EN BANC

[G.R. No. 73155. July 11, 1986.]

PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M. HAGAD, SERGIO HILADO, VIRGILIO GASTON,
CONCHITA MINAYA, TERESITA ESTACIO, DESIDERIO DEFERIA, ROMEO GAMBOA, ALBERTO
LACSON, FE HOFILENA, EMILY JISON, NIEVES LOPEZ AND CECILIA MAGSAYSAY, petitioners, vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
respondents.

Gamboa & Hofileña Law Office for petitioners.

DECISION

ALAMPAY, J p:
Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 — An Act Creating a New Province in
the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, which took effect on
December 3, 1985, Petitioners herein, who are residents of the Province of Negros Occidental,
in the various cities and municipalities therein, on December 23, 1985, filed with this Court a
case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondents Commission on Elections from
conducting the plebiscite which, pursuant to and in implementation of the aforesaid law, was
scheduled for January 3, 1986.
Said law provides:
"SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava,
Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador Benedicto, all in the
northern portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby separated from the province to be known
as the Province of Negros del Norte.
"SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of
Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south and the
territorial limits of the northern portion to the Island of Negros on the west, north and east,
comprising a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers more or less.
"SEC. 3. The seat of government of the new province shall be the City of Cadiz.
"SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the
areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act.
After the ratification of the creation of the Province of Negros del Norte by a majority of the
votes cast in such plebiscite, the President of the Philippines shall appoint the first officials of
the province.
"SEC. 5. The Commission on Elections shall conduct and supervise the plebiscite herein
provided, the expenses for which shall be charged to local funds.
"SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval." (Rollo, pp. 23-24)
Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is unconstitutional and it is not in complete
accord with the Local Government Code as in Article XI, Section 3 of our Constitution, it is
expressly mandated that —
"Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes
in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected."
Section 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates the conditions which must exist to
provide the legal basis for the creation of a provincial unit and these requisites are:
"SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. — A province may be created if it has a territory of at
least three thousand five hundred square kilometers, a population of at least five hundred
thousand persons, an average estimated annual income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance,
of not less than ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years, and its creation shall not
reduce the population and income of the mother province or provinces at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements under this section. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two or more islands.
'The average estimated annual income shall include the income alloted for both the general and
infrastructural funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring income. (Rollo, p. 6)
Due to the constraints brought about by the supervening Christmas holidays during which the
Court was in recess and unable to timely consider the petition, a supplemental pleading was
filed by petitioners on January 4, 1986, averring therein that the plebiscite sought to be
restrained by them was held on January 3, 1986 as scheduled but that there are still serious
issues raised in the instant case affecting the legality, constitutionality and validity of such
exercise which should properly be passed upon and resolved by this Court.
The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del Norte, namely:
the Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante,
Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.B. Magalona and Don Salvador Benedicto. Because of the
exclusions of the voters from the rest of the province of Negros Occidental, petitioners found
need to change the prayer of their petition "to the end that the constitutional issues which they
have raised in the action will be ventilated and given final resolution." At the same time, they
asked that the effects of the plebiscite which they sought to stop be suspended until the
Supreme Court shall have rendered its decision on the very fundamental and far-reaching
questions that petitioners have brought out.
Acknowledging in their supplemental petition that supervening events rendered moot the
prayer in their initial petition that the plebiscite scheduled for January 3, 1986, be enjoined,
petitioners plead, nevertheless, that —
". . . a writ of Prohibition be issued directed to Respondent Commission on Elections to desist
from issuing official proclamation of the results of the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986.
"Finding that the exclusion and non-participation of the voters of the Province of Negros
Occidental other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte
to be not in accordance with the Constitution, that a writ of Mandamus be issued, directed to
the respondent Commission on Elections, to schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which
all the qualified voters of the entire Province of Negros Occidental as now existing shall
participate, at the same time making pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3,
1986 has no legal effect, being a patent legal nullity;
"And that a similar writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to the respondent Provincial
Treasurer, to desist from ordering the release of any local funds to answer for expenses
incurred in the holding of such plebiscite until ordered by the Court." (Rollo, pp. 19-10).
Petitioners further prayed that the respondent COMELEC hold in abeyance the issuance of any
official proclamation of the results of the aforestated plebiscite. dctai
During the pendency of this case, a motion that he be allowed to appear as amicus curiae in this
case (dated December 27, 1985 and filed with the Court on January 2, 1986) was submitted by
former Senator Ambrosio Padilla. Said motion was granted in our resolution of January 2, 1986.
Acting on the petition, as well as on the supplemental petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction with prayer for restraining order, the Court, on January 7, 1986 resolved, without
giving due course to the same, to require respondents to comment, not to file a motion to
dismiss. Complying with said resolution, public respondents, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, on January 14, 1986, filed their Comment, arguing therein that the challenged
statute — Batas Pambansa 885, should be accorded the presumption of legality. They submit
that the said law is not void on its face and that the petition does not show a clear, categorical
and undeniable demonstration of the supposed infringement of the Constitution. Respondents
state that the powers of the Batasang Pambansa to enact the assailed law is beyond question.
They claim that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 does not infringe the Constitution because the
requisites of the Local Government Code have been complied with. Furthermore, they submit
that this case has now become moot and academic with the proclamation of the new Province
of Negros del Norte.
Respondents argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of the Province of Negros
Occidental not included in the area of the new Province of Negros del Norte, do not fall within
the meaning and scope of the term "unit or units affected", as referred to in Section 3 of Art. XI
of our Constitution. On this reasoning, respondents maintain that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885
does not violate the Constitution, invoking and citing the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes
versus the Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al. (G.R. No. 55628, March 2,
1984 (128 SCRA 61), particularly the pronouncements therein, hereunder quoted:
"1. Admittedly, this is one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is allowed
considerable leeway. There is indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the expression 'unit
or units affected'. It is plausible to assert as petitioners do that when certain Barangays are
separated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the voters therein are affected. It is
much more persuasive, however, to contend as respondents do that the acceptable
construction is for those voters, who are not from the barangays to be separated, should be
excluded in the plebiscite.
"2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two possible
constructions, one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a result,
the former is to be preferred. That which will save, not that which will destroy, commends itself
for acceptance. After all, the basic presumption all these years is one of validity. . . .
"3. . . . Adherence to such philosophy compels the conclusion that when there are
indications that the inhabitants of several barangays are inclined to separate from a parent
municipality they should be allowed to do so. What is more logical than to ascertain their will in
a plebiscite called for that purpose. It is they, and they alone, who shall constitute the new unit.
New responsibilities will be assumed. New burdens will be imposed. A new municipal
corporation will come into existence. Its birth will be a matter of choice — their choice. They
should be left alone then to decide for themselves. To allow other voters to participate will not
yield a true expression of their will. They may even frustrate it. That certainly will be so if they
vote against it for selfish reasons, and they constitute the majority. That is not to abide by the
fundamental principle of the Constitution to promote local autonomy, the preference being for
smaller units. To rule as this Tribunal does is to follow an accepted principle of constitutional
construction, that in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to
doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people may be gleaned from provisions in pari
materia."
Respondents submit that said ruling in the afore-cited case applies equally with force in the
case at bar. Respondents also maintain that the requisites under the Local Government Code
(P.D. 337) for the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte have all been duly complied
with. Respondents discredit petitioners' allegations that the requisite area of 3,500 square
kilometers as so prescribed in the Local Government Code for a new province to be created has
not been satisfied. Petitioners insist that the area which would comprise the new province of
Negros del Norte, would only be about 2,856.56 square kilometers and which evidently would
be lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute. Respondents, in this
regard, point out and stress that Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 creating said new
province plainly declares that the territorial boundaries of Negros del Norte comprise an area of
4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less. LLjur
As a final argument, respondents insist that instant petition has been rendered moot and
academic considering that a plebiscite has been already conducted on January 3, 1986; that as a
result thereof, the corresponding certificate of canvass indicated that out of 195,134 total votes
cast in said plebiscite, 164,734 were in favor of the creation of Negros del Norte and 30,400
were against it; and because "the affirmative votes cast represented a majority of the total
votes cast in said plebiscite, the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers proclaimed the new
province which shall be known as "Negros del Norte". Thus, respondents stress the fact that
following the proclamation of Negros del Norte province, the appointments of the officials of
said province created were announced. On these considerations, respondents urge that this
case should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic as the creation of the
new province is now a " fait accompli."
In resolving this case, it will be useful to note and emphasize the facts which appear to be
agreed to by the parties herein or stand unchallenged.
Firstly, there is no disagreement that the Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Negros
Occidental has not disbursed, nor was required to disburse any public funds in connection with
the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as so disclosed in the Comment to the Petition filed by
the respondent Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental dated January 20, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 36-
37). Thus, the prayer of the petitioners that said Provincial Treasurer be directed by this Court
to desist from ordering the release of any public funds on account of such plebiscite should not
longer deserve further consideration.
Secondly, in Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which led to the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg.
885 and the creation of the new Province of Negros del Norte, it expressly declared in Sec. 2 of
the aforementioned Parliamentary Bill, the following:
"SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of
Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the South and the
natural boundaries of the northern portion of the Island of Negros on the West, North and East,
containing an area of 285,656 hectares more or less." (Emphasis supplied).
However, when said Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was very quickly enacted into Batas Pambansa
Blg. 885, the boundaries of the new Province of Negros del Norte were defined therein and its
boundaries then stated to be as follows:
"SEC 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Toboso,
Escalante. Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona; and Salvador Benedicto, all in the northern
portion of the Island of Negros, are hereby separated from the Province of Negros Occidental
and constituted into a new province to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte.
"SEC. 1. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the City of
Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos on the south and the
territorial limits of the northern portion of the Island of Negros on the West, North and East,
comprising a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers more or less."
Equally accepted by the parties is the fact that under the certification issued by Provincial
Treasurer Julian L. Ramirez of the Province of Negros Occidental, dated July 16, 1985, it was
therein certified as follows:
"xxx xxx xxx
"This is to certify that the following cities and municipalities of Negros Occidental have the land
area as indicated hereunder based on the Special Report No. 3, Philippines 1980, Population,
Land Area and Density: 1970, 1975 and 1980 by the National Census and Statistics Office,
Manila.
Land Area
(Sq. Km.)
"1. Silay City 214.8
2. E.B. Magalona 113.3
3. Victorias 133.9
4. Manapla 112.9
5. Cadiz City 516.5
6. Sagay 389.6
7. Escalante 124.0
8. Toboso123.4
9. Calatrava 504.5
10. San Carlos City451.3
11. Don Salvador Benedicto (not available)
"This certification is issued upon the request of Dr. Patricio Y. Tan for whatever purpose it may
serve him.
"(SGD.) JULIAN L. RAMIREZ
Provincial Treasurer" (Exh. "C" of Petition, Rollo, p. 90).
Although in the above certification it is stated that the land area of the relatively new
municipality of Don Salvador Benedicto is not available, it is an uncontradicted fact that the
area comprising Don Salvador municipality, one of the component units of the new province,
was derived from the City of San Carlos and from the Municipality of Calatrava, Negros
Occidental, and added thereto was a portion of about one-fourth the land area of the town of
Murcia, Negros Occidental. It is significant to note the uncontroverted submission of petitioners
that the total land area of the entire municipality of Murcia, Negros Occidental is only 322.9
square kilometers (Exh. "D", Rollo, p. 91). One-fourth of this total land area of Murcia that was
added to the portions derived from the land area of Calatrava, Negros Occidental and San
Carlos City (Negros Occidental) would constitute, therefore, only 80.2 square kilometers. This
area of 80.2 square kilometers if then added to 2,685.2 square kilometers, representing the
total land area of the Cities of Silay, San Carlos and Cadiz and the Municipalities of E.R.
Magalona, Victorias, Manapla, Sagay, Escalante, Taboso and Calatrava, will result in
approximately an area of only 2,765.4 square kilometers using as basis the Special Report,
Philippines 1980, Population, Land Area and Density: 1970, 1975 and 1980 of the National
Census and Statistics Office, Manila (see Exhibit "C", Rollo, p. 90).
No controversion has been made by respondent with respect to the allegations of petitioners
that the original provision in the draft legislation, Parliamentary Bill No. 3644, reads:
"SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one
hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act. After the ratification of the creation of
the Province of Negros del Norte by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite, the President
shall appoint the first officials of the new province." cdtai
However, when Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 was enacted, there was a significant change in the
above provision. The statute, as modified, provides that the requisite plebiscite "shall be
conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected."
It is this legislative determination limiting the plebiscite exclusively to the cities and towns
which would comprise the new province that is assailed by the petitioners as violative of the
provisions of our Constitution. Petitioners submit that Sec. 3, ART XI thereof, contemplates a
plebiscite that would be held in the unit or units affected by the creation of the new province as
a result of the consequent division of and substantial alteration of the boundaries of the
existing province. In this instance, the voters in the remaining areas of the province of Negros
Occidental should have been allowed to participate in the questioned plebiscite.
Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance with
constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province
proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before us cannot truly be viewed as already
moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province which
petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this
Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should
not provide the very excuse for perpetuation of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the
respondents' urging that, as there has been fait accompli, then this Court should passively
accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the
instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents'
submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its
duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those
who strut about in the corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create,
merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily,
confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if they
manage to bring about a fait accompli.
In the light of the facts and circumstances alluded to by petitioners as attending to the
unusually rapid creation of the instant province of Negros del Norte after a swiftly scheduled
plebiscite, this Tribunal has the duty to repudiate and discourage the commission of acts which
run counter to the mandate of our fundamental law, done by whatever branch of our
government. This Court gives notice that it will not look with favor upon those who may be
hereafter inclined to ram through all sorts of legislative measures and then implement the
same with indecent haste, even if such acts would violate the Constitution and the prevailing
statutes of our land. It is illogical to ask that this Tribunal be blind and deaf to protests on the
ground that what is already done is done. To such untenable argument the reply would be that,
be this so, the Court, nevertheless, still has the duty and right to correct and rectify the wrong
brought to its attention.
On the merits of the case.
Aside from the simpler factual issue relative to the land area of the new province of Negros del
Norte, the more significant and pivotal issue in the present case revolves around in the
interpretation and application in the case at bar of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution,
which being brief and for convenience, We again quote:
"SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes
in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected."
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there
be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units
affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration
of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing
province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its
existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del
Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected.
The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be
substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area
subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said
constitutional requirement but eliminates the participation of either of these two component
political units. No amount of rhetorical flourishes can justify exclusion of the parent province in
the plebiscite because of an alleged intent on the part of the authors and implementors of the
challenged statute to carry out what is claimed to be a mandate to guarantee and promote
autonomy of local government units. The alleged good intentions cannot prevail and overrule
the cardinal precept that what our Constitution categorically directs to be done or imposes as a
requirement must first be observed, respected and complied with. No one should be allowed to
pay homage to a supposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee and promote autonomy
of local government units but at the same time transgress, ignore and disregard what the
Constitution commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof. Respondents would be no different from
one who hurries to pray at the temple but then spits at the idol therein.
We find no merit in the submission of the respondents that the petition should be dismissed
because the motive and wisdom in enacting the law may not be challenged by petitioners. The
principal point raised by the petitioners is not the wisdom and motive in enacting the law but
the infringement of the Constitution which is a proper subject of judicial inquiry.
Petitioners' discussion regarding the motives behind the enactment of B.P. Blg. 885 to say the
least, are most enlightening and provoking but are factual issues the Court cannot properly pass
upon in this case. Mention by petitioners of the unexplained changes or differences in the
proposed Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 and the enacted Batas Pambansa Blg. 885; the swift and
surreptitious manner of passage and approval of said law; the abrupt scheduling of the
plebiscite; the reference to news articles regarding the questionable conduct of the said
plebiscite held on January 3, 1986; all serve as interesting reading but are not the decisive
matters which should be reckoned in the resolution of this case.
What the Court considers the only significant submissions lending a little support to
respondents' case is their reliance on the rulings and pronouncements made by this Court in
the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes versus The Honorable Executive Secretary to the
President, et al., G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6). In said case relating to a
plebiscite held to ratify the creation of a new municipality from existing barangays, this Court
upheld the legality of the plebiscite which was participated in exclusively by the people of the
barangay that would constitute the new municipality. cda
This Court is not unmindful of this solitary case alluded to by respondents. What is, however,
highly significant are the prefatory statements therein stating that said case is "one of those
cases where the discretion of the Court is allowed considerable leeway" and that "there is
indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the expression "unit or units affected." The ruling
rendered in said case was based on a claimed prerogative of the Court then to exercise its
discretion on the matter. It did not resolve the question of how the pertinent provision of the
Constitution should be correctly interpreted.
The ruling in the aforestated case of Paredes vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary, et al.
(supra) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent when it is acknowledged
therein that "it is plausible to assert, as petitioners do, that when certain Barangays are
separated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the voters therein are affected."
It is relevant and most proper to mention that in the afore-cited case of Paredes vs. Executive
Secretary, invoked by respondents, We find very lucidly expressed the strong dissenting view of
Justice Vicente Abad Santos, a distinguished member of this Court, as he therein voiced his
opinion, which We hereunder quote:
"2. . . . when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of the
people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or all of
the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. I see no ambiguity in the
Constitutional provision."
This dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos is the forerunner of the ruling which we
now consider applicable to the case at bar. In the analogous case of Emilio C. Lopez, Jr., versus
the Honorable Commission on Elections, L-56022, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 633, this dissent was
reiterated by Justice Abad Santos as he therein assailed as suffering from a constitutional
infirmity a referendum which did not include all the people of Bulacan and Rizal, when such
referendum was intended to ascertain if the people of said provinces were willing to give up
some of their towns to Metropolitan Manila. His dissenting opinion served as a useful guideline
in the instant case.
Opportunity to re-examine the views formerly held in said cases is now afforded the present
Court. The reasons in the mentioned cases invoked by respondents herein were formerly
considered acceptable because of the views then taken that local autonomy would be better
promoted. However, even this consideration no longer retains persuasive value.
The environmental facts in the case before us readily disclose that the subject matter under
consideration is of greater magnitude with concomitant multifarious complicated problems. In
the earlier case, what was involved was a division of a barangay which is the smallest political
unit in the Local Government Code. Understandably, few and lesser problems are involved. In
the case at bar, creation of a new province relates to the largest political unit contemplated in
Section 3, Art. XI of the Constitution. To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than
three cities and eight municipalities will be subtracted from the parent province of Negros
Occidental. This will result in the removal of approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the
land area of an existing province whose boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. It
becomes easy to realize that the consequent effects of the division of the parent province
necessarily will affect all the people living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental and the
proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy of the parent province as well as that of
the new province will be inevitably affected, either for the better or for the worse. Whatever be
the case, either or both of these political groups will be affected and they are, therefore, the
unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which must be included in
the plebiscite contemplated therein.
It is a well accepted rule that "in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may
give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people, may be gleaned from the
provisions in pari materia." Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new
province of Negros del Norte recites in Sec. 4 thereof that "the plebiscite shall be conducted in
the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this
Act." As this draft legislation speaks of "areas," what was contemplated evidently are plurality
of areas to participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such plebiscite would
be the people living in the area of the proposed new province and those living in the parent
province. This assumption will be consistent with the requirements set forth in the Constitution.
We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change made when Parliamentary Bill No.
3644 was enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 so that it is now provided in said enabling law
that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas
affected." We are not disposed to agree that by mere legislative fiat the unit or units affected
referred in the fundamental law can be diminished or restricted by the Batasang Pambansa to
cities and municipalities comprising the new province, thereby ignoring the evident reality that
there are other people necessarily affected.
In the mind of the Court, the change made by those responsible for the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 885 betrays their own misgivings. They must have entertained apprehensions
that by holding the plebiscite only in the areas of the new proposed province, this tactic will be
tainted with illegality. In anticipation of a possible strong challenge to the legality of such a
plebiscite there was, therefore, deliberately added in the enacted statute a self-serving phrase
that the new province constitutes the area affected. Such additional statement serves no useful
purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous and far from truth. The remaining portion of the
parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the
parent province, not to mention the other adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently
argue the points raised by the petitioners. LLpr
Petitioners have averred without contradiction that after the creation of Negros del Norte, the
province of Negros Occidental would be deprived of the long established Cities of Silay, Cadiz,
and San Carlos, as well as the municipality of Victorias. No controversion has been made
regarding petitioners' assertion that the areas of the Province of Negros Occidental will be
diminished by about 285,656 hectares and it will lose seven of the fifteen sugar mills which
contribute to the economy of the whole province. In the language of petitioners, "to create
Negros del Norte, the existing territory and political subdivision known as Negros Occidental
has to be partitioned and dismembered. What was involved was no 'birth' but "amputation."
We agree with the petitioners that in the case of Negros what was involved was a division, a
separation; and consequently, as Sec. 3 of Article XI of the Constitution anticipates, a
substantial alteration of boundary.
As contended by petitioners, —
"Indeed, the terms 'created', 'divided', 'merged', 'abolished' as used in the constitutional
provision do not contemplate distinct situation isolated from the mutually exclusive to each
other. A province maybe created where an existing province is divided or two provinces
merged. Such cases necessarily will involve existing unit or units abolished and definitely the
boundary being substantially altered.
"It would thus be inaccurate to state that where an existing political unit is divided or its
boundary substantially altered, as the Constitution provides, only some and not all the voters in
the whole unit which suffers dismemberment or substantial alteration of its boundary are
affected. Rather, the contrary is true."
It is also our considered view that even hypothetically assuming that the merits of this case can
depend on the mere discretion that this Court may exercise, nevertheless, it is the petitioners'
case that deserve to be favored.
It is now time for this Court to set aside the equivocations and the indecisive pronouncements
in the adverted case of Paredes vs. the Honorable Executive Secretary, et al. (supra). For the
reasons already here expressed, we now state that the ruling in the two mentioned cases
sanctioning the exclusion of the voters belonging to an existing political unit from which the
new political unit will be derived, from participating in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose
of determining the formation of another new political unit, is hereby abandoned.
In their supplemental petition, dated January 4, 1986, it is prayed for by petitioners that a writ
of mandamus be issued, directing the respondent Commission on Elections, to schedule the
holding of another plebiscite at which all the qualified voters of the entire province of Negros
Occidental as now existing shall participate and that this Court make a pronouncement that the
plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.
The Court is prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as null and void and
violative of the provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The Court is not, however,
disposed to direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, because we find no legal basis to do so. With
constitutional infirmity attaching to the subject Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 and also because the
creation of the new province of Negros del Norte is not in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, the factual and legal basis for the creation of such
new province which should justify the holding of another plebiscite does not exist.
Whatever claim it has to validity and whatever recognition has been gained by the new
province of Negros del Norte because of the appointment of the officials thereof, must now be
erased. That Negros del Norte is but a legal fiction should be announced. Its existence should be
put to an end as quickly as possible, if only to settle the complications currently attending to its
creation. As has been manifested, the parent province of Negros del Norte has been impleaded
as the defendant in a suit filed by the new Province of Negros del Norte, before the Regional
Trial Court of Negros (del Norte), docketed as Civil Case No. 169-C, for the immediate
allocation, distribution and transfer of funds by the parent province to the new province, in an
amount claimed to be at least P10,000,000.00.
The final nail that puts to rest whatever pretension there is to the legality of the province of
Negros del Norte is the significant fact that this created province does not even satisfy the area
requirement prescribed in Section 197 of the Local Government Code, as earlier discussed.
prLL
It is of course claimed by the respondents in their Comment to the exhibits submitted by the
petitioners (Exhs. C and D, Rollo, pp. 19 and 91), that the new province has a territory of
4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less. This assertion is made to negate the proofs
submitted, disclosing that the land area of the new province cannot be more than 3,500 square
kilometers because its land area would, at most, be only about 2,856 square kilometers, taking
into account government statistics relative to the total area of the cities and municipalities
constituting Negros del Norte. Respondents insist that when Section 197 of the Local
Government Code speaks of the territory of the province to be created and requires that such
territory be at least 3,500 square kilometers, what is contemplated is not only the land area but
also the land and water over which the said province has jurisdiction and control. It is even the
submission of the respondents that in this regard the marginal sea within the three mile limit
should be considered in determining the extent of the territory of the new province. Such an
interpretation is strained, incorrect, and fallacious.
The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated therein
the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The use of the word
territory in this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last sentence
thereof, clearly, reflects that "territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land
area and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control.
Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a) in
physical contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, text, or adjacent
(Webster's New World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307). "Contiguous", when employed as an
adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes physical contact, or a
touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute
may be ascertained by reference to words associated with or related to them in the statute
(Animal Rescue League vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R., p. 110). Therefore, in the context of the
sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the "territory" — the physical mass of land
area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had
intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land area but also territorial waters, It can
be safely concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be
synonymous with "land area" only. The words and phrases used in a statute should be given the
meaning intended by the legislature (82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words are used
furnished the rule of construction (In re Winton Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664).
The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents make is an artificial or
strained construction of the disputed provision whereby the words of the statute are arrested
from their plain and obvious meaning and made to bear an entirely different meaning to justify
an absurd or unjust result. The plain meaning in the language in a statute is the safest guide to
follow in construing the statute. A construction based on a forced or artificial meaning of its
words and out of harmony of the statutory scheme is not to be favored (Helvering vs.
Hutchings, 85 L. Ed., p. 909).
It would be rather preposterous to maintain that a province with a small land area but which
has a long, narrow, extended coast line, (such as La Union province) can be said to have a larger
territory than a land-locked province (such as Ifugao or Benguet) whose land area manifestly
exceeds the province first mentioned.
Allegations have been made that the enactment of the questioned statute was marred by "dirty
tricks", in the introduction and passing of Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 "in secret haste" pursuant
to sinister designs to achieve "pure and simple gerrymandering"; "that recent happenings more
than amply demonstrate that far from guaranteeing its autonomy it (Negros del Norte) has
become the fiefdom of a local strongman" (Rollo, p. 43; parenthesis supplied).
It is not for this Court to affirm or reject such matters not only because the merits of this case
can be resolved without need of ascertaining the real motives and wisdom in the making of the
questioned law. No proper challenge on those grounds can also be made by petitioners in this
proceeding. Neither may this Court venture to guess the motives or wisdom in the exercise of
legislative powers. Repudiation of improper or unwise actions taken by tools of a political
machinery rests ultimately, as recent events have shown, on the electorate and the power of a
vigilant people. cdlex
Petitioners herein deserve and should receive the gratitude of the people of the Province of
Negros Occidental and even by our Nation. Commendable is the patriotism displayed by them
in daring to institute this case in order to preserve the continued existence of their historic
province. They were inspired undoubtedly by their faithful commitment to our Constitution
which they wish to be respected and obeyed. Despite the setbacks and the hardships which
petitioners aver confronted them, they valiantly and unfalteringly pursued a worthy cause. A
happy destiny for our Nation is assured as long as among our people there would be exemplary
citizens such as the petitioners herein.
WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation
of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials thereof are
also declared null and void.
SO ORDERED.
Abad Santos, Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and Paras, JJ ., concur.
Teehankee, C .J ., files a separate opinion congratulating his brethren for the Court's unanimous
decision striking down a manifestly unconstitutional Act and illegal plebiscite and restoring the
territorial integrity of the once premier province of Negros Occidental.
Melencio-Herrera, J ., in the result.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C .J ., concurring:
I congratulate my brethren for the unanimous decision we issue today striking down an Act
approved in "deep secrecy and inordinate haste" apparently on the last day of session of the
Batasang Pambansa on December 3, 1985 and signed on the same day by the then President of
the authoritarian regime. The Act provided for the partitioning of the province of Negros
Occidental and would substantially alter its boundaries by lopping off the progressive cities of
Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and municipality of Victorias with seven other municipalities to
constitute the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Negros Occidental would thereby
lose 4,019.95 square kilometers in area and seven of fifteen sugar mills which contribute to the
economic progress and welfare of the whole province. Cdpr
The discredited Commission on Elections of the time played its customary subservient role by
setting the plebiscite with equal "indecent haste" for January 3, 1986, notwithstanding that the
Act itself provided for an ample period of 120 days from its approval within which to inform the
people of the proposed dismemberment and allow them to freely express and discuss the
momentous issue and cast their vote intelligently. This was learned by petitioners through an
item in the printed media one day before they filed the present rush petition on December 23,
1985 to seek a restraining order to atop the plebiscite, even as no printed copies of the Act as
finally enacted and approved were available to them and the Act had not been published, as
required by law, for its effectivity. As petitioners ruefully state: "it was in vain hope" for
everything had apparently been timed for the Christmas holidays; the Court was in Christmas
recess and "there was no chance to have their plea for a restraining order acted upon speedily
enough." In fact, it was only on January 7, 1986 that the Court took cognizance of the petition
and required respondents' comment.
The scenario, as petitioners urgently asserted, was "to have the creation of the new Province a
fait accompli by the time elections are held on February 7, 1986. The transparent purpose is
unmistakably so that the new Governor and other officials shall by then have been installed in
office, ready to function for purposes of the election for President and Vice-President." Thus,
the petitioners reported after the event: "With indecent haste, the plebiscite was held; Negros
del Norte was set up and proclaimed by President Marcos as in existence; a new set of
government officials headed by Governor Armando Gustilo was appointed; and, by the time the
elections were held on February 7, 1986, the political machinery was in place to deliver the
'solid North' to ex-President Marcos. The rest is history. What happened in Negros del Norte
during the elections — the unashamed use of naked power and resources — contributed in no
small way to arousing 'people's power' and steel the ordinary citizen to perform deeds of
courage and patriotism that makes one proud to be a Filipino today." (Record, pp. 9, 41).
The challenged Act is manifestly void and unconstitutional. Consequently, all the implementing
acts complained of, viz. the plebiscite, the proclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte
and the appointment of its officials are equally void. The limited holding of the plebiscite only in
the areas of the proposed new province (as provided by Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion of
the voters of the remaining areas of the integral province of Negros Occidental (namely, the
three cities of Bacolod, Bago and La Carlota and the Municipalities of La Castellana, Isabela,
Moises Padilla, Pontevedra, Hinigaran, Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladolid, San
Enrique, Ilog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and Candoni), grossly contravenes and disregards
the mandate of Article XI, section 3 of the then prevailing 1973 Constitution that no province
may be created or divided or its boundary substantially altered without "the approval of a
majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. " It is plain that all the cities
and municipalities of the province of Negros Occidental, not merely those of the proposed new
province, comprise the units affected. It follows that the voters of the whole and entire
province of Negros Occidental have to participate and give their approval in the plebiscite,
because the whole province is affected by its proposed division and substantial alteration of its
boundary. To limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded
from the province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote for the
secession that they demanded against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic
principle of majority rule.
The argument of fait accompli viz. that the railroaded plebiscite of January 3, 1986 was held
and can no longer be enjoined and that the new province of Negros del Norte has been
constituted, begs the issue of invalidity of the challenged Act. This Court has always held that it
"does not look with favor upon parties 'racing to beat an injunction or restraining order' which
they have reason to believe might be forthcoming from the Court by virtue of the filing and
pendency of the appropriate petition therefor. Where the restraining order or preliminary
injunction are found to have been properly issued, as in the case at bar, mandatory writs shall
be issued by the Court to restore matters to the status quo ante." (Banzon v. Cruz, 45 SCRA 475,
506 [1972]). Where, as in this case, there was somehow a failure to properly issue the
restraining order stopping the holding of the illegal plebiscite, the Court will issue the
mandatory writ or judgment to restore matters to the status quo ante and restore the
territorial integrity of the province of Negros Occidental by declaring the unconstitutionality of
the challenged Act and nullifying the invalid proclamation of the proposed new province of
Negros del Norte and the equally invalid appointment of its officials. cdasia
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 declared unconstitutional.

C o p y r i g h t 1 9 9 4 - 1 9 9 9 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.