Polytechnic University of The Philippines College of Law: Submitted by

POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
COLLEGE OF LAW
CASE DIGESTS
IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, ELECTION LAW, AND THE LAW ON PUBLIC

OFFICERS
Submitted by
Marlon B. Raquel
JD Student
Submitted to
Atty. Raquel De Guzman-Buensalida

Professor
February 3, 2019
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
EMERSON B. BAGONGAHASA vs. JOHANNA L. ROMUALDEZ

G.R. No. 179844, March 23, 2011
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
 Aug. 11, 2004- Philracom issued a directive directing the Manila Jockey Club, Inc.
(MJCI) and Philippine
t appears that Complainants Johanna L. Romualdez; Dietmar L. Romualdez; Sps.
Daniel and [Ana] Romualdez and Jacquelin[e] C. (sic) Romualdez are absolute and
lawful owners of separate parcels of lands, each parcel with an area of 36,670
square meters, 47,187.50 square meters and 55,453 square meters, respectively, all
situated [in] Sitio Papatahan, Paete, Laguna. Johanna and Dietmar purchased their
properties from Roberto Manalo on January 6, 1994; while Sps. Daniel and [Ana], as
well as Jacqueline bought their landholdings from Leonisa A. Zarraga on August 5,
1998. They allege that the said properties are planted [with] different fruit-bearing
trees. They and their predecessors-in-interest have been paying realty taxes due on
the properties up to the present. However, sometime in 1994 and 1995, the then
Secretary of Agrarian Reform declared the property to be part of the public domain,
awarded the same to the Defendants and forthwith issued Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the respective defendants Said directive was issued
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 5 dated 28 March 1994 by the Department of
 In compliance with the directive, MJCI and PRCI ordered the owners
of racehorses stable in their establishments to submit the horses to blood
sampling and administration of the Coggins Test to determinwhether they are
afflicted with the EIA virus. Subsequently, on 17 September 2004, Philracom issued
copies of the guidelines for the monitoring and eradication of EIA.(2 nd directive)
 Petitioners refused to comply with the directives. Despite resistance from
petitioners, the blood testiproceeded. The horses, whose owners refused to comply
were banned from the races, were removed fro
the actual day of race, prohibited from renewing their licenses or evicted from their
stables.
 Racehorse owners complained before the Office of the President (OP) which in
turn issued a directiinstructing Philracom to investigate the matter
The case is a Consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure. Complainants Johanna L. Romualdez; Dietmar L.
Romualdez; Sps. Daniel and Romualdez and Jacqueline Romualdez are absolute
and lawful owners of separate parcels of lands in Paete, Laguna. Johanna and
Dietmar purchased their properties from Roberto Manalo on January 6, 1994; while
Sps. Daniel and Ana, as well as Jacqueline bought their landholdings from Leonisa
A. Zarraga on August 5, 1998. They allege that the said properties are planted with
different fruit-bearing trees. They and their predecessors-in-interest have been
paying realty taxes due on the properties up to the present. However, sometime in
1994 and 1995, the then Secretary of Agrarian Reform declared the property to be
part of the public domain, awarded the same to the Defendants and forthwith issued
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the respective defendants.
Petitioners appealed to the DARAB bust was dismissed and an MR was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court has primary jurisdiction in settling the controversy in this
case
HELD:
No.The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a
controversy over which jurisdiction was initially lodged with an administrative body of
special competence. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not allow a court to
arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. The Office of the
DAR Secretary is in a better position to resolve the particular issue of non-issuance
of a notice of coverage.
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. UNIWIDE SALES, INC.

G.R. No. 174674, October 20, 2010
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
In 1999, the respondent Uniwide Sales Inc. filed in the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) a petition for declaration of suspension of payment, formation
and appointment of rehabilitation receiver, and approval of rehabilitation plan. The
petition was duly approved. Thereafter, the newly appointed Interim Receivership
Committee filed a rehabilitation plan in the SEC which is anchored on return to core
business of retailing; debt reduction via cash settlement and dacion en pago; loan
restructuring; waiver of penalties and charges; freezing of interest payments; and
restructuring of credit of suppliers, contractors, and private lenders. Subsequent
amendments of the said rehabilitation plan were filed before the SEC and were all
approved.
Petitioners, as unsecured creditors of respondents, appealed to the SEC praying that
the approval of the rehabilitation plan be se set aside and a new one be issued
directing the Interim Receivership Committee, in consultation with all the unsecured
creditors, to improve the terms and conditions of the plan. Acting on it, the SEC
denied the appeal for lack of merit.
 Said directive was issued pursuant to Administrative Order No. 5 dated 28 March
1994 by the Department of
stables.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction is applicable in this case
HELD:
YES. First, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that from the time of the filing in
this Court of the instant petition, supervening events have unfolded substantially
changing the factual backdrop of this rehabilitation case. The Court thus defers to
the competence and expertise of the SEC to determine whether, given the
supervening events in this case, the amended rehabilitation plan is no longer
capable of implementation and whether the rehabilitation case should be terminated
as a consequence.
Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine a
controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services
of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. In
other words, if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized training, and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the court is had even if the
matter may well be within the latter's proper jurisdiction.
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in
determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an
administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some
question arising in the proceeding before the court. Petition dismissed.
EXEMPTION TO THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 138381, November 10, 2004
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Avelina B. Conte and Leticia Boiser-Palma were former employees of the
Social Security System (SSS) who retired from government service. They availed of
compulsory retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 660. In addition, petitioners
also claimed benefits granted under SSS Resolution No. 56, series of 1971 that
provides financial incentive and inducement to SSS employees qualified to retire to
avail of retirement benefits under RA 660 as amended, rather than the retirement
benefits under RA 1616 as amended, by giving them “financial assistance”
equivalent in amount to the difference between what a retiree would have received
under RA 1616, less what he was entitled to under RA 660. Thereafter, COA issued
a ruling disallowing in audit “all such claims for financial assistance under SSS
Resolution No. 56” for the reason that it results in the increase of benefits beyond
what is allowed under existing retirement laws. Said directive was issued pursuant
to Administrative Order No. 5 dated 28 March 1994 by the Department of
stables.
On account of the consolidated cases of the parties involved, the Court promulgated
a decision, on the one hand, ordering the refund of amounts representing fringe
benefits granted to GSIS employees; and on the other, affirming the disallowance in
excess of that approved by the COA which was later on deducted by GSIS from the
employees’ retirement benefits.
The GSIS retirees then filed a motion for amendatory and clarificatory judgment
(“amendatory motion”) asking the court whether the GSIS may lawfully deduct any
amount from their retirement benefits in light of Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291.
The court then ruled that the said provision provides the Exemption of Retirement
benefits from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. As settled in several cases, retirement
pay accruing to a public officer may not be withheld and applied to his indebtedness
to the government. Hence, the GSIS employees retained their retirement benefits
including those which were properly disallowed by the COA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Board has the primary jurisdiction over the demands of the
respondents
HELD:
Yes. Only matter that was properly elevated to this Court was the issue of whether or
not the Board had jurisdiction over respondents demands. We did not resolve the
issue of whether or not the deductions were valid under Section 39 of RA 8291, for
the simple reason that the Board, as well as the appellate court, did not tackle the
issue. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction would ordinarily preclude us from resolving
the matter, which calls for a ruling to be first made by the Board. It is the latter that is
vested by law with exclusive and original jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising
under RA 8291, as well as other matters related thereto
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction would ordinarily preclude the court from resolving
the matter, which calls for a ruling to be first made by the Board. It is the latter that is
vested by law with exclusive and original jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising
under RA 8291, as well as other matters related thereto.
However, both the GSIS and respondents have extensively discussed the merits of
the case in their respective pleadings and did not confine their arguments to the
issue of jurisdiction. Respondents, in fact, submit that we should resolve the main
issue on the ground that it is a purely legal question. Respondents further state
that a remand of the case to the Board would merely result in unnecessary delay
and needless expense for the parties.
GREGORIO R. VIGILAR vs. ARNULFO D. AQUINO

G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011
SERENO, J.:
FACTS:
stables.
Aquino was invited by DPWH to a bidding for the construction of a dike by bulldozing
a part of the Porac River at Barangay Ascomo-Pulungmasle, Guagua, Pampanga.
Aquino was subsequently awarded the “Contract of Agreement” by the said
government agency.
By 9 July 1992, the project was duly completed by respondent, who was then issued
a Certificate of Project Completion dated 16 July 1992. However, claimed that
PhP1,262,696.20 was still due him, but petitioners refused to pay the amount. He
thus filed a Complaint for the collection of sum of money with damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga. Petitioners, for their part, set up the
defense that the Complaint was a suit against the state; that respondent failed to
exhaust administrative remedies; and that the “Contract of Agreement” covering the
project was void for violating Presidential Decree No. 1445, absent the proper
appropriation and the Certificate of Availability of Funds.
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent. Petitioners (DPWH) then appealed
the case before the CA which ruled in their favor, declaring the contract null and void
ab initio but ordered compensation to Aquino for worked delivered, subject to
Commission on Audit rules. Unsatisfied with the CA’s decision, Petitioners then
raised the issue before the Supreme Court seeking complete dismissal of the case
without paying Aquino any money. Petitioners avers that that respondent failed to
exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners need to exhaust administrative remedies
HELD:
No. Petitioners claim that the Complaint filed by respondent before the Regional Trial
Court was done without exhausting administrative remedies. Petitioners aver that
respondent should have first filed a claim before the Commission on Audit (COA)
before going to the courts. However, it has been established that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not
ironclad rules. In Republic of the Philippines v. Lacap, Court enumerated the
numerous exceptions to these rules, namely: (a) where there is estoppel on the part
of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is
patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable
delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the
amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to
be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where
the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where
the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l)
in quo warranto proceedings. In the present case, conditions (c) and (e) are present.
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is
on a certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.
Said question at best could be resolved only tentatively by the administrative
authorities. The final decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of
justice.
EXEMPTION TO THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
GERALDINE GAW GUY VS. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE

BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION
G.R. No. 167824, July 2, 2010
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
stables.
The father of petitioners Geraldine Gaw Guy and Grace Guy Cheu became a
naturalized Filipino citizen sometime in 1959. Respondent Atty. Alvin Agustin T.
Ignacio, filed a Complaint for blacklisting and deportation against petitioners before
the Bureau of Immigration (BI) on the basis that the latter two are Canadian citizens
who are illegally working in the Philippines, petitioners having been issued Canadian
passports. BOC ruled in favour of Atty. Ignacio. Petitioners filed before the RTC for
issuance of a temporary restraining order which was granted. Public respondents
filed their answer and the trial court enjoined public respondents from further
continuing with the deportation proceedings. Public respondents filed Petition
for Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before CA which was granted. Petitioners filed an MR but the
same was denied by CA. Hence, this petition arguing that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, relied upon by the CA in its decision, does not apply in the present case
because it falls under an exception.

ISSUE:
Is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction apply in the instant case?
HELD:
Yes. In this regard, it must be remembered though that this Court's ruling in
Dwikarna v. Domingo did not abandon the doctrine laid down in BOC v. Dela
Rosa. The exception remains. Dwikarna merely reiterated the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction when this Court ruled that if the petitioner is dissatisfied with the
decision of the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, he can
move for its reconsideration and if his motion is denied, then he can elevate his
case by way of a petition for review before the Court of Appeals, pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. However, utmost caution must
be exercised in availing of the exception laid down in BOC v. Dela Rosa in order to
avoid trampling on the time-honoured doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The court
cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to resolving the same, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special
knowledge, experience and services in determining technical and intricate matters of
fact. In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the
court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. Above all else, this Court still upholds the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. As enunciated in Republic v. Lacap. The general rule is that before a
party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means
afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies
are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to
a court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of
the same after due deliberation. Petition is granted.
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Sangguniang Barangay,

Barangay Sun Valley, Paranaque City
G.R. No. 156686, July 27, 2011
Leonardo-De Castro, J.:
FACTS:
stables.
The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley (the BSV Sangguniang
Barangay) issued BSV Resolution No. 98-09 on October 13, 1998, entitled
Directing the New Sun Valley Homeowners Association to Open Rosemallow and
Aster Streets to Vehicular and Pedestrian Traffic. he New Sun Valley Homeowners
Association, Inc. (NSVHAI), represented by its President, Marita Cortez, filed
a Petitior for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Permanent Injunction with prayer for
issuance of TRO with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paranaque City which was
granted by RTC. The BSV SB filed a Motion to Dismiss which was denied thereby
forcing them to file a Motion for Reconsideration. RTC subsequently dismissed the
case. NSVHAI filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-quoted Order but
this was denied by the RTC for lack of merit. The case was appealed to CA was
denied. Hence, NSVHAI went to Supreme Court. Petitioner avers that contrary to the
ruling of the Court of Appeals, the RTC had jurisdiction to hear and decide the
Amended Petition, and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not
applicable.
ISSUE:
Is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was applicable in this case?
HELD:
No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of
our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative
agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is
obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of
controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from
a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed.
ARLIN OBIASCA VS. JEANE BASALLOTE

G.R. No. 176707, February 17, 2010
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
stables.
Basallote was appointed as Administrative Officer II. However, her appointment
could not be her forwarded to the CSC because of her failure to submit the position
description form (PDF) duly signed by Gonzales (school principal). Despite repeated
requests, the signature could still not be obtained. She was then advised by Oyardo
(new City Schools Division Superintendent) to return to her former teaching position
of Teacher I. Subsequently, Oyardo appointed Obiasco as Administrative Officer II.
This prompted Basallote to file a protest with the CSC. The CSC approved
Basallote’s appointment and recalled the approval of Obiasca’s appointment. The
CA and the SC agreed with the CSC. The appointment of Obiasca was inconsistent
with the law and well-established jurisprudence. It not only disregarded the doctrine
of immutability of final judgments but also unduly concentrated on a narrow portion of
the provision of law, overlooking the greater part of the provision and other related
rules and using a legal doctrine rigidly and out of context. Its effect was to perpetuate
an injustice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner exhausted administrative remedies available
HELD:
No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that, for reasons
of law, comity and convenience, where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for
administrative review and provides a system of administrative appeal or
reconsideration, the courts will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have
been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the
administrative forum. In Orosa v. Roa, the Court ruled that if an appeal or remedy
obtains or is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to
before resort can be made to the courts. While the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is subject to certain exceptions, these are not present in this
case.
REPUBLIC vs. CARLITO LACAP

G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
stables.
Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros
Occidental. On October 5, 1989, City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed
Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana for violation of Department of
Local Government (DILG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980 in
relation to DILG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58.
Divinagracia’s complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City

Council or Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has
continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that
purpose from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required
by DILG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DILG Memorandum Circular
No. 74-58 of the same department; that on July 8, 1989, Javellana, as counsel for
Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang, filed a case against City Engineer Ernesto
C. Divinagracia of Bago City for “Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages”
putting him in public ridicule. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint
states no cause of action and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the
action since respondent did not appeal to the COA the decision of the District Auditor
to disapprove the claim which was denied by RTC. The OSG filed its Answer
invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The decision
was appealed to CA but was also denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies
HELD:
Yes. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine
of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical
considerations, are not inflexible rules. Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are
based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules.
There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the
part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is
patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant;
(d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical
and oppressive;
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the
courts of justice;
(f) where judicial intervention is urgent;(g) when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when
the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;
(j)when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public
interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings. Exceptions (c) and (e) are
applicable to the present case.
DOCTRINE OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
KHRISTINE REA M. REGINO vs. ANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY
G.R. No. 156109, November 28, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
stables.
Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at
Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST). Reared in a
poor family, Regino went to college mainly through the financial support of her
relatives. During the second semester of... school year 2001-2002, she enrolled in
logic and statistics subjects under Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa
Baladad, respectively, as teachers.
In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the "Rave Party and
Dance Revolution," the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the
school's tennis and volleyball courts. Each student was required to pay for two
tickets at the price of P100 each. The... project was allegedly implemented by
recompensing students who purchased tickets with additional points in their test
scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the final
examinations.
Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties and
celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the tickets. On March 14 and March 15,
2002, the scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and statistics, her
teachers -- Respondents
Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad -- allegedly disallowed her from taking the
tests. According to petitioner, Gamurot made her sit out her logic class while her
classmates were taking their examinations. The next day, Baladad, after
announcing to the entire... class that she was not permitting petitioner and another
student to take their statistics examinations for failing to pay for their tickets,
allegedly ejected them from the classroom. Petitioner's pleas ostensibly went
unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who unrelentingly... defended their positions as
compliance with PCST's policy.
Petitioner filed a complaint against PCST. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies. RTC dismissed
the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in a
civil action exclusively for damages based on violation of the human relation
provisions of the Civil Code, filed by a student against her former school.
HELD:
Petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST. Neither is she
demanding it to allow her to take her final examinations; she was already enrolled in
another educational institution. A reversal of the acts complained of would not
adequately redress her grievances; under the circumstances, the consequences of
respondents' acts could no longer be undone or rectified.
Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is

competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained
of. Administrative agencies are not courts; they are neither part of the judicial
system, nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have
the power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her
case before the Commission.
Third, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the
issue is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner's
action for damages inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the
Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts.

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POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, ELECTION LAW, AND THE LAW ON PUBLIC

Atty. Raquel De Guzman-Buensalida

EMERSON B. BAGONGAHASA vs. JOHANNA L. ROMUALDEZ

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. UNIWIDE SALES, INC.

GREGORIO R. VIGILAR vs. ARNULFO D. AQUINO

Whether or not petitioners need to exhaust administrative remedies

GERALDINE GAW GUY VS. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE

New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Sangguniang Barangay,

ARLIN OBIASCA VS. JEANE BASALLOTE

DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

REPUBLIC vs. CARLITO LACAP

Divinagracia’s complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City

KHRISTINE REA M. REGINO vs. ANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND

Second, exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is

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