de Papa V Camacho PDF

7/17/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 144
VOL. 144, SEPTEMBER 24, 1986 281

De Papa vs. Camacho
*
No. L-28032. September 24, 1986.
FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO,

NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO PAPA, plaintiffs-
appellees, vs. DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO
TONGKO and GODOFREDO CAMACHO,
defendantsappellants.
Succession; In reserva troncal, the successional rights of the

relatives of the praepositus within the 3rd degree are determined
by, and subject to, the rules of intestate succession; so as to exclude
uncles and aunts of the descendant from the reservable property by
his niece or nephew.—That question has already been answered in
Padura vs. Baldovino, where the reservatario was survived by
eleven nephews and nieces of the praepositus in the line of origin,
four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim was also
made that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in
equal shares. This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, declared the principles of intestacy to be controlling, and
ruled that the nephews and nieces of whole blood were each
entitled to a share double that of each of the nephews and nieces
of half blood in accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same.—Following the order prescribed by law in
legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the descendant
within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called
reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person
holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes
that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be
alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which such property came,
inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is
in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of
designated persons who are within the third degree of the person
from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of
the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as
reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016bff0b97c97be1a6c3003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/13
Same; Same.—Reversion of the reservable property being
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
282
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Papa vs. Camacho
governed by the rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-

appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt
and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus), they
are excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant-
appellant, although they are related to him within the same
degree as the latter. To this effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris where
Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code were cited and
applied.
Same; Same.—Under the last article (1009), the absence of
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a
precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being
called to the succession. This was also and more clearly the case
under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded
the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386).
Same; Same.—We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under
our laws of succession, a decedent’s uncles and aunts may not
succeed ab intestate so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent
survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.
Same; Same.—Had the reversionary property passed directly
from the praepositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs-
appellees would have been excluded by the defendant-appellant
under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a
different result should obtain simply because “the transmission of
the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva;” i.e.,
the property took a “detour” through an ascendant—thereby
giving rise to the reservation—before its transmission to the
reservatario.
NARVASA, J.:
This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of

the Civil Code on reserva troncal, was submitted for
judgment in the lower court by all the parties on the

following “Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise”:
“1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D.

TongkoCamacho and the plaintiffs, Francisca Tioco de
Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate
relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant’s grandaunt and
granduncles.
2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D.
Tongo-Camacho have as a common ancestor the late
Balbino Tioco
283
VOL. 144, SEPTEMBER 24, 1986 283

De Papa vs. Camacho
(who had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of

plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant. The family
relationship of the parties is as shown in the chart
attached hereto as Annex ‘A’ and made an integral part of
this stipulation.
3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime
gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece
Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which parcels
of land are presently covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. A-64165, 64166 and 64167 of the Registry of
Deeds of Manila, copies of which are attached to this
stipulation as Annexes ‘B’, ‘B-1’, and ‘B-2’.
4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in 1915,
survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two
legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon
(mother of defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho) and
leaving the afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the
inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-indiviso
shares.
5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate,
survived by his legitimate children by his wife Marciana
Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate
grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the
partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land now
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and
16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of which
are attached hereto as Annexes ‘C’ and ‘C-1’, were
adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco,
but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the
said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two
legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in

equal pro-indiviso shares.
6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate,
single and without issue, leaving his one-half (½) pro-
indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land above-
mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole
intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a
reserva troncal which was subsequently annotated on the
Transfer Certificates of Title Annexes ‘B’, ‘B-1’, ‘B2’, ‘C’
and ‘C-1’.
7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died
intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels of
land above-mentioned were inherited by her only
legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho,
subject to the usufructuary right of her surviving
husband, defendant Primo Tongko.
8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died
intestate, survived his only legitimate descendant,
defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.
9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-
284

De Papa vs. Camacho
Camacho now owns one-half (½) of all the seven (7)

parcels of land abovementioned as her inheritance from
her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon
legal advice, the other half of the said seven (7) parcels of
land abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal
imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and
under the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs,
also upon legal advice, oppose her said claim because they
claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half proindiviso
interest in said parcel of land, which interest was
inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or
three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of
their being also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.
11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial
determination in this case the legal issue of whether
defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the
whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in question, or
whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of
Faustino Dizon are reservatarios (together with said
defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso share therein

which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son
Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said
one-half pro-indiviso share, or three eights (3/8) of said
seven (7) parcels of land, and, therefore, to three-eights
(3/8) of the rentals collected and to be collected by
defendant Dalisay P. Tongko Camacho from the tenants of
said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real estate
taxes corresponding to plaintiffs’ share in the rentals.
12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives
and have acted upon legal advice in pursuing their
respective claims, and in order to restore and preserve
harmony in their family relations, they hereby waive all
their claims against each other for damages (other than
legal interest on plaintiffs’ share in the rentals which this
Honorable Court may deem proper to award), attorney’s
fees and expenses of 1
litigation which shall be borne by the
respective parties.”
On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs

Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as
the defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled, as
reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in
dispute, in equal proportions, rendering judgment as
follows:
_______________
1 Record on Appeal, pp. 66-71.
285
VOL. 144, SEPTEMBER 24, 1986 285

De Papa vs. Camacho
“* * *. Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the

parties, the court holds that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel
Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of one-
half (½) pro-indiviso shares or three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7)
parcels of land involved in this action. Consequently, they are,
likewise, entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and
to be collected by the defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho from
the tenants of the said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or
real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs’ share in the rentals.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties
expressly waived all their claima against each other for damages
including attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation other than the
legal interests on plaintiffs’ share in the rentals, the court renders
judgment adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to three-eights (3/8) of

the seven (7) parcels of land described in Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. T-64165, T-64166, T-64167, T-16546 and T-16554 of the
Registry of Deeds of Manila. The defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-
Camacho is hereby ordered to make an accounting of all rents
received by her on the properties involved in this action for the
purpose of determining the legal interests which should be paid to
the plaintiffs on their shares in the rentals of the property in
question. 2
SO ORDERED.”
Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.

The issue raised is whether, as contended by the
plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the lower Court, all
relatives of the praepositus within the third degree in the
appropriate line succeed without distinction to the
reservable property upon the death of the reservista, as
seems to be implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil Code, which
reads:
“Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title
from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree
and who belong to the line from which said property came. (811)”,
or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of

said relatives are subject to, and should be determined by,
the rules
_______________
2 Id., pp. 74-75.
286

De Papa vs. Camacho
on intestate succession.
That question
3
has already been answered in Padura vs.
Baldovino, where the reservatario was survived by eleven
nephews and nieces of the praepositus in the line of origin,
four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and the claim
was also made that all eleven were entitled to the
reversionary property in equal shares. This Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the
principles of intestacy to be controlling, and ruled that the
nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled to a

share double that of each of the nephews and nieces of half
blood in accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code.
Said the Court:
“The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case

of reserva troncal, where the only reservatarios (reservees)
surviving the reservista, and belonging to the line of origin, are
nephews of the descendant (prepositus), but some are nephews of
the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood,
should the reserved properties be apportioned among them
equally, or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share
twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood?
“* * *
The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish
commentators on the subject. After mature reflection, we have
concluded that the position of the appellants is correct. The
reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the
return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives
belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and
avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the
inheriting ascendant (reservista).
“* * *
The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the
property has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of
origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its
application. In the relations between one reservatario and another
of the same degree there is no call for applying Art. 891 any
longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in the reversionary
property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate
succession. In this spirit
_______________
3 G.R. No. L-11960, Dec. 27, 1958 (unreported); see 104 Phil. 1065.
287
VOL. 144, SEPTEMBER 24, 1986 287

De Papa vs. Camacho
the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has

resolved that upon the death of the ascendant reservista,
the reservable property should pass, not to all the
reservatarios as a class but only to those nearest in degree
to the descendant (prepositus), excluding those
reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de
los Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905). And within the third

degree of relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the
right of representation operates in favor of nephews
(Florentino vs. Florentino, supra).
“Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession,

when there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree,
the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the
property which the reservista (person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more
remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the
one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is
not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the
line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right
granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree
personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who
are within the third degree of the person from whom the
reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and
the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios,
since the law does not recognize them as such.
“In spite of what has been said relative to the right of
representation on the part of one alleging his right as reservatario
who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless
there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are
within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of
nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable
property came. * * *.” (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-
490) (Italics supplied) See also Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and de
Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic
principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that
whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double
that of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in determining the
rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the
right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of
double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should
be likewise operative. In other words, the reserva troncal merely
determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to whom the
property should be returned; but within that group, the individual
right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of
ordinary intestate succession, since
288

De Papa vs. Camacho
Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is

strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an
exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is
strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law. As expressed
by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):
“* * * creándose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe

ampliarse, sino más bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto,
manteniendo la excepción mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese realmente
contenida en la disposición, y aplicando las reglas generales y
fundamentals del Código en materia de sucesión, en aquellos extremos
no resueltos de un modo expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera
de acción de la reserva que se crea.”
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of

the new Civil Code’s hostility to successional reservas and
reversions, as exemplified by the suppression of the reserva viudal
and the reversion legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and 968-
980).”
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the

rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must
be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and
uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus),
they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the
defendant-appellant, although they are related to him
within the same degree4
as the latter. To this effect is
Abellana vs. Ferraris where Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and
1009 of the Civil Code were cited and applied:
“Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in

case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all
other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the
succession. This is readily apparent from Articles 1001, 1004,
1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provide as
follows:
“Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitle to one-half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.”
_______________
4 122 Phil. 319, again per Reyes, J.B.L., J.
289
VOL. 144, SEPTEMBER 24, 1986 289

De Papa vs. Camacho
“Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full
blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.”
“Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews
and nieces who are the children of the decedent’s brothers and sisters of
the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per
stirpes.”
“Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children
of brothers and sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate.”
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters,

nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other
collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession.
This was also and more clearly the case under the Spanish Civil
Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in
force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889
prescribed as follows:
“Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces,

children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving
spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased.”
“Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives
shall succeed to the estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference
among them by reason of the whole blood.”
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and

sisters and nephews and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the
surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after the
widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines
merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces
and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the
preferred position of the latter vis a vis the other collaterals.”
“* * *.
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of
succession, a decedent’s uncles and aunts may not succeed ab
intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive
and are willing and qualified to succeed. * * *”
This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in
290

De Papa vs. Camacho
Padura, supra, that as to the reservable property, the

reservatarios do not inherit from the reservista, but from
the descendant praepositus:
“* * *. It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part

of the estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as
long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58
Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista,
but from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are
the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must
survive the reservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286;
Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310)* * *.”
5
To the same effect is Cano vs. Director of Lands , where it
was ruled that intestacy proceedings to determine the right
of a reservatario are not necessary where the final decree of
the land court ordering issuance of title in the name of the
reservista over property subject to reserva troncal identifies
the reservatario and there are no other claimants to the
latter’s rights as such:
“The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary

rests upon the assumption that the reservatario will succeed in, or
inherit, the reservable property from the reservista. This is not
true. The reservatario is not the reservista’s successor mortis
causa nor is the reservable property part of the reservista’s estate;
the reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the
descendant (prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line
of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed
during the reservista’s lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that
there being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the matter
must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in
the reservable property.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of
the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the
appellee in this case) becomes, automatically and by operation of
law, the owner of the reservable property. As already stated, that
property is no part of the estate of the reservista, and does not
even answer for the debts of the latter. * * *.”
Had the reversionary property passed directly from the
_______________
5 105 Phil. 1, again per Reyes, J.B.L., J.
291
VOL. 144, SEPTEMBER 24, 1986 291
De Papa vs. Camacho
praepositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees

would have been excluded by the defendant-appellant
under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason
why a different result should obtain simply because “the
transmission of the property 6
was delayed by the
interregnum of the reserva;” i.e., the property took a
“detour” through an ascendant—thereby giving rise to the
reservation—before its transmission to the reservatario.
Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings
already cited, the defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-
Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary
property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower
Court is reversed and set aside and the complaint is
dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, and Feliciano, JJ.,

concur.
Yap, J., took no part. Justice Paras was designated

to sit in the First Division.
Judgment reversed and set aside.
Note.—When the reservation has once been created,

however, because of the death of the descendant, who has
not made any partition of his properties, but has instituted
voluntary heirs, the partition of the estate thus left,
whether judicial or extrajudicial, cannot be effected in such
a way as to prejudice the relatives within the third degree,
on one hand, or the ascendant on the other. That is, the
partition should not be such as to allot to the free portion
all such property acquired gratuitously by the descendant
from an ascendant or brother or sister; this will be a
malicious denial of the right of relatives within the third
degree. On the other hand, all such property should not be
given to the ascendant for his legitime; this will prejudice
the ascendant who will not have absolute freedoms
_______________
6 Padura v. Baldovino, G.R. No. L-11960. Dec. 27, 1958, supra;

footnote.3
292

Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals
of disposition over such property. The equitable solution,

therefore, is to start on the assumption of the reserva
minima, and adjudicate to the ascendant one-half of such
properties as part payment of this legitime, and the other
half to the voluntary heirs or legatees (Tolentino:
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. III, pp. 261-262).
——o0o——
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7/17/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 144

VOL. 144, SEPTEMBER 24, 1986 281

FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO,

Succession; In reserva troncal, the successional rights of the

Same; Same.—Reversion of the reservable property being

282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De Papa vs. Camacho

governed by the rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-

This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of

judgment in the lower court by all the parties on the

“1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D.

VOL. 144, SEPTEMBER 24, 1986 283

(who had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of

legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in

284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Camacho now owns one-half (½) of all the seven (7)

defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso share therein

On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs

1 Record on Appeal, pp. 66-71.

VOL. 144, SEPTEMBER 24, 1986 285

“* * *. Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the

judgment adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to three-eights (3/8) of

Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.

or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of

2 Id., pp. 74-75.

286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled to a

“The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case

VOL. 144, SEPTEMBER 24, 1986 287

the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has

los Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905). And within the third

“Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession,

288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is

“* * * creándose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe

The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of

Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the

“Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in

4 122 Phil. 319, again per Reyes, J.B.L., J.

VOL. 144, SEPTEMBER 24, 1986 289

Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters,

“Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces,

It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and

This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in

290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Padura, supra, that as to the reservable property, the

“* * *. It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part

“The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary

Had the reversionary property passed directly from the

5 105 Phil. 1, again per Reyes, J.B.L., J.

VOL. 144, SEPTEMBER 24, 1986 291

De Papa vs. Camacho

praepositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees

Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, and Feliciano, JJ.,

Yap, J., took no part. Justice Paras was designated

Note.—When the reservation has once been created,

6 Padura v. Baldovino, G.R. No. L-11960. Dec. 27, 1958, supra;

292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals