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Turkish Studies
Vol. 12, No. 4, 643 – 662, December 2011
Turkey’s Growing Relations with Iran

and Arab Middle East
ANOUSHIRAVAN EHTESHAMI & SÜLEYMAN ELIK
School of Government and International Affairs, University of Durham, Durham, UK
Downloaded by [188.41.165.123] at 05:04 12 December 2011
ABSTRACT During its final two centuries, the Ottoman Empire failed to introduce an “exit
strategy” from the Middle East. On account of this uneasy disengagement, Republican Turkey
turned back and followed an anti-revisionist policy toward the region. In the 1920s, the revolu-
tionary leadership of the Turkish Republic focused on internal reformation and modernization
programs, which made a structural transformation in domestic politics and systemic change
that further forced Turkish governments not to pursue an active policy in the region. During
the Cold War, Turkey’s Middle East policy was not viewed as friendly toward the Middle
East while there was a strong security ties with Iran, especially in Central Treaty Organization.
However, Turkey followed a more aggressive and coercive entrance strategy toward the region
by the end of the Cold War. The Justice and Development Party has made a shift and attempted
to exercise soft power policies to normalize its relations with Arab nations and Iran by improving
societal and economic interdependence relations. In order to understand the new activism in
Turkish–Iranian relations, it is necessary to provide a historical context of the changing
dynamic of regional politics by analyzing threat perceptions and security alignments from the
perspective of developing Turkish–Iran relations.
Introduction
The disengagement of Turkish– Arab relations goes back to the Ottoman moderniz-
ation in the nineteenth century. The multi-national political regime of the Ottoman
Empire was an alternative to the nation state system but unable to satisfy nationalist
movements within empire due to changes in the international system. Therefore, the
Pan-Islamist strategy of Sultan Abdul Hamid II and the Ottoman nationalism of the
Young Turks, which aimed at a restoration of order under the banner of Turkishness,
could not stall the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman Turks also failed to
introduce an “exit strategy” from the Middle East. In terms of this conceptual frame-
work, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani presented a strategic project to Sultan Abdul
Hamit when arrived in Istanbul in 1892. He strongly advised Sultan Abdul Hamit II to
give full freedom to the nations under the Ottoman rule in order to defend themselves
Correspondence Address: Prof. Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Dr. Süleyman Elik, School of Government
and International Affairs, University of Durham, Durham, DH1 3TU UK. Email: a.ehteshami@durham.
ac.uk; [email protected]
ISSN 1468-3849 Print/1743-9663 Online/11/040643–20 # 2011 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2011.624322
644 A. Ehteshami & S. Elik
against Western colonialization. However, the Ottoman Empire failed to introduce

such a policy of peaceful disengagement.1 Similarly, the Committee of Union and
Progress (CUP, İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) government’s centralization policies dra-
matically increased nationalist uprisings against the Ottoman Empire. For example,
the “Great Arab Revolt” of 1916 under the leadership of Sharif Hussein became a
symbol of political disintegration between Arabs and Turks.2
The dismemberment process continued under the rule of Mustafa Kemal who
began a creeping modernization toward establishment of a nation state. Meanwhile,
he put aside the preceding Ottoman territorial claims over the Mosul province, which
was one of the debated issues during the Laussane Conference of 1923.3 In a sense,
the regime attempted to adapt itself to the new conditions of the international system.
They enforced to the new regime to create a secular nation state by cancelation of
imperial institution such as the Caliphate, the Ottoman dynasty and its relevant
societal, political and economic organizations. However, generally speaking, the

abolishment of these institutions, especially the Caliphate not only cut ties but also
breached the “social contract” between Kurds, Arabs and Turks.4 Under the rule of
Mustafa Kemal (1923 – 38), Turkey focused on modernization particularly, but did
not show much interest in the Arab region. Turkey managed to achieve border settle-
ment with Iraq over the oil-rich Mosul area in 1926 and friendship and border agree-
ments with Iran in 1932. However, the accession of Alexandretta (Hatay) to Turkey
from Syria in 1939 raised serious strain between Turkey and Syria that was to con-
tinue for almost 60 years. The Saadabat Pact of 1937 with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan
was an exception for Turkey in the region, but this did not the provide opportunity for
Turkey to normalize its relations with the Arab Middle East. In addition, the Baghdad
Pact in 1955 and its successor, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), part of the
Western security system, did not offer Turkey a viable security engagement. It is
essential to analyze the management of Turkish– Iranian diplomatic crisis in 1989
and in 1997 to understand how historical experience led to recast contemporary
relations of the two neighboring states.
Due to violation of the “non-interference principle of internal affairs,” the two
neighboring countries have experienced diplomatic crises twice since 1979. The
first diplomatic crisis occurred due to a series of uneasy relations. Iran criticized
Turkey on account of its perceived lack of a firm stand against Salman Rushdie’s
Satanic Verses. Iran also exerted pressure to have the book banned in Turkey. The
Iranian ambassador to Ankara, Monouchehr Mottaki’s speech on Jerusalem Night5
in the city of Konya on April 10, 1988, echoed the anti-Israeli discourse of the
Iranian regime, which also increased the tension.6 The Iranian council (Ali Asghar
Shafi) in the city of Erzurum distributed copies of the Khomeini fatwa against
Rushdie to muftis throughout eastern Anatolia for dissemination among the
Kurdish Alevi population.7 In addition to the Rushdie controversy, Iranian govern-
ment’s direct critics to the Turban affair of April 1989, arose following the
banning of headscarves in Turkish universities was one of example of Iran’s interfer-
ence in Turkey’s internal affairs. The headscarf case is one of the sensitive questions
of Republican Turkey, which has created many controversies between Islamist and
Turkey’s Growing Relations with Iran and Arab Middle East 645
secular. Hence, Turkish government almost declared Manouchehr Mottaki persona

non grata and Iran thus had to recall its ambassador from Turkey.
A second diplomatic crisis occurred in 1997 and severely damaged bilateral
relations when Sincan mayor, Bekir Yıldız, organized Jerusalem Night, and invited
the Iranian Ambassador to Turkey, Mohammed Reza Baqeri, and the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization (PLO) representative in Turkey, Muhammad bin Yasini, as
speakers. The gala occasion featured posters of Abbas Musavi, Musa Sadr and
Fathi Shakaki who were Hezbollah and Hamas leaders in Lebanon, and among the
Palestinians. Baqeri strongly criticized Israel in his speech.8 The Sincan event
created a political firestorm in Turkey on February 4, 1997, when the Turkish
armed forces sent 50 tanks, armored personnel carriers and other military vehicles
through Sincan’s Atatürk Boulevard. Even though pro-Islamist Turkish Prime Min-
ister Erbakan tried to prevent the expulsion of Baqeri and other Iranians from Turkey,
he was not able to save his post. Additionally, Mesut Yılmaz, leader of the Mother-
land Party (Anavatan Partisi) labeled Baqeri as a terrorist and not a diplomat. He
demanded that Baqeri and Muhammad Reza Rashid, the head of the Iranian consulate
in Istanbul, be sent home immediately on February 19, 1997. Hence, Baqeri and
Muhammad Rashid were immediately declared personae non grata and expelled
from Turkey. In addition to this, Said Zare, head of the Iranian consulate in
Erzurum, was also expelled on March 1, 1997, on account of his criticism of
Deputy Chief-of-Staff General Çevik Bir. Iran retaliated to the expulsion of its dip-
lomats by evicting Osman Korutürk, Turkey’s Ambassador to Iran, and Ufuk Ó´zsan-
cak, the Turkish consul in Urmiya.9
Another parameter for the measure of Turkish – Iranian relations is to analyze the
threat perception of Turkey and Iran throughout the last two centuries. Since the
Republican period, in most cases, the internal and external threat perceptions of
the Turkish Republic have been redefined in accordance with new conditions in
the domestic and international environments by Turkish governments. With the for-
mation of the Republic, the Turkish government concentrated on two internal threats:
Kurdish nationalism and political Islam. Hence, as the guardians of secularism, the
military governments in 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1997 tried to use its civilizing
vision to democratize the state and society in Turkey. Since the beginning of the
multi-party system in 1950, right wing parties under leaders, such as Adnan Men-
deres (1950 – 60), Süleyman Demirel (1965 – 71; 1975 – 77 and 1991 – 93) and
Turgut Özal (1983 – 89), benefited from the opportunities of central government
that provided more space for peripheral identities in the governing body,10 but this
small-scale transformation in Turkish society did not change Turkey’s internal
threat perception. It is assumed that during the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras,
Turkey’s axis shift from East to West not only depended on continuity and change
in domestic politics but also concern of sovereignty and the survival strategy of
the Turkish elites.
A major structural transformation in Turkish central – periphery relations occurred
when the Justice and Development Party (AKP, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) won par-
liamentary elections in November 2002. The nature of Turkey’s policy toward the
Middle East changed under the banner of new activism in Turkish foreign policy.
This characterization is an injustice to the continuities in Turkey’s relations with
the region. In this endeavor, the social transformation in Turkish domestic politics
not only reviewed the strategies of the state but also redefined its internal and external
threats. According to Political scientist, Steven David’s seminal work “Explaining
Third World Alignment;” an “internal threat is more important than external
one.”11 In the current period, the internal threat is considered to be external when con-
sidering Turkish and Iranian strategic thinking on the issues such the trans-national
Kurdish question and secularism and political Islam. Turkey’s new grand theory,
which presumably emphasizes human emancipation in regional security affairs, has
become one of the components of Turkey’s soft power strategy.12 However,
Ankara has understood that Turkey does not have much capacity to stop civil war
in Libya and Syria. According to the new activist principles, Turkey has reviewed
its alignment with regional states.13 There is continuity between the previous govern-
ments and the new activism of the AKP toward Middle East,14 but little change in
Erdogan’s government, which has adopted its foreign policy in response to
changes in internal and external dynamics. In a sense, Turkey was no longer satisfied
to define its geopolitics in the Middle East with Cold War parameters. This has given
a new vision to Turkey as a central country in the midst of Afro-Eurasia, which has
the capability to develop relations with all actors in the region. In contrast to Interwar
and Cold War politics, Turkey’s entrance strategy toward the Middle East has not
been perceived by the Arab Middle East as a hegemonic regional threat but rather
as a balancing act. Turkey’s positive attitude toward the democratization of Arab
countries, notably the Arab Spring will also help Turkey’s new activism in the
region.15 This article basically tries to explain how the structural transformations in
Turkish domestic politics influenced its Middle East regional politics in conjunction
with developing relations with Iran. It is therefore prudent to examine Turkey and
Iran’s geopolitical considerations in the Middle East, notably threat perception,
regional alignment, and the presence of hard and soft power indicators.
Geopolitics, Internal/ External Threats and Security Alignments

Turkey sees the Middle East as a key strategic region in the global power struggle, in
addition to its concerns over access to the region’s gas and oil resources. Geopoliti-
cally speaking, the region is defined as a “marginal crescent,” a “shatter belt” and an
“arch of crisis” by Sir Halford Mackinder, Nicholas Spykman and Zbigniew Brze-
zinski, respectively. Similarly, Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense and a
principal strategic planner under President George W. Bush, was apparently thinking
along Mackinder’s lines.16
The revival of the Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex came after the wave
of decolonization between 1945 and 1948 and the establishment of Israel in 1948.17
Following the withdrawal of Great Britain from the Persian Gulf, the Arab Gulf Sub-
Security System emerged in 1971. The saving grace for geopolitical consideration of
both the Iranian and Turkish governments is that it gives us essential guidance when
evaluating both countries relations with each other in addition to their relations with
the region. On account of religious identity differences and historical rivalry, both
countries’ relations can be characterized as “skeptical,” “competitive” and a “coop-
erative relationship.” However, since the beginning, Turkish strategic thinking
acknowledged that territorial integrity and Iranian sovereignty were essential to
Turkey’s national security. For example, during regime transition in Iran. Ankara
feared that Iran could be the second Iraq during the regime transition from Qajar to
the Pahlavi dynasty.
While Turkey closed its door to the Arab Middle East, Turkey – Iran relations con-
tinued within an atmosphere of cooperative and competitive détente relationship from
1925 to the 2011. The foundation of Turkey – Iran relations provides a great example
of middle power state behavior, which is identified as friendly, rivalry and détente
relations in the framework of Turkish and Iranian diplomatic relations.18 Broadly
speaking, Turkish– Iranian relations during the twentieth century can be broken
down distinctly into four periods. The first, notably the Reza Shah and Mustafa
Kemal period was dominated by a series of crises and agreements. Both leaders
acknowledged that Turkey and Iran were no longer great powers but rather small
powers located in a critical geography. Hence, the two neighboring countries relin-
quished old historical competition and restored relations.19 However, the Kurdish
revolt created diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Iran in late 1920s. The co-
operation against Kurdish revolts (1925 – 30) was marked by the signing of the
Friendship Agreement in 1926 and the Turkish – Iranian border agreement in 1932.
The Shah’s visit to Turkey in 1934 displayed a rehabilitation of bilateral relations.
Reza Shah was impressed by the modernization drives of Mustafa Kemal that had
developed the war-torn country.20 Though Reza Shah asked for a military pact, to
protect their territory from great power invasion, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and
Iraq instead established the Saadabad Pact in 1937. This pact only underlined the sig-
natory countries’ affirmation of “non-interference in each others” internal affairs’
during their reformation and modernization processes.21
Turkey was faced with a similar concern about the sovereignty and the territorial
integrity question of Iran during Anglo-Russian occupation of Iran in WWII, which
dominated the second period of Turkish – Iranian relations. Hence Turkey did not
support the Kurdish Mahabad Republic and the Azerbaijan People’s Government
in 1946, but rather supported Iranian nationalists to maintain Iran’s territorial integrity
and sovereignty. Turkey and Iran viewed each other as buffer security zones against
Russia’s demand for passage through the Strait of Hormuz and the Straits of Istan-
bul.22 Hence, Soviet Russia was a common external threat for Pahlavi Iran and
Turkey during the Cold War. The other dimension of mutual concern for Turkey
and Iran was that if one of the parties had fallen into Russia’s sphere of influence,
such rapprochement with the Kremlin endangered the national security of the other
country. Turkey’s first move toward Israel was based on the same reasoning.
Ankara feared that new state would align itself with Soviet Russia. Therefore,
Turkey voted in favor of the Arab states at the UN against the partitioning of Palestine
in 1947. However, the rise of Arab nationalism and the call for solidarity against
foreign power influence enforced Turkey to reverse its position and recognize the
State of Israel in 1948, the first state with a majority Muslim population to do so.
However Iran never recognized Israel though there were cordial relations, during
the Mohammed Reza period.23
On the verge of the Cold War, Washington saw the sovereignty of Turkey and Iran
as essential to developing an alliance relationship to assist the containment strategy of
the USA.24 Turkey and Iran’s options were strictly limited toward the Middle East as
an extension of their pro-Western foreign policy. When British influence was crum-
bling with Arab nationalism, Britain tried to maintain its power in the Persian Gulf
and control the Suez Canal by establishing the Middle East Security Network. In con-
trast to British initiatives, the USA anchored Turkey into NATO against the Soviet
Union in 1952.25
The third period (1950 – 80) gives a distinctive foothold for Turkish –Iranian and
Arab relations and their relative engagement with NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In
one stroke, through the transition of power from Britain to the USA, the British gov-
ernment further attempted to sustain its power in the Gulf against the nationalization
of the Suez Canal and oil nationalization of Iran, which failed. Washington’s pressure
on Britain did not allow military action against the Mossadeq government, but clan-
destine Operation Ajax in 1953 to dismantle his government provided Washington
with access to the Middle East.26 The following restoration of the Pahlavi regime
in Iran was Washington’s second success in addition to the oil agreement signed
by Roosevelt and King Abd al-Aziz in (Ibn Saud) in 1947. In 1954, the evacuation
agreement recognized the Egyptian backed Arab Collective Security Pact (ACSP)
and was a qualified victory for Egypt. As a result the revelation of polarity in Arab
affairs further pushed Iraq into the Northern Tier Security Network (NTSN) that
support Turkish, Iranian and Iraqi security ties.27
Due to Britain’s weakening position in the Middle East and the need to protect the
area from Soviet control, the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles introduced a
containment strategy, creating a geographic barrier. This was the Northern Tier
policy, which included Greece, Iran, Turkey and Iraq to effectively contain the com-
munist threat. The Northern Tier Alliance was established in April 1954 with the
signing of the Turkish– Pakistan defense treaty and the US – Iraq arms deal.
British – US efforts solidified the Northern Tier by signing the Baghdad Pact in
1955,28 but constant British and US efforts encouraging the Turkish government to
convince Jordan to join the pact failed. Due to fear of post-colonial Arab states,
Iranian and Turkish initiatives in the Arab Middle East could not find any opportunity
to penetrate the region. Hence, acting together did not improve their relations.
After the Suez Canal War of 1956, Nasser’s populism polarized both the regional
balance between middle powers (Iraq and Egypt – Syria) and superpowers (USA and
USSR competition). The Soviet link with Egypt and the ACSP aimed at containing
the NTSN in the 1950s. The Egypt – Syrian alliance was further expanded to include
Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The other failure of NTSN was that Kremlin achieved in
keeping Afghanistan out of the short-lived Baghdad Pact (which collapsed with the
Iraqi revolution in 1958) and CENTO. It is certain that Ankara misjudged Arab
nationalism and failed to understand that its alliance relationship with Britain was
perceived as an extension of the British mandate in the Arab Middle East.29
During the Lebanese civil war in 1958, Turkey’s permission for the USA to use
military bases on its soil to carry out landing in Lebanon demonstrates the involve-
ment of Turkey with the Western security system. The main motivation of
Turkey – Iran co-operation was that the Soviets backed Arab nationalism. However,
both countries did not want to risk a confrontational policy toward the region and
refrained from a display of the pro-Western picture in Arab World. Hence, the
Turkey – Iran – Ethiopia and Israeli Periphery alliance in 1959 served as an indirect
engagement of Tel Aviv with NTSN in the Middle East.30 In fact, Israel’s own ties
with France, Britain and the USA always created an alternative balance in the sub
Middle East security system.
Strategically, Turkey chose to stay out of Middle Eastern affairs with the exclusion
of Iran and Israel. Due to its pro-Western policies during the Algerian Independence
movement, the Suez Canal War and Mossadeq’s oil nationalization movement,
Turkey was perceived as an unfriendly neighbor by most of the Middle Eastern
states. Turkey’s pro-Western position toward the Middle East has been considered
a necessity for Turkey’s alliance relationship with the NATO as Turkey is one of
the strategic countries that has benefited from Marshall Aid and trade relations
with Europe. However, in terms of strategic relations, there was not much depen-
dency from Turkey on Middle Eastern countries in the 1960s. It is important to
note that Turkey’s role in NATO’s forward defense strategy, introduced a pre-
emptive attack and second strike options to stop Soviet Russia on its own territory
before it had a chance to attack, demonstrates Turkey’s geopolitical importance.
During the Cold War, Turkey first allowed the deployment of the strategic
weapons such as the Jupiter missile in 1962 and still hosts 90 B91 nuclear
weapons positioned for preventive attack.31
Turkey’s alliance relationship was checked by a series of incidents such as the
removal of the Jupiter missiles, which was relevant to Cuban Missile Crisis
between Soviet Russia and USA in 1961,32 Johnson’s blunt letter regarding
Turkish demand for military intervention in Cyprus in June 1964, the Opium crisis
occurred when Washington pressured the Turkish government to prohibit opium cul-
tivation and its trade to the USA in 1969 were a critical stage of Turkish –American
relations.33 Ankara did not realize the cost of disengagement with the Arab Middle
East. This situation therefore changed Turkey’s policy. There were five reasons
behind Turkey’s multi-dimensional policy toward region: (i) the votes of the Arab
states against Turkey’s Cyprus proposal to the UN; (ii) the defeat of the Arabs in
1967; (iii) the Oil Embargo in 1974; (iv) the US military embargo of Turkey in
1975 and (v) the broken equilibrium between Turkey and Iran after the Shah
became a proxy power of the USA in the Persian Gulf during the 1970s.
Turkey started its new policy of activism in the region using three channels to gain
footholds in the Middle East. These are the Organization for Islamic Conference; the
Palestinian political card and the Soviet – Turkish rapprochement. In this endeavor,
for instance, Turkey opened an air corridor to Soviet aircraft during the Yom
Kippur War in 1973. During the 1970s, there were two internal dynamics, which
influenced Turkey’s foreign policy toward the Middle East and the Palestinian resist-
ance movement. The Turkish left wing element appeared in Palestinian guerrilla
camps in Beirut and Palestine and still plays an effective role in the Turkish press sup-
porting Palestinian resistance. In addition to this, Young Turkish –Kurdish Islamists
movements also captured the attention of the Arab Street in 1970s.34 Turkey installed
diplomatic representation for the PLO in Ankara in 1978 and reduced its diplomatic
relations with Israel to a lower level of chargé d’affaires following the Israeli
announcement of Jerusalem as a new capital in the 1980s.
One of the reasons behind Arab – Turkish rapprochement was the Gulf Arab states
concern about the rise of Muhammad Reza Shah as a regional power. Ankara feared
the Shah’s interference into Arab affairs, and particularly his support of Iraqi Kurds
and the clandestine agenda regarding Turkish Alevis in Turkey.35 Importantly,
Basheer Musa Mohammed Nafi claims that the Turkish army’s landing on Northern
Cypriot shore in 1974 was received with enthusiasm and had wide approval in Arab-
Islamic circles.36 The competitive relations between Ankara and Tehran created a
balance when Turkey attempted to use Azeri ethnic political cards, but this resulted
in a second diplomatic crisis between the two countries in the late 1970s. In a sense,
Iran was considered to be a safe haven for Western interests prior to the Islamic revo-
lution. Due to this tension between Turkey and Iran, both neighbors’ relations could
be classified as low level or frozen relations.
The fourth period was dominated by a series of events and regional crises. One
seismic event was that of Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the following
Iran – Iraq war (1980– 88). The new regime of Iran left behind old alliances such as
CENTO and was insistent on striking a negative balance between the two super-
powers.37 Tehran’s new policy emphasized the mantra “neither West, nor East” in
the 1980s.38 Due to the rise of regional instability in the Persian Gulf, however,
regional and global actors introduced new policies in the Middle East. The USA
decided to deploy a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and naval fleet in the Persian
Gulf. Additionally, Gulf Arab states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the
United Arab Emirates and Oman) formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in
1981. The organization conspicuously excludes both Iran and Iraq.
Intertwined with the notion of strategic parity, Tehran supported the establishment
of Hezbollah in Lebanon and made an alliance relationship with Syria in the Levant.
Geopolitically speaking, Lebanon is a frontline security zone for Syria, Iran and Israel
which plays a strategic role in the heart of the Middle East. During the Iran – Iraq war
(1980– 88), Turkey followed an active, neutral and pragmatic policy to reap the
benefits of wartime economics, to co-operate with Iraq to negate the Iranian –
Syrian axis and to allow military incursions into Northern Iraq in hot pursuit of the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK, Parti Karkerani Kurdistan) a separatist Kurdish ter-
rorist group.39 Turkey’s neutrality protected the operation of the Kirkuk – Ceyhan oil
pipeline while Syria closed the Iraqi – Syrian pipeline.
In the 1980s Turkey’s security perception toward the Middle East was based on
three issues; (i) the power vacuum in Northern Iraq that could increase Kurdish
guerrilla campaigns from Iraq and Syria and Iran against Turkey; (ii) Iran’s ability to
take a small part of Iraq that would break the regional balance, in particular the
concern of Turkish elites increased during a critical stage of the Iran – Iraq war
(1988); (iii) and an immigration flood from Northern Iraq that could establish solidar-
ity between Turkish and Iraqi Kurds against the Turkish government. However,
during the Iran – Iraq war, Turkey successfully overcame these internal and external
threats. Additionally, the end of the US arms embargo in 1978 followed by the
Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement in 1984, restored Turkish –American
relations as well as led to a review of Turkey’s regional relations with Iran and the
Arab Middle East.40
At the beginning of the Post-Cold War era, Turkey’s relations with neighboring
states, namely Iran, Syria and Iraq, were not friendly at all. For example, the cancela-
tion of hot pursuit rights and the rejection of a Turkish– Syrian proposal on water
issue by the Baghdad government changed Turkey’s security perception toward

the Middle East.41 Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu
Projesi) limits the water flow of Tigris and Euphrates rivers to Syria and Iraq.42 As
mentioned above, Turkey’s relations with Iran also deteriorated on account of
Iran’s interference in the headscarf issue, which created the Turkish – Iranian diplo-
matic crisis. Both neighboring countries called back their ambassadors in 1989 and
1997. Hence, due to the isolation of Turkey from the region, hard power and coercive
diplomacy became unavoidable options for Turkey’s strategy toward the Middle
East.
The Politics of Coercion and Post-Cold War Alignments

An important factor that motivated the Turkish – American coalition was Iraq’s con-
quest of Kuwait in 1990 which threatened to tilt things in Baghdad’s favor. Toward
that end, the offshore balancing strategy of the USA and the anti-revisionist policy of
Turkey would reject the use of military force to contain threats rooted from the
Middle East in the 1990s.43 The USA assembled a multi-national coalition centered
on its RDF and a US-led coalition force which commenced Operation Desert Storm to
restore Kuwait’s independence. While Turkey’s active participation in the First Gulf
War in 1991, aimed at removing Saddam’s regime, was not totally successful, Iran
maintained its neutral standing while the hostile regime of Iraq was weakening.44
The one exception that Turkey’s active participation in the US-led coalition achieved
was to obtain regional initiatives in Northern Iraq by signing of hot pursuit rights with
the Kurdish Autonomous Government to operate military incursions into Northern
Iraq in 1994.
There are four essential political changes in Turkish politics toward the Middle
East due to civil war between Kurdish groups and the changing regional balance
of power during this period; (i) Turkey deployed its troops in four locations in North-
ern Iraq to stop the Kurdish civil war in the 1990s.45 As a result of the UN economic
embargo, war-torn Iraq was weakened and isolated from the international system. To
counterweight Turkey’s growing influence in the region, President Rafsanjani formed
a regional alliance with Russia and Armenia and used religious and Kurdish political
cards against Turkey’s pro-Western policy. Hence, (ii) Turkey had full confidence to
pursue the Clinton administration’s dual containment strategy; instead of using Iraq
and Iran to check each other, the USA began trying to contain both. This policy guar-
anteed only that each country came to view the USA as a bitter enemy.46 It also
required the USA to deploy large numbers of troops in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
(iii) Turkey found an opportunity to follow a double track policy on the Israeli –Pales-
tinian conflict when the Oslo negotiations were started. Turkey’s foreign policy
during the Madrid Process in 1991 was to support a possible two-state solution
based on the pre-1967 war border and to improve its diplomatic relations with the
region. For the first time, Ankara raised its diplomatic relations with Israel from
chargé d’affaires to the ambassadorial level. Ankara also granted a diplomatic
office to the PLO in Ankara in 1991. In fact, the rapprochement between Turkey
and Iran was aimed at negating the Iranian – Syrian alliance and containing the
Russian support of the Kurdish guerrilla campaign in 1990s. Even though a tripartite
commission existed between Turkey – Syria and Iran, it could not solve the Turkish–
Syrian conflict. Turkey gained leverage to penetrate the region and employed coer-
cive diplomacy to create a deterrent toward the Syria – Iran axis with the signing of
a Military Training Agreement with Tel Aviv in 1996. Thus, Post-Cold War politics
demonstrates that realignment between Turkey and Israel created strength against the
Syrian – Iranian axis during the Turkey – Syrian crisis in 1997.47 After the signing of
Adana Agreement with Syria48 and following the capture of PKK leader Abdullah
Öcalan with the support of CIA and Mossad in 1998, the Kurdish insurgency cam-
paign appeared defeated to many. This situation lasted until 2004.49 One exception
to this is that Turkey and Iran lost their control over the management of Kurdish
nationalism. In fact, the US initiatives in Washington process of 1998 provided a
basis for a US – Kurdish alliance in 2000s, while Tehran and Ankara process lost
their influence on Kurdish groups in the Northern Iraq.50 This process continued
with UN economic sanctions and US military deployment in the Gulf region to
contain the influences of two regional powers, namely Turkey and Iran in Northern
Iraq. The presence of Western military forces became significant preoccupations
for Turkish and Iranian leaders. Additionally, (iv) the removal of B91 Nuclear Tac-
tical Weapons from Turkey’s western city, Balıkesir to Southern Turkey, İncirlik, and
Turkey’s agreement on a missile shield is a demonstration of Turkey developing a
new strategic depth in the region considering Turkey’s geopolitics in the US
policy agenda in 1996. Hence, Turkey’s alliance relations with the Western security
system kept Turkey – Iran relations skeptical.
The rise of the Salafi-oriented global guerrilla network was used in the 1980s
against Soviet Russia’s war in Afghanistan by the USA. This situation changed
after the post-Cold War international system as the anti-Western terrorist activities
of al-Qaida’s global network become a threat to the West as well as Iran and
Turkey in the Middle East and Central Asia and Caucasus. The declaration of
Osama bin Laden’s war on America began with the bombing of the Khobar
Towers in 1996, the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 and, eventually, 9/11 attack
to the Word Trade Centre and Pentagon initiated the “War on Terror.”51 In fact, both
capitals, Tehran and Ankara were never happy to see Saudi-financed Hizbuttahrir’s
activities in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus and the Taliban’s insurgency
campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Therefore, before George W. Bush’s
announcement of the “Axis of Evil,” the Khatami government cooperated with the
USA to overthrow the Taliban regime.52 In addition to this, the War on Terror
policy helped restore Turkey’s relations with Russia and Iran against Salafi-oriented
Islam, which reduced the Turkish and Iranian influence in the region. It is important
to note that Turkey’s policy change recognizing the Russian – Chechen conflict as an
internal Russian affair came after the removal of PKK guerrillas from Iran and Russia
in the late 1990s. However, Turkey never sacrificed its alliance relationship with the
USA, enjoyed participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program53 and sup-
ported US-led war in Afghanistan in terms of the Northern Distribution Network
and ISAF in Central Asia.54

Though the US-led operation removed Saddam’s hostile regime, strategically this
operation by Western military forces have checked the influence of both Turkey and
Iran in the region. While the superpower cannot ignore middle powers,55 Turkey and
Iran’s geopolitical role as a balancing actor between conflicting parties that intersect
with the interests of the global powers is questionable.56 In addition to the long his-
torical experience in the region, both countries’ military machines and social capital
have the capacity to strike bargains with global and regional powers in the Middle
East.57 However despite this, Turkey and Iran have to accept US military presence
in GCC countries, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE and Oman, host US forces that
play an essential role in American military supremacy in the Persian Gulf.58
It is essential to note that the Persian Gulf is the only passageway for Iranian oil trans-
port. Therefore, Iran prefers to maintain friendly relations with the GCC states despite
their close military alliance with the USA. Similarly, on account of increasing US-led
war in Iraq, it is presumed that the Turkish Parliament did not allow the US army a
short-pass through its territory into the Northern Front in Iraq. Strategically thinking,
the Turkish elite feared that granting passage to foreign forces through densely popu-
lated Kurdish areas could create a long-term threat to Turkish national security. The
US-led war would cause the country to be split and allow for the strengthening of
the Kurdish separatist movement against a backdrop of instability and chaos. Many
diplomats and scholars believe that one of the primary turning points in Turkish –
American relations was the US seizure of Turkish Special Forces in Northern Iraq in
2003 as it led to the deterioration of Turkish– American security ties, allowing for
improved Turkish– Iranian economic and political relations. In addition, the increase
in The Party of the Free Life of Kurdistan’s (PJAK) military campaigns against Iran
further developed Turkish– Iranian security relations since 2004.
Growing Relations with Iran

During the Turkish – US turmoil, Ankara and Tehran reviewed their bilateral
relations. The then General Secretary of the National Security Council (MGK),
Tuncer Kılınç, went so far as to say “Turkey would be better off trying to form alli-
ances with Russia and Iran.”59 Robert Olson claimed that Turkey – Iran relations
increased dramatically following Turkey’s concern regarding possible external
support for Kurdish nationalism in Northern Iraq.60 Olson posits that Turkish –
Iranian interests overlapped in regional politics after the US-led invasion of Iraq.61
Turkey’s growing relations with Iran can be sub-divided into four categories,
namely security mechanisms, economic relations and the Turkey – Brazil – Iran
nuclear swap deal. There are four institutional security mechanisms, which organize
the security relations of Turkey and Iran. The High Security Commission and the
Turkey – Iran Joint-Security Commission are the most significant security mechan-
isms between the Turkish and Iranian governments. However, these mechanisms
did not function effectively until Iran accepted the PKK as a terrorist organization
in 2004. The insurgency campaign of PJAK (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistane)
was the key to Tehran’s policy change.

A second parameter in bilateral relations is that of economic interactions. By 2000,
cross border trade reached nearly $1billion, a figure that increased to $4 billion in
2005. In 2008, Turkey became Iran’s fifth largest trading partner and cross-border
trade exceeded $10 billion. However, trade fell to $5.63 billion in 2009 due to a slow-
down in the global economy.62 Improving the bilateral trade is in the interest of both
neighboring countries. In tandem with, the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan
claimed that Iranian – Turkish bilateral trade would reach $30 billion by 2015.63 In an
interview with Press TV in July 2010, Mohsen Rezaee, a former military commander
and currently the Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, claimed the potential value of Iranian – Turkish trade to be
around $40– 50 billion.64
Turkey’s energy hub ambition is not competitive for Iran’s initiatives in the
Caspian Sea and the Middle East; it would be rather more supportive should
Iranian gas join the Southern Corridor of the EU through Turkey. Finally,
Turkey’s approach to the Iranian nuclear program is tied to Turkey’s own security
considerations, because Turkey considers potential Iranian instability to be more
dangerous than a nuclear Iran. Due to ethnic and religious diversity, the instability
or weakening of central power in Iran can cause a civil war that would directly
affect Turkey’s national security in the Kurdish region. Additionally, Turkey supports
Iran’s peaceful nuclear program but would not welcome a nuclear weapons
program.65 Hence, the Turkey – Brazil – Iran nuclear fuel deal was also aimed to
avoid stopping the imposition of sanctions that could destabilize the Iranian regime.
Turkey’s Soft Power Strategy

Coupled with the events of the Arab Spring, the rise of Turkey as a new regional
power signals a major shift in the Middle East labyrinth. Turkey’s creeping rehabili-
tation with the Middle East could change the regional balance of power and further
fracture the Arab system. To this end, growing relations between Turkey, Iran and
Syria heralded a new triangle to replace the old Arab triangle (Egypt– Syria and
Saudi Arabia).66 The new dynamics of Turkish activism are not only grounded in his-
torical continuity,67 but also introduce new models of democratic transition for the
Arab Middle East. Simultaneously, the AKP started using multi-channels to
produce reliable access strategies into the Middle East.68 Ankara has mediated
between Israel and Syria, Israel and Hamas, Syria and Iraq, within the broader
Sunni and Arab world, as well as between the USA and Iran. Turkey’s mediation
efforts between Israel and Hamas can facilitate positive movement against a self-
imposed mutual boycott of contact, but this mediation has not proven to be success-
ful. Similarly, Turkey’s initiative in the Israel – Syria mediation effort is no longer in
process. Turkey’s confident Islamic identity and its difficult EU membership appli-
cation have dramatically increased skepticism surrounding the relationship between
Turkey and Europe and drawn Turkey to look more seriously at engaging with the
Middle East. However, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has clearly
stated on several occasions that “We are not turning our face to East or West.”
Rather, his seminal work Strategic Depth (Stratejik Derinlik) weaves elaborate con-
nections between Turkey’s past and present and among its relations in Middle East.69
Turkey’s spoke and hub diplomacy, including rhythmic diplomacy, and a policy of
“zero problems” toward its neighbors have already enabled the creation of a visa-
free regime and the development of free trade agreements linking Turkey, Jordan,
Lebanon and Syria.70 Turkey’s new activism achieved some degree of success in
the four round Syrian – Israeli peace talks.71 Turkey believed that an Israel – Syrian
agreement could weaken Iran – Syria – Hezbollah ties. The Israel – Hezbollah war in
Lebanon triggered Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s call for his Turkish counterpart’s
mediation between Israel and Syria in September 2006 at the track-one level.72 So
the mediation began with an offer by Turkey to mediate. However, Iran has not
been happy with Turkey’s mediation and the rise of its soft power in the region.
The rise of Turkey’s soft power strategy underwent a strain with Israel and the US
diplomatic environment when then Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül hosted
the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS)’s leader Khalid Mashal at the headquar-
ters of the AKP building on February 16, 2006.73 An Israeli official had announced
earlier that the visit would be damaging to Israeli – Turkish relations, and asked “How
would you feel if we hosted Abdullah Öcalan?”74 Turkey was of the opinion that the
lack of US –EU and Israeli diplomatic ties with HAMAS and Hezbollah would give
credibility to Turkey’s soft power strategies despite the deliberate risk of its regional
alliance relationship. However, Turkey’s open political channels to Hamas enabled it
to offer to mediate on a prisoners’ exchange deal in the aftermath of the capture of
Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in June 2006 though the mediation did not succeed.
The mediation process between Israel and Syria was delayed by Israel’s bombing
of Syria’s military installation in September 2007 (incidentally flying through
Turkish airspace). Between May 2008 and December 2008, four rounds of official
indirect talks via Turkey’s shuttle diplomacy took place. But, the Turkish – Israeli
relationship deteriorated after Ehud Olmert’s visit to Turkey and Israel’s Operation
Cast Lead invasion of Gaza in December 2008 – January 2009 halted the peace
process. This was followed by the Davos demarche of Erdogan in 2009 and the
Mavi Marmara incident on May 22, 2010, which led to the freezing of Turkish –
Israeli military relations.
Turkey’s soft power strategy also performed a conciliatory role between hostile
Arab states such as the Syrian – Iraqi dispute over the latter’s accusation of bombings
in Baghdad in August 2009. Finally, Turkey mediated a micro-crisis over the quasi-
cancellation of a state visit by the King of Saudi Arabia to Syria in the fall of 2009 on
account of tensions between Damascus and Riyadh. The 2009 High-Level Strategic
Cooperation Council Agreements between Turkey and Syria, and Turkey and Iraq,
with the possibility that they could include Iran in the future, was an unprecedented
development. Much of this is now on hold with the uprisings in Syria.
Since the demonstrations of March 2011, the Syrian government has used force
against protestors, forcing Turkey to review its close relations with the Assad
regime. Turkey’s expectation from Syria is that peaceful transition has to be facili-
tated under the initiatives of the Assad regime.75 Turkey warned that should Syria
fail to introduce a democratic transition and continue to use violence against its civi-
lians; the regime would invite foreign penetration into Syria. Ankara fears that foreign
military intervention similar to that which occurred in Iraq and Libya will destroy the
countries’ political and societal structure to reveal old rivalries and create new hosti-
lities between parties.76 Hence, Turkey has stopped its protection policy of Syrian
government amid international pressure. On the other hand, a prominent Middle
East political analyst, Meir Javedanfar, claims that Iranian government gives the
Assad regime diplomatic and military support to maintain its alliance regime in
Syria by sending security advisers, and technical support for shutting off the Internet
to control anti-government demonstrations.77 The Iranian government has also
repeatedly criticized Turkey’s policy toward the Assad regime. Turkey and Iran
also have their own regional ambitions, which are now manifested in Syria. The situ-
ation is likely to increase pressure on Turkey to review its ties with Tehran.
Turkey’s soft power strategy is not limited to regional conflict but also includes the
domestic affairs of Arab states. For example, in October 2009 Turkish military officials
participated in mediation efforts between the Egyptian government and the Muslim
Brotherhood78 and gave counter insurgency training to the transitional government
of Egypt following the ousting of Hosni Mubarak. Similarly, Davutoğlu’s talks with
the leader of Hezbollah, Hasan Nasrallah, at his office in January 2011 regarding poten-
tial areas of conflict between Hezbollah and the new government strengthens Turkey’s
position in the Middle East.79 Turkey does not see either Hamas or Hezbollah as a
proxy of Iran when assessing their social and regional dynamics. However,
Turkey’s position on the “Arab Spring” has not yet identified any opportunities for
Turkish initiatives but Turkey’s economic engagement in Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) and the energy sectors continues to improve in the Middle East.
FDI Flow and Energy Politics

Turkey’s voluntary participation in the Greater Middle East Initiative and active role
in the active political role, introduced by George Bush in 2004, encouraged Turkish
private enterprise to invest in construction, oil, natural gas and telecommunication

systems in the Middle East.80 FDI flow is one of the criteria to analyze interdepen-
dence between Turkey and Middle Eastern countries. Looking at Turkey’s total
direct investment balance sheet, the highest rates of Turkish direct investment
abroad totaled $258,247 million in 2004 and $616,962 million in 2007. However,
total direct investment to Turkey from abroad increased from $16,789 million (in
2002) to $207,123 million in 2008.81 However, the figure dramatically reduced
over the last three years. Despite this, the Middle East now makes up 24 percent
of Turkey’s trade. Consequently, Turkey’s opening in the region has allowed it to
take advantage of cash flow from Arab states providing a flexible approach to over-
coming the global economic crisis.82
Energy innovation also features in Turkey’s soft power strategy toward the Middle
East policy exemplified in its initiatives in natural gas transport from Arab pipelines, in
Iraq, Qatar and Egypt.83 According to Cambridge Energy Research Associates, Turkey
will be the second largest natural gas market in Europe in 2020 and will play an essen-
tial role in terms of transit of Arab and Caspian gas to Europe.84 Turkey has three long-
term contracts with Russia, a 6 bcm contract ending in 2012, a 8 bcm contract ending in
2021 and a 16 bcm contract (Blue Stream) ending in 2028.85 Turkey’s 25-year contro-
versial natural gas contract with Iran is not economically profitable for Turkey due to
the contract arrangement, which does not contain “take-or-pay” options and the con-
tinued interruption of gas flow on the Tabriz – Turkey natural gas pipeline.86 Heavy
dependence on Iranian and Russian gas forced Turkey to diversify its energy supply
especially from Middle Eastern countries. Hence, Iraqi and Qatari gas are scheduled
to play an essential role in Turkish medium and long-term energy strategy.87 Turkey
has become a reliable partner to the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq. Turkish
state-owned energy company Petroleum Pipleine Corporation (Boru Hatları İle
Petrol Taşıma Anonim Şirketi) has entered into co-operation with Shell to develop
and market gas from Northern Iraq. Turkey’s long-term energy plan aims to build a par-
allel natural gas pipeline with Kirkuk – Ceyhan Oil Pipeline connecting Turkey to the
national network.88 In extension of this, the Turkish – Iraqi natural gas agreement,
signed in Ankara on August 7, 2007, provided an opportunity to transport Iraqi gas
to the international market.89 For the long-term energy strategy of Turkey, Qatar –
Iraq – Turkey pipeline will transport Arab gas through Turkey to the Europe. Qatar’s
significant investment in the LNG sector has meant that it prefers to use the LNG
option to double its natural gas trade with Turkey in the short term.90 In this regard,
Turkey’s soft power vision could contribute to the energy security of Europe if
Turkey successfully manages to be an energy trader country with Iran, Iraq, Qatar
and Caspian Sea. Interdependence between Europe and supplier countries can increase
the regional stability.
Conclusion
Turkey’s growing relations with Iran and its Arab Middle East neighbors has become
a function of Ankara’s application of its soft power, which includes broad economic
engagement and deepening ties in the energy sector. However, Turkey’s security
strategy is still broadly defined in relation to its NATO commitments, despite the dif-
ficulties within the alliance with regard to Israel and also the US’ security commit-
ments to the latter. This systemic dependency of Turkish defense strategy creates
problems with Iran and Syria in the region. Following the onset of the war on
terror, and the AKP’s rise to power in November 2002, Turkey embarked on a
new multi-dimensional political strategy and used its growing domestic reservoirs
of power to normalize its uneasy relations with Iran and the Arab Middle East. Nor-
malization of this magnitude in Turkey’s foreign policy accelerated when the new
government adopted overtly facilitative strategies in its diplomatic endeavors. The
potential for such substantive and indeed dramatic policy changes in Turkish politics
clearly existed, but could only become a reality upon the AKP’s rise to power and this
government’s confidence and willingness to deal with the deep-rooted societal and
identity politics of the Turkish state despite of some of the problems, like the
Kurdish issue which has not been really dealt with by AKP government.
Turkey’s new activism has aimed at keeping its old alliances in balance while
establishing relations with a new power center in the Middle East. Turkey’s strategy
is to avoid regional conflict and create relations of interdependence by using political,
social and economic channels, especially through private enterprise and the oil and
natural gas pipelines network. This matter is also related to Iran’s nuclear standoff
in Turkey’s regional strategy: Turkey perceives the dismemberment of Iran to be
more dangerous than even a nuclear Iran. In addition to this, developing Turkey’s
relations with Iran should be considered in the context of Turkey’s own new neigh-
borhood policy—Turkey requires good relations with its neighbors because instabil-
ity is not good for its own regional and international position. Finally, the success of
Turkey’s soft power strategy depends largely on the peaceful transformation of the
country’s domestic political environment, notably a resolution of the Kurdish ques-
tion and the place of political Islam in this constitutionally secular state. Ultimately,
peaceful political change in Turkey will influence the process and tempo of change in
the internal and external threat perceptions of state elites, which in turn will affect the
direction of the state’s current regional alignments in the Middle East. Peaceful dom-
estic political changes, thus, will add an aspect of inspiration on the country’s
regional role perception. At a time of rapid political change in the Middle East,
Turkey could again play a historically significant role, albeit wearing very different
political clothes compared with the last time Turks found themselves caught up in
an Arab awakening.
Notes
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5. In response to the Israeli Parliament’s declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israeli state in July 30,
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6. Robert Olson, Turkey– Iran Relations, 1979–2004: Revolution, Ideology, War, Coups and Geopolitics
(Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publishers, 2004).
7. Ibid.
8. G. Babak, Iran and Israel: Asymmetric Warfare and Regional Strategy (Defence Academy of the
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9. Robert Olson, Turkey-Iran Relations, 1979–2004: Revolution, Ideology, War, Coups and Geopolitics
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Turkey’s Growing Relations with Iran

ISSN 1468-3849 Print/1743-9663 Online/11/040643–20 # 2011 Taylor & Francis

against Western colonialization. However, the Ottoman Empire failed to introduce

societal, political and economic organizations. However, generally speaking, the

secular. Hence, Turkish government almost declared Manouchehr Mottaki persona

Geopolitics, Internal/ External Threats and Security Alignments

issue by the Baghdad government changed Turkey’s security perception toward

The Politics of Coercion and Post-Cold War Alignments

and ISAF in Central Asia.54

Growing Relations with Iran

was the key to Tehran’s policy change.

Turkey’s Soft Power Strategy

FDI Flow and Energy Politics

private enterprise to invest in construction, oil, natural gas and telecommunication

4. U. Mumcu, Kürt Islam Ayaklanmasi (1919–25) (Istanbul: Tekin Yayinevi, 1991).

national Relations, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1991), pp. 233 –56.

MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).

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