Saludo v. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 498, G.R. No. 95536, March 23, 1992. COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 207 PDF

ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR.
,
MARIA SALVACION SALUDO,
LEOPOLDO G. SALUDO and
SATURNINO G. SALUDO,
petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, TRANS WORLD
AIRLINES, INC., and
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,
respondents.
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Saludo, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 95536. March 23, 1992.*
Remedial Law; Appeals; Petition for review on certiorari; Exceptions to rule on

conclusiveness of Court of Appeals findings of fact.—At the outset and in
view of the spirited exchanges of the parties on this aspect, it is to be
stressed that only questions of law may be raised in a petition filed in
this Court to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals.
This being so, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and
conclusive and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. The rule,
however, admits of established exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is
grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (c) when the inference made is
:
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (d) when the judgment of
the Court of Appeals was based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when
the factual findings are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when
the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion; and (h) where the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions
without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the
petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence
and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
Transportation Law; Common Carriers; Bill of Lading.—A bill of lading is a

written acknowledgment of the receipt of the goods and an agreement
to transport and deliver them at a specified place to a person named or
on his order. Such instrument may be called a shipping receipt,
forwarder’s receipt and receipt for transportation. The designation,
however, is immaterial. It has been held that freight tickets for bus
companies as well as receipts for cargo transported by
________________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
499
VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 499

:
all forms of transportation, whether by sea or land, fall within the
definition. Under the Tariff and Customs Code, a bill of lading includes
airway bills of lading. The two-fold character of a bill of lading is all too
familiar; it is a receipt as to the quantity and description of the goods
shipped and a contract to transport the goods to the consignee or other
person therein designated, on the terms specified in such instrument.
Same; Same; Same; A bill of lading, when properly executed and delivered to a
shipper, is evidence that the carrier has received the goods described therein for
shipment.—Ordinarily, a receipt is not essential to a complete delivery of
goods to the carrier for transportation but, when issued, is competent
and prima facie, but not conclusive, evidence of delivery to the carrier. A
bill of lading, when properly executed and delivered to a shipper, is
evidence that the carrier has received the goods described therein for
shipment. Except as modified by statute, it is a general rule as to the
parties to a contract of carriage of goods in connection with which a bill
of lading is issued reciting that goods have been received for
transportation, that the recital being in essence a receipt alone, is not
conclusive, but may be explained, varied or contradicted by parol or
other evidence.
Same; Same; Observance of extraordinary diligence, when it commences.

—Explicit is the rule under Article 1736 of the Civil Code that the
extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier begins from the time
the goods are delivered to the carrier. This responsibility remains in full
force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or stored in
transit, unless the shipper or owner exercises the right of stoppage in
transitu, and terminates only after the lapse of a reasonable time for the
acceptance of the goods by the consignee or such other person entitled
to receive them. And, there is delivery to the carrier when the goods are
:
ready for and have been placed in the exclusive possession, custody and
control of the carrier for the purpose of their immediate transportation
and the carrier has accepted them. Where such a delivery has thus been
accepted by the carrier, the liability of the common carrier commences
eo instanti. Hence, while we agree with petitioners that the
extraordinary diligence statutorily required to be observed by the
carrier instantaneously commences upon delivery of the goods thereto,
for such duty to commence there must in fact have been delivery of the
cargo subject of the contract of carriage. Only when such fact of delivery
has been unequivocally established can the liability for loss, destruction
or deterioration of goods in the custody of the carrier, absent the
excepting causes under Article 1734, attach and the presumption of
fault of the carrier under Article 1735 be invoked.
500

Same; Same; Right of carrier to require good faith on the part of shipper; Duty
of carrier to make general inquiry as to nature of articles shipped.—It is the
right of the carrier to require good faith on the part of those persons
who deliver goods to be carried, or enter into contracts with it, and
inasmuch as the freight may depend on the value of the article to be
carried, the carrier ordinarily has the right to inquire as to its value.
Ordinarily, too, it is the duty of the carrier to make inquiry as to the
general nature of the articles shipped and of their value before it
consents to carry them; and its failure to do so cannot defeat the
shipper’s right to recovery of the full value of the package if lost, in the
absence of showing of fraud or deceit on the part of the shipper. In the
absence of more definite information, the carrier has the right to accept
:
shipper’s marks as to the contents of the package offered for
transportation and is not bound to inquire particularly about them in
order to take advantage of a false classification and where a shipper
expressly represents the contents of a package to be of a designated
character, it is not the duty of the carrier to ask for a repetition of the
statement nor disbelieve it and open the box and see for itself. However,
where a common carrier has reasonable ground to suspect that the
offered goods are of a dangerous or illegal character, the carrier has the
right to know the character of such goods and to insist on an inspection,
if reasonable and practical under the circumstances, as a condition of
receiving and transporting such goods.
Same; Same; Interpretation of contracts.—The hornbook rule on

interpretation of contracts consecrates the primacy of the intention of
the parties, the same having the force of law between them. When the
terms of the agreement are clear and explicit, that they do not justify an
attempt to read into any alleged intention of the parties, the terms are to
be understood literally just as they appear on the face of the contract.
The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together and
such a construction is to be adopted as will give effect to all provisions
thereof. A contract cannot be construed by parts, but its clauses should
be interpreted in relation to one another. The whole contract must be
interpreted or read together in order to arrive at its true meaning.
Certain stipulations cannot be segregated and then made to control;
neither do particular words or phrases necessarily determine the
character of a contract. The legal effect of the contract is not to be
determined alone by any particular provision disconnected from all
others, but in the ruling intention of the parties as gathered from all the
language they have used and from their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts.
:
501
VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 501

Same; Same; Carrier’s liability for delay.—The oft-repeated rule regarding a

carrier’s liability for delay is that in the absence of a special contract, a
carrier is not an insurer against delay in transportation of goods. When
a common carrier undertakes to convey goods, the law implies a
contract that they shall be delivered at destination within a reasonable
time, in the absence of any agreement as to the time of delivery. But
where a carrier has made an express contract to transport and deliver
property within a specified time, it is bound to fulfill its contract and is
liable for any delay, no matter from what cause it may have arisen. This
result logically follows from the well-settled rule that where the law
creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled from performing it
without any default in himself, and has no remedy over, then the law
will excuse him, but where the party by his own contract creates a duty
or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good notwithstanding
any accident or delay by inevitable necessity because he might have
provided against it by contract. Whether or not there has been such an
undertaking on the part of the carrier is to be determined from the
circumstances surrounding the case and by application of the ordinary
rules for the interpretation of contracts.
Same; Same; Acceptance of bill of lading without dissent.—There is a holding

in most jurisdictions that the acceptance of a bill of lading without
dissent raises a presumption that all terms therein were brought to the
knowledge of the shipper and agreed to by him, and in the absence of
fraud or mistake, he is estopped from thereafter denying that he
assented to such terms. This rule applies with particular force where a
:
shipper accepts a bill of lading with full knowledge of its contents, and
acceptance under such circumstances makes it a binding contract. In
order that any presumption of assent to a stipulation in a bill of lading
limiting the liability of a carrier may arise, it must appear that the clause
containing this exemption from liability plainly formed a part of the
contract contained in the bill of lading. A stipulation printed on the back
of a receipt or bill of lading or on papers attached to such receipt will be
quite as effective as if printed on its face, if it is shown that the
consignor knew of its terms. Thus, where a shipper accepts a receipt
which states that its conditions are to be found on the back, such receipt
comes within the general rule, and the shipper is held to have accepted
and to be bound by the conditions there to be found.
Same; Same; Contracts of adhesion.—Granting arguendo that Condition No.

5 partakes of the nature of a contract of adhesion and as such must be
construed strictly against the party who drafted the same or gave rise to
any ambiguity therein, it should be borne in mind
502

that a contract of adhesion may be struck down as void and

unenforceable, for being subversive of public policy, only when the
weaker party is imposed upon in dealing with the dominant bargaining
party and is reduced to the alternative of taking it or leaving it,
completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.
However, Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, et al. instructs us that contracts of
adhesion are not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the
contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his
:
consent. Accordingly, petitioners, far from being the weaker party in
this situation, duly signified their presumed assent to all terms of the
contract through their acceptance of the airway bill and are
consequently bound thereby. It cannot be gainsaid that petitioners were
not without several choices as to carriers in Chicago with its numerous
airways and airlines servicing the same.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of

Appeals. Imperial, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for petitioners.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for Trans World Airlines, Inc.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for Phil. Airlines, Inc.
REGALADO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision in CA-

G.R. CV No. 20951 of respondent Court of Appeals1 which affirmed the
decision of the trial court2 dismissing for lack of evidence herein
petitioners’ complaint in Civil Case No. R-2101 of the then Court of First
Instance of Southern Leyte, Branch I.
The facts, as recounted by the court a quo and adopted by respondent

court after “considering the evidence on record,” are as follows:
________________
1Justice Jorge S. Imperial, ponente, with Justices Filemon D. Mendoza

and Artemon D. Luna, concurring; Petition, Annex C; Rollo, 154.
:
2
Penned by Judge Lucio F. Saavedra; Petition, Annex A; Rollo, 51.
503
VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 503

“After the death of plaintiffs’ mother, Crispina Galdo Saludo, in

Chicago, Illinois, (on) October 23, 1976 (Exh. A), Pomierski and Son
Funeral Home of Chicago, made the necessary preparations and
arrangements for the shipment of the remains from Chicago to the
Philippines. The funeral home had the remains embalmed (Exh. D) and
secured a permit for the disposition of dead human body on October 25,
1976 (Exh. C), Philippine Vice Consul in Chicago, Illinois, Bienvenido
M. Llaneta, at 3:00 p.m. on October 26, 1976 at the Pomierski & Son
Funeral Home, sealed the shipping case containing a hermetically
sealed casket that is airtight and waterproof wherein was contained the
remains of Crispina Saludo Galdo (sic) (Exh. B). On the same date,
October 26, 1976, Pomierski brought the remains to C.M.A.S
(Continental Mortuary Air Services) at the airport (Chicago) which
made the necessary arrangements such as flights, transfers, etc.;
C.M.A.S. is a national service used by undertakers throughout the
nation (U.S.A.), they furnish the air pouch which the casket is enclosed
in, and they see that the remains are taken to the proper air freight
terminal (Exh. 6-TWA). C.M.A.S. booked the shipment with PAL thru
the carrier’s agent Air Care International, with Pomierski F.H. as the
shipper and Mario (Maria) Saludo as the consignee. PAL Airway Bill
No. 079-01180454 Ordinary was issued wherein the requested routing
was from Chicago to San Francisco on board TWA Flight 131 of October
27, 1976, and from San Francisco to Manila on board PAL Flight No. 107
of the same date, and from Manila to Cebu on board PAL Flight 149 of
:
October 29, 1976 (See Exh. E., Also Exh. 1-PAL).
“In the meantime, plaintiffs Maria Salvacion Saludo and Saturnino

Saludo, thru a travel agent, were booked with United Airlines from
Chicago to California, and with PAL from California to Manila. She then
went to the funeral director of Pomierski Funeral Home who had her
mother’s remains and she told the director that they were booked with
United Airlines. But the director told her that the remains were booked
with TWA flight to California. This upset her, and she and her brother
had to change reservations from UA to the TWA flight after she
confirmed by phone that her mother’s remains would be on that TWA
flight. They went to the airport and watched from the look-out area. She
saw no body being brought. So, she went to the TWA counter again, and
she was told there was no body on that flight. Reluctantly, they took the
TWA flight upon assurance of her cousin, Ani Bantug, that he would
look into the matter and inform her about it on the plane or have it
radioed to her. But no confirmation from her cousin reached her that her
mother was on the West Coast.
“Upon arrival at San Francisco at about 5:00 p.m., she went to the TWA
counter there to inquire about her mother’s remains. She was told they
did not know anything about it.
504

“She then called Pomierski that her mother’s remains were not at the
West Coast terminal, and Pomierski immediately called C.M.A.S.,
which in a matter of 10 minutes informed him that the remains were on
:
a plane to Mexico City, that there were two bodies at the terminal, and
somehow they were switched; he relayed this information to Miss
Saludo in California; later C.M.A.S. called and told him they were
sending the remains back to California via Texas (see Exh. 6-TWA). “It
turned out that TWA had carried a shipment under PAL Airway Bill No.
079-ORD-01180454 on TWA Flight 603 of October 27, 1976, a flight
earlier than TWA Flight 131 of the same date. TWA delivered or
transferred the said shipment said to contain human remains to PAL at
1400H or 2:00 p.m. of the same date, October 27, 1976 (See Exh. 1-TWA).
‘Due to a switch(ing) in Chicago’, this shipment was withdrawn from
PAL by CMAS at 1805H (or 6:05 p.m.) of the same date, October 27
(Exh. 3-PAL, see Exh. 3-a-PAL).
“What transpired at the Chicago (A)irport is explained in a memo or

incident report by Pomierski (Exh. 6-TWA) to Pomierski’s lawyers who
in turn referred to said memo and enclosed it in their (Pomierski’s
lawyers) answer dated July 18, 1981 to herein plaintiff’s counsel (See
Exh. 5-TWA). In that memo or incident report (Exh. 6-TWA), it is stated
that the remains (of Crispina Saludo) were taken to CMAS at the
airport; that there were two bodies at the (Chicago Airport) terminal,
and somehow they were switched, that the remains (of Crispina Saludo)
were on a plane to Mexico City; that CMAS is a national service used by
undertakers throughout the nation (U.S.A.), makes all the necessary
arrangements, such as flights, transfers, etc., and see(s) to it that the
remains are taken to the proper air freight terminal.
“The following day October 28, 1976, the shipment or remains of

Crispina Saludo arrived (in) San Francisco from Mexico on board
American Airlines. This shipment was transferred to or received by PAL
at 1945H or 7:45 p.m. (Exh. 2-PAL, Exh. 2-a-PAL). This casket bearing
:
the remains of Crispina Saludo, which was mistakenly sent to Mexico
and was opened (there), was resealed by Crispin F. Padagas for
shipment to the Philippines (See Exh. B-1). The shipment was
immediately loaded on PAL flight for Manila that same evening and
arrived (in) Manila on October 30, 1976, a day after its expected arrival
on October 29, 1976.”3
In a letter dated December 15, 1976,4 petitioners’ counsel
_________________
3
Rollo, 159-163.
4
Exhibit G, Bill of Exhibits, 7.
505
VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 505

informed private respondent Trans World Airlines (TWA) of the

misshipment and eventual delay in the delivery of the cargo containing
the remains of the late Crispina Saludo, and of the discourtesy of its
employees to petitioners Maria Salvacion Saludo and Saturnino Saludo.
In a separate letter on June 10, 1977 addressed to co-respondent
Philippine Airlines (PAL),5 petitioners stated that they were holding
PAL liable for said delay in delivery and would commence judicial
action should no favorable explanation be given.
Both private respondents denied liability. Thus, a damage suit6 was

filed by petitioners before the then Court of First Instance, Branch III,
Leyte, praying for the award of actual damages of P50,000.00, moral
:
damages of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs
of suit.
As earlier stated, the court below absolved the two respondent airline
companies of liability. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
lower court in toto, and in a subsequent resolution,7 denied herein
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
In predictable disagreement and dissatisfaction with the conclusions

reached by respondent appellate court, petitioners now urge this Court
to review the appealed decision and to resolve whether or not (1) the
delay in the delivery of the casketed remains of petitioners’ mother was
due to the fault of respondent airline companies, (2) the one-day delay
in the delivery of the same constitutes contractual breach as would
entitle petitioners to damages, (3) damages are recoverable by
petitioners for the humiliating, arrogant and indifferent acts of the
employees of TWA and PAL, and (4) private respondents should be
held liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages, aside from
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.8
At the outset and in view of the spirited exchanges of the parties on this
aspect, it is to be stressed that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition filed in this Court to review on
_______________
5
Exhibit H, ibid., 9.
6
Original Record, 1.
7
Petition, Annex E; Rollo, 200.
:
8
Rollo, 16-17.
506

certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals.9 This being so, the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and
cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. The rule, however, admits of
established exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is grave abuse of
discretion; (b) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (c) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (d) when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals was based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the factual
findings are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;10 (g) when the Court
of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion;11 and (h) where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions without
citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the
petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence
and are contradicted by the evidence on record.12
To distinguish, a question of law is one which involves a doubt or

controversy on what the law is on a certain state of facts; and, a
question of fact, contrarily, is one in which there is a doubt or difference
as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.13 One test, it has been
:
held, is whether the appellate court can
________________
9
Section 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court.
10
Ramos, et al. vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I., et al., 19 SCRA 289
(1967); Malaysian Airline System Bernad vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
156 SCRA 321 (1987).
11 Abellana, et al. vs. Dosdos, etc., et al., 13 SCRA 244 (1965); Uytiepo, et
al. vs. Aggabao, et al., 35 SCRA 186 (1970); Carolina Industries, Inc. vs.
CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., 97 SCRA 734 (1980).
12
Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 33 SCRA 622 (1970); Sacay vs.
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 (1986); Manlapaz vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., 147 SCRA 236 (1987).
13
Pilar Development Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
507
VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 507

determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the

evidence, in which case it is a question of law, otherwise it will be a
question of fact.14
Respondent airline companies object to the present recourse of

petitioners on the ground that this petition raises only factual
questions.15 Petitioners maintain otherwise or, alternatively, they are of
the position that, assuming that the petition raises factual questions, the
:
same are within the recognized exceptions to the general rule as would
render the petition cognizable and worthy of review by the Court.16
Since it is precisely the soundness of the inferences or conclusions that

may be drawn from the factual issues which are here being assayed, we
find that the issues raised in the instant petition indeed warrant a
second look if this litigation is to come to a reasonable denouement. A
discussion seriatim of said issues will further reveal that the sequence of
the events involved is in effect disputed. Likewise to be settled is
whether or not the conclusions of the Court of Appeals subject of this
review indeed find evidentiary and legal support.
I. Petitioners fault respondent court for “not finding that private

respondents failed to exercise extraordinary diligence required by law
which resulted in the switching and/or misdelivery of the remains of
Crispina Saludo to Mexico causing gross delay in its shipment to the
Philippines, and consequently, damages to petitioners.”17
Petitioners allege that private respondents received the casketed

remains of petitioners’ mother on October 26, 1976, as evidenced by the
issuance of PAL Air Waybill No. 079-0118045418 by Air Care
International as carrier’s agent; and from said date, private respondents
were charged with the responsibility to et al., 146 SCRA 215 (1986).
________________
14
Vda. de Arroyo vs. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, et al,
23 SCRA 525 (1968).
15
Comment of Respondent TWA, 5; Rollo, 206; Comment of
Respondent PAL, 10-11; Rollo, 213.
:
16 Consolidated Reply, ibid., 229.
17
Rollo, 17-26.
18
Exhibit E, Bill of Exhibits, 5; Exhibit 1-PAL, Bill of Exhibits, 32.
508

exercise extraordinary diligence so much so that for the alleged

switching of the caskets on October 27, 1976, or one day after private
respondents received the cargo, the latter must necessarily be liable.
To support their assertion, petitioners rely on the jurisprudential

dictum, both under American and Philippine law, that “(t)he issuance of
a bill of lading carries the presumption that the goods were delivered to
the carrier issuing the bill, for immediate shipment, and it is nowhere
questioned that a bill of lading is prima facie evidence of the receipt of
the goods by the carrier. x x x In the absence of convincing testimony
establishing mistake, recitals in the bill of lading showing that the
carrier received the goods for shipment on a specified date control (13
C.J.S. 235).”19 A bill of lading is a written acknowledgment of the receipt
of the goods and an agreement to transport and deliver them at a
specified place to a person named or on his order. Such instrument may
be called a shipping receipt, forwarder’s receipt and receipt for
transportation.20 The designation, however, is immaterial. It has been
held that freight tickets for bus companies as well as receipts for cargo
transported by all forms of transportation, whether by sea or land, fall
within the definition. Under the Tariff and Customs Code, a bill of
lading includes airway bills of lading.21 The two-fold character of a bill
:
of lading is all too familiar; it is a receipt as to the quantity and
description of the goods shipped and a contract to transport the goods
to the consignee or other person therein designated, on the terms
specified in such instrument.22
Logically, since a bill of lading acknowledges receipt of goods to be

transported, delivery of the goods to the carrier normally precedes the
issuance of the bill; or, to some extent, delivery of the goods and
issuance of the bill are regarded in commercial practice as simultaneous
acts.23 However, except as may be
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19
Rollo, 20.
20
13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers 771.
21
4 Alcantara, Commercial Laws of the Philippines, 118 (1987).
22 13 C.J.S., Carriers, 233.
23 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers 775.
509
VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 509

prohibited by law, there is nothing to prevent an inverse order of events,

that is, the execution of the bill of lading even prior to actual possession
and control by the carrier of the cargo to be transported. There is no law
which requires that the delivery of the goods for carriage and the
issuance of the covering bill of lading must coincide in point of time or,
:
for that matter, that the former should precede the latter.
Ordinarily, a receipt is not essential to a complete delivery of goods to

the carrier for transportation but, when issued, is competent and prima
facie, but not conclusive, evidence of delivery to the carrier. A bill of
lading, when properly executed and delivered to a shipper, is evidence
that the carrier has received the goods described therein for shipment.
Except as modified by statute, it is a general rule as to the parties to a
contract of carriage of goods in connection with which a bill of lading is
issued reciting that goods have been received for transportation, that
the recital being in essence a receipt alone, is not conclusive, but may be
explained, varied or contradicted by parol or other evidence.24
While we agree with petitioners’ statement that “an airway bill estops
the carrier from denying receipt of goods of the quantity and quality
described in the bill,” a further reading and a more faithful quotation of
the authority cited would reveal that “(a) bill of lading may contain
constituent elements of estoppel and thus become something more than
a contract between the shipper and the carrier. x x x (However), as
between the shipper and the carrier, when no goods have been delivered for
shipment no recitals in the bill can estop the carrier from showing the true facts
x x x. Between the consignor of goods and a receiving carrier, recitals in a bill
of lading as to the goods shipped raise only a rebuttable presumption that such
goods were delivered for shipment. As between the consignor and a receiving
carrier, the fact must outweigh the recital.”25 (Italics supplied)
For this reason, we must perforce allow explanation by private

respondents why, despite the issuance of the airway bill
_______________
:
24
13 C.J.S., Carriers 232.
25 Op cit., 240-243.
510

and the date thereof, they deny having received the remains of Crispina
Saludo on October 26, 1976 as alleged by petitioners.
The findings of the trial court, as favorably adopted by the Court of

Appeals and which we have earlier quoted, provide us with the
explanation that sufficiently overcomes the presumption relied on by
petitioners in insisting that the remains of their mother were delivered
to and received by private respondents on October 26, 1976. Thus—
“x x x Philippine Vice Consul in Chicago, Illinois, Bienvenido M.

Llaneta, at 3:00 p.m. on October 26, 1976 at the Pomierski & Son Funeral
Home, sealed the shipping case containing a hermetically sealed casket
that is airtight and waterproof wherein was contained the remains of
Crispina Saludo Galdo (sic) (Exh. B). On the same date October 26, 1976,
Pomierski brought the remains to C.M.A.S. (Continental Mortuary Air
Services) at the airport (Chicago) which made the necessary arrangements such
as flights, transfers, etc; C.M.A.S. is a national service used by
undertakers throughout the nation (U.S.A.), they furnish the air pouch
which the casket is enclosed in, and they see that the remains are taken to
the proper air freight terminal (Exh. GTWA). C.M.A.S. booked the shipment
with PAL thru the carrier’s agent Air Care International, with Pomierski
F.H. as the shipper and Mario (Maria) Saludo as the consignee. PAL
Airway Bill No. 079-01180454 Ordinary was issued wherein the requested
:
routing was from Chicago to San Francisco on board TWA Flight 131 of
October 27, 1976, and from San Francisco to Manila on board PAL Flight No.
107 of the same date, and from Manila to Cebu on board PAL Flight 149 of
October 29, 1976 (See Exh. E, also Exh. 1-PAL).”26 (Emphasis ours).
Moreover, we are persuaded to believe private respondent PAL’s

account as to what transpired on October 26, 1976:
“x x x Pursuant thereto, on 26 October 1976, CMAS acting upon the

instruction of Pomierski, F.H., the shipper requested booking of the casketed
remains of Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo on board PAL’s San Francisco-Manila
Flight No. PR 107 on October 27, 1976.
“2. To signify acceptance and confirmation of said booking, PAL issued to said
Pomierski F.H., PAL Airway Bill No. 079-01180454 dated October 27, 1976
(sic, ‘10/26/76'). PAL confirmed the booking and transporting of the
shipment on board of its Flight PR 107 on October
________________
26 Rollo, 160.
511
VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 511

27, 1976 on the basis of the representation of the shipper and/or CMAS
that the said cargo would arrive in San Francisco from Chicago on
board United Airlines Flight US 121 on 27 October 1976.”27
In other words, on October 26, 1976 the cargo containing the casketed
:
remains of Crispina Saludo was booked for PAL Flight Number PR-107
leaving San Francisco for Manila on October 27, 1976, PAL Airway Bill
No. 079-01180454 was issued, not as evidence of receipt of delivery of
the cargo on October 26, 1976, but merely as a confirmation of the
booking thus made for the San Francisco-Manila flight scheduled on
October 27, 1976. Actually, it was not until October 28, 1976 that PAL
received physical delivery of the body at San Francisco, as duly
evidenced by the Interline Freight Transfer Manifest of the American
Airline Freight System and signed for by Virgilio Rosales at 1945H, or
7:45 P.M. on said date.28
Explicit is the rule under Article 1736 of the Civil Code that the
extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier begins from the time
the goods are delivered to the carrier. This responsibility remains in full
force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or stored in
transit, unless the shipper or owner exercises the right of stoppage in
transitu,29 and terminates only after the lapse of a reasonable time for
the acceptance of the goods by the consignee or such other person
entitled to receive them.30 And, there is delivery to the carrier when the
goods are ready for and have been placed in the exclusive possession,
custody and control of the carrier for the purpose of their immediate
transportation and the carrier has accepted them.31 Where such a
delivery has thus been accepted by the carrier, the liability of the
common carrier commences eo instanti.32
Hence, while we agree with petitioners that the extraordinary diligence

statutorily required to be observed by the carrier
________________
27 Memorandum for Private Respondent PAL, 1-2.

:
28
Exhibits 2 and 2-A PAL; Bill of Exhibits, 31.
29
Article 1737, Civil Code.
30
Article 1738, id.
31 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers 763-764.
32 Op cit., 762-763.
512

instantaneously commences upon delivery of the goods thereto, for

such duty to commence there must in fact have been delivery of the
cargo subject of the contract of carriage. Only when such fact of delivery
has been unequivocally established can the liability for loss, destruction
or deterioration of goods in the custody of the carrier, absent the
excepting causes under Article 1734, attach and the presumption of
fault of the carrier under Article 1735 be invoked.
As already demonstrated, the facts in the case at bar belie the averment
that there was delivery of the cargo to the carrier on October 26, 1976.
Rather, as earlier explained, the body intended to be shipped as agreed
upon was really placed in the possession and control of PAL on October
28, 1976 and it was from that date that private respondents became
responsible for the agreed cargo under their undertakings in PAL
Airway Bill No. 079-01180454. Consequently, for the switching of
caskets prior thereto which was not caused by them, and subsequent
events caused thereby, private respondents cannot be held liable.
:
Petitioners, proceedings on the premise that there was delivery of the
cargo to private respondents on October 26, 1976 and that the latter’s
extraordinary responsibility had by then become operative, insist on
foisting the blame on private respon-dents for the switching of the two
caskets which occurred on October 27, 1976. It is argued that since there
is no clear evidence establishing the fault of Continental Mortuary Air
Services (CMAS) for the mix-up, private respondents are presumably
negligent pursuant to Article 1735 of the Civil Code and, for failure to
rebut such presumption, they must necessarily be held liable; or,
assuming that CMAS was at fault, the same does not absolve private
respondents of liability because whoever brought the cargo to the
airport or loaded it on the plane did so as agent of private respondents.
This contention is without merit. As pithily explained by the Court of

Appeals:
“The airway bill expressly provides that ‘Carrier certifies goods

described below were received for carriage’, and said cargo was
‘casketed human remains of Crispina Saludo,’ with ‘Maria Saludo as
Consignee; Pomierski F.H. as Shipper; Air Care International as
513
VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 513

carrier’s agent.’ On the face of the said airway bill, the specific flight
numbers, specific routes of shipment and dates of departure and arrival
were typewritten, to wit: Chicago TWA Flight 131/27 to San Francisco
and from San Francisco by PAL 107 on October 27, 1976 to Philippines
and to Cebu via PAL Flight 149 on October 29, 1976. The airway bill also
:
contains the following typewritten words, as follows: ‘all documents
have been examined (sic). Human remains of Crispina Saludo. Please
return back (sic) first available flight to SFO.
“But, as it turned out and was discovered later the casketed human
remains which was issued PAL Airway Bill #079-01180454 was not the
remains of Crispina Saludo, the casket containing her remains having
been shipped to Mexico City.
“However, it should be noted that, Pomierski F.H., the shipper of Mrs.

Saludo’s remains, hired Continental Mortuary Services (hereafter
referred to as C.M.A.S.), which is engaged in the business of
transporting and forwarding human remains. Thus, C.M.A.S. made all
the necessary arrangements—such as flights, transfers, etc.—for
shipment of the remains of Crispina Saludo.
‘The remains were taken on October 26th, 1976, to C.M.A.S. at the

airport. These people made all the necessary arrangements, such as
flights, transfers, etc. This is a national service used by undertakers
throughout the nation. They furnished the air pouch which the casket is
enclosed in, and they see that the remains are taken to the proper air
freight terminal. I was very surprised when Miss Saludo called me to
say that the remains were not at the west coast terminal. I immediately
called C.M.A.S. They called me back in a matter of ten minutes to inform me
that the remains were on a plane to Mexico City. The man said that there were
two bodies at the terminal, and somehow they were switched. x x x (Exh. 6—
‘TWA’, which is the memo or incident report enclosed in the stationery
of Walter Pomierski & Sons Ltd.)’
“Consequently, when the cargo was received from C.M.A.S. at the

Chicago airport terminal for shipment, which was supposed to contain
:
the remains of Crispina Saludo, Air Care International and/or TWA, had no
way of determining its actual contents, since the casket was hermetically sealed
by the Philippine Vice-Consul in Chicago and in an air pouch of C.M.A.S., to
the effect that Air Care International and/or TWA had to rely on the
information furnished by the shipper regarding the cargo’s content. Neither
could Air Care International and/or TWA open the casket for further
verification, since they were not only without authority to do so, but even
prohibited.
“Thus, under said circumstances, no fault and/or negligence can be

attributed to PAL (even if Air Care International should be
514

considered as an agent of PAL) and/or TWA, the entire fault or

negligence being exclusively with C.M.A.S.”33 (Emphasis supplied.)
It can correctly and logically be concluded, therefore, that the switching

occurred or, more accurately, was discovered on October 27, 1976; and
based on the above findings of the Court of Appeals, it happened while
the cargo was still with CMAS, well before the same was placed in the
custody of private respondents.
Thus, while the Air Cargo Transfer Manifest of TWA of October 27,
197634 was signed by Garry Marcial of PAL at 1400H, or 2:00 P.M., on
the same date, thereby indicating acknowledgment by PAL of the
transfer to them by TWA of what was in truth the erroneous cargo, said
misshipped cargo was in fact withdrawn by CMAS from PAL as shown
by the notation on another copy of said manifest35 stating “Received by
:
CMAS—Due to switch in Chicago 10/27-1805H,” the authenticity of
which was never challenged. This shows that said misshipped cargo
was in fact withdrawn by CMAS from PAL and the correct shipment
containing the body of Crispina Saludo was received by PAL only on
October 28, 1976, at 1945H, or 7:45 P.M., per American Airlines Interline
Freight Transfer Manifest No. AA204312.36 Witness the deposition of
TWA’s ramp serviceman, Michael Giosso, on this matter:
“ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.:

On that date, do (sic) you have occasion to handle or deal with the transfer
of cargo from TWA Flight No. 603 to PAL San Francisco?
MICHAEL GIOSSO:
Yes, I did.
ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.:
What was your participation with the transfer of the cargo?
_______________
33 Rollo, 163-165.
34
Exhibit 1-TWA, Bill of Exhibits, 33.
35 Exhibit 3-PAL, ibid., 30.
36 Exhibit 2-PAL, ibid., 101.
515
VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 515

MICHAEL GIOSSO:
I manifested the freight on a transfer manifest and physically moved it to
PAL and concluded the transfer by signing it off.
:
You brought it there yourself?
MICHAEL GIOSSO:
Yes, sir.
Do you have anything to show that PAL received the cargo from TWA on
October 27, 1976?
MICHAEL GIOSSO:
Yes, I do.
(Witness presenting a document)

For purposes of clarity, Exhibit I is designated as Exhibit I-TWA.
xxx
This Exhibit I-TWA, could you tell what it is, what it shows?
MICHAEL GIOSSO:
It shows transfer of manifest on 10-27-76 to PAL at 1400 and verified with
two signatures as it completed the transfer.
Very good, Who was the PAL employee who received the cargo?
MICHAEL GIOSSO:
The name is Garry Marcial.”37
The deposition of Alberto A. Lim, PAL’s cargo supervisor at San

Francisco, as deponent-witness for PAL, makes this further clarification:
“ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:

You mentioned Airway Bill, Mr. Lim. I am showing to you a PAL Airway
Bill Number 01180454 which for purposes of evidence, I would like to
request that the same be marked as evidence Exhibit I for PAL.
:
xxx
In what circumstances did you encounter Exhibit I-PAL?
_______________
37 Exhibit 5-PAL, ibid., 39-41.
516

ALBERTO A. LIM:
If I recall correctly, I was queried by Manila, our Manila office with regard
to a certain complaint that a consignee filed that this shipment did not
arrive on the day that the consignee expects the shipment to arrive.
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
Okay. Now, upon receipt of that query from your Manila office, did you
conduct any investigation to pinpoint the possible causes of mishandling?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
Yes.
xxx
What is the result of your investigation?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
In the course of my investigation, I found that we received the body on
October 28, 1976, from American Airlines.
What body are you referring to?
xxx
ALBERTO A. LIM:
The remains of Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo.
:
Is that the same body mentioned in this Airway Bill?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
Yes.
What time did you receive said body on October 28, 1976?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
If I recall correctly, approximately 7:45 of October 28, 1976.
Do you have any proof with you to back the statement?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
Yes. We have on our records a Transfer Manifest from American Airlines
Number 204312 showing that we received a human remains shipment
belong to Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo or the human remains of Mrs. Cristina
(sic) Saludo.
At this juncture, may I request that the Transfer Manifest referred to by the
witness be marked as an evidence as Exhibit II-PAL.
xxx
517
VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 517

Mr. Lim, yesterday your co-defendant TWA presented as their Exhibit I
evidence tending to show that on October 27, 1976 at about 2:00 in the
afternoon they delivered to you a cargo bearing human remains. Could you
go over this Exhibit I and please give us your comments as to that exhibit?
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MENDOZA:
That is a vague question. I would rather request that counsel propound
specific questions rather than asking for comments on Exhibit I-TWA.
In that case, I will reform my question. Could you tell us whether TWA in
fact delivered to you the human remains as indicated in that Transfer
:
Manifest?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
Yes, they did.
I noticed that the Transfer Manifest of TWA marked as Exhibit I-TWA bears
the same numbers or the same entries as the Airway Bill marked as Exhibit
I-A PAL tending to show that this is the human remains of Mrs. Cristina
(sic) Saludo. Could you tell us whether this is true?
ALBERTO A. LIM.
It is true that we received human remains shipment from TWA as indicated
on this Transfer Manifest. But in the course of investigation, it was found
out that the human remains transferred to us is not the remains of Mrs.
Cristina (sic) Saludo which is the reason why we did not board it on our
flight.”38
Petitioners consider TWA’s statement that “it had to rely on the

information furnished by the shipper” a lame excuse and that its failure
to prove that its personnel verified and identified the contents of the
casket before loading the same constituted negligence on the part of
TWA.39
We uphold the favorable consideration by the Court of Appeals of the

following findings of the trial court:
“It was not (to) TWA, but to C.M.A.S. that the Pomierski & Son Funeral
Home delivered the casket containing the remains of Crispina
_______________
38 Exhibit 5-PAL, ibid., 58-63, 71-73.
39
Rollo, 229-230.
518
:
Saludo. TWA would have no knowledge therefore that the remains of

Crispina Saludo were not the ones inside the casket that was being
presented to it for shipment. TWA would have to rely on the
representations of C.M.A.S. The casket was hermetically sealed and also
sealed by the Philippine Vice Consul in Chicago. TWA or any airline for that
matter would not have opened such a sealed casket just for the purpose of
ascertaining whose body was inside and to make sure that the remains inside
were those of the particular person indicated to be by C.M.A.S. TWA had to
accept whatever information was being furnished by the shipper or by the one
presenting the casket for shipment. And so as a matter of fact, TWA carried
to San Francisco and transferred to defendant PAL a shipment covered
by or under PAL Airway Bill No. 079-ORD-01180454, the airway bill for
the shipment of the casketed remains of Crispina Saludo. Only, it turned
out later, while the casket was already with PAL, that what was inside
the casket was not the body of Crispina Saludo so much so that it had to
be withdrawn by C.M.A.S. from PAL. The body of Crispina Saludo had
been shipped to Mexico. The casket containing the remains of Crispina
Saludo was transshipped from Mexico and arrived in San Francisco the
following day on board American Airlines. It was immediately loaded
by PAL on its flight for Manila.
“The foregoing points at C.M.A.S., not defendant TWA much less

defendant PAL, as the ONE responsible for the switching or mix-up of
the two bodies at the Chicago Airport terminal, and started a chain
reaction of the misshipment of the body of Crispina Saludo and a one-
day delay in the delivery thereof to its destination.40
Verily, no amount of inspection by respondent airline companies could

:
have guarded against the switching that had already taken place. Or,
granting that they could have opened the casket to inspect its contents,
private respondents had no means of ascertaining whether the body
therein contained was indeed that of Crispina Saludo except, possibly, if
the body was that of a male person and such fact was visually apparent
upon opening the casket. However, to repeat, private respondents had
no authority to unseal and open the same nor did they have any reason
or justification to resort thereto.
It is the right of the carrier to require good faith on the part of those
persons who deliver goods to be carried, or enter into contracts with it,
and inasmuch as the freight may depend on
_______________
40
Ibid., 166-167.
519
VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 519

the value of the article to be carried, the carrier ordinarily has the right
to inquire as to its value. Ordinarily, too, it is the duty of the carrier to
make inquiry as to the general nature of the articles shipped and of their
value before it consents to carry them; and its failure to do so cannot
defeat the shipper’s right to recovery of the full value of the package if
lost, in the absence of showing of fraud or deceit on the part of the
shipper. In the absence of more definite information, the carrier has the
right to accept shipper’s marks as to the contents of the package offered
for transportation and is not bound to inquire particularly about them
in order to take advantage of a false classification and where a shipper
:
expressly represents the contents of a package to be of a designated
character, it is not the duty of the carrier to ask for a repetition of the
statement nor disbelieve it and open the box and see for itself.41
However, where a common carrier has reasonable ground to suspect
that the offered goods are of a dangerous or illegal character, the carrier
has the right to know the character of such goods and to insist on an
inspection, if reasonable and practical under the circumstances, as a
condition of receiving and transporting such goods.42
It can safely be said then that a common carrier is entitled to fair

representation of the nature and value of the goods to be carried, with
the concomitant right to rely thereon, and further noting at this juncture
that a carrier has no obligation to inquire into the correctness or
sufficiency of such information.43 The consequent duty to conduct an
inspection thereof arises in the event that there should be reason to
doubt the veracity of such representations. Therefore, to be subjected to
unusual search, other than the routinary inspection procedure
customarily undertaken, there must exist proof that would justify cause
for apprehension that the baggage is dangerous as to warrant
exhaustive inspection, or even refusal to accept carriage of the same;
and it is the failure of the carrier to act accordingly in the
_______________
41
13 C.J.S., Carriers 148.
42
13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers 751.
43
Manuel A. Barcelona, Liabilities of Carriers: Airline Practices and
Procedures, in CURRENT ISSUES AFFECTING AIRLINES IN THE
PHILIPPINES, 103 (1989).
:
520

face of such proof that constitutes the basis of the common carrier’s
liability.44
In the case at bar, private respondents had no reason whatsoever to

doubt the truth of the shipper’s representations. The airway bill
expressly providing that “carrier certifies goods received below were
received for carriage,” and that the cargo contained “casketed human
remains of Crispina Saludo,” was issued on the basis of such
representations. The reliance thereon by private respondents was
reasonable and, for so doing, they cannot be said to have acted
negligently. Likewise, no evidence was adduced to suggest even an iota
of suspicion that the cargo presented for transportation was anything
other than what it was declared to be, as would require more than
routine inspection or call for the carrier to insist that the same be
opened for scrutiny of its contents per declaration.
Neither can private respondents be held accountable on the basis of

petitioner’s preposterous proposition that whoever brought the cargo to
the airport or loaded it on the airplane did so as agent of private
respondents, so that even if CMAS whose services were engaged for the
transit arrangements for the remains was indeed at fault, the liability
therefor would supposedly still be attributable to private respondents.
While we agree that the actual participation of CMAS has been

sufficiently and correctly established, to hold that it acted as agent for
private respondents would be both an inaccurate appraisal and an
:
unwarranted categorization of the legal position it held in the entire
transaction.
It bears repeating that CMAS was hired to handle all the necessary
shipping arrangements for the transportation of the human remains of
Crispina Saludo to Manila. Hence, it was to CMAS that the Pomierski &
Son Funeral Home, as shipper, brought the remains of petitioners’
mother for shipment, with Maria Saludo as consignee. Thereafter,
CMAS booked the shipment with PAL through the carrier’s agent, Air
Care International.45 With its aforestated functions, CMAS may
accordingly be classified as a forwarder which, by accepted
_______________
44 Nocum vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., 30 SCRA 69 (1969).
45 Rollo, 160.
521
VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 521

commercial practice, is regarded as an agent of the shipper and not of

the carrier. As such, it merely contracts for the transportation of goods
by carriers, and has no interest in the freight but receives compensation
from the shipper as his agent.46
At this point, it can be categorically stated that, as culled from the

findings of both the trial court and appellate courts, the entire chain of
events which culminated in the present controversy was not due to the
fault or negligence of private respondents. Rather, the facts of the case
:
would point to CMAS as the culprit. Equally telling of the more likely
possibility of CMAS’ liability is petitioners’ letter to and demanding an
explanation from CMAS regarding the statement of private respondents
laying the blame on CMAS for the incident, portions of which, reading
as follows:
“x x x we were informed that the unfortunate a mix-up occurred due to

your negligence. x x x.
“Likewise, the two airlines pinpoint the responsibility upon your

agents. Evidence were presented to prove that allegation.
“On the face of this overwhelming evidence we could and should have
filed a case against you. x x x.”47
clearly allude to CMAS as the party at fault. This is tantamount to an

admission by petitioners that they consider private respondents
without fault, or is at the very least indicative of the fact that petitioners
entertained serious doubts as to whether herein private respondents
were responsible for the unfortunate turn of events.
Undeniably, petitioners’ grief over the death of their mother was

aggravated by the unnecessary inconvenience and anxiety that attended
their efforts to bring her body home for a decent burial. This is
unfortunate and calls for sincere commiseration with petitioners. But,
much as we would like to give them consolation for their undeserved
distress, we are barred by the inequity of allowing recovery of the
damages prayed for by them at the expense of private respondents
whose fault or negligence
________________
:
46
13 C.J.S., Carriers 41; 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers 572.
47
Annex 2, Opposition to Joint Motion to Dismiss, 1-2, Original Record,
253-254; Memorandum of Private Respondent TWA, 250.
522

in the very acts imputed to them has not been convincingly and legally
demonstrated.
Neither are we prepared to delve into, much less definitively rule on,
the possible liability of CMAS as the evaluation and adjudication of the
same is not what is presently at issue here and is best deferred to
another time and addressed to another forum.
II. Petitioners further fault the Court of Appeals for ruling that there
was no contractual breach on the part of private respondents as would
entitle petitioners to damages.
Petitioners hold that respondent TWA, by agreeing to transport the

remains of petitioners’ mother on its Flight 131 from Chicago to San
Francisco on October 27, 1976, made itself a party to the contract of
carriage and, therefore, was bound by the terms of the issued airway
bill. When TWA undertook to ship the remains on its Flight 603, ten
hours earlier than scheduled, it supposedly violated the express
agreement embodied in the airway bill. It was allegedly this breach of
obligation which compounded, if not directly caused, the switching of
the caskets.
:
In addition, petitioners maintain that since there is no evidence as to
who placed the body on board Flight 603, or that CMAS actually put the
cargo on that flight, or that the two caskets at the Chicago airport were
to be transported by the same airline, or that they came from the same
funeral home, or that both caskets were received by CMAS, then the
employees or agents of TWA presumably caused the mix-up by loading
the wrong casket on the plane. For said error, they contend, TWA must
necessarily be presumed negligent and this presumption of negligence
stands undisturbed unless rebutting evidence is presented to show that
the switching or misdelivery was due to circumstances that would
exempt the carrier from liability.
Private respondent TWA professes otherwise. Having duly delivered or

transferred the cargo to its co-respondent PAL on October 27, 1976 at
2:00 P.M., as supported by the TWA Transfer Manifest, TWA faithfully
complied with its obligation under the airway bill. Said faithful
compliance was not affected by the fact that the remains were shipped
on an earlier flight as there was no fixed time for completion of carriage
stipulated on. Moreover, the carrier did not undertake to carry the cargo
aboard any specified aircraft, in view of the condition on the
523
VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 523

back of the airway bill which provides:
“CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT
xxx
:
“It is agreed that no time is fixed for the completion of carriage
hereunder and that Carrier may without notice substitute alternate
carriers or aircraft. Carrier assumes no obligation to carry the goods by
any specified aircraft or over any particular route or routes or to make
connection at any point according to any particular schedule, and
Carrier is hereby authorized to select, or deviate from the route or
routes of shipment, notwithstanding that the same may be stated on the
face hereof. The shipper guarantees payment of all charges and
advances.”48
Hence when respondent TWA shipped the body on an earlier flight and
on a different aircraft, it was acting well within its rights. We find this
argument tenable.
The contention that there was contractual breach on the part of private
respondents is founded on the postulation that there was ambiguity in
the terms of the airway bill, hence petitioners’ insistence on the
application of the rules on interpretation of contracts and documents.
We find no such ambiguity. The terms are clear enough as to preclude
the necessity to probe beyond the apparent intendment of the
contractual provisions.
The hornbook rule on interpretation of contracts consecrates the

primacy of the intention of the parties, the same having the force of law
between them. When the terms of the agreement are clear and explicit,
that they do not justify an attempt to read into any alleged intention of
the parties, the terms are to be understood literally just as they appear
on the face of the contract.49 The various stipulations of a contract shall
be interpreted together50 and such a construction is to be adopted as
will give
:
_______________
48
Exhibit 2-A-TWA, Bill of Exhibits, 26.
49
Article 1370, Civil Code; Philippine Airlines vs. Philippine Airlines
Employees Association, 70 SCRA 180 (1976); Government Service
Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 145 SCRA 311 (1986);
Honrado, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 198 SCRA 326 (1991).
50
Article 1374, Civil Code.
524

effect to all provisions thereof.51 A contract cannot be construed by

parts, but its clauses should be interpreted in relation to one another.
The whole contract must be interpreted or read together in order to
arrive at its true meaning. Certain stipulations cannot be segregated and
then made to control; neither do particular words or phrases necessarily
determine the character of a contract. The legal effect of the contract is
not to be determined alone by any particular provision disconnected
from all others, but in the ruling intention of the parties as gathered
from all the language they have used and from their contemporaneous
and subsequent acts.52
Turning to the terms of the contract at hand, as presented by PAL Air

Waybill No. 079-01180454, respondent court approvingly quoted the
trial court’s disquisition on the aforequoted condition appearing on the
reverse side of the airway bill and its disposition of this particular
assigned error:
:
“The foregoing stipulation fully answers plaintiffs’ objections to the
one-day delay and the shipping of the remains in TWA Flight 603
instead of TWA Flight 131. Under the stipulation, parties agreed that no
time was fixed to complete the contract of carriage and that the carrier
may, without notice, substitute alternate carriers or aircraft. The carrier
did not assume the obligation to carry the shipment on any specified
aircraft.
xxx
“Furthermore, contrary to the claim of plaintiffs-appellants, the

conditions of the Air Waybill are big enough to be read and noticed.
Also, the mere fact that the cargo in question was shipped in TWA
Flight 603, a flight earlier on the same day than TWA Flight 131, did not
in any way cause or add to the one-day delay complained of and/or the
switching or mix-up of the bodies.”53
Indubitably, that private respondent can use substitute aircraft even

without notice and without the assumption of any obligation
whatsoever to carry the goods on any specified
_______________
51
See Section 9, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
52
Ruiz, et al. vs. Sheriff, et al., 34 SCRA 83 (1970); National Union Fire
Insurance Company of Pittsburg, et al. vs. Stolt-Nielsen Philippines,
Inc., et al., 184 SCRA 682 (1990).
53
Rollo, 168-169.
525
:
VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 525
aircraft is clearly sanctioned by the contract of carriage as specifically

provided for under the conditions thereof.
Petitioners’ invocation of the interpretative rule in the Rules of Court

that written words control printed words in documents,54 to bolster
their assertion that the typewritten provisions regarding the routing
and flight schedule prevail over the printed conditions, is tenuous. Said
rule may be considered only when there is inconsistency between the
written and printed words of the contract.
As previously stated, we find no ambiguity in the contract subject of

this case that would call for the application of said rule. In any event,
the contract has provided for such a situation by explicitly stating that
the above condition remains effective “notwithstanding that the same
(fixed time for completion of carriage, specified aircraft, or any
particular route or schedule) may be stated on the face hereof.” While
petitioners hinge private respondents’ culpability on the fact that the
carrier “certifies goods described below were received for carriage,”
they may have overlooked that the statement on the face of the airway
bill properly and completely reads—
“Carrier certifies goods described below were received for carriage

subject to the Conditions on the reverse hereof the goods then being in
apparent good order and condition except as noted hereon.”55
(Emphasis ours.)
Private respondents further aptly observe that the carrier’s certification

regarding receipt of the goods for carriage “was of a smaller print than
:
the condition of the Air Waybill, including Condition No. 5—and thus if
plaintiffs-appellants had recognized the former, then with more reason
they were aware of the latter.”56
In the same vein, it would also be incorrect to accede to the suggestion

of petitioners that the typewritten specifications of the flight, routes and
dates of departures and arrivals on the
_______________
54 Section 13, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
55
Exhibit E, Bill of Exhibits, 5.
56 Comment of Private Respondent PAL, 9; Rollo, 221.
526

face of the airway bill constitute a special contract which modifies the
printed conditions at the back thereof. We reiterate that typewritten
provisions of the contract are to be read and understood subject to and
in view of the printed conditions, fully reconciling and giving effect to
the manifest intention of the parties to the agreement.
The oft-repeated rule regarding a carrier’s liability for delay is that in

the absence of a special contract, a carrier is not an insurer against delay
in transportation of goods. When a common carrier undertakes to
convey goods, the law implies a contract that they shall be delivered at
destination within a reasonable time, in the absence, of any agreement
:
as to the time of delivery.57 But where a carrier has made an express
contract to transport and deliver property within a specified time, it is
bound to fulfill its contract and is liable for any delay, no matter from
what cause it may have arisen.58 This result logically follows from the
well-settled rule that where the law creates a duty or charge, and the
party is disabled from performing it without any default in himself, and
has no remedy over, then the law will excuse him, but where the party
by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound
to make it good notwithstanding any accident or delay by inevitable
necessity because he might have provided against it by contract.
Whether or not there has been such an undertaking on the part of the
carrier is to be determined from the circumstances surrounding the case
and by application of the ordinary rules for the interpretation of
contracts.59
Echoing the findings of the trial court, the respondent court correctly
declared that—
“In a similar case of delayed delivery of air cargo under a very similar
stipulation contained in the airway bill which reads: ‘The carrier does
not obligate itself to carry the goods by any specified
________________
57
13 C.J.S., Carriers 390, 392; Mason vs. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 262 Ill.
App 580.
58
13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers 854; Chicago & A.R. Co. vs. Kirby, 225 US
155, 56 Led 1033, 32 Sct 648; Harmony vs. Bingham, 12 NY 99.
59
13 C.J.S., Carriers 395; Frey vs. New York Cent., etc., R. Co., 100 N.Y.S.
225, 114 App. Div. 747.
:
527
VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 527

aircraft or on a specified time. Said carrier being hereby authorized to

deviate from the route of the shipment without any liability therefor’,
our Supreme Court ruled that common carriers are not obligated by law
to carry and to deliver merchandise, and persons are not vested with
the right to prompt delivery, unless such common carriers previously
assume the obligation. Said rights and obligations are created by a
specific contract entered into by the parties (Mendoza vs. PAL, 90 Phil.
836).
“There is no showing by plaintiffs that such a special or specific contract

had been entered into between them and the defendant airline
companies.
“And this special contract for prompt delivery should call the attention
of the carrier to the circumstances surrounding the case and
approximate amount of damages to be suffered in case of delay (See
Mendoza vs. PAL, supra). There was no such contract entered into in the
instant case.” 60
Also, the theory of petitioners that the specification of the flights and
dates of departures and arrivals constitute a special contract that could
prevail over the printed stipulations at the back of the airway bill is
vacuous. To countenance such a postulate would unduly burden the
common carrier for that would have the effect of unilaterally
transforming every single bill of lading or trip ticket into a special
contract by the simple expedient of filling it up with the particulars of
:
the flight, trip or voyage, and thereby imposing upon the carrier duties
and/or obligations which it may not have been ready or willing to
assume had it been timely advised thereof.
Neither does the fact that the challenged condition No. 5 was printed at
the back of the airway bill militate against its binding effect on
petitioners as parties to the contract, for there were sufficient indications
on the face of said bill that would alert them to the presence of such
additional condition to put them on their guard. Ordinary prudence on
the part of any person entering or contemplating to enter into a contract
would prompt even a cursory examination of any such conditions,
terms and/or stipulations.
There is a holding in most jurisdictions that the acceptance of a bill of

lading without dissent raises a presumption that all
_______________
60 Rollo, 168-169.
528

terms therein were brought to the knowledge of the shipper and agreed
to by him, and in the absence of fraud or mistake, he is estopped from
thereafter denying that he assented to such terms. This rule applies with
particular force where a shipper accepts a bill of lading with full
knowledge of its contents, and acceptance under such circumstances
makes it a binding contract. In order that any presumption of assent to a
stipulation in a bill of lading limiting the liability of a carrier may arise,
:
it must appear that the clause containing this exemption from liability
plainly formed a part of the contract contained in the bill of lading. A
stipulation printed on the back of a receipt or bill of lading or on papers
attached to such receipt will be quite as effective as if printed on its face,
if it is shown that the consignor knew of its terms. Thus, where a
shipper accepts a receipt which states that its conditions are to be found
on the back, such receipt comes within the general rule, and the shipper
is held to have accepted and to be bound by the conditions there to be
found.61
Granting arguendo that Condition No. 5 partakes of the nature of a

contract of adhesion and as such must be construed strictly against the
party who drafted the same or gave rise to any ambiguity therein, it
should be borne in mind that a contract of adhesion may be struck
down as void and unenforceable, for being subversive of public policy,
only when the weaker party is imposed upon in dealing with the
dominant bargaining party and is reduced to the alternative of taking it
or leaving it, completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on
equal footing.62 However, Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, et al.63 instructs
us that contracts of adhesion are not entirely prohibited. The one who
adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres,
he gives his consent. Accordingly, petitioners, far from being the weaker
party in this situation,
________________
61
13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers 778-779; See Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 91 SCRA 223 (1979) and Pan American World Airways, Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 164 SCRA 268 (1988).
62 Qua Chee Gan vs. Law Union and Rock Insurance Co., Ltd., etc., 98
:
Phil. 85 (1955); Fieldman’s Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Vda de Songco, 25
SCRA 70 (1968); Sweet Lines, Inc. vs. Teves, 83 SCRA 361 (1978).
63
Supra, Fn. 61.
529
VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 529

duly signified their presumed assent to all terms of the contract through
their acceptance of the airway bill and are consequently bound thereby.
It cannot be gainsaid that petitioners were not without several choices
as to carriers in Chicago with its numerous airways and airlines
servicing the same.
We wish to allay petitioners’ apprehension that Condition No. 5 of the

airway bill is productive of mischief as it would validate delay in
delivery, sanction violations of contractual obligations with impunity or
put a premium on breaches of contract.
Just because we have said that Condition No. 5 of the airway bill is
binding upon the parties to and fully operative in this transaction, it
does not mean, and let this serve as fair warning to respondent carriers,
that they can at all times whimsically seek refuge from liability in the
exculpatory sanctuary of said Condition No. 5 or arbitrarily vary routes,
flights and schedules to the prejudice of their customers. This condition
only serves to insulate the carrier from liability in those instances when
changes in routes, flights and schedules are clearly justified by the
peculiar circumstances of a particular case, or by general transportation
practices, customs and usages, or by contingencies or emergencies in
aviation such as weather turbulence, mechanical failure, requirements
:
of national security and the like. And even as it is conceded that specific
routing and other navigational arrangements for a trip, flight or voyage,
or variations therein, generally lie within the discretion of the carrier in
the absence of specific routing instructions or directions by the shipper,
it is plainly incumbent upon the carrier to exercise its rights with due
deference to the rights, interests and convenience of its customers.
A common carrier undertaking to transport property has the implicit

duty to carry and deliver it within a reasonable time, absent any
particular stipulation regarding time of delivery, and to guard against
delay. In case of any unreasonable delay, the carrier shall be liable for
damages immediately and proximately resulting from such neglect of
duty.64 As found by the trial court, the delay in the delivery of the
remains of Crispina
________________
64
Chicago & A.R. Co. vs. Kirby, supra; Warren vs. Portland Terminal
Co., 121 Me 157, 116 A 411, 26 ALR 304.
530

Saludo, undeniable and regrettable as it was, cannot be attributed to the

fault, negligence or malice of private respondents,65 a conclusion
concurred in by respondent court and which we are not inclined to
disturb.
We are further convinced that when TWA opted to ship the remains of
Crispina Saludo on an earlier flight, it did so in the exercise of sound
:
discretion and with reasonable prudence, as shown by the explanation
of its counsel in his letter of February 19, 1977 in response to petitioners’
demand letter:
“Investigation of TWA’s handling of this matter reveals that although

the shipment was scheduled on TWA Flight 131 of October 27, 1976, it
was actually boarded on TWA Flight 603 of the same day,
approximately 10 hours earlier, in order to assure that the shipment
would be received in San Francisco in sufficient time for transfer to
PAL. This transfer was effected in San Francisco at 2:00 P.M. on October
27, 1976.66
Precisely, private respondent TWA knew of the urgency of the shipment

by reason of this notation on the lower portion of the airway bill: “All
documents have been certified. Human remains of Cristina (sic) Saludo.
Please return bag first available flight to SFO.” Accordingly, TWA took it
upon itself to carry the remains of Crispina Saludo on an earlier flight,
which we emphasize it could do under the terms of the airway bill, to
make sure that there would be enough time for loading said remains on
the transfer flight on board PAL.
III. Petitioners challenge the validity of respondent court’s finding that

private respondents are not liable for tort on account of the humiliating,
arrogant and indifferent acts of their officers and personnel. They posit
that since their mother’s remains were transported ten hours earlier
than originally scheduled, there was no reason for private respondents’
personnel to disclaim knowledge of the arrival or whereabouts of the
same other than their sheer arrogance, indifference and extreme
insensitivity to the feelings of petitioners. Moreover, being passengers
and not merely consignors of goods, petition-
:
________________
65
Petition, Annex A; Rollo, 79.
66
Exhibit F and Exhibit 4-TWA, Bill of Exhibits, 6.
531
VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 531

ers had the right to be treated with courtesy, respect, kindness and due
consideration.
In riposte, TWA claims that its employees have always dealt politely
with all clients, customers and the public in general. PAL, on the other
hand, declares that in the performance of its obligation to the riding
public, other customers and clients, it has always acted with justice,
honesty, courtesy and good faith. Respondent appellate court found
merit in and reproduced the trial court’s refutation of this assigned
error:
“About the only evidence of plaintiffs that may have reference to the
manner with which the personnel of defendants treated the two
plaintiffs at the San Francisco Airport are the following pertinent
portions of Maria Saludo’s testimony.
‘Q When you arrived there, what did you do, if any?

I immediately went to the TWA counter and I inquiredabout whether my
A
mother was there or if they knew anything about it.
Q What was the answer?
A They said they do not know. So, we waited.
About what time was that when you reached San Francisco from
:
Q Chicago?
A I think 5 o’clock. Somewhere around that in the afternoon.

Q You made inquiry it was immediately thereafter?
A Right after we got off the plane.
Up to what time did you stay in the airport to wait until the TWA people
Q
could tell you the whereabouts?
Sorry, Sir, but the TWA did not tell us anything. We stayed there until
A about 9 o’clock. They have not heard anything about it. They did not say
anything.
Do you want to convey to the Court that from 5 up to 9 o’clock in the
Q evening you yourself went back to the TWA and they could not tell you
where the remains of your mother were?
A Yes sir.
Q And after nine o’clock, what did you do?
I told my brother my Mom was supposed to be on the Philippine
Airlines flight. ‘Why don’t’ we check with PAL instead to see if she was
A there?’ We tried to comfort each other. I told him anyway that was a
shortest flight from Chicago to California. We will be with our mother on
this longer flight. So, we checked with the PAL.
Q What did you find?
532

A We learned, Yes, my Mom would be on the flight.
Q Who was that brother?
A Saturnino Saludo.
And did you find what was your flight from San Francisco to the
Q Philippines?
I do not know the number. It was the evening flight of the Philippine
A
Airline(s) from San Francisco to Manila.
Q You took that flight with your mother?
:
A We were scheduled to, Sir.
Now, you could not locate the remains of your mother in San Francisco
Q
could you tell us what did you feel?
A After we were told that my mother was not there?
After you learned that your mother could not fly with you from Chicago
Q to California?
Well, I was very upset. Of course, I wanted the confirmation that my

mother was in the West Coast. The flight was about 5 hours from Chicago
A to California. We waited anxiously all that time on the plane. I wanted to
be assured about my mother’s remains. But there was nothing and we
could not get any assurance from anyone about it.
Your feeling when you reached San Francisco and you could not find out
Q
from the TWA the whereabouts of the remains, what did you feel?
Something nobody would be able to describe unless he experiences it
himself. It is a kind of panic. I think it’s a feeling you are about to go
A
crazy. It is something I do not want to live through again.’ (Inting, t.s.n.,
Aug. 9, 1983, pp. 14-18).
“The foregoing does not show any humiliating or arrogant manner with
which the personnel of both defendants treated the two plaintiffs. Even
their alleged indifference is not clearly established. The initial answer of
the TWA personnel at the counter that they did not know anything
about the remains, and later, their answer that they have not heard
anything about the remains, and the inability of the TWA counter
personnel to inform the two plaintiffs of the whereabouts of the
remains, cannot be said to be total or complete indifference to the said
plaintiffs. At any rate, it is any rude or discourteous conduct,
malfeasance or neglect, the use of abusive or insulting language
calculated to humiliate and shame passenger or bad faith by or on the
part of the employees of the carrier that gives the passenger an action
for damages against the carrier (Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways,
43 SCRA 397; Air France vs. Carrascoso, et al., 18 SCRA 155; Lopez, et al. vs.
Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431; Northwest Airlines, Inc. vs.
:
Cuenca, 14 SCRA 1063), and none of the above is obtaining in
533
VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 533

the instant case.”67
We stand by respondent court’s findings on this point, but only to the

extent where it holds that the manner in which private respondent
TWA’s employees dealt with petitioners was not grossly humiliating,
arrogant or indifferent as would assume the proportions of malice or
bad faith and lay the basis for an award of the damages claimed. It must
however, be pointed out that the lamentable actuations of respondent
TWA’s employees leave much to be desired, particularly so in the face
of petitioners’ grief over the death of their mother, exacerbated by the
tension and anxiety wrought by the impassé and confusion over the
failure to ascertain over an appreciable period of time what happened
to her remains.
Airline companies are hereby sternly admonished that it is their duty

not only to cursorily instruct but to strictly require their personnel to be
more accommodating towards customers, passengers and the general
public. After all, common carriers such as airline companies are in the
business of rendering public service, which is the primary reason for
their enfranchisement and recognition in our law. Because the
passengers in a contract of carriage do not contract merely for
transportation, they have a right to be treated with kindness, respect,
courtesy and consideration.68 A contract to transport passengers is quite
different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation, and
:
generates a relation attended with public duty. The operation of a
common carrier is a business affected with public interest and must be
directed to serve the comfort and convenience of passengers.69
Passengers are human beings with human feelings and emotions; they
should not be treated as mere numbers or statistics for revenue.
The records reveal that petitioners, particularly Maria and Saturnino

Saludo, agonized for nearly five hours, over the
_______________
67 Petition, Annex C; Rollo, 169-172.
68Alitalia Airways vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 187 SCRA 763 (1990); cf.
Air France vs. Carrascoso, et al., 18 SCRA 168 (1966).
69See Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 188 SCRA 461
(1990).
534

possibility of losing their mother’s mortal remains, unattended to and

without any assurance from the employees of TWA that they were
doing anything about the situation. This is not to say that petitioners
were to be regaled with extra special attention. They were, however,
entitled to the understanding and humane consideration called for by
and commensurate with the extraordinary diligence required of
common carriers, and not the cold insensitivity to their predicament. It
is hard to believe that the airline’s counter personnel were totally
:
helpless about the situation. Common sense could and should have
dictated that they exert a little extra effort in making a more extensive
inquiry, by themselves or through their superiors, rather than just shrug
off the problem with a callous and uncaring remark that they had no
knowledge about it. With all the modern communications equipment
readily available to them, which could have easily facilitated said
inquiry and which are used as a matter of course by airline companies
in their daily operations, their apathetic stance while not legally
reprehensible is morally deplorable.
Losing a loved one, especially one’s parent, is a painful experience. Our

culture accords the tenderest human feelings toward and in reverence to
the dead. That the remains of the deceased were subsequently
delivered, albeit belatedly, and eventually laid in her final resting place
is of little consolation. The imperviousness displayed by the airline’s
personnel, even for just that fraction of time, was especially
condemnable particularly in the hour of bereavement of the family of
Crispina Saludo, intensified by anguish due to the uncertainty of the
whereabouts of their mother’s remains. Hence, it is quite apparent that
private respondents’ personnel were remiss in the observance of that
genuine human concern and professional attentiveness required and
expected of them.
The foregoing observations, however, do not appear to be applicable or

imputable to respondent PAL or its employees. No attribution of
discourtesy or indifference has been made against PAL by petitioners
and, in fact, petitioner Maria Saludo testified that it was to PAL that
they repaired after failing to receive proper attention from TWA. It was
from PAL that they received confirmation that their mother’s remains
would be on the same flight to Manila with them.
:
535
VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 535

We find the following substantiation on this particular episode from the

deposition of Alberto A. Lim, PAL’s cargo supervisor earlier adverted
to, regarding their investigation of and the action taken on learning of
petitioner’s problem:
“ATTY. ALBERTO C. MENDOZA:

Yes.
Mr. Lim, what exactly was your procedure adopted in your so called
investigation?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
I called the lead agent on duty at that time and requested for a copy of
airway bill, transfer manifest and other documents concerning the
shipment.
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MENDOZA:
Then, what?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
They proceeded to analyze exactly where PAL failed, if any, in forwarding
the human remains of Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo. And I found out that there
was not (sic) delay in shipping the remains of Mrs. Saludo to Manila. Since
we received the body from American Airlines on 28 October at 7:45 and we
expedited the shipment so that it could have been loaded on our flight
leaving at 9:00 in the evening or just barely one hour and 15 minutes prior
to the departure of the aircraft. That is so (sic) being the case, I reported to
Manila these circumstances.”70
IV. Finally, petitioners insist, as a consequence of the delay in the

shipment of their mother’s remains allegedly caused by wilful
contractual breach, on their entitlement to actual, moral and exemplary
:
damages as well as attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and legal
interest.
The uniform decisional tenet in our jurisdiction holds that moral

damages may be awarded for wilful or fraudulent breach of contract71
or when such breach is attended by malice or bad
_______________
70
Exhibit 5-PAL, 50-51; Bill of Exhibits, 83-84.
71
Article 2220, Civil Code; Tamayo vs. Aquino, et al., 105 Phil. 949
(1959); China Airlines Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 169 SCRA 226
(1989).
536

faith.72 However, in the absence of strong and positive evidence of

fraud, malice or bad faith, said damages cannot be awarded.73 Neither
can there be an award of exemplary damages74 nor of attorney’s fees75
as an item of damages in the absence of proof that defendant acted with
malice, fraud or bad faith.
The censurable conduct of TWA’s employees cannot, however, be said

to have approximated the dimensions of fraud, malice or bad faith. It
can be said to be more of a lethargic reaction produced and engrained in
some people by the mechanically routine nature of their work and a
racial or societal culture which stultifies what would have been their
accustomed human response to a human need under a former and
:
different ambience.
Nonetheless, the facts show that petitioners’ right to be treated with due
courtesy in accordance with the degree of diligence required by law to
be exercised by every common carrier was violated by TWA and this
entitles them, at least, to nominal damages from TWA alone. Articles
2221 and 2222 of the Civil Code make it clear that nominal damages are
not intended for indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication
or recognition of a right violated or invaded. They are recoverable
where some injury has been done but the amount of which the evidence
fails to show, the assessment of damages being left to the discretion of
the court according to the circumstances of the
_______________
72
Perez vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 13 SCRA 137 (1965); Sabena Belgian
World Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 171 SCRA 620 (1989).
73Coscolluela vs. Valderrama, 2 SCRA 1095 (1961); Pan American World

Airways, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 186 SCRA 687
(1990).
74
Article 2232, Civil Code; Davila, et al. vs. Philippine Airlines, 49
SCRA 497 (1973); Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
159 SCRA 433 (1988); Esguerra vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 173 SCRA 1
(1989).
75
Article 2208, Civil Code; Federation of United NAMARCO
Distributors, Inc. et al. vs. National Marketing Corporation, 4 SCRA 867
(1962); Songcuan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 191 SCRA 28
(1990).
:
537
VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 537

case.76 In the exercise of our discretion, we find an award of P40,000.00

as nominal damages in favor of petitioners to be a reasonable amount
under the circumstances of this case.
WHEREFORE, with the modification that an award of P40,000.00 as and

by way of nominal damages is hereby granted in favor of petitioners to
be paid by respondent Trans World Airlines, the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Decision affirmed with modification.
Note.—Petitioner carrier, not being privy to the transaction between

HSBC and CMI cannot be expected to look beyond what is contained in
the bill of lading in question and guess which of the many banks in
Metro Manila could possibly be the consignee. (Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 512.)
——o0o——
_______________
76
See Northwest Airlines, Inc. vs. Cuenca, et al., 14 SCRA 1063 (1965);
Robes-Francisco Realty & Development Corporation vs. Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Branch XXXIV), et al., 84 SCRA 59 (1978); Alitalia vs.
:
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 192 SCRA 9 (1990).
538
:

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Saludo v. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 498, G.R. No. 95536, March 23, 1992. COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 207 PDF

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ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR.

G.R. No. 95536. March 23, 1992.*

Remedial Law; Appeals; Petition for review on certiorari; Exceptions to rule on

Transportation Law; Common Carriers; Bill of Lading.—A bill of lading is a

VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 499

Same; Same; Observance of extraordinary diligence, when it commences.

500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Same; Same; Interpretation of contracts.—The hornbook rule on

VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 501

Same; Same; Carrier’s liability for delay.—The oft-repeated rule regarding a

Same; Same; Acceptance of bill of lading without dissent.—There is a holding

Same; Same; Contracts of adhesion.—Granting arguendo that Condition No.

502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

that a contract of adhesion may be struck down as void and

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for petitioners.

Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for Trans World Airlines, Inc.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for Phil. Airlines, Inc.

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision in CA-

The facts, as recounted by the court a quo and adopted by respondent

1Justice Jorge S. Imperial, ponente, with Justices Filemon D. Mendoza

VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 503

“After the death of plaintiffs’ mother, Crispina Galdo Saludo, in

“In the meantime, plaintiffs Maria Salvacion Saludo and Saturnino

504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“What transpired at the Chicago (A)irport is explained in a memo or

“The following day October 28, 1976, the shipment or remains of

In a letter dated December 15, 1976,4 petitioners’ counsel

VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 505

informed private respondent Trans World Airlines (TWA) of the

Both private respondents denied liability. Thus, a damage suit6 was

In predictable disagreement and dissatisfaction with the conclusions

506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

To distinguish, a question of law is one which involves a doubt or

VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 507

determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the

Respondent airline companies object to the present recourse of

Since it is precisely the soundness of the inferences or conclusions that

I. Petitioners fault respondent court for “not finding that private

Petitioners allege that private respondents received the casketed

508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

exercise extraordinary diligence so much so that for the alleged

To support their assertion, petitioners rely on the jurisprudential

Logically, since a bill of lading acknowledges receipt of goods to be

22 13 C.J.S., Carriers, 233.

23 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers 775.

VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 509

prohibited by law, there is nothing to prevent an inverse order of events,

Ordinarily, a receipt is not essential to a complete delivery of goods to

For this reason, we must perforce allow explanation by private

510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The findings of the trial court, as favorably adopted by the Court of

“x x x Philippine Vice Consul in Chicago, Illinois, Bienvenido M.

Moreover, we are persuaded to believe private respondent PAL’s

“x x x Pursuant thereto, on 26 October 1976, CMAS acting upon the

VOL. 207, MARCH 23, 1992 511

Hence, while we agree with petitioners that the extraordinary diligence