G.R. Nos. 205963-64. July 7, 2016.*
 
AMANDO A. INOCENTES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HON. ROLAND B. JURADO, in his capacity as
Chairperson, Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, HON. CONCHITA
CARPIO-MORALES, in her capacity as OMBUDSMAN, as
Complainant; and HON. FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA, OFFICE OF
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG), in its capacity as counsel for
the People, respondents.

Criminal Law; Conspiracy; The Supreme Court (SC) had

underscored before the fact that under our laws conspiracy should
be understood on two (2) levels, i.e., a mode of committing a crime
or a crime in itself.—On the contention that the informations did
not detail Inocentes’ individual participation in the conspiracy, we
have underscored before the fact that under our laws conspiracy
should be understood on two levels, i.e., a mode of committing a
crime or a crime in itself. In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 377
SCRA 538 (2002), we explained that when conspiracy is charged
as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements must be set
forth in the information, but when it is not and conspiracy is
considered as a mode of commit-

_______________

*  SECOND DIVISION.

 
 

35

VOL. 796, JULY 7, 2016 35

Inocentes vs. People

ting the crime, there is less necessity of reciting its

particularities in the information because conspiracy is not the
gravamen of the offense.
 Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Jurisdiction; Courts;
Sandiganbayan; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; The
applicable law provides that violations of Republic Act (RA) No.
3019 committed by presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or -controlled corporations, and state
universities shall be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.—On the issue on jurisdiction, it is of no
moment that Inocentes does not occupy a position with a salary
grade of 27 since he was the branch manager of the GSIS’ field
office in Tarlac City, a government-owned or -controlled
corporation, at the time of the commission of the offense, which
position falls within the coverage of the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction. The applicable law provides that violations of R.A.
No. 3019 committed by presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, and
state universities shall be within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We have clarified the provision
of law defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
explaining that the Sandiganbayan maintains its jurisdiction
over those officials specifically enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section
4(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, regardless of their salary
grades. Simply put, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26
and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, provided they hold the positions enumerated by
the law. In this category, it is the position held, not the salary
grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Furthermore, as the Sandiganbayan correctly held, even low-level
management positions fall under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. We settled this point in Lazarte, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, 581 SCRA 431 (2009), and Geduspan v. People,
451 SCRA 187 (2005).
Same; Same; Same; It is well-settled that jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is acquired upon (1) his arrest or
apprehension, with or without a warrant, or (2) his voluntary
appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the court.—We are
aware, however, that Inocentes availed of this remedy after he
had posted bail before the Sandiganbayan which, in our
jurisdiction, is tantamount to voluntary surrender. Simply put,
questioning the findings of probable cause by the Sandiganbayan
at this point would be pointless as it

 
 

36

36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Inocentes vs. People
 has already acquired jurisdiction over Inocentes. It is well-
settled that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired
upon (1) his arrest or apprehension, with or without a warrant, or
(2) his voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of
the court. For this reason, in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,
300 SCRA 367 (1998), we held that even if it is conceded that the
warrant issued was void (for nonexistence of probable cause), the
accused waived all his rights to object by appearing and giving a
bond, viz.: On this score, the rule is well-settled that the giving or
posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his
person to the jurisdiction of the court. [...] By posting bail, herein
petitioner cannot claim exemption from the effect of being subject
to the jurisdiction of respondent court. While petitioner has
exerted efforts to continue disputing the validity of the
issuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail,
his claim has been negated when he himself invoked the
jurisdiction of respondent court through the filing of
various motions that sought other affirmative reliefs.
Constitutional Law; Due Process; Right to Speedy Disposition
of Cases; The Office of the Ombudsman, for its failure to resolve
the criminal charges against Inocentes for seven (7) years, violated
Inocentes’ constitutional right to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the case against him, as well as its own
constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed before it.—
The Office of the Ombudsman, for its failure to resolve the
criminal charges against Inocentes for seven (7) years, violated
Inocentes’ constitutional right to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the case against him, as well as its own
constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed before it. A
person’s right to a speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed
under Section 16, Article III of the Constitution: All persons shall
have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. This
constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or
administrative in nature, as well as in all proceedings, either
judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may
demand expeditious action of all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.
Same; Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; The
Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in not acting on the case
within a

 
 
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 VOL. 796, JULY 7, 2016 37
Inocentes vs. People

reasonable time after it had acquired jurisdiction over it.—

Plainly, the delay of at least seven (7) years before the
informations were filed skews the fairness which the right to
speedy disposition of cases seeks to maintain. Undoubtedly, the
delay in the resolution of this case prejudiced Inocentes since the
defense witnesses he would present would be unable to recall
accurately the events of the distant past. Considering the clear
violation of Inocentes’ right to the speedy disposition of his case,
we find that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in not
acting on the case within a reasonable time after it had acquired
jurisdiction over it.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Velasco, Madriaga Law Offices for petitioner.

BRION, J.:
 
We resolve the Petition1 filed under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court by petitioner Amando A. Inocentes (Inocentes),
assailing the Resolutions dated February 8, 20132 and
October 24, 20123 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
Nos. SB-12-CRM-0127-0128 entitled People of the
Philippines v. Amando A. Inocentes, et al.
 
The Factual Antecedents
 
Inocentes, together with four (4) others, was charged
with violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019,4
as amended. The informations read:

_______________

1   For Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus with Prayer for Tem-

porary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. Rollo, pp. 3-23.
2  Id., at pp. 26-34; penned by Associate Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-
Tang and concurred in by Associate Justices Roland B. Jurado and
Alexander G. Gesmundo.
3  Id., at pp. 36-57.
4  Otherwise known as the ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.

 
 
38
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Inocentes vs. People

That on or about October 2001 or immediately prior or

subsequent thereto, in Tarlac City, Tarlac, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused, Amando A. Inocentes, Celestino Cabalitasan, Ma.
Victoria Leonardo and Jerry Balagtas, all public officers, being
the Branch Manager, Division Chief III, Property Appraiser III,
and Senior General Insurance Specialist, respectively, of the
Government Service Insurance System, Tarlac City Field Office,
committing the crime herein charged in relation to and in taking
advantage of their official functions, conspiring and confederating
with Jose De Guzman, through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence; did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally [gave] undue preference, benefit or
advantage to accused Jose De Guzman by processing and
approving the housing loans of Four Hundred Ninety-One (491)
borrowers of [Jose De Guzman]’s housing project under the GSIS
Bahay Ko Program, with a total amount of loans amounting to
Two Hundred Forty-One Million Fifty-Three Thousand Six
Hundred Pesos (Php241,053,600.00), knowing fully well that the
said borrowers/grantees were not qualified and were not under
the territorial jurisdiction of the
Tarlac City Field Office, thereby giving said borrowers/grantees
unwarranted benefit and causing damage and prejudice to the
government and to public interest in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5

and

[...] processing, approving and granting loans under the GSIS

Bahay Ko Program to Fifty-Three (53) borrowers of [Jose De
Guzman]’s land development project known as Teresa Homes
amounting to Fifty-Two Million and One Hundred Seven
Thousand Pesos (Php52,107,000.00), despite the knowledge of the
fact that the lots covered were intended for commercial purposes
and by causing the

_______________

5  Rollo, pp. 60-62.

 
 
39
 VOL. 796, JULY 7, 2016 39
Inocentes vs. People

over-appraisal in the amount of Thirty-Three Million Two

Hundred Forty Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-Eight Pesos and
Thirty-Six Centavos (Php33,240,848.36) of the land and buildings
offered as collaterals, thus causing undue injury to the
Government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6

  
On May 10, 2012, the Sandiganbayan issued a minute
resolution finding probable cause and ordered the issuance
of a warrant of arrest against all the accused.7 To avoid
incarceration, Inocentes immediately posted bail.
On July 10, 2012, Inocentes filed an omnibus motion (1)
for judicial determination of probable cause; (2) to quash
the informations filed against him; and (3) to dismiss the
case for violating his right to the speedy disposition of this
case (omnibus motion).8 In this motion, he argued as
follows:
First, the informations filed against him were fatally
defective because they did not allege the specific acts done
by him which would have constituted the offense. All that
was alleged in the informations was that he conspired and
cooperated in the alleged crime.
Second, there is no evidence showing how he cooperated
or conspired in the commission of the alleged offense. The
findings of the investigating unit revealed that the
connivance was perpetuated by the marketing agent and
the borrowers themselves by misrepresenting their
qualifications. The GSIS Internal Audit Service Group
Report even said that it was the marketing agent who had
the opportunity to tamper and falsify the documents
submitted before Inocentes’ office.
Third, the informations filed against him should be
quashed because the Sandiganbayan does not have
jurisdiction over the case. At the time of the commission of
the alleged offense,

_______________

6  Id., at pp. 63-65.

7  Id., at p. 59.
8  Id., at pp. 68-81.

 
 
 40

40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Inocentes vs. People

Inocentes held a position with a Salary Grade of 26. He

likewise claims that he cannot fall under the enumeration
of managers of GOCCs because his position as department
manager cannot be placed in the same category as the
president, general manager, and trustee of the GSIS.
Fourth, Innocentes insisted that the case against him
must be dismissed because his right to the speedy
disposition of this case had been violated since seven (7)
years had lapsed from the time of the filing of the initial
complaint up to the time the information was filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
After the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) filed its
opposition and Inocentes filed his reply, the
Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution. The
Sandiganbayan maintained its jurisdiction over the case
because Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No.
8249,9 specifically includes managers of GOCCs — whose
position may not fall under Salary Grade 27 or higher —
who violate R.A. No. 3019. It also ruled that the
informations in this case sufficiently allege all the essential
elements required to violate Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Further, it said that it already determined the existence
of probable cause when it issued the warrant of arrest in its
minute resolution dated May 10, 2012.
Lastly, it held that the delay in this case was excusable
considering that the records of this case were transferred
from the Regional Trial Court in Tarlac City, where the
case was first filed.
In his motion for reconsideration, Inocentes reiterated
the same arguments he raised in his omnibus motion. In
addition, he asserted that the present case against him
should be dismissed because the Office of the Ombudsman
dismissed the estafa case against him for the same
transactions. He also

_______________

9  An Act Further
  Defining the Jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.

 
 
 41

VOL. 796, JULY 7, 2016 41

Inocentes vs. People

filed a supplemental motion attaching a copy of the

affidavit of a certain Monico Imperial to show (1) that there
existed political persecutions within the GSIS against the
critics of then President and General Manager Winston F.
Garcia, and (2) that the GSIS branch manager relies on the
recommendation of his subordinates in approving or
disapproving real estate loan applications.
The Sandiganbayan remained unconvinced. On the
contents of the affidavit, it agreed with the prosecution
that these are matters of defense that must stand scrutiny
in a full-blown trial. With respect to the dismissal of the
estafa case against him, the Sandiganbayan said that the
dismissal of that case does not necessarily result in the
dismissal of the present case because the same act may
give rise to two (2) or more separate and distinct offenses.
To contest the denial of his motion for reconsideration,
Inocentes filed the present petition asserting, among
others, that the quantum of evidence required to establish
probable cause for purposes of holding a person for trial
and/or for the issuance of a warrant of arrest was not met
in this case. He argued that absent any allegation of his
specific acts or evidence linking him to the anomalous
transactions, probable cause can hardly exist because it
would be imprudent to insinuate that Inocentes knew of
the criminal design when all he did was only to approve the
housing loan applications. Obviously relying on his
subordinates, Inocentes claimed that he could not have
conspired with them when he had no personal knowledge of
any defect.
On April 10, 2013, we required the respondents to
comment on Inocentes’ petition, and deferred action on the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction.
In its comment, the OSP counters that what Inocentes
asks at this point is for this Court to examine and weigh all
the pieces of evidence and thereafter absolve him of all
charges without undergoing trial.
 
 
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42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Inocentes vs. People

The OSP said that the Office of the Ombudsman did not
act arbitrarily in conducting the preliminary investigation
and finding probable cause. Moreover, the Sandiganbayan
likewise found probable cause after considering all the
pleadings and documents submitted before it and saw no
sound reason to set aside its finding.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General
filed a manifestation saying that it will no longer submit its
comment as the OSP, pursuant to its expanded mandate
under R.A. No. 6770,10 shall represent the People before
this Court and the Sandiganbayan.
 
Our Ruling
 
We find the present petition meritorious.
 
Preliminary Considerations
 
The Constitution, under Section 1, Article VIII,
empowers the courts to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.11 This is an overriding
authority that cuts across all branches and
instrumentalities of government and is implemented
through the petition for certiorari that Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court provides.12
Inocentes, through this remedy, comes before this Court
asserting that there was grave abuse on the part of the
Sandiganbayan when it exercised its discretion in denying
his omnibus motion. This extraordinary writ solely
addresses lower court actions rendered without or in excess
of jurisdic-

_______________

10  Otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

11  Reyes, Jr. v. Belisario, G.R. No. 154652, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA
31, 45.
12  Id.

 
 
43
 VOL. 796, JULY 7, 2016 43
Inocentes vs. People

tion or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is a circumstance
beyond the legal error committed by a decision-making
agency or entity in the exercise of its jurisdiction; this
circumstance affects even the authority to render
judgment.13
Under these terms, if the Sandiganbayan merely legally
erred while acting within the confines of its jurisdiction,
then its ruling, even if erroneous, is not the proper subject
of a petition for certiorari. If, on the other hand, the
Sandiganbayan ruling was attended by grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, then
this ruling is fatally defective on jurisdictional ground and
should be declared null and void.14
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan denied
Inocentes’ omnibus motion (1) to judicially determine the
existence of probable cause; (2) quash the information that
was filed against him; and/or (3) dismiss the case against
him for violation of his right to speedy trial. In determining
whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse in the
exercise of its discretion, we shall review the
Sandiganbayan’s judgment denying the omnibus motion in
the light of each cited remedy and the grounds presented
by Inocentes to support them.
 
The Sandiganbayan hardly
committed any grave abuse
of discretion in denying the
motion to quash the infor-
mation.
 
Inocentes is unyielding in his position that the
informations filed against him should be quashed based on
the following grounds: (1) that all the information alleged is
that Ino-

_______________

13  Id., at pp. 46-47.

14  People v. Romualdez, 581 Phil. 462, 479; 559 SCRA 492, 508 (2008).

 
 
44
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Inocentes vs. People

centes conspired and confederated with his co-accused

without specifying how his specific acts contributed to the
alleged crime; and (2) that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over Inocentes because he was occupying a
position with a salary grade less than 27.
On the contention that the informations did not detail
Inocentes’ individual participation in the conspiracy, we
have underscored before the fact that under our laws
conspiracy should be understood on two levels, i.e., a mode
of committing a crime or a crime in itself.15
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,16 we explained that when
conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and
all the elements must be set forth in the information, but
when it is not and conspiracy is considered as a mode of
committing the crime, there is less necessity of reciting its
particularities in the information because conspiracy is not
the gravamen of the offense, to wit:

To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of

conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be set forth in
the complaint or information.
x x x x x x x x x
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different
when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the
mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar. There is less
necessity of reciting its particularities in the information because
conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The
conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal
liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them
answerable as coprincipals regardless of the degree of their
participation in the crime. The liabilities of the conspira-

_______________

15  Lazarte, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 600 Phil. 475, 493; 581 SCRA 431, 447-448
(2009).
16    427 Phil. 820; 377 SCRA 538 (2002). See also  Enrile v.
People, G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015, 766 SCRA 1.

 
 
45

VOL. 796, JULY 7, 2016 45

 Inocentes vs. People

tors is collective and each participant will be equally responsible

for the acts of others, for the act of one is the act of all. In People
v. Quitlong, we ruled how conspiracy as the mode of committing
the offense should be alleged in the information, viz.:

A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the

components of conspiracy or allege all the details thereof
like the part that each of the parties therein have
performed, the evidence proving the common design or the
facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web
of conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy
with the same degree of particularity required in describing
a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment
contains a statement of facts relied upon to be constitutive
of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as
much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a
manner that can enable a person of common understanding
to know what is intended, and with such precision that the
accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a
subsequent indictment based on the same facts.
x x x x x x x x x

Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is

enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an
offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word,
“conspire,” or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate,
connive, collude, etc.; or (2) by allegations basic facts constituting
the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common
understanding would know what is intended, and with such
precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea
to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.17 [italics
supplied]

_______________

17  Id., at pp. 859-862; pp. 562-565.

 
 
46

46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Inocentes vs. People

With these guidelines in mind, Inocentes’ challenge with

respect to the informations filed against him necessarily
fails as he could gather that he is one of those GSIS
officials who conspired in approving the anomalous
transactions. Accordingly, the informations filed against
Inocentes in this case are valid because they adequately
provide the material allegations to apprise him of the
nature and cause of the charge.
On the issue on jurisdiction, it is of no moment that Ino-
centes does not occupy a position with a salary grade of 27
since he was the branch manager of the GSIS’ field office in
Tarlac City, a government-owned or -controlled
corporation, at the time of the commission of the offense,
which position falls within the coverage of the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.
The applicable law provides that violations of R.A. No.
3019 committed by presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations,
and state universities shall be within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.18 We have clarified the
provision of law defining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan by explaining that the Sandiganbayan
maintains its jurisdiction over those officials specifically
enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, regardless of their salary grades.19 Simply put,
those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may
still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
provided they hold the positions enumerated by the law.20
In this category, it is the position held, not the salary
grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.21
 

_______________

18  P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, Section 4(1)(g).

19  Inding v. Sandiganbayan, 478 Phil. 506, 507; 434 SCRA 388, 398 (2004).
20  People v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), 613 Phil. 407, 409; 596
SCRA 49, 60 (2009).
21   Alzaga v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division), 536 Phil. 726, 731; 505
SCRA 848, 853 (2006).

 
 
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VOL. 796, JULY 7, 2016 47

Inocentes vs. People
 Furthermore, as the Sandiganbayan correctly held, even
low-level management positions fall under the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. We settled this point in Lazarte, Jr.
v. Sandiganbayan22 and Geduspan v. People.23
Based on the foregoing, we find that the Sandiganbayan
was correct in denying Inocentes’ motion to quash; hence,
there was no grave abuse in the exercise of its discretion
regarding this matter.
 
A redetermination of a judicial
finding of probable cause is
futile when the accused volun-
tarily surrenders to the jurisdic-
tion of the court.
 
In the present case, the Office of the Ombudsman and
the Sandiganbayan separately found that probable cause
exists to indict and issue a warrant of arrest against
Inocentes. However, what Inocentes brings before this
Court right now is only the finding of the Sandiganbayan
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Under our jurisdiction, any person may avail of this
remedy since it is well-established in jurisprudence that
the court may, in the protection of one’s fundamental
rights, dismiss the case if, upon a personal assessment of
evidence, it finds that the evidence does not establish
probable cause.24
In People v. Castillo,25 we discussed the two kinds of
determination of probable cause, thus:
 
 

_______________

22  Supra note 15.
23    G.R. No. 158187, February 11, 2005, 451 SCRA 187, 192-
193.
24    Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 197293, April 21, 2014, 722
SCRA 647.
25  607 Phil. 754, 755; 590 SCRA 95, 105-107 (2009).

 
 
48

48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Inocentes vs. People
 There are two kinds of determination of probable cause:
executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable
cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a
function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is
given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause
exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed
the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial.
Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to
determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court.
Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the
public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct
ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other
hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must
satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is
necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause,
the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
Corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be compelled to
issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no
probable cause for doing so, the judge in turn should not override
the public prosecutors’ determination of probable cause to hold an
accused for trial on the ground that the evidence presented to
substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient. It
must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the public
prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of discretion in determining
whether a criminal case should be filed in court, and that courts
must respect the exercise of such discretion when the
information filed against the person charged is valid on its face,
and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be
imputed to the public prosecutor.
Thus, absent a finding that an information is invalid on its face
or that the prosecutor committed manifest

 
 
49

VOL. 796, JULY 7, 2016 49

Inocentes vs. People

error or grave abuse of discretion, a judge’s determination of

probable cause is limited only to the judicial kind or for the
purpose of deciding whether the arrest warrants should be issued
against the accused. [emphasis supplied; citations omitted]

 
    Under this ruling, we made it clear that the judge
does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has
no capacity to review the prosecutor’s determination of
probable cause; rather, he makes a determination of
probable cause independently of the prosecutor’s finding.26
Despite the fact that courts should avoid reviewing an
executive determination of probable cause, we are not
completely powerless to review this matter under our
expanded judicial power under the Constitution.
We are aware, however, that Inocentes availed of this
remedy after he had posted bail before the Sandiganbayan
which, in our jurisdiction, is tantamount to voluntary
surrender.27 Simply put, questioning the findings of
probable cause by the Sandiganbayan at this point would
be pointless as it has already acquired jurisdiction over
Inocentes.
It is well-settled that jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired upon (1) his arrest or apprehension,
with or without a warrant, or (2) his voluntary appearance
or submission to the jurisdiction of the court. For this
reason, in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,28 we held that
even if it is conceded that the warrant issued was void (for
nonexistence of probable cause), the accused waived all his
rights to object by appearing and giving a bond, viz.:

On this score, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting

of bail by the accused is tantamount to

_______________

26  Supra note 24.
27    See  People v. Go, G.R. No. 168539, March 25, 2014, 719
SCRA 704.
28  G.R. No. 134307, December 21, 1998, 300 SCRA 367.

 
 
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50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Inocentes vs. People

submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. [...]

 By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption from
the effect of being subject to the jurisdiction of respondent court.
While petitioner has exerted efforts to continue disputing
the validity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest despite
his posting bail, his claim has been negated when he
himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court
through the filing of various motions that sought other
affirmative reliefs.29 [omission and emphasis ours]

  
 Therefore, at this point, we no longer find it necessary
to dwell on whether there was grave abuse on the part of
the Sandiganbayan in finding the existence of probable
cause to issue a warrant of arrest. Had Inocentes brought
this matter before he posted bail or without voluntarily
surrendering himself, the outcome could have been
different. But, for now, whether the findings of probable
cause was tainted with grave abuse of discretion — thereby
making the warrant of arrest void — does not matter
anymore as even without the warrant the Sandiganbayan
still acquired jurisdiction over the person of Inocentes.
 
The Sandiganbayan should have
granted Inocentes’ motion to dismiss
for violation of his right to speedy
disposition of cases; it took seven
long years before the information
was filed before it.
 
The Office of the Ombudsman, for its failure to resolve
the criminal charges against Inocentes for seven (7) years,
violated Inocentes’ constitutional right to due process and
to a speedy disposition of the case against him, as well as
its own

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29 Id., at p. 387.

 
 
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Inocentes vs. People

constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed

before it.
 A person’s right to a speedy disposition of his case is
guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the
Constitution:

All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their

cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

  
This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases,
be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as in all
proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial.30 In this
accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious action
of all officials who are tasked with the administration of
justice.31
In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,32 we held that the long
delay of close to three (3) years in the termination of the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Tanodbayan
constituted a violation not only of the constitutional right of
the accused under the broad umbrella of the due process
clause, but also of the constitutional guarantee to “speedy
disposition” of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of
Rights, viz.:

We find the long delay in the termination of the

preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the
instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of
the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the
requirements of the law governing the conduct of
preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law
for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of
the proce-

_______________

30    Roquero v. Chancellor of UP-Manila, G.R. No. 181851,

March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 723; Binay v. Sandiganbayan, 314 Phil.
413, 446-447; 316 SCRA 65, 92-93 (1999).
31  Id.
32  G.R. Nos. 72335-39, March 21, 1988, 159 SCRA 70.

 
 
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52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Inocentes vs. People
dural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the
fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of
the due process clause, but under the constitutional
guarantee of “speedy disposition” of cases as embodied in
Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the
1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the
petitioner’s constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3)
years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of
the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not
impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the
long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that “the
delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the
Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high
ranking government official.” In the first place, such a statement
suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be
emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges
against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn
statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No.
3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and
factual issues necessitating such “painstaking and gruelling
scrutiny” as would justify a delay of almost three years in
terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges
relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted
benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and
factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of
three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.33
[Emphasis ours]

 
  The Sandiganbayan insists that the delay in this case
is justifiable because the informations were initially filed
before the RTC in Tarlac City. However, after going over
the records of the case, we find that the period of time in
between the incidents that could have contributed to the
delay were unreasonable, oppressive, and vexatious.

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33  Id., at p. 82.

 
 
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Inocentes vs. People
 According to the Sandiganbayan, the complaint in the
case at bar was filed sometime in 2004. After the
preliminary investigation, on September 15, 2005, the
Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding
probable cause to charge Inocentes. Following the denial of
his motion for reconsideration on November 14, 2005, the
prosecution filed the informations with the RTC of Tarlac
City. However, on March 14, 2006, the Office of the
Ombudsman ordered the withdrawal of the informations
filed before the RTC. From this point, it took almost six (6)
years (or only on May 2, 2012) before the informations
were filed before the Sandiganbayan.
To our mind, even assuming that transfers of records
from one court to another oftentimes entails significant
delays, the period of six (6) years is too long solely for the
transfer of records from the RTC in Tarlac City to the
Sandiganbayan. This is already an inordinate delay in
resolving a criminal complaint that the constitutionally
guaranteed right of the accused to due process and to the
speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the dismissal of the
criminal case is in order.34
Moreover, the prosecution cannot attribute the delay to
Inocentes for filing numerous motions because the
intervals between these incidents are miniscule compared
to the six-year transfer of records to the Sandiganbayan.
The prosecution likewise blames Inocentes for not
seasonably invoking his right to a speedy disposition of his
case. It claims that he has no right to complain about the
delay when the delay is because he allegedly slept on his
rights.
We find this argument unworthy of merit, in the same
way we did in Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan (First
Division):

Records show that they could not have urged the speedy
resolution of their case because they were unaware that the
investigation against them was still ongo-

_______________

34 Anchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 122728, February

13, 1997, 268 SCRA 301, 304.

 
 
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54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Inocentes vs. People

ing. They were only informed of the March 27, 2003 resolution
and information against them only after the lapse of six (6) long
years, or when they received a copy of the latter after its filing
with the SB on June 19, 2009. In this regard, they could have
reasonably assumed that the proceedings against them have
already been terminated. This serves as a plausible reason as to
why petitioners never followed up on the case altogether.
Instructive on this point is the Court’s observation in Duterte v.
Sandiganbayan, to wit:

Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged

the speedy resolution of their case because they were
completely unaware that the investigation against them
was still ongoing. Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the
fact that petitioners were merely asked to comment, and not
file counter-affidavits which is the proper procedure to
follow in a preliminary investigation. After giving their
explanation and after four long years of being in the dark,
petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume that the
charges against them had already been dismissed.
On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman failed
to present any plausible, special or even novel reason which
could justify the four-year delay in terminating its
investigation. Its excuse for the delay — the many layers of
review that the case had to undergo and the meticulous
scrutiny it had to entail — has lost its novelty and is no
longer appealing, as was the invocation in the Tatad case.
The incident before us does not involve complicated factual
and legal issues, specially (sic) in view of the fact that the
subject computerization contract had been mutually
cancelled by the parties thereto even before the Anti-Graft
League filed its complaint.

  Being the respondents in the preliminary

investigation proceedings, it was not the petitioners’ duty

 
 
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Inocentes vs. People

to follow up on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it

was the Office of the Ombudsman’s responsibility to
expedite the same within the bounds of reasonable
timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on all
complaints lodged before it. As pronounced in the case of
Barker v. Wingo:
A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the
State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the
trial is consistent with due process.35

 
Plainly, the delay of at least seven (7) years before the
informations were filed skews the fairness which the right
to speedy disposition of cases seeks to maintain.
Undoubtedly, the delay in the resolution of this case
prejudiced Inocentes since the defense witnesses he would
present would be unable to recall accurately the events of
the distant past.
Considering the clear violation of Inocentes’ right to the
speedy disposition of his case, we find that the Ombudsman
gravely abused its discretion in not acting on the case
within a reasonable time after it had acquired jurisdiction
over it.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Inocentes’ petition
is GRANTED. The resolutions dated February 8, 2013 and
October 24, 2012 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
Nos. SB-12-CRM-0127-0128 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. For violating Inocentes’ right to a speedy
disposition of his case, the Sandiganbayan is hereby
ORDERED to DISMISS the case against him.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio** (Acting CJ., Chairperson), Del Castillo and Leonen,

JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., On Official Leave.

_______________

35  G.R. No. 191411, July 15, 2013, 701 SCRA 188, 198-199.
** Per Special Order No. 2357 dated June 28, 2016.

 
 
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Inocentes vs. People

Petition granted, resolutions reversed and set aside.

   Notes.—Violations of RA No. 3019 by a municipal
mayor come within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan because under RA No. 6758, otherwise
known as the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989, municipal mayors are local officials classified as
Grade “27.” (Caballero vs. Sandiganbayan, 534 SCRA 30
[2007])
A special appearance before the court — challenging its
jurisdiction over the person through a motion to dismiss
even if the movant invokes other grounds — is not
tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his
objection to jurisdiction over his person, and, such is not
constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of
the court. (Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, 603 SCRA 348
[2009])
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