Over The Beach

Over the Beach
Beach
US Army Amphibious
Amphibious
Operations in the
Korean
Korean War
War
Colonel (Retired)
(Retired) Donald W. Boose Jr.
Jr.
Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center
Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Kansas
Photo GR-02 (3). LST heading for beach at Iwon with troops of the 2d Battalion,
31st Infantry. Note the rugged mountains in the distance, terrain into which this
battalion was about to enter. Photo courtesy George Rasula.
Over the Beach
US Army Amphibious
Operations in the
Korean War
Colonel (Retired) Donald W. Boose Jr.
Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Boose, Donald W.
Over the beach : US Army amphibious operations in the Korean War /
Donald W. Boose Jr.
p. cm.
1. Korean War, 1950-1953--Amphibious operations. 2. Korean War,
1950-1953--Participation, American. 3. United States. Army--History--
Korean War, 1950-1953. 4. Amphibious warfare--History--20th century.
I. Title.
DS919.B66 2008
951.904’242--dc22
2008038959
First printing, December 2008.
CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history

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are those of the author and not necessarily those of the
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full list of CSI Press publications, many of them available
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The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an

official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official seal on any
republication of this material without the written permission of the Director
of CSI.
Foreword
The Combat Studies Institute is pleased to present the latest publica-
tion in our Special Study Series, Over the Beach: US Army Amphibious
Operations in the Korean War, by historian and retired Army Colonel
Donald W. Boose Jr. Colonel Boose has exhaustively studied and skill-
fully written the little known history of the Army’s amphibious operations
during the Korean War. This book is part of our tradition of publishing
high-quality historical studies from outside authors that have continuing
relevance to the US Army today.
Building on its extensive experiences in World War II, General
MacArthur and the US Army conducted three major amphibious land-
ings during the war, including the brilliant counterstroke in September
1950, an assault at the port of Incheon behind North Korean lines. After
the massive Chinese attacks of November and December 1950, the Army
conducted a number of amphibious withdrawals as it fell back southward
on the Korean peninsula to more defensible positions. Throughout the war,
the Army also conducted a number of non-assault amphibious operations
and over-the-shore logistical operations.
Since the Korean War, the Army’s amphibious role has greatly
decreased in importance. The Army, however, conducted extensive riverine
operations in Vietnam and continues to employ them in Iraq. Additionally,
over-the-shore logistics remains an important part of Army doctrine and
logistical capability today. This historical study chronicles an aspect of
the US Army’s history that may seem remote from the challenges facing
the Army in 2008. If history “proves” anything, however, it is that the
hard-won lessons from the past tend to be relearned in the future. If this
study makes that relearning process faster and more effective, it will have
fulfilled its purpose. CSI—The Past Is Prologue!
Timothy R. Reese
Colonel, Armor
Director, Combat Studies Institute
iii
Acknowledgments
This study was begun at the direction of General Richard Cody, the
Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, at a time when he was the Army Deputy
Chief of Staff, G3, and General Leon J. Laporte, US Army (Retired),
who was then the Commander, Republic of Korea–US Combined Forces
Command; Commander, United Nations Command; and Commander,
US Forces, Korea. The initial G3 Project Officer was Lieutenant Colonel
Robert R. Mackey. For most of the years of research and writing, the proj-
ect officer was Mr. James C. Boyt. Both Colonel Mackey and Mr. Boyt
have been exceptionally helpful throughout the process, as has Mr. John
Auger, the Booz-Allan-Hamilton project officer.
The former Chief of Military History, Brigadier General John S.
Brown, US Army (Retired), was supportive when I began this study and
Dr. Jeffrey J. Clarke, the current Chief of Military History, continued that
essential support throughout the period of my research. Dr. William M.
Donnelly; Colonel Jon T. Hoffman, United States Marine Corps Reserve
(USMCR); and Mr. Frank R. Shirer of the Center of Military History at
Fort McNair, DC, provided valuable advice and recommendations based
on their extensive knowledge of the Korean War and amphibious opera-
tions. Professor Allan R. Millett, a retired Marine Corps Reserve colonel
as well as one of the preeminent historians of the Korean War, graciously
offered encouragement, support, and advice.
Much of the research for this book was conducted at the US Army
Military History Institute (MHI) at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The
entire staff of MHI has my gratitude, in particular, the Director, Dr. Conrad
Crane, who was instrumental in my being selected to do this study; Dr.
Richard Sommers; Dr. Arthur Bergeron; Ms. Louise Arnold-Friend; Mr.
Richard Baker; Mr. Clif Hyatt; and the Circulation Desk Staff, Mr. Tom
Buffenbarger, Ms. Isabel Manske, Ms. Amy Pealer, Mr. Shaun Kirkpatrick,
Mr. Gary Johnson, Ms. Jessica Sheets, Mr. Steve Bye, Mr. Billy McElrath,
and Ms. Youngae Raymond.
My principal guide, mentor, colleague, and friend at MHI, Mr. David
Keough, provided indispensible advice, suggested avenues for research,
and tracked down obscure sources. He and Colonel Walter Wood, USMC
(Retired), have been my close companions throughout this project, serv-
ing as sounding boards and counselors, and reading the entire manuscript.
Dr. David Jablonsky also read the manuscript, sharing with me his deep
and broad knowledge of modern military history. Captain Albert Lord,
United States Navy (USN), the Senior Navy Representative at the Army
War College, reviewed the manuscript and made helpful suggestions.
v
Colonel Clark Summers shared his experience with Transportation Corps
watercraft and over-the-shore logistics with me while he was a student at
the Army War College. Colonel (Retired) George Rasula read portions of
the manuscript and provided unique insights based on his own participa-
tion as an officer in the 31st Infantry Regiment in the Incheon and Iwon
landings, the battle east of the Jangjin (Changjin/Chosin) Reservoir, and
the Heungnam evacuation.
Dr. Lewis Bernstein, the United Nations Command/Combined Forces
Command/US Forces Korea Command Historian has been exceptionally
helpful, and I also wish to acknowledge Mr. Karl Swanson and Mr. Bruce
Conard, United States Forces Korea historians; and Major Patrick J. Berry,
of the Eighth Army G5. I have fond memories of retracing the Incheon
Landing with these four men. Dr. Choi Yong Ho, Dr. Nam Jeong-ok, and Dr.
Kang Ch’ang-guk of the Korean Institute for Military History Compilation
made great efforts to help me acquire material from Korean archives and
were unsparing of their time. Mr. John A. Burzynski of the United Nations
Command Component of the Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC)
provided advice and assistance, including communication with sources
and contacts in Korea, and UNCMAC interpreter/translators, Mr. Ham,
Chi Min; Ms. Kim, Hyun-young; Ms. Kim, Mi-na; and Mr. Yim, Chae-sul,
provided advice on current geographical nomenclature and translated some
of the Korean sources.
At the National Archives at College Park, I was greatly assisted by Mr.
Richard Boylan. Dr. Paul K. Walker, the Chief Historian of the Corps of
Engineers, provided useful leads for research and Dr. Michael J. Brodhead
spent many hours helping me find my way through the Engineer histori-
cal archives. At Fort Eustis, Virginia, the Transportation Corps Command
Historian, Mr. Richard E. Killblain, was also unstinting of his time and
effort. Dr. Jim Ginther, Ms. Patricia A. Mullen, and Mr. Michael Miller at
the Marine Corps University Archives were unfailingly helpful. Captain
Patrick Roth, USN (Retired), of the Center for Naval Analyses, Dr.
Edward Marolda, the Senior Historian at the Naval Historical Center, and
Ms. Kathleen M. Lloyd, the head of the Operational Archives Branch of
the NHC, provided helpful information on naval matters.
I have received much encouragement and support from the US Army
War College Department of Distance Education, in particular from the
Department Chairman, Dr. C. Clayton Chun; the Directors of Second
Year Studies, Dr. Stephen Lemons and Colonel Dwight Raymond; and
the Second Year Administrative Staff, Ms. Kathy Ramsey and Ms. Sylvia
Hollenbaugh. My friends at the US Army War College Library could
vi
always be counted on for cheerful and professional assistance and sup-
port. I wish to thank in particular the Director, Mr. Bohdan Kohutiak, Ms.
Jacqueline Bey, Ms. Virginia Shope, Ms. Margaret D. Baumgardner, and
Ms. Kathy Hindman. In Carlisle, I was provided with books, friendship,
and a pleasant working environment through the courtesy of Elizabeth and
Jeffrey Wood; Robert and Naomi Pham; Amy, Doug, and Andrew Fulton;
and Linda McBeth.
The following members of the Combat Studies Institute, US Army
Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, exhibited great pro-
fessional skill as well as patience and understanding in shepherding this
manuscript through the editing and publication process: Mr. Kendall D.
Gott, Chief, Research and Publications Team; Ms. Elizabeth Weigand, edi-
tor; and Ms. Robin Kern, illustrator.
My wife, Lil, assisted in the research, tracked down the history of
every LST that ever landed on a Korean beach, proofread the pages, and
provided the love and encouragement that have sustained me through the
years of research and writing.
Any errors or omissions in this book are, however, entirely my own.
vii
Contents
Page
Foreword .................................................................................................iii
Acknowledgments ................................................................................... v
Maps ...................................................................................................... xii
Chapter 1. Introduction ..........................................................................1
A Note on Definitions ...........................................................4
Chapter 2. Amphibious Heritage .........................................................11
American Amphibious Warfare to 1919 .............................11
Amphibious Doctrine and Planning, 1919–38 ...................19
The Joint Board.............................................................20
Marine Corps Developments .......................................22
Army Activities .............................................................24
Amphibious Developments on the Eve of World
War II ......................................................................25
Development of Landing Ships and Craft ....................29
World War II .................................................................31
Amphibious Developments in 1942 ...................................35
The Army Amphibious Training Center and
Engineer Amphibian Command ..............................35
Amphibious Ships, Craft, and Vehicles ........................39
Amphibious Operations in 1942 ........................................40
Army Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalions ...........45
South and Southwest Pacific Operations .....................45
The Aleutians ...............................................................48
Mediterranean Operations ..........................................49
Central Pacific Operations ..........................................49
Southwest Pacific Area Operations .............................53
Central Pacific Operations ..........................................56
Operations in Europe ...................................................57
Advance to the Philippines ..........................................60
Amphibious Doctrine, Planning, and Training, 1945–50 ...65
The Postwar Amphibious Establishment .....................65
Resumption of Amphibious Exercises ..........................67
The Unification and Roles and Missions Struggle .............68
ix
Page
Post-National Security Act, Army Amphibious
Doctrine and Training ................................................72
The Situation in the Far East on the Eve of the
Korean War .................................................................. 79
GHQ FEC Amphibious Training Program ......................... 81
Chapter 3. Initial Operations and Planning ........................................ 111
North Korean Attacks and ROK and US Evacuations ...... 111
Command Relationship Changes and Arrival of
US/UN Forces ............................................................ 116
Amphibious Planning and Operation BLUEHEARTS ..... 118
Delay and Reinforcement ................................................. 126
The Pusan Perimeter ......................................................... 127
Over-the-Shore Logistics: The Jindong-ri
(Chindong-ni) Operation ........................................... 127
Evacuation of ROK 3d Division, 13–17 August 1950 ..... 131
The Tongyeong Amphibious Operation ............................ 135
Amphibious Special Operations, July–August 1950 ........ 139
Chapter 4. CHROMITE: The Incheon Landing ................................. 155
Planning ............................................................................ 155
The Plan ..................................................................... 162
5th Marines Issue ....................................................... 168
Decision in Washington ............................................. 169
Special Operations in Preparation for CHROMITE ......... 172
Operations LEE and TRUDY JACKSON .................. 172
GHQ FEC Raider Company Demonstration at
Gunsan .................................................................. 174
Operational Execution ...................................................... 176
Incheon D+1 Operations ................................................... 178
Excursions and Alarms ..................................................... 183
The Miryang Battalion’s Jangsa-dong Operation ..... 183
The Raiders Attempt at Gimpo ................................... 186
Morning Alarms ......................................................... 186
The Incheon Build-Up, D+2 to D+4 ................................. 186
Considerations of a Landing at Gunsan ............................ 192
Han River Crossing .......................................................... 194
The Conclusion of the Incheon–Seoul Operation ............. 194
ROK Operations ........................................................ 201
Incheon Port and Logistic Support Operations ......... 201
Chapter 5. Operations in North Korea, October–December 1950 ..... 217
x
Page
The Invasion of North Korea ............................................ 217
Strategic Setting ......................................................... 217
X Corps Mount Out .................................................... 220
Eighth Army Moves into North Korea ....................... 222
Yeseong Resupply Operation ..................................... 224
Opening of Jinnampo Port ......................................... 224
TAILBOARD (Wonsan/Iwon), 29 October–
4 November 1950 ...................................................... 226
Special Operations in Support of Operations in the
North .......................................................................... 231
Amphibious Withdrawals, December 1950 ..................... 232
Evacuation of Jinnampo ............................................ 236
Evacuation of Wonsan and Seongjin .......................... 238
Washington Deliberations .......................................... 239
The Heungnam Evacuation ........................................ 240
Chapter 6. The War of Movement, December 1950–
November 1951 ............................................................................. 251
Evacuation of Incheon ..................................................... 251
Planning for Evacuation of Korea and the Defense
of Japan....................................................................... 254
Special Operations: Irregulars in the Northwest
Islands in January–February 1951 ............................. 256
Eighth Army Counteroffensive ........................................ 259
Amphibious Demonstrations and the Reoccupation
of Incheon .................................................................. 262
The Siege of Wonsan ....................................................... 263
Rehabilitation of Incheon Port ......................................... 264
Amphibious Raids, Demonstrations, and Special
Operations to Support the Offensive ......................... 267
Hwacheon (Hwach’on) Reservoir Operation,
9–11 April 1951 ......................................................... 271
Amphibious Training, March–May 1951 ........................ 284
Van Fleet in Command: Amphibious Plans, April–
June 1951 ................................................................... 285
Amphibious Training, May–August 1951 ....................... 292
Special Operations, June–August 1951 ........................... 293
Amphibious Planning and Training, August–
November 1951 ......................................................... 296
Chapter 7. Amphibious Planning and Training during the
Stalemate, 1952–53 ....................................................................... 313
xi
Page
Reserve Amphibious Units .............................................. 313
Amphibious Training, August 1951–April 1952 ............. 314
Operations in the Offshore Islands .................................. 318
Amphibious Training, May 1952 to the End of the
War .............................................................................. 319
Amphibious Planning and Operations, 1952–53 ............. 321
Chapter 8. Postwar Activities, Current Situation, and Lessons
Learned ........................................................................................ 327
Doctrine, Force Structure, and Training ........................... 327
Vietnam and After ............................................................. 338
Conclusions and Lessons Learned .................................... 347
Glossary ............................................................................................... 357
Bibliography ........................................................................................ 363
Appendix A. Korean Geographical Names .......................................... 415
Appendix B. Landing Ships, Craft, and Vehicles in Use during
the Korean War .............................................................................. 419
Appendix C. Amphibious Terms, Abbreviations, and Acronyms:
Army Doctrine in Effect from 1950 to 1953 ................................. 435
Index .................................................................................................... 457
About the Author .................................................................................. 501
Maps
1. Pacific areas .....................................................................................32
2. The South and Southwest Pacific ....................................................34
3. Southern approaches to Europe .......................................................44
4. New Guinea area .............................................................................47
5. Final Overlord plan .........................................................................58
6. Philippine area .................................................................................62
7. North Korean attack: initial amphibious operations ......................112
8. Korean ports and US bases in Japan .............................................115
9. Pusan Perimeter .............................................................................128
10. Task Force Kean and Task Force Keen, 7–12 August 1950 ...........130
11. 3d ROK Division evacuation ........................................................131
12. Tongyeong operation—KPA attacks .............................................136
13. Tongyeong amphibious operation .................................................138
14. Amphibious special operations, July–August 1950 ......................140
15. Incheon coast .................................................................................164
xii
Page
16. Incheon Landing overview ............................................................165
17. Incheon approaches .......................................................................173
18. UNC offensive, 15–22 September 1950.........................................175
19. Incheon landing .............................................................................177
20. Incheon: D+1 Marine attacks ........................................................179
21. Incheon Harbor beaches ................................................................181
22. Advance by 1st Marines, 17 September ........................................187
23. Crossing of the Han and capture of Seoul .....................................191
24. 5th Marines and A/56th ATTB cross the Han ................................195
25. 7th Marines cross the Han .............................................................197
26. 1st Marines and 32d Infantry cross the Han ..................................198
27. UNC OPORD No. 2 ......................................................................219
28. Geumcheon (Kumch’on) Pocket and the Yeseong River ..............225
29. UNC advance north .......................................................................227
30. Iwon Beach ....................................................................................230
31. Amphibious Special Operations, October–November 1950 .........233
32. Eighth Army Withdrawal, December 1950 ...................................237
33. X Corps evacuation plan, December 1950 ....................................241
34. Chinese 1951 Third Phase Offensive ............................................252
35. Northwest Islands ..........................................................................258
36. UNC counteroffensive, Phase I .....................................................261
37. Amphibious demonstrations, January–February 1951 ..................263
38. Wonsan Islands ..............................................................................265
39. Raids, demonstrations, and special operations, March–
April 1951 ....................................................................................268
40. Eighth Army Offshore Partisan Bases, August 1951 .....................270
41. Operations RUGGED and DAUNTLESS .....................................272
42. Hwacheon Reservoir and the Bukhan River Valley ......................273
43. Hwacheon Reservoir Operation, 9–11 April 1951 ........................275
44. Hwacheon Operation: The Eastern (Dongcheon-ri)
Peninsula, 11 April 1951 ............................................................281
45. Chinese spring offensive, 1951 .....................................................287
46. Amphibious demonstrations, April–May 1951 .............................289
47. Proposed Tongcheon operation, 6 June 1951 ................................290
48. Amphibious raids and demonstrations, June–December 1951 .....295
49. Line of contact and east coast beaches, 10 July 1951 ...................297
50. Line of contact and east coast beaches, 31 October 1951 .............300
51. Vietnam ....................................................................................340
xiii
Chapter 1
Introduction
In the summer of 950, when the North Korean Army attacked South
Korea, a US Army infantry battalion landing team was conducting an
amphibious landing exercise in Japan. Over the previous 5 years, the
Army and the Marine Corps had struggled bitterly over which Service
should have the responsibility for amphibious warfare. During the 920s
and 930s, both Services had grappled with the problem of transporting
and landing ground forces from the sea, but the Marine Corps systemati
cally developed doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment
for assault landings against defended shores. During World War II, both
Services made use of those techniques and developed improved methods
for conducting amphibious operations. In Admiral Chester W. Nimitz’s
Pacific Ocean Areas (POA), both Marine and Army forces carried out
landings against Japanese-held islands in the South and Central Pacific,
culminating in the seizure of Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands by forces
of Tenth US Army under Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. In
the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO) and European Theater of
Operations (ETO), the Army, working with the British who had pioneered
their own approach to amphibious operations, had developed doctrine and
capabilities for continental assault landings and had carried out some of
the largest amphibious operations in history in North Africa, Sicily, Italy,
Normandy, and Southern France. In the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA),
General Douglas MacArthur used predominantly Army and some Marine
forces to carry out a series of landings along the coast of New Guinea
and the nearby islands before conducting the amphibious invasion of the
Philippines, which included several landings of various sizes. MacArthur’s
ground forces were transported in these operations by Rear Admiral Daniel
E. Barbey’s Seventh Amphibious Force and other Navy amphibious ele
ments and by the very versatile engineer special brigades that, unique to
SWPA, included engineer boat units operating landing craft. By the end of
the war, more amphibious operations had been conducted in MacArthur’s
theater than in any other theater of war.
When World War II ended, the Army leadership believed their
Service should assume the amphibious warfare mission, but it was the
Marine Corps that emerged from the defense unification and roles and
missions struggles of the late 940s with their amphibious warfare mission
validated by Congress, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Despite this validation for the Marines, the Army was also charged
with providing forces for joint amphibious operations. Thus, the Army

maintained an amphibious capability in the form of one understrength
engineer special brigade and one amphibious tank and tractor battalion,
developed amphibious doctrine, and conducted several large-scale
amphibious exercises with the Navy.
Fortuitously, in the months prior to the Korean War MacArthur’s
Japan-based General Headquarters (GHQ), Far East Command (FEC) had
initiated an amphibious training program that introduced key members
of the staff to the concepts of amphibious warfare and predisposed them
to consider amphibious operations when war came. The landing exercise
phase of the training had just begun when the North Koreans attacked and
so there were in Japan a Marine training team and a Navy amphibious
group able to provide amphibious expertise and the nucleus of an amphibi
ous task force. General MacArthur, as the Supreme Commander of the
Allied Powers (SCAP) in charge of the occupation, also had available
under his control the Shipping Control Administration, Japan (SCAJAP)—
a fleet of Japanese-manned landing ships, tank (LSTs) and cargo ships.
The recently formed Western Pacific (WestPac) office of the Military Sea
Transportation Service (MSTS) provided an organization with cargo and
transport ships and the ability to lease additional civilian shipping to sup
plement the amphibious force.
Thus, within weeks of the North Korean attack, Navy Amphibious
Group One and the Army’s st Cavalry Division were able to mount an
unopposed amphibious landing with a hastily-trained landing force and
a mixed assortment of US Navy, MSTS, SCAJAP, and Japanese civilian
shipping. The st Cavalry Division’s landing at Pohang in July 950 was
unopposed, but in September the US Army X Corps carried out the only
seaborne amphibious assault landing of the war at Incheon (Inch’on)2 with
the st Marine Division accompanied by an element of the US Army’s 2d
Engineer Special Brigade (ESB) and a company of the 56th Amphibious
Tank and Tractor Battalion (ATTB) making the initial assault, the 2d ESB
in charge of the shore party and logistical operations, and the Korean
Marine Corps (KMC) regiment and the Army’s 7th Infantry Division as
the follow-on forces.3 In October the 7th Infantry Division made an unop
posed landing at Iwon in northeast Korea as the Marines went ashore,
also unopposed, at Wonsan. Following a massive Chinese assault in late
November and December 950, Army units then took part in the amphibi
ous withdrawals from Jinnampo (Chinnamp’o) in the west and from
Wonsan, Seongjin (Songjin), and Heungnam (Hungnam) in the east.
While no further amphibious assaults were carried out after Incheon,
Army Engineer and Transportation Corps units conducted over-the-shore
2
logistic operations throughout the war. Most of the wartime amphibious
raids and reconnaissance missions were conducted by the United States,
Republic of Korea (ROK), and British Navy and Marine forces, but US
and ROK Army special operations forces conducted some such missions
and supported Korean partisan forces operating from off-shore islands. In
April 1951 US Army Rangers and soldiers of the 7th Cavalry Regiment
attempted a waterborne attack against the Hwacheon (Hwach’on) Dam in
central Korea. Army units in Japan planned and trained for major amphibi
ous operations that never took place, and the last amphibious operation
of the war, a demonstration off Gojeo (Kojo) on the east coast in October
952 by a regimental combat team of the st Cavalry Division, was an
Army–Navy operation.
In the years after the Korean War, the Army further refined its amphib
ious doctrine, carried out amphibious exercises, and, during the Vietnam
War, conducted large-scale over-the-shore logistics and riverine opera
tions. Beginning in the 1970s, the Army gradually lost interest in amphibi
ous operations, but retained an over-the-shore logistic capability. Today,
the Army’s role in forcible entry4 is seen primarily as the conduct of air
borne operations, but Army interest in strategic and operational maneuver
by and from the sea and other water areas continues.
This study examines Army participation in amphibious and over-the
shore operations in the Korean War, beginning with a backward glance at
the Army’s amphibious heritage; its participation in the development of
amphibious doctrine prior to World War II; the World War II experience
that shaped the Army’s Korean War era amphibious doctrine, techniques,
and attitude; the 1945–50 inter-Service unification and roles and missions
struggles; and the pre-Korean War training and exercises. The study also
briefly reviews Army amphibious doctrine, units, planning, and training
following the Korean War and the current state of Army waterborne stra
tegic and operational maneuver capabilities.
The study concludes that, while the Marine Corps will continue to
be the nation’s amphibious warfare specialists, and future assault land
ings on hostile shores are likely to be conducted by Marines, the Korean
War experience indicates that Army forces should be prepared to conduct
or participate in amphibious operations in the absence of or in conjunc
tion with Marines. It would be prudent for the Army to maintain a small
amphibious support element that can develop and test Army-specific doc
trine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment and serve as the basis
for an Army amphibious-capable force for situations in which Marine
Corps and/or Navy amphibious forces are insufficient or not available.
3
A Note on Definitions5
Most amphibious operations are joint, which “connotes activities,
operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military
Departments participate,” while combined activities are those involving
“two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies.”6 The current joint
doctrinal definition of an amphibious operation is a “military operation
launched from the sea by an amphibious force, embarked in ships or craft
with the primary purpose of introducing a landing force ashore to accom
plish the assigned mission.”7 The definition has varied over the years, with
the Army sometimes using or arguing for a broader definition that includes
other waterborne operations, including those on inland waters. The types
of amphibious operations currently include the amphibious assault (the
principal type of amphibious operation that involves establishing a force
on a hostile or potentially hostile shore); amphibious demonstration (a
type of amphibious operation conducted for the purpose of deceiving the
enemy by a show of force with the expectation of deluding the enemy into
a course of action unfavorable to him); amphibious raid (a type of amphib
ious operation involving swift incursion into or temporary occupation of
an objective followed by a planned withdrawal); amphibious reconnais
sance (an amphibious landing conducted by minor elements, normally
involving stealth rather than force of arms, for the purpose of securing
information, and usually followed by a planned withdrawal); and amphibi
ous withdrawal (a type of amphibious operation involving the extraction
of forces by sea in ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore).
Other amphibious operations include noncombatant evacuation operations
(NEO) and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA).8 Amphibious landings
may be conducted against undefended or lightly defended areas to bypass
or envelop enemy forces, or they may be conducted against defended areas
in operations known at the time of the Korean War as “landings on hos
tile shores” and currently called amphibious operations against coastal
defenses.
During World War II and at the time of the Korean War, the Army made
a distinction between “ship-to-shore” and “shore-to-shore” operations.
Ship-to-shore movement was conducted by transferring troops, equip
ment, and supplies from transports to the beach in landing craft or landing
vehicles. Shore-to-shore movement was the movement of troops, equip
ment, and supplies directly from the embarkation area to the beach with
out transfer at sea, except for that portion of the landing force that landed
directly on the beach from landing ships. These short distance operations
were normally made mostly by landing craft and only a very few land
ing ships.9 Most amphibious operations were a combination of both types
4
because of the mix of ships, including attack transports (APA) and attack
cargo ships (AKA) that required ship-to-shore movement and ramped land
ing ships that could land troops and equipment directly onto the beach.0
Some of General MacArthur’s operations along the New Guinea coast
and in the Philippines were purely shore-to-shore operations using pre
dominantly Army landing craft, but most of the SWPA and European and
Mediterranean operations used a combination of ship-to-shore and shore-
to-shore techniques. The long-range operations in the Central Pacific were
by necessity largely ship-to-shore operations, although shore-to-shore
operations were often conducted among closely neighboring islands.
Related but different from amphibious operations are those activi
ties to sustain combat operations on shore by means of landing supplies,
personnel, and equipment over beaches rather than through port facili
ties. Currently called logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operations, they
are defined as “the loading and unloading of ships without the benefit of
deep-draft-capable, fixed-port facilities; or as a means of moving forces
closer to tactical assembly areas dependent on threat force capabilities.”
During the Korean War, the lack of adequate dock facilities and prob
lems caused by extreme west coast tides also required the frequent use of
lightering in which troops, cargo, and equipment were transferred between
ships anchored in the harbor (in the stream) and the shore using landing
ships, landing craft, powered barges (lighters), or other vessels collectively
called lighterage.2
Amphibious and LOTS operations may be conducted as part of an
expedition (defined by both the Department of Defense and the Army as
“a military operation conducted by an armed force to accomplish a spe
cific objective in a foreign country”).3 Naval expeditionary warfare is cur
rently defined as “military operations mounted from the sea, usually on
short notice, consisting of forward deployed, or rapidly deployable, self-
sustaining naval forces tailored to achieve a clearly stated objective.”4
The US Navy defines “expeditionary maneuver warfare” as “the ability
to mass overwhelming naval, joint, and allied military power, and deliver
it ashore to influence, deter, contain, or defeat an aggressor. Naval expe
ditionary forces provide the Joint Task Force Commander with the abil
ity to conduct military operations in an area of control, extending from
the open ocean to the littorals, and to accessible inland areas that can be
attacked, supported, and defended directly from the sea.”5 The Marine
Corps has tended to conflate the terms “expeditionary” and “amphibious,”
exemplified by its renaming the newest amphibious assault vehicle as the
“Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle.”16 In 2005 the Marine Corps introduced
the Expeditionary Warfare Family of Concepts that includes Operational
5
Maneuver from the Sea, Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (landing operations),
Sustained Operations Ashore, and Other Expeditionary Operations.17 A
related concept is sea basing, in which ships and other platforms would be
combined to form a base at sea from which Marine or Army forces could
conduct and sustain amphibious operations.8
Some of the same techniques and equipment used in amphibious
operations may be used in river crossing operations or on inland bodies of
water. From time to time, the Army, as well as the Navy and Marine Corps,
has also conducted military operations along rivers and inland waterways.
These riverine operations make use of amphibious techniques and materiel
as well as specially adapted tactics, weapons, and equipment, but while
water is an obstacle to be overcome in amphibious and river crossing
operations, in riverine warfare the fluid concourses of rivers, lakes, bays,
and estuaries are avenues of approach providing access to the enemy and
routes of transportation and sustainment for friendly forces.9
See appendix C for definitions of terms applicable to amphibious
operations as they appeared in doctrine during the Korean War period.
6
Notes

1. The landing ship, tank (LST) was a 328-foot long ship with a bow ramp
that was capable of running up onto a beach (beaching) to discharge tanks, vehi
cles, personnel, or other cargo and then pulling back off the beach (retracting).
Gordon L. Rottman, Landing Ship, Tank (LST) 1942–2002, New Vanguard 5
(Oxford, UK: Osprey Publications, 2005); Norman Friedman and A.D. Baker,
U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft; An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2002), 117–124. A descriptive list of amphibious ships and
craft in use at the time of the Korean War is at Appendix B, “Landing Ships, Craft,
and Vehicles in Use during the Korean War.” SCAJAP in June 950 consisted of
2 ex-US Navy freighters and 39 LSTs manned by Japanese but controlled by
SCAP. These ships had been used to repatriate Japanese from the continent fol
lowing the war and continued to be used for Far East Command (FEC) logistic
support and as interim transport in the Japanese islands until the war-destroyed
Japanese Merchant Marine could be reconstituted. James A. Field Jr., History of
United States Naval Operations, Korea (Washington, DC: GPO, 1962), 46, 54,
71–74.
2. Korean place names are presented in this study using the National
Academy of the Korean Language style. On first use, the Modified McCune-
Reischauer (Times-Herald) style generally in use at the time of the Korean War is
provided in parentheses. See Appendix A, “Korean Geographical Names,” for the
place names used in this study in both the new and old styles.
3. In Korean War era Army doctrine, a shore party was an organization
formed to provide logistical support within the beach area to landing force units
during the early phases of an amphibious operation. Its basic mission was to unload
supplies and equipment; to receive, segregate, and safeguard this materiel; pro
vide services and facilities ashore; maintain security of the beach area; and evacu
ate casualties and prisoners of war. The Navy equivalent was the beach party: the
element of a shore party that controls the landing of craft and larger landing ships
and regulates water traffic near the beach. The beach party was controlled by the
Navy beach master. Roughly speaking, the beach party was responsible for activ
ity below the high tide line and the shore party for activity above the high tide line.
However, under Army doctrine, the shore party commander had overall control
of the beachhead, including the beach party, except for purely Navy matters. See
Appendix C, “Amphibious Terms, Abbreviations, and Acronyms: Army Doctrine
in Effect 1950–53.”
4. Forcible entry is the seizing and holding of a military lodgment (a des
ignated area in a hostile or potentially hostile territory that, when seized and held,
makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible, and provides maneu
ver space for subsequent operations) in the face of armed opposition. Department
of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/
doddict/index.html (accessed 7 May 2007), hereafter, DOD Dictionary.
5. The material in this section was current as of June 2008.
7
6. Unless otherwise indicated, these definitions are all from the DOD
Dictionary. During World War II, the British used the term “combined” in the
way “joint” is used today and generally used the term “combined operations” to
describe amphibious operations.
7. An amphibious force is an amphibious task force (a Navy task organi
zation formed to conduct amphibious operations) and a landing force (a Marine
Corps or Army task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations)
together with other forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibi
ous operations.
8. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-02, Joint Doctrine for
Amphibious Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), I-2–I-3; Joint Publication
3-8, Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations, Appendix A, “Amphibious
Operations” (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001).
9. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 60-10,
Amphibious Operations: Regiment in Assault Landings (Washington, DC: GPO,
1952), 2–3.
10. Attack transports (Navy designation APA) and attack cargo ships (AKA),
originally called combat loaders, were transports (troop carriers) and cargo ships
modified to carry landing craft suitable for amphibious assaults. An APA could
carry a battalion of troops. Three APAs and an AKA could carry a regiment.
Tanks and other heavy equipment were normally carried in LSTs. The other major
Korean War era amphibious ship was the landing ship, dock (LSD), a 475-foot
ship that could carry landing craft, amphibious tractors, or amphibious trucks in
a well deck that could be flooded to allow the craft to be launched under their
own power through stern gates. Smaller landing ships were 203-foot long landing
ships, medium (LSMs) and 120-foot landing ships, utility (LSU), which had been
known as landing craft, tank (LCT) during World War II and were redesignated
landing craft, utility (LCU) after the Korean War. Landing craft were ramped ves
sels small enough to be carried aboard APAs, AKAs, or LSTs and included several
types of 36-foot vessels designed to put troops and light vehicles on the beach and
56-foot landing craft, mechanized (LCM), originally intended to carry tanks. Some
rubber boats were also designated as landing craft. Amphibious vehicles included
landing vehicles, tracked (LVT), which were amphibious tractors; armored LVTs
mounting howitzers; and amphibious trucks, of which the most important and
numerous was the DUKW, or “Duck,” an amphibious 2½-ton truck; Friedman
and Baker, U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft, 117–124. The development of these
ships, craft, and vehicles is discussed in chapter 2. A descriptive list of amphibi
ous ships and craft in use at the time of the Korean War is at appendix B.
. DOD Dictionary.
2. René de Kerchove, International Maritime Dictionary, 2d ed. (Princeton,
NJ: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., October 1961).
3. de Kerchove, International Maritime Dictionary; Headquarters,
Department of the Army, FM -02, Operational Terms and Graphics (Washington,
DC: GPO, 2004).
8
4. DOD Dictionary.
5. US Navy, Seapower for a New Era: A Program Guide to the New Navy
(Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2007), 22, www.navy.mil/navydata/

policy/seapower/spne07/top-spne07.html (accessed 20 June 2008).
16. Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Direct Reporting Program
Manager, Advanced Amphibious Assault, “Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle,” efv.
usmc.mil/ (accessed 7 May 2007).
17. Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, “Expeditionary Maneuver
Family of Concepts,” Marine Corps Concepts and Programs, 2005, hqinet00.
hqmc.usmc.mil/p&r/concepts/2005/PDF/Ch2PDFs/CP05%20Chapter% 202%20
Warfighting%20Concepts%20pg%20025_Expeditionary%20Maneuver%20Warf
are%20Family%20of%20Concepts.pdf (accessed 13 May 2007).
8. Henry B. Cook, “Sea Basing and Maritime Pre-positioning,” Army
Logistician, Vol. 35, Issue 3 (May–June 2004): 36–39. The latest statement of
Marine Corps doctrinal concepts as of the time of this writing (June 2008) is,
US Marine Corps, Concepts and Program 2008 (Washington, DC: Headquarters,
US Marine Corps, 2008), www.usmc.mil/units/hqmc/pandr/Documents/
Concepts/2008/toc.htm (accessed 20 June 2008).
19. George E. Buker makes this point and uses the term “fluid concourses”
in Swamp Sailors: Riverine Warfare in the Everglades, 1835–1842 (Gainesville
FL: University Presses of Florida, 1975), 4–5. The DOD Dictionary defines riv
erine operations as “operations conducted by forces organized to cope with and
exploit the unique characteristics of a riverine area, to locate and destroy hostile
forces, and/or to achieve or maintain control of the riverine area. Joint riverine
operations combine land, naval, and air operations, as appropriate, and are suited
to the nature of the specific riverine area in which operations are to be conducted.”
Scott C. Truver, “The Sea Base: Cornerstone of the U.S. Tri-Service Maritime
Strategy,” Naval Forces, Vol. XXIX, No. II (2008): 9–19; US Navy Seapower for
a New Era, 24–25, 4–30.
9
Chapter 2
Amphibious Heritage
American Amphibious Warfare to 1919

With its long indented coastline, bays, lakes, and rivers, the North
American continent has always lent itself to waterborne operations,
which were an essential part of military campaigns from the beginning
of European colonization. Colonial and United States military and naval
forces conducted many river crossings, operations on inland lakes, riv
erine operations, and small-scale amphibious raids in their long history.
A series of expeditions beginning in 1645 by British and colonial troops
against the French settlement of Port Royal in what would later become
Nova Scotia is among the earliest recorded amphibious operations by
Europeans in North America. In 1690 Sir William Phips led some 450
colonial militiamen in the seizure of Port Royal during King William’s
War (the War of the League of Augsburg). Later that same year he failed
to capture Quebec with a much larger expedition. Colonial troops also par
ticipated in Admiral Edward Vernon’s generally unsuccessful amphibious
operations in the Caribbean during the War of Jenkins’ Ear (1738–48).1
In 1745, 4,200 Maine volunteers, led by William Pepperrell, sailed in
90 ships to capture the French fortress of Louisburg on Cape Breton Island.
Louisburg was returned to France under the provisions of the Treaty of Aix
la-Chapelle, but in 1758, during the French and Indian War (Seven Years
War), General Jeffrey Amherst and Admiral Edward Boscowen recaptured
the fortress with some 14,000 British regulars and American Rangers car
ried in 150 transports escorted by 40 fighting ships. The following year,
General James Wolfe carried out a brilliant amphibious landing to seize
Quebec, an operation that General Douglas MacArthur would use as an
example in his arguments for the amphibious landing at Incheon (Inch’on)
191 years later. Some 4,000 Americans of Amherst’s New York forces
also participated in Admiral Sir George Pocock’s amphibious assault on
Havana in 1762.2
The first eight American combatant ships of the Revolutionary War were
ordered into service by General George Washington as commerce raiders and
manned by Army troops, many of them soldiers of General John Glover’s
14th Massachusetts Continental Regiment (The Marblehead Mariners).3
Under Commodore Esek Hopkins, 250 sailors and marines who raided
the British port of New Providence in the Bahamas in March 1776 carried
out the first American amphibious operation. The only other amphibious
operation of any size during the Revolutionary War took place in 1779
11
when an expedition of 40 ships and 21,000 soldiers, sailors, and marines,
under the joint command of General Solomon Lovell and Commodore
Dudley Saltonstall, made an unsuccessful attempt to recapture the Castine
Peninsula on Penobscot Bay, Maine. However, Continental Navy ships
and craft and Continental Army forces carried out frequent coastal defense
operations and used lakes and rivers for transportation. Indeed, an iconic
image of the Revolutionary War is that of Washington being rowed across
the Delaware River by soldiers of Glover’s regiment.4
Following the Revolution, river transportation sustained Anthony
Wayne’s 1792–93 Ohio campaign and the Lewis and Clark exploratory
expedition to the Pacific coast.5 Throughout the War of 1812, American
forces carried out coastal, lake, and river operations. These actions saw
some of the best and the worst examples of the then-standard American
approach to command and control in joint operations: the principle of
voluntary “mutual cooperation,” with the land and naval commanders of
equal status, neither subordinate to the other, and the effectiveness of the
operation depending on the willing cooperation of each with the other.6
The height of effective cooperation was reached in October 1813 during
the Battle of the Thames, when Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry, hav
ing swept the British from Lake Erie, supported Major General William
Henry Harrison’s forces with naval gunfire and over-the-shore logistics.
Perry then turned command of his squadron over to Captain Jesse Elliott
and went ashore to serve at Harrison’s side during the ensuing campaign.7
The actions of Commodore Isaac Chauncey the following year were in
stark contrast. Following effective but troubled Army–Navy cooperation
in the attack on Sackett’s Harbor, Major General Jacob Brown called on
Chauncey to support the Niagara campaign in July and August 1814. The
commodore replied that, while
You might find the fleet somewhat of a convenience in the
transportation of Provisions and Stores for the use of an
Army and an agreeable appendage to attend its marches
and counter marches . . . the Secretary of the Navy has
honored us with a higher destiny—we are intended to Seek
and fight the Enemy’s fleet . . . and I shall not be diverted
in my efforts to effectuate it by any Sinister attempt to
render us subordinate to or an appendage of the Army.8
Keel boats and other river boats supported the postwar Western expan
sion, and the Army’s overland expedition during the First Seminole Wars
of 1816–23 made some use of water transportation. During the Second
Seminole War of 1836–42, Army units, watercraft of the US Revenue
Marine (predecessor of the US Coast Guard), and a fleet of Navy ships and
12
craft that came to be known as the Mosquito Fleet conducted amphibious
landings and riverine warfare, carrying out waterborne raids and counter
guerrilla operations along the coast and rivers and through the swamps
of Florida, with waterborne logistical support provided in part by Army-
owned or chartered ships and craft.9
During the Mexican War of 1846–47, Commodore Robert Field
Stockton and US Army Major John C. Fremont conducted a small landing
at San Diego in July 1846 and Navy forces of the Home Squadron under
Commodore David Conner carried out landings along the Rio Grande and
Tabasco Rivers and at Tampico on the gulf coast. A superb example of
cooperation and the largest seaborne US amphibious operation to date
took place on 9 March 1847 at Vera Cruz under the command of Major
General Winfield Scott and Commodore Conner. This operation had many
of the hallmarks of modern landings on hostile shores. Scott, the senior
officer of the US Army, planned the operation carefully and arranged for
the procurement of 141 40-man surf or flat boats for his assault troops,
the first landing craft specifically designed for amphibious landings in US
history. Scott’s relations with Conner were exemplary. Prior to the land
ing, Scott organized his 8,000-man force into boat teams. He and Conner
conducted a joint beach reconnaissance, and then Scott placed his Army
forces under Conner’s control for the landing. On the morning of 9 March,
steamers towed the surfboats to the troop-carrying transports. At 1530
Conner signaled and the soldiers clambered down into the boats, and at
1730, after a brief naval gunfire bombardment that scattered the Mexican
troops on the beach, Conner signaled to land the landing force. Rowed by
Navy crews and guided by control vessels on the flanks, the boats sped
toward shore in 10-boat waves with signal flags and regimental colors
fluttering in the breeze and fixed bayonets glittering in the afternoon sun.
Just before 1800 the first wave splashed ashore to find that the Mexican
defenders had fled behind the sand dunes. Bands aboard the ships began
playing the “Star Spangled Banner,” and within 5 hours 8,600 troops had
been landed without loss of a single life. After capturing the city of Vera
Cruz, Scott’s forces began a march to Mexico City, which they occupied
on 14 September 1847. The expedition was logistically supported during
the 15-month campaign through the ports and beaches of the Mexican gulf
coast.10
Although there was no strong defense of the beach and the landing was
essentially unopposed, the Vera Cruz operation nonetheless demonstrated
appropriate organization of a landing force, smooth ship-to-shore troop
movement, and effective coordination of naval gunfire support. While
there is little evidence these lessons entered the doctrine of the Army and
13
Navy, the Army engineers responsible for the planning and execution of
the Army part of the landing came away with experience that would be
reflected in Army waterborne operations during the Civil War.11
Although frequently marred by erratic strategic direction, divided
counsels, and poor inter-Service cooperation, major joint amphibious and
riverine operations were carried out during the Civil War. The initial Union
strategy was one of coastal blockade combined with a large expedition down
the Mississippi River. The latter operation never took place as originally
conceived, but the coastal blockade, including the seizure of lodgments at
key points along the Confederate coast, was carried out much in the way
it was planned by the 1861 Blockade Board, which was chaired by Navy
Captain Samuel F. DuPont and included Army Engineer representation.12
Early amphibious operations included the capture of forts at the entrance to
the Hatteras inlet in North Carolina by Navy Flag Officer Silas Stringham
and Major General Benjamin F. Butler in August 1861 and the seizure
of Port Royal off Hilton Head, South Carolina, by Captain DuPont and
Brigadier General Thomas W. Sherman in November of that year.13
Early in the war, Major General George B. McClellan proposed a
plan to use joint operations to penetrate the Confederacy by way of the
great river systems and the coast to seize key railway junctions and thus
paralyze the Southern transportation and communications systems. The
strategy was never fully implemented, although McClellan did arrange for
the activation of a special amphibious division comprised largely of New
England seamen and commanded by Major General Ambrose E. Burnside.
Initially operating with Army-owned and chartered ships and then in con
junction with naval forces under Flag Officer Louis M. Goldsborough,
Burnside’s Coast Division captured Roanoke Island and New Berne on
the Carolina coast in February 1862 before being diverted for operations
against Richmond.14
The capture of New Orleans by forces of Butler and Navy Flag Officer
David G. Farragut in April 1862 and joint Army and Navy operations on
the Western rivers in 1862 and 1863 were vital contributions to Union
victory.15 The Army operated transports on the Western rivers throughout
the war and, until they were turned over to the Navy in October 1862,
maintained a small force of gunboats. The Western theater also saw the
operation of a unique Army amphibious force—the brainchild of Lieutenant
Colonel Alfred W. Ellet, a self-taught engineer, who had long argued for
swift, unarmored vessels with reinforced rams that could destroy enemy
ships. In March 1862 Ellet persuaded Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton
to allow him to outfit a flotilla of seven paddle steamers with armored
14
prows, wooden bulwarks to protect the machinery and boilers, and hoses
that could spray scalding steam on the enemy in battle. Beginning in
April 1862, Ellet’s Army Ram Fleet operated on the Mississippi directly
under Secretary Stanton’s control and independent of Army and Navy
commanders.
In August 1862 Ellet proposed the formation of an amphibious riv
erine force to deal with Confederate guerrilla bands that were harassing
and interdicting Federal lines of communication. The newly arrived Navy
commander, Acting Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter, saw merit in the
idea. Ellet was promoted to brigadier general and in October 1862 was
given command of the Mississippi Marine Brigade, consisting of one
infantry battalion, one cavalry battalion, and an artillery battery. Although
officially designated a “Marine Brigade,” the roughly 1,500 troops were
all Army volunteers, some of them recruited from among the convales
cents at hospitals in Saint Louis. The brigade’s transports were converted
river packets fitted with ramps so troops and horses could debark quickly.
Operating in conjunction with the Army Ram Fleet, initially under Porter’s
control and later under General Ulysses S. Grant, the brigade conducted
operations with mixed results until 1864 and was disbanded in January
1865.16
In the east, the movement of McClellan’s Army of the Potomac by
water to the Virginia peninsula (and its later withdrawal) was a major
operation that involved Navy cooperation and the use of Army watercraft.
Particularly notable was the training and equipping of Brigadier General
William B. Franklin’s division as an amphibious assault force that included
an engineer brigade equipped to support river crossings and amphibious
landings. Lieutenant Colonel Barton S. Alexander, who had developed
methods of landing heavy equipment over beaches while supervising the
construction of fortifications and lighthouses during prewar service, trained
these engineers. In April 1862 in preparation for a proposed landing below
Gloucester, opposite Yorktown on the York River in Virginia, Alexander
directed the construction of amphibious assault vessels, including landing
barges each capable of carrying and landing a battery of artillery. Pontoon
boats originally intended for the construction of floating bridges served as
40-man infantry landing craft. The infantry practiced boarding the pontoon
boats from transport ships (Alexander designed special ramps to speed the
process) and landing in battle order while the artillery rehearsed loading
and debarking its guns and horses. The Confederates abandoned Yorktown
before the landing could take place, but the division used its special equip
ment and techniques to make an unopposed landing at West Point, some
15
25 miles upriver from Gloucester on 6 May 1862. At 1600 the first wave
of 2,000 men went ashore and formed a line of battle. Within 3 hours
10,000 men were ashore, and by dawn the next day all of the artillery
and supporting equipment had been landed and the division had gone into
action. Franklin’s division was the most well-trained amphibious force in
the Union Army at that time, but like Burnside’s Coast Division, it was
thereafter used in conventional military operations. Nonetheless, the West
Point landing is an indication of what might have been had the Union lead
ership elected to put more emphasis on Army amphibious operations.17
In January 1865, after a failed attempt in December 1864 that reflected
the worst of the American cooperation approach to joint warfare, Army
and Navy forces successfully captured Fort Fisher at the mouth of the
Cape Fear River. In spite of previous friction between the two officers,
Major General Alfred H. Terry and Admiral Porter cooperated closely.
The operation was well planned, the preliminary naval bombardment was
accurate and intense, the unopposed landing north of the fortress was well
organized, and Porter’s ships provided close support fires during the final
assault, which included a 2,000-man naval brigade of sailors and marines
as well as Terry’s army forces. The seizure of Fort Fisher opened the way
to the capture of Wilmington, North Carolina, thus establishing a secure
line of communication for Major General William T. Sherman’s army
advancing northward from Georgia.18
The Army’s extensive amphibious and riverine experience in the Civil
War was not codified into formal doctrine, although some institutional
memory of these operations is likely to have survived.19 During the last
decades of the 19th century, the few amphibious operations carried out
by US forces were generally conducted by Navy landing teams of sailors
and marines, exemplified by the seizure of forts along the Han River in
Korea in June 1871 by a naval landing force.20 In the words of historian
Brian McAllister Linn, these “punitive strikes, naval landings, amphibious
raids, and other landing operations . . . were ad hoc incidents of military
forces assisting the commerce-protecting gunboat diplomacy of the era.”21
However, in the 1890s the Navy began to consider the possibility of large-
scale overseas expeditions, and the first of such operations came in the
Spanish–American War. While Army–Navy cooperation was often good
at the tactical level, those landings revealed problems in inter-Service
cooperation and coordination and Army preparedness.
In a preliminary operation on 10 June 1898, Lieutenant Colonel
Robert T. Huntington’s 650-man Marine battalion temporarily based at
Key West, Florida, was landed at Guantánamo, Cuba. The landing went
16
smoothly and, reinforced by some 60 Cuban insurgents, the Marines held
off a Spanish attack with light casualties. The US expedition was thereby
provided with a useful anchorage, coaling station, and base of operations,
and the Marine Corps increased its focus on the seizure and defense of
advanced bases as their special role.22
General William R. Shafter’s US Army V Corps then made unopposed
landings at Daiquirí and Siboney in Cuba between 22 and 26 June 1898.
The landings were impeded by heavy surf and a lack of docking facilities
and lighterage, but after a preliminary bombardment of suspected Spanish
positions by Navy ships, the 16,000-man V Corps was put ashore with
the loss of only two troopers of the 10th Cavalry who drowned. However,
there were no special craft to land horses and mules, some 30 of which
perished after the animals were pushed into the sea to swim ashore.23 In
July, 27,000 troops under Major General Nelson A. Miles landed unop
posed at Guánica, Ponce, and Arroyo, Puerto Rico. With the help of an
engineer unit with small craft and pier-building materials and a fleet of
captured lighters, these landings went smoothly, reflecting “the Army’s
growing skill at amphibious campaigning.”24 Following Commodore
George Dewey’s destruction of the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay in May
1898 and subsequent occupation of Manila by a naval landing force, the
Army dispatched an 11,000-man expeditionary force under Major General
Wesley Merritt. Cooperation between Dewey and Merritt was close and
the landings of this force also went smoothly, using Navy launches, ships’
boats, and improvised landing craft.25 During the long war against the
Philippine insurgents that followed, there were many instances of Army–
Navy cooperation in operational and tactical movement by water.26 The
shipment and landing of troops in the Caribbean and the Philippines, while
generally successful, demonstrated the need for transports and lighterage.
In November 1898 the Army Quartermaster Corps established an Army
Transport Service (ATS) that, except for a brief period during and after
World War I, operated a fleet of large ocean-going transports until it was
absorbed by the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) on the eve
of the Korean War.27
The Spanish–American War provided rich lessons for joint operations
in general and landing operations in particular. It also set the stage for a
continuing US military and naval presence in the Western Pacific. After
the Japanese military and naval success in the 1904–05 Russo–Japanese
War, this presence provided the focus for Pacific strategy over the next four
decades. The problems of conducting joint operations during the war led to
reforms by both Services that included establishment of an Army General
17
Staff, the Navy General Board, the Army War College as both an educational
institution and as an extension of the Army Staff for planning and strategic
thought, and, in 1903, the Joint Board of the Army and Navy.
The Joint Board was intended to provide a forum for the discussion
of matters that required the cooperation of the two Services. The Board
engaged in some war planning in the years prior to World War I, includ
ing joint studies for a possible war with Japan, and considered command
and control of joint operations.28 In 1908 Dewey, the senior member of
the Board, recommended that when Army, Navy, and Marine forces were
engaged in joint operations on shore, the senior line Army officer should
command the joint force and have authority to issue orders to the officers
in command of the forces of the other two Services. At the time, both
Service Secretaries agreed, but such action required legislation and by
1913 the Navy had reversed its position and the project ceased.29
During this same period, the Marine Corps underwent changes that
would ultimately result in the adoption of landing force operations as its
primary mission. The Marine success at Guantánamo coincided with a
growing sense within the Navy that a force devoted to the landing mission
should replace the traditional ad hoc landing forces.30 In 1900 the Navy
General Board gave the mission of seizing and defending advance bases
to the Marine Corps after considering, and dismissing, Army forces for
this role, because an appropriate Army force might not always be avail
able. In 1901 the Marine Corps designated a battalion for the advance base
mission, carried out landing exercises in the Caribbean, and in 1910 estab
lished an Advance Base School at New London, Connecticut.31 While far
less focused on the issue than the Marines, the Army produced a rudimen
tary manual on landing doctrine in 1908 and conducted a landing exercise
on the coast of Massachusetts in August 1909.32
The most significant landing operation before World War I took place
in April 1914, when a US Naval Division composed of marines and sailors
from ships of the Atlantic Fleet, augmented by a Marine battalion from
the Advance Base Force, seized the Mexican port city of Vera Cruz. On
24 April Brigadier General Frederick Funston arrived with a reinforced
Army regiment to replace the naval division, take operational control of
the marines, and begin an occupation that lasted until 23 November.33
World War I provided no opportunities for US amphibious operations,
but other belligerent powers carried out several landings. In September
1914 the Japanese landed on the coast of China to seize the German col
ony at Qingdao (Tsingtao). They also occupied German possessions in
the Marianas, Caroline, Palau, and Marshall Island groups in the Central
18
Pacific; while Australian forces seized the German holdings in New
Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Solomon Islands; and New
Zealand occupied German Samoa.34
All these were traditional landing operations against undefended or
lightly defended beaches followed by movement to the objective. However,
in April 1915 British troops conducted an assault landing against defended
beaches at the southern tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula in an attempt to force
passage through the Dardanelles, capture Constantinople, put Turkey out
of the war, and reopen the southern route to Russia. In spite of the use of
innovative landing craft by the British, the Turkish defenders immediately
pinned down the landing force. Turkish forces also contained a second
landing at Suvla Bay on the west coast of the peninsula by an Australian
and New Zealand Corps (ANZAC).35
Although they had no tradition of amphibious warfare, in October
1917 the German Army and Navy conducted a well-planned landing to
seize islands at the mouth of the Gulf of Riga and trap Russian warships.
The amphibious phase of the operation went smoothly and the Germans
gained access to the Riga Harbor facilities; however, several German
ships were lost and most of the Russian warships escaped.36 The last major
amphibious operation of the war took place in April 1918, when the British
tried to block the German submarine bases at Ostend and Zeebrugge,
Belgium, by sinking concrete-laden ships in the entrance channel and
detonating explosive-filled submarines. A commando force of some 200
Royal Marines sent in to disable the coast defense guns took very heavy
casualties and the channel was only partially blocked. The US Army and
Marine Corps would study all of these operations in the years after the
war.37
Amphibious Doctrine and Planning, 1919–3838
After World War I the United States turned inward, but could not
completely disengage from a world in which it had economic interests
in Europe and Asia, overseas possessions (most notably Hawaii, the
Philippines, and the Panama Canal Zone), and cultural links. There was
no realistic threat from Europe for the near future, but Japan’s acquisi
tion of the German Pacific island possessions, Japanese expansion into
Manchuria, and the growth of Japanese naval and commercial maritime
power raised the possibility of war between the United States and Japan.
The Philippines and Guam would be at immediate risk, because they were
at the end of a long sea line of communication and vulnerable to inter
diction from the Japanese-held islands. Under the provisions of the 1922
Washington treaties, the United States and Japan agreed not to fortify their
19
island possessions in the Western Pacific and the United States agreed not
to improve its existing fortifications at the mouth of Manila Bay.
The Navy saw Japan as the only likely enemy and did its war plan
ning based on the assumption that war would begin with a Japanese attack
on the Philippines and end, after a climactic naval battle in the Western
Pacific, with a blockade of the Japanese home islands. By the 1930s the
general outline of Navy planning was for a counteroffensive across the
Pacific that would require long-range ships and aircraft and the ability to
replenish ships at sea, and also the seizure of Japanese-held islands for use
as intermediate bases.39
The Army’s challenge was to balance requirements for the continental
defense of the United States with the defense of the Panama Canal, Hawaii,
and the Philippines as budgets and the size of the Army shrank. Any adequate
defense of the Philippines would require the use of Philippine troops, but
in the aftermath of the Philippine War and subsequent operations against
the Moros in the south, the Army was reluctant to arm large numbers of
Filipinos. By the late 1930s a force of some 11,000 US and Filipino troops
guarded the Philippines and the issue of whether and how they would
be reinforced in the event of war with Japan was still being debated.40
The Army also considered, more as a theoretical exercise than a likely
scenario, the possibility of the United States going to war with a European
power or Mexico. In either case, or in the event of an intervention in Latin
America or China, the Army would have to transport troops overseas and
might have to land on a hostile shore. By 1938 events in Europe made this
possibility far less theoretical.41
The Joint Board

While both Services grappled with the problems of how to defend US
overseas territory and interests as the military budget shrank, joint consid
eration of these issues was carried out by the Army and Navy Joint Board,
reorganized in 1919 after languishing during World War I. The members
of the Board were the Army Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO), their deputies, and the chief planners. For the study of joint issues,
the Board created a Joint Planning Committee (JPC) consisting of officers
from the Army War Plans Division (WPD) and the Navy Plans Division
and generally referred to as the Joint Planners.42 Over the next two decades,
the Joint Board would establish doctrine for joint expeditionary opera
tions, develop a range of war plans, and examine command and control in
joint operations. The Board also provided a structure and procedures for
joint deliberations that would smoothly transition to the Joint Chiefs of
20
Staff organization in February 1942. The war plans developed by the Joint
Board and the study of joint overseas expeditions pursued at the Army and
Navy War Colleges in the 1920s and 1930s provided the strategic context
within which the Marine Corps and Navy, with some contribution by the
Army, developed the tactics and techniques for landing operations on hos
tile shores.
With regard to command relations, the joint planners initially consid
ered whether there should be a single commander (unified command) for
joint operations. They concluded in 1919 that the “paramount” interest
of one or the other Services would be evident in such operations and that
“intelligent and hearty cooperation” would be just as effective as unity of
command under a single commander of either Service, which “might cause
jealousy and dissatisfaction.”43 This principle of “paramount interest” was
incorporated into the first document designed to address joint operations,
Joint Action of the Army and Navy in Coast Defense, published in 1920,
and replaced in 1927 by Joint Action of the Army and Navy (JAAN), which
provided for coordination of joint operations either by paramount interest
or unity of command, with the method of coordination specified in the war
plan for each phase of a campaign. A 1935 revision stated that unity of
command could only occur by specific order of the President; otherwise,
the commander having “paramount interest” would exercise “limited uni
ty of command.” He could designate Army and Navy missions, but could
not control forces from other Services.44 During the 1930s the trend was
toward unified command in joint operations, but in 1938 the Service chiefs
agreed that, except for specific, specified operations, coordination of joint
operations should be by mutual cooperation, with unity of command only
when ordered by the President, by agreement between the two Service
Secretaries, or when “commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the
situation requires the exercise of unity of command and further agree as to
the Service that shall exercise such command.”45
In 1904 the Joint Board had begun assigning colors to identify major
potential adversaries and allies in war plans. The revived Joint Board con
tinued this practice. The major war plan in the 1920s was a Red–Orange
Plan based on the scenario of a war with an Anglo–Japanese alliance. Such
a war was not deemed likely, but it provided a useful exercise to con
sider strategy and the size of forces required in a two-front war. One last
ing legacy of these plans was the inculcation of an assumption that if the
United States was faced with a simultaneous war with a European power
and Japan, US interests would best be served by initially concentrating on
the defeat of the European power while pursuing defensive operations in
21
the Pacific.46 Beginning in the early 1920s, the Joint Board also developed
a plan for operations against Japan fighting alone (Joint Basic War Plan
Orange). This plan originally envisioned operations across the Pacific to
transport an Army expeditionary force to rescue the Philippines. While all
the variations of the Orange Plan called for the Navy to fight its way across
the Pacific, capturing Japanese-held island bases en route, the Army’s role
in the Philippines varied from reinforcement, to holding out with the forces
available, to abandonment. The last version of the plan before World War
II began was approved in 1938. Under this plan, the Army would reinforce
Alaska with 7,000 troops, Hawaii with 25,000 troops, and the Panama
Canal Zone with 15,000 troops. Neither the Philippines nor Guam would
receive reinforcements. Guam was undefended in accordance with the
Washington Treaties and was expected to fall quickly. The Army would
hold out in the Philippines with the forces available as long as possible.47
The third area of Joint Board deliberations relevant to amphibious
operations was the publication of guidance for expeditionary warfare. The
Army and Navy had conducted joint maneuvers in Hawaii in 1925 that
included a landing by two battalions of marines.48 In 1929 the Joint Board
published Joint Overseas Expeditions—Tentative. Revised and reissued in
1933 as Joint Overseas Expeditions, this document addressed cooperation
between the Services and the functions of each during joint landing opera
tions. It provided broad guidance on the organization of landing forces
into battalion combat teams, the functions of Navy beach masters and
Army shore parties, commercial versus combat loading of transports, the
necessity of Army and Navy commanders to be aboard the same ship, and
the selection of beaches. It also addressed the advantages and disadvan
tages of day and night landings: better control of landing craft and troops,
better air and naval fire support coordination, and better defense against
hostile air and naval units in the case of the former; increased chance of
tactical surprise and reduced efficacy of the defenders’ fires in the case of
the latter. However, it did not provide specific guidance on the tactics and
techniques of landing on a defended beach—a subject the Marines would
take as their special mission.49
Marine Corps Developments
Major General John A. Lejeune, who became commandant of the
Marine Corps in 1920, put particular emphasis on the advance base force
mission. Under his direction, a group of staff officers headed by Major
Earl H. Ellis produced a detailed study of the requirements for “Advanced
Base Operations in Micronesia.” Approved in July 1921, it served as the
basis for Marine Corps planning, mobilization, and training.50 In 1922
22
Lejeune defined the primary mission of the Marine Corps as “to supply
a mobile force to accompany the Fleet for operations on shore in support
of the Fleet [and to be used] in conjunction with Army operations on
shore, when the active naval operations reach such a stage as to permit
its temporary detachment from the Navy.”51 Although the JAAN and Joint
Overseas Expeditions presumed that the Army would provide large-scale
expeditionary forces, and the language of the documents was in terms
of Army–Navy coordination, the document recognized the role of the
Marines in the seizure of advanced bases for the Navy. The 1927 version
of JAAN assigned the Marine Corps the responsibility to “provide and
maintain forces . . . for land operations in support of the fleet for the initial
seizure of advanced bases and for such limited auxiliary land operations
as are essential to the prosecution of the naval campaign.” Because the
Marines were in “constant association” with naval units, they were to be
given “special training in the conduct of landing operations.”52
In 1933 the Marine Corps schools at Quantico discontinued classes
to devote the full efforts of the students and staff (including at least one
unidentified Army officer) to the development of a landing operations
manual.53 Until then Navy doctrine for landing operations was contained in
the Landing Force Manual, United States Navy, which, in various editions
since 1905, had remained basically unchanged in its guidance for getting
troops ashore. Lines of whaleboats towed by motor launches would carry
the troops ashore while other launches on the flanks provided fire support
with machineguns.54 The new manual dealt with naval gunfire and air sup
port, ship-to-shore movement, security of the beachhead, and logistics.
Because the Marines at that time were an integral part of the Navy, the
issue of command relations was not developed. A naval officer would have
command of the attack force, consisting of the landing force and the sup
porting naval forces (consisting of a transport group, fire support group,
air group, mine group, screening group, and salvage group). The Navy
published this manual in June 1934 as the Tentative Landing Operations
Manual. This document would provide the template for all later Service
doctrinal literature on amphibious warfare.55
While the intellectual work of developing the manual was underway in
1933, two brigades of marines were established, one on each coast, as the
Fleet Marine Force (FMF). This force could put into practice the doctrine
prescribed in the new manual through a series of fleet landing exercises
(FLEXs). In the words of one Marine historian, establishment of the FMF
“would dedicate a body of Marines to the full-time study, development,
and practice of amphibious war.”56
23
Army Activities
Although not becoming as deeply involved as an institution in the
study of landing operations as the Marine Corps, the Army did not ignore
these operations. Army members of the Joint Board were actively involved
in the examination of and promulgation of joint doctrine on expeditionary
warfare. The War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff
studied landing operations as part of its war planning duties and some
Army officers attended the Naval War College, where they studied
expeditionary and landing operations. Students at the Army War College
studied the preparation of joint Army and Navy war plans, many of which
included landing operations. Naval officers gave lectures at the Army
War College on expeditionary operations and joint landings.57 Faculty
and students at the Infantry School and the Army War College studied
the Japanese landings of the Russo–Japanese War and the World War I
amphibious operations.58
In 1923 the Army General Service Schools (later the Command
and General Staff School) collaborated with the Naval War College in
producing an exercise based on a joint expeditionary force landing in
the Lingayen Gulf to recover the Philippines, and in 1926 and 1927 the
two institutions conducted joint Army and Navy exercises involving
expeditionary operations.59 In 1928 the General Service Schools studied
the requirements for ship-to-shore movement of divisional and corps
artillery in an opposed landing on a hostile shore.60 The following
year the Army War College studied the problems involved in training,
planning, deployment, execution, and sustainment of a joint Army–Navy
expeditionary force using Gallipoli as a historical case study and a landing
to recapture Luzon in the Philippines as a theoretical study. The study
included examination of the nature of beaches, naval gunfire support,
deception operations, beach master and shore party operations, and the
types of ships and craft available.61
Throughout the 1930s, students and faculty at the Command and
General Staff School and the Army War College continued to examine
landing operations in the context of planning for future coalition warfare.
Student committees in the Conduct of War and Analytical Studies courses
repeatedly examined the Fort Fisher landing operations in the American
Civil War; the Japanese Port Arthur Campaign in the Russo–Japanese War;
and the World War I Tsingtao, Gallipoli, and Baltic Islands campaigns.62
By 1940 they were also studying Japanese landing operations in the Sino–
Japanese War that had begun in 1937.63
24
Army observers participated in the first two FLEXs in 1935 and
1936.64 In 1937 the Army formed the First Expeditionary Brigade, con
sisting of the 30th Infantry Regiment and attached artillery and engineer
elements to participate in FLEX 3. Three regiments (one Regular and two
National Guard) and supporting troops participated in FLEX 4 in 1938.65
Following the exercise, the Chief of Staff of the Army expressed a desire
for greater Army participation in amphibious training, but was rebuffed by
Admiral William D. Leahy, then Chief of Naval Operations, who argued
that amphibious operations were essentially naval in character and so the
Navy and Marines were best suited to conduct amphibious doctrine and
tactics development.66
In late 1939 the Army began its own independent efforts at amphibi
ous training. The Corps of Engineers conducted an Engineer School prob
lem in 1939–40 to assess the engineers’ role in an opposed landing and
in late 1939 the 3d Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington, began
preparations to begin amphibious training.67
Amphibious Developments on the Eve of World War II

This increased emphasis on amphibious training took place in the
context of dangerous world events. In 1937 increasing Japanese aggres
sion in China prompted the Joint Board to direct a review of War Plan
Orange. The war in Spain, the German expansionism and alliance with
Italy, and the 1938 crisis over Czechoslovakia that resulted in the ill-fated
Munich accords all provided further evidence that the United States faced
the very real possibility of war. Accordingly, in November 1938 the Joint
Board ordered a study of joint action to be taken in the event of interfer
ence in the Western Hemisphere by Germany or Italy and in July 1939
directed the development of a new family of plans known as the Rainbow
plans because they envisioned war with more than one country. All plans
focused on the protection of the Western Hemisphere, but Rainbow 5
involved the dispatch of forces to Europe or Africa to assist Britain and
France. This was the first time since post-World War I joint planning had
begun that a joint expeditionary operation to Europe or Africa was seri
ously contemplated.68
Amphibious training continued at a stepped-up pace. From January
to March 1940, the Navy carried out FLEX 6 without Army participation.
The landing force was provided by Brigadier General H.M. Smith’s 1st
Marine Brigade. The exercise tested various experimental landing craft
and demonstrated the need for specialized transports, rather than warships,
25
to carry the troops.69 In lieu of participation in FLEX 6, the Army requested
Navy support for a joint landing exercise on the West Coast in January
1940. The 9,000 troops and 1,100 vehicles of the 3d Infantry Division were
to be lifted by Army transports and chartered vessels from Puget Sound
and then landed in Navy landing craft in the Monterey area. The Navy
refused to risk its landing craft in the beach assault and insisted on landing
most of the troops at a pier, so the division conducted its landing exercise
in an open field (the alfalfa assault) with trucks playing the role of landing
craft.70 At about that same time, the 1st Infantry Division’s 18th Infantry
Regiment began studying amphibious operations with on-shore training at
Fort Devens, Massachusetts, and boat exercises at the Edgewood Arsenal
in Maryland.71
As part of the hemispheric defense mission, various studies were
conducted for assembling troops and shipping for expeditions to the
Caribbean and Latin America. When Germany invaded France in June
1940, preparations were made to land the 1st Marine Brigade and 1st
Infantry Division on the French islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe
in the Caribbean to prevent German acquisition of French fleet units
stationed there. This plan was forestalled when the French admiral
neutralized the ships, but it was the beginning of serious US consideration
of joint amphibious operations. German success in Europe put amphibious
operations in a new light. Previously, US planners had assumed that forces
sent to Europe would land through existing French seaports. Now that
Germany was in control of the ports, the only way to return to the continent
of Europe was through a large-scale amphibious invasion. On 26 June 1940
the War Department established an Army General Headquarters (GHQ)
with responsibility for supervision and direction of the training of Army
tactical forces and officially directed the 1st and 3d Infantry Divisions to
conduct amphibious training.72
In September 1940 the Chief of Naval Operations directed the estab
lishment of a large-scale program to train landing craft crews for assign
ment to transports and cargo ships. The training began in November of
that year, with the assignment of US Coast Guard warrant officers and
enlisted personnel to Navy transports to provide their special expertise in
small boat operations in heavy seas and surf. Preparations were already
underway for the potential transfer of the Coast Guard from the Treasury
Department to the Navy.73
Throughout 1940 and 1941, coordination between the still-neutral
United States and the beleaguered British grew. Rear Admiral Robert
Ghormley became a permanent observer in London in the summer of
26
1940 to discuss US–British naval cooperation if the United States entered
the war. In January 1941 an American, British, and Canadian Conference
(ABC-1) was held in Washington. In the spring of that year, a 17-man team
of special observers (SPOBs) led by Major General James E. Chaney was
established in London and Admiral Ghormley was redesignated Special
Naval Observer. The observer title was a cover name for the real task of
these missions, which was to conduct coordination with the British on
potential US military and naval activities when and if the United States
entered the war and to provide the nucleus for a wartime US headquarters
in Britain.74
The ABC-1 talks also started combined planning for possible US entry
into the war. Military leaders of the three countries agreed on a US–British
Commonwealth Joint Basic War Plan that called for a concentration of
effort to defeat Germany, with initial defensive operations in the Pacific if
Japan entered the war. The plan identified a requirement to capture bases
from which the offensive against Germany could be launched. After talks
in Singapore with British Commonwealth and Dutch authorities in April
1941, an August 1941 US–British summit conference, and mobilization
planning in September, the Rainbow 5 plan was revised. The new plan
envisioned a two-ocean war, with the principal US effort to be in the
Atlantic and Europe while the United States conducted defensive opera
tions in the Pacific. The plan identified the boundaries of the US land and
sea defense commands and provided a troop list of forces to be sent to
Britain and Northern Ireland, Hawaii, Iceland, and the west coast of South
America during the first 3 months of deployment.75 Although planning had
assumed there would be no reinforcements for the Philippines, the escala
tion of tensions with Japan had caused a relook at Western Pacific defense
requirements. In July 1941 General MacArthur, then serving in retirement
as commander of the Philippine Commonwealth Army, was recalled to
Active Duty and assigned as Commander of United States Army Forces
in the Far East (USAFFE). By the end of the year, US Army forces had
increased to nearly 19,000, augmented by a newly mobilized Philippine
Army, and 35 modern B-17 bombers and 159 fighter planes had been dis
patched to the Philippines.76
Amphibious training continued throughout this period, although there
were a number of obstacles to developing an effective Army amphibious
force. The Army was expanding rapidly and it was difficult to keep
together a trained force capable of conducting amphibious operations. The
1st Infantry Division was the best trained and equipped Army force and
was, therefore, identified as the Army element of various task forces being
27
considered for deployment. Both the 1st and 3d Infantry Divisions did
their best to carry out amphibious training, but both units were repeatedly
stripped of experienced officers and soldiers to serve as cadre for new units
being activated. Neither unit was able to bring an entire division together
for training during those hectic days. Furthermore, Major General Lesley J.
McNair, GHQ Chief of Staff, was concerned that such specialized training,
if carried too far, would interfere with the unity of the Army and its ability
to carry out its fundamental ground combat mission. In early 1941 McNair
cautioned the commanding general of the 3d Infantry Division that basic
training was more important than the amphibious training, warning, “Even
though landing is the first step, success presumably will come only from
skill in combat.”77
Early in 1941 an Engineer School committee examined the role of
“engineer troops in an amphibious assault,” studying Marine Corps and
British doctrine and recent German and Japanese tactics. They proposed
using engineers as assault troops to destroy beachhead fortifications ahead
of the first wave of infantry and stressed the importance of overall Army
engineer control of beach and shore operations. (Under doctrine current
at that time, the Navy beach party removed underwater obstacles and pro
vided temporary docks and ramps, while the Army shore party constructed
emergency roads, removed mines and obstacles, and prepared hasty defen
sive positions against counterattacks, with the Navy beach party control
ling the overall operation.) The committee recommended that the Army
develop craft suitable both for river crossings and to augment Navy land
ing craft if necessary, and that engineer combat units be trained to handle
small boats in rough seas and for transferring materiel from ships to shore
(lightering). In June 1941 the Army published its own amphibious field
manual, FM 31-5, Landing Operations on Hostile Shores, and while most
of it was taken almost verbatim from the Navy/Marine Corps manual, FM
31-5 also incorporated some of the conclusions from the engineer study.78
Army forces once again participated in FLEX 7 in February 1941 in
the Caribbean, where three battalions of General H.M. Smith’s 1st Marine
Division were joined by a two-battalion task force of the 1st Infantry
Division. In June 1941 the Joint Board issued a plan (the Carib Plan) for
amphibious training on the east coast. The 1st Infantry Division and the
1st Marine Division were organized into the landing force component of
the 1st Joint Training Force, subsequently renamed Amphibious Force,
Atlantic Fleet, which conducted further exercises at New River, North
Carolina, in August 1941. The Pearl Plan of September 1941 designated
the 3d Infantry Division and the 2d Marine Division as the landing force
of the 2d Joint Training Force (later, Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet) at
28
San Diego, California. GHQ exercised responsibility for the Army forces
in these organizations, while the Navy had overall control, and the landing
forces were commanded by Marine Corps Major General H.M. Smith for
the 1st Joint Training Force and Major General Clayton B. Vogel for the
2d Joint Training Force.79
Development of Landing Ships and Craft

A crucial element in the conduct of effective amphibious operations
was the production of suitable ships to transport troops and equipment to
the objective and landing craft to transfer them from the ships to the beach.
Although some expeditionary transports had been built for the Marine
Corps after World War I, warships had generally been used to transport
landing forces, which were then delivered to the shore by beetle boats (a
covered motor launch with a primitive ramp system), cumbersome artil
lery lighters, whaleboats, and motor launches. In the late 1930s the Navy
converted several World War I four-stack destroyers into fast transports
(APDs) by removing some of the boilers to provide troop space and add
ing davits for landing craft. One APD could carry a company of troops
and its 4-inch guns provided fire support. First tested during FLEX 7, they
were particularly useful for transporting raider units to seize special objec
tives. Eventually, 36 destroyers and 98 destroyer escorts would be con
verted to APDs and several of the destroyer escort types would serve in
the Korean War.80
The Navy also began converting some troop transports (AP) and cargo
ships (AK) by modifying the davits and other gear to carry landing craft.
Initially called combat loaders, they were later designated attack transports
(APA) and attack cargo ships (AKA). One APA could carry a battalion
landing team; four could carry a regimental landing team, with its heavy
gear and supplies carried aboard an AKA. The establishment in 1936 of the
US Maritime Commission facilitated the arrival of combat loaders on the
amphibious scene. Intended to revitalize the American Merchant Marine,
the Commission also explicitly planned for the expansion of the US Navy
fleet of auxiliaries and so several of its standard merchant ship types were
designed to be easily converted to combat loaders.81
Both the Army and the Navy searched for improved landing craft
during the 1930s, but it was the Marine Corps that took the lead in identi
fying and testing the Eureka boat, a fast, durable, spoon-bowed 30-footer
designed by Louisiana boat builder Andrew Jackson Higgins. A 36-foot
version was adopted as the landing craft, personnel (large) (LCP[L]),
which became the progenitor of the World War II fleet of landing craft.
The next version, the landing craft, personnel (ramped) (LCP[R]), had
29
a narrow bow ramp that allowed troops to run directly onto the beach
rather than climbing over the sides. The installation of a wider ramp to
accommodate trucks and other light vehicles resulted in the optimum
landing craft, the 36-foot landing craft, vehicle, personnel (LCVP)—the
most widely used American World War II landing craft. The LCP(R) with
its narrow bow had excellent sea-keeping qualities particularly useful for
beach reconnaissance and raiding missions, so it continued in service
aboard APDs for use by raiders and underwater demolition teams (UDTs).
To get tanks and heavy equipment ashore, a 50-foot craft originally called
a tank lighter and then designated landing craft, mechanized (LCM), was
also put into service.82 The third platform for ship-to-shore movement
introduced before the war was an amphibious tractor based on a vehicle
developed for rescue work in the Florida Everglades. The Marines saw
in it a way to get cargo onto the shore and then inland, reducing conges
tion at the beachhead, as well as a way to cross the coral reefs that ringed
Pacific atolls. By July 1941 the first military version, the landing vehicle,
tracked (LVT[1]), was in production. In December 1941 Food Machinery
Corporation (FMC) and Borg–Warner began work on improved cargo-
carrying LVTs as well as an Army-sponsored armored version that could
mount a 37-mm gun turret to provide an amphibious assault and fire sup
port capability.83
On the other side of the Atlantic, the British had established an Inter-
Service Training and Development Center (ISTDC) in 1937 to study
the techniques and equipment for amphibious warfare on a joint basis.
By 1939 the British had produced small numbers of LCMs and landing
craft, assault (LCA), an armored equivalent of the US LCP(R) and LCVP,
designed to be carried aboard landing ships, infantry (LSIs), the British
equivalent of the American combat loaders. The tiny British amphibious
fleet first saw action during the battles on the Norwegian fjords around
Narvik in 1940. That year, a Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ)
was established to continue the development of amphibious doctrine and
to carry out amphibious commando raids on the coast of Europe. The land
ing craft, tank (LCT), a 150-to-200-foot-long tank lighter that could carry
three to six 40-ton tanks, entered British service in 1940. By 1941 the
British were experimenting with the conversion of shallow-draft tankers
into ocean-going tank landing ships and had entered into talks with the
Americans concerning production of an Atlantic-crossing tank carrier that
would become known as the landing ship, tank (LST), as well as a landing
ship, dock (LSD), that could carry landing craft and LVTs in a floodable
well deck and launch them from the stern. Early operations at Dakar and
North Africa had convinced the British that warships made poor command
30
posts for amphibious operations: firing the guns interfered with radio com
munications and the warships were likely to be called away from the land
ing area to deal with hostile naval units. Accordingly, the British developed
a headquarters ship for amphibious operations.84
World War II85
By December 1941 Britain had been standing against the Axis powers
of Germany and Italy for 2 years. The Germans occupied all of Northern
Europe except neutral Sweden, Switzerland, and Spain. The southern
part of France remained nominally independent under a government at
Vichy that also controlled the French North African colonies of Morocco,
Algeria, and Tunisia. British forces in Egypt faced German and Italian
forces in Libya. Germany had invaded Russia in June 1941, pushing nearly
to Moscow. Japan, at war with China since 1937, controlled the China
coast and, with the acquiescence of the Vichy Government, had occupied
French Indochina.
The Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines in December
1941 and the subsequent German declaration of war brought the United
States into the conflict. The Rainbow 5 plan with its “Germany first” strat
egy was put into effect immediately, but the rapid Japanese advance into
Southeast Asia and the threat to Australia meant that much of the flow of
US troops and materiel in the early months of the war went to the Pacific.
At an initial US–British strategy conference in Washington (ARCADIA),
the Allies agreed to try to hold the “Malay Barrier”—the line running
through Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies (now Indonesia) north of
Australia—and to reestablish the line of communication to the Philippines.
However, by May 1942 the Japanese had defeated US, Australian, British,
and Dutch forces; occupied Burma, Malaya, the Indies, and the Philippines,
as well as Wake Island, Guam, and Rabaul in the Bismarck Archipelago;
and had established footholds on the northeast coast of New Guinea and the
Solomon Islands. Allied strategy shifted from trying to stop the Japanese
advance to securing the island chain along the line of communication to
Australia, developing bases, and building up forces to defend Australia
and prepare for a counteroffensive.86 (See map 1.)
The Japanese offensive began to falter in May 1942 when the Japanese
launched an amphibious operation to capture Port Moresby on the south
eastern coast of New Guinea for use as a base from which to threaten
Australia. In the ensuing naval battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese sank
the US aircraft carrier Lexington, but lost one of their own small carriers
and canceled the Port Moresby operation. In June 1942 US naval forces
sank four Japanese aircraft carriers for the loss of the carrier Yorktown in
31
USSR C anada
A ttu A l e u ti a n I s la n d s
K i s k a
A m c h i t k a
N o r th P a c ific A re a
42° N 42° N U n it e d
S ta te s
Japan P a c ific O c e a n A r e a s
C h in a
F re n c h I w o J i m a
Iw
H a w a iia n Is la n d s
In d o c h i n a O k i n a w a
M id w a y
F o rm o s a (T a iw a n )
B a t t le
B urm a
20° N S a ip a n C e n tr a l P a c ific A re a
130° E & T in ia n W ake
Th
P h ilip p in e M a r ia n a J o h n s to n
Jo
a il
I s la n d s I s la n d s
an
G uam P a c if ic O c e a n
d
K w a ja l e i n
M a r s h a ll
P a l a u
P a lm y ra
M a la y a
P e le liu T ru k I s la n d s
Is
F a n n in g
0° C a r o lin e I s la n d s T a ra w a & M a k in C h r is tm a s 0°
G ilb e r t
N ew Rabaul S o lo m o n
N e th e
r la n d
s E a s t In
d ie s G u in e a I s la n d s I s la n d s C a n to n S o u th P a c ific A re a
E l l ic e
8° S I s la n d s Samoa
104° E C o ra l S e a B o ra B o ra
16° 30’ S B a t t le G u a d a lc a n a l
110° E P o rt T u la g i F i ji
M o re s b y
T o n g a ta p u
New
A u s t ra lia C a le d o n ia T h e P a c if i c A r e a s
as of 1 August 1942
A r e a b o u n d a r ie s
New 0
S u b d iv is io n b o u n d a r ie s
1 ,0 0 0 2 ,0 0 0
S o u th w e s t P a c ific A re a
159° E
Z e a la n d S t a t u t e M il e s o n t h e E q u a t o r
Map 1. Pacific areas.
the Battle of Midway, ending the Japanese threat to Hawaii. In a secondary

operation that same month, Japanese forces attacked the Aleutians, occu
pying the islands of Kiska and Attu, and beginning a strange and deadly
campaign among the craggy islands, icy waters, fogs, and williwaw winds
of the thousand-mile-long Aleutian chain.
In the summer of 1942, the Allies prepared to go on the offensive.
In accordance with the agreed-on strategy, Army Chief of Staff General
George C. Marshall and the US Army leadership argued for a concentration
of effort in Europe, a buildup of forces in Britain, and preparation for an
invasion of the continent across the English Channel in 1943. The Army
Special Observers mission in London had been redesignated United States
Army Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI) after Pearl Harbor and its
mission expanded from prewar planning for strategic air bombardment
to command of the growing US ground force in Northern Ireland and
preliminary planning for the invasion of Europe. In mid-April 1942,
General Marshall made an agreement with Vice Admiral Lord Louis
Mountbatten, the British Chief of Combined Operations, for a small
32
cadre of American Army officers and noncommissioned officers to be
assigned to Mountbatten’s COHQ to assist in amphibious planning and
to participate in commando raids to gain combat experience. The mission,
led by Colonel Lucian K. Truscott, arrived in London in May. Truscott’s
team also recruited men from the forces in Northern Ireland to form a US
commando-type force—the First Ranger Battalion.87
Admiral Ernest J. King, commander in chief of the US Fleet and Chief
of Naval Operations, and the US Navy leadership, while agreeing to the
“Germany first” approach, wanted to assure sufficient forces were avail
able in the Pacific to stop the Japanese advance and to permit an early
counteroffensive. The strategic debate in the Pacific was whether to begin
the Central Pacific offensive envisioned in the prewar Orange Plan, as the
Navy desired, or to adopt a proposal by General MacArthur for an offen
sive to capture Rabaul (the main Japanese base in the Southwest Pacific)
as a step toward recapture of the Philippines. In March 1942 the US Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), which had replaced the Joint Board as the senior
joint military-naval policy and strategy body, had established two unified
commands in the Pacific. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the commander in
chief of the US Pacific Fleet, was given command of the Pacific Ocean
Areas (POA) encompassing the area north of Formosa (Taiwan), east
of the Philippines, north of New Guinea, and east of a line through the
central Solomon Islands. The southern part of the POA was designated
as a subordinate unified command, the South Pacific Area, under Vice
Admiral Ghormley. General MacArthur, who had been ordered from the
Philippines to Australia that same month, became Supreme Commander
of the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) encompassing Australia, the
Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, New Guinea, and the northwest
ern Solomon Islands.88
Given the forces then available, the Central Pacific drive was not
yet feasible. On 2 July 1942 the JCS issued a directive to Nimitz and
MacArthur giving them three tasks. Task One, seizure of Tulagi Island in
the Solomons (where the Japanese had established a sea plane base), was
to be carried out by Ghormley’s Navy and Marine Corps forces. Task Two,
for MacArthur, was to seize the northern Solomon Islands and to clear
the Japanese from Papua (the eastern part of New Guinea). Task Three,
also for MacArthur, was to occupy Rabaul and the adjacent island of New
Ireland.89 (See map 2.)
The events that took place in the summer of 1942 affected the plans for
Europe and the Pacific. In North Africa, Axis forces began an offensive in
late May that pushed British forces back nearly to Alexandria in Egypt. This
33
34
145 ° 150 ° 155 °
N in igo M an us T he S outh
H e rm it Island L o re n g a u
Islan ds • and S outhw est P acific
Islan ds
A d m ira lty N ew A ugust 19 42
K a vvie
ie n g
Islan ds H ano ver 0 50 100
•
N ew S ta tu te M ililee s
W ewak Ireland
B ism arck S ea G re e n
• Rabaul
Islan ds
• N issa
i ssa n
S aint B uka Island

5°
5° M adang T a llaa se a G eo rg e
C a p e G lo
l o u ce ste r 55°°
• • C hannel
N ew • B oug ainville
S a iidd o r N ew B ritain Island S o lom o n
G uinea • • Islan ds
A ra w e B allale
• G a sm a ta
F in
i n sch h a fe n E m p ress A ugus ta B ay Island
Lae •
• C hoiseul
S a llaa m a u a S hortland Island F a iisi
si
• • K olom bangara Island
S olom on S ea T reasury Island
N assau B ay R ekata B ay
V ella Lavella
M o ro be B ay S anta Isabel
Owen M unda
S tanley G ona K iriw ina G izo Island • N ew G eorgia M alaita
M ou ntains Buna Islands R end ova Island
O ro B ay
••
W oodlark V ang un u Island F lorida Island
K o ko d a
• Islands
C ape E spe rance T u llaa ggii
•
P o rt M o re sb y •
10°
10 ° G ua dalcanal 10
10°°
M ilne B ay
145 ° 150 ° 155 ° 160 °
Map 2. The South and Southwest Pacific.

crisis diverted shipping and ruled out an early cross-channel attack. In July
the JCS reluctantly agreed to a landing in North Africa as an alternative.90
That same month, aerial reconnaissance and intelligence reports revealed
that the Japanese were building an airfield on Guadalcanal. This led to
the identification of that island as the specific objective of Task One of
the 2 July directive.91 These two circumstances set the stage for the first
two Allied amphibious operations of the war: the landing in August 1942
of the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal and the landing in November
1942 of US and British forces in North Africa. While the preparations
for these operations were underway, changes were taking place in the
amphibious forces.
Amphibious Developments in 1942

The Army Amphibious Training Center and Engineer Amphibian
Command
Training for the two amphibious forces in the Atlantic and Pacific
continued after the war began, although the Amphibious Force, Atlantic
Fleet moved its training area from the North Carolina coast to Chesapeake
Bay because of the threat of German submarines. In March 1942 the
two forces were renamed Amphibious Corps, Atlantic and Pacific
Fleet. By this time the Army leadership had become dissatisfied with
the amphibious training being conducted under the Navy and Marine
Corps leadership. Complaints specified inadequate and poorly trained
shore parties, poor coordination between beach and shore parties, and
inadequate communication between the Navy and the landing forces
resulting in troops being put ashore at the wrong place. There were also
complaints of friction between the Services, some of which may have had
to do with the personality of General H.M. Smith—a passionate advocate
for amphibious warfare and the Marine Corps—who did not soft pedal
his criticisms of the Navy and Army. Furthermore, the Army was now
focused on the invasion across the English Channel planned for 1943 and
believed that this very large shore-to-shore operation would involve a scale
of forces and techniques quite different from the Pacific island landings
for which Marine Corps doctrine was designed. Army leaders considered
that doctrine useful, but best suited for the seizure of small islands by
specialized assault forces that would subsequently be relieved by garrison
forces and then carry out repeated landing operations in cooperation with
the Navy. The Army saw an amphibious operation as a way to put forces
ashore to conduct sustained operations on land. Because Army forces
believed they would only conduct one amphibious landing and then
35
carry on with the overarching land mission, it was not seen as desirable
to develop specialized amphibious forces. Instead, standard Army units
would be trained to carry out the initial landing. After the beachhead was
seized, support of the Army force would become a matter of large-scale
seaborne logistic sustainment that would no longer require the use of
specialized naval amphibious ships. There was also a widely held belief in
the Army that Marine Corps officers and staffs did not have the expertise
and capacity to organize and command corps, army, and larger operations
on the scale envisioned in Europe.92
The Army, and the British, also saw differences between landing on
islands where the choice of landing sites was limited, tactical surprise
was unlikely, and enemy reinforcements from off the island could be
interdicted; and landing on continental land masses with many potential
landing sites, the possibility of tactical surprise, the threat of massive enemy
reinforcement of the forces defending the beachhead, and the likelihood
of large-scale counterattacks. The Navy and Marines considered that in
island landings, the better coordination and control inherent in a daylight
assault outweighed the value of surprise but required extensive air and
naval gunfire destruction of enemy defenses and suppression of enemy fire
during the landing. The Army, thinking in terms of continental assaults,
firmly believed that tactical surprise was paramount. This meant night
landings with no extensive preliminary bombardment that would alert the
enemy as to the location of the landing. In light of these differences, the
Army proposed splitting the amphibious training and preparation, with
the Army preparing with the Navy on the Atlantic coast for the European
cross-channel invasion and the Marines moving to the Pacific to conduct
the island operations along with such Army forces as might be necessary.
Left for the future was the issue of who would conduct and control the
operations against the larger Pacific land masses—New Guinea, the
Philippines, and Formosa (Taiwan). These discussions coincided with
Army–Navy talks in which the Navy indicated it did not have the capacity
to man large numbers of landing craft while also mobilizing to fill the
crews of new combatant ships coming into service. Thus, it was tentatively
agreed that the Army, with assistance from the Coast Guard, would take
responsibility for crewing many of the landing craft.93
With these factors in mind, the Army Ground Forces (AGF), which
had replaced GHQ as the organization responsible for training, prepara
tion, and deployment of ground forces, began considering the establish
ment of an Army amphibious training program to prepare 12 divisions (in
addition to the 1st, 3d, and 9th Divisions, which were already carrying out
amphibious training under the existing system) for operations in Europe.
36
The training was to be conducted by an Amphibious Training Command
(ATC—later renamed the Amphibious Training Center) at Camp Edwards
on Cape Cod, Massachusetts, beginning in July 1942, with additional facil
ities to be established at Carrabelle, Florida, and Fort Lewis, Washington.
The mission of organizing and training the shore parties, landing craft
crews, and boat maintenance units was given to the Services of Supply,
which established an Engineer Amphibian Command (EAC), also at Camp
Edwards, in June 1942, and began recruiting watermen, fishermen, yachts
men, and others with small boat and maritime experience.94
The commander of the EAC, Colonel Daniel Noce, and his chief of
staff, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Trudeau, developed an organization for
an engineer shore regiment that would combine the roles of the Navy
beach party and Army shore party with two near shore companies to load
and dispatch landing craft and two far shore parties to bring troops, equip
ment, and supplies across the beach and handle logistical support until
the beachhead had been established. Noce and Trudeau anticipated that
each shore regiment would be integrated with a boat regiment to operate
the landing craft and other service elements, thus forming an engineer
amphibian brigade (EAB). Their initial guidance was to organize and train
eight of these brigades. The first two units were activated in June 1942.95
The next month the 45th Infantry Division arrived at Camp Edwards to
begin training at the ATC, which also began a program of amphibious
commando training.96 Coast Guard Commandant Vice Admiral Russell
R. Waesche gave whole-hearted support to the effort, assigning a Coast
Guard element to assist in the training.97
The EAC and ATC pressed on with training and self-invention through
out the rest of 1942 and into 1943, but the situation kept changing. On
1 July the AGF objective was changed from 12 to 8 divisions. Two weeks
later the number of engineer amphibious brigades was reduced from eight
to five. For a while it appeared that the Army engineers would operate the
larger LCTs, but then the decision was made that the Navy would crew and
operate all large landing vessels and the Army would operate the smaller
landing craft. The 1st EAB completed its organization in mid-July and
prepared to take up duties with the ATC when it was alerted for movement
overseas. When it arrived in England, it found that the decision had been
made to land in North Africa, which would mean a transoceanic ship-to
shore operation instead of a cross-channel shore-to-shore landing. General
Dwight D. Eisenhower had agreed to put the Navy in charge of all amphib
ious training in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) and the Navy
saw no use for the engineer boat regiments or any other Army amphibious
organization larger than a battalion. The 1st EAB thus lost all its boats and
37
would spend the war as a shore party organization for the landings in North
Africa, Sicily, Normandy, and Okinawa. In August the EAC was advised
that only three brigades would be required and Admiral King recanted his
decision to have soldiers man landing craft. It appeared that all the EABs
would be shore party units only, until events in September and October
altered the situation.98
In September Noce and Trudeau had recommended reorganizing the
brigades by combining the boat and shore units into three engineer boat
and shore regiments (EB&SR), each with one boat and one shore battal
ion. This would facilitate the tactical division of the brigade to support the
three regimental combat teams (RCTs) in a division.99 The brigade would
also include a headquarters and headquarters company, a boat mainte
nance battalion, and other service elements. At about this time, General
MacArthur requested amphibious support for his planned operations in the
SWPA. The Navy had proved reluctant to share its own meager amphibi
ous resources with MacArthur (or to risk aircraft carriers and other fleet
units in the narrow and dangerous waters off New Guinea). They were
willing to send landing craft to SWPA for MacArthur’s use, but the space
available on the decks of cargo ships and transports would limit the ship
ments to about 60 a month. At that rate it would take a year to provide
enough amphibious lift for one division. However, Trudeau calculated that
large numbers of 36-foot LCVPs could be shipped disassembled in bulk
and reassembled in theater by Army engineers. While this discussion was
taking place, MacArthur requested EABs, including boats and operators,
because those units would be ideal for the kind of shore-to-shore opera
tions he envisioned for SWPA. In October the Navy approved the scheme,
and the 2d EAB and the 411th Engineer Base Shop Battalion (augmented
by specialists from the Higgins, Chris-Craft, and other boat assembly
yards) were alerted for movement to the Southwest Pacific.100
Ultimately, the 2d, 3d, and 4th Brigades, now renamed Engineer
Special Brigades (ESBs) since the Navy had assumed the amphibious
mission, went to SWPA, while two other brigades, the 5th and 6th, con
sisting of shore party only, would participate along with the 1st ESB at
Normandy. Before closing its doors, the EAC produced a body of doc
trinal literature on boat and shore operations and the logistic support and
sustainment of amphibious operations.101 The AGF ATC trained three divi
sions, the 45th, 36th, and 38th, at Camp Edwards and at Camp Gordon
Johnson in Carrabelle, Florida, before it, too, shut down in March 1943.
The Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet was reconstituted in March 1942 at
Camp Pickett, Virginia, and trained the 3d and 9th Infantry Divisions and
2d Armored Division under Navy control before closing in October 1942.
38
Thereafter, the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet at Little Creek, Virginia,
and the Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet at Coronado, California, con
ducted the amphibious training with additional small facilities elsewhere,
including a Scout and Raider School at Fort Pierce, Florida.102
Amphibious Ships, Craft, and Vehicles

The first LST was launched in September 1942.103 Before the end of
the year, 23 of a total wartime production of 1,054 would be commis
sioned, with the first ships entering combat in 1943. The keel of the first
LSD was laid in June and the first of 25 entered service in 1943. The LCVP
was first tested in October 1942 and small numbers were used in North
Africa the following month. Over 23,000 would be built before the war
ended. In 1942 the Services settled on the Higgins version of the LCM,
which went into large-scale production as the LCM(3). A US version of
the LCT, smaller than the British designs and capable of being carried on
the deck of an LST, was produced as the 105-foot LCT(5). A modified
drive-through version, the LCT(6), had a gate at the stern that could be
opened to allow vehicles to drive off an LST ramp, through the LCT, and
onto the beach in situations where the LST could not get close enough to
the shore. An alternative arrangement was developed using pontoons that
could be lashed to the sides of the LSTs and then bolted together to form a
long causeway from the LST ramp to the shore. These, too, entered service
in 1943.104
Early in 1942 the British Combined Operations Headquarters
approached the Americans about a “raiding” ship that could carry an
infantry company at least 200 nautical miles, approach shore quietly, and
land the troops directly onto the beach. The Army leadership saw merit in
such a vessel as a way to get troops across the channel. Eventually, the ship
would be produced as the 153-foot landing craft, infantry (large) (LCI[L]).
The early versions had gangways on either side of the bow, but later ver
sions had a bow ramp. The LCI(L) was widely used in the Mediterranean,
at Normandy, and in the Solomons and Southwest Pacific where it was
particularly useful for shore-to-shore operations. It also proved to be
quite adaptable. A gunboat version, the landing craft, infantry (gunboat)
(LCI[G]), was later developed into the landing craft, support (large)
(LCS[L]). Others were used as salvage vessels, barrage balloon tenders,
and control ships to guide landing craft ashore. They were not well suited
for the Central Pacific, however, because they could not cross coral reefs
and, because they had to beach to unload troops, could not transfer troops
into LVTs at the reef line, like the LSTs and LCTs. At the end of the war,
the Pacific Fleet recommended the type be discontinued and they quickly
39
disappeared.105 An increase in the size and weight of tanks and the poor
sea-keeping qualities of the LCTs led to yet another amphibious ship in
1943, the 203-foot landing ship, medium (LSM). Smaller, faster, and more
maneuverable than an LST, the LSM could carry five medium tanks and
operate on steeper beaches than the LCT. With the addition of a 5-inch
gun and rockets, it became the landing ship, medium (rocket) (LSM[R]), a
handy fire support vessel.106
During 1942 the Army began testing and procuring LVTs, including an
armored version. They also experimented with amphibious trucks, begin
ning with a small vehicle called the Ford General Purpose Amphibian
(GPA), an amphibious version of the ¼-ton utility truck, widely known
as the jeep. The GPA (also known as the sea-going jeep or seep) was not
particularly useful, but an amphibious version of the ubiquitous General
Motors 2½-ton CCKW truck proved to be a key element of over-the-shore
supply operations. Designated DUKW (D = 1942 model, U = amphibious,
K = all-wheel drive, and W = dual rear wheels) and commonly known as
the “Duck,” it could be loaded with supplies, driven aboard an LST or
LSD, then launched off shore and driven through the surf and across the
beach to the supply dumps. With a small modification, a 105-mm howitzer
could be carried and some DUKWs had light cranes installed to unload
the howitzer (or other heavy cargo). The DUKW could also be used as
the prime mover for the artillery piece until the regular artillery trucks
were brought ashore. DUKWs quickly became the standard vehicle for
bringing light artillery ashore. In the Southwest Pacific, Army amphibi
ous engineers rigged DUKWs with rocket launchers, and at Normandy,
the Rangers installed extensible fire ladders in DUKWs as a way to assist
in scaling the cliffs west of Omaha Beach. Over 21,000 of these versatile
vehicles were built by the end of the war.107
Amphibious Operations in 1942108
General MacArthur was anxious to start operations toward Rabaul,
which would be the beginning of his return to the Philippines. First, the
Japanese offensive in Papua had to be halted. Having been stymied in their
attempt to take Port Moresby by amphibious assault, the Japanese sent their
forces across the Owen Stanley Mountains. On 18 September when they
were within 30 miles of Port Moresby, they stopped, having been ordered
by the Japanese Command to concentrate at Buna on the north coast of
Papua for possible redeployment to Guadalcanal. MacArthur then began
his counteroffensive to retake Buna. The Australians and some elements
of the US 32d Division began the difficult task of crossing the mountains,
while other 32d Division units were airlifted to the north coast of Papua.
40
In the absence of any Navy support in these early days, the Buna operation
depended on the use of captured Japanese landing craft (the only boats
available with ramps that could be used to land light armored vehicles
over the beach) and small Australian coastal freighters generically known
as luggers. These circumstances led MacArthur to request the engineer
amphibious units. The Allies would finally secure the Buna–Gona area in
January 1943 (see map 2).109
On 7 August 1942 Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift’s 1st
Marine Division landed on Guadalcanal and the nearby small islands of
Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo. The Guadalcanal landing was initially
unopposed and the small islands were secured after 2 days of fierce resis
tance by Japanese naval infantry. However, Japanese air and naval forces
reacted quickly and on 9 August, after a night attack that sank four US
and Australian heavy cruisers, Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, the
amphibious force commander, withdrew the partially unloaded transports.
For the next 4 months, the Japanese challenged the Americans in a series
of air and naval battles and sent naval infantry and army reinforcements
to try to wrest the island from the Marines. With air support from Marine,
Navy, and Army aircraft flown into the Guadalcanal air strip, Henderson
Field, the Marines held on. In October they were joined by a regiment of
Major General Alexander Patch’s newly-formed Americal Division. On
18 October Admiral William F. Halsey Jr. replaced Admiral Ghormley as
Commander, South Pacific and on 9 December, Patch replaced Vandegrift
in command of operations on Guadalcanal when the 1st Marine Division
was relieved by Patch’s Americal Division and elements of the 2d Marine
Division.110
The Guadalcanal operation, mounted hastily under severe pressure
and without control of the air and sea that would become essential for
such operations, provided many lessons for future landings. This first
amphibious landing demonstrated the need for prelanding rehearsals and
proved that intelligence about beach conditions was as important as infor
mation about enemy forces. Unloading over the beach was too slow due to
limitations of the early landing craft, excessive nonessential supplies and
equipment, and failure to provide enough manpower for the shore party.
The new amphibious tractors (LVTs) demonstrated their value in bringing
supplies over the beach, as well as in river crossing and as light combat
vehicles. Disagreement between Vandegrift and Turner raised questions
about the system of command relations in which the Navy amphibious
force commander retained overall control of the operation, including post-
landing operations ashore. Eventually, the Americans adopted a system
41
based on the prewar concept of “paramount interest” in which the naval
commander of the amphibious task force commanded the operation until
the landing force was established ashore, then the commander of the land
ing force would take command of operations on land and give general
direction to the naval commander on matters directly related to support of
the land operations. This system worked well throughout the war, although
it left room for controversy on precisely when the transfer of authority
would take place and who would make the decision.111
Three smaller amphibious operations also took place in August 1942.
On 18 August, 18 marines from the 2d Raider Battalion landed by sub
marine on Butaritari Island in the Makin Atoll of the Gilbert Islands.
Although the marines forced the defenders to withdraw, killing 86 of them,
the Japanese quickly sent reinforcements by flying boat and the marines
withdrew, losing 21 killed and 9 inadvertently left behind to be executed
by the Japanese. The operation was hardly worth the cost, especially as
it may have caused the Japanese to improve the defenses of the Gilbert
Islands, to the later cost of marines landing on Tarawa.112
On 19 August 1942 a force of 9,800 British and Canadians, accompanied
by 60 US Army Rangers, carried out a dress rehearsal for the cross-channel
attack by conducting a large-scale raid at the French seaport of Dieppe.
To achieve surprise, there had been no preliminary bombardment, but a
coastal German convoy came across some of the inbound landing craft,
alerting the German defenders. Naval gunfire support was limited to that
of a few destroyer guns, and the Germans soon sank 33 landing craft and
1 destroyer and disabled all of the 33 tanks that accompanied the landing
force. Although the raiders managed to capture one of their objectives, a
coast defense battery, they lost some 4,500 killed, wounded, or captured.
The cost was high, but it was argued that many useful lessons were learned
(or relearned) about the necessity of air superiority, the value of naval
gunfire support, the importance of intense preliminary air and naval
bombardment, the value of close-in fire support craft, the need for dedicated
amphibious command ships, and the importance of getting enough tanks
onto the beach and through the beach defenses. It also appears to have
convinced the Germans to concentrate their defenses on ports, while the
Allies concluded that the best approach for the cross-channel invasion
would be to land across open beaches, sustain the operation over-the-shore
initially, and then capture ports through land operations.113
On 30 August 1942 the Americans took the first step toward recaptur
ing the lost Aleutian Islands when Army forces occupied Adak, halfway
along the Aleutian chain and about 250 miles from Kiska. In spite of fog,
42
Japanese submarines, and a storm that struck the beach just as the troops
landed, Major General Eugene M. Landrum’s 4,500-man Adak Landing
Force went ashore quickly and began construction of an airfield to support
further operations.114
On 8 November 1942 British and American forces under the overall
command of Eisenhower made simultaneous landings in North Africa at
Casablanca on the Atlantic coast of French Morocco; Oran, 280 miles east
of Gibraltar; and Algiers, 220 miles east of Oran. The forces for the Oran
and Algiers landings came from England, but Major General George S.
Patton’s western task force was carried to Casablanca across the Atlantic
from the east coast of the United States by an amphibious task force
under the command of Rear Admiral Henry Keith Hewitt, commander of
Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet. Patton’s troops got ashore successfully
at three beaches north and south of Casablanca in spite of initial resistance
from the French, but there were many problems and lessons to be learned.
To achieve tactical surprise, the landings were to be made before dawn.
The first waves touched down before daylight, but delays in disembark
ing the troops meant that most landed in broad daylight. Inexperienced
crews and high surf led to many wrecked landing craft. The shore party
was too small to clear the beach efficiently, and the Americans relearned
the lesson that warships do not make good amphibious command ships.
Hewitt’s flagship, the cruiser Augusta, had to leave the landing area to
engage French warships just as Patton was preparing to disembark, and
the shock and vibration of the guns disabled his tactical radios. Overall,
however, the amphibious doctrine proved to be sound.115 (See map 3.)

The first 6 months of 1943 were a time of preparation for amphibi
ous operations. At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, American
and British leaders concluded they were still unprepared for the major
cross-channel attack and agreed that the next step after the Germans and
Italians were cleared from North Africa would be the invasion of Sicily.
Forces were already in position in North Africa to continue operations in
the Mediterranean and the seizure of Sicily would reduce the air threat
to shipping and provide an advance base from which to invade Italy. The
buildup in Britain for the cross-channel invasion would continue and the
initiative would be maintained against the Japanese through offensives in
the South and Southwest Pacific and across the Central Pacific.116
Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark’s newly-activated US Fifth Army
established an Invasion Training Center on the Algerian coast to “develop
43
44
0°
0° D ijijoo n A ustria
11 Sep 44 S w itze rr - H ungary
A tlantic O cean
• la n d R om ania
M ililaa n
B lack S ea
F rance • G othic Y ugoslavia
L ine
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Cannes J a n -A
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••• t ic
T o u lloo n Italy G us ta v Se
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1 5 A ug 4 4 R om e L in
al
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io F o g g iiaa
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S pain N a p llee s T urkey
S a llee rn o
Po
22 Jan 44
• •• • • •
38°
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G re 38 °
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M editerranean S ea S icily
P a llee rm o ssin
M e ss in a
12 Nov 42
G iibb ra l ta r
ralta 8 Nov 42 • •
B ize
i ze rte
• Cap Bon 3 Sep 43
SP 8 Nov 42
• • 1 0 J ul 4 3
A lgiers
l giers T unis 1 0 J ul 4 3
M ay 43 C re te
O ra n
• C o n sta n ttin
in e
•
M o ro c c
8 Nov 42 o
T é b e ssa K a sse rrin
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C a sa b llaa n ca
•• M editerranean S ea
• A lgeria G a fsa
M a re th
T o b ru k
E l A llaa m e iinn
• •
M orocco Feb 43 T ripoli
T unisia
• •
30°
30 ° S outhern A pproaches to E urope Jan 43 Nov 42 30°
30 °
US U S & France
U S & B ritain B ritain E gypt
0 100 200 300
Libya
S ta tu te M ililee s
20°
20 °
Map 3. Southern approaches to Europe.

doctrines, technique, and instruction for invasion and to build up a reserve
of trained troops for invasion operations.”117 The name “invasion,” rather
than “amphibious,” was chosen for the training center to emphasize that
the purpose was not just to deal with the assault landing, “the water and
craft phase,” but also with the action after landing that would be the major
mission of the Army forces that trained there.118 This reflected the Army
view that its role was to conduct sustained operations on land and that
an amphibious operation was just the first phase of an invasion. Under
the command of Brigadier General John W. O’Daniel, and with support
of Navy, Army, Air Force, and 1st Engineer Amphibian Brigade [later,
1st ESB] elements, the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center prepared for
the Sicily operation (Operation HUSKY) by providing amphibious and
follow-on operations instruction for the 3d and 45th Infantry Divisions,
the 2d Armored Division, and the 1st Ranger Battalion.119
Army Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalions

The Army had quickly become convinced of the value of LVTs and
in 1943 began a program to train amphibious tank and tractor battalions
(ATTBs) at Monterey, California. This training was carried out by Colonel
William S. Triplet’s 18th Armored Group (Amphibious). Triplet, who had
been a sergeant in World War I and had extensive infantry and armor expe
rience, developed techniques for using the LVTs in heavy surf, collabo
rated with Marine amphibious tank and tractor experts from Coronado,
and constantly sought ways to improve the capabilities of the vehicles
and the survivability of the crews (often clashing with the Navy Bureau of
Ships and the AGF in the process). Among his many achievements was the
development of an improved amphibious tank, the LVT(A)4, that mounted
a turret from an M-8 75-mm howitzer motor carriage on an LVT chassis.
By the time Triplet left in 1944 to take over an armored division combat
command in Europe, he had supervised the training and deployment of
nine ATTBs, all but two of which served in the Pacific.120
South and Southwest Pacific Operations

On Guadalcanal, the Americal Division and the lead elements of the
2d Marine Division were joined in January 1943 by the 25th Division
and the rest of the 2d Marine Division to form the XIV Corps under
General Patch. By the end of February, the last of the Japanese defend
ers escaped by sea from the island and the long battle of Guadalcanal
ended. In the Southwest Pacific, MacArthur prepared to clear the Japanese
from Papua and to continue the advance to Rabaul. MacArthur’s ability
to conduct amphibious operations improved in the early months of 1943
45
with the arrival of Lieutenant General Walter Krueger and the Sixth Army
Headquarters; Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey’s Navy amphibious force
(including the first LSTs and LCTs seen in SWPA); and Brigadier General
William F. Heavey’s 2d ESB.121 The first task of the amphibious engineers
was to assist the 411th Engineer Base Shop Battalion in constructing the
facility for the assembly of landing craft. In April the first of thousands of
LCVPs was completed and the 2d ESB began amphibious training with
the US 41st and Australian 9th Divisions.122 (See map 4.)
In March 1943 the JCS sent a new directive to MacArthur, Nimitz,
and Halsey, ordering them to establish airfields on Woodlark and Kiriwina
Islands and to capture the Huon Peninsula area of New Guinea, west
ern New Britain, and the Solomon Islands as far north as southern
Bougainville. Halsey and MacArthur met in April to refine their plan for
these operations, dubbed Operation CARTWHEEL, and the offensive
against the Japanese resumed on 30 June 1943, with unopposed landings
on Woodlark and Kiriwina, landings by Admiral Halsey’s forces at sev
eral places on the island of New Georgia, and the first landing conducted
by the Army’s amphibious engineers on the coast of New Guinea.123 The
latter was a small-scale operation compared to those that would follow:
29 LCVPs, 1 LCM, and 3 captured Japanese landing craft manned by
the boat battalion of the 532d EB&SR loaded a task force of the 41st
Division at Morobe Bay, about 75 miles west of Buna, and landed them
at Nassau Bay, 50 miles up the coast. Many of the landing craft broached
in the heavy surf, the Japanese quickly counterattacked, and the amphibi
ous engineers found themselves fighting as infantry to defend the beach
head. The Japanese were repulsed, and for the next month and a half, the
engineers supported the operation by hauling ammunition and supplies
up the coast, back-hauling casualties, and establishing additional beaches
for over-the-shore supply operations. In late August Admiral Barbey’s
ships landed the 9th Australian Division near Lae, while the amphibious
engineers traveled along the coast to support the operation by delivering
supplies and reinforcements over the shore. On 22 September 2d ESB
scouts went in with the first wave of Australian troops at Finschhafen, on
the north shore of the Huon Peninsula, to mark the beaches and routes
through the coral reefs for the Navy’s LSTs and LCTs. On 11 October
the amphibian engineers once again found themselves defending a beach
head, this time from a Japanese amphibious landing at Finschhafen. By
November 1943 MacArthur’s Australian and US forces had secured the
Huon Peninsula and Halsey’s Army and Marine forces had fought their
way up the Solomon chain to Bougainville. In December the 1st Marine
Division landed at Cape Gloucester at the western tip of New Britain,
46
135 ° 145 °
M o ro ta i I
Sep 44 T he N e w G uinea A rea
A xis of A llied advance
H alm ahera J ul 4 4 P a cific O cea n 0 100 200 300 400
0°
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il e s
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E m irau
•
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ko p B iak I M ay 44
A dm iralty Island
Apr 44 Island M ar 44
W ak de I
H o lla
ll a n d ia
ia Apr 44 K a vie
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• A ita
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H ansa B ay
• •
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Island
l and S olom on
M adang
• n Islands
N ew B rit ai
N ew G uinea uo
N a d za b H u on B ougainville
ougainvil l e hoiseull
C hoiseu
Pen Dec 43
Lae
Sep 43 Huon Pen T reasu ry Nov 43 S anta
••
Papua • J un 4 3 Island el
Isab el
S o lo m o n S e a V ella
Lavella
G ulf o f G ona K iriw ina N ew J ul 4 3 F lorida
A ra fu ra S e a P apua Buna
N o v 4 2 Islands G eo rgia
Sep 42 W oodlark R ussell
ussel l
T im or
••
P o rt Is l ands
Islands A ug 4 2
10 °
10° C o ra l S ea M o re sb y
• 10
10°°
M ilne B ay G ua dalcan
da l can al
135 ° 145 ° 155 °
Map 4. New Guinea area.
47
while the Army’s 112th Cavalry Regiment landed on the southern side of
the cape at Arawe aboard landing craft of the 2d ESB carried in the davits
of one of Barbey’s transports.124
The Arawe operation saw the introduction of a new unit and weapon:
the 2d ESB Support Battery equipped with rocket DUKWs mounting
120 4.5-inch rocket tubes each. The support battery was developed to
deal with the 1,000 yard or 4 minute gap, so called because, to prevent
friendly fire from hitting friendly troops, the naval bombardment was
halted or shifted inland when the first waves of the landing force were
1,000 yards from the beach—a distance it took the landing craft about 4
minutes to travel—giving the enemy a chance to come out from cover
and begin firing before the troops hit the beach. The answer was to begin
a barrage of rockets against enemy positions as soon as the naval gunfire
was lifted. The support battery equipped with rocket DUKWs, as well as
heavily armed LCVPs, LCMs, and LVTs, was formed experimentally in
July 1943 and went into action at Arawe. It was so successful that the 2d
ESB Support Battery (Provisional) was activated in February 1944 with
the mission of providing neutralization fire during the 4-minute gap, to
neutralize enemy strongpoints from the water or from the land, to provide
antiaircraft protection, and to provide fire support for coastal boat patrols.
The 220-man unit consisted of a headquarters section, a maintenance
platoon, and two combat platoons, each equipped with two rocket DUKWs;
two LVT(A)s; two rocket LCVPs; and two flak LCMs equipped with 37-
mm, 20-mm, .50-caliber, and .30-caliber machineguns as well as rockets.
The composition and armament of the support battery was constantly
modified and eventually a fire support platoon was organized within each
boat battalion. The support battery and its successor fire support platoons
operated with the 2d ESB in every operation until the end of the war.125
The Aleutians
In the Aleutians, US forces occupied Amchitka Island, only 40 miles
from Kiska, on 5 January 1943. The next step was an amphibious assault
on Attu. Major General Albert Brown’s 7th Infantry Division, originally
a mechanized unit trained for desert warfare, was selected to conduct the
amphibious landing. Two regiments of the 7th Infantry Division landed
on 11 May 1943, but soon bogged down, stymied by the Aleutian weather
and terrain and the Japanese defense. Four days into what they had hoped
would be a 3-day operation, the Alaska commanders called for General
Landrum to come up from Adak and take over. By the time Landrum
arrived on 16 May, the situation had already begun to improve, but 2
weeks of tough fighting still lay ahead, including a final Japanese counter
attack that overran the American front line before Attu was secured. On
48
15 August the 7th Infantry Division, now commanded by Major General
Charles H. Corlett, landed on Kiska to find that the Japanese had already
evacuated the island.126
Mediterranean Operations
The Sicily landing on 10 July 1943 was the largest to date and was
successful in spite of bad weather and determined German and Italian
counterattacks against the beachheads. Army respect for naval gunfire sup
port was heightened when Navy ships helped stop an Axis armor counter
attack at Gela.127 Sicily saw the first use in Europe of purpose-built LSTs
(rather than converted tankers), LCI(L)s, and DUKW 2½-ton amphibious
trucks, and the first large-scale use of LCVPs. All of these ships, craft,
and vehicles proved their worth, as did the first of the new amphibious
force flagships, Ancon (AGC-4).128 Coordination of air support was poor
however, and there was some difference of opinion between Army and
Navy commanders as to when the landing force commander was to take
command of operations ashore. There were also still problems with shore
party operations, but overall, it was clear that the Allies were improving
their amphibious warfare skills.129
Following the defeat in Sicily of Axis forces (many of which escaped
across the Strait of Messina in a large-scale amphibious withdrawal), the
Allies determined to land on the Italian mainland in conjunction with an
Italian offer of surrender. It was hoped that this would pin down large
numbers of German forces and prevent reinforcement of the Eastern Front
during the Soviet offensive and in northern France during the cross-channel
attack the next spring. The seizure of southern Italy would also provide
air bases for the strategic air offensive against Germany. On 3 September
British forces crossed the Strait of Messina to the Calabrian Coast and
landed at the port of Taranto in the southeast. British and American forces
of General Clark’s Fifth Army landed at Salerno, south of Naples, a landing
site largely determined by the range of fighter aircraft flying from Sicily.
The Germans immediately counterattacked, but after a difficult battle
were repulsed by the Fifth Army, supported by air and naval gunfire and
reinforced by additional forces, including airborne troops landed in the
beachhead. After a link up with British forces coming up from the south,
Fifth Army captured Naples on the west coast and the British occupied the
airfield complex at Foggia in the east.130
Central Pacific Operations

Wartime strategy conferences in Washington in May 1943 (TRIDENT),
in Quebec in August (QUADRANT), and in Cairo and Tehran in November
49
(SEXTANT-EUREKA) established Allied strategy for the last half of
1943 and 1944, including decisions to conduct the cross-channel invasion
in the spring of 1944 and to carry out the Pacific offensive against Japan
along two lines of operation: through the Southwest Pacific and across
the Central Pacific. In the Southwest Pacific, Rabaul was to be isolated
and neutralized rather than captured in a costly amphibious operation.
MacArthur was then to continue his advance along the New Guinea coast
to the Vogelkop (the large round peninsula at the westernmost end of New
Guinea) and then prepare to land on Mindanao in the southern Philippines.
For Nimitz’s forces, these decisions set the stage for the Central Pacific
campaign envisioned in War Plan Orange. First, islands in the Gilberts
chain would be captured to provide air bases to support the next step,
seizure of islands in the Marshalls Group. Then Saipan, Tinian, and Guam
in the Marianas would be captured and used as bases for the air attack and
blockade of the Japanese home islands. These operations beyond the range
of land-based fighter aircraft would be supported by a new generation
of fast aircraft carriers, carried out by the latest amphibious ships, and
sustained by fleets of logistic ships. It was the beginning of a new phase of
amphibious warfare in the pattern originally conceived by the Marines.131
The Central Pacific thrust began in November 1943 with Operation
GALVANIC, landings in the Gilbert Islands at Betio in the Tarawa Atoll by
Major General Julian C. Smith’s 2d Marine Division, and at Butaritari in
the Makin Atoll by the 165th RCT of Major General Ralph C. Smith’s 27th
Infantry Division. The overall commander of the Central Pacific Force was
Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance. The amphibious assault force, com
manded by Turner, was divided into a northern attack force commanded
by Turner himself and including General Ralph Smith’s RCT, and a south
ern attack force commanded by Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill and including
General Julian Smith’s marines. Major General H.M. Smith, commander
of V Amphibious Corps, was responsible for training and preparation of
the Army and Marine Corps troops, but his position during the operation
was ambiguous. He was directed to be aboard Turner’s flagship and to
advise him on the operation, but the chain of command ran directly from
Turner to Generals Ralph Smith and Julian Smith, who would take com
mand ashore when directed by Turner.132
The landings took place on 20 November. For the first time, LVTs
were not used just as logistical support vehicles, but carried the first waves
of troops to the beach. The 165th RCT was supported by 48 LVTs operated
by a provisional company of the 193d Tank Battalion. They proved to be
priceless, because a peculiarity of the tide prevented landing craft from
crossing the reef at both islands, while the LVTs took the coral reefs in
50
stride. Unfortunately, there were not enough of them. At Betio, Japanese
resistance was fierce. Many of the LVTs in the first waves were destroyed
and so most of the marines had to disembark from LCVPs at the reef and
wade ashore, taking heavy casualties. Three days of fighting at Tarawa
cost the marines over 3,000 casualties, more than 1,000 of whom were
killed or died of wounds.133
Complicating the Makin attack was a decision to land on two widely
separated beachheads, poor communications that made coordination
between the two assault forces difficult, and the same dodging tide that had
plagued the marine landing on Betio. But Butaritari was far more lightly
defended, and the soldiers took far fewer casualties than the marines (66
killed and 152 wounded). However, it took 4 days before General Ralph
Smith could report “Makin taken,” sparking criticism of the Army’s slow
advance by General H.M. Smith. The official Army historians concluded:
“Considering the size of the atoll, the nature of the enemy’s defenses, and
the great superiority of force enjoyed by the attacking troops [Smith’s],
criticism seems justified.”134
Nonetheless, both landings provided important lessons. The
preparatory naval gunfire bombardment was insufficient. Air support
was poorly coordinated with the landings and the naval aviators did not
provide adequate close air support. There were communications problems
in the coordination among infantrymen, tanks, artillery, flame throwers,
and demolitions. The problem of using a warship as the amphibious
flagship was once again demonstrated when gunfire from Hill’s flagship,
the battleship Maryland, disabled General Julian Smith’s communications
off Betio. A proposal to land artillery on nearby islands to support the
Betio landing had been rejected, a mistake that would not be made again.
On the positive side, the LVTs had proven their value as troop carriers
for the first waves of the assault, although there had not been enough of
them, and an armored version was needed to improve survivability. The
Army units at Makin had put most of their supplies on wooden pallets
that could be dragged over the beach and coral, a technique first used in
the Aleutians. This cut the landing craft unloading time to one-twelfth
and was a technique adopted for all future amphibious operations by both
the Army and the Marines. All of these “lessons learned” were quickly
disseminated to the units preparing for the next offensive—the Marshall
Islands in January 1944.135

The pace of amphibious operations had quickened in the second half
of 1943 and continued to do so throughout 1944 as the Allies closed in on
51
the Axis powers in both Europe and the Pacific. The year opened with a
series of amphibious landings in rapid succession in the Southwest Pacific,
the Mediterranean, and the Central Pacific.
The first, and smallest, of these operations took place in the SWPA
with the landing of the 32d Infantry Division’s 126th RCT on Saidor, New
Guinea, on 2 January 1944, completing the conquest of the Huon Peninsula.
The operation was conducted on short notice, but by now Krueger’s sol
diers, Barbey’s Navy amphibians, and Heavey’s amphibious engineers
had become a well-coordinated team. The initial landing was carried out
by 9 APDs and 16 landing craft, infantry (LCI) carrying the 126th RCT
and the shore battalion of the 542d EB&SR with 15 destroyers providing
naval gunfire support and protection from Japanese submarines. On D+1,
six LSTs towing the LCMs of the 542d’s Boat Battalion arrived with addi
tional troops and equipment, after which the amphibious engineers set up
the now-routine over-the-shore sustainment operation.136
In Italy an amphibious landing was seen as a way to bypass German
defenses (the Gustav Line) that had stalled Allied forces of the 15th Army
Group (US Fifth Army in the west and British Eighth Army on the Adriatic
coast) south of Rome. The plan for Operation SHINGLE envisioned US
and British forces of Major General John P. Lucas’s VI Corps landing
behind the German lines at Anzio, 33 miles south of Rome, while 15th
Army Group conducted a general offensive, including a breakthrough by
Fifth Army to link up with VI Corps.137 The 22 January 1944 amphibious
landing went smoothly, but before Lucas’s forces could secure the high
ground overlooking the beachhead, the Germans counterattacked, nearly
driving VI Corps into the sea. Only a tenacious defense, massive and effec
tive naval gunfire support (at the cost of several ships lost to German air
attacks), and close air support prevented a disaster. Furthermore, the offen
sive from the south failed to break through, leaving the beachhead iso
lated. It was not until late May that VI Corps finally broke out of the Anzio
beachhead to link up with the advancing Fifth Army. For 2½ months, the
situation in the Anzio beachhead resembled, in the words of one veteran,
the Western Front in World War I.138
The Central Pacific offensive continued with Operation FLINTLOCK,
landings on Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands on 31 January 1944.139
By now, the amphibious warfare techniques had been honed and the les
sons of Operation GALVANIC had been passed on quickly to the units that
would conduct the landings, the Army 7th Infantry Division and the 4th
Marine Division. Corlett’s 7th Infantry Division, veterans of the Aleutian
landings, had the added advantage of training in Hawaii as the operation
52
was being planned and so could review the operational plans and use them
in their final rehearsals (the 4th Marine Division trained at Camp Pendleton
in California, making such coordination difficult). This time, small offshore
islands near the objective would be captured before the main assault to
provide artillery support bases. The 708th Provisional Amphibian Tractor
Battalion had enough LVTs, including 56 of the armored versions, to put
the entire first wave ashore and a company of LVT(A)1s would provide
additional support with their 37-mm guns, both during the landing and
on the beach. In rehearsals, the Army armored amphibians developed a
technique of stationing the LVT(A)1s on the flanks of the leading wave of
transport LVTs so that they wouldn’t mask the fire of the transport LVTs’
own machineguns, a procedure that would become standard for amphibi
ous operations. Over 100 DUKWs were made available to keep supplies
flowing across the beach. Another Army innovation was the establishment
of repair stations on unoccupied islets and the conversion of some LSTs
to support vessels to service LVTs and DUKWs and provide amenities
for the crews, reducing attrition of the amphibians. Other innovations for
Operation FLINTLOCK included underwater demolition teams to recon
noiter the beach and destroy obstacles and a provisional Joint Assault
Signal Company (JASCO) assigned to the 7th Infantry Division to ensure
good communications between ships and the shore and to coordinate naval
gunfire and close air support.140 All the training and preparation paid off
in the landings at Kwajalein Atoll on 31 January 1944, followed by the
seizure of Eniwetok Atoll at the western edge of the Marshalls in February.
Admiral Turner called Operation FLINTLOCK “the perfect one” that
established the pattern of subsequent Pacific amphibious operations.141
Southwest Pacific Area Operations
In the Southwest Pacific, MacArthur had planned to secure the
Admiralty Islands in April 1944, but in February Nimitz’s carrier forces
raided the Japanese stronghold of Truk in the Caroline Islands, ending the
air and naval threat from that area, and aircraft flying from SWPA bases
reported a lack of activity in the Admiralties. In spite of conflicting intelli
gence reports, General MacArthur decided to send a reconnaissance force
to the islands immediately. On 29 February 1944, a 1,000-man force of
the 1st Cavalry Division, accompanied by MacArthur and Vice Admiral
Thomas C. Kinkaid, the Seventh Fleet commander, landed from three
APDs escorted by a small naval force. The Japanese attacked the next
day, but the reconnaissance force held until reinforcements could be sent
to clear the island. The Admiralties operation provided an excellent harbor
and air base for future operations and, with the capture by Halsey’s forces
of Emirau to the north, completed the isolation of Rabaul.142
53
The early seizure of the Admiralties led MacArthur to recommend to
the JCS that the Japanese forces at Hansa Bay and Wewak be bypassed in a
bold operation that would leapfrog to the Hollandia region of New Guinea
400 miles to the west. On 12 March 1944 the JCS issued a directive con
firming that MacArthur was to capture Hollandia and Aitape in April with
the support of one of Nimitz’s aircraft carrier task forces. Nimitz was then
to move into the Marianas in June to seize Saipan, Tinian, and Guam and
then into the Palaus in September. In November MacArthur was to land on
Mindanao in the southern Philippines and then to plan for the invasion of
Luzon in early 1945 while Nimitz planned for the invasion of Formosa.143
On 22 April MacArthur’s forces had grown to the point that he could
send a force of 217 ships and 80,000 men to make three simultaneous
landings—at Tanahmerah Bay and at Humboldt Bay in Hollandia, and at
Aitape 140 miles to the east. All three landings were unopposed. MacArthur
had cut the Japanese Army in New Guinea in half, isolated most of the
forces to the east, and secured an important airfield complex. MacArthur’s
amphibious engineer capability was expanded with the arrival in New
Guinea of the 3d ESB in February 1944 and the 4th ESB in May. The fast
pace of operations continued with a landing at Wakde–Sarmi, 115 miles to
the west of Hollandia, on 17 May; at Biak, 300 miles west of Hollandia, on
27 May; at Noemfoor Island on 2 July; and at Sansapor on the Vogelkop
Peninsula on 30 July—the end of a 1,500 mile journey completed in 1
year.144
By the summer of 1944, the unique character of the SWPA was appar
ent. Much of this difference was driven by the geography of the New
Guinea coast and the nearby islands, but it was also influenced by the char
acter of General MacArthur, with his strong determination to return to the
Philippines and his sense of competition for strategic priority and resources
with the Central Pacific Theater. The command structure in SWPA also
differed from that in other theaters. Unlike Admiral Nimitz, who com
manded the Pacific Fleet as well as the POA, and Eisenhower, who after
the Normandy invasion acted as the ground component commander as well
as Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, MacArthur was not
granted authority to command any national force operationally and had to
relinquish command of USAFFE on assumption of the supreme command
of SWPA. Since the majority of ground combat forces in the theater were
initially Australian, and for logical political reasons, an Australian general
was appointed Commander, Allied Land Forces. The re-establishment of
USAFFE in February 1943 gave MacArthur administrative control of US
Army forces, but operational control still rested with Australian General
Sir Thomas Blamey, the Allied Land Forces commander. When General
54
Krueger arrived and Sixth Army was activated, MacArthur bypassed the
binational command structure by giving Krueger command of a task force
(Alamo Force) that came directly under GHQ, SWPA. Alamo Force had
most of the same staff and troop units as Sixth Army, but was not under
Blamey’s control. Sixth Army was the US Army component of Allied Land
Forces and had administrative control of US Army forces, while Alamo
Force was the operational force. In the words of one Army historian, the
organization of SWPA ground forces was “somewhat complicated.”145
MacArthur refused to appoint a single commander at the operational
level with overall authority over the planning and conduct of joint opera
tions. Below MacArthur, SWPA relied on the principle of cooperation
rather than unity of command. Krueger had authority to coordinate plan
ning for the ground, naval, and air forces, but his position was one of first
among equals rather than as a joint force commander.146 Krueger would
have preferred a system of unity of command, but he made the arrange
ment work by establishing joint planning groups with representatives of
the Navy and Air Force headquarters; through planning conferences among
the commanders; and through constant informal coordination visits and
consultation among the headquarters. This system overcame the problems
of personal and Service cultural differences and the great geographical
separation of the Service headquarters.147 It seems likely that MacArthur
used Krueger’s joint planning groups as the model for the Joint Strategic
Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) that he later established at his Far
East Command Headquarters in Tokyo before the Korean War.148
SWPA was also different from any other theater in the number and
pace of its operations. After the Admiralties, Krueger recalled, “Operations
now followed one another with little intermission, and Headquarters
Alamo Force had to prepare plans for a number of impending ones while
two or three were actually in progress.”149 The pace was driven by a need
to stay ahead of the Japanese and not give them time to redeploy forces
and establish defenses, but also because of MacArthur’s sense that he had
to show that the SWPA provided the best and fastest way to get to the
China–Formosa–Luzon area so that his theater would not be bypassed in
favor of Nimitz’s Central Pacific offensive.150 These multiple, fast-paced
operations were possible because of the effective planning and coordina
tion system and because all of the staffs and forces involved were now
amphibious veterans. At GHQ, at Krueger’s Sixth Army/Alamo Force
Headquarters, and at Barbey’s amphibious headquarters, it was normal
to have three teams working simultaneously on three consecutive opera
tions, and it was routine to plan, organize, and pull together the forces for
hastily conceived amphibious operations. It was very different from the
55
Europe/Mediterranean and Central Pacific theaters, where the operations
took place at intervals of months rather than weeks or days, as they did in
SWPA.151
SWPA was also unique in having the use of three Army ESBs to pro
vide a quick reaction capability through their multiple skills and capabili
ties. The amphibious engineers provided landing craft and crews trained
and equipped for assault landings; carried out shore party tasks during
those landings and then provided sustainment through over-the-shore
resupply; conducted beach reconnaissance; provided coastal transporta
tion services; carried out offshore security and combat patrols; and per
formed such varied tasks as port operation, road and facility construction,
earth moving, machinery repair and maintenance, and infantry combat. All
within a single organization that was immediately responsive to the Sixth
Army commander and trained to work well with the other Services.
Central Pacific Operations
As SWPA operations followed one after the other across the northern
coast of New Guinea, Admiral Nimitz’s forces prepared for the next step in
the Central Pacific. On 15 June Marine and Army forces of General H.M.
Smith’s V Amphibious Corps landed on the large island of Saipan in the
Mariana Islands. The initial landings were made by the 2d and 4th Marine
Divisions, a substantial number of which were carried ashore in 196 LVTs
of the Army’s 708th, 715th, and 773d Amphibious Tractor Battalions and
supported by 138 Army LVT(A)1s and LVT(A)4s. The 311th and 539th
Army Transportation Port Companies came ashore early to assist in orga
nizing the beachhead and found themselves fighting off Japanese infiltra
tors while bringing in supplies on D-Day.152
Japanese resistance at the beachhead was heavy and on D+1 General
H.M. Smith brought in the lead elements of his reserve, Major General
Ralph Smith’s 27th Infantry Division, the unit that H.M. Smith had
criticized at Makin.153 The fighting on Saipan was bloody and difficult. It
would take 3 weeks to secure the island and, in the middle of the battle,
General H.M. Smith once again became displeased with what he perceived
as the slow advance of the 27th Division. On 24 June he relieved General
Ralph Smith of command, a controversial action that caused a long-lasting
bitter feeling between the two Services. Soon after the Saipan campaign
ended, Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson Jr., Commanding General,
Army Forces, Central Pacific Area, convened a board composed entirely
of Army officers to investigate the incident. The board concluded that
although H.M. Smith had the authority to relieve Ralph Smith, he had not
been fully informed of the conditions in the 27th Infantry Division zone
56
and the relief was not justified by the facts. The unbalanced composition
of the board called its findings into question and no further action was
taken at the Washington level, other than to remove Ralph Smith from the
theater (he was initially given command of another division and then sent
to Europe as liaison officer to the French military forces) and to reassign
H.M. Smith as Commander, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, a position where
his expertise and leadership would be of value, but where he would no
longer directly command Army forces. One side effect was that Army
officers in Washington reviewing the material presented to the board found
what they saw as evidence that H.M. Smith’s V Amphibious Corps’ staff
work was below acceptable standards, reinforcing a preconceived view
that marines did not have the training and experience to command above
division level—an argument that would influence Army views during
the postwar inter-Service struggles over defense unification, roles, and
missions.154
In any event, the US advance westward continued with the capture of
Guam by the 3d Marine Division and 77th Infantry Division from 21 July
to 8 August 1944, and by a very smooth and efficient operation to capture
the island of Tinian, near Saipan, from 25 July to 1 August. In the Tinian
operation, over half of the LVTs and LVT(A)s were provided by the Army,
which also provided the shore party, while XXIV Corps provided artillery
support from Saipan.155
Operations in Europe
On 6 June 1944, a week before the Saipan landing, the long-awaited
cross-channel invasion of Europe began with Operation OVERLORD, the
landing of Allied forces at Normandy between the Cotentin Peninsula and
the city of Caen (see map 5). The landing site had been selected because
it was within range of Britain-based fighter aircraft, was near the port of
Cherbourg, and was not quite as heavily defended as the Pas de Calais
area directly across the English Channel from Dover, which would oth
erwise have been the ideal location.156 It was a huge undertaking with
five reinforced divisions in the initial amphibious assault and three air
borne divisions making preliminary landings behind the beaches. More
than 30 divisions would then be funneled through the beachhead. Because
Cherbourg would not be available for some weeks after the landing,
huge floating harbors were fabricated in secrecy and pre-positioned on
the English coast so they could be towed into place to sustain the opera
tion ashore. Three ESBs and a quartermaster port would support the US
beaches. The use of LVTs for the initial assault waves was not contem
plated. Instead, conventional tanks were fitted with folding waterproof
57
58
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Map 5. Final Overlord plan.

screens that permitted them to float in calm seas and propellers so they
could be driven to shore. The resulting vehicle was called a duplex drive
tank.157 The issue of day versus night landings and long, heavy prepara
tory bombardment versus tactical surprise was settled by a compromise.
The landings would take place just after dawn to provide good visibil
ity for coordination and fire direction. Instead of an extended prelanding
bombardment, there would be a short, intense, naval gunfire bombard
ment followed by air strikes on beach fortifications and obstacles by heavy
and medium bombers just before the landing.158
The landings were successful, but the costs and consequences varied
among the invading forces. On the British beaches to the east, the first
waves were across the beach and moving inland within an hour of land
ing, in spite of a pile up of supplies due to delayed landing craft arrivals
and heavy initial German defensive fires. At Utah Beach in the west, cur
rents swept the incoming landing craft off course and to a lightly defended
stretch of beach. Within 3 hours, the US 4th Infantry Division had secured
the beachhead at a cost of 197 Army casualties out of 23,000 men who
landed on D-Day. Among those 23,000 was a regimental commander in
the 4th Infantry Division, Colonel James A. Van Fleet, who would later
command Eighth Army in Korea. His D-Day experience gave him a posi
tive impression of amphibious operations. At Omaha Beach, it was very
different. Many of the landing craft were swamped by heavy seas that also
sank over half of the duplex drive tanks. The heavy bombers overshot the
beach and most of their bombs landed 3 miles inland. Most of the radios of
the gunfire direction teams were on board the sunken landing craft, making
it difficult to adjust the naval fires. The beach obstacles were particularly
dense on that stretch of beach and a veteran German division had unex
pectedly arrived in the area just before the landing. Nonetheless, by night
fall 34,000 men were ashore and holding a lodgment on Omaha Beach at
a cost of 2,500 killed and wounded. By the end of June, two Allied armies
had come ashore with nearly a million men, over a million tons of sup
plies, and 177,000 vehicles in spite of the destruction of one of the artifi
cial harbors and heavy damage to another by a storm on 19 June.159 The
main reason the destruction of the artificial harbor did not delay the logisti
cal buildup was the versatility of the LSTs. Experimentation showed that
LSTs could be beached and then “dried out”—allowed to remain sitting
on the beach when the tide went out—without damage to the hulls. This
permitted them to be unloaded between the tides and then refloated on
the incoming tide. Thus, vast quantities of supplies and equipment could
be brought ashore over the beach without a requirement for an artificial
harbor.160
59
Two months later, on 15 August 1944, the last large-scale amphibi
ous operation in Europe was carried out in Southern France by Lieutenant
General Jacob L. Devers’Allied Sixth Army Group. Meant to occur simul
taneously with Operation OVERLORD, Operation DRAGOON had been
postponed because of a shortage of amphibious shipping and controversy
within the Allied war councils. It was a hastily mounted operation, but one
that was conducted smoothly because many of the planners and forces
involved were Mediterranean amphibious warfare veterans.161
By 1944 the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center, now under Brigadier
General Henry C. Wolfe, had been relocated near Naples. The 36th and
45th Divisions trained there for the Southern France operation, while the
3d Division, veteran of four major amphibious operations, conducted its
own training. In each case, the preparations included a full-scale rehearsal
of the landing.162
The landing was made in daylight, the decision having been made
that improved visibility was worth the risk. The landing forces advanced
quickly (Major General Lucian Truscott, the assault force commander, had
been at Anzio and did not want to repeat the disastrous results of the delay
in capturing the high ground) and by 28 August the Allies had captured the
ports of Toulon and Marseilles that, along with the roads and rail lines of
the Rhone Valley, provided a valuable additional line of communication
for Allied forces in France. During the remainder of the war in Europe,
amphibious assets and techniques would be used by US forces in the major
river crossings and by the British to capture the island of Walcheren on the
Dutch coast in November 1944.
Advance to the Philippines

On 15 September 1944 MacArthur’s forces took the first step toward
the Philippines by landing on the large island of Morotai, between New
Guinea and the southern Philippine island of Mindanao. On the same
day, Admiral Nimitz’s forces invaded the Palau Islands, with Marines
landing on Peleliu and Army forces landing on Angaur, to the south. On
23 September an Army RCT made an unopposed landing at Ulithi Atoll,
between the Palaus and the Philippines. The opposition on Angaur was
light, but the fighting on Peleliu was bloody and difficult, dragging on
until November. However, these landings completed the twin advances
through New Guinea and across the Central Pacific. There was still debate
through September as to whether the next step should be the seizure of
the main Philippine Island of Luzon or Formosa, which would set the
stage for securing a port on the coast of China from which to support air
60
operations against Japan. Councils in Washington were divided. Admiral
Nimitz argued for the Formosa invasion, but his senior commanders and
staff favored Luzon, and Nimitz had directed his staff to prepare alternate
plans for the seizure of Okinawa rather than Formosa. MacArthur argued
vigorously for Luzon. He intended to land in Mindanao in mid-November
and conduct the major assault at Leyte in December, with movement into
Luzon in early 1945.163
Circumstances would advance that timetable and lead to the deci
sion to take Luzon rather than Formosa. In September the Japanese con
ducted a major offensive in China, overrunning the area where the United
States planned to build airfields, and the capture of the Marianas provided
bases from which long-range bombers could attack Japan more easily
than from China, removing much of the rationale for the Formosa option.
Furthermore, airmen flying over the southern Philippines from Pacific
Fleet carriers reported a lack of naval activity or air opposition, leading
MacArthur to propose scrapping the Mindanao operation and moving
directly to Leyte in October 1944 with an invasion of Luzon in December.
For these operations, he would only need Pacific Fleet aircraft carrier sup
port until air bases could be established in the Philippines. Consequently,
Nimitz recommended that instead of Formosa his forces capture Iwo Jima,
650 miles south of Tokyo, in late January 1945, and then take Okinawa
and the other Ryukyu Islands, 850 miles southwest of Tokyo, in March.
On 3 October 1944 the JCS directed MacArthur to begin the Luzon inva
sion on or about 20 December and directed Nimitz to execute the Iwo Jima
and Okinawa operations on the schedule he had proposed. (See map 1.)
The Leyte landing, the biggest amphibious operation in the Pacific
to date, took place on 20 October 1944 (see map 6). For this invasion,
additional elements from the Central Pacific Area reinforced General
MacArthur’s SWPA forces, including an amphibious task force. However,
Admiral Halsey’s Third Fleet, which provided supporting fast aircraft car
rier and battleship task forces, remained under the command of Admiral
Nimitz. In a preliminary operation, the 6th Ranger Battalion was landed
on outlying islands by an amphibious force commanded by Rear Admiral
Arthur D. Struble, who had arrived in the theater from Europe, where he
had participated in the Normandy invasion. Struble would conduct several
amphibious operations in the Philippines and would command the Seventh
Fleet during the Korean War landings. The main assault force consisted of
General Krueger’s Sixth Army, with two corps of two divisions each in
the initial landing.164 The X Corps was transported from Hollandia and the
Admiralties by Admiral Barbey’s Seventh Amphibious Force. There was
61
125 °
Apr 45
O kin a w a
C hina T he P hilipp ine A rea

0 100 200 300
S ta tu te M ile
il e s
F orm osa (T aiw an )
0 25
20 °
20° M ililee s 20 °
20°
S ou th C hina S ea
ub i c
S ubic
B ataan
B ay
M anila
B ataan
Lingayen P eninsula
G ulf Luzon C orregid or
Jan 45
Island
ni l a
M a nila
P h ilipp ine S ea
Apr 45
M in d o ro
Dec 44
Sam ar
L e yte O rm o c
Panay
V isa yan
Islands
• O ct 44
10 °
10° P a la w a n C a m o te s 10 °
10°
Feb 45 M ar 45 Islan ds
M ar 45
N e g ro s
Bohol Cebu
S ulu S ea
M indanao
M ar 45
Apr 45
D a va o
•
J un 4 5
Apr 45 J ul 4 5
B runei
B ay N orth B orneo S ulu A rchipelago
S arang ani
B ay
M ay 45
Ta ra ka n
125 ° M o ro ta i
Map 6. Philippine area.
62
no way that the 2d ESB’s many landing craft could make the 1,200-mile
journey, so Barbey’s ships off loaded their own landing craft and used the
2d ESB landing craft for the assault. The engineers’ boats then remained
to support the operation in the Philippines and Barbey’s transports picked
up their own boats on subsequent trips.165 The Japanese reacted quickly
and in force, but during the resulting Battle of Leyte Gulf, from 23 to
26 October, much of the Japanese fleet was destroyed. However, the divi
sion of command between MacArthur and Nimitz led to a dangerous situa
tion in which a major Japanese surface force nearly broke through a screen
of small aircraft carriers and destroyers to threaten the amphibious force
while Admiral Halsey’s main battle force engaged Japanese aircraft carri
ers to the north.166
A tenacious Japanese defense, poor weather, and difficult terrain made
the ground operations on Leyte difficult. The fighting continued into 1945
and involved several additional amphibious operations, the largest being
the landing of the 77th Infantry Division by Struble’s ships at Ormoc, on
the west coast of Leyte. The 2d ESB supported these operations and, in
the case of landings on the Comotes Islands off the west coast of Leyte,
all of the craft involved were those of the 2d ESB (rocket and flak LCMs
for fire support, 30 landing craft, and 48 LVTs in the assault) with no
Navy assistance. The amphibious engineers also provided coastwise
logistics support, operated ports, transported Philippine guerrilla units,
and conducted armed coastal patrols, for which the flak and rocket landing
craft were particularly useful. On 15 December 1944 Struble’s amphibians
landed two RCTs on the island of Mindoro, south of Luzon. Several Navy
landing ships and 2d ESB landing craft were sunk by Japanese suicide
aircraft, but the landing itself was easy. The amphibious engineers
remained to provide over-the-shore supply, resupply of radar stations on
outlying islands, coastal patrol, and other duties, including pulling five
stranded patrol torpedo (PT) boats off a reef.167

On 9 January 1945 two Sixth Army corps landed at Lingayen Gulf on
the main Philippine island of Luzon. The 4th ESB, reinforced with two
regiments of the 3d ESB, provided the usual amphibian engineer support.
The flat beach gradient, poor weather, and heavy surf impeded shore party
operations, which were also complicated by differences in procedures
between the SWPA and Central Pacific amphibious forces. Nonetheless, the
landings and the beach clearing operations were successful. In his report
on the Luzon operation, Admiral Barbey said that the “Engineer Special
Brigade as organized in the Southwest Pacific Area is now the most efficient
63
Shore Party organization now functioning in amphibious warfare . . .
the permanent organization of these [brigades has] contributed in large
measure to the success of amphibious operations in this theater.”168
After the Lingayen Gulf landing, most of the Japanese Army forces
withdrew into the mountains to conduct a protracted delay and defense,
but naval units in Manila held the city with fanatical determination and
systematically demolished the port as they withdrew, sinking ships at
their piers and in the approach channels, blowing up docks and wharves,
destroying unloading facilities, and burning down buildings. Manila was
essential to sustain operations in the Philippines, and so a major effort was
made to rehabilitate the devastated port. On 26 February units of the 4th
ESB, reinforced with Navy LCTs, two amphibian truck companies, two
port companies, and engineer maintenance and ordnance elements arrived
at Manila Harbor to begin the rehabilitation of the port and to assist in
unloading and lightering operations. The first ships arrived to be unloaded
on 11 March and by the end of the month, the 4th ESB, assisted by 11 port
companies and 3 DUKW companies, were unloading nearly 5,000 tons of
cargo a day.169
The many islands and convoluted coastline of the Philippines made
amphibious and over-the-shore logistic operations essential, and dozens
of landings were carried out before the islands were declared secure. In
February Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger’s Eighth Army, sup
ported by the 2d and 3d ESBs, began a campaign to occupy the south
ern Philippine islands. On 28 February 1945 two regiments were landed
at Palawan and on 10 March another regiment landed in southwest
ern Mindanao. These were followed by a series of landings in the Sulu
Archipelago, the Visayan Islands, and at several places on the coast of
Mindanao. Eichelberger finally declared the southern islands cleared on
30 June 1945.170
While these operations were taking place in the Philippines, two
Marine divisions with a few Army troops, including two amphibious truck
companies, landed on Iwo Jima on 19 February 1945. The amphibious
landing operation was carried out smoothly, but the strong Japanese
defenses in over a month of hard fighting caused severe casualties that
required the commitment of a third Marine division. On 26 March the
77th Infantry Division landed on the Kerama Islands north of Okinawa in
preparation for the main assault on 1 April 1945. Admiral Spruance was the
overall commander of the operation; Vice Admiral Turner was Commander,
Joint Expeditionary Force; and Army Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar
Buckner Jr. commanded the Tenth Army, which provided the expeditionary
64
troops. With the 1st ESB providing the shore party support, two Army
and two Marine divisions went ashore almost unopposed, but then ran
into extremely strong and tenacious Japanese defenses inland. Buckner
committed two more Army divisions and an additional Marine regiment.
On 16 April the 77th Infantry Division made another landing at Ie Shima
Island, west of Okinawa. By the time the island was secured on 10 June
1945, some 50,000 US and British Commonwealth soldiers, sailors, and
marines had been killed or wounded, including General Buckner who was
killed on 18 June, and 79 ships had been sunk or damaged beyond repair
by Japanese suicide attacks.171
The last amphibious operations of the war were carried out in the
Southwest Pacific. On 1 May 1945 Australian troops landed on Tarakan,
northeast of Borneo, in LCMs of the 3d ESB that had been carried aboard
a Navy LSD and several Australian merchant ships or towed behind LSTs.
Australian troops also carried out the final amphibious operation, landing
on 10 July 1945, at Brunei Bay in Borneo, in landing craft manned by US
Army amphibious engineers.172
Amphibious Doctrine, Planning, and Training, 1945–50

The Postwar Amphibious Establishment
When World War II ended, the Pacific-based ESBs were preparing for
the invasion of Japan. Instead, they helped land the occupation forces in
Japan and Korea and then spent a few months conducting port operations
and general engineering duties. The immense amphibious forces developed
during the war were quickly demobilized. Because of their extraordinary
value and versatility, General MacArthur recommended incorporating the
ESBs into the postwar Regular Army force structure. The 2d ESB was
selected to become the single postwar Regular Army ESB, with all the
other brigades and all of the ATTBs to be inactivated. On 15 October 1945
the 2d ESB turned over its port operation duties in Yokohama to a newly-
formed port command and began moving in increments to its new home
base at Fort Ord, California. The 5th and 6th ESBs returned from Europe
to be inactivated at their old training center at Camp Gordon Johnson in
Carrabelle, Florida, in October 1945. In January 1946 the 1st ESB was
inactivated in Korea and the 3d ESB was inactivated in California. The 4th
ESB remained in Japan on occupation duty for a few more months before
it, too, was inactivated in April 1946.173
The Navy also underwent a substantial demobilization. Of the nearly
3,000 large amphibious warfare ships (LCI[L] and larger) in commission
at the end of the war, only 158 were on Active Duty in 1948, with 611 in
65
the Navy Reserve.174 The Navy retained a small amphibious force on each
coast after the war, as well as the nucleus of its amphibious training capa
bility. The ATC, Pacific remained in operation at Coronado, California,
and the ATC, Atlantic, which had been inactivated in May 1945, was
reactivated at Little Creek, Virginia, in February 1946. Each command
included a Marine Corps troop training unit (TTU) to provide amphibi
ous warfare instruction for Army and Marine Corps units. A few Army
officers were assigned to the two Navy establishments as liaison officers
and instructors.175
As the great amphibious force was dispersed, some attempts were
made to capture the Army’s wartime experience. The ETO produced an
extensive after action report on the Normandy landing and river cross
ing operations. The AGF published a series of studies on all aspects of its
operations, including the wartime amphibious training. General officers
who had commanded amphibious operations wrote and spoke widely.176
The Army’s amphibious expertise, and interest in promulgating an Army
perspective on amphibious operations, lay with the Headquarters, AGF,
commanded by Devers and officially designated as the War Department
Operational Representative for Amphibious Training of Army Ground
Units within the United States in June 1946.177 At the tactical level, the
Army’s amphibious expertise rested with the amphibious engineer and
armor units in the Active and Reserve Components.
During the first year after the war, the two remaining EB&SRs and the
boat maintenance battalion of the 2d ESB were stationed at three Army
posts in southern California. In 1946 they participated in an amphibious
exercise with the 2d Infantry Division. In December 1946 the unit was
reduced to the Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company;
Headquarters Company, Company B (Boat), and Companies D and E
(Shore) of the 532d EB&SR; and Company A, 562d Boat Maintenance
Battalion. In 1947 the unit relocated to Fort Worden, Washington, at the
entrance to Puget Sound, where it was joined briefly by the 75th Amphibian
Tank Battalion (ATB), a Reserve unit stationed at nearby Camp Casey.
The brigade remained at Fort Worden for the remainder of the decade,
maintaining the Army’s amphibious expertise, participating in amphibious
exercises, and, in 1947 taking part in the atomic tests at Eniwetok Atoll.
In 1949 the 56th Amphibious Tractor Battalion, 50th Port Construction
Company, and 501st Transportation Harbor Craft Platoon were activated
from the General Reserve, where they had been on inactive status. The 56th
was reorganized as a composite ATTB and all three units were attached to
the 2d ESB.178
66
A small amphibious capability was also maintained in the Army
Organized Reserve Corps, beginning with the 75th ATB, activated in
1946 and inactivated the following year. The 409th ESB was organized in
December 1946, with its headquarters in Los Angeles, California, and its
subordinate units, the 369th, 370th, and 371st EB&SRs; the 425th Medical
Battalion; the 380th Engineer Boat Maintenance Battalion; the 356th
Ordnance Maintenance Company; and the 409th Quartermaster Company
based along the Pacific Coast in Los Angeles; Portland and Salem,
Oregon; and Seattle, Washington. In January 1947 the 302d Amphibious
Tractor Battalion was activated on the Gulf Coast of Mississippi. The
747th Amphibian Tank Company was organized in 1949 at Gainesville,
Florida, and nearby small towns and reorganized the following year as an
ATTB. All of these units were at greatly reduced strength, but they helped
to maintain some amphibious force structure for the Army and several
would be mobilized during the Korean War.179
Resumption of Amphibious Exercises

The first postwar amphibious exercise took place within General
MacArthur’s command in the Far East. In April 1946 Eighth Army in Japan
began planning a large-scale exercise in coordination with the Amphibious
Force, Pacific Fleet now commanded by Rear Admiral Struble, who had
commanded several amphibious operations in the Philippines. As the exer
cise was originally conceived, 13 RCTs would receive amphibious train
ing culminating in a division-size landing exercise. Rapid demobilization
led to a reduction in the scope of the exercise to four RCTs by July, when
a TTU from the Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet arrived in Japan to begin
18 days of shore training for each RCT. The ships scheduled for the exer
cise were diverted to Operation MAGIC CARPET (the return of US troops
to the United States) and were not available until October. After 7 days
during which one RCT conducted three landings, further training was can
celed because of a shortage of personnel.180
On 21 January 1946 the AGF announced resumption of Army
amphibious training in the United States. On the east coast, ATC, Atlantic
developed a program that included a demonstration landing exercise
for West Point cadets and Annapolis midshipmen. The first Cadets-
Midshipmen (CAMID) exercise took place in August 1946 and continued
as an annual event in late summer for the rest of the decade and through
the Korean War years.181
On the west coast, Major General George P. Hayes’s Sixth Army
was tasked as the AGF agency responsible for Pacific Coast amphibious
67
training, with the 12th Air Force representing the Tactical Air Command
(TAC). On 1 July 1946 Sixth Army and ATC, Pacific began planning for
the first large-scale west coast exercise, Operation DUCK/OILSKIN/
MOUNTAIN GOAT. The 2d Infantry Division, then stationed at Fort
Lewis, provided the landing force and the other participating Army units
included the 2d ESB and the 41st ATB. After preliminary training at San
Diego, Fort Lewis, Coronado, and San Clemente Island, the landings took
place on 25 and 26 November at Aliso Canyon near San Diego. Time
constraints prevented exercise of the follow-up phase: landing of supplies
and equipment after D+5, operation of the beaches after the beachhead
was secured, and initiation of base development.182
Hayes noted in his after action report, “By agreement with the Army
Ground Forces, the Navy utilized the Mid-Pacific doctrine as a basis of
instruction.” The Mid-Pacific doctrine assumed the withdrawal of the
landing force, including the shore parties, and its replacement by a garrison
force once the beachhead was established. Hayes recommended the doctrine
be revised “to include operations against continental land masses as well
as small islands.” He explained that in continental operations, Army units
are landed with the intention of conducting sustained land operations and
shore parties are not integral parts of the landing forces, but are “advance
elements of the Service of Supply which is built up progressively to
provide logistical support for a large military force.” To accommodate
this type of operation, Hayes argued that “Mid-Pacific doctrine should
include provisions for the employment of ESBs, DUKW companies,
Port companies, Truck companies, QM service companies, Gas Supply
companies, and Ordnance companies, none of which are contemplated in
the present doctrine.”183
The Unification and Roles and Missions Struggle

General Hayes’s critique of “Mid-Pacific doctrine” reflected an issue
that would persist over the next 4 years. Those Army officers with a
passionate interest in amphibious warfare would fight a running battle
with both the Army leadership and the Navy over the nature of amphibious
doctrine and the Army’s role in amphibious operations. Their complaint
to the Army Staff was that the leadership was paying insufficient attention
to amphibious doctrine and allowing by default an inappropriate doctrine
to be promulgated by the Navy, which had taken control of the amphibious
training program. Their argument to the Navy generally followed Hayes’s
comments—techniques and procedures suited to the kind of large-scale
operations the Army expected to conduct were being ignored.
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Three major bodies of amphibious experience had emerged from the
war. The Mid-Pacific doctrine adopted by the Navy and promulgated in
its postwar training and exercises was derived from the campaigns among
the islands of the Central Pacific. The postwar Army view of amphibious
operations drew largely on the Mediterranean and Normandy experience,
which generally conformed to the prewar views on continental amphibi
ous operations, and that of MacArthur’s SWPA: principally shore-to-shore
operations against undefended or lightly defended areas, bypassing enemy
force concentrations, and with a major contribution by ESBs that included
boat as well as shore party units.
There was a dichotomy in the Army attitude toward amphibious opera
tions. Some, like General Omar Bradley whose experience was in Europe,
remembered Salerno, Anzio, and Omaha Beach at Normandy and saw
amphibious operations as inherently dangerous, risky, and unnecessary
except when needed to establish an initial lodgment. Others, especially
those who served in the Southwest Pacific and looked at the coastlines,
rivers, and inland waterways, were convinced that amphibious war
fare would continue to be an essential military capability.184 Some saw
the atomic bomb as making large-scale amphibious operations obsolete,
because amphibious task forces and beachheads would be vulnerable to
atomic destruction, but if amphibious operations of division or larger size
were to be conducted, then the Army should conduct those operations. The
Marines might have invented the doctrine for landing on hostile shores,
but the Army had developed the techniques for large-scale operations and
had conducted more amphibious operations during the war.185 All of these
Army attitudes would come into play during the postwar struggle over
Service unification, roles, and missions.
During the war, the Army leadership became convinced that the
Services should be unified into one military department with a single chief
of staff to improve the efficiency of decisionmaking and reduce the dupli
cation of effort and competition for resources.186 As the war neared its end,
Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall raised the issue within the JCS.
As part of this overall position, the Army leadership also argued for a sepa
rate Air Force with control over all land-based aircraft and for a reduction
in the size and role of the Marine Corps. The Navy leadership opposed this
approach, preferring to adhere to existing JAAN arrangements under which
the war had been fought successfully. To some extent, the Navy concerns
reflected a fear that the Army, as the largest Service, would dominate any
unified organization. The Marines, now at unparalleled strength and pres
tige and proud of their wartime service and sacrifice, saw a renewed threat
to their existence and to their role as amphibious experts.187
69
The Marine concerns were not without foundation. Prior to World
War II there had never been a Marine Corps unit larger than brigade size.
Many Army officers, who saw warfare as an activity that was conducted
at the corps, army, or higher level, believed the Marine experience of
division and higher command was too short for them to have developed
the experience and understanding to command above the division level.
Furthermore, the Marine Corps, which had grown to six divisions and two
amphibious corps headquarters, and had garnered much public adulation
for its Pacific victories, would now compete with the Army for manpower
and resources in the postwar world of constrained budgets. Added to this,
and less easy to measure, was the antipathy many Army officers felt for
what they generally saw as an elitist and disdainful attitude on the part of
Marines. They particularly resented General H.M. Smith’s frequent criti
cism of the performance of Army troops and leaders, and they remained
angry about H.M. Smith’s relief from command of General Ralph Smith
on Saipan, which they saw as unjustified.188
During a 1946 internal JCS exchange of views on postwar missions
of the Services, Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower argued that the
Marine Corps should be restricted to units no larger than regiments and
its role confined to the initial phase of landing operations and guard duty,
with all major amphibious operations carried out by the Army. Air Force
Chief of Staff General Carl Spaatz supported Eisenhower in this. Admirals
Leahy and Nimitz, the Navy members of the JCS, objected strongly to this
recommendation. The Navy view was that amphibious operations were
essentially naval in character until after a beachhead had been established
and sustained combat operations began on land. The Marines, organized
into divisions and including armor and artillery, should be assigned the
responsibility for the amphibious phase. The members of the JCS were
unable to resolve this impasse and in June 1946 agreed to suspend further
consideration of the Services missions. The JCS did not discuss the “roles
and missions” issue again until 1948.189
In parallel with this internal JCS debate, Congress had begun hearings
on the unification issue. In congressional testimony, in the media, and in
behind the scenes debate, the Services engaged in a harsh war of words,
intensified by deeply held beliefs on all sides.190 The Marines had strong
and influential support within Congress, and the National Security Act as
enacted in 1947 stated:
The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped
to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together
with supporting air components, for service with the fleet
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in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for
the conduct of such land operations as may be essential
to the prosecution of a naval campaign. It shall be the
duty of the Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with
the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious
operations which pertain to the tactics, technique, and
equipment employed by landing forces.191
The Marines thus had their existence and amphibious mission written
into law. Nonetheless, some disagreements over Service roles and mis
sions remained. When President Truman signed the National Security Act,
he also promulgated an Executive order setting forth the Service func
tions. It did not specify Marine Corps operational responsibilities beyond
assigning the Navy the mission of seizing shore positions by “such landing
forces as may be comprised within the fleet organization,” but it assigned
to the Army the mission of seizing, occupying, and defending land areas
through airborne and joint amphibious operations.192 The Army view, sup
ported by the Air Force, was that in such joint amphibious operations (as
opposed to operations incidental to naval campaigns), the Army should
provide the landing force. For the Navy to develop Marine units of divi
sion, corps, or larger size capable of joint amphibious operations would be
an unnecessary duplication of effort, as well as a violation of the principles
of Service integration and unity of command.193
At the insistence of Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal, the JCS
met at Key West, Florida, in March 1948 to address this and other roles and
missions issues. The resulting Key West Agreement stated that the Marine
Corps functions as stated in the National Security Act did not “contem
plate the creation of a second land army” but otherwise set no limit on the
size of the corps. The agreement also specified, “The Marine Corps shall
have primary interest in the development of those landing force tactics,
techniques, and equipment which are of common interest to the Army and
the Marine Corps.”194 The Army was given primary interest in the devel
opment of airborne doctrine, procedure, and equipment, but was also to
“develop, in coordination with the other Services, tactics, techniques, and
equipment of interest to the Army for amphibious operations” not other
wise provided for in the Marine Corps’ amphibious function.195 The Key
West Agreement also set forth a definition of amphibious operations that
would later be contested by Army officers who argued for a unique Army
style of amphibious warfare:
Amphibious Operations—An attack launched from the
sea by naval and landing forces embarked in ships or
71
craft involving a landing on a hostile shore. An amphibi
ous operation includes final preparation of the objec
tive area for the landing and operations of naval, air and
ground elements in over water movements, assault, and
mutual support. An amphibious operation may precede a
large-scale land operation in which case it becomes the
amphibious phase of a joint amphibious operation. After
the troops are landed and firmly established ashore the
operation becomes a land operation.196
Army critics saw the definition as misleadingly narrow in its restric
tion to “naval and landing forces,” which ignored the kinds of purely Army
shore-to-shore operations carried out in SWPA, and in its limitation of the
definition to “final” preparation of the objective. They also objected to the
distinction between an amphibious operation (which the Navy argued was
quintessentially a naval operation and must be commanded by a naval
officer) and a land operation because, in their view, an amphibious opera
tion might be a phase in a land operation under the overall command of
an Army officer.197 However, Army leadership had accepted the definition
and the voices of the critics were temporarily stilled or ignored.
Post-National Security Act, Army Amphibious Doctrine and

Training
The National Security Act and the Key West Agreement led to a revi
sion of Service doctrine taking into account the new separate US Air Force
and the newly defined missions and functions of the Services. Post-1947
amphibious exercises were conducted in this new environment and in the
context of strategic war planning, which assumed that in a war against
the United States and Britain, the Soviet Union would overrun most of
continental Europe, Turkey, Iran, Korea, Manchuria, and North China,
requiring amphibious operations in any counteroffensive.198 The 1949
plan (OFFTACKLE) anticipated that, although Allied forces would try to
maintain a lodgment in Europe, perhaps at the line of the Pyrenees, evacu
ation of forces to Britain and North Africa would likely be required. The
United States and its allies might then conduct limited offensives to seize
footholds on Sicily, Southern Italy, Sardinia, and/or Corsica, eventually
reentering Western Europe through a two-pronged operation, with north
ern landings between Cherbourg and the base of the Jutland Peninsula as
far to the east as possible and a southern thrust from North Africa into
Southern France and up the Rhone Valley. The last plan developed before
the Korean War (DROPSHOT) included several alternative schemes for
72
the counteroffensive, with amphibious operations on the North Sea and
Black Sea coasts. Thus, even in the atomic era, there was a need to train
joint forces in the conduct of amphibious operations.199
The first joint exercise held after the unification of the armed forces,
Exercise Seminole, took place in October and November 1947 near Panama
City, Florida. Combat Command A of the 2d Armored Division provided
the landing force. The objectives were to train air, naval, and ground per
sonnel for landing operations; to practice high-level amphibious planning;
and to develop techniques for loading and landing armored forces and
other heavy equipment. The exercise provided valuable experience that
would later be incorporated into instructional material and an amphibi
ous study produced by the Armor School at Fort Knox, Kentucky.200 The
following year, the Puerto Rican 65th Infantry participated with Marine
Corps units in a 1st Marine Division exercise at Vieques Island, serving
both as a floating reserve and as part of the amphibious assault force.201
In early 1949 the 2d ESB stepped up its training in preparation for
major exercises planned for the next 2 years. Company E, 532d EB&SR
served as the shore party for an Antilles Command amphibious exercise
at Vieques Island in January. In April Company B (Boat), 532d EB&SR
and watercraft of the 501st Harbor Craft Platoon carried out a 21-day,
1,114-mile cruise on the Columbia River. The first of the big exercises
was Joint Army–Navy Exercise Miki, held on the west coast and in
Hawaii from 20 September to 25 November 1949. The scenario for the
exercise, which was strictly an Army–Navy affair with no Marine Corps
or Air Force participation, simulated the invasion of a large enemy-held
island (Oahu, Hawaii). It was a substantial operation. General Clark,
Commanding General of Sixth Army and soon to replace General Devers
as Commanding General of Army Field Forces (AFF), was the maneuver
director.202 The Navy amphibious task force that transported the landing
force from the west coast to Hawaii included 40 major amphibious ships
escorted by two aircraft carrier divisions sailing under simulated combat
conditions. The 2d Infantry Division, minus one regiment, was the landing
force. Company C, 56th ATTB provided support for the landing in Hawaii
and the 2d ESB (minus the boat elements) provided the shore party. The
boat company did not participate, as postwar Navy policy was to exclude
ESB boat units from exercises (very different from the days when Admiral
Barbey carried ESB landing craft aboard his own transports in SWPA).
Although dangerously heavy surf prevented the use of some of the
planned beach on Oahu, all of the troops and 1,700 vehicles were ashore
by D+2 and most of the exercise objectives (training in all phases of an
73
amphibious operation) were judged to have been met. It was the largest
and most complex amphibious operation since World War II, and would
not be exceeded until the Incheon landing the following year.203
While not as large as Miki, the next joint amphibious exercise was
still substantial. Puerto Rican Exercise (PORTREX) took place at Vieques
Island in the Caribbean from 25 February to 11 March 1950, with pre
liminary training in January and February. While Miki was an Army–Navy
exercise, PORTREX was directed by the JCS to provide training in the
planning and execution of a joint operation and to test actual contingency
plans. The scenario was one of invasion of an island by means of a coor
dinated airborne and amphibious attack to establish a lodgment for sub
sequent operations of the kind envisioned in the war plans. The attacking
force included a battalion combat team of the 82d Airborne Division and
a landing force consisting of major elements of the 3d Infantry Division
plus some 17,000 marines, with Company D, 56th ATTB, in support and
the 532d EB&SR (less boat elements) providing the nucleus of the shore
party. The 65th RCT simulated the enemy defenders.204
Thus, both of the Active Army divisions that deployed from the
Continental United States to Korea during the Korean War, the 2d and
3d Infantry Divisions, had participated in large-scale amphibious exer
cises within a year of deployment. Although General MacArthur requested
the 2d Infantry Division to be part of the landing force for the Incheon
operation, circumstances caused the early commitment of the division into
ground combat and neither of the amphibious-trained Army divisions was
ever actually used in an amphibious assault operation.205
While these exercises provided the opportunity for amphibious plan
ning and operations, the intellectual work took place at AGF/AFF, the US
Army Command and General Staff College, and the Service schools. At
the Command and General Staff College, Lieutenant Colonel William B.
Rosson, a veteran of the North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, and Southern
France amphibious operations, developed a course in 1947 designed to
teach amphibious staff planning techniques and tactical principles at the
infantry division level. The Armor School developed amphibious doctrine
specifically related to landing armor forces, and Brigadier General David
Ogden, who had commanded the 3d ESB in World War II and the 2d ESB
after the war, lectured at the Engineer School, as well as at other venues,
and wrote about the Army-unique perspective on amphibious operations.206
AFF monitored the information collected from exercises and reports from
the Army liaison officers serving with the Navy ATCs, and served as an
advocate for Army involvement in amphibious doctrine development.207
74
Since 1946 advocates for Army amphibious operations had com
plained about certain aspects of the Navy’s training program. An under
lying concern was that, based on the wartime agreements that gave the
Navy responsibility for amphibious training, the Navy had developed its
postwar training program with very little, if any, Army input. The fault did
not lie entirely with the Navy. In 1946 Admiral Nimitz had proposed the
assignment of Army officers and enlisted men to fleet amphibious forces,
amphibious groups, and ATCs. The unification struggle had already begun
by then and some Army general staff officers were concerned that the
assignment of such officers might be used by the Navy as an argument
against unification, arguing that their presence “might lead to the conclu
sion that the staffs are joint, thereby indicating a lessening of the necessity
for unification, whereas, in effect, those staffs will merely contain liaison
officers.”208 The officers were assigned, ranging in rank from lieutenant col
onel to staff sergeant, but they rarely received guidance from the Army and
had no authority to speak for the Army on policy recommendations.209
Specific issues raised by Army advocates primarily concerned the
Navy emphasis on Mid-Pacific doctrine and the focus on operations against
islands that assumed the landing force and the shore party would with
draw once the beachhead was secured. The Army anticipated that it would
be involved in large-scale operations of corps size or larger. (“The Army
does not fight small wars,” General Ogden said in his critique of the 1946
exercise and repeated frequently thereafter.) In such a case, the landing
force troops would not depart after the beachhead was secure, but would
continue to conduct sustained operations on land. The shore party in these
operations would be the lead element of a major sustainment effort.
The Army advocates also objected to the Navy assumption that all
amphibious operations were primarily naval operations of such a techni
cal nature that the joint expeditionary force commander had to be a naval
officer who must remain in overall command until the landing force was
established ashore. Pointing to the SWPA experience, the Army advocates
noted that a shore-to-shore operation might be conducted entirely by Army
forces and that even in the case of ship-to-shore operations, the landing
was likely to be part of the initial phase of a land operation. In such cases,
the Navy would be the supporting force and the Army commander should
have overall command throughout the operation. A related issue was the
importance to Army forces of control over landing craft after the landing
for support of operations ashore through over-the-shore logistics; coastal
and inland waterway transportation; and such follow-on operations as
subsidiary shore-to-shore landings, river crossings, and waterborne patrol
75
and intelligence operations. Furthermore, in the post-National Security
Act era, Army advocates argued that the joint operations envisioned in
the Act, the Executive order, and the Key West Agreement required that
joint doctrine be developed jointly by the Services and not unilaterally by
a single Service. They also argued for a truly joint amphibious training
establishment.210
At the Army staff level, there was not universal agreement about
the importance of amphibious operations. In 1947 Lieutenant General J.
Lawton Collins, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, expressed concern that
the curriculums of Army schools included too much time on amphibious
operations at the expense of airborne operations. The subject would arise
again over the next 2 years, and in 1949 the Army Staff considered chang
ing the organization and mission of the ESBs to reduce the amphibious
beachhead shore party responsibilities and add responsibility for operating
airheads during airborne operations.211 Nonetheless, the Army staff sup
ported an effort by AFF to develop an agreed Army position on amphibi
ous operations. In September 1948 General Devers appointed a board of
officers led by Lieutenant General Truscott to “define the position of the
Department of the Army on basic doctrine, policies, and procedures on
joint matters pertaining to joint amphibious operations.”212 Ogden was a
member of the panel that heard testimony from a large number of offi
cers with amphibious experience, including General Krueger, Sixth Army
commander in SWPA, and Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, who had
commanded XXIV Corps in the Central and Southwest Pacific amphibi
ous operations.
Among the panel’s principal conclusions were that unilateral devel
opment of amphibious doctrine had resulted in “narrow concepts and
arbitrary views”; that all of the Services must participate actively in the
development of amphibious doctrine and techniques; that an amphibious
operation “is essentially an assault of any size to achieve an objective on
land in which the landing force is dependent on waterborne means for
transport and for tactical and logistical support”; that when “the objec
tive of a joint amphibious operation is within the field of normal land
combat operations, Army responsibility is dominant” and the amphibious
assault is “only an initial step in the development of land combat”; and
that the Army should have in its peacetime establishment “an organization
to develop and train shore parties and other special purpose amphibious
units.”213 Based on these conclusions, the panel recommended the estab
lishment of a joint agency to supervise the development of joint amphibi
ous operations. The panel argued that all the Services should recognize
that, although an amphibious operation might be conducted to seize a base
76
for naval operations, it could also be a phase of land combat. For this
reason, the panel recommended one of the primary functions of the Army
be “to conduct such amphibious operations as are necessary for the sei
zure of objectives in a land campaign.” The panel also proposed a new
definition of an amphibious operation to replace the one in the Key West
Agreement:
An attack launched from the sea by forces embarked in
ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile shore. An
amphibious operation includes preparation of the objec
tive area for the landing, and operations of these forces in
over water movements, assault, and support. The amphib
ious operation is a joint amphibious operation when the
assigned forces are composed of elements of more than
one Service of the National Military Establishment.214
Other recommendations provided for greater Army control of amphib
ious assets and operations when the land campaign was the dominant
element. There were also recommendations for unilateral Army actions,
including the maintenance of some equivalent of the ESB to train shore
parties and other special purpose amphibious units. The panel did not insist
that the Army own its own landing craft, but that there be “sufficient army-
controlled landing craft (Army or Navy operated) to ensure minimum
maintenance of army logistics and minimum support of minor operations
of an amphibious nature.”215 The report was forwarded to the Army Staff
and became the basis for the Army position on amphibious operations.
Shortly thereafter, in August 1949, Army General and Service School
instructors met at the Engineer School at Fort Belvoir.216 Among the topics
discussed was the Army role in amphibious operations, the findings of the
Truscott Panel, and the Army’s view of inter-Service amphibious doctrinal
differences. As the Army officers perceived the basic difference, the Navy
based its thinking on limited operations ashore, while the Army had to
plan for extensive operations on land, for which the amphibious landing
was only the first phase. As one participant put it, “The Navy looks at [the
amphibious assault] primarily from the standpoint of a beachhead and the
Army looks at it from the standpoint of invasion.”217
The Navy and Marine Corps and the Army also approached shore
party operations differently. Because the Marine Corps trained all of its
combat units to conduct amphibious operations, the Navy and Marine
Corps believed that shore parties could be organized quickly from the
landing force units. Army divisions, however, were organized, trained, and
equipped for sustained operations on land. Units selected for an amphibi
ous assault could be given the required training prior to the operation,
77
but the key to an effective amphibious operation was a well-trained and
equipped shore party capable of moving large quantities of supplies and
large numbers of troops over the beach and inland. As one of the confer
ence participants put it, “The Marine idea is you take all your divisions
and train them for amphibious operations and you don’t need a [specially
trained] shore party. . . . The Army’s position is that we should be able to
take any Army division and with a little bit of training in climbing in and
out of boats, put it ashore in amphibious operations. But the key to the
whole situation is the existence of a well-trained shore party.”218
The instructors also discussed the ESB units, noting the value of
engineer boat and shore units in the Southwest Pacific. The 2d ESB,
which retained the Army’s amphibious expertise, was organized after the
Southwest Pacific pattern, although there was some move toward expand
ing its mission to include the logistic support of airborne airheads as well
as amphibious beachheads. The discussants noted that the Army had no
objection to relinquishing to the Navy the responsibility for operating
landing craft, so long as the Army’s continuing requirements for shore-
to-shore, coastal, and inland waterway transportation were met. However,
the conference participants were not sanguine that the Navy would be pre
pared to meet those requirements.219
The Truscott Panel report served as the basis for the Army position
during coordination of Joint Action Armed Forces published in 1951 to
replace the old JAAN document. Some of the recommendations would later
be reflected in the language of Army amphibious doctrine published in the
early 1950s. The 1952 draft of the Army’s capstone operational doctrine
publication, Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations,
adhered closely to the AFF panel recommendations. The final version,
published in 1954, reverted to the phrase, “a joint amphibious operation
is essentially an attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces
embarked in ships or craft” (emphasis added). But it also identified cer
tain fundamentals. One of these was that “[l]arge amphibious operations
are usually joint in nature [and all] large amphibious operations involv
ing Army landing forces will be joint operations.” The field manual noted
that small amphibious operations might be “unilateral Navy operations,”
but the Army might conduct small shore-to-shore operations unilaterally.
Another fundamental was that control of the joint force involved in an
amphibious operation “must be vested in one commander,” leaving open
the possibility that it might be an Army commander. The manual also noted
that amphibious shore-to-shore techniques might be used for “subsidiary
interisland or coastal flanking operations,” on navigable rivers and lakes,
and the crossing of wide or swift rivers.220
78
By the time these manuals were published, Army forces had partici
pated in actual amphibious operations in Korea. The preparations for those
operations had begun while the panel was deliberating. In the Far East,
General MacArthur was arguing and planning for a large-scale amphibi
ous training program to prepare his command for war.
The Situation in the Far East on the Eve of the Korean War
In 1947 the JCS had established two unified commands in the Pacific.
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, then commander in chief of the US Pacific
Fleet, was named Commander in Chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC)
with responsibilities in the Central Pacific. MacArthur, then command
ing the occupation of Japan as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers
(SCAP) and Commanding General, USAFFE, was named Commander in
Chief, Far East (CINCFE) with responsibilities in the Western Pacific. At
that time the chain of command ran from the President and Secretary of
Defense through the JCS, who designated specific Service chiefs as execu
tive agents for the various unified commands. Strategic direction and guid
ance was communicated to Radford through the Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman; and to General MacArthur through the Chief
of Staff of the Army, General Collins. The Far East Command (FEC)221
initially encompassed Japan; Korea; the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa); the
Philippines; and the Mariana, Bonin, and Volcano Islands. However, from
1947 until the start of the Korean War, Korea was removed (at General
MacArthur’s request) from the FEC area of responsibility (AOR). The
commander of US forces in Korea reported directly to the Army Chief of
Staff.222
The JCS intention was that unified commands would have balanced,
joint staffs. General MacArthur’s approach was to re-designate GHQ
USAFFE as GHQ FEC. As a result, there was no joint staff and no Army
Service Component Command. Because MacArthur did not establish
a separate staff for Army Forces Far East, each major Army command
in the theater reported directly to CINCFE.223 To aid in carrying out his
joint responsibilities, in 1949 MacArthur established the JSPOG under
Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright, who was also the GHQ FEC chief
of operations (G3). Consisting of three Army, three Navy, and two Air
Force general and flag officers, JSPOG was the primary joint planning
element throughout the Korean War, including responsibility for planning
amphibious operations.
The most significant Army command in the Far East was Lieutenant
General Walton H. Walker’s Eighth US Army (EUSA), which acted as
the Army Service Component Command. On the eve of the war, Eighth
79
Army, with its headquarters in Yokohama, Japan, consisted of four under-
strength divisions (1st Cavalry and 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions),
the 40th Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA) Brigade with seven AAA battalions,
and service and logistic support units. Two battalions of the 29th Infantry
Regiment and two AAA battalions were located on Okinawa. The near
est units outside the theater were the 5th RCT in Hawaii; the 1st Marine
Division and 1st Marine Air Wing at Camp Pendleton, California; and
the 2d Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington. The only American
soldiers stationed in Korea at the start of the war were the 492 members
of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea
(KMAG).224
Lieutenant General George Stratemeyer commanded the Air Force
component command, Far East Air Forces (FEAF). FEAF included three
numbered air forces (Major General Earle E. Partridge’s Fifth Air Force in
Japan consisting of air defense fighters and light bombers, 13th Air Force
in the Philippines, and 20th Air Force responsible for the air defense of
Okinawa), the 19th Bombardment Group (B-29s) in the Marianas, and a
FEAF Materiel Command.225
Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy commanded the Navy component com
mand, Naval Forces, Far East (NAVFE). NAVFE included small naval
forces in the Philippines (TF 93) and the Marianas (TF 94), but its main
strength was in Japanese waters and was provided by TF 96 (Naval Forces
Japan): a cruiser, several destroyers, a submarine, and a few minesweep
ers. Admiral Joy also had operational control over the Shipping Control
Administration, Japan (SCAJAP). SCAJAP in June 1950 consisted of 12
ex-US Navy freighters and 39 LSTs manned by Japanese but controlled by
SCAP. These ships had been used to repatriate Japanese from the continent
following the war and continued to be used for FEC logistic support and as
interim transport in the Japanese islands until the war-destroyed Japanese
Merchant Marine could be reconstituted.226 By 1949 NAVFE had come to
see the constant repair and maintenance of these old ships to be a liability
and recommended they be scrapped. Wright, the FEC G3, and officers of
the G4 (Logistics) section, argued that the ships should be kept operational
“as an amphibious capability in the event of an emergency.” Within a year,
the value of these LSTs would become clear.227
As SCAP, MacArthur also had operational control of Lieutenant
General H.C.H. Robertson’s British Commonwealth Forces (BCOF); No.
77 Squadron Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF); the 3d Battalion, Royal
Australian Rifles; and the Australian frigate Shoalhaven, which served
with TF 96 as Task Unit (TU) 96.5.3, Commonwealth Support Element. In
80
the FEC AOR, but not under MacArthur’s control, were Struble’s Seventh
Fleet at Subic Bay in the Philippines, which was under CINCPAC, and
the British Far East Fleet commanded by Rear Admiral Sir William G.
Andrewes. Struble’s force included an aircraft carrier, a heavy cruiser, eight
destroyers, four submarines, and a small force of auxiliaries. Andrewes’
force included an aircraft carrier, cruiser, and several destroyers and escort
ships.228
The primary responsibility for water transportation, other than Rear
Admiral James H. Doyle’s amphibians and the SCAJAP fleet, rested with
the MSTS, a unified organization within the Navy Department that was
established in October 1949, absorbing both the Naval Transportation
Service (the Navy’s nonamphibious transports and cargo ships) and the
sea-going ships and functions of the Army Transportation Corps. MSTS
had primary responsibility for water transportation for the military. It oper
ated its own fleet of ships, chartered civilian ships, and scheduled ship
ping. In January 1950 Navy Captain Alexander F. Junker arrived in Tokyo,
to prepare to assume his duties as the deputy commander for MSTS in the
Western Pacific (DepComMSTS WestPac) effective 1 July 1950. By the
time his office began operation, Junker would be faced with the challenge
of orchestrating the shipping resources in support of the Korean War.229
GHQ FEC Amphibious Training Program

When reading accounts of the Incheon landing, one sometimes receives
the impression that the FEC staff was totally ignorant of amphibious war
fare. An examination of the GHQ FEC records for the period prior to the
war tells a somewhat different story. It is true that most of the amphibious
expertise lay with the Navy and Marine amphibious forces, but General
MacArthur had initiated a vigorous amphibious training program in 1949
that was about to come to fruition when the North Koreans attacked.
US forces in Japan had spent the first years after the end of World War
II focused primarily on occupation duty to the detriment of their combat
readiness. However, as the occupation proceeded peacefully, the Japanese
regained increasing control over their own affairs, and tensions increased
between the United States and the Soviet Union, MacArthur began to
refocus the effort toward regaining combat proficiency. On 10 June 1949
GHQ FEC announced a new joint training program with RCT-level
amphibious landing exercises to be conducted by 31 July 1950.230 That
month MacArthur requested a commitment from the Navy for instruction
and shipping to conduct amphibious training for one battalion landing
team (BLT) from each of the four divisions in Japan. By December he had
81
increased the scope of the program to training for 10 battalions culminating
in a division-size landing exercise (LEX) in Okinawa. By February 1950
MacArthur notified the Army Staff that his planning for a “large scale joint
amphibious-air transportable exercise” was progressing satisfactorily, but
there had been no commitment from the Navy for the essential shipping
support. The Navy’s response later that month was that other commitments
would limit Navy support to the four-BLT program originally planned.231
A disappointed MacArthur accepted that the training planned for May
to August 1950 would have to be limited, but he then proposed a major
amphibious training program, arguing that he considered “amphibious
training to have unusual significance and importance in the Far East
Command since the nature of troop dispositions and geography of the
theater are such that a continuous requirement exists for the training of
troops in over-water movement.” His new program would begin in 1951
with the training of a division headquarters and three RCTs and a divisional
LEX in Okinawa. He proposed a similar program for the next 3 fiscal years.
He also advised that a reconnaissance of the Okinawa beaches revealed a
requirement for LVTs, since LCVPs and LCMs could not pass over the
offshore reefs. Additionally, he requested consideration of temporary
assignment of the 2d ESB to participate in the LEX and the establishment
of a permanent amphibious training center in the Far East.232
While awaiting a response (and receiving generally discouraging sig
nals from the Navy), GHQ FEC pressed ahead to do as much as possible
from within its own resources. Funds were provided to Eighth Army for
the construction of an amphibious training center at Camp McGill, about
75 miles southwest of Tokyo. Soldiers with amphibious or maritime expe
rience were recruited to form a provisional ATC within Eighth Army. Navy
LST crews were requested to man SCAJAP LSTs to form a nucleus of an
FEC amphibious training force. When the Navy failed to respond, a search
began for potential civilian or military mariners of whatever Service. Plans
were made to convert one or more SCAJAP cargo ships into makeshift
assault transports by fitting them with Welin davits and other amphibious
gear taken from SCAJAP LSTs.233 Meanwhile, Major General Edward M.
Almond, GHQ FEC Chief of Staff, peppered the staff with queries on the
status of the program, amphibious warfare doctrine, and the conduct of
amphibious operations in SWPA in World War II.234
By the spring of 1950, Eighth Army had established an amphibious
training center at Camp McGill, on the east coast of Sagami Bay south
west of Tokyo, and near a suitable beach for landing exercises (Chigasaki
82
Beach), and on 1 April 1950 had activated a 50-man unit of Army engi
neers and others with amphibious and related expertise as the 8206th
Army Unit (AU), ATC.235 In April Doyle’s Amphibious Group One arrived
to add Navy ships and expertise to the training program. Designated as
Task Force 90 (Amphibious Force, Far East) upon its assignment to Naval
Forces Far East, Amphibious Group One consisted of Doyle’s flagship,
the amphibious flag ship Mount McKinley (AGC-7), the attack transport
Cavalier (APA-37), the attack cargo ship Union (AKA-106), the tank land
ing ship LST-611, and the fleet tug Arikara (ATF-98). Doyle was one of
the most experienced amphibious officers in the US Navy. During World
War II he had been the operations officer of Amphibious Force, South
Pacific during the Guadalcanal and Solomon Islands Campaigns; served in
the Amphibious Section of the staff of the commander in chief, US Fleet;
served on the Joint Amphibious Warfare Committee; and commanded a
light cruiser during the Okinawa campaign. After service with the United
Nations Military Committee, he had returned to amphibious warfare. He
was highly respected by MacArthur’s staff and commanders and acknowl
edged as an expert on amphibious warfare.236
On 27 April Marine Colonel Edward H. Forney’s Mobile Training
Team (MTT) Able and an Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
(ANGLICO) arrived from the Coronado, California, amphibious train
ing base.237 The training program began with the arrival in May of the
35th Infantry Regiment of the 24th Infantry Division, soon followed by
the 5th Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division. Forney’s MTT was to con
duct the first few cycles of pre-afloat (on-shore) training; then the 8206th
would take over. The pre-afloat training was to be followed by battalion-
size landing exercises at nearby Chigasaki Beach carried out by Doyle’s
TF 90.238 On 29 April 1950 lead elements of the 35th Infantry Regiment
arrived at Camp McGill. The amphibious training school opened on 1 May
and training began on 1 June. The first landing exercise coincided almost
exactly with the North Korean attack that began the Korean War.
83
Notes
1. A useful summary of British amphibious operations in the colonial
period is Herbert Richmond, Amphibious Warfare in British History (Exeter, UK:
A. Wheaton & Company, 1941). A description of Phips’s bloodless capture of
Port Royal and his disastrous expedition against Quebec is in the biography of
Sir William Phips in Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online, biographica/EN/
ShowBio.asp?BioId=34586 (accessed 15 June 2005). For Vernon’s Caribbean
operations, see Richard Harding, Amphibious warfare in the eighteenth century:
the British expedition to the West Indies, 1740–1742 (Suffolk, UK: Boydell Press,
1991).
2. For the Louisburg and Quebec operations, see Brook Nihart, “Amphibious
Operations in Colonial North America,” in Merrill L. Bartlett, ed., Assault from
the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1983), 46–48; John Creswell, Generals and Admirals: The Story of
Amphibious Command (New York, NY: Longmans, Green, 1952), 63–84; William
M. Fowler Jr., Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for
North America, 1754–1763 (New York, NY: Walker and Company, 2005), 163–172;
and Douglas Edward Leach, “The Colonial Period,” in John E. Jessup and Louise
B. Ketz, eds., Encyclopedia of the American Military (New York, NY: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1994), Vol. 1, 507–544. For MacArthur’s comparison of the
Incheon landing to the Quebec operation, see Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences
(New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964, Second Printing), 349–350.
For Pocock’s Havana expedition, see Francis Russell Hart, The Siege of Havana
1762 (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1931).
3. Glover’s Regiment, which included African–American soldiers,
became known as the amphibious regiment after its river crossing operations
in the evacuation of Long Island and at the Battle of Trenton. David Hackett
Fisher, Washington’s Crossing (New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA,
2004), 21–22; Glover’s Marblehead Regiment, gloversregiment.org/history.html
(accessed 5 May 2007).
4. Charles Dana Gibson and E. Kay Gibson, The Army’s Navy Series, Vol. I,
Marine Transportation in War: The U.S. Army Experience, 1775–1860 (Camden,
ME: Ensign Press, 1992), 7–8, 31–33; Fisher, Washington’s Crossing, 21–24,
101, 110, 215–220; Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United
States Marine Corps (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1991), 9–10; James Kirby
Martin and John Morgan Dederer, “The War of the Revolution,” in Encyclopedia
of the American Military, Vol. 1, 545–594; and George E. Buker, The Penobscot
Expedition: Commodore Saltonstall and the Massachusetts Conspiracy of 1779
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002).
5. James Ripley Jacobs, The Beginning of the U.S. Army, 1783–1812
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947), 149, 153; Gibson & Gibson,
Marine Transportation, 41–44.
6. William S. Dudley, “The War of 1812 and Postwar Expansion,” in
Encyclopedia of the American Military, Vol. 1, 629–676. A particularly useful
84
study of the history of joint operations and command and control in US Armed
Forces is Lawrence J. Legere, “Unification of the Armed Forces,” PhD diss.,
Harvard University, 1950. Pages 14 through 26 cover joint command relations in
the War of 1812.
7. Letter, Captain Oliver H. Perry to Secretary of the Navy Jones, 7 October
1813, and letter, Major General William Henry Harrison, USA, to Secretary of
War Armstrong, 9 October 1813, in William S. Dudley, ed., The Naval War of
1812: A Documentary History, Vol. II (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center,
1992), 570–576.
8. Letter, Commodore Isaac Chauncey to Major General Jacob Brown,
USA, 10 August 1814, in Dudley, ed., The Naval War of 1812, Vol. III, 2002,
584–585.
9. Gibson & Gibson, Marine Transportation, 45–66; Dudley, “The War of
1812 and Postwar Expansion”; George E. Buker, Swamp Sailors: Riverine Warfare
in the Everglades, 1835–1842 (Gainesville, FL: University Presses of Florida,
1975), 136–140. Buker argues that the concepts of riverine warfare developed
in the Second Seminole War and later used in the Mexican and Civil Wars were
essentially the same as those used by Army riverine forces in the Mekong Delta
during the Vietnam War.
10. K. Jack Bauer, Surfboats and Horse Marines, U.S. Naval Operations
in the Mexican War, 1846–48 (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 1969); Henry
W.T. Eglin, “General Scott’s Landing at Vera Cruz, March 9, 1897,” in The Coast
Artillery Journal, Vol. 68, No. 3 (March 1928): 244–247; John Fleming Polk, “Vera
Cruz, 1847,” in Bartlett, ed., Assault from the Sea, 74–78; Cornelius C. Smith Jr.,
“Our First Amphibious Assault,” Military Review, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 11 (January
1959): 18–28; and Gibson & Gibson, Marine Transportation, 87–94.
11. The impact of the operation on Army engineers is discussed by Rowena
Reed, Combined Operations in the Civil War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1978), xii–xiii.
12. Reed, Combined Operations, 3–10; Kevin J. Weddle, Lincoln’s Tragic
Admiral: The Life of Samuel Francis DuPont (Charlottesville and London:
University of Virginia Press, 2005), 106–124. Weddle argues that the Blockade
Board was the first (and only Civil War) body that systematically formulated joint
naval and military strategy.
13. Charles Dana Gibson and E. Kay Gibson, The Army’s Navy Series, Vol.
II, Assault and Logistics: Union Army Coastal and River Operations, 1861–1866
(Camden, ME: Ensign Press, 1995), 3–23; Reed, Combined Operations, 11–32;
Weddle, Lincoln’s Tragic Admiral, 125–137.
14. Robert W. Daley, “Burnside’s Amphibious Division,” in Bartlett, ed.,
Assault from the Sea, 88–94; Gibson & Gibson, Assault and Logistics, 24–33.
15. These operations are described in Gibson & Gibson, Assault and
Logistics; and Reed, Combined Operations.
16. Chester G. Hearn, Ellet’s Brigade: The Strangest Outfit of All (Baton
Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2000). I am indebted to David
Keough of MHI for bringing this unit and this book to my attention.
85
17. “Reports of Lieutenant Colonel Barton S. Alexander, US Army,
Engineer Officer of Operations from April 20 to July 12” (Washington, DC, 28
January 1863), Official Records of the Rebellion, Vol. 11, Chapter 23, Part 1:
“Peninsular Campaign, Reports,” 134–139; Reed, Combined Operations, 149–
160. I am indebted to Dr. James B. Batholomees of the US Army War College for
bringing this operation to my attention.
18. Gary J. Ohls, “Fort Fisher: Amphibious Victory in the American Civil
War,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 59, No. 4, Autumn 2006, 81–99; Joseph
E. King, “The Fort Fisher Campaigns, 1864–65,” in Bartlett, ed., Assault from the
Sea, 95–104; Reed, Combined Operations, 321–383.
19. Graham T. Cosmas makes this point in “Joint Operations in the
Spanish–American War,” in James C. Bradford, ed., Crucible of Empire: The
Spanish–American War & Its Aftermath (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1993), 104.
20. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., Avenging the General Sherman: The 1871 Battle
of Kang Hwa Do (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Foundation, 2002).
21. Brian McAllister Linn, “America’s Expeditionary War Transformation,”
Naval History, Vol. 19, Issue 5, October 2005, 58.
22. Jack Shulimson, “Marines in the Spanish–American War,” in Bradford,
ed., Crucible of Empire, 127–157; Millett, Semper Fidelis, 131–134.
23. David F. Trask, The War With Spain in 1898 (New York, NY: Macmillan,
1981), 213–214, 353–358; Cosmas, “Joint Operations,” in Bradford, ed., Crucible
of Empire, 115–116; Jonas L. Goldstein, “Cuba Libre! Army–Navy Cooperation
in 1898,” Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 2000, 116–121. Graham T. Cosmas
discusses the Army’s attempts to procure landing craft for the operation and the
use of the ship’s lifeboats, Navy steam launches, and other small craft for the
Daiquirí and Siboney landings in An Army for Empire: The United States Army
in the Spanish–American War, 2d ed. (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing
Company, 1994), 180–182, 192, 207–208, 233–234.
24. Cosmas, An Army for Empire, 235. The communications between
General Miles and the Secretary of War and other correspondence during the
Puerto Rico landings are particularly informative on the technical aspects of the
landing operations. These are collected in Correspondence Relating to the War
With Spain including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China
Relief Expedition, April 15, 1898, to July 30, 1902, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC:
Center of Military History, United States Army, 1993), 285–338.
25. Cosmas, An Army for Empire, 240; Trask, The War with Spain,
382–388.
26. Trask, The War with Spain, 96–107; Brian McAllister Linn, The U.S.
Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1898–1902 (Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 99, 113, 115, et passim.
27. Erna Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army: A History of the Corps,
1775–1939 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1962), 551–555, 566–569, 609–610, 715–
716. The Navy took over the fleet of transports and the US Shipping Board from
1917 to 1920. Thereafter, the Army Quartermaster Corps continued to operate
86
the ATS until the creation on 31 July 1942 of the Transportation Corps, which
operated the ATS until it was absorbed into the MSTS in 1950. Chester Wardlow,
United States Army in World War II: The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities,
Organization, and Operations (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military
History, 1951), 32–33, 55; James A. Field Jr., History of United States Naval
Operations, Korea (Washington, DC: GPO, 1962), 71–74.
28. Vernon E. Davis, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War
II, Organizational Development, Vol. I, Origin of the Joint and Combined Chiefs
of Staff (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 1972), 6–10.
29. Legere, “Unification of the Armed Forces,” 60.
30. Jack Shulimson, The Marine Corps Search for a Mission: 1880–1898
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993).
31. Kenneth J. Clifford, Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History
of the United States Marine Corps, 1900–1970 (Washington, DC: History and
Museums Division, US Marine Corps, 1973), 1–15; Millett, Semper Fidelis, 138–
144, 271–276.
32. William F. Atwater, “United States Army and Navy Development of
Joint Landing Operations, 1898–1942,” PhD diss., Duke University, 1986, 52–53;
citing for the landing manual, War Department, United States Army Transport
Service Regulations, 1908 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1908), (Atwater notes there
was an even more rudimentary section on landing operations in the 1905 version);
and, for the landing exercise, “Field Exercise in Massachusetts,” Army and Navy
Journal 52 (28 August 1909): 1474–1478.
33. Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the
Occupation of Veracruz (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1962),
85–155; James H. Alexander, “Roots of Deployment—Vera Cruz, 1914,” in
Bartlett, ed., Assault from the Sea, 132–141; Jack Sweetman, The Landing at
Veracruz, 1914 (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 1968).
34. Charles B. Burdick, The Japanese Siege of Tsingtau (Hamden, CT:
Archon Books, 1976); W.J. Davis, “Japanese Operations at Tsing Tao, 1914,” in
Monographs of the World War (Fort Benning, GA: US Army Infantry School
[1923?]; Clifford Jones, “Japanese Landing at Tsing-tao,” Coast Artillery Journal,
Vol. 68, No. 6 (June 1928): 145–149.
35. Lathrop B. Clapham, “The Gallipoli Expedition Until May 6, 1915”;
and Charles E. Speer, “From Battle of Sari Bair, August 10, 1915, to include Third
Phase of the Gallipoli Campaign Evacuation, January 9, 1916,” in Monographs
of the World War (Fort Benning, GA: US Army Infantry School [1923?]; Shepard
L. Pike, Landing and Operations at Gallipoli, Apr 25, 1915: Study (Washington,
DC: Army War College, 1929); and Ned B. Rehkopf, “The Landing at Gallipoli,”
Coast Artillery Journal, Vol. 68, No. 6 (June 1928): 475–491, and Vol. 69, No. 1
(July 1928): 19–35.
36. Michael B. Barrett, Operation ALBION: The German Conquest of the
Baltic Islands (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008); Robert Foley,
“Ösel & Moon Islands: Operation ALBION, September 1917, The German Invasion
87
of the Baltic Islands,” Tristan Lovering, ed., Amphibious Assault: Manoeuvre from
the Sea (Rendlesham, Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: Seafarer Books, 2007), 23–36.
37. Deborah Lake, The Zeebrugge and Ostend Raids 1918 (Barnsley, South
Yorkshire, UK: Leo Cooper, 2002); Barrie Pitt, Zeebrugge (New York, NY:
Ballantine Books, 1958). This overview of World War I amphibious operations
is also based on Army War College studies in the Curricular Archives at the US
Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA, hereafter, MHI.
38. An excellent overview of amphibious warfare developments in the United
States, Great Britain, and Japan is provided by Allan R. Millett, “Assault from the
Sea: The Development of Amphibious Warfare Between the Wars: The American,
British, and Japanese Experiences,” in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett,
eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 41–95. See also Kenneth J. Clifford, Amphibious Warfare
Development in Britain and America from 1920–1940 (New York, NY: Edgewood,
1983). Army activities are summarized in John T. Greenwood, “The U.S. Army and
Amphibious Warfare During WWII,” Army History PB-20-93-4, No. 27 (Summer
1993): 1–10. More detailed information is provided in Atwater, “Development of
Joint Landing Operations.” For Marine Corps developments, see Jeter A. Isely and
Philip Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory and Practice in the
Pacific (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951); Millett, Semper Fidelis,
319–343; and Clifford, Progress and Purpose, 25–59. British developments are
covered by Bernard Fergusson, The Watery Maze: Story of Combined Operations
in World War II (New York, NY: Collins, 1961), and L.E.H. Maund, Assault from
the Sea (London: Methuen, 1949).
39. Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan
1897–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 19–38; H.P. Willmott,
Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982), 106–118.
40. Brian McAllister Linn, Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the
Pacific, 1902–1940 (Chapel Hill & London: The University of North Caroline
Press, 1997), xii–xiii, 239–242, 254.
41. Steven T. Ross, American War Plans, 1890–1939 (London: Frank Cass,
2002), 128–137. One of the plans for Mexico essentially recapitulated the 1847
operation, anticipating a landing at Vera Cruz followed by a march to Mexico
City.
42. Davis, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 14–15.
43. JPC Report in Joint Board Serial No. 19, “Joint Operations of Army,
Navy, and Marine Corps,” quoted in Legere, “Unification of the Armed Forces,”
73.
44. US Joint Board of the Army and Navy, Joint Action of the Army and the
Navy (JAAN) (Washington, DC: GPO, 1927), 4–6, and (1935 Revision), 56.
45. Change No. 2 (30 November 1938) to JAAN, 1935. Legere, “Unification
of the Armed Forces,” 149–150, describes the discussion of this issue, citing the
relevant correspondence.
46. Ross, American War Plans, 1890–1939, 154–156.
88
47. Ross, American War Plans, 1890–1939, 164–166.
48. Leo J. Daugherty III, “Away All Boats: The Army–Navy Maneuvers of
1925,” Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1998–99, 107–113.
49. US Joint Board of the Army and Navy, Joint Overseas Expeditions
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1933).
50. Millett, “Assault from the Sea,” in Murray and Millett, eds., Military
Innovation in the Interwar Period, 72. The most detailed account of Ellis’s
development of the advanced base force study is Dirk Anthony Ballendorf and
Merrill Lewis Bartlett, Pete Ellis: An Amphibious Warfare Prophet, 1880–1923
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 119–125.
51. Clifford, Progress and Purpose, 30.
52. JAAN, 1927, 3, 12.
53. Clifford, Progress and Purpose, 46; Anthony A. Frances, History of the
Marine Corps Schools (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Schools, 1945).
54. US Navy, The Landing-Force and Small-Arms Instructions, 1905 and
1907 (with corrections to pages 293–352 of 1910 and 1911 versions), 1912, and
1915. In 1918 the document was reissued with a new title, Landing-Force Manual,
United States Navy. This was the first major revision with much more detail on
tactics, conduct of fire, and field fortifications, but the flotilla of boats with line of
columns of towed boats was essentially unchanged from 1905. The 1920 version
contained a new chapter on “Minor Warfare,” but otherwise had few changes. The
1927 version was revised to be in agreement with US Army Training Regulations
for Infantry, machinegun units, and combat principles, but was unchanged with
regard to the actual movement of troops from ship to shore. This was the version
still in effect when the 1933 Marine Corps schools’ study began. A whaleboat was
a large, long, narrow, highly maneuverable rowing or motor boat carried aboard
US warships. It was similar to the 19th century boats used to hunt whales.
55. Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, 35–44. The final
prewar version was published on 25 November 1938 as Fleet Training Publication
167, Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S. Navy (FTP-167). Clifford provides a
chronology in Progress and Purpose, appendix F, 139–140.
Innovation in the Interwar Period, 76–77.
57. Greenwood, “The U.S. Army and Amphibious Warfare During WWII,”
1–10; Henry G. Gole, “War Planning at the U.S. Army War College, 1934–40,
‘The Road to Rainbow’,” Army History 25 (Winter 1993): 13–28.
58. See, for example, Pike, Landing and Operations at Gallipoli; and
Clapham, “The Gallipoli Expedition Until May 6, 1915,” in Monographs of the
World War, 92–108.
59. Atwater, “Development of Joint Landing Operations,” 44–45.
60. R.G. Kirkwood, “Artillery Loads for Navy Lighter for Landing Heavy
Artillery” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The General Service Schools, 20 June 1928),
MHI Archives, Box: CGSC Curricular Material 1927–28.
61. US Army War College, “Course at the Army War College, 1929–1930,
G1”; Report of Committee No. 8: “Joint Army and Navy Landing Operations;
89
Modification in Training, Equipment, and Supply for Long Overseas Expeditions,
and Operations in Specific Theaters; and Principles Governing the Construction
of War Plans, Including Joint Army and Navy War Plans,” 26 October 1929. No.
361-8, MHI Archives, Box: AWC Curricular Archives, 1929–30, G1 Course, Files
No. 361, 1–8 to File No. 361A, 1–5.
62. These reports are in the Curricular Archives at MHI. See also General
Eli K. Cole and Major Watkins, Joint Overseas Operations, Overseas Expedition:
A Compilation of Joint Articles by General Cole, Major Watkins (Fort Humphreys,
VA: US Army Engineer School, 1932). In 1929 Cole had published an article on
joint overseas operations envisioning Army troops as the landing force. In the
1930s George S. Patton, examining ways to defend Hawaii against amphibious
invasion, studied the Gallipoli operation in depth. The knowledge of amphibious
warfare he gained in this study was one of the reasons he was selected to command
an Army landing force in the 1942 North Africa landings. Martin Blumenson,
The Patton Papers, 1885–1940, Vol. 1 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1972),
819–820, 912–916.
63. US Army War College, “Course at the Army War College, 1939–1940,
Analytical Studies: Report of Committee No. 8, Joint Operations of the Army and
the Navy,” 6–1940–8, 28 February 1940, MHI Archives, Box: AWC Curricular
Archives, 1939–40, Analytical Course, File No. 6–1940–7 to 6–1940–9, File No.
6–1940A, 1–14.
64. US War Department, The Adjutant General’s Office, “Notes on Fleet
Landing Exercise No. 2, Culebra, P.R.,” AG 354.23 (3–24–36), 30 March 1936,
copy at MHI.
Innovation in the Interwar Period, 76; Isely and Crowl, The U.S. Marines and
Amphibious War, 46, 52.
66. Atwater, “Development of Joint Landing Operations,” 109–110.
67. Atwater, “Development of Joint Landing Operations,” 5; Blanche D.
Coll, Jean E. Keith, and Herbert H. Rosenthal, United States Army in World War
II, The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment (Washington, DC: Historical
Division, Department of the Army, 1958), 356–357; John B. Dwyer, Commandos
from the Sea: The History of Amphibious Special Warfare in World War II and the
Korean War (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 2002), 5.
68. This account is based on Ross, American War Plans, 1941–1945, 3–18;
Mark Skinner Watson, United States Army in World War II, The War Department,
Chief of Staff; Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington, DC: Department
of the Army Historical Division, 1950); Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell,
United States Army in World War II, The War Department, Strategic Planning For
Coalition Warfare: 1941–1942 (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department
of the Army, 1953), 5–8, 12–13, 24–28, 43–47; Legere, “Unification of the Armed
Forces,” 184–201.
69. Anne Cipriano Venzon, From Whaleboats to Amphibious Warfare: Lt.
Gen. “Howling Mad” Smith and the U.S. Marine Corps (London and Westport,
CT: Praeger, 2003), 67–68.
90
70. Atwater, “Development of Joint Landing Operations,” 122–126. The
Army did provide observers to the Navy–Marine Corps exercise that year.
71. Dwyer, Commandos from the Sea, 5.
72. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, United
States Army in World War II, The Army Ground Forces, The Organization of
Ground Combat Troops (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department of
the Army, 1947), 32, 85; Atwater, “Development of Joint Landing Operations,”
127–129.
73. The Coast Guard would ultimately man large numbers of amphibious
ships and craft and would participate in every major amphibious operation of
World War II. Gary J.E. Thornton, The U.S. Coast Guard and Army Amphibious
Development, US Army War College Military Studies Program Paper (Carlisle
Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1987), 5, 6, handle.dtic.mil/100.2/
ADA180972 (accessed 11 February 2008). The Thornton monograph is a well-
documented and valuable summary of Coast Guard involvement in amphibious
operations that makes use of primary sources from the Coast Guard files. See also,
Malcolm F. Willoughby, The U.S. Coast Guard in World War II (Annapolis, MD:
United States Naval Institute, 1957), 8–9, for prewar Coast Guard activities.
74. The establishment and operation of General Chaney’s Special Observers
is described in Charles L. Bolte, “History of First Days in England, 1941–1942”
[1945?], ii–iv, 4, 27–35, copy in the Charles L. Bolte Papers, Box 3, MHI Archives;
US Department of the Army, Office of Military History, The Administration and
Logistical History of the ETO, Part I, The Predecessor Commands: SPOBS and
USAFBI, 1945, copy at MHI in Box, “OCMH IIIA, Drafts, WWII, Admin & Log
Hist ETO, Part I,” 1–44, MHI Archives; Gordon A. Harrison, United States Army
in World War II, The European Theater of Operations, Cross-Channel Attack
(Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1951), 1–2. The
operation of the Army Special Observers group is also described retrospectively
by General Bolte, who was Chaney’s plans officer and later chief of staff, in his
oral history, Conversations Between General Charles L. Bolte, USA, Ret., and Mr.
Arthur J. Zoebelein, 3 vols., US Army Military History Research Collection, Senior
Officers Debriefing Program (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Military History Institute,
1972), Vol. 1, Section 1, 72–80, and Vol. I, Section 2, 6–13, 55–61, copy in the
Charles L. Bolte Papers, Box 17, “Oral History Interview” Part I, MHI Archives.
75. Ross, American War Plans 1941–1945, 16–17.
76. Linn, Guardians of the Empire, 244–245.
77. Letter, Major General Lesley J. McNair to Major General C.F. Thompson,
10 March 1941, quoted in Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, Organization of Ground
Combat Troops, 38.
78. Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers: Troops and
Equipment, 357–358; Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM)
31-5, Landing Operations on Hostile Shores (Washington, DC: GPO, 1941).
79. Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, Organization of Ground Combat Troops,
85; Atwater, “Development of Joint Landing Operations,” 130–136. Two Coast
Guard cutters had participated in FLEX 6 and five of the Navy assault transports
91
used in FLEX 7 carried temporarily assigned Coast Guard landing craft crews.
During this exercise, the Coast Guard also took over the operation of three Army
transports previously manned by civilian crews that refused to operate under
simulated combat conditions. Thornton, Coast Guard and Army Amphibious
Development, 6–7, 9; Robert Erwin Johnson, Coast Guard-Manned Naval Vessels
in World War II, US Coast Guard Historian’s Office, www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/his
tory/h_cgnvy.html (accessed 9 February 2008).
80. Norman Friedman and A.D. Baker, U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft:
An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002),
33–35, 195–197; James C. Fahey, Ships and Aircraft of the United States Fleet,
1945 (New York, NY: Ships and Aircraft, 1945, reprinted Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1976), 26–30, 64, 76. APD was the Navy designation for auxil
iary (A) transport (P) destroyer (D), but the ships were universally known as fast
transports or high-speed transports. Jon T. Hoffman relates the development of the
APDs, initially in conjunction with the formation of the Marine Raider battalion
in From Makin to Bougainville: Marine Raiders in the Pacific War (Washington,
DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1993); and in “The Legacy and Lessons of
WW II Raids,” Marine Corps Gazette (September 1992): 62–65.
81. Friedman and Baker, U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft, 3, 37–65;
Frederic L. Lane, Ships for Victory, A History of Shipbuilding Under the U.S.
Maritime Commission in World War II (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1951), passim.
82. Friedman and Baker, U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft, 67–101; John
W. Mountcastle, “From Bayou to Beachhead: The Marines and Mr. Higgins,”
Military Review 60 (March 1980): 20–29; Jerry E. Strahan, Andrew Jackson
Higgins and The Boats That Won World War II (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana
State University Press, 1994).
83. Friedman and Baker, U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft, 99–100; Victor
J. Croizat, one of the Marine Corps LVT pioneers, describes the development and
operational use of the LVTs, and provides a fine account of amphibious opera
tions in World War II, in Across the Reef: The Amphibious Tracked Vehicle at War
(Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1989, reprinted London: Blandford,
1992), 31–32.
84. Maund, Assault from the Sea, 9–19, 24–59, 65–82, 112–113 (Admiral
Maund was the Director of the ISTDC); ONI 226 Allied Landing Craft and Ships
(Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, 1944), reprinted
as Allied Landing Craft of World War II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1985); Friedman and Baker, U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft, 111–120. See also,
Fergusson, Watery Maze.
85. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett provide an excellent single-
volume account of World War II: A War to be Won; Fighting the Second World
War, 1937–1945 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2000). Still useful for an Army-focused concise account with emphasis on strat
egy is Maurice Matloff, World War II: A Concise Military History of America’s
92
All-Out, Two-Front War (New York, NY: Galahad Books, 1982) (extracted from
his American Military History [Washington, DC: GPO, 1988]).
86. Allied strategy for the Pacific during this period is described in Grace P.
Hayes, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against
Japan, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Historical Section, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1953),
45–186; Willmott, Empires in the Balance, 181–197, 218–238, and 255–282;
and Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning For Coalition Warfare: 1941–1942,
120–164.
87. Bolte, “History of First Days in England,” 84; Lucian K. Truscott,
Command Missions: A Personal Story (New York, NY: E.P. Dutton and Company,
1954), 17–72. Truscott would later participate in every amphibious operation in
the Mediterranean, commanding a regimental task force in the Morocco landing
at Port Lyautey; the 3d Division at Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio; and the VI Corps in
Southern France. He ended the war as a lieutenant general and was promoted to
full general in 1954. MHI biographical file.
88. A unified command was (and is) a command with a broad continu
ing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned
components of two or more military departments. The Pearl Harbor attack had
revealed the problems with Service coordination through mutual cooperation at
the geographical theater level and the unified commanders established in 1942
had authority over the assigned forces of both Services. In June another unified
command, the European Theater of Operations, was established under the com
mand of Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Matloff and Snell, Strategic
Planning For Coalition Warfare: 1941–1942, 168–169, 196–197.
89. Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning For Coalition Warfare: 1941–
1942, 256–263.
90. Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning For Coalition Warfare: 1941–
1942, 244–255, 265, 279–286.
91. John Miller Jr., United States Army in World War II, The War in the
Pacific, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive (Washington, DC: Historical Division,
Department of the Army, 1949), 19.
Equipment, 538–359. These views were expressed, among other places, in a
study of 3d Infantry Division amphibious training by Lieutenant Colonel Floyd
L. Parks, deputy chief of staff of Army Ground Forces (AGF), and in a memoran
dum by Major General John P. Lucas, then commander of the 3d Infantry Division
(and later commander of VI Corps at the February 1944 Anzio landing) to the
Commanding General of AGF, quoted in Marshall O. Becker, The Amphibious
Training Center, Study No. 22 (Washington, DC: Historical Section, Army Ground
Forces, 1946), 1–2. General H.M. Smith’s life and personality are described in
Venzon, From Whaleboats to Amphibious Warfare. General Smith tells his own
story in Holland M. Smith, Coral and Brass (New York, NY: Scribner’s, 1949).
93. Becker, The Amphibious Training Center, 1–3; Coll, Keith, and
Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment, 357–359; Thornton,
93
Coast Guard and Army Amphibious Development, 9–10, 16–17. In September
1941 the Commandant of the Coast Guard had agreed to provide over 2,000 Coast
Guard officers and men to operate as part of the Navy, including the operation
of four transports, with their assigned landing craft, as well as the landing craft
aboard 22 other Navy transports and other ships.
Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment, 359–362. AGF and
Services of Supply (later renamed Army Service Forces) were established in
March 1942 as part of a reorganization of the War Department. Ray S. Cline,
United States Army in World War II, The War Department, Washington Command
Post: The Operations Division (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military
History, Department of the Army, 1951), 93. See also, US Army Recruiting,
Publicity Bureau, “Put ‘em Across! That is the Slogan of the Army Engineer
Amphibian Command,” Army Life and United States Army Recruiting News,”
Vol. XXIV, No. 8, August 1942, 2, 3, 14.
Equipment, 361–365; William F. Heavey, Down Ramp! The Story of the Army
Amphibian Engineers (Washington, DC: Infantry Journal Press, 1947, reprinted,
Nashville, TN: Battery Press, 1988), 1–13. (Brigadier General Heavey com
manded the 2d Engineer Amphibious (later Special) Brigade during its entire
World War II service.)
96. Becker, The Amphibious Training Center, 10; Merle T. Cole, “Cape Cod
Commando Training,” Military Collector & Historian, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Summer
2006): 95–101.
97. Thornton describes the Coast Guard participation in Coast Guard and
Army Amphibious Development, 16–27.
Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment, 369–372, 376–379.
99. A regimental combat team was an infantry regiment reinforced with a
field artillery battalion (FAB), a combat engineer company, and other combat and
support elements capable of operating as a self-contained combat unit.
100. Arthur G. Trudeau, Engineer Memoirs, “Oral History of Lieutenant
General Arthur G. Trudeau,” EP 870–1–26 (Fort Belvoir, VA: US Army Corps
of Engineers, Office of the Chief of Engineers, 1986), 75–111; Coll, Keith, and
Rosenthal, The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment, 376–387.
101. Copies of the manuals are in RG 337 (Records of Headquarters, Army
Ground Forces), Entry 32A (G4 Administrative Division Decimal File 1947), Box
67, National Archives and Records Administration, Modern Military Records,
College Park, MD, hereafter, NACP.
102. Becker, The Amphibious Training Center, 4–17; “Unit History of
Amphibious Training Command, U.S. Atlantic Fleet,” attached to Letter,
Commander Amphibious Training Command, US Atlantic Fleet, to Chief of
Naval Operations, same subject, 5 November 1953, copy provided to the author
by Captain Patrick H. Roth, USN (Ret), Center for Naval Analyses. The Fort
Pierce facility was initially organized by the G2 of Amphibious Corps, Atlantic
94
Fleet, Lieutenant Colonel Louis B. Ely, who would later organize an amphibious
special operations force in the early days of the Korean War. “Louis Brainard
Ely,” biography at Arlington National Cemetery Web site, arlingtoncemetery.net/
lely.htm (accessed 10 July 2006); West Point Register of Graduates and Former
Cadets, Class of 1919; Dwyer, Commandos from the Sea, 8, 243. Ely’s correspon
dence on scout and raider operations is in the Lloyd E. Peddicord Papers, Box 14,
MHI Archives.
103. The Army had contributed to the development of these ships. A key
issue was ventilation of the tank deck so tanks could warm up their engines prior
to a landing without suffocating the crews. In the spring of 1942, Army carpenters
built a structure at Fort Knox, Kentucky, that duplicated the interior of an LST.
Using actual tanks, a Navy design group tested various systems before deciding
on large exhaust fans that effectively kept the tank deck clear of fumes. Paul W.
Urbahns, “Ft. Knox’s Ark: The LST Building,” www.aths.com/history-ftknox.
html (accessed 28 February 2008). I am indebted to David Keough of MHI for
bringing this interesting sidelight to my attention.
104. Friedman and Baker, U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft, 120–121, 130–
139, 207, 483, 485.
105. Friedman and Baker, U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft, 138–148.
106. Friedman and Baker, U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft, 202–205,
246–249.
107. Timothy J. Kutta, Don Geer, and Perry Manley, “DUKW in Action,”
Armor Number 36 (Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1996).
108. For a good one-volume account of World War II amphibious operations,
see John A. Lorelli, To Foreign Shores: U.S. Amphibious Operations in World
War II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995). Gordon L. Rottman cov
ers amphibious tactics in US World War II Amphibious Tactics: Army & Marine
Corps, Pacific Theater, Elite No. 117 (Botley, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2004), and
US World War II Amphibious Tactics: Mediterranean & European Theaters, Elite
144 (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publications, 2006). Jon T. Hoffman wrote a series of
excellent analyses of all the major World War II Army and Marine Corps amphibi
ous operations that appeared in Marine Corps Gazette between 1992 and 1995
(see the bibliography). Richard B. Frank provides a useful compressed history
of the development of amphibious warfare in World War II (but almost com
pletely ignores the Southwest Pacific Area and the ESBs) in “The Amphibious
Revolution,” Naval History, Vol. 19, No. 4, August 2005, 20–26. Amphibious
operations in the Mediterranean Theater are well covered in Barbara Brooks
Tomblin, With Utmost Spirit: Allied Naval Operations in the Mediterranean,
1942–1945 (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2004). See also the
series of case studies in Lovering, ed., Amphibious Assault.
109. Samuel Milner, United States Army in World War II, The War in the
Pacific, Victory in Papua (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department of
the Army, 1957); Charles R. Anderson, The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War
II: Papua, CMH Pub 72-7 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1992). On the use of coastal
shipping, see Harry A. Gailey, MacArthur Strikes Back: Decision at Buna New
95
Guinea 1942–1943 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2000), 73–74; D. Clayton James,
The Years of MacArthur, Vol. II, 1941–1945 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1975), 211–220.
110. The official accounts of Guadalcanal are Frank O. Hough, Ludwig E.
Verle, and Henry I. Shaw, History of the United States Marine Corps Operations
in World War II, Vol. I, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal (Washington, DC: Historical
Branch, G3 Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1958), and Miller,
Guadalcanal: The First Offensive. See also, Charles R. Anderson, The U.S. Army
Campaigns of World War II: Guadalcanal, CMH Pub 72-8 (Washington, DC:
GPO, n.d.); Lorelli, To Foreign Shores, 43–57; Richard B. Frank, Guadalcanal
(New York, NY: Random House, 1990); and Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and
Amphibious War, 109–165.
111. Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, 153–162; Creswell,
Generals and Admirals, 159–160.
112. Hoffman, From Makin to Bougainville, 6–9.
113. Address by Commodore J. Hughes-Hallett (Naval Force Commander
at Dieppe) and Address by Major General Hamilton Roberts (Military Force
Commander in the Dieppe Operation) at the Assault Training Center Conference,
26 May 1943, 7 June 1943, in Conference on Landing Assaults, 24 May–23
June 1943, US Assault Training Center, European Theater of Operations, United
States Army, 1943; Fergusson, Watery Maze, 168–185. Lorelli provides a con
cise summary of the Dieppe operation, To Foreign Shores, 58–60. For a critical
account of the planning for the raid that assesses it as a tragic “failure of deci
sion making,” see Brian Loring Villa, Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the
Dieppe Raid (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989). For an argument that
the “useful lessons” of the operation have been overstated, see Stephen Prince,
“The Raids on St. Nazaire and Dieppe: Operation CHARIOT, March 1942 and
Operation JUBILEE, August 1942,” Lovering, ed., Amphibious Assault, 123–125,
130–144.
114. Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, United States
Army in World War II, The Western Hemisphere, Guarding the United States and its
Outposts (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1960),
270–272; Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in
World War II, Vol. 7, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944
(Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), 12–13; Brian Garfield, The
Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1969), 151–161.
115. The official Army account is George F. Howe, United States Army in
World War II, The Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Northwest Africa: Seizing
the Initiative in the West (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department of the
Army, 1957). A concise account is Charles R. Anderson, The U.S. Army Campaigns
of World War II: Algeria-French Morocco, CMH Pub 72-11 (Washington, DC:
GPO, n.d.). Rick Atkinson provides a thoroughly researched and lively account in
An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa (New York, NY: Henry Holt & Co.,
2002). See also Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations
96
in World War II, Operations in North African Waters, October 1942–June 1943
(Boston, MA: Little, Brown, & Company, 1989); Tomblin, With Utmost Spirit,
23–80; Lorelli, To Foreign Shores, 61–84; Jon T. Hoffman, “The Legacy and
Lessons of Operation TORCH,” Marine Corps Gazette, December 1992, 60–63.
116. Maurice Matloff, United States Army in World War II, The War
Department, Strategic Planning For Coalition Warfare: 1943–1944 (Washington,
DC: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1959), 36–37.
117. Fifth Army History, Part I, From Activation to the Fall of Naples
(Florence, Italy: Headquarters, Fifth Army, 1945), 6.
118. John W. O’Daniel, Memorandum, “Invasion Training Center,” 1
November 1943, copy in the John W. O’Daniel Papers, Box 4, “WWII Operation
‘Husky’ 3d and 45th Div, 1942–1943,” MHI Archives, 1.
119. O’Daniel, Memorandum, 1, 2; Truscott, Command Missions, 182–185.
120. William S. Triplet, A Colonel in the Armored Forces: A Memoir, 1941–
1945, ed. Robert H. Ferrell (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2001),
45–93. The William S. Triplet Papers in the MHI Archives includes Triplet’s
lively and detailed journal, as well as other documents on the 18th Armored
Group (Amphibious). The LVT1, LVT2, LVT3, and LVT4 were various types of
personnel and cargo carrying amphibious tractors. The designation LVT(A), or
“armored amphibian,” generally referred to amphibious tanks mounting a 37-mm
gun, the LVT(A)1; or a 75-mm howitzer, the LVT(A)4; but was also used for the
Army’s armored version of the cargo/personnel amphibious tractor, the LVT(A)2.
The final version of the armored amphibian, the LVT(A)5, had a gyro-stabilized
howitzer that could be fired accurately even while moving. It was introduced at
the end of the war and served in Korea. Croizat, Across the Reef; Robert J. Ickes,
Landing Vehicles Tracked (Windsor, UK: Profile Publications, n.d.); Steven J.
Zaloga, Terry Hadler, and Mike Badrocke, Amtracs: US Amphibious Assault
Vehicles, New Vanguard 30 (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publications, 1999).
121. General Krueger’s own account of the war in SWPA is Walter
Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of Sixth Army in World War
II (Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 1953); for an account of Krueger’s
leadership, see Kevin Holzimmer, General Walter Krueger: Unsung Hero of
the Pacific War (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2007). Admiral
Barbey has described the operations of his amphibious force in Daniel E. Barbey,
MacArthur’s Amphibious Navy: Seventh Amphibious Force Operations, 1943–
1945 (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 1969). General Heavey tells the story
of the amphibious engineers in Down Ramp!; see also, Karl C. Dod, United
States Army in World War II, The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan
(Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1966).
122. US Army Forces, Pacific, General Headquarters, Office of the Chief
Engineer, Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, Vol. IV, Amphibian Engineer
Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 1959), 38–48.
123. John Miller Jr., United States Army in World War II, The War in the
Pacific, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul (Washington, DC: Historical
Division, Department of the Army, 1959), 19–27.
97
124. William F. Heavey, “Amphibian Engineers in Action,” Military Engineer,
Vol. XXXVI, No. 223, May 1944, 145–151; Miller, Cartwheel; Edward J. Drea, The
U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II: New Guinea, CMH Pub 72-9 (Washington,
DC: GPO, n.d.); Stephen J. Lofgren, The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II:
Northern Solomons, CMH Pub 72-10 (Washington, DC: GPO, n.d.); Douglas T.
Kane and Henry I. Shaw, History of the United States Marine Corps Operations in
World War II, Vol. II, Isolation of Rabaul (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G3
Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1958).
125. US Army Forces, Pacific, Amphibian Engineer Operations, 146, 156,
723–729.
126. These operations are described in Garfield, The Thousand-Mile War;
Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States and its Outposts; and
Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls.
127. The official Army account is Albert N. Garland and Howard McGaw
Smyth, United States Army in World War II, The Mediterranean Theater of
Operations, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy (Washington, DC: Historical
Division, Department of the Army, 1965). See also, Carlo D’Este, Bitter Victory:
The Battle for Sicily (New York, NY: E.P. Dutton, 1988); Tomblin, With Utmost
Spirit, 148–194; Lorelli, To Foreign Shores, 123–133.
128. Friedman and Baker, U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft, 264. AGC stood
for Miscellaneous Auxiliary (AG), Command (C), but the ships were always
referred to as “Amphibious Force Flagships.” Although Ancon was the fourth
AGC built, it was the first to see service.
129. Tomblin, With Utmost Spirit, 138–139; Lorelli, To Foreign Shores,
132–133.
130. The official Army account is Martin Blumenson, United States Army
in World War II, The Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Salerno to Cassino
(Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1969). See also,
Tomblin, With Utmost Spirit, 241–267; Lorelli, To Foreign Shores, 133–155.
131. Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944, 133–
139, 234–235, 374–377; Croizat, Across the Reef, 97–99; Philip A. Crowl and
Edmund G. Love, United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific,
Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls (Washington, DC: Historical Division,
Department of the Army, 1955, reprinted 1985, 1989, 1995); Morison, History
of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Aleutians, Gilberts and
Marshalls; Henry I. Shaw, Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin C. Turnbladh, History
of the United States Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. III, Central
Pacific Drive (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G3 Division, Headquarters,
United States Marine Corps, 1966).
132. Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, 34–36.
133. Joseph H. Alexander, Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995). The Makin Operation is covered in
Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, 75–126.
134. Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, 126. General
H.M. Smith appears to have developed a very critical attitude toward the 27th
98
Infantry Division that began with the Makin Operation. While the 165th RCT’s
capture of the island was not particularly speedy, historian Harry A. Gailey, after
studying the records of the operation, noted that the 165th accomplished all of its
objectives on the island on time. Harry A. Gailey, “Howlin’ Mad” vs. The Army:
Conflict in Command, Saipan 1944 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986).
135. This discussion of lessons learned is taken from Lewis Bernstein,
Learning and Transmitting Lessons in the Pacific War: From GALVANIC to
FLINTLOCK, November 1943–February 1944, unpublished paper prepared for
the Conference of Army Historians, 13–15 July 2004. Copy provided to the writer
by Dr. Bernstein. On pallets, see Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and
Marshalls, 48–49.
136. Miller, Cartwheel, 295–302; Heavey, Down Ramp!, 110–111.
137. US Department of the Army, Office of Military History, Anzio
Beachhead, 22 January–25 May 1944 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1948).
138. Clayton D. Laurie, The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II: Anzio,
CMH Pub 72-19 (Washington, DC: GPO, n.d.), 23.
139. Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, 219–332; Robert
D. Heinl and John A Crown, The Marshalls: Increasing the Tempo (Washington,
DC: Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 1954).
140. Bernstein, From GALVANIC to FLINTLOCK, 14–15; Crowl and Love,
Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, 172–180, 183–193; Alfred D. Bailey,
Alligators, Buffaloes and Bushmasters: The History of the Development of the
LVT Through World War II, Occasional Paper (Washington, DC: History and
Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1986), 100–105, 129–135;
A.V. Arnold, “Preparation for a Division Amphibious Operation,” Military Review,
Vol. XXV, No. 2 (May 1945): 3–11; George C. Dyer, The Amphibians Came to
Conquer: The Story of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Vol. 2 (Washington, DC:
GPO, 1972), 743–748; Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, History of the United States
Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. III, 134, 175.
141. Dyer, The Amphibians Came to Conquer, 733.
142. John Miller Jr., “MacArthur and the Admiralties,” in Kent Roberts
Greenfield, ed., Command Decisions (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace, 1959),
287–302; concerning the intelligence picture, see Edward J. Drea, MacArthur’s
ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942–1945 (Lawrence, KS:
University of Kansas Press, 1992), 97–104.
143. Robert Ross Smith, United States Army in World War II, The War in the
Pacific, The Approach to the Philippines (Washington, DC: Historical Division,
Department of the Army, 1953), 11–12.
144. Smith, United States Army in World War II, 53–83; Drea, New Guinea,
18–25; Barbey, MacArthur’s Amphibious Navy, 215; US Army Forces, Pacific,
Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, Vol. IV, Amphibian Engineer Operations, 141,
450–451.
145. Louis Morton, United States Army in World War II, The War in the
Pacific, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years (Washington, DC: Historical
Division, Department of the Army, 1962), 247–248, 403–408.
99
146. Miller, Cartwheel, 26.
147. Kevin Holzimmer describes this process in General Walter Krueger
and, more specifically, in “Joint Operations in the Southwest Pacific, 1943–1945,”
Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 38, 102–108. He ascribes the success of the system
to the seminar system of cooperation in planning developed and inculcated at the
Army and Navy War Colleges in the interwar years.
148. The writer has found no specific document making this link, but the
record indicates that MacArthur’s GHQ FEC staff frequently examined the SWPA
experience: RG 554 (Records of GHQ FEC), Entry 50, ACofS G3, Training
Division Memorandums (Action File), NACP.
149. Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon, 75.
150. Stephen R. Taaffe makes this argument in MacArthur’s Jungle War: The
1944 New Guinea Campaign (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1998),
27–28.
151. Admiral Barbey describes this three-fold planning system in MacArthur’s
Amphibious Navy, 179–182. John A. Lorelli quotes from the oral history of an
officer on Barbey’s staff who describes the system and notes the contrast between
SWPA and the Central Pacific in To Foreign Shores, 211–212.
152. Philip A. Crowl, United States Army in World War II, The War in
the Pacific, Campaign in the Marianas (Washington, DC: Historical Division,
Department of the Army, 1960), 81–83, 96; Russell A. Gugeler, Army Amphibian
Tractor and Tank Battalions in the Battle of Saipan, 15 June–9 July 1944, US
Army Center of Military History, army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/WWII/amsai.htm
(accessed 25 October 2006). The official Marine Corps account is Shaw, Nalty,
and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive. See also Carl W. Hoffman, Saipan: The
Beginning of the End (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Headquarters, United
States Marine Corps, 1950, reprinted Nashville, TN: Battery Press, 1988).
153. Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas, 99–101.
154. The official Army historian’s account is in Crowl, Campaign in the
Marianas, 149–151, 178–179,191–201. Crowl’s conclusion is “that Holland Smith
had good reason to be disappointed with the performance of the 27th Infantry
Division . . . whether the action he took to remedy the situation was a wise one,
however, remains doubtful,” 201. To get the full flavor of the situation on Saipan
and the immediate aftermath of the incident, the reader should begin with the offi
cial Army and Marine Corps accounts by Crowl and Carl W. Hoffman. Harry A.
Gailey provides a well-researched account that is sympathetic to Ralph Smith in
Howlin’ Mad vs. the Army. The series of Infantry Journal articles and letters to the
editor cited in the bibliography are also essential reading on this complex and con
troversial incident. H.M. Smith’s own account is in Coral and Brass, 171–173.
Anne Cipriano Venzon gives a good account of the aftermath of the incident in
From Whaleboats to Amphibious Warfare, 111–115. Harold J. Goldberg provides
a thoughtful account of the entire Saipan campaign and the “Smiths” episode
in D-Day in the Pacific: The Battle of Saipan (Bloomington and Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press, 2007).
155. Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas, 285–303 (Tinian), 339–437 (Guam);
100
Charles R. Anderson, The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II: Western Pacific,
CMH Pub 72-29 (Washington, DC: GPO, n.d.).
156. The literature on the Normandy invasion is immense. The official Army
account is Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack. William M. Hammond provides a
concise account in The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II: Normandy, CMH
Pub 72-18 (Washington, DC: GPO, n.d.). A recent compilation of articles by vari
ous historians is Jane Penrose, ed., The D-Day Companion (Oxford, UK: Osprey
Publishing, 2004).
157. Gordon Rottman explains that there were not enough LVTs for both
the Pacific and European theaters and the Pacific had priority because the LVTs
were essential to cross the broad reefs that fringed the Pacific atolls and islands.
Furthermore, he suggests that the surf conditions in the Mediterranean and Europe
were too rough for LVTs (US World War II Amphibious Tactics, 24). But Richard
B. Frank notes that 300 LVTs were available in England (Frank, The Amphibious
Revolution, 25). Army LVT battalions trained in Monterey, California, in very
difficult surf conditions. Colonel William Triplet, commanding the 18th Armored
Group (Amphibious), noted the excellent sea-keeping qualities of the amphibious
tractors (William S. Triplet Papers), while during the Normandy landings, many
of the duplex drive tanks with their frail flotation screens and low freeboard sank
in the rough seas on the way to the beach.
158. Adrian Lewis, who has written extensively on the Normandy land
ing, discusses and criticizes these decisions in Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory
(Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).
159. These figures on men, supplies, and vehicles are from Maurice Matloff,
ed., American Military History (Washington, DC: GPO, 1988), 488.
160. Omaha Beach handled considerably more cargo than the port of
Cherbourg until the fall of 1944. The performance of the LSTs at Normandy raises
the question as to whether the enormous effort and resources put into the fabrica
tion of the artificial harbors might better have been spent on more LSTs. Harrison,
Cross-Channel Attack, 426; Roland G. Ruppenthal, United States Army in World
War II, The European Theater of Operations, Logistical Support of the Armies,
Volume I: May 1941–September 1944 (Washington, DC: Historical Division,
Department of the Army, 1953), 392, 414–415.
161. The official Army history of the Southern France operation is Jeffrey J.
Clarke and Robert Ross Smith, United States Army in World War II, The European
Theater of Operations, Riviera to the Rhine (Washington, DC: Historical Division,
Department of the Army, 1993). Jeffrey J. Clarke also provides concise accounts
in The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II: Southern France, CMH Pub 72-31
(Washington, DC: GPO, n.d.), and “The Champagne Campaign,” Military History
Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 2, Winter 2008, 37–45.
162. Truscott, Command Missions, 400–401.
163. This discussion is based on Robert Ross Smith, “Luzon Versus Formosa,”
in Greenfield, ed., Command Decisions, 461–477.
164. The official Army account is M. Hamlin Cannon, United States Army
in World War II, The War in the Pacific, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines
101
(Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1954). Charles
R. Anderson provides a concise account in The U.S. Army Campaigns of World
War II: Leyte, CMH Pub 72-27 (Washington, DC: GPO, n.d.). Naval operations
are covered in Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations
in World War II: Leyte, June 1944–January 1945 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and
Company, 1958).
165. Heavey, Down Ramp!, 132.
166. In addition to Morison, Leyte, two classic and still valuable accounts of
the naval Battle of Leyte Gulf are James A. Field, The Japanese at Leyte Gulf:
The Sho Operation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947), and C.
Vann Woodward, The Battle for Leyte Gulf (New York, NY: The Macmillan Co.,
1947), reprinted with an introduction by Evan Thomas (New York, NY: Skyhorse
Publishing, 2007). Two authoritative recent accounts are Thomas Cutler, The
Battle of Leyte Gulf: 23–26 October 1944 (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute
Press, 2001), and H.P. Willmott, The Battle of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005). A dramatic account that
focuses on the actions of two Japanese and two American commanders during the
battle is Evan Thomas, Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great
Naval Campaign 1941–1945 (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2006).
167. Heavey, Down Ramp!, 133–142. Samuel Eliot Morison, History
of United States Naval Operations in World War II: The Liberation of the
Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas, 1944–1945 (Boston, MA: Little,
Brown and Company, 1959), 17–51. A patrol torpedo (PT) boat was a fast 80-foot
Navy motor torpedo boat.
168. “VII Amphibious Force Report Luzon” quoted in Robert Ross Smith,
United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, Triumph in the
Philippines (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department of the Army,
1963, reprinted 1968, 1984, 1991), 128.
169. US Army Forces, Pacific, Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, Vol. IV,
Amphibian Engineer Operations, 571–577.
170. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 583–648.
171. The official Army account is Roy E. Appleman et al., United States Army
in World War II, The War in the Pacific, Okinawa: The Last Battle (Washington,
DC: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1948). 1st ESB operations are
in Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, Vol. IV, Amphibian Engineer Operations,
682–691. Naval operations are covered in Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United
States Naval Operations in World War II: Victory in the Pacific, 1945 (Boston:
Little, Brown & Company, 1960). The British Commonwealth casualties were
those from the British Pacific Fleet (Task Force 57), an aircraft carrier task force
composed of British, Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand ships and aircraft.
Amphibian Engineer Operations, 659–682.
Amphibian Engineer Operations, 697–682; Heavey, Down Ramp!, 186–188.
102
174. Fahey, Ships and Aircraft of the United States Fleet, 1945, 61–64, 76–
79, 96, and 1948 Addendum; Friedman and Baker, U.S. Amphibious Ships and
Craft, 288.
175. “Unit History of Amphibious Training Command, U.S. Atlantic Fleet,”
2–4; “Report of Amphibious Troop Training Operations in the Pacific During
Calendar Year 1946,” Commander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, 21 June
1947, RG 337, Entry 55, Army Ground Forces General Correspondence 1942–
1948, Box No. 695, NACP; Army Ground Forces G1 Memo, 5 September 1947,
“Amphibious Experience,” list of officers at Coronado and Little Creek and
officers at HQ AGF with amphibious experience, RG 337, Entry 9, Box 63, Folder
353 (Amphibious) (Training), Action 1, NACP.
176. US Forces European Theater, General Board, Report of the General
Board, United States Forces, European Theater, Study No. 22: “Control of the
Build-up of Troops in a Cross-channel Amphibious Operation as Illustrated in
Operation Overlord”; Study No. 72: “Engineer Tactical Policies”; Study No.
129: “Mounting the Operation ‘Overlord’,” 1945, 1946; Becker, The Amphibious
Training Center. For some key examples of the postwar retrospectives on amphib
ious operations, see, for example, Jacob L. Devers, “OPERATION DRAGOON:
The Invasion of Southern France,” Military Affairs, Vol. X, No. 2, Summer 1946,
2–41; Jacob L. Devers, “Major Problems Confronting a Theater Commander in
Combined Operations,” address at the Armed Forces Staff College, 8 October
1947, copy at MHI; Arnold, “Preparation for a Division Amphibious Operation”;
Arthur G. Trudeau, Doctrine and Techniques in Amphibious Operations
(Washington, DC: Army Services Forces, 1946). A series of articles analyzing
World War II amphibious operations was published throughout 1946 and into
1947 in Military Affairs.
177. War Department Memorandum WDGS G3 for Commanding General
Army Ground Forces, 12 June 1946, “Amphibious Training,” RG 337, Entry 55,
Box 712, Action 100, NACP.
178. Historical Report, 2d Engineer Special Brigade, 1949, 28 March 1950,
I-3, V-5, and Appendixes 1–4 (activation orders for units from General Reserve),
RG 407, Entry 429, Box 4665, NACP.
179. Unit History, Hq & Svc Co, 302d Amphibious Tractor Battalion, 1949,
Box 4599; Command Report, Headquarters, 409th Engineer Brigade, September
1951, Box 5119; Unit History, 747th Amphibian Tank Battalion, Box 4599, all in
RG 407, Entry 429, NACP. The 75th Amphibian Tank Battalion is identified as a
Reserve unit activated in 1946 in Mary Lee Stubbs and Stanley Russell Connor,
Army Lineage Series, Armor-Cavalry, Part I: Regular Army and Army Reserve
(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, US Army, 1969), 76.
The 2d ESB history does not identify it as a Reserve unit and refers to it as an
ATTB, but it seems likely it is the same unit identified in Stubbs and Connor.
180. Report of Amphibious Troop Training Operations in the Pacific dur-
ing Calendar Year 1946 (San Diego, CA: Office of the Commander, Amphibious
Force, US Pacific Fleet, 21 June 1947), RG 337, Entry 55, “Army Ground Forces
103
General Correspondence 1942–48,” Box 695, File “353/12 Amphib (Separate
Enclosure),” NACP.
181. “Unit History of Amphibious Training Command, US Atlantic Fleet,”
9–10.
182. US Army, Sixth Army, Sixth Army Report on Amphibious Training
Program, 1946 (Presidio of San Francisco, CA: Headquarters, Sixth Army
[1946?]); Jean R. Moenk, A History of Large-Scale Army Maneuvers in the
United States, 1935–1964 (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Branch, Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Force, US Continental
Army Command, December 1969), 110–114; US Pacific Fleet, Operation DUCK:
Operation Plan (Training) No. A109-46 (San Diego, CA: Amphibious Forces,
Pacific Fleet, Commander Amphibious Group One, and Commander Task Group
13.12, 25 October 1946), MHI Archives, Box: “Operation Duck Observer Reports
1946.”
183. Sixth Army Report, Annex 7, “Critique of ‘OPERATION DUCK’
Covering West Coast Amphibious Training Exercises held by Commander,
Amphibious Forces, US Pacific Fleet at Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado,
1 December 1946,” 2.
184. D. Clayton James points out this difference in perspective, and the
impact of Anzio in particular, on Generals Omar N. Bradley and J. Lawton
Collins (future chairman of the JCS and chief of staff of the Army at the time of
the Incheon landing in Korea) in The Years of MacArthur, Vol. III, Triumph and
Disaster 1945–1964 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), 464–466 and (with
Anne Sharp Wells) in Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea
1950–1953 (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1993), 165. Although neither general
was directly involved in Anzio, both had read the analyses of the operation.
185. These views are set forth in a 1948 historical study by Albert N. Garland,
Amphibious Doctrine and Training, AGF Study No. 6, and in an unpublished
essay by Major General Clark L. Ruffner titled “What are they trying to do to
the Marines?” 16 June 1947. Both documents are in the Historical Manuscript
File at the US Army Center of Military History. I am indebted to Mr. Frank R.
Shirer for bringing these documents to my attention. In World War II, General
Ruffner had served as Deputy Chief of Staff, US Army Forces, Central Pacific
in 1943, and Chief of Staff, US Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas and Middle
Pacific in 1944–45. He had assisted in the planning for the Gilberts operation,
had participated in the Makin and Leyte assaults, and had been involved in the
planning for the amphibious invasion of Japan. (See “Biographical File, General
Clark L. Ruffner, USA,” MHI.) The number of amphibious operations conducted
is difficult to pin down, since there were many small-scale landings of less than
regimental size, but the numbers developed by the US Army Center of Military
History for assault landings of regimental size or larger are 42 Army, 10 Marine,
and 6 that involved both Army and Marine units. The list was “based on readily
available sources and is not an official definitive statement on the subject.” See
“Major U.S. Amphibious Operations—World War II and Korea,” 27 July 1964,
CMH File 228.01 HRC 370.03 Invasions, Amphibious Operations. Engineers of
104
the Southwest Pacific, Vol. IV, Amphibian Engineer Operations, identifies 148
“combat landings” in which the 2d, 3d, and 4th ESBs participated, 698.
186. Ray S. Cline and Maurice Matloff, “Development of War Department
Views on Unification,” Military Affairs, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (Summer 1949): 66–68.
187. The debate within the JCS in 1946 is described in James F. Schnabel, The
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,
Vol. I, 1945–1947 (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1979), 227–247.
188. These views are summarized in Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of
Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process (New York, NY:
Columbia University Press, 1966), 66–68.
189. The JCS debate came to be known as the “JCS 1478 Papers” when it
became public knowledge during the congressional hearings. “JCS 1478” was the
number assigned to the topic by the Joint Staff. Schnabel, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
and National Policy, Vol. I, 227–247; Legere, 320.
190. Caraley and Legere describe the activities of the Services during the
congressional debate on unification. For Marine Corps activities, see Gordon W.
Keiser, The U.S. Marine Corps and Defense Unification, 1944–47 (Baltimore,
MD: Nautical and Aviation, 1966). Jon T. Hoffman provides an excellent
account of the activities of Brigadier General Merritt A. Edson, one of the key
players on the Marine Corps side, in Once a Legend: “Red Mike” Edson of the
Marine Raiders (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1994). See also Hoffman’s “The Roles
and Missions Debate,” Marine Corps Gazette, December 1994, 16–19. David
Jablonsky describes the imbroglio from the Army perspective in his forthcoming
War by Land, Sea and Air: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Concept of Unified
Command (unpublished manuscript).
191. Public Law 253–80th Congress, as amended by Public Law 36–81st
Congress and Public Law 216–81st Congress.
192. Executive Order 9877, 26 July 1947. “Joint” amphibious operations
would be those in which forces of two or more Services participate. The Army
leadership anticipated these would be much larger operations than the seizure of
advanced naval bases as set forth in the Marine Corps mission in the National
Security Act.
193. Kenneth W. Condit, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint
Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. II, 1947–1949 (Wilmington, DE: Michael
Glazier, Inc., 1979), 165–184.
194. Departments of the Army and the Air Force, “Functions of the Armed
Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff” (Key West Agreement), Joint Army and Air
Force Bulletin No. 18 (Washington, DC: Departments of the Army and the Air
Force, 13 May 1948), Section V copy in MHI Archives, Adjutant General AGO
Letters 1950.
195. Departments of the Army and the Air Force, Joint Army and Air Force
Bulletin No. 18, Section IV.
196. Departments of the Army and the Air Force, Joint Army and Air Force
Bulletin No. 18, Section VII.
197. Report of Army Advisory Panel on Joint Amphibious Operations (Fort
105
Monroe, VA: Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, 18 January 1949), RG
337, Entry 38 (Development and Testing Section Decimal File 1942–50), Box 11,
NACP, Annex B to Appendix A, A-B-1–A-B-6.
198. Michael A. Palmer, Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American Naval
Strategy in the First Postwar Decade (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center,
1988), 15, 29–30. I am indebted to David Keough of the MHI for bringing this
rationale for postwar amphibious operations to my attention.
199. Steven T. Ross, American War Plans, 1945–1950 (New York & London:
Garland Publishing, Inc., 1988), 115–119, 130–131. Frank Pace, Secretary of
the Army during this period, recalls reconnoitering the Pyrenees line to assess
whether a foothold could be retained in Europe. Frank Pace Oral History, 21–22,
MHI Archives.
200. Exercise Seminole: Report of Joint Amphibious Training Exercises,
November 1947. Fleet Post Office (New York, NY: Commander Amphibious
Force, United States Atlantic Fleet, Commander Joint Expeditionary Force,
1947), (I)(A)-1; J.C. Kennedy, Planning Amphibious Operations (Fort Knox, KY:
Instructor Training Division, General Instruction Department, US Army Armored
School, 27 April 1948); LTC Alva T. McDaniel et al., The Armored Division as
an Assault Landing Force, Research Report (Fort Knox, KY: US Army Armored
School, 1951–52).
201. Gilberto Villahermosa, “The 65th Infantry Regiment: Prelude to
Inchon: The Puerto Rican Exercises of 1950,” valerosos.com/PreludetoInchon.
html (accessed 25 June 2006).
202. AFF replaced AGF in March 1948 as the agency responsible for the
training of Army forces in the Continental United States.
203. Commander First Task Fleet, Control Order No. 2-49, Exercise MIKI,
1 August 1949; Observer’s Report, Exercise MIKI, After Action Report, Joint
Army–Navy Exercise, FY 49, MIKI, 25 November 1949; all in The William
Lawton Papers, MHI Archives; 2d ESB Historical Report 1949, IV-3–IV-7;
Moenk, History of Large-Scale Army Maneuvers, 128–135.
204. US Army, Second Army, Report on Joint Puerto Rican Exercise
(PORTREX), Fort George G. Meade: Headquarters, Second Army, 1 July 1950,
copy at MHI; 2ESB Historical Report 1949, II-7, IV-8; Villahermosa, “Prelude
to Inchon”; Moenk, History of Large-Scale Army Maneuvers, 136–143. The 3d
Infantry Division did participate in the amphibious withdrawal from northeast
Korea in December 1950.
205. Moenk, History of Large-Scale Army Maneuvers, 150.
206. US Army Command and General Staff College, “Infantry Division
in Amphibious Operations,” Subject 3503A (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army
Command and General Staff College, 31 March 1948). Box: “CGSC Curricular
1940s,” MHI Archives; Kennedy, Planning Amphibious Operations; “Amphibious
Operations Manual,” Command and General Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, KS:
1 September 1948); David A. Ogden, Amphibious operations: lecture before the
Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia—March 15, 1949 (Fort Belvoir, VA: US
Army Engineer School, The Engineer Center, 1949); David Ogden, Amphibious
106
Operations of Especial Interest to the Army (Fort Belvoir, VA: US Army Engineer
School, The Engineer Center, 1951).
207. Garland, Amphibious Doctrine and Training. RG 337, Entry 55 series
(Army Ground Forces/Army Field Forces General Correspondence) contains the
record of these reports and studies.
208. War Department G3 Memorandum WDGCT 353 Amph, 4 February
1946, to Chief of Staff of the Army, “Army Personnel for Post-War Amphibious
Staff Organization,” RG 337, Entry 55, Box 712, NACP.
209. Letter, Office of Chief of Army Field Forces, GNGCT-22 319.1, 1
May 1948, to Senior Army Officer, Troop Training Unit, Amphibious Training
Command, Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet, “Report on TTU Amphibious Force,
Pacific Fleet,” RG 337, Entry 55H, Box 16, File 535 (Amph), NACP.
210. Garland, Amphibious Doctrine and Training, summarizes these argu
ments on pages 90–134. The arguments are also set forth in the various exercise
after action reports, in General Ogden’s writings, in Army comments on proposed
US Fleet doctrinal publications USF-6, 63, and 66 published in 1946 and 1947
(RG 337, Entry 31A, Box 26, NACP), and in the testimony and discussion con
tained in Report of Army Advisory Panel.
211. Letter, War Department General Staff G3, 29 December 1947, to
Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, “Amphibious and Airborne
Instruction” and other correspondence in Action 353/5006, Office of the Chief,
Army Field Forces, 12 January 1948, “Amphibious and Airborne Instruction,”
RG 337, Entry 55, Box 714, Action 353/5008, NACP; Ogden, Amphibious
Operations, 50.
212. Report of Army Advisory Panel on Joint Amphibious Operations.
213. Report of Army Advisory Panel on Joint Amphibious Operations,
14–16.
17–21.
17–21.
216. US Army, Engineer School, “Abstract of Proceedings, Conference
of General and Special Service School Instructors, 15–18 August 1949” (Fort
Belvoir, VA: US Army Engineer School, The Engineer Center, and Fort Belvoir,
1949), copy in the Engineer School Collection, MHI Archives.
217. Engineer School, “Abstract of Proceedings, Conference of General and
Special Service School Instructors,” 27–28, 73–76. The quotation is on page 73.
Special Service School Instructors,” 28–29.
Special Service School Instructors, 27, 30, 73–76.
220. Department of the Army, Draft Field Service Regulations: Operations,
1953; 299–323; Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Field Service
Regulations: Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 1954).
221. The acronym for the Far East Command used in Washington was
107
FECOM; however, within the Far East Command itself, the preferred acronym
was FEC.
222. This discussion of FEC command relations is based on Ronald H. Cole
et al., The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946–1993 (Washington, DC:
Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995),
11; James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The History of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. 3, The Korean War, Part
One (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1998),
29, 49–52, 56.
223. In June 1950 these were Eighth Army; GHQ Headquarters and Service
Group; Ryukyus Command; and the Marianas-Bonins Command.
224. Donald W. Boose Jr., U.S. Army Forces in the Korean War 1950–1953,
Battle Orders No. 11 (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2005), 63. The 1st Cavalry
Division was organized as an infantry division.
225. Robert Frank Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953
(Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, US Air Force, 1983), 1–4.
226. Field, History of United States Naval Operations, Korea, 46, 54, 71.
227. Letter, Major General E.K. Wright, USA Retired, to Colonel Robert
Heinl, USMC, 27 April 1967, 35, copy in the Robert D. Heinl Papers, Box
42, PCC277, folder, “Victory at High Tide 1967/2,” Marine Corps University
Archives, hereafter, MCUA.
228. Field, History of United States Naval Operations, Korea, 44–48.
229. Field, History of United States Naval Operations, Korea, 72.
230. General Headquarters, Far East Command, Annual Historical Report,
1 January 1950–31 October 1950, 6, RG 409, Entry 429, Box 346, NACP.
231. GHQ FEC G3 Memo for Chief of Staff, FEC, Subject: “Department
of the Army Message WX 99128, Relative to Amphibious Training,” 6 February
1950; Letter, GHQ FEC to Director, Organization and Training, General Staff,
US Army, “Informal Quarterly Report, 7 February 1950”; GHQ FEC G3 Training
Memorandum for the Record, “Amphibious Training for FEC, 1950,” 18 February
1950, RG 554, Entry 57, Box 1, NACP. A battalion landing team was an infantry
battalion specially reinforced by additional combat and service elements and was
the basic unit for planning an assault landing.
232. GHQ FEC letter to ACofS, G3, Operations, Department of the Army,
“Advance Amphibious Planning, Far East Command,” 3 April 1950, RG 554,
Entry 57, Box 1, NACP.
233. GHQ FEC 1st Indorsement to Eighth Army letter, “New Construction
for Amphibious Training Center, Camp McGill,” 28 March 1950; GHQ FEC
G3 Memorandum, “Troop Housing for Amphibious Training,” 20 April 1950;
GHQ FEC G3 3d Indorsement (Check Note) to G1, “Request for Permanent
Augmentation of NAVFE Strength by Crews for 5 LSTs,” 5 May 1950; GHQ
FEC G3 Training Memorandum for the Record Brief, “Request for Permanent
Augmentation of NAVFE, 27 May 1950; GHQ FEC letter, “Permanent Assignment
of an Attack Transport to Naval Forces,” 5 June 1950; GHQ FEC G3 Memo for
108
Chief of Staff, “Use of SCAJAP Liberty Ship, JOHN W. WEEKS, in Far East
Command Amphibious Training Program,” 15 June 1950, RG 554, Entry 57, Box
1, NACP. A Welin davit (a type of crane for lowering boats into the water from
ships) is designed to accommodate three LCVPs or LCPRs on an amphibious
ship. For the location of Camp McGill and other bases in Japan, see map 8.
234. These documents are located in RG 554, Records of GHQ FEC, Entry
50 (ACofS G3 Training Division Memorandums—Action File, 1950), Box 1,
NACP.
235. US Army, 8206th Army Unit, Amphibious Training Center, Unit History
[1951?], hereafter, ATC History, 3–5. A photographic copy of this document is at
MHI. For the locations of Camp McGill and Chigasaki Beach, see map 8.
236. Dyer, The Amphibians Came to Conquer, 266, 606, 1054,1123; James
F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, Policy and Direction: The
First Year (Washington, DC: GPO, 1972), 145 and note 5.
237. MTT Able was a detachment of Marine Brigadier General William
S. Fellers’ Troop Training Unit (TTU) of the Training Command, Amphibious
Forces, Pacific Fleet, based at Coronado, California, with the mission of training
Marine and Army forces in amphibious warfare techniques and procedures.
238. ATC History, 3–5; Field, History of United States Naval Operations,
Korea, 45, 46; US Marine Corps Board, An Evaluation of the Influence of Marine
Corps Forces on the Course of the Korean War (4 Aug 50–15 Dec 50), hereafter,
Marine Corps Evaluation, Vol. I, Part 3, III-B-1, MCUA.
109
Chapter 3
Initial Operations and Planning
North Korean Attacks and ROK and US Evacuations

The Korean War began on 25 June 1950 when the North Korean
People’s Army (KPA) invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK). The ini
tial North Korean attacks included small-scale amphibious operations on
the east coast while, in the west, the ROK conducted a regimental-size
amphibious evacuation from the Ongjin Peninsula and US civilians were
evacuated by sea from the port of Incheon. (See map 7.)
Evidence indicates that the North Koreans established two naval
infantry units (Yukjeondae: literally, land combat unit) under the KPA
Naval Headquarters (599th Unit) at Jinnampo (Chinnamp’o) in July 1949.
The 956th Naval Infantry Unit was based at Jinnampo in the west and the
945th at Wonsan on the east coast, where it received amphibious train
ing by Soviet advisors.1 Another unit, the 766th Independent Unit, a guer
rilla force established under the direction of future Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) defense minister O Jin U, also received
amphibious training at Wonsan before the outbreak of war. On 22 June
the 766th Independent Unit moved to the port of Yangyang, where it was
joined by the 945th Naval Infantry Unit and several small separate guer
rilla units, bringing the size of the combined organization to 1,200 to 1,500
amphibious troops. Their mission was to support the KPA 5th Division’s
attack by landing at beachheads along the South Korean east coast behind
the defending ROK Army forces and to disrupt the line of communications
by destroying railroad tracks, bridges, tunnels, and telephone and telegraph
facilities. The forces that had conducted the amphibious landings would
then join with the nonamphibious elements of the 766th that had remained
behind to participate in the KPA 5th Division’s land attack. The reconsti
tuted unit would serve as a reconnaissance and ranger force supporting the
5th Division and infiltrating guerrilla teams through the mountains to the
west and south toward Busan (Pusan) and Daegu (Taegu).2
The first three battalions of the 766th Independent Unit and elements
of the 945th Naval Infantry Unit loaded aboard small coastal cargo ships,
fishing boats, and motor launches at the port of Yangyang. The other units,
joined by several hundred more guerrillas, moved to various coastal ports
to embark in assorted small ships and craft, including sail boats. These
motley flotillas sortied between 22 and 25 June and headed south, some
of them escorted by motor torpedo boats of the 2d Naval Squadron. The
North Korean attack began in the predawn hours of 25 June along the
111
112
W on sa n
T he N orth K orean A ttack
• Initial A m phibious O perations
P yeo ng ya ng 25 – 28 Ju ne 1 95 0
25–
N orth K orea III S outh K ore an defe nsive are as, 25 June
S outh K ore an fro nt, eve ning 28 Ju ne
JJin
in n a m p o N orth K orea n attacks, 25 June
S a id o r
0 10 20 30 40
• S a id o r
M ile
il e s
S a riw
riw o n
•
N K I C o rp s P ye o n g g a n g N K II C o rps III
I II
• 17
E a st S ea
I II
III
M otorc
o t o rc yycc llee
203 105 C h e o rw o n G im
im h w a
(S ea o f Jap an )
XX
III XX XX XX
• 5
14 6 1 4
• 3 XX
X III
I II
X XX 2 XX
1 0 5 (-)
(-) 7 6 6 I.U
I. U .
3 BC 6 ((-)
-) 7
Y e o n ch e o n H w a ch e o n Y a n g ya n g
H a e ju
ju R O K 1st Inf D iv (-)
(-) • • IInn jjee • 38th P arallel
• G o ra n g p o -ri
-ri •
O n g jijinn
G a e se o n g • D o n g d u ch e o n 10th Inf, 2 5 J une : K P A L a nd ing
i ng s
• III Yeonan
• R O K 8th Inf D iv III
• XX M u n sa n
• XX P o ch e o n C h u n ch e o n ji n
Ju m u n jin•
• • • XX
17th Inf, R O K 7th Inf D iv
R O K 6th Inf D iv (-)
(-) G angneung
R O K C ap Inf D iv U ije
ije o n g b u N a kp u n g --ri
ri
• H o n g ch e o n ji n
Je o n g d o n g jin
••
G IM
IM P O
• O kg ye
A IR FIE
IR F I E LD
••
(-)
R O K 6th Inf D iv (-)
2 6 J une : E va c ua ttio gim
i o n o f 1 7 th R O K R e g i m e nt S eoul
eou l M u kh o
( - ),
21st Inf (-),
•
H o e n g se o n g
• •
Yeongdeungpo • R O K 8th Inf D iv iv S a m ch e o k
II I
I n ch e o n
In • R m nts, R O K C ap 1, 2, •
& 7th Inf D ivs
i vs W on ju
ju Ju kb ye o n
Suwon • •
• S UW O N m w o n jijinn
IIm
• RF
A IIR FIE
I E LD •
O sa n Je ch e o n
W e st S ea • •
(Y e llow S ea ) A n se o n g
S outh K orea U ljin
lji n
• • P ye o n g ta
ta e k C h u n g jjuu •
• D a n ya n g
•
Cheonan Y e o n g jjuu
• •
around 0400 and moved down the narrow coastal plain toward Gangneung
Yeodan) and elements of the 766th Independent Unit, crossed the border
38th Parallel. In the east, following a preparatory artillery barrage, the
(Kangnung). Opposing them were the ROK 8th Division, commanded by

KPA 5th Division, reinforced by the 1st Border Guard Brigade (Gyeongbi
Map 7. North Korean attack: initial amphibious operations.
Colonel Lee Song Ga, with its headquarters at Gangneung. Lieutenant
Colonel Ko Kung Hong’s 10th Infantry Regiment was in defensive posi
tions near the border, just north of the little port of Jumunjin (Chumunjin).
One battalion of Lieutenant Colonel Kim Yong Bae’s 21st Regiment was
based at the coastal town of Samcheok (Samch’ok); the other two battal
ions were conducting counterguerrilla operations in the mountains to the
west.3
Soon after the attack began, ROK police and military units began
receiving reports of sightings of North Korean soldiers along the coast.
Shortly after 0500, Major Gerald E. Larson, the US advisor with the ROK
8th Division, was notified that enemy troops were landing in two loca
tions near Samcheok. Larson, Lieutenant Colonel Kim Yong Bae, and the
21st Regiment operations officer drove by jeep up the coast, where they
saw junks and sampans circling off shore and about a battalion of North
Korean troops on the beach.4 They saw a similar scene south of Samcheok
and villagers at other locations along the coast reported groups of North
Korean soldiers moving inland. One attempted landing north of Nakpung
ri (Nakp’ung-ni) was driven off by soldiers of the 21st Regiment, who
sank at least two of the boats with 57-mm antitank guns. However, some
1,300 KPA troops landed successfully at various places on the coast
between Gangneung and Uljin (Ulchin), with most of the landings concen
trated around the coastal towns of Jeongdongjin (Chongdongjin), south of
Gangneung, and Imwonjin, north of Uljin.5
The North Koreans had planned another landing, probably by the
3d Battalion of the 766th Independent Unit and/or elements of the 945th
Naval Infantry Unit, at Busan. This would have had serious implications,
as the city was essentially undefended and was the primary port of debar
kation for US reinforcements and materiel coming into Korea. However,
a small ROK Navy force successfully intercepted the North Korean ship.
On Sunday evening, 25 June, the ROK Navy submarine chaser PC-701
(Baekdusan) and motor minesweepers YMS-512 and YMS-518 were
patrolling north of Busan under the tactical control of the captain of PC
701, Commander Choi Yong Nam.6 Just after sunset lookouts sighted
smoke on the horizon. PC-701 steamed toward the smoke and discov
ered an unidentified 1,000-ton cargo ship. After repeatedly challenging the
ship by blinker light with no response, Commander Choi brought PC-701
to within 600 yards and illuminated the suspicious vessel with a search
light. He could clearly see North Korean soldiers in uniform crowding the
deck of the unmarked ship, which was armed with a 76-mm gun and four
machineguns. Choi radioed ROK Navy Headquarters in Busan, reported
his sighting, and was granted permission to shoot. PC-701 commenced 20
113
rounds of rapid fire with its 3-inch gun, damaging the North Korean ship,
which came to a stop and returned fire, sending a 76-mm shell crashing
through PC-701’s wheelhouse, killing an officer and a sailor. PC-701 fired
20 more rounds until its 3-inch gun jammed, but by then the armed trans
port was listing to starboard with its mast toppled. A few moments later,
it plunged bow-first beneath the waves as the ROK sailors cheered their
Navy’s first battle and first victory at sea.7
As these events were taking place in the east, the North Korean assault
was continuing in the Ongjin Peninsula on the west coast. There, ROK
Army Colonel Paik In Yup’s 17th Regiment was cut off from reinforce
ment or escape by land and in danger of being overwhelmed by the KPA
14th Regiment and 3d Border Guard Brigade. Fortunately, one ROK Navy
and two ROK Merchant Marine landing ships, tank (LSTs) were able to
sail to the area. In the late 1940s, several LSTs that had been in use by
the US Government in Korea had been transferred to the ROK Merchant
Marine along with some small freighters. However, at the beginning of
the war, the ROK Navy had only one such ship, LST-801, commanded
by ROK Navy Lieutenant Kim Ok Gyeong. The Merchant crews were
not trained in beaching and retraction techniques, but the LST-801 had an
effective commander and crew fully capable of amphibious operations.
On 26 June the three LSTs, along with fishing boats carrying 20 to 50 men
each, evacuated about 1,750 survivors of the regiment.8
That same day plans to evacuate American military dependents and
embassy, business, and missionary families were put into effect. Fifth Air
Force fighters provided overhead cover and US destroyers Mansfield and
De Haven steamed to Incheon to provide protection to the Norwegian
freighter Reinholt, hastily cleaned up from its previous cargo of fertilizer,
to accommodate the evacuees.9 Among these was a professional geog
rapher who would later be employed by General Douglas MacArthur’s
headquarters in Japan. Years later she recollected that the evacuation was
affected by the same hydrographic conditions that would later shape the
amphibious landing at Incheon. “In time-honored fashion,” she recalled,
“we were poled—slowly-slowly—in barges over the mud flats [and] my
barge experienced a few shots from two enemy planes overhead to scare
us.” The Reinholt was packed with some 300 people, most of them women
and children, who cheered loudly when one of the Navy destroyers met
them at sea during the night.10
As these first amphibious combat moves of the war were taking place
in Korea, the amphibious training program that had been under develop
ment by the General Headquarters (GHQ) Far East Command (FEC) was
114
underway in Japan (see map 8). By coincidence, on 25 June 1950, the
same day that the North Koreans began their attack, Admiral James H.
Doyle’s amphibious ships were underway from Yokosuka with one bat
talion landing team of the 35th Infantry Regiment on board. The battalion
went ashore at Chigasaki Beach on 26 June. The second landing exercise
began as scheduled on 28 June, but all the Fifth Air Force units, Far East
Air Force (FEAF) observers, tanks, and destroyers were withdrawn, and
once the landing was completed, the ships returned to port to debark the
troops. The subsequent exercises were canceled, and on 30 June Doyle’s
amphibious group was placed on 4-hour notice to sail.11
U S B ases in Japan
K orean P orts and
500
P a cific O cea n
t a ttuu te M ililee s
250
S ta
•••SCeanmdpa iY(Co uanmgph aSnesn d a i, C a m p S ch iimm m e lflfee n n iigg )

0
Map 8. Korean ports and US bases in Japan.

H o kka ido
S a kha lin
Iw o Jim a
H o n shu
• Camp Haugen
T ok yo Japan
io g a m a
• Y o ko h a m a
S h io
• • •• • •Y oOkopsup akam a
S aga m i B ay
C h iigg a sa k i C a m p M cG ill
•
•
O ta ru
C a m p C ra w fo rd
D ra ke•
Camp
B e a ch
(S ea of Japan)
ta
O h a ta
USSR
E ast S ea
i cka m a u g a
S h iko ku
Kobe
C a m p C h icka
K orea
it a kyu sh u M o ji
•• • •
• Pohang
O kin a w a
B usan
•
• Heungnam
F u ku o ka
K yu sh u
S a se b o
• W on sa n
•
K ita
•
ROK
DPRK
• In ch e o n
• in n a m p o
C hina
JJin
115
Command Relationship Changes and Arrival of US/UN Forces
On the outbreak of hostilities, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
returned Korea to MacArthur’s FEC area of responsibility (AOR).
Formosa (Taiwan) and surrounding waters and islands were also added to
MacArthur’s AOR. On 27 June the JCS advised MacArthur that President
Harry S. Truman had removed all restrictions on the use of FEC naval
and air assets and directed that these be used to “offer fullest possible
support” to ROK forces.12 Two days later, the JCS transferred the Seventh
Fleet to MacArthur’s operational control, and directed Admiral Arthur W.
Radford, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command and Pacific Fleet to pro
vide support and reinforcement “as necessary and practicable.” MacArthur
further delegated operational control of the Seventh Fleet to Admiral C.
Turner Joy. In the same message, the JCS authorized MacArthur to extend
his operations into “Northern Korea against air bases, depots, tank parks,
troop columns, and other such purely military targets” when MacArthur
judged these attacks to be essential to carry out his mission or to avoid
unnecessary casualties to US forces.13
The North Korean advance continued. By the end of June, the KPA
had captured the ROK capital of Seoul and all the territory north of the
Han River. In the central part of the country, the KPA were advancing
toward the crucial transportation hub at Wonju, and in the east ROK forces
had been pushed south of Gangneung.
On 30 June General MacArthur was authorized to use US ground
troops to support the South Koreans.14 The next day, Admiral Joy issued
Commander, United States Naval Forces, Far East (COMNAVFE)
Operation Order (OPORD) No. 7-50, directing Admiral Doyle to use his
Task Force (TF) 90 amphibious ships to move the 24th Infantry Division
from Fukuoka and Sasebo, Japan, to Korea, and assigning 16 Shipping
Control Administration, Japan (SCAJAP) LSTs to expand the lift
capability of Doyle’s small amphibious force. Doyle arrived at Sasebo on
3 July to find that the 24th Infantry Division had already begun moving by
locally available shipping and air. His ships were retained at Sasebo and
Doyle flew to Tokyo for a meeting with MacArthur concerning his next
mission—an amphibious operation.15
On 1 July the lead element of the 24th Infantry Division, a reinforced
infantry battalion designated TF Smith, flew to Korea, moving forward
the next day to engage the advancing North Koreans. TF Smith went into
action near the town of Osan, about 30 miles south of the ROK capital
of Seoul, on 5 July. It was able to do little to delay the KPA, but addi
tional forces were on the way.16 The rest of the 24th Infantry Division was
116
in Korea by 6 July and the lead elements of the 25th Infantry Division
began loading on leased Marus (Japanese merchant ships) at Moji, Japan,
on 8 July. The movement of Army forces to Korea was the first major
task of Captain Alexander Junker’s newly formed Western Pacific Office,
Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS). Doyle’s amphibious group
was an operational unit of COMNAVFE with no connection to MSTS, but
Doyle’s staff coordinated with that of Junker, and MSTS (and SCAJAP)
ships were often assigned to Doyle to provide sufficient shipping for
amphibious operations.17
Other nations were also providing support to the effort in Korea.
On 25 June, 27 June, and 7 July, the United Nations Security Council
passed three resolutions that condemned the North Korean attack, called
on UN member states to assist the ROK to “repel the armed attack and to
restore international peace and security in the area,” asked UN states to
make forces available “to a unified command under the United States,”
and requested the United States designate a force commander. President
Truman designated MacArthur to be commander in chief of the United
Nations Command (CINCUNC) as well as commander in chief of the
FEC.18
The United Kingdom and Australia immediately put their naval
forces in Far Eastern waters (an aircraft carrier, two cruisers, destroyers,
and frigates) under MacArthur’s operational control. New Zealand, the
Netherlands, and Canada deployed ships to the Far East, and Australia
made No. 77 Squadron (the one Commonwealth combat air unit that was
still in Japan) available for combat operations in Korea. Eventually, the
ROK and 15 UN nations, in addition to the United States, contributed com
bat forces to the United Nations Command (UNC), while 5 other nations
sent medical units. On 3 July the United States declared a naval block
ade of the Korean coast, aircraft from the USS Valley Forge and H.M.S.
Triumph attacked the North Korean capital of Pyeongyang (P’yongyang),
and No. 77 Squadron Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) began conduct
ing air strikes in support of ROK ground troops.19
On 13 July 1950 General Walton H. Walker moved his headquarters
to Korea, establishing Eighth United States Army in Korea (EUSAK).
On 14 July President Syngman Rhee gave operational control of all ROK
military forces to MacArthur, who designated Walker as the UNC Ground
Component Commander with operational control of all US, ROK, and UN
ground forces. Walker initially had to commit forces piecemeal to delay
the North Koreans until he could form a coherent line to stop the North
Korean attack and defend until enough forces could be assembled to begin
a counterattack.
117
Amphibious Planning and Operation BLUEHEARTS20
At the beginning of July 1950, a week after the North Korean attack,
the concerns of the US JCS over amphibious operations focused not on
attack but withdrawal. On 1 July the Secretary of Defense had asked for a
military estimate of the situation in Korea. The next day, the Joint Strategic
Plans Committee presented the JCS with the results of their deliberations.
One of the questions the Secretary asked was “Is there any possibility
that Korea could be another ‘Dunkirk’?” The planners concluded that the
chances of a forced withdrawal from Korea were “negligible,” so long
as only North Korean forces were involved and would be increased only
slightly if Chinese or Manchurian forces intervened. If evacuation became
necessary, Russian air and submarine forces would be a serious threat,
but the United States could probably maintain air and naval superiority at
the evacuation area and could, therefore, conduct a successful withdrawal.
The planners concluded that the United States had available “adequate lift
for a withdrawal of a force of two divisions” within 10 days for an orderly
withdrawal of equipment and personnel, or within as little as 1 day if all
equipment and supplies were abandoned or destroyed and only personnel
were evacuated.21
While the Joint Staff planners were deliberating on the likelihood of
another Dunkirk, General MacArthur, whose success in World War II was
based on a series of amphibious operations across the Southwest Pacific
and into the Philippines, was thinking in terms of another Hollandia or
Leyte. It is impossible to determine the exact moment when the Incheon
amphibious operation was conceived, but given MacArthur’s experience
and the emphasis within the FEC on amphibious training, it is possible
that the idea of an amphibious counterthrust was on the minds of the com
mander in chief, his chief of staff, and his G3 immediately following the
North Korean attack. On 26 June, the day after the attack, General Edward
M. Almond, the GHQ FEC Chief of Staff, had directed General Edwin K.
Wright’s Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) to begin
preparing plans “with regard to the present emergency in Korea.”22
As early as 1948, the Army G4 Plans Division had conducted a series
of strategic studies to determine logistic requirements in potential theaters
of operations. One of these studies, SL-17, was based on a scenario
involving an invasion of South Korea, with friendly forces withdrawing
to a defensible perimeter, then conducting a breakout in conjunction
with an amphibious landing in the vicinity of Incheon. The study had
been approved and distributed to the Army technical services the week
of 19 June 1950. According to the staff officer who wrote the strategic
118
concept for SL-17, GHQ FEC requested 50 copies of the study the week
of 26 June.23
On 29 June MacArthur flew to Korea accompanied by General George
Stratemeyer, General Almond, Major General Charles A. Willoughby (FEC
G2), General Wright, and Brigadier General Courtney Whitney (Chief of
the Supreme Commander Allied Powers [SCAP] Government Section).
From a hill overlooking the Han River, MacArthur observed ROK Army
forces withdrawing to the south amidst throngs of refugees. Later that day,
in reporting the situation to the JCS, he recommended immediate commit
ment of a US regimental combat team (RCT) and the buildup of a two-
division US force in Korea for a counteroffensive.24 In his retrospective
account, MacArthur says that it was while he stood watching the refugees
and ROK soldiers streaming south that he conceived his “desperate” plan
to “throw my occupation soldiers into this breach” and “rely upon strategic
maneuver to overcome the odds against me.” It was here, MacArthur later
claimed, that “the genesis of the Inchon operation began to take shape.”25
On 1 July Major General Alonzo P. Fox, the SCAP Chief of Staff,
announced that General Almond would hold a meeting with Admiral
Doyle and the principal FEC staff officers the next day to discuss “plans
for possible use of amphibious forces, plus requirements for lifting such
forces.” He noted that Admiral Joy estimated that in the theater lift was
available for 1,600 men and equipment.26 That same day the officers of
the 8206th Army Unit, Amphibious Training Center (ATC), were brought
to the headquarters to assist in amphibious planning and ATC teams were
sent to begin teaching basic amphibious techniques (preparation of vehi
cles and equipment, embarkation procedures, and the technique of climb
ing down nets into landing craft) at camps across Japan.27
Following Almond’s preliminary meeting on 2 July, General Wright’s
JSPOG began developing a plan, BLUEHEARTS, for an amphibious
assault at Incheon, using the 1st Cavalry Division and a Marine Corps
RCT to cut the North Korean line of communications and seize the crucial
Seoul area as the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions attacked from the south.
MacArthur sent a message to the JCS requesting the Marine RCT. Also,
Colonel Edward H. Forney’s Mobile Training Team (MTT), which had
been attached to Eighth Army while conducting the amphibious training
at Camp McGill, was attached to Admiral Doyle’s amphibious group and
Forney was brought up to the FEC staff to serve as advisor on amphibious
operations. On 3 July MacArthur told the Department of the Army that
he urgently needed trained US personnel “to man and operate 13 LST, 20
LCM [landing craft, mechanized], and 20 LCVP [landing craft, vehicle,
119
personnel].” He recommended they be airlifted to Japan to arrive no later
than 15 July. That same day the JCS advised him that they had approved
the “earliest practicable dispatch” of the Marine RCT and an escort carrier
with supporting tactical aircraft.28
Unaware that GHQ had other plans for the 1st Cavalry Division,
General Walker suspended the 5th Cavalry Regiment’s amphibious train
ing at Camp McGill on 1 July and on 2 July directed Major General
Hobart R. Gay, the division commander, to prepare plans for movement to
Korea.29 On receiving an information copy of Walker’s message to Gay,
General Almond asked, “What started this? We are not going to move 1st
Cav to Pusan!” The FEC G3 Plans Chief, in his response to Almond, noted
that General Walker’s directive was sent “prior to any knowledge on the
part of anyone in Eighth Army that the C-in-C had directed the preparation
of a plan for the amphibious assault by the 1st Cav Div against the north
west coast of South Korea.”30
Thus, planning for BLUEHEARTS was well underway when, on
4 July 1950, MacArthur called a conference to discuss the amphibious
operation. Among those attending were Generals Almond and Wright,
Marine Brigadier General William S. Fellers (Commanding General of
the Troop Training Unit [TTU], Training Command, Amphibious Force,
Pacific Fleet, who was visiting Korea to observe the amphibious training
program), Admiral Doyle, and Colonel Forney. Wright explained the con
cept of the operation. One Marine RCT and the 1st Cavalry Division would
land at Gunsan (Kunsan) or, preferably, Incheon. They would then seize
Seoul and cut the KPA line of communication through the city.31 Doyle was
directed to work up a detailed plan for the landing, reactivate landing craft
then in storage, and convert MSTS ships to be suitable for amphibious
operations. Forney was assigned as G5 (Plans) of the 1st Cavalry Division
with selected Marine Corps officers in planning billets.32
On 5 July MacArthur requested the amphibious trained 2d Infantry
Division, then stationed at Fort Lewis, Washington; the 2d Engineer Special
Brigade (ESB) at Fort Worden, Washington; and one airborne RCT be sent
to Japan for possible amphibious operations. He also requested armor and
antiaircraft artillery battalions.33 The JCS approved these requests and on
9 July the 2d ESB, with the attached 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor
Battalion (ATTB), 50th Engineer Port Construction Company, and 501st
Transportation Harbor Craft Platoon, was alerted for movement to the Far
East.34 Apparently, even at this early date, consideration was being given
to the use of the southeast coast port of Pohang as a site for bringing in
US forces, as the ATC Deputy Commander, Lieutenant Colonel John B.
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Gibbons, flew to Pohang with representatives of the Navy underwater
demolition team (UDT) assigned to Admiral Doyle’s amphibious force
and the Marine MTT. The reconnaissance party examined the port and
nearby beaches, then returned to Japan.35
On 6 July MacArthur called General Gay and a few members of his
staff to FEC headquarters for a briefing on the plan to land his division
at Incheon. There was still an expectation that US Army forces would
make short work of the North Koreans. In the office of the G2, Gay was
told to expedite his preparations “because if the landing is delayed all that
the 1st Cavalry Division will hit when it lands will be the tail end of the
24th Division as it passes north through Seoul.” Three years later, Gay
recollected, “This prophecy did not prove to be correct. The 1st Cavalry
Division did hit the tail end of the 24th Division on the 20th of July 1950,
but the [24th] Division was not moving north.”36
While General Gay and his staff were being briefed on the operation,
the 8206th Army Unit, ATC, was attached to the 1st Cavalry Division to
assist in planning and training for the operation. An embarkation-planning
group was established at FEC headquarters to develop the plan for load
ing the troops and equipment aboard ship and a subordinate group went
to work at the 1st Cavalry Division Headquarters at Camp Drake (about
20 miles northwest of the center of Tokyo). To prepare the division for the
operation, teams from the ATC and detachments of marines from MTT
Able were sent to each of the 1st Cavalry Division camps. Platforms with
landing nets were installed and the marines and ATC soldiers began inten
sive, if abbreviated, amphibious training, including how to debark from
ships into landing craft, DUKW operations, vehicle and signal equipment
waterproofing, and communications.37
Lieutenant Colonel Gibbons of the ATC was designated commander
of the 1st Cavalry Division shore party, the organization that would con
trol the flow of logistic support over the beach. The officers and soldiers of
the ATC were to serve as the nucleus of the shore party, with most of the
personnel provided by the 8th Engineer Combat Battalion (the 1st Cavalry
Division’s engineer battalion) augmented by members of the 13th Engineer
Combat Battalion (temporarily detached from the 7th Infantry Division)
and two separate units, the 14th Engineer Combat and 43d Engineer
Construction Battalions.38
On 8 July D-Day was set for 18 July, allowing 10 days to “prepare
all plans, waterproof vehicles, procure [equipment to replace shortages],
load completely the entire landing force and sail to Korea.”39 The planning
process proceeded at the same time as the division was moving to the
121
embarkation ports. So units could move to the ports on time, some annexes
to the plan were distributed before the entire plan was completed. The plan
was finished the night of 13 July, about the same time the division had
finished loading and the first ships sailed. Beginning on 9 July, 1st Cavalry
Division units began moving from their home stations to the embarkation
ports of Yokosuka, Yokohama, and Oppama (south of Yokohama).
Detachments of the 7th Infantry Division arrived from their bases in Japan
to the 1st Cavalry Division bases to take over security and occupation
functions of the departing forces.40
Meanwhile, shipping was being assembled for the operation. Admiral
Doyle’s small amphibious force was insufficient to transport the assault
echelon of the division, so 15 of the Japanese-manned SCAJAP LSTs and
two MSTS cargo ships were assigned to TF 90, as were seven landing
ships, utility (LSUs) that had been brought out of storage. US Navy sig
nalers and quartermasters (petty officers responsible for steering the ships)
were put aboard the SCAJAP LSTs to provide for communications and
assist in beaching and retracting the ships. Because the 120-foot LSUs
were to be towed behind LSTs, towing gear had to be installed.41
The two MSTS ships, Oglethorpe and Titania, were still designated as
AKAs, but much of their amphibious equipment had been removed and
they had no landing craft aboard. During the short time remaining, they
were fitted with the appropriate boat fittings, slings, skids, nets, and other
gear to turn them back into combat loaders. Meanwhile, 36-foot LCVPs
(the primary landing craft for putting troops and light vehicles on the
beach) and 56-foot LCMs (for landing larger vehicles) were reactivated.
Some landing craft crews were recruited from the ATC and Army engineer
and transportation units, and additional Navy crews were flown from the
United States.42
The division was to be moved to Korea in three lifts or echelons. The
first lift was the assault force consisting of the division headquarters, the
5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments each organized into two battalion land
ing teams, an artillery group of three 105-mm howitzer field artillery
battalions (FABs) and an amphibian truck company, and the divisional
reconnaissance company.43 The second lift would bring in the 7th Cavalry
Regiment, two more artillery battalions, the rear echelons of the two lead
regiments, and other units. Support units and the rest of the division’s sup
plies and equipment would come in on the third lift. On 9 July the support
elements of the 5th Cavalry joined the regiment at Camp McGill, from
where it would move to Yokosuka, its embarkation location. On 10 July
the 8th Cavalry began moving to its embarkation port of Yokohama and
the artillery units traveled to the LST port at Oppama.44
122
As preparations for the landing were taking place, the ROK Army and
US 24th Infantry Division had been withdrawing. As the front line moved
south, the likelihood of success of a landing at Incheon diminished. On 7
July GHQ FEC had notified Admiral Doyle’s and General Gay’s planners
that Gunsan should be considered as an alternate landing site and this was
incorporated into the planning. By 8 July General MacArthur had decided
that a landing at Incheon was not feasible and the issue became how to
get the 1st Cavalry Division into Korea at all, since Busan Harbor was
clogged with shipping. On 10 July Doyle suggested landing the division
at the southeast coast port of Pohang, which had piers capable of han
dling shallow-draft ships and beaches suitable for LSTs and landing craft.
Another reconnaissance team had surveyed the port and beaches on 9 July,
finding them suitable for such an operation. Although the North Korean
advance threatened Pohang, the ROK 3d Division was still holding the
line to the north. A US Air Force contingent was guarding the nearby air
field of Yeongil (Yongil), and ground crews and equipment of the 35th
Fighter Group were being landed by LST.45
The Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) that was at
Camp McGill for the prewar amphibious training program was assigned
to the 1st Cavalry Division. ANGLICO teams were sent to the 5th Cavalry
Regiment at Camp McGill, the 7th Cavalry Regiment at Camp Drake, and
the 8th Cavalry Regiment at Camp Zama to provide those regiments naval
gunfire and naval air support.46
Embarkation began on 11 July. At Yokohama, Gay and the 1st Cavalry
Division command group boarded Doyle’s flagship, the Mount McKinley,
and the 8th Cavalry Regiment loaded onto the APA Cavalier, AKA
Oglethorpe, and three LSTs. At Yokosuka, the 5th Cavalry loaded aboard
the AKAs Union and Titania. At Oppama, the 61st, 77th, and 99th Field
Artillery Battalions, the 6 M-24 light tanks of the 16th Reconnaissance
Company, 66 DUKWs of the 8062d Army Unit (Amphibious Truck
Company), and the personnel and equipment of the shore party that were
not still assisting the embarkation at the other ports began loading onto
LSTs.47 The use of DUKWs to move light artillery ashore was a technique
developed during World War II amphibious operations. Each howitzer
was loaded into a DUKW. One DUKW per firing battery had an A-frame
to unload the howitzers once ashore. The DUKWs would then serve as
prime movers to tow the artillery pieces until trucks were brought ashore,
then the amphibian trucks would revert to the shore party.48 At Oppama,
the lower deck of each LST was covered with ammunition, and then the
DUKWs were driven aboard and parked on top of the ammunition boxes.
The division’s light aircraft were to be flown to the Busan airfield to be
123
available when the division landed, but the artillerymen of the 77th FAB
disassembled their L-4 (military version of the Piper Cub) and loaded it
aboard an LST with their guns.49
On 12 July Admiral Joy issued his order for BLUEHEARTS,
Commander, United States Naval Forces, Far East (COMNAVFE) OPORD
No. 9-50, identifying the landing area as Pohang. Admiral Doyle’s TF 90
was designated as the attack force, and the 1st Cavalry Division was des
ignated as the landing force. If the North Koreans captured Pohang before
the force arrived, the division was prepared to make an assault landing. A
gunfire support group (the light cruiser Juneau; the US destroyers Kyes,
Higbee, and Collett; and the Australian destroyer Bataan) would bombard
the beach and Admiral Arthur D. Struble’s Seventh Fleet would provide
air cover and close air support.50
Admiral Doyle issued his own operation order on 13 July. It was
based on the assumption that the landing would take place at Pohang, but
that the time and place could be changed at any time. The order stated:
“Amphibious Group ONE has been ordered to land the First Cavalry
Division in Korea at a place and time to be designated. The landing is
designed as an amphibious assault but may take place against no opposi
tion. In either case the division will be placed ashore as a division orga
nized for immediate operations against the enemy.”51
Amphibious shipping for the assault would consist of a Transport
Group (TG 90.1 consisting of Admiral Doyle’s flagship, Mount McKinley;
the APA Cavalier; the AKA Union; and the two MSTS ships converted
into AKAs, Titania and Oglethorpe) and a Tractor Group (TG 90.3 con
sisting of US Navy LST-611; 15 SCAJAP LSTs; six LSUs, which were to
be towed to the objective area behind LSTs; two fleet tugs, Lipan and Cree;
and a salvage ship, Conserver). A Protective Group of seven minesweep
ers (TG 90.4) would ensure the approaches to Pohang were clear of mines.
Beach reconnaissance, control of the landing craft, and organization of the
beach would be the responsibility of the fast transport Diachenko (APD
123), the tug Lipan, and a detachment of UDT-3.52 Follow-up shipping for
the second and third lifts would consist of three MSTS transports (Fred C.
Ainsworth, David C. Shanks, and General Edwin D. Patrick), 12 SCAJAP
LSTs, and four chartered Japanese merchant ships (Marus).53
On 13 July, the same day Doyle issued his operation order, the ships
carrying the 8th Cavalry Regiment sailed from Yokohama and the LSTs
and LSUs with the artillery, tanks, and shore party sailed from Oppama.
On 14 July the 7th Cavalry Regiment and other elements of the second lift
began boarding Ainsworth, Shanks, and E.D. Patrick at Yohohama, and
124
an advance party flew to Korea to await the division’s arrival at Pohang.
Also on 14 July, the minesweepers of the Protective Group began sweep
ing Yeongil Bay and the approaches to Pohang. On 15 July the 5th Cavalry
Regiment on the Mount McKinley sailed from Yokosuka.54
The transports and LSTs linked up outside Yeongil Bay on the morning
of 18 July. The 1st Cavalry troopers were unaware that ROK forces still
held the line north of Pohang and expected an opposed landing. But there
was no opposition, and the ships of the gunfire support group remained
off shore in watchful silence as the LSUs cast off from the LSTs that had
towed them across the East Sea, landing craft were lowered from the APA
and AKAs, troops were boated (clambered down landing nets into the
LCVPs), and light vehicles and equipment were winched over the sides
into LCMs. At 0559 Admiral Doyle signaled “Land the Landing Force,”
and the landing craft formed into waves and headed for the beach. The 8th
Cavalry troopers splashed ashore at 0610, the 5th Cavalry at 0630, and
the LSTs and LSUs nosed onto the beach at 0730. It was not necessary for
the DUKWs to swim ashore. Nine of the LSTs dropped their ramps at the
Pohang jetty or along the gently curving beach of Yeongil Bay. Because
of congestion in the harbor, seven of the LSTs were diverted around the
peninsula 35 miles south of Pohang to the little port of Guryeongpo-ri
(Kuryongp’o-ri). As each unit landed, it moved to a previously-designated
assembly area. The lead element of the division headquarters set up an
advance command post near the Yeongil air strip at 1430. By midnight
more than 10,000 troops, 2,000 vehicles, and nearly 3,000 tons of cargo
had been discharged.55
General Gay took command ashore at noon on 19 July as unload
ing of the LSTs continued. The entire first echelon was unloaded by 1700
and began the move inland toward Daejeon (Taejon) by rail and truck to
link up with the 24th Infantry Division. As predicted, the 1st Cavalry did
run into the 24th Infantry Division, but the 24th was not attacking to the
north; it was withdrawing to the east under enemy pressure. Since the 1st
Cavalry Division moved west out of range of naval gunfire, the ANGLICO
was detached on 19 July and returned to Yokohama the next day aboard
Cavalier. On 22 July the 1st Cavalry Division assumed responsibility for
blocking the enemy advance.56
The second lift was scheduled to arrive on 21 July, but the remnants
of Typhoon Grace with 50-mile-an-hour winds came up the coast, delay
ing their arrival and forcing the ships of Admiral Doyle’s attack force to
seek safer heavy-weather anchorages in deeper water. The MSTS ships
of the second lift arrived on 23 July and the Japanese Marus arrived the
125
next day. Doyle headed back for Yokosuka on 23 July, leaving the captain
of LST-611 as the senior officer present afloat. The LSTs of the third lift
arrived on 26 and 29 July. The unloading of the follow-on ships was a
much slower process than that of the attack force. The shore party was
tiring after days of intense labor, the MSTS transports were short of per
sonnel and unloading gear, and there were no trained hatch crews for the
Japanese merchant ships.57 By 30 July unloading was complete and all the
shipping had cleared the harbor except for the 7 LSUs, which were left
behind to be turned over to the ROK Navy, and the 11 LCMs of the 8206th
Army Unit, ATC. The 14th Engineer Combat Battalion moved out to the
front lines, the other engineers returned to their units, and only Lieutenant
Colonel Gibbons’ Korea element of the ATC remained as the sole defend
ers of Pohang Harbor.58
Delay and Reinforcement

During the last 2 weeks of July 1950, ROK and US forces continued to
withdraw under North Korean pressure. The ROK Army fought mostly in
the mountainous central and eastern part of the country and along the west
coast, while the US Army forces delayed along the broad valley running
southeast from Daejeon toward the city of Daegu. The American ground
force now consisted of the remnants of the 24th Infantry Division (whose
commander, Major General William F. Dean, was captured by the North
Koreans near Daejeon), the 25th Infantry Division, and the newly-arrived
1st Cavalry Division. By 29 July General MacArthur realized he had to
increase the combat force in Korea if he were to stop the North Korean
advance. On that date he advised the JCS that, although he still hoped to
carry out an amphibious landing, for now both the 1st Marine Provisional
Brigade and the 2d Infantry Division (the units that were to have con
ducted the landing) would have to be committed to the ground fighting in
Korea.59
The aircraft of Marine Air Group 33 (MAG-33), the air element of the
Marine brigade, flew into Japan on 1 August from the deck of the escort
carrier Badoeng Strait and the 5th Marines (the RCT that was the brigade’s
ground element) arrived at Busan on 2 August.60 The 2d Infantry Division
arrived in Korea in increments between 1 and 20 August.61
By the end of July substantial naval reinforcements had arrived in
Korean waters, including Rear Admiral Charles C. Hartman’s Cruiser
Division 3 with the heavy cruisers Helena and Toledo. On 25 July Hartman
took command of Task Group 96.5, the Japan–Korea Support Group, with
four subordinate elements. Royal Navy Rear Admiral Sir William G.
Andrewes commanded the West Coast Support Element and all non-US
126
naval forces of the UNC. Royal Navy Captain A.D.H. Jay commanded the
Escort Force, protecting shipping between Japan and Korea. There were
two East Coast Support Elements that would rotate on station off the east
coast of Korea, bombarding the coastal line of communication and sup
porting UNC forces with naval gunfire. Admiral Hartman commanded one
element, consisting of the Helena and a destroyer division, while Rear
Admiral John M. Higgins commanded the other, consisting of the Toledo
and another destroyer division.62
Doyle’s amphibious force had also been greatly strengthened with the
arrival of the ships that had brought the Marine brigade to the Far East: two
LSDs (Fort Marion and Gunston Hall), three AKAs (Alshain, Achernar,
and Whiteside), three APAs (George Clymer, Henrico, and Pickaway), and
the transport General A.E. Anderson.63
The Pusan Perimeter64

General Walker had to hold Busan (Pusan) (see map 9), the only deep
water port in South Korea, and enough territory west and north of Busan to
provide depth to the defense. The Nakdong (Naktong) River was the obvi
ous location for a main line of resistance. The river runs south for about
80 miles from the mountain town of Nakdong-ri (Naktong-ni), 40 miles
northwest of Daegu (Taegu), to within 10 miles of the south coast before
turning east to empty into the Korea Strait near Busan. Sixty miles of
mountainous terrain from Nakdong-ri to the east coast town of Yeongdeok
(Yongdok) provided a northern anchor for the defense. During the first
week of August 1950, Eighth Army forces withdrew behind the line of
the Nakdong and finally halted the North Korean offensive at what came
to be known as the Pusan Perimeter. Throughout August and the first 2
weeks of September, Eighth Army held the perimeter against a series of
North Korean attacks along four lines of operation: down the east coast
toward the port of Pohang, toward Waegwan and Daegu, toward the town
of Miryang via a bend in the river on the west side of the perimeter called
the Naktong Bulge, and along the south coast of Korea toward the city of
Masan.65
Over-the-Shore Logistics: The Jindong-ri (Chindong-ni)

Operation
After the landing of the 1st Cavalry Division had been completed on
30 July, Lieutenant Colonel Gibbons’ element of the 8206th Army Unit,
ATC remained at Pohang, Korea. Admiral Doyle’s TF 90 had left seven
LSUs behind for the ROK Navy, but since there were no ROK crews avail
able, the ATC took them over, thus acquiring its largest amphibious craft.
127
T he P usan P erim eter
1 A ug ust–1
ust – 1 S eptem ber 19 50
K orea 0 10 20
M ililee s
• Y e ch e o n
• •
Andong
H a m ch a n g
ong R
N akd
5 A ug P ha s e L ine
S a n g jjuu
• Yeongdeok
•
N a kd o n g --ri
ri
• • U iise
se o n g
• G unwi
2 6 A ug P
ha s e L ine
XX
ROK 8
• G iim
m ch e o n XX
ROK 6
•
Pohang
XX XX
W ae g w o n
• ROK 1 ROK CAP
XX
XX ROK 3
•
1
D aegu
XXXX • G ye o n g ju
ju
E IG H T H
W a lk e r
KANSAS BEACH
XX
U lsa
l sa n
•
•
24
M iirya
rya n g
NAKTONG • Y e o n g sa n
B U LG E
Na
kd
on
gR
XX
25
R
m
Na
• •
Jin
J i n ju
ju
M a sa n
•
B usan
E as t S e a
• G o se o n g (S ea o f J a p a n )
Map 9. Pusan Perimeter.
128
At noon on 30 July the unit was ordered to move to Busan.66 On the morn
ing of 31 July, the ATC’s 11 LCMs and 7 newly-acquired LSUs sortied
from Pohang Harbor into the teeth of a storm. Battered by rain squalls and
high winds that drove one LCM onto a reef, the rest of the convoy sailed
30 miles down the coast, arriving at a sheltered area called KANSAS
Beach by 2000. There, they put in for the night. They off-loaded two jeeps
so that Gibbons and the executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Frank Spier,
could drive up the coast to recover the crew of the wrecked LCM. The
next morning was bright and fair. The sea-going soldiers resumed their
journey, arriving by 1000 at Busan. Since landing craft were at a premium,
they were immediately pressed into service off-loading the ships anchored
in the harbor.
During the first week in August, the Korea-based element of the ATC
operated as a boat company, moving men, ammunition, and rations ashore
and evacuating the wounded to hospital ships Hope and Consolation
anchored off shore. The men of the ATC were fundamentally Army
engineers, albeit sea-going engineers, and their skills were put to various
uses, including assistance in the construction of an airfield by the unit’s
heavy equipment operators. On 8 August two officers and eight enlisted
men were sent back with a few landing craft to Pohang, now threatened
by the advancing KPA, to help evacuate US Air Force personnel from
Yeongil Airfield. On the same day, another ATC contingent was attached
to an ad hoc over-the-shore logistics force created to support the first allied
counteroffensive of the war.
Once the front was stabilized and the North Korean advance checked,
General Walker had ordered an attack against the enemy’s southern thrust
toward Masan. For this purpose, he formed TF Kean under Major General
William B. Kean, commanding general of the 25th Infantry Division.
The task force was made up of the 25th Infantry Division, less the 27th
RCT, and reinforced by the Army 5th RCT and 5th Marine RCT, an ROK
Army unit called the Min Force, and a Korean Marine Corps battalion.
TF Kean began its attack on 7 August 1950 with the 5th Marine RCT
advancing along the southern coast. To provide them with logistical sup
port, the Navy organized a group of ships and landing craft dubbed TF
Keen, consisting of three SCAJAP LSTs, ROK Navy submarine chaser
PC-501, and Colonel Gibbons’ 33-man ATC contingent with two LCMs
and LSU-1042. TF Keen sailed before dawn on 8 August to Jindong-ri
(see map 10). Finding that the Marines had not yet captured the town, they
lay off shore until the area was secure. Then, using Jindong-ri as a base,
the Army/Navy floating supply dump moved along the coast, evacuating
129
T ask F orce K ean N a kd o n g R
24
and T ask F orce K een XX
7–1
7 – 1 2 A u gust 195 0 25
U S positions, m orning, 7 A ug
24th IN positions, 12 A ug
U S attacks • U irye
i rye o n g
P rincipal engag em ents A/2 9 (-)

(-)
K orea
N orth K orea n attacks, 7 ––12
12 A ug
N orth K orea n p ositions, 12 A ug
T rack of T ask F orce K een
B /29 (-)
(-) • G e o m a m -ri
-ri
to B u sa n
2/24
•
0 5 10
III
II I
2/35
Haman
M ile
il e s 35
THE 1/24
7-12
7 - 12 Aug
NOTCH E lm 1/24
Nam R
• Jin
J i n ju
ju
J IN JU
PASS
••
B a n se o n g 35
III Dundeok
s, N
•K SEOBUKSAN
M a sa n
•
M u ch e o n -ri
-ri
5 2/24
][
6 th D iv
•
3/24 Jin
J in h a e
to
to H a d o n g
3/24
••
IIII
II
5 M ar
B o n g a m --nn i D a e jjee o n --ri
ri M as an B ay
•
5th R C T
•
6-8
6 - 8 Aug
5 G o g a n --ri
ri
I
5 M II II I
III
• S a ch e o n
ar
I II
III
5 M ar
7-12
7 - 12 A
Aug
ug
5 Jin
J i n d o n g --ri
ri
•
9-12
9 - 12 Aug
A ug
Ja n g jjee o n --ri
ri
Jinhae
J i nhae B ay
• G o se o n g
Map 10. Task Force KEAN and Task Force KEEN, 7–12 August 1950.
casualties and providing supplies to the Marines as they advanced toward

the coastal town of Goseong (Kosong).67
By 11 August the Marines had taken Goseong and were continuing
the attack when North Korean threats to other parts of the perimeter
caused General Walker to recall TF Kean. By 14 August the Marines had
withdrawn to Jindong-ri, where TF Keen outloaded the casualties and
heavy equipment that could not be taken by road to Masan. Last to leave
was SCAJAP LST-Q019, which retracted from the beach as North Korean
soldiers entered the burning town. The 5th Marine RCT would be called
on to deal with a North Korean penetration of the perimeter in the vicinity
of Yeongsan (Yongsan) at the Naktong Bulge (see map 9). Meanwhile,
another North Korean thrust down the east coast had imperiled the ROK
3d Infantry Division north of Pohang, resulting in the next amphibious
operation of the war when, in August 1950, ROK and US naval forces,
with some assistance from the 8206th Army Unit (AU), ATC, successfully
130
evacuated the ROK 3d Division, which was cut off by KPA forces north
of Pohang.
Evacuation of ROK 3d Division, 13–17 August 1950 (Map 11)

The 3d (Baekgol or Skeleton) Division originally consisted of two
infantry regiments, a 12-gun battalion of 75-mm howitzers, and support
elements. At the start of the war, it had been conducting counterguer
rilla operations in southern Korea. After the North Korean attack, the 22d
Os
ip R
Yeongdeok
• E ast S ea
(S ea of Japan)
XX
-)
N K 5 ((-)
• -d o n g
G a n g g u -d
-d o n g
Ja n g sa -d
• XX
ROK 3
-d o n g
D o kse o kk-d
•
AN
R O K 8th D iv
KS
HA
BI
Heunghae
• XX
766th I.U . ROK 3
• G iigg ye 12th D iv
5th D iv
20 Aug
Y eongil
eong il B ay
• Pohang
• • •
-ri
A n g a n g -ri
II I
III Y e o n g il -ri
G u rye o n g p o -ri
T F M in Y e o ng il
•
XX A irfie
irf i e ld
II I
III 16 – 19 Aug
16–19 III I
Y e o n g ch e o n RO K Cap
RO K 17 T F B ra d llee y
15 – 20 Aug
15–20
11 - 15 Aug
11-15 11 – 20 Aug
11–20
X
T F Po ha ng
11 – 18 Aug
11–18
3d R O K D ivision E vacua tion

11 – 20 A ug ust 1950
11–
•
III I
2 23 ju
G ye o n g ju
R O K and U S positions,11
pos i tions,11 A ug
as o f 17 Aug
R O K 8th D iv positions, 20 A ug
A xis of R O K attack
R O K 3d D iv w ithdra w al
N orth K orea n attacks, 10 –17
– 17 A u g
N orth K orea n p ositions (appro x), 11 A u g
N orth K orea n assem bly area, 20 A ug
0 5 10
M ile
il e s
Map 11. 3d ROK Division evacuation.
131
Regiment, the divisional engineer battalion, and an antitank company were
sent to Seoul to assist in the defense, but were badly mauled by the KPA.
The division, now consisting of one regiment, the artillery battalion, and
support troops, was sent north to Uljin on 29 June to block the east coast
road against the KPA 5th Division, which was attempting to push down
the coast road to capture the port of Pohang and nearby Yeongil Airfield
(K-3), while the KPA 12th Division advanced inland to the city of Andong,
which it captured on 1 August. The 3d Division conducted a delay back
to Yeongdeok, about 25 miles north of Pohang. During the first week of
August, the division commander was relieved and replaced by Brigadier
General Kim Suk Won.68
At Yeongdeok, the division was reinforced by the remnants of the 22d
Regiment, the 2d Yeongdeungpo (Yongdungp’o) Separate Battalion, and
the 1,200-man Korean National Police Kangwon Battalion. Supported by
a US 105-mm artillery battalion, naval gunfire support from Rear Admiral
Hartman’s cruiser-destroyer force, and F-51 fighter-bombers of the US
35th Fighter Group flying from Yeongil Airfield, the 3d Division held off
the attacking North Koreans until 8 August, when the US artillery battal
ion was withdrawn to assist in the defense of Daegu and the division was
pushed further south, to the town of Ganggu-dong (Kanggu-dong) at the
mouth of the Osip River.69
Forced out of Ganggu-dong on 9 August, the division managed to
hold the south bank of the Osip and a 6,000-yard wide strip of coast run
ning south for 11 miles to the village of Dokseok-dong (Toksokdong or
Toksong-ni) and including the small port of Jangsa-dong (Changsa-dong).
On 10 August the KPA captured the town of Heunghae (Hunghae), cut
ting the east coast road that connected the division to its rear headquarters
and other UNC forces in the vicinity of Pohang. The division’s American
advisor, Lieutenant Colonel Roland S. Emmerich, requested a helicopter
from Admiral Hartman’s flagship, Helena, and flew to Yeongil Airfield to
confer with General Walker, Lieutenant General Earle E. Partridge (Fifth
Air Force commander), and Brigadier General Francis Farrell, Chief of
the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). Walker told Emmerich to
request General Kim Suk Won to hold the road as long as possible to delay
the KPA north of Pohang, and General Farrell directed that the division be
resupplied by LST.70
On 11 August elements of the KPA 766th Independent Unit (which
had participated in the east coast amphibious landings on 25 June) cut
the road west of Pohang and the KPA 12th Division entered the city. With
Yeongil Airfield threatened and the possibility that the KPA would break
132
through toward Busan, Walker established a task force under Brigadier
General Joseph S. Bradley (assistant division commander of the US 2d
Division) consisting of a battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment, a tank
company, a combat engineer battalion, an artillery battery, an antiaircraft
automatic weapons battery, and supporting mortar, signal, and medical
units. TF Bradley moved to protect the airfield and the avenue of approach
to the south.71 In the north, enemy pressure caused the 3d Division to con
tract its perimeter. The division command post was moved to Jangsa-dong
and then further south to Dokseok-dong, where there was a narrow chan
nel through a rocky reef leading to a beach suitable for landing an LST.
On 12 August Admiral Hartman sent two helicopters from the Helena to
transfer medical supplies and gasoline to the beleaguered division. A tacti
cal air control party (TACP) under US Air Force First Lieutenant Russell
L. Rodgers coordinated close air support, while the KMAG artillery advi
sors, First Lieutenant John W. Airsman and Sergeant First Class Nicholas
Reuland, directed naval gunfire.72
During the night of 12 August, an ROK LST arrived at Jangsa-dong
with ammunition and other supplies, but due to the rocky reefs and heavy
seas, it could not come close enough to unload supplies directly onto the
beach. After several failed attempts to build ramps with wrecked fishing
boats and sand-filled rice bags, the Korean soldiers and KMAG advisors
contrived a pulley and cable device to haul supplies from the ship to the
shore. Gasoline drums were tied together in sets of 6 to 10 and floated
ashore, being guided through the heavy surf by KMAG noncommissioned
officers (NCOs) and enlisted advisors and ROK soldiers. Helicopters from
the Helena were used to evacuate the seriously wounded and transport food
from the ships. A second LST arrived on 13 August and was successfully
beached and unloaded at Dokseok-dong. The first LST took 313 wounded
on board at Jangsa-dong, then moved down the coast to Dokseok-dong
to pick up rations for the wounded. However, as it pulled away from the
beach it struck the submerged rocks and was seriously damaged. Water
poured into the hull, shutting down the diesel engines. A walkway was
jury-rigged between the two LSTs and most of the wounded were car
ried over the rickety swaying bridge above the pounding surf. One of the
LSTs had two DUKW amphibious trucks aboard, and these were used to
transfer 86 of the wounded to an ROK Navy hospital ship that had arrived
and anchored 500 yards offshore. The rest of the wounded were carried to
Busan aboard the second LST.73
On 14 August Air Force ground personnel and heavy equipment
were withdrawn from Yeongil Airfield by three LSTs (an operation in
which part of the 8206th AU, ATC, participated).74 The Helena and two
133
destroyers had been diverted to shell the coastal railroad at Sinchang
(Sinch’ang), northeast of Heungnam (Hungnam), on the 14th, but as the
situation at Pohang and Jangsa-dong worsened, Admiral Hartman curtailed
the bombardment mission and returned with his ships at high speed. On
15 August General Walker ordered the 3d Division to be evacuated and
relocated to Guryeongpo-ri, about 20 miles south of Jangsa-dong. One
ROK and three SCAJAP LSTs were sent north from Busan. Concerned that
the evacuation LSTs might not arrive in time, Admiral Hartman developed
a plan for removing the soldiers by rafts towed by whaleboats to the ships
offshore.75 Meanwhile, the KMAG advisors developed a plan to coordinate
the evacuation. First Lieutenant Mario Paglieri flew out to the Helena to
coordinate the rescue shipping. Major Perry Austin, who had flown up
from Pusan with details on the LST arrival, flew back to Guryeongpo-ri to
meet the first of the LSTs from Busan and to send it on to Dokseok-dong.
While these preparations were underway, Air Force C-119s dropped 75
mm artillery ammunition for the 3d Division’s howitzers. In spite of the
small beachside drop zone, just 800 yards long and 200 yards wide, every
one of the artillery rounds was recovered.76 On 16 August aircraft of the
carriers Philippine Sea and Valley Forge joined the fight. In spite of some
difficulties with communications, the Navy aircraft usefully added their
ordnance to the naval gunfire support and the division’s own artillery.77
The first of the four LSTs from Busan arrived at Dokseok-dong on
16 August. It beached successfully and took on board the divisional sup
port troops and headquarters personnel. The badly-worn Korean Army
vehicles didn’t have enough power to drive through the sand and up the
ramp of the LST, so a ¾-ton weapons carrier was secured at the top of the
ramp and its front bumper winch was used to assist the vehicles aboard.
By the end of the day, the LST was loaded. It retracted from the beach
and waited off shore for the arrival of the other three LSTs. Preparations
were made to blow up the wrecked LST with the 1,200 rounds of artillery
ammunition that were still on board. However, two US Navy salvage tugs
and five South Korean vessels arrived on the 16th and were able to pull the
damaged ship off the beach and tow it south to Busan.78
Three more LSTs arrived during the night of 16 August. The destroyer
Wiltsie led the ships through the darkness to Dokseok-dong beach, where
the KMAG advisors guided them to shore through the rocky channel using
jeep headlights. General Kim Suk Won had ordered each battalion to have
one company conduct an attack at 2100 as the rest of the troops withdrew
to the beach. He also deployed jeeps to flash their lights out to sea at vari
ous locations so as to confuse the enemy as to the exact location of the
134
evacuation site.79 The ships were beached with ramps down at 2130 and
the loading began, with a certain amount of confusion and delay due to
the soft beach sand that mired the vehicles, inexperience of the soldiers
with amphibious ships, and language problems. Nonetheless, the loading
took place steadily, as the ships offshore, the divisional artillery, and the
last detachments of ROK soldiers kept up a heavy fire. The ROK artillery
men fired as they withdrew to the ships and continued to do so until the
very end as enemy forces closed on the beachhead. One KMAG team with
an SCR 300 walkie-talkie radio went aboard each LST to maintain com
munications. By 0700, 17 August, the last LST retracted from the beach
as Fifth Air Force fighter-bombers, aircraft from the carriers, and Admiral
Hartman’s cruiser and destroyers, in the words of two of the American
advisors, “laid down a curtain of fire completely around the beach area.
Automatic weapons and heavy machineguns of the 3d Division were
mounted on the top deck [of the LST] adding their fire power to the pro
tective curtain of fire around the area.”80 Escorted by Admiral Hartman’s
ships and with a Navy and Air Force fighter umbrella overhead, the four
LSTs steamed south to Guryeongpo-ri packed with some 9,000 3d Division
troops, 1,200 Korean National Police, and over 1,000 civilian laborers. By
1030 the division began debarking. Resupplied and reorganized, the divi
sion rejoined the battle to hold the line south of Pohang and to prepare
to recapture the city, which was back in UNC hands by 18 September.81
The successful evacuation of the ROK 3d Division again demonstrated
the value for operational maneuver of an amphibious capability, including
ships and craft capable of beaching.
The Tongyeong Amphibious Operation
While these operations were taking place on the east coast, the ROK
Navy was involved in the evacuation by sea of refugees along the south
coast in the face of advancing North Korean forces. Following the conclu
sion of the TF Kean operations, an ROK Marine battalion known as the
Kim Sung-eun Unit, which had participated in the capture of Jindong-ri,
had returned to its base at the Jinhae (Chinhae) Naval Headquarters. On
16 August the unit was alerted for action to deal with a North Korean
threat to the coastal town of Tongyeong (T’ongyong) south of Goseong.
While the North Korean 6th Division attacked toward Masan, elements
of the KPA 7th Division were pushing south toward Tongyeong. If they
were to consolidate their hold on the town, they could cross the nar
row Gyeonnaeryang (Kyonnaeryang) channel separating the Tongyeong
Peninsula from the large island of Geojedo (Koje-do), from where they
could threaten Masan and Jinhae.82 (See map 12.)
135
136
T he T ong yeong O perations
rye o n g
U iirye Jin
J i n ye o n g --ri
ri K P A A ttacks
S outh K orea
• • 0 5 10
Changwon M ile
il e s
Ju n g a m --ri
ri •
• mhae
G iim G ijijaa n g
Haman •
• •
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Donghae
M a sa n
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B a n se o n g Jin
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• XX •
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•
• • •
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Je o rye on g do (Y e o n gd o )
XX • G ye o n n a e rya ng
7 G a d e okd o
G o se o n g •
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• • •
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G yeonnaeryang T o yo sa ki
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the island by attacking south from Tongyeong. The force of about 600
Geojedo Island to block and annihilate enemy forces attempting to seize
(CNO), ordered the Kim Sung-eun Unit to land on the east coast of
On 16 August Admiral Sohn Won-il, ROK Chief of Naval Operations
ROK Marines sailed that day aboard motor minesweeper YMS-512 and
Map 12. Tongyeong operation—KPA attacks.
the patrol boat Pyongtaek. They landed at an island off the coast of the
Tongyeong Peninsula, set up a command post, and sent reconnaissance
teams to the west coast of Geojedo Island and the headland northeast of
Tongyeong. The Tongyeong reconnaissance team reported that the KPA
had occupied Tongyeong City with about 600 troops armed with mortars
and heavy weapons. Based on this information, the Marine commander rec
ommended to the ROK CNO that, rather than just defend Geojedo Island,
his troops land on the Tongyeong Peninsula and seize the high ground
(Wonmun Hill) that controlled the narrow neck of the peninsula, thus
blocking any attempt by the KPA to move south, and trapping the enemy
forces in Tongyeong City. At around noon on 17 August, Commander Lee
Song Ho (Yi Seong-ho), captain of ROK Navy submarine chaser PC-703,
provided additional information on the disposition of KPA forces, advising
that the North Koreans were deployed along the south coast of Tongyeong,
with strong defenses in and near the city. (See map 13.)
At 1700 on 17 August, Admiral Sohn Won-il approved the plan and
gave the Marine commander operational control over all naval forces in
the vicinity of Tongyeong (the Pyongtaek, PC-703, and four motor mine
sweepers) for the purpose of conducting the amphibious landing. Jinhae
Naval Command also requested air support from the Republic of Korea
Air Force (ROKAF), which sent a flight of F-51 fighters and six machine-
gun armed T-6 trainer/observation aircraft that had been conducting train
ing near Jinhae. The aircraft strafed a KPA artillery unit that was moving
to assist the forces in Tongyeong while the warships shelled the enemy
positions near Tongyeong City and conducted an amphibious demonstra
tion designed to deceive the KPA into believing the landing would take
place in Tongyeong Harbor.
At 1800 on 17 August, the 2d Company of the Marine Kim Sung-eun
Unit landed on the coast of the Tongyeong peninsula opposite Geojedo
Island and established a beachhead. The 3d and 7th Companies, the Heavy
Weapons Company, and Headquarters Company landed as the follow-on
force. The Marines seized Wonmun Hill and the adjacent high ground.
They resisted a KPA counterattack with the help of ROKAF air support
and naval gunfire and, after being resupplied with ammunition, the ROK
Marines continued the attack south, entering Tongyeong City and mopping
up the remaining North Korean forces. Two of the motor minesweepers,
YMS-513 and YMS-504, destroyed three wooden junks that were sailing
north toward Goseong and sent landing parties ashore to cut off the KPA
escape routes. Following this action, Commander Lee Song Ho headed
north with PC-703 for other missions among the islands west of Incheon.
137
G ye o n n a e rya n g
G e o je do
I
G yeonnaeryang
I
3
I
I
7
C hannel
2
Hwado
-ri
Ja n g p ye o n g -ri
I
•
7
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D o n g a m -ri
•
M a e rya n g d o
Map 13. Tongyeong amphibious operation.

S a n b o n g sa n
I
•
2
H w a p o --ri
ri
•
N a m m a n g sa n
l- r i
D o n g d a l-ri
••
T o n g ye o n g
W onm unp o
•
B ay
W O N M U N H IL L
II
C h e o n a m sa n
•
5
A m phibious O peration
T he T ong yeong
R O K N vessels
K M C attacks
il e s
2 .5
M ile
0
Over the next 3 days, the marines and sailors, assisted by air and naval
gunfire support, fought off repeated North Korean attempts to recapture
Wonmun Hill. On 8 September the KPA made one more battalion-size
attack in a concerted but unsuccessful attempt to overcome the ROK
defenses. On 20 September the ROK 11th Naval Reserve Coast Defense
Unit took over the defense of the Tongyeong Peninsula and the Marine
138
Kim Sung-eun Unit was withdrawn to become part of the Korean Marine
Corps Regiment for the Incheon landing.
So ended the first independent ROK amphibious landing in modern
times. The operation was notable for the flexibility demonstrated by the
Marines and the Navy headquarters, the rapidity with which the operation
plan was developed, the granting of operational control over Navy war
ships to the Marine landing force commander, and the effective coopera
tion between the ROK Navy and Marine forces and the fledgling ROKAF
in a genuine joint operation.
Amphibious Special Operations, July–August 1950

In the early months of the Korean War, as US and ROK forces were
pushed south by the North Korean attack, efforts were made to use
American air and sea power to slow the Communist offensive. The long
Korean coastline was vulnerable to incursions from the sea, while the prox
imity to the ocean of the east coast North Korean railroad line made it a
tempting target. Naval gunfire was one weapon that could be used against
railroad bridges near the coast. However, until Admiral Hartman’s heavy
cruisers arrived, the heaviest firepower available to Naval Forces Far East
lay with the 5-inch guns of Admiral Higgins’ antiaircraft cruiser Juneau
and the 6-inch guns of H.M.S. Belfast and Jamaica. Accordingly, during
the first 2 weeks of July, these ships and their accompanying destroyers
struck railroad lines and roads along the Korean east coast.83
On 10 July Admiral Joy directed Higgins to extend the blockade as
far north as possible and to do his best to damage railway tunnels along
the line running from the Soviet border south to the major port and indus
trial complex of Wonsan. Juneau and the US destroyer Mansfield steamed
north to attempt to destroy a railroad tunnel between the little coastal ports
of Seongjin (Songjin) and Dancheon (Tanch’on). Gunfire had little effect
against tunnels, so Higgins ordered a demolition party to destroy the tun
nel with explosive charges. This would be the first US amphibious raid
of the war, and the first landing in North Korea. It was strictly a Navy–
Marine Corps affair and more closely resembled the landings of the 18th
and 19th centuries than the recent World War II amphibious assaults. (See
map 14.)
On the evening of 11 July, four marines and four sailors led by
Commander William B. Porter, the Juneau’s executive officer, transferred
from the cruiser to the Mansfield, which then sailed close to shore and
debarked the raiding party in a whaleboat. Porter’s team landed unob
served, scrambled over the rugged terrain, and planted two 60-pound
139
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•
RES
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A m phibious S pecia l O perations

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July–A
July – A ug ust 1950
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38°
• ••
C h u n ch e o n
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•
M u n sa n
•
B aen gn ye on gd o G angneung
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•
S eou l H o n g ch e o n
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• • (S ea o f Jap an )
•
W on jjuu S a m ch e o k
D eokjeok Islands
Ha
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R
Je ch e o n
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R O K N a vy O p e ra tio n s A san B ay
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9 A u g u st S outh K orea M iirya
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st
5 /6 A u g u st
Map 14. Amphibious special operations, July–August 1950.
charges in the tunnel, set to detonate when a train came through. They
withdrew without incident, although they were unable to observe whether
any explosion took place. This was the first of many such anti-railroad
operations that the Navy would carry out during the war.84
Maritime special operations began to gather momentum at the end
of July and the first weeks of August. On 27 July Admiral Joy directed
Admiral Doyle to conduct harassing and demolition raids against military
140
objectives on the east coast of North Korea.85 The next day he ordered
small craft to be seized along the west and south coasts to deny the North
Korean forces advancing along the coast their use. On 1 August Joy
directed UNC surface units and the ROK Navy to interdict land and water
movement along the south coast, particularly in the vicinity of Namhaedo
Island, where KPA forces were threatening Eighth Army’s southern flank.
ROK Navy forces were active in assisting refugees and establishing
guerrilla bases in the islands off the coast near Incheon and in sinking
North Korean small craft off the west coast. On 9 August ROK Navy
LST-801 established a supply base at the island of Eocheongdo (Och’ong
do), 40 miles west of Gunsan, to support the coastal interdiction and guer
rilla operations.86
Meanwhile, Doyle, in response to Admiral Joy’s directive to conduct
raids, established a small Navy special operations force. The assets
available to him for such missions consisted of an 11-man detachment from
UDT-3, commanded by Lieutenant (jg) George Atcheson, and Marines of
MTT Able, including Major Edward P. Dupras, who had been a company
commander in the 1st Marine Raider Battalion at Tulagi and Guadalcanal
and had much experience with rubber boats and beach reconnaissance.87
The Marines and Atcheson’s detachment were in Japan as part of the
prewar amphibious training program. They had been joined soon after
the war started by the high-speed transport Diachenko, which arrived at
Sasebo flying the flag of Captain Selden C. Small. Small commanded
Transport Division (TRANSDIV) 111, which was based in San Diego
and consisted of four high-speed transports (APDs), the Diachenko
(APD-123), Harold A. Bass (APD-124), Wantuck (APD-125), and Begor
(APD-127). The Korean War era APDs were destroyer escorts that had
been converted to carry four landing craft and were capable of carrying a
UDT or a company-size force of 162 troops that could be landed over the
beach in the landing craft or, when stealth was required, in rubber boats.
Their single 5-inch gun, six 40-mm guns, and six 20-mm guns gave them a
naval gunfire support capability. The APDs were primarily used for beach
reconnaissance and other special operations and as control ships to guide
landing craft to the beach in amphibious operations.88 They usually carried
two standard 36-foot LCVP landing craft and two landing craft, personnel
(ramped) (LCP[R]). The older LCP(R) had a narrow ramp and could not
carry vehicles. It had been superseded by the wide-ramped LCVP for
most amphibious operations, but was faster and had better sea-keeping
qualities than the LCVP and so was preferred for UDT and clandestine
operations.89
141
Another of Small’s APDs, the Horace A. Bass, arrived at Sasebo on
2 August carrying an advance element of the 1st Marine Division Recon
naissance Company and UDT-1, which absorbed Atcheson’s frogmen. On
6 August Admiral Doyle activated the Navy Special Operations Group
(SOG), consisting of the two APDs, the UDT, and the Reconnaissance
Marines. Captain Small had overall command of the force, while Major
Dupras commanded the Marine element. The rest of UDT-3 arrived from
the west coast at mid-month to join the SOG.90
Even before the SOG was activated, the Diachenko had set sail with
Atcheson’s detachment for its first operation. The objective was a small
railway bridge near the town of Yeosu (Yosu) on the south coast. On the
night of 5 August, the Diachenko arrived off Yeosu and under a full moon
launched the LCP(R)s, one of which then towed a rubber boat to within a
mile of shore. From there, the team paddled closer to shore. Then Atcheson
and Boatswain’s Mate Warren Foley swam to the beach, where they dis
covered a 20-foot tall embankment that had not been revealed on aerial
photographs. They scrambled up, did a brief reconnaissance, and signaled
the rubber boat to come ashore. As the UDT prepared to set their charges, a
squad of North Korean soldiers arrived on a railroad handcar and drove off
the raiders with small arms fire, wounding Foley. Atcheson’s team returned
to the Diachenko without any further casualties and the APD bombarded
the Yeosu railroad yard for 40 minutes before departing, thus bringing an
end to the second US Navy amphibious raid of the war.91 There would be
many more.
On 8 August the Navy SOG was strengthened by the arrival of the
transport submarine Perch (ASSP-313). The Perch could carry 160 troops
and had a 16-by-36-foot-long watertight cylinder mounted on its after
deck. The cylinder was designed to hold an amphibious tractor (LVT), but
this had been replaced by a motor launch nicknamed the Skimmer that was
better suited to towing rubber boats. Recommmissioned after these modifi
cations in 1948, the Perch had trained on the west coast for 18 months with
Company B of the 5th Marine Regiment and with members of UDT-3. The
crew of the Perch had anticipated that they would operate in the Far East
with the Marines they had trained with, but Company B had been thrown
into the Pusan Perimeter fight along with the rest of the 5th Marines. The
Perch embarked with UDT-1, but after a week’s training the UDT was
flown off for another mission.92
The Navy SOG undertook another series of railway-busting missions
in mid-August. This time, it was the Horace A. Bass that took aboard the
Marine reconnaissance company and members of the UDT and headed
142
to the northeast coast of Korea. Between 12 and 15 August, the Bass
bombarded the rail line by day, and the SOG raiders landed at night three
times to blow up tunnels and bridges from north of Hamheung to an area
north of Seongjin. During these raids, the Marines provided beach security
while the UDT placed the demolitions. The Horace A. Bass team would
set sail again later in the month to conduct beach reconnaissance missions
at Gunsan and Asan Bay between 21 and 25 August in preparation for the
Incheon landing. During the last of these missions, once again under a
nearly full moon, the Marines and UDT came under automatic weapons
fire. The mission was aborted and all the members of the team were recov
ered, although three were wounded.93
As these raids and reconnaissance missions were taking place, a new
unit was being formed by GHQ FEC. It would be the only Army amphibi
ous special operations unit of the war. On 6 August the Headquarters and
Service Command, GHQ FEC, was directed to organize a Provisional
Raider Company from personnel assigned to the command. One writer has
suggested that this was General Almond’s idea and that he was inspired by
the exploits of Civil War Confederate General John Moseby’s Raiders.94
This may be true, but there were many scout, raider, ranger, commando,
and other amphibious special operations groups in World War II that were
likely to have been in the minds of the FEC planners. The unit with the
closest identification with General MacArthur would have been the Alamo
Scouts.
The Alamo Scouts were formed in 1943 in MacArthur’s Southwest
Pacific Area (SWPA) by Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, command
ing general of Sixth Army. They were organized in six-man teams that
conducted reconnaissance ahead of Sixth Army amphibious operations. In
106 missions in New Guinea, the Bismarck Islands, and the Philippines,
including participation in two prison camp rescues, the Alamo Scouts
killed 84 Japanese and captured 24 without the loss of a single man. They
were usually inserted by rubber boat, paddling ashore from PT boats, but
they also made use of landing craft, flying boats, submarines, and light
aircraft.95
Whatever its inspiration, the GHQ Provisional Raider Company was
to be trained in scouting and raider tactics and was intended to provide
“direct assistance to the combat effort in Korea.” When the call for volun
teers went out to Army service units in the Tokyo–Yokohama area, over
700 applied and many of the 125 selected had World War II combat expe
rience, some with special operations and airborne units.96 Under the com
mand of Major James H. Wear, the Raiders were sent to Camp McGill
143
on 9 August. There they were trained by the Marine MTT in rubber boat
and amphibious reconnaissance techniques, demolitions, and physical
conditioning.97
Two other maritime special operations units joined the Raiders at
Camp McGill. In mid-August MacArthur accepted an offer by the British
Government of a Royal Marine Commando to conduct amphibious
raids against North Korean supply lines. Under the command of Acting
Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, a veteran of Royal Marine
Commando operations in the Far East during World War II, the 200-man
unit, the 41 Independent Commando Royal Marines, was flown to Japan
and established at the FEC ATC at Camp McGill.
Another small group of 10 British sailors and 6 marines recruited from
the shipboard detachments of the British Far East Fleet and commanded by
Lieutenant Derek Pounds, Royal Marines, arrived at about the same time.
Known as the Fleet Volunteers, the unit was the brainchild of Admiral
Sir Patrick Brind, the commander in chief of the Royal Navy’s Far East
Station in Hong Kong, who responded to a request from Admiral Joy for
Royal Navy volunteers to form a small raiding force under US command.
The Fleet Volunteers trained on weapons, demolitions, and rubber boats
at Camp McGill, alongside the GHQ FEC Provisional Raider Company.
Some of the Fleet Volunteers were attached to 41 Commando, while 10 of
them served with the Army Raider Company.98
On 22 August the Perch docked at Camp McGill, where Major Wear
and 67 men of the GHQ Raider Company went aboard to begin training
in submarine-launched coastal insertion techniques. A week later, Perch
returned to Camp McGill to embark Captain D.H. Olson and the remain
ing 56 Raiders. The Raiders’ submarine training concluded at the end
of the month, when they were informed they would not be serving with
the Perch. They awaited word on how, where, and when they would be
employed against the enemy.99
The FEC originally intended that the GHQ Raider Company, the Royal
Marine Commando, the Fleet Volunteers, and the Marine Reconnaissance
Company be combined to form a Special Activities Group (SAG) under
the command of Colonel Louis B. Ely. From June 1941 to August 1943,
Ely had served on the staff of the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, where
he established an amphibious Scouts and Raiders School and experimented
with the use of rubber boats for amphibious operations. From August 1943
to January 1944, he served at the US Assault Training Center in Bideford,
England. During the Okinawa Campaign, he was the G2 of Tenth Army.
After the war, he served at Headquarters, Army Ground Forces (renamed
144
Army Field Forces in 1948) and participated in a study of amphibious
doctrine.100
The SAG was established on 7 September, but General Oliver P.
Smith, 1st Marine Division commanding general, would not release the
reconnaissance company and the Royal Marine Commando was diverted
to coastal raiding missions. Ely had to be content with Wear’s GHQ Raider
Company, reinforced by the small contingent of Fleet Volunteers. Its future
missions would be preliminary to the Incheon landing, which was being
planned throughout July and August 1950.
There were other maritime special operations forces in the Far East
during the war. The Air Force used crash rescue boats and other vessels
for intelligence collection and other special operations, and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) had a large clandestine operation that included
the insertion of agents, raiders, and guerrilla teams by boat, including the
Navy APDs and the Perch, as well as Korean fishing boats and other craft.
However, these operations are beyond the scope of this study.101
145
Notes
1. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., North Korean Special Forces (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1998), 34–37, 51, and “Korean People’s Army Guerrilla
and Unconventional Warfare Units, June 1950–September 1950,” Part 3, updated
material posted on the Internet by Bermudez in March 2000, korean-war.com/
Archives/2000/03/msg00016.html (accessed 20 January 2007). In the 1930s
the Soviets had developed amphibious doctrine building on their experiences in
World War I and the subsequent Civil War and had organized naval infantry units
up to brigade size. During World War II they conducted over 100 amphibious
operations, including several major operations in the Baltic, Crimea, and Far East.
Soviet doctrine did not differentiate between river crossings and landings from the
sea; they classified both as amphibious operations. These operations were seen
as flank support to land operations, with the army generally in overall command.
While their doctrine was well-thought out and effective, they were hampered
throughout the war by a lack of specialized amphibious ships and craft and thus
had to make expedient use of warships, small combatant vessels, merchant ships,
fishing boats, and small craft to transport landing forces. In August 1945 they
carried out three amphibious assaults at ports on the northeast Korean coast, as
well as several landings on the coast of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. The larg
est Soviet waterborne operations were crossings of the Amur, Ussuri, and Aigun
Rivers in Manchuria. The North Korean amphibious operations in June 1950 were
very similar to those conducted by Soviet naval infantry in August 1945. Charles
B. Atwater Jr., Soviet Amphibious Operations in the Black Sea, 1941–1943, www.
globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1995/ACB.htm (accessed 12 February
2008); Raymond L. Garthoff, “Soviet Operations in the War With Japan, August
1945,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 92, No. 5, (May 1966):
50–63; David M. Glantz, August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in
Manchuria (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 1983), 71–77,
139–153, 167–168, 170–189.
2. Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces; Bermudez, “Korean People’s
Army Guerrilla and Unconventional Warfare Units”; Republic of Korea Ministry
of National Defense, 6.25 Jeonjaengsa, 2, Bukhan ui Jeonmyeonnamchim gwa
Bangeojeontu (The Korean War, Vol. 2, The North Korean All-out Southern
Invasion and the Early Defensive Battles) (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense
Military History Compilation Research Institute, 2005), 554–560, 598.
3. This account is based on 6.25 Jeonjaengsa, 597–601, 605–606; and
Roy E. Appleman, United States Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong,
North to the Yalu (Washington, DC: GPO, 1961), 27–28.
4. 6.25 Jeonjaengsa, 606.
5. Appleman, South to the Naktong, 27; Bermudez, North Korean Special
Forces, 35–38, and Internet updates; Kim Sang Mo, “The Implications of the
Sea War in Korea from the Standpoint of the Korean Navy,” Naval War College
Review, Vol. XX, No. 1 (Summer 1967): 105–139; 6.25 Jeonjaengsa, 549–553,
597–601, 605–606.
146
6. Classified as submarine chasers, the ships provided to the ROK Navy
were 173-foot steel hulled patrol craft armed with one 3-inch deck gun and six
.50-caliber machineguns. Later in the war, the armament varied. Ships of the
Republic of Korea Navy: Pak Tu San PC-701, Naval Historical Center, history.
navy.mil/photos/sh-fornv/rok/roksh-mr/paktusn.htm (accessed 20 June 2006).
The “Motor Minesweepers” (YMS) were 136-foot ships armed with one 3-inch
gun and machineguns. James C. Fahey, Ships and Aircraft of the United States
Fleet, 1945 (New York, NY: Ships and Aircraft, 1945; reprinted, Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1976), 36.
7. James A. Field Jr., History of United States Naval Operations, Korea
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1962), 51; Walter Karig, Malcolm W. Cagle, and Frank
A. Manson, Battle Report: The War in Korea (New York, NY: Rinehart and
Company, 1952), 29, 30; and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “Korean People’s Army—
766th Independent Unit—revision,” militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.
php?t=41529 (accessed 28 February 2007) (this is a further revision of Bermudez’s
book posted on the Internet).
8. 6.25 Jeonjaengsa, 135–139, 152–157; Appleman, South to the Naktong,
22.
9. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 52.
10. Dr. Patricia M. Bartz, letter to Colonel (Retired) Donald W. Boose Jr.,
10 February 2007.
11. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 53–54.
12. Teletype transcript CA TT 3426, “Korea Situation,” of teletype confer
ence between JCS (plus the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force) and CINCFE,
27 June 1950, RG 218, UD 7, Entry 7, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) Sec. 21,
Correspondence from 2–21–50 through 7–1–50, National Archives and Records
Administration, Modern Military Records, College Park, MD, hereafter, NACP.
13. JCS Messages 84681 and 84718 to CINCFE, 29 and 30 June 1950, in
Teletype transcript CA TT 3426. The Pacific Command, with its headquarters in
Hawaii, was responsible for the Central Pacific area. Although the Seventh Fleet
was based in the Far East, before the war it was under the operational control of
CINCPAC rather than CINCFE.
14. JCS Message 84718 to CINCFE, 30 June 1950, RG 218, UD 7, Entry
7, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) Sec. 21, Correspondence from 2–21–50 through
7–1–50, NACP.
16. Appleman, South to the Naktong, 59–76.
18. Donald W. Boose Jr., “The United Nations Command in the Korean
War: A Largely Nominal Connection,” paper presented 8 June 2000 at the 2000
Conference of Army Historians, 7–13. The quotations are from UN Security
Council Resolutions S/1511 and S/1588, in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950,
223–224, 230.
19. Boose, “The United Nations Command,” 9–10; JCS Message 84622
to CINCFE, 29 June 1950, Sec. 21, Correspondence from 2–21–50 through
147
7–1–50; Naval Blockade: JCS Message 84885 to CINCFE, 3 July 1950, CCS
383.21 Korea (3–19–45) Sec. 22, Correspondence from 7–2–50 through 7–7–
50, both in RG 218, UD-7, Entry 7, Box 38, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45),
NACP.
20. Recent concise overviews of the planning and conduct of amphibious
operations during the first 3 months of the war include Stephen L.Y. Gammons,
The Korean War: The UN Offensive, 16 September–2 November 1950, CMH Pub
19-7 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2000), 1–19; Curtis A. Utz,
Assault from the Sea: The Amphibious Landing at Inchon, in Edward J. Marolda,
ed., The U.S. Navy in the Korean War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2007), 52–109; Edward Howard Simmons, USMC (Retired), Over the Seawall:
US Marines at Inchon (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division,
Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 2000); and Gordon L. Rottman, Inch’on 1950:
The Last Great Amphibious Assault (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publications, 2006).
The most useful and authoritative of the more detailed secondary accounts are
Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 102–108 (Pohang) and 171–218 (Incheon);
Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, Sea War in Korea (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1957), 39–44 (Pohang) and 75–106 (Incheon); Appleman,
South to the Naktong, 195–196 (Pohang) and 488–514 (Incheon); Lynn Montross
and Nicholas A. Canzona, US Marine Operations in Korea, 1950–1953, Vol. II,
The Inchon–Seoul Operation (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G3, 1955);
James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, Policy and Direction:
The First Year (Washington, DC: GPO, 1972; reprinted 1992), 85–86 (Pohang)
and 139–177 (Incheon); Robert Debs Heinl, Victory at High Tide: The Inchon–
Seoul Campaign (Annapolis, MD: Nautical & Aviation Pub. Co. of America,
1979); and Shelby L. Stanton, America’s Tenth Legion, X Corps in Korea, 1950
(Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1989), 21–93. An excellent analysis of all of the
US amphibious operations in Korea that focuses on command relationship issues
is Donald Chisholm, “Negotiated Joint Command Relationships,” Naval War
College Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Spring 2000): 65–124.
21. JCS 1776/12, “Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on Military Estimate of the Present Korean Situation,” 2 July
1950, 77–78, RG 218, UD-7, Entry 7, Box 38, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45),
Sec. 22, Correspondence from 7–2–50 through 7–7–50, NACP. By 25 July the
joint planners estimated that in the event of Soviet intervention, the United States
had the capability of withdrawing three US divisions with their equipment, plus
the personnel of two US divisions and 35,000 ROK forces in 7 to 10 days. JSPC
853/26, “Withdrawal from Korea,” 25 July 1950, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)
Sec. 26, Correspondence from 7–22–50 to 7–31–50, RG 218, UD-7, Entry 7, Box
39, NACP.
22. Memorandum from JSPOG (Lt Col Warren AO) to JSPOG, 26 Jun 50,
“Korea Emergency Planning,” RG 554, Entry 50, GHQ FEC ACofS, G3, Planning
Division; Memorandums (“Action File”) 1949–50 (290/48/16/4, Containers 1–2),
Box 1, December 1949–September 1950, NACP. JSPOG was a group of senior
148
Army, Navy, and Air Force officers established to conduct strategic joint planning
for the FEC. General Wright was also the GHQ FEC Chief of Planning and
Operations (G3).
23. Donald McB. Curtis, “Inchon Insight,” letter to the editor, Army, Vol.
35, No. 7 (July 1985): 5.
24. History of the Korean War, Chronology, 25 June 1950–31 December
1951 (Tokyo: Military History Section, Far East Command, 1952), 11, hereaf
ter, Korean War Chronology; CINCFE Message C 56942 to JCS, 30 June 1950,
quoted in Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 77–78. The RCT was an infantry regi
ment reinforced with a field artillery battalion (FAB), a combat engineer company,
and other combat and support elements capable of operating as a self-contained
combat unit.
25. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1964, Second Printing), 333.
26. Memorandum from A.P.F. C/S, ROK, to G3, G1, G2, G4, 1 July 1950,
Subject: “Chief of Staff Conference, 1730, 2 Jul 50,” RG 554, Entry 50, GHQ
FEC ACofS, G3, Planning Division; Memorandums (“Action File”) 1949–50
(290/48/16/4, Containers 1-2), Box 1, December 1949–September 1950, NACP.
27. US Army, 8206th Army Unit, ATC, Unit History [1951?], hereafter,
ATC History, 7.
28. Marine Corps Evaluation, III–B–1; CINCFE C 57061 (CM IN 9291), 2
July 1950, to JCS; CINCFE CX 57149 (CM-IN 9573), 3 July 1950, to DEPTAR;
and JCS 84876, 3 July 1950, to CINCFE, all in JCS Geographic File 1948–50,
CCS 381 Far East (7–2–50), “Emergency Reinforcements to C-in-C Far East,”
Sec 1: Correspondence from 7–2–50 through 7–23–50, RG 218, UD 7, Entry 7,
Box 22, NACP.
29. Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division, Activities Report for the Month of
July (1950), hereafter, 1CavDiv AR July 1950, “First Cavalry Division Command
Reports 1949–1954,” RG 407, Entry 429, Box 429, NACP.
30. Memorandum from Colonel Armstrong to G3 and CofS, ROK [A.P.
Fox], 3 July 1950, “CofS Query Re Eighth Army Msg #EX 33362 FB, A Planning
Directive to CG, 1st Cav Div,” RG 554, Entry 50, GHQ FEC ACofS, G3, Planning
Division; Memorandums (“Action File”) 1949–50 (290/48/16/4, Containers 1–2),
Box 1, December 1949–September 1950, NACP.
31. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 139.
32. Colonel Edward H. Forney, USMC, Transcript of Special Report
[1951?], hereafter, Forney Special Report, 1, copy in RG 127, Entry 17 (Quantico
Schools Files, 1947–70), Box 1, NACP; Chisholm, “Negotiated Command
Relations,” 72 (Chisholm’s account is based on the COMPHIBGRU 1 War Diary,
24 June to 15 July 1950).
33. CINCFE CX 57218 (CM IN 9974), CX 57243 (CM IN 9994), and CX
57248 (CM IN 9997), all 5 July 1950, all to DEPTAR, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–
19–45) Sec. 21, Correspondence from 2–21–50 through 7–1–50, RG 218, UD-7,
Entry 7, Box 38; Forney, Transcript of Special Report.
149
34. Korean War Chronology, 11; Headquarters, 2d Engineer Special
Brigade, Unit Activities Report, 9 July 1950 to 1 October 1950, hereafter, 2ESB
UAR, 1, RG 407, Entry 429, Box 4665, NACP.
35. ATC History, 6.
36. Letter, Hobart R. Gay to Roy E. Appleman, 24 August 1953, RG 319,
Records of OCMH 2–3.7A BA2, Box 746, NACP.
37. 1CavDiv AR July 1950; 1st Cavalry Division War Diary, July 1950, here
after, 1CavDiv WD, “Summary,” 1, RG 407, Entry 429, Box 429, “First Cavalry
Division Command Reports 1949–1954,” NACP; Marine Corps Evaluation,
III–B–2.
38. ATC History; 1CavDiv AR July 1950.
39. ATC History, 5.
40. 1CavDiv AR July 1950.
41. On 10 April 1949 the landing craft, tank (LCT) was redesignated land
ing ship, tank (small) (LST[S]). It was redesignated LSU in late 1949 and this
was the designation it carried during the first 2 years of the Korean War. It was
redesignated landing craft, utility (LCU) on 15 April 1952. Norman Friedman
and A.D. Baker, U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft, An Illustrated Design History
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002), 383.
42. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 104–105. During World War II the 50
foot LCM(3) had been superseded by the 56-foot LCM(6), which was the type
used during the Korean War. The LCM had originally been intended for landing
tanks, but tanks had now become too large and heavy for the LCMs and had to be
carried in LSUs or LSTs. Friedman and Baker, U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft,
290–295.
43. At that time, the regiments of the 1st Cavalry Division had only two
infantry battalions and no regimental tank companies. As explained below, the
amphibious trucks were used to carry the artillery and serve as prime movers
(vehicles to tow the artillery pieces) until regular trucks were brought ashore.
44. 1CavDiv WD, 7–10 July 1950.
45. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 103; Chisholm, “Negotiated Command
Relations,” 72; ATC History, 6.
46. Marine Corps Evaluation, III–C–1.
47. 1CavDiv WD, 11 September 1950; Marine Corps Evaluation, III–B–3;
ATC History, 6.
48. Amphibious Operations Instructional Notes, T 18, Oct 55, Department
of Tactics and Combined Arms, The Artillery and Guided Missile School, Fort Sill,
Oklahoma, Artillery School Files, Box: “Artillery, Artillery School, Curricular
1950–1955,” MHI Archives.
49. Letter, Colonel W.A. Harris (Commander of the 77th FAB at the time of
BLUEHEARTS) to Roy E. Appleman, 18 May 1954, RG 319, Records of OCMH
2–3.7A BA2 “South to the Naktong,” Box 746, Folder: “Korea 1951—Chs I–XX,”
NACP, hereafter, Harris letter, 18 May 1954. Colonel Harris would be involved in
several of the amphibious operations during the Korean War. During World War
150
II, he was the Chief of Special Plans Section, First US Army Group, in charge of
planning for the American contribution to Operation FORTITUDE, which was
intended to deceive the Germans into believing first that the Allies were going to
invade Norway and then that they were to invade France via the Pas de Calais.
During the Normandy invasion, Harris was in charge of a deception operation
at Utah Beach. Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the
Second World War (New York, NY: Scribner, 2004), 502–504, 519, 522–523,
575–576, 637.
50. Chisholm, “Negotiated Command Relations,” 74.
51. ComPhibGru ONE OPORD No. 10-50, 13 July 1950, RG 407, Entry
429, Box 4405, 1CavDiv WD, NACP.
52. ComPhibGru ONE OPORD No. 10-50, 13 July 1950, RG 407, Entry
429, Box 4405, 1CavDiv WD, NACP. The terms “transport group” for APAs and
AKAs and “tractor group” for LSTs and other landing ships was the standard
terminology. Tractor group originated because the assault echelons usually went
ashore in amphibious tractors (LVTs) carried in the landing ships. There were no
LVTs available at the time of the BLUEHEARTS operation, but the term “tractor
group” remained.
53. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 104; 1CavDiv WD, 14 July 1950.
54. 1CavDiv WD, 13–15 July 1950; Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 107.
55. 1CavDiv WD, 18 July 1950; Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 107; ATC
History, 6; Annex I (Ship to Shore Movement), of ComPhibGru ONE OPORD
No. 10-50.
56. 1CavDiv WD, 19–22 July 1950; Marine Corps Evaluation, III–C–2.
57. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 108. Hatch crews are military, naval,
or civilian personnel responsible for unloading ships through the hatches (open
ings into the cargo space).
58. ATC History, 7–8.
59. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 144–145. The 5th Marine Regiment
and Marine Air Group 33 (MAG-33) together formed the 1st Provisional Marine
Brigade commanded by Brigadier General Edward A. Craig. Brigadier General
Thomas H. Cushman, commander of MAG-33, was Brigade Deputy Commander,
and Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray commanded the 5th Marines.
60. Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona, U.S. Marine Operations in
Korea, 1950–1953, Vol.1, The Pusan Perimeter (Washington, DC: Historical
Branch, G3, 1954), 89–91.
61. Donald W. Boose Jr., U.S. Army Forces in the Korean War 1950–1953,
Battle Orders No. 11 (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2005), 40.
63. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 85. A landing ship, dock (LSD) was a
475-foot ship that could carry landing craft, amphibious tractors, or amphibious
trucks in a well deck that could be flooded to allow the craft to be launched under
their own power through stern gates (see appendix B).
64. Although Korean geographic names are rendered here in the National
151
Institute of the Korean Language style, some widely used terms (Pusan Perimeter,
Naktong Bulge) and those that were part of the names of military units (Pusan
Base Command) are spelled in the style in use during the Korean War.
66. This account is from the ATC History, 6–7.
67. ATC History, 8–10 (which says TF Keen also provided support to
elements of the 24th and 25th Divisions during the operation); Field, Naval
Operations, Korea, 145.
68. Major Perry Austin and Captain Mario Paglieri (KMAG advisors with
ROK 3d Div), “It Can Be Done: A Lesson in Tactics,” undated manuscript, also
in the RG 319 OCMH records, Box 746, Folder: “Korea 1950—Chs I–XX”;
Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. 1 (Lincoln and London:
University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 494–495; Colonel Roland S. Emmerich and
Captain Mario Paglieri (KMAG advisors with ROK 3d Div), “Notes on the ROK
3d Division in August,” n.d., in the collection of documents relating to the writ
ing of Roy E. Appleman’s South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu in RG 319,
“Records of OCMH 2–3.7 BA2, Box 743, Folder: “August 1950,” NACP, 1.
69. Hanguk Jeonjang Sa [History of the Korean War], Vol. 3 (Seoul:
Ministry of National Defense, 1970), 388–389.
70. Austin and Paglieri, “A Lesson in Tactics,” 2.
71. Appleman, South to the Naktong, 325.
74. Appleman, South to the Naktong, 329–330; ATC History, 10.
77. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 148–149. Austin and Paglieri, “A
Lesson in Tactics,” say that air support came from the aircraft carrier USS Leyte,
but that ship did not arrive in Korean waters until October 1950.
78. Austin and Paglieri, “A Lesson in Tactics,” 8. The detachment from the
8206th AU, ATC, which had been sent to Pohang to assist in the evacuation of
Yeongil Airfield provided their expertise to the salvage operation. ATC History,
10.
79. Hanguk Jeonjang S, 395–396; Baeggol Sadan Yeoksa, 1947 nyeon 12
wol 1 il buto, 1980 nyeon 10 wol 31 il ggaji [History of the Skeleton Division
from 1 December 1947 to 31 October 1980] (Seoul: ROK 3d Division, 1980),
159.
81. Baekgolsadan Yeoksa, 158–161. Both the history of the 3d Division and
the Austin and Paglieri account give these figures; but Field, Naval Operations,
Korea, says that 5,800 ROKs, 1,200 civilian refugees, the KMAG advisors, and
some 100 vehicles were evacuated, 149. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, says that
three of the LSTs that made the evacuation on the 16th and 17th were SCAJAP
and one was ROK. None of the accounts specifically identify the ROK LSTs as
152
ROK Navy or Merchant Marine. It seems likely that one of them was the very
active ROK Navy LST-801.
82. This description of the Tongyeong operation is based primarily on
Saryukjeonsa [History of Amphibious Operations] (Daejeon, ROK: Haeguntaehak
[Navy War College], 2004), 463–473; see also Korean War Chronology, 39–40,
and Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 154.
84. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 99–100. There never was any confir
mation that the charge ever detonated.
85. Naval Historical Center, Selected Documents: Korean Conflict, Korean
War: Chronology of US Pacific Fleet Operations, June–December 1950, July, his
tory.navy.mil/wars/korea/chron50.htm#jun (accessed 21 June 2005).
87. A UDT was a “naval unit organized and equipped to perform beach
reconnaissance and underwater demolition missions in an amphibious operation”
(Department of the Army Field Manual 17-34, Amphibious Tank and Tractor
Battalions (Washington, DC: GPO, 1950). The nickname “frogmen” became
attached to the UDT members during World War II. The Marine Raider battalions
were developed in 1941 and 1942 as light strike forces capable of landing in rubber
boats from high-speed transports converted from destroyers. The Raider concept
was also somewhat influenced by the experience of British Commando forces.
Jon T. Hoffman, From Makin to Bougainville: Marine Raiders in the Pacific
War (Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1993), 1–5; Gordon
L. Rottman, US Special Warfare Units in the Pacific Theater 1941–45: Scouts,
Raiders, Rangers and Reconnaissance Units, Battle Orders No. 12 (Oxford, UK:
Osprey Publications, 2005), 46–49.
88. As described in chapter 2, the first APDs were converted from World
War I-era four-stack, flush-deck destroyers specifically to carry Marine Raiders.
They were so useful that 35 old destroyers and 98 destroyer escorts were con
verted to APDs during World War II, Friedman and Baker, U.S. Amphibious Ships
and Craft, 195–197; Fahey, Ships and Aircraft, 26, 76; Department of the Navy,
Naval Historical Center, Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, hereafter,
DANFS, Diachenko, www.history.navy.mil/danfs/d4/diachenko.htm (accessed
10 October 2006).
89. John B. Dwyer, Commandos from the Sea: The History of Amphibious
Special Warfare in World War II and the Korean War (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press,
2002), 239–240; Friedman and Baker, U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft, 86.
90. Joseph H. Alexander, The U.S. Navy and the Korean War, Fleet
Operations in a Mobile War: September 1950–June 1951 (Washington, DC:
Department of the Navy, Navy Historical Center, 2001), 9; Montross and Canzona,
The Inchon–Seoul Operation, 47–48; Michael E. Haas, In the Devil’s Shadow:
U.N. Special Operations During the Korean War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2000), 133–134, 144–146.
91. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 137; Dwyer, Commandos from the Sea,
153
237–239. Field says the raid was the night of 4/5 August, but Atcheson’s first-
person account in Dwyer says that the Diachenko got underway from Sasebo the
morning of 5 August.
92. Haas, Devil’s Shadow, 136–140; Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 147;
DANFS, Perch, history.navy.mil/danfs/p5/perch-ii.htm (accessed 20 July 2006).
ASSP stood for auxiliary (A) submarine (SS) transport (P) and was the hull num
ber of Perch in 1950. Over the years, Perch was variously designated SS-313,
SSP-313, ASSP-313, APSS-313, and LPSS-313, and IX-313, “Haze Gray and
Underway: Naval History and Photography: Perch,” hazegray.org/danfs/submar/
ss313.txt (accessed 20 July 2006).
93. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 146–147; Dwyer, Commandos from
the Sea, 240–242; Haas, Devil’s Shadow, 146–147, Alexander, Fleet Operations
in a Mobile War, 9.
94. Dwyer, Commandos from the Sea, 243.
95. Rottman, US Special Warfare Units in the Pacific Theater, 43–45.
96. GHQ UNC/FEC Command Reports 1950, “Staff Section Reports,
Annex XIV Headquarters & Service Command—GHQ, FEC 1 Jan–31 Oct 1950,”
Adjutant General Section Report, 9, and G1 Section Report, 6, RG 407, Entry
429, Box 361, NACP.
97. Marine Corps Evaluation, III–B–7; Dwyer, 243.
98. Fred Hayhurst, Green Berets in Korea: The Story of 41 Independent
Commando Royal Marines (Cambridge, MA: Vanguard, 2001), 19–21, 27, 28–
33; Dwyer, Commandos from the Sea, 243; Marine Corps Evaluation, III–B–7.
99. Haas, Devil’s Shadow, 139.
100. “Louis Brainard Ely,” biography at Arlington National Cemetery Web
site, arlingtoncemetery.net/lely.htm (accessed 10 July 2006); West Point, Register
of Graduates and Former Cadets, Class of 1919, 1919. Dwyer, Commandos from
the Sea, 243, says that Ely also served as police chief of the National Defense
Force of Korea.
101. These Air Force and CIA operations are addressed by Haas, Devil’s
Shadow; also, Ed Evanhoe, Dark Moon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the
Korean War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995). Evanhoe, 8, says that
the Horace A. Bass was sent to Korea in response to a CIA request.
154
Chapter 4
CHROMITE: The Incheon Landing
Planning
Throughout July and August 1950, as the Pohang Landing, the
defense of the Pusan (Busan) Perimeter, and operations on the Korean
south and east coasts were taking place, planning continued for a west
coast amphibious landing. General Douglas MacArthur’s vision was not
confined to an assault at Incheon; if he had had enough forces to do so,
he would have liked to carry out a double envelopment with landings at
Incheon in the west and Wonsan in the east. He directed General Edwin K.
Wright to assemble information on the beaches and terrain near Wonsan,
but shortage of personnel and shipping meant that only one landing could
be conducted at a time. Nonetheless, MacArthur still considered Wonsan
a suitable landing site and the Wonsan plan remained in the Joint Strategic
Plans and Operations Group’s (JSPOG) files to be resurrected at an
opportune time.1
In Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Services grap-
pled with the problems of quickly reinforcing the Far East while balanc-
ing the needs of the active war in Korea against the potential requirement
to defend Europe and other areas against possible Soviet aggression. On
9 July Admiral Arthur W. Radford advised the Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, that two-thirds of the US Pacific Fleet was
directly supporting or committed to support of Commander in Chief, Far
East (CINCFE), and the rest of his command was being made ready to
assist. He anticipated a requirement for a much larger ground, air, and
naval force to deal with the North Korean offensive and recommended that
combat ships and aircraft be activated, the Marine regimental combat team
(RCT) already committed to Korea be built up to full division strength,
and “amphibious and other shipping be activated to carry and logistically
supply these forces.” Sherman concurred and proposed to the JCS that
they recommend a partial mobilization.2
At that time the JCS and the Services were also discussing a CINCFE
request for the 1st Marine Division and an airborne RCT. On 10 July,
the day the BLUEHEARTS Incheon operation was canceled, MacArthur
met with Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Commanding General,
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Recalling the 1st Marine Division’s service in
the Southwest Pacific Area, MacArthur told Shepherd that if he had the 1st
Marine Division again, he could conduct an amphibious operation at the
earliest possible opportunity. With Shepherd’s encouragement, MacArthur
155
amended his 3 July request for a Marine RCT, now asking the JCS for a
full Marine division “with appropriate supporting air components.”3
On 13 July, a few days after Shepherd’s visit, MacArthur met with
Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins and Air Force Chief of
Staff General Hoyt S. Vandenberg. He told them he intended to conduct an
amphibious landing at Incheon, including an airborne landing north of the
Han River using the airborne RCT he had requested. Collins was skeptical
about the Incheon landing site because of the extreme tides and pointed
out that limited numbers of specially trained airborne troops were avail-
able. The 82d Airborne Division was the only effective infantry unit left in
the strategic reserve, while the 11th Airborne Division could field a single
half-strength regiment—the 187th Airborne Infantry.4
During their deliberations on these requests, the JCS agreed that the 1st
Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, which was badly understrength and
had been further sapped of troops to fill the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade,
should be built up to war strength. They recommended the President put
the Selective Service Law into effect to make this possible and to replace
the forces being sent to the Far East. On 19 July the President announced
to the nation that he was increasing military service personnel limits using
the Selective Service Law as necessary; on 20 July mobilization of the
Reserves, including the Marine Corps Reserve, began.5 The official Navy
historian has called this one of a set of “interlocking circumstances” that
made it possible for MacArthur to plan for a mid-September amphibious
operation. The other circumstances were the availability of enough
amphibious ships to transport the marines and confidence on the part
of the Marine Corps that an “expedited arrival” of Marine forces to the
Far East was “both desirable and feasible,” thus producing an advanced
departure date for the 1st Marine Division.6 One could argue that equally
important circumstances were MacArthur’s strategic vision, the prewar
development of the amphibious training program in Japan with the
concomitant predisposition of the Far East Command (FEC) headquarters
for amphibious operations, and the availability of both the Shipping
Control Administration, Japan (SCAJAP) landing ships, tank (LSTs) and
a much-reduced but very well trained 2d Engineer Special Brigade (ESB)
capable of serving as a nucleus of a shore party, boat unit, and logistical
support establishment.
In spite of the presidential action, a full-strength Marine division
was not yet on its way to Korea. On 20 July the JCS advised MacArthur
that it would not be possible to bring the division to full strength before
November or December. Over the next few days, MacArthur and the
156
JCS exchanged messages and in a teleconference MacArthur urgently
requested reconsideration, because the presence of the Marine division by
10 September was “an absolutely vital element to accomplish a decisive
stroke.” On 23 July, in response to a JCS query, MacArthur described
his planned operation as a two-division corps amphibious landing behind
enemy lines to envelop and destroy enemy forces in conjunction with an
attack from the south by Eighth Army. The requested airborne RCT would
be flown from Japan and air dropped in the Incheon objective area “as
soon after D-Day as the situation will warrant” to seize a “key commu-
nication center immediately ahead of [the] troops advancing out of [the]
beachhead area.”7 Finally, on 25 July the JCS advised that, after further
consideration, the Navy had determined it could deploy a second Marine
RCT (the 1st Marines), a division headquarters, and reinforcing elements
that, added to the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade already en route, would
provide MacArthur with a full-strength division minus one RCT. The
third RCT, the 7th Marines, would be built from the nucleus of marine
forces then based in the Mediterranean, but it would not arrive in Korea
until after the Incheon assault had taken place. Furthermore, by filling the
187th Airborne RCT with airborne-qualified volunteers from other units,
it could be brought up to strength and deployed to the Far East. The unit
was alerted for movement, but it, too, would not arrive in Korea until just
after the Incheon landing.8
Meanwhile, planning for the amphibious operation continued. On
20 July, with the original BLUEHEARTS plan overtaken by events and
the 1st Cavalry Division no longer available, MacArthur directed JSPOG
to develop another plan for an amphibious assault using the 5th Marine
RCT and the 2d Infantry Division. Wright’s team developed three outline
plans—100-B for a landing at Incheon, 100-C for a landing at Gunsan,
and 100-D for a landing at Jumunjin on the east coast—and sketched out
the concepts for alternative landings at Jinnampo on the west coast near
Pyeongyang and Wonsan on the east coast. On 23 July General Wright dis-
tributed these outline plans to key members of the General Headquarters
(GHQ) staff for review and comment. Although there were several alterna-
tives, MacArthur made it clear he favored a landing at Incheon. On 25 July
MacArthur advised the Army Staff that one of the two corps headquar-
ters he had requested 6 days earlier would be used to control the planned
amphibious operation. By 29 July the desperate situation in Korea forced
MacArthur to divert the inbound 5th Marine RCT and 2d Infantry Division
to Eighth Army in Korea.9 When MacArthur notified the JCS of this action,
he also signaled that he still hoped to conduct the amphibious assault,
even if he had to launch it from within the Pusan (Busan) Perimeter, and
157
advised that he intended to commit the last division remaining in Japan,
the 7th Division, to Korea.10 Three days earlier he had alerted General
Walton H. Walker to begin rebuilding the now half-strength 7th Division
through intensive training and reequipping.11
With the two units intended for the amphibious landing no longer avail-
able and the 7th Division gutted to provide fillers for the units deployed
to Korea, Wright and the planning staff urged MacArthur to postpone the
Incheon operation to October. MacArthur remained steadfast. He wanted
to relieve the pressure on the Pusan (Busan) Perimeter as soon as pos-
sible and also realized that the optimum conditions at Incheon would
occur between 15 and 18 September, when the spring tides would be high
enough to allow LSTs and landing craft to go in over the mud flats.12 High
tides would come again in mid-October, but then the autumn weather was
likely to cause heavy surf and the onset of winter would affect the break-
out and pursuit phases of the operation.13 Furthermore, by the first week
of August the North Korean advance had finally been halted with Eighth
Army’s establishment of the Pusan (Busan) Perimeter. The North Korean
People’s Army (KPA) would continue their attacks, but the Eighth Army
delay and withdrawal had ended and from this point on, its strength inside
the perimeter would grow steadily, while that of the KPA, at the end of a
long line of communication repeatedly hit by United Nations Command
(UNC) air and naval forces, diminished.14
On 4 August MacArthur directed Walker to have the 7th Division
ready for deployment by 15 September and had 1,700 replacements, origi-
nally intended to provide a third battalion to the depleted 29th RCT on
Okinawa, diverted to the 7th Division.15 The next day he provided Walker
with the “Strategic Concept for the Destruction of the North Korean
Forces in the Field.” At a date to be determined, “an amphibious force
of not less than two divisions, to be known as the GHQ Reserve, will be
landed at X and will establish a beachhead from which a rapid advance
can be made to area Y. This area will be seized and secured as a base for
operations towards the East and South against the enemy.” Eighth Army
was “to launch an offensive, in conjunction with the amphibious attack,
in the direction of the PUSAN [BUSAN]–TAEGU [DAEGU]–TAEJON
[DAEJEON]–Ascom City–SUWON rail and highway line.” The forces
identified as available for the amphibious landing included the 1st Marine
Division, the 7th Infantry Division, one airborne RCT of the 11th Airborne
Division, the 2d ESB, an artillery group of two 155-mm field artillery bat-
talions (FAB), one antiaircraft automatic weapons (AAA AW) battalion,
and an engineer group of three battalions, plus Navy lift and support ele-
ments and “[s]uch Service and Supply elements as required.”16
158
Immediately after the strategic concept was sent to Walker, another
high-level delegation arrived in Tokyo, giving MacArthur one more chance
to argue his case for the Incheon operation and for more reinforcements.
The visitors were Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, accompanied by
Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for
Plans, and Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad, Acting Vice Chief of Staff of
the Air Force. They had been sent by President Harry S. Truman to “discuss
the Far East political situation” and ensure MacArthur’s understanding of
and commitment to the policy of neutralization of Formosa after some
disquieting public statements MacArthur had made after visiting the island
on 31 July.17 During his meetings with Harriman’s delegation, MacArthur
described his plans for the Incheon landing and made a plea that the rest
of the 1st Marine Division and the 3d Infantry Division be sent to arrive
in the Far East no later than 15 September, with the 2d Marine Division
to be sent by 15 October.18 On their return to Washington, Harriman and
the two generals endorsed MacArthur’s Incheon plan and recommended
approval of his request for additional forces. It would be impossible to
bring the 2d Marine Division to combat strength within the timeframe
MacArthur desired, but the understrength 3d Infantry Division could be
filled out by assigning the 65th Infantry Regiment from Puerto Rico as
the third divisional RCT (the 65th itself would be brought up to strength
by assigning to it the 33d Infantry Battalion, then stationed in the Panama
Canal Zone). Because this action and the measures needed to provide a
third RCT for the 1st Marine Division would further reduce the general
reserve, the JCS took the issue to the President, who approved both actions
on 10 August.19
Sometime between 10 and 15 August, MacArthur decided that General
Edward M. Almond would command the GHQ Reserve (referred to as
Force X during the early stages of planning and later designated X Corps)
for the Incheon operation. On 12 August JSPOG issued the next revision of
Operation Plan (OPLAN) 100-B, which identified the Incheon–Seoul area
as the objective and set the date of the amphibious assault for 15 September.
On 15 August Almond directed that a “Special Planning Staff, GHQ” be
established to develop a plan, CHROMITE, based on the 100-B concept
of a landing at Incheon. Major General Mark L. Ruffner, who had arrived
on 6 August, was put in charge of this group. During World War II Ruffner
had served as Deputy Chief of Staff, US Army Forces, Central Pacific in
1943 and then as Chief of Staff, US Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas
and Middle Pacific in 1944–45. He had helped plan the Army part of the
Gilberts operation, participated in the Makin and Leyte assault landings,
and was involved in the planning for the amphibious invasion of Japan.
159
Marine Colonel Edward H. Forney, the commander of the Marine Mobile
Training Team (MTT) who had served as the amphibious planner for
the 1st Cavalry Division’s Pohang operation, was assigned as Ruffner’s
deputy. Nine other Marine and two Navy officers of Forney’s MTT were
assigned to the planning staff.20
As Ruffner’s group began working out the operational details of
CHROMITE, another Washington delegation arrived to confer with
General MacArthur. CINCFE had provided Washington with no additional
information about his plans since the late July exchange of messages, so
the JCS decided to send General Collins, Admiral Sherman, and Lieutenant
General Idwal H. Edwards representing General Vandenberg, to Japan to
discuss the operation. They arrived on 21 August and were soon joined
by Admiral Radford and General Shepherd from Hawaii. On 23 August
MacArthur met with Admiral Sherman, General Collins, General Edwards,
Admiral Radford, General Almond, General Doyle O. Hickey, Admiral C.
Turner Joy, Admiral Arthur D. Struble, Admiral James H. Doyle, General
George Stratemeyer, and General Ruffner at his headquarters for briefings
on the proposed operation. Doyle’s staff described the concept and pointed
out the problems inherent in making an amphibious landing in a built-up
area with a convoluted approach channel and extreme tides. In Doyle’s
opinion, the best he could say was that an Incheon landing would not be
impossible. MacArthur acknowledged the Navy objections as “substan-
tial and pertinent,” but pointed out that those very obstacles would assure
surprise, because the enemy would be convinced that no such landing was
possible. He likened the situation to that of Major General James Wolfe’s
use of a seemingly impossible route for his successful amphibious attack
on Quebec in 1757 and expressed complete confidence in the Navy’s abil-
ity to overcome the obstacles. He dismissed the Gunsan alternative as too
shallow an envelopment that would be indecisive and ineffective, arguing
that the Seoul–Incheon complex was the key area where the enemy’s sup-
ply line could be cut, sealing off the peninsula. The alternative to Incheon,
he argued, was to continue the “savage sacrifice” in the Pusan (Busan)
Perimeter with no end in sight. He concluded by expressing complete con-
fidence that CHROMITE would not fail.21
In spite of MacArthur’s persuasive rhetoric, the Navy and Marine
Corps officers still had reservations. Major General Oliver P. Smith, com-
mander of the 1st Marine Division, had arrived in Tokyo on 22 August
and found that Doyle remained skeptical about Incheon because of the
tidal mud flats, lack of beaches suitable for landing craft, docks and sea
walls along the waterfront, and the large urban area at the landing site.
His underwater demolition team (UDT) had examined other west coast
160
sites, including Gunsan and Poseungmyeon (Posung Myon) at Asan Bay,
about 20 miles south of Incheon and due west of Osan. The Navy UDT
and Marine amphibious scouts operating from the fast transport Horace
A. Bass surveyed Poseungmyeon between 22 and 25 August and reported
that the beach was much better for landing craft and could be used with-
out regard to tides, thereby eliminating any restriction on the date or hour
of the assault. Furthermore, the area was not built up. General Shepherd
became quite enthusiastic about Poseungmyeon as an alternative and
both he and Doyle tried to persuade Almond and MacArthur. However,
MacArthur was determined to land at Incheon and would not accept the
Poseungmyeon alternative, although Almond said it might be used for a
subsidiary landing.22
MacArthur’s confidence in the operation, in spite of the problems inher-
ent in the Incheon landing site, were no doubt the product of his experi-
ences in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) in World War II where he had
seen such problems repeatedly overcome. In the debates over CHROMITE
and in postwar discussion and analyses, one can see a number of factors
that influenced the perceptions of the various players. Smith, Doyle, and
other Marine Corps and some Navy writers have stressed not only the
challenges of Incheon as a landing site and the obduracy of MacArthur and
Almond, but also the short planning time for the Incheon operation. Doyle
and Smith had gained their amphibious experience in the Central Pacific
where amphibious operations took place at intervals of months with a long
planning time, systematic development, and a large Commander in Chief,
Pacific Command (CINCPAC)/Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas
(CINCPOA) staff to work out the details. MacArthur’s memory, and the
historical information imparted to Almond and the staff, was of the SWPA,
where the majority of the landings were shore-to-shore, conducted on a
fast time schedule, with little planning time and multiple simultaneous
operations. Struble also came from this environment, where he had con-
ducted half a dozen landings ranging from battalion to division size, most
on very short notice, and under some of the most intense air attacks of the
war.
General Oliver Smith was frequently exasperated at what he saw as
Almond’s lack of appreciation of the complexity and risks of an amphibi-
ous operation, which Almond on at least one occasion dismissed as techni-
cal matters. While it is true that Almond had no amphibious experience,
he had studied amphibious doctrine and operations during the develop-
ment of the GHQ amphibious training program. His confidence in the suc-
cess of CHROMITE no doubt derived in part from MacArthur, but he
was also looking at the operation from a different perspective than Smith.
161
The Marine general, perhaps reflecting the Mid-Pacific mindset, saw the
amphibious landing as his most important challenge, while to Almond it
was a preliminary action: a necessary precondition to his overarching mis-
sion to conduct sustained operations on the Korean Peninsula after the
landing.23
The Plan
With General Oliver Smith now in Japan, detailed planning for Opera-
tion CHROMITE began in earnest. On 21 August MacArthur had requested
Department of the Army approval to activate Headquarters, X Corps as
the command element of the CHROMITE operation and on 26 August he
issued GHQ Order 24 formally activating X Corps with Almond in com-
mand and Ruffner as chief of staff. The corps-level planning focused on
the post-landing, exploitation, phase of the operation. Doyle and Smith’s
staffs worked together on board the Mount McKinley to develop the fire
support and landing plans. The advance party of the 2d ESB had arrived in
Japan on 30 July, with the rest of the brigade arriving in company with the
56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion (ATTB), 50th Engineer Port
Construction Company, and 501st Transportation Harbor Craft Platoon at
Yokohama on 14 August. The 2d ESB staff joined in the CHROMITE
planning, coordinating with X Corps and the Navy/Marine team in the
process.24 One individual who was particularly helpful during the planning
was Army Warrant Officer W.R. Miller, a transportation corps watercraft
specialist who had lived on Wolmido and operated Army boats in Incheon
Harbor before the war. Now stationed in Yokohama, he was brought in to
add his expertise on tides and the details of the harbor.25
Admiral Struble was given overall command of the amphibious phase
of the CHROMITE operation, for which Joint Task Force (JTF) 7 was
established. Struble’s chain of command ran through Admiral Joy from
General MacArthur. His mission was to transport the landing forces, seize
a beachhead in the Incheon area, and transport and land the follow-on
forces on the beachhead. Once Almond assumed command ashore, JTF
7 would provide naval air, gunfire, and logistical support until relieved of
this responsibility.26
The first major component of JTF 7 was Doyle’s Task Force (TF) 90,
the attack force, which would consist of the amphibious ships, a support
force of small aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, fire support ships,
escorts (including British, New Zealand, French, and Republic of Korea
[ROK] Navy ships), and US and ROK minesweepers. Of the 47 LSTs in
TF 90, 30 would be Japanese-manned SCAJAP ships. The second echelon
162
group that would bring the 7th Infantry Division in on D+3 and the third
echelon group that would bring in the X Corps support elements consisted
largely of Navy and Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) trans-
ports and civilian cargo ships.
Admiral Sir William G. Andrewes’ TF 91, the blockade and covering
force, was composed of a British aircraft carrier; a British cruiser; and
eight British, Australian, Canadian, and Dutch destroyers. Rear Admiral
G.R. Henderson’s TF 99, the patrol and reconnaissance force, would be
made up of US and British maritime reconnaissance aircraft and seaplane
tenders. Rear Admiral E.C. Ewen’s TF 77, the fast carrier force, would be
comprised of up to four aircraft carriers and escorting destroyers. Captain
B.L. Austin’s TF 79, the service squadron, would be made up of oilers,
tenders, supply ships, and rescue and salvage ships.
The major land component of JTF 7 was Almond’s X Corps, desig-
nated as TF 92 while it was embarked on the ships of Doyle’s attack force.
It would include the 1st Marine Division, the 7th Infantry Division, and
Corps Troops—which consisted of the Corps Artillery (Headquarters and
Headquarters Battery, 5th Field Artillery Group, 92d and 96th FABs, and
the 50th AAA AW Battalion) and the 19th Engineer Group.
The first challenge facing those planning the assault landing was the
convoluted, island-strewn channel from the West Sea (Yellow Sea) to the
entrance of Incheon Harbor (see map 15). The next challenge was the for-
tified island of Wolmido that lay just off Incheon Harbor. The guns on
Wolmido would have to be destroyed and the island captured before the
landing force could go ashore at Incheon. The third challenge was the
32-foot tide and the impenetrable mud flats at low tide. Between 15 and
18 September the high spring tide would allow LSTs to enter the harbor
and unload at the sea wall along the shore. After those dates, LSTs could
only use a single channel through the harbor at high tide; otherwise, troops
and supplies would have to be lightered ashore in landing craft, mecha-
nized (LCM) and landing craft, vehicle, personnel (LCVP). A tidal basin
normally permitted full-size ships to dock during high tide and to remain
within the basin during the low tide period, but the entrance gates to the
lock had been disabled during the withdrawal in June 1950. Until the gates
were repaired, only landing craft could use the basin. A much larger tidal
basin was under construction, but was not yet usable. There was no actual
beach. Most of the waterfront consisted of a stone sea wall. The initial
waves of troops would have to use ladders to get over the sea wall and
holes would have to be blasted to allow LSTs and landing craft to unload
over their ramps.
163
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FL A T MUD
h C ha n ne
D aem uuido MUD

A sa
sann B ay
MUD S om uuido
F ly in g F is
H aorido P alm ido

SAN D
Incheon C oast
O ido
0 5 10 D aechochid o B ukjangjaseo MUD
M ile
il e s S ochochido
high, one battalion of the 5th Marines, supported by tanks, would seize
take place in two phases. On the morning of D-Day, while the tide was
Because Wolmido had to be secured first, the D-Day assault would
Map 15. Incheon coast.

Wolmido. They would land on the side of the island facing the West Sea
(Yellow Sea), which was designated as GREEN Beach (see map 16). The
battalion would have to hold the island during the low tide period, during
which they would be cut off from the sea by the mud flats. During the
evening high tide, the rest of the 5th Marines would land on RED Beach,
T he Incheon Landing
as of 15 S eptem ber 19 50
il e s
B lue B each
M ile
½
0
A /56 A T T B
R C T -1
Map 16. Incheon Landing overview.

1st M a rine D ivision
In che o n H a rb o r
G reen B each
R ed B each
R C T -5 (-)
B LT -3
(Y e llow S ea )
W e st S ea
R C T -5
165
just north of the narrow causeway that connected Wolmido to the city of
Incheon. Once the tide receded, the 5th Marines would again be cut off
from reinforcements or supplies; therefore, six LSTs loaded with ammu-
nition and other supplies and two LSTs loaded with medical and surgical
facilities would be brought in to RED Beach and remain overnight as sup-
ply dumps and aid stations. They would retract on the morning tide and
be replaced by more LSTs. Simultaneous with the 5th Marines landing on
RED Beach, the 1st Marines would land south of the city at an area desig-
nated as BLUE Beach. Because the water at BLUE Beach would be shal-
low, even at high tide, the assault waves of the 1st Marines would come in
aboard LVTs, with the follow-on forces landing in LCVPs. The 1st Marine
Division amphibious tank battalion could not be used for the operation
because all of the division’s 17-year-old marines had been transferred into
that unit after receipt of a Secretary of the Navy directive that no marine
under 18 years of age was to be sent into combat. US Army Captain James
D. O’Donnell’s Company A, 56th ATTB was, therefore, attached to the
1st Marines for the operation.27
After securing Incheon, the Marines were to move inland to seize the
city of Seoul and the high ground to the east and protect the corps left flank.
The ROK 17th Regiment would occupy Seoul as the Marines continued
the attack (on 3 September the 1st Korean Marine Corps (KMC) Regiment
was substituted for this mission). The 7th Infantry Division would land
administratively after D-Day to expand the beachhead to the south and
protect the corps right flank, providing one regiment for the corps reserve.
The 187th Airborne RCT was to be prepared for airborne or ground opera-
tions or to act as the corps reserve.28
The 1st Marine Division would be responsible for logistics at Incheon
until it was relieved of that responsibility by an organization designated as
Inchon (Incheon) Base Command. The 2d ESB, which was designated as
the X Corps shore party, would be attached to the Marine division until the
Inchon (Incheon) Base Command was activated. On D-Day, the marines
would provide their own shore party for the assault landings. A 2d ESB
reconnaissance team from the brigade’s intelligence section would accom-
pany the 5th Marines onto RED Beach on D-Day to survey the port facili-
ties. On order, 2d ESB would assume operational control of the Marine
shore party elements and take responsibility for all port operations. The
marines would operate RED and GREEN Beaches under 2d ESB direc-
tion, while the 532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment (EB&SR), with
the 50th Engineer Port Construction Company attached, would operate the
inner harbor, designated as YELLOW Beach, and the tidal basin. As the
marines moved inland, the 2d ESB would take over their beaches and the
166
Inchon (Incheon) Base Command would assume shore party and harbor
defense responsibilities once it was established ashore.29
A full-strength ESB was capable of supporting a corps-size amphibious
landing with two divisions landing simultaneously. However, the 2d ESB
was far from a full-strength organization and required augmentation to
carry out its mission. Officers of the technical services were attached to the
2d ESB staff during the planning and initial phase of the operation. Naval
Beach Group 1, the 104th Naval Construction Battalion, the 1st Marine
Division Shore Party Battalion, the 1st Combat Service Group and 7th
Motor Transport Battalion (Fleet Marine Force Pacific units), the Army
73d Combat Engineer Battalion, and other smaller units would be attached
to the brigade effective on D-Day. In addition, Japanese and Korean work-
ers were recruited to serve as stevedores and hatch crews to assist in load-
ing and unloading the ships. The 532d EB&SR was reorganized to include
a provisional boat battalion and a provisional shore battalion to provide
command and control for the organic boat company, the two organic shore
companies, the Marine shore party battalion, and the 50th Engineer Port
Company, which would initially operate as an ad hoc shore party unit.
A group of Air Force elements, an Army aviation engineer battalion (an
airfield construction and repair unit), and an AAA AW battery were desig-
nated as TF Kimpo, with the mission of putting the airfield into operation
after it was captured.30
In planning for fire support, the old issue of tactical surprise versus
destruction of enemy fortifications arose again. The compromise was that
Navy and Marine aircraft would strike a range of targets on the Korean
west coast, increasingly focusing on the Incheon area and culminating in
napalm attacks on Wolmido a few days prior to the landing to burn off the
vegetation that might conceal fortifications. Naval gunfire bombardments
would be carried out at various places on both coasts as a deception measure
and an amphibious raid at Gunsan on 13 September was intended to further
confuse the enemy as to the actual objective. The plan called for only 1 day
of preparatory bombardment on D-1. However, on 10 September Admiral
Struble decided on a 2-day operation beginning on D-2. On 13 September
a cruiser-destroyer force would steam up the channel to bombard Wolmido
and Incheon to destroy as much of the fortifications as possible and to draw
enemy fire so that coastal defense guns could be located and destroyed
during a second bombardment on 14 September. Navy and Marine Corps
aircraft flying from carriers would conduct strikes on both days. Final
preparatory fires would precede the landings on D-Day.31
Although General Stratemeyer desired to have control of all aviation
during the operation, General MacArthur’s decision was that Navy and
167
Marine aircraft would support the landing and conduct all air operations
within the amphibious objective area (AOA)—a radius of approximately
60 miles around Incheon—beginning on D-3 and would conduct attacks
against airfields within 150 miles of Incheon. Far East Air Force (FEAF)
would be responsible for interdiction operations to isolate the Seoul–
Incheon area, support of Eighth United States Army in Korea (EUSAK),
and other air operations outside the AOA. Aircraft of Marine Air Group
(MAG) 33, providing preliminary air strikes and close air support would
initially fly from the two small carriers of Rear Admiral R.W. Ruble’s
Carrier Division 15 and be under Ruble’s operational control until their
headquarters and planes were established ashore. Then the commanding
general of MAG 33 of the 1st Marine Air Wing would become the X Corps
Tactical Air Commander, controlling all air operations within the X Corps
operational area with the option of calling on Fifth Air Force (FEAF’s
tactical air force) for air support.32
On 30 August MacArthur issued UNC/FEC Operation Order (OPORD)
No. 1, giving X Corps the mission to “Land over beaches in the INCHON
[INCHEON] area, seize and secure INCHON, KIMPO [GIMPO] AF and
SEOUL and block enemy forces south of the line: SUWON-ICH’ON. Sever
enemy communications in SEOUL Area.” Smith, 1st Marine Division
commander, was to command the landing force and Major General David
Barr, 7th Infantry Division commander, was to command the follow-up
force. The 3d Infantry Division and 187th Airborne RCT were designated
as GHQ Reserve with the 187th prepared to “Execute air drop or landing
in area when ordered.” Eighth Army was to initiate its offensive on D+1
and was to release the 1st Marine Brigade, the 73d Tank Battalion, and the
ROK 17th Regiment (all amphibiously combat loaded) to the 1st Marine
Division by 4 September. Although D-Day was not specified in the order,
the day was set as 15 September 1950.33 At Kobe and Yokohama, the troops
were preparing to embark. Loading of the cargo ships had already begun,
although it had been interrupted when Typhoon Jane swept across Japan
on 3 September. Another storm was brewing at GHQ over the release of
the 5th Marines.
5th Marines Issue

On 30 August, the day UNC/FEC OPORD No. 1 was issued, Smith
asked for the return of the 1st Provisional Brigade to 1st Marine Division
control by 1 September. GHQ FEC ordered Walker to make the brigade
available on 4 September, but on 31 August the North Koreans began
another major offensive in an attempt to break through the Pusan (Busan)
Perimeter. With desperate fighting taking place in Korea, the order was
168
rescinded. Almond offered to provide the 32d Infantry Regiment of the
7th Division as an alternative, but Smith refused arguing that to send in
an untrained Army regiment for the initial assault would be unfair both to
the soldiers and to his marines. He also doubted that the substitution could
be made, since the ship was already en route to Korea to pick up the 5th
Marines and would have to return to Japan to load the 32d Infantry. The
issue was finally resolved on 3 September when Struble proposed that one
of 7th Division’s regiments be sent to Busan to serve as a floating reserve
offshore. The Marine brigade could then be released to the 1st Marine
Division and, if the floating reserve regiment was not used in the perim-
eter, it could later rejoin the 7th Division.34 The 17th Infantry was alerted
for movement that same night.35 General Wright flew to Korea the next
day to explain the situation to General Walker. The Marine brigade was
to be pulled off the line no later than the night of 5/6 September and sent
immediately to Busan. The 17th Infantry was to arrive off Busan no later
than 7 September to serve as the floating reserve. The lead regiment of
the incoming 3d Division, the 65th Infantry, would also be sent to Busan
between 18 and 20 September and assigned to Eighth Army. Once the 65th
Infantry arrived, the 17th Infantry (if it had not been committed to combat
by that time) would be sent on to Incheon to join the 7th Division.36
Decision in Washington
There was still some disquiet in Washington following the JCS visit to
Tokyo. On 28 August the JCS had sent MacArthur a message concurring
in an amphibious landing on the west coast, but with only conditional
approval of the Incheon landing site:
1. After reviewing the information brought back by
General Collins and Admiral Sherman we concur in
making preparations and executing a turning movement
by amphibious forces on the west coast of Korea either
at Inchon in the event that enemy defenses in vicinity of
Inchon prove ineffective or at a favorable beach south
of Inchon if one can be located. We further concur in
preparation, if desired by CINCFE, for an envelopment
by amphibious forces in the vicinity of Kunsan [Gunsan].
We understand that alternate plans are being prepared in
order best to exploit the situation as it develops.
2. We desire information as becomes available with
respect to conditions in the possible objective areas and
timely information as to your probable intentions and
plans for offensive operations.37
169
On 5 September the JCS asked MacArthur to inform them of any
changes that might have been made to his plans for the mid-September
amphibious assault.38 MacArthur replied the next day that the general out-
line of the plan had not changed and he was dispatching a courier who
would arrive in Washington approximately 11 September with a copy of
the GHQ campaign plan and the OPORDs of the major subordinate com-
mands. On 7 September the JCS concurred in launching a counteroffensive
as early as feasible, but expressed concern over recent events, clearly a ref-
erence to the North Korean offensive and the commitment of practically
all of Eighth Army’s reserves. They reminded MacArthur that all available
trained reserves except the 82d Airborne Division had been allocated to the
Far East and, even though National Guard divisions were being mobilized,
they could not reach Korea for at least 4 months in the event the linkup of
Eighth Army and X Corps could not be effected quickly. It would appear
that the ghost of Anzio hung over the JCS as they asked for MacArthur’s
estimate of the “feasibility and chance of success” of the planned opera-
tion. MacArthur responded at once, reassuring the JCS that there was no
question in his mind as to the feasibility of the operation, downplaying the
significance and impact of the recent KPA attacks, and pointing out that
the success of the operation did not depend on an early EUSAK—X Corps
linkup, since both forces were “completely self-sustaining because of our
absolute air and naval supremacy.” He noted pointedly that the “embarka-
tion of troops and preliminary air and naval preparations” were already
underway. On 8 September the JCS radioed that, in view of MacArthur’s
7 September message, “we approve your plan and President has been so
informed.”39
As these final messages were crossing the Pacific, the embarkation
and preliminary activities MacArthur mentioned were taking place. On
5 September the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade reverted to 1st Marine
Division command and moved to Busan to begin outloading. It was
met there by Lieutenant Colonel Kim Sung Eun’s 3,000-man 1st KMC
Regiment, which had conducted the Tongyeong operation the previous
month, and had now been substituted for the ROK 17th Regiment as the
Incheon occupation force. The two units began loading aboard the trans-
ports. They would join the division at sea en route to Incheon.40 That same
day, Colonel Herbert B. Powell’s 17th RCT began loading aboard two
large MSTS transports (General W.M. Black, T-AP-113, and General John
Pope, T-AP-110) and a leased civilian freighter. Heavy cranes lifted the
tank company vehicles and the regimental trucks, combat loaded with
ammunition, onto the freighter. Powell was aboard one of the transports,
but the senior Navy captain in charge of the little convoy was aboard the
170
other transport, complicating coordination. The three ships sailed at 0200
on 6 September.41
The ships carrying the 17th RCT arrived at the crowded Busan
Harbor the next day (7 September), anchoring 3 miles off shore. Powell
went ashore to check in with the Eighth Army chief of staff and the G3,
Colonel John Dabney, who were unclear as to exactly what orders Powell
had been given or how much authority Eighth Army had over its floating
reserve. However, later that day Eighth Army received a message from
GHQ FEC confirming the verbal instructions that sent the 17th RCT to
Busan. Powell’s RCT would spend the next 17 days floating off Busan. To
be ready for deployment, the vehicle drivers turned their engines over each
day and Powell received permission to bring one of the transports into
port every other day so that groups of soldiers could debark for a 5-mile
march to keep them in shape for combat. They also got some impromptu
amphibious training, as they debarked and re-embarked by climbing land-
ing nets thrown over the sides of the ships.42
The rest of the 7th Division had begun embarkation at Yokohama
on 6 September. It had undergone a quick course of amphibious training
and was still absorbing huge numbers of replacements. Because the 7th
Division had been so badly depleted by providing fillers to the divisions
deploying to Korea, extraordinary measures had to be taken to bring it up
to strength. In addition to the replacements diverted from Okinawa, all
of the infantry and artillery replacements going to the Far East from the
end of August to the end of the first week of September had been sent to
the 7th Division. These 390 officers and 5,400 enlisted replacements were
still not enough to bring the unit up to war strength, so General MacArthur
had directed General Walker to send South Korean civilian volunteers to
Japan to be hastily trained and assigned to the division. Over 8,600 of
these men of various ages had arrived over a 3-day period, “stunned, con-
fused, and exhausted,” to undergo an intense training regime, be outfitted
in American uniforms, and folded into the 7th Division. Every rifle com-
pany and artillery battery received 100 of these men, each of which was
assigned an American “buddy” for training and control. It was not an ideal
system, but it worked well enough to be adopted for all US Army units as
the Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA) Program.43
On 10 September Lieutenant Colonel Lynn D. Smith, the courier
MacArthur had promised to send to JCS, left Tokyo with a copy of the
CHROMITE plan. Concerned that the JCS would try to meddle with the
operation if they were given too much advance notice, MacArthur told
Lieutenant Colonel Smith, “Don’t get there too soon.” He also advised
171
Lieutenant Colonel Smith that, if the JCS said the operation was too big
a gamble, “tell them I said this is throwing a nickel in the pot after it has
been opened for a dollar. The big gamble was Washington’s decision to
put American troops on the Asiatic mainland.” Lynn Smith would arrive
in Washington just before midnight on 13 September and report to the JCS
the next morning. At 1100 on 14 September (15 September Korea time)
Smith entered the JCS briefing room. General Collins said, “This is D-
Day, isn’t it, Colonel?” and asked when H-hour was. When Smith replied
that the landing on Wolmido would begin in 6 hours, Collins said, “Thank
you. You’d best get on with the briefing.” The Chiefs listened to the brief-
ing and asked questions for 2 hours without any criticism of the concept
of the operation or of any of the details. Smith noticed that as they left the
briefing room, they each glanced at the clock on the wall, realizing that the
5th Marines would hit the Wolmido sea wall in 4 hours.44
On 9 September the LSTs carrying the 1st Marines and A/56th ATTB
shoved off from the pier at Kobe. Captain O’Donnell’s armored amphib-
ians, which would constitute the first wave going into BLUE Beach, were
distributed among four LSTs. On 11 September the 1st Marine Division
(less the 5th and 7th Marines) sailed from Kobe, and the 7th Division
sailed from Yokohama into heavy seas caused by approaching Typhoon
Kezia. Admiral Doyle was counting on the typhoon curving north, away
from the route of his attack force, as indeed it did.45 The next day, the 5th
Marines sailed from Busan. On 13 September Admiral Struble’s cruiser-
destroyer force steamed up the Flying Fish Channel to begin the prepa-
ratory bombardment of Wolmido and Incheon. Watching their approach
were an ROK Navy commander and a US Navy lieutenant who with a
group of young guerrillas had ensured the offshore islands were in friendly
hands and had reconnoitered the approaches to Incheon.
Special Operations in Preparation for CHROMITE

Operations LEE and TRUDY JACKSON
In the month before the Incheon landing, ROK Navy patrol and land-
ing craft, supported by warships of the Royal Navy and Royal Canadian
Navy, carried out reconnaissance probes, raids, and landings on the islands
along the approaches to Incheon. These activities were collectively called
Operation LEE, after Commander Lee Sung Ho whose submarine chaser
PC-703 had played a key role in the opening stage of the Tongyeong oper-
ation on the south coast. Lee had tactical control of the ROK operations
that began on the night of 17 August 1950, as PC-703 arrived from south-
ern waters and joined two motor minesweepers and LST-801, supported
by the Canadian destroyer Athabaskan, which landed 110 ROK sailors
172
125 ° 126 ° to P ye o n g ya n g 127 °
Ja n g ye o n H w a n g h a e P ro vince C h e o rw o n
• •
B om bardm ent
and A ir S trike
D aedong R 2 7 S e p te m b e r
D aedong B ay
H a e jjuu
38 °
38° B aen gn ye on gd o
• 38°
38 °
G a e se o n g
•
O n g jin
•ji n Yeonan
D aeche on gd o
•
Incheon. (See map 17.)
Y ongm aedo
S ocheo ng do
U ijijee o n g b u
D eun gsan got R O K N Landing •
2 0 S e p te m b e r
R O K N Landing Y eon pyeo ng do

2 6 S e p te
te m b e r H M S C eylon Lan ding
2 9 S e p te
te m b e r Yeongdeungpo H an R
R O K N Landing G imim p o
8 S e p te m b e r A iirfie
rf i e lldd •
S o sa
• In ch e o n
•
R O K N Landing P alm ido A n ya n g -ri
-ri
1 7 A u g u st
•
D eokjeok
)
Y eon gh eu ng do
W e st S ea Islands Suwon
udo
•
o -s
(Y e llow S ea )
(S e
D aeb ud o
el
O sa n
•
ann
h
hC
A san B ay
F is
37 °
37° 37°
37 °
in g
P o se u n g m ye o n
•
F ly
T he Incheon A pproaches
A ugust–S
ugust – S e ptem ber 195 0
A ttack force approach ro ute H .A . B ass R aid
A ir operations Joint T ask F orce 7 B each R econ Cheonan
0 10 20 2 3 – 2 4 A u g u sstt •
M ile
il e s
126 ° 127 °
lighthouse. On 1 September Commander Lee was joined by US Navy
from the Athabaskan landed on the island of Palmido at the mouth of
on Deokjeok (Tokchok-do), the largest of a string of islands southwest of
On 19 August they secured the island of Yeongheungdo (Yonghung-
Incheon Harbor and disabled the navigation light and radio in the Palmido
do), about 14 miles southwest of Incheon. The next day, Canadian sailors
173
Map 17. Incheon approaches.
Lieutenant Eugene F. Clark, who had been sent by Far East Command
Joint Special Operations, and two Korean officers to gather intelligence
on the tides and beach conditions in preparation for the landing. Clark, a
former Navy enlisted man, had been commissioned in 1943 and served as
a Japanese linguist and amphibious warfare officer. He had commanded an
LST and an attack transport and had been involved in intelligence opera-
tions on the China coast before the war; thus, he was well suited to the
task ahead.46
Clark’s mission, code named Operation TRUDY JACKSON, was a
special project of the Joint Special Operations Staff, which had been set
up by GHQ FEC to coordinate intelligence efforts. The FEC G2 represen-
tative for the operation was retired Major General Holmes E. Dager. In
addition to Clark and his two Korean colleagues (ROK Navy Commander
Youn Joung, who operated under the alias “Yong Chi Ho,” and ROK Army
counterintelligence Colonel Ke In-Ju, who operated under the alias “Kim
Nam Sun”), the TRUDY JACKSON team included a US Army major, a
civilian intelligence analyst, and two signal corps lieutenants.47
In the 2 weeks prior to the Incheon operation, Clark, Youn, and Ke,
supported by Commander Lee’s forces, set up a base on the island of
Yeongheungdo. There they recruited a force of men and teenage boys to
serve as a security and reconnaissance force and acquired a small fleet
of machinegun-armed sailing junks, sampans, and one motorized junk.
To collect intelligence for the upcoming operation, they questioned local
fishermen and conducted personal explorations of Palmido (where Clark
determined that the light could be put back into operation), Incheon, and
even the outskirts of Seoul, where they made contact with other resis-
tance groups. On 8 September Clark’s armed fishing boats fought off an
attempted North Korean landing, but on 14 September the North Koreans
mounted a more determined attack. Clark evacuated his base island and set
off for Palmido, where he reignited the light to help guide the approaching
UNC invasion force. Back at Yeongheungdo, the North Koreans rounded
up and shot 50 of the men, women, and children left behind.
GHQ FEC Raider Company Demonstration at Gunsan

Other operations were taking place in preparation for the landing. From
21 to 24 August Navy UDT frogmen and Marine reconnaissance company
members of the Navy Special Operations Group operating from the APD
Harold A. Bass reconnoitered the beaches at Gunsan to the south and at
Poseungmyeon in the Asan Bay. These operations provided intelligence
about alternative beaches and, equally important, were part of a deception
plan to confuse the North Koreans about the actual landing site.
174
Major James H. Wear’s GHQ Raider Company also contributed to the
deception operation, but at a cost. On 12 September the Raider Company
and 10 of the Royal Navy Fleet Volunteers boarded the British frigate
Whitesand Bay, accompanied by Colonel Louis B. Ely. On 13 September
they arrived off the coast near Gunsan, where they paddled ashore in rub-
ber boats to a small island at the mouth of Gunsan Bay (see map 18). After
moving a short distance inland, they came under machinegun fire. Having
no hand grenades, they had to engage with rifle fire. In the course of the
• H ye sa n jin
ji n
• • H a p su
M a n p o jin
ji n
•
R
C hina • • •
Ja n g jin
ji n G a p sa n
Ja ng jin
G a n g g ye G ilju
ilju
• C h o sa n
• P u n g sa n
• •
R
lu
•
Ya
M u p ye o n g -ri
-ri B U JE O N S e o n g jin
ji n
B ye o kd o n g
•
RES
••
JA N G JIN
J IN D a n ch e o n
•
-ri
N a m sa n -ri
• •
(C H O S IN )
H a g a ru -ri
-ri E a st S ea
••
•
H u ich
i ch e o n B u kch e o n g
U iju
iju
(S ea o f Jap an )
•
Da
er
S in
i n u iju
iju In ch o -ri
-ri
ye
••
on
ng R
gR
R
don
g
D ae Hamheung
R
eo
•
G u ry eo
ch
Heungnam
•
ng
Je o n g jjuu
eo
•
D e o kch e o n
Ch
U N C O ffensive
N orth K orea
S iinn a n jjuu
15 – 22 S eptem ber 19 50
15–
Yangdeok
• W on sa n
•
U N C operatio ns
P usan perim eter
••
(1 5 S e p te m b e r)
P yeo ng ya ng G o je
je o
•
T o n g ch e o n 0 25 50
Jin
J in n a m p o
•
nR
il e s
M ile
Y eseo ng R
G o se o n g
Im ji
C hod o
• S a riw
riw o n
•
P ye o n g g a n g
• •
• •
N a m ch e o n jjee o m G a n se o n g
G im
im h w a
•
• •
C h e o rw o n
• • •
O n g jin
ji n H a e ju
ju G a e se o n g Y a n g ya n g
38 °
38° 38 °
38°
• ••
C h u n ch e o n
Ju m u n jin
ji n
•
M u n sa n
•
B aen gn ye on gd o Yeonan U ije
ije o n g b u G angneung
•
•
X C orps Incheo n L an ding
S am cheok D em onstration
•
1 5 S e p ttee m b e r In ch e o n
•
W on jjuu S a m ch e o k te m b e r
1 5 S e p te
Ha
Suwon
n
• •
R
Je ch e o n
D eokjeok Islands O sa n
A san B ay
• U lji
ljinn
•
•
C h u n g jjuu
Y e o n g jjuu
•
Andong
• • Yeongdeok
•
R
S a n g jjuu
R
dong
um
Ge
D a e jjee o n
•
N ak
Jangsa - d on g O peration
Jangsa-d
• •
G iim
m ch e o n Pohang
• •
(D ookse
kse ok -d on g B e ach )
- don
• •
G u n sa n Y e o g ch e o n
G unsan D em onstration 1 5 S e p te m b e r
Je o n jjuu
1 3 S e p te m b e r Daegu G ye o n g jjuu
•
M iirya
rya n g U llsa
sa n
• E ighth A rm y B reakout
S outh K orea 1 6 – 2 2 S e p te m b e r
• •• •
M a sa n JJin
in h a e
•
JJin
i n jjuu
•
it
M o kp o
ra
•
Y e o su
• N am hae
Ko
re
a
T sushim a
Map 18. UNC offensive, 15–22 September 1950.
175
firefight, two of the Raiders were killed: First Lieutenant James W. Clance,
a veteran of the 82d Airborne Division, and Corporal John W. Maines.
Corporal Raymond E. Puttin was seriously wounded. As they withdrew,
the Raiders came under artillery fire and were unable to bring the two
bodies of their comrades with them. Corporal Puttin died of his wounds
aboard the Whitesand Bay.48 The frigate then headed north for the Raiders’
next mission.
Operational Execution
On 13 and 14 September Admiral Struble’s cruisers and destroy-
ers and Admiral Ewen’s aircraft bombarded Wolmido and Incheon,
destroying most of the coast defense guns at a cost of one officer killed
and eight men wounded. They had also detonated several mines, but
the North Koreans had fortuitously only emplaced a few of their large
stockpile. Admiral Doyle’s attack force arrived before dawn on D-Day,
15 September. Doyle’s flagship (the Mount McKinley, anchored in the
channel) and the fire support ships, destroyers, and LSMRs moved into
position. At 0520 Doyle ordered, “Land the landing force.” Three APDs—
Horace A. Bass, Diachenko, and Wantuck—carried Lieutenant Colonel
Robert D. Taplett’s 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, who now boarded LCVPs
and headed for GREEN Beach as the three landing ships, medium (rocket)
(LSM[R]s) each fired a barrage of 1,000 5-inch rockets and Marine F4U
Corsair fighter-bombers strafed the shoreline. At 0633 Taplett’s marines
went ashore against light opposition and by 0655 had raised an American
flag on the 325-foot peak of Radio Hill, the highest ground on the island.
Taplett’s battalion was reinforced by 10 tanks that had been brought ashore
in 3 landing ships, utility (LSUs), which had made the journey from Kobe
in the well deck of the Fort Marion. The battalion reserve came in behind
the tanks. After several firefights with bypassed North Koreans, the 3/5th
Marines secured the island by 0800. Now the tide receded and Taplett’s
marines waited for the next act to begin. General MacArthur sent a mes-
sage to the JCS: “Landing first phase successful with losses light. Surprise
apparently complete. All goes well and on schedule.” He commented on
the noteworthy cooperation between the Services, and pointed out that
the “natural obstacles, combined with the extraordinary tidal conditions,
demanded a complete mastery of the technique of amphibian warfare.”
During the day Struble took MacArthur, Almond, and Shepherd aboard
his barge for a cruise along GREEN Beach and to within 1,000 yards of
the still-hostile RED Beach. The Navy construction battalion that had
landed at Wolmido spent the day building a pontoon causeway to facilitate
unloading LSTs.49 (See map 19.)
176
to G im p o
A i r fi e l d
A s c o m C ity
II
II I
RED 3
5 M a r (-) BEACH to
CEMETERY II Seoul
GREEN H IL L 2
BEACH
II
3 5 M ar In c h e o n
OBSERVATORY
W o lm i d o H IL L II
2
S o w o lm i d o 5 M ar
III II
3
1 M ar
I
A LVT 56
USA
II
1
II I B LU E
1 M ar BEACH
I I
A LVT 56 Rcn
USA
T h e I n c h e o n L a n d in g
1 5 – 1 6 S e p te m b e r 1 9 5 0
M a r in e la n d in g , 1 5 S e p
M a r in e p o s it io n s , n ig h t , 1 5 S e p
M a r in e p o s it io n s , n ig h t , 1 6 S e p
F o r c e B e a c h h e a d lin e
0 ½ 1
M ile
Map 19. Incheon landing.
The cruisers, destroyers, and Navy and Marine Corps aircraft contin-
ued their bombardment of Incheon throughout the day, increasing in inten-
sity as the attack transports Cavalier (APA-37) and Henrico (APA-45)
carrying Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray’s 5th Marines (minus the
3d Battalion, which had made the Wolmido assault) and the LSTs carrying
Colonel Lewis B. Puller’s 1st Marines and Captain O’Donnell’s A/56th
ATTB approached Incheon with the rising tide. At 1445 Doyle once again
signaled “Land the landing force.” Off RED Beach, the LCVPs and LCMs
carrying the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 5th Marines followed the guide
ship, APD Horace A. Bass, to the line of departure. The LSM(R)s fired
a final barrage of some 6,500 rockets as the landing craft raced toward
the beach. At 1732 the 5th Marines, carrying scaling ladders, hit the sea
wall at RED Beach with two battalions abreast. Resistance was moder-
ate, and by 2000 the 5th Marines had secured the high ground behind
the beach. The eight supply and hospital LSTs came in between 1830
and 1900. Some damage and casualties were caused aboard the LSTs by
enemy fire, but otherwise the operation went smoothly. The eight landing
177
ships remained aground during the night, providing ammunition, rations,
and medical care to the marines. Lieutenant Claude L. Roberts Jr. and the
2d ESB reconnaissance team that had come ashore on D-Day with the
5th Marines picked their way through the rubble to survey the piers along
YELLOW Beach and the tidal basin in preparation for the arrival of the
brigade the next morning.50
The landing of the 1st Marines on BLUE Beach was set for the same
time as that of the 5th Marines on RED Beach. At 1630 O’Donnell’s land-
ing vehicles, tracked (armored) (LVT[A]s) rumbled down the ramps of the
LSTs and into the water. They formed up and, assisted by UDT guide boats,
crossed the line of departure at 1705 and headed for the shore. Behind
them came the LVTs carrying the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 1st Marines.
The Army LVTs soon disappeared from the marines’ view into a yellow
and gray haze caused by the intense preparatory fires. Brigadier General
Edwin H. Simmons, then a major commanding the Weapons Company,
3/1st Marines, recalled that the “soldiers had the compasses and seaman-
ship to pierce the smoke and reached the beach on time. The second and
following waves did not do so well.” Some of the Marine LVTs strayed off
course, and the leading wave of the regimental reserve (BLT 1/1) initially
landed along some salt flats to the left of BLUE Beach before reaching the
assigned landing area.51
BLUE Beach, like RED Beach, was fronted by a 15-foot high sea
wall. O’Donnell’s LVT(A)s sought a way past the wall, some of them
trundling back into the water to move around to the flank. Eventually, all
of his armored amphibians managed to get on line beyond the sea wall,
where they engaged enemy automatic weapons and snipers with their 75-
mm howitzers. In spite of the initial confusion, the marines quickly came
ashore, disembarked from their LVTs, and climbed over the sea wall, mov-
ing inland past the Army LVT(A)s. Throughout the night, O’Donnell’s
howitzers periodically answered calls for indirect fire from the marines.52
Incheon D+1 Operations

By 0730 on 16 September, the 1st and 5th Marine RCTs had linked
up and continued the attack inland toward the Force Beachhead Line (see
map 20). On BLUE Beach, O’Donnell moved the 18 amphibious tanks
of Company A, 56th ATTB, 1,000 yards inland. There, they established a
perimeter defense, set up a fire direction center, and ran telephone wire to
Puller’s command post so that the company no longer had to rely on the
SCR 300 walkie-talkies for communications with the 1st Marine RCT.
When Puller displaced his headquarters forward, he ordered O’Donnell’s
company to stay in place and stand by for indirect fire missions. Although
178
gunfire support from the ships offshore and from the 11th Marines on
Wolmido and RED Beach continued throughout the day, no fire missions
came for Company A.53
The 1st KMC Regiment landed on D+1 and took over responsibil-
ity for the security of the Incheon area, initially reporting to 1st Marine
Division Headquarters and then to the 2d ESB as the Marines moved
inland. Colonel Joseph J. Twitty, the brigade commander, and his head-
quarters came ashore later in the day.54 On Wolmido, Team 3 of the 1st
Marine Shore Party Battalion Group A continued unloading operations
while the 104th Naval Construction Battalion completed the first pontoon
pier on the west side of the island, began work on a second pier on the east
side, and continued to improve the LST ramps. The eight LSTs at RED
Beach retracted with the morning tide and eight more arrived. Six made it
to shore safely to be unloaded during the day by the Naval Beach Group,
the Shore Party Battalion Headquarters and Service Company, and Shore
Party Group A (reinforced by a team from Group B), but two of the ships
grounded too far out to be unloaded and had to wait for the next tide. On
ttoo G iim mpo

A irfie
i r fi e lldd
A scom C ity
5
3 /5
3/5 III
1
to
to
Seoul
2/5
Incheon II
W olm
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do 214
KM
C
III
5 2/5 2/1
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m iiddoo 2/5
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/1 II
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3/1
1/1
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/1
RECON
33/1
/1
M u nhan g P enins
en i ns ula
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M arine A ttacks 33/1

/1
N a m do ng P eninsula
en i nsu l a
D + 11,, 16 S eeptem
ptem ber 19 50
F ront liline s, 24
nes, 00
2400
F orce B eachhe ad lilinnee
0 ½ 1
M ile
il e
Map 20. Incheon: D+1 Marine attacks.
179
BLUE Beach, the supply LVTs that had been prevented from landing the
previous evening by the outgoing tide now came ashore to be unloaded. As
the marines moved inland, they could be supplied from the other beaches.
The small and unsatisfactory BLUE Beach was therefore closed down on
the evening of D+1 and Shore Party Group B (-) moved to Wolmido.55
The 532d EB&SR, with the 50th Engineer Port Construction Company
and the Headquarters and Company Aof the 73d Engineer Combat Battalion
attached, was scheduled to take responsibility for the Incheon inner harbor
area on arrival. The inner harbor was collectively designated YELLOW
Beach (see map 21), with specific areas designated as NORA and OPAL
Beaches on the eastern shore of Wolmido; GRACE, FANNY, WANDA,
and CAROL Beaches between the Wolmido causeway and the tidal basin;
and BETTY Beach south of the tidal basin. The field order called for the
532d and other 2d ESB units to come ashore over RED Beach on D+1.
However, the brigade reconnaissance team that had come ashore on RED
Beach with the marines on D-Day had scouted the waterfront during the
night and determined that, in spite of widespread destruction and damage
to the lock, the channel leading to the tidal basin was open and BETTY
Beach to the south was clear. Knowing that RED Beach would be unus-
able in a few days when the spring tides waned, Lieutenant Colonel E.C.
Adams, the regimental commander, decided to bring the brigade units in
over BETTY Beach, reducing the congestion on RED Beach.56
The four SCAJAP LSTs carrying the brigade and its attached units
arrived at BETTY Beach with the morning tide. LST-Q067, with the brigade
headquarters and the 50th Port Construction Company aboard, beached
successfully, but LST-Q099 grounded short, leaving Company B (the boat
company), Shore Company D, most of the 287th Signal Company, and a
contingent of the Navy Beach Group temporarily stranded by 150 yards
of deep sticky mud between the ramp and the beach. LST-Q090, with the
73d Combat Engineers aboard, and LST-Q075, carrying the headquarters
companies of the 532d Regiment and the Provisional Shore Battalion, as
well as Shore Company E, arrived after the tide had begun to ebb, forcing
both LSTs to stand offshore and wait for the next high tide. The regimental
and battalion commanders, along with small staffs and an eight-man team
from the 287th Signal Company, climbed aboard LCVPs and, as the fall-
ing tide once again isolated Incheon, motored toward the tidal basin to set
up a command post near the brigade headquarters and to take charge of
YELLOW Beach unloading operations.57
180
R ed B ea ch Incheon H arbor B eaches
0 1/8 1/4
M ile
il e
Incheon H arbo r A rea

G re en B ea ch
G ra c e
B ea ch
y
nn
F a a ch
Be
r
ch
a
a ch
C
Wa
B ea ol
O p al B e a ch
B e nda
T idal B asin
Y e llow B ea ch A re a
N o ra B ea ch
B e tty
W olm ido B ea ch
181
Map 21. Incheon Harbor beaches.
Since little could be done without civilian laborers to supplement the
understrength engineer units, the brigade contracting officers headed to city
hall and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, which represented Chinese
companies holding construction and stevedoring contracts in Incheon.
Within 2 hours of landing, they had hired nearly 800 civilian workers. The
50th Port Construction Company used some of this contract labor to build
a log causeway over the mud so that Boat Company B, Shore Company D,
and the others on board LST-Q099 could come ashore.58
Company B’s landing craft, along with dozens of Japanese powered
barges to be used as harbor lighters, were still in Japan awaiting follow-
on shipping. Until these vessels arrived, the boat company operated Navy
landing craft, a few DUKWs the brigade had brought with it, and local
Korean barges and harbor craft that had survived the bombardment.
Company D’s engineers set to work along the waterfront between the
tidal basin and the Wolmido causeway, breaking gaps in the seawall and
bulldozing LST ramps. Since Shore Company E was still afloat, the 50th
Port Engineers took on the additional and unaccustomed task of cargo
discharge at BETTY Beach and the tidal basin, using some cranes unloaded
from its beached LST and others borrowed, along with their crews, from
the Marine shore party battalion. With the assistance of the Marine crane
operators, Company D and the 50th Port emptied 50 LCM loads of cargo
when the evening high tide once again allowed landing craft to come into
the harbor.59
The amphibious engineers also went into the railroad business, mak-
ing initial repairs to the tracks that serviced the piers. The brigade had no
trained railway men, but its troops were accustomed to making machinery
operate under difficult conditions. By midnight on D+1, they had a switch
engine and six freight cars in operation and 3 days later, a train carried
1,200 marines from Incheon to Ascom City and daily cargo runs began,
all organized by an ad hoc 2d ESB rail transportation section. As seemed
always to happen in amphibious operations, many of the trucks intended
for clearing the beach dumps disappeared inland, commandeered to haul
troops and supplies to the forward areas. The ability of the amphibious
engineers to make the trains run long before the regular transportation
railway engineers arrived was fortuitous and helped compensate for the
severe shortage of trucks.60
The convoy of ships carrying the 7th Infantry Division (less the 17th
RCT, which was still afloat off Busan as Eighth Army Reserve) dropped
anchor in Incheon Harbor the evening of D+1.61 By that time, the marines
had pushed to the Force Beachhead Line, so the harbor was now out of
enemy artillery range. At 1800 General Oliver Smith opened his command
182
post east of Incheon, assuming command of operations ashore and ending
the amphibious assault phase of CHROMITE.62
Excursions and Alarms

While the marines fought their way to the Force Beachhead Line and
the Army amphibious engineers and the marines and sailors of the beach
and shore parties unloaded cargo and sent it inland, other dramas were
playing out elsewhere on the peninsula.
The Miryang Battalion’s Jangsa-dong Operation
On the same day as the Incheon landing, but on the opposite coast, an
attempt was made to put an ROK Army guerrilla battalion ashore.63 Eighth
Army had planned to land the force to block the eastern coastal road north
of Pohang in preparation for the Incheon landing and the breakout from
the perimeter. The intent was to tie up North Korean forces during the
west coast amphibious operation and facilitate a ROK 3d Division attack
to recapture Pohang. Dokseok-dong, where the 3d Division had been
evacuated the previous month, offered a good location because the narrow
coastal plain behind the town was a natural chokepoint and the nearby
Jangsa-dong beach was suitable for an amphibious landing in spite of some
offshore rocky shoals. Eighth Army originally intended to use the newly
formed Eighth Army Ranger Company for this mission, but the unit had
not yet completed its training. The task was passed to the ROK II Corps,
which directed the ROK 3d Division to provide a battalion for the opera-
tion. Since the division was fully committed at that time, its commander
recommended the mission be given to an irregular force commanded by
Captain Yi Myeong-heum and variously known as the 1st Independent
Mobile Unit, the Miryang Guerrilla Battalion, or the Myeong (Lustrous)
unit. This was a group of young high school student volunteers and North
Korean defectors then training at the town of Miryang. They were armed
with captured Soviet and Japanese weapons and dressed in an assortment
of Korean peasant clothing, school uniforms, and military battle dress.64
This guerrilla band was to be transported to Dokseok-dong by an ROK
Merchant Marine LST escorted by an ROK Navy frigate and landed dur-
ing the night of 14/15 September. Admiral Charles C. Hartman’s cruiser-
destroyer force, which was scheduled to conduct a bombardment and
demonstration at Samcheok, about 80 miles north of Dokseok-dong, would
provide a prelanding bombardment. The ROK 3d Division Headquarters
requested a US tank company and combat engineer platoon to reinforce
the guerrillas and assist in the landing. The UNC turned down the request
and canceled the prelanding bombardment, causing Hartman to conclude
that the entire operation had been called off.65 (See map 18.)
183
In fact, the US planners had left the decision up to ROK Army
Headquarters. There it was decided that the benefits of the operation would
be worth risking the inadequately trained irregulars. After discarding a
plan to infiltrate the guerrillas by fishing boats, the planners reverted to the
original idea of transporting the entire unit on one LST. The landing was
to be made at 0230 on 15 September, with the ROK Navy frigate provid-
ing naval gunfire support and illumination of the landing area. However,
since star shell rounds were in short supply, the illumination mission was
canceled and the time of the landing was changed to 30 minutes before
dawn.66
ROK Merchant Marine LST-667, Munsan-ho, escorted by the US
destroyer-minesweeper Endicott (DMS-35) in lieu of the ROK Navy
frigate, departed on 14 September carrying the 772-man guerrilla bat-
talion and its two American advisors, First Lieutenant William Harrison
and Sergeant Frederick D. Cooper, who carried the unit’s only radio, an
SCR-300 walkie-talkie.67 En route, they encountered heavy weather from
Typhoon Keizia. The ships, slowed by 10-foot waves, arrived off Jangsa-
dong well after dawn. Rather than landing clandestinely at night, the
LST stood in toward the beach in broad daylight, in 20 to 30 knot winds
and heavy seas, and under the eyes of the 12th Regiment of the KPA 5th
Division, which was garrisoned in a village overlooking the beach, having
been sent there to recuperate after its battles with the ROK 3d Division the
previous month.
As the LST approached the shore, the captain dropped a stern anchor
intended to keep the ship perpendicular to the beach and to assist in retrac-
tion after the landing. However, the anchor cable immediately parted. As
the bow hit the beach, the waves and wind caused the ship to broach and
dragged it sideways over a rocky shoal that tore open a gash beneath the
waterline. The LST settled to the bottom in shallow water just offshore.
Several of the guerrillas plunged into the surf and swam ashore to tie ropes
between the sunken ship and trees behind the beach. The rest of the bat-
talion struggled through the breaking waves, clinging to the ropes, and
quickly moved into the hills, supported by fire from the Endicott’s 5-inch
guns. After a 4-hour gun battle, the KPA drove the guerrillas back to the
beach, where they established a defensive perimeter in the sand dunes
near the wrecked LST. Cooper then made radio contact with the Endicott,
whose commander reported the situation to Admiral Hartman.68
Hartman, who had not been informed that the Jangsa-dong opera-
tion was still on, was astonished to get this news. His cruiser-destroyer
force, Task Group 95.2, had been reinforced by the battleship Missouri
184
and was in the midst of the Samcheok bombardment. Hartman ceased fire
and turned his ships south to help the beleaguered guerrillas. For the next
4 days, the Miryang Battalion held off its attackers with the help of naval
gunfire from Hartman’s ships and close air support from Air Force and
Navy aircraft. Hartman brought Captain Yi out to his flagship by heli-
copter to coordinate the support and rescue effort. Navy helicopters also
evacuated the most seriously wounded, including Harrison and Cooper,
and carried ammunition and food to the soldiers ashore. It was only by
chance that Hartman’s flagship, the cruiser Helena, was able to provide
ammunition for the Miryang Battalion’s Russian weapons. During the pre-
vious few weeks, Hartman’s ships, which had been operating in support of
ROK Army units on the east coast, had provided ammunition, spare parts,
rations, and comfort items (including ice cream) to the Korean Military
Advisory Group (KMAG) ashore. They, in return, had sent out captured
weapons (including swords, as well as submachineguns and pistols) as
war souvenirs. They also sent out captured ammunition that had been
stored in the Helena’s magazines, and this was now used to replenish the
beleaguered guerrillas.69
On 16 September Lieutenant Colonel Frank Spier, the executive offi-
cer of the 8206th Army Unit (AU), Amphibious Training Center (ATC),
arrived off Jangsa-dong aboard Army tug LT-636. He and the tug’s civilian
captain, Charles Roy, went ashore in a rubber boat to assess the situation
and determined that the Munsan-ho was unsalvageable. Spier, who had
considerable amphibious, and specifically LST, experience, assisted with
the evacuation efforts over the next few days. On 19 September ROK
Merchant Marine LST-665, Chochiwon-ho, arrived at Jangsa-dong. The
civilian captain was unwilling to risk his ship by running it up onto the
beach, but with Spier’s advice and encouragement, he brought the LST
close enough that the guerrillas could come out through the surf, again
using ropes strung between the ship and the shore.70 The operation ended
on 20 September when the Chochiwon-ho returned to Busan with the sur-
vivors of the guerrilla battalion and the crew of the wrecked LST, includ-
ing 110 wounded. Of the young student-soldiers, 39 had been killed or had
drowned and 39 were left behind.71
In spite of the bravery of the young guerrillas and the professional-
ism of their commander, Admiral Hartman’s team, Spier, and others, it is
difficult to find any salutary aspect to this operation. There is no evidence
that the North Koreans were seriously inconvenienced and the rescue
operation diverted Hartman’s task group from its mission of bombard-
ment and deception. Admiral Joy radioed to Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith,
commander of the UNC blockading and escort force (TF 95), who had
185
operational control of the ROK Navy, that any such missions in the future
should be conducted by people experienced in amphibious operations.72
The Raiders Attempt at Gimpo

The GHQ Raider Company conducted the other Incheon-related spe-
cial operation. It was also unsuccessful, although there were no casual-
ties. During the planning for the Incheon operation, General Almond and
Colonel Ely had proposed that, after the Gunsan raid, the Raider Company
would move up to Incheon, paddle ashore during the night of 16 September,
and make an early capture of Gimpo Airfield. General Oliver Smith had
argued against the mission, anticipating confusion and the possibility of
friendly-fire casualties, even if it were successful, which Smith thought
unlikely. Almond canceled the raid, but Ely either did not get the word or
made the decision to proceed independently.73
Whatever the reason, Ely and Major Wear’s Raider Company sailed
north aboard Whitesand Bay after the Gunsan raid and, in the approaches
to Incheon, transferred to an ROK Navy frigate that then carried them into
the Han River estuary. On the evening of 16 September, they prepared to
make a 3-mile paddle in their rubber boats and then march overland for 12
miles to take possession of the airfield in the face of over 500 North Korean
defenders. However, it proved impossible to paddle the boats against the
strong tides and the attempt was abandoned.74 The Raiders then joined the
invasion fleet and went ashore on 19 September to report to the X Corps
Advance Command Post for further orders. The failed mission was to be
the Raiders last amphibious operation of the war.75
Morning Alarms
Sunday morning, 17 September (D+2), opened with an unexpected
flourish as, just before 0600, a pair of North Korean fighter-bombers
flew in over the anchored transports, dropped eight 100-pound bombs
near Struble’s flagship, and machine-gunned the British cruiser Jamaica.
Although straddled by the bombs, one of which bounced off the ship with-
out exploding, the Rochester was undamaged, but one sailor was killed
and two more were wounded aboard the Jamaica, whose guns brought
down one of the aircraft.76
The Incheon Build-Up, D+2 to D+4

Later that morning, General MacArthur came ashore to view the
battlefield as the marines continued the attack inland toward the town of
Sosa and the Gimpo Airfield (see map 22). The Army’s 96th Field Artillery
Battalion brought its 155-mm howitzers ashore that day and was placed
186
Ha
nR
21 H a e n g ju
125
OBJ
131
DOG
OBJ 3 S o ry u -ri
G IM P O A IR F IE L D
OBJ 2 (O B J C H A R L IE )
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FOX
OBJ 1
B upyeong
I OBJ
A (-) EASY
II
3 1 BJ
O KER
II II
KMC 2 5 1 5
BA
II I

ABLE
OBJ
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II A s c o m C ity
3 5
M a h a n g -ri
II
2 1
2 /1
Sosa
II
3 1 D E F IL E
I
B II In c h e o n - S e o u l
2 5
I 3 /1 H ig h w a y
1 /1
H ill
208
1 /1
A d v a n c e b y 1 s t M a r in e s a n d
t h e D r i v e t o G im p o b y 5 t h M a r i n e s
to In c h e o n 1 7 – 1 8 S e p te m b e r
II
1 1
X C o r p s p h a s e lin e C C
M a r in e a d v a n c e s
II
Recon H i l ls
0 1 2
M ile s
Nam dong
P e n in s u la
Map 22. Advance by 1st Marines, 17 September.
187
in support of Puller’s 1st Marines for the drive inland. Company A of the
56th ATTB was detached from the 1st Marines at 1000 and attached to
the 11th Marines. During the day, the 11th Marines moved their howitzers
from Wolmido to the A/56th position inland from BLUE Beach. With
their wheeled vehicles still aboard the LST, the Army amphibious tankers
borrowed a DUKW from the 2d ESB to haul water, and then they waited.
Over the next 2 days, they stood ready to add their 75-mm howitzer fire to
the support of the marines, but no calls for fire broke the silence until the
evening of 19 September when the company was called forward to support
the first Han River crossing.77
On D+2 Rear Admiral Lyman A. Thackrey, commander of Amphibious
Group 3, arrived aboard his amphibious command ship, Eldorado (AGC-
11), to take charge of Incheon port operations. His Army counterpart was
Brigadier General George C. Stewart, who would assume duties initially
as the Incheon base commander and then as the commanding general of
the 3d Logistical Command.78 Over the next 3 months, Stewart would play
a key role in supporting operations in northwestern Korea. During World
War II, he had served as chief of transportation for the Mediterranean
Theater and had supervised over-the-shore logistic operations for the
Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, and Southern France amphibious operations. After
the war, he organized the Transportation Center at Fort Eustis and was
the assistant division commander of the 10th Infantry Division when the
Korean War broke out.79
SCAJAP LST-Q075 carrying Company E of the 532d EB&SR had
waited for the evening tide on D+1, but had again failed to make it to
shore. It finally beached on the morning of 17 September. Company E
relieved the 50th Port Construction Company at BETTY Beach and the
tidal basin. The 50th Port now focused its efforts on getting the huge lock
of the tidal basin into operation. Until that was accomplished, only shal-
low draft landing craft could make use of the basin.80
LST-Q090, carrying the Headquarters and Company A of the 73d
Engineer Combat Battalion, arrived on D+2. It was the first LST to land at
OPAL Beach on the east side of Wolmido. The combat engineers unloaded
themselves, bulldozed LST ramps, and, under the direction of an officer
from the 532d EB&SR staff, set up operations as cargo handlers on that
beach until D+10, when they were detached from the regiment and sent
forward to assist in river crossings.81
At midnight on 17 September, Colonel Twitty assumed operational
control of the 1st Marine Division’s 1st Shore Party Battalion, which was
still operating GREEN and RED Beaches, and the Fleet Marine Force 1st
188
Combat Service Group and 7th Motor Transport Battalion.82 The brigade
was responsible for operating beach dumps (unloading supplies, transport-
ing them to the dumps, storing them, and issuing them to the combat units
at the dump sites). The Army controlled the ammunition and engineering
material dumps, while 1st Combat Service Group operated all the others.
The Army engineers and the marines worked well together, although differ-
ences in operating procedures sometimes had to be worked out.83
In addition to its primary task of operating the port, Twitty’s brigade
was responsible for Incheon security. The KMC regiment moved out of
Incheon on 18 September to join the 1st Marine Division, but it left the
KMC 2d Battalion to assist in the port security mission until D+4. For
civilian law and order, Korean National Police Lieutenant Park Song Wook
was installed as the acting chief of police with an initial force of about
200 police officers. (General Smith, having been directed to establish civil
government in Incheon, and acting on the advice of Admiral Sohn Won il,
the ROK Chief of Naval Operations, had earlier appointed Mr. Pyo Yang-
moon, a recent holder of the office, to be acting mayor of Incheon.)84
At 0800 on the 18th, the 2d ESB also took control of some 700 pris-
oners of war (POWs), including 94 wounded, who had been held by the
marines in hastily-constructed compounds on the beach. A brigade sur-
vey party examined the Incheon prison and found it to be suitable and
large enough for the task. A platoon of the versatile Company A of the 73d
Combat Engineers was brought in from Wolmido to operate the prison
until a X Corps Military Police (MP) Company arrived 5 days later.85 The
POW mission entailed setting up cooking, sanitation, and medical facili-
ties and the hiring of local Korean doctors, nurses, and workers, in addi-
tion to the stevedores, supply dump laborers, craftsmen, and unskilled
workers needed to operate the port. By 18 September over 2,300 civilians
were on the payroll. By the end of the month, nearly 10,000 civilians and
the Japanese contract workers brought over to work as hatch crews aboard
the transports and cargo ships were on the payroll.86
Brigadier General Henry I. Hodes, the Assistant Division Commander
of the 7th Infantry Division, had come ashore on 17 September with the
Division G2, G3, and a small staff to establish the division advance command
post. On 18 September the first combat elements of the division landed.
These were the Headquarters and the 1st and 2d Battalions of Colonel
Charles E. Beauchamp’s 32d RCT, the 7th Reconnaissance Company, and
the Headquarters and Company A of the 73d Tank Battalion. Because of
the tides, the transports and cargo ships could not tie up to the pier and
had to unload in the stream—troops and equipment being transferred onto
189
LSTs and landing craft and then brought ashore. The ships were all MSTS
transports without the special gear for handling landing craft, and the
transfer process damaged some of the vehicles and equipment.87
By the time the 7th Division began arriving in Incheon, the marines had
captured Gimpo Airfield. The first aircraft, a Marine helicopter carrying
General Shepherd, landed at 1000 on 18 September. The next day, Marine
F4U Corsair fighter-bombers and F7F Tigercat night fighters arrived,
Major General Field Harris set up the X Corps Tactical Air Command, and
General Thomas J. Cushman’s Marine Air Group 33 began operating out
of Gimpo.88
On the morning of 19 September, the X Corps Deputy Chief of Staff
established an advance command post (CP) at the 1st Marine Division
Headquarters and General Barr activated his 7th Division Headquarters
ashore.89 (See map 23.) The GHQ Raider Company provided security for
the X Corps advance CP until noon, when Marine MPs replaced them. The
Raiders were then attached to the 1st Marine Division and moved forward
to assist the KMC regiment in providing security in the area west of Gimpo.
The Fleet Volunteers were now detached from the Raider Company and
returned to Japan, where they were assigned to 41 Independent Commando
Royal Marines.90
The 7th Division’s 31st Infantry came ashore on 19 September and
began operations south of Incheon toward Suwon. The 32d Infantry moved
forward on that day to take responsibility from the 1st Marines for the
area south of the Incheon–Seoul Highway as part of a complex series of
maneuvers in preparation for the first Han River crossing.91 General Smith
and General Almond had conferred that morning and decided that a ferry
site north of Gimpo Airfield and across the river from the town of Haengju
was most suitable for the river crossing operation.
To align the forces for the crossing and subsequent operations, the 2d
Battalion, 32d Infantry moved to an area southeast of the town of Sosa,
relieving the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, which then moved by truck to the
west and north to replace the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines on the high ground
northwest of the industrial suburb of Yeongdeungpo opposite Seoul on the
south bank of the Han River. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines moved back
to the vicinity of Gimpo Airfield to join the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines and
other units preparing for the river crossing. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines
moved to secure the south bank of the river at the proposed crossing site.
The Marine 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, which had been supporting
the 1st Marines, was now attached to the 5th Marines.92
190
II
1 7 M ar
II I
7 M ar N e u n g -d o n g 28 S e p
H ill
23 , 2 4 S e p II I 224
7 M a r (-)
2 /7 M a r
H a e n g ju 2 /1 M a r
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32
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1 /3 2
A n y a n g -ri
II
3 /3 2
2 1 – 2 2 S ep
T h e C a p tu re o f S e o u l
1 9 – 2 8 S e p te m b e r
A x is o f Ad v a n c e
2 0 -2 1 S e p te m b e r U S p o s it io n s , e v e n in g , 1 9 S e p
2 2 -2 4 S e p te m b e r U S p o s it io n s , e v e n in g 2 1 S e p
2 2 -2 8 S e p te m b e r U S f o r w a r d p o s it io n s , e v e n in g , 2 4 S e p
3 2 d I n f p o s it io n s , e v e n in g , 2 4 S e p
2 3 -2 5 S e p te m b e r
M a in N o r t h K o r e a n w it h d r a w a l
2 4 -2 8 S e p te m b e r A s s a u lt r iv e r c r o s s in g s
2 5 -2 8 S e p te m b e r M a in N o r t h K o r e a n p o s it io n s
0 1 2
I II
U n it lo c a t io n
M ile s
Map 23. Crossing of the Han and capture of Seoul.
Back at Incheon, Company A, 56th ATTB was also directed to support

the river crossing. They were attached to the 5th Marines, displaced to an
assembly area south of the river, refueled, issued rations, dug in, and pre-
pared to provide artillery preparation fires and to participate in the crossing.
The 1st Marine Shore Party Battalion reverted to 1st Marine Division con-
trol for the crossing and at 0915 began moving inland to the crossing site.93
The withdrawal of this unit, which had been operating GREEN Beach,
had an impact on operations, but the 104th Navy Construction Battalion
remained at Wolmido and took over unloading operations at OPAL Beach,
191
freeing up the 73d Combat Engineers for construction work, including a
DUKW ramp and approach road.94
The 2d Battalion of the KMC regiment, which had been providing
port security under Colonel Twitty’s direction, was also pulled out on
19 September, moving inland to join the 5th Marines. Since there were
no MPs in the understrength 2d ESB, Twitty called on the 73d Combat
Engineers (who had supplied hatch crews aboard the ships, had been oper-
ating OPAL Beach, and were constructing and repairing roads) to provide
two companies to serve as provisional MPs until the X Corps MP units
arrived. A security platoon of Company A, 562d EB&SR Maintenance
Battalion was organized to set up traffic checkpoints throughout the city,
and quick reaction teams were established to deal with snipers and civil
disturbances.95
Considerations of a Landing at Gunsan

While these activities were taking place ashore, General MacArthur,
aboard the Mount McKinley, had become concerned about the lack of
progress on the Eighth Army front and was considering another amphibi-
ous operation on the west coast.
The Incheon landing was a turning movement, intended to seize key
terrain deep behind the enemy forces attacking the Eighth Army perimeter,
threaten the enemy’s rear, and cause the enemy to turn to meet that threat.96
Anticipating that the North Koreans would be aware of the threat to their
rear, the Eighth Army offensive was scheduled to begin the day after the
Incheon landing. On 16 September Eighth Army units began the attack,
but the North Korean defenses were still unshaken. Furthermore, Walker’s
forces had to cross the Nakdong River and, because priority for bridging
equipment had gone to X Corps, he had limited resources to do so. “I have
a river across my whole front,” Walker told FEC Acting Chief of Staff
Hickey, “and the two bridges I have don’t make much.”97
It was not until 18 September that the first Eighth Army unit, a bat-
talion of the 2d Division’s 38th Infantry, made the first crossing of the
Nakdong River. Two regiments of the 24th Division crossed the next day,
but the 5th RCT and the 1st Cavalry Division were still fighting their way
to the river and in some places, the KPA were still attacking. By that time
MacArthur had begun to fear that Eighth Army would not be able to break
through and conduct a timely linkup with X Corps.98
General Shepherd left a record of the initial deliberations by key
members of MacArthur’s staff. On 19 September Shepherd had concluded
192
that, with the assault phase of the operation completed, it was time for
him to leave, but MacArthur asked him to stay on for another day or so.
Aboard the Mount McKinley that evening, MacArthur invited Shepherd to
sit in on a staff conference. There he found MacArthur; Admirals Struble
and Doyle; and Generals Almond, Alonzo P. Fox, Courtney Whitney,
and Wright seated at a table with a large map of Korea in front of them.
Shepherd now learned of MacArthur’s concern about Eighth Army’s lack
of progress and his growing belief that the North Koreans were not going
to quit even after Seoul was captured.99
MacArthur proposed using two of Walker’s US divisions and one
ROK division for an amphibious landing at Gunsan, one of the sites for
which Wright’s JSPOG staff had prepared alternative plans before Incheon
was decided on. This Gunsan landing would be an immediate threat to the
enemy rear and, MacArthur believed, would cause the southern front to
collapse. The Gunsan forces could then link up with both X Corps and the
advancing Eighth Army. Struble assured MacArthur that there was enough
shipping to carry out the landing. Doyle confirmed that nonamphibious
shipping could support X Corps by 1 October, freeing up his amphibious
ships for the operation. Doyle saw Gunsan as a suitable landing site and did
not expect any enemy resistance at that location. The others concurred in
the scheme, although Shepherd argued that the 1st Marine Division should
be used for the landing and Struble, with strong support from Shepherd,
proposed Poseungmyeon, the site the Navy and Marines had argued for so
strongly during the CHROMITE planning, as a more suitable alternative
to Gunsan.
MacArthur wanted the Marine division, his strongest division, to con-
tinue the attack toward Seoul, which he still considered the most critical
objective. Doyle had studied the Poseungmyeon area since the earlier argu-
ments about the CHROMITE landing sites and had since concluded that
it was not suitable, as there were rice paddies in the area where unloading
would take place and no roads led inland from the beach.100
MacArthur ordered Wright to develop a plan for a Gunsan landing.
Wright radioed Hickey to begin planning based on CINCFE OPLAN 100-C,
which had been one of the Incheon alternatives developed the previous
month. Hickey advised Walker of the concept on 22 September. Walker
objected to giving up any of his divisions, and by then North Korean resis-
tance had begun to collapse and Eighth Army was surging forward.101 The
5th RCT and the 2d and 24th Divisions had crossed the Nakdong River
in strength, the 2d Division had thrown a bridge across the river, the 25th
193
Division had broken through in the southwest, and in the east the ROK 3d
Division had recaptured Pohang (see map 18). By 23 September the KPA
were in retreat all along the Eighth Army front.102
Han River Crossing103

The 5th Marines, with the participation of Company A, 56th ATTB,
crossed the Han River at the Haengju ferry site west of Seoul on
20 September after an unsuccessful attempt the night before (see map 24).
The forces, including Captain O’Donnell’s Army amphibious tank com-
pany (A/56th ATTB) had formed up on the south bank of the river on the
evening of 19 September. A reconnaissance team swam across the river
without incident, reaching the north bank at 2040. They then signaled that
they had no enemy contact and the reconnaissance company commander
ordered his troops to cross in nine LVTs. However, the amphibious trac-
tors came under heavy fire as they crossed the river and were forced to
turn back.104
After this failed attempt at a hasty crossing, plans were made for a
deliberate assault the next morning. After a 15-minute artillery prepara-
tion, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines crossed the river in LVTs at dawn and
successfully occupied high ground on the north side (Objectives ABLE,
BAKER, and CHARLIE). At 1000 the 2d Battalion crossed in LVTs, fol-
lowed by the 2d Battalion of the KMC regiment riding in DUKWs and
accompanied by A/56th ATTB. The 2/5th Marines and KMC 2d Battalion
passed through the 3d Battalion while still mounted, turned east, and moved
on Objectives DELTA and EASY. A group of North Korean soldiers who
were dug in on Objective EASY surrendered after the Army amphibious
tanks fired a few 75-mm rounds at them. O’Donnell’s company then dug
in and prepared for indirect fire missions.105
The next day, the Headquarters, 1st, and 2d Platoons of A/56th re-
crossed the river to assist in the security of Gimpo Airfield, while the five
LVT(A)s of the 3d Platoon remained north of the river in general support
of the 1st Marine Division.106
The Conclusion of the Incheon–Seoul Operation

As the 5th Marines crossed the Han River on 20 September, most
of the X Corps Headquarters and Headquarters Company came ashore
from the Buckner (like the 7th Division troops, they transferred from the
MSTS transport to an LST that brought them to the beach) and took over
the headquarters area vacated by the 1st Marine Division when General
Smith displaced his CP to Gimpo Airfield. General Almond arrived from
194
to G a e s o n g
5 t h M a r in e s a n d A / 5 6 t h A T T B
C r o s s th e H a n R iv e r
2 0 S e p te m b e r
R yokoku A p p ro a c h
H i l ls
51 0 500 1 ,0 0 0
Y a rd s
OBJ B S o jo n g
II
2 5
G 5
I
II OBJ C D 5
214 OBJ E
95
H a e n g ju
I I 5
I Recon
F 5
1 9 S ep
2 0 S ep
I
H 5
to S e o u l
I I
II F 5 E 5
LVT 1 II
125 2 0 S ep 2 0 S ep OBJ D
3 5
USMC
2 0 S ep Ha OBJ A
II n
2 5
R
2 0 S ep
I
A LVT 56 II
131 2 1
USA
KMC
noon, he met with General MacArthur at Gimpo Airfield just before the
General Barr, Colonel Puller, and General Smith at their CPs. In the after-
the Mount McKinley at 0900 on 21 September. During the day he visited
195
Map 24. 5th Marines and A/56th ATTB cross the Han.
commander in chief returned to Tokyo, and at 1700 he assumed command
ashore in a ceremony at the X Corps CP.107 At the same time, Stewart acti-
vated the Inchon (Incheon) Base Command and took over the responsibil-
ity for shore party operations and defense of Incheon from Colonel Twitty.
The next day, X Corps Headquarters displaced to Ascom City.108
The next day the 7th Marines and the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines
arrived at Incheon. The 3d and 2d Battalions moved inland to join the divi-
sion north of the Han River while the 1st Battalion unloaded the transports
before also joining the division.109 The 7th Infantry Division continued
its debarkation on 21 September. The necessity of using LSTs and land-
ing craft to lighter troops and equipment ashore from transports anchored
in the stream, the inability to move within the harbor except at high tide,
and the limited beach facilities all made this a slow process. The shortage
of trucks also hampered the clearing of the beach dumps. General Hodes
halted the unloading until the backlog on the beach was reduced, and
General Stewart agreed to provide additional trucks to haul the division’s
petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) and other supplies inland.110
As the 5th Marines consolidated their position north of the river and
began moving toward Seoul, and the 1st Marines began the fight for con-
trol of Yeongdeungpo, the two regiments of the 7th Division secured the
area south of Seoul. On 21 September the 32d Infantry captured the town
of Anyang-ri, cutting the Seoul–Suwon Highway. The division reconnais-
sance company and an armored task force, TF Hannum, probed south
toward Suwon, engaging KPA tank and infantry units, and reaching the
town around midnight. They secured the Suwon Airfield the next day and
were relieved by the 31st Infantry Regiment. North of the Han River, the
1st Marine Division began advancing toward Seoul, hitting the main line
of KPA resistance and beginning the battle for the city.111
On 22 September General Smith alerted the 7th Marines that they
were to cross to the north side of the Han River the next day and join
the 5th Marines in the fight for Seoul. Smith’s plan was to have the 1st
Marines cross the Han River west of Yeongdeungpo and move into posi-
tion on the right (southeastern) flank of the 5th Marines. The 7th Marines
would secure the left flank and prevent KPA forces from escaping to the
north. The entire division with three regiments on line would then move
into Seoul. Almond approved this approach in a meeting with Smith that
afternoon, but directed that the KMC regiment and the ROK 17th Infantry
Regiment (due to arrive on 24 September) take part in the liberation of
Seoul.112 (See map 25.)
196
II
1 7 M ar
N e u n g -d o n g 2 8 S ep
II I
II I 7 M a r (-)
7 M ar
2 3 -2 4 S e p
5 M a r (+ )
H a e n g ju
7 M II
5M
I
ar
23, 24 Sep 125
ar
II I
7 M ar
3 /5
1 / 5
I I
2 8 S e p
1 /K M C
Ha
nR
ade
5 M ar
rig
1 /5 M a r
187 AB N R C T III
hB
A /5 6 A T T B (-) 1 M ar
25t
S eogang
NK
7 t h M a r in e s C r o s s in g 1 /1
t h e H a n R iv e r 118
11 Ma
r 24 Sep
2 0 -2 8 S e p te m b e r
2 0 -2 1 S e p te m b e r II I
1 M ar
2 2 -2 8 S e p te m b e r
2 4 -2 8 S e p te m b e r Seoul
Yeongdeungpo 9977 t h R e g t N K 9 t h D i v
2 5 -2 8 S e p te m b e r E lm s , N K 1 8 th D iv
Ma
H i l ls A /1 M a r r X
X 7
0 500 1 ,0 0 0
Y a rd s 2 , 3 /1 M a r E lm s / 1 M a r
Map 25. 7th Marines cross the Han.
Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg’s 7th Marines began crossing the Han

on the morning of 23 September. His Headquarters and Service Company
and the 3d Battalion were shuttled across by LVTs of the Marine 1st
Amphibian Tractor Battalion. By 1710 he had opened his regimental CP
north of the river. Meanwhile, the 3d Platoon of A/56th ATTB, which was
supporting the 5th Marines on the northeast side of the river, re-crossed
back to Gimpo Airfield, where it was put in support of the 2d Battalion,
7th Marines.113
Generals Almond and Smith met again on 23 September, at which time
the 5th Marines were still fighting against stiff opposition. Almond pro-
posed to have the 1st Marines cross the Han River east of Yeongdeungpo,
taking “advantage of the possibility of maneuver from the south and east
against a position which was being stubbornly defended by the enemy.”
Smith did not want to have his division split by the Han River, and
Almond agreed with his request to have the 1st Marines cross to the west
of Yeongdeungpo as planned.114 (See map 26.)
197
1 s t M a r in e s a n d 3 2 d I n f a n tr y
C r o s s th e H a n R iv e r
2 0 -2 8 S e p te m b e r
2 0 -2 1 S e p te m b e r
2 2 -2 8 S e p te m b e r H ill
2 4 -2 8 S e p te m b e r 224
2 5 -2 8 S e p te m b e r
0 500 1 ,0 0 0
2 /7 M a r
Y a rd s
7 M II
2 /1 M a r
5M
ar
I
3 /7 M a r
ar
28 Sep 1 /1 M a r
II
3 /5
1 /5
II 3 /5 M a r 3 /3 2
28 Sep
II
28 Sep
K 1 /3 2
O II
1 /K M C 7R
2 /1 II 28 S
ep
Sep
28
e
gad
1 /5 M a r 5 M ar Seoul
ri
hB
III
K
1 M ar
25t
32
RO
1 7 II
S eogang 2 /3 2
NK
II
20 Sep
SOUTH
24 Sep M O U N T A IN
Ha
n H an
II I
7 M ar R R
9 7 th R e g t N K 9 th D iv
ep II 3 /3 2
3/
E lm s , N K 1 8 th D iv S II I
1 (-)
Ma 25 32 LVT
A /1 M a r r X USMC
X 7 II I
S in s a - r i 17 RO K LVT A /5 6
Map 26. 1st Marines and 32d Infantry cross the Han.
On the morning of 24 September, after a tough 4-day fight for posses-

sion of Yeongdeungpo, the 1st Marines crossed the Han River at Seogang.
A reconnaissance party and assault force of the 2d Battalion crossed at
0800 after an hour delay while mines were cleared at the crossing site,
and the rest of the regiment crossed in LVTs and DUKWs over the next 2
hours.115 The 3d Battalion, 187th Airborne RCT was airlifted from Ashiya,
Japan, to Gimpo Airfield. They took over the Gimpo security mission from
the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, which then made the crossing of the Han,
followed by the 1st Battalion, which had finished its task of unloading the
ships. The 3d Platoon of A/56th ATTB was relieved of its mission of sup-
port of the 2/7th Marines and commenced support of the 187th Airborne
RCT.116
At 1230 General Almond met with General Smith in Yeongdeungpo
and presented his plan to change the boundary between the 1st Marine
Division and the 7th Infantry Division and to have the 32d Infantry and the
ROK 17th Regiment (then debarking at Incheon) cross the Han River east
198
of Yeongdeungpo in LVTs of the Marine 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion.
The 32d and 17th would then capture and “take the enemy resistance then
confronting the 1st Marine Division in reverse and by maneuver from the
south and southeast capture the dominant terrain feature of South Mountain
[Namsan, the prominent high ground south of Seoul].”117 General Smith
disagreed both with the planned use of the 32d Infantry and with its use
of Marine LVTs, but, in the words of the official Marine Corps historian,
“Differences between commanders are not remarkable, and it is noteworthy
that Corps and Division usually managed in the Inchon–Seoul operation
to reach an acceptable solution. Such was the case [when Almond agreed
to allow Smith to keep his division together north of the river and used the
32d Infantry in place of the 1st Marines as the maneuver element to the
southeast].”118
The 32d RCT had already been alerted for the river crossing at 1115
that morning. When General Almond made the final decision on the after-
noon of 24 September, the Marine 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion (less
one company) and the 1st and 2d Platoons of Company A, 56th ATTB
were attached to the 32d RCT to support the crossing (Headquarters and
3d Platoon of the 56th ATTB remained at Gimpo in support of the 187th
Airborne RCT). The amphibious tanks and tractors road marched to the
32d’s position south of the river, and at 2200 that night, the ROK 17th
Regiment was also attached to the 32d RCT.119
At dusk on the evening of 24 September, the transports carrying the
17th RCT steamed into Incheon Harbor after cruising “through a sea of
glass under a bright blue sky.”120 As they dropped anchor, the battleship
Missouri was firing its 16-inch main battery in support of the troops inland
while the Japanese stevedores, brought over to unload the ships, watched
the show from atop the hatch covers. By midnight, the tide was high enough
for the regimental commander, Colonel Herbert B. Powell, to go ashore in
a launch to the assigned beach and coordinate with the Navy beach master
and the amphibious engineers from the 532d EB&SR. The troops went
over the rails of the transport and into LSTs while the regiment’s equip-
ment and vehicles were loaded onto the LSTs by cranes. Most of the regi-
ment was ashore by 0400 on 25 September. During the day, they moved
by train and foot to the vicinity of Anyang-ri, where the 1st Battalion was
designated the corps reserve, the 3d Battalion was designated the division
reserve, and the 2d Battalion was moved north to the Han River to occupy
part of the area held by the 32d Infantry as that unit crossed the Han.121
As the 17th RCT was coming ashore before dawn, the 32d RCT was
preparing to cross the Han River at the Sinsa-ri ferry site, across from the
199
900-foot high mass of Namsan (South Mountain). At 0600 the 48th Field
Artillery Battalion and the regimental heavy mortars began a 30-minute
artillery preparation, and at 0630 the assault company of the 2d Battalion,
32d Infantry entered the river in amphibious tractors. By 0730 the entire
battalion and the 2d Platoon of A/56th ATTB were across the river with-
out any casualties and the battalion was moving toward Namsan. The 1st
Platoon of A/56th ATTB remained south of the river to provide artillery
support. By 0830 the 1st Battalion of the 32d Infantry was across the river
and moving to the east, followed by the 3d Battalion a little after noon.
The ROK 17th Regiment followed the 3d Battalion. The 2d Battalion had
secured Namsan by 1500. During the night, 2/32d Infantry repelled a KPA
counterattack and the ROK 17th Regiment attacked through the night
toward the high ground 4 miles east of the city, which they secured the
next day. By nightfall on 26 September, the 32d Infantry and the ROK 17th
Regiment had cleared the enemy from their zones and the 2/32d Infantry
had made contact with the marines west of Namsan.122
The 2d ESB also played a role in the 32d Infantry’s Han River cross-
ing. First Lieutenant Claude L. Roberts’s DUKW Platoon of Company B
(the boat company), 532d EB&SR, helped carry troops across the river and
the 73d Combat Engineer Battalion, released from duty at OPAL Beach on
Wolmido, came up to construct a 50-ton ferry at the crossing site.123
By 26 September the 1st Marine Division, elements of the 7th Infantry
Division, the ROK 17th Regiment, and ROK marines occupied substan-
tial parts of Seoul, although heavy fighting continued. The next day, lead
elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (TF 777, 7th Cavalry) met elements
of the 7th RCT, 7th Division, south of Suwon Airfield, near Osan, accom-
plishing the linkup of Eighth Army and X Corps at almost the same spot
where TF Smith had been overrun on 5 July 1950.124
On 28 September enemy resistance in Seoul ended, although combat
was still taking place north of the city. That same day, Company A, 56th
ATTB, finally began operating again as a single unit. For the last sev-
eral days, the company had been thoroughly dispersed. The Headquarters
Platoon had remained at Gimpo. The 1st Platoon on the south bank of the
Han River had provided indirect fire in support of the 32d Infantry and
ROK 17th Infantry while the 2d Platoon had crossed the river with the
32d, providing direct fire. The 3d Platoon had been attached to the 187th
Airborne RCT. Now the entire unit was brought together and attached to
the 187th as it cleared the area northwest of Gimpo. Captain O’Donnell
attached one tank from the Headquarters Platoon to each of the other pla-
toons, so there were now three six-gun firing batteries. O’Donnell noted
on 29 September, “all guns were firing” and that morale was high.125
200
ROK Operations
Elsewhere in Korea, on 20 September the ROK 3d Division captured
the port of Pohang.126 In the week following the Incheon landing, ROK
Navy coastal forces cleared islands along the west coast from Gunsan to
the islands in the West Sea (Yellow Sea) west of the Ongjin Peninsula.
In the south, ROK Navy and Marine forces cooperating with Eighth
Army captured Namhae Island on 27 September and the port of Yeosu on
29 September. On 3 October Commander Lee with PC-703 and several
smaller craft supported a landing by ROK marines to secure the south-
western port of Mokpo (see map 18).127
On 24 September Eugene Clark (now promoted to lieutenant com-
mander) returned to Korea with orders to liberate major islands south of the
38th Parallel (see map 17). His guerrillas augmented a KMC battalion and
ROK Navy LST-801. Landings were made on Yongmaedo Island, south-
east of Haeju on 20 September and on Socheongdo (Soch’ong-do), west of
Ongjin on 26 September. Royal Navy units were active in support of these
ROK operations. The cruiser Manchester and four destroyers bombarded
enemy troop concentrations on Deungsangot (Tungsan-got), a peninsula
south of Ongjin, on 27 September, and on 29 September the cruiser Ceylon
put a landing party ashore on Daecheongdo (Taech’ong-do), another of the
islands west of Ongjin, finding it deserted. On 2 October Clark’s mission
was expanded to include liberating West Sea (Yellow Sea) islands north
of the 38th Parallel off the coast of North Korea’s Hwanghae province,
the largest of these being Baengnyeongdo (Paengyong-do), which would
become a base for guerrilla and other special operations against North
Korea later in the war. Clark concluded his mission on 14 October and his
irregulars returned to their home islands and disbanded.128
Incheon Port and Logistic Support Operations

While these combat actions were taking place, the vital logistic sus-
tainment operation continued at Incheon and along the lines of commu-
nication to the front line forces. On 23 September the 8206th AU, ATC,
which had been conducting logistical support operations along the southern
Korean coast, arrived at Wolmido, having been transported with their LSU
and LCMs aboard the landing ships, dock (LSDs) Gunston Hall and Fort
Marion. The unit was placed in direct support of the 2d ESB and began
assisting in the lighterage operations. Some of its personnel were assigned
to the railroad repair mission, some were assigned temporarily to the POW
security task, and one contingent was sent up the Han River with landing
craft to assist the 1st Marine Shore Party Battalion in the ferrying opera-
tions at the Haengju ferry site.129 There, the Marine 1st Engineer Battalion
201
had assembled a raft within 6 hours of the 19 September assault crossing
so that tanks could be brought across. They assembled another raft the
next day and had three rafts in operation by 25 September, when the ferry
operation was taken over by the 1st Shore Party Battalion, assisted by
Army engineers of the 532d EB&SR and the ATC detachment.130 The 73d
Engineers were also detached from the 2d ESB on 25 September and sent
forward to assist in the river crossings.131
On 25 September the 50th Engineer Port Construction Company fin-
ished repairing one of the tidal basin lock gates so it could be manually
opened and closed. The first ship to enter was a small Japanese coastal
freighter.132 It was a significant first step, but the process of manually oper-
ating the lock was difficult and time-consuming. On 3 October an engineer
team arrived from Tokyo to repair the electric motors and machinery. By
9 October three of the four locks could be operated electrically, reducing
the time for locking ships into or out of the basin from more than 3 hours
to 15 minutes. The fourth lock had to be worked manually, but overall, the
tidal basin operation was enormously improved.133
On 26 September the rest of the 3d Logistical Command, the advance
party had arrived on 18 September, landed at Incheon. General Stewart put
the command into operation on that date, replacing the Inchon (Incheon)
Base Command as the Army organization responsible for unloading,
receiving, storing, and forwarding supplies in support of X Corps.134 Also
on 26 September, the 532d EB&SR took over the duties of the Navy beach
master unit (control of LSTs and landing craft, direction of lighterage
operations, provision of pilotage for ships entering the harbor, the opera-
tion of aids to navigation, and operations of the harbor communications
system) and also took control of the Navy boat unit. That same day, the
14th Transportation Port Battalion, consisting of the headquarters and the
155th Port Company, arrived. Initially, it conducted port operations under
the direction of the 532d EB&SR pending the withdrawal of the regiment
and the assumption by the battalion of responsibility for operating the port.
A second port company, the 153d, would arrive on 10 October, by which
time the 2d ESB had turned over responsibility for operating the port of
Incheon to the 14th Transportation Port Battalion.135
On 1 October the 3d Logistical Command took over the railroad oper-
ation from the 2d ESB, which was now preparing for the next amphibious
operation.136 On 3 October the ATC turned its LSUs over to the Navy and
the following week the unit was transferred from the 2d ESB and assigned
by the 3d Logistical Command to assist in the operation of Incheon
Port.137
202
The Incheon amphibious operation had concluded. The operation of
Incheon Port was now a logistical operation to support combat forces con-
ducting sustained combat operations on land. However, another amphibi-
ous operation was in the offing. On 27 September Admiral Thackrey
relieved Admiral Doyle, who sailed back to Japan to prepare for that oper-
ation.138 On 29 September General MacArthur conducted a ceremony in
which he returned the city of Seoul to Syngman Rhee. Shortly before the
ceremony, MacArthur had met with his commanders and informed them
of his plan for the next phase of operations: an offensive by Eighth Army
into North Korea and another amphibious operation by X Corps to capture
the east coast port of Wonsan.
203
Notes
1. James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, Policy and
Direction: The First Year (Washington, DC: GPO, 1972; reprinted 1992), 187,
based on a July 1955 letter from General Wright to Schnabel.
2. JCS 1776/25, Memorandum by the Chief of Naval Operations for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Recommendations of Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet,
Concerning Support of Commander in Chief, Far East,” 9 July 1950, RG 218,
Entry UD7, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–5) Section 23, Box 38, National Archives
and Records Administration, Modern Military Records, College Park, MD, here-
after, NACP.
3. General Shepherd records that his motivation for encouraging
MacArthur to request the Marine division was to “ensure that the Marine Units in
Korea would be under command of a Marine General officer of sufficient rank to
protect the interests of the Corps” in light of “attempts by the Army and Air Force
to dismember the Marine Corps and reduce its roles and missions during discus-
sion of the recently enacted ‘Unification of the Services’ [legislation],” Lemuel C.
Shepherd, Korean War Diary covering period 2 July to 7 December 1950, copy
provided to the writer by Professor Allan R. Millett (a copy is also available in
the Lemuel C. Shepherd Papers at the Marine Corps University Archives), 3–5;
CINCFE Message C-57553 (CM IN 11150) to Department of the Army for JCS,
10 July 1950, RG 218, Entry UB7, CCS 381 Far East (7–2–50), Section 1, Box
22, NACP.
4. J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 82–85.
5. JCS Action 2147, “Reinforcement to Commander in Chief, Far East,”
11 July 1950, RG 218, Entry UB7, CCS 381 Far East (7–2–50), Section 1, Box
22; JCS 1776/34, “Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Increase
in Strength of the First Marine Division,” 14 July 1950, RG 218, Entry UD7, CCS
383.21 Korea (3–19–45) Sec 24, Box 39, both at NACP; James F. Schnabel and
Robert J. Watson, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff
and National Policy, Vol. 3, The Korean War, Part 1 (Washington, DC: Office of
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1998), 77–78.
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1962),171–172.
7. CINCFE Message CX 58239 (CM IN 13725) to JCS, 19 July 1950; JCS
86511 to CINCFE, 20 July 1950; CINCFE Message CX 58327 (CM IN 14303),
21 July 1950 [decisive stroke]; JCS 86511 to CINCFE, 20 July 1950; CINCFE
Message CX 58327 (CM IN 14303), 21 July 1950; CINCFE CX 58473 (CM IN
14839) to JCS, 23 July 1950 [description of the operation], RG 218, Entry UB7,
CCS381 Far East (7–2–50), Section 1, Box 22, NACP.
8. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 168–171.
9. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 141–145, 159–171; Schnabel and
Watson, Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. 3, The Korean War, Part
1, 80, 81; Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona, U.S. Marine Operations
204
in Korea, 1950–1953, Vol. II, The Inchon–Seoul Operation (Washington, DC:
Historical Branch, G3, 1955), 18–34, 56–57; Roy E. Appleman, United States
Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington,
DC: GPO, 1961), 489.
10. Summary of 29 July 1950 personal message from General MacArthur
to General Collins, contained in a Letter, Department of the Army G3 to
Commandant, Army War College, 30 December 1954, 2, copy in MHI Archives.
12. A spring tide is an exceptionally high tide that occurs during a full or
new moon, when the sun, moon, and earth are approximately aligned. A neap tide
is the lowest level of high tide, occurring twice each month during the first and
third quarters of the moon.
14. The Pusan (Busan) Perimeter battles are described in Uzal W. Ent,
Fighting on the Brink: Defense of the Pusan Perimeter (Paducah, KY: Turner
Publishing Co., 1996), and in Appleman, South to the Naktong, 289–487.
16. “Strategic Concept for the Destruction of the North Korean Forces in
the Field,” 5 August 1950, copy in the Ridgway Papers, Series 2 Correspondence,
Box 8, MHI Archives.
17. D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Vol. 3, Triumph and
Disaster 1945–1964 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), 452–456, provides
the background on the Harriman mission. President Truman’s concern was that
MacArthur had exceeded his authority in coordinating with Republic of China
(Taiwan) President Chiang Kai-shek’s generals and planning to send fighter air-
craft to the island, actions that should have had prior Washington approval.
18. Memorandum, “Conference in Office of CINCFE,” 8 August 1950, and
Memorandum, “Notes on 081035–081255 Conference with General MacArthur,” 8
August 1950, Ridgway Papers, Series 2 Correspondence, Box 8, MHI Archives.
19. JCS Action 2147/4, 10 August 1950, “Reinforcement of the Far East
Command,” RG 218, Entry UB7, CCS 381 Far East (7–2–50), Section 2, Box 22,
NACP; Schnabel and Watson, Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. 3,
The Korean War, Part 1, 81–84.
20. Edward M. Almond, “How Inchon Korea was Chosen for the X Corps
Amphibious Landing There on 15 Sept. 1950,” The Edward M. Almond Papers,
Box 75, MHI Archive; “Biographical File, General Clark L. Ruffner, USA,” MHI;
Montross and Canzona, The Inchon–Seoul Operation, 58.
21. There was no transcript of MacArthur’s remarks, but the various
observers agree on the key points. MacArthur’s own version appears in Douglas
MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964,
Second Printing), 349–350. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, provides a similar
summary, 149–151. Schnabel and Watson provide background on the JCS visit in
Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. 3, The Korean War, Part 1, 87.
22. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 148–150; Montross and Canzona,
The Inchon–Seoul Operation, 43–44, 48; Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 175;
205
Shepherd Diary, 21 and 24 August 1950. Several weeks later, during the Incheon
operation, Admiral Doyle took another look at Poseungmyeon and determined
that, because of the configuration of the terrain behind the beach, it was not very
suitable for an amphibious operation. Shepherd Diary, 19 September. See map 17
for the location of Poseungmyeon in relationship to Incheon.
23. There were also personality issues that are beyond the scope of this
study. Admirals Sherman and Struble were not well liked by Admiral Doyle and
many other naval officers because they were not believed to have been suffi-
ciently passionate Navy advocates during the unification struggles. There may
have been some professional jealousy between Doyle and Struble, both of whom
had strong amphibious backgrounds (although postwar Navy writers rarely men-
tion Struble’s extensive amphibious experience). Almond and Smith did not get
along well. Smith seems to have viewed Almond as condescending, arrogant, and
stubborn, while Almond saw Smith as an overly cautious naysayer. Colonel (later
Brigadier General) Forney and Lieutenant Colonel (later Lieutenant General)
William J. McCaffrey, two officers who worked closely with both Almond and
Smith in 1950, had a high regard for both generals and saw their mutual antipathy
as unfortunate. The unification struggles clearly affected attitudes of the various
Service leaders, especially early in the war, and it seems likely that the scars
from the Smith-vs-Smith episode had not yet completely healed. In this regard,
it should be noted that Almond was a close friend of Ralph Smith, who visited
Almond in Italy following his relief from command by H.M. Smith. Ruffner was
the Chief of Staff of Army Forces in POA at the time of the incident. For var-
ious perspectives on the personality issues, see Robert Debs Heinl, Victory at
High Tide: The Inchon–Seoul Campaign (Annapolis, MD: Nautical & Aviation
Pub. Co. of America, 1979); Thomas B. Buell, “Naval Leadership in Korea: The
First Six Months,” in Edward J. Marolda, ed., The U.S. Navy in the Korean War
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 110–174; and Donald Chisholm,
“Negotiated Joint Command Relationships,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 53,
No. 2 (Spring 2000): 65–124. Some of the tensions among these strong personali-
ties played out in correspondence with Heinl during his research on Victory at High
Tide: letters from Almond, Struble, Doyle, Smith, Ruffner, and others are avail-
able in The Robert D. Heinl Papers, PC 277, Box 42, Marine Corps University
Archives. Forney’s comments on Smith and Almond are in his “Special Report.”
McCaffrey’s assessment is contained in his correspondence with Roy Appleman,
available in the Roy Appleman Collection, 1945–1989, Box 20, MHI Archives.
24. History of the Korean War, Chronology 25 June 1950–31 December
1951 (Tokyo: Military History Section, Far East Command, 1952), 29, 38,
hereafter, Korean War Chronology; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 156–157;
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 489; Montross and Canzona, The Inchon–Seoul
Operation, 55–62; Headquarters, 2d Engineer Special Brigade, Unit Activities
Report, 9 July 1950 to 1 October 1950, hereafter, 2ESB UAR, 1, RG 407, Entry
429, Box 4665, NACP.
25. Heinl, Victory at High Tide, 34.
206
26. UNC/FEC OPORD No. 1, Annex A, Task Organization, Annex E,
Command Relations; Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 179–181.
27. Kenneth W. Estes, Marines Under Armor: The Marine Corps and the
Armored Fighting Vehicle, 1916–2000 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2000), 139; Company A, 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion, Diary
Report of “A” Company, 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion to Cover
the Period from 26 August to 15 January 1950–51, RG 338, Entry 37042, ATTB
Cmd Rpts Jan 51, Box 28, NACP, hereafter, A/56th ATTB Diary Report, 1.
28. This description of the CHROMITE plan is from X Corps OPORD No.
1, 28 August 1950, RG 554, Entry 48, Box 5, NACP.
29. X Corps OPORD No. 1; 2d Engineer Special Brigade Field Order 1-50,
2 September 1950, RG 407, Entry 429, Box 4665, NACP, hereafter, 2ESB FO
1-50; 2ESB UAR; After Action Report, Inchon Operation, 532d Engineer Boat &
Shore Regiment, 3 November 1950, copy in the Office of the Engineer Command
Historian, hereafter, 532d Inchon AAR.
30. 2ESB UAR; 2ESB FO 1-50; X Corps OPORD No. 1.
31. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 179, 186–187, 191–193.
32. Annex F, “Coordination of Air Operations,” to UNC/FEC Operation
Plan No. 1; Robert Frank Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953
(Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, US Air Force, 1983), 151–152;
Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 179; Montross and Canzona, The Inchon–Seoul
Operation, 67–71. Ruble’s carriers would be part of Admiral Doyle’s TF 90, not
under Admiral Ewen’s TF 77.
33. GHQ FEC Operations Order No. 1, 30 August 1950, RG 218, Entry
UD7, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45), Box 43, NACP.
34. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 164–165; Appleman, South to the
Naktong, 496–497.
35. Herbert B. Powell, “Conversations between General Herbert B. Powell
and Lieutenant Colonel Philip J. Stevens and Others,” Vol. I, Senior Officer
Debriefing Program (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Military History Institute
Research Collection, 1972), 52, hereafter, Powell Oral History.
37. Message JCS 89960, JCS to CINCFE, 28 August 1950, RG 218, UD-
7, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45) Entry 7, Section 29, Box 40, NACP. General
MacArthur invariably referred to the Incheon operation as an “envelopment” or
a “deep envelopment,” while the JCS referred to it as a “turning movement.” In
terms of the contemporary doctrine, the Incheon operation was a turning move-
ment, “an enveloping maneuver which passes around the enemy’s main forces
to strike at a vital point deep in the hostile rear” in which the “force making the
maneuver usually operates so far from the secondary attack that the principal
tactical groupings may be beyond mutual supporting distance.” An envelopment
was a shallower maneuver: an attack “directed against the flank or rear of the
initial disposition of the enemy’s main forces and toward an objective in rear of
his front lines.” Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Field Service
207
Regulations: Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 1949), 82–83. These definitions
appeared in the 1923 edition of Field Service Regulations and remain essentially
the same in current Army doctrine (see United States War Department, Field
Service Regulations, United States Army, Washington, DC: GPO, 1923, 88–89,
and, for current doctrine, FM 3-90, Tactics (Washington, DC: GPO, July 2001),
3-12 to 3-19). They do not appear in the earlier doctrinal manuals (Field Service
Regulations, United States Army [Washington, DC: GPO, 1905 and 1910], for
example); raising the possibility that MacArthur was not particularly conver-
sant with the term “turning movement,” which would have been familiar to the
younger members of the JCS and Army Staff.
38. Message JCS 90639, JCS to CINCFE, 5 September 1950, RG 218,
Entry UD7, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45), Section 30, Box 40, NACP.
39. Message CINCFE C 62213 (CM IN 8572), to Department of the
Army (DEPTAR) for JCS, Personal for General Collins, 6 September 1950; JCS
Message 90908, Personal for MacArthur, 7 September 1950; CINCFE Message
C 62423, DEPTAR for JCS, 8 September 1950; JCS Message 90958, to CINCFE,
8 September 1950, all in RG 218, Entry UD7, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)
Section 31, Correspondence from 9–6–50 to 9–14–50, Box 40, NACP.
40. Korean War Chronology, 48; Edwin Howard Simmons, Over the
Seawall: U.S. Marines at Inchon (Washington, DC: History and Museums
Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 2000), 22; Montross and Canzona,
The Inchon–Seoul Operation, 73–74.
41. Powell Oral History, 53; 7th Infantry Division, War Diary, 1 September
to 30 September 1950, hereafter, 7th Div WD, RG 407, Entry 429, Box 3171,
NACP, 5 and 6 September 1950.
42. Powell Oral History, 53–54; 7th Div WD, 6 and 7 September 1950.
Powell does not identify the Eighth Army chief of staff, but it would have been
either Colonel Eugene M. Landrum or Brigadier General Leven C. Allen, who
replaced Landrum at about this time.
43. 7th Div WD, “Narrative Summary,” 1; Address by Major General David
G. Barr, USA, Before the Army War College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 February
1951, AWC R-201, MHI Archives, hereafter, Barr Lecture, 3; “stunned, confused,
and exhausted,” Appleman, South to the Naktong, 492.
44. GHQ UNC Letter to JCS, 9 September 1950, “United Nations Command
Operational Plans and Orders,” RG 218, Entry UD7, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–
45) Section 31, Correspondence from 9–6–50 to 9–14–50, Box 40, NACP; Lynn
D. Smith, “A Nickel After a Dollar,” Army (September 1970): 25, 33–34.
45. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 188–190; A/56th ATTB Diary Report,
9 and 10 September 1950; 7th Div WD; Barr Lecture.
46. This account of Clark’s activities and Operation LEE is based primarily
on Clark’s own memoir, written in 1951 and published posthumously: Eugene
Franklin Clark, The Secrets of Inchon: The Untold Story of the Most Daring
Covert Mission of the Korean War (New York, NY: Putnam’s, 2002). Other
sources include Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 178, 183–185, 190, and 202; and
Heinl, Victory at High Tide, 66–69, 89.
208
47. Clark, Secrets of Inchon, 8; Charles Adam Willoughby, MacArthur:
1941–1951 (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1954), 372–373.
Willoughby was the GHQ FEC G2. Since Clark mentions only the two ROK offi-
cers as accompanying him on the mission, presumably the others operated from
Tokyo. Major Norberg’s first name and background are unknown.
48. This account is based on John B. Dwyer, Commandos from the Sea:
The History of Amphibious Special Warfare in World War II and the Korean War
(Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 2002), 243–244; Fred Hayhurst, Green Berets in
Korea: The Story of 41 Independent Commando Royal Marines (Cambridge, MA:
Vanguard, 2001), 43–44; and an on-line summary by Ed Evanhoe, “GHQ 1st
Raider Company,” korean-war.com/ghqraiders.html (accessed 10 July 2006). The
accounts differ. Hayhurst quotes one of the Fleet Volunteers who says there were
two Raiders killed and who suggested they were killed by friendly fire, possibly
by Ely himself, who got separated from the main body and reported engaging
North Koreans. Dwyer’s account, which is based on letters from Colonel (Retired)
James H. Wear and Lieutenant Colonel Albert T. Noreen, only mentions two killed
(Clance and Maines). Evanhoe’s account, for which no sources are given, says the
landing was on an island and that Corporal Puttin died of wounds.
49. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 191–198; Curtis A. Utz, Assault
from the Sea: The Amphibious Landing at Inchon (Washington, DC: Naval
Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1994), 80–87; Simmons, Over the
Seawall, 26–29; Montross and Canzona, The Inchon–Seoul Operation, 87–96; 1st
Marine Division, FMF, Special Action Report for the Inchon–Seoul Operation,
15 September–7 October 1950, Volume III, Annex QueenQueen, 5th Marines,
hereafter 5th Marines SAR. MacArthur’s message: CINCUNC Message, C 63153
(CM IN) 15 September 1950, to JCS, RG 218, Entry UD7, CCS 383.21 Korea
(3–19–45), Box 41, Section 32, NACP.
50. 5th Marines SAR, 4–7; 2ESB UAR; Lynn Montross and Nicholas A.
Canzona, “Large Sedentary Targets on RED Beach,” Marine Corps Gazette,
Vol. 44, No. 9 (September 1960): 44–50; Claude L. Roberts Jr., “2d Engineer
Special Brigade,” Barry W. Fowle and Jon C. Lonnquest, eds., Remembering the
“Forgotten War”: U.S Army Engineer Officers in Korea (Alexandria, VA: Office
of History, Headquarters, US Army Corps of Engineers, 2005), 109; Utz, Assault
from the Sea, 87–88; Simmons, Over the Seawall, 33–36.
51. A/56th ATTB Diary Report, 15 September 1950; US Marine Corps, 1st
Marine Division, FMF, Special Action Report for the Inchon–Seoul Operation,
15 September–7 October 1950, Volume II, Annex PeterPeter, 1st Marines,
12 November 1950, hereafter, 1st Marines SAR, 5; Simmons, Over the Seawall,
38–42 (quote is on page 41); Montross and Canzona, The Inchon–Seoul Operation,
make a similar statement about seamanship and compasses with regard to the
UDT, 115.
52. A/56th ATTB Diary Report, 15 September 1950.
53. A/56th ATTB Diary Report, 16 September 1950; Montross and Canzona,
The Inchon–Seoul Operation, 131–136.
54. Appleman, South to the Naktong, 504; 2ESB UAR, 8, 10.
209
55. 1MarDiv, 1st SPBn SAR, 5; 2ESB UAR, 14.
56. This description of D+1 activities is based on 2ESB UAR; 532d Inchon
AAR; and Frank L. Mann, “Operation Versatile: Korean Saga of the 2d Engineer
Special Brigade,” Military Engineer, Vol. XLIV, No. 299 (May–June 1952):
168–169.
57. 532d Inchon AAR, 9.
58. 2ESB UAR, 12; 532d Inchon AAR, 9.
59. 532d Inchon AAR, 7, 11; 1MarDiv, 1st SPBn SAR, 5.
60. Trucks of the Marine 1st Combat Service Group (36 2½-ton trucks),
the 120 trucks of the FMF 7th Motor Transport Battalion, and the brigade’s own
organic transportation were all pooled under the 2d ESB (2ESB UAR, 11–12).
The vehicle shortage was made worse when most of the 85 DUKWs of the 1st
Marine Division, which the 2ESB boat company had counted on for off-loading
ammunition at Wolmido GREEN Beach, were taken inland to be used to transport
the 1st Marines (532d Inchon AAR, 10; Simmons, Over the Seawall, 55).
61. 7th Div WD, 16 September 1950.
62. Montross and Canzona, The Inchon–Seoul Operation, 142.
63. The most complete English language account of this episode is in Walter
Karig, Malcolm W. Cagle, and Frank A. Manson, Battle Report: The War in Korea
(New York, NY: Rinehart and Company, 1952), 243–255. Former ROK Chief of
Naval Operations, Admiral Ham Myong-su, described the operation in a series of
articles in a Korean newspaper (Ham, Myong-su. “Badaro! Syegyero!” [“To the
sea! To the world!”], Kukbang Ilbo [Korea Defense Daily], 22, 27, 28, 29 March,
3 April 2006). Ed Evanhoe, who served with the Eighth Army special operations
staff, describes the operation based on interviews with survivors of the Miryang
Battalion in Dark Moon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 25–30. There are also brief, mutu-
ally consistent accounts in Kim Sang Mo (who cites the ROKN Naval History)
in “The Implications of the Sea War in Korea from the Standpoint of the Korean
Navy,” Naval War College Review, Vol. XX, No. 1 (Summer 1967): 127; Cagle
and Manson, Sea War in Korea, 298–299; Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 212;
and Montross and Canzona, The Inchon–Seoul Operation, 145.
64. Evanhoe, Dark Moon, 27; Ham, Korea Daily Defense, 22 March,
27 March, and 3 April 2006 installments. The 27 March installment includes a
photograph of the young irregulars of the Miryang Battalion. There is some con-
fusion about the name of the battalion commander: Ham refers to him as Captain
Yi Myeong-heum (later known as Yi Chong-hun); Karig refers to him as Captain
Choi Byung Chen.
65. Evanhoe, Dark Moon, 27–28; Ham, Korea Daily Defense, 27 March
2006 installment.
66. Evanhoe, Dark Moon, 28. Evanhoe suggests that ROK Army
Headquarters considered the Miryang Battalion, with its large contingent of North
Korean defectors, to be expendable.
67. Karig, Battle Report, 244, 246; Ham, Korea Daily Defense, 27 March
2006 installment. Admiral Ham says the LST departed Busan at 1600; Evanhoe
210
says it departed from Jinhae at noon. It seems likely that the LST sortied from the
Jinhae naval base and embarked the guerrilla battalion at Busan.
68. Evanhoe, Dark Moon, 29; Karig, Battle Reports, 245, 246; and Ham,
Korea Daily Defense, 27 March 2006 installment.
69. Karig, Battle Reports, 247–251; Evanhoe, Dark Moon, 30; Ham, Korea
Daily Defense, 22 and 27 March 2006 installments.
70. The nature of Spier’s encouragement is reported differently in the vari-
ous accounts. The Karig narrative has Spier holding a pistol to the head of the
LST captain. Admiral Ham’s account simply says the civilian LST skipper “had
no intention of willingly damaging his ship.”
71. Karig, Battle Reports, 251–255; Ham, Korea Daily Defense, 29 March
installment. Ham says the men were left behind because the LST was in danger of
being destroyed by enemy fire; Karig says they refused to enter the dangerous surf.
72. Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, Sea War in Korea (Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1957), 299.
73. In a letter to Robert Debs Heinl, Almond recollected 16 years after
the event that, “The plan, when analyzed by General Smith, and his staff, was
considered impractical [and] an order was immediately issued to recall the
project. . . . If Ely took any steps after the cancellation, . . . he did it because
of failure in communication or as you intimate, enthusiastic over indulgence.”
Letter, Almond to Heinl, 31 August 1966, Heinl Papers, Box 42, MCUA.
74. Forney, “Special Report,” 4–6, MHI Archives.
75. “GHQ Raider Company,” korean-war.com/ghqraiders.html (accessed
21 November 2005); Hayhurst, Green Berets in Korea, 47.
76. Heinl provides a vivid account based on the Rochester and Jamaica
action reports (Victory at High Tide, 141). The incident was also reported in the
7th Div WD, 17 September 1950.
77. A/56th ATTB Diary Report, 17–18 September 1950; MacArthur’s
visit, the arrival of the 96th FAB, and the drive inland toward Sosa and Gimpo
are described in Simmons, Over the Seawall, 48–55; Montross and Canzona, The
Inchon–Seoul Operation, 131, 143–183; and Appleman, South to the Naktong,
509–513.
78. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 204; Headquarters, X Corps, Operation
CHROMITE, X Corps Command, 15 Aug to 30 Sep 1950, RG 407, Entry 429, AG
Command Reports, X Corps, Box 1968, NACP, hereafter, X Corps Command;
George Craig Stewart, “Korea: August, 1950–December 15, 1950,” unpublished
manuscript in the Blair Collection, Box 83, “Forgotten War, Alphabetical File
S-V,” MHI, hereafter, Stewart MS.
79. Biography of Major General George Craig Stewart, MHI; Obituary of
General Stewart in Assembly, Vol. LIV, No. 1, September/October 1995, 159.
82. 1st Shore Party Bn SAR, 6; 2ESB UAR, 6. By 18 September the tides
were no longer high enough to allow LSTs to reach the shore at RED Beach, so
the marines closed that beach and consolidated their operations on Wolmido.
211
83. On 24 September the 1st Combat Service Group was attached to the
newly-established Inchon (Incheon) Base Command and the 2d ESB was relieved
of responsibility for the dump operations. 2ESB UAR, 17; Montross and Canzona,
The Inchon–Seoul Operation, 129.
84. 2ESB UAR, 9–10; Incheon City Government Web site, http://incheon.
go.kr/inpia_en/servlet/html?pgm_id=INPIA_EN000019 (accessed 6 June 2006);
Montross and Canzona, The Inchon–Seoul Operation, 143–144.
85. Apparently, the X Corps MPs took little interest in the POW mission.
Later, when the 3d Logistical Command was given responsibility for the POWs,
General Stewart was shocked to find 16,000 people living at the prison unguarded
and in squalor. He relocated the prisoners to an old factory complex and arranged
for locally-procured food to be supplied until proper arrangements could be made
for clothing, bedding, and food to be delivered from Japan. Stewart MS, 6–8.
86. 2ESB UAR, 5, 8.
87. 7th Div WD, 17 and 18 September 1950; Comments by Colonel Charles
E. Beauchamp, Commanding Officer, 32d Infantry, on draft manuscript of South
to the Naktong, attached to letter of 19 January 1954, RG 319, Records of OCMH,
2-3.7A BA2, Box 746, NACP; Barr Lecture, 3.
88. Shepherd Diary, 18 September 1950; Simmons, Over the Seawall,
51–52.
89. X Corps Command, 19 September 1950; 7th Div WD, 19 and
20 September 1950.
90. The Raiders’ amphibious career was now behind them. They provided
flank security for the marines at Gimpo and after the capture of Seoul were trans-
ferred from GHQ FEC to X Corps, later being designated the 8245th Army Unit,
X Corps Raider Company. They performed reconnaissance and intelligence
missions with X Corps in Northeast Korea and, according to one source, were
part of TF Drysdale, a force built around the British 41st Independent Company
Royal Marines, which took heavy casualties at the Jangjin (Chosin) Reservoir
in November 1950. The Raider Company was disbanded in April 1951 along
with the Ranger Airborne Infantry companies then serving in the Far East. “GHQ
Raider Company,” korean-war.com/ghqraiders.html (accessed 21 November
2005); Hayhurst, Green Berets in Korea, 47.
91. 7th Div WD, 19 September; X Corps WD, 12.
92. Montross and Canzona, The Inchon–Seoul Operation, 184–185, 206.
93. 1st Shore Party Bn SAR, 6; A/56th ATTB Diary Report, 19 September
1950.
94. The 2ESB boat company (B/532d EB&SR) made use of this ramp to
unload an ammunition ship, a slow process since eight of the brigade’s DUKWs
had to do the work of 85 Marine Corps DUKWs that had been deployed inland to
transport the 1st Marines and to support river crossings; 532d Inchon AAR, 10.
On 22 September General Almond directed General Smith to send 15 DUKWs
back to Incheon temporarily to help with the ammunition unloading. Edward M.
Almond Personal Notes, 31 August 1950–15 July 1951, hereafter, Almond Diary,
21 September 1950, Edward M. Almond Papers, Box 64, MHI.
212
95. 2ESB UAR, 9–10.
96. For a discussion of the Incheon operation as a “turning movement,” see
note 37, above.
97. Quoted in Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 176.
99. Shepherd Diary, 19 September 1950.
100. Shepherd Diary, 19 September 1950. Doyle’s rejection on 19 September
of the Poseungmyeon landing site raises questions about the original proposal to
land there, for which the Navy and Marines had argued so vociferously. The issue
seems to have been the suitability of the area behind the beaches for rapid exploita-
tion of the initial landing. The UDT reconnaissance party apparently determined
that the beaches were favorable for an initial landing, but Doyle’s second thoughts
had to do with the exits from the beach for follow-on and sustainment operations.
102. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 176; Appleman, South to the Naktong,
554–559, 569–572.
103. Appleman, South to the Naktong, 515–516 (3/5 Marines), 527–530
(32d Inf); Montross and Canzona, The Inchon–Seoul Operation, 183–197 (3/5
Marines), 251–255 (RCT-1, ROK 17th Regiment, and 32d Inf); 7th Div WD, and
32d Div WD.
104. 5th Marines SAR, 9.
105. A/56th ATTB Diary Report, 20 September 1950; 5th Marine SAR, 9–
10; Montross and Canzona, The Inchon–Seoul Operation, 196–197.
107. Almond Diary, 21 September 1950.
108. X Corps Command, 21–23 September 1950; X Corps OPORD No. 1,
paragraph 3l, “Inchon Base Command.”
110. 7th Div WD, 21 September 1950. Lightering is the transfer by barges or
landing craft of personnel and/or cargo between the shore and ships anchored off
shore (in the stream).
111. TF Hannum was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Calvin S. Hannum,
Commander of the 63d Tank Battalion, and consisted of Hannum’s advance
command group and Company B of the 63d Tank Battalion, Company K of the
32d Infantry, and Battery C of the 48th Field Artillery Battalion. 7th Div WD,
21 and 22 September 1950; X Corps WD, 15, 16; Montross and Canzona, The
Inchon–Seoul Operation, 519–523; Appleman, South to the Naktong, 520–523.
112. Because of the problems the engineer boat company was having in getting
ammunition unloaded, Almond also directed Smith to send back 15 DUKWs with
the assurance that they would be returned by midnight on 24 September for the
1st Marines’ river crossing. Almond Diary, 22 September 1950; Montross and
Canzona, The Inchon–Seoul Operation, 243; Appleman, South to the Naktong,
519–520.
113. 7th Marines Special Action Report, 10–12RR; A/56th ATTB Diary
Report, 23 September 1950.
213
114. Almond Diary, 23 September 1950. The matter of how best to accom-
plish the capture of Seoul was a contentious one, with disagreement between
General Almond and General Smith. At issue were differences in approach, a
desire on the part of Almond to capture Seoul by 25 September (3 months after
the North Korean attack), and an apparent desire on the part of Smith to have the
city captured by his division alone. It is likely that a contributing factor was the
underlying Army–Marine antipathy that dated back at least to the beginning of
World War II, was made worse by Marine General H.M. Smith’s relief of Army
General Ralph Smith on Saipan in 1944, and was intensified by the post-World
War II unification and roles and missions struggles. Some sources say that at the
23 September meeting, Almond gave Smith a 24-hour deadline to make progress
or else he would change the boundaries and bring in part of the Army 7th Division
to conduct the desired maneuver from the southeast. Almond’s diary and Smith’s
account make no mention of such a deadline, but it seems likely that Almond had
this plan (which he put into effect on 24 September) in mind at least as early as the
23 September meeting. In any event, these matters are beyond the scope of this
study. Heinl corresponded extensively with all the concerned parties when writing
his book, Victory at High Tide, and provides a thorough discussion, 210–213.
115. 1st Marines Special Action Report (1MarDiv SAR, Annex PP), Box
8–6, MCUA.
116. 7th Marines SAR; A/56th ATTB Diary Report.
117. Almond Diary, 24 September 1950.
119. 7th Div WD, 24 September 1950; A/56th ATTB Diary Report,
24 September 1950.
120. Letter, Herbert B. Powell (RCT 17 Commander) to Beryl King Powell,
24 September 1950, Herbert B. Powell Collection, Series I; Papers, Box 9,
Correspondence to Beryl King Powell, 1926–1951,” MHI Archives.
121. 7th Inf Div WD, 24, 25 September 1950; Powell Oral History, 56–57.
122. 7th Div WD, 25 September 1950; A/56th ATTB Diary Report,
25 September 1950; Appleman, South to the Naktong, 529–530.
123. Remembering the “Forgotten War,” 110; 532d Inchon AAR, 10.
124. Korean War Chronology, 56–57.
126. Korean War Chronology, 54.
127. UNC Command Report; Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 216–217;
Korean War Chronology, 61.
128. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 217–218; Evanhoe, Dark Moon, 38.
See map 17 for the location of these operations.
[1951?], hereafter, ATC History, 10.
130. 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex NN (1st Engineer Battalion), 6; ATC History,
10.
214
133. 2ESB UAR, 14; 532d Inchon AAR, 11; Memorandum, 1st Lt Albert
Krause, Utilities Branch, GHQ FEC Engineer Section, to Colonel Medding,
20 October 1950, Subject: “Repair of Locks at Inchon and Power Situation in the
Seoul–Inchon Areas,” copy in File XII-9-13, Office of the Engineer Command
Historian.
134. Headquarters, US Army Forces Far East and Eighth US Army (Rear),
Logistics in the Korean War, Vol. I, 1 December 1955, copy at the Office of the
Engineer Chief Historian.
135. 532d Incheon AAR, 10, 11.
136. 2ESB UAR, 13.
137. ATC History, 12.
215
Chapter 5
Operations in North Korea, October–December 1950
The Invasion of North Korea
Strategic Setting
The decision to invade North Korea ran on parallel tracks in Tokyo and
Washington. During his 13 July meeting with Generals J. Lawton Collins
and Hoyt S. Vandenberg, General Douglas MacArthur made clear that he
saw his mission as not just to restore the 38th Parallel, but to destroy the
North Korean forces and, if necessary, occupy all of North Korea.1 His
plans for amphibious operations included potential landings at Jinnampo
(Chinnamp’o) and Wonsan, although at the time of the planning he had
no authorization to conduct operations in North Korea.2 In Washington,
the decision to invade North Korea had been under consideration from the
opening days of the war. Initial United Nations Command (UNC) objec-
tives established by the 27 June 1950 UN Security Council Resolution
were to “repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and secu-
rity in the area.” This clearly required driving the attacking forces back to
the 38th Parallel, but both US policy and earlier UN General Assembly
resolutions identified the long-range goal as a free, united, and indepen-
dent Korea. Republic of Korea (ROK) President Syngman Rhee and some
of President Harry S. Truman’s advisors saw the war as an opportunity to
achieve that goal.3
On 17 July 1950, even as US and ROK forces were being pushed
south by the North Koreans, Truman ordered a formal study to deter-
mine if the UNC should conduct operations north of the 38th Parallel.
The National Security Council (NSC) secretly debated this issue and on
11 September President Truman approved policy paper NSC 81, which
recommended postponing a decision, but anticipated that the president
would decide to approve operations in North Korea unless the Soviets or
Chinese intervened first. MacArthur was to be ordered to prepare plans to
occupy North Korea, but not to execute those plans without explicit presi-
dential approval. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) informed MacArthur of
the gist of the decision on 15 September, the same day the Incheon land-
ing took place. On 27 September President Truman made the decision to
invade North Korea. Also, on that date the JCS informed MacArthur that
his objective was now the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces,
authorized him to conduct operations north of the 38th Parallel so long as
the Soviets or Chinese had not intervened or threatened to intervene, and
directed him to submit plans for invading and occupying North Korea.4
217
MacArthur immediately directed General Edwin K. Wright and the
Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) staff to develop a
plan that would include an amphibious operation well north of the 38th
Parallel in conjunction with an overland attack by Eighth Army. He
wanted two alternatives, one in which Eighth Army would make the main
effort in the west, attacking toward Pyeongyang (P’yongyang), while X
Corps landed at Jinnampo or another suitable location. The other was
for an Eighth Army attack toward the east coast and a simultaneous X
Corps landing at Wonsan. With the plan for a Wonsan landing already
in existence, Wright suggested a combination of the two alternatives: an
Eighth Army main attack to capture Pyeongyang with a X Corps land-
ing at Wonsan. Several characteristics of Wonsan recommended it as the
amphibious objective. There were suitable beaches for the landing, it was
far enough north to provide a basis for encircling the North Korean field
force, and the Wonsan–Hamheung (Hamhung)–Heungnam (Hungnam)
complex was the east coast transportation nexus. There was a good avenue
of approach to Pyeongyang to the west across the narrow waist of Korea,
which would facilitate operations by X Corps to link up with Eighth Army.
Furthermore, a large east coast port would be necessary to sustain the
advance into North Korea. Neither Incheon (Inch’on) with its strong tides
and small capacity, nor Busan (Pusan) at the beginning of a long line of
communication to the north, would be adequate for that purpose.5
MacArthur submitted his plan to the JCS on 28 September, advis-
ing them that he would issue a surrender proclamation on 1 October
and, if he received no response, would then enter North Korea to accom-
plish his objectives. Eighth Army would continue the attack across the
38th Parallel to seize Pyeongyang; X Corps would make an amphibi-
ous landing at Wonsan, then link up with Eighth Army; the 3d Infantry
Division would initially remain in Japan as General Headquarters (GHQ)
Reserve; and ROK forces would attack north along the east coast toward
Heungnam. ROK forces only would operate north of Heungnam. After
obtaining President Truman’s authorization, the JCS advised MacArthur
on 29 September that his plan was approved. An hour after the JCS mes-
sage was dispatched, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall sent a per-
sonal message to General MacArthur noting a report that ROK divisions
would halt at the 38th Parallel “for regrouping,” and advising that “[w]e
want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north
of 38th Parallel.”6
On 29 September, just before the ceremony in Seoul to return the
city to President Rhee, MacArthur met with Generals Walton H. Walker,
Edward M. Almond, and George Stratemeyer, and Admiral C. Turner Joy
218
to inform them of the plan, with a tentative date for the Wonsan amphibious
landing of 20 October. Almond was directed to turn over control of Seoul
to Walker by 7 October, to move the 7th Division to Busan for embarka-
tion, and to mount out the Corps Troops and the 1st Marine Division from
Incheon.7
MacArthur broadcast his surrender message on 1 October, and lead
elements of the 3d ROK Division crossed the 38th Parallel on the east coast
of Korea (see map 27). UNC Operation Order (OPORD) No. 2, issued on 2
• H ye sa n jijinn
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Map 27. UNC OPORD No. 2.
219
October, directed Eighth Army to attack north toward Pyeongyang on a line
of operation Gaeseong (Kaesong)–Sariwon–Pyeongyang, while X Corps
conducted an amphibious turning movement, landing at Wonsan with a
subsequent attack westward to link up with Eighth Army. Together, Eighth
Army and X Corps would destroy North Korean People’s Army (KPA)
forces south of a line Jeongju (Chongju)–Gunu-ri (Kunu-ri)–Yeongwon
(Yongwon)–Hamheung–Heungnam. Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE)
was to outload X Corps Headquarters and the 1st Marine Division (the
assault force) from Incheon and the rest of X Corps (including the 7th
Infantry Division, the follow-on force) from Busan. The 187th Airborne
Regimental Combat Team (RCT) was to assemble in the Gimpo (Kimp’o)
area as GHQ Reserve and be prepared to carry out an airdrop or air landing
as required. The 3d Division (minus the 65th RCT, which had been sent
directly to Korea and was operating with Eighth Army) was to be prepared
to ship out from the port of Sasebo. The 65th RCT would outload at Busan
and revert to control of the 3d Division when directed. Admiral Joy would
command all the forces engaged in the amphibious assault through Admiral
Arthur D. Struble’s Joint Task Force (JTF) 7. Control of the landing force
would pass from the commander, attack force (Admiral Doyle), to the
commander, landing force “at such time as Landing Force has been landed
ashore, the beachhead secured and Commander Landing Force, informs
the Commander Attack Force, that he is ready to assume responsibility for
further operations ashore” [punctuation as in the original].8
X Corps Mount Out

On 4 October amphibious shipping began to assemble at the ports of
Incheon and Busan and the 1st Marine Division began to assemble in the
Incheon area. The next day, the 7th Infantry Division, which had already
assembled in the Incheon–Suwon area, began moving by rail and road to
Busan in preparation for outloading. Its tanks and heavy equipment were
loaded aboard Shipping Control Administration, Japan (SCAJAP) landing
ships, tank (LSTs) at Incheon and transported to Busan, where the rest
of the division would be loaded aboard transports and cargo ships. On
7 October X Corps was relieved of responsibility for the Seoul area by
Eighth Army and reverted to GHQ Reserve. That same day, the 1st Marine
Division closed Incheon Harbor and on 8 October began loading aboard
assault shipping under the direction of Admiral Lyman A. Thackrey, com-
mander of Amphibious Group 3.9
On 10 October General George C. Stewart’s 3d Logistical Command
was transferred from X Corps to Eighth United States Army in Korea
(EUSAK), which in turn attached it to the 2d Logistical Command
220
(headquartered in Busan). The command would continue to operate the
Seoul–Incheon advance base in support of the Eighth Army operations
in North Korea.10 On 11 October Thackrey was relieved of his Incheon
Port responsibilities and sailed aboard the Eldorado to Busan to direct the
7th Infantry Division mount out.11
The 2d Engineer Special Brigade (ESB) had been ordered to assist
in outloading the 1st Marine Division and X Corps troops at Incheon and
then to outload itself. As was the case during the landing and subsequent
port operations, the tides and inability to bring the transports and cargo
ships up to the piers complicated the loading. In a reverse process, LSTs
and landing craft lightered the troops out to the transports. Vehicles were
carried out on LSTs and then loaded by cranes onto the ships. While the
outloading took place, the 2d ESB continued to operate the Incheon Port.
Once the LSTs and most of the landing ships, utility (LSUs) were com-
bat loaded, they were no longer available for lightering duty. With 1,100
vehicles (two-thirds of the total) still to be loaded, the 532d Engineer Boat
and Shore Regiment (EB&SR) made use of barges and floating cranes
to supplement the few remaining LSUs and landing craft, mechanized
(LCMs) to get the vehicles on board the ships. By 16 October the marines
and X Corps troops, vehicles, and equipment were all embarked. The
2d ESB turned the port operation mission over to the 14th Transportation
Port Battalion on that day and began its own embarkation. The plan at this
time was that the 1st Marine Division would make the initial assault into
Wonsan using its own shore party assets. The 2d ESB was to follow them
in and then operate the port. Since they were not expected to be part of the
assault landing, the brigade was ordered to load administratively so that
it could unload at Wonsan as quickly and efficiently as possible to put the
port into operation. At twilight, 21 October, the last LCM carrying Colonel
Joseph J. Twitty, the rest of the brigade command and staff personnel, and
the last group of boat crews locked out of the tidal basin, and the amphibi-
ous engineers went aboard their transport, the Military Sea Transportation
Service (MSTS) T-AP-154, General Leroy Eltinge. The outloading was
complete.12
Also on board the Eltinge were Captain James D. O’Donnell with
4 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 71 enlisted men of Company A, 56th
Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion (ATTB), which had been attached
to the 2d ESB for the move to North Korea. The tanks, drivers, assistant
drivers, and maintenance section remained in Incheon to be brought for-
ward later by turn-around shipping. O’Donnell’s outfit was finding itself
to be something of an orphan. The troops had not been paid since August,
nor had repair parts been delivered. O’Donnell asked a Navy officer who
221
was on his way to Japan to contact the 56th ATTB commander and pass
on a list of parts needed to keep the tanks running. In spite of these trials,
O’Donnell reported that morale was high.13
The move of the 7th Infantry Division units to Busan over poor roads
and damaged rail lines was a difficult operation. The roads and railways
were overloaded by the two-way traffic of Eighth Army supplies and rein-
forcements moving north at the same time the 7th Infantry Division was
moving south. It was also a dangerous journey because of attacks by North
Korean forces that had been bypassed by Eighth Army in its advance north
after the breakout. By 12 October, however, all of the 7th Infantry Division
units were in the Busan area and preparing to embark.14
Logistics presented additional problems. UNC OPORD No. 2 had spec-
ified that X Corps was responsible for logistic support of all UN forces in
its area of responsibility (AOR) and that Eighth Army was responsible for
logistic support of all UN forces in Korea except for those in the X Corps
AOR. Thus, while X Corps was responsible for logistic support of its own
assigned and attached units, Eighth Army was responsible for support-
ing X Corps. The X Corps had been requisitioning its supplies directly
from the Japan Logistical Command (JLC) in Yokohama and had estab-
lished detailed supply plans with that agency. Those arrangements were
now disrupted and another level added between X Corps and the JLC just
as the division was outloading.15 Furthermore, X Corps had required the
2d Logistical Command in Busan to provide 10 days supply of clothing
and construction material and 15 days of all other classes of supply to be
delivered to Wonsan by D+8. Stocks in the Busan area, especially of win-
ter clothing, were soon depleted and the supplies had to be requisitioned
from Japan.16 In spite of these difficulties, the troops and equipment of the
division were aboard ship and ready to sail by 17 October.17 Other compli-
cations had arisen, however, and the sailing date was to be postponed.
Eighth Army Moves into North Korea18
Since 1 October Brigadier General Kim Paik-il’s ROK I Corps had
been advancing rapidly up the east coast, resupplied over the beach from
time to time by LSTs. By 9 October they were approaching Wonsan. This
rapid movement and the likelihood that General Kim’s forces would cap-
ture Wonsan before the amphibious force had even finished outloading
caused General MacArthur to consider a change in plans. He requested
General Wright’s staff prepare an alternative to UNC OPORD No. 2 in
which the 7th Infantry Division would land administratively just north of
Wonsan, and the 1st Marine Division would conduct an assault landing
at Heungnam, some 50 miles further north. X Corps would then attack
222
to the west, across the peninsula, toward Pyeongyang. Wright presented
a proposed Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) Operation Plan
(OPLAN) 9-50 (Alternate) to MacArthur on 8 October, but Admiral Joy
persuaded the commander in chief that it would be unwise to split the two
divisions and pointed out the limited time available to change the plan for
amphibious assault. He also doubted that the approaches to both Wonsan
and Heungnam could be cleared of mines in time for the proposed opera-
tion. On 10 October MacArthur directed that the original plan be carried
out. That same day, General Kim Paik-il’s ROK I Corps forces entered
Wonsan, securing the port city on 11 October. Walker notified MacArthur
that Wonsan was secure and requested the harbor and approaches be swept
clear of mines so that resupply operations could begin. MacArthur advised
that Wonsan sweeping operations, which had begun on 10 October, would
continue, but that no LSTs would be available for ROK resupply until
X Corps landed. He also advised that X Corps would take over operational
control of ROK I Corps.19
On 13 October Major General Field Harris, commander of the
1st Marine Air Wing and the X Corps Tactical Air Command (TAC),
arrived by air to inspect the airfield, after which he ordered his squadrons
to begin flying in. On 16 October General Almond sent his deputy chief of
staff, Lieutenant Colonel William J. McCaffrey, to Wonsan to establish an
advance command post and to make contact with General Kim and with
Captain Richard T. Spofford, commander of the minesweeper task group.
On 18 October a survey party from the 2d ESB flew in to reconnoiter the
port facilities.20
Spofford’s minesweepers had uncovered a serious problem that would
significantly delay the X Corps landing. The sweepers started finding
mines as soon as they began their operation on 10 October. Helicopters
flying ahead of the sweepers spotted five lines of mines planted in an
exceptionally dense pattern. By the end of the day, Spofford reported that
there were at least 2,000 mines of various types blocking the approaches
to Wonsan. A substantial, difficult, and dangerous sweeping effort would
be required before Admiral James H. Doyle and Admiral Thackrey’s ships
could enter the port.21
Meanwhile, Eighth Army was on the move. An unintended conse-
quence of the decision to re-embark X Corps for an amphibious operation
was that the outgoing forces blocked Eighth Army’s lines of communica-
tion and Walker was logistically incapable of beginning his attack north.
Not only was the line of communication from Busan clogged, unload-
ing at Incheon had virtually stopped as the 1st Marine Division, X Corps
223
Headquarters, and the 7th Division’s tracked vehicles and heavy equip-
ment outloaded. By 7 October, however, Walker was ready to move and
asked his chief of staff to advise GHQ Far East Command (FEC). General
Doyle O. Hickey, the acting FEC chief of staff, immediately responded
that MacArthur had given the go-ahead, and patrols from the 1st Cavalry
Division began to slip across the 38th Parallel that night. On 9 October
MacArthur transmitted a second surrender message and Walker gave
orders to Eighth Army “to strike out for Pyongyang [Pyeongyang] without
delay.” Later that day, the 1st Cavalry Division, the British 27th Brigade,
the ROK 1st Division, and elements of the US 24th Division crossed the
38th Parallel in force.22
Yeseong Resupply Operation

The 1st Cavalry Division moved north, with the 7th Cavalry RCT on its
left flank pushing toward the Yeseong River, west of Gaeseong (Kaesong)
(see map 28). As the 7th Cavalry approached the river, the G4 advised
Colonel William A. Harris, the regimental commander, that the division
could not provide fuel and ammunition support. Harris sent the regimental
assistant S3, Captain Arthur Westburg, back to Incheon to request support
from the 3d Logistical Command. On 9 October General Stewart ordered
the 8206th Army Unit (AU), Amphibious Training Center (ATC), to sup-
port the 7th Cavalry. The men of the ATC loaded 500 tons of supplies into
13 LCMs and, escorted by an ROK Navy gunboat and under Marine Corps
air cover, the convoy motored up the coast through the West Sea (Yellow
Sea), the Ganghwa (Kanghwa) Channel between the Gimpo Peninsula and
Ganghwa Island, the Han River estuary, and the Yeseong (Yesong) River
to the 7th Cavalry positions, arriving late on the afternoon of 10 October
at a destroyed bridge site.
After unloading supplies, the ATC used its LCMs to ferry tanks of
Company C, 70th Tank Battalion across the river while I Corps engineers
constructed a pontoon ferry at the bridge site. Then they headed back to
Incheon for more supplies, returning on 13 October with five LCMs and
an LSU. The Army watermen remained in the area, conducting a ferry
service across the Yeseong River until 17 October, when they returned to
Incheon and continued to assist in port operations.23
Opening of Jinnampo Port

To keep Eighth Army supplied, the rail lines, bridges, and highways
damaged or destroyed by air attacks during the defense phase of operations
now had to be repaired or replaced. As an interim measure to supplement
the ground line of communication, an LST beach for over-the-shore
224
operations was established at the port of Haeju. The Haeju LST beach
was helpful, but insufficient. The port of Jinnampo also had to be put into
service. Jinnampo, at the mouth of the Daedong (Taedong) River, was
the seaport for Pyeongyang, as Incheon was the seaport for Seoul. Like
Incheon, Jinnampo suffers from huge tides, a long island-clogged approach
channel, 3-to-5 knot tidal currents, and broad mud flats at low tide. By the
time Eighth Army crossed the 38th Parallel, the North Koreans had heavily
mined the approaches to Jinnampo. But because of the configuration of
Ad v an ced 1 0 m iles
to P ye o ng ya n g
to S in g ye
II
1 4 O c to b e r
N a m ch e on jeo m
K
XX
RO
X
• S ib ye o n -ri
I
2/7
1 4 O c to b e r
1 3 – 1 4 O c tob e r
• H a n p o -ri
Im
jin
R
1 1 – 1 2 O c tob e r
1 3 – 1 4 O c tob e r
• G e u m ch e on
E LM S , 19th &
1 1 – 1 2 O c tob e r
27th In fan try D ivisio n s
Y ese ong R
1 3 – 1 4 O c tob e r 9 – 1 2 O c tob e r
E LM S , N .K . 17th
Arm o red D ivisio n
ROK I
XX
I C av
N .K . 43d In fan try
X
D ivisio n 27 Br
III
III
9 – 1 0 O c tob e r 8
•
5
G o ra n g po -ri
B a kch e on •
XX
G a e seo n g XX
1 (-)
(-) 1 ROK
III (fro m S eoul)
eo u l )
7 III
5
to H a eju
][
Im ji n
R • M u n sa n
G eum cheon (K um ch ’on) P ocket
and the Y eseong R iver
U S assem bly areas, eve ning, 8 O ct
A xis of U N attacks
H an R
0 2½ 5
M ile
il e s II I
III
21 24
Map 28. Geumcheon (Kumch’on) Pocket and the Yeseong River.
225
the northwest Korean coast and lack of suitable LST beaches elsewhere,
Jinnampo was the only port capable of supporting Eighth Army’s military
operations in the north and it had to be made usable. The first step was to
clear the mines from the channel. The Navy began a major minesweeping
effort on 21 October and by 6 November the first ships (small Japanese
cargo ships and a SCAJAP LST) arrived at the port. Soon thereafter, an
element of the 7th Transportation Medium Port and the 501st Harbor Craft
Platoon arrived by LST to operate the port facilities, and by the end of the
month nearly 5,000 tons of cargo were being unloaded daily.24 The city was
without power, but Lieutenant Commander Henry J. Ereckson’s destroyer
escort, the USS Foss (DE-59), was sent to assist. The Foss, a turbo-electric
powered ship that had been equipped with ship-to-shore power conversion
equipment in 1946, tied up at the Jinnampo wharf and generated electric
power for the city. The ROK Navy established a Jinnampo Naval Base
Command and provided port and harbor security with a shore patrol and
three motor launches.25
TAILBOARD (Wonsan/Iwon), 29 October–4 November 1950

While X Corps was mounting out, General MacArthur was meeting
with President Truman at Wake Island. During this 15 October 1950 meet-
ing, MacArthur outlined his plan. With Wonsan already in UNC hands,
he intended to land X Corps at the captured seaport and then cut across
Korea to link up with Eighth Army. He anticipated that North Korea would
collapse soon thereafter and he could begin sending troops back to the
United States. There was “very little” chance of Chinese intervention, he
said in reply to a question. However, he qualified this by stressing that
his opinion was only speculation, since the issue of whether or not other
nations would enter the war was in the realm of political intelligence and
should be dealt with by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and State
Department intelligence groups, rather than by the theater commander’s
intelligence staff.26
At Wonsan, Captain Spofford’s multinational task force of US and
ROK Navy and Japanese civilian minesweepers worked their way through
the dense minefield. On 12 October two US minesweepers were sunk,
and on 17 October one of the Japanese contract minesweepers was sunk.
Although most of the amphibious attack force had already sailed from
Incheon by 13 October (the 2d ESB would not sail until 26 October),
Admiral Joy ordered Admiral Thackrey at Busan to delay the 7th Infantry
Division’s sailing until more progress was made with the minesweeping.
Those transports that had already loaded remained anchored in Busan
Harbor to await developments.27
226
M a n p o ji n
• G apsan
•
G anggye
M a n c h u r ia •
S U IH O C hosan
RM NTS
Pungsan
RES • N o rth K o re a n P e o p le ’s A rm y •
S e o n g ji n
J A N G J IN •
Byeokdong Pyeong wo n ( C H O S IN ) BU JEO N
G o ja n g
R
• • • RES RES
Y a lu
X
G o in -d o n g
• N .K . 2 4
II I
S a k ju X XXX 1 RO K C AP
H a g a ru -ri
• E lm s N .K . 3 1
• CCF 4 2 (-) II I Iw o n
Iw
G o to - ri
XXX
XXX II I
C AV RO K C AP
•
B u k ji n CCF 38 X •
CCF 6 6 (-) 8 RO K C AP Bukcheong
E lm s N .K . 1 8 •
XXX XXX •
Da
CCF 40 XX H u ic h e o n R •S in h e u n g
er
CCF 5 0 (-)
•
on
ye
ROK 6
he
on
XXX
g
O n jo n g
gc
• XX
R
G useong CCF 39 U nsan
eon
X RO K C AP
• T aecheon
XXX G u ja n g -
•
Ch
to
X
E lm s N .K . 2 6 Hamheung
K o r e a n G u lf
Seoncheon E lm s C C F
• 32 dong •
X X E lm s N .K . 2 5
• Heungnam
XX
E lm s N .K . 1 7 ROK 1
Yeongwon • •
D eokcheon XX U N C A d v a n c e N o rth
to Bakcheon
G u n u -ri
S i n u i ju J e o n g ju
• o n gR ROK 8
•
• ry e •
Gu X
A n ju I X R O K II U N C f r o n t lin e , e v e n in g , 2 0 O c t
X R O K II X X
S i n a n ju
•• X U N C p o s it io n s r e a c h e d , e v e n in g , 2 4 O c t
X X Yongheung
27 Br • L im i t s o f N K P A c o n c e n t r a t i o n a r e a ( a p p r o x )
XXX
Suncheon CCF A r m y , C h i n e s e C o m m u n is t f o r c e s
X
• XX X II
• Sukcheon 2 23 RO K
ROK 6 E IG H T H X 0 10 20 30
II I
Yeongyu 187 X XX
M ile s
• ROK 3
Sunan
W onsan
•
XX •
ROK 8 a jeo
MM Anbyeon
a jo n - r i
•
P ye o n g y a n g
•
R
XX B y e o p d o n g -ri XX
g
1 (+ ) • 1 M AR
on
II I •
G o je o
ed
7 XX (A F L O AT )
Da
ROK 1 RM NTS
J in n a m p o
XX N o rth K o re a n P e o p le ’s A rm y
ROK 7
•
east coast to west of Majeon-ri (Majon-ni), then north through the Jangjin
south of the Jeongju (Chongju)–Heungnam line (the narrow waist), Eighth

between Eighth Army and X Corps was to follow the 38th Parallel from the
was in position to advance to the west (see map 29). On order, the boundary
Meanwhile, General Walker’s lead forces were nearing Pyeongyang
No. 4, to become effective if Pyeongyang was captured before X Corps

in the west. On 17 October 1950 General MacArthur issued UNC OPORD
(Changjin/Chosin) Reservoir to the border. Instead of clearing North Korea
227
Map 29. UNC advance north.
Army in the west and X Corps in the east would make a general advance
to the north to a line making an arc from Seoncheon (Sonch’on) on the
west coast to Seongjin (Songjin) on the east coast. The 3d Division was
to assemble in the Wonsan area as GHQ Reserve and the 187th Airborne
RCT was to prepare to parachute into Suncheon (Sunch’on) and Sukcheon
(Sukch’on), north of Pyeongyang to try to trap KPA forces escaping to the
north and to liberate UNC prisoners of war (POW).28
Unknown to the UNC, the Chinese leadership had decided to inter-
vene in Korea. On 19 October as the 1st Cavalry Division and 1st ROK
Division entered Pyeongyang and UNC OPORD No. 4 was put into effect,
Chinese forces began crossing the Yalu River into Korea.29 On 20 October
the 187th Airborne RCT made its jump north of Pyeongyang. That same
day, General Almond established his X Corps Headquarters in Wonsan
and took command of all forces in its new zone.
Offshore, minesweeping operations continued while the 21 transports
and 15 LSTs carrying the 1st Marine Division steamed north and south
off the coast, in what the marines called Operation YO-YO. It was not
until 25 October that the channel was declared clear and the ships were
allowed to enter the port. That evening, the five LSTs carrying the marine
shore party, combat service group, and Navy engineers beached on the
south shore of the peninsula that forms the southern boundary of Wonsan
Bay. The next day, the main ship-to-shore landing began with the first
of 39 waves of landing craft, LSTs, and LSUs coming ashore, where the
marines were welcomed by X Corps Headquarters, the 1st Marine Air
Wing, and the ROK forces occupying Wonsan. Unloading would continue
until 31 October.30
In the west, Eighth Army advanced rapidly north of Pyeongyang, cross-
ing the Cheongcheon (Ch’ongch’on) River on 23 October. Since the rail
and vehicle bridges over the river had been bombed out, General Stewart
carried out an aerial reconnaissance to locate a suitable site for an LST
beach for over-the-shore supply delivery.31 The Eighth Army advance came
to an abrupt end on 25 October, when a large force of Chinese People’s
Volunteers (CPV) hit Walker’s lead elements and pushed the Eighth Army
center and right flank back to the Cheongcheon River. By 6 November the
Chinese attacks ended and their forces withdrew.32 By that time X Corps
was established ashore in the east and was advancing north.
With the 1st Marine Division at Wonsan, Almond no longer saw any
benefit to landing the 7th Infantry Division in their wake. Instead, he decided
to land them further north to be better able to carry out MacArthur’s orders
for a rapid advance. He flew along the coast, looking for suitable landing
228
sites, and settled on the beach at Iwon, about 105 miles north of Wonsan.
On 26 October he issued X Corps Operations Instruction No. 13, directing
General Kim’s I Corps to advance north rapidly in multiple columns and
to form a “flying column” of at least one RCT supported by one LST for
logistic support to advance along the coastal road as rapidly as possible.
The 1st Marine Division was to relieve ROK forces at Wonsan and at the
coastal town of Gojeo (Kojo) to the south, concentrate one RCT in the
Hamheung–Heungnam area, and advance rapidly to the northern border,
being prepared to use one battalion landing team (BLT) for amphibious
movement to outflank pockets of KPA forces. The 7th Infantry Division
was to land over the beaches at Iwon and advance rapidly to the northern
border.33
On 26 October Admiral Thackrey, who had directed the outloading of
the 7th Infantry Division and X Corps troops at Busan, arrived at Wonsan
aboard the Eldorado. Learning of the change in plans, he now sailed to
Iwon to inspect the landing site and supervise the 7th Infantry Division
landing. En route he issued an order advising that the approaches to Iwon
had been swept and the beach surveyed by the underwater demolition
team (UDT) to establish a new landing site “to expedite the landing of the
7th Infantry Division.” The 17th RCT would be the first unit to be landed
over the Iwon beaches. The division (still anchored in Busan Harbor) was
embarked on an MSTS transport (General Weigle, T-AP-119), an AKA
(Thuban, AKA-19), and several chartered merchant ships. Only the Thuban
carried landing craft, so the SCAJAP LSTs carrying the vehicles and heavy
equipment and three LSUs being carried aboard the LSD Colonial would
be used as lighters after they were unloaded and would ferry troops and
equipment from the ships to the shore.34 Colonel Herbert B. Powell’s 17th
Infantry, as the first unit to go ashore and secure the beach, had to be able
to land immediately, so while Powell flew north with the assistant division
commander, Brigadier General Henry I. Hodes, to reconnoiter the beach
and get instructions from X Corps Headquarters, his executive officer
supervised the debarkation of the RCT from its transports and cargo ship
and reloading aboard SCAJAP LSTs.35
The 2d ESB was at sea, off Incheon, when it got the word on 26 October
that instead of landing administratively at Wonsan to operate the port, the
engineers would land over the beach at Iwon, prepare the beach for over-
the-shore operations, and assist in the landing of the 7th Division. The
ships carrying the brigade sailed for the northeast, arriving at Iwon on
29 October to find eight LSTs already on the beach unloading the 17th
RCT. Colonel Powell, who had earlier flown to Wonsan from Busan,
was standing on the shore when the LSTs arrived. The Japanese LST
229
commanders brought their ships in as close as possible to the beach, which
still left a gap with water about 5 feet deep between the end of the ramps
and the shore. The loose sand provided very little traction for vehicles, so
Powell ordered his tanks off the LSTs first and used them as impromptu
tractors to haul the trucks and artillery ashore. Korean Augmentation to
the US Army (KATUSA) soldiers, who formed a human chain to pass the
boxes to the beach, unloaded rations and other supplies.36 (See map 30.)
Ma
in S
} #2
S lo ts o u t e
u p p ly
7
L C M S lo ts
6
KW
R
4 5
DU t 1 1 2 3 4
n
Poi G reen B each
} #1
LST
}
3
1 2
Y ellow B each
Iw on B each
0 440 880
rd s
Y a rd
Map 30. Iwon Beach.
The 2d ESB aboard the Eltinge and the merchant ship Luxembourg
Victory, which carried the brigade’s heavy equipment, arrived offshore at
1215 along with the 3 LSUs, brought to Iwon by the LSD Colonial, and
10 LCMs. These 13 craft provided the only lighterage until the SCAJAP
LSTs were unloaded. The 532d EB&SR sent their shore party in with bull-
dozers to assist the final stages of unloading the 17th RCT, then one of the
LSTs was used to bring equipment ashore from the Luxembourg Victory.
Powell initially provided security for the beach before moving inland.
On the morning of 30 October, the 2d ESB took control of beach opera-
tions, using the dismounted armored amphibians of Captain O’Donnell’s
Company A, 56th ATTB for beach security after the 17th RCT departed.
First priority was to get bulldozers ashore so vehicles being brought in by
230
the LSTs, LSUs, and LCMs could be towed through the surf and loose
sand. A storm that struck later that day caused unloading of the rest of the
division to be postponed, giving the 2d ESB time to prepare the beach.
The biggest problem was the soft sand, but the engineers found suitable
fill soil inland, which they used to stabilize the bulldozed sand ramps that
would permit the LSTs to unload directly onto the beach. The engineers
contracted for local labor, bought materials from a nearby lumberyard, and
purchased huge quantities of rice straw sacks that proved to be better than
sandbags for trimming the LST ramps.37
Unloading resumed on 31 October. The 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry
Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, landed at Iwon on 3 November 1950 and
the rest of the regiment and lead elements of the 32d Infantry came ashore
the next day. It was a slow process, but by 8 November the 7th Infantry
Division and its supporting elements had been landed and the division was
moving inland and preparing to advance to the north. On 17 November
one final late-arriving LST was unloaded by a rear detachment of the bri-
gade. After completion of 7th Infantry Division debarkation, the 2d ESB
moved via LST, LSD, train, and truck to Heungnam to operate the port
there beginning on 19 November 1950. In total, the brigade unloaded some
14,000 tons of supplies and equipment, nearly 5,000 vehicles, and 21,000
troops over the beach, not including the men, vehicles, and equipment of
the 17th RCT, which had unloaded itself.38
On 2 November the 7th Marines and ROK I Corps units advancing north
were hit by the Chinese at the town of Sudong about 20 miles northwest of
Hamheung. A fierce battle ensued, but during the night of 6/7 November
the Chinese broke contact and withdrew.39 Between 5 and 15 November,
X Corps had been bolstered by the arrival at Wonsan of the 3d Infantry
Division. With the ROK 26th Regiment attached, the 3d Infantry Division
relieved the 1st Marine Division of responsibility for securing the port
areas and took up blocking positions to deal with North Korean forces
moving up from the south while the 1st Marine and 7th Infantry Divisions
pushed inland to the north.40
Special Operations in Support of Operations in the North

During the time that Eighth Army and X Corps were advancing into
North Korea, British commandos were carrying out more coastal inter-
diction raids. On 20 September General MacArthur approved the use of
Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale’s 41 Independent Commando
Royal Marines for raids against North Korean lines of communications.
The commandos had been training aboard the transport submarine Perch,
which set sail on 25 September for their first mission. On 30 September
231
they made their first tunnel destruction attempt near Dancheon (Tanch’on).
However, the engine of their motor launch (the Skimmer) failed, the dis-
tance to shore was too far for paddling, radar detected a North Korean
patrol boat in the area, and lights began flickering ashore, so the mission
was aborted. On 1 October, with the Skimmer’s engine repaired, the Royal
Marines went ashore at a secondary target in the Dancheon area and suc-
cessfully detonated explosives in a culvert and railway tunnel with one
casualty. The next day, the Perch put the Royal Marines aboard two US
destroyers that later transferred them to the APDs Horace A. Bass and
Wantuck. Perch returned to Yokosuka on 5 October and, after an assess-
ment of the risks and problems with these missions, Admiral Joy decided
to end submarine raids.41 (See map 31.)
After a brief period of training with the two APDs, the comman-
dos were dispatched on another mission. Escorted by the US destroyer
DeHaven, they conducted a successful tunnel destruction raid near
Cheongjin (Ch’ongjin) on the night of 5/6 October, and then landed again
to destroy a tunnel and bridge near Seongjin on the night of 6/7 October.
This would be their last raid for many months, since in mid-October the
Commando was reorganized and re-equipped for sustained operations
ashore and served on operations in North Korea as an additional recon-
naissance company of the 1st Marine Division.42
Amphibious Withdrawals, December 1950

The Chinese attacks during 25 October to 6 November raised the
possibility of a major Chinese intervention. Even as Eighth Army and
X Corps forces continued their advance deeper into North Korea, Admiral
Joy decided to take precautionary measures in the event a large-scale
withdrawal was required. He recommended ships that were released for
return to the United States be recalled and on 13 November issued NAVFE
OPLAN No. 116-50, which established procedures for the emergency
evacuation of UN forces from Korea. The plan, which would be put into
effect either as a result of a “general emergency” or the outbreak of a
world war, covered circumstances ranging from “controlled withdrawal of
forces with ships being loaded from docks” to a “Dunkirk type evacuation
conducted under attack conditions from beachheads, utilizing any or all
available shipping.” It directed that plans be flexible enough to provide for
concurrent evacuations from both the east and west coasts of Korea and be
based on the principle of an “assault in reverse.” 43
Annexes provided estimates of the UN and ROK troop strength over
the next 4 months, the specific ships likely to be available and their char-
acteristics, and information on the hydrography and capacity of Korean
232
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H ye sa n jin
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D e o kch e o n
Ch
A m phibious S pecia l O perations

N orth K orea
S iinn a n jjuu
O ctober–N
ctober – N o vem ber 19 50
P ort A rthur
N aval B ase A rea
Yangdeok
• W on sa n
•
0 25 50
••
M ililee s
P yeo ng ya ng je o
G o je
•
T o n g ch e o n
J in n a m p o
Jin
•
nR
Y eseo ng R
G o se o n g
Im ji
C hod o
• riw o n
S a riw
•
P ye o n g g a n g
• •
• •
im h w a
G im
•
• •
C h e o rw o n
• • •
ji n
O n g jin ju
38 °
38° 38 °
38°
• ••
C h u n ch e o n
ji n
Ju m u n jin
•
M u n sa n
•
U ije
E a st S ea
•
S eo
eouull H o n g ch e o n
In ch e o n
•
S a m ch e o k
D eokjeok Islands W on jjuu
Ha
Suwon
n
• •
R
Je ch e o n
O sa n
A san B ay
• U lji
ljinn
•
•
C h u n g jjuu
Y e o n g jjuu
•
Andong
• • Yeongdeok
•
R
S a n g jjuu
R
dong
um
Ge
D a e jjee o n
•
N ak
• •
G iim
m ch e o n Pohang
• • G u n sa n
Je o n jjuu •
Daegu
Y e o g ch e o n
•
G ye o n g jjuu
S outh K orea M iirya

•
rya n g U llsa
sa n
•
• •• •
JJin
in h a e
•
M a sa n
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JJin
•
it
M o kp o
ra
•
Y e o su
• N am hae
Ko
re
a
T sushim a
Map 31. Amphibious Special Operations, October–November 1950.
and Japanese ports.44 Admiral Doyle (Commander, Task Force [CTF] 90)
would control all naval and air operations in the embarkation areas (iden-
tified as the area within a 35-mile radius of each designated evacuation
port), while Admiral Struble’s Seventh Fleet would control the aircraft car-
rier groups and coordinate air operations, including the “activities of any
Far East Air Force (FEAF) planes assisting.”45 TF 95, the blockading and
escort force, would provide escorts, gunfire support ships, minesweepers,
antisubmarine operations, and ships for the evacuation as required.
233
On 21 November 7th Infantry Division elements reached the Yalu
River near Hyesanjin, the furthest X Corps penetration of North Korea.
Three days later, Eighth Army, then generally north of the Cheongcheon
River, began a coordinated attack toward the Manchurian border. But on
the night of 26 November the Chinese began their Second Phase Offensive
with attacks against Eighth Army forces that badly mauled ROK II Corps
and the US 2d Infantry Division. On 27 November the Chinese struck the
1st Marine Division west of the Jangjin (Changjin/Chosin) Reservoir and
the 31st RCT of the 7th Infantry Division east of the reservoir.46
On 28 November General Walker and General Almond flew to Tokyo
to meet with General MacArthur. At that time, Walker said that he believed
he could hold a line north of Pyeongyang, and Almond expressed confi-
dence that he could continue his advance north in spite of the Chinese
attack. Nonetheless, MacArthur ordered X Corps to withdraw from its
advance positions and concentrate at Heungnam. At the time, there still
seemed to be a possibility of holding an enclave in the Heungnam area.47
MacArthur radioed a report to the JCS, advising them that with the inter-
vention of the Chinese the United States and the UNC faced “an entirely
new war.” His immediate strategic plan was “to pass from the offensive
to the defensive with such local adjustments as may be required by a con-
stantly fluid situation.”48
While MacArthur’s Tokyo meeting was taking place on 28 November,
Admiral Doyle arrived at Heungnam aboard his flagship, the Mount
McKinley, in time to receive an alert from Admiral Joy that there was a
possibility of a general emergency. The next day, Doyle issued CTF 90
OPORD No. 19-50. Half of TF 90, most ships of which were located at
Sasebo in Japan, was to deploy to the west coast and come under Rear
Admiral Thackrey, commander of Amphibious Force 3, which would
become the Western Deployment Force (TG-90.1). This force would be
prepared to evacuate Eighth Army forces from Jinnampo and Incheon.
The other half of TF 90 would deploy to the Wonsan–Heungnam area for
the amphibious evacuation of X Corps forces from Heungnam, Wonsan,
and Seongjin in the northeast.49
On 29 November, on his return to Korea from Tokyo, Almond directed
his forces to discontinue the attack and withdraw. X Corps OPORD No. 8
ordered the 1st Marine Division to concentrate initially at Hagaru-ri, south
of the reservoir, the 7th Infantry Division to concentrate in the Hamheung–
Heungnam area, the ROK I Corps to protect the east flank, and the 3d
Infantry Division to attack to the west from Yeongheung (Yonghung) to
assist Eighth Army. The 3d Infantry Division was also to establish a task
force based on one US battalion with the Korean Marine Corps (KMC) 1st
234
Regiment attached to protect Wonsan port and airfield.50 On the morning
of 30 November, Eighth Army Movements Control Branch ordered all the
ships taking on cargo at Pusan (Busan) Port to stop loading. All of the LSTs
and other vessels that were discharging cargo were ordered to be unloaded
as quickly as possible and to stand by for instructions.51 That afternoon,
General Almond traveled to the 1st Marine Division Headquarters at
Hagaru-ri to meet with his US commanders, Generals Oliver P. Smith and
David Barr, and other senior officers to advise them of the situation and
the plan for withdrawing to Heungnam. That same day, he issued orders
to General Kim Paik-il to stop the ROK I Corps advance and move south,
protecting the X Corps right flank and the east coast road.52
Admiral Doyle, anticipating seaborne evacuation from both coasts,
ordered half his combat loaders (four APAs and two AKAs) to Incheon and
the other half to Wonsan. Nonamphibious shipping was also mobilized for
the withdrawal, but because of the difficulty of loading large transport and
cargo ships out of the west coast ports with their smaller tide-beset har-
bors, Doyle sent two-thirds of the LSTs, LSDs, and other beaching ships
and craft to the west to augment Thackrey’s Amphibious Group 3, operat-
ing as TG 90.1. Thackrey himself had flown to Incheon on 29 November
with General Walker to inspect the port facilities while members of his
staff flew to Jinnampo. On 1 December Thackrey’s flagship the Eldorado,
an additional APA, 2 LSDs, the destroyer-transport Horace A. Bass, and
10 SCAJAP LSTs were sent to the west coast to join the amphibious and
other shipping already there.53
Also on 30 November, the JCS approved MacArthur’s intention to
pass to the strategic defensive and asked for his plan to coordinate the
operations of X Corps and Eighth Army. MacArthur explained that the
terrain between X Corps and Eighth Army made a continuous defensive
line across the peninsula impracticable and pointed out that in its current
position, X Corps threatened the flank of the Chinese and forced them
to commit several divisions that would otherwise be available to join
the attack on Eighth Army. He advised that X Corps would contract its
position into the Hamheung–Wonsan area, avoiding entrapment by the
Chinese. The JCS, still concerned about the progressively widening gap
between Eighth Army and X Corps, suggested that X Corps be extricated
from what seemed to them to be an exposed position. The next day, the
JCS advised MacArthur that General Collins was flying out to the Far East
for discussions on the situation.54
On 1 December MacArthur directed that the 3d Infantry Division
move to Wonsan for movement south to reinforce Eighth Army. This
would disrupt Almond’s plans for the withdrawal and risk the 1st Marine
235
Division’s being cut off and destroyed. Therefore, Almond sent two offi-
cers, Marine Colonel Edward H. Forney and the X Corps G2, Lieutenant
Colonel William Quinn, to Tokyo to try to persuade the FEC to leave the
division with X Corps. After they met with Acting Chief of Staff Hickey,
the order was reversed and the 3d Infantry Division was ordered to move
from Wonsan to Heungnam to secure the concentration area and to assist
the 1st Marine Division and 7th Infantry Division as they withdrew.55
Evacuation of Jinnampo
After the defeat of Eighth Army forces at the Cheongcheon River,
Walker pulled his forward elements back to a line running from Sukcheon
near the west coast, through Suncheon to Seongchon. He had hoped to
establish a defensive perimeter around Pyeongyang, but concluding that
he did not have enough troops to form a coherent perimeter, he decided
to withdraw further south. To provide time to empty the Army and Air
Force supply points in Pyeongyang and the west coast port of Jinnampo,
he intended to delay at a line about 20 miles north of Pyeongyang. The
evacuation of the supply points began on 1 December.56 Although most
of the material in and around Pyeongyang was removed overland by rail
and truck (and much of it destroyed), some supplies were transferred by
rail from Pyeongyang to the Jinnampo port for evacuation by surface ship-
ping.57 The withdrawal came just as Jinnampo was beginning to reach its
capacity after the approach channel had been swept of mines and the 7th
Medium Port had begun operations. (See map 32.)
Eighth Army forces reached the line north of Pyeongyang on
3 December and Walker immediately ordered a withdrawal further to the
south, moving with his command post from Pyeongyang to Seoul on that
day. With Jinnampo now unprotected, Eighth Army sent an urgent mes-
sage to NAVFE requesting that the ships of Transport Squadron One, then
en route to Incheon from Japan, be sent to evacuate the port. NAVFE sig-
naled Admiral Thackrey’s headquarters (CTG 90.1), but Thackrey was
still ashore and there was a delay in his staff’s responding. However, the
Transport Squadron One commander, Captain Samuel G. Kelly, inter-
cepted the signal. Kelly waited for 5 hours and when he still received no
orders, changed course on his own initiative and headed for Jinnampo. Six
hours later the orders came from CTG 90.1, but by that time Kelly and
his squadron—his flagship (the attack transport Bayfield), two other APAs
(Bexar and Okanogan), and two AKAs (Algol and Montague)—were well
on their way to Jinnampo.58
Commander Ereckson’s destroyer escort, Foss, was continuing to pro-
vide electrical power to Jinnampo. At approximately 0300 on 4 December,
236
S u n ch e o n 1 Dec
R
S u kch e o n
• • E ig hth A rm y W ithdraw al
ong
3 Dec D ecem ber
be r 19 5500
X
D aed
I X
X S e o n g ch e o n
• Yangdeok
X • E igh
i ghth
th A rm y fron
fronttlin
li nee
W on sa n
• P lan
l anne
ne d d e layin
l ay i n g lin es
li nes
P yeo ng ya ng 0 20 40 60
5 Dec
N orth K orea M ile
il e s
Ju n g h w a
X Y u l- ri
l-ri
JJin
in n a m p o • I X
•
X X
I G o ksa n Bu
G ye o m ip
ip o • kh
• • an
R
nR
I m ji
S a riw
riw o n
• • S iinn g ye I ch e o n
Ich
• P ye o n g g a n g
• G a n se o n g
E a st S ea
H w angh ae •
P en
eninsula
i nsu l a C h e o rw o n G im
im h w a (S ea o f Jap an )
S ib
i b ye o n -ri
• -ri •
Y es eo ng R
• HW ACHEO N
L IN E
A RES
H w a ch e o n
Y e o n ch e o n Y a n g ya n g
ju
H a e ju
• LIN E B
• •
• 23 Dec
• G a e se o n g
C h u n ch e o n ri
W on p o --ri
X P o ch e o n •
I X IX • IX X R O K III RO •
X
•
M u n sa n X KI X
II X
X RO G angneung
U ije
ije o n g b u X KI
• H ongche on R I •
e o n
gch X
H o n
•
S eoul
eou l R O K II X R O K I
EC X
Ha L IN
nR H o e n g se o n g
S a m ch e o k
nR
IInn ch e o n
• • •
Ha
W on jjuu
Suwon •
• Y e o jjuu
•
D Je ch e o n
W e st S ea L IN E • S outh K orea
Ja n g h o w o n
•
(Y e llow S ea ) P ye o n g ta
ta e k
A n se o n g
• • C h u n g jjuu
•
i n ch e o n
JJin
• Y e o n g ju
ju
•
Ereckson was notified that the ROK naval base commander had been
Australian, Canadian, and US destroyers under Captain Jeffrey V. Brock,

blockading and escort force, that Task Element (TE) 95.12, a force of
Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith, commander of Task Force (TF) 95, the UN
Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), was sailing to his assistance and that Royal
ordered to leave. At about the same time, Kelly received a message from
Navy cruiser Ceylon was also sailing from Sasebo. In addition, Royal
237
Map 32. Eighth Army Withdrawal, December 1950.
Navy Rear Admiral Sir William G. Andrewes, commander of the West
Coast Support Group (TF 95.1), was also steaming toward the west coast
with British aircraft carrier Theseus and four destroyers.59
At 0930 on 4 December, when Kelly and his transports arrived at the
end of the channel that had been swept by the UNC minesweepers, he
assumed command of the Jinnampo evacuation. Ordering his ships to man
their guns, lower their boats, and keep steam up, he commenced load-
ing. After his hazardous journey up the Daedong River, Kelly was disap-
pointed to find that the only remaining personnel to be transported were
the 1,700 soldiers of the 7th Medium Port and 501st Harbor Craft Platoon,
who had their own shipping, and about 7,000 wounded ROK soldiers,
government workers, military and civilian prisoners, and police. Two of
Captain Brock’s destroyers, HMCS Sioux and HMAS Warramunga, had
run into problems navigating the dark, narrow channel, but the HMCS
Cayuga, HMCS Athabaskan, HMAS Bataan, and USS Forrest Royal
arrived at Jinnampo at 0230 the next morning and trained their guns on the
Jinnampo waterfront.60 Loading continued throughout 5 December, with
Royal Navy aircraft of the Theseus arriving overhead around noon, the
Foss continuing to provide power, and the ROK Navy shore party and
motor launches guarding the waterfront. About 100 civilian sailing junks
carrying some 20,000 refugees, all they could hold, slipped down the chan-
nel, leaving about 30,000 refugees behind to head south over land. Kelly’s
transports began to sail independently a little after noon on 5 December
and the beach was clear by 1630. An additional 3,000 refugees showed
up, but they were accommodated by an MSTS ship that arrived late in the
day. At 1730 the Bexar, the last of the transports to leave the harbor, stood
down the channel escorted by the Foss. The LSTs with the 7th Medium
Port personnel aboard anchored for the night in Jinnampo Harbor while
the destroyers bombarded the oil storage facilities, railroad equipment,
and dockyard cranes. In spite of the ad hoc nature of the operation, the
evacuation was carried out quickly and efficiently, and when the destroy-
ers and LSTs sailed away on the morning of 6 December, very little was
left behind and only negligible quantities of supplies and equipment had
to be destroyed.61
Evacuation of Wonsan and Seongjin
On 2 December X Corps published Operations Instruction No. 21
ordering the 3d Division, less the 7th Infantry, to concentrate at Wonsan
to protect the port and Yonpo Airfield. The KMC 1st Regiment was to
move to Hamheung to cover the withdrawal of troops from the Jangjin
(Changjin/Chosin) Reservoir.62
238
Admiral Doyle sent Transport Division 11 to Wonsan to lift the
3d Division to Heungnam and to evacuate the remaining personnel and
equipment. The heavy cruiser St. Paul (CA-73) arrived at Wonsan on
3 December, escorting four APAs and one APD. Most of the 3d Division
moved from Wonsan to Heungnam by rail on 4 December, but elements
of the 1st Marine Division, one battalion of the 3d Division, Company
B of the 64th Tank Battalion, and the KMC 1st and 3d Battalions loaded
aboard the ships. By 7 December some 4,000 troops, 12,000 tons of mate-
rial, 1,146 vehicles, and over 7,000 refugees had been removed by sea and
only a KMC battalion remained in the port. A Victory ship loaded the ROK
marines and 7,000 refugees on 9 December. The next day the last ships
departed, protected by a US destroyer.63
On 5 December Captain Michael J. Flaherty steamed north to the
small port of Seongjin with his ship, the USS Noble (APA-218), and two
merchantmen to outload General Kim’s ROK I Corps (Headquarters and
ROK 3d and Capital Divisions). Flaherty’s ships were joined at Seongjin
by one SCAJAP LST and one ROK LST. The little port had a 1,800-foot
quay with a water depth of more than 27 feet, so the ships were able to
tie up to take the ROK soldiers aboard beginning on 7 December. The
operation was completed by 1600 on 9 December and the ROK troops
were unloaded at Heungnam, from where they would be further evacuated
south along with the rest of X Corps.64
Washington Deliberations
In Washington the JCS continued to monitor the situation in Korea.
As General Collins flew to the Far East, the Army Chief of Transportation
directed an urgent study of the feasibility and requirements to evacuate UN
forces from North Korea. The Transportation staff assumed that 60,000
US, 2,000 UN, and 50,000 ROK troops would have to be withdrawn and
that all equipment would be destroyed. As of 5 December, the “E-Day” on
which they assumed the withdrawal would begin, 100 Victory-type ships,
10 smaller C1MAV1 cargo ships, 8 to 10 troop transports, and 50 operable
LSTs were known to be within the FEC area, in addition to the Navy APAs
and AKAs.65 The study, presented on 6 December, concluded that suffi-
cient shipping was available to remove the troops within 5 days. However,
FEC, X Corps, NAVFE, and Admiral Doyle were already in action. When
it was completed, the evacuation of Northeast Korea redeployed about
the number of troops anticipated by the Washington study, but also over
100,000 civilian refugees and almost all of the X Corps and ROK I Corps
vehicles, equipment, and supplies.
239
The Heungnam Evacuation
On 5 December X Corps issued OPORD No. 9 for the concentration of
the corps forces in the Hamheung–Heungnam area. By separate instruction,
Almond ordered the 3d Division to establish a task force (TF Dog) based
on Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. O’Neil’s 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, and
Lieutenant Colonel Leon Lavoie’s 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion
(155-mm self-propelled howitzers) reinforced with a company of com-
bat engineers and other elements. Its mission was to help the 1st Marine
Division, the attached Army elements (including a composite battalion
dubbed “31/7” consisting of the survivors of RCT-31’s action east of the
Jangjin Reservoir), and Drysdale’s Royal Marine Commandos withdraw
from the reservoir area. TF Dog was alerted on 7 December and moved to
the northwest of Heungnam to establish a blocking position.66 Meanwhile,
on 6 December, General Collins arrived in Tokyo to confer with General
MacArthur. On 7 December Collins and MacArthur met in Tokyo with
General Stratemeyer, Admiral Joy, Admiral Struble, and General Lemuel
C. Shepherd. There was agreement that UNC forces should withdraw from
North Korea, with the seaborne evacuation of the Heungnam enclave and
withdrawal to successive positions by Eighth Army. On its return from
North Korea, X Corps would be subordinate to Eighth Army, which would
attempt to hold a line across the peninsula north of Seoul. Consideration
was also given to withdrawing UNC forces from Korea out of a beachhead
at Busan. The next day, MacArthur issued the order for the evacuation
from Heungnam.67
General Almond issued X Corps Operations Instruction No. 27 on
9 December. It called for the withdrawal of X Corps by air and water
from Heungnam to the Busan–Pohang area (see map 33). A control group
under Colonel Forney was established to provide overall coordination of
the evacuation of personnel, equipment, and supplies. The 2d ESB, with
the Marine 1st Shore Party Battalion, the 58th MP Company, the 79th
Combat Engineer Battalion, and Company A, 56th ATTB (minus the tanks)
attached, was to be responsible for loading the ships, operating the port
facilities, stocking the ships with rations for the voyage, and operating the
final staging area where the troops awaiting evacuation would be fed and
sheltered. X Corps OPORD No. 10, issued on 11 December, provided for
a defensive perimeter around the Heungnam area that would be reduced
in size by phases until the final evacuation took place. Initially, the perim-
eter would be manned by the 3d Division (with the KMC 1st Regiment
attached) and the 7th Division while the 1st Marine Division embarked.
Then the 7th Division would embark on order, after which the 3d Division
would hold the perimeter. The last combat force on the perimeter would be
240
H ongw on
•
XX
ro - ri
O ro-ri E lm
lm s 7
Se
on 77-12
- 12 Aug
gch
eo
nR
J i n a m po
Ic h
eo
nR
H am heung XXX
XX lm s
E lm ROK I
Jig yeong
•
E as t S e a
H eungnam S eohojin (S ea o f J a p a n )
Y eonpo
X C orps E vacuation P lan

D ecem
ec em ber 19 50
pe rim
T race of X C orps per 1 1 D ec
i m eter, 11
vacuation
E vacuat i on ph ase lilines
nes
0 5 10
M ililee s
Map 33. X Corps evacuation plan, December 1950.
an RCT of the 3d Division. Naval gunfire would supplement, and eventu-

ally replace, artillery and carrier air would provide overhead cover.68
On the night of 11 December, the last Marine and Army forces arrived
at the Heungnam perimeter, followed by TF Dog, which was then dis-
banded. The Chinese attack appeared to have reached a culminating point,
and pressure on the withdrawing forces had eased considerably. The UN
forces had now completed their concentration within the Heungnam evac-
uation area. Amphibious shipping, MSTS ships, and chartered merchant
ships had also begun to arrive. That same day, General MacArthur flew to
the Heungnam airfield to meet with General Almond. Almond explained
the disposition of the corps, the plans for outloading and for the defense
of Heungnam, and the plans for phasing out X Corps as a separate force.69
The challenge facing X Corps, Doyle, the 2d ESB, and Forney was that
105,000 troops, over 18,000 vehicles, and some 350,000 tons of bulk cargo
would have to be moved. Between 10 and 15 December, 3,000 troops, 200
vehicles, 500 tons of bombs, and some refugees were airlifted out of the
Heungnam airfield. The rest went out by ship.70
241
The outloading operations by the 2d ESB and its attached units began
on 9 December. Until that time, the brigade had been unloading incoming
ships and to some extent continued this effort even as troops and material
were being outloaded, since ammunition, medical supplies, and other criti-
cal items were still needed by the defending forces. An added complica-
tion was that the electrical power source for the city lay well outside the
perimeter, and on 7 December the Chinese cut off the power. This had been
anticipated, however, and Commander Ereckson’s “electric” destroyer
escort Foss was brought in to provide power during the evacuation.
Because the order for evacuation was expected, the brigade had made
a preliminary plan and it was put into effect. An assembly area for staging
outbound units was cleared and a tent city built in the area behind the LST
beach. Six berths capable of handling Victory-type cargo ships were made
ready, and sunken barges and other debris were cleared from alongside
another pier so that it too could be used. The 532d EB&SR was desig-
nated the shore party for outloading ships from alongside the piers. To
load the LSTs and ships in the stream, a provisional shore party was estab-
lished under the command of the brigade S4, using troops from the brigade
headquarters company, the boat maintenance battalion, the quartermas-
ter company, the marine shore party battalion, the 73d Combat Engineer
Battalion, and an antiaircraft battery. Company A of the 7th Infantry
Division provided security until it was outloaded. Thereafter, Captain
O’Donnell’s amphibious tankers became the security force, using landing
vehicles, tracked (armored) (LVT[A]s) found in the Corps Ordnance Depot
to replace their own vehicles, which were still at Incheon and had been
pressed into service in the defense of that port. Colonel Forney maintained
a list of all shipping as it arrived, allocated shipping among the units, and
coordinated with the commander of each unit or the officer responsible for
the cargo to be loaded. Each unit to be embarked was required to designate
a transportation quartermaster (TQM) to coordinate with the control group
and supervise the loading.
Civilian hatch crews hired in Japan worked throughout the evacuation
living aboard their barracks ship the Shinano Maru. It became increasingly
difficult to hire Korean civilian laborers as the evacuation proceeded, thus
requiring a levy of military personnel from the remaining units to assist in
loading the ships. A further complication occurred when General Almond
ordered that the civilian refugees crowding the harbor be embarked to
the maximum extent possible consistent with the mission. Korean LSTs
and coastal freighters were primarily used for this task, although other
ships also took refugees on board. All were filled with as many people as
242
possible. Normally, LSTs had berthing and mess facilities for up to 250
troops, with a capacity of 550 for short voyages. But they were essentially
large hollow boxes, and so in an emergency, could squeeze in much larger
numbers. One LST, for example, embarked over 10,000 refugees during
the Heungnam evacuation.71
By 14 December most of the 1st Marine Division had been loaded
aboard the transports and the 7th Division began embarking. On
19 December the commanding general of the 3d Division assumed com-
mand of the remaining forces at Heungnam and General Almond and the
X Corps staff went aboard the Mount McKinley. A small X Corps staff
element remained on shore until the end of the operation, but responsi-
bility for the evacuation passed to Admiral Doyle. On 20 December the
7th Division completed loading and sailed at first light the next morning.
Seven LSTs and many landing vehicles, tracked (LVTs) lined the beach
in preparation for the final departure. On 23 December the 3d Division
withdrew to the final perimeter. From 0930 to 1100 the 3d Division and
some remaining elements of the 7th Division loaded out. The 39th Field
Artillery Battalion covered the loading and then boarded the LSTs. At
1230 the last 7th Division troops left the beach in LVTs. The 65th RCT
departed at 1237, the 15th Infantry at 1400, and the 3d Division command
post closed ashore and opened aboard the USS Bayfield.72 The 2d ESB had
begun to withdraw its landing craft, equipment, and personnel as loading
of the outbound units was completed. At 1 hour before midnight on the
23d, the headquarters and all of the 532d EB&SR went aboard the LSD
Fort Marion and the MSTS transport General David I. Sultan. The last
amphibious engineers to leave the beach were the men of Company D,
532d EB&SR, who assisted in a final effort to load remaining ammunition
until 0600 on 24 December, when they went aboard an LST and shoved
off from the shore.73
D-Day was 24 December. By 1405 all the beaches were clear. At 1410
Admiral Doyle ordered the UDT to destroy the facilities and seawall and
by 1436, all US personnel were off the beach and afloat.74 MacArthur radi-
oed to the JCS:
The Tenth Corps accomplished its withdrawal from
the Hungnam perimeter at 1436 hours and all elements
are at sea or landed in the Pusan–Pohang concentra-
tion area. . . . The outloading of this Command, com-
menced on 12 December and completed 11 days later, has
embraced withdrawal of 105,000 troops, including ROK
units, approximately 100,000 refugees, 17,500 vehicles,
243
350,000 tons of organizational equipment and supplies,
1,500 tons of which were evacuated by air. There has been
no abandonment of equipment or supplies. The smooth-
ness of loading out of this base is a tribute to the troops
and the Navy alike and the final withdrawal today, and for
the past three days, has been executed brilliantly by the
Third Division under cover of masterful supporting fire
provided by Naval guns and aircraft.75
244
Notes
1. J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 82–83.
2. James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War, Policy and
Direction: The First Year (Washington, DC: GPO, 1972; reprinted 1992), 140,
187.
3. James I. Matray develops this argument in “Truman’s Plan for Victory,”
Journal of American History (September 1979): 314–333.
4. Donald W. Boose Jr., “The Decision to Cross the 38th Parallel,” in
Spencer C. Tucker, ed., The Encyclopedia of the Korean War (New York, NY:
ABC Clio, 2000); JCS Message 92801, Personal for MacArthur, 27 September
1950, RG 218, Entry UD 48, Box 9, Folder 5, National Archives and Records
5. Schnabel lays out these arguments based on his conversations with
General Wright in Policy and Direction, 187–188.
6. CINCFE Message C-64805 (CM IN 16170), to Department of the Army
for JCS, 28 September 1950; Chairman, JCS, Memorandum for the Secretary of
Defense, 29 September 1950, “Future Korean Operations”; JCS Message 92975,
to CINCFE, 29 September 1950; JCS Message (SECDEF Sends) 92985, Personal
for General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, 29 September 1950, all in RG 218,
Entry UD7, Box 41, Section 34, NACP.
7. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 188; X Corps War Diary, Monthly
Summary, 1 October 1950 to 31 October 1950, “Wonsan–Iwon Landings,” 1, RG
319, Records of the OCMH 2-3.7 BA2, Box 743.
8. GHQ UNC, OPORD No. 2, 2 October 1950, RG 218, Entry UD7, Box
42, Section 42, NACP.
9. X Corps War Diary; Seventh Infantry Division, War Diary, 1 September
to 30 September 1950, 5 October 1950, hereafter, 7ID WD; History of the Korean
War, Chronology 25 June 1950–31 December 1951 (Tokyo: Military History
Section, Far East Command, 1952), 62, hereafter, Korean War Chronology; James
A. Field Jr., History of United States Naval Operations, Korea (Washington, DC:
GPO, 1962), 224.
10. US Army Forces, Far East. Logistics in the Korean Operations (Camp
Zama, Japan: Headquarters, US Army Forces Far East and Eighth US Army
(Rear), APO 343, 1955), Vol. 1, 24.
12. After Action Report, Inchon Operation, 532d Engineer Boat & Shore
Regiment, 3 November 1950, copy in the Office of the Engineer Command
Historian, hereafter, 532d Inchon AAR; X Corps OPORD No. 1; 2d Engineer
Special Brigade Field Order 1-50, 2 September 1950, RG 407, Entry 429, Box
4665, NACP, hereafter, 2ESB UAR, October 1950.
13. Company A, 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion, Diary Report
of “A” Company 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion to Cover the
245
Period from 26 August to 15 January 1950–51, RG 338, Entry 37042, ATTB Cmd
Rpts Jan 51, Box 28, NACP, hereafter, A/56th ATTB Diary Report, 5–19 October
1950.
14. 7ID WD, 7–12 October 1950; X Corps War Diary, 2.
15. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 207–208; UNC OPORD No. 2, Annex
D, Logistics.
16. Roy E. Appleman, United States Army in the Korean War: South to the
Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington, DC: GPO, 1961), 632–633.
17. 7ID WD, 12–17 October 1950.
18. Richard W. Stewart provides a concise account of operations in North
Korea prior to the Chinese intervention in The Korean War: The Chinese
Intervention, 3 November 1950–24 January 1951, CMH Pub 19-8 (Washington,
DC: Center of Military History, 2000), 1–11. For more detailed discussions,
see Billy C. Mossman, United States Army in the Korean War: Ebb and Flow,
November 1950–July 1951 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military
History, 1990), 61–64; Appleman, South to the Naktong, 654–774; Roy E.
Appleman, Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur (College Station,
TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1989), 34–59; Roy E. Appleman, Escaping the
Trap, The US Army X Corps in Northeast Korea, 1950 (College Station, TX: Texas
A&M University Press, 1990), 44–58; Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. Canzona,
U.S. Marines Operations in Korea, 1950–1953, Vol. III, The Chosin Reservoir
Campaign (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G3, 1957), 61–150; Schnabel,
Policy and Direction, 274–330; and Shelby L. Stanton, America’s Tenth Legion,
X Corps In Korea, 1950 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1989), 167–206.
19. Korean War Chronology, 63; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 206.
20. Montross and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, 31–34; X
Corps War Diary; After Action Report of Iwon Operation, 532d Engineer Boat &
Shore Regiment, 31 December 1950, hereafter, 532d EB&SR Iwon AAR, copy at
Office of the Engineer Command Historian, XII-16b-12.
21. Montross and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, 208–209;
Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 232–233. For a detailed account of the Wonsan
mine sweeping operations, see Arnold S. Lott, Most Dangerous Sea: A history of
mine warfare and an account of U.S. Navy mine warfare operations in World War
II and Korea (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1959).
22. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 195, 202.
[1951?], hereafter, ATC History, 10–15; Appleman, South to the Naktong, 628,
citing Ltr, (LtCol James B. Webel, 7th Cav S3, Oct 50) to author, 13 Apr 54; Ltr,
Harris to author, 7 Apr 54; 7th Cav Regt WD, 10–11 Oct 50; 3d Log Comd Hist
Opn Rpt, G4 Sec (Hist Memo: Yeseong River Supply and Ferry Mission), 10–12
Oct 50. See also Letter, William Harris to Roy E. Appleman, 18 May 1954, in RG
319, Records of OCMH, 2-3.7A BA2, Box 746, NACP.
24. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 237–242; Appleman, Disaster in Korea,
306.
246
25. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 272–273; Dictionary of American Naval
Fighting Ships, hereafter, DANFS, Foss, www.history.navy.mil/danfs/f4/foss.html
(accessed 15 January 2007).
26. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 210–214; D. Clayton James, The Years
of MacArthur, Vol. III, Triumph and Disaster 1945–1964 (Boston, MA: Houghton
Mifflin, 1985), 508.
27. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 233–237, 243.
28. CINCUNC Message CX 66705, to CG Eighth Army, CG FEAF,
COMNAVFE, X Corps, 17 October 1950, RG 218, Entry UD7, Box 42, Section
36, NACP.
29. For the Chinese decision to intervene in the Korean War see Jian Chen,
China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation
(New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1994); William Stueck, The Korean
War: An International History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995);
and Zhang Shu Guang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War,
1950–1953 (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1995).
30. Appleman, South to the Naktong, 648–658; Montross and Canzona, The
Chosin Reservoir Campaign, 38–42.
31. George Craig Stewart, “Korea: August, 1950–December 15, 1950,”
unpublished manuscript in the Blair Collection, Box 83, “Forgotten War,
Alphabetical File S-V,” MHI, hereafter, Stewart MS, 12.
32. Appleman, South to the Naktong, 653–715. The Chinese forces were
called Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) by the UNC; however, the English
equivalent of the name that the Chinese used for the forces that intervened in
Korea was the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV).
33. X Corps Operations Instruction No. 13, 26 October 1950, in X Corps
War Diary, October 1950.
34. Commander, Amphibious Group 3 OPORD No. 4-50, 28 October 1950,
RG 407, Entry 429, Box 3172, NACP.
35. Herbert B. Powell, “Conversations between General Herbert B. Powell
and Lieutenant Colonel Philip J. Stevens and Others,” Vol. I, Senior Officer
Debriefing Program (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Military History Institute
Research Collection, 1972), Section 3, 70, 71; Section 4, 1–2, hereafter, Powell
Oral History.
36. Powell Oral History, 20–22.
37. This description of 2d ESB operations at Iwon is based on 2ESB Activities
Report, October 1950, and 352d EB&SR Iwon AAR. See also Frank L. Mann,
“Operation Versatile: Korean Saga of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade,” Military
Engineer, Vol. XLIV, No. 299 (May–June 1952): 168–173.
38. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 246, says that 29,000 troops were
unloaded, but this number seems too high. Based on the engineer after action
reports, the total number, including the 17th RCT, seems likely to have been
between 26,000 and 27,000 men. 2ESB UAR; 532d EB&SR Iwon AAR;
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 733.
247
39. Montross and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, 99–120.
40. Appleman, Escaping the Trap, 275.
41. Michael E. Haas, In the Devil’s Shadow: U.N. Special Operations
During the Korean War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 148–150,
152–156; Fred Hayhurst, Green Berets in Korea: the Story of 41 Independent
Commando Royal Marines (Cambridge, MA: Vanguard, 2001), 53–58; Field,
Naval Operations, Korea, 217; DANFS, Perch, history.navy.mil/danfs/b3/bataan-
i.htm (accessed 26 January 2007).
42. Hayhurst, Green Berets in Korea, 63–77, 89; Field, Naval Operations,
Korea, 226.
43. COMNAVFE OPLAN No. 116-50, CNFE/A4-3(9), 13 November 1950,
copy in RG 127, Entry 17 170/A/54/07 Box 1 (Quantico Schools, 1947–1970)
NACP; Donald Chisholm, “Negotiated Joint Command Relationships,” Naval
War College Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Spring 2000): 103; Field, Naval Operations,
Korea, 265.
44. Hydrography refers to the characteristics of bodies of water or to the
mapping of bodies of water.
45. In an interview with Robert Debs Heinl, Admiral Doyle said he told
Admiral Joy that he “could not and would not come under Struble again.” Quoted
in Chisholm, “Negotiated Command Relations,” 103.
46. For the Chinese attack and Eighth Army and X Corps operations,
see Stewart, The Chinese Intervention, 11–27. For more detailed discussions,
see Mossman, Ebb and Flow, November 1950–July 1951, 61–148; Appleman,
Disaster in Korea, 77–389; Appleman, Escaping the Trap, 59–373; Montross
and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, 151–335; and Stanton, America’s
Tenth Legion, 207–288.
47. Appleman, Escaping the Trap, 119–121, 267–268.
48. CINCFE Message C 69953 to JCS, 28 November 1950, RG 218, Entry
UD7, Box 42, Section 39, NACP.
49. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 265; Chisholm, “Negotiated Command
Relations,” 105–106.
50. Summary of OPORD No. 8, 30 November 1950, in November War
Diary Summaries, Headquarters X Corps: 1 November 1950 to 30 November
1950, V. “Catalog of Plans and Orders,” copy in The Edward M. Almond Papers,
Box 75, “War Diary 1950–1951, Command Report January to March 1951,”
MHI; Appleman, Escaping the Trap, 121. The 3d Division attack to the west was
later canceled and the division was given the mission of securing the Heungnam
enclave.
51. Monthly Action Reports, 2d Logistical Command (C), Nov 30,
Transportation, Water Division in Folder, “1 Dec 1950,” Box 22 (Chronological
Files), Roy Appleman Collection 1945–1989, MHI. Appleman’s handwritten com-
ment: “evacuation possibility already in minds of high command.”
52. Edward M. Almond, “Personal Notes Covering Activities of Lt. Gen.
E.M. Almond During Military Operations in Korea 31 August 1950–15 July 1951”
(Almond Diary), Box 64: Personal Notes on the Korean Operation, The Edward
248
M. Almond Papers. MHI Archives Collection. Almond Diary, 30 November 1950;
Mossman, Ebb and Flow, November 1950–July 1951, 129.
54. JCS Message 97592 to CINCFE, 29 November 1950; CINCFE Message
50095 (CM IN 15673) to JCS, 30 November 1950; JCS Message 97772 to
CINCFE, 30 November 1950; JCS Message 97804 to CINCFE, 1 December
1950, all in RG 218, Entry UD7, Box 43, Section 40, NACP.
55. Appleman, Escaping the Trap, 278; see also comments by General
William McCaffrey in the Appleman Collection, Box 20, “Correspondence w/
Gen. Ridgway and Gen. McCaffrey,” MHI. On 2 December Admiral Doyle had
advised COMNAVFE that TF 90 was prepared to move the 3d Infantry Division
from Wonsan to either Hamheung or Busan, as required. Field, Naval Operations,
Korea, 265; Chisholm, “Negotiated Command Relations,” 105–106.
56. A concise description of the Eighth Army withdrawal is in Stewart,
The Chinese Intervention, 20–22. For more detailed discussions, see Mossman,
Ebb and Flow, November 1950–July 1951, 149–157; and Appleman, Disaster in
Korea, 294–330.
57. Eighth US Army, Logistical Problems and Their Solutions (25 August
1950–31 August 1951): Monograph, compiled by personnel of the Historical
Section, EUSAK and the Eighth Army Historical Service Detachment (Prov.)
(Seoul: Headquarters, Eighth US Army, Korea (EUSAK) [1950–52?], copy at
MHI.
58. Roy E. Appleman, Ridgway Duels for Korea (College Station, TX: Texas
A&M University Press, 1990), 333; Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 272.
61. Command Report, 2d Logistical Command, December 1950, The Roy
E. Appleman Collection, Box 22 (Chronological Files), Folder, “5 Dec 1950,”
MHI, 6; Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 273–274; Appleman, Ridgway Duels for
Korea, 334.
62. X Corps Operations Instruction No. 21, X Corps War Diary, December
1950.
63. Chisholm, “Negotiated Command Relations,” 109; Appleman, Escaping
the Trap, 279; see also Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 286–287.
65. Office of the Chief of Transportation memorandum TCMPI-SP
1838(TS), 6 December 1950, “Withdrawal of UN Forces from Northeast Korea.
The study group used the term “Victory-type” to cover all Maritime Commission
ship types of roughly equivalent capacity (10,000 deadweight tonnage), including
EC-2 (Liberty ships), VC-2 (Victory ships), and C-2 and C-3 cargo ships. The
characteristics of these ships, and the smaller C-1 types (such as the C1MAV1),
are set forth in Frederic L. Lane, Ships for Victory, A History of Shipbuilding
Under the U.S. Maritime Commission in World War II (Baltimore, MD: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951), 28.
66. X Corps OPORD No. 9, 5 December 1950, RG 127, Entry 17, 170/
249
A/54/07 Box 1, NACP; Appleman, Escaping the Trap, 282–283. For details on
the 31/7 composite battalion, see Changjin Journal 02.28.03 and 05.01.03, library-
automation.com/nymas/changjinjournalTOC.html (accessed 21 August 2008).
67. X Corps War Diary, December 1950; Mossman, Ebb and Flow, November
1950–July 1951, 158–160; Chisholm, “Negotiated Command Relations,” 106;
Appleman, Escaping the Trap, 383; Lemuel C. Shepherd, Korean War Diary cov-
ering period 2 July to 7 December 1950, copy provided to the writer by Professor
Allan R. Millett (a copy is also available in the Lemuel C. Shepherd Papers at the
Marine Corps University Archives), hereafter, Shepherd Diary, 7–8 December.
68. X Corps Operations Instruction No. 27, 9 December 1950; X Corps
OPORD No. 10, 11 December 1950, copies in the Edward M. Almond Papers,
Box 75, MHI; 2d Engineer Special Brigade, Command Report, 1 December to
31 December 1950, RG 407, Entry 429, Box 4665, NACP.
69. Almond Diary, 11 December 1950; Appleman, Escaping the Trap, 316–
318, 322–323.
70. X Corps War Diary, December 1950.
71. This description of the work of the 2d ESB is based on the 2ESB Command
Report for December and After Action, Hungnam, Korea, 532d Engineer Boat &
Shore Regiment, n.d., copy in the Office of the Engineer Command Historian,
hereafter, 532d EB&SR Heungnam AAR.
72. X Corps War Diary, December 1950; Appleman, Escaping the Trap, 331;
Korean War Chronology, 85–86; Chisholm, “Negotiated Command Relations,”
109–110.
73. 532d EB&SR Heungnam AAR, 6.
74. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 304–305; Appleman, Escaping the
Trap, 331.
75. CINCFE Message C-52020 (CM IN 3838), 25 Dec 50, To: DEPTAR
for JCS, RG 218, Entry UD 48 Chairman’s File—General Bradley, 1949–53,
Messages Relating to Operations in the Far East, 1950–1953, Box 1, Folder 2,
NACP.
250
Chapter 6
The War of Movement, December 1950–November 1951
Evacuation of Incheon
On 23 December 1950 General Walton H. Walker was killed in a jeep
accident north of Seoul. Three days later Lieutenant General Matthew B.
Ridgway arrived in Korea to take command of Eighth Army. Ridgway,
who had been serving as the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
and Administration at the time of Walker’s death, was a distinguished air
borne commander in World War II. In that conflict he had been involved
with three major amphibious operations—commanding the 82d Airborne
Division during the Sicily and Salerno landings and jumping with this
division at Normandy. But his participation was always with the airborne
forces, rather than those landing across the beach.1
With the completion of the evacuation of northeast Korea on
26 December, X Corps lost its independent status and became part of
Eighth Army. That same day the Chinese resumed their attack, beginning
a general offensive (their Third Phase Offensive) (see map 34) across a
44-mile front from east of Gaeseong (Kaesong) in the west to northeast of
Chuncheon (Ch’unch’on) in the east, with their main effort directed south
toward Seoul, Gapyeong (Kap’yong), and Wonju.2
Between 30 December 1950 and 3 January 1951, Far East Command
(FEC) and Eighth Army considered the possibility of conducting a small-
scale diversionary landing in the vicinity of Haeju.3 However, Eighth
Army was forced to pull back, initially to a line along the Han River north
of Seoul. On 3 January 1951 Ridgway, concerned that the I and IX Corps
forces in western Korea would be cut off and surrounded, ordered the
evacuation of Seoul.4
Based on Admiral C. Turner Joy’s guidance, Rear Admiral Lyman A.
Thackrey, commander of TG 90.1, had been preparing for the evacuation
of the Seoul–Incheon area since early December. On 7 December 1950
Thackrey requested carrier support and began preparations for the removal
of Army supplies from Incheon making use of the immediately available
ships: his flagship the Eldorado; 1 attack cargo ship; 2 attack transports; 2
landing ships, dock (LSDs); 1 APD; and 11 landing ships, tank (LSTs) (two
US Navy ships and 9 Shipping Control Administration, Japan [SCAJAP]
vessels). The Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) held an additional
15 empty cargo ships in Japan as a reserve to supplement Thackrey’s
amphibians. Six additional SCAJAP LSTs and other ships were made
available after the completion of the Heungnam (Hungnam) evacuation.5
251
to P y e o n g y a n g
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kh
252
an
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XX ROK 5 ROK 3
•
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E ig h t h A rm y f r o n t lin e , 2 6 D e c

• P la n n e d d e la y in g lin e s
N o rth K o re a n a tta c k s , 2 6 – 3 0 D e c
U S a n d R O K a tta c k s , 3 0 – 3 1 D e c
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• P y e o n g ta e k
• 0 10 20 30
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• XX M iles
2 (+ )
Map 34. Chinese 1951 Third Phase Offensive.
over 1,000 vehicles, and 55,000 tons of cargo to Busan (Pusan) or Japan.6
much of the personnel and equipment from Seoul, Gimpo (Kimp’o), and
Incheon (Inch’on) were withdrawn by land and the Chinese attack was
refuge for some 135,000 troops. However, this became unnecessary as
Thackrey had initially contemplated the use of the Deokjeok
During December TG 90.1 ships transported 32,000 military personnel,

(Tokchok) Islands, about 30 miles southwest of Incheon, as a temporary
delayed long enough for the seaborne evacuation to proceed smoothly.

During the evacuation, the 8206th Army Unit (AU), Amphibious
Training Center (ATC) had continued to provide yeoman service. On
1 December the unit of about 40 men had been assigned a defensive
sector at Incheon along a ridge east of the city, overlooking the Seoul–
Incheon Highway. In the event of attack, the ATC was to delay, then cross
the causeway to Wolmido. On 11 December the ATC had been ordered
to leave Incheon and deploy to Busan. They made the journey aboard
SCAJAP LST-Q043, towing LSU 1381 loaded with three smaller craft,
arriving on 23 December. Additional equipment was loaded at Busan and
on Christmas Day, the LST sailed for Pohang, where the ATC troops pre
pared that port for the arrival of the 1st Marine Division as it returned from
North Korea.7
Admiral Thackrey continued loading troops and equipment as
the Chinese approached Incheon. On 4 January he received an order
from Admiral Joy to destroy the port facilities. Colonel John G. Hill’s
3d Logistical Command ceased port operations at noon that day and at
1800, the 50th Engineer Port Construction Company began the demolition,
including destruction of the huge tidal locks, which significantly reduced
Incheon’s capability as a deep-water port. Since the United Nations
Command (UNC) had complete control of the waters off Korea, this
destruction was unnecessary and would soon be regretted when Incheon
was reoccupied the next month.8
As Chinese forces entered the outskirts of the city on 5 January 1951,
the last elements of the 50th Engineer Port Construction Company loaded
aboard the transports and Thackrey sortied his shipping from Incheon.
During the first 5 days of January, TG 90.1 had transported an additional
37,000 military personnel and over 64,000 civilian refugees.9
With Incheon now in enemy hands, a port was needed to support Eighth
Army forces in the west. In September 1950 an underwater demolition team
(UDT) operating from the submarine Perch had reconnoitered the beaches
at Daecheon (Taech’on) 25 miles north of Gunsan (Kunsan) at the mouth of
Cheonsu (Ch’onsu) Bay as an alternative to Incheon for the CHROMITE
landing. In December 1950 Thackrey, anticipating the withdrawal from
Incheon, had the approaches to Daecheon swept. As the evacuation LSTs
left Incheon in January, he sent two minesweepers back in to check sweep
to ensure no mines had been planted, and then sent the LSTs from Incheon
to discharge their cargo on the beach at the small port. On 8 January 1951
more LSTs brought the 3d Division’s tanks and artillery up to Daecheon.
Over the next 2 days, SCAJAP LSTs brought petroleum, oils, and lubricants
(POL) and other cargo up from Busan to Daecheon and Gunsan.10
253
Planning for Evacuation of Korea and the Defense of Japan
After withdrawing from Seoul, Eighth Army pulled back to a line run
ning from Pyeongtaek (P’yongt’aek) on the west coast, through Wonju
in the center of the country, to the town of Wonpo-ri (Wonp’o-ri) on the
east coast. Ridgway prepared to bring on line the X Corps, now consisting
of the US 2d and 7th Infantry Divisions, and the remnants of three ROK
divisions. On 7 January 1951 the North Koreans captured Wonju, which
turned out to be the high water mark of their offensive.
General Douglas MacArthur and the Washington community consid
ered the possibility of UNC forces being ejected from Korea.11 Admiral
Joy’s Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE) Headquarters began planning for
the evacuation by sea of US, UN, and Republic of Korea (ROK) mili
tary forces; ROK police and government officials and their families; and
prisoners of war (POWs). Admiral James H. Doyle’s Task Force (TF) 90
preparations for this large-scale evacuation included the conduct of hydro
graphic surveys of Korean and Japanese beaches to identify those suit
able for amphibious use. These surveys were conducted by the underwater
demolition unit (UDU) (consisting of UDT-1, UDT-3, and part of Naval
Beach Group One) and continued through June 1951.12
The FEC Operation Plan (OPLAN) No. 1-51 envisioned the relocation
of the ROK Government, a substantial number of ROK forces, and others
(up to a million people) to the island of Cheju-do and the continuation of
military operations through guerrilla, commando, and covert operations.13
A later plan, OPLAN No. 4-51, provided for the evacuation of ROK per
sonnel to ports in Japan and then, as shipping became available, to Saipan
and Tinian.14 Unlike the situation in July and August 1950, when possible
evacuation of US and ROK military forces was seen as a precursor to an
amphibious re-entry to the peninsula, there was little or no talk now of
such a return by means of another “Normandy.”15
Nonetheless, Ridgway did not ignore the possibility of using the strong
Navy TF 90 amphibious force and the amphibious-trained marines for
smaller scale operations. After their return from the north, the 1st Marine
Division was detached from X Corps and, after a brief period refitting near
Masan, had been relocated in mid-January to the Pohang area, traveling by
road and LST. There they served as Eighth Army Reserve and provided rear
area security protecting the 75-mile Pohang to Andong railway line from
North Korean guerrillas.16 Ridgway flew to Pohang to confer with General
Oliver P. Smith. During this conversation, Ridgway raised the possibility
of using Doyle’s amphibious ships and marine forces to conduct landings
along the east coast to block the southward advance of Chinese forces
254
along the coastal avenue of approach. Smith argued that any amphibious
operations should be made in strength, and Ridgway did not pursue the
idea further at that time.17
In an attempt to provide some ground combat force for the defense of
Japan, in January 1951 MacArthur withdrew the 34th Infantry Regiment
and the 63d Field Artillery Battalion from the 24th Infantry Division in
Korea. Brought up to full strength and augmented by the 56th Amphibious
Tank and Tractor Battalion (ATTB), this small force prepared to defend the
Kanto Plain near Tokyo.18 Company A of the 56th ATTB had been detached
from the 2d Engineer Special Brigade (ESB) on 12 January and returned to
Japan by LST on 16 January, bringing the entire battalion together again.
A shortage of tanks prevented the unit from reorganizing as a light tank
force. Instead, attached to the 34th Infantry, the 56th ATTB prepared to
assist in the defense of Japan with their amphibious tractors and 75-mm
howitzer-armed landing vehicles, tracked (armored) (LVT[A]s).19
Beginning in January, the amphibious ships of Doyle’s TF 90 were
divided into three roughly equal groups. At any time, one-third of the force
was conducting amphibious training for Army units in Japan, one-third was
on call for transportation and other services (including amphibious dem
onstrations) for forces in Korea, and one-third was conducting upkeep and
maintenance at Yokosuka. In addition to its hydrographic survey work and
in the absence of amphibious missions, TF 90 was tasked on 15 January
with carrying refugees and POWs to the Korean islands of Geojedo (Koje
do) and Jejudo (Cheju-do). The first AKA fitted with makeshift cells and
loaded with POWs departed from Busan on 20 January. This was Doyle’s
last mission in the Far East, and he transferred his flag to Vice Admiral
Ingolf N. Kiland on 24 January.20
During January 1951 the 2d ESB, with an ordnance detachment and
a petroleum distribution platoon attached, operated the port of Ulsan, ini
tially to offload LSTs carrying ammunition from the Heungnam evacuation.
Later, Ulsan became a rations and POL unloading and distribution facility.
Colonel Joseph J. Twitty was designated by 2d Logistical Command as
the commander of the Ulsan Port Command Area, with responsibility for
operating the port, maintaining the roads, and providing logistical sup
port to units in the area. The Ulsan operation was strengthened during
the month by the addition of the 558th Transportation Amphibious Truck
Company and the 60th Transportation Truck Company.21
On 13 January 2d Logistical Command directed the brigade to establish
an ammunition unloading facility at Suyeong (Suyong), a fishing village
at the head of a small bay about 8 miles north of Busan. Turning the Ulsan
255
operation over to the 532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment (EB&SR),
Twitty moved his Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company by
LST to Suyeong, accompanied by Company A of the 562d Engineer Boat
Maintenance Battalion; a platoon from Company D of the 532d EB&SR;
and small signal, ordnance, and quartermaster elements. There, using the
Suyeong beaches and a small pier, he established a facility for unload
ing ammunition. The 532d EB&SR commander took over the Ulsan Port
Command Area responsibilities. The Suyeong Group was reinforced soon
after its arrival by the rest of Company D of the 532d EB&SR with its
landing craft, mechanized (LCM) and about a dozen Navy landing ships,
utility (LSUs). The Navy stationed an LSD near Suyeong to provide for
maintenance of the watercraft. The 3d Transportation Amphibious Truck
Company put its DUKWs into action in early February. Using the LSUs,
LCMs, DUKWs, and appropriated barges as lighters, the brigade was
able to offload several hundred tons of ammunition and other cargo a day.
Two Victory-type ships could be offloaded at the same time from the pier,
while LSTs landed their cargo directly over the beach. Ships could also be
offloaded from the harbor anchorage (in the stream) by LSUs that brought
the cargo to the piers and by DUKWs that landed over the LST beach.
During the first 10 days of February, the brigade unloaded an average of
400 tons a day at the little seaport.22
The troops of the 8206th AU, ATC, after assisting in preparing Pohang
Port for the reception of the 1st Marine Division, redeployed to Gunsan
via Busan aboard SCAJAP LST-Q030, arriving on 10 January 1951. After
a week of stevedoring duties, unloading fuel from LSTs and then reloading
the LSTs with rice, they returned briefly to Busan. On 20 January the peri
patetic outfit again mounted out by LST, this time to the island of Geoje,
where they would spend the next several months working as stevedores
and construction engineers, assisting in the building of a large POW camp,
billets, and dock facilities.23
Thus, throughout the early months of 1951, as Eighth Army withdrew,
halted the Chinese attack, and then began a counteroffensive to the north,
all the Army amphibious forces in the Far East, as well as the 1st Marine
Division, were committed to other than amphibious activities.
Special Operations: Irregulars in the Northwest Islands in

January–February 1951
But while the Army conventional amphibious troops were otherwise
occupied, Eighth Army was about to become involved in unconventional
warfare, including ad hoc and irregular amphibious operations, that would
256
play out along the rugged coastline and offshore islands of North Korea’s
Hwanghae province. The population of Hwanghae was culturally and
politically aligned with Seoul and had resisted the imposition of the North
Korean regime as early as 1947. When UNC forces invaded the north
in the fall of 1950, armed Hwanghae irregulars made contact with the
advancing forces, protected the UNC lines of communication, and harried
the retreating North Koreans. When the Chinese attacked, these guerrillas
were forced to flee, along with thousands of refugees and irregular forces
from other parts of North Korea. Some carried on the resistance from the
mountains, some established strongholds along the Hwanghae coast, and
others took refuge on the offshore islands. Many fled from the coast south
west of Jinnampo (Chinnamp’o) by way of the village of Wolsa-ri (“a
Korean Dunkirk”) to the island of Chodo (Ch’odo). Others escaped to
the southwest through the town of Jangyeon (Changyon) into the small
Jangsangot (Changsan-got) peninsula and then south to the string of
islands: Baengnyeongdo (Paengyong-do), Daecheongdo (Taech’ong-do),
and Socheongdo (Soch’ong-do).24 (See map 35.)
The flood of escapees traveling to the islands in sampans and junks
continued throughout December 1950, with some assistance from ROK
Navy ships. During the first weeks of January 1951, ROK Navy, including
the merchant marine LST Tangyang, evacuated refugees from the south
west coast of Hwanghae province as the partisans delayed the advancing
Chinese and North Korean forces. KPA forces in northwest Hwanghae
province cut off and attacked a second group of irregulars. On 19 January
the group in northwestern Hwanghae province, which called itself the
Pyeongyang Partisan Regiment, fought its way out to the coast and was
withdrawn by sea from the mainland to Chodo Island. In all, on 19 January
the ROK Navy evacuated some 13,000 North Korean refugees and guer
rilla fighters from the northwest Korean coast, covering the operation with
a heavy bombardment and an amphibious landing south of Jinnampo.25
Although the FEC and Eighth Army knew about the exodus, they
were unaware that guerrilla fighters were among the civilian refugees
until 8 January, when TG 95.7, the ROK Navy group that was assisting
the refugees, reported that some 1,000 volunteers armed with Japanese
weapons were operating in Hwanghae province and asked if Eighth Army
had any Japanese ammunition that could be made available.26 The plea
for help found a willing and informed ear in Colonel John McGee of the
Eighth Army Staff. McGee had conducted a successful guerrilla campaign
in the Philippines during World War II and had tried to persuade Eighth
Army to arm and equip a behind-the-lines guerrilla force in July 1950.
257
J in n a m p o
• HW ANGHAE
Seokdo P R O V IN C E
•
P ip a g o t
Chodo
•
W o ls a - ri
Anak
• S a riw o n
C ha
Y eseong R
e ry
eon
gR
• Jangyeon
Jangsangot
B aen gn ye on gd o
D aedong B ay
• H a e ju
•
O n g jin P e n in s u la G aeseong
• O n g ji n
Daecheongdo
Socheongdo
H a e ju B a y
S u n w id o G yod on gd o
H a n R iv e r E s t u a ry
D eungsangot Udo
Yeonpyeongdo
S eokm odo G anghwado

W est Sea Y e o n g jo n g d o
( Y e l lo w S e a )
Y ong yu do
D a e m u u id o
Yeongheungdo
D e o k je o k I s la n d s
N o r t h w e s t I s la n d s
0 25 50 Daebudo
As
M ile s an
Ba
y
Map 35. Northwest Islands.
That plan had been abandoned, but now McGee found support for estab
lishing an organization to assist, organize, and direct the Hwanghae irregu
lars. Believing that they could be turned into an organized guerrilla force
to disrupt North Korean and Chinese supply lines and support a future
offensive, the Eighth Army G3 Miscellaneous Division, which had been
coordinating special operations in Korea, established on 15 January 1951
an Attrition (Partisan) Section to direct the efforts of the North Korean
irregulars. McGee arranged to make contact with the partisans and to sup
ply them with food and other supplies from civil relief resources.27
On 23 January Eighth Army published a plan drafted by McGee called
“Plan Able,” to train and equip the partisans and then infiltrate them back
onto the mainland from the offshore islands. The plan called for an initial
phase in which cadres would be trained on the islands. The teams of par
tisans were to carry out intelligence collection and sabotage missions and
assist in the recovery of downed UNC aircrews. In the second phase of the
258
operation, the partisan force was expected to be of sufficient size, organi
zation, and training to be able to make a major contribution to a renewed
Eighth Army offensive. Throughout the spring and summer, there was still
some hope that such an offensive would actually take place.28
On 15 February 1951 a base of operations for the partisans was estab
lished on the west coast island of Baengnyeongdo (already in use by the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the South Korean Government, and
the US Air Force for their own clandestine operations). Two other opera
tional units were formed: Baker Section, with its headquarters and train
ing camp near Busan, to conduct airborne training and insertions; and TF
Redwing, an American-led company of ROK Marines that carried out
intelligence, sabotage, and commando operations along the coasts and
among the islands off North Korea. Originally code-named William Able,
the Baengnyeongdo base was renamed Leopard in March and the partisan
units adopted the nickname “Donkey” with a number to indicate the iden
tity of the team.29
The William Able and Leopard operations were planned, directed, and
supplied (sometimes meagerly) by Eighth Army, and they were amphibi
ous in that the partisans infiltrated by sea from islands off the coast, largely
with a fleet of motorized junks (some modified with an additional powerful
engine, hidden radio antennas, and concealed recoilless rifles), as well as
smaller craft (including sailing junks and little boats powered by a single
oar sculled over the stern and referred to in English as “wiggle sticks” or
“wiggle boats” from the motion of the oar). Supported from time-to-time
by ships of the Royal Navy, they conducted raids against Chinese and
North Korean forces and carried out intelligence collection, aircrew res
cue, sabotage, and assassination missions until the end of the war.30 They
were tactically effective in terms of producing enemy casualties. However,
the partisan operations were essentially limited to Hwanghae province. If
the large-scale UNC offensive into the north had materialized, the parti
sans were unlikely to have had much effect in the crucial interior areas.
Nevertheless, they might have had an important effect in disrupting that
part of the North Korean transportation and communications network that
ran through the west coast.
Eighth Army Counteroffensive

By mid-January the Chinese offensive had stalled, the North Korean
V Corps began withdrawing from Wonju, and the 9th RCT of the 2d Infantry
Division cautiously moved into the city.31 On 15 January Ridgway began
aggressive patrolling and large-scale reconnaissance-in-force operations to
regain contact and probe the Chinese front line. On 25 January he began a
259
full-scale counteroffensive with two operations called THUNDERBOLT,
an attack by I and IX Corps in the west that was expanded on 11 February
by Operation ROUNDUP by X Corps and the ROK III and I Corps in the
east (see map 36). By 11 February Eighth Army had reached a line from
just south of Seoul in the west to just south of the port city of Gangneung
in the east.32
When Ridgway attacked, he did so aggressively, but with deliberation
and caution, using phase lines to control forward movement and ensure
that units maintained contact with the forces on their flanks. In a memo
randum to MacArthur at the height of the THUNDERBOLT operation and
on the eve of ROUNDUP, Ridgway described his operation as “a coordi
nated, phased advance under Army control for the purpose of developing
the enemy situation in their front; inflicting maximum losses with mini
mum sustained; and prepared to exploit on army order up to the Han, and
there to hold.”33
Ridgway pointed out that an advance to the line of the Han River was
“a sound operation, with a high potential payoff, providing resistance does
not stiffen to the point where our losses would cancel out military gains.”
However, an advance beyond the river would offer “little of military value
commensurate with the risks incurred, unless Communist China should
elect to withdraw north of the 38th Parallel.” He also argued that retaking
Seoul would put his forces on the enemy side of an unfordable obstacle
and would risk destruction of those forces. He therefore considered recap
ture of Seoul to be unsound, although he was prepared to capture the city
if the opportunity arose to do so safely.34
MacArthur concurred with Ridgway’s views. He believed that the
reoccupation of Gimpo Airfield and of the Incheon Harbor would “unques
tionably be of marked value, and if they present easy prey they should be
taken.” Although he had argued the previous fall that Seoul was the key to
a successful counteroffensive, he now said that while the “occupation of
Seoul itself would, of course, present certain diplomatic and psychological
advantages which would be valuable . . . its military usefulness is practi
cally negligible.”35
US intelligence indicated that the North Koreans and Chinese feared
another amphibious attack. There were neither Army nor Marine forces
available to conduct large scale amphibious operations at this time, but
to take advantage of these fears, Commander in Chief, United Nations
Command (CINCUNC) ordered a series of amphibious demonstrations
to cause the enemy to reinforce Incheon and other coastal areas and draw
forces from the front.36 At the same time, a major effort was underway to
260
So
P ye o n g g a n g
ya
• ng
R U N C ounteroffensive
IR O N P hase I
S ib
i b ye o n -ri
-ri T R IA N G LE
• G im
im w h a 25 Jan uary
C h e o rw o n
• Line A rizon a
• 0 10 20 30
PUNCH BOW L M ililee s
HW ACHEO N D a e p o --ri
ri
RES H a n g ye --ri
ri
•
H w a ch e o n
•
• In
I n je
je Y a n g ya n g
• •
B uk
han
R
E a st S ea
M u n sa n C h u n ch e o n (S ea o f Jap an )
• •
G angneung
U ijijee o n g b u •
•
H o n g ch e o n
•
S eoul
G IM P O
A IIR ELD
R F IIE Y a n g p ye o n g
Ha
H o e n g se o n g nR
•
IInn ch e o n Jip
J i p ye o n g -ri
• -ri
• S a m ch e o k
X
•
IX X X
X
X
Ha
I X IX
n
W on jjuu
X
R
•
ROUNDUP I
• Y e o jjuu
• K
5–11 Feb O
X R
T H U N D E R B O LT X
• M a sa n III X
25 Jan–11 Feb K
Yeongwol O
• R
III
Je ch e o n
K
•
RO
X
XXXX X X
X
X IX
X
X
X E IG
IG H T H
IX X X
A n se o n g I X
P ye o n g ta U lji
ljinn
ta e k •
• C h u n g jjuu •
•
other transportation facilities along the coastal routes. Rear Admiral Allan
this interdiction effort through air operations; through naval gunfire; and
through a resumption of amphibious raids against bridges, tunnels, and
interdict the enemy’s lines of communication. Naval forces contributed to
261
Map 36. UNC counteroffensive, Phase I.
E. Smith, commander of TF 95, developed an operational concept that
included the seizure of islands off the North Korean coast as observation
posts, areas from which coastal interdiction operations could be mounted,
bases for irregular operations against the vulnerable road and rail lines
along the coasts, and staging areas for future operations. The most impor
tant objective was the blockade of Wonsan, which was not only North
Korea’s major east coast port, but also a key transportation node. Control
of Wonsan Harbor would prevent Soviet resupply of North Korean and
Chinese forces through that port. Admiral Joy and General MacArthur
approved Admiral Smith’s concept, which included the bombardment of
Incheon and Wonsan and possible seizure of islands in Wonsan Harbor.
Joy also approved the capture of Wolmido in Incheon Harbor. All of the
island seizures were to be done by ROK Navy and Marine forces, which
began training in early February.37
Amphibious Demonstrations and the Reoccupation of Incheon

The ROK 4th Marine Battalion, supported by the American and
Canadian ships of TG 95.1 providing gunfire support, conducted a brief
landing and raid at Incheon on 27 and 28 January. Commander, United
States Naval Forces, Far East (COMNAVFE) ordered TF 95 to conduct
demonstrations, including bombardments and amphibious demonstra
tions, on the east coast. The first of these, Operation ASCENDANT, was
conducted on 30 and 31 January near Ganseong (Kansong) (see map 37)
and Goseong (Kosong). Rear Admiral Smith, aboard his flagship—the
destroyer tender Dixie (AD-14), directed the demonstration, which
included a bombardment, mine sweeping, and simulated landing activities
by two attack cargo ships, several LSTs, and some landing ship, medium
(rocket) (LSM[R]) rocket-firing ships (perhaps the only time such an oper
ation had ever been led by a destroyer tender). Another such demonstra
tion was planned for 10 February at Incheon with two AKAs and an LSD
under the same Captain Samuel G. Kelly who had played a prominent role
in the evacuation of Jinnampo the previous December, supported by air
and naval gunfire from a combined British–American force that included
the battleship USS Missouri, the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Theseus, cruis
ers, and destroyers. Kelly’s small amphibious force arrived off Incheon on
8 February and the next day the Missouri began its bombardment of the
beaches. However, before the amphibious ships could stand in to simulate a
landing on 10 February, the enemy evacuated the city. Consequently, ROK
marines were able to land at Incheon unopposed later that afternoon.38
On 10 February Ridgway acknowledged the value of the amphibious
demonstrations in a message to Admiral Joy in which he noted the apparent
262
C h e o n g jijinn
•
• • H a p su
M a n p o jijinn
•
R
C hina • • •
Ja ng jin
G a n g g ye G ilj
iljuu
• C h o sa n
• P u n g sa n
• •
R
a lu
•
Y
M u p ye o n g --ri
ri B U JE O N S e o n g jijinn
B ye o kd o n g
•
RES
••
•
N a m sa n --ri
ri
• •
(C H O S IN )
H a g a ru --ri
ri
••
•
U ijijuu H u iich
•
Da
er
S iinn u ijijuu IInn ch o --ri

ri
ye
••
on
ng R
gR
R
don
g
n
D ae Hamheung
R
eo
A m phibious D em onstrations
•
G u ry eo
ch
Heungnam
•
ng
Je o n g jjuu
eo
•
D e o kch e o n January–F
January – F e bru ary 19 51
Ch
N orth K orea
S iinn a n jjuu
0 25 50
•
M ile
il e s
•
Yangdeok
W on sa n
••
•
T o n g ch e o n
Jin
J in n a m p o O peratio n A S C E N D A N T
•
nR
3 0 – 3 1 Ja n u a ry 1 9 5 1
Y eseo ng R
G o se o n g
Im ji
C hod o
• S a riw
riw o n
•
P ye o n g g a n g
• •
• •
G iim
mhwa
•
• •
C h e o rw o n
• • •
38 °
38° 38 °
38°
• ••
C h u n ch e o n
Ju m u n jijinn
•
M u n sa n
•
E a st S ea
•
S eou
eoull H o n g ch e o n
Incheo n B om bardm ent I n ch e o n
In
•
9 F e b ru a ry 1 9 5 1 W on jjuu S a m ch e o k
Ha
Suwon
n
• •
D em onstration (cancelled)
R
Je ch e o n
O sa n
K M C Lan ding
1 0 F e b ru a ry 1 9 5 1
A san B ay
• U lji
ljinn
•
•
C h u n g jjuu
Y e o n g jjuu
•
Andong
D eokjeok Islands
• • Yeongdeok
•
R
S a n g jjuu
R
dong
um
Ge
D a e jjee o n
•
N ak
• •
G iim
m ch e o n Pohang
• • G u n sa n
Je o n jjuu •
Daegu
Y e o g ch e o n
•
G ye o n g ju
ju

•
rya n g U llsa
sa n
•
• • • ••
Jin
J in h a e
•
M a sa n
i n jjuu
JJin
W e st S ea G w a n g jjuu S u ye o n g
•
T o n g ye o n g
B u sa n it
M o kp o
ra
•
Y e o su
• N am hae
Ko
r ea
T sushim a
Map 37. Amphibious demonstrations, January–February 1951.
disappearance of the enemy forces that had recently been opposing

I Corps. The realism of the prelanding operations had the desired effect.
He concluded that the “Wholehearted cooperation and expeditious manner
in which this [operation] was effected are fully appreciated.”39
The Siege of Wonsan

As the bombardments, amphibious demonstrations, and reoccupa
tion of Incheon were taking place on the west coast, Admiral Smith’s east
263
coast plan went into effect (see map 38). The ROK Navy had activated
two Korean Marine Corps (KMC) units, the 41st and 42d Companies,
trained specifically for the capture and garrison of the offshore islands.
On 7 February Second Lieutenant Shim Hee T’aek’s 42d Company
sailed aboard ROK Navy LST-801 and headed for Yeongheung Bay. On
12 February minesweepers check-swept the approaches to Wonsan and
Yeongheung Bay to ensure they had not been re-mined. Two days later,
Lieutenant Shim’s marines conducted a raid on Wonsan and occupied
the islands of Yodo and Ungdo. On 16 February two US destroyers stood
into the harbor to bombard the port, beginning a continuous naval and air
bombardment of the port that would last for months. Two days later, the
destroyers returned. During the bombardment, USS Ozbourn (DD-846)
was hit by artillery fire from one of the offshore islands, which was sub
jected to an air strike by TF 77 carrier aircraft. On 19 February the H.M.S.
Belfast added its weight of metal to the bombardment; and on 24 February,
two destroyers, a frigate, and the LST-801 carrying 110 Korean marines
of the 42d Company entered the harbor. The marines then went ashore on
Sindo and Daedo Islands. On 27 February the Korean marines conducted
another raid on Wonsan. A detachment then sailed south on ROK Navy
minesweeper AMS-501 and on 4 March transferred to two US Navy land
ing craft, vehicle, personnel (LCVPs) to land on and occupy the island of
Hwangtodo.40
Rehabilitation of Incheon Port
With Incheon now back in friendly hands, the badly damaged port had
to be returned to working order as quickly as possible. Admiral Thackrey,
who had returned to Yokosuka after the evacuation, was put in charge
of the rehabilitation operations. The 2d ESB was ordered to turn over
the Ulsan and Suyeong operations to the 7th Medium Port, which had
been operating Pusan (Busan) Port, and to move to Incheon to bring their
special skills and expertise to put the port back into operation. Thackrey
sailed from Yokohama on 10 February with Eldorado leading an amphibi
ous task group (TG 90.1) consisting of five LSTs, two LSDs (Tortuga and
Catamount), and one APA(Okanogan). Newly promoted Brigadier General
Twitty and one of his staff officers joined Thackrey aboard the Eldorado,
and the Tortuga transported an advance element of the 532d EB&SR to
Incheon on 12 February. The rest of the 532d EB&SR (less Company D,
which was at Suyeong) and the 558th Transportation Amphibious Truck
Company loaded out from Ulsan from 12 to 15 February and embarked
on the Catamount. The Brigade Headquarters and Company D of the 532d
EB&SR left Suyeong via two LSTs on 17 February. The 50th Engineer
264
20’ 30’ 40’
40 50’ 128’
to H a m h e u n g
3 9 m il e s W o n s a n I s la n d s
G owon
N
2 0 F a t h o m lin e
AI
PL
1 0 0 F a t h o m li n e
0 1 2 3 4 5
N a u t i c a l M il e s
S o n g je o n B a y
S o n g je o n
3 9 °2 0 ’ P e n in s u la
20’
Hodo
P e n in s u la D aeganggot
M uncheon
Y eongheung B ay
O kpyeo ng
U ngdo E ast Sea
(S e a o f J a p a n )
M unpyeong
Yeodo
S in d o
G a lm a D aedo
P e n in s u la
W onsan
H wangdodo
10’ 3 9 °1 0 ’
U m id o
A IR S T R IP H a p jin - r i
to P y e o n g y a n g
1 1 0 m ile s
N am dae
R
1 2 7 °2 0 ’ 30’ 40’ 50’
50 128’
265
Map 38. Wonsan Islands.
Port Construction Company and the 5th KMC Battalion were attached to
the brigade and deployed to Incheon from Busan aboard LSTs. Because
indigenous labor was unlikely to be available at the newly liberated city
of Incheon, the brigade also recruited 1,400 Korean laborers at Busan and
brought them to Incheon aboard four LSTs.41
Admiral Thackrey and General Twitty arrived at Incheon on
15 February, followed a day later by the advance detachment of the 532d
EB&SR and the 5th KMC Battalion, which immediately established a
security perimeter. The rest of the 532d EB&SR and the 50th Engineer
Port Construction Company arrived on 17 February and began work. The
DUKW ramp at Incheon and the causeway to Wolmido were found to be
heavily mined. Thus, the first project for the amphibious engineers was to
clear the ramp and the road. On 18 February a representative from Eighth
Army G4 arrived to clarify the mission and the situation. General Twitty
had previously been directed to get the port up to 1,000 tons per day as
soon as possible. However, even though Eighth Army was now pushing
north, the danger of another Chinese attack meant that the brigade had to
be ready to evacuate the port once again. In this situation, it was undesir
able to have large stockpiles of incoming cargo at the port, and lack of
transportation in the area would make it difficult to clear 1,000 tons a
day. Therefore, the initial requirement was reduced to 500 to 600 tons a
day. Twitty decided to reload onto the LSTs all but the troops and equip
ment necessary to meet that requirement. Thackrey was opposed to leav
ing these LSTs to dry out on the beach during the low tides and ordered
them to anchor offshore and to come into port only to unload equipment
when required.42
On 19 February Thackrey received a message from Eighth Army advis
ing him that in light of a possible enemy counterattack, I Corps might with
draw from the Incheon area at any moment. Based on this, Twitty decided
to leave only elements of two companies of the 532d EB&SR and the 5th
KMC Battalion ashore and to move the brigade’s campsite to Wolmido.
The port remained under 48-hour evacuation warning for the rest of the
month, but unloading and port rehabilitation continued. On 24 February
the 558th Amphibious Truck Company was unloaded. The next day, the
50th Engineer Port Construction Company was also unloaded and went
to work on the repair of the docks and movement of the huge tidal lock
gates to the open position. It would be some time before the tidal lock was
put back into operation, but with the gate open the basin could be used by
LCMs, LSUs, and other lighterage.43
On 20 February Eighth Army had begun its next offensive, Operation
KILLER, which would take the IX and X Corps to a line (LINE ARIZONA)
266
some 15 miles north of Wonju. When the 1st Cavalry Division operat
ing east and north of the Han River found high water and flooded fords
impeding its line of communication, two platoons from the 558th were
sent to help get supplies across the river with their DUKWs. The amphibi
ous trucks would also be used to evacuate wounded across the river and
to provide logistic support to the 25th Infantry Division and other units
during the offensive.44
Amphibious Raids, Demonstrations, and Special Operations to

Support the Offensive
To support the Operation KILLER offensive, Eighth Army once again
asked for amphibious demonstrations to fix enemy forces. Admiral Sir
William G. Andrewes, the British commander of the west coast force,
began his deception efforts on 27 February. The light carrier, USS Bataan
(CVL-29), conducted air strikes in the vicinity of Jinnampo and 2 days
later, US and Korean mine sweepers, escorted by a British frigate, swept
a channel up the Daedong River. (See map 39.) On 3 March three APAs
and two AKAs appeared offshore escorted by two destroyers and steamed
toward Chodo before reversing course back to Incheon.45
On 1 March TF Leopard (the partisans operating from the Northwest
Islands) were instructed to initiate partisan operations as soon as possible
to support Eighth Army’s operations. This first insertion of partisan teams
was named Operation SHINING MOON. The first of the TF Leopard
teams to go in, code name Donkey 1, consisted of 38 partisans commanded
by a former merchant named Chang Chae Hwa. First Lieutenant William
Harrison, who had been the advisor to the Miryang Battalion in its ill-
fated landing at Jangsadong on 15 September 1950, had trained the unit in
communications and demolitions. Chang’s partisans successfully landed
over the beach on the Jangsangot peninsula the night of 3/4 March and
moved up into the hills to make contact with locals who were willing
to join forces with the partisans. On the night of 20/21 March, during a
meeting of local Communist party officials, Donkey 1 conducted a raid
on a police station killing 27 men and women and capturing weapons and
ammunition. After other successful attacks on truck stops and warehouses,
the team gained adherents until it was more than 100 strong. It continued
its operations on the mainland for 4½ months. By mid-July the team had
engaged in many actions: claimed to have assassinated or killed in battle
some 500 soldiers, police, and Communist officials; blown up bridges;
rescued prisoners; raided warehouses; and, in the words of a former
member of the Eighth Army Attrition Section, “generally, raised hell.”
They had also taken many casualties, and on the night of 23 July the 20
267
• H ye sa n jin
ji n
C h e o n g jijinn
•
• • H a p su
M a n p o jin
ji n
•
R
C hina • • •
Ja n g jin
ji n G a p sa n
Ja ng jin
G a n g g ye G ilju
ilju
S pecial T F 74
• C h o sa n
• P u n g sa n R oyal M arin es and U D T
• •
R
lu
•
Ya 6 – 7 A p ril
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M u p ye o n g -ri
ji n
B ye o kd o n g
•
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JA N G JJIN
IN D a n ch e o n
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N a m sa n -ri
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• •
(C H O S IN )
H a g a ru -ri
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R a id, D em onstrations,
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and S pecial O perations
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• •
• •
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•
• •
C h e o rw o n
• • •
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38 °
38° 38 °
38°
• ••
C h u n ch e o n
Ju m u n jin
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•
M u n sa n
•
G angneung
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•
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Ha
Suwon
n
• •
R
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B ase O peratio ns
A san B ay
• lji n
U ljin
•
•
ju
C h u n g ju
ju
Y e o n g ju
•
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•
B aen gn ye on gd o
• • Yeongdeok
R
ju
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R
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um
D eokjeok Islands
Ge
je o n
D a e je
•
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• •
i m ch e o n
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• • G u n sa n
ju
Je o n ju •
Daegu
Y e o g ch e o n
•
G ye o n g jjuu
S outh K orea •
i rya n g
M irya U lsa
l sa n
•
• • • ••
in h a e
JJin
•
M a sa n
i n ju
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W e st S ea ju
G w a n g ju S u ye o n g
•
T o n g ye o n g
B u sa n it
M o kp o
ra
•
Y e o su
• N am hae
Ko
re
a
T sushim a
Map 39. Raids, demonstrations, and special operations, March–April 1951.
survivors waded through the low tide to a friendly-held island ending their
operation. Other Donkey teams infiltrated during this time, but Donkey 1’s
operation was the most successful.46
The ROK marines were also active in the Northwest Islands during this
time. On 28 March ROK Navy LST-801 carrying the KMC 41st Company,
commanded by First Lieutenant Lee Tong Ho, sailed to the islands off
the northwest coast. On 2 April they landed on the island of Gyodongdo
(Kyodong-do), just west of the mouth of the Yeseong (Yesong) River in the
268
Han River estuary, and made contact with friendly guerrilla forces. They
also recruited about 100 young men from a group of 700 refugees on the
island and organized them into a guerrilla unit. After training by the ROK
marines, the new guerrilla force was infiltrated by sea into the Haeju area
of mainland North Korea. Having completed its mission on Gyodongdo,
Lieutenant Lee’s marines moved up to the island of Baengnyeongdo, the
hub of special operations activity in the northwest. There they took over
defense of the island and then sent a detachment north to the island of
Seokdo (Sok-do), northeast of Chodo near the mouth of the Daedong
River. Landing on 7 May, the Korean marines established a base camp
and recruited another 100 young men for intelligence and harassment
operations.47
In April and May 1951, the effort was extended to the east coast with
the organization of a partisan operation called TF Kirkland with its main
base at Jumunjin (Chumunjin). East coast operations posed some difficul
ties. There were far fewer suitable offshore islands than in the west and the
CIA, which was conducting clandestine operations from islands further
north, insisted that the partisan activities be confined to the coastal area
south of Wonsan. Eventually, forward bases for TF Kirkland were estab
lished on the small islands of Namdo (Nan Do) and Solseum (Sol-sum)
southeast of Wonsan.48 (See map 40.)
Recruitment of partisans posed another problem. Unlike the situation
in the northwest, there was no large pool of anti-Communist North Koreans
in the east. Initially, Eighth Army gave some thought to deploying teams
of the Hwanghae partisans to TF Kirkland. However, the success of the
Hwanghae guerrillas depended on their knowledge of and familiarity with
their operating area. With no knowledge of the east coast and no contacts
there, they were unsuitable for the Kirkland mission. Therefore, Eighth
Army recruited the east coast partisans from among North Korean defec
tors already in the south, principally from the survivors of the Miryang
Battalion that had conducted the unsuccessful landing at Jangsa-dong on
15 September 1950. Colonel McGee, who was in charge of the partisan
operation, asked the ROK Army for permission to recruit 200 guerril
las from the battalion. ROK Army Headquarters had always mistrusted
the loyalty of the former North Koreans of the Miryang Battalion and
were glad to transfer the entire battalion to Eighth Army control. First
Lieutenant Harrison, then serving as advisor to Donkey 1, was given com
mand of TF Kirkland. The east coast partisans were infiltrated by sea or
land behind Communist lines to support Eighth Army offensive operations
by collecting intelligence, recovering downed aircrews, and disrupting
enemy lines of communication beyond the range of naval gunfire.49
269
• H ye sa n jin
ji n
C h e o n g jin
ji n
•
• • H a p su
M a n p o jin
ji n
•
R
C hina • • •
Ja n g jin
ji n G a p sa n
Ja ng jin
G a n g g ye G ilju
ilju
• C h o sa n
• P u n g sa n
• •
R
lu
•
Ya
M u p ye o n g -ri
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B ye o kd o n g
•
RES
••
JA N G JJIN
IN D a n ch e o n
•
-ri
N a m sa n -ri
• •
(C H O S IN )
H a g a ru -ri
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C h a n g se o n g RES Iw
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D e o kch e o n 0 25 50
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IIII
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•
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D -10
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III I C hod o
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S a riw
•
P ye o n g g a n g
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D --33
• •
• •
III I je o m
N a m ch e o n je G a n se o n g IIIIII
• •
III I D --20
20 G iim
mhwa
Rear B ase
D --21
21 Ja n g ye o n G im
i m ch e o n
•
• •
C h e o rw o n
• • •
III I O n g jijinn H a e jjuu G a e se o n g Y a n g ya n g
38 °
38° 38 °
38°
• ••
D --44 C h u n ch e o n
Ju m u n jijinn
•
M u n sa n
•
G angneung
III
IIII
Yeonan
III I
U ijijee o n g b u
E a st S ea
•
III I S eou l H o n g ch e o n
• (S ea o f Jap an )
D --22 D --11 D --55
•
III I II I n ch e o n
In
•
D --88 ju
W on ju S a m ch e o k
Ha
D -11
- 11
Suwon
n
• •
R
B aen gn ye on gd o O sa n
Je ch e o n
A san B ay
• lji n
U ljin
•
•
ju
C h u n g ju
ju
Y e o n g ju
LE O P A R D A rea
•
Andong
D eokjeok Islands
• • Yeongdeok
•
R
ju
S a n g ju
R
dong
um
Ge
je o n
D a e je
•
N ak
•
Pohang
•
i m ch e o n
G im
• • G u n sa n
ju
Je o n ju •
Daegu
Y e o g ch e o n
•
G ye o n g jjuu
S outh K orea •
i rya n g
M irya U llsa
sa n
•
• •• •
JJin
in h a e
•
M a sa n
i n ju
JJin ju
W e st S ea ju
G w a n g ju
•
it
M o kp o
ra
•
Y e o su
• N am hae
Ko
r ea
T sushim a
Map 40. Eighth Army Offshore Partisan Bases, August 1951.
During this period, the 41st Independent Commando Royal Marines

resumed their operations as coastal raiders. On 6 and 7 April Special Task
Force 74, consisting of 274 Royal Marines aboard the USS Fort Marion
(LSD-22) and a UDT aboard the fast transport Begor (APD-127), escorted
by the heavy cruiser St. Paul (CA-73) and the destroyers Lind (DD-703)
and Massey (DD-778), conducted a raid at Soryedong near Seongjin, south
of Cheongjin. Coming ashore in LVTs carried aboard the Fort Marion,
they secured a beachhead without enemy opposition and blew up 100 feet
of track at a key railway bridge, leaving 8-foot deep craters.50
270
Hwacheon (Hwach’on) Reservoir Operation, 9–11 April 1951
Operation KILLER had brought Eighth Army forces to the Han River
by the end of February 1951. The next operation, RIPPER, began on
7 March and continued the advance to the north all across the front. Seoul
was liberated on 14 and 15 March. By 22 March Chuncheon, in the central
part of the country, was in friendly hands and that same day paratroopers
of the 187th Airborne RCT and the 2d and 4th Ranger Infantry Companies
(Airborne) dropped just south of the Imjin River near Munsan-ni. At the
end of March, Eighth Army was close to the 38th Parallel. In the face of
indications that a Chinese counterattack was imminent, General Ridgway
recommended, and General MacArthur and President Harry S. Truman
approved, a further advance across the 38th Parallel to disrupt the enemy’s
offensive preparations and to secure defensible terrain further north.51
Ridgway’s plan was to conduct an attack, Operation RUGGED, to
a line from the Imjin River to the Hwacheon Reservoir and east to the
sea (LINE KANSAS) (see map 41). A second operation, DAUNTLESS,
would push I and IX Corps 20 miles further north in the central sector
to a line, WYOMING, just south of the towns of Cheorwon (Ch’orwon)
and Gimhwa (Kumhwa). These two towns and the town of Pyeonggang
(P’yonggang) outlined an area of rugged terrain and a transportation and
logistic nexus known as the Iron Triangle. LINE WYOMING would be
heavily fortified and, when the Chinese attacked, Eighth Army would, if
necessary, conduct a slow withdrawal under pressure to LINE KANSAS,
inflicting as much damage and as many casualties as possible.52
The first phase of the operation began on 1 April. By 6 April
Major General William M. Hoge’s IX Corps, consisting of the 27th
Commonwealth Brigade on the left, the ROK 6th Division in the center,
and the 1st Cavalry Division with the 7th Marines attached, on the right
flank, had reached LINE KANSAS almost everywhere. In the east of the
corps zone, however, the 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments, slowed by the
difficult terrain and Chinese resistance, were still some 3 miles south of
the Hwacheon Reservoir (see map 42). General Ridgway was concerned
that the Chinese were fighting hard to keep the cavalry away from the
reservoir because they wanted to let the water rise behind the Hwacheon
Dam sluice gates and then release it to flood the Bukhan River Valley to
the south.53
The irregularly shaped Hwacheon Reservoir was 13 square miles in
area. Its southern shore constituted 16 miles of LINE KANSAS. It was
created by a dam across the Bukhan River at the northwest corner of the
reservoir that held back 19 billion cubic feet of water. The 275-foot high
271
272
Pyeonggang G eumseong
F o r w a r d p o s it io n s , 1 A p r • • O p e r a t io n s R U G G E D E ast Sea
F o r w a r d p o s it io n s , e v e n in g , 2 2 A p r G anseong (S e a o f J a p a n )

E n e m y O r d e r o f B a t t le , e v e n in g 2 2 A p r and DAU NTLESS •

IR O N
Bu
k
L in e W y o m in g
T R IA N G L E
ha
S oyang R
L in e K a n s a s
G im h w a
nR
XXXXX C heorwon
• XXX
P L A III I I XXXXX XXX NK V
XXXXX XX
• P L A IX
IX N K II I XX
XXXX XXXX P L A X II I X X X X NK 45
XXXX XX NK 6 Y o n g d a e -ri
PLA 15 XXXX XXXX PLA 27 PLA 39

PLA 21 XXXX
Im j
PLA 12 PLA 60 NK 12
•
PLA 40 HW ACHEO N
in R
RES
11
X 25 X OK
XXXX 3 X 25 X 24 H wacheo n Yanggu O K X XR
PLA 65
ta n X RO
• • R ap
H an IX K6 X I n je C
XXXXX XXXX R I X 2 X X
X
X 1 M
a r Y u c h e o n -ri X 7
• X K I Yangyang
•
P L A X IX P L A 6 3 Ye ongpyeong X • 7 XROK 5 RO
X III X
to G a e s e o n g

G o ra n g p o -ri IX X ROK X
XXXX Y e o n g p ye
yeong J ic h e o n -ri
• X
• R G w a n d a e -ri
• X
PLA 64
• O K III
nR
Ga
XXX X X R a p
py
XX X
I m ji
NK 1 H y e o n -ri KC
eo
NK 8 a ng R X RO

S oy N a e p y e o n g -ri
•
ng

XX ROK
1 X
• K3 X
R
III
NK 47 X 3 (2 2 X RO
K
A p r3) X 2 5 X OK 6
r) 24 X R
RO
IX X
X
M unsan Ap X K5 X
X
C huncheon
• X 3 (1 B uk
• X
X X RO
X
han 2 X R O K III X R O K I
X
1 X G apyeong R X Ma r
R OK a v 1 H angye X 7 X
• X 1 C v X
X IX 1 Ca X

X K6 X N aecheon R
• K5 X
I RO RO
X CHEONGPYEONG
H an R
U i je o n g b u 0 5 10 15
RES
H ongcheon
to S e o u l
• H ongcheon R • M ile s
Map 41. Operations RUGGED and DAUNTLESS.

HW ACHEON
• B o n -ri
DAM
•
H wacheon
• H w a -d o n g
17 HW ACHEON
RES
W o n c h e o n -ri • Y u c h e o n -ri •
S im p o - r i • M -2 T R E A D W A Y
F L O A T IN G B R ID G E 38°
38°
• Ir a m -r i D a e d o n g -ri •
Bu
S oyang R
•
kh
an
S e o s a n g -ri
R
G e u m s a n -ri •
M -2 T R E A D W A Y C huncheon
F L O A T IN G B R ID G E
H w acheon R eservo ir and the
D a n g n im - r i • B ukhan R iver V alle y
• D a e g o k -ri • C hangcheon
0 1 2 3 4 5
M ile s
• G u g o k -ri
Map 42. Hwacheon Reservoir and the Bukhan River Valley.
dam had a concrete spillway 826 feet wide with 18 sluice gates across the
top that could raise the water level an additional 32 feet.54 In February,
before Operation RIPPER, General Ridgway had considered destroy
ing the dam to release the water, and then beginning the attack after the
water had subsided. With this in mind, he asked Eighth Army engineer
Colonel Paschal N. Strong what effect “bomb demolition” of the dam
would have on friendly and enemy operations. Strong replied that “instan
taneous demolition” of the dam would cause a 60-foot high flood imme
diately below the dam flattening to a 15-foot rise at the confluence of the
Bukhan and Han Rivers and further flattening to 7 feet where the Han
River ran through Seoul. This would create an impassable water barrier
along the length of the Bukhan River that would last for 48 hours and
make river crossing “difficult but not impossible” in the vicinity of Seoul
for 36 hours. Offensive operations north of Cheorwon would be impos
sible until the water subsided. The engineer pointed out, however, that it
was nearly impossible to destroy the dam with conventional bombs and
that destruction of the sluice gates alone would not release enough water
to make the Bukhan River impassable.55
273
Since the danger of flooding appeared slight, Ridgway did not pur
sue the matter and did not include the dam among the RUGGED and
DAUNTLESS objectives. However, on 4 April after Operation RUGGED
began, the IX Corps engineer conducted an appraisal that came to different
conclusions. He argued that if the reservoir was filled to capacity and all
the sluice gates and penstocks were opened simultaneously, the Bukhan
River would rise immediately 10 to 12 feet in the river gorge near LINE
KANSAS, flooding the Chuncheon Plain to a depth of 5 feet, disrupting
lateral movement in the corps zone, and obstructing traffic along the corps’
main line of communication. That line of communication ran from below
Chuncheon to Hwacheon along Route 17, which crossed the Bukhan River
on two floating treadway bridges. If these bridges were to be flooded out,
logistical sustainment of IX Corps would be severely hampered.56
Based on this new assessment, Ridgway kept the dam under aerial
observation and on 6 April moved the trace of LINE WYOMING slightly
to the north, including the dam as an objective of Operation DAUNTLESS.
He also shifted the boundary between IX and X Corps so that the dam and
its approach from the south were both in the IX Corps sector, while most
of the reservoir remained within the X Corps sector (see map 43). The
1st Marine Division, with the KMC 1st Regiment attached, was scheduled
to relieve the 1st Cavalry Division as the right flank of IX Corps front line
unit once the Corps reached LINE KANSAS, so the mission of captur
ing the dam logically would have fallen to the marines. However, after
the Munsan-ni airborne operation, Eighth Army released Captain Dorsey
B. Anderson’s 4th Ranger Company from the 187th Airborne RCT and
attached it to IX Corps. General Hoge decided that this unit, which arrived
on 7 April, would be ideally suited to conduct a raid to put the sluice
gates out of commission. Accordingly, he attached the Rangers to the 1st
Cavalry Division and instructed the division commander, Major General
Charles D. Palmer, to use the Ranger Company against the dam before
the division was pulled out of the line. Hoge did not, however, specify
precisely how the operation was to be conducted.57
There were only two ways to approach the dam from the south. One
was by way of a 2½-mile long peninsula formed by a horseshoe bend in
the Bukhan River and forming the west shore of the reservoir. The other
approach could only be made by crossing the water to another mile-long
peninsula that jutted south into the reservoir east of the dam. Hoge’s con
cept was that the Rangers would infiltrate along the west shore of the reser
voir (the eastern side of the western peninsula); destroy the gate machinery,
thus immobilizing the sluice gates in the closed position; and then with
draw. Hoge anticipated that the operation would take 2 to 4 hours.58
274
HW ACHEON
454 DAM
D ongche on -ri P eninsula

eninsu la
XXXX
E lm s PLA 39
HW ACHEON
RES
R
364
han
Buk
II
2 7 Cav
9–11 Ap r
I
A 7 Cav
11 Ap r
3 I
H w acheon R eservo ir O peration
1= 4 Rgr X 9 – 1 1 A pril 195 1
9–1
IX X X
I X
F urthest 7th C av a dva nce
I 7 Cav Line K a nsas
11 Ap r 0 ½ 1
M ililee s
Y ucheon-ri
Map 43. The Hwacheon Reservoir Operation, 9–11 April 1951.
Palmer, commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division, appar

ently unaware of Hoge’s concept for a raid, attached the Rangers to the
7th Cavalry Regiment, and directed the regimental commander, Colonel
William A. Harris, to capture the dam and immobilize the sluice gates.
Harris further attached the Rangers to his 2d Battalion, commanded by
Lieutenant Colonel John B. Callaway, to whom he assigned the dam mis
sion.59 The battalion jumped off at 0730 on 8 April in an attempt to get
closer to the dam. Moving up from their reserve position, they skirted
275
the IX Corps right flank, entering the X Corps zone to pass through the
23d Infantry Division and the French Battalion (the left flank units of
the US 2d Infantry Division). With Company G in the lead, the battalion
moved slowly forward without meeting much initial resistance, although
its patrols came under attack later in the day and received mortar fire. By
nightfall, the 2d Battalion and the Rangers had arrived just south of the
base of the western peninsula.60
While Callaway’s battalion and the Rangers moved forward on
8 April, Captain Anderson and Major Russell J. Wilson, the commander
of the 8th Engineer Combat Battalion (the 1st Cavalry Division Engineer
Battalion), visited another dam across the Bukhan River at Cheongpyeong
(Chungp’yong) to examine the sluice gate machinery, which was pre
sumed to be similar to that of the Hwacheon Dam. They determined that if
the cogs on the wheel that controlled the sluice gates were destroyed, the
gates would be immobilized.61
Given the slow rate of advance toward LINE KANSAS by the 1st Cav
alry Division, Colonel Harris did not expect the dam operation to take
place for several days, but two events now increased the pace of opera
tions. Late on 8 April, General Palmer ordered his two assault regiments,
the 7th and 8th Cavalry, to press the attack to LINE KANSAS the next
day. At midnight on 8 April, the Chinese soldiers and North Korean dam
employees began opening the sluice gates. Because the central electrical
power system was not working, the gates had to be opened manually or
with auxiliary power, a slow process, and only 10 gates were opened to
varying degrees. Early in the morning of 9 April, pilots flying over the dam
reported that about half of the gates had been opened and a crest of water
was moving down the river. At 0715 debris pushed down the river ahead
of the water surge damaged the northernmost of the floating bridges before
it could be swung out of the way. Engineers cut the southern bridge loose
and swung it to the east side of the river before the surge of water hit so it
was not damaged. Although the water level reached 7 feet in the Bukhan
River Valley, IX Corps was able to keep its supplies flowing across the
river using ferries constructed of assault rafts. The flood surge soon passed
and both bridges were put back into operation.62
As the sluice gates were opened, the Chinese opposing the 7th and
8th Cavalry Regiments withdrew behind the river to avoid being cut off
by the flood. This left the way open for a 1st Cavalry Division advance,
and by 1200 on 9 April Palmer’s two assault regiments had reached
LINE KANSAS. General Ridgway, who had made an aerial reconnais
sance of the flood damage, was at the IX Corps command post (CP) at
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the time, and ordered Hoge to carry out the planned raid to close the open
sluice gates and immobilize the machinery to prevent them from being
reopened. Hoge ordered Palmer to carry out the dam operation immedi
ately. Callaway’s 2d Battalion, with the Ranger Company and a platoon of
engineers attached, was designated as TF Callaway for this operation.63
The plan was for the 2/7th Cavalry (which during the morning had
advanced to the high ground south of the western peninsula) to advance
north to seize Hill 454, overlooking the dam. Once Hill 454 was secured,
the Rangers and engineers would slip forward along the west bank of the
reservoir to the dam, close the opened sluice gates, destroy the gate mech
anism, then cross the dam and secure the high ground overlooking the
dam on the eastern peninsula.64 The hastily-planned attack began at 1330.
At about 1500 the lead unit, Company F, 2/7th Cavalry, reached the road
at the base of the western peninsula. As soon as they crossed the road,
Company F came under small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire
from an estimated company of Chinese that held a line across the narrow
neck of the peninsula and who were supported by fire from Hill 364 and
from the high ground west of the Bukhan River.
Artillery and air support for the task force was limited. The 7th
Cavalry’s line of communication was a narrow, twisting road that came up
from the south through the 2d Infantry Division sector and then ran from
the village of Yucheon-ri (Yuch’on-ni) to the reservoir. It was a mountain
track, impassable by anything larger than a jeep, thus preventing the
105-mm direct support artillery battalions from being brought within range.
Artillery support was limited to that of the divisional 155-mm howitzer
battalion (the 82d Field Artillery Battalion) firing at extreme range.
Poor weather hindered air support; however, one close air support mis
sion made it through the clouds at about 1700. Colonel Callaway called
it in based on reports from Company F, which had misreported its posi
tion so the air strike fell on unoccupied ground with little impact on the
Chinese. Soon thereafter, Company F called for six stretchers and reported
that its commander had been killed. Callaway took this to mean that the
company had sustained heavy casualties although, in fact, only one other
soldier had been hit. As darkness fell, with its lead company pinned down
by enemy fire, Callaway called in artillery fire, withdrew his force back
behind the road at the base of the peninsula, and prepared to resume the
attack the next morning.65
During the morning of 9 April, prior to TF Callaway’s attack, Captain
Anderson of the Rangers made an aerial reconnaissance of the reservoir
and concluded that, while an overland approach was limited by the terrain
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to a narrow frontal attack, it would be possible for the Rangers to cross the
reservoir under cover of darkness, land on the eastern peninsula, and make
a surprise attack on the dam while the Chinese were diverted by the attack
up the western peninsula. Colonel Harris had reached a similar conclusion
and directed his staff to get 20 assault boats from the 8th Engineers. The
engineers, anticipating a requirement to cross the Bukhan River, had ear
lier acquired boats and material for an amphibious operation; but before
Harris’s request reached them, and anticipating the 1st Cavalry Division’s
relief by the 1st Marine Division on 10 April, they had returned most of the
gear to the depots at Chuncheon and turned the rest over to the marines.66
In any event, there was to be one more attempt to reach the dam over
land. Before dawn on the morning of 10 April, Callaway and Anderson dis
cussed the plans for the attack. Anderson proposed the amphibious opera
tion, but believing that the Chinese had withdrawn from the critical terrain
(as they had consistently done during the previous days’ actions), Callaway
sent his men forward at 0730 in another frontal attack based essentially
on the same plan as the previous day, this time with Company G in the
lead.67 Once again, they were stopped by small arms, automatic weapons,
and mortar fire as soon as they crossed the road. Some 2 dozen soldiers
were killed or wounded. Low on ammunition, unable to push through the
enemy troops dug in along the half-mile wide neck of land, and expecting
to be relieved by the KMC 2d Battalion that evening, Callaway halted the
attack and broke contact with the enemy at 1530.68
The relief of the 1st Cavalry Division had already begun with the
8th Cavalry moving off the line to be replaced by the 1st Marine Division
and the KMC regiment. By 1730 the relief was completed and the
8th Cavalry moved south into a reserve position. The 7th Cavalry remained
in place, however. General Hoge, who had visited the 1st Cavalry Division
command post at 1000, was displeased with the efforts so far. Based on the
light casualties, Hoge concluded that the Chinese resistance was not great.
He insisted that the 7th Cavalry conduct a bona fide attack on the dam
before it left the front line. Callaway received word at 1830 that his task
force would not be relieved and would “take the dam.” Thinking that they
might continue the attack that night, the battalion sent forward ammunition
and communications equipment.69
General Hoge’s verbal order was confirmed by a IX Corps message to
General Palmer received by the 1st Cavalry Division at 2245 on 10 April:
“Take immediate steps to deny by fire enemy access to dam at CT9319.
Dispatch force to dam to close flood gates and to execute such work as will
reduce enemy capability to release additional water from reservoir.”70
278
General Palmer told Colonel Harris that he could commit his entire
regiment if necessary. Harris decided to resume the attack before dawn
the next morning, making a much more substantial effort involving all
four battalions (including the Greek Battalion, which was attached to the
7th Cavalry), as well as the Rangers. The Rangers would cross the reservoir
in assault boats and land on the peninsula east of the dam under cover of
darkness with a lead element departing the south shore at 0230 and the
main body crossing at 0330. This would be the main effort. Meanwhile, the
2d Battalion would make another frontal attack up the western peninsula,
jumping off at 0400 to “contain and pin down the enemy.” Company C of
the 70th Tank Battalion was to move through the 23d Infantry Division and
up the road through the 7th Cavalry zone to support the attack. Six DUKW
amphibious trucks of the 558th Transportation Amphibious Truck Company
were to follow the tanks and then support the amphibious operation. The
3d Battalion would be prepared to support the Rangers, either by crossing
the reservoir to reinforce them, by passing through the 2d Battalion, or by
securing the western peninsula after it was captured by the 2d Battalion.
As a diversion, the 1st Battalion was to send one reinforced company
northwest across the Bukhan River and attack the Chinese entrenched on
the high ground to the west. The Greek Battalion would be the regimental
reserve, prepared for commitment wherever required.71
During the afternoon of 10 April, after the TF Callaway attack had
been called off, the Rangers prepared demolitions, organized teams, and
rehearsed various alternative courses of action. At this point, they did
not know whether they would be ordered to capture the dam, sneak in to
destroy the machinery, or to seize the high ground east of the dam and then
move in to immobilize the sluice gates.72
Meanwhile, a major effort was being made to retrieve the assault
boats, life preservers, and other amphibious gear, including the six DUKW
amphibious trucks of the 558th, that had been passed on to the 1st Marine
Division. Consideration was even given to air-dropping life boats from
air-sea rescue B-17s. Efforts were also made to obtain smoke to obscure
the crossing from Chinese observation. The regiment requested Air Force
smoke aircraft, smoke pots, and smoke generators to support the operation,
but the smoke aircraft mission was refused without explanation and, while
an attempt was made to airlift the smoke generating gear, the pots and gen
erators did not arrive until 2 days after the operation was concluded.73
During the night of 10/11 April, one battery of 155-mm howitzers
of the 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, and two batteries of 8-inch howitzers
of the 17th Field Artillery Battalion were brought forward to support the
279
operation. The 1st Cavalry Division Artillery 105-mm howitzers remained
out of range.74 At midnight on 10 April the Rangers were finally told they
were to conduct the amphibious crossing of the reservoir to seize high
ground east of the dam and then move in to immobilize the machinery.
This gave them 2 hours to prepare and move to the embarkation site.
Reinforced by a machinegun section from the 3d Battalion, 7th Cavalry
Weapons Company (Company M) and artillery and mortar forward
observers, the Rangers moved to a cove on the west bank of a narrow inlet
protruding south from the reservoir. There were only nine assault boats and
six outboard motors, which had been brought forward with great difficulty
over the mountain trail by jeeps and trailers or manhandled by Korean
porters. Additional boats were on the way, but these nine would be enough
to get the Rangers across the reservoir. There were no life preservers, so
two inflatable air mattresses were placed in each assault boat.75
Lieutenant Michael Healey’s 3d Platoon, 4th Ranger Company began
paddling across the water at 0345 on 11 April. One squad of Healey’s
platoon was the “killer” element, armed with knives, hand axes, hand gre
nades, pistols, and carbines. Their task was to secure the landing site. One
assault team of the second squad carried demolitions and was charged with
destroying the sluice gate machinery. The other second squad assault team
included a 57-mm recoilless rifle. The third squad carried sniper rifles,
automatic rifles, and “Ranger-type” rifle grenades: 60-mm mortar rounds
rigged to be fired from rifle grenade launchers. The outboard motors were
not used for the initial crossing to maintain surprise, so the men paddled
quietly across the water through wisps of fog and smoke, reaching the far
shore at 0420. Soon Captain Anderson arrived with the 2d Platoon, the
machine gunners, and the forward observers. The boats were then sent
back for the 1st Platoon while the men of the 3d and 2d Platoons climbed
through rain and sleet toward their first objective, a hill some 500 yards
north of the landing site.76
The Rangers’ main objective (Objective 77) (see map 44) was a steep
hill just east of the dam. Three finger-like ridges ran south from this hill.
The high ground of each of these ridges had been designated from west
to east as Objectives 80, 79, and 76. The Rangers initially moved up to
Objective 79. Although the hill was occupied by Chinese, the Rangers
managed to get to within a hundred yards before they came under rifle and
machinegun fire at around 0600. Knocking out one machinegun with fire
from the recoilless rifle and the other with grenades, the Rangers seized
the hill by 0615. Anderson decided to remain on Objective 79 and to
secure Objective 80 rather than move inland to Objective 77, because he
280
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Map 44. Hwacheon Operation: The Eastern (Dongcheon-ri)

Peninsula, 11 April 1951.
281
feared being cut off by the Chinese and he wanted to cover the landing of
the 1st Platoon, which was now paddling across the reservoir and coming
under enemy fire. Half of the platoon got across the reservoir and moved
to Objective 80, where heavy enemy small arms, automatic weapons, and
mortar fire stopped them. The second half of the platoon, including the
company executive officer, came under such heavy fire that they returned
to the embarkation site, where they joined Company I of the 3d Battalion,
7th Cavalry.77
At around 0700 Anderson, with his Rangers unable to advance
against the Chinese fire and running out of ammunition, requested
permission to withdraw. Colonel Harris refused and ordered Company I
of the 3d Battalion, which was assembled at the Rangers’ embarkation
site, to cross the reservoir to reinforce the Rangers and to resupply them
with ammunition. Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Hallden, commanding
officer of the 3d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, had selected Company I to be
the lead company if the battalion was committed. He sent Captain Norris
M. Teague, his S2 (who had ranger and amphibious experience), to the
embarkation site to organize the movement across the reservoir. On the
south bank, Teague assisted the Company I commander, Captain Thomas
J. Kennedy, to organize his men into 10-man boat teams and platoon-size
groups (boat waves) and had the men practice getting in and out of the boats
and paddling. Kennedy was alerted at 0900 that he was to reinforce the
Rangers. There were only eight boats and two working motors available,
but Kennedy and Teague launched the first wave (the 3d Platoon) across at
around 1000. It took them 1½ hours to cross the reservoir under small arms
and mortar fire, but they arrived on the far shore with no casualties (but
some holes in the boats) at around 1130 and moved up to Objective 79 to
make contact with the Rangers. By noon, the Rangers, most of which had
moved to Objective 80, were still unable to advance and the movement of
Company I was going slowly due to the lack of boats and motors. Using
the two powered boats to tow up to five additional assault boats, Teague
and Kennedy finally got the last of Company I across the reservoir by
1400, but by that time the entire operation was stalled.78
The 2d Battalion began its attack on the western peninsula at 0430
with Company E in the lead. Soon after crossing the road at the base of
the peninsula, Company E came under heavy fire from a line of Chinese
pillboxes that wounded 25 of its men. The Chinese fortifications appeared
impervious to the long-range artillery fire. Incoming Chinese artillery
fire killed the Company H (Heavy Weapons Company) commander and
two other soldiers. Shortly after 0600 tanks from Company C, 70th Tank
Battalion tried to move up to support the attack, but couldn’t get past
282
craters in the road (the DUKWs of the 558th Amphibious Truck Company
that were to follow the tanks and support the operation finally arrived
late in the afternoon). Callaway attempted to move Company G around
the flank of Company E, but the peninsula was too narrow for maneuver.
At 1300 Callaway ordered Company E to prepare to send an element by
boat around the flank of the Chinese position. However, all the assault
boats were being used to move Company I of the 3d Battalion across
the reservoir to reinforce the Rangers.79 The 1st Battalion’s diversionary
attack across the river never materialized. Company A sent out patrols to
find crossing sites, but came under heavy fire from Chinese emplaced on
the high ground on the west bank.80
At noon, with neither the Rangers nor the 2/7th Cavalry making
any headway, General Palmer called Colonel Harris and asked if he rec
ommended calling off the operation. Harris was still confident that the
Rangers could get to the dam if the 3d Battalion could get across the res
ervoir. At 1300 Palmer called again and gave Harris permission to end
the operation. By 1600 the Rangers and Company I were still blocked
on the eastern peninsula, and the shortage of boats and operable motors
prevented rapid reinforcement of the Rangers by the rest of the 3/7th
Cavalry. The 2/7th Cavalry was pinned down on the western peninsula,
while the 1/7th Cavalry had made no progress in its attempt to find river
crossing sites and was under fire from the Chinese on the western heights.
Harris concluded that the losses suffered were more than the operation was
worth and at 1800, concerned that the Chinese would attack the force on
the far side of the reservoir during the night, he ordered the Rangers and
Company I to withdraw. They returned to the landing site, and at 1830
the Rangers paddled back across the reservoir, followed by Company I at
2100. The Chinese did not interfere with the withdrawal. Both units closed
the assembly area south of the reservoir by 0130 on April 12.81
The Chinese had made a tenacious defense of the approaches to the
dam, but other factors affected the outcome of the operation. The configu
ration of the terrain restricted maneuver room in the attack up the western
peninsula. The terrain and the constricted line of communication made
resupply difficult and kept much of the divisional artillery out of range.
The poor weather hindered air operations. Perhaps more importantly, the
attacks were hastily planned and coordination among the attacking and the
supporting units was poor. The knowledge that the 1st Cavalry Division
was to be relieved on the line on 10 April affected the planning for the
operation, including the decision to turn in the assault boats and other
amphibious equipment just before the decision was made to use them, and
probably reduced the enthusiasm of the 7th Cavalry to press the attack.82
283
Both General Hoge and the Ranger company commander believed that
the mission could have been accomplished had the Rangers been sent in
initially to infiltrate along the west shore to the dam and conduct a surprise
raid. But once the element of surprise was lost and the enemy reinforced
his positions on 11 April, Hoge estimated that an entire division would
have to be committed to capture the ground dominating the dam. Since
Ridgway’s orders had been to get the job done without needless casualties
and with Operation DAUNTLESS now beginning, Hoge decided to wait
until the dam could be captured as part of the IX Corps general advance to
LINE WYOMING.83
As the 7th Cavalry was making its final, unsuccessful attempt to reach
the Hwacheon Dam, the Chinese that were dug in along the south bank of
the reservoir began withdrawing to the north. The 23d Infantry Regiment
of the 2d Division, X Corps, observed the Chinese making an amphibi
ous withdrawal to the north and called in air strikes that reported sinking
15 boats. On 12 April the 2d Infantry Division reached the area south of
the Hwacheon Reservoir as the Chinese continued to withdraw by boat.
That same day, the KMC 1st Regiment took over the 7th Cavalry sec
tor. On 13 April the Netherlands Battalion, attached to the 2d Infantry
Division, probed along the south bank of the reservoir without making
contact with enemy forces and by 16 April it was clear that the Chinese
were gone. Elements of the ROK 1st Marine Regiment occupied positions
on the west bank of the Hwacheon Reservoir on 16 April and on 18 April
they secured the dam.84
During the Chinese Spring Offensive, Eighth Army abandoned the
dam on 25 April. In late May, Eighth Army had once again crossed the
Bukhan River and faced the possibility of another enemy release of water
from the dam. To preclude this, Navy Skyraider attack aircraft damaged
three of the sluice gates with aerial torpedoes. When the ROK 6th Division
captured the dam for the final time on 1 June 1951, engineers removed five
of the sluice gates so that further water impoundment and release would
be impossible.85
Amphibious Training, March–May 1951

In March 1951 General MacArthur began to rebuild the FEC’s
amphibious capability. GHQ FEC requested the 2d ESB, then still operat
ing the port of Incheon, be returned to its amphibious capabilities and mis
sion. General Ridgway agreed that it would be desirable to relieve 2d ESB
from port operations to permit overhauling equipment and retraining, but
argued that four substitute port facility units would be required to operate
Incheon. These were not available from within the FEC resources and, at
284
that time, the relief of the brigade was not considered important enough to
warrant a request to Department of the Army for additional transportation
port units. Ridgway agreed, however, to have the brigade train as much as
possible in its primary amphibious role, consistent with its required use as
a port unit, and transferred the 866th Transportation Port Company from
Japan to Korea to take over some of the port operations. The eventual
relief of the brigade would be at his discretion.86
These actions coincided with the establishment of a corps headquar
ters in Japan with responsibility for the ground defense of the Japanese
islands, a mission that soon included the development of amphibious-
capable Army forces. During the first 9 months of the war, the FEC
referred to combat units in Japan as the GHQ Reserve, although there was
no separate headquarters with this function. On 12 March 1951 a corps
headquarters, initially designated GHQ Reserve Corps, was assembled at
Sendai, Japan, under Major General Roderick Allen. On 1 April 1951 the
unit was formally activated with the mission of providing “ground defense
and general security for Hokkaido, and for Honshu north and east of the
western boundaries of Niigata, Nagano, and Shizuoka prefectures.”87 The
corps included the newly arrived 40th and 45th Divisions (California and
Oklahoma National Guard units that had been called to Active Federal
Service in September 1950), the 34th RCT, the 56th ATTB (now operat
ing as a light tank unit), and the 229th Signal Operations Company, which
had been transferred from Korea in April. GHQ Reserve Corps assumed
responsibility for the general security of its zone on 20 April.88
On 10 May 1951, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, XVI
Corps was activated at Sendai, Japan, from the personnel and equipment of
the GHQ Reserve Corps.89 Allen continued in command. Although the pri
mary XVI Corps mission continued to be the defense of Japan, the Corps
was about to begin a vigorous amphibious training program to be pre
pared in the event a landing should be required. By that time Eighth Army
in Korea had come under the command of an officer with amphibious
experience, an offensive spirit, and a desire to make use of the American
amphibious capability.
Van Fleet in Command: Amphibious Plans, April–June 1951

On 14 April 1951 Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet took com
mand of Eighth Army, replacing General Ridgway, who had succeeded
General MacArthur as Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE)/
CINCUNC following President Truman’s relief of MacArthur from com
mand on 11 April.90 At this time the mission of Eighth Army was essen
tially defensive (“to repel aggression against so much of the territory (and
285
the people therein) of the Republic of Korea, as you now occupy”) with the
goal of “inflicting maximum personnel casualties and materiel losses on
hostile forces in Korea.” Van Fleet was to “maintain the offensive spirit”
of Eighth Army and “retain the initiative, through maximum maneuver
of firepower, within the limitations imposed by logistics and terrain, and
without undue sacrifice of men or equipment.” To this end, Van Fleet was
authorized to conduct amphibious and airborne landings, although advance
beyond the KANSAS–WYOMING Line running from the junction of the
Han and Imjin Rivers, through Cheorwon, the Hwacheon Reservoir, and
Daepo-ri (Taep’o-ri) was to be on Ridgway’s orders only.91 (See map 45.)
Van Fleet was an advocate of amphibious operations, both actual
assaults to outflank the Communists and deceptive demonstrations to fix
their forces in place and disperse their defensive efforts. In World War II,
as commander of the 8th Infantry Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division,
he had spent months conducting shore-to-shore amphibious training in
the United States, followed by intensive ship-to-shore training in England
before his regiment landed at Utah Beach on D-Day. Unlike the bitter and
bloody situation on adjacent Omaha Beach, the Utah Beach landings went
relatively smoothly, reinforcing Van Fleet’s positive view of amphibious
operations.92
His attitude toward amphibious operations was reflected in an anec
dote recounted by Rear Admiral George C. Dyer, who replaced Admiral
Smith as the commander of TF 95 (the offshore blockade and escort force)
in June 1951. Dyer, who had served with amphibious forces in the Sicily
and Salerno operations in World War II, commanded a cruiser division in
the Mediterranean in 1948, during the Greek Civil War when Van Fleet
was Chief of the US Military Mission to Greece. Dyer had pointed out to
Van Fleet that Greece was a peninsula, with coasts vulnerable to amphibi
ous assault and naval bombardment. When Dyer arrived in Korea in June
1951, Van Fleet’s first words to him were, “Korea is a peninsula!”93
A week after Van Fleet took command of Eighth Army, he and Ridgway
discussed upcoming operations. Van Fleet agreed with Ridgway that with
a new Chinese offensive imminent, Eighth Army should not push beyond
its current front line, but he suggested that later in the summer it might
be advantageous for Eighth Army to conduct an amphibious operation on
the east coast near Wonsan to push north and establish a more favorable
defensive line. Ridgway dismissed the idea as too risky.94
Van Fleet’s next, and more formal, recommendation for an amphibi
ous operation to support a ground offensive came following the Chinese
Spring (Fifth Phase) Offensive of 22 April to 20 May 1951. During the first
286
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in the west to a point about 10 miles north of the 38th Parallel in the east.
Army had stabilized its front along a line running from just north of Seoul
the Eighth Army line west of the Hwacheon Reservoir. By 30 April Eighth
impulse of their offensive, from 22 to 30 April, the Chinese broke through
287
Map 45. Chinese spring offensive, 1951.
The Chinese renewed their offensive on 16 May, focusing on the eastern
half of the Eighth Army line, pushing the US X Corps and ROK III Corps
south and eventually forming a deep salient.95
In support of the Eighth Army defense and to fix enemy forces on the
east coast, Rear Admiral Kiland’s TF 90 (Amphibious Forces Far East)
and Rear Admiral Allen E. Smith’s TF 95 conducted a series of amphibi
ous demonstrations (see map 46). TF 95 cruisers—the St. Paul, Helena,
and Manchester—and four destroyers bombarded Goseong on 24 April.
On 29–30 April, the Helena, Manchester, and two TF 90 APAs and one
AKA conducted an amphibious demonstration near Gojeo (Kojo). General
Van Fleet requested another such operation for 6–7 May at Ganseong
(Kansong). This was carried out by the Helena and four destroyers, which
opened fire as ROK forces ashore were coming under heavy attack. The
Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) credited the naval gunfire with
saving the ROK unit. On 20 May a small contingent of Royal Marines
using landing craft from the LSD Comstock, and supported by US and
Commonwealth naval units, made a brief incursion on the west coast south
of Jinnampo and across from the island of Chodo.96
By 20 May the Chinese offensive had been brought to a halt and
General Van Fleet immediately went on the offensive (see map 47).
The ROK I Corps pushed north along the coast toward Yangyang while
X Corps advanced toward the area between the Hwacheon Reservoir and
the ROK I Corps boundary. The corps consisted of the 1st Marine Division
on the left and the US 2d Division with the ROK 5th Division attached
in the center. On the right was the US 3d Division, which had made a
fast march across the width of Korea from the Seoul area to reinforce
X Corps, with the ROK 9th Division and one regiment of the ROK 8th
Division attached. Van Fleet was anxious to capture as many Chinese and
North Koreans as possible. Almond, hoping to cut them off by attack
ing northeast toward the coast, issued orders for Operation CHOPPER
on 25 April. The marines were to advance to Yanggu at the eastern tip of
the reservoir, the 2d Division was to capture the town of Inje, and the 3d
Division was to destroy the enemy in the eastern part of the corps zone.
The 187th Airborne RCT, which had also been attached to I Corps, was to
form TF Baker and strike out to the northeast, all the way to the coast, and
capture the seaport of Ganseong.97
Van Fleet wanted Ganseong specifically, for he had conceived a bold
operation to bag a substantial part of the enemy force. On 28 May he
requested approval for an amphibious landing to take place on 6 June (the
288
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C h a n g se o n g RES -ri
H a g a ru -ri Iw o n
•
iju
U iju i ch e o n
•
Da
er
i n u iju
S in iju -ri
In ch o -ri
A m phibious D em onstrations
ye
••
on
ng R
gR
R
don
g
n
D ae Hamheung
R
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A pril–M
pril – M ay 1 95 1
•
G u ry eo
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•
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ju
Je o n g ju
eo
•
D e o kch e o n
Ch
0 25 50
N orth K orea
i n a n ju
S in ju il e s
M ile
R oyal M arin es
D em onstration
Yangdeok
• W on sa n
•
D em onstration
2 9 – 3 0 A p ril
r il
••
20 M ay
T F 95 B om bardm ent
•
T o n g ch e o n
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•
r il
2 4 A p ril
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S a riw
•
P ye o n g g a n g B om bardm ent
• • 6–7 M ay
• •
je o m
N a m ch e o n je G a n se o n g
im h w a
G im
•
• •
C h e o rw o n
• • •
ji n
O n g jin ju
38 °
38° 38 °
38°
• ••
C h u n ch e o n
ji n
Ju m u n jin
•
M u n sa n
•
U ije
E a st S ea
•
I n ch e o n
In
•
S a m ch e o k
D eokjeok Islands W on jjuu
Ha
Suwon
n
• •
R
Je ch e o n
O sa n
A san B ay
• U lji
ljinn
•
•
C h u n g jjuu
Y e o n g jjuu
•
Andong
• • Yeongdeok
•
R
S a n g jjuu
R
dong
um
Ge
D a e jjee o n
•
N ak
• •
G iim
m ch e o n Pohang
• • G u n sa n
Je o n jjuu •
Daegu
Y e o g ch e o n
•
G ye o n g jjuu

•
rya n g U llsa
sa n
•
• • • ••
JJin
in h a e
•
M a sa n
i n jjuu
JJin
W e st S ea G w a n g jjuu S u ye o n g
•
T o n g ye o n g
B u sa n it
M o kp o
ra
•
Y e o su
• N am hae
Ko
r ea
T sushim a
Map 46. Amphibious demonstrations, April–May 1951.
seventh anniversary of his Utah Beach landing) in coordination with an

offensive northeast of Hwacheon. The 1st Marine Division was to be with
drawn from the line and replaced by ROK units backed up by the US 2d
Division, X Corps Artillery, and additional armor. Part of the marine divi
sion would then stage through Ganseong, where they would mount out
aboard the amphibious ships of TF 90 and then land 28 miles to the north
289
P roposed T ong cheon O peration
6 June 1 95 1
A ctual
ctua l lim it of E ighth A rm y advanc e
0 10 20 30
Y eonghe ung B ay
M ililee s
W onsan B ay
W on sa n
E a st S ea
(S ea o f Jap an )
T o n g ch e o n
•
• -ri
D u p o -ri
1 M ar D iv
(E lem en ts)
G o se o n g
• • Ja n g a d a e g o t
H u iya
i ya n g
•
• -ri
H yo n -ri
-)
1 M ar D iv ((-)
• Changdo
•
G eumseong
•
G a n se o n g
• G im
im h w a
R O K I C o rp s
X C o rp s
S o kch o
•
IX C o rp s
H w a ch e o n • Yanggu
•
HW ACHEO N
RES
je
In je
•
Map 47. Proposed Tongcheon operation, 6 June 1951.
in a shore-to-shore operation at Tongcheon. The rest of the division would

move up the coast road. The entire division would then attack to the south
west along the Tongcheon–Gimhwa (Kumhwa) road while the IX Corps,
reinforced with the US 2d and ROK 9th Divisions and the 187th Airborne
RCT, was to attack from Hwacheon northeast toward Gimhwa. IX Corps
and the marines would trap the retreating enemy forces between them and
they would then be destroyed by the advancing X Corps.98
On 28 May General Almond met with Lieutenant General Lemuel C.
Shepherd (Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific), Major
General Gerald C. Thomas (who had replaced Oliver P. Smith as command
ing general of the 1st Marine Division on 24 April), and Major General
290
Clark L. Ruffner (commanding general of the 2d Division). Thomas was
enthusiastic about the marines carrying out the kind of amphibious opera
tion for which they were trained.99 That same day, Ridgway met with Van
Fleet at the Eighth Army Tactical Command Post at Pyeongtaek to discuss
the next steps, including Van Fleet’s proposed amphibious operation. To
Van Fleet’s disappointment, Ridgway raised objections to the plan.
Ridgway pointed out that since the UN forces were extremely dispersed
and the enemy still had an offensive capability, removing the Marine divi
sion from the front line would be dangerous. Furthermore, JCS approval
would be required for any operation beyond the approved objective line
(known as the KANSAS–WYOMING Line). Ridgway saw small rewards
to be gained even if the operation was successful and noted the impossibil
ity of clearing all of Korea of enemy forces and the necessity of securing
a line that Eighth Army could hold. He reminded Van Fleet of the mission
requirement to “effect maximum destruction of the enemy with minimum
casualties to our own forces,” and the desirability of advancing to, but not
beyond, the KANSAS–WYOMING Line.100
Ridgway also argued that he could not support the proposed operation
from Japan, to which Van Fleet replied that the Chinese Army had been
“completely defeated” and that Eighth Army was in the pursuit and so
its ammunition requirements would be less than in a deliberate attack.101
Ridgway was not persuaded. Years later he noted that had the operation
taken place, the marines would have been isolated by the mountain spine
inland of Tongcheon. “It could have had, again, the makings of the same
damn situation that MacArthur had blundered into . . . when he separated
the X Corps. So I would have none of it. I thought he would get heavy
casualties out of it with little return.”102
Van Fleet remained convinced that the Chinese Army was so weak
ened that an amphibious turning movement and push to the north would
have been successful and would have put the UNC in a good position for
the armistice negotiations that would soon begin. However, the Chinese
resistance to the UNC offensive had stiffened by the end of May and, in
the central sector, Eighth Army was unable to capture the key logistics and
transportation area encompassed by the towns of Cheorwon, Gimhwa, and
Pyeonggang known as the “Iron Triangle.” Historian Roy E. Appleman,
after analyzing the intelligence assessments of the Chinese and North
Korean capabilities, concluded that Van Fleet’s and Almond’s views on
the state of enemy forces and the likelihood of success of an amphibious
operation in the Wonsan area “were unrealistic and euphoric” and that
“General Ridgway’s more cautious views were in order.” Nonetheless,
291
with the amphibious and other naval assets then available, the Chinese
forces in the process of withdrawing, and the enemy coastal defenses
not yet consolidated, Van Fleet’s arguments for an amphibious operation
remain persuasive.103
Amphibious Training, May–August 1951

Although Ridgway rejected Van Fleet’s proposals for amphibious
operations, he recognized the potential value of such operations and as
CINCFE continued the reconstitution of an amphibious capability begun
by General MacArthur the previous March. From 20 to 28 May, all of
the available units of TF 90 began an extensive period of amphibious
training in Japan in accordance with Combined Task Force (CTF) 90
Operation Order (OPORD) No. 6-51. The training included landing exer
cises at Chigasaki Beach in Sagami Bay on 26–27 May. No US Marine
or Army units participated in this Navy training, although the British 41st
Independent Commando Royal Marines made a landing before dawn on
the morning of the 26 May as part of this training.104
That same month, Ridgway directed XVI Corps to begin amphibious
training at the RCT-level using specialist instructor teams from the Naval
Amphibious Training Center at Camp McGill. The 40th Division was
scheduled to receive amphibious training from 10 June to 10 September
1951 and the RCTs of the 45th Division would receive their training from
September to November. At this time there were no Army amphibious
units in Japan. The 56th ATTB was still configured as a light tank unit
attached to the 34th RCT for Kanto Plain defense and the 2d ESB could
not yet be spared from their duties in Korea.105
The goal was for elements of XVI Corps to be combat ready and capa
ble of participating in amphibious operations by 1 September. Preliminary
moves toward truce talks had begun in June and Ridgway considered an
offensive to keep up the pressure on the Chinese and North Koreans and to
establish a suitable defensible front line to serve as a basis for a cease-fire
line. On 19 June he directed Van Fleet and the other Service component
commanders to prepare an operation plan and “to include an estimate of
the feasibility of and requirements for an advance north of the KANSAS–
WYOMING Line.” The scheme of maneuver was to be a main effort
toward Wonsan with the left flank anchored on the Yeseong River and an
advance toward Pyeongyang—with the objective of establishing a defen
sive zone along the line running from Pyeongyang in the west to Wonsan
in the east. Ridgway anticipated that, if negotiations were to take place,
a demilitarized zone might be established “on the basis of the position of
the opposing ground units in combat at the time” of the negotiations. The
292
PYEONGYANG–WONSAN Line would be an advantageous truce line.
Ridgway noted, “The plan should examine the desirability of conducting
an amphibious operation in the WONSAN area.”106
Two RCTs of the 40th Division were scheduled for pre-afloat train
ing at Camp Haugen followed by afloat phases, including landings at
Chigasaki and Ohata, in July and August.107 Amphibious training of the
160th and 223d RCTs of the 40th Infantry Division began on 11 June.108
From 23 to 27 June the Commander of Transport Division 12 (CTG 90.2)
aboard his flagship, the Calvert (APA-32), conducted the afloat phase of
the training. Troops of the RCTs were embarked at Shiogama, near the
Japanese city of Sendai, and landed at Chigasaki Beach.109
On 19 June 1951 General Allen visited Camp Younghans to inspect
the amphibious training and on 27 June, Allen and Ridgway observed the
223d’s amphibious landing at Chigasaki Beach. They expressed satisfac
tion that the landing was well planned and executed. By the end of June,
both RCTs had completed their amphibious training.110 Amphibious train
ing for other XVI Corps elements at the battalion and regimental level
continued in July. The monthly command report noted, “Training was as
realistic as possible. Authority was granted to use napalm bombs in the
amphibious assaults.”111
In July XVI Corps requested authority to reorganize the 56th ATTB
into a cavalry reconnaissance battalion. The unit had previously been
equipped as a light armored unit to supplement the defense of Japan and
was currently training as such with emphasis on the battalion in the attack,
exploitation and pursuit, delaying actions, and defense, in addition to
the mission of reconnoitering the Kanto Plain. CINCFE disapproved the
request, because he wished to expand the XVI Corps amphibious capabil
ity and was about to direct that the 56th ATTB be reorganized to perform
its original function as an amphibious unit.112
By August 1951 GHQ FEC believed there were enough transportation
corps units in Korea that the 2d ESB, which had been operating the port of
Incheon since January, could be returned to Japan “to sharpen its state of
readiness to perform its combat mission as an amphibious unit.” Ridgway
once again asked for Van Fleet’s views. Van Fleet said that in September
his command would make a detailed study of the port operation require
ments and assess whether there was a continuing need for the 2d ESB.113
Special Operations, June–August 1951

By June 1951 preliminary moves toward truce talks led to a slowdown
in combat operations. The talks began on 10 July 1951, bringing a lull in
293
the war of movement that had taken place during the first 6 months of
1951. However, the siege of Wonsan, partisan operations along the coasts,
amphibious raids, intelligence collection missions, and naval bombard
ments of KPA positions continued.
During this time, the fast transport Begor (APD-127) ranged along
the northeast coast of Korea, putting South Korean intelligence agents and
guerrillas ashore. One of the largest of these clandestine operations took
place on the night of 2/3 June, when UDT-3 guided 235 ROK guerrillas to
shore on Songdo Island, near Gojeo south of Wonsan (see map 48). That
same night an ROK intelligence team was evacuated from the vicinity of
Goseong under cover of fire by an ROK Navy submarine chaser and the
US destroyer Rush. Four days later, the destroyer Rupertus (DD-851) put
a raiding party ashore at Seongjin. The sailors captured three prisoners
and, after coming under small arms fire, returned to the ship without
casualties.114
In May 1951 Eighth Army revised its organization for partisan
operations. Since the beginning of the program in January, these
operations had been conducted under the direction of the Attrition Section
of the Eighth United States Army in Korea (EUSAK) G3 Miscellaneous
Division. This had created the anomaly of a staff section engaging in
operations. Accordingly, on 15 May Eighth Army deactivated the Attrition
Section and reactivated it as the 8086th AU, Miscellaneous Group.115 The
partisans operating from TF Leopard base on the west coast continued
their operations during this period and the east coast partisans of TF
Kirkland were called on in early June to conduct an operation behind the
lines in support of the ROK I Corps’ final drive to LINE KANSAS. The
beginning of the truce talks in July had an impact on partisan operations,
however. The prospect of a major Eighth Army offensive faded and the
static military situation meant that the partisans could not be used in the
optimum fashion, to support conventional military operations as a behind
the-lines auxiliary force. As pressure on the front line eased, North Korean
and Chinese forces were freed for increased security measures. The morale
of the partisans, who were fighting for a united non-Communist Korea,
was also affected by the realization that the liberation of the north was
increasingly unlikely. Nonetheless, the west coast partisans continued to
carry out their operations, while, with few sources of recruitment, an ever-
diminishing TF Kirkland force spent the rest of the war on the east coast
conducting occasional raids and intelligence collection.116
Operations against Wonsan and the surrounding area were stepped up
in the summer of 1951. Since the KMC 42d Company had established
294
C h e o n g jijinn
•
• • H a p su
M a n p o jijinn
•
R
C hina • • •
Ja ng jin
G a n g g ye G ilj
iljuu
• C h o sa n
• P u n g sa n
• •
R
lu
•
Ya
M u p ye o n g --ri
ri B U JE O N S e o n g jijinn U S S R upertus R aid
B ye o kd o n g
•
RES 6 Ju n e
••
JA N G JJIN
IN D a n ch e o n
•
N a m sa n --ri
ri
• •
(C H O S IN
IN )
H a g a ru --ri
ri
••
C h a n g se o n g RES IIw
won
•
U ijijuu H u iich
U S /B ritish M arine R aid
•
Da
er
S iinn u ijijuu In ch o --ri

ri 2 D e ce m b e r
ye
••
on
ng R
R
R
ong
g
n
d Hamheung
D ae
R
eo
•
G u ry eo
ch Heungnam
•
ng
Je o n g jjuu
eo
•
D e o kch e o n W onsan S eige
Ch
N orth K orea
S iinn a n jjuu
G uerrilla Lan ding, 2 – 3 Ju n e
Yangdeok
• W on sa n
•
T F K irkland
•• Jangjeo n D em onstration
•
T o n g ch e o n
Jin
J in n a m p o 3 1 A u g u st
•
nR
Y eseo ng R
G o se o n g
Im ji
C hod o
• S a riw
riw o n
•
P ye o n g g a n g Intel T eam E vacuation
• • 2 – 3 Ju n e
• •
G iim
mhwa
•
• •
C h e o rw o n
• • •
38 °
38° 38 °
38°
• ••
C h u n ch e o n
Ju m u n jijinn
•
M u n sa n
•
E a st S ea
•
LE O P A R D B ase S eoul
eou l H o n g ch e o n
P artisan O perations I n ch e o n
In
•
W on jjuu S a m ch e o k
Ha
Suwon
n
• •
R
Je ch e o n
A san B ay
• U lji
ljinn
•
•
C h u n g jjuu
Y e o n g jjuu
•
Andong
• • Yeongdeok
•
R
S a n g jjuu
R
dong
um
W e st S ea
Ge
D a e jjee o n
•
N ak
• •
G iim
m ch e o n Pohang
(Y e llow S ea )
• • G u n sa n
Je o n jjuu •
Daegu
Y e o g ch e o n
•
G ye o n g jjuu

•
rya n g U llsa
sa n
•
• • • ••
JJin
in h a e
•
M a sa n
J i n jjuu
Jin
A m phibious R a ids G w a n g jjuu S u ye o n g
•
T o n g ye o n g
B u sa n it
and D em onstrations M o kp o
ra
G eoje do St
•
Y e o su
June – D ecem ber 1951
June–D
0 25 50
• N am hae
Ko
r ea
M ile
il e s T sushim a
Map 48. Amphibious raids and demonstrations, June–December 1951.
itself on the islands off Wonsan in February and March, a number of intel
ligence and special operations organizations had begun operating there.
On 1 July an advance party of Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale’s
41st Independent Commando Royal Marines, accompanied by a Marine
Shore Fire Control Party (SFCP), left Camp McGill to establish a base on
Yodo, the largest of the islands. The Royal Marines conducted some local
small-scale raids before beginning operations along the northeast coast.117
295
Also in July, the UNC established a Senior Military Liaison Office on
Yodo to control the various military ground units operating in the Wonsan
area, to “supervise ROK Marine garrisons on the islands, and furnish liai
son and central authority through which the naval commander in the area
would be fully informed.” However, the liaison office exercised no con
trol over the multifarious intelligence collections activities of the various
groups operating in the Wonsan area.118
Amphibious Planning and Training, August–November 1951

On 23 August the North Korean People’s Army (KPA)/Chinese
People’s Volunteers (CPV) side broke off the truce negotiations. With
the talks stalled, Eighth Army resumed limited objective attacks to keep
pressure on the Communists and to seize terrain to improve its defensive
position. In the west, Eighth Army made gains of about 4 miles along
the front from the west coast to Cheorwon. Heavy fighting took place in
the eastern sector near a terrain feature called the Punchbowl in rugged
terrain that came to be known as Heartbreak Ridge and Bloody Ridge.119
(See map 49.)
Along the east coast, the ROK I Corps pushed north to the outskirts of
Goseong. To support this attack, General Ridgway ordered Admiral Joy to
conduct a large-scale amphibious demonstration in the vicinity of Jangjeon
(Changjon) north of Goseong. On 27 August a minesweeping group and
the dock landing ship Whetstone moved into the presumed beachhead
area. A gunfire support group consisting of the heavy cruiser Helena, three
destroyers, and an LMS(R) rocket-firing ship followed them. The battle
ship New Jersey, escorted by a destroyer, arrived on 30 August, and on
that day the surface ships began bombarding the beach and surrounding
area. The bombardment continued through 31 August, when carrier air
craft saturated the beach with rockets and an amphibious transport group
moved in. Landing craft were lowered into the water, formed into waves,
and churned toward the beach. Then they turned away, returned to the
transports, and were recovered. The New Jersey and its consorts fired a
final bombardment and steamed off, the demonstration complete. It is not
clear whether the operation succeeded in persuading the North Koreans to
hold forces in the Jangjeon area rather than sending them to reinforce the
front line.120
The Eighth Army attacks continued into September. While they were
taking place, General Van Fleet proposed an operation called TALONS
through which he intended to straighten the line along the Eighth Army
eastern front by capturing terrain from 1 to 15 miles to the north of
296
W on sa n
XXXX XXX
•
NK GHQ N K V II Line of C ontact and
E ast C oast B eaches
R
P yeo ngyan g G o je
je o 10 July 19 51
ng
T o n g ch e o n
do
R
e
E ighth A rm y front
••
Da
Jin
J in n a m p o
XXX
Im ji n
NK IV 0 10 20 30 40
• je o n
Ja n g je
• M ile
il e s
XXXX G o se o n g
XXXX •
PLA 12 PLA 42
XXXX XXX
PLA 68 XXXX N K III
S a rriw
iw o n
• IR O N PLA 27 XX
T R IA N G LE im w h a
G im ROK 3
XXXX X X X X P ye o n g g a n g XXX
G a n se o n g
• XX
Y eseong R
XXXX
PLA 63 PLA 15
• XXXX X X X M u n d e u n g --ri
r i N K II
RO K 11
XXXX PLA 26
PLA 20 NK V
• •
XX
PLA 47 G eumseong PUNCHBOW L
• XX RO K Cap E a st S ea
C h e o rw o n
• XX XX
XXXX ROK 2 XX R O K 5 (+)
XX ROK 6 (S ea o f Jap an )
PLA 65 3 (+) X X 1 M A R (+
(+))
XX XX
XXXX 24 ROK 7
XXX 1 (+) Y a n g ya n g
H a e jjuu NK I PLA 64 •
38 °
38° • XXX P a n m u n jjee o m HW ACHEO N 38
38°°
TA
NK VI XX RES
X
O n g jijinn G a e se o n g 7
EB
B R IT 2 9 (+)
• • • XX
XX
AE
C h u n ch e o n ROK 8
K
XX 25 •
R O K 1 (+)
XX
MO
2 G angneung
U ijijee o n g b u X
UN
•
T
• TURK
AI
XXXX
NS
Ha
n E IG H T H
R
Ha
nR
S eoul S a m ch e o k
In ch e o n •
Map 49. Line of contact and east coast beaches, 10 July 1951.
297
the existing front. However, the heavy casualties incurred during the
Heartbreak and Bloody Ridge battles caused Van Fleet to conclude that the
casualties would be prohibitive and on 7 September he informed General
Ridgway that he was canceling the operation.121 Ridgway had reached
similar conclusions after analyzing casualty projections. He confided to
his diary on 5 September, “My feeling is that this estimate of casualties
[much more than 4,000] if reasonably correct would substantially exceed
the figure which this operation, even if successful, would justify.”122
Van Fleet was still looking for ways to push forward to a line that would
put Eighth Army in a better position to deal with future enemy offensives
and improve the UNC’s negotiating position when the truce talks resumed.
On 17 September he attended a conference called by General Ridgway,
who asked for Van Fleet’s plans if the enemy “exercised his maximum
offensive capability.” Van Fleet said that his scheme of maneuver would
be to reel with the punch, stop it on or in front of LINE KANSAS, and
then launch a counteroffensive. He then described his ideas for operations
in October: a limited offensive in the western, west-central, and central
sectors in preparation for a larger offensive operation in late October that
would include an amphibious operation near Gojeo.123
Van Fleet and his staff had drawn up plans for these operations soon
after the Punchbowl operations had begun in September. The first phase,
CUDGEL, would be a 15-mile drive north of Cheorwon and Gimhwa to
force the enemy out of his forward positions and protect the Cheorwon–
Gimhwa railroad. The railroad would then be used to provide logistic sup
port to the next phase of the plan, dubbed WRANGLER. This attack in
the east was intended to cut off the North Korean forces opposing the
US X Corps and ROK I Corps on the Eighth Army right flank and would
include an amphibious operation by the 1st Marine Division to establish
a beachhead in the Gojeo–Tongcheon area. An ROK division would then
follow the marines ashore. An attack to the northeast from Gimhwa by IX
Corps would link up with the amphibious force. This was very similar to
Van Fleet’s May proposal, and while Ridgway approved continuing lim
ited objective attacks as opportunities arose, he would only approve the
amphibious operation for planning purposes.124
Nonetheless, Ridgway notified the JCS that he was considering the
option of an amphibious assault in the Wonsan area with one division
in the assault and another in follow-up. The objective would be to seize
Wonsan and a lodgment area covering the port in preparation for a rapid
advance to the west or southwest to link up with forces launching a major
overland attack from the south. An alternative under consideration was
298
Van Fleet’s proposal for an amphibious landing in the area of Tongcheon
rather than Wonsan. Another option was a general offensive by Eighth
Army, either acting in combination with one of the amphibious assaults or
independently, to inflict heavy losses on the enemy and to seize and hold a
line along good defensible terrain.125
A month later, in October 1951, the JCS responded that they had con
sidered the plan for an amphibious assault and had doubts “as to its fea
sibility or advantages.” If Ridgway still had the plan in mind, they asked
him to submit details for JCS consideration.126 In fact, Van Fleet himself
had concluded that the plan was too risky and had submitted an alterna
tive to Ridgway for a more modest 6-mile advance to a new defense line
called JAMESTOWN. On 24 October Ridgway advised the JCS that he
had decided against the plans for amphibious assaults or an Eighth Army
general offensive. The next day, the truce talks resumed.127
Even as the negotiators renewed their talks, Van Fleet was still plan
ning offensive operations, including a push north of the Cheorwon–
Gimhwa railroad followed by a IX Corps attack to the northeast toward
Tongcheon (see map 50). There would be no amphibious assault, but ROK
I Corps would strike north along the coastal road to link up with IX Corps
at Tongcheon. On 31 October Ridgway told Van Fleet to postpone the
operation. The truce talks were making progress toward agreement on a
truce line—the Military Demarcation Line (MDL). Ridgway was con
cerned that the agreed-on MDL might run south of Tongcheon and he did
not want to incur casualties to seize territory that would then have to be
given up. He was prepared, nevertheless, to resume the offensive if the
talks broke down again, and planning continued for major operations that
would take Eighth Army to the PYEONGYANG–WONSAN Line, or even
north to the Yalu River.128
However, agreement on the MDL caused all these plans to be shelved.
On 12 November 1951 Ridgway directed Van Fleet to assume the “active
defense” and on 27 November the two sides agreed to an MDL running
approximately along the line of ground contact. Although subsequent
fighting required some minor adjustments, the line remained substantially
unchanged until the armistice was signed.129 The war of movement in
Korea was over. Although there would still be 1½ years of conflict, they
would be, in the words of one Army historian, “Years of Stalemate.”130
299
300
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• Ja n g je
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• M ile
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NK VI XX
Im ji n
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• PLA 26 PLA 67 N K III
XXXX XXX
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ROK 2 ROK 7 XX
PLA 47 XX XX
•
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• ROK 6 XX 1 M A R (+) E a st S ea
XX
XXXX • ROK 3
ROK 9 G eumseong XX
PLA 64 XX (S ea o f Jap an )
C h e o rw o n ROK 8
XXXX 1 (+) PUNCHBOW L
PLA 65 XX HW ACHEO N Y a n g ya n g
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•
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38° • P a n m u n je
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Map 50. Line of contact and east coast beaches, 31 October 1951.
Notes
1. History of the Korean War, Chronology 25 June 1950–31 December
1951 (Tokyo: Military History Section, Far East Command, 1952), 88, hereafter,
Korean War Chronology. Aconcise account of Ridgway’s assumption of command,
the Chinese offensive, and the Eighth Army defense is in Richard W. Stewart,
The Korean War: The Chinese Intervention, 3 November 1950–24 January 1951,
CMH Pub 19-8 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2000), 27–33; more
detailed accounts are in Billy C. Mossman, United States Army in the Korean
War: Ebb and Flow, November 1950–July 1951 (Washington, DC: Office of the
Chief of Military History, 1990), 177–227; and Roy E. Appleman, Ridgway Duels
for Korea (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1990), 3–115.
2. Korean War Chronology, 87; Stewart, The Chinese Intervention,
28–29.
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1962), 314.
4. CG Eighth Army Message, GX 1-236 KG00, to CG X, IX, and I Corps,
4 January 1951 (confirming “1/3/51 Verbal”), copy in Blair Collection, Box 68,
“Forgotten War, Units, High-level Correspondence,” MHI Archives; Korean War
Chronology, 89.
5. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 308, 311–312.
6. See map 35 for the location of the Deokjeok Islands.
[1951?], hereafter, ATC History, 17–18.
8. Mossman, Ebb and Flow, November 1950–July 1951, 210–212;
Headquarters, Eighth US Army in Korea (EUSAK), Logistical Problems and
Their Solutions: Monograph, compiled by personnel of the Historical Section,
EUSAK and the Eighth Army Historical Service Detachment (Prov) (Seoul:
Headquarters, Eighth US Army, Korea (EUSAK)) [1950–52?], 95; US Far East
Command, Command Report. Separate volumes by month, November 1950–July
1953 (Tokyo: GHQ Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section), January
1951, 1 and 14; Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 312.
10. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 313–314. A check sweep is a mine-
sweeping operation in which the minesweeping craft tow a wire through an area
previously swept, or believed not to have been mined, to verify that no mines are
present. For the location of Daecheon and Cheonsu Bay, see map 37.
11. JCS Message, JCS 80902, Personal for MacArthur, 12 January 1951,
RG 218, Entry UD 48 Chairman’s File—General Bradley, 1949–1953; Messages
relating to Operations in the Far East, 1950–1953, Box 9: Outgoing Messages
(“Declassified”) 25 June 1950–29 January 1952, Folder 3, “JCS—Declassified
Outgoing Dispatches—1/3/51—5/31/51,” National Archives and Records
301
13. FEC, Command Report, January 1951, 1.
14. CINCFE Message CX 64845, to Department of the Army, 130423Z
June 1951, copy in Blair Collection, Box 68, “Forgotten War, Units, High-Level
Correspondence,” MHI Archives.
15. See, for example, a State Department “Outline for Discussion with
JCS,” 9 January 1951, which set forth the case for an evacuation of the ROK
Government and military forces to Cheju-do and the conduct of guerrilla, com
mando, and covert operations by ROK forces and agents, but does not mention the
idea of using Cheju-do as a base for an amphibious return to Korea. Nor is such an
option addressed in the JCS documents. RG 218, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–19–45)
Sec 42, Correspondence from 12–28–50 through 1–23–51, NACP.
16. 1st Marine Division, Historical Diary for January 1951, 1 May 1951,
Marine Corps University Archives (MCUA), 5–6.
17. Lynn Montross, Hubard D. Kuokka, and Norman W. Wicks, U.S. Marine
Operations in Korea, 1950–1953, Vol. IV, The East-Central Front (Washington,
DC: Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Historical Branch, G3, 1962), 44–45.
19. FEC, Command Report, February 1951, 47; Company A, 56th
Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion, “Diary Report of “A” Company, 56th
Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion,” Command Report Narrative Summary,
1–31 January 1951, RG 407, Entry 429, Box 4826, NACP.
21. This description of the 2d ESB activities is based on Headquarters, 2d
Engineer Special Brigade, Command Report (1 January to 31 January 1951), RG
407, Entry 429, Box 5110, NACP.
22. Headquarters, 2d ESB, Command Report (1 February to 28 February
1951), RG 407, Entry 429, Box 5110, NACP, hereafter, 2ESB Command Report.
23. ATC History, 18–21.
24. US Army Forces Far East, UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict,
1951–52: A Study of Their Characteristics and Operations, Project MHD-3
(Seoul: 8086th Army Unit [USAFFE Military History Detachment], 1954), here
after, Partisan Forces, 5–6, 71.
26. Partisan Forces, 71.
27. Rod Paschall, “Special Operations in Korea,” Conflict, Vol. 155, No. 2
(November 1987): 158.
28. Frederick W. Cleaver et al., UN Partisan Warfare in Korea, 1951–1954,
ORO T-64 AFFE (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Operations Research
Office, June 1956), hereafter, UN Partisan Warfare, 31–32; Ben S. Malcom
with Ron Martz, White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea (Washington,
DC: Brassey’s, 1996), 141–142; Ed Evanhoe, Dark Moon: Eighth Army Special
Operations in the Korean War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 72–
77; Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 422.
29. UN Partisan Warfare, 31, 32, 39. The origin of the name “Donkey” for
the partisan teams is unclear and is variously attributed to the heavy backpack
302
loads carried by the partisans and by the posture of a person cranking a portable
radio.
30. These operations are described in Partisan Forces and UN Partisan
Warfare. Colonel Ben S. Malcom, USA (Retired), who served as an advisor to one
of these partisan bands, provides a first-person account in Malcom with Martz,
White Tigers. Another useful account is provided by Evanhoe, Dark Moon, 36–46.
31. Korean War Chronology, 92.
32. A concise account of the first UNC counteroffensive in 1951 is in John
J. McGrath, The Korean War: Restoring the Balance, 25 January–8 July 1951,
CMH Publication 19-9 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2001), 5–9.
More detailed accounts are in Mossman, Ebb and Flow, November 1950–July
1951, 228–265, and Appleman, Ridgway Duels for Korea, 3–115.
33. Letter, Commanding General Eighth United States Army (EUSAK)
to Commander in Chief, Far East Command, 3 February 1951, copy in Blair
Collection, Box 68, “Forgotten War, Units, High-level Correspondence,” MHI.
34. Ltr, CG, EUSAK, to CINCFE, 3 February 1951, copy in Blair
Collection.
35. CINCFE Message C-54811, to CG Eighth Army, 4 February 1951, copy
in Blair Collection, Box 68, MHI.
36. FEC, Command Report, January 1951, 4. In message of 2 March 1951,
General Ridgway again noted these enemy fears of amphibious assaults in his
rear areas and the value of deception operations to play on this fear and fix enemy
reserves. He suggested that the deployment of the 40th and 45th Divisions to
the Far East could serve as the basis for a deception operation. CG Eighth Army
Message to CINCFE, G 3-245 KGOP (65281), 2 Mar 51, copy in Blair Collection,
Box 68, “Forgotten War, Units, High-Level Correspondence.”
37. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 326; FEC, Command Report, February
1951, 16.
38. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 323–324; James F. Schnabel, United
States Army in the Korean War, Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington,
DC: GPO, 1972; reprinted 1992), 336; Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson.
Sea War in Korea (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1957), 305; FEC,
Command Report, January 1951, 15–16, citing COMNAVFE Msg to COM7th Flt
and CTF 95, 28 Jan 51 (G-3 TS “I” No. 1708).
39. CG Eighth Army Message, GX-2-1049-KGCO (48592), to COMNAVFE,
10 February 1951, copy in Blair Collection, Box 68, “Forgotten War, Units, High-
Level Correspondence,” MHI.
40. Korean Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. 2 (Lincoln and
London: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 572–573; Field, Naval Operations,
Korea, 326–327; FEC, Command Report, February 1951, 17.
41. 2ESB Command Report, February 1951, 7.
42. 2ESB Command Report, February 1951, 7–8; FEC, Command Report,
February 1951, 17.
43. 2ESB Command Report, February 1951, 8–9; Field, Naval Operations,
Korea, 326.
303
44. Appleman, Ridgway Duels for Korea, 327, 341, 343.
45. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 330; Dictionary of American Naval
Fighting Ships, hereinafter DANFS, Bataan I, history.navy.mil/danfs/b3/bataan-i.
htm (accessed 26 January 2007).
46. Evanhoe, Dark Moon, 63–66.
47. Korean Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. 2, 574–575.
48. UN Partisan Warfare, 31–34.
49. UN Partisan Warfare, 31–34.; Evanhoe, Dark Moon, 72–84 (Evanhoe
was an advisor to TF Kirkland during the war); Michael E. Haas, In the Devil’s
Shadow: U.N. Special Operations During the Korean War (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2000), 49–51.
50. Fred Hayhurst, Green Berets in Korea: The Story of 41 Independent
Commando Royal Marines (Cambridge, MA: Vanguard, 2001), 264–278; Field,
Naval Operations, Korea, 339–340; Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, 305–
306; FEC, Command Report April 1951, 53; Navy Historical Center, Korean War:
Chronology of U.S. Pacific Fleet Operations, January–June 1951, www.history.
navy.mil/wars/korea/chron51a.htm#apr (accessed 13 December 2006); Eighth
Army Command Report, G3 Section Report, April 1951; DANFS, Fort Marion,
history.navy.mil/danfs/f4/fort_marion.htm (accessed 12 October 2006); DANFS,
Begor, history.navy.mil/danfs/b4/begor-i.htm (accessed 12 October 2006).
51. Operations KILLER and RIPPER are described briefly in McGrath,
Restoring the Balance, 9–16. More detailed accounts are in Mossman, Ebb and
Flow, November 1950–July 1951, 301–350; and Appleman, Ridgway Duels for
Korea, 307–314 and 334–403. For the decision to cross the 38th Parallel, see
Mossman, Ebb and Flow, November 1950–July 1951, 344–347; and Appleman,
Ridgeway Duels for Korea, 409–410. The objectives of the follow-on RUGGED
and DAUNTLESS operations are described in Eighth Army Command Report,
April 1951, RG 407, Entry 429, Box 1179, NACP.
52. McGrath, Restoring the Balance, 16–17.
53. Mossman, Ebb and Flow, November 1950–July 1951, 353. During
World War II, General Hoge had commanded the Provisional Engineer Special
Brigade Group that had been responsible for amphibious shore party operations at
Normandy (Hoge biography at MHI).
54. Delbert M. Fowler, “Operations at the Hwachon Dam, Korea,” Military
Engineer, Vol. XLIV, No. 297 (January–February 1952): 7–8. The Hwacheon
Dam spillway was formed by the slanting concrete north face of the dam. The
sluice gates could be opened to varying degrees to allow controlled release of
water over the top of the spillway.
55. CG Eighth Army Message to Eighth Army Engineer, 280815I February
1951; Eighth Army Engineer Message 7285 to CG Eighth Army, 281450I February
1951, in Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, Series 3, Official Papers, Eighth US Army,
Special Files, December 1950–April 1951, Box 68, MHI Archives.
56. “Engineer Study of Hwachon Reservoir and Dam,” Annex 1 to IX Corps
Periodic Intelligence Report (PIR) 190, 4 April 1951, copy in Eighth US Army
Korea, Command Report, 1951, Section IV: After-Action Interviews, Book 3:
304
Hwachon Dam, interviews by First Lieutenant Martin Blumenson, 3d Historical
Detachment, Military History Section, Eighth United States Army Korea
(EUSAK), 1951, hereafter Hwachon Dam Interviews (a copy of this document
is at the Center of Military History); Summary of IX Corps Engineer Report in
IX Corps Command Report, 4 April 1951, Box 1797, RG 407, Entry 429, NACP;
Fowler, “Operations at the Hwachon Dam, Korea,” 7–8. A penstock is a pipe or
channel that diverts water to a turbine or around the spillway of a dam. A treadway
bridge is a bridge with the travel surface consisting of one track (for a pedestrian
bridge) or two tracks (for a vehicular bridge), instead of a complete roadway.
57. Interview with General Hoge, 15 April 1951, in Hwachon Dam
Interviews.
58. Hoge interview. The following account of the Hwacheon Dam opera
tion is based on the Hwachon Dam Interviews and command reports/war dia
ries of the participating units. The operation is also described in Mossman, Ebb
and Flow, November 1950–July 1951, 354–362; Appleman, Ridgway Duels for
Korea, 422–426; Robert W. Black, Rangers in Korea (New York, NY: Ballantine
Books, 1989), 121–130; and Melbourne C. Chandler, Of GarryOwen in Glory:
The History of the Seventh United States Cavalry Regiment (Annandale, VA: The
Turnpike Press, 1960), 320.
59. 7th Cavalry War Diary, 7 April 1951, Box 4508, RG 407, Entry 419,
NACP; Interview with Colonel William Harris, Commanding Officer, 7th Cavalry
Regiment, 18 April 1951, in Hwachon Dam Interviews. Harris had commanded
the 77th Field Artillery Battalion at the time of the BLUEHEARTS operation at
Pohang in July 1950 and commanded the 7th Cavalry during the Amphibious
Training Center’s Yeseong River resupply operation.
60. In interviews conducted soon after the operation, the 7th Cavalry opera
tions officer described the movement of the 2/7th Cavalry on 8 April as a move
from their reserve position to a location from where they would be prepared to
conduct the attack on the dam, but the battalion operations journal describes the
day’s activities as a movement to contact. Interview with Major James H. Webel,
S3, 7th Cavalry Regiment, in Hwachon Dam Interviews; 7th Cavalry War Diary,
S2 Journal Summary, 7 April 1951; 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry War Diary, S3
Journal, 7–8 April 1951, both in Box 4508, RG 407, Entry 429, NACP.
61. Interview with Captain Dorsey B. Anderson, Commanding Officer,
4th Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne), 13 April 1951, in Hwachon Dam
Interviews.
62. Harris interview, and interview with Captain Arnold Frank, Commanding
Officer, IX Corps Engineer Technical Intelligence Team, 15 April 1951, in
Hwachon Dam Interviews; Eighth Army Command Report, 9 April 1951; War
Diary, Office of the Commanding General Eighth Army, 9 April 1951, Box 1180;
IX Corps Command Report, G3 Section Report, 9 April 1951, Box 1797, all in
RG 407, Entry 429, NACP. See also, Fowler, “Operations at the Hwachon Dam,
Korea,” 8; Mossman, Ebb and Flow, November 1950–July 1951, 358.
63. IX Corps PIR #195, 9 April 1951, copy in Hwachon Dam Interviews;
War Diary, Office of the Commanding General Eighth Army, 9 April 1951; Eighth
305
Army Command Report, 9 April 1951; 8th Cavalry Regiment Command Report,
April 1951, Box 4517; IX Corps Engineer Section Command Report, 9 April
1951, Box 1798, all in RG 407, Entry 429, NACP. It is not clear whether it was
IX Corps, the 1st Cavalry Division, or Colonel Harris who bestowed the TF
Callaway designation.
64. Anderson interview, in Hwachon Dam Interviews.
65. This account of the 9 April combat is based on an interview with
Lieutenant Colonel John W. Callaway, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion,
7th Cavalry, in Hwachon Dam Interviews; 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry War Diary,
9 April 1951; and GHQ FEC Daily Intelligence Summary No. 3135, 10 April
1951, Box 433, RG 407, Entry 429, NACP.
66. 7th Cavalry War Diary, 11 April 1951; Harris and Anderson interviews,
and interview with Major Russell J. Wilson, Commanding Officer, 8th Engineer
Combat Battalion, 18 April 1951, in Hwachon Dam Interviews.
67. Callaway interview in Hwachon Dam Interviews. There is some incon
sistency among the accounts regarding the availability of assault boats. The
7th Cavalry S3, Major James H. Webel, says that “Despite the effort to bring the
boats forward, . . . the 2d Battalion Commanding Officer preferred to advance by
land.” However, Colonel Harris says that if boats had been available on the 10th,
he would have directed the Rangers to conduct the amphibious operation on that
date. Captain Anderson, the Ranger company commander, says he presented his
amphibious alternative to Callaway’s scheme of maneuver but does not say why
Callaway chose to continue the overland attack. Major Wilson, the 8th Engineer
Battalion commander, says that efforts to get the boats began on the evening of
10 April. Webel, Harris, Anderson, and Wilson interviews. The weight of the
evidence indicates that the boats did not arrive in time for the 10 April attack.
Although river crossing would seem to be the more accurate term, amphibious is
the word used in all of the command reports and interviews, both for the antici
pated river crossing and the crossing of the reservoir.
68. Callaway interview; 7th Cavalry War Diary, S2 Journal Summary,
10 April 1951; 2/7th Cavalry War Diary, 10 April 1951; GHQ FEC Daily
Intelligence Summary No. 3136, 11 April 1951.
69. 8th Cavalry War Diary, 10 April 1951; Hoge interview; IX Corps
Command Report, Chief of Staff Daily Journal Summary, 10 April 1951, Box
1797, RG 407, Entry 429, NACP; “take the dam”: 2/7th Cavalry War Diary,
10 April 1951.
70. IX Corps Periodic Operations Report (POR) #579, 10 April 1951; inter
view with Lieutenant Colonel John Carlson, G3, 1st Cavalry Division, both in
Hwachon Dam Interviews.
71. Harris and Webel interviews (“contain and pin down”: Harris inter
view); Addendum 1 to 7th Cavalry OPORD No. 11-51, 10 April 1951, copy in
72. Anderson interview, and interview with First Lieutenant John S. Warren,
Executive Officer, 4th Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne), 13 April 1951, in
306
73. Webel interview, and interview with Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M
Magness Jr., Chemical Officer, IX Corps, 3 May 1951, in Hwachon Dam Interviews.
Magness was not informed of the request until the afternoon of 11 April. He
claimed that had he been informed of the requirement earlier, the smoke pots and
generators could have been sent forward in time to support the operation.
74. Interviews with Major Paul Gray, S3, and Captain William W Cover,
Assistant S3, IX Corps Artillery, in Hwachon Dam Interviews.
75. Weber and Warren interviews, and interview with Major Dayton
F. Caple, Assistant G4, 1st Cavalry Division; and Major Russell J. Wilson,
Commanding Officer, 8th Engineer Combat Battalion, 18 April 1951, in Hwachon
Dam Interviews. Eventually, 35 boats and 20 motors were obtained to support
the operation, with an additional 21 boats arriving at Chuncheon the evening of
11 April. The plywood M2 assault boat was 13 feet long, weighed 410 pounds,
and could carry 12 troops plus two boat operators. On this operation, see also
7th Cavalry War Diary, 10–11 April 1951; Mossman, Ebb and Flow, November
1950–July 1951, 360; Black, Rangers in Korea, 124–125; Chandler, Of GarryOwen
in Glory, 320.
76. Anderson interview, in Hwachon Dam Interviews.
77. Anderson and Wilson interviews, and interviews with First Lieutenant
James L. Johnson, Platoon Leader, 1st Platoon, 4th Ranger Infantry Company
(Airborne); 13 April 1951; and Master Sergeant Donald G. Laverty, Platoon Sergeant,
1st Platoon, 4th Ranger Company, 14 April 1951, in Hwachon Dam Interviews.
78. Harris and Anderson interviews, and interviews with Lieutenant Colonel
Hallden, Captain Teague, and Captain Kennedy, 16 April 1951, in Hwachon Dam
Interviews.
79. Callaway interview, and interview with Captain John R. Flynn, S3,
2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 17 April 1951, in Hwachon Dam Interviews. 7th
Cavalry War Diary, S2 Journal Summary, 11 April 1951; and the 2/7th Cavalry
War Diary, 11 April 1951.
80. Interview with Captain Carl W. Kueffer, S3, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry,
in Hwachon Dam Interviews.
81. Hoge, Harris, Callaway, Anderson, Hallden, and Teague interviews, in
Hwachon Dam Interviews; FEC Daily Intelligence Summary No. 3137, 12 April
1951, 7–8, Box 433, RG 407, Entry 429, NACP.
82. Eighth Army G3 chalked up the failure of the 7th Cavalry to take the
dam on heavy enemy fire and restricted avenues of approach while the Eighth
Army Command Report noted that the dam did not really threaten the main supply
route and argued that the operation was hindered by the tenacious enemy defense,
bad weather and thus little close air support, and insufficient logistic support
(April 1951 command reports). Historian Roy Appleman wonders “whether the
7th Cavalry troops on 11 April made their best effort, in view of the fact that
they knew the entire division was to go into reserve that night” (Ridgway Duels
for Korea, 426). In his personal research notes, Appleman scrawled, “This opn.
[operation] a mess.” (Roy E. Appleman Papers, Box 24, Chronological Files,
Folder: 1–13 April 1951, MHI.)
307
83. Hoge and Anderson interviews, in Hwachon Dam Interviews.
84. 2d Infantry Division Command Report, 11, 12, and 16 April 1951, Box
2526; 23d Infantry Command Reports, 12, 13, and 16 April, Box 2696; X Corps
Command Report, 12 April 1951, Box 2006, all in RG 407, Record Group 429,
NACP; Eighth Army Command Report, 12 April 1951; IX Corps Command
Report, G3 Historical Summary, 12 April 1951 and Chief of Staff Daily Journal
Summary, 18 April 1951; Korean War Chronology, 106–108.
85. Fowler, “Operations at the Hwachon Dam, Korea,” 8; Korean War
Chronology, 107–108, 115. The issue of dams across the Han River resurfaced
in 1986, when North Korea began building a new dam across the Bukhan River
north of the DMZ. There was great consternation in South Korea that this “Dam
of Aggression” was intended to impound water that would later be released to
flood Seoul. The ROK Government began building a “Peace Dam” to protect
the city and citizens were asked to contribute to the project. The Peace Dam was
never completed, but the North Korean dam was completed in 1999, substan
tially reducing the flow of water in the river to the detriment of South Korea
hydroelectric plans. South Korean concerns about flooding were revived in 2002,
when cracks began appearing in the North Korean dam. Aiden Foster-Carter,
“Pyongyang Watch: The Dam Nuisance,” Asia Times on line, 16 May 2003,
atimes.com/koreas/DE16Dg03.html (accessed 23 March 2007).
86. FEC, Command Report, March 1951, 73–74, citing: G3 Sec GHQ FEC/
UNC Staff Sec Rpt Mar 51 (Annex 4).
87. CINCFE Memorandum for Commanding General, GHQ Reserve
Corps, 30 April 1951, copy in Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, Series 3, Official
Papers, CINC Far East 1951–1952, Box 73, MHI.
88. FEC, Command Report, April 1951, 2, 35, and 61; Korean War
Chronology, 102, 104.
89. The combat units of the XVI Corps in the summer of 1951 were the 40th
and 45th Infantry Divisions, the 187th Airborne RCT, the 34th Infantry Regiment,
the 63d Field Artillery Battalion, and the 56th ATTB. On 24 October 1951, the
50th Signal Battalion (Corps) was activated to serve as the XVI Corps signal bat
talion. XVI Corps Command Reports, May and October 1951.
90. Eighth Army Command Report, Office of the Commanding General
Narrative, 14 April 1951, RG 407, Entry 429, Box 1180, NACP; Korean War
Chronology, 106–107.
91. CINCFE Memorandum for Commanding General, Eighth Army,
25 April 1951, copy in Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, Series 3, Official Papers,
CINC Far East 1951–1952, Box 73, MHI.
92. “James A. Van Fleet Oral History,” James A. Van Fleet Papers, 1892–
1973, Part 2, 48–56, MHI Archive Collection.
93. Cagle and Manson, Sea War in Korea, 388. Dyer, who served on
Admiral Ernest King’s staff in the first years of World War II and was Admiral
Richard L. Connolly’s chief of staff during Mediterranean amphibious operations,
commanded a cruiser during the Philippine amphibious operations and later
wrote a biography of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner that delves deeply into
308
amphibious operations in the South and Central Pacific in World War II: George
C. Dyer, The Amphibians Came to Conquer: The Story of Admiral Richmond
Kelly Turner, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1972).
94. Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950–1953 (New
York, NY: Times Books, 1987, Reprinted, Doubleday Anchor, 1989), 819. Blair
cites a Ridgway Memo of 21 April 1951, located in the Special File, Ridgway
Papers, Box 20, MHI. This document is now missing. He also cites a retrospective
comment by Ridgway in his Oral History, but that comment may refer to a later
proposed landing at Tongcheon. Nonetheless, it is clear from his other comments
that Ridgway, while recognizing the value of amphibious operations, was also
keenly aware of the risks and potential costs.
95. McGrath, Restoring the Balance, 18–22; Korean War Chronology, 111.
96. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 351; DANFS, Comstock, www.history.
navy.mil/danfs/c12/comstock.htm (accessed 12 October 2006).
97. X Corps Command Report, 1 May to 31 May 1951, 24–25, copy in the
Edward M. Almond Papers, Box 67 (Korean War: Command Reports X Corps,
May to August 1951), MHI Archives.
98. Eighth Army War Diary, Command Report G3 Section, May 1951, RG
407, Box 1197, NACP; Mossman, Ebb and Flow, November 1950–July 1951, 485–
486, citing CG Eighth Army message to CINCFE, GX-5-5099, 28 May 1951.
99. Montross et al., The East-Central Front, 132–133; Personal Notes
Covering Activities of Lt. Gen. E.M. Almond During Military Operations in
Korea, 31 August 1950–15 July 1951, entry for 28 May 1951, copy in the Edward
M. Almond Papers, Box 64 (Personal Notes on the Korea Operation), MHI
Archives.
100. FEC, Command Report, May 1951, 43; Memorandum for the Record,
31 May 1951, Subject: Conference between General Ridgway and General Van
Fleet, copy in Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, Box 73 (Series 3, Official Papers,
CINC, Far East 1951–1952), Folder: “Memoranda and Communiqués 1950–
1952,” MHI Archives.
101. Van Fleet Oral History, Part 4, 28.
102. Interview with General Matthew B. Ridgway by Colonel John M. Blair,
US Army Military History Institute Senior Officer Debriefing Program, Session 3,
86–87, Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, Series 5, Oral Histories 1971–1972, Box 89,
MHI Archives.
103. Appleman, Ridgway Duels for Korea, 552.
104. Naval Historical Center, Korean War Naval Chronology, May 1951,
history.navy.mil/wars/korea/chron51a.htm (accessed 23 March 2007). For the
location of bases in Japan, see map 8.
105. FEC, Command Report, May 1951, 30; XVI Corps Command Report
1–31 May 1951; Korean War Chronology, 110.
106. GHQ FEC Letter, AG 381 (19 Jun 51) JSPOG, to Commanding General,
Eighth Army; Commander, United States Naval Forces, Far East; and Commanding
General, Far East Air Forces, 19 June 1951, copy in Matthew B. Ridgway Papers,
Series 3, Official Papers, CINC Far East 1951–1952, Box 73, MHI.
309
107. FEC, Command Report, June 1951, 34–35.
108. XVI Corps, Command Report 1–30 June 1951, 4.
109. Korean War Naval Chronology, June 1951.
110. XVI Corps, Command Report 1–30 June 1951, 4.
111. FEC, Command Report, June 1950, 77.
112. FEC, Command Report, July 1951, 53.
113. FEC, Command Report, August 1951, 74–75.
114. Naval Chronology, June 1951; Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 357;
Jack Creamons, “The Role of USS BEGOR (APD-127) in Clandestine Operations
in North Korea, 1950–51,” USS Begor (APD-127) Association Web site, ussbegor.
org/seaStories49.htm (accessed 10 March 2007).
115. UN Partisan Warfare, 36.
116. UN Partisan Warfare, 8–9; Evanhoe, Dark Moon, 72–84; Haas, In the
Devil’s Shadow, 49–51.
117. Hayhurst, Green Berets in Korea, 296–300; Field, Naval Operations,
Korea, 419.
118. FEC, Command Report, July 1951, 56. One of the holders of the Senior
Military Liaison Officer position on Yodo later in the war would be Major Robert
Debs Heinl, author of Victory at High Tide.
119. These operations are described in Andrew J. Birtle, The Korean War:
Years of Stalemate, July 1951–July 1953, CMH Pub 19-10 (Washington, DC:
Center of Military History, 2000), 1–13; and Walter G. Hermes, United States
Army in the Korean War: Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington, DC: Office
of the Chief of Military History, 1966), 73–111.
120. FEC, Command Report, August 1951, 16; Field, Naval Operations,
Korea, 414; Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 109–110.
121. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 86.
122. Ridgway Memorandum for Diary, 5 September 1951, item 70, Matthew
B. Ridgway Papers, “CINCFE Special File,” Part 2 of 4, Box 72, MHI Archives.
123. Ridgway Memorandum for Diary, 17 September 1951, item 77, Matthew
B. Ridgway Papers, “CINCFE Special File,” Part 2 of 4, Box 72, MHI Archives.
124. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 86–87, 97–98; Cagle and
Manson, Sea War in Korea, 391.
125. CINCFE Message C 51424 (DA IN 19478), to JCS, 23 Sep 51, RG 218,
Entry UD 48 Chairman’s File—General Bradley, 1949–53, Messages Relating
to Operations in the Far East, 1950–1953, Box 2: Incoming messages, Folder 3:
“JCS—Declassified Incoming Messages 9/1/51–9/30/51,” NACP.
126. JCS Message 84810, to CINCFE, 23 Oct 51, RG 218, Entry UD 48,
Box 9: Outgoing messages (“Declassified”) 25 June 1950–29 January 1952,
Folder 5: “JCS—Declassified Outgoing Dispatches 8/2/51–10/31/51,” NACP.
127. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 97–98; CINCFE Message C
55688 (DA IN 10933), 24 October 1951, to Department of the Army for JCS,
Blair Collection, Box 68, “Forgotten War, Units, High-Level Correspondence,”
MHI Archives.
128. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 175–176.
310
129. Donald W. Boose Jr., “The Korean War Truce Talks: A Study in Conflict
Termination,” Parameters, Vol. XXX, No. 1 (Spring 2000): 107–108.
130. Birtle, The Korean War: Years of Stalemate.
311
Chapter 7
Amphibious Planning and Training
during the Stalemate, 1952–53
During the remaining 18 months of the Korean War there were no
more significant amphibious operations, although other amphibious-type
operations took place. The United Nations Command (UNC) carried out
amphibious demonstrations; units near the coast were supplied by over-
the-shore logistic operations; US and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces
conducted raids, espionage, and intelligence collection missions from
the sea; and battles for control of the offshore islands near Wonsan, the
Han River estuary, and the northwest coast of Korea erupted from time
to time. However, the stabilization of the front line after the November
1951 agreement on the location of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL),
American unwillingness to risk heavy casualties, and greatly increased
Communist coast defenses were all deterrents to major amphibious
assaults. Nevertheless, during this period, the US Army in the Far East
raised its amphibious capability to the highest level of the war by return-
ing the 2d Engineer Special Brigade (ESB) and the 56th Amphibious Tank
and Tractor Battalion (ATTB) to their original amphibious missions and
through a vigorous amphibious training program in Japan. Also during
this period, mobilized Reserve units maintained an amphibious capability
in the Continental United States (CONUS), and amphibious engineers and
transportation watercraft operators continued to demonstrate their versatil-
ity in a variety of roles.
Reserve Amphibious Units

Soon after the outbreak of the Korean War and the alert of the 2d ESB
and 56th ATTB for deployment to Korea, a portion of the Army Reserve
amphibious force was mobilized to provide an amphibious capability
in CONUS. In August 1950 the 747th Amphibious Tank Battalion in
Florida was mobilized and sent to Fort Worden, Washington, where it
was reconstituted as a composite amphibious tank and tractor battalion.
About half of the battalion’s enlisted men were levied to fill out the newly
mobilized 89th Engineer Port Construction Company.1 In October 1950
the 409th ESB, located at various places along the coasts of Oregon
and California, was mobilized along with most of its subordinate units,
most notably the 369th and 370th Engineer Boat and Shore Regiments
(EB&SRs) and the 380th Boat Maintenance Battalion. The 371st EB&SR
was left in Reserve status. These units joined the 747th ATTB and 89th
Engineer Port Construction Company at Fort Worden, where they trained
313
until July 1951. At that time, the Headquarters and Headquarters Company
of the 409th ESB was sent to Korea and reorganized as an engineer brigade
headquarters with responsibility for supervising engineer construction
and maintenance in southern Korea. The 369th and 370th EB&SRs were
reorganized as separate engineer amphibious support regiments. The 369th
remained at Fort Worden, while the 370th was sent to the Panama Canal
Zone. One detachment of the 370th was then sent to Greenland to assist in
the construction of an airfield. A detachment of the 369th participated in
atomic tests in the desert during 1951, while the rest of the regiment and the
747th ATTB participated in PHIBTEST—the largest wartime amphibious
exercise, which was conducted at Coronado, California, from June to
October 1952.2 During their time on Active Duty, these units demonstrated
the resourcefulness and adaptability of the amphibious engineers.
Amphibious Training, August 1951–April 1952

The 40th Infantry Division completed its amphibious training in Japan
in August 1951. The 45th Infantry Division was then scheduled to begin
amphibious training, but that month the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) noti-
fied General Matthew B. Ridgway that they wished to see the two National
Guard divisions sent to Korea as soon as they completed their ground com-
bat training, raising the possibility that the division’s amphibious training
would be curtailed or canceled. However, Ridgway objected to sending
the Guardsmen to Korea at that time. The Eighth Army summer offensive
was taking place and he did not want to move combat-experienced divi-
sions out of Korea so long as there was danger of an enemy counteroffen-
sive. He also feared that a divisional exchange would disrupt the defense
of Japan during the 3 months it would take to complete the transfer. With
the move to Korea postponed indefinitely, it was decided that the 179th
and 279th RCTs of the 45th Division would receive the full course of
amphibious training recommended by the Marine Mobile Training Team
(MTT) at Camp McGill. This would bring the division up to the fullest
possible amphibious proficiency, thus providing two trained divisions if
the opportunity arose to conduct a corps-size amphibious assault.3
Ridgway’s arguments for postponing the division exchange did not
find favor in Washington, where it was noted that many of the National
Guardsmen would come to the end of their Service obligation the follow-
ing August. Because of congressional interest and state pride in the units,
the Army leadership also disapproved a Ridgway request to use the two
divisions as replacement fillers. In September President Harry S. Truman
approved a plan to send one of the divisions to Korea and, at a suitable time,
rotate one of the combat-experienced divisions back to Japan. This same
314
process could then be repeated later with the other National Guard division.
These deliberations increased the likelihood that the two divisions would
soon be deployed to Korea after all and may have influenced an October
decision to compress the on-going amphibious training from 6 to 4 weeks
by extending the daily training from a half to a full day. This turned out
to be a sound move, since the JCS ordered Ridgway to begin the deploy-
ment of the National Guard divisions to Korea in November, and the 45th
Division and 1st Cavalry Division began their rotation cycle at the end of
the month. By using the same shipping for both divisions and by exchang-
ing heavy equipment and supplies, the transfer took place smoothly, with
the 180th Infantry Regiment arriving in Korea on 5 December and the 5th
Cavalry departing for Japan on the same ships 2 days later. By the end of
the month, the exchange was complete and the 45th Division was on the
front line. In January and February the 40th Division replaced the 24th
Division in Korea and the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions were
placed on the schedule for amphibious training in Japan.
The 1952 amphibious training cycle would begin with the 29th
Separate Infantry Regiment in Okinawa undergoing the pre-afloat phase
of amphibious training in January and February 1952 and the afloat phase,
including a landing exercise, in April. In preparation, Ridgway directed
Commander, United States Naval Forces, Far East (COMNAVFE) to sur-
vey the beaches of Okinawa to determine the feasibility of conducting a
landing exercise there using landing craft, vehicle, personnel (LCVPs);
landing ships, tank (LSTs); and DUKWs. Amphibious training would con-
tinue throughout 1952 with one regimental combat team (RCT) complet-
ing training and participating in a landing exercise each month from May
until October, when the weather would no longer be suitable. By the end of
the year, the RCTs of both the 24th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry
Division would have completed amphibious training.4
The Far East Command (FEC) amphibious training and operations
capability was expanded with the October 1951 deployment back to Japan
of the 2d ESB, which had been operating the port of Incheon since March
1951. The mission of the brigade was to retrain and equip for amphibious
operations. In November the 56th ATTB also began converting back from
a light armor to an armored amphibious unit. Ridgway ordered the 2d ESB
back to Japan over the objections of Lieutenant General James Van Fleet,
because of “an urgent requirement for combat units with such amphibious
capability to be in Japan in the event of an emergency.” Commander in
Chief, Far East (CINCFE) directed that the engineers carry out “intensified
training” with special emphasis on the operation of landing craft in heavy
surf; night operation of landing craft; and weapons, communication,
315
and physical training to bring the unit up to 85 percent proficiency by
December. In part this was because the 2d ESB and the 56th ATTB were
expected to take part in the Okinawa training and exercises with the 29th
Infantry and because of concern that the marines might be removed from
the theater, greatly reducing the FEC amphibious capability. But Ridgway
was also preparing for a possible amphibious landing in Korea in March
when weather conditions would be favorable for such an operation.5
On 12 October 1951 the 2d ESB turned Incheon Port operations over
to the 21st Transportation Medium Port and boarded ships for Japan a
week later, moving into Camp McGill on 19 October to begin the pro-
cess of re-equipping and re-training. The brigade initially focused on
amphibious and infantry combat reorientation, but in November the 532d
EB&SR began specialized training with a heavy schedule of practice in
pilotage, navigation, control of landing craft in surf, engine maintenance,
crane-shovel operation, and communications. Throughout this period, the
amphibious engineers also carried out individual and crew-served weap-
ons practice and infantry combat drill. The boat company (Company B)
conducted two practice assault-landing exercises and then joined with
Navy boats and crews at Chigasaki Beach for more advanced work on
assault landing techniques and control of the landing craft, mechanized
(LCM) in heavy surf. By December the boat company and one of the shore
companies conducted a demonstration of a shore-to-shore operation for
the brigade amphibious indoctrination course. At the end of the month,
the regiment participated in a joint Army–Navy exercise using Camp
McGill as the near shore embarkation and staging point and Chigasaki
Beach as the amphibious objective area. The end of the exercise simulated
an assault landing of two RCTs abreast with naval personnel and brigade
service troops simulating the infantry landing force. In January the brigade
successfully conducted an RCT shore-to-shore exercise in spite of severe
winter weather. The brigade and the regiment were now ready to take up
their roles as trainers and as boat and shore elements for the upcoming
Okinawa exercise.6
Like the amphibious engineers, the 56th ATTB was also relearning its
trade. Since January 1951 the battalion had been organized as a light tank
unit, equipped with M24 light tanks and M10 tank destroyers, and attached
to various infantry units for the defense of the Kanto Plain. In November
they turned in the tanks and tank destroyers and began drawing LVTs and
LVT(A)s from the Tokyo Ordnance Depot. The depot had only five of
the new LVT(A)5s (with gyro-stabilized howitzers that could be fired
effectively from the water en route to the beach), the type the battalion
316
had brought to the Far East, so 25 of the older LVT(A)4s were issued
instead, along with 106 LVT4 cargo-personnel carriers. On 23 November
the battalion officially reorganized under the 1950 tables of organization
and equipment (TOEs) for an amphibious tank and tractor battalion.
Companies A and B once again became amphibious tank companies and
Companies C and D became amphibious tractor companies. The unit was
then detached from the 40th Infantry Division and moved to Camp McGill,
where it was attached to the 2d ESB on 6 December. The 2d ESB and the
56th ATTB continued training together.7
In March the 532d EB&SR received 21 DUKWs, with which they
formed an amphibious truck platoon to be used to land artillery during
the upcoming amphibious training cycle. On 15 April the 2d ESB and
the 56th ATTB embarked for Okinawa, where the 29th Infantry had been
undergoing preliminary shore training for the upcoming landing exercise,
Operation CORALHEAD. The LVTs of the 56th and the brigade’s rolling
stock traveled to Okinawa aboard LSTs, while the rest of the brigade was
transported in an APA and an AKA. After 10 days of training with the 29th
Infantry, the two units supported the regiment during the landing exercise
on 27 April. The amphibious tankers finally had the chance to operate their
LVTs in the environment for which they had originally been designed—
crossing coral reefs. By the end of the month, the two units were back in
Japan, beginning a busy summer of training one RCT after another.8
The year 1952 brought changes to the Shipping Control Administration,
Japan (SCAJAP) LST fleet. Negotiations were underway to conclude
a peace treaty with Japan that would return sovereignty to that nation.
Japanese-manned SCAJAP LSTs would no longer be at the call of the
FEC, yet the logistic operations of the command, as well as any large-
scale amphibious operation depended on those ships. In January 1952,
General Headquarters (GHQ) advised the JCS of its continuing need for
38 LSTs for logistic support and possible amphibious operations and noted
that operations of units on the front line in the northeast were largely sus-
tained over an LST beach at the coastal port of Sokcho. CINCFE proposed
an arrangement whereby the ships could continue to be used under con-
tract for support of operations in Korea; for the redeployment of troops,
supplies, and equipment from Korea; and for intra-theater support of the
FEC. The final arrangement was that the ships would be returned to the
United States. On 31 March 1952, 33 of the LSTs were transferred to the
Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) and continued to be operated
under contract while 5 others were returned to the US Navy. The next day,
SCAJAP was dissolved.9
317
Operations in the Offshore Islands
When the truce talks resumed in October 1951, one of the issues was
the status of the coastal islands north of the 38th Parallel occupied by
UNC forces (see map 35). These included islands off the North Korean
Hwanghae province in the northwest, islands off the Han River estuary
(HRE) and the mouth of the Imjin River northwest of Seoul, a few islands
off the east coast, and the islands in the bay east of Wonsan. A variety of
organizations used these islands as bases for special operations, including
raids into North Korea by the partisans of Task Force (TF) Leopard on
the west coast and TF Kirkland on the east coast. Some were also used
as radar stations, and the islands near Wonsan were part of the siege and
blockade of that seaport. The most substantial UNC presence was on three
groups of islands to the west of the Ongjin Peninsula (Baengnyeongdo,
Daecheongdo, and Socheongdo) and two island groups southeast of the
Ongjin Peninsula (Yeonpyeongdo and Udo), referred to collectively as the
Northwest Islands.
As the post-armistice status of the islands was discussed at Panmunjom,
the North Koreans also began to react to the partisan incursions by
mounting amphibious operations to recapture the more vulnerable of the
islands. Some of these operations were of substantial size, involving more
than a thousand North Korean troops and guerrilla forces. North Korean
or Chinese air strikes even supported the attacks on islands furthest to the
northwest. In October 1951 a large North Korean force overran a friendly
island in the HRE, and in November both North Korean People’s Army
(KPA) and UNC forces carried out amphibious raids on each other’s islands.
A small island off Wonsan was overrun by the Communists in November,
and on 2 December US and British marines carried out a coastal raid on
Dancheon, about 120 miles northeast of Wonsan.10 On the west coast, some
1,200 North Korean guerrillas succeeded in capturing seven islands off
Haeju on the last day of November and the first few days of December. TF
90 LSTs supported by British cruisers brought ROK marines and partisans
in to bolster the Northwest Island defenses and to bring out refugees from
the lost islands, and a landing ship, dock (LSD) and minesweepers were
dispatched to the area to assist in the defense. Nonetheless, during January
the KPA captured five more small islands off Hwanghae province. On
6 January 1952 CINCFE gave COMNAVFE the responsibility for defense
of designated islands off both coasts and Admiral C. Turner Joy further
delegated this responsibility to the commander of TF 95 (the UN blockade
and escort force). A West Coast Island Defense Element was formed
under a US Marine Corps officer and two battalions of ROK marines were
distributed among the islands. Although the North Koreans captured more
318
islands in February, by March the defensive measures had taken hold and
partisan forces began recapturing some of the lost islands.11
In December 1951 the truce negotiators agreed in principle that on the
initiation of an armistice, all coastal islands would revert to the control of
the side that held them before the war. There was still disagreement about
the islands off the Ongjin Peninsula lying below the 38th Parallel, but
on 3 February 1952 the Communists agreed that the UNC would remain
in possession of the Northwest Islands. Even though the other occupied
islands would have to be evacuated when the truce took effect, UNC
forces continued to hold them until that time. For the rest of the war, the
North Koreans continued to make periodic attempts, sometimes success-
ful, to wrest control of the islands from the partisans. Periodically, TF 95
manned anti-invasion stations along the northwest coast from the HRE to
Jinnampo in support of friendly guerrilla forces and carried out bombard-
ments of North Korean coastal positions and installations. In June 1953,
just before the armistice went into effect, TF 90 LSTs evacuated thou-
sands of partisans, their families, and civilians who had been living on the
islands off both coasts.12
Amphibious Training, May 1952 to the End of the War

On their return from Okinawa, the troops of the 2d ESB continued
their participation in the 1952 amphibious training program. In May they
worked with the 34th RCT of the 24th Division, which conducted its land-
ing exercise at Chigasaki Beach on 29 May.13 In June Shore Company
E of the 532d EB&SR, along with other elements of the brigade and a
Navy beach group, loaded aboard an LST. With their heavy equipment in
2 LSUs carried in the well deck of 1 LSD, and 18 LCMs in the well deck
of another LSD, they sailed to Hokkaido in northern Japan to participate
with the 7th Cavalry in a landing exercise called Operation SEAHORSE.
The regimental boat company (Company B) deployed themselves to the
exercise area, sailing 24 LCMs accompanied by a utility boat, a tanker,
and a tug, nearly 600 miles up the coast to join the rest of the brigade. This
was also the first exercise for the Provisional DUKW Platoon, which trav-
eled to Hokkaido aboard an LST and there practiced landing the howitzers
of the 77th Field Artillery Battalion of the 7th Cavalry RCT. There was no
suitable beach for the landing exercise on 23 June, so the operation was
carried out just like an actual amphibious assault, except that the landing
craft did not actually run up onto the shore, but approached a simulated
shore line 5,000 yards off the beach.14
Elements of the brigade, including one of the 532d’s shore party com-
panies (Company D), were back in Hokkaido in July for the 5th Cavalry’s
319
landing exercise. Once again lack of a suitable beach led to an exercise
with no actual landing. This meant that the shore party’s duties were lim-
ited to outloading the RCT and had no chance to practice their skills at
moving equipment and supplies over the beach. However, the Provisional
DUKW Platoon was able to work with the 61st Field Artillery Battalion
(FAB), landing their howitzers on a small beach suitable for amphibious
truck operations. The boat company, which had remained in Hokkaido,
was put to use by the Navy doing lightering and transport work. The expe-
rienced Army LCM crews took considerable pride in their seamanship and
were happy to demonstrate their skill in front of the Navy.15
In August 1952 the 2d ESB was reorganized and redesignated the 2d
Amphibious Support Brigade (ASB). The 532d EB&SR was redesignated
as an engineer amphibious support regiment (EASR) with one boat bat-
talion and one shore battalion. Six LCMs remained in Hokkaido when the
rest of the boat company returned to Camp McGill. They joined Navy craft
to support a visit to Hokkaido by the battleship Iowa on 9 and 10 August,
then returned to Camp McGill in the well deck of an LSD. As the 8th
Cavalry RCT began its amphibious training, the shore party company was
sent back to Camp McGill leaving a planning group behind, because it was
felt that it was a waste of time to keep the entire company in Hokkaido
if there was to be no actual landing. In September the 19th RCT of the
24th Division conducted its amphibious training, with a full-scale landing
exercise that included back loading the RCT and its tanks and artillery out
over the beach after the landing had been completed. The 532d EB&SR
shore party was able once again to perform its mission in a “realistic and
satisfactory manner.”16
On 1 October 1952 Company D of the engineer shore battalion trav-
eled to Hokkaido aboard an LSM to assist the 8th Cavalry in its landing
exercise. The engineer troops were loaded aboard Navy amphibious ships
and given to understand that this time they were going to participate in an
actual amphibious assault against the North Korean coast. On 12 October
they conducted a rehearsal landing at a beach near Gangneung, Korea. They
outloaded the 8th Cavalry from the beach the next day and on the morning
of 15 October found themselves off the coast of North Korea in heavy seas
and high winds and in the company of several aircraft carriers; cruisers;
destroyers; a battleship; and landing ships, medium (rocket) (LSM[R]s)
that were conducting preparatory fires on the beach. The amphibious engi-
neers prepared to join the cavalry troopers aboard the landing craft, but
then received the order not to load. The empty boats were lowered into the
water and headed for the beach, then turned back and were loaded back
aboard the transports, which sailed for Pohang to unload the 8th RCT.
320
At Pohang they assisted in the outloading of the 187th Airborne RCT
and two combat engineer battalions that were being returned to Japan.17
On 7 November 1952 the amphibious exercise program came to an end.
Elements of the 2d Amphibious Support Brigade (ASB) had participated
in seven regimental-level landing exercises, as well as additional train-
ing, and had carried out the wide variety of tasks for which engineers
are trained ranging from construction of roads, buildings, piers, and other
facilities to repair and maintenance of maritime and other equipment. The
amphibious engineers were at the peak of readiness and well prepared if
they “should be committed to actual operations again.”18
In November the FEC submitted its requirements for Navy support to
amphibious training for the next 3 years. For 1953 the command intended
to train 12 RCTs in Japan, 4 in Korea, and 1 in Okinawa. The follow-
ing year, anticipating that the war might be over, it reduced the plan to
12 RCTs in Japan and 1 in Okinawa, with 6 RCTs to be trained in Japan
and 1 in Okinawa in 1955.19
The 2d ASB carried out shore party exercises at Chigasaki Beach in
January and the 532d EASR’s boat battalion was put to work doing port
lightering in February. The first regimental exercise was carried out in
May with the 29th Infantry on Okinawa. That same month, the 1st Marine
Division was placed in reserve and began amphibious training in Korea
using a beach on the west coast near Gunsan for landing exercises. Two
such exercises, MARLEX I and II, took place in May and June, but the
third, MARLEX III, was canceled as all available shipping was held in
readiness for the repatriation of prisoners of war (POWs). All Marine,
Army, and Navy landing exercises and afloat training were canceled from
June to October 1953.20
Amphibious Planning and Operations, 1952–53

During the first week in February 1952, Van Fleet proposed several
different operations to Ridgway for his consideration. One of these, BIG
STICK, would involve, in the west-central sector, a ground attack as part
of an advance to the Yeseong River to destroy Communist supply com-
plexes and capture Gaeseong. In the east, the 1st Marine Division would
conduct a simultaneous amphibious demonstration to fix enemy forces
that might otherwise reinforce against the ground attack. Another version,
HOMECOMING, would use only ROK forces and would not involve an
amphibious attack. Neither operation was approved; however, the idea of
an amphibious operation on the east coast remained in play, particularly
during those times when the truce talks stalled.21 Although the possibil-
ity of a Soviet intervention in the war or of a greatly increased Chinese
321
reinforcement had faded, CINCFE continued to maintain an operation
plan for withdrawal from Korea, including detailed lists of shipping
requirements.22
In March 1952 the 1st Marine Division was transferred from its eastern
location to the western flank of the Eighth Army front. Between 17 and
24 March, the division moved by rail and truck, with the heavy equipment
and armor loading aboard LSTs and LSDs at the beach at Sokcho for
transportation to Incheon. In its new location, the division provided
additional security for the Gimpo Peninsula, as well as the main avenue of
approach from the north toward Seoul. This move seemed to end serious
consideration of an amphibious operation on the east coast, although the
XVI Corps with its two divisions in Japan continued to conduct amphibious
training in Japan for such an eventuality. Furthermore, the marines were
now close to the port of Incheon, from where they could be outloaded if the
decision were made to conduct an amphibious assault.23 Although the FEC
continued to maintain that capability, the likelihood of success for such
an operation seemed to diminish as the North Koreans steadily improved
their coastal defenses at feasible landing sites. An increasing toll on the
ships conducting the Wonsan siege, the conduct of anti-invasion exercises
by the KPA, and the capture of plans for counteramphibious operations
were all indications of the probable high cost of any such operation.24
The enemy’s concern about an amphibious invasion did cause the
diversion of forces from the front lines. Although the military impact dur-
ing the long period of static warfare is problematic, GHQ continued to
see merit in pinning down enemy forces through amphibious demonstra-
tions, which led to the last significant amphibious operation of the war,
the Kojo (Gojeo) Feint in October 1952. In July the Commander in Chief,
United Nations Command (CINCUNC) directed the 1st Cavalry Division
to provide an RCT to Korea for security missions. The 8th Cavalry was
selected as the first such unit, and it was decided that “in the interest of
economy and realistic training” it would be useful to combine the move-
ment of the regiment to Korea with an amphibious exercise. Vice Admiral
Robert P. Briscoe had replaced Admiral Joy as COMNAVFE the previous
June. The new naval commander believed the operation would provide
an excellent opportunity for training and suggested that it be carried out
as if it were an actual landing, including air and naval gunfire prepara-
tion of the beach area. It was hoped that enemy forces would be lured
into what they believed was an amphibious objective area and that heavy
casualties might be inflicted on them by air and surface forces. General
Mark W. Clark, who had replaced Ridgway on 12 May 1952, ordered that
322
COMNAVFE, in coordination with Eighth Army and XVI Corps, submit
a plan for the proposed operation. The target date for the demonstration
was set for 15 October. The fact that this was a deception operation was
kept close hold and known only to the highest-level commanders and staff.
Consequently, planning began in September 1952 as if an actual opera-
tion was to take place. Two operations were planned: one for a corps-
level operation involving two divisions to be landed in column and the
other for an RCT-size landing. The final decision was for a regimental-size
operation to be carried out in conjunction with the deployment of the 8th
Cavalry from Hokkaido to Korea.25
Operation Plan No. 5-52 was developed as if for an actual two-division
amphibious landing by XVI Corps and naval forces at Gojeo (Kojo), 40
miles southeast of Wonsan and one of the areas previously considered for
an amphibious assault. The concept of the operation was for the amphibi-
ous assault to be conducted in conjunction with a simultaneous Eighth
Army ground attack and an airborne assault to encircle and destroy enemy
forces south of a line from Pyeonggang in the Iron Triangle to the coast at
Gojeo. Eighth Army and XVI Corps would then continue the attack north
to capture Wonsan. Vice Admiral J.J. Clark, Seventh Fleet commander,
was designated Commander Joint Amphibious Task Force 7, which was
activated on 8 October 1952. As part of the deception measures, the 187th
Airborne Regiment was alerted to be withdrawn from the line and pre-
pared for an airdrop.
Operation DOMINO began with the mount out of the 8th Cavalry
RCT, a shore party company of the 532d EASR, and other elements of
the 2d ASB on 7 October from Hokkaido. On 12 October, in spite of high
winds and heavy seas that caused damage to some of the landing craft,
they conducted a rehearsal landing near Gangneung on the east coast.
While the rehearsal was taking place, a large naval force, which included
four aircraft carriers, two escort carriers, a battleship, two heavy cruisers,
and destroyers, bombarded Gojeo. The tempo of Air Force operations was
also increased, including a simulated airborne drop.
On 13 and 14 October Eighth Army launched a limited objective attack
toward Gimhwa (Kumhwa) by two battalions, and on D-Day, 15 October,
a force of more than a hundred ships arrived off Gojeo and began what
appeared to be a full-scale amphibious landing. However, poor weather
conditions delayed the prelanding naval gunfire and air bombardment.
Because of 50-knot winds and dangerous sea conditions, the troops were
not actually loaded into the boats. Instead, empty landing craft formed up,
headed toward shore, and then turned back and returned to the transports.
323
The ships carrying the 8th Cavalry then proceeded to Pohang. It was one
of the largest amphibious operations of the war, but because of the poor
visibility, it is unclear whether the North Koreans were aware that it took
place. There were no significant troop movements and very little reaction
from coastal defenses. It was unclear whether this was because the bad
weather prevented the KPA from seeing the extent of the offshore armada
or whether they were holding their fire until the troops were ashore. On
the UNC side, the deception was so convincing that all but the highest
echelons really believed that the UNC was going on the offensive. When
it all turned out to be a sham, there was a natural let down. Some of the
planners and participants were angry at having been deceived, especially
since the preliminary air and naval operations had been conducted with
some risk of casualties.26
Planning for amphibious operations continued. Clark, on 14 May
1953, facing the possibility that the armistice talks could break down again
and another long recess could occur, sent a message to the JCS outlining
his plans to put additional military pressure on the Communists. Within
his existing directives, CINCUNC could conduct limited objective attacks
and expand air, naval, and guerrilla operations. He also suggested breach-
ing operations against a number of irrigation dams not yet attacked; an air
attack on the Communist logistic center at Gaeseong; unilateral release of
about 35,000 North Korean POWs; and a combined land and amphibious
attack in the Toncheon (T’ongch’on)–Geumseong (Kumsong)–Gimhwa
area in the fall of 1953 to destroy North Korean forces, shorten the front
line, and provide a better base from which to conduct operations toward
the narrow waist of Korea.27 It is unknown whether Washington would
have approved these ambitious and costly operations, but the issue became
moot on 27 July 1953 when the armistice was signed and the active com-
bat of the Korean War ended.
324
Notes
1. 747th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion, Command Report, 1950,
RG 407, Entry 429, Box 4399, National Archives and Records Administration,
Modern Military Records, College Park, MD, hereafter, NACP.
2. Command Reports, 409th Engineer Special Brigade, 369th and 370th
Engineer Boat and Shore Regiments/Engineer Amphibious Support Regiments,
1950, 1951; RG 407, Entry 429, Boxes 4666 and 4667, NACP; Headquarters,
Sixth Army, Report of PHIBTEST, 19 September 1952, RG 407, Entry 429, Box
6044; Amphibious Force Pacific Fleet, PHIBTEST, RG 407, Entry 429, Box 5584,
NACP.
3. This discussion of amphibious training and Korea deployment for the
two National Guard divisions is based on Walter G. Hermes, United States Army
in the Korean War: Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington, DC: Office of the
Chief of Military History, 1966), 202, and Far East Command, Command Report,
separate volumes by month, November 1950–July 1953 (Tokyo: GHQ Far East
Command, Military Intelligence Section), September 1951, 74, and October 1951,
76–77.
4. FEC, Command Report, September 1951, 74–75, and January 1952, 92.
5. FEC, Command Report, September 1951, “urgent requirement,” 69, pos-
sibility of an amphibious operation in March, 92–93.
6. Headquarters, 532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, Command
Reports for October, November, and December 1951 and January 1952, RG 407,
Box 6045, NACP.
7. Headquarters, 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion, Command
Report Narrative Summaries, November and December 1951, RG 338, Entry
37042, Box 30, NACP.
8. FEC, Command Report, January 1952, 82–83; 532d EB&SR Command
Reports, February, March, and April 1952.
9. CINCFE Message CX 61516 (DA IN 505), to Department of the Army
for JCS, 15 January 1952, “Post-Treaty Operation of SCAJAP Fleet,” RG 218,
Entry UD48, Box 3, Folder 3, NACP; FEC, Command Report, March 1952,
94–95; James A. Field Jr., History of United States Naval Operations, Korea
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1962), 430. The disposition of the LSTs is summa-
rized in the appendixes to Norman Friedman and A.D. Baker, U.S. Amphibious
Ships and Craft; An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2002); in the individual ship histories of the US Department of the Navy,
Naval Historical Center, Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, history.
navy.mil/danfs/index.html (accessed 13 February 2008); and in a compilation of
information on the disposition of LSTs, www5e.biglobe.ne.jp/~vandy-1/lst2.htm
(accessed 10 February 2007).
10. FEC, Command Report, December 1951, 21; Field, Naval Operations,
Korea, 420–423. See maps 49 and 51 for the locations of these islands and
forces.
325
11. FEC, Command Report, January 1952, 19–20, February 1952, 27–28,
and March 1952, 10, 19; Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 423–425; Hermes,
Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 161.
12. Field, Naval Operations, Korea, 430, 457; FEC, Command Report, July
1952, 26, June 1953, 13–15; Naval Historical Center, “Korean War: Chronology
of U.S. Pacific Fleet Operations,” www.history.navy.mil/wars/korea/chron50.
htm (accessed 21 November 2007), entries for 1952 and 1953; and Agreement
Between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the One Hand,
and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander
of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on the Other Hand, Concerning a Military
Armistice Agreement in Korea,” Article IIA (a copy of the Armistice Agreement
is Appendix C of Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front).
13. 532d EB&SR, Command Report, May 1952.
14. 532d EB&SR, Command Report, June 1952. See map 8 for the various
geographical locations in Japan.
15. 532d EB&SR, Command Report, July 1952.
16. 532d EB&SR, Command Report, August and September 1952.
17. 532d Engineer Amphibious Support Regiment (EASR), Command
Report, October 1952. The event that the engineers had participated in was
Operation DOMINO, an amphibious demonstration.
18. 532d EASR, Command Report, November 1952.
19. FEC, Command Report, November 1952, 40.
20. 532d EASR, Command Report, January–May 1953.
21. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 187.
22. FEC, Command Report, March 1952, 41.
23. Lynn Montross, Pat Meid, and James M. Yingling, U.S. Marine
Operations in Korea, 1950–1953, Vol. IV, Operations in West Korea (Washington,
DC: Historical Branch, G3, 1972), 9–11.
25. FEC, Command Report, August 1952, 5; Hermes, Truce Tent and
Fighting Front, 328–329.
26. FEC, Command Report, October 1952, 5–7; Malcolm W. Cagle and
Frank A. Manson, Sea War in Korea (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1957), 390–394.
27. FEC, Command Report, May 1953, 3–4.
326
Chapter 8
Postwar Activities, Current Situation, and Lessons Learned
At the end of the Korean War, the Army still had an amphibious
infrastructure based on the amphibious support brigade (ASB) and the
amphibious tank and tractor battalion (ATTB). The 2d ASB and the 56th
ATTB were deactivated in the mid-1950s, with the Transportation Corps
inheriting much of the equipment and mission of the amphibious engi
neers. The 2d Engineer Amphibious Support Command, a new organiza
tion, was established a year later and remained in existence for about a
decade until its final deactivation. The Army Field Forces, which became
the Continental Army Command (CONARC) in 1955, continued to be the
Army agency responsible for amphibious training and doctrine. Postwar
Army field manuals and publications reflected some of the pre-Korean
War doctrinal issues until the Joint Staff began publishing joint amphibi
ous doctrine in the late 1980s. During the Vietnam War, the Army con
ducted over-the-shore logistics, coastal and riverine transport, and security
operations. It also conducted brigade-size riverine combat operations in
conjunction with the Navy. After Vietnam, with few exceptions, the Army
increasingly focused on the airborne and airmobile aspects of forcible
entry operations. Only the Transportation Corps retained the watercraft
and other assets for, and an interest in, amphibious and over-the-shore
operations.
Doctrine, Force Structure, and Training
In September 1951 all three Services published identical manuals titled
Joint Action Armed Forces (JAAF) that replaced the old Joint Action of the
Army and Navy (JAAN). The new document established the broad princi
ples for doctrine and command of the Armed Forces mutually agreed on by
the Services and was generally consistent with the Key West Agreement.
It contained a section for each of the Services identifying responsibili
ties for amphibious operations. The Navy and Marine Corps were charged
with organizing naval forces, including naval close air support forces; con
ducting joint amphibious operations; amphibious training of all forces “as
assigned for joint amphibious operations”; developing “in coordination
with the other Services” amphibious doctrines and procedures; developing
the doctrines and techniques applicable specifically to naval forces in joint
amphibious operations and for training those forces; participating in joint
amphibious training; and establishing and operating a joint amphibious
board with representation from all the Services. Disputes arising in this
board were to be resolved through inter-Service consultation and, if irre
solvable, presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for resolution. The
327
board was specifically exempted from dealing with landing force tactics,
techniques, and equipment, which were to be the responsibilities of the
Marine Corps. The Marine Corps was charged with the development, “[i]n
coordination with the Army, Navy, and the Air Force,” of the tactics, tech
niques, and equipment for landing forces in amphibious operations and for
establishing, maintaining, and operating a “joint landing force board, with
representation from all the Services.”1 The Army’s responsibilities were to
organize, train, and provide Army forces for joint amphibious operations;
to train these forces “in accordance with joint doctrines”; to develop, “in
coordination with the other Services, tactics, techniques, and equipment
of interest to the Army for amphibious operations” not provided for in the
activities of the Marine Corps; and to participate with the other Services in
joint amphibious training and exercises “as mutually agreed to.”2
The year after the Army and Air Force published its statement of
amphibious doctrine, the Navy produced its own statement. This document,
Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) Number 22, became the basis for the
series of Navy publications on amphibious warfare and for Marine Corps
landing force manuals.3 NWP 22 was a unilateral Navy interpretation,
not coordinated with or accepted as joint doctrine by the other Services.
Nevertheless, the Services generally adopted the broad principles and
techniques of amphibious warfare contained in the document, although
there were some points of disagreement. For the Army, the contentious
issues had to do with Navy insistence on control by a naval officer of
all amphibious operations, the range of operations within the rubric
“amphibious,” the timing of transfer of control from the amphibious task
force commander to the landing force commander, and the logistical issues
that had been matters of contention before the Korean War. The Army
objected to the Navy view that an amphibious operation was complete in
itself, arguing that when the effort was the first phase of sustained land
operations, the shore party became the lead element of a major logistical
effort. The Air Force’s principal concern was with control of aviation assets
during amphibious operations. A more fundamental issue was the concept
of joint doctrine. When the Joint Amphibious Board provided for in JAAF
convened in 1952, the Navy presented NWP 22 as the solution for joint
doctrine. The other Service representatives insisted that for doctrine to be
joint, all of the Services had to participate in all phases of its development.
The issue was not resolved, the Joint Amphibious Board became dormant
in 1954, and the doctrinal issues continued to smolder for the rest of the
decade.4
New Army amphibious field manuals were published just prior to
and during the Korean War. In the early months of 1950, Field Manual
328
(FM) 60-5, Amphibious Operations: Battalion in Assault Landings, and
FM 60-10, Amphibious Operations: Regiment in Assault Landings, were
issued in draft form. They were published during the war, in February
1951 and January 1952, respectively. Reflecting the post-World War II
amalgamation of amphibious tanks and tractors into a single composite
unit, FM 17-34, Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion, was issued in
draft in 1948 and published in June 1950, the same month as the North
Korean attack. The last of the wartime series of amphibious field manuals—
FM 60-30, Amphibious Operations: Embarkation and Ship Loading (Unit
Loading Officer)—was published in September 1952.5 These doctrinal
statements made no significant changes in the methodology for conducting
landings on hostile shores developed during World War II and primarily
reflected relatively minor changes in technology and organization. They
generally followed the doctrine as set forth by the Navy and Marine
Corps, with some reflection of the Army-specific viewpoint, particularly
in the distinction between amphibious operations intended to capture an
island advance base (seizure) and large-scale continental operations that
would constitute the first phase of sustained operations on land (invasion).
A new series of engineer tables of organization and equipment (TOEs)
issued in 1951 and a new FM in 1952 reflected the change from “engineer
special brigade” to “amphibious support brigade” and the replacement
of the engineer boat and shore regiment with a new amphibious support
regiment.6
In September 1954 a revised version of FM 100-5, Field Service
Regulations: Operations, was published. The new Army capstone man
ual on operational doctrine noted the continuing relevance of amphibious
operations and the Army’s predominant role in joint amphibious opera
tions. It also noted that the Army might conduct small unilateral shore-
to-shore operations and that amphibious shore-to-shore techniques were
applicable to operations on navigable rivers and lakes, large-scale river
crossing operations, and “interisland or coastal flanking operations” that
might take place after a major amphibious invasion.7
Immediately after the war, a substantial part of the Army’s amphibi
ous capability shifted from the Corps of Engineers to the Transportation
Corps. The Office of the Chief of Transportation carried out a study in
the summer of 1953, as the Korean War was ending. Published in August
1953, the study identified several assumptions, including that in a future
war with the threat of atomic weapons, the dispersion of friendly forces
and the likelihood that sea ports would be the target of nuclear attack
would result in a large and continuing requirement for logistics-over-the
shore (LOTS) and amphibious resupply operations. It noted that during
329
World War II, Transportation Corps units and personnel were constantly
involved in amphibious assault and LOTS operations. As of the time of
the study, the Transportation Corps provided boat and boat maintenance
elements that were organic to the amphibious support brigade (the Army’s
shore party organization) and continued to have responsibility for the
operation of ports and logistical beach discharge points. The landing craft
then being used by the Transportation Corps were designed for amphibi
ous assault operations and were of an expendable nature, not intended
for sustained LOTS-type operations. Furthermore, the Transportation
Corps doctrine, equipment, and organization were not ideal for either the
amphibious assault or LOTS missions, although they were being made
to work through ingenuity, hard work, and considerable prior planning.
The authors of the study recommended further research to determine the
types and numbers of Army landing craft needed to assure the success of
Transportation Corps aspects of amphibious operations from the assault to
the establishment of a rear boundary. Other recommendations concerned
the development of doctrine and training programs.8
In the years immediately after the war, boat functions were transferred
from the engineers to the Transportation Corps. The 159th Transportation
Boat Battalion was activated on 1 September 1953 at Fort Eustis, Virginia,
to assume the responsibility for combat landings, LOTS, and terminal
(lighterage) operations. It consisted of four light boat companies equipped
with 56-foot LCM(6)s—and later with 74-foot LCM(8)s—and two heavy
boat companies equipped with 115-foot landing craft, utility (LCU) (the
post-Korean War designation of the landing ship, utility [LSU] and the
World War II landing craft, tank [LCT]), as well as DUKWs and, eventu
ally, the larger amphibious trucks known as lighter, amphibious resupply,
cargo (LARC) and barge, amphibious resupply, cargo (BARC). Lieutenant
Colonel Michael D. Isrin, battalion commander from January 1954 to
September 1957, gained authorization for the soldiers of the 159th to wear
red patches at knee level on their fatigue trousers, the emblem of shore
party troops since World War II, and otherwise carry on the traditions of
the amphibious engineers. Over the next decade, the 159th would con
duct LOTS exercises, including annual training operations on the north
ern coast of France, and would refine new techniques developed at the
Transportation School at Fort Eustis, Virginia, such as the use of aerial
tramways (a cable strung between towers) to unload material from DeLong
floating piers—sectional, prefabricated piers that could be floated to unim
proved sites so that deep-draft berths could be established quickly.9
The 56th ATTB and the 2d Engineer ASB were both inactivated at
Otawa, Japan, on 24 June 1955.10 However, there was still a continuing
330
need for engineer amphibious expertise, and in 1956, the 2d Engineer
Amphibious Support Command (EASC) was activated at Fort Belvoir,
Virginia, for test and evaluation purposes. In March 1958 the unit moved
to Fort Lewis, Washington. Composed of the Command Headquarters
and the 592d Service Support Battalion (Headquarters, Headquarters and
Service Company, 560th Engineer Amphibious Equipment Company, and
793d Engineer Amphibious Company), the 2d EASC had the mission to
provide assault transport in amphibious tractors and shore party support
for Army units.11
From 1950 to 1964 the Transportation Corps continued to practice and
improve its LOTS capabilities, conducting Offshore Discharge Exercises
(ODEX) and New Offshore Delivery Exercises (NODEX) in northern
France to test over-the-shore delivery methods.12 From 1951 to 1965 the
Transportation Corps also supported construction of the Distant Early
Warning (DEW) Line in Greenland and in Labrador and Baffin Island,
Canada, through LOTS operations. In 1958 another LOTS operation sup
ported the US peacekeeping effort in Lebanon.13
During the latter half of the 1950s, Army units also participated in
a series of amphibious exercises that diminished in size due to a with
drawal of Navy support and assets. In March 1954 Headquarters, United
States Army Forces Antilles (USARFANT) and the Military District of
Puerto Rico (MDPR) conducted Exercise Sentry Box, which included an
amphibious landing exercise.14 Joint Army–Navy Exercise Surf Board
took place at the Hunter Liggett Military Reservation from 28 January to
7 April 1955, under the auspices of Sixth Army.15 Two large-scale exer
cises were planned for Fiscal Year 1956: joint Army–Air Force Exercise
Sagebrush and Exercise High Seas, a joint Army–Navy amphibious exer
cise. However, on 1 June 1955 the Navy concluded that it could not support
an exercise of the scope and size planned, and High Seas was canceled.16 It
subsequently took place the following year as a command post exercise.17
The Army attempted to have the task organization and command relation
ships reflect Army doctrine as set forth in its own field manuals, but the
Navy insisted that NWP 22 be used.18 Another large-scale amphibious
exercise, Rocky Shoals, was planned for the fiscal year 1959 Army exer
cise program. However, on 27 August 1957 the Chief of Naval Operations
once again said that the Navy could not support an exercise of the size
contemplated and recommended sealift for the exercise be restricted to a
maximum of 11,000 troops. Rocky Shoals was subsequently conducted in
1958 with two battle groups participating.19 The Navy again insisted on
applying NWP 22 as the doctrine for the exercise, and the Army had no
choice but to agree if it was to have an amphibious exercise.20
331
By this time in the late 1950s, the differences among the Services over
amphibious doctrine were narrowing, generally along the lines preferred
by the Navy. In 1955 Phillip A. Crowl, a historian at the Office of the
Chief of Military History, examined the current statements of Service doc
trine to determine exactly where the differences lay. Crowl brought some
experience and perspective to this work. He was the coauthor of one of
the first comprehensive histories of Marine Corps amphibious operations
in the Pacific and had written the official Army histories of the Gilberts,
Marshalls, and Marianas operations. Crowl found that much of the previous
Army–Navy disagreement had disappeared. Both Services now agreed on
the principle of unity of command at all levels of an amphibious operation:
when two or more Services participated in an operation, an officer desig
nated from one of the Services would command all of the Service forces
during the operation. The Army agreed that the amphibious task force
commander should be a naval officer and the amphibious task force com
mander should coordinate the planning of an amphibious operation, with
the landing force and tactical air commanders reporting to the amphibious
task force commander during that planning. The Army also agreed that
NWP 22 should be the doctrine for the embarkation, rehearsal, movement
to the objective area, pre-assault and assault operations, and the early con
solidation of the beachhead. In other words, there was agreement on the
applicable doctrine for all but the consolidation phase of the amphibious
operation. Finally, the Army agreed that the Navy–Marine Corps system
of coordination of close air support should be used in joint amphibious
operations as it was specifically designed for amphibious operations.21
Crowl found only two points of difference between the Army and Navy
official positions. The first involved the scope of an amphibious operation,
a somewhat pale reflection of the old issue of small-scale “seizure”
operations (as in the Mid-Pacific doctrine) and large-scale “invasion”
operations. The Army thought a joint amphibious operation should include
a final phase that would set the stage for sustained operations on land: a
“final phase” in Crowl’s interpretation of the Army doctrine, “of logistical
build-up, consolidation of the objective, and establishment of facilities for
the support of projected operations.” The Navy (and Air Force) did not.
The Navy defined the “consolidation phase” of an amphibious operation
as the final phase of the operation when the “lodgment, or advance base,
area, or area to be denied the enemy is made secure.”22 The operation
would then be over and the amphibious task force dissolved. Crowl found
the only discernable difference between the Services on this issue was
an Army desire to have the landing force commander be independent
of the amphibious task force commander at some point before the final
332
consolidation and buildup was completed, while the Navy wished to permit
relatively early departure of the amphibious shipping. Crowl suggested
that it should not be difficult for the Services to establish a set of mutually
agreeable principles to govern the timing of dissolution of the amphibious
task force.23
The other issue concerned command relationships and was, again, an
attenuated reflection of the recurring Army view that when conducting an
amphibious operation in pursuit of Army objectives, the Army commander
should have control over the operation. That view had faded to an Army
desire that there be a joint task force headquarters directing the overall
joint amphibious operation, as opposed to the Navy view that only a single
headquarters—the joint amphibious task force headquarters—would be
required. Moreover, the Army also agreed that a naval officer would com
mand the joint headquarters. The Army balanced these concessions, how
ever, by the contention that the overall joint task force commander should
be from the Service having “dominant interest in the basic purpose of the
over-all operation” (Army Draft Training Circular, paragraph 5a). Crowl
saw no reason why the Navy should reject this idea, because that was
the approach taken in the Central Pacific in World War II, with Admiral
Raymond A. Spruance in the role of joint task force commander (although
not with that particular title). However, Crowl saw the determination of
dominant interest to be potentially complicated, as most major operations
had more than one strategic purpose.24
Crowl also found two points of ambiguity between the two Service
doctrines. One concerned the transfer of authority from the amphibious
force commander to the landing force commander. Army doctrine tended
to leave this judgment to the landing force commander, with the transfer
occurring as soon as the landing force command was functioning ashore.
Navy doctrine tended to give the amphibious force commander leeway on
the timing. The other issue was a lack of clarity in both Service doctrines
on control of ship-to-shore landing craft after the initial assault. Crowl
pointed out that this was a neuralgic issue throughout World War II and
was never satisfactorily resolved. He recommended a joint agreement on
“an explicit and clear cut doctrine as to who controls what landing craft,
and where, and when.”25
Crowl found one point of strong disagreement between the Air Force
on one side and the Army and Navy on the other. The Army and Navy
held firmly to the principle of unity of command at all levels, while the Air
Force argued for the old principle of mutual cooperation below the level
of theater commander with the three Service component commanders
333
“coequal and interdependent.” Further, the Air Force doctrine explicitly
stated, “The ground forces and the naval forces are joined into an amphibi
ous task force for amphibious operations. The amphibious task force will
not include any air forces in its organization. The air commander of the air
forces participating in conjunction with the operations is always coequal
with the amphibious task force commander.”26
With some exceptions, these issues were resolved as the Services
worked their way toward an agreed on doctrine for amphibious operations.
The amphibious warfare proponents at the Continental Army Command
were not entirely pleased with the process, which they perceived had a
tendency to resolve issues in favor of Navy doctrine. They noted, “The
Army has a continuous requirement for joint doctrine covering all aspects
of operations involving strategic and tactical mobility and fire support.”
The study concluded:
The Army has been the major war time user of amphibi
ous operations. The Army requirements for operations
involving amphibious techniques stem from strategic and
tactical mobility requirements incident to land warfare.
Since the Army requirements include unilateral water
barrier crossings and other waterborne operations on
restricted coastal and inland waters, the Army cannot rely
solely upon development by another Service regardless of
proponent responsibility assignments.27
The next generation of Army amphibious warfare doctrine, published in
the early 1960s, would reflect some of the CONARC views.
The new multi-Service doctrinal statement was published in July 1962
as Army, Navy, and Marine Corps Doctrine for Amphibious Operations. At
this point, the differences with the Air Force had not been reconciled and
the Air Force did not concur with the document.28 A revision published in
1967 incorporated Air Force views and was published as an Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, and Air Force document.29 Some of the key elements of the
document reflected the resolution of the earlier disagreements:
● An amphibious operation is an attack launched
from the sea by naval and landing forces embarked
in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile
shore [paragraph 101a].
● Combat operations which involve waterborne
movement, such as inland-water, ferrying, and
shore-to-shore operations in which the landing
334
forces are not embarked in naval ships, waterborne
administrative landings on friendly territory,
and water terminal and logistics over-the-shore
operations possess certain characteristics and
employ some of the techniques of an amphibious
operation. However, these are not amphibious
operations [paragraph 101b].
● The amphibious operation is a complete operation
within itself. As an entity, an amphibious operation
includes planning, embarkation of troops and
equipment, rehearsals, movement to the objective
area, final preparation of the objective, assault
landing of troops and accompanying supplies and
equipment, and support of the landing force
until termination of the amphibious operation
[emphasis added; paragraph 103].
● Except during the planning phase, the amphibious
task force commander, a Navy officer (emphasis
added), is responsible for the operation and
exercises that degree of authority over the entire
force necessary to ensure the success of the
operation [paragraph 213a(1)].
● When Air Force forces are assigned to the amphibious
task force they will be organized as a separate force
or component under the command of an Air Force
officer . . . when the preponderance of tactical
aviation is provided by the Air Force . . . an Air Force
officer will be designated . . . to direct the total air
effort in the amphibious objective area . . . when the
preponderance of tactical aviation comes from the
Navy or Marine Corps, the overall air effort in the
objective area will be directed by a naval aviator
under the amphibious task force commander until
control is passed ashore [paragraph 226a and b].30
During the same general timeframe that this joint doctrine statement
was being worked out, the Army published its next generation of doctrinal
literature on amphibious operations with the Pentomic Army battle group
landing team as the basic element of an Army landing force—soon to be
replaced by the brigades and battalions of the Reorganized Army Division
(ROAD) force structure. The new publications included FM 31-12,
335
Army Forces in Amphibious Operations (The Army Landing Force),
published in March 1961, followed by FM 31-13, Battle Group Landing
Team, Amphibious, in September 1961, and FM 60-30, Embarkation and
Loading—Amphibious, in May 1962. Of these, the key publication setting
forth the fundamental Army amphibious doctrine was FM 31-12. The
following statements reflect those areas of particular Army interest:
● Amphibious operations may be categorized
according to operational purposes as follows: (1)
Invasion. This category implies initial but large-
scale intervention by land combat forces into an
enemy controlled territory. . . . Invasion implies
intent to enter forcibly a national political area
and to occupy captured territory for an indefinite
period of time. (2) Seizure. This category implies
capture of a voluntarily restricted portion of an
enemy controlled territory. Capture of an isolated
land mass such as an island falls with this category.
[Paragraph 8. Italics in the original. The Joint
document made no such differentiation.]
● The amphibious operation is a complete operation
within itself. However, when it is conducted by
a joint force it is usually one phase or part of a
campaign of larger magnitude [emphasis added;
paragraph 9].31
The 1960s also saw the publication of new doctrine for the amphibi
ous engineers. Although the Transportation Corps had taken over much of
the over-the-shore and amphibious logistics capability, the engineers were
still responsible for supporting Army amphibious assaults. FM 5-156,
The Engineer Amphibious Support Command (Draft), April 1958, was
never published, but FM 5-144, Engineer Shore Assault Units, was pub
lished in October 1963 and replaced by FM 5-144, Engineer Amphibious
Units, in November 1966. The 1963 manual was based on a unit called an
“Engineer Amphibious Command” that would include one or more engi
neer amphibious groups composed of engineer amphibious companies
(shore party units) and engineer amphibian assault companies (equipped
with LVTs to provide ship-to-shore movement and inland mobility). The
1966 manual, revised in 1969, envisioned an engineer amphibious bri
gade headquarters and headquarters company that would provide the com
mand element for two to four engineer amphibious groups, each of which
would control a number of engineer amphibious battalions. Each engineer
336
amphibious battalion would consist of a headquarters and headquarters
company, two engineer amphibian assault companies (with LVTs), and an
engineer amphibious company (shore party company).
These engineer units were designed for large-scale amphibious land
ings and envisioned the kind of operations conducted 20 years earlier in
the Southwest Pacific, the Mediterranean, and Northwest Europe. The
engineer amphibious brigade would be assigned to support a field army or
independent corps in amphibious or shore-to-shore operations, with each
engineer amphibious group of two or three engineer amphibious battalions
supporting a corps or multidivision landing. The engineer amphibious bat
talion would support a brigade landing with two battalion landing teams
(BLTs) in the assault, with one engineer amphibian assault company pro
viding LVTs for ship-to-shore, shore-to-shore, or inland movement for one
BLT, while the engineer amphibious company would supervise shore par
ties, amphibious combat support, and signal operations for two BLTs. The
assault companies were to be equipped with the then current version of the
LVT, the LVTP5 (the personnel carrier) and the landing vehicle, tracked,
retriever (LVTR)—a salvage and recovery vehicle. The engineer amphibi
ous company was to be equipped with the successor to the DUKW, the
LARC 5-ton amphibious truck.32
In 1964 the US Army Engineer School at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, devel
oped an exercise “involving engineer combat support to a hypothetical
joint amphibious operation established in an environment of limited war.”
Operation SUNSET was part of the Engineer Officer Career Course for
US Army Reserve engineer officers. The exercise was the major part of
a lesson called “Engineers in an Amphibious Assault and Link-Up with
Airborne Forces.” The objective of the exercise was—
To provide the student with a general knowledge of
an amphibious operation planned to seize a division
beachhead, a link-up with airborne forces, and subsequent
expansion of control over the initial objective area.
Engineer planning and operations, to include employment
of elements of Engineer Shore Assault and Amphibian
Assault units in assault and shore party operations, will
be emphasized.33
The scenario posited an “aggressor army” invasion of Cambodia from
Laos and a counteroffensive by US Pacific Forces under overall Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) command. A composite SEATO
corps would enter Cambodia overland from Thailand, while elements
of the I US Corps conducted airborne and amphibious landings on the
337
Cambodian coast. The notional 22d Infantry Division (Reinforced) was to
conduct the amphibious assault with three brigade landing teams directing
surface and helicopter-borne assaults. Three engineer amphibious assault
companies would support the landing, transporting the assaulting forces
in their landing vehicles, tracked (LVTs), while an engineer shore assault
group would provide shore party support. The students were provided
with extensive background information and then asked to play the roles
successively as the intelligence staff of the shore assault group, the infantry
division staff, and commander of one of the shore assault companies.
They were asked to conduct a beach study, evaluate a proposed concept
of operation for the landing, evaluate a proposed plan for shore party
operations, and develop recommendations for the landing of one of the
battalion landing teams and supporting engineers. Considerable effort had
been put into the development of this exercise, demonstrating that, as the
United States stepped up its involvement in Vietnam, the engineers were
preparing officers to conduct major amphibious operations.
However, this immense and powerful organization set forth in the
field manuals, the TOEs, and Operation SUNSET existed only on paper.
From 1963 to 1965 the Army’s actual engineer amphibious establishment
consisted of the 2d EASC Headquarters with two companies assigned:
the 560th Engineer Amphibian Equipment Company (with three platoons,
each operating 10 LVTP5s borrowed from the Marine Corps) and the 793d
Engineer Amphibious Company (shore party). The amphibious engineers
participated in several exercises, and in August 1964 moved to Fort Story,
Virginia. In July 1965 the 2d EASC and its two companies were inacti
vated, and the story of the amphibious engineers came to an end.34
Vietnam and After

In 1960 Army Transportation Corps units participated in a Strategic
Army Command (STRAC) mobility exercise, conducted over-the-shore
operations in Exercise Tarheel, and participated in the first joint Army
and Marine Corps landing exercise, JAMLEX, at Camp Lejeune, North
Carolina. There would be additional JAMLEX and other exercises involv
ing Army LOTS and water transportation operations throughout the early
1960s, and in 1962 the 159th Transportation Battalion prepared to conduct
amphibious operations during the Cuban Missile Crisis.35
During the long Vietnam War, the Army conducted no significant
amphibious operations as narrowly defined in the joint doctrine, but
many Army activities possessed the characteristics and employed the
techniques of amphibious operations. The 4th Transportation Command,
338
which had operated ports during World War II and had developed water
terminal doctrine and techniques after the war, deployed to Vietnam in
August 1965. The 4th Transportation Command initially operated the
Saigon port complex and water terminals at Cam Ranh Bay, Cat Lai, Nha
Be, Nha Trang, Phan Rang, Qui Nhon, and Vung Tau. In 1966 the 124th
Transportation Terminal Command took over the operation of Nha Trang,
Cam Ranh Bay, Vung Ro Bay, and Phan Rang. The 5th Transportation
Command operated Qui Nhon with lighterage support provided by the
159th Transportation Battalion, while the 125th Transportation Command
operated the main port of Saigon. Later in the war, the 4th Transportation
Command opened small ports at other locations as they were required.36
(See map 51.)
In September 1965 large-scale landing ship, tank (LST) operations
began, with the landing ships transporting vehicles, supplies, and person
nel from Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Okinawa to shallow-water ports
such as Qui Nhon, Vung Tau, and Nha Trang. Ramps of crushed coral and
sand were constructed at these and other ports to facilitate operations by
the LSTs and by LCUs and LCMs lightering cargo ashore from vessels
anchored offshore, and DeLong floating piers were installed to provide
deep-draft berths.37
Units of the 159th Transportation Battalion, which arrived in Vietnam
in August 1966, conducted terminal operations in the port of Saigon and
operated LST beaches and over-the-shore logistical activities at Cam Ranh
Bay, Da Nang, and Qui Nhon, lightering cargo from ships to the shore
with LCUs, LCM(8)s, BARCs, and LARCs. In May 1967 a detachment
of one of the battalion’s boat companies set up a small LOTS operation
at Sau Hugynh Beach near the 101st Airborne Division forward sup
ply base at Duc Pho using BARCs and LCMs to bring supplies over the
beach. During the Battle of Hue at the time of the 1968 Tet Offensive,
Transportation Corps LCUs operated with Navy landing craft to deliver
supplies to units fighting along the Qua Viet and Perfume Rivers. In
March 1968 the 159th Transportation Battalion set up the largest LOTS
operation of the war at Thon My Thuy Beach near the demilitarized zone
(DMZ) to provide logistical support for operations in the northern I Corps
area. Between March and August 1968, over a thousand tons of cargo a
day was brought in over the beach at Thon My Thuy, which was initially
called Utah Beach and then dubbed Wunder Beach when the amphibious
transporters put up the sign “Welcome to Wunder Beach: The Home of
Sunder’s Wonders.” (Lieutenant Colonel Charles Sunder was the 159th
Transportation Battalion commander.) From 1968 to the end of the war,
339
Army Transportation Corps detachments supplemented Navy and Marine
units delivering supplies over the beach in the I Corps Tactical Zone and
conducted LOTS operations along the coast of the Mekong Delta.38
N O R T H V IE T N A M
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Map 51. Vietnam.
340
The 10th, 11th, 24th, 71st, and 394th Transportation Battalions (Ter
minal) operated ports and water terminals, including lighterage and LOTS
operations.39 In July 1967 the 4th Transportation Command formed the US
Army Transportation Battalion Vung Tau/Delta (Provisional). This unit,
with its two heavy boat companies (LCUs) and one medium boat company
(LCMs), operated a terminal at Vung Tau, delivered supplies to small ports
and bases along the coast, and provided beaching craft for tactical opera
tions. Throughout the war, other transportation boat companies conducted
similar operations.40
The 458th Transportation Company deployed to Vietnam in October
1966 as a light amphibious unit equipped with LARC Vs. The unit con
ducted lighterage and over-the-shore operations until August 1967, when
its mission was changed to inland water and port security and it traded its
LARCs for Boston Whalers. In 1968 the 458th received Navy armed river
patrol boats (PBRs), becoming the only Army PBR unit. Attached to the
92d Military Police (MP) Battalion of the 18th MP Brigade, detachments
of the 458th patrolled ports, waterways, and canals at various locations in
Vietnam until the unit was inactivated in September 1971.41
At various times during the war, US Army advisors accompanied
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops on small-scale amphibi
ous operations along the coasts and broad rivers of the Mekong Delta and
elsewhere.42 But the most significant Army amphibious-type combat oper
ations were those carried out by the Mobile Riverine Force in the Mekong
Delta. In 1966 General William C. Westmoreland, commanding general of
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) conceived the idea of
deploying an Army division to the Delta with one of its brigades stationed
aboard Navy ships to conduct operations along the extensive navigable
waterways. In late 1966 two US Navy barracks ships and a number of
landing craft were sent to the Delta, and troops of Colonel William B.
Fulton’s 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, trained in riverine warfare with
Navy units and Army Transportation Corps boat units in an area south of
Saigon. By May 1967 Fulton’s brigade headquarters and three infantry
battalions were established on a man-made island called Dong Tam a few
miles west of the Mekong River town of My Tho in Dinh Tuong prov
ince, as the Army component of the Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Force,
later redesignated the Mobile Riverine Force. The Navy component was
Captain Wade C. Wells’ Task Force (TF) 117 (River Assault Flotilla One)
with two river assault squadrons, each consisting of 26 assault troop car
riers, three command and control boats, five fire support craft (monitors),
and a refueling craft, all of them modified LCM(6)s. The Mobile Riverine
Force was supported by River Support Squadron Seven, consisting of four
341
modified LSTs, a barge, and a harbor tugboat. The LST Benewah served
as Wells’ flagship and Fulton’s headquarters and accommodated the artil
lery and security troops. Another LST provided quarters for an infantry
battalion, while the other two LSTs and the barge provided logistical and
maintenance support.43
One problem was the provision of artillery support to the riverine force.
Captain John A. Beiler and Major Daniel P. Carlton, of the 3d Battalion,
34th Field Artillery, proposed mounting artillery on barges. Existing Navy
barges had too deep a draft and were too difficult to move, but standard
Navy P-1 pontons could be used to construct a suitable barge. The result
ing 90- by 28-foot barge could accommodate two 105-mm howitzers, but
was too heavy to be pushed by the Navy LCM(6)s. Captain William G.
Pagonis’s 1097th Transportation Medium Boat Company was deployed
with its larger and more powerful LCM(8)s to the riverine force base at
Dong Tam to support the floating artillery. Two batteries of the 3/34th
Field Artillery were embarked on the barges. Three barges, each with an
Army LCM(8) push boat, could mount a six-tube battery with an additional
LCM(8) serving as a fire direction center and command post and another
as an ammunition resupply craft. Armor plate was fitted to the sides of the
artillery barges, with sections that could be dropped so that the howitzers
could fire at zero elevation with antipersonnel “beehive” rounds if the gun
ners were ambushed as they moved along the waterways. In addition to
supporting the 3/34th Field Artillery Battalion, the 1097th also provided
logistical support to Fulton’s brigade, transporting men and materiel to
and from the Dong Tam base. During these artillery and logistical opera
tions, the 1097th frequently came under fire and by the end of its tour in
Vietnam had become one of the most decorated units in Transportation
Corps history.44
The Mobile Riverine Force carried out operations in the Delta until
1969. During this time, some of the old Army–Navy amphibious com
mand and control issues arose once again. General Westmoreland wished
to have the force commanded by the assistant division commander of the
9th Division, an Army brigadier general, with a joint Army–Navy staff.
The Navy insisted that the joint doctrine, to which the Army had agreed,
specified that an amphibious operation would be commanded by a naval
officer until the landing force was established ashore, when command
passed to the ground commander. The compromise was that there would
be no overall commander and the force would operate on the mutual coop
eration basis. The senior Army commander would have responsibility for
the riverine bases, including the afloat (but anchored) support ships, but
342
once the ships got underway to move to a new location, the senior Navy
commander would be in charge until the element anchored again. In com
bat, the Navy commander took control once the troops were embarked in
the landing craft. After they went ashore, the Army commander regained
control. When they re-embarked, the Navy commander took charge until
they reached the base.45 The Mobile Riverine Force conducted operations
with considerable effectiveness until 1969, when the brigade was with
drawn and the naval assets were either turned over to the Vietnamese as
part of the Vietnamization program or incorporated into other Navy coastal
and river interdiction forces.46
The Navy and Marine Corps carried out amphibious operations
throughout the war, beginning with the arrival of one battalion of the 9th
Marine Expeditionary Brigade in an administrative landing over the beach
(through very heavy surf) at Da Nang on 8 March 1965. In August 1965
Operation STARLIGHT, the first battle of the war in which US forces
engaged a large main force Viet Cong unit, began with a helicopter and
amphibious assault by a battalion of Marines south of Chu Lai.47 The
Marines carried out several company and battalion-size amphibious oper
ations in 1965, and on 28 January 1966 conducted Operation DOUBLE
EAGLE I, with 1,200 Marines of two BLTs landing on the coast of Quang
Ngai province.46 As the Marines became ever more deeply engaged in
counterinsurgency and combat operations on land, however, the amphibi
ous operations became the purview of the Seventh Special Landing Force
(SLF). This floating mobile contingency force consisted of a regimental
staff, a Marine battalion landing team (an infantry battalion reinforced
with artillery and other support elements), and a Marine helicopter squad
ron embarked on the half dozen or so ships of an amphibious ready group
(ARG). In 1966 the SLF conducted eight amphibious landings along the
entire coast of Vietnam from near Saigon in the south to the DMZ in the
north with the objective of trapping enemy forces and interdicting their
coastal supply line.49 A second SLF was established in 1967, but the first
operation of the year, in the Mekong Delta area, was the last one con
ducted outside the I Corps area. The SLF battalions were kept in country
for longer and longer periods after each operation and, as the war went
on, some came to question the value of these amphibious operations, sug
gesting that “any combat Marine not ashore and fighting was not being
properly utilized.”50 Nonetheless, the operations continued, although more
often than not the marines were inserted by helicopter rather than over the
beach. In January 1969 the largest amphibious operation of the war, and
the largest since CHROMITE, took place south of Chu Lai with two BLTs
343
going ashore in helicopters and LVTs.51 The last SLF landing took place
in September 1969 south of Da Nang with participation by Republic of
Korea (ROK) marines.52
The United States used amphibious techniques from time to time in
the succeeding years to put forces ashore in peacekeeping operations and,
on a small scale, in the 1983 Grenada URGENT FURY and 1989 Panama
JUST CAUSE operations. From 1987 to 1989, during Operation PRIME
CHANCE I, the US Army participation in Operation EARNEST WILL,
the reflagging and protection of Kuwaiti oil tankers during the Iran–Iraq
War, US Army Special Forces observation and attack helicopters of
Detachment 160 using the radio call sign SEABAT, operated from US
Navy warships to protect merchant ships transiting the Persian Gulf and to
prevent the Iranian Navy from laying mines in the shipping channels.53
During Operation JUST CAUSE/NIMROD DANCER, the 1989 US
intervention in Panama, the 1097th Transportation Medium Boat Company
transported 7th Infantry Division troops by water within Panama; con
ducted a reinforced company-size amphibious assault at Gamboa Prison
on 20 December 1989; assisted Navy special operations forces in coastal
security patrols; and ferried cargo, passengers, and prisoners of war across
the canal.54 Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in 1990
and 1991 saw the last large-scale application of an amphibious force in
combat, although there was no assault landing, as US Navy and Marine
forces offshore in the Persian Gulf during Operation DESERT SHIELD
threatened and diverted Iraqi forces.
In 1994 a brigade combat team (BCT) and aviation brigade of the 10th
Mountain Division embarked aboard the aircraft carrier USS Eisenhower
and Special Forces troops and helicopters aboard the USS America were
prepared to conduct an airmobile assault into Haiti while Marines went in
over the beaches. Negotiations precluded the amphibious and airmobile
assault, but the ability of Army forces to operate from Navy ships in
landing operations was once more demonstrated.55 In 2001 Special Forces
helicopters again operated from US Navy ships when TF Sword conducted
operations into Afghanistan from the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Kitty
Hawk.56
During the 1980s and 1990s there was increasing emphasis on joint
operations and doctrine, a process that was accelerated by the 1986
Goldwater–Nichols Act, which centralized military advice to the President
and Secretary of Defense in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
vested operational control of forces in unified commands, with the Services
retaining the responsibilities to organize, train, and equip those forces. Joint
344
amphibious doctrine began to appear in the 1990s. The current capstone
document, Joint Publication 3-02, Joint Amphibious Doctrine for Joint
Operations, was published in 2001. It provides a definition of an amphibi
ous operation that is less Service-centric than any of its predecessors:
A military operation launched from the sea by an amphib
ious force, embarked in ships or craft with the primary
purpose of introducing a landing force (LF) ashore to
accomplish an assigned mission. Types of amphibi-
ous operations [emphasis in original] include assaults,
withdrawals, demonstrations, raids, and other amphibi
ous operations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile
environment.57
The doctrine continues to evolve. The previously sacrosanct rule that
only a naval officer could command an amphibious task force ended in
2004, when Marine Brigadier General Joseph V. Medina assumed com
mand of Expeditionary Strike Group Three.58 In 2005 the Marine Corps
introduced the “Expeditionary Warfare Family of Concepts” that includes
“Operational Maneuver from the Sea,” “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver”
(landing operations), “Sustained Operations Ashore,” and “Other
Expeditionary Operations.”59 A related concept is “Sea Basing,” in which
ships and other platforms would be combined to form a base at sea from
which Marine or Army forces could conduct and sustain amphibious
operations.60 In 2006 the US Navy announced the organization of riv
erine forces. As of 2008, the Marine Corps maintained a small number
of riverine units,61 and the Army Transportation Corps had shallow-draft
watercraft to conduct riverine logistical support and troop lift operations.
In Iraq, Army engineers used bridging boats as ad hoc riverine patrol plat
forms and Army mariners of the 10th Transportation Battalion trained
Army infantrymen to operate and maintain Boston Whalers and Iraqi Fast
Assault Boats for riverine operations. However, the Army had no doctrine
for the conduct of riverine combat operations.62
Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, the current manifestation of
the Key West Agreement, still requires Army forces to be capable of con
ducting joint amphibious as well as airborne operations. Since the Vietnam
War, however, the Army has focused on airborne and airmobile operations
as its forcible entry specialties, essentially leaving the amphibious assault
mission to the Marines.63 The last Army doctrinal publication on amphibi
ous operations, FM 20-12, Amphibious Embarkation, was published
25 August 1975. With the deactivation of the 2d Engineer Amphibious
Support Command in 1965, the Transportation Corps became the keeper
345
of the Army’s amphibious and over-the-shore logistics capabilities and
expertise. As of June 2007, those assets resided with the 7th Sustainment
Brigade (descendant of the 7th Medium Port that played an important role
in the Korean War). The brigade currently includes two terminal battalions
with amphibious watercraft. The 10th Transportation Battalion (Terminal)
includes a heavy boat company equipped with LCUs, a floating craft com
pany (with tugs, barges, and floating cranes), port operation capabilities,
and two of the Army’s three Active-Duty Logistic Support Vessels—
sea-going ramped ships somewhat reminiscent of Korean War era LSTs.
The 24th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) includes floating craft and
heavy boat companies, the last remaining medium boat company equipped
with LCM(8)s, and a third of the active logistics support vehicles (LSVs).
Three other LSVs are in the Reserve component. A third terminal battalion,
the 11th, has a LOTS capability and until 2001 its LARC LX Company
operated the Army’s last LARCs (the only true Army amphibians, because
they could operate on both land and sea). The Transportation Corps relin
quished its LARCs in October 2001 in anticipation of the acquisition of
air cushion vehicles that failed to materialize. Nonetheless, the ramped
watercraft and other equipment of the corps continue to provide an ability
to deliver troops and cargo over the beach, even if they do not provide a
true amphibious capability.64 At least two other allied nations have Army
units with capabilities similar to those of the US Army Transportation
Corps. The French 519th Logistics Regiment operates LCMs and LARCs,
in addition to other equipment suitable for over-the-beach as well as port
operations. The British counterpart is the 17th Port & Maritime Regiment,
which operates a fleet of watercraft, including LCUs.65
Until the current operations in Iraq became the primary focus of the
Army’s efforts, there was a renewal of Army interest in, if not amphibious
assault, at least the use of seaborne capabilities for operational maneuver.
The experience of the First Gulf War and subsequent crises that required
the rapid deployment of Army forces led to an examination of the Army’s
strategic mobility capabilities. In 1999 Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera
and Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki outlined a concept for
Army transformation into a more “responsive, deployable, agile, versatile,
lethal, survivable, and sustainable” force.66 The transformation initiative
included restructuring Army forces and a search for ways to make Army
combat systems lighter and more easily deployable. A related effort
involved improvements in strategic and operational mobility. The wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq initially gave further impetus to these efforts, with
increasing emphasis on an expeditionary capability as Army transformation
346
developed in the first years of the 21st century. The 2005 Army Campaign
Plan stated:
Being expeditionary is far less about deployability than
about operational and tactical agility, including the ability
to reach routinely beyond organic capabilities for required
effects. If in the process the Army can leverage our sister
services’ mobility, reach, and lethality to satisfy some of
those mission requirements, all the better. To achieve that,
we must expand our view of Army force design to encom
pass the entire range of available joint capabilities.67
A fundamental requirement for expeditionary operations is strategic
mobility based on airlift, sealift, and pre-positioning of military equipment.
A limitation of sealift has been that many of the ships available for deploy
ment of Army forces require deep-water ports, hindering rapid and flexible
deployment. Attention focused on high-speed sealift platforms that could
operate in shallow waters and at austere port facilities. For intertheater sea
lift, the focus was on a Shallow Draft High Speed Sealift (SDHSS) vessel
large enough to carry a substantial number of troops and their equipment to
any port with at least a 10-foot depth of water and an offload site.68 During
the East Timor peacekeeping mission, Australian forces made use of high-
speed, shallow-draft, catamaran (twin hulled) ships that could carry some
200 troops along with their equipment and light armored vehicles. The
US Army leased two of these ships and operated them as HSV-X1 (High
Speed Vessel–Experimental) Joint Venture and TSV-X1 (Theater Support
Vessel–Experimental) Spearhead, and subsequently initiated procure
ment of similar vessels to be used as Theater Support Vessels (TSV) for
intratheater lift.69 Twelve TSVs would be capable of carrying one BCT or
Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), the equivalent of 239 C-17 airlift
sorties. There were plans to locate TSVs near BCTs and SBCTs stationed
at Fort Lewis, Washington, and Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.70 However,
during 2006, Army funding expired for Joint Venture and Spearhead, and
in 2008 they were returned to the Australian Incat Company. Once again
the possibility of the Navy taking over all watercraft operations is under
consideration, and the future of Army watercraft is somewhat obscure due
to funding and manpower issues.71
Conclusions and Lessons Learned
Throughout its long history, the US Army has frequently made use
of amphibious techniques to exploit the world’s oceans, beaches, and
waterways, often in unexpected places and in unanticipated ways. Since
347
the Marine Corps will continue to be the nation’s amphibious warfare
specialists, future assault landings on hostile shores are likely to be
conducted by Marines. But during the Korean War, Army forces had to
be prepared to conduct or participate in amphibious operations in the
absence of or in conjunction with Marines and may be called on to do
so again in the future. It would be prudent for the Army to maintain a
small amphibious support element that can develop and test Army-specific
doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment and serve as the
basis for an Army amphibious-capable force for such situations in which
Marine Corps amphibious forces are not available.
Many of the difficult command and control issues that plagued the
Services in the past have been overcome or resolved through the develop
ment of joint doctrine, the establishment of unified and joint commands,
the removal of the Services from the operational branch of the chain of
command, and a growing Service mindset attuned to joint operations.
No doubt, new issues will arise so long as there are different operating
environments and Services optimized to operate in those environments,
particularly in times of competition for constrained resources, but it is to
be hoped that the kind of counterproductive inter-Service tensions and
suspicion that marked some periods of the past will not recur. The question
arises whether, in a productive and businesslike joint environment, it is
necessary for the Army to control its own amphibious assets, particularly
when the large-scale invasions of the type that the Army once saw as its
particular forte are unlikely in the foreseeable future.
Some time ago, Lieutenant General Jack C. Fuson, a veteran of the
Army’s Engineer Amphibious Command, the Camp Edwards Amphibious
Training Center, the 2d Engineer Special Brigade in the Southwest Pacific,
a port commander during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, Commanding
General of Fort Eustis, and Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics,
made these points:
Currently the Army has no capability, no concept, no
doctrine, no training, no unit equipment, and no organi
zation to carry out these difficult amphibious operations
in combat. The organizations nearest to having such a
capability are the Transportation Corps’ logistics over-
the-shore units, equipped and trained to unload and move
cargo. But they are not organized, equipped, or trained to
develop lodgment (beachhead) areas with all the engineer
ing requirements that go with such actions. Plans do not
exist to marry them up with combat units for assistance
348
in combat unit landings and their subsequent deployment
and unloading over unfriendly beaches in combat. Nor do
plans include the even more difficult task of assisting to
develop lodgment areas and providing logistics support
under combat conditions until normal resupply can be
established.
I understand the Army has neither the funds nor the desire
to add this capability. It has not been approved as joint
doctrine. But if war were to occur, in all probability the
Transportation Corps would be called upon to duplicate
the actions of the engineer amphibious units in World
War II. Therefore, it would be wise for the Transportation
Corps, either in its museum or in its school, to acquire
all historical information on the Engineer Amphibious
Command and its engineer boat and shore regiments of
World War II.
They should build a library of manuals, doctrine, orga
nizational information, training literature, and training
records. It would certainly be wise to update the informa
tion to match the current automated Army supply, main
tenance, and transportation doctrine. I’m sure the Army
does not believe the need exists; however, filing all the
relevant information in the museum and school would
make it available should the need ever arise. Looking
back on my firsthand experience with the difficulties in
learning how to accomplish this mission in World War II,
I know that it would be a slow, costly, and difficult job to
reinvent such capabilities in the future.72
General Fuson’s 1994 comments remain valid today. The Army may
not have the funds, desire, or personnel to establish the kind of amphibi
ous capability reflected in the past by the Amphibious Training Center or
the Engineer Amphibious Support Command, but it should assure that the
Army retains its historical memory of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and
procedures of amphibious warfare and remains a part of the Marine Corps
and Navy efforts to assure that America’s amphibious capability remains
current and effective.
349
Notes
1. Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, Army Field
Manual (FM) 110-5, Navy JAAF, and Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Joint Action
Armed Forces (Washington, DC: GPO, 1951), 14–16.
2. Army FM 110-5, Navy JAAF, and AFM 101, Joint Action Armed
Forces, 11.
3. Department of the Navy, Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 22,
Amphibious Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 1952).
4. The Army perspective on this is set forth in a Chronology and Analysis of
the Development of Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (Fort Monroe, VA:
US Army Continental Army Command, 1958). A copy is in the MHI Library.
5. US Army, FM 60-5, Amphibious Operations: Battalion in Assault
Landings, February 1950 (Draft), 21 February 1951; FM 60-10, Amphibious
Operations: Regiment in Assault Landings, April 1950 (Draft), January
1952; FM 60-20, Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalions, 24 February 1945
(Superseded by FM 17-34); FM 17-34, Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion,
May 1948 (Draft), June 1950 (Superseded by FM 60-20); FM 60-30, Amphibious
Operations: Embarkation and Ship Loading (Unit Loading Officer), 6 September
1952 (Superseded by FM 20-12).
6. FM 60-25, Employment of the Amphibious Support Brigade, 8 January
1952; T/O&E 5-511, Engineer Amphibious Support Regiment, January 1951;
T/O&E 5-512, Headquarters, Headquarter and Service Company, Engineer
Amphibious Support Regiment, January 1951. The T/O&Es for the Ordnance
Maintenance Company (9-97, July 1951) and the Quartermaster Company
(10-277, February 1951) also referred to the Amphibious Support Brigade. The
field manuals and T/O&Es did not always track precisely. In spite of the name
change and appearance of the field manual for the amphibious support brigade, the
1946 Engineer Special Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company table of
organization and equipment (T/O&E 5-510-1T, January 1946) remained in effect
until 1965, when the T/O&E 5-401E series (Engineer Amphibious Brigade) was
issued.
7. US Army, Draft Field Service Regulations: Operations, 1953, 299–323;
US Army, FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations (Washington, DC:
GPO, 1954).
8. US Army, Transportation Corps, Amphibious and Port and Beach
Doctrine as it Pertains to the Transportation Corps, United States Army: A Staff
Study (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Transportation, 1953).
9. “159th Transportation Battalion (Boat) (Terminal),” unpublished man
uscript in files of the Office of the Transportation Corps Command Historian;
Norman Friedman and A.D. Baker, U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft; An Illustrated
Design History (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002), 302–303.
10. Department of the Army, Lineage and Honors, Command Headquarters,
2d Engineer Amphibious Support Command, Enclosure 1 to letter, HQDA,
OCMH, “Certificate of Lineage and Honors,” 30 January 1962, RG 338, Entry
350
37042, Commands, 2d EASC, Historical Reports, National Archives and Records
Administration, Modern Military Records, College Park, MD, hereafter, NACP .
11. Headquarters, The Engineer Center and Fort Belvoir, Virginia, General
Orders Number 96, “Activation of Units,” 9 November 1956, RG 338, Entry
37042, Commands, 2d EASC, General Orders, NACP; HQDA Message, 211528Z
March 1959, “Movement Advice” and “History of the 2d Engineer Amphibious
Support Command,” n.d., RG 338, Entry 37042, Commands, 2d EASC, Historical
Reports, NACP.
12. Richard E. Killblane, “The History of Logistics-Over-The-Shore (LOTS)
Operations,” unpublished manuscript, n.d., in files of the Command Historian,
Fort Eustice, VA.
13. Killblane, “History of LOTS Operations.”
14. US Army Forces Antilles and Military District of Puerto Rico, Sentry
Box: USARFANT & MDPR, final report: Vieques Island, 29 March 1954 (Fort
Brooke, Puerto Rico: Headquarters, US Army Forces Antilles and Military District
of Puerto Rico, 1954).
15. US Sixth Army, Plan for the Conduct of Exercise Surf Board (Fort Ord,
CA: Headquarters Maneuver Director, Exercise Surf Board, 1955).
16. Jean R. Moenk, A History of Large-Scale Army Maneuvers in the United
States, 1935–1964 (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Branch, Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Force, US Continental Army
Command, December 1969), 203.
17. US Sixth Army, High Seas: Joint Army–Navy Command Post Exercise:
General Plan, Fort Ord, Calif., 16–23 May 1956 (Presidio of San Francisco, CA:
Headquarters, Sixth Army, 1956).
18. CONARC, Chronology and Analysis, 5. The writer has been unable
to locate a copy of the document (Letter, ATTNG-D&R 353 (Amphib)(C), Hq
USCONARC, 4 April 1956, “Doctrine Governing Joint Amphibious Operations”)
that set forth the Army objections, but based on other documentation, it is likely
the issue was Army insistence that the unified command concept apply to all
phases of the operation, with the Service of the joint amphibious task force com
mander being determined by paramount interest, as opposed to Navy insistence
that command of a joint amphibious task force is a naval function, regardless of
the assignment of command above the level of the amphibious task force.
19. Moenck, 222; US Sixth Army, Rocky Shoals: Army–Navy Amphibious
Exercise, California 1958: Observers Handbook (Presidio of San Francisco, CA:
Headquarters Sixth Army, Office of the Commanding General, 1958); Exercise
Rocky Shoals Miscellaneous Papers, both in the MHI Archives.
20. CONARC, Chronology and Analysis, 6.
21. Philip A. Crowl, Memorandum for the Chief of Military History,
“Critique of Proposed Training Circular, ‘Doctrines Governing Joint Amphibious
Operations’ submitted by the Office of the Adjutant General, Department of the
Army, 21 December 1954,” 21 April 1955. Copy in OCMH, CMH 228.03, HRC
353, “Amphibious Operations.”
22. NWP 22, paragraph 1800.
351
23. Crowl, Memorandum, “Critique of Proposed Training Circular,” 6–9.
26. Crowl, Memorandum, “Critique of Proposed Training Circular,” 12–13;
the quoted material is from AFM 1–5, 11.
27. CONARC, Chronology and Analysis, 9.
28. US Army, FM 31-11, US Navy NWP 22(A), US Marine Corps LFM 01,
Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (Washington, DC: Departments of the Army
and the Navy, July 1962).
29. US Army, FM 31-11, US Navy NWP 22(A), US Air Force AFM 2-53,
US Marine Corps LFM 01, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (Washington,
DC: Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, 2 August 1967).
30. US Army, FM 3-11, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, August 1967.
31. US Army, FM 31-12, Army Forces in Amphibious Operations (The Army
Landing Force) (Washington, DC: GPO, March 1961).
32. US Army, FM 5-144, Engineer Amphibious Units (Washington, DC:
GPO, November 1966, with Change 1, 9 May 1969), 1-1–1-3, 2-1–2-3, 4-1,
4-7–4-11; TOE 5-408G, Engineer Amphibious Company, February 1968; TOE
5-407G, Engineer Amphibian Assault Company, March 1968; TOE 5-405G,
Engineer Amphibious Battalion, May 1968.
33. US Army Engineer School, Operation SUNSET, USAR ADT Course
S.122-117 (Fort Belvoir, VA: The Department of Engineering and Military
Science, US Army Engineer School, 1 June 1964), copy in the Engineer School
Collection, MHI Archives.
34. Historical Summary, June 1942 through December 1962, Headquarters,
2d Engineer Amphibious Support Command, 2 April 1965; Annual Historical
Summary, 2d Engineer Amphibious Support Command, 1 January 1963 to
31 December 1963; Final Historical Report, Headquarters, 2d Engineer
Amphibious Support Command, n.d., RG 338, Entry 37042, Box 1, NACP.
“LVTP5s borrowed from the Marines”: letter from Mr. David Diels to Colonel
(Retired) Donald W. Boose Jr., 8 June 2006. Mr. Diels was a platoon leader in
the 560th Amphibian Tractor Company (Engineer Equipment Company) in
1965. The ephemeral nature of these engineer amphibious units is reflected in an
Infantry School manual on amphibious operations published in 1962 that makes
no mention of the engineer amphibious units or the transportation boat units, but
simply states, “The nucleus of the division shore party is the engineer battalion.
Other combat service support and naval beach party elements may be assigned as
required.” Amphibious Operations Manual (Fort Benning, GA: US Army Infantry
School, September 1962), 21.
35. E-mail message from Richard E. Killblane, Transportation Corps
Command Historian, to Colonel (Retired) Donald W. Boose Jr., 16 June 2008.
36. Shelby L. Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle (Washington, DC: U.S.
News Books, 1981), 222–223; “A History of the 4th Transportation Command,”
in The History of Army Transportation Units in Vietnam, grambo.us/atav/history.
htm (accessed 13 February 2008).
352
37. Carroll H. Drum, Vietnam Studies: Base Development in South Vietnam,
1965–1970 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1972), 54–58, 68–69.
38. “159th Transportation Battalion,” unpublished manuscript, 5–12;
Killblane, “History of LOTS Operations.”
39. Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle, 224–227.
40. Richard E. Killblane, “Army Riverine Operations in Vietnam and
Panama (What the Navy Won’t Tell You),” unpublished manuscript, n.d., copy
provided to author by Mr. Killblane; “A Brief History of the VungTau/Delta
Transportation Battalion (Provisional),” History of Army Transportation Units in
Vietnam. For other logistic and tactical boat operations see, for example, “1099th
Transportation Company (Medium Boat),” also in History of Army Transportation
Units in Vietnam.
41. Killblane, “Army Riverine Operations in Vietnam and Panama,” 15–17.
42. The writer participated in one such operation in early 1967 as senior
advisor to the 1st Battalion, 14th ARVN Infantry, 9th ARVN Division, when
several ARVN battalions landed on the coast of Vinh Binh province in LCUs and
LCMs.
43. George L. MacGarrigle, United States Army in Vietnam: Combat
Operations: Taking the Offensive, October 1966 to October 1967 (Washington, DC:
Center of Military History, 1998), 395–397, 401, 405, 413–414. General Fulton
has described the operations of the Mobile Riverine Force in detail in William B.
Fulton, Vietnam Studies: Riverine Operations 1966–1969 (Washington, DC: Center
of Military History, 1985); William B. Fulton, Mobile Riverine Force: America’s
Mobile Riverine Force Vietnam (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing Co., 1998).
44. David Ewing Ott, Vietnam Studies: Field Artillery, 1954–1973
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1975) 76–80; 1097th Transportation
Company (Medium Boat), Unit History Annual Supplement, 1 March 1968, and
Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command News Release, 8 July 1968, both reprinted
in Douglas R. Magee Jr., “The Striking History of the 1097th Transportation
Company” (Panama: USARSO Printing Plant, 1997); Killblane, “Army Riverine
Operations in Vietnam and Panama,” 17–20.
45. MacGarrigle, US Army in Vietnam, 414–415.
46. Killblane, “Army Riverine Operations in Vietnam and Panama,” 21;
Jim Mesko, Riverine: A Pictorial History of the Brown Water Navy in Vietnam
(Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1985).
47. Jack Shulimson and Charles M. Johnson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The
Landing and the Buildup, 1965 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division,
Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1978), 9–15, 72.
48. Shulimson and Johnson, The Landing and the Buildup, 1965, 84–203;
Jack Shulimson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: An Expanding War, 1966 (Washington,
DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1982),
19–28.
49. Shulimson, An Expanding War, 297–306.
50. Gary L. Telfer and Lane Rogers, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Fighting
the North Vietnamese, 1967 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division,
353
Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1984), 150–181; Quotation, “any Marine not
ashore”: Charles R. Smith, U.S. Marines in Vietnam: High Mobility and Standdown,
1969 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine
Corps, 1988), 297.
51. Telfer and Rogers, Fighting the North Vietnamese, 300–301.
52. Graham A. Cosmas and Terrence P. Murray, U.S. Marines in Vietnam:
Vietnamization and Redeployment, 1970–1971 (Washington, DC: History and
Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1986), 386.
53. John W. Partin, Special Operations in Operation EARNEST WILL/PRIME
CHANCE I (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: US Special Operations Command,
History and Research Office, 1998), describes these operations. See also Harold
Lee Wise, Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf, 1987–
1988 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 76, 80, 84, 89, 97–102.
54. Edward M. Flanagan Jr., “Battle for Panama: Inside Operation Just
Cause” (Washington, DC: Brassey’s (US), 1993), 130–131, reprinted in Magee,
The Striking History of the 1097th Transportation Company; Killblane, “Army
Riverine Operations in Vietnam and Panama,” 21–22. Operation NIMROD
DANCER was the Army deployment to Panama of forces during Operation JUST
CAUSE.
55. John R. Ballard, Upholding Democracy: The United States Military
Campaign in Haiti, 1994–1997 (Westport, CT, and London: Praeger, 1998), 91–
93, 105–118; Joseph Fischer, Richard Stewart, and Stanley Sandler, Operation
UPHOLD/RESTORE/MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY (Fort Bragg, NC: US Army
Special Operations Command, Directorate of History, Archive, Library and
Museums, 1997), 28–32; Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T.
Fischel, Invasion, Intervention, “Intervasion”: A Concise History of the U.S. Army
in Operation Uphold Democracy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command
and General Staff College Press, 1998), 59–79.
56. Benjamin S. Lambeth, Airpower Against Terror: America’s Conduct of
Operation Enduring Freedom (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005),
65, 123, 146; Rebecca Grant, “An Air War Like No Other,” Air Force Magazine,
Vol. 85, No. 11 (November 2002): 33.
57. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-02, Joint Doctrine for
Amphibious Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2001).
58. Jared Plotts, “U.S. Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Joseph V. Medina: Marine
General Leads Strike Group into History,” Defend America News, 10 June
2004, defendamerica.mil/cgi-bin/prfriendly.cgi?http://www.defendamerica.mil/
profiles/jun2004/pr0601004a.html (accessed 31 May 2007); Official Biography:
Joseph V. Medina, usmc.mil/genbios2.nsf/biographies/DA9C6F9E36A70158852
56D730013425D?opendocument (accessed 31 May 2007).
59. Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, “Expeditionary Maneuver
Family of Concepts,” Marine Corps Concepts and Programs, 2005, hqinet001.
hqmc.usmc.mil/p&r/concepts/2005/PDF/Ch2PDFs/CP05%20Chapter%202%20
Warfighting%20Concepts%20pg%20025_Expeditionary%20Maneuver%20Warf
are%20Family%20of%20Concepts.pdf (accessed 13 May 2007).
354
60. Henry B. Cook, “Sea Basing and Maritime Pre-positioning,” Army
Logistician, Vol. 36, No. 3 (May–June 2004): 36–39; Scott C. Truver, “The Sea
Base: Cornerstone of the U.S. Tri-Service Maritime Strategy,” Naval Forces, Vol.
XXIX, No. II, 2008; Seapower for a New Era, 24–25, 114–130.
61. Amy Klamper, “River War,” Seapower, Vol. 49, No. 2 (February 2006):
10–12; Patrick Donahoe and Laurence McCabe, “Controlling the Rivers,” U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 132, No.1 (January 2006): 27; Milan Vego,
“Warfare Concepts: Riverine Warfare,” Naval Forces, Vol. XXIX, No. 11 (2008):
26–33; Edward Wiser, “One Size Does NOT Fit All: A dialogue between industry
and government is producing new mount for the riverine cavalry,” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, Vol. 134, No. 6 (June 2008): 26–31. Also see Daniel A.
Hancock, “The Navy’s Not Serious About Riverine Warfare,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, Vol. 134, No.1 (January 2008).
62. For the Army Transportation Corps riverine lift capability, I am indebted
to Colonel Clark H. Summers, US Army Transportation Corps, former commander
of the 385th Transportation Battalion. For Army mariners training infantrymen in
riverine techniques, see Richard E. Killblane, “Operation Iraqi Freedom/Enduring
Freedom Trip Report 2008,” unpublished manuscript, April 2008, copy in the files
of the Transportation Corps Command Historian, Fort Eustis, VA.
63. US Department of Defense, Directive 5100.1, “Functions of the
Department of Defense and Its Major Components” (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, 1 August 2001), 17, paragraph 6.6.1.2.3, dtic.mil/whs/
directives/corres/pdf/d51001_080102/d51001p.pdf (accessed 6 April 2006). For
the Army emphasis on airborne and airmobile operations, see, for example, James
B. Brown, “Joint Amphibious/Air Assault Operations,” Joint Force Quarterly
(Autumn/Winter 1998–99): 48–52; Brian J. Dunn, “Rethinking Army–Marine
Corps Roles,” Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn 2000): 38–42.
64. 7th Sustainment Brigade home page, 7sustainment.forscom.army.mil/
default.htm (accessed 13 June 2007); US Army, Office of the Chief of Transportation,
“Army Watercraft Master Plan and Theater Support Vessel (TSV) Information
Briefing,” 22 May 2002, globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2002/CASCOM_
AWMP_and_TSV.pdf (accessed 10 February 2007); Stephen Harding, Sail Army: A
Pictorial Guide to Current U.S. Army Watercraft (Missoula, MT: Pictorial Histories
Publishing Co., 2005); information provided by OCOT Command Historian, 12
June 2007. Information on 309th LARC LX Company: e-mail message, Richard E.
Killblane to Donald W. Boose Jr., 16 June 2008.
65. Gunnar Borch and Massimo Annati, “Maritime Sealift—Organizations
and Assets.” Naval Forces, Vol. XXVI, No. VI (2005): 18.
66. “The Army Magazine Hooah Guide to Army Transformation” provides
a readable overview of the background of Army Transformation and its status as
of 2001, ausa.org/PDFDocs/Hooah_Guide_web.pdf (accessed 6 April 2006).
67. US Army, “Organizing for Conflict,” United States Army: Serving A
Nation At War, army.mil/jec/5_dms.html (accessed 30 June 2005).
68. Kenneth E. Hickins, “Strategic Mobility: The U.S. Military’s Weakest
Link,” Army Logistician, Vol. 34, No. 6 (November–December 2002): 34–37;
355
Shawn M. Callahan, The Impact of Fastship and High Speed Sealift on Strategic
Sealift, Research Report (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and
Staff College, Air University, 1998), fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/docs/99
021.pdf (accessed 25 March 2005); “High Speed Sealift,” Global Security.Org,
globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/hss.htm (accessed 25 March 2005); US
Army, United States Army 2003 Transformation Roadmap (Washington, DC:
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2004), 8–15.
69. Army 2003 Transformation Roadmap, 8–15; Harding, Sail Army:
A Pictorial Guide, 7–17; Huba Wass de Czege and Zbigniew M. Majchrzak,
“Enabling Operational Maneuver From Strategic Distances,” Military Review,
May–June 2002, leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/English/MayJun02/wass.htm
(accessed 25 September 2007); Stephen R. Trauth et al., “Army Transformation
at Sea: The New Theater Support Vessel,” Military Review, November–December
2005; OCOT, “Army Watercraft Master Plan and Theater Support Vessel
(TSV) Information Briefing,” 22 May 2002, globalsecurity.org/military/library/
report/2002/CASCOM_AWMP_and_TSV.pdf (accessed 30 March 2006); OCOT,
“Theater Support Vessel Information Briefing,” unpublished PowerPoint presen
tation, Fort Eustis, VA: US Army Combined Arms Support Command, Directorate
of Combat Development for Transportation, 1 September 2003; OCOT, “Theater
Support Vessel,” unpublished PowerPoint presentation [2003?]; US Army, Office
of the Transportation Corps Command Historian, “Interview with General Robert
Dail,” unpublished manuscript, 5 November 2002; Army 2003 Transformation
Roadmap, 8–15; Kenneth E. Hickins, “Transforming Strategic Mobility,”
Army Logistician, Vol. 35, No. 3 (May–June 2003), almc.army.mil/alog/issues/
MayJun03/MS856.htm (accessed 25 March 2005).
70. Association of the United States Army, “Force Projection Capability for
a Transforming Army,” May 2002, ausa.org/PDFdocs/tsv.pdf (accessed 31 March
2006); US Department of Defense News Release, “Department of Army Unveils
Active Component Brigade Combat Team Stationing,” 27 July 2005, army.
mil/modularforces/index.htm (accessed 21 February 2006); John M. Brown III,
“USARPAC: The Army’s Expeditionary Force in the Pacific,” Army, Vol. 55, No.
10 (October 2005): 115–118.
71. Information provided to the writer by the Transportation Corps Command
Historian, 13 June 2007. On return of the ships to Incat: Incat Internet site, www.
incat.com/au/domino/incat/incatweb.nsf/v-title/Incat%20Home?OpenDocument
(accessed 21 June 2008). Potential use of these vessels continues to be a matter of
discussion. See, for example, Edward H. Lundquist, “Fleet Experimentation Lays
Groundwork for New Concepts at Sea,” Naval Forces, Vol. XXIX, No. 11 (2008):
20–25; and Robert K. Morrison and Phillip E. Pournelle, “Widen the Lens for
JHSV,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 134, No. 6 (June 2008): 54–58.
72. Jack C. Fuson, Transportation and Logistics: One Man’s Story
(Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1994), 201.
356
Glossary
AAA antiaircraft artillery
ABC-1 American, British, and Canadian Conference
AFF Army Field Forces
AFM Air Force Manual
AGF Army Ground Forces
AKA attack cargo ships
ANGLICO Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
ANZAC Australian and New Zealand Corps
AOA amphibious objective area
AOR area of responsibility
APA attack transport ship
APD high-speed transport (auxiliary personnel-transport destroyer)
ARG amphibious ready group
ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASB amphibious support brigade
ASSP auxiliary submarine transport
AST Army Transport Service
ATB amphibian tank battalion
ATC Amphibious Training Command/Amphibious Training Center
ATT Army Training Test
ATTB amphibious tank and tractor battalion
AU Army unit
AW automatic weapon
BARC barge, amphibious resupply, cargo
BCOF British Commonwealth Forces
BCT brigade combat team
BHL beachhead line
BLT battalion landing team
CAMID cadets–midshipmen
CCBP Combined Communications Board Publication
CCF Chinese Communist Forces
CCKW 2½-ton truck
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
C-in-C commander in chief
CINCFE Commander in Chief, Far East
CINCPAC Commander in Chief, Pacific Command/Commander in Chief,
Pacific Fleet
CINCPOA Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas
CINCUNC Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
COHQ Combined Operations Headquarters
COMNAVFE Commander, United States Naval Forces, Far East
CONARC Continental Army Command
357
CONUS Continental United States
CP command post
CPV Chinese People’s Volunteers
CTF combined task force/commander, task force
DANFS Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships
DEW Distant Early Warning
DMZ demilitarized zone
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
DUKW 2½-ton amphibious truck
EAB engineer amphibian brigade
EAC Engineer Amphibian Command
EASC engineer amphibious support command
EASR engineer amphibious support regiment
EB&SR engineer boat and shore regiment
ESB engineer special brigade
ETO European Theater of Operations
EUSA Eighth United States Army
EUSAK Eighth United States Army in Korea
FAB field artillery battalion
FEAF Far East Air Forces
FEC Far East Command
FECOM Far East Command (used in Washington)
FHA foreign humanitarian assistance
FLEX Fleet Landing Exercise
FM field manual
FMC Food Machinery Corporation
FMF Fleet Marine Force
GHQ General Headquarters
GPA General Purpose Amphibian
GPO Government Printing Office
HMAS Her Majesty’s Australian Ship
HMCS Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship
HMS Her Majesty’s Ship
HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army
HRE Han River Estuary
HSV-X High Speed Vessel–Experimental
ISTDC Inter-Service Training and Development Center
JAAF Joint Action Armed Forces
JAAN Joint Action of the Army and Navy
JANAP Joint Army Navy Air Publication
JASCO Joint Assault Signal Company
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
jg junior grade
JLC Japan Logistical Command
JLFM Joint Landing Force Manual
358
JPC Joint Planning Committee
JSPOG Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group
JTF joint task force
KATUSA Korean Augmentation to the US Army
KMAG Korean Military Advisory Group
KMC Korean Marine Corps
KPA North Korean People’s Army
LARC lighter, amphibious resupply, cargo
LARC-LX lighter, amphibious resupply, cargo, 60-ton
LCA landing craft, assault
LCI landing craft, infantry
LCI(G) landing craft, infantry (gunboat)
LCI(L) landing craft, infantry (large)
LCM landing craft, mechanized
LCP(L) landing craft, personnel (large)
LCP(R) landing craft, personnel (ramped)
LCS(L) landing craft, support (large)
LCT landing craft, tank
LCU landing craft, utility
LCVP landing craft, vehicle, personnel
LEX landing exercise
LF landing force
LFM landing force manual
LOTS logistics-over-the-shore
LSD landing ship, dock
LSI landing ship, infantry
LSM landing ship, medium
LSM(R) landing ship, medium (rocket)
LST landing ship, tank
LSU landing ship, utility
LSV logistic support vessel
LVT landing vehicle, tracked
LVT(A) landing vehicle, tracked (armored)
LVTP landing vehicle, tracked, personnel
LVTR landing vehicle, tracked, retriever
MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAG Marine Air Group
MAW Marine Air Wing
MCUA Marine Corps University Archives
MDL Military Demarcation Line
MDPR Military District of Puerto Rico
MHI Military History Institute
MP military police
MSTS Military Sea Transportation Service
MTO Mediterranean Theater of Operations
359
MTT Mobile Training Team
NAVFE Naval Forces Far East
NCO noncommissioned officer
NEO noncombatant evacuation operation
NODEX New Offshore Delivery Exercise
NSC National Security Council
NWP Navy Warfare Publication
OCOT Office of the Chief of Transportation
OCMH Office of the Chief of Military History
ODEX Offshore Discharge Exercise
OPLAN operation plan
OPORD operation order
PBR river patrol boat
POA Pacific Ocean Areas
PIR Periodic Intelligence Report
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
PORTREX Puerto Rican Exercise
POW prisoner of war
PT patrol torpedo
QM Quartermaster
RAAF Royal Australian Air Force
RCN Royal Canadian Navy
RCT regimental combat team
RGR ranger
RN Royal Navy
ROAD Reorganized Army Division
ROK Republic of Korea
ROKA Republic of Korea Army
ROKAF Republic of Korea Air Force
SAG Special Activities Group
SBCT Stryker Brigade Combat Team
SCAJAP Shipping Control Administration, Japan
SCAP Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers
SDHSS Shallow Draft High Speed Sealift
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SFCP Shore Fire Control Party
SLF Special Landing Force
SOG Special Operations Group
SPOBS Special Observers
STRAC Strategic Army Command
SWPA Southwest Pacific Area
TOE (T/O&E) table of organization and equipment
TAC tactical air command
TACP tactical air control party
TC Transportation Corps
360
TE task element
TF task force
TG task group
TM technical manual
TQM transportation quartermaster
TRANSDIV transport division
TSV Theater Support Vessel
TSV-X Theater Support Vessel–Experimental
TTU troop training unit
TU task unit
UDT underwater demolition team
UDU underwater demolition unit
UN United Nations
UNC United Nations Command
UNCMAC United Nations Component of the Military Armistice
Commission
US United States
USAFBI United States Army Forces in the British Isles
USAFFE United States Army Forces in the Far East
USARFANT United States Army Forces Antilles
USMC United States Marine Corps
USMCR United States Marine Corps Reserve
WestPac Western Pacific
WPD War Plans Division
361
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2004.
———. FM 3-0, Operations. Washington, DC: GPO, February 2008.
———. FM 3-90, Tactics. Washington, DC: GPO, July 2001.
———. FM 5-5, Engineer Field Manual: Engineer Troops. Washington, DC:
GPO, 11 October 1943. (Change 1 added new Chapter 8, “Engineer Units
with Army Service Forces,” Section XV, “Engineer Special Brigade.”)
———. FM 5-5, Engineer Troop Units, May 1954. (No reference to Engineer
Special or Amphibious Brigade, but Chapter 4, “Engineer Combat
Support Units,” includes Section IX, “Engineer Shore Battalion.”)
———. FM 5-144, Engineer Shore Assault Units. Washington, DC: GPO,
October 1963.
———. FM 5-144, Engineer Amphibious Units. Washington, DC: GPO,
November 1966.
372
———. FM 5-156, Engineer Shore Battalion. Washington, DC: GPO, August
1954.
———. FM 5-156, The Engineer Amphibious Support Command (Draft).
Washington, DC: GPO, April 1958.
———. FM 17-34, Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion (Draft). Washington,
DC: GPO, May 1948, June 1950. (Superseded FM 60-20.)
———. FM 20-12, Amphibious Embarkation. Washington, DC: GPO, 25 August
1975. (Superseded FM 60-30.)
———. FM 31-5, Landing Operations on Hostile Shores. Washington, DC: GPO,
2 June 1941, 13 November 1944.
———. FM 31-5 (Supplement), Landing Operations on Hostile Shores; Joint
U.S. Air—Amphibious Communications Instructions. Washington, DC:
GPO, April 1943, October 1943.
———. FM 31-11, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations. Washington, DC:
Departments of the Army and the Navy, July 1962. (Also published as
US Navy NWP 22(A), US Marine Corps LFM 01.)
———. FM 31-11, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations. Washington, DC:
Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, 2 August 1967.
(Also published as US Navy NWP 22(A), US Air Force AFM 2-53, US
Marine Corps LFM 01.)
———. FM 31-12, Army Forces in Amphibious Operations (The Army Landing
Force). Washington, DC: GPO, March 1961.
———. FM 31-13, Battle Group Landing Team, Amphibious. Washington, DC:
GPO, September 1961.
———. FM 55-25, Ports (Overseas) Headquarters and Headquarters Companies.
Washington, DC: GPO, May 1945.
———. FM 55-25, Ports in Theaters of Operations. Washington, DC: GPO,
September 1952.
———. FM 55-26, Transportation Inland Waterways Service. Washington, DC:
GPO, March 1953.
———. FM 55-50, Army Water Transport Operations. Washington, DC: GPO,
September 1976, June 1985.
———. FM 55-50-1, Transportation Amphibian Operations (Test). Washington,
DC: GPO, March 1967.
———. FM 55-51, Army Water Transport Units. Washington, DC: GPO, August
1972.
———. FM 55-53, Transportation Amphibious Truck Company. Washington,
DC: GPO, August 1956.
———. FM 55-58, Transportation Boat Units. Washington, DC: GPO, December
1959.
———. FM 55-105, Water Transportation: Ocean Going Vessels. Washington,
DC: GPO, September 1944.
———. FM 55-110, Transportation Port Company, Military Stevedoring.
Washington, DC: GPO, November 1952.
373
———. FM 55-130, Small Boats and Harbor Craft. Washington, DC: GPO,
31 January 1944.
———. FM 55-130, The Harbor Craft Company. Washington, DC: GPO, March
1951.
———. FM 55-501, Marine Crewman’s Handbook. Washington, DC: GPO,
March 1983.
———. FM 55-501-1, Landing Craft Operator’s Handbook. Washington, DC:
GPO, May 1985.
———. FM 55-501-2, Harbor Craft Crewman’s Handbook. Washington, DC:
GPO, December 1984.
———. FM 55-506-2, Marine Engineman’s Electrical Handbook. Washington,
DC: GPO, April 1977.
———. FM 55-509, Marine Engineman’s Handbook. Washington, DC: GPO,
October 1986.
———. FM 55-511, Operation of Floating Cranes. Washington, DC: GPO,
December 1985.
———. FM 60-5, Amphibious Operations: Battalion in Assault Landings (Draft).
Washington, DC: GPO, February 1950, 21 February 1951.
———. FM 60-10, Amphibious Operations: Regiment in Assault Landings
(Draft). Washington, DC: GPO, April 1950, January 1952.
———. FM 60-20, Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalions. Washington, DC:
GPO, 24 February 1945. (Superseded by FM 17-34.)
———. FM 60-25, Employment of the Amphibious Support Brigade. Washington,
DC: GPO, 8 January 1952.
———. FM 60-30, Amphibious Operations: Embarkation and Ship Loading
(Unit Loading Officer). Washington, DC: GPO, 6 September 1952.
(Superseded by FM 20-12.)
———. FM 60-30, Embarkation and Loading—Amphibious. Washington, DC:
GPO, May 1962.
———. FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations. Washington, DC:
GPO, 1941, August 1949 (Section XII, Joint Amphibious Operations,
233–237); (Draft) 1953 (Section XIII, Amphibious Operations, 299–323);
27 September 1954 (Section XIII, Amphibious Operations, 178–196).
———. FM 101-5, Staff Officers Manual. Washington, DC: GPO.
———. FM 110-5, Joint Action Armed Forces. Washington, DC: GPO, 1951.
(Also published as Navy JAAF and Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1.)
———. FM 110-101, Intelligence: Joint Landing Force Manual. Washington,
DC: GPO, January 1955. (Also published as OPNAV INST 3800.2,
AFM 200-131, JLFM-1.)
Technical Manuals
Technical Manual (TM) 9-775, Landing Vehicle Tracked, MK I and MK II,
February 1944.
TM 9-776, Tracked Landing Vehicle, MK 4 (LVT(4)), June 1951.
TM 9-2853, Preparation of Ordnance Material for Deep Water Fording.
374
Army Training Tests
Army Training Test (ATT) 17-10, Amphibious Tank Battalion, August 1951.
ATT 17-11, Amphibious Tank Company, August 1951.
ATT 17-12, Amphibious Tank Platoon, August 1951.
ATT 17-13, Amphibious Tractor Platoon, August 1951.
ATT 17-14, Amphibious Tractor Company, August 1951.
ATT 17-15, Amphibious Tractor Battalion, August 1951.
MTP 60-1, Amphibian Tank or Tractor Battalion, 27 July 1945 (Mobilization
Training Program).
Tables of Organization and Equipment
1-387S, Air Combat Control Squadron, Amphibious, September 1944.
5-401E, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer Amphibious Brigade,
July 1965.
5-401G, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer Amphibious Brigade,
May 1968.
5-402E, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer Amphibious Group,
July 1965.
5-402G, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer Amphibious Group,
September 1967.
5-405E, Engineer Amphibious Battalion, July 1965.
5-405G, Engineer Amphibious Battalion, May 1968.
5-406E, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer Amphibious Battalion,
July 1965.
5-406G, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer Amphibious Battalion,
May 1968.
5-407E, Engineer Amphibian Assault Company, July 1965.
5-407G, Engineer Amphibian Assault Company, March 1968.
5-408E, Engineer Amphibious Company, July 1965.
5-408G, Engineer Amphibious Company, February 1968.
5-510-1, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer Amphibian Brigade,
July 1942.
5-510-1, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer Amphibian Brigade,
September 1942.
5-510-1S, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer Special Brigade,
April 1943.
5-510-1S, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer Special Brigade,
April 1944.
5-510-1 M-S, Medical Detachment, Engineer Special Brigade, April 1943.
5-510-1 M-S, Medical Detachment, Engineer Special Brigade, April 1944.
5-510-1T, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer Special Brigade,
January 1946.
5-510-1T M, Medical Detachment, Engineer Special Brigade, January 1946.
5-510-3, Maintenance Company, Engineer Amphibian Brigade, July 1942.
5-511, Engineer Boat Regiment, July 1942.
375
5-511S, Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, April 1943.
5-511S, Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, April 1944.
5-511S-M, Medical Detachment, Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, April 1944.
5-511T, Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, January 1946.
5-511T-M, Medical Detachment, Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, January
1946.
5-511, Engineer Amphibious Support Regiment, January 1951.
5-512, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer Boat Regiment, July
1942.
5-512S, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer Boat and Shore
Regiment, April 1943.
5-512S, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer Boat and Shore
5-512T, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer Boat and Shore
Regiment, January 1946.
5-512, Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, Engineer Amphibious
Support Regiment, January 1951.
5-513, Engineer Boat Maintenance Company, July 1942.
5-514, Engineer Lighter Company, July 1942.
5-515, Engineer Boat Battalion, July 1942.
5-515, Boat Battalion, Engineer Amphibian Regiment, April 1943.
5-515S, Boat Battalion, Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, April 1944.
5-515T, Boat Battalion, Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, January 1946.
5-515, Engineer Boat Battalion, January 1951.
5-516, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer Boat Battalion, July
1942.
5-516S, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Boat Battalion, Engineer Boat
and Shore Regiment, April 1943.
5-516S, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Boat Battalion, Engineer Boat
5-516S-R, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Boat Battalion, Engineer
Boat and Shore Regiment, March 1945.
5-516T, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer Boat Battalion,
January 1946.
5-516, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer Boat Battalion, January
1951.
5-517, Engineer Boat Company, July 1942.
5-517S, Engineer Boat Company, April 1943.
5-517S, Engineer Boat Company, April 1944.
5-517T, Engineer Boat Company, January 1946.
5-517, Engineer Boat Company, January 1951.
5-521, Engineer Shore Regiment, July 1942.
5-522, Headquarters and Headquarters and Service Company, Engineer Shore
Regiment, July 1942.
5-525, Engineer Shore Battalion, July 1942.
376
5-525S, Shore Battalion, Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, April 1943.
5-525S, Shore Battalion, Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, April 1944.
5-525T, Shore Battalion, Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, January 1946.
5-525, Engineer Shore Battalion, January 1951.
5-525A, Engineer Shore Battalion, April 1953.
5-525R, Engineer Shore Battalion, March 1955.
5-526, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer Shore Battalion, July
1942.
5-526S, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Shore Battalion, Engineer Boat
5-526S, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Shore Battalion, Engineer Boat
5-526T, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Shore Battalion, Engineer Boat
and Shore Regiment, January 1946.
5-526, Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, Engineer Shore Battalion,
January 1951.
5-526A, Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, Engineer Shore
Battalion, April 1953.
5-526R, Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, Engineer Shore
Battalion, March 1955.
5-527, Engineer Near Shore Company, July 1942.
5-527S, Engineer Shore Company, April 1943.
5-527S, Engineer Shore Company, April 1944.
5-527T, Engineer Shore Company, January 1946.
5-527, Engineer Shore Company, January 1951.
5-527A, Engineer Shore Company, April 1953.
5-527R, Engineer Shore Company, March 1955.
5-528, Engineer Far Shore Company, July 1942.
5-535, Engineer Base Shop Battalion, Engineer Amphibian Command, July 1942.
5-535S, Engineer Special Shop Battalion, September 1943.
5-536, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer Base Shop Battalion,
Engineer Amphibian Command, July 1942.
5-536S, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Engineer Special Shop
Battalion, September 1943.
5-537, Power Plant Repair Company, Engineer Base Shop Battalion, Engineer
Amphibian Brigade, July 1942.
5-537S, Power Plant Repair Company, Engineer Special Shop Battalion, September
1943.
5-538, Hull Repair Company, Engineer Base Shop Battalion, Engineer Amphibian
Command, July 1942.
5-538S, Hull Repair Company, Engineer Special Shop Battalion, September 1943.
5-539, Salvage and Dockage Company, Engineer Base Shop Battalion, Engineer
Amphibian Command, July 1942.
5-539S, Salvage and Dockage Company, Engineer Special Shop Battalion, September
1943.
377
5-547, Depot Company, Engineer Base Shop Battalion, Engineer Amphibian
Command, July 1942.
5-547S, Depot Company, Engineer and Special Shop Battalion, September 1943.
5-550G, Engineer Dredge Teams, February 1968.
5-550H, Engineer Dredge Teams, December 1974.
5-555S, Engineer Boat Maintenance Battalion, April 1943.
5-555S, Engineer Boat Maintenance Battalion, April 1944.
5-555T, Engineer Boat Maintenance Battalion, January 1946.
5-555, Engineer Boat Maintenance Battalion, October 1951.
5-556S, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Engineer Boat Maintenance
5-556S, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Engineer Boat Maintenance
5-556T, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Engineer Boat Maintenance
Battalion, January 1946.
5-556, Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, Engineer Boat
Maintenance Battalion, October 1951.
5-557S, Engineer Boat Maintenance Company, April 1943.
5-557S, Engineer Boat Maintenance Company, April 1944.
5-557T, Engineer Boat Maintenance Company, January 1946.
5-557, Engineer Boat Maintenance Company, October 1951.
5-558T, Engineer Heavy Maintenance Company, Engineer Boat Maintenance
5-559T, Parts Supply Platoon, Engineer Boat Maintenance Battalion, January
1946.
5-600T, Engineer Amphibious Support Command (Tentative), January 1958.
5-605T, Service Support Battalion, Engineer Amphibious Support Command
(Tentative), August 1958.
5-606T, Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, Service Support
Battalion, Engineer Amphibious Support Command (Tentative), January
1958.
5-607T, Composite Direct Support Company, Service Support Battalion, Engineer
Amphibious Support Command (Tentative), January 1958.
5-617T, Engineer Amphibian Equipment Company, Engineer Amphibious Support
Command (Tentative), January 1958.
5-627T, Engineer Amphibious Company, Engineer Amphibious Support Command
(Tentative), January 1958.
5-637S, Engineer Dredge Crew, Hydraulic Suction 21-Inch Cutter Type, September
1944.
5-638S, Engineer Dredge Crew, Steam Turbine Powered Suction Dredge, 24-Inch
Cutter, September 1944.
5-647S, Engineer Dredge Crew, Diesel Electric, Sea-Going Hopper Dredge, 700
Cubic Yards, September 1944.
5-648S, Engineer Dredge Crew, Diesel Electric, Seagoing Hopper Dredge, 1,400
Cubic Yards, September 1944.
378
5-649S, Engineer Dredge Crew, Diesel, Seagoing Hopper Dredge, 2,700 Cubic
Yards, September 1944.
8-195, Medical Battalion, Engineer Amphibian Brigade, July 1942.
8-195S, Medical Battalion Engineer Special Brigade, April 1943.
8-195S, Medical Battalion Engineer Special Brigade, October 1944.
8-196, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Medical Battalion, Engineer
Amphibian Brigade, July 1942.
8-196S, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Medical Battalion, Engineer
Amphibian Brigade, April 1943.
8-196S, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Medical Battalion,
Engineer Amphibian Brigade, October 1944.
8-197, Medical Company, Battalion, Engineer Amphibian Brigade, July 1942.
8-197S, Medical Company, Battalion, Engineer Special Brigade, April 1943.
8-197S, Medical Company, Battalion, Engineer Special Brigade, October 1944.
9-97, Ordnance Platoon, Engineer Amphibian Brigade, July 1942.
9-97S, Ordnance Maintenance Company, Engineer Special Brigade, April 1943.
9-97S, Ordnance Maintenance Company, Engineer Special Brigade, October
1943.
9-97S, Ordnance Maintenance Company, Engineer Special Brigade, October
1944.
9-97T, Ordnance Maintenance Company, Engineer Special Brigade, January
1946.
9-97, Ordnance Maintenance Company, Amphibious Support Brigade, July
1951.
9-97A, Ordnance Maintenance Company, Amphibious Support Brigade, June
1953.
9-97R, Ordnance Maintenance Company, Amphibious Support Brigade, April
1955.
10-275, Quartermaster Battalion, Engineer Amphibious Brigade, July 1942.
10-276, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Quartermaster Battalion,
Engineer Amphibian Brigade, July 1942.
10-276S, Quartermaster Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer,
Special Brigade, April 1943.
10-276S, Quartermaster Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer,
Special Brigade, September 1943.
10-276T, Quartermaster Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Engineer,
Special Brigade, January 1946.
10-277, Quartermaster Company, Amphibious Support Brigade, February 1951.
10-277A, Quartermaster Company, Amphibious Support Brigade, October 1952.
10-277R, Quartermaster Company, Amphibious Support Brigade, March 1955.
17-115, Amphibian Tank Battalion, January 1944.
17-115, Amphibious Tank Battalion, June 1950.
17-115A, Amphibious Tank Battalion, September 1953.
17-115R, Amphibious Tank Battalion, April 1955.
17-115D, Armored Amphibious Battalion, May 1959.
379
17-116, Headquarters and Headquarters and Service Company, Amphibious Tank
17-116, Headquarters and Headquarters and Service Company, Amphibious Tank
Battalion, June 1950.
17-116A, Headquarters and Headquarters and Service Company, Amphibious
Tank Battalion, September 1953.
17-116R, Headquarters and Headquarters and Service Company, Amphibious
Tank Battalion, April 1955.
17-116D, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Armored Amphibious Tank
Battalion, May 1959.
17-117, Amphibian Tank Company, January 1944.
17-117, Amphibious Tank Company, June 1950.
17-117A, Amphibious Tank Company, September 1953.
17-117R, Amphibious Tank Company, April 1955.
17-117D, Armored Amphibious Company, May 1959.
17-125, Amphibian Tractor Battalion, April 1944.
17-125, Amphibious Tractor Battalion, August 1950.
17-125A, Amphibious Tractor Battalion, August 1953.
17-125R, Amphibious Tractor Battalion, April 1955.
17-126, Headquarters and Headquarters and Service Company, Amphibian,
Tractor Battalion, April 1944.
17-126, Headquarters and Headquarters and Service Company, Amphibian,
Tractor Battalion, August 1950.
17-126A, Headquarters and Headquarters and Service Company, Amphibian,
Tractor Battalion, August 1953.
17-126R, Headquarters and Headquarters and Service Company, Amphibian,
Tractor Battalion, April 1955.
17-127, Amphibian Tractor Company, April 1944.
17-127, Amphibious Tractor Company, August 1950.
17-127A, Amphibious Tractor Company, August 1953.
17-127R, Amphibious Tractor Company, April 1955.
20-300, Amphibious Support Brigade, December 1951.
20-300A, Amphibious Support Brigade, October 1953.
20-300R, Amphibious Support Brigade, April 1955.
20-301, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Amphibious Support Brigade,
June 1951.
20-301A, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Amphibious Support
Brigade, June 1953.
20-301R, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Amphibious Support
Brigade, April 1955.
20-511, Amphibious Support Regiment, April 1953.
20-511R, Amphibious Support Regiment, April 1955.
20-512, Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, Amphibious Support
380
20-512R, Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, Amphibious
Support Regiment, April 1955.
55-9, Transportation Harbor Craft Company, Amphibious Support Brigade,
December 1951.
55-9A, Transportation Harbor Craft Company, Amphibious Support Brigade,
May 1953.
55-9R, Transportation Harbor Craft Company, Amphibious Support Brigade,
April 1955.
55-9C, Transportation Harbor Craft Company, Amphibious Support Brigade,
January 1956.
55-37, Amphibian Truck Company, April 1943.
55-37, Amphibian Truck Company, May 1944.
55-37, Transportation Amphibious Truck Company, November 1948.
55-37A, Transportation Amphibious Truck Company, August 1952.
55-37B, Transportation Amphibious Truck Company, Army or Communications
Zone (Type B), September 1953.
55-37, Transportation Amphibious Truck Company, Army or Communications
Zone, May 1954.
55-37R, Transportation Amphibious Truck Company, Army or Communications
Zone, April 1955. (Superseded by TOE 55-137C, January 1957.)
55-137C, Transportation Amphibious Truck Company, January 1957. (Supersedes
TOE 55-37R, April 1955.)
55-137D, Transportation Amphibious Truck Company, April 1961.
55-137H, Transportation Medium Lighter Company (ACV), June 1980.
(Supersedes TOE 55-139H, January 1976.)
55-138E, Transportation Light Amphibian Company, July 1962.
55-138G, Transportation Light Amphibian Company, July 1968.
55-138H, Transportation Light Amphibian Company, December 1975.
55-139E, Transportation Medium Amphibian Company, February 1963.
55-139G, Transportation Medium Amphibian Company, August 1967.
55-139H, Transportation Medium Amphibian Company, January 1976. (Super-
seded by TOE 55-137H, June 1980.)
55-140E, Transportation Heavy Amphibian Company, February 1963.
55-158T, Transportation Amphibian General Support Company, October 1962.
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Appendix A
Korean Geographical Names
(In National Institute of the Korean Language style and, in parentheses,

Modified McCune-Reischauer [Times-Herald] style.)
Baengnyeongdo (Paengyong-do)
Busan (Pusan)
Cheongcheon (Ch’ongch’on) River
Cheongjin (Ch’ongjin)

Cheongpyeong (Chungp’yong)

Cheonsu (Ch’onsu) Bay
Cheorwon (Ch’orwon)

Chodo (Ch’o-do)
Chongcheon (Ch’ongch’on) River

Chuncheon (Ch’unch’on)

Daecheon (Taech’on)
Daecheongdo (Taech’ong-do)
Daedong (Taedong) River
Daegu (Taegu)

Daejeon (Taejon)

Daepo-ri (Taep’o-ri)

Daebudo (Taebu-do)
Dancheon (Tanch’on)
Deokjeok (Tokchok) Islands

Deungsangot (Tungsan-got)

Dokseok-dong (Toksokdong or Toksong-ni)
Dongcheon-ri (Tongch’on-ni)

Donghae (Tonghae)
Eocheongdo (Och’ong-do)
Gaeseong (Kaesong)
Ganghwa (Kanghwa)
Gangneung (Kangnung)
Ganggu-dong (Kanggu-dong)
Ganseong (Kansong)
Gapyeong (Kap’yong)

Geojedo (Koje-do)

Geum (Kum) River (Geumgang)

Geumcheon (Kumch’on)

Gimhwa (Kumhwa)

Gimpo (Kimp’o)

415
Gojeo (Kojo)
Goseong (Kosong)
Gunsan (Kunsan)
Gunu-ri (Kunu-ri)

Guryeongpo-ri (Kuryongp’o-ri)

Gyeonnaeryang (Kyonnaeryang) Channel

Gyodongdo (Kyodong-do)
Hamheung (Hamhung)
Heunghae (Hunghae)
Heungnam (Hungnam)
Hwacheon (Hwach’on)

Incheon (Inch’on)

Jangjeon (Changjon)

Jangsa-dong (Changsa-dong)
Jangsangot (Changsan-got)

Jangyeon (Changyon)

Jejudo (Cheju-do)

Jeongdongjin (Chongdongjin)

Jeongju (Chongju)

Jindong-ri (Chindong-ni)

Jinhae (Chinhae)

Jinnampo (Chinnamp’o)

Jukbyeon (Chukpyon or Jukpyon)

Jumunjin (Chumunjin)

Majeon-ri (Majon-ni)

Nakdong (Naktong) River
Nakdong-ri (Naktong-ni)

Nakpung-ri (Nakp’ung-ni)
Namdo (Nan Do, Nam Do)

Poseungmyeon (Posung Myon)
Pyeonggang (P’yonggang)
Pyeongtaek (P’yongt’aek)
Pyeongyang (P’yongyang)
Samcheok (Samch’ok)
Seogang (Sogang)
Seokdo (Sok-do)
Seoncheon (Sonch’on)
Seongjin (Songjin)
Sinchang (Sinch’ang)
Socheongdo (Soch’ong-do)
Solseum (Sol-sum)
416
Sukcheon (Sukch’on)
Suncheon (Sunch’on)
Suyeong (Suyong)
Tongyeong (T’ongyong)

Uijeongbu (Uijongbu)

Uljin (Ulchin)

Weonju (Wonju)

Wonpo-ri (Wonp’o-ri)

Yeongdeok (Yongdok)
Yeongdeungpo (Yongdungp’o)
Yeongheung (Yonghung)
Yeongheungdo (Yonghong-do)
Yeongheung (Yonghung) Bay
Yeongil (Yongil) Airfield and Bay
Yeongju (Yongju)
Yeongsan (Yongsan)
Yeongwon (Yongwon)
Yeonpyeongdo (Yonpyong-do)
Yeosu (Yosu)
Yeseong (Yesong) River
Yucheon-ri (Yuch’on-ni)
417
Appendix B
Landing Ships, Craft, and Vehicles in Use
during the Korean War
Amphibious Force Flagship (AGH)

US Navy Photo, NHC
A converted Maritime Commission C2-S-AJ1 type freighter, the

Mount McKinley, AGC-7, was built in 1943. It served as the flagship of
Amphibious Force, Far East in 1950–51 and in 1953. The figure shows
the Mount McKinley off Heungnam during the December 1950 evacuation
with LSU-637 alongside. During the war, the Mount McKinley participated
in the Incheon, Wonsan, and Heungnam amphibious operations.
Length Overall: 459’ 3”
Beam: 63’ 0”
Maximum Draft: 28’ 2”
Top Speed: 15 knots
Light Tonnage: 7,650
Crew: 622
Armament: two 5-inch guns; four twin 40-mm guns, ten twin 20-mm
guns
419
Attack Transport (APA)
US Navy Photo, NHC

The Bayfield (APA-33), a Maritime Commission C3-S-A2 type, was
built in 1943. Shown above is the Bayfield en route to the 1950 PORTREX
Amphibious Exercise near Puerto Rico prior to the Korean War. During
the war, the Bayfield participated in the Incheon, Wonsan, and Heungnam
amphibious operations.
Beam: 69’ 6”
Top Speed: 16.5 knots
Crew: 575
Capacity: 1,226 troops (an APA normally carried one battalion landing
team of approximately 1,000 troops)
Armament: two 5-inch guns, eight 40-mm guns
420
Attack Cargo Ship (AKA)
US Navy Photo, NHC
The Union, AKA-106, a Maritime Commission C2-S-AJ3 type built

in 1944, is a typical AKA. The Union participated in amphibious exercise
Miki in 1949, was part of Rear Admiral James C. Doyle’s Amphibious
Group One at the start of the Korean War, and participated in the Pohang
and Incheon amphibious operations. The figure shows the Union in April
1945. Its Korean War appearance was almost identical.
Beam: 63’ 0”
Crew: 387
Capacity: normally carried the vehicles and heavy equipment of a
regimental combat team
Armament: one 5-inch gun, eight 40-mm guns, sixteen 20-mm guns
421
Transport (AP)
US Navy Photo, NHC

Various types of ships served as personnel transports. The General J.C.
Breckinridge, T-AP-176, a Maritime Commission P-2-S2-R2 transport was
built in 1945. The “T” indicates that it was a Military Sea Transportation
Service (MSTS) ship. The General J.C. Breckinridge participated in the
Incheon, Wonsan, and Heungnam amphibious operations.
Beam: 75’ 6”
Maximum Draft: 25’
Top Speed: 21 knots
Crew: 466
Capacity: 5,289 troops
Armament: four 5-inch guns, four 40-mm guns, twenty 20-mm guns
422
APD (High Speed Transport)
US Navy Photo, NHC
The Begor, APD-127, was built in 1944. During the Korean War,
the Begor participated in the Heungnam amphibious operation and in
special missions. The photograph shows the Begor off Heungnam as the
port facilities were being destroyed on the last day of the evacuation,
24 December 1950.
Beam: 37’ 0”
Crew: 204
Capacity: 162 troops
Armament: one 5-inch gun, six 40-mm guns
423
Landing Ship, Dock (LSD)
US Navy Photo, NHC

The Gunston Hall, LSD-5, was built in 1943. During the Korean War,
the Gunston Hall participated in the Incheon and Wonsan amphibious
operations. Shown here is the Gunston Hall in the late 1940s, but its
appearance would have been identical during the Korean War.
Beam: 72’ 2”
Maximum Draft: 18’
Top Speed: 15 knots
Crew: 326
Capacity: 3 LSUs or 14 LCMs or 64 LVTs or 74 DUKWs (92 LVTs or 108
DUKWs if temporary decks and ramps were installed)
Armament: one 5-inch gun, twelve 40-mm guns
424
Landing Ship, Tank (LST)
Korean War Signal Corps Collection, MHI
Units of the 1st Cavalry Division prepare to disembark from an LST at

Pohang, Korea, 18 July 1950. This LST is typical of those that participated
in Korean War amphibious operations.
Beam: 50’ 0”
Maximum Draft: 7’ 1” forward, 13’ 6” aft (fully loaded), 3’ 1” forward, 9’
6” after (fully loaded, beaching)

Top Speed: 10+ knots
Crew: 108–125
Capacity: 70 trucks (average) or 20 M4 tanks or 17 LVTs or 22 DUKWs
Armament: varied, usually one or two 40-mm guns and six 20-mm guns
425
Landing Ship, Medium (LSM)
Office of Naval Intelligence

The LSM-258 is similar in appearance to those used in the Korean
War.
Beam: 34’ 6”
Maximum Draft: 6’ 4” forward, 8’ 3.5” aft
Light Tonnage: 520 tons
Crew: 58
Capacity: 3 tanks or 6 LVTs or 9 DUKWs or 50 troops
Armament: one 40-mm gun, four 20-mm guns
426
Landing Ship, Medium, Rocket (LSM[R])
USS LSM/LSM(R) Association
LSM(R)-536, later renamed USS White River, conducted operations

off Chodo on the northwest coast of Korea in support of Partisan operations
in 1952 and 1953.
Beam: 34’ 6”
Crew: 81
Armament: one 5-inch gun, two 40-mm guns, three 20-mm guns, 75 rocket
launchers (1,000 5-inch rockets per salvo).
427
Landing Ship, Utility (LSU)/Landing Craft, Utility (LCU)
US Navy Photo, NHC

LSU-1160 is a typical Korean War era LSU. Originally called a
landing craft, tank (LCT) in World War II and redesignated landing ship,
tank (small) (LST[S]) after the war, the type was redesignated LSU in late
1949 and this was the designation carried during the first 2 years of the
Korean War. The type was redesignated landing craft, utility (LCU) on
15 April 1952.
Beam: 32’ 0”
Maximum Draft: 2’ 10” forward, 4’ 2” aft
Top Speed: 8 knots
Crew: 11
Capacity: three tanks, fifteen 2½-ton trucks
Armament: two 20-mm guns
428
Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM)
US Navy Photo, NHC
The LCM was originally designed to carry tanks and other heavy
vehicles. By the time of the Korean War, tanks had become too heavy
for the LCMs and were transported in LSUs, LSMs, and LSTs. Like the
LCVP, the LCM could be carried aboard amphibious ships. It was the
workhorse of the Engineer Special Brigade and the 8206th Army Unit,
Amphibious Training Center, during the Korean War.
The LCM(6) shown above was an enlarged 56-foot version of the
World War II 50-foot LCM(3). The version currently in service with the
Transportation Corps medium boat companies is the 74-foot LCM(8).
Length Overall: 56’ 1.5”
Beam: 14’ 0.25”
Maximum Draft: 3’ forward, 4’ aft
Top Speed: 9 knots
Crew: 5
Capacity: 1 medium tank or 120 troops
Armament: two .50-caliber machineguns or two 20-mm guns
429
Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP)
US Navy Photo, NHC

The LCVP, carried in the davits of APAs, AKAs, APDs, and LSTs,
was the ubiquitous personnel landing craft of World War II and Korea and
could carry trucks up to one ton. In the background of this photograph,
taken during the Incheon landing, is the SCAJAP LST-Q0-12.
Beam: 10’ 6”
Maximum Draft: 2’ 2” forward, 3’ aft
Top Speed: 8 knots
Crew: 3
Capacity: 36 troops
Armament: two .30-caliber machineguns
430
Landing Craft, Personnel, Ramped (LCP[R])
http:/ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/ships-lcpr.html
The LCP(R) was a ramped version of the original Higgins Boat, the
spoon-bowed 36-foot LCP(L). The narrow ramp precluded the transport
of vehicles, and in 1942 the LCP(R) was replaced by the LCVP. However,
the LCP(R) was faster and had better sea-keeping qualities than the LCVP
and thus was continued in use as a utility boat and for special operations
by underwater demolition teams, reconnaissance teams, and raiders.
Length Overall: 35’ 11.75”
Beam: 10’ 9.5”
Maximum Draft: 2’ 2” forward, 3’ aft
Top Speed: 10 knots
Light Tonnage: 6.5 tons
Crew: 3
Capacity: 36 troops
431
Amphibious 2½-ton Truck (DUKW)
http://my.voyager.net/~dukw/dukwpage.htm
A restored DUKW amphibious 2½-ton truck identical to that of the
Korean War era DUKW.
The DUKW was an amphibious version of the GMC CCKW 353 2½-
ton truck (C = designed in 1942, C = standard cab, K = front wheel drive,
W = rear wheel drive). The standard version was the DUKW 353 (D =
designed in 1942, U = amphibious, K = all wheel drive, W = dual rear
wheels).
Length: 31’
Width: 8’ 2.5”
Top Speed: 45 mph on land, 6.3 mph in water
Weight: 19,570 pounds
Crew: 2
Capacity: one 105-mm howitzer or one ¼-ton truck or 5,350 pounds of
cargo or 25 troops or 6 casualties on litters
432
Landing Vehicle, Tracked and Armored Landing Vehicle,
Tracked (LVT4 and LVT[A]5)
National Archives Photo
The LVT was a troop and cargo carrier originally designed to cross
coral reefs. Because it provided some protection to the troops on board, it
was used to carry troops in an initial assault. The armored LVT (LVT[A])
had a turret-mounted artillery piece. The LVT(A)5 mounted a gyro-
stabilized 75-mm howitzer that could be used as a direct-fire weapon
during the amphibious assault and as an indirect fire artillery piece on
land. The figure shows an LVT(A)5 (top) and two LVT4s at Camp Casey,
Washington, in early 1950 preparing for amphibious exercise PORTREX.
LVT4: Length: 26’ 1”
Width: 10’ 8”
Top Speed: 20 mph on land, 7.5 mph in water
Crew: 2
Capacity: one 105-mm howitzer or one ¼-ton truck or 5,350
pounds of cargo or 25 troops or 6 casualties on litters
LVT(A)5: Length: 26’ 2”
Width: 10’ 8”
Top Speed: 16 mph on land, 7 mph in water
Crew: 6
Armament: one 75-mm howitzer, three .30-caliber
machineguns
433
Appendix C
Amphibious Terms, Abbreviations, and Acronyms:
Army Doctrine in Effect from 1950 to 1953
Terms
Advance force—In a joint overseas expedition, a force preceding the main

part of a joint task force to the objective. The advance force normally
dissolves on D-Day and is redistributed to other parts of the joint task
force. (The advance force prepares the objective by reconnaissance,
minesweeping, preliminary naval and air bombardment, and underwater
demolition operations.) (FM 17-34)
Amphibious forces—1. The ground, sea, and air forces equipped and trained
for amphibious operations. 2. Permanent naval organizations established
for planning, training, preparing, and conducting landing operations.
(FM 60-10)
Amphibious operations—Types of (FM 31-5):
a. Demonstration: An expedition intended only as an exhibition of
force, implying attack.
b. Raid: An assault expedition involving relatively small forces
designed to land, accomplish a mission, and retire within a limited time.
c. Occupation: An assault expedition to seize and hold a prescribed
area without continuing a land operation.
d. Invasion: A major landing assault with extensive forces and
resources, involving continued operations on land against an active
enemy.
Amphibious troops—The troops of all Services assigned to a joint amphib-
ious task force for operations ashore, including the landing force, garrison,
and base troops. (FM 60-10)
Assault craft—A landing craft employed for landing troops and equipment
in an assault on an enemy beach. (FM 17-34)
Attack force—A subdivision of an expeditionary force consisting of
assault shipping with embarked troop and supporting naval and tactical
units, operating to establish a landing force on shore and support its opera-
tion thereafter. (FM 17-34)
Battalion landing team—An infantry battalion specially reinforced by nec-
essary combat and service elements; the basic unit for planning an assault
435
landing. A battalion landing team (BLT) normally is embarked aboard one
APA or an appropriate number of smaller ships. Also referred to as a land-
ing team. (FM 17-34)
Beach—Shoreline of landing area assigned to one combat team. Each
beach is given a color designation and subdivisions of the beach are num-
bered from left to right as you face the beach. (FM 17-34)
Beach, colored—Shoreline of a landing area assigned for the assault to
one regimental combat team (RCT). Each RCT beach is color coded, and
BLT subdivisions are numbered left to right from seaward. (FM 60-10)
Beach dump—Area adjacent to a beach, utilized by the shore group for
temporary storage of supplies and equipment. (FM 17-34)
Beachhead—A designated area on a hostile shore that, when seized and
held, ensures the continuous landing of troops and materiel and provides the
requisite maneuver space for the projected operations ashore. It is the physi-
cal objective of the amphibious part of an operation, and it corresponds to
a bridgehead in land operations. (Its depth should be sufficient to protect the
beach from ground-observed artillery fire.) (FM 17-34)
Beachhead line—An objective which fixes the limits of a beachhead; a
main line of resistance based, if practicable, on terrain features that can
be defended against enemy counterattack before the advance out of the
beachhead. (FM 60-10)
Beach marker—A sign or device used to identify a beach, or certain activi-
ties thereon, for incoming waterborne traffic. Markers may be panels, lights,
buoys, or electronic devices. (FM 17-34)
Beach master—The officer in command of the beach party; responsible
for the beaching and unloading of boats. (Under the command of the shore
party commander except for purely naval functions.) (FM 17-34)
Beach party—A Navy unit responsible for effecting and coordinating
movement of a landing force and its supplies and equipment through the
surf zone and onto the hostile shore. (See naval beach group.)
Billet—An assignment of quarters and duties aboard a naval ship.
(FM 60-10)
Boat—Any small craft capable of being stowed aboard a ship. As a verb,
to load personnel into a boat. (FM 17-34)
Boat assembly area—The area astern, to the quarter, or abeam of a trans-
port where empty landing craft circle, awaiting a call to the ship to take on
personnel or cargo. (FM 17-34)
436
Boat assignment table—A table showing the organization of a boat group
and the assignment of personnel and materiel to each boat (or landing
vehicle). (FM 17-34)
Boat group—The landing craft organization for landing a battalion land-
ing team. It also denotes the landing craft carried by an attack transport.
(FM 17-34)
Boat pool—Additional boats available to transports to aid or replace
boats that become inoperative before or during an amphibious operation.
(FM 60-10)
Boat rendezvous area—The area where boats rendezvous after being
loaded and prior to movement to line of departure. (FM 17-34)
Boat space—The space and weight factor used to determine the capacity
of boats and landing craft. With respect to landing craft, it is based on
the requirements of one man with his individual equipment. (One man
is assumed to weigh 224 pounds and to occupy 13.5 cubic feet of space.)
(FM 17-34)
Boat team—A subordinate unit of the landing team, constituted to function
from the predebarkation phase of the landing until normal unit organiza-
tion has been reestablished ashore. It is the personnel, with their equip-
ment, loaded in one landing boat charged with the performance of a task
after debarking from the landing boat. (The senior officer or enlisted man
in the boat is the boat team commander.) (FM 17-34)
Boat wave—The landing craft or LVTs within a boat group that carry those
troops scheduled to land simultaneously or at approximately the same time.
(FM 17-34)
Broach—To tend to be thrown broadside on the surface or in a seaway.
Often currents flowing parallel to a shoreline have this effect on landing
craft causing them to land broadside to the beach. (FM 60-10)
Brodie launching device—An overhead landing wire, erected ashore or
aboard ship, for launching and recovering aircraft specially equipped for
use with this device. (FM 60-10)
Build-up—The process of attaining prescribed strengths of units and levels
of supply. Also may be applied to the means of accomplishing this process.
(Troops, equipment, and supplies of the build-up are landed over beaches
or in ports already captured to further the operation and for protection,
operation, and expansion of the base.) (FM 17-34)
Cargo and loading analysis—A form prepared from the consolidated unit
personnel and tonnage table of a landing force element. The form lists all
437
cargo by organization, number of containers, type of equipment or sup-
plies, weight, cubic measure, and where stowed. Also called a cargo list.
(FM 60-10)
Cargo ship, attack (AKA)—A naval cargo vessel capable of being combat
loaded and fitted with special equipment to permit it to carry and launch
landing craft and to facilitate the unloading of cargo into landing craft
from off shore. (Expanded definition based on that of FM 60-10)
Close support fire—Fire to support units ashore. It is placed on enemy
troops, weapons, or positions whose proximity presents the most immedi-
ate and serious threat to the supported units. Close support vessels may
be the light cruisers, destroyers, gunboats, LSM(R)s, LVT(A)s, or other
support landing craft. (FM 60-10)
Combat cargo officer—The member of the Navy staff corresponding to the
unit loading officer (q.v.). Each APA and AKA of the amphibious forces
has in its regular complement a Marine Corps officer assigned duty as the
ship combat cargo officer. Officers assigned this duty are trained in ship-
loading schools.
The duties of the ship combat cargo officer, as promulgated in United
States Fleet Publication 66, Tactical and Operational Instructions,
Amphibious Forces, 7 July 1947, are to advise and assist the commanding
officer of the ship in the following: (1) All matters relating to loading and
unloading troop cargo and to embarking, billeting, and messing troops.
(2) The preparation, in conjunction with the ship’s first lieutenant, of
detailed plans for loading and stowing cargo, for unloading cargo, and
for billeting and messing troops. (3) Acting as liaison officer with the
commanding officer of troops during the planning and operational phases
of an amphibious operation. (4) Advising the unit loading officer in the
preparation of detailed loading, stowage, and unloading plans. (5) The
preparation, correction, maintenance, and distribution of the transport
characteristics pamphlet.
During the embarkation and rehearsal phase, the combat cargo officer
performs the following duties: (1) Maintains continuous liaison with the
commanding officer of troops through the unit loading officer. (2) Maintains
a progress report on the assembly of cargo on shore in order that the load-
ing of all hatches may progress efficiently and without delay. (3) Ensures
that loading and stowage plans are being followed. (FM 60-30)
Combat loader—An attack cargo ship or attack transport. The term was
widely used early in World War II but less so during the Korean War.
438
Combat loading—The loading of assault troops with their essential combat
equipment and initial combat supplies in the same ship or craft, and in
a manner permitting immediate and rapid debarkation in desired priority
to conform to the anticipated tactical operation of the unit for the landing
attack. (FM 17-34)
Combat team—See regimental combat team (RCT).
Commander, landing force—Commander of the task organization of
ground troops equipped and trained to carry out an amphibious assault
landing. (FM 60-10)
Condition 1A—That condition of battle readiness on vessels carrying
troops or materiel for an amphibious landing when all stations are fully
manned for debarkation. (FM 60-10)
Control group—A naval task organization consisting of personnel, ves-
sels, craft, boats, and the necessary communication facilities to control the
ship-to-shore movement. (FM 60-10)
Control officer—A naval officer, designated by the attack force com-
mander, charged with overall supervision of the ship-to-shore movement.
(FM 60-10)
Control vessels, boats, and craft—In an amphibious operation, a vessel to
guide and act as a headquarters for the control of waterborne traffic to and
from the beach. (FM 17-34)
a. Primary control vessels: Vessels used by central control, transport
squadron control, and transport division control officers. (FM 17-34)
b. Secondary control vessels: Vessels used by boat group and boat
wave commanders and wave guide officers. (FM 17-34)
c. Special control vessels: Vessels used by corps and division (army)
commanders, boat flotilla commanders, senior beach masters, and shore
group commanders. (FM 17-34)
Convoy loading—The loading of troops together with their equipment and
supplies on vessels in the same convoy, but not necessarily on the same
ship. (FM 60-10)
Davit loading—See rail loading. (FM 60-10)
D-Day—The term used to designate the unnamed day that an assault land-
ing is to be made, an attack is to be launched, or a movement is to begin.
(FM 17-34)
Deadweight ton—See tonnage.
439
Debarkation—The unloading of troops, equipment, or supplies from a ship
or an aircraft. (FM 17-34)
Debarkation schedule—A schedule showing the type of boat, the station
and time it is to report alongside a transport for loading, and the boat team
it is to embark. This schedule is prepared by the landing force. (FM 17-34)
Debarkation station—A location definitely established at the rail of a
transport where troops and materiel load into boats for the ship-to-shore
movement. There are usually four or more such stations located on each
side of an APA. (FM 17-34)
Deck loading—Cargo loaded on the open deck or on the hatch covers of
vessels. (FM 60-10)
Deep support—The naval gunfire on inland targets to support the operation
as a whole, as distinguished from close support, which is for the immedi-
ate benefit of front line troops. Normally fired by battleships and heavy
cruisers (16-inch and 8-inch guns). (FM 17-34)
Deep support fire—Naval gunfire on inland shore targets to support the
operation as a whole. The gunfire is usually provided by battleships, heavy
cruisers, and light cruisers. (FM 60-10)
Demonstration—(1) An attack or a show of force, on a front where a deci-
sion is not sought, made with the object of deceiving the enemy. (2) In an
amphibious operation, an exhibition of force which may be a feint or a
minor attack. (FM 17-34)
Demonstration group—The vessels assigned the task of transporting and
supporting the troops that are to participate in an amphibious demonstra-
tion. (FM 17-34)
Distance—(1) The space between adjacent individual ships or boats mea-
sured in any direction between foremasts. (2) The space between adjacent
men, animals, vehicles, or units in a formation measured from front to rear.
(3) In air operations, the term has no specialized meaning. (FM 17-34)
Division shore party—A shore party organized to support an assault infan-
try division in an amphibious operation. (FM 60-10)
DUKW control point—A point located on or near beach exits to control the
shuttle movement of amphibious trucks between ships and transfer points
on shore. (For DUKW, see Abbreviations and Acronyms.) (FM 60-10)
DUKW-truck transfer point—A beach installation consisting of revolv-
ing cranes at which sling loads are transferred from amphibious trucks to
trucks for further movement. (FM 60-10)
440
Dunnage—Any material, such as boards, mats, planks, blocks, bamboo, etc.,
used in transportation and storage to support and secure supplies, to protect
supplies from damage, or for convenience in handling supplies. (FM 7-34)
Embarkation—The loading of troops, with their supplies and equipment,
aboard vessels or aircraft. (FM 17-34)
Embarkation area—In an amphibious operation, an area, including a group of
embarkation points, in which final preparations are completed and through
which personnel and loads for craft and ships are called forward to embark.
A marshalling area. (FM 17-34)
Embarkation group—The basic organization for embarking landing force
troops, equipment, and supplies. The group is composed of the troops and
cargo to be embarked in a single transport division or similar naval task
organization. An infantry RCT typically forms the nucleus of an embarka-
tion group, but other types of embarkation groups may be formed around
division artillery units, special battalions, division service and supply
units, or a combination of these units. (FM 60-30)
Embarkation officer—The troop officer designated to plan and supervise
the loading and unloading of troops, equipment, and supplies. Each unit
from division down to the BLT and each team to be embarked on a single
ship has an assigned embarkation officer. (FM 60-10)
Embarkation team—Any element or combination of elements of the land-
ing force assigned to one vessel. (FM 60-30)
Fire support area—The sea area assigned to the fire support group to permit
it to maneuver so as to carry out the naval gunfire support. (FM 17-34)
Fire support coordination center—A single location in which all com-
munications incident to the control of the artillery, air, and naval gunfire
are centralized to provide for coordination of fire support. (The artillery
commander of the appropriate echelon acts as the fire support coordinator.)
(FM 17-34)
Fire support group—Basic naval unit for the delivery of naval gunfire
support. (FM 60-10)
Flagship—Headquarters ship of the amphibious force commander, from
which naval, landing force, and air commanders exercise control of a land-
ing operation. See AGC. (FM 60-10)
Floating dump—A dump of critical supplies held on boats, barges, or land-
ing vehicles established afloat in the vicinity of a control vessel for quick
dispatch to assault troops ashore. Also called offshore dump. (FM 60-10)
441
Garrison force—All units assigned to a base for defense, development,
operation, and maintenance of facilities. Units operating from the base
normally are included for logistical purposes. (FM 17-34)
Gross ton—See tonnage. (FM 60-10)
H-hour—(1) The term used to designate the hour for an attack to be launched
or for a movement to begin. (2) In an amphibious operation, the clock time
designated for the first wave to land on the designated beach. Other letters
of the alphabet may be used; e.g., F-hour, G-hour. (FM 17-34)
Hatch crew—A group of deckhands, soldiers, marines, or civilians, with a
petty officer or noncommissioned officer in charge, responsible for loading
and unloading the cargo for a specific hatch (opening into the cargo spaces
of the hull) of a ship. The hatch crew manhandles the cargo and rigs it in
slings or nets for hoisting by boom. The hatch crew may include boom
operators. They are also responsible for placing dunnage and balancing the
load as well as battening (securing) the hatch. (Traditional definition.)
Headquarters ship—A naval vessel from which naval, landing force,
and air commanders exercise control in landing operations. See AGC.
(FM 17-34)
Heavy lift cargo—All cargo packages, other than pallets, weighing more
than 800 pounds or occupying more than 100 cubic feet (definition for
amphibious operations only). (FM 60-10)
Hydrography—The description and analysis of the characteristics of the
earth’s surface waters. The mapping of bodies of water.
Joint communication center—A communication center established for
joint use of the Armed Forces. (FM 60-10)
In the stream—A ship is “in the stream” when it is being unloaded while at
anchor in a harbor, rather than tied up at a pier, dock, or quay.
Interval—(1) The space between adjacent groups of ships or boats
measured in any direction between the corresponding ships or boats in
each group. (2) The space between adjacent individuals, vehicles, or units
in a formation that are placed side by side, measured abreast. (3) In air
operations, the term has no specialized meaning. (FM 17-34)
Joint—Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which
elements of more than one Service of the Department of Defense
participate. (FM 17-34)
Joint expeditionary force—A joint force organized to undertake a joint
overseas expedition. (FM 17-34)
442
Landing area—Includes the beach, the approaches to the beach, the
transport area(s), the fire support area(s), the air occupied by close
supporting aircraft, and the land included in the advance inland to the
initial objective. (FM 17-34)
Landing craft—A craft which is especially designed for beaching,
unloading, or loading on a beach, and retracting. (This term generally
is applied to nonocean-going vessels, less than 160 feet long, designed
for use in landing operations; the designation landing craft (LC) is
used with appropriate modifications to designate particular types.)
(FM 17-34)
Landing craft availability table—A tabulation of all landing craft available
to embark and transport troops and materiel ashore. It is prepared by the
transport group commander and submitted to the commander of troop
units for planning purposes. (FM 17-34)
Landing diagram—A graphic diagram of the organization of the boat group
into waves, showing the distance between waves, expressed in minutes,
after H-hour, and the interval between boats and formations, shown in
yards. (FM 17-34)
Landing force—A task organization of troops, especially trained and
equipped, assigned to carry out amphibious operations against a position or
group of positions so located as to permit their seizure by troops operating
under a single tactical command. Some of its elements may be transported
by air. (FM 17-34)
Landing schedule—A schedule showing the place, hour, and priorities of
landing of all units embarked on a transport. It further shows necessary
coordination for the ship-to-shore movement to execute the desired
scheme of maneuver, and planned supporting naval and air bombardment
missions. (FM 60-10)
Landing ship—A large type assault ship, generally over 200 feet long,
designed for long sea voyages and for rapid unloading over or onto a beach.
(LS is the naval prefix used to designate these ships.) (FM 17-34)
Landing vehicle—Amphibious vehicles used in landing operations that are
capable of operating on land and water; they include LVTs (landing vehicle,
tracked) and DUKWs (amphibious trucks). (FM 17-34)
Lighter, Lightering—A lighter is a watercraft used to transport cargo or
personnel between a vessel and the shore. Lightering is the transfer of cargo
or personnel between a vessel and the shore. (International Maritime
Dictionary)
443
Line of departure—A line designated to coordinate the departure of attack
elements—a jump-off line. In amphibious operations, a suitably marked
off-shore coordinating line to assist assault craft to land on designated
beaches at scheduled times. (FM 17-34)
Line of transfer (transfer area)—A line designated between the line of depar-
ture and the beach for the purpose of coordinating the transfer of troops or
supplies between naval craft and LVTs and DUKWs; generally marked by
vessels that control traffic to the beach. (FM 17-34)
Loading analysis—See cargo and loading analysis. (FM 60-10)
Loading officer—An Army officer of the embarked unit who is trained to
plan and supervise the loading and unloading of his unit’s personnel and
equipment aboard the ships assigned. (FM 17-34)
Loading point—Any location where ships or landing vessels are loaded
with personnel, supplies, and equipment. (FM 60-10)
Main landing—The landing on which the ultimate success of the opera-

tion depends. It envisages the securing of a beachhead where assault forces
can assume the offensive and continue operations inland against an active
enemy. (FM 60-10)
Marker vessel—A vessel that takes accurate station at a designated control
point for the purpose of controlling vessels in the ship-to-shore movement.
(FM 60-10)
Maru—Japanese merchant ship. The word Maru is a suffic traditionally
applied to the names of Japanese civilian vessels. The term was used by
American mariners to differentiate Japanese merchant ships from those of
other nations.
Mine group or mine warfare group—Task unit of a joint attack force
assigned the mission of laying (emplacing) and sweeping (locating and
neutralizing) mines in the objective area. Mine warfare group elements
may be attached to the advance force. (FM 60-10)
Naval beach group (NBG)—Established after World War II to provide
naval elements to an amphibious task force. At the time of the Korean War,
there were two NBGs: NBG-ONE in the Pacific and NBG-TWO in the
Atlantic. An NBG consisted of a headquarters section; a construction bat-
talion (CB); two underwater demolition teams (UDT); a boat unit, which
maintained and operated assault landing craft for the ship-to-shore move-
ment of troops and equipment; and a beach master unit, which maintained
the special teams to control boat traffic and conduct boat salvage opera-
tions in the surf. (“History of Naval Beachmaster Unit TWO,” bmu2.sur-
for.navy.mil/Site%20Documents/History.aspx [accessed 11 April 2007].)
444
Naval gunfire liaison officer (NGLO)—A naval officer attached to an RCT
or BLT, to advise that organization on all matters pertaining to naval gunfire
support. He assists the fire support coordination center in the planning and
coordination of naval gunfire support with artillery and air. (FM 17-34)
Naval gunfire officer (NGFO)—An officer on the staff of a division or
higher landing force unit whose duties are to plan naval gunfire support for
amphibious operations. (FM 60-10)
Naval gunfire support (NGS)—Fire support of troops in an amphibious
assault or engaged in other operations on shore by naval ordnance on sup-
porting vessels. Types of support (FM 17-34):
a. Close support fire: Naval gunfire delivered in close support of
friendly troops, either ashore or in landing craft. It is fired on enemy troops,
weapons, or positions which, because of their proximity, present the most
immediate and serious threat to the supported unit. Support landing craft,
destroyers, and antiaircraft batteries of cruisers and battleships provide
close support fire.
b. Deep support fire: Naval gunfire delivered on objectives not in
the immediate vicinity of friendly forces, but farther inland on enemy
reserves, supply dumps, fire direction centers, artillery concentrations, etc.
Battleships and cruisers provide deep support fire.
Naval gunfire support area—An appropriate station and maneuver area
assigned to fire support ships from which they deliver naval gunfire sup-
port for a landing operation. (FM 60-10)
Naval platoon—Naval unit, commanded by the beach master, assigned to a
battalion shore party. The unit is often called the beach party. (FM 60-10)
Naval task force—A subdivision of the naval attack force composed of
ships appropriate for one specific mission. (FM 17-34)
Neap tide—The lowest level of high tide, occurring twice each month dur-
ing the first and third quarters of the moon.

Objective area—A definite geographical area within which is located the
objective to be seized or reached by the expeditionary troops or landing force.

(FM 17-34)
Officer in tactical command (OTC)—In naval usage, the officer charged
with tactical control of a formation. He is designated by proper authority
to assume tactical command or, in the absence of such designation, he is
the senior line officer present. (FM 60-10)
Offshore dump—See floating dump. (FM 60-10)
445
Organizational unit loading—The loading of troop units with their equip-
ment and supplies in the same vessel, but without regard for any planned
priority of debarkation. (FM 17-34)
Pallet—A portable platform on which materials are placed for convenient
handling and stowage. (A low platform constructed of wood or steel and
mounted on runners or rounded baseboards on which are stacked and secured
ammunition, rations, or other supplies to facilitate handling from ship holds
to beach dumps. Usually approximately 4x6 feet and having attached towing
slings, they haul approximately one ton bulk cargo.) (FM 17-34)
Patrol torpedo boat (PT Boat)—A high-speed motorboat mounting 2 or
4 torpedo tubes, antiaircraft, and machineguns; and equipped with depth
charges and smoke making apparatus. Used for coastal patrol and convoy.
(FM 60-10)
Ponton (or, pontoon), N.L.—Navy lightered ponton; cube shaped, sheet
steel, airtight cell from which ponton barges and causeways are assembled
when required. (FM 60-10)
Preparatory fires—Intensive naval fires delivered on landing beaches and
adjacent areas immediately prior to and during the approach to the beach
of the assault landing craft of the leading waves. (FM 17-34)
Primary control vessel—Vessel used by the senior naval officer in control of
landing craft for a transport squadron or transport division. (FM 60-10)
Profile loading plan—A profile view of a loading vessel with the itemized
list of materiel stowed in the holds indicated in the proper hold spaces. See
stowage diagram. (FM 60-10)
Rail loading—Loading personnel and materiel into landing craft suspended
from ship davits (Welin type) prior to launching the craft. (FM 17-34)
Reconnaissance group—A task organization of the attack force designated
to reconnoiter landing areas before D-Day. They may also do such tasks as
locating enemy naval forces, locating beaches, establishing aids to naviga-
tion, clearing minefields, selecting suitable targets for naval gunfire, and
clearing beach approaches of underwater obstacles. (FM 60-10)
Regimental combat team (RCT)—Reinforced infantry regiment operating
as a balanced fighting unit of essential arms. The normal ground force ratio
is one regiment of infantry, one battalion of artillery, and one company of
engineers, but may be changed to meet the demands of the tactical situa-
tion. (FM 17-34)
Regimental shore party—The element of a division shore party that sup-
ports an RCT. When the RCT lands separately or at a location where it is
446
not practicable to provide support from the division beach support area, a
regimental shore party may be formed from an engineer shore company
with necessary attachments. (FM 60-10)
Reserve force—A task organization of a joint amphibious task force con-
sisting of the ships carrying the reserve troops, usually formed into a land-
ing force that can land according to the general scheme of maneuver or as
the tactical situation dictates. (FM 60-10)
Reserve supplies—Supplies accumulated in excess of immediate needs
to ensure continuity of an adequate supply. (FM 60-10) Selected types of
reserve supplies:
a. Beach reserves: An accumulation of supplies of all classes estab-
lished in dumps on the beach; normally 5 to 10 days of supply of all classes.
(FM 60-10)
b. Individual reserves: The supplies carried on the soldier, animal, or
vehicle for his (or its) individual use. This generally includes the combat
load of ammunition for all weapons in the BLT; normally 1 or 2 days of
supply of all classes. (FM 60-10)
c. Initial reserves: Those supplies normally unloaded immediately
following the assault waves; usually enough to begin and sustain combat
until higher supply installations are established; normally 3 to 5 days of
supply of all classes. (FM 60-10)
Rhino barge—Barge assembled from cube shaped, sheet steel, airtight
pontons. (FM 60-10)
S-day—Sailing date for a scheduled operation. (FM 60-10)
Salvage group—A naval task organization designed and equipped to res-

cue personnel and to salvage equipment and materiel. (FM 60-10)
Screening group—A defensive unit of naval vessels employed to protect

the attack force. It includes antisubmarine vessels and picket boats located
seaward from the transport and fire support areas. (FM 60-10)
Secondary control vessel—Vessels used by naval boat group and wave
commanders and wave guide officers. (FM 60-10)
Selective loading—Loading of supplies and equipment in cargo vessels so
that specific items can be unloaded on call. (FM 60-10)

Senior Officer Present Afloat (SOPA)—The highest ranking officer aboard
ship in a harbor when more than one vessel is in the harbor. He com-
mands all naval operations afloat in that harbor. (Naval Historical Center.
(“Glossary of U.S. Naval Abbreviations,” www.history.navy.mil/books/
OPNAV20-P1000/S.htm [accessed 26 August 2008].)
447
Ship’s platoon—Personnel furnished by the Army to handle materiel and
equipment being loaded on or unloaded from assault ships. Their function
is essentially that of hatch crews. (FM 60-10)
Shore fire control party—A specially trained unit of naval gunnery, artil-
lery, and communication personnel for control of naval gunfire in support
of troops ashore. A shore fire control party consists of a naval gunfire spotter
team including a naval gunfire spotter, assistant spotter, and radio and wire
teams; and a naval gunfire liaison team including a naval gunfire liaison
officer who is supported by a radio team and a wire team. (FM 17-34)
Shore group—The appropriate number of shore party units to provide the
logistical support for an RCT. (FM 17-34)
Shore party—A task organization formed for the purpose of providing logis-
tic support within the beach area to landing force units during the early
phases of an amphibious operation. Its basic mission is to unload supplies
and equipment; provide services and facilities ashore; receive, segregate,
and safeguard this materiel; maintain security of the beach area; evacuate
casualties and prisoners of war; and re-embark other personnel as directed.
(FM 17-34)
Shore party team—The shore party organization basically organized to sup-
port a battalion landing team in an amphibious operation. The shore party
team is the basic unit of a shore party. In Army usage, the organization
performing this mission takes the name of the major T/O&E unit involved,
normally a shore company. (FM 17-34)
Special control vessel—A vessel used by corps and division commanders,
boat flotilla commanders, senior beach masters, and division shore party
commanders. (FM 60-10)
Spring tide—An exceptionally high tide that occurs during a full or new
moon, when the sun, moon, and earth are approximately aligned.
Stevedore—One who works at or is responsible for the loading or unload-
ing of a vessel in port. (FM 17-34)
Stores—In naval usage, this term is sometimes used instead of the term
“supplies” to denote any article or commodity used by a naval vessel or
station; for example, equipage, consumable supplies, clothing, petroleum
products, ammunition, and medical supplies. (FM 60-10)
Stowage diagram—A schematic drawing of each hatch level showing
stowage space for cargo. It may include overall dimensions, and indicate
boom capacity, stanchions, and minimum clearance. (FM 60-10)
448
Support group—A task group of naval vessels and craft assigned to fur-
nish naval gunfire support in an amphibious operation. Usually there is
one support group for each attack force. The support group may consist of
two or more support units. (FM 60-10)
Supporting arms coordination center (SACC)—An organization having
the same functions as the fire support coordination center, but located
aboard a ship and remaining afloat. (FM 60-10)
Tactical air control party (TACP)—A subordinate operational component
of the land-based tactical air control group designed for the control of air-
craft from forward observation posts. The tactical air control party oper-
ates at division, regimental, or battalion level. (Typically consists of one
air officer and three enlisted men attached to each landing team and combat
team for the purpose of directing and controlling air support.) (FM 17-34)
Tactical air coordinator (airborne) (TACA)—An air officer who coordi-
nates, from an airplane, the action of combat aircraft engaged in close
support of ground or sea forces. (FM 60-10)
Ton—A unit of volume or weight. In volume: measurement ton = 40 cubic
feet; gross ton = 100 cubic feet. In weight: short ton = 2,000 pounds; long
ton (weight ton) = 2,240 pounds; metric ton = 2,205 pounds (1,000 kilo-
grams). (FM 60-10)
Tonnage—An expression of cubic content or weight used to indicate the
aggregate of tons shipped, carried, handled, or mined; also to indicate a
ship’s weight, size, and carrying capacity. (FM 60-10)
a. Deadweight cargo tonnage: The cargo carrying capacity, expressed
in long tons. It is the part of the deadweight tonnage of the vessel that
remains after deducting the weight of fuel, water, stores, dunnage, and
other voyage items. Also known as cargo capacity tonnage.
b. Deadweight tonnage: The carrying capacity of a ship, expressed
in long tons. It is the difference between displacement tonnage loaded
and displacement tonnage light. Light deadweight tonnage: total weight
of the ship to exclude the weight of cargo, passengers, fuel, water, stores,
and dunnage. Loaded deadweight tonnage: total weight including all those
items listed above.
c. Displacement tonnage: The weight of the ship expressed in long
tons, either light or loaded.
d. Gross tonnage: Total internal cubic capacity of a ship expressed in
tons of 100 cubic feet capacity.
449
Tractor group—A term sometimes used to designate a group of landing
ships in an amphibious operation that carries the amphibious vehicles of
the landing force. (FM 17-34)
Transfer line—A line on the water at which the transfer of troops and sup-
plies from landing craft to amphibious vehicles is made. Its location may
be arbitrary, or may be dictated by the existence of reefs beyond which
landing craft cannot navigate. (FM 60-10)
Transport quartermaster (TQM)—Each APA and AKA of the amphibious
forces normally has in its regular complement a Marine officer, usually a
captain, assigned duty as transport quartermaster. He maintains ship’s data
as it affects loading, unloading, billeting, and messing; performs liaison
between the commanding officer of the ship and the commanding officer
of the troops prior to embarkation; assists the loading officer in the prepara-
tion of detailed loading plans; and supervises cargo stowage in accordance
with approved loading plans. (FM 17-34)
Transport, attack (APA)—A naval transport capable of being combat
loaded and fitted with special equipment to permit it to carry and launch
landing craft and to facilitate the unloading of personnel into landing craft
from off shore. (Expanded definition based on that of FM 60-10)
Transport division—The attack transports and attack cargo ships required
to carry personnel, supplies, and equipment of one RCT. (During the first
part of World War II, a transport division typically consisted of three APAs
and one AKA. By the end of the war, a transport division typically con-
sisted of five APAs and two AKAs.) (FM 17-34)
Transport group—A subdivision of an attack force consisting of assault
shipping and, when attached, its protective and service units, organized for
the purpose of embarking, transporting, and landing troops, equipment,
and supplies of the landing force. (FM 17-34)
Transport area—The sea area designated as a station area for trans-
ports debarking troops during the assault phase of a landing operation.
(FM 17-34)
Transport squadron—Two or more transport divisions organized to carry
a reinforced infantry division. (FM 17-34)
Underwater demolition team (UDT)—A naval unit organized and equipped
to perform beach reconnaissance and underwater demolition missions in
an amphibious operation. (FM 17-34)
Unit loading officer—Normally an officer of the senior organization
within the embarkation team. He must have been trained in a ship-loading
450
school. His assignment as unit loading officer will be temporary but, upon
appointment, he will be relieved of all other duties. His principal duties as unit
loading officer includes: (1) Acts as direct representative of the commanding
officer of troops of the embarkation team in all matters pertaining to loading.
(2) Effects liaison between the commanding officer of the ship and the
commanding officer of troops. (3) Prepares detailed loading plans for the ship
to which the embarkation team is assigned (assisted by the ship’s combat cargo
officer). (4) Coordinates and supervises the execution of the loading plan.
(5) Assists in the execution of the unloading plan. (FM 60-30)
Unit personnel and tonnage table—A table showing total personnel and
cubic measurements and weights of each class of material and number,
size, and weight of each type of vehicle to be embarked by a combat unit.
(FM 17-34)
Vessel—Any type of watercraft larger than a rowboat. (FM 60-10)
Wave—A formation of landing ships, craft, or amphibious vehicles required
to arrive at the beach at about the same time.
Welin davit—A type of davit with a three-boat capacity that became stan-
dard on US amphibious ships during World War II. (International Maritime
Dictionary)
Abbreviations and Acronyms

(Attack cargo ships, attack transports, landing ships, and landing craft are
described in appendix B.)
AAA AW Antiaircraft artillery automatic weapon. (FM 60-10)
AAOC Antiaircraft operations center. (FM 60-10)
AAS Artillery-air-spot (net). (FM 60-10)
AGC Naval symbol for an amphibious force flagship

(headquarters ship). (FM 60-10)
AH Naval symbol for a hospital ship. (FM 60-10)
AK Naval symbol for a cargo ship. (FM 60-10)
AKA Naval symbol for a cargo ship, attack. (FM 60-10)
AMTANK An amphibious tank that can operate both on land
and in water. Landing vehicle, tracked (armored)
(LVT[A]) is current terminology. (FM 60-10)
451
AMTRAC An amphibious tractor used for the movement of
troops and cargo from ship to shore in the assault
phase of an amphibious operation, or for limited
movement of troops and cargo over land or
water. Landing vehicle, tracked (LVT) is current
terminology. (FM 60-10)
ANGLICO Air and naval gunfire liaison company. A Navy/
Marine Corps unit attached to ground units to
control naval gunfire and close air support.
AP Naval symbol for a troop transport. (FM 60-10)
APA Naval symbol for attack transport; a vessel capable
of combat unit loading and transporting the bulk
of an assault battalion landing team. (FM 60-10)
APD Naval symbol for a destroyer-type high-speed
transport. Korean War era APDs were converted
from destroyer escorts. They were 300-foot long
ships mounting a 5-inch gun and smaller guns and
carrying four 36-foot landing craft. (FM 60-10)
BB Naval symbol for battleship. Battleships that par-
ticipated in the Korean War were 900-foot long
ships capable of speeds greater than 30 knots and
armed with nine 16-inch guns, twenty 5-inch guns,
and many 40-mm and 20-mm guns. (FM 60-10)
BHL Beachhead line. An objective that fixes the limits
of the beachhead; a tentative main line of resis-
tance based, if practicable, on terrain features
that can be defended against enemy counterattack
prior to advance out of the beachhead; occupied
and organized as demanded by the situation.
(FM 17-34)
BMNT Beginning morning nautical twilight. (FM 60-10)
CA Naval symbol for heavy cruiser (a cruiser mount-
ing 8-inch guns as the primary armament).
(FM 60-10)
CAP Combat air patrol. (FM 60-10)
CL Naval symbol for light cruiser (a cruiser mount-
ing 6-inch guns as its primary armament).
(FM 60-10)
452
COMLANFOR/CLF Commander, landing force. (FM 60-10)
COMNAVFOR Commander, naval force; commander of the naval
units of the joint force. This officer also may be
the task force commander. (FM 17-34)
COMTRANSDIV Commander, transport division. (FM 60-10)
COMTRANSGROUP Commander, transport group. (FM 60-10)
COMTRANSRON Commander, transport squadron. (FM 60-10)
COMTRACTORS Commander, tractor group. (FM 17-34)
CV Naval symbol for aircraft carrier. A CV was
an 855-foot long ship carrying more than 80
aircraft and with a speed of more than 30 knots.
(FM 60-10)
CVE Naval symbol for escort aircraft carrier built on a
merchant ship hull. About 500 feet long, carrying
about 20 aircraft, and with a speed of 18 knots,
they were used primarily to escort convoys and
to deploy Marine or Navy aircraft supporting
ground troops ashore. (FM 60-10)
CVL Naval symbol for a light aircraft carrier built on
a light cruiser hull. Less than 700 feet long, car-
rying about 35 aircraft, and with a speed of more
than 30 knots. (FM 60-10)
DCP DUKW control point. (FM 60-10)
DD Naval symbol for destroyer. Korean War era de-
stroyers were 380 to 390-foot long ships mounting
six 5-inch guns and smaller weapons. (FM 60-10)
DE Naval symbol for destroyer escort. Korean War
era DEs were 300-foot long ships carrying two
5-inch guns. (FM 60-10)
DMS Destroyer minesweeper. A destroyer modified to be
capable of locating and neutralizing naval mines.
DUKW A 2½ ton, 6x6 truck capable of operating on both
land and water. DUKW was a General Motors
Corporation designation based on their prod-
uct codes: D = 1942 model, U = amphibious,
K = all-wheel drive, and W = dual rear wheels.
(FM 60-10)
453
FAC Forward air controller. (FM 60-10)
FSCC Fire support coordination center. (FM 60-10)
FSG Fire support group. (FM 60-10)
HF High frequency (radio). (FM 60-10)
LC Landing craft. (FM 60-10)
LCI Landing craft, infantry. (FM 60-10)
LCM Landing craft, mechanized. (FM 60-10)
LCP(L) Landing craft, personnel (large). (FM 60-10)
LCP(R) Landing craft, personnel (ramped). (FM 60-10)
LCS Landing craft, support. (FM 60-10)
LCVP Landing craft, vehicle, personnel. (FM 60-10)
LEX Naval term for a practice landing, a landing
exercise. (FM 17-34)
LO Loading officer. (FM 60-10)

LSD Landing ship, dock. (FM 60-10)
LSM Landing ship, medium. (FM 60-10)
LSMR, LSM(R) Landing ship, medium, rocket. (FM 60-10)
LST Landing ship, tank. (FM 60-10)
LSTH, LST(H) Landing ship, tank (casualty evacuation). An
LST configured to care for personnel casualties.

(FM 60-10)
LSU Landing ship, utility. (FM 60-10) (Designated
landing craft, tank (LCT) until 10 April 1949, then
redesignated landing ship, tank (small) (LST[S]).
Redesignated LSU in late 1949. Redesignated
landing craft, utility (LCU) on 15 April 1952.)
LSV Landing ship, vehicle. (FM 60-10)
LVT Landing vehicle, tracked. (FM 60-10)
LVT(A) Landing vehicle, tracked (armored). (FM 60-10)
MSL Mean sea level. (FM 60-10)
MSTS Military Sea Transport Service. (FM 60-10)
MTB Motor Torpedo Boat (see PT Boat).
454
MTT Mobile Training Team. An element of a Marine
Corps Troop Training Unit (TTU). (See TTU.)
NATU Naval amphibious training unit. (FM 60-10)
NGF Naval gunfire. (FM 60-10)

NGFO Naval gunfire officer. (FM 60-10)

NGLO Naval gunfire liaison officer. (FM 60-10)

N.L. Ponton Navy lightered pontoon. (FM 60-10)
OTC Officer in tactical command. (FM 60-10)
PC Submarine chaser. A 173-foot long patrol craft
armed with one or two 3-inch guns as well as 20-
mm and/or 40-mm guns, .50-caliber machineguns,
and depth charges. During the Korean War, they
were widely used by the ROK Navy as patrol
vessels.
PT Boat Patrol torpedo boat. Also called a motor torpedo
boat (MTB). An 80-foot long boat capable of
speeds greater than 40 knots and armed with two
or four torpedoes, 20-mm and .50-caliber guns,
and, sometimes, depth charges. (FM 60-10)
RCT Regimental combat team. (FM 17-34)
SACC Supporting arms coordination center. (FM 60-10)
S/AS Ship-air-spot (net). (FM 60-10)
SCAJAP Shipping Control Administration, Japan. (FM 17-34)
SFCP Shore fire control party. (FM 17-34)
SS Naval symbol for submarine.
TAC Tactical air command (net). (FM 60-10)
TACA Tactical air coordinator (airborne). (FM 60-10)
TACC Tactical air control center. (FM 60-10)
TACP Tactical air control party. (FM 60-10)
TAD Tactical air direction (net). (FM 60-10)
TADC Tactical air direction center. (FM 60-10)
TAF Tactical air force. (FM 60-10)
TAO Tactical air observation (net). (FM 60-10)
455
TAR Tactical air request (net). (FM 60-10)
TRANSDIV Transport division. (FM 60-10)
TRANSGROUP Transport group. (FM 60-10)
TRANSRON Transport squadron. (FM 60-10)
TTU Troop training unit. A Marine Corps organization
designed to provide amphibious training to

Marine Corps or Army units. (FM 60-10)
UDT Underwater demolition team. A Navy unit
primarily intended for beach reconnaissance,
to destroy enemy beach obstacles, and to guide
landing forces coming ashore. During the Korean
War, Navy UDTs also conducted amphibious
raids. (FM 17-34)
UP&T Table Unit personnel and tonnage table. (FM 60-10)
VHF (Radio) Very high frequency.
456
Index
1st Independent Mobile Unit. See ROK Guerrilla Forces, Independent Mobile
Unit, Miryang Guerrilla Battalion
14th Massachusetts Continental Regiment. See Continental Army, 14th Massachusetts
Continental Regiment (The Marblehead Mariners)
38th Parallel, Korea, 112, 201, 217–219, 224–225, 227, 245, 260, 271, 287, 304,
318–319
Adams, Lieutenant Colonel E.C. (USA), 180
Adak, Aleutian Islands, Alaska, Occupation of, August 1942, 42–43, 48
Admiralty Islands, 34, 47, 53
Advance Base School, USMC, 18
Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, USMC Planning, 22
aerial tramways (a cable strung between towers for over-the-shore logistic
operations), 330
Afghanistan, 344, 346
Airsman, First Lieutenant John W. (USAF), 133
Aitape, New Guinea, Landing, April 1944, 54
Aix-la-Chapelle, France, Treaty of, 1748, 11
Alamo Scouts, Southwest Pacific, World War II, 143
Aleutian Islands, Alaska, 32, 42, 48, 52
Alexander, Lieutenant Colonel Barton S. (USA), 15, 86
alfalfa assault (Army amphibious exercise without boats, 1940), 26
Algeria, 31, 96
Aliso Canyon, California, Amphibious Training Site, 68
Allen, Major General Roderick (USA), 285, 293
Almond, Major General Edward M. (USA), 82, 118–120, 159–162, 169, 176,
186, 190, 193–194, 196–199, 205–206, 211–214, 218–219, 223, 228, 234–
236, 240–243, 248–250, 288, 290, 309
Amchitka Island, Aleutian Islands, Alaska, Occupation of, January 1943, 48
American, British, and Canadian Conference (ABC-1), 27
Amherst, General Jeffrey (British Army), 11
amphibious assault, 2, 4–5, 9, 11, 15, 28, 30, 40, 48, 50, 57, 73, 76–77, 85, 88,
95–97, 119–120, 124, 148, 157, 159, 170, 183, 220, 223, 286, 298–299, 314,
319–320, 322–323, 330, 337–338, 343–346, 433, 439, 445
Amphibious Corps, Atlantic and Pacific Fleet, 35, 38, 50, 56–57, 70, 94
amphibious demonstration, 4, 137, 288, 296, 321, 326, 440
amphibious developments before World War II, 3, 25
amphibious developments in 1942, 35, 90
amphibious doctrine
British development, 1, 11, 28, 30–31, 35–36, 43
US Army development, 2–3, 6–7, 13, 16, 19, 69, 72, 74, 76, 78, 82, 92, 103–
104, 107, 145, 161, 327–328, 332–333, 335–336, 338, 352
US Navy–Marine Corps development, 1, 23, 25, 35, 83, 89, 92, 327, 329, 331,
333–334
457
US Navy–Marine Corps Mid-Pacific doctrine, 68–69, 75, 332
Post World War II developments, 3, 65, 74
amphibious exercises. See exercises
Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, 18, 28, 35, 38–39, 43, 94, 103–104, 106, 144
Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet, 28, 33, 35, 39, 54, 61, 67, 79, 102–104, 107,
109, 116, 120, 153, 155, 204, 304, 325–326
amphibious objective area (AOA), 168, 316, 322, 335
amphibious operations, 1–6, 8, 11, 14, 16, 18, 22, 24–27, 29, 31, 35, 38, 40, 42–
43, 45, 51, 53, 55, 59–61, 63–79, 82, 84, 88, 91–92, 95, 103–107, 111–112,
114, 117–120, 123, 141, 143–144, 146, 148, 150, 153, 156, 161, 182, 186,
188, 217, 251, 255–256, 260, 286, 292, 308–309, 313, 315, 317–318, 324,
327–330, 332, 334–336, 338, 341, 343, 345, 348, 350–352, 354, 419–422,
424–425, 435, 442–445
amphibious raid, 4, 139, 142, 167
amphibious ready group (ARG), 343
amphibious reconnaissance, 4, 144
amphibious ships
attack cargo ship (AKA) (see also US Navy vessels, attack cargo ships
(AKA)), 5, 8, 29, 83, 122–125, 127, 151, 229, 235–236, 239, 251, 255,
262, 267, 288, 317, 421, 430, 438, 450–451
attack transport (APA) (see also US Navy vessels, attack transports (APA)),
5, 8, 29, 83, 108, 123–125, 127, 151, 174, 177, 235–236, 239, 251, 264,
267, 288, 293, 317, 420, 430, 436–438, 440, 450–452
combat loaders, 8, 29–30, 122, 235, 438
high-speed transports (APD, also called fast transports and destroyer
transports), 29–30, 52–53, 92, 124, 141–142, 145, 153, 174, 176–177,
232, 239, 251, 270, 294, 310, 423, 430, 452
landing ship, infantry (Royal Navy), 30, 63
amphibious special operations, 95, 139–140, 143, 233
amphibious support brigade (ASB), 320–321, 323, 327, 329–330, 350
amphibious tank and tractor battalion (ATTB), 2, 66–67, 73–74, 103, 120, 162,
166, 172, 177–178, 188, 191, 194–195, 197–200, 207–209, 211–214, 221–
222, 230, 240, 245–246, 255, 285, 292–293, 302, 308, 313–317, 325, 327,
329–330, 350
amphibious tanks. See amphibious vehicles, landing vehicle, tracked (armored)
amphibious task force commander, 328, 332, 334–335, 351
amphibious tractors. See amphibious vehicles, landing vehicles, tracked (LVT)
amphibious training, 2, 25–28, 35–37, 39, 46, 66–68, 75–76, 79, 81–83, 93–94,
103–104, 106, 108–109, 111, 114, 118–121, 123, 141, 156, 161, 171, 255,
284–286, 292–293, 313–315, 319–322, 325, 327–328, 455–456
Amphibious Training Command/Center (ATC), 35, 37–38, 66–68, 82–83, 93–94,
103–104, 107–109, 119–122, 126–127, 129–130, 133, 144, 149–152, 185,
201–202, 214–215, 224, 246, 253, 256, 292, 301–302, 305, 348–349, 429
amphibious training cycle, 315, 317
458
amphibious vehicles
¼-ton, general purpose amphibian (GPA), 40
2½-ton amphibious truck (DUKW), 8, 40, 49, 64, 68, 95, 121, 123, 133, 188,
192, 200, 266, 279, 319–320, 337, 432, 440, 453
barge, amphibious resupply, cargo (BARC), 330
expeditionary fighting vehicle (EFV), 2, 9
landing vehicle, tracked (armored) (LVT[A]), 45, 48, 53, 56–57, 97, 178, 194,
242, 255, 316–317, 431, 433, 438, 451, 454
landing vehicle, tracked, retriever (LVTR), 337
lighter, amphibious resupply, cargo (LARC), 330, 337, 341, 346, 355
amphibious warfare, 1–3, 11, 19, 23, 30, 35, 49–50, 52, 60, 64–66, 68–69, 71,
81–84, 88–90, 93, 95, 100, 109, 174, 328, 334, 348–349
amphibious withdrawal, 4, 49, 106, 284
Anderson, Captain Dorsey B. (USA), 274, 276–278, 280, 282, 305–308
Andong railway line, Korea, 254
Andong, Korea, 132
Andrewes, Admiral Sir William G. (Royal Navy), 81, 126, 163, 238, 267
antiaircraft artillery automatic weapon (AAA AW), 158, 163, 167, 451
Antilles Command, Amphibious Exercise, 73, 331, 351
Anzio, Italy, Landing, January 1944, 52, 60, 69, 74, 93, 99, 104, 170, 188
area of responsibility (AOR), 79, 116, 222
Army Amphibious Doctrine and Training, 3, 72, 78, 336
Army Amphibious Training Center, 35
Army Campaign Plan, 2005, 347
Army Draft Training Circular, 333, 351–352
Army Field Forces (see also Army Ground Forces, Continental Army Command,
US Army Forces Command), 73, 106–107, 145, 327
Army General Headquarters (GHQ), 2, 26, 28–29, 36, 55, 79, 81–82, 100, 108–
109, 114, 118–120, 123, 143–145, 148–149, 154, 157–159, 161–162, 168,
170–171, 174–175, 186, 190, 207–209, 211–212, 215, 218, 220, 224, 228,
245, 284–285, 293, 301, 306, 308–309, 317, 322, 325
Army General Staff, 24, 75
Army Ground Forces(AGF) (see also Army Field Forces, Continental Army
Command, US Army Forces Command), 36–38, 45, 66–68, 74, 91, 93–94,
103–104, 106–107, 144
Army Quartermaster Corps, 17, 86
Army Ram Fleet (Civil War), 15
Army Special Observers (SPOBS) Mission in London, 27, 32, 91
Army Transport Service (ATS), 17, 87
Army War College, 18, 24, 86–91, 205, 208
Army War Plans Division (WPD), 20
Army–Marine Corps issues
amphibious doctrine differences, 1–3, 6, 8, 18–19, 23–24, 28, 35–36, 69, 71,
76–78, 95, 104, 109, 161, 328–329, 332, 334
459
defense unification controversy, 1, 3, 57, 68–70, 73, 75, 87–88, 90, 105, 204,
206, 214
roles and missions controversy, 1, 3, 57, 68–71, 105, 204, 214
“Smith-vs-Smith” controversy (see also Saipan; Smith, Ralph; Smith, Holland
M.), 25, 35, 50–51, 56–57, 70, 93, 100, 206, 214
Army–Navy Joint Board, 18, 20–22, 24–25, 28, 33, 88–89
Arroyo, Puerto Rico, Landing, July 1898, 17, 86
Asan Bay, Korea, 143, 161, 174
Ashiya, Japan, 198
Atcheson, Lieutenant (jg) George (US Navy), 141–142
atomic bomb, 66, 69, 73, 314, 329
Attu Island, Alaska, Landing, May 1943, 32, 48
Austin, Captain B.L. (USA), 163
Austin, Major Perry (USA), 134, 152
Australia, 31–33, 117
Australian and New Zealand Corps (ANZAC), World War I, 19
Australian Air Force (Royal Australian Air Force), No. 77 Squadron, 80, 117
Australian Navy (Royal Australian Navy) Ships (HMAS)
Bataan (destroyer), 124, 238, 248, 267, 304
Joint Venture (water-piercing catamaran), leased by US Army, 347
Shoalhaven (frigate), 80
Spearhead (water-piercing catamaran), leased by US Army, 347
Warramunga (destroyer), 238
Axis Forces, 33, 49

Axis Forces of Germany and Italy, 31
Baengnyeongdo (Paengyong-do), Korea, 140, 173, 175, 201, 219, 233, 257–259,
263, 268–270, 289, 295, 318, 415
Baffin Island, Canada, 331
Bahamas, 11
Baker Section, Eighth Army G3 Miscellaneous Division, 259
Barbey, Rear Admiral Daniel E. (US Navy), 1, 46, 48, 52, 55, 61, 63, 73, 97,
99–100
Barr, Major General David (USA), 168, 190, 195, 208, 212, 235
battalion landing team (BLT), 1, 29, 81–82, 108, 115, 122, 165, 178, 229, 337–
338, 343, 420, 435–437, 441, 445, 447–448, 452
beaches
BETTY Beach (Incheon), 180–182, 188
BLUE Beach (Incheon), 165–166, 172, 177–178, 180, 188
CAROL Beach (Incheon), 180–181
FANNY Beach (Incheon), 180–181
GRACE Beach (Incheon), 180–181
GREEN Beach (Incheon), 165–166, 176–177, 181, 188, 191, 210, 230
KANSAS Beach, Korea, 128–129
NORA Beach (Incheon), 180–181
460
Omaha Beach, Normandy, France, June 1944, 40, 59, 69, 101, 286
OPAL Beach (Incheon), 180–181, 188, 191–192, 200
RED Beach (Incheon), 165–166, 176–180, 188, 209, 211
Thon My Thuy, Vietnam, Utah Beach, Wunder Beach, 339
Utah Beach, Normandy, France, June 1944, 59, 151, 286, 289
Utah Beach, Vietnam, Thon My Thuy, Wunder Beach, 339
WANDA Beach (Incheon), 339
Wunder Beach, Vietnam, Thon My Thuy, Utah Beach, 339
YELLOW Beach (Incheon), 166, 178, 180–181
beaching, 7, 114, 122, 135, 235, 341, 425, 436, 443

Beauchamp, Colonel Charles E. (USA), 189, 212
Betio, Tarawa, Gilbert Islands, Landing, November 1943, 50–51
Bismarck Archipelago, 19, 31, 47
Black Sea Coast, Cold War Plans for Amphibious Operations on, 73
Blamey, General Sir Thomas (Australian Army), 54–55
Blockade Board of 1861 (Civil War), 14, 85
Bloody Ridge, Korea, Battle of, 296, 298
Borg-Warner Corporation, 30
Borneo, 65
Boscowen, Admiral Edward (Royal Navy), 11
Boston Whalers (boats), 341, 345
Bradley, Brigadier General Joseph S. (USA), 133, 250, 301, 310
Bradley, General Omar (USA), 69, 104
brigade combat team (BCT), 344, 347, 356
Brind, Admiral Sir Patrick (Royal Navy), 144
Briscoe, Vice Admiral Robert P. (US Navy), 322
British Army, 1, 8, 11–12, 19, 26–28, 30–33, 35–36, 39, 42–43, 49, 52, 60, 262
British Army Units
17th Port & Maritime Regiment, 346
27th Brigade, 224
British Chief of Combined Operations, 32
British Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ), 30, 33, 39
British Commonwealth Forces (BCOF) (Japanese Occupation), 27, 80
British Navy. See Royal Navy
British Royal Marines, 19, 144, 232, 240, 270, 288
British Royal Marines, 41st Independent Commando (see also Drysdale, Lieutenant
Colonel Douglas B.), 144, 154, 190, 209, 212, 231, 248, 270, 292, 295, 304
Brock, Captain Jeffrey V. (Royal Canadian Navy), 237–238
Brown, Major General Albert (USA), 48
Brown, Major General Jacob (USA), 12, 85
Buckner, Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar, Jr. (USA), 1, 64–65
Bukhan (Pukhan) River, Korea, 146, 237, 252, 261, 271–279, 284, 287, 308
Burnside, Major General Ambrose E. (USA), 14, 16, 85
Burnside’s Coast Division (Civil War), 14, 16
461
Busan (Pusan), Korea, 111, 113, 115, 123, 126–130, 133–134, 136, 140, 155,
157–158, 160, 168–172, 175, 182, 185, 205, 210–211, 218–223, 226, 229,
233, 235, 240, 249, 252–253, 255–256, 259, 263–264, 266, 268, 270, 289,
295, 415
Butaritari Island, Makin Atoll, Gilbert Islands
Landing by 165th RCT, USA, November 1943, 50, 99
Landing by 2d Raider Battalion, USMC, August 1942, 42
Butler, Major General Benjamin F. (USA), 14
Caen, France, 57–58
Calabrian Coast, Italy, Landing, September 1943, 49
Caldera, Secretary of the Army Louis, 346
Callaway, Lieutenant Colonel John B. (USA), 275–278, 283
Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, 359
Cambodia, 337–338, 340
Camp Drake, Japan, 121, 123
Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, US Army Amphibious Training Center and
Engineer Amphibious Command, 37–38, 348
Camp Gordon Johnson, Florida, Amphibious Training Site, 38, 65
Camp Haugen, Japan, 293
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, 338
Camp McGill, Japan, Far East Command Amphibious Training Site, 82–83, 108–
109, 119–120, 122–123, 143–144, 292, 295, 314, 316–317, 320
Camp Younghans, Japan, 293
Camp Zama, Japan, 123, 245
Canada, 32, 117, 331
Canadian Navy (Royal Canadian Navy) Ships (HMCS)
Athabaskan (destroyer), 172–173, 238
Cayuga (destroyer), 238
Sioux (destroyer), 238
Cape Breton Island, Canada, Fortress of Louisburg, Captured 1745 and 1758, 11
Cape Cod, Massachusetts, Amphibious Training Site, 37, 94
Cape Fear River, North Carolina, Amphibious Training Site, 16
Cape Gloucester, New Britain, Landing, December 1943, 46
cargo ship (AK), 2, 5, 8, 26, 29, 38, 81–83, 111, 113, 122, 163, 168, 189, 220–221,
226, 229, 235, 239, 242, 249, 251, 262, 421, 438, 450–451
Caroline Islands, 53
Carrabelle, Florida, Amphibious Training Site, 37–38, 65
Casablanca, Morocco, Landing, November 1942, 43–44
Castine Peninsula, Maine, Raid on (1779), 12
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 145, 154, 226, 259, 269
Central Pacific Area, 56, 61
Central Pacific Force, 50
Central Pacific Offensive, 33, 52, 55
Central Pacific Operations, World War II, 49, 56
Chaney, Major General James E. (USA), 27, 91
462
Chang Chae Hwa (ROK Partisan Leader), 267
Chauncey, Commodore Isaac (US Navy), 12, 85
Cheongcheon (Ch’ongch’on) River, Korea, 228, 234, 236, 415
Cherbourg, France, 57, 72, 101
Chesapeake Bay, 35
Chief of Logistics (G4), US Army Staff, 80, 94, 118, 149, 224, 246, 266, 307
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), US Navy, 20, 25–26, 33, 79, 94, 155, 204, 331
Chief of Operations (G3), US Army Staff, 79–80, 96, 98, 100, 103, 107–109, 118,
120, 149, 151, 171, 189, 205, 246, 258, 294, 302, 304–309, 326
Chigasaki Beach, Japan, Amphibious Training Site, 82–83, 109, 115, 292–293,
316, 319, 321
Chinese Military Forces, 118, 228, 231–232, 234–235, 241–242, 246–249, 251–
254, 256–257, 259–260, 262, 266, 271, 276–280, 282–284, 286–288, 291–
292, 294, 296, 301, 318, 321
Chinese People’s Volunteer (CPV). See Chinese Military Forces
Chinese Spring Offensive, April 1951, 284, 287
Chodo (Ch’o-do), Korea, 140, 175, 219, 233, 257–258, 263, 267–270, 288–289,
295, 415, 427
Choi Nam Yong (Commander, ROK Navy), 113
Civil War, American, 14, 16, 24, 85–86, 143, 146
Clance, First Lieutenant James W. (USA), 176, 209
Clark, General Mark W. (USA), 43, 49, 73, 322
Clark, Lieutenant Eugene F. (US Navy), 174, 201, 208–209
Clark, Vice Admiral J.J. (US Navy), 323–324
Coast Guard, 12, 26, 36–37, 91–92, 94
Collins, General J. Lawton (USA), 76, 79, 104, 156, 160, 169, 172, 204–205, 208,
217, 235, 239–240, 245
combat loaders. See amphibious ships, combat loaders
Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) (British), 30, 33, 39
combined task force (CTF), 292, 234, 303
Commander, Task Force 90 (see also Doyle, Rear Admiral James H.), 233
Command and General Staff School, 24
Commander in Chief of the US Fleet, 33
Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Fleet, 33, 79
Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), 79, 147–149, 155, 160, 169, 193, 204–
205, 207–208, 223, 245, 248–250, 285, 292–293, 302–303, 308–310, 315,
317–318, 322, 325
Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), 117, 209, 247,
260, 285, 322, 324, 326
Commander, Task Force (CTF) (US Navy term), 233
Commander, Task Force 90 (CTF 90). See US Navy Units, NAVFE Task Force 90
(NAVFE Amphibious Force)
Commander, United States Naval Forces, Far East (COMNAVFE), 116–117, 124,
247–249, 262, 303, 309, 315, 318, 322–323
Conduct of War and Analytical Studies Courses, 24
463
Congress, US, 1, 70, 105
Conner, Commodore David (US Navy), 13
Continental Army Command (see also Army Ground Forces, Army Field Forces,
US Army Forces Command), 104, 327, 334, 350–351
Continental Army, 14th Massachusetts Continental Regiment (The Marblehead
Mariners), 11
Continental United States (CONUS), 74, 106, 313
Cooper, Sergeant Frederick D. (USA), 184–185
Coral Sea, Battle of the, May 1942, 31
Corlett, Major General Charles H. (USA), 49
Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962, 338
Cushman, General Thomas J. (USA), 190
Czechoslovakia, 25
Dabney, Colonel John (USA), 171
Daecheongdo (Taech’ong-do), Korea, 173, 201, 257, 318, 415
Daegu (Taegu), Korea, 111, 126–128, 132, 140, 158, 175, 219, 233, 263, 268,
270, 289, 295, 415
Daejeon (Taejon), Korea, 125–126, 130, 140, 153, 158, 175, 219, 233, 263, 268,
270, 289, 295, 415
Dager, Major General Holmes E. (USA), 174
Daiquiri, Cuba, Landing, 1898, 17, 86
Dakar, French North Africa, Landing, November 1942, 30
Dancheon (Tanch’on), Korea, 139–140, 175, 219, 232–233, 263, 268, 270, 289,
295, 318, 415
D-Day, 56, 58–59, 100–101, 121, 157, 164, 166–168, 172, 176, 178, 180, 243,
286, 323, 435, 439, 446
Dean, Major General William F. (USA), 126
DeLong floating piers (apparatus for over-the-shore logistics operations), 330,
339
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). See DPRK
Deokjeok (Tokchok) Islands, Korea, 140, 173, 175, 219, 233, 252, 258, 263, 268,
270, 289, 295, 301, 415
Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, 345, 355
destroyer transports (APD). See amphibious ships, high-speed transports (APD)
Deungsangot (Tungsan-got) (peninsula) Korea, 173, 201, 258, 415
Devers, Lieutenant General Jacob L. (USA), 60, 66, 73, 76, 103
Dewey, Commodore George (US Navy), 17–18
Dieppe, France, Landing, August 1942, 42, 96
disagreements on doctrine for amphibious operations, 71, 334
Distant Early Warning (DEW) Radar Installations, 331
doctrine for amphibious operations, 8, 334, 350, 352, 354
Dokseok-dong (Toksokdong/Toksong-ni), Korea, 131–134, 175, 183, 415
Donkey Teams (ROK Partisan Forces), 259, 267–269, 302
Dover, England, UK, 57
464
Doyle, Rear Admiral James H. (US Navy), 81, 83, 115–117, 119–127, 140–142,
160–163, 172, 176–177, 193, 203, 206–207, 213, 220, 223, 233–235, 239,
241, 243, 248–249, 254–255, 421
DPRK, Korean People’s Army (KPA) Units
1st Border Guard Brigade (Gyeongbi Yeodan), 112
3d Border Guard Brigade (Gyeongbi Yeodan), 114
599th Unit (Naval Headquarters), 111
766th Independent Unit, 111–113, 131–132, 147
945th Unit (Naval Infantry Yukjeondae), 111, 113
956th Unit (Naval Infantry Yukjeondae), 111
Divisions
3d Division, 132–134
5th Division, 111–112, 132, 184
6th Division, 135
7th Division, 135
12th Division, 132
Naval Units, 2d Naval Squadron, 111

Regiments
12th Regiment, 5th Division, 132, 184
14th Regiment, 114
Drysdale, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. (Royal Marines) (see also Royal Marine
Commandoes, 41 Independent Company), 144, 231, 240, 295
DUKW. See amphibious vehicles, 2½-ton amphibious truck (DUKW).
DuPont, Captain Samuel F. (US Navy), 14, 85
Dupras, Major Edward P. (USMC), 141–142
Dyer, Rear Admiral George C. (US Navy), 99, 109, 286, 308–309
E-Day (Heungnam Evacuation, December 1950), 239–241, 243, 255

Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, 26
Edwards, Lieutenant General Idwal H. (USAF), 160
Egypt, 31, 33, 44
Eichelberger, Lieutenant General Robert (USA), 64
Eighth United States Army in Korea (EUSAK), 117, 168, 170, 219–220, 249, 294,
301, 303, 305
Eisenhower, General Dwight D. (USA), 37, 43, 54, 70, 93, 105
Ellet, Lieutenant Colonel Alfred W. (USA), 14–15
Ellet’s Army Ram Fleet (Civil War), 15
Elliott, Captain Jesse (US Navy), 12
Ellis, Major Earl H. (Pete) (US Navy), 22, 89
Ely, Colonel Louis B. (USA), 95, 144–145, 154, 175, 186, 209, 211
Emmerich, Lieutenant Colonel Roland S. (USA), 132, 152
engineer amphibian brigade (EAB), 37–38, 45
Engineer Amphibian Command (EAC), 35, 37–38, 94
engineer boat units, 1, 37, 213
465
engineer special brigades (ESB), 1–2, 38, 45–46, 48, 54, 63–68, 73–74, 77–78,
82, 102–103, 106, 120, 150, 156, 158, 162, 166–167, 178–180, 182, 188–189,
192, 200–202, 206–207, 209–210, 212, 221, 223, 226, 229–231, 240–243,
245, 247, 250, 255, 264, 284, 292–293, 302, 304, 313–317, 319–320, 325,
329, 348, 350, 429,
English Channel, 32, 35, 57
Eniwetok Atoll, Caroline Islands
atomic tests, 1947, 66
landing, February 1944, 53
Eocheongdo (Och’ong-do), Korea, 141, 415
Ereckson, Lieutenant Commander Henry J. (US Navy), 226, 236–237, 242
European Theater of Operations (ETO), World War II, 1, 37, 66, 91, 93, 95–96, 101
Ewen, Rear Admiral E.C. (US Navy), 163, 176
Exercises
Alfalfa Assault (Army amphibious exercise without boats, 1940), 26
PORTREX (Puerto Rican Exercise), February–March 1945, 74, 106, 420, 433
Cadets–Midshipmen Amphibious Exercise (CAMID), 1946 and subsequent
years, 67
Fleet Landing Exercises (FLEX), 23, 25
FLEX 1, 1935, 25
FLEX 2, 1936, 90
FLEX 3, 1937, 25
FLEX 4, 1938, 25
FLEX 6, 1940, 25–26, 91
FLEX 7, 1941, 28–29, 92
High Seas, planned for 1955 (canceled), 331, 351
Joint Army–Marine Landing Exercise (JAMLEX), 1960 and subsequent
years, 338
Joint Army–Navy Exercise Miki, 1949, 73–74, 106, 421
Marine Landing Exercises (MARLEX)
MARLEX I, May 1953, 321
MARLEX II, June 1953, 321
New Offshore Delivery Exercises (NODEX), 1950–64, 331
Offshore Discharge Exercises (ODEX), 1950–64, 331
Operation DUCK/OILSKIN/MOUNTAIN GOAT, 1946, 68, 104
Operation CORALHEAD, 1952, 317
Operation SUNSET (Engineer School Exercise), 1964, 337–338, 352
PHIBTEST, 1951, 314, 325
Rocky Shoals, 1958, 331, 351
Sagebrush, Joint Army–Air Force Exercise, 1955, 331
Seminole, 1947, 12, 73, 85, 106
Sentry Box, 1954, 331, 351
Surf Board, Joint Army–Navy Exercise, 1955, 331, 351
Tarheel, 1960, 338
expeditionary warfare, 5, 22, 24, 345
466
Far East Command (FEC), 7, 79, 82, 107–109, 149, 156, 205–206, 245, 251, 301,
303, 315, 325
area of responsibility (AOR), 79, 81, 116, 222
G2, 119, 121, 144, 149, 174, 189, 209, 236
G3, 79–80, 108, 118, 120, 148–149, 171, 189, 308
General Headquarters (GHQ), FEC, 2, 79, 81–82, 100, 108–109, 114, 118–
120, 123, 143–144, 148–149, 154, 168, 171, 174, 207, 209, 212, 215,
224, 284, 293, 301, 306, 308–309, 325
GHQ FEC Provisional Raider Company, later renamed 8245th Army Unit,
X Corps Raider Company, 144–145, 174–175, 186, 190, 209, 211–212
Headquarters and Service Command, FEC, 143
Japan Logistical Command (JLC), 222
Joint Special Operations Staff, 174
Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG), 55, 79, 118–119, 148,
155, 157, 159, 193, 218, 309
Special Activities Group (SAG), 144–145
Farragut, Navy Flag Officer David G. (US Navy), 14

Farrell, Brigadier General Francis (USA), 132
fast transports (APD). See amphibious ships, high-speed transports (APD)
Fellers, Brigadier General William S. (USMC), 109, 120
field artillery battalion (FAB). See US Army Units, battalions, field artillery
battalions (FAB)
Flaherty, Captain Michael J. (US Navy), 239
Fleet Landing Exercises (FLEXs). See exercises
Fleet Marine Force (FMF), 23, 57, 70, 155, 167, 188, 209–210, 290
fleet volunteers. See Royal Navy Units, fleet volunteers
Flying Fish Channel (Seo-sudo), Korea, 172
Foley, Boatswain’s Mate Warren (US Navy), 142
Food Machinery Corporation (FMC), 30
force beachhead line (BHL), 178, 182–183
forcible entry operations, 8, 327
Ford General Purpose Amphibian (GPA). See amphibious vehicles, ¼-ton, general
purpose amphibian (GPA)
foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), 4
Formosa (Taiwan), 32–33, 36, 54–55, 60–62, 101, 116, 159
Forney, Colonel Edward H. (USMC), 83, 119–120, 149, 160, 206, 211, 236, 240–
242
Forrestal, Secretary of Defense James V., 71
Fort Eustis, Virginia, 188, 330, 348, 355–356
Fort Fisher, Landings, 1864, 1865, 16, 24, 86
Fort Knox, Kentucky, 73, 95, 106
Fort Lewis, Washington, 25, 37, 68, 80, 120, 331, 347
Fort Story, Virginia, 338
Fort Worden, Washington, 66, 120, 313–314
Fox, Major General Alonzo P. (USA), 119, 149, 193
467
Franklin, Brigadier General William B. (USA), 15–16
Franklin’s division (Civil War), 16
Fremont, Major John C. (USA), 13
French and Indian War (1754–63), American Part of the Seven Years’ War
(1756–63), 11, 84
French Army units
519th Logistics Regiment, 346
French fortress of Louisburg, Canada, Captured 1745 and 1758, 11
French Indochina, 31
French Morocco, 43, 96
French North African Colonies of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, Landings,
November 1942, 31
Fukuoka, Japan, 115–116
Fulton, Colonel William B. (USA), 341–342, 353
Funston, Brigadier General Frederick (USA), 18
Fuson, Lieutenant General Jack C. (USA), 348–349, 356
G3 Miscellaneous Division (Eighth Army), 258, 294
Gaeseong (Kaesong), Korea, 112, 140, 175, 219–220, 224–225, 233, 237, 251–
252, 258, 263, 268, 270, 272, 289, 295, 297, 300, 321, 324, 415
Gallipoli Peninsula, Landing 1915, 19, 24, 87, 89–90
Ganggu-don (Kanggu-dong), Korea, 131–132, 415
Gangneung (Kangnung), Korea, 112–113, 116, 140, 175, 191, 219, 233, 237,
260–261, 263, 268, 270, 287, 289, 295, 297, 300, 320, 323, 415
Ganseong (Kansong), Korea, 140, 164, 175, 179, 219, 233, 237, 262–263, 268,
270, 272, 288–290, 295, 297, 300, 415
Gavutu-Tanambogo Islands, Solomon Islands, Landing, August 1942, 41
Gay, Major General Hobart R. (USA), 120–121, 123, 125, 150
General Headquarters (GHQ), 2, 26, 28–29, 36, 55, 79, 81–82, 100, 108–109,
114, 118–120, 123, 143–145, 148–149, 154, 157–159, 161-162, 168, 170–
171, 174–175, 186, 190, 207–209, 211–212, 215, 218, 220, 224, 228, 245,
284–285, 293, 301, 306, 308–309, 317, 322, 325
Geojedo (Koje-do), Korea, 135–138, 140, 175, 219, 233, 255, 263, 268, 270, 289,
295, 415
German forces, 49
German Samoa, Occupied by Japanese Forces, 1914, 19
Ghormley, Rear Admiral Robert (US Navy), 26–27, 33, 41
GHQ FEC Amphibious Training Program, 2, 81–82, 109, 114
Gibbons, Lieutenant Colonel John B. (USA), 120–121, 126–127, 129
Gibraltar, 43–44
Gilbert Islands, 42–50
Gilberts, Marshalls, and Marianas Operations, 332
Gimpo (Kimpo) Airfield, 112, 164, 168, 173, 177, 179, 186–187, 190–191, 194–
195, 197–198, 252, 260–261, 287
Gimpo (Kimpo) Peninsula, Korea, 224, 322
Gimpo (Kimp’o), Korea, 220, 252, 415
468
Gloucester, Virginia, Proposed landing, 1862, 15–16, 34, 46
Glover, General John (Continental Army), 11–12, 84
Gojeo (Kojo), Korea, 3, 140, 175, 219, 227, 229, 233, 263, 268, 270, 288–289,
294–295, 297–298, 300, 322–323, 416
Goldsborough, Flag Officer Louis M. (US Navy), 14
Goldwater–Nichols Act, 344
Goseong (Kosong), Korea, 128, 130, 135–137, 140, 175, 219, 233, 262–263, 268,
270, 288–290, 294–297, 300, 416
Grant, General Ulysses S. (USA), 15
Greenland, 314, 331
Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, Landing, August 1942, 32, 34–35, 40–41, 45, 47,
83, 93, 96, 141
Guadeloupe Island, French West Indies, Planning for Occupation of, 1940, 26
Guam, Marianas Islands, 19, 22, 31–32, 50, 54, 57, 100
Guanica, Puerto Rico, Landing, 1898, 17
Gulf of Riga, Russia, German Landings, 1917, 19
Gunsan (Kunsan), Korea, 120, 123, 140–141, 143, 157, 160–161, 167, 169, 174–
175, 186, 192–193, 201, 219, 233, 253, 256, 263, 268, 270, 289, 295,
321, 416
MacArthur Considers Landing at, September 1950, 123, 157, 160–161, 169,
193
GHQ FEC Raider Company Deception Operation, September 1950, 186
Guryeongpo-ri (Kuryongp’o-ri), Korea, 125, 131, 134–135, 416
Gyeongbi Yeodan (DPRK, Korean People’s Army [KPA] Border Guard Brigades),
112
Gyeonnaeryang Channel, Korea, 136, 138, 416
Haeju, Port of, Korea, 112, 140, 173, 175, 201, 219, 225, 233, 237, 251, 258, 263,
268–270, 289, 295, 297, 300, 318
Haengju ferry site, Korea, 194, 201
Haengju, Korea, 187, 190–191, 195, 197
Hagaru-ri, Korea, 140, 175, 219, 227, 233–235, 263, 268, 270, 289, 295
Hallden, Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. (USA), 282, 307
Halsey, Admiral William F., Jr. (US Navy), 41, 46, 53, 61, 63
Hamheung (Hamhung), Korea, 140, 143, 175, 218–220, 227, 229, 231, 233–235,
238, 240–241, 249, 263, 265, 268, 270, 289, 295, 416
Han River, Korea, 16, 116, 119, 156, 186, 190, 194, 196–201, 224, 251, 260, 267,
269, 271, 273, 308, 313, 318
Crossing of, September 1950, 188, 190, 194, 197–198, 200
Hansa Bay, New Guinea, Bypassed 1944, 47, 54
Harriman, Ambassador W. Averell, 159, 205
Harris, Colonel William A. (USA), 150–151, 224, 246, 267, 275–276, 278–279,
282–283, 305–307
Harris, Major General Field (USMC), 190, 223
Harrison, First Lieutenant William (USA), 184–185, 269
Harrison, Major General William Henry (USA), 12, 85
469
Hartman, Admiral Charles C. (US Navy), 126–127, 132–135, 139, 183–185
Havana, Siege of (1762), 11, 84
Hawaii, 19–20, 22, 27, 32, 52, 73, 80, 90, 147, 160, 347
Hayes, Major General George P. (USA), 67–68
Healey, Lieutenant Michael (USA), 280
Heartbreak Ridge, Battle of, 1951, 296, 298
Heavey, Brigadier General William F. (USA), 46, 52, 94, 97–99, 102
heavy boat company (LCU), 8, 150, 330, 339, 341, 346, 353, 428
Henderson Field, Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, 41
Heunghae (Hunghae), Korea, 131–132, 416
Hewitt, Rear Admiral Henry Keith (US Navy), 43
Hickey, General Doyle O. (USA), 160, 192–193, 224, 236
Higgins, Rear Admiral John M. (US Navy), 127, 139
high speed vessel-experimental (HSV-X). See US Army Vessels
high-speed transports (APD). See amphibious ships, high-speed transports
Hill, Colonel John G. (USA), 253
Hill, Rear Admiral Harry W. (US Navy), 50–51
Hilton Head, South Carolina, Capture of Port Royal, 1861, 14
Hodes, Brigadier General Henry I. (USA), 189, 196, 229
Hodge, Lieutenant General John R. (USA), 76
Hoge, Major General William M. (USA), 271, 274–275, 277–278, 284, 304–308
Hokkaido, Japan, 115, 285, 319–320, 323
Hopkins, Commodore Esek (US Navy), 11
Hue, Vietnam, Battle of, 1968, 339
Huntington, Lieutenant Colonel Robert T. (USMC), 16
Huon Peninsula, New Guinea, Landing, September 1943, 46–47, 52, 340
Hwacheon (Hwach’on) Reservoir, Korea, Amphibious Operation, 1951, 3, 112,
237, 252, 261, 271–276, 281, 284, 286–290, 297, 300, 304–305, 416
Hwanghae irregulars (ROK Partisan Forces), 257–258
Hwanghae province, Korea, 201, 257, 259, 318
Iceland, 27
Imjin River, Korea, 140, 175, 219, 225, 233, 237, 252, 263, 268, 270–272, 286,
289, 295, 297, 300, 318
Imwonjin, Korea, 112–113
Incheon (Inch’on), Korea, 2, 11, 74, 114, 118–121, 123, 137, 140–141, 148, 157–
159, 161–164, 166–170, 172–183, 186, 188–191, 193, 196, 198–199,
201–203, 206, 212–213, 215, 218–221, 223–226, 229, 233–236, 242,
251–253, 260, 262–264, 266–268, 270, 284, 289, 293, 295, 315–316,
322, 416, 419–422, 424, 430
Incheon (Inch’on) Port, Korea, 111, 188, 201–203, 221, 264, 293, 316, 322
Incheon Landing (Operation CHROMITE), September 1950, 74, 81, 84, 104,
114, 118, 139, 143, 145, 155–157, 159–162, 165, 169, 171–172, 177,
183, 192–193, 201, 206–207, 211, 217, 253, 343
Tidal basin, 163, 166, 178, 180, 182, 188, 202, 221
470
Incheon–Seoul Highway, Korea, 187, 190
Incheon–Seoul Operation, Conclusion of, 194
Inchon Base Command, 166–167, 188, 196, 202, 212–213
Inter-Service Training and Development Center (ISTDC) (British), 30, 92
Iran–Iraq War, 1980–88, 344
Iraqi Fast Assault Boats, 345
Iron Triangle, Korea, 271, 291, 323
Isrin, Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. (USA), 330
Italian Forces, 31
Italy, 1, 25, 31, 43, 49, 52, 72, 97–98, 206
Iwo Jima, Japan, Landing, 1945, 32, 61, 64
Iwon beaches, Korea, 229–230
Iwon, Korea, 2, 226, 229–231, 245–247
Jangjin (Changjin/Chosin) Reservoir, 212, 227, 234, 238, 240
Jangsa-dong (Changsa-dong), Korea, 132–134, 183–185, 269, 416
Jangsangot (Changsan-got) (peninsula), Korea, 257, 267, 416
Jangyeon (Changyon), Korea, 257, 270, 416
Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, 31–32, 93, 96
Japanese Port Arthur Campaign, 1904, 24
Jay, Captain A.D.H. (Royal Navy), 127
Jeongdongjin (Chongdongjin), Korea, 113, 416
Jindong-ri (Chingdong-ni), Korea, 127, 129–130, 135, 416
Jinhae (Chinhae), Korea, 135, 137, 211, 416
Jinnampo (Chinamp’o) Naval Base Command, 226
Jinnampo (Chinamp’o), Korea, 2, 111, 157, 217–218, 224–226, 234–236, 238,
257, 262, 267, 288, 319, 416
Joint Action of the Army and Navy (JAAN), 21, 23, 69, 78, 88–89, 327
Joint Assault Signal Company (JASCO), 53
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 1, 8, 33, 35, 46, 54, 61, 69–71, 74, 79, 87–88, 93,
104–105, 108, 116, 118–120, 126, 147–149, 155–157, 159–160, 169–172,
176, 204–205, 207–209, 217–218, 234–235, 239, 243, 245, 248–250, 291,
298–302, 310, 314–315, 317, 324–325, 327, 344, 354,
Joint Strategic Plans Committee (Joint Planners), 118, 148
joint operations, 12, 14, 17–18, 20–21, 55, 76, 78, 85, 344, 348
joint overseas expeditions, 21–23, 89
Joint Planning Committee (JPC), JCS, 20, 88,
Joint Special Operations Staff (FEC), 174
Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG), FEC, 55, 79, 118–119, 148,
155, 157, 159, 193, 218, 309
Joint Strategic Plans Committee, JCS, 118, 148
joint task forces (JTF), 5, 333, 435
JTF 7, 162–163, 220
Joy, Vice Admiral C. Turner (US Navy), 80, 116, 119, 124, 139–141, 144, 160, 162,
185, 218, 220, 223, 226, 232, 234, 240, 248, 251, 253–254, 262, 296, 318, 322
471
Jumunjin (Chumunjin), Korea, 112–113, 140, 157, 175, 219, 233, 263, 268–270,
289, 295, 416
Junker, Navy Captain Alexander F. (US Navy), 81, 117
Jutland Peninsula, Denmark, 72
Kanto Plain, Japan, 255, 292–293, 316
Ke In-Ju (ROK Army Counterintelligence Colonel), 174
Kean, Major General William B. (USA), 129
keel boats, 12
Kelly, Captain Samuel G. (US Navy), 236–238, 262
Kennedy, Captain Thomas J. (USA), 281–282, 307
Key West Agreement, 1948, 71–72, 76–77, 105, 327, 345
Key West, Florida, Marine Port of Embarkation, 1898, 16, 71
Kiland, Vice Admiral Ingolf N. (US Navy), 255, 288
Kim Ok Gyeong (Lieutenant, ROK Navy), 114
Kim Paik-il (Brigadier General, ROK Army), 222–223, 235
Kim Suk Won (Brigadier General, ROK Army), 132, 134
Kim Sung Eun (Lieutenant Colonel, ROK Marine Corps), 170
Kim Yong Bae (Lieutenant Colonel, ROK Army), 113
King William’s War (War of the League of Augsburg 1689–97), 11
King, Admiral Ernest J. (US Navy), 33, 38
Kinkaid, Vice Admiral Thomas C. (US Navy), 53
Kiska Island, Alaska, Landing, August 1943, 32, 42, 48–49
Ko Kung Hong (Lieutenant Colonel, ROK Army), 113
Kobe, Japan, 115, 168, 172, 176
Kojo Feint (Operation DOMINO), October 1952, 322–323, 326
Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA) Program, 171, 230
Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), 80, 132–135, 152, 185, 288
Korean National Police, 132, 135, 189
Krueger, Lieutenant General Walter (USA), 46, 52, 55, 61, 76, 97, 100, 143
Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands, Landing, January 1944, 52–53
Lake Erie, Battle of, 1813 (War of 1812), 12
landing craft
landing craft, assault (LCA) (Royal Navy), 30
landing craft, infantry (gunboat) (LCI[G]), 39
landing craft, infantry (large) (LCI[L]), 39, 49
landing craft, mechanized (LCM), 8, 30, 39, 46, 48, 52, 63, 65, 82, 119, 122,
125–126, 129, 150, 163, 177, 182, 201, 221, 224, 230–231, 256, 266,
316, 319–320, 330, 339, 341–342, 346, 353, 424, 429, 454
landing craft, personnel (large) (LCP[L]), 29, 431, 454
landing craft, personnel (ramped) (LCP[R]), 29–30, 141–142, 431, 454
landing craft, support (large) (LCS[L]), 39
landing craft, tank (LCT), 8, 30, 37, 39–40, 46, 64, 150, 330, 428, 454
landing craft, utility (LCU), 8, 150, 330, 339, 341, 346, 353, 428, 454
472
landing craft, vehicle, personnel (LCVP), 30, 38–39, 46, 48–49, 51, 82, 109,
119, 122, 125, 141, 163, 166, 176–177, 180, 264, 315, 429–431, 454
landing exercise (LEX). See exercises
landing force (LF), 2, 4, 7–8, 13, 16–19, 22–23, 25, 28–29, 35, 42–43, 48–49,
60, 68, 71–78, 89–90, 106, 121, 124–125, 139, 146, 162–163, 168, 176–177,
220, 316, 328, 332–336, 342–343, 345, 352, 435–437, 439–443, 445, 447–
448, 450, 453, 456
Landing Force Manual, United States Navy, 23, 89
landing ships
landing ship, dock (LSD), 8, 30, 39–40, 65, 127, 151, 201, 229–231, 235,
243, 251, 256, 262, 264, 270, 288, 318–320, 322, 424, 454
landing ship, infantry (LSI) (Royal Navy). See amphibious ships, landing
ships, infantry
landing ship, medium (LSM), 8, 40, 320, 426–427, 429, 454
landing ship, medium (rocket) (LSM[R]), 40, 176–177, 262, 320, 427, 438,
454
landing ship, tank (LST), 2, 7–8, 30, 39–40, 46, 49, 52–53, 59, 65, 80, 82–83,
95, 101, 108, 114, 116, 119, 122–126, 129–130, 132–135, 141, 150–153,
156, 158, 162–163, 166, 172, 174, 176–180, 182–185, 188, 190, 194,
196, 199, 201–202, 210–211, 220–226, 228–231, 235, 238–239, 242–
243, 251, 253–257, 262, 264, 266, 268, 315, 317–319, 322, 325, 339,
342, 346, 425, 428–430, 454
landing ship, utility (LSU), 8, 122, 124–127, 129, 150, 176, 201–202, 221,
224, 228–231, 253, 256, 266, 319, 330, 419, 424, 428–429, 454
landing vehicle, tracked (LVT), 8, 30, 39–41, 45, 48, 50–51, 53, 56–57, 63, 82, 92,
97, 99, 101, 142, 151, 166, 178–180, 194–195, 197–199, 242–243, 255, 270,
316–317, 336–338, 344, 352, 424–426, 433, 437–438, 443–444, 451–452,
454
Landrum, Major General Eugene M. (USA), 43, 48, 208
Larson, Major Gerald E., 113
Latin America, 20, 26
Lavoie, Lieutenant Colonel Leon (USA), 240
Leahy, Admiral William D. (US Navy), 25, 70
Lee Song Ga (Colonel, ROK Army), 113
Lee Song Ho (Commander, ROK Navy), 137
Lee Tong Ho (First Lieutenant, ROK Marine Corps), 268
Lejeune, Major General John A. (USMC), 22–23
Lewis and Clark Expedition (1804–06), 12
Leyte Gulf, Battle of, October 1944, 61–63, 101–102, 104, 118, 152, 159
lightering, lighterage, lighters, 5, 17, 28–29, 64, 182, 201–202, 213, 221, 229–
230, 256, 266, 320–321, 330, 339, 341, 443
Line
KANSAS–WYOMING Line, 286, 291–292
LINE KANSAS, 271–272, 274–276, 294, 298
473
LINE WYOMING, 271–272, 274, 284
PYEONGYANG–WONSAN Line, 293, 299
Lingayen Gulf, Philippines, Landing, January 1945, 24, 62–64
Linn, Brian McAllister, 16, 86, 88, 91
Litzenberg, Colonel Homer L. (USMC), 197
lodgment areas (beachhead), 7, 14, 23, 28, 30, 36–37, 46, 49, 51–52, 56–57, 59,
68–70, 72, 74–78, 92, 99, 111, 135, 137, 157–158, 162, 166, 177–179, 182–
183, 220, 232, 240, 270, 296, 298, 332, 337, 348–349, 436, 444, 452
logistic support vessel (LSV), 346, 454
logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operations, 5, 329–331, 338–341, 346, 351, 353
Louisburg, Canada, Capture of (1745, 1758), 11, 84
Lovell, General Solomon (Continental Army), 12
Lucas, Major General John P. (USA), 52, 93
Luzon, Philippines, 24, 54–55, 60–63, 101–102
M-24 light tanks, 123

MacArthur, General Douglas (USA), 1, 2, 5, 11, 27, 33, 38, 40–41, 45–46, 50, 53–
55, 60–61, 63, 65, 67, 69, 74, 79–84, 95–97, 99–100, 104, 114, 116–121, 123,
126, 143–144, 149, 155–162, 167–171, 176, 186, 192–193, 195, 203–205,
207–209, 211, 217–219, 222–224, 226–228, 231, 234–235, 240–241, 243,
245–247, 254–255, 260, 262, 271, 284–285, 291–292, 301
Maines, Corporal John W. (USA), 176, 209
Makin Atoll, Gilbert Islands. See Butaritari
Malay Barrier, 31
Manchuria, 19, 72, 118, 146, 227, 234
Manila Bay, Philippines, Battle of, 1898, 17, 20, 62, 64
Marblehead Mariners. See Glover, John, Continental Army, 14th Massachusetts
Continental Regiment
Marianas Islands, 18, 50, 54, 61, 80, 100, 108, 332
Marine Air Group (MAG), 126, 151, 168, 190
Marine Corps developments, 88
Marshall Islands, 18, 51–52
Marshall, General George C. (USA), 32, 69, 218
Martinique Island, French West Indies, Planning for Occupation of, 1940, 26
Marus (Japanese Merchant Ships), 17, 124–125
Masan, Korea, 127–130, 135–136, 140, 175, 219, 233, 254, 261, 263, 268, 270,
287, 289, 295
McCaffrey, Lieutenant Colonel William J. (USA), 206, 223, 249
McClellan, Major General George B. (USA), 14–15
McGee, Colonel John (USA), 257–258, 269
McNair, Major General Lesley J. (USA), 28, 91
Medina, Brigadier General Joseph V. (USMC), 345, 354
Mediterranean Sea, 44
Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO), World War II, 1, 5, 39, 43, 49, 52,
56, 60, 69, 93, 95–96, 98, 101, 157, 188, 286, 308, 337
474
Medium Boat Company, 341–342, 344, 346
Merchant Ship Luxembourg Victory, 230
Merritt, Major General Wesley (USA), 17, 105
Mexican War, 1846–47, 13
Mexico City, Mexico, Capture of, 1847, 13, 88
Mid-Pacific doctrine, 68–69, 75, 162, 332
Midway, Battle of, June 1942, 32
Miles, Major General Nelson A. (USA), 17, 86
Military Demarcation Line (MDL), Korea, 299, 313
Military District of Puerto Rico (MDPR), 331, 351
Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) (see also MSTS ships), 2, 17, 81, 87,
117, 120, 122, 124–126, 163, 170, 190, 194, 221, 229, 238, 241, 243, 251,
317, 422, 454
Miller, Warrant Officer W.R. (USA), 162
Mindanao, Philippines, Landings, March–July 1945, 50, 54, 60–61, 64, 102
Miryang Battalion. See ROK Guerrilla Forces, Independent Mobile Unit, Miryang
Guerrilla Battalion
Jangsa-dong Operation, 183–184
Miryang, Korea, 127–128, 140, 175, 183, 185, 210, 219, 233, 263, 267–270, 289,
295
Mississippi Marine Brigade, US Army (Civil War), 15
Mississippi River, 14
Mobile Riverine Force (Vietnam), 341–343, 353
Moji, Japan, 115, 117
Morobe Bay, Papua New Guinea, 46
Morocco, 31, 43–44, 93, 96
Moros (Philippine Ethnic Group), 20
Moscow, Russia, 31
Moseby’s Raiders (Civil War), 143
Mosquito Fleet, Seminole Wars, 13
Mountbatten, Vice Admiral Lord Louis (Royal Navy), 32–33, 96
MSTS Ships
David C. Shanks (T-AP-180), 124
Fred C. Ainsworth (T-AP-181), 124
General David I. Sultan (T-AP-150), 243
General Edwin D. Patrick (T-AP-180), 124
General John Pope (T-AP-110), 170
General Leroy Eltinge (T-AP-154), 221
General W.M. Black (T-AP-113), 170
General Weigle (T-AP-119), 229
Oglethorp (T-AKA-100), 122–124
Titania (T-AKA-13), 122–124
Munich, Germany, 25
Munsan, Korea, 112, 219, 225, 237, 252, 261, 287
Murray, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. (USMC), 151, 177
475
Myeong (Lustrous) Unit (see also 1st Independent Mobile Unit, also Miryang
Guerrilla Battalion), 183
Nakdong (Naktong) River, Korea, 127–128, 130, 136, 140, 175, 192–193, 219,
233, 263, 268, 270, 289, 295, 416
Nakpung-ri (Nakp’ung-ni), Korea, 112–113, 416
Naktong Bulge, Korea, 127, 130, 152
Namdo (Nan-do), Korea, 164, 179, 187, 269–270, 416
Namhaedo, Korea, 136, 141
Namsan (South Mountain), Korea, 138, 140, 175, 199–200, 219, 233, 263, 268,
270, 289, 295
Narvik, Norway, Landings, 1940, 30
Nassau Bay, New Guinea, Landing, June 1943, 46
National Guard, 25, 170, 285, 314–315, 325
National Security Act of 1947, 70–72, 76, 105
National Security Council (NSC), 217
Naval Amphibious Training Center, 292
Naval War College, 24, 86, 146, 148, 206, 210, 248
Navy General Board, 18
Navy Plans Division, 20
Netherlands, 47, 117, 284
Netherlands East Indies, 31–33
New Berne, North Carolina, Landing, 1862, 14
New Britain, Bismarck Archipelago, 19, 31, 46
New Guinea, 1, 5, 19, 31, 33, 36, 38, 46–47, 50, 52, 54, 56, 60, 98–100, 143
New Ireland, Bismarck Archipelago, 19, 31, 33
New London, Connecticut, 18
New Orleans, Louisiana, Capture of, 1862, 14
New Providence, Bahamas, Raid on (1776), 11
New River, North Carolina, Amphibious Training Site, 28
New Zealand, 19, 102, 117, 162
Niagara campaign, 1814 (War of 1812), 12
Nimitz, Admiral Chester W. (US Navy), 1, 33, 46, 50, 53–56, 60–61, 63, 70, 75
Noce, Colonel Daniel (USA), 37–38
Noemfoor Island, Landing, July 1944, 47, 54
Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), 4
Normandy, France, Landing, June 1944, 1, 38–40, 54, 57, 61, 66, 69, 101, 151,
251, 254, 304
Norstad, Lieutenant General Lauris (USAF), 159
North Africa, Landings, November 1942, 1, 30–31, 33, 35, 37–39, 43, 72, 74, 90,
96–97
North Korea. See Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
North Korea People’s Army (KPA). See DPRK, Korean People’s Army (KPA)
North Sea Coast, 73
Northern Ireland, 27, 32–33
Northwest Islands, Korea, 256, 258, 267–268, 318–319
476
Norwegian fjords, 30
Nova Scotia, Canada, 11
O Jin U (DPRK Guerrilla Commander and, later, Defense Minister), 111
O’Daniel, Brigadier General John W. (USA), 45, 97
O’Donnell, Captain James D. (USA), 166, 172, 177–178, 194, 200, 221–222,
230, 242
O’Neil, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. (USA), 240
Oahu, Hawaii, 73
Objective ABLE, Han River Crossing Operation, Korea, 194
Objective BAKER, Han River Crossing Operation, Korea, 194
Objective CHARLIE, Han River Crossing Operation, Korea, 194
Objective DELTA, Han River Crossing Operation, Korea, 194
Objective EASY, Han River Crossing Operation, Korea, 194
Ogden, Brigadier General David (USA), 74, 106
Ohata, Japan, Amphibious Training Site, 115, 293
Okinawa, Japan, Landing, 1945, 1, 32, 38, 61–62, 64–65, 79–80, 82–83, 102, 115,
144, 158, 171, 315–317, 319, 321, 339
Olson, Captain D.H. (USA), 144
Omaha Beach, Normandy 1944, 40, 59, 69, 101, 286
Ongjin Peninsula, Korea, 111, 114, 318–319
Ongjin, Korea, 201
operational maneuver, 3, 135, 346
Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS), 345
Operations in Europe, 1944, 36, 57
operations orders (OPORDs)
COMNAVFE OPORD 7-50, 116
COMNAVFE OPORD 9-50, 124
CTF 90 OPORD 19-50, 234
operations plans (OPLANs)

“Plan Able” (plan for Korean War Partisan operations), 258
CINCFE OPLAN 9-50 (Alternate), 223
CINCFE OPLAN 100-C, 157
COMNAVFE OPLAN No. 116-50, 232, 248
COMNAVFE OPLAN No. 5-52, 323
Pearl Plan of September 1941, 28
operations (Korean War unless otherwise identified)
ALBION (German Assault on the Russian Baltic Islands 1917), 87
ASCENDANT, January 1951, 262–263
BIG STICK, February 1952 (canceled), 321
BLUEHEARTS, July 1950, 118–120, 124, 150–151, 155, 157, 305
CHOPPER, April 1952, 288
CHROMITE, September 1950, 155, 159–162, 171–172, 183, 193, 207, 211,
253, 343
CUDGEL, September 1951 (canceled), 298
DAUNTLESS, April 1951, 271–272, 274, 284, 304
477
DESERT SHIELD (Persian Gulf), 1990–91, 344
DESERT STORM (Persian Gulf), 1991, 344
DOMINO, October 1952, 323, 326
DOUBLE EAGLE (Vietnam), 1966, 343
DRAGOON (Southern France Landing, August 1944), also called ANVIL/
DRAGOON, 60, 103
EARNEST WILL (Persian Gulf), 1987–89, 344, 354
FLINTLOCK (Marshall Islands, January 1944), 52–53, 99
FORTITUDE, 1944, 151
GALVANIC (Gilbert Islands, November 1944), 50, 52, 99
GUNSAN DEMONSTRATION, September 1950, 174–175
HUSKY (Sicily, July 1943), 45, 97
HOMECOMING, February 1952 (canceled), 321
JUST CAUSE (Panama), 1989, 344, 354
JUST CAUSE/NIMROD DANCER (Panama), 1989, 344
KILLER, February 1951, 266–267, 271, 304
Kojo Feint (Operation DOMINO, October 1952), 322
LEE, September 1950, 172
Leopard. See Task Forces (TF), TF Leopard
MAGIC CARPET (Return of US Service People from the Pacific, 1945–46), 67

OVERLORD (Normandy Landing, June 1944), 57–58, 60, 103
PRIME CHANCE (Persian Gulf) 1987–89, 344, 354
RIPPER, March 1951, 271, 273, 304
ROUNDUP, February 1951, 260–261
RUGGED, April 1951, 271–272, 274, 304
SEAHORSE (Japan), June 1952, 319
SHINGLE (Anzio Landing, January 1944), 52
STARLIGHT (Vietnam), 1965, 343
TAILBOARD, October 1950, 226
TALONS, September 1951 (canceled), 296
THUNDERBOLT, January–February 1951, 260–261
TRUDY JACKSON, September 1950, 172, 174
URGENT FURY (Grenada), 1983, 344
William Able, 1951, 259
WRANGLER, September 1951 (canceled), 298
YO-YO, 1950, 228
Oppama, Japan, 115, 122–124

Oran, Algeria, Amphibious Landing November 1942, 43
Osan, Korea, 112, 116, 140, 161, 173, 175, 200, 219, 227, 233, 252, 263, 268,
270, 273, 289, 295
Osip River, Korea, 131–132
Ostend, Belgium, Landing 1918, 19, 88
other expeditionary operations, 6, 345
over-the-shore operations (see also logistics-over-the-shore operations), 3, 229,
327, 335, 338, 341
478
Owen Stanley Mountains, Papua New Guinea, 40
Pacific Fleet, 28, 33, 35, 39, 54, 61, 67, 79, 102–104, 107, 109, 116, 120, 153, 155,
204, 304, 325–326
Pacific Ocean Areas (POA), 1, 33, 54, 104, 159, 161, 206
Paglieri, First Lieutenant Mario (USA), 134, 152
Paik In Yup (Colonel, ROK Army), 114
Palau Islands, Landings, September 1944, 18, 32, 60
pallets, use in amphibious operations, 51, 99, 442, 446
Palmer, Major General Charles D. (USA), 274–279, 283
Palmido Island, Korea, 167, 173–174
Panama Canal Zone, 19, 22, 159, 314
Panama City, Florida, 73
Papua, New Guinea, 33, 40, 45, 47, 95
Park Song Wook (ROK police lieutenant), 189
Partridge, Lieutenant General Earle E. (USAF), 80, 132
Pas de Calais, France, 57, 151
Patch, Major General Alexander (USA), 41, 45
Patton, Major General George S. (USA), 43, 90
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 31–32, 93, 96
Pepperrell, William (British Colonial Officer), 11
Perfume River, Vietnam, 339
Perry, Commodore Oliver Hazard (US Navy), 12, 85
Persian Gulf, 344, 354
petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL), 196, 253, 255
Philippines, 1, 5, 17, 19–20, 22, 24, 27, 31, 33, 36, 40, 50, 54, 60–61, 63–64, 67,
79–81, 99, 101–102, 118, 143, 257
Phips, Sir William (British Colonial Officer), 11, 84
Pocock, Sir George (Royal Navy), 11, 84
Pohang, Korea, 2, 115, 120–121, 123–132, 134–135, 140, 148, 152, 155, 160,
175, 183, 194, 201, 219, 233, 240, 243, 253–254, 256, 263, 268, 270, 289,
295, 305, 320–321, 324, 421, 425
Ponce, Puerto Rico, Landing, 1898, 17
Port Moresby, Papua, New Guinea, 31, 40
Port Royal, Nova Scotia, Canada, Capture of (1690), 11, 14, 84
Porter, Acting Rear Admiral David Dixon (US Navy), 15–16
Porter, Commander William B. (US Navy), 139
Pounds, Lieutenant Derek (Royal Marines), 144
Powell, Colonel Herbert B. (USA), 170–171, 199, 207–208, 214, 229–230, 247
prisoner of war (POW), 7, 189, 201, 212, 228, 254–256, 321, 324, 344, 448
Puget Sound, Washington, 26, 66
Puller, Colonel Lewis B. (USMC), 177–178, 188, 195
Punchbowl, Korea, 296, 298
Pusan (Busan) Perimeter, 127–128, 142, 151–152, 155, 157–158, 160, 168, 175,
205
Puttin, Corporal Raymond E. (USA), 176, 209
479
Pyeonggang (P’yonggang), Korea, 112, 140, 175, 219, 233, 237, 261, 263, 268,
270–272, 287, 289, 291, 295, 297, 300, 323, 416
Pyeongtaek (P’yongt’aek), Korea, 112, 237, 252, 254, 261, 287, 291, 416
Pyeongyang (Pyongyang), Korea, 112, 117, 140, 157, 173, 175, 218–220, 223–
225, 227–228, 233–234, 236–237, 252, 257, 263, 265, 268, 270, 289, 292–
293, 295, 297, 299–300, 416
Pyo Yang-moon (ROK official), 189
Pyrenees Mountains, France and Spain, 72, 106
Qingdao (Tsingtao), China, Japanese Landings, World War I, 1914, 18
Qua Viet River, Vietnam, 339
QUADRANT, World War II Conference of Allies, August 1943, 49
Quang Ngai province, Vietnam, 340, 343
Quantico, Virginia, 23, 86, 89, 92, 149, 248
Quebec, Canada, Capture of (1759), 11, 49, 84, 160
Quinn, Lieutenant Colonel William (USA), 236
Rabaul, New Britain, 31, 33–34, 40, 45, 47, 50, 53, 97–98
Radford, Admiral Arthur W. (US Navy), 79, 116, 155, 160
Radio Hill, Wolmido, Korea (Incheon), 176
Radio, SCR-300 (walkie-talkie), 184
Raider Company, GHQ FEC Provisional Raider Company, later 8245th Army
Unit, X Corps Raider Company, 143–145, 174–175, 186, 190, 209, 211–212
Rangers, US Army, 3, 11, 40, 42, 153, 274–280, 282–284, 305–307
regimental landing team (RLT), 29
Reinholt, Norwegian Cargo Ship, 114
Republic of Korea (ROK). See ROK
Republic of Korea Army. See ROK Army
Republic of Vietnam Army (ARVN), 341, 353
retracting, 7, 122, 443
Reuland, Sergeant First Class Nicholas (USAF), 133
Revision of Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, 1967, 334
Revolutionary War, 1775–83, 11–12
Rhee, President Syngman (ROK), 117, 203, 217–218
Rhone Valley, France, Operations, August 1944, 60, 72
Richardson, Lieutenant General Robert C., Jr. (USA), 56
Richmond, Virginia, Operations Against, 1862, 14
Ridgway, Lieutenant General Matthew B. (USA), 159, 205, 249, 251, 254–255,
259–260, 262, 271, 273–274, 276, 284–286, 291–293, 296, 298–299, 301,
303–305, 307–310, 314–316, 321–322
Rio Grande River, Landings, 1846, 13
riverine operations, 3, 6, 9, 11, 14, 345, 353–354
Roanoke Island, North Carolina, 1862, 14
Roberts, First Lieutenant Claude L., Jr. (USA), 178, 200, 209
Robertson, Lieutenant General H.C.H. (British Army), 80
Rodgers, First Lieutenant Russell L. (USAF), 133
480
ROK Army units
Battalions
2d Yeongdeungpo Separate Battalion, 132
Corps
I Corps, 222–223, 231, 234–235, 237, 239, 241, 252, 260, 288, 290, 294,
296, 298–299
II Corps, 183, 234, 237, 252
Divisions
3d Division (Baegol [Skeleton] Division), 123, 130–131, 135, 152, 183–
184, 194, 201, 219, 239
5th Division, 288
8th Division, 112–113, 288
9th Division, 288, 290
Regiments
10th Regiment, 113
17th Regiment, 112, 167–168, 170, 196, 198–200, 213
21st Regiment, 8th ROK Division, 113
22d Regiment, 3d ROK Division, 131–132
Min Force, 129
ROK forces, Partisans (see also ROK Partisan units), 116, 125, 139, 148, 217–
218, 228–229, 254, 257–258, 288, 302–304, 310, 313, 321, 427
ROK Guerrilla Forces, Independent Mobile Unit, Miryang Guerrilla Battalion,
183–185, 201, 211, 254, 257–258, 269, 294, 302, 318–319, 324
ROK Marine Corps Units,
Battalions
2d Korean Marine Corps Battalion, 189, 194
Kim Sung-eun Unit, 135–137, 139
Companies
41st KMC Company, 264, 268
42d KMC Company, 264, 294
Regiments
1st Korean Marine Corps (KMC) Regiment, 166, 170, 179
ROK Merchant Marine Vessels

Chochiwon-ho (LST-665), 185
Munsan-ho (LST-667), 184–185
ROK National Police (KNP) Units
KNP Kangwon Battalion, 132
ROK Navy Units
Task Group (TG) 95.7, 257
ROK Navy vessels
landing ships, tank, LST-801, 114, 153, 172, 201, 264, 268
minesweeper, AMS-501, 264
motor minesweepers
YMS-504, 137
YMS-512, 113, 136
481
YMS-513, 137
YMS-518, 113
patrol boat, Pyongtaek, 137
submarine chasers
PC-701 (Baekdusan), 113–114, 147
PC-703, 137, 172, 201
PC-501, 129
ROK Partisan Units

Donkey Teams, 259, 267–269, 302
Hwanghae Irregulars, 257–258
Pyeongyang Partisan Regiment, 257
Rosson, Lieutenant Colonel William B. (USA), 74
Roy, Charles (US Army civilian mariner), 185
Royal Marine Commandoes, 19, 144–145, 240, 292
41 Independent Commando Royal Marines (see also Douglas B. Drysdale),
154, 190, 209, 212, 231, 248, 270, 295, 304
Special Task Force 74, 268, 270
Royal Marines, 144, 232, 288, 295
Royal Navy Units
Far East Fleet, 81, 144
Far East Station, Hong Kong, 144
Fleet Volunteers, 144–145, 175, 190, 209
Royal Navy vessels

aircraft carriers
Theseus, 238, 262
Triumph, 117
cruisers
Belfast, 139, 264
Ceylon, 173, 201, 237
Jamaica, 139, 186, 211
Manchester, 201, 288
frigate, Whitesand Bay, 175–176, 186

Ruble, Rear Admiral R.W. (US Navy), 168, 207
Ruffner, Major General Clark L. (USA), 104, 159–160, 162, 205–206, 291
Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), 17, 24
Ryukyu Islands, Japan, Landings, April 1945, 1, 61, 79, 108
Sackett’s Harbor, New York, Attack on, 1814, 12
Saltonstall, Commodore Dudley (Continental Navy), 12, 84
Samcheok (Samch’ok), Korea, 112–113, 140, 175, 183, 185, 219, 233, 237, 261,
263, 268, 270, 287, 289, 295, 297, 300, 416
San Clemente Island, California, Amphibious Training Site, 68
Sardinia, Italy, Cold War Operations Planned Against, 44, 72
Sasebo, Japan, 115–116, 141–142, 154, 220, 234, 237
SCAJAP ships
LST-Q019, 130
482
LST-Q067, 180
LST-Q075, 180, 188
LST-Q090, 180, 188
LST-Q099, 180, 182
Scott, Major General Winfield (USA), 13, 85

SCR 300 Radio (walkie-talkie), 135, 178, 184
sea basing, 6, 9, 345, 355
SEABAT, Radio Call Sign, 344
Secretary of Defense, 1, 71, 79, 118, 218, 245, 344
Selective Service Law, 156
Seminole Wars
First Seminole War (1816–23), 12
Second Seminole War (1836–42), 12, 85
Seogang (Sogang), Korea, 191, 197–198, 416
Seongjin (Songjin), Korea, 2, 130, 136, 139–140, 143, 175, 219, 227–228, 232–
234, 237–239, 263, 268, 270, 289, 294–295, 416
Seoul, Korea, 112, 116, 119–121, 132, 140, 146, 148, 152–153, 159–160, 166,
168, 174–175, 177, 179, 190–191, 194–200, 203, 205–215, 218–221,
225, 233, 236–237, 240, 249, 251–254, 257, 260–261, 263, 268, 270–
273, 287–289, 295, 297, 300–302, 308, 318, 322
X Corps, Capture of, September 1950, 2, 168, 170, 186, 190–194, 196, 200,
202–203, 205, 207, 211–214, 218, 220–223
Seoul–Suwon Highway, Korea, 187, 196
SEXTANT–EUREKA, World War II Conference of Allies, November 1943, 50
Shafter, General William R. (USA), 17
Shallow Draft High Speed Sealift (SDHSS) vessel, 347
Shepherd, Lieutenant General Lemuel C. (USMC), 155–156, 160–161, 176, 190,
192–193, 204, 206, 212–213, 240, 250, 290
Sherman, Admiral Forrest P. (US Navy), 79, 155, 160, 169, 206
Sherman, Brigadier General Thomas W. (USA), 14
Sherman, Major General William T. (USA), 16
Shim Hee T’aek (Second Lieutenant, ROK Marine Corps), 264
Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. (USA), 346
Shipping Control Administration, Japan (SCAJAP) (see also SCAJAP Ships), 2,
7, 80–82, 109, 116–117, 122, 124, 129–130, 134, 152, 156, 162, 180, 188,
220, 226, 229–230, 235, 239, 251, 253, 256, 317, 325, 430, 455
ship-to-shore movement, 4–5, 13, 23–24, 30, 37, 75, 226, 228, 286, 333, 336–337,
439–440, 443–444
shore-to-shore operations, 4–5, 35, 37–39, 69, 72, 75, 78, 161, 286, 290, 316, 329,
334, 337
Siboney, Cuba, Landing, 1898, 17, 86
Sicily, Italy, Landing, July 1943, 1, 38, 43–45, 49, 72, 74, 93, 98, 188, 251, 286
Simmons, Brigadier General Edwin H. (USMC), 148, 178, 208–212
Sinchang (Sinch’ang), Korea, 134, 416
Singapore, 27
483
Sinsa-ri ferry site, Korea, 191, 198–199
Situation in the Far East on the Eve of the Korean War, 79
SL-17 (US Army G4 Study), 118–119
Small, Captain Selden C. (US Navy), 141–142
Smith, Brigadier General H.M. (USMC), 25, 28–29, 35, 50–51, 56–57, 70, 93,
98, 100, 206, 214
Smith, General Oliver P. (USMC), 145, 160–162, 168–169, 182, 186, 189–190,
194–199, 206, 211–214, 235, 254–255, 290
Smith, Lieutenant Colonel Lynn D. (USA), 171–172, 208
Smith, Major General Ralph C. (USA), 50–51, 56–57, 70, 100, 206, 214
Smith, Rear Admiral Allan E. (US Navy), 185, 237, 262–263, 286, 288
Socheongdo (Soch’ong-do), Korea, 173, 201, 257, 318, 416
Sohn Won il (Admiral, ROK Navy), 136–137, 189
Solomon Islands, 19, 31–34, 39, 46–47, 83, 98
Solseum (Sol-som), Korea, 269, 416
Soryedong, Korea, 270
South and Southwest Pacific Operations, 45
South Korea. See Republic of Korea
South Pacific Area, 33
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 337
Southern France, Landing, August 1944, 1, 60, 72, 74, 93, 101, 103, 188
Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), 1, 5, 33, 38, 46, 52–56, 61, 63, 69, 72–73, 75–
76, 82, 95, 97, 100, 143, 155, 161
Soviet advisors, 111
Soviet amphibious doctrine, 49, 72, 81, 111, 139, 146, 148, 155, 183, 217, 262,
321
Spaatz, Air Force Chief of Staff General Carl (USAF), 70
Spain, 25, 31, 44, 86
Spanish fleet, 17
Spanish–American War, 1898, 16–17, 86
Special Activities Group (SAG), Far East Command (FEC), 144–145
Special Forces helicopters, 344
Special Observers (SPOBs), 1941 US Army Mission to London, 27, 32, 91
Special Operations Forces (SOF), 3, 145, 344
Special Task Force 74 (Royal Marines, Korean War), 268, 270
Spier, Lieutenant Colonel Frank (USA), 129, 185, 211
Spofford, Captain Richard T. (US Navy), 223, 226
Spruance, Admiral Raymond A. (US Navy), 50, 64, 333
Stanton, Secretary of War Edwin M., 14–15
Stewart, General George C. (USA), 188, 196, 202, 211–212, 220, 224, 228, 247
Stockton, Commodore Robert Field (US Navy), 13
Strategy conferences, World War II
QUADRANT, 49
SEXTANT–EUREKA, 50
TRIDENT, 49
484
Stratemeyer, General George (USAF), 80, 119, 160, 167, 218, 240
Stringham, Flag Officer Silas (US Navy), 14
Strong, Colonel Paschal N. (USA), 273
Struble, Admiral Arthur D. (US Navy), 61, 63, 67, 81, 124, 160–162, 167, 169,
172, 176, 186, 193, 206, 220, 233, 240, 248
Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 347
Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), 2, 7, 54, 79–80, 119
sustained operations ashore, 61, 232, 345
Suwon Airfield, Korea, 112, 196, 200
Suwon, Korea, 112, 140, 158, 168, 173, 175, 190, 196, 219–220, 233, 237, 263,
268, 270, 289, 295
Suyeong (Suyong), Korea, 255–256, 263–264, 268, 289, 295, 417
Sweden, 31
Switzerland, 31
Tabasco River, Mexico, Landings, 1846, 13

Tables of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E or TOE), 317, 329, 338, 350, 352,
448
Tactical Air Command (TAC), 68, 168, 190, 223, 455
Tampico, Mexico, Landings, 1846, 13
Taplett, Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. (USMC), 176
Taranto, Italy, Landing, September 1944, 44, 49
Task Forces (TF) (Korean War unless otherwise identified)
TF Bradley, 131, 133
TF Kirkland, 268–270, 294–295, 304, 318
TF Alamo Force (World War II, SWPA), 55
TF Callaway, 277, 279, 306
TF Kean, 129–130, 135
TF Keen, 129–130, 152
TF Kimpo, 167
TF Kirkland, 268–269, 294–295, 304, 318
TF Leopard, 259, 267, 294, 318
TF Smith, 116, 200
TF Sword (Afghanistan), 344
task group (TG), 185, 223, 264, 449
task unit (TU), 80, 444
Teague, Captain Norris M. (USA), 282, 307
Terry, Major General Alfred H. (USA), 16, 97
Thackrey, Rear Admiral Lyman A. (US Navy), 188, 203, 220–221, 223, 226, 229,
234–236, 251–253, 264, 266
Thailand, 32, 337, 340
Thames River, Canada, Battle of (1813), 12
The Marblehead Mariners, 11, 84
Thomas, Major General Gerald C. (USMC), 290
Thon My Thuy Beach, Vietnam, 339
485
tidal basin lock gates, Incheon, 202
Tokyo, Japan, 55, 61, 81–82, 115–116, 121, 143, 149, 159–160, 169, 171, 196,
202, 206, 209, 217, 234, 236, 240, 245, 255, 301, 316, 325
Tongcheon (T’ongch’on), Korea, 140, 175, 233, 263, 268, 270, 289–291, 295,
297–300, 309
Tongyeong (T’ongyong), Korea, 135–138, 140, 153, 170, 172, 175, 219, 233,
263, 268, 270, 289, 295, 417
tractor troup (US Navy), 124, 151, 450, 453
transport group (US Navy), 23, 124, 151, 296, 443, 450, 453, 456
Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 11
TRIDENT, World War II Conference of Allies, May 1943, 49
Triplet, Colonel William S. (USA), 45, 97, 101
troop transport (AP), 29, 170, 221, 229, 239, 422, 452
Trudeau, Lieutenant Colonel (later Lieutenant General) Arthur G. (USA), 37–38,
94, 103
Truk, Caroline Islands, 32, 53
Truman, President Harry S., 71, 116–117, 159, 205, 217–218, 226, 245, 271, 285,
314
Truscott, Colonel (later, Lieutenant General) Lucian K. (USA), 33, 60, 76–78,
93, 97, 101
Tulagi Island, Solomon Islands, 32–34, 41, 141
Tunisia, 31, 44
Turkey, 19, 44, 72
Turner, Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly (US Navy), 41, 50, 53, 64, 99, 308–309
Twitty, Colonel Joseph J. (USA), 179, 188–189, 192, 196, 221, 255–256, 264, 266
Typhoon Grace, 125
Typhoon Jane, 168
Typhoon Keizia, 184
Uljin (Ulchin), Korea, 112–113, 132, 140, 175, 219, 233, 261, 263, 268, 270, 287,
289, 295, 417
underwater demolition team (UDT) (see also US Navy units, underwater
demolition teams), 30, 53, 121, 124, 141–143, 153, 160–161, 174, 178, 209,
213, 229, 243, 253–254, 268, 270, 294, 431, 444, 450, 456
Ungdo, Korea, 264
Union Army (Civil War), 16, 85
United Kingdom (see also British), 117
United Nations Command (UNC), 117, 127, 132, 135, 141, 147, 154, 158, 168,
174–175, 183, 185, 207–209, 214, 217, 219, 222, 226–228, 234, 238, 240,
245–247, 253–254, 257–261, 285, 287, 291, 296–298, 300, 303, 308, 313,
318–319, 322, 324, 326,
United Nations Command Naval units
West Coast Support Group (TF 95.1), also called West Coast Support Element,
238, 262
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 117
486
US Army Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI), 32, 91
US Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), 27, 54, 79, 302
US Air Force Aircraft
Fairchild C-119 Flying Boxcar (Cargo and Troop Transport), 134
North American F-51 Mustang (fighter) (also used by ROK Air Force), 132, 137
North American T-6 Texan (Trainer Observation) (also used by ROK Air
Force), 137
US Air Force Units
Air Forces
Fifth Air Force, 80, 114–115, 132, 135, 168
Far East Air Forces (FEAF), 80, 115, 168, 233, 247, 309
Fighter Groups
35th Fighter Group, 123, 132
US Army Doctrine
FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations (Rev), September 1954,
78, 107, 207, 329, 350
FM 17-34, Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion, June 1950, 153, 350,
435–437, 439–446, 448–456
FM 20-12, Amphibious Embarkation, 25 August 1975, 345, 350
FM 31-12, Army Forces in Amphibious Operations (The Army Landing
Force), March 1961, 336, 352
FM 31-13, Battle Group Landing Team, Amphibious, September 1961, 336
FM 31-5, Landing Operations on Hostile Shores, June 1941, 28, 91, 435
FM 5-144, Engineer Shore Amphibious Units, November 1966, 336, 352
FM 5-156, The Engineer Amphibious Support Command (Draft), April 1958
(Unpublished), 336
FM 60-10, Amphibious Operations: Regiments in Assault Landings, January
1952, 8, 329, 350, 435–456
FM 60-30, Amphibious Operations: Embarkation and Ship Loading (Unit
Loading Officer), September 1952, 329, 350, 438, 441, 451
FM 60-30, Embarkation and Loading—Amphibious, May 1962, 356
FM 60-5, Amphibious Operations: Battalions in Assault Landings, February
1951, 350
US Army Forces
US Army Reserve, 103, 182, 254, 313, 337
Amphibious Force, 14, 16, 27–28, 35–36, 39, 256
US Army G4 Plans Division, 118
US Army Units
8206th Army Unit (AU), Amphibious Training Center (ATC), 83, 109, 119,
121, 126–127, 130, 133, 149, 152, 185, 201, 214, 224, 246, 253, 256,
301, 429
Armies
Army of the Potomac (Civil War), 15
Eighth US Army (EUSA), 79, 215, 245, 249, 301, 304
487
G3 Miscellaneous Division, 258, 294
G3 Miscellaneous Division, Attrition (Partisan) Section, 258
Eighth Army Movements Control Branch, 235
Eighth Army Tactical Command Post, 291
Eighth US Army in Korea (EUSAK), 117, 168, 170, 219–220, 249, 294,
301, 303, 305
Sixth Army, 46, 55–56, 60–61, 63, 67–68, 73, 76, 97, 104, 143, 325,
331, 351
Tenth Army, 64, 144
Army Groups
First US Army Group, 151
Assault Training Center, Bideford, England, 96, 144
Battalions, Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA)
50th AAA Automatic Weapons (AW) Battalion, 163
Battalions, Armor Amphibious
56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion (ATTB), 2, 66, 73–74, 120,
162, 166, 172, 177–178, 188, 191, 194–195, 197–200, 207–209,
211–214, 221–222, 230, 240, 245–246, 255, 285, 292–293, 302,
308, 313, 315–317, 325, 327, 330
708th Amphibious Tractor Battalion, 53, 56
715th Amphibious Tractor Battalion, 56
747th Amphibious Tank Battalion, 103, 313–314, 325
773d Amphibious Tractor Battalion, 56
Battalions, Armor
193d Tank Battalion, 50
70th Tank Battalion, 224, 279, 282
73d Tank Battalion, 168, 189
Battalions, Engineer Amphibious
380th Boat Maintenance Battalion, 66, 313
562d Engineer Boat Maintenance Battalion, 66, 256
592d Service Support Battalion, 331
Battalions, Engineer
8th Engineer Combat Battalion, 121, 276, 306–307
13th Engineer Combat Battalion, 121
14th Engineer Combat Battalion, 121, 126
73d Combat Engineer Battalion, 167, 180, 188–189, 192, 200, 202, 242
411th Engineer Base Shop Battalion, 38, 46
43d Engineer Construction Battalion, 121
Battalions, Field Artillery Battalions (FAB)
3d Battalion, 34th Field Artillery, 342
39th FAB, 243
61st FAB, 123, 320
63d FAB, 255, 308
77th FAB, 123–124, 150, 305, 319
92d FAB, 163
488
96th FAB, 163, 186, 211
99th FAB, 123
Battalions, Infantry
1st Battalion, 32d Regimental Combat Team, 7th Division, 189
1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, 283, 307
2d Battalion, 32d Infantry, 7th Division, 190, 200
2d Battalion, 38th Infantry, 2d Division, 192
2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, 283, 306–307
2d Battalion, 32d Regimental Combat Team, 189
3d Battalion, 31st Infantry, 7th Infantry Division, 190, 231
3d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, 280, 282–283
Composite Battalion 31/7, 7th Infantry Division, 240, 250
Battalions, Military Police
92d Military Police Battalion, 18th Military Police Brigade, 341
Battalions, Ranger
First Ranger Battalion, 33
Battalions, Transportation
10th Transportation Battalion (Terminal), 345–346
11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal), 341, 346
24th Transportation Battalion (Terminal), 341, 346
71st Transportation Battalion (Terminal), 341
159th Transportation Battalion, 338–339, 353
159th Transportation Boat Battalion, 330, 350
394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal), 341
Transportation Battalion Vung Tau/Delta (Provisional), 341, 353
Batteries, Engineer Amphibious
2d ESB Support Battery (Provisional), 48
Brigades, Engineer Amphibious (ESB)
1st Engineer Amphibian Brigade, 45
1st Engineer Special Brigade, 38, 45, 65, 102
2d Amphibious Support Brigade, 330
2d Engineer Special Brigade, 2, 38, 46, 48, 63–66, 68, 73–74, 78, 82, 94,
103, 106, 120, 150, 156, 158, 162, 166–167, 178–180, 182, 188–
189, 192, 200–202, 206–207, 209–213, 215, 221, 223, 226, 229–
231, 240–243, 245, 247, 250, 255, 264, 284, 292–293, 302–303,
313, 315–317, 319–320, 348,
3d Engineer Special Brigade, 38, 54, 63–65, 74, 105
4th Engineer Special Brigade, 38, 54, 63–65, 105
5th Engineer Special Brigade, 65
6th Engineer Special Brigade, 65
409th Engineer Special Brigade, 67, 103, 313–314
Brigades
First Expeditionary Brigade, 25
2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, 341
7th Sustainment Brigade, 346, 355
489
Commands
2d Engineer Amphibious Support Command (EASC), 327, 331, 338,
345, 350–352
2d Logistical Command, 220, 222, 248–249, 255
Engineer Amphibian Command (EAC), 35, 37–38, 94
Companies, Armor Amphibious

Company A, 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion, 166, 178–
179, 188, 191, 194, 199–200, 207, 221, 230, 240, 245, 255, 302
Company D, 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion, 74
Companies, Armor
Company C, 70th Tank Battalion, 224, 279, 282
Companies, Engineer Amphibious
560th Engineer Amphibious Equipment Company, 331, 338, 352
793d Engineer Amphibious Company, 331, 338
Companies, Engineer
50th Engineer Port Construction Company, 66, 120, 162, 166–167, 180,
182, 188, 202, 253, 264, 266
89th Engineer Port Construction Company, 313
Company A, 73d Engineer Combat Battalion, 180, 188–189
Companies, Infantry
16th Reconnaissance Company, 1st Cavalry Division, 123
Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, 283
Company E, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, 282–283
Company H (Heavy Weapons Company), 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st
Cavalry Division, 282
Company I, 3d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, 282–283
Company M (Weapons Company), 3d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry
Division, 280
Companies, Military Police
X Corps, Military Police Company, 189, 192, 212
Companies, Raider
GHQ FEC Provisional Raider Company, later 8245th Army Unit,
X Corps Raider Company, 143–144, 212
Companies, Ranger
2d Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne), 271
4th Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne), 271, 274, 280, 305–307
Companies, Signal
287th Signal Company, 180
Companies, Transportation, Amphibian Truck Companies (also called
Amphibious Truck Companies)
3d Transportation Amphibious Truck Company, 256
558th Transportation Amphibious Truck Company, 255, 264, 266–267,
279, 283
8062d Army Unit (AU), Amphibious Truck Company, 123
490
Companies, Transportation
60th Transportation Truck Company, 255
1097th Transportation Company (Medium Boat), 342, 344, 353–354
1099th Transportation Company (Medium Boat), 353
458th Transportation Company, 341
Continental Army Command, 104, 327, 334, 350–351
Corps
V Corps, 17
IX Corps, 251, 260, 271, 274, 276, 278, 284, 290, 298–299, 304–308
X Corps, 2, 61, 148, 159, 162–163, 166, 168, 170, 189–190, 192–194,
196, 200, 202–203, 205, 207, 211–213, 218, 220–223, 226–229,
231, 234–236, 239–241, 243, 245–251, 254, 260, 266, 274, 276,
284, 288–291, 298, 308–309
X Corps Advance Command Post, 186
X Corps Tactical Air Command, 168, 190, 223
XVI Corps, 285, 292–293, 308–310, 322–323
XXIV Corps, 57, 76
Divisions
1st Cavalry Division, 2–3, 53, 80, 83, 108, 119–127, 149–150, 157, 160,
192, 200, 224, 228, 267, 271, 274–276, 278, 280, 283, 306–307, 315,
322, 425
1st Infantry Division, 26–28, 36
2d Armored Division, 38, 45, 73
2d Infantry Division, 66, 68, 73–74, 80, 120, 126, 157, 234, 259, 276–
277, 284, 308
3d Infantry Division, 25–26, 28, 36, 38, 74, 93, 106, 159, 168, 218, 231,
234–236, 249, 288
7th Infantry Division, 2, 48–49, 52–53, 121–122, 158, 163, 166, 168,
182, 189, 196, 198, 200, 208, 220, 222, 226, 228–229, 231, 234, 236,
238, 240, 242, 254, 344
9th Infantry Division, 36, 38, 341
10th Mountain Division, 344
11th Airborne Division, 156, 158
22d Infantry Division (Reinforced), 338
24th Infantry Division, 80, 83, 116, 119, 121, 123, 125–126, 130, 152,
192–193, 244, 255, 315, 319–320
25th Infantry Division, 45, 80, 117, 119, 126, 129, 152, 193–194, 267
29th Infantry Division, 316–317, 321
40th Infantry Division, 285, 292–293, 303, 308, 314–315, 317
41st Infantry Division, 46
45th Infantry Division, 37–38, 45, 60, 97, 285, 292, 303, 308, 314–315
77th Infantry Division, 57, 63–65
82d Airborne Division, 74, 156, 170, 176, 251
Americal Division, 41, 45
491
Groups, Armor Amphibious
18th Armored Group (Amphibious), 45, 97, 101
Platoons, Engineer Amphibious
Provisional DUKW Platoon, 2d Engineer Special Brigade, 319–320
Platoons, Transportation
501st Transportation Harbor Craft Platoon, 66, 73, 120, 162, 226, 238
Regimental Combat Teams (RCT)
5th RCT (Separate), 80, 129, 192–193
8th Cavalry RCT, 320, 323
17th RCT, 7th Division, 170–171, 199, 229–231, 247
19th RCT, 24th Division, 320
31st RCT, 7th Division (RCT-31), 234
160th RCT, 40th Infantry Division, 293
165th RTC, 50, 99
187th Airborne RCT, 157, 166, 168, 198–200, 220, 228, 271, 274, 288,
290, 308, 321
223d RCT, 40th Infantry Division, 293
Regiments, Airborne Infantry
187th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 156
Regiments, Cavalry
112th Cavalry Regiment, 48
Regiments, Engineer Amphibious,
369th Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment (EB&SR), 67, 313–314, 325
370th Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment (EB&SR), 67, 313–314, 325
371st Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment (EB&SR), 67, 313
532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment(EB&SR), 46, 66, 73–74, 166–
167, 180, 188, 199–200, 202, 207, 212, 221, 230, 242–243, 245–247,
250, 256, 264, 266, 316–317, 319–321, 323, 325–326
Regiments, Infantry
5th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (also 5th Cavalry RCT), 120, 122–123,
125, 315, 319
7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (also 7th Cavalry RCT), 3, 122–124,
200, 224, 246, 275, 277–279, 282–284, 305–307, 319
8th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (also 8th Cavalry RCT), 122–125,
271, 276, 278, 306, 320, 322–324
9th Infantry, 2d Division, 36, 38, 341–342
17th Infantry, 7th Division, 169, 229
18th Infantry Regiment, 26
29th Infantry Regiment (Separate), 80, 315–317, 321
30th Infantry Regiment, 25
31st Infantry, 7th Division, 190, 196, 231
492
32d Infantry, 7th Division, 40, 52, 169, 190, 196, 198–200, 212–213, 231
34th Infantry, 24th Division, 255, 308
65th Infantry, 3d Division, 73, 106, 159, 169
Special Forces Detachment 160, 344
Strategic Army Command (STRAC), 338
Tokyo Ordnance Depot, 316
Transportation Corps, Commands and Other Units
4th Transportation Command, 338–339, 341, 352
5th Transportation Command, 339
7th Transportation Medium Port, 226
311th Transportation Port Company, 56
539th Transportation Port Company, 56
United States Army Forces Antilles (USARFANT), 331, 351

US Army Vessels
HSV-X1 Spearhead (High Speed Vessel–Experimental), 347
LSU-1042 (Navy Vessel operated by US Army 8206th Army Unit, Amphibious
Training Center), 129
TSV-X1 Joint Venture (Theater Support Vessel–Experimental), 347
LT-636 (Tug), 185
US Army
Army National Guard, 25, 170, 285, 314–315, 325
Chief of Military History, 87, 94, 103, 246, 301, 310, 325, 332, 351
US Coast Guard, 12, 26, 36–37, 91–92, 94
US Joint and Unified Commands
European Theater of Operations (ETO), 1, 37, 66, 91, 93, 96, 101
Far East Command (FEC), 2, 7, 55, 79, 82, 107–109, 114, 149, 156, 174,
205–206, 224, 245, 251, 301, 303, 315, 325
Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO), 1, 96, 98
Pacific Command (PACOM), 79, 116, 147, 161
Pacific Ocean Areas (POA), 1, 33, 54, 104, 159, 161, 206
Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), 1, 5, 33, 38, 46, 52–56, 61, 63, 69, 72–73,
75–76, 82, 95, 97, 100, 143, 155, 161
US Joint Doctrine
Joint Action Armed Forces (JAAF), 78, 327–328, 350
Joint Action of the Army and Navy (JAAN), 21, 23, 69, 78, 88–89, 327
Joint Publication 3-02, Joint Amphibious Doctrine for Joint Operations, 2001,
8, 345, 354
US Marine Corps Aircraft
Grumman F7F Tigercat (Night Fighter), 190
Vought F4U Corsair (Fighter-Bomber), 176, 190
US Marine Corps Doctrine
Operational Maneuver from the Sea, 345
493
Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (landing operations), 6, 345
Expeditionary Warfare, Family of Concepts, 5, 9, 345, 354
US Marine Corps Units
1st Combat Service Group (Fleet Marine Force Pacific), 167, 188–189, 210,
212
Air Units
1st Marine Air Wing (MAW), 80, 168, 228
Marine Air Group 33 (MAG 33), 126, 151, 168, 190
Battalions
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 1st Marine Division, 190, 197, 199
1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, 190, 196
1st Engineer Battalion, 1st Marine Division, 201, 214
1st Marine Raider Battalion, 141
1st Shore Party Battalion, 1st Marine Division, 167, 179, 188, 190, 201–
202, 240
Headquarters and Service Company, 179, 197
Group A, Team #3, 179
2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, 177, 190, 194, 196
3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, 176–177, 190, 194, 196
3d Battalion, 11th Marines (Artillery), 196
7th Motor Transport Battalion (Fleet Marine Force Pacific), 167, 210
Brigades
1st Marine Brigade, 25–26, 168
1st Marine Provisional Brigade, 126
9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 343
Companies
1st Marine Division Reconnaissance Company, 142
Weapons Company, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, 1st Marine Division, 178,
280
Divisions
1st Marine Division, 2, 28, 35, 41, 46, 73, 80, 142, 145, 155–156, 158–
160, 163, 166, 168–170, 172, 179, 188–191, 193–194, 196–200,
209–210, 219–223, 228–229, 231–232, 234–236, 239–240, 243, 253,
256, 278–279, 288–290, 298, 302, 321–322
2d Marine Division, 28, 41, 45, 50, 159
3d Marine Division, 57
4th Marine Division, 52–53, 56
Marine Mobile Training Team (MTT), 121, 144, 160, 314

Regiments
1st Marines, also 1st Marine RCT, 178, 284
5th Marines, also 5th Marine RCT, 126, 129–130, 142, 151, 157, 172,
178
7th Marines, also 7th Marine RCT, 157, 172, 196–198, 213–214, 231,
271
11th Marines (Artillery), 179, 188, 196, 279
494
Seventh Special Landing Force (SLF), 343–344
Troop Training Unit (TTU), Training Command, Amphibious Force, Pacific
Fleet, 66–67, 107, 109, 120, 455–456
X Corps Tactical Air Command (see also 1st Marine Air Wing), 168, 190,
223
US Navy Aircraft, Douglas AD Skyraider (Attack Aircraft), 284
US Navy Doctrine
Naval Warfare Publications (NWP), 328, 331–332, 350–352
Sea Basing, 6, 9, 345, 355
US Navy Units
104th Naval Construction Battalion, 167, 179
Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), 83, 123, 125, 452
Amphibious forces
Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, 28, 35, 38–39, 43, 144
Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet, 28, 39, 67, 107, 120

Amphibious Force, Far East, 83, 419
Seventh Amphibious Force, 1, 61, 97
Amphibious Groups
Amphibious Group One, 2, 83, 104, 124, 421
Cruiser Division 3, 126
East Coast Support Elements, 127
Fleets
Pacific Fleet, 28, 33, 35, 39, 54, 61, 67, 79, 102–104, 107, 109, 116, 120,
153, 155, 204, 304, 325, 326
Seventh Fleet, 53, 61, 81, 116, 124, 147, 233, 323
Naval Beach Group 1, 167
River Support Squadron Seven, 341
Special Operations Group (SOG), 142–143, 174
Task Forces (TF)
TF 77 (Seventh Fleet Striking Force, later renamed Fast Carrier Force),

163, 200, 207, 264
TF 79 (Seventh Fleet Service Squadron), 163
TF 90 (NAVFE Amphibious Force, JTF 7 Attack Force), 80, 116, 122,
124, 127, 162, 207, 234, 249, 254–255, 288–289, 292, 318–319
TF 91 (NAVFE Blockade and Covering Force), 163
TF 92 (JTF 7 Land Component/US X Corps), 163
TF 99 (NAVFE Patrol and Reconnaissance Force), 163
TF 117 (River Assault Flotilla One), 341
TF Keen, 129–130, 152
Task Groups (TG)
TG 90.3 (NAVFE Tractor Group [LSTs], Pohang Landing), 124
TG 90.4 (NAVFE Protective Group [Minesweepers], Pohang Landing),
124
TG 96.5 (NAVFE Japan–Korea Support Group), 126
Transport Division 11 (TRANSDIV 11), 239
495
Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT), 30, 53, 121, 160, 229, 253, 431, 444,
450, 456
UDT-1, 142, 254
UDT-3, 141–142, 254, 294
United States Naval Forces, Far East (NAVFE), 80, 108, 116–117, 124, 220,
232, 236, 239, 247–249, 254, 262, 303, 309, 315, 318, 322–323
US Navy vessels
aircraft carriers
Badoeng Strait (CVE-116), 126
Bataan (CVL-29), 124, 238, 267, 304
Eisenhower (CVN-69), 344
Kitty Hawk (CV-63), 344
Lexington (CV-2), 31
Philippine Sea (CV-47), 134
Valley Forge (CV-45), 117, 134
Yorktown (CV-5), 31
amphibious force flagships

Ancon (AGC-4), 49, 98
Eldorado (AGC-11), 188, 221, 229, 235, 251, 264
Mount McKinley (AGC-7), 83, 123–125, 162, 176, 192–193, 195, 234,
243, 419
attack cargo ships
Achernar (AKA-53), 127
Algol (AKA-54), 236
Alshain (AKA-55), 127
Montague (AKA-98), 236
Oglethorp (AKA-100/T-AKA-100), 122–124
Thuban (AKA-19), 229
Titania (AKA-13/T-AKA-13), 122–124
Union (AKA-106), 83, 123–124, 421
Whiteside (AKA-90), 127
attack transports
Bayfield (APA-33), 236, 243, 420
Bexar (APA-237), 236, 238
Cavalier (APA-37), 83, 123–125, 177
George Clymer (APA-27), 127
Henrico (APA-45), 127, 177
Noble (APA-218), 239
Okanogan (APA-220), 236, 264
Pickaway (APA-222), 127
battleships
Iowa (BB-61), 320
Missouri (BB-63), 184, 199, 262
New Jersey (BB-62), 296
cruisers
496
Augusta (CA-31), 43
Helena (CA-75), 126–127, 132–134, 185, 288, 296
Juneau (CL-119), 124, 139–140
Rochester (CA-124), 186, 211
St. Paul (CA-73), 239, 270, 288
Toledo (CA-133), 126–127
destroyer escort, Foss (DE-59), 226, 236, 238, 242, 247

destroyer tender, Dixie (AD-14), 262
destroyer-minesweeper, Endicott (DMS-35), 184
destroyers
Mansfield (DD-728), 114, 139–140
De Haven (DD-727), 114
Forrest Royal (DD-872), 238
Lind (DD-703), 270
Massey (DD-778), 270
Ozbourn (DD-846), 264
Rupertus (DD-851), 294–295
Rush (DD-714), 294
Wiltsie (DD-716), 134
fleet tugs
Arikara (ATF-98), 83
Cree (ATF-84), 124
Lipan (ATF-85), 124
high speed transports

Begor (APD-127), 141, 270, 294, 304, 310, 423
Diachenko (APD-123), 124, 140–142, 153–154, 176
Horace A. Bass (APD-124), 142–143, 154, 161, 176–177, 232, 235
Wantuck (APD-125), 141, 176, 232
hospital ships
Consolation (AH-15), 129
Hope (AH-7), 129
landing ships, dock
Fort Marion (LSD-22), 127, 176, 201, 243, 270, 304
Catamount (LSD-17), 264
Comstock (LSD-19), 288, 309
Gunston Hall (LSD-5), 127, 201, 424
Tortuga (LSD-26), 264
Colonial (LSD-18), 229, 230
Fort Marion (LSD-22), 127, 176, 201, 243, 270, 304
Whetstone (LSD-27), 296
landing ships, tank
Benewah (LST-325), 342
LST-611, 83, 124, 126
landing ships, utility, LSU-1042 (Operated by US Army 8206th Army Unit,
Amphibious Training Center), 129
497
motor launch, Skimmer, 142, 232
salvage vessel, Conserver (ARS-39), 124
submarine, Perch (SS/SSP/ASSP/APSS/LPSS/IX-313), 142, 144–145, 154,
231–232, 248, 253
transport, General A.E. Anderson (AP-111), 127
US Revenue Marine (predecessor of the US Coast Guard), 12
US–British Summit Conference, August 1941, 27
Utah Beach (Normandy Landing 1944), 59, 151, 286, 289
Utah Beach, Vietnam (Wunder Beach, Thon My Thuy), 339
Van Fleet, Lieutenant General James A. (USA), 59, 285–286, 288, 291–293, 296,
298–299, 308–309, 315, 321
Vandegrift, Major General Alexander A. (USMC), 41
Vandenberg, General Hoyt S. (USAF), 156, 160, 217
Vera Cruz, Mexico, Landing, 1847, 13, 18, 85, 87–88
Vernon, Admiral Edward (Royal Navy), 11, 84, 87
Vieques Island, Puerto Rico, Amphibious Training Site, 73–74, 351
Vietnam War, 3, 85, 327, 338–343, 345, 348, 352–354
Visayan Islands, Philippines, Landings, March 1945, 62, 64
Vogel, Major General Clayton B. (USMC), 29
Vogelkop, New Guinea, Landing, July 1944, 47, 50, 54
Waegwon, Korea, 128
Waesche, Vice Admiral Russell R. (US Coast Guard), 37
Wakde-Sarmi, New Guinea, Landings, May 1944, 54
Walcheren Island, Netherlands, Landing, November 1944, 60
Walker, General Walton H. (USA), 79, 117, 120, 127, 129–130, 132–134, 158–
159, 168–169, 171, 192–193, 218–219, 223–224, 227–228, 234–236, 251
War Department General Staff, 24, 107
War of Jenkins’ Ear (1738–48), 11
War of the League of Augsburg (1688–97), 11
War Plans Division, Army Staff, 20, 24
war plans
DROPSHOT, 72
Joint Basic War Plan Orange, 22, 25, 33, 50, 88
OFFTACKLE, 72
Rainbow Plan 5, 25, 27, 31
Red–Orange Plan, 21
US–British Commonwealth Joint Basic War Plan, 27, 65
Washington Treaties of 1922, 19, 22

Washington, George, 11–12, 25
Wayne, Anthony (Colonial General), 12
Wear, Major James H. (USA), 143–145, 175, 186, 209
Wells, Captain Wade C. (US Navy), 341–342
West Coast Island Defense Element, 318
West Point, Virginia, Landing, 1862, 15–16
498
West Sea (Yellow Sea), 163, 165, 201, 224
Westburg, Captain Arthur (USA), 224
Western Pacific, 2, 17, 20, 27, 81, 101
Western Pacific Office, Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS WestPac), 117
Westmoreland, General William C. (USA), 341–342
Wewak, New Guinea, Bypassed 1944, 34, 47, 54
Whitney, General Courtney (USA), 119, 193
Wilmington, North Carolina, 16
Willoughby, Major General Charles A. (USA), 119, 209
Wilson, Major Russell J. (USA), 276, 306–307
Wolfe, Brigadier General Henry C. (USA), 60
Wolfe, General James (British Army), 11, 160
Wolmido, Korea, 162–167, 172, 176–177, 179–182, 188–189, 191, 200–201,
210–211, 253, 262, 266
Wolsa-ri, Korea, Partisan Escape Route, “a Korean Dunkirk,” 257–258
Wonju, Korea, 112, 116, 140, 175, 219, 233, 237, 251–252, 254, 259, 261, 263,
267–268, 270, 287, 289, 295, 417
Wonmun Hill, Korea, 137–138
Wonsan, Korea, 2, 111–112, 115, 139–140, 155, 157, 175, 203, 217–223, 226–
229, 231, 233–236, 239, 245–246, 249, 262–265, 268–270, 286, 289–
300, 313, 318, 322–323, 419–420, 422, 424
World War I Amphibious Operations, 18–20, 24, 29, 45, 52, 146, 153
World War I Tsingtao, Gallipoli, and Baltic Islands Campaigns, 24
World War II, 1, 3–4, 8, 25, 29–31, 65, 70, 74, 81–83, 87–88, 90–104, 118, 123,
139, 143–144, 146, 150, 153, 159, 161, 188, 209, 214, 246, 249, 251,
257, 286, 304, 308–309, 329–330, 333, 339, 349, 428–430, 438, 444,
450–451
Wright, General Edwin K. (USA), 79–80, 108, 118–120, 149, 155, 157–158, 169,
193, 204, 218, 222–223, 245
Wunder Beach, Vietnam (Thon My Thuy, Utah Beach), 339
Yalu River, Korea, 140, 146, 152, 175, 205, 219, 227–228, 233–234, 246, 263,
268, 270, 289, 295, 299
Yangyang, Korea, 111–112, 140, 175, 219, 233, 237, 252, 261, 263, 268, 270,
272, 287–289, 295, 297, 300
Yeongdeungpo (Yongdungpo), Korea, 112, 173, 190–191, 196–199, 417
Yeongdeok (Yongdok), Korea, 127–128, 131–132, 140, 175, 219, 233, 263, 268,
270, 289, 295, 417
Yeongil (Yongil) Airfield, Korea, 123, 125, 129, 131–133, 152, 417
Yeongil (Yongil) Bay, Korea, 125, 131, 417
Yeongil (Yongil), Korea, 123, 131
Yeongsan (Yongsan), Korea, 128, 130, 417
Yeosu (Yosu), Korea, 140, 142, 175, 201, 219, 233, 263, 268, 270, 289, 295, 417
Yi Myeong-heum (Captain, ROK Navy), 183, 210
Yodo, Korea, 258, 264, 295–296, 310
499
Yokohama, Japan, 65, 80, 115, 122–125, 143, 162, 168, 171–172, 222, 264
Yokosuka, Japan, 115, 122–123, 125–126, 232, 255, 264
Yongmaedo, Korea, 173, 201
York River, Virginia, Operations on, 1862, 15
Yorktown, Virginia, Landing, 1862 (canceled), 15
Youn Joung (Commander, ROK Navy), 174
Yukjeondae (DPRK Korean People’s Army [KPA] Naval Infantry Units), 111
Zeebrugge, Belgium, Landing, 1918, 19, 88
500
About the Author
Donald W. Boose Jr., a retired Army colonel, teaches at the US Army
War College. Much of his 30-year military career involved Northeast Asia
political-military matters and included service as the Korean Politico-
Military planner for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 6 years with the UN
Command Component of the Military Armistice Commission in Korea,
and 3 years as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Policy
(J5) for US forces in Japan. He is the author of U.S. Army Forces in the
Korean War, coauthor of Great Battles of Antiquity, a major contributor
to the Encyclopedia of the Korean War, coeditor of Recalibrating the
U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance, a major contributor to the Encyclopedia
of the Korean War, and the author of many articles on the Korean War
and Northeast Asia security issues. Professor Boose has a degree in
Anthropology from Cornell University, a master’s degree in Asian Studies
from the University of Hawaii, and is a graduate of the US Army War
College.
501
Combat Studies Institute
The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is a military history “think
tank” that produces timely and relevant military history research
publications and contemporary operational history for the US Army.
CSI also conducts battlefield staff rides and provides other types of
educational and historical support to Army units and commands on
request. CSI consists of six divisions: the Research and Publications
Team, the Staff Ride Team, the Contemporary Operations Study Team,
the Military History Instructional Support Team, the Combined Arms
Center Command History Office, and the Frontier Army Museum.
Other CSI Special Studies

Scouts Out! The Development of Reconnaissance Units in
Modern Armies
Iroquois Warriors in Iraq
Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for US Armed

Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries
Breaking the Mold: Tanks in the Cities
The Brigade: A History, Its Organization and Employment in

the US Army
Crossing the Line of Departure: Battle Command on the

Move—A Historical Perspective
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Over the Beach

Combat Studies Institute Press

Colonel (Retired) Donald W. Boose Jr.

Combat Studies Institute Press

First printing, December 2008.

CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an

Maps ...................................................................................................... xii

Chapter 1. Introduction ..........................................................................1

A Note on Definitions ...........................................................4

Chapter 2. Amphibious Heritage .........................................................11

American Amphibious Warfare to 1919 .............................11

Amphibious Doctrine and Planning, 1919–38 ...................19

The Joint Board.............................................................20

Marine Corps Developments .......................................22

Army Activities .............................................................24

Amphibious Developments on the Eve of World

Development of Landing Ships and Craft ....................29

World War II .................................................................31

Amphibious Developments in 1942 ...................................35

The Army Amphibious Training Center and

Engineer Amphibian Command ..............................35

Amphibious Ships, Craft, and Vehicles ........................39

Amphibious Operations in 1942 ........................................40

Amphibious Operations in 1943 ........................................43

Army Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalions ...........45

South and Southwest Pacific Operations .....................45

The Aleutians ...............................................................48

Mediterranean Operations ..........................................49

Central Pacific Operations ..........................................49

Amphibious Operations in 1944 ........................................51

Southwest Pacific Area Operations .............................53

Central Pacific Operations ..........................................56

Operations in Europe ...................................................57

Advance to the Philippines ..........................................60

Amphibious Operations in 1945 ........................................63

Amphibious Doctrine, Planning, and Training, 1945–50 ...65

The Postwar Amphibious Establishment .....................65

Resumption of Amphibious Exercises ..........................67

The Unification and Roles and Missions Struggle .............68

Doctrine and Training ................................................72

The Situation in the Far East on the Eve of the

Korean War .................................................................. 79

GHQ FEC Amphibious Training Program ......................... 81

Chapter 3. Initial Operations and Planning ........................................ 111

North Korean Attacks and ROK and US Evacuations ...... 111

Command Relationship Changes and Arrival of

US/UN Forces ............................................................ 116

Amphibious Planning and Operation BLUEHEARTS ..... 118

Delay and Reinforcement ................................................. 126

The Pusan Perimeter ......................................................... 127

Over-the-Shore Logistics: The Jindong-ri

(Chindong-ni) Operation ........................................... 127

Evacuation of ROK 3d Division, 13–17 August 1950 ..... 131

The Tongyeong Amphibious Operation ............................ 135

Amphibious Special Operations, July–August 1950 ........ 139

Chapter 4. CHROMITE: The Incheon Landing ................................. 155

Planning ............................................................................ 155

The Plan ..................................................................... 162