see Figure 9). The PSNP institutional setup builds therefore
coordination among government levels in political, technical and operational arenas, as well
as with donors of the program. The PSNP could also be mentioned as a program that creates a
new kind of cooperation and partnership between the government and donors.
The process of transfer responsibilities for disaster risk management from an independent
agency (DPPC) into the MoARD (see Figure 11) is another example where donors play a
significant role. The integration of the Disaster Risk Management Agency (DRM) into the
MoARD has been brought as a result of World Bank’s Business Process Reengineering
Support to Ethiopia. This support was designed to restructure government institutions to
enhance accountability, action-oriented structures and efficiency (IEH, 2012). This
restructuring acknowledges the relationship between improvements in agriculture and
disasters as well as the need to link consumption objectives with the protection and creation
of assets (Loma-Ossorio E., and Lahoz C., 2012).

6.2. Challenges of donors coordination

Development partners have made huge efforts to better coordinate, in particular through a
number of working groups addressing different FNS issues. This observation regarding
donors can be made for almost all developing countries as this is in line with international
commitments on aid effectiveness27. One can imagine that if development partners have too
much divergent views the coordination process can be very long and difficult, and it can
obstruct having better policies. However, in Ethiopia, joint working groups
seems to help in narrowing the divergent views in terms of policies, strategies and priorities
among different donors as well as in aligning their resources and technical capacity with the
government. Efforts of coordination have then undoubtedly improved aid efficiency on the
ground, but intersectoral coordination remains a major challenge. Within large aid actors in
particular, FNS issues are often addressed by different departments or services (i.e. rural,
social, nutrition, etc.) for effectiveness reasons but this internal organisation without (or with
weak) intersectoral mechanism tends to result in fragmentation of FNS interventions. Given
the weight of large aid actors on FNS policy design, this fragmentation might contribute to the
difficulties of intersectoral collaboration at national policy level.
In Ethiopia, donors’ willingness, flexibility and cooperation in pooling financial and
technical/knowledge resources and management role have been reported as important to help
to minimise wastage while strengthening national capacity in managing and refining
interventions continuously.

7. The policy content of trade policies

Trade policies are particularly important for food security as they strongly impact food prices.
At the same time, they represent a highly controversial domain. Controversies relate
especially to price distortions resulting from agricultural subsidies and different policy
options on key issues, such as the “food price dilemma” between interests of producers and
consumers, or trade-offs between export-oriented agriculture and domestically-oriented
agriculture. Schematically, trade policy options are reflected in free trade policy or support to
local production through border protection (tariffs and non-tariff measures) and domestic
supports to producers. As recalled by Huchet-Bourdon and Laroche-Dupraz (2014), the
effects of such trade policy options on the economic welfare of producers and consumers are
well known: a protective policy (i.e. high agricultural tariffs) has positive effects on domestic
supply (the same with coupled domestic support), but negative impacts on domestic
consumers; an open market (i.e. low or zero tariffs) is positive for urban consumers, but could
discourage domestic producers from developing their investment and supply.
Trade policies are translated into various instruments, such as tariffs, safeguards, quotas,
market interventions, price risk insurance, commodity exchanges, futures and other hedge
instruments, export restrictions, various forms of food reserves, and trade and export
promotion (Häberli, 2013). For simplification reasons, this Section is focused on two main
instruments of trade policies: border measures and subsidies.
7.1. Liberal trade policy while ad hoc state interventions in Ethiopia
Ethiopia has experimented with a whole spectrum of agricultural pricing policies ranging
from parastatal-centric control through production quota and trade control during the Derge
regime, to a dual pricing approach during the period 1992-99 to total liberalization (except
security reserve and safety nets) with ad hoc interventions since 1999 (Rashid, 2007).
Ethiopia’s government current trade policy in relation to food security could be categorized
into three groups: (i) food especially wheat price stabilization through import and improve trade
effectiveness (e.g. ECX); (ii) ad hoc pricing policy; and (iii) ad hoc intervention in food
export markets.
Regarding food price stabilization, there are widely held beliefs, albeit with little evidence,
that “middlemen” are to be blamed for both the ever increasing food prices and for the fact
that farm gate prices remain below world market levels. As a consequence, price stabilization
measures through governmental cereal/wheat supplies to millers and bakers enjoy high
general support (Lawrence, 2003). The new Commodity Exchange (ECX) is the first of its kind
in Sub-Saharan Africa. It had
been hailed as a big step forward in the fight for transparency and against market power abuse
by the “middlemen”. Now farmers can bring their crops to one of the 17 warehouses
established by the ECX in the growing regions, agree with managers on the quality grading
and give their minimum offering price, which they can modify after each trading day and for
one month (after which there is a penalty). Today ECX handles over 60% of Ethiopian coffee
(different schemes, some export directly, or through coops, with a primary market around the
warehouse through local traders). Trading is by ‘open cry’ and the farmer can see all the paid
prices on his cell phone.
Yet there is no price risk hedging. At this point in time and to the disappointment of a number
of people who had hoped for more, only contracts for three export crops are traded on this
spot market: coffee, sesame, and white beans (Häberli, 2013). This focus on non-food export
crops reflect the export-oriented strategy adopted by Ethiopia in its agricultural policy
(Agricultural Growth Programme). Despite enhancing the transparency in trade of these crops
via ECX, there are no much studies that ascertain the actual benefit accrued to smallholders.
Similarly, today’s experience and lessons from ECX trading on these few crops is not translated
into expansion of this modern trading activity into major food crops like teff, wheat
and maize, which are extensively produced and traded in the country.
The launch of production insurance for small farmers about a decade ago could also be
considered as an intervention that potentially help enhancing food security. Production
insurance operates inter alia by Nyala Insurance Company, in-cooperation with WFP, Oxfam
America, and others. It started in 2006 with 120 farmers/ 261ha for wheat, teff, and haricot
beans; in 2008 there were 827 farmers/ 778ha with additional farmers and surfaces insured by
2010. Farmers unable to pay the insurance premium can obtain an insurance license through
“work for insurance” at a “work for food” project operated by Oxfam or USAID (e.g. for
environmental protection, forest, or compost). After an initial trial and error period with more
specific risks insured, its operation has become much simpler with compensation now
triggered by a weather-based index (Häberli, 2013).
Reinsurance for this scheme is guaranteed by the Switzerland-based reinsurance company
(Swiss Re). It is too early to consider the scheme as a commercial success with a
demonstrable impact on farmers’ income stabilisation. However, it should be recognised that
the scheme covers certain production risks only and in particular, does not help farmers to
gauge and hedge commercial risks, such as price fluctuations, or longer-term investment
risks. This incidentally is just one of the problems accelerating the “land rush” of foreignbased
investors benefitting from such insurance (and legal protection). Initial yield-based
insurance schemes have also other difficulties to address, especially communication and
organisational mistakes that presently limit their usefulness (evaluation report by Terefe
Degefa for Nyala Insurance in May 2010). In addition, crop insurance may not work for
riskadverse farmers according to Getaw Tadesse from IFPRI, though it is easier to handle than
livestock insurance which has a much longer production cycle (Häberli, 2013).
Finally, it has to be noted that three or four years ago when food inflation exceeded 40%, the
government intervened in the market directly through price cap and banned export food
grains. The government seems to continue implementing these policies, but on ad hoc bases.
Key food items such as wheat, food oil or sugar are imported and distributed by the
government to keep prices affordable for consumers and keep inflation low.

8. Conclusions
Despite the wide recognition of the multidimensionality of FNS and of the need to mobilize
all the concerned sectors (agriculture, health, social affairs, trade, etc., short-term and longterm
responses), FNS policies barely reflect a comprehensive and well-balanced approach. In
Ethiopia the introduction of the PNSP seems to succeed in making the bridge between shortterm
and long-term interventions and bringing a social perspective to FNS. In Burkina Faso,
the current resilience agenda has also the ambition to build this bridge. However, FNS
policies and institutional frameworks remain predominantly agricultural production-oriented
and most often focused on monitoring the agricultural season in Ethiopia, Burkina Faso and
also Kenya and Benin.
This paper tries to understand this form of disconnection between the holistic concept of FNS
which asks for inter-sectoral FNS policies and the reality of FNS policies which are mainly
sector-specific. The original framework used for the analysis is based on both the cognitive
policy analysis where actors’ representations play a determining role in policy changes and
the neo-institutionalism where the weight of institutions explains policy inertia. Between 10
and 20 semi-structured interviews with key informants were conducted, especially to
understand how they perceive the FNS challenges and what should be the solutions. The
analytical framework proves to be particularly powerful to respond to our research questions.
Historically, decision makers have understood FNS in terms of food production only. Since
only a few years, awareness on nutrition for example has emerged very high on the political
agenda. This initial framing of FNS challenges around food availability and the prevention
and management of food crises continues to weight on FNS actors’ visions. This illustration
of path dependency is strongly rooted in actors’ training (the vast majority of them have their
background in agriculture) and the bias of national food security information systems towards
production indicators (despite their significant enlargement to other FNS indicators).
Alternative visions of FNS, focusing more on social and nutrition perspectives of FNS, are
gaining importance but this tends to lead to parallel agenda and institutional frameworks. For
example, both in food security and nutrition, intersectoral bodies are created in order to
convoke all the relevant sectors. This situation creates some confusion and overlap between
FNS institutions and, in fact, these intersectoral bodies are facing difficulties in properly
addressing the multiple dimensions of FNS.
Paradoxically, trade policies have usually been unfavourable to producers through agricultural
taxation, low tariffs and ad hoc state interventions to keep domestic prices accessible to
consumers. Generally governments want to keep the prices low because of pressures from
urban vocal consumers. It should be ensured, however, that efforts to lower consumer food
prices are aligned with opportunities to sustain livelihoods and growth in farming. Farmers
should be given enough incentives. The decrease of agricultural taxation over the last decades
and the ambitious programs to support agricultural production in view of improving food
selfsufficiency since the 2007/08 food crisis can be considered as a reduction of this paradox.
Such reform has effectively been going hand in hand with an upscaling of social protection
measures for consumers that are vulnerable to shocks in the market.

Shaping and implementing comprehensive and well-balanced FNS policies does not prejudge
any form of intersectoral collaboration and institutional architecture. Questions such as what
is the most appropriate institutional anchorage for FNS issues (under the Ministry of
Agriculture, the Prime Minister or the Presidency), or whether food security and nutrition
institutions should be merged into a single intersectoral body, are very context-specific.
Successful national experiences of FNS institutional framework can barely be transferred or
replicated in other countries. It’s up to each country, given its political and social history and
specificities, to design its own institutional mechanism which would enable to move from the
agricultural bias of FNS policies towards more multidimensional policies.
The weight of initial FNS framings (agricultural-oriented), the routine practices and
functioning of FNS organisations, as well as the interests of the historical (agricultural) actors
in FNS and power relations with other actors, suggest some inertia in FNS policies. Effective
multidimensional FNS policies would certainly take some time to be implemented as they
question these historical trends, sectoral logics and interests built over time.
High-level commitments and leadership and/ or the existence of policy entrepreneurs are
important factors contributing to initiate FNS policy changes. In Ethiopia, the high-level
political willingness to move away from annual humanitarian appeal is part of the explanation
of the FNS policies’ shift towards addressing chronic food insecurity. Donors have made huge
efforts to coordinate and align with the government’s position, in line with aid effectiveness
principles. However, this experience has to be understood in the specific context of the
Ethiopian governance. Various forms of political commitments are possible and further
research would be necessary to explore the relation between some forms of governance and
leadership and the evolution of FNS policies.
Development partners (donors, NGOs, etc.) are nevertheless important actors in FNS
policymaking processes in all the studied countries. Hence, changes in their vision of FNS, their
functioning and their interventions may significantly contribute to FNS policy changes. In
particular, a better coordination between the different services or units in charge of FNS in the
internal organisation of large aid actors, such as the European Commission, is a major
challenge. In terms of recommendations for the EU policies in aid and development,
examples of EU programs aiming at better linking emergency and development responses
already exist (e.g. projects where the delegation could take over from ECHO support when it
comes to an end). Ensuring a strong articulation of supports in agriculture, social transfers and
nutrition appears now to be a key effort for more multidimensional FNS policies.

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