Free-Fall Lifeboat Safety: Purpose Incident Analysis - Aquarosa

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Marine Notice 15/2015

Free-fall lifeboat safety


Purpose Incident analysis – Aquarosa
This Marine Notice alerts the maritime The ATSB identified that the Second
industry to findings of two recent accident Engineer accidently activated the lifeboat’s
investigations conducted by the Australian on-load release mechanism while carrying
Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) and the out a test procedure. When the Second
New Zealand Transport Accident Engineer cycled the hydraulic system, the
Investigation Commission (TIAC). These retaining hook was released allowing the
investigations have highlighted ongoing lifeboat to move down the launch ramp.
safety issues related to free-fall lifeboats and
identified maintenance issues that the The ATSB found that the hydrostatic on-load
maritime industry should be aware of. release mechanism hydraulic cylinder ram
had not fully retracted after use, preventing
The incidents the stopper block from resetting correctly.
Aquarosa (IMO No. 9506708) - On 1 March This left the release hook in a partially
2014, Aquarosa’s free-fall lifeboat was disengaged position.
inadvertently released during a routine
maintenance inspection while the ship was The ATSB noted that the design of the
en route to Fremantle, Western Australia. release mechanism cover plate prevented
One crew member was injured in the incident visual confirmation that the hook was
and it took 5 hours for the crew to recover the correctly reset.
lifeboat.

Aquarosa’s Free-fall Lifeboat arrangement Aquarosa’s free-fall lifeboat release system

Da Dan Xia (IMO No. 9451290) - On 14 April The lifeboat was fitted with simulation wires
2014, the wire lifting sling for the ship’s free- to prevent it from launching under these
fall lifeboat failed catastrophically during circumstances. However, on this occasion,
recovery of the lifeboat after a routine the simulation wires failed allowing the
launching exercise in Wellington, New lifeboat to move down the guide rails into the
Zealand. This resulted in the lifeboat falling sea. The ATSB found that the simulation
several metres into harbour waters. One crew wires failed due to a combination of incorrect
member was injured, and the lifeboat installation and cumulative internal wear from
launching davit was rendered unserviceable. numerous shock loading events that resulted
from previous lifeboat launching drills.

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Incident analysis – Da Dan Xia On board safety management
TAIC identified that the wire pennants AMSA continues to observe numerous
parted under tensile overload. Subsequent defects and deficiencies related to ship’s
testing confirmed that the sling wires had lifeboats and liferafts. This is difficult to
been significantly weakened by severe understand given the IMO and AMSA focus
corrosion. This corrosion had gone on risks associated with the incorrect
undetected inside a plastic sheathing that operation and maintenance of survival
the manufacturer had fitted to the wire. craft.
The sheathing prevented the crew from Wire failure was the critical factor in both
identifying the corrosion and did not allow the Aquarosa and Da Dan Xia incidents.
for lubrication or the application of other This highlights the importance of:
corrosion-inhibiting substances. The crew
• Ships’ crews following established
were also unaware of the necessity for
maintenance procedures and being
greater vigilance and the application of
vigilant and observant during all
anticorrosive substances during inspections.
maintenance tasks.
• The examination of maintenance
procedures to ensure they are effective.
• Effective crew familiarization and
training, to minimise risk when crew are
conducting test procedures and training
drills.
AMSA inspections
Marine Notice 2/2014 highlighted the
requirement for additional restraints to be
installed on lifeboats during AMSA
inspections. This requirement is a control
Examples of the damage to Da Dan Xia’s wire slings mechanism that AMSA has implemented to
after failure (Courtesy TAIC) reduce the AMSA inspector’s exposure to
risk. It is recommended that these
TAIC found that the wires were of adequate restraints be used anytime maintenance is
strength when manufactured, but that the being carried out on lifeboats. The
sheathing allowed saltwater ingress, aiding continued cooperation of all owners,
corrosion by retaining water, and prevented operators and masters is appreciated.
external observation.
More information regarding the details of
IMO Convention requirements each investigation can be found at:
Chapter III, Regulation 20 of the www.taic.org.na/ReportsandSafetyRecs/
International Convention for the Safety of www.atsb.gov.au/publications/
Life at Sea (SOLAS) requires operational
readiness, maintenance, and inspection of
lifeboats and rescue boats. Under
applicable Australian law, owners and Gary Prosser
operators are responsible for implementing Deputy Chief Executive Officer
effective routines and procedures that meet Australian Maritime Safety Authority
SOLAS requirements. These incidents GPO Box 2181
reinforce the need to ensure effective CANBERRA ACT 2601
implementation of these processes. August 2015
File no: 2014/712

Internet address for all current Marine Notices: www.amsa.gov.au Page 2 of 2

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