Case Digest Quezon City PTCA Vs DepEd
Case Digest Quezon City PTCA Vs DepEd
Case Digest Quezon City PTCA Vs DepEd
LEONEN, J.:
Facts:
This resolves a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that respondent Department of
Education's Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009 (Department Order) be nullified for being
unconstitutional and contrary to law, and that a writ of prohibition permanently enjoining the Department
of Education and all persons acting on its behalf from enforcing the assailed Department Order be
issued.
The Petition also prays that, in the interim, a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction be issued, restraining the enforcement of the Department Order.
On June 1, 2009, the Department of Education, through Former Secretary Jesli A. Lapus, issued
Department Order No. 54, Series of 20093 entitled Revised Guidelines Governing Parents-Teachers
Associations (PTAs) at the School Level.
More specifically, the Department Order provides for:
(1) The approval of the school head as a prerequisite for PTAs to be organized; (2) The terms of office
and manner of election of a PTA's board of directors; (3) The cessation of recognition of existing
parents-teachers community associations (PTCAs) and of their federations effective school year 2009-
2010. The Department Order gave them until June 30, 2009 to dissolve, wind up their activities, submit
financial reports, and turn over all documents to school heads and schools division superintendents.
In principle, Administrative agencies, however, are not given unfettered power to promulgate rules. As
noted in Gerochi v. Department of Energy, two requisites must be satisfied in order that rules issued by
administrative agencies may be considered valid: the completeness test and the sufficient standard
test: In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to various
specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle. Given the volume and
variety of interactions in today's society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal
adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to
administrative bodies - the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields - the
authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All
that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Issues:
Whether Department Order is invalid and ineffective as no public consultations were (supposedly) held
before its adoption, and/or as it was not published by the Department of Education
Ruling:
No. Contrary to petitioner's contentions, the adoption of the Department Order is not tainted with fatal
procedural defects. Petitioner decries the supposed lack of public consultations as being violative of its
right to due process. Notice and hearing are not essential when an administrative agency acts pursuant
to its rule-making power. In Central Bank of the Philippines v. Cloribel: Previous notice and hearing, as
elements of due process, are constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested property rights,
as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event which has to be established or ascertained.
It is not essential to the validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of
a class of persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. "It is also clear from the
authorities that where the function of the administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not
required by due process of law. Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: 'If the
nature of the administrative agency is essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are
not necessary. The validity of a rule of future action which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or
property are not involved, is not determined according to the same rules which apply in the case of the
direct application of a policy to a specific individual.' It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies
and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in
an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances
involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative
proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity
of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative,
or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter,
and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights
or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing." In any case, petitioner's
claim that no consultations were held is belied by the Department of Education's detailed recollection of
the actions it took before the adoption of the assailed Department Order:
1. On March 1, 2003, pursuant to D.O. No. 14, s. 2004, respondent DepEd created a task force to review,
revise, or modify D.O. No. 23, s. 2003 (the existing guidelines), in order to address numerous complaints
involving PTAs and PTCAs and to resolve disputes relative to the recognition and administration of said
associations. The task force came up with draft guidelines after consultations with parents, teachers and
students;
2. On May 3, 2003, pursuant to D.O. No. 28, s. 2007, the task force was reconstituted to evaluate the draft
guidelines prepared by the original task force and to review the provisions of D.O. No. 23;
3. On February 2, 2009, the reconstituted task force, after soliciting comments, suggestions and
recommendations from school heads and presidents of PTAs or PTCAs, submitted a draft of the "Revised
Guidelines governing PTAs/PTCAs at the School Level;"
4. The draft was submitted for comments and suggestions to the participants to the Third National
Federation Supreme Student Governments (NFSSG) Conference held in February 2009. The
participants, composed of regional education supervisors, presidents of regional federations of Supreme
Student Governments (SSG), and representatives from the SSG advisers, submitted another set of
revised guidelines;
5. The draft was subjected to further review and consultations, which resulted in the final draft of D.O. No.
54, s. 2009. Apart from claiming that no consultations were held, petitioner decries the: non-publication,
by the Department of Education itself, of the assailed Department Order. This does not invalidate the
Department Order. As is evident from the previously quoted provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the
Administrative Code, all that is required for the validity of rules promulgated by administrative agencies is
the filing of three (3) certified copies with the University of the Philippine Law Center. Within 15 days of
filing, administrative rules become effective.