*

G.R. No. 152894. August 17, 2007.

CENTURY CANNING CORPORATION, petitioner,  vs.COURT OF APPEALS and GLORIA C.

PALAD, respondents.

Labor Law;  Apprenticeship;  One of the objectives of Title II (Training and Employment of Special
Workers) of the Labor Code is to establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices; an
apprenticeship program should first be approved by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
before an apprentice may be hired, otherwise the person hired will be considered a regular employee; An
apprenticeship program should first be approved by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
before an apprentice may be hired, otherwise the person hired will be considered a regular employee.—The
Labor Code defines an apprentice as a worker who is covered by a written apprenticeship agreement with an
employer. One of the objectives of Title II (Training and Employment of Special Workers) of the Labor Code
is to establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices. In line with this objective, Articles
60 and 61 of the Labor Code provide: ART. 60.  Employment of apprentices.—Only employers in the
highly technical industries may employ apprentices and only in apprenticeable occupations
approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

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(Emphasis supplied) ART. 61.  Contents of apprenticeship agree-ments.—Apprenticeship agreements,

including the wage rates of apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by the Minister of Labor and
Employment. The period of apprenticeship shall not exceed six months.  Apprenticeship agreements
providing for wage rates below the legal minimum wage, which in no case shall start below 75
percent of the applicable minimum wage, may be entered into only in accordance with
apprenticeship programs duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The Ministry
shall develop standard model programs of apprenticeship. (Emphasis supplied) In  Nitto Enterprises v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 248 SCRA 654 (1995), the Court cited Article 61 of the Labor Code
and held that an apprenticeship program should first be approved by the DOLE before an apprentice may be
hired, otherwise the person hired will be considered a regular employee.
Same; Same; Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA); Republic Act No. 7796
(RA 7796), which created the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), has
transferred the authority over apprenticeship programs from the Bureau of Local Employment of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
(TESDA).—Republic Act No. 7796 (RA 7796), which created the TESDA, has transferred the authority over
apprenticeship programs from the Bureau of Local Employment of the DOLE to the TESDA. RA 7796
emphasizes TESDA’s approval of the apprenticeship program as a pre-requisite for the hiring of apprentices.
Such intent is clear under Section 4 of RA 7796: SEC. 4. Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act: x x x
j)  “Apprenticeship”  training within employment with compulsory related theoretical instructions
involving a  contract between an apprentice and an employer on an approved apprenticeable
occupation;k)“Apprentice”  is a person undergoing  training for an approved apprenticeable
occupation  during an established period assured by an apprenticeship agreement; l)  “Apprentice
Agreement” is a contract wherein a prospective employer binds himself to train the apprentice who in turn
accepts the terms of training for a recognized apprentice-able occupation emphasizing the rights,
duties and responsibilities of each party; m) “Apprenticeable Occupation” is an

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occupation officially endorsed by a tripartite body and  approved for apprenticeship by the
Authority [TESDA]; (Emphasis supplied)
Same;  Same;  Same;  An apprenticeship agreement which lacks prior approval from the Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) is void; Prior approval from the Technical Education
and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) is necessary to ensure that only employers in the highly technical
industries may employ apprentices and only in apprenticeable occupations.—In this case, the apprenticeship
agreement was entered into between the parties before petitioner filed its apprenticeship program with the
TESDA for approval. Petitioner and Palad executed the apprenticeship agreement on 17 July 1997 wherein
it was stated that the training would start on 17 July 1997 and would end approximately in December 1997.
On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted for approval its apprenticeship program, which the TESDA
subsequently approved on 26 September 1997. Clearly, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced even
before the TESDA approved petitioner’s apprenticeship program. Thus, the apprenticeship agreement is
void because it lacked prior approval from the TESDA. The TESDA’s approval of the employer’s
apprenticeship program is required before the employer is allowed to hire apprentices. Prior approval from
the TESDA is necessary to ensure that only employers in the highly technical industries may employ
apprentices and only in apprentice-able occupations. Thus, under RA 7796, employers can only hire
apprentices for apprenticeable occupations which must be officially endorsed by a tripartite body and
approved for apprenticeship by the TESDA. This is to ensure the protection of apprentices and to obviate
possible abuses by prospective employers who may want to take advantage of the lower wage rates for
apprentices and circumvent the right of the employees to be secure in their employment.
Same;  Same;  Same;  Where a worker is not considered an apprentice because the apprenticeship
agreement was enforced before the TESDA’s approval of the apprenticeship program, the worker is deemed a
regular employee.—Since Palad is not considered an apprentice because the apprenticeship agreement was
enforced before the TESDA’s approval of petitioner’s apprenticeship program, Palad is deemed a regular
employee performing the job of a “fish cleaner.” Clearly, the job of a “fish cleaner” is necessary in petitioner’s
business as a tuna and sardines factory. Under Article 280 of the Labor

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 Code, an employment is deemed regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.
Same;  Same;  Dismissals;  Absenteeism and Inefficiency;  Habitual absenteeism and poor efficiency of
performance are among the valid causes for which the employer may terminate the apprenticeship agreement
after the probationary period.—In this case, the Labor Arbiter held that petitioner terminated Palad for
habitual absenteeism and poor efficiency of performance. Under Section 25, Rule VI, Book II of the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, habitual absenteeism and poor efficiency of performance are among
the valid causes for which the employer may terminate the apprenticeship agreement after the probationary
period.
Same;  Same;  Same;  When the alleged valid cause for the termination of employment is not clearly
proven, as in this case, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.—Under Article 227 of the
Labor Code, the employer has the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized
cause. Petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that Palad was terminated for valid reasons. In fact, the
NLRC found that petitioner failed to prove the authenticity of the performance evaluation which petitioner
claims to have conducted on Palad, where Palad received a performance rating of only 27.75%. Petitioner
merely relies on the performance evaluation to prove Palad’s inefficiency. It was likewise not shown that
petitioner ever apprised Palad of the performance standards set by the company. When the alleged valid
cause for the termination of employment is not clearly proven, as in this case, the law considers the matter a
case of illegal dismissal.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Bolisay and Partners Law Offices and Engelberto A. Farol for petitioner.
     Joel G. Martinez for private respondent.
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CARPIO, J.:

The Case
1 2
This is a petition for review  of the Decision  dated 12 No-vember 2001 and the Resolution dated 5
April 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60379.

The Facts

On 15 July 1997, Century Canning Corporation (petitioner) hired Gloria C. Palad (Palad) as “fish
cleaner” at petitioner’s 3tuna and sardines factory. Palad signed on 17 July 1997 an
apprenticeship agreement   with petitioner. Palad received an apprentice allowance of P138.75
daily. On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted its apprenticeship program for approval to the
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) of the Department of Labor and
Employment
4
(DOLE). On 26 September 1997, the TESDA approved peti-tioner’s apprenticeship
program.
According to petitioner, a performance evaluation was conducted on 15 November 1997, where
petitioner gave Palad a rating of N.I. or “needs improvement” since she scored only 27.75% based
on a 100% performance indicator. Furthermore, according to the performance evaluation, Palad
incurred
5
numerous tardiness and absences. As a consequence, petitioner issued a termination
notice  dated 22 November 1997 to Palad, informing her of her termination effective at the close
of business hours of 28 November 1997.

_______________
1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion with Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Juan Q. Enriquez,
Jr., concurring.
3 CA Rollo, pp. 57-58.
4 Id., at p. 63.
5 Id., at p. 59.

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Palad then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, under-payment of wages, and non-payment of
pro-rated 13th month pay for the year 1997.
On 25 February 1999, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit but ordered
petitioner to pay Palad her last salary and her pro-rated 13th month pay. The dispositive portion
of the Labor Arbiter’s decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the complaint for illegal
dismissal filed by the complainant against the respondents in the above-entitled case should be, as it is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. However, the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant
the amount of ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS (P1,632.00), representing her last
salary and the amount of SEVEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT (P7,228.00) PESOS
representing her prorated 13th month pay.
All other issues are
6
likewise dismissed.
SO ORDERED.”

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed with modification the
Labor Arbiter’s decision, thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Arbiter dated 25 February 1999 is hereby
MODIFIED in that, in addition, respondents are ordered to pay complainant’s backwages for two (2) months
in the amount of P7,176.00 (P138.75 x 26 x 2 mos.). All other dispositions of the Arbiter as appearing in the
dispositive portion of
7
his decision are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.”

Upon denial of Palad’s motion for reconsideration, Palad filed a special civil action
for certiorari with the Court of Ap-

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6 Id., at pp. 32-33.
7 Id., at p. 42.

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 Century Canning Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

peals. On 12 November 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the questioned decision of the NLRC is hereby SET ASIDE and a
new one entered, to wit:

(a) finding the dismissal of petitioner to be illegal;

(b) ordering private respondent to pay petitioner her underpayment in wages;
(c) ordering private respondent to reinstate petitioner to her former position without loss of seniority
rights and to pay her full backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld from her
up to the time of her reinstatement;
(d) ordering private respondent to pay petitioner attorney’s fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the
monetary award herein; and
(e) ordering private respondent to pay the costs of the suit.
8
SO ORDERED.”

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals held that the apprenticeship agreement which Palad signed was not valid
and binding because it was executed more than two months before the TESDA approved
petitioner’s apprenticeship program.
9
The Court of Appeals cited  Nitto Enterprises v. National
Labor Relations Commission,  where it was held that prior approval by the DOLE of the proposed
apprenticeship program is a condition sine qua non  before an apprenticeship agreement can be
validly entered into.
The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner illegally dismissed Palad. The Court of Appeals
ruled that petitioner failed to show that Palad was properly apprised of the re-

_______________
8 Rollo, p. 29.
9 G.R. No. 114337, 29 September 1995, 248 SCRA 654.

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quired standard of performance. The Court of Appeals likewise held that Palad was not afforded
due process because petitioner did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT AN APPRENTICE; and
 2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD NOT ADEQUATELY PROVEN THE EXISTENCE
OF A VALID
10
CAUSE IN TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF PRIVATE RE-
SPONDENT.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is without merit.

Registration and Approval by the TESDA of Apprenticeship Program Required Before

Hiring of Apprentices

The Labor Code defines an apprentice

11
as a worker who is covered by a written apprenticeship
agreement with an employer.   One of the objectives of Title II (Training and Employment of
Special Workers)
12
of the Labor Code is to establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of
apprentices.  In line with this objective, Articles 60 and 61 of the Labor Code provide:
“ART. 60.  Employment of apprentices.—Only employers in the highly technical industries may
employ apprentices and

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10 Rollo, p. 70.
11 Article 58(b) of the Labor Code.
12 Article 57(3) of the Labor Code.

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only in apprenticeable occupations approved by the Minister of Labor and

Employment. (Emphasis supplied)
ART. 61. Contents of apprenticeship agreements.—Apprenticeship agreements, including the wage rates
of apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The period of
apprenticeship shall not exceed six months.  Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates
below the legal minimum wage, which in no case shall start below 75 percent of the applicable
minimum wage, may be entered into only in accordance with apprenticeship programs duly
approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.  The Ministry shall develop standard model
programs of apprenticeship.” (Emphasis supplied)
13
In Nitto Enterprises v. National Labor Relations Commission,  the Court cited Article 61 of the
Labor Code and held that an apprenticeship program should first be approved by the DOLE
before an apprentice may be hired, otherwise the person hired will be considered a regular
employee. The Court held:
“In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was
executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of “care
maker/molder.” On the same date, an apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and submitted to
the Department of Labor and Employment. However, the apprenticeship agreement was filed only on June
7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the Department of Labor and Employment, the
apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed.
Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law.  It is
mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be
entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of
Labor and Employment.

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13 Supra note 9.

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Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship
program is, therefore, a condition  sine qua non  before an apprenticeship agreement can be
validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is
a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-
apprentice relationship.
Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to “establish a national apprenticeship program
through the participation of employers, workers and government and non-government agencies” and “to
establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices.” To translate such objectives into
existence, prior approval of the DOLE to any apprenticeship program has to be secured as a condition sine
qua non  before any such apprenticeship agreement can be fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in
apprenticeship programs and agreements cannot be debased.
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no force and
effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent’s
assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy (“kargador” or “pahinante”) deserves
credence. He should rightly be considered
14
as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the
Labor Code x x x. (Emphasis supplied)”
15
Republic Act No. 7796  (RA 7796), which created the TESDA, has transferred the authority 16over
apprenticeship programs from the Bureau of Local Employment of the DOLE to the TESDA.  RA
7796 emphasizes TESDA’s approval of

_______________
14 Id.,at pp. 660-661.
15 Otherwise known as the TESDA Act of 1994.
16 Sections 5 and 18 of RA 7796 provide:

SEC. 5.  Technical Education and Skills Development Authority, Creation.—To implement the policy declared in this Act,  there is
hereby created a Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), hereinafter referred to as the
Authority, which shall replace and ab-

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the apprenticeship program as a pre-requisite for the hiring of apprentices. Such intent is clear
under Section 4 of RA 7796:
“SEC. 4. Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act:
xxx

j) “Apprenticeship”  training within employment with compulsory related theoretical instructions

involving a  contract between an apprentice and an employer on an approved
apprenticeable occupation;
k) “Apprentice”  is a person undergoing  training for an approved apprenticeable
occupation during an established period assured by an apprenticeship agreement;
l) “Apprentice Agreement” is a contract wherein a prospective employer binds himself to train the
apprentice who in turn accepts the terms of  training for a recognized apprenticeable
occupation emphasizing the rights, duties and responsibilities of each party;
m) “Apprenticeable Occupation”  is an occupation officially endorsed by a tripartite body
and approved for apprenticeship by the Authority [TESDA]”; (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the apprenticeship agreement was entered into between the parties before petitioner
filed its apprentice-

_______________

sorb the National Manpower and Youth Council (NMYC), the Bureau of Technical and Vocational Education (BTVE) and the personnel
and functions pertaining to technical-vocational education in the regional offices of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) and  the apprenticeship program of the Bureau of Local Employment of the Department of Labor and
Employment. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 18. Transfer of the Apprenticeship Program.—The Apprenticeship Program of the Bureau of Local Employment of the
Department of Labor and Employment shall be transferred to the Authority [TESDA] which shall implement and administer
said program in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied)

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ship program with the TESDA for approval. Petitioner and Palad executed the apprenticeship
agreement on 17 July 1997 wherein it was stated that17
the training would start on 17 July 1997
and would end approximately in December 1997.   On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted for
approval
18
its apprenticeship program, which the TESDA subsequently approved on 26 September
1997.   Clearly, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced even before the TESDA approved
petitioner’s apprenticeship program. Thus, the apprenticeship agreement is void because it
lacked prior approval from the TESDA.
The TESDA’s approval of the employer’s apprenticeship program is required before the
employer is allowed to hire apprentices. Prior approval from the TESDA is necessary to ensure
that only employers in the19 highly technical industries may employ apprentices and only in
apprenticeable occupations.   Thus, under RA 7796, employers can only hire apprentices for
apprenticeable occupations which must be officially endorsed by a tripartite body and approved
for apprenticeship by the TESDA. This is to ensure the protection of apprentices and to obviate
possible abuses by prospective employers who may want to take advantage of the lower wage
rates for apprentices and circumvent the right of the employees to be secure in their employment.
The requisite TESDA approval of the apprenticeship program prior to the hiring of apprentices
was further emphasized by the DOLE with the issuance of Department Order No. 68-04 on 18
August 2004. Department Order No. 68-04, which provides the guidelines in the implementation
of the Apprenticeship and Employment Program of the government, specifically states that  no
enterprise shall be allowed to

_______________
17 CA Rollo, p. 57.
18 Id.,at p. 63.
19 See Article 60 of the Labor Code.

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hire apprentices
20
unless its apprenticeship program is registered and approved by
TESDA.

_______________
20 DOLE Department Order No. 68-04: Guidelines in the Implementation of the Kasanayan at Hanapbuhay
Program (An Apprenticeship and Employment Program) pertinently provides:
B. Definition of Terms

1. Apprenticeship—training within employment involving a  contract between an apprentice and an

enterprise on an apprenticeable occupation.
2. Apprentice—a  person undergoing training for an approved apprenticeable occupation  during an
established period and covered by an apprenticeship agreement.
3. Apprenticeship Agreement—a contract wherein a prospective enterprise binds himself to train the apprentice
who, in turn, accepts the terms of  training for a recognized apprenticeable occupation  emphasizing the
rights, duties and responsibilities of each party.
4. Apprenticeable Occupation—an occupation officially approved for apprenticeship by TESDA.

xxxx
G. Registration of Apprenticeship Program
The enterprise shall register its apprenticeship program with any of the TESDA Provincial Offices. It shall submit the
following:

1. Letter of Application;
2. Certification that the number of apprentices to be hired is not more than 20 percent of the total regular workforce;
and
3. Skills Training Outline.

No enterprise shall be allowed to hire apprentices unless its apprenticeship program is registered and
approved by TESDA.
H. Apprenticeship Agreement
No apprenticeship training will commence until an Apprenticeship Agreement has been forged between an enterprise
and an apprentice. (Emphasis supplied)

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Since Palad is not considered an apprentice because the apprenticeship agreement was enforced
before the TESDA’s approval of petitioner’s apprenticeship program, Palad is deemed a regular
employee performing the job of a “fish cleaner.” Clearly, the job of a “fish21cleaner” is necessary in
petitioner’s business as a tuna and sardines factory. Under Article 280   of the Labor Code, an
employment is deemed regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.

Illegal Termination of Palad

We shall now resolve whether petitioner illegally dismissed Palad.

_______________
21 Article 280 of the Labor Code reads:

ART. 280. Regular and casual employment.—The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of
the oral agreements of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer except where
the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the
time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for
the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That any employee who has
rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect
to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists. (Emphasis supplied)

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22
Under Article
23
279  of the Labor Code,24 an employer may terminate the services
25
of an employee for
just causes  or for authorized causes.  Furthermore, under Article 277(b) of the

_______________
22 ART. 279. Security of Tenure.—In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall
be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld
from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
23 ART. 282. Termination by employer.—An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative
in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust re-posed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of
his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

24 ART. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of per-sonnel.—The employer may also terminate the employment
of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing
or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the
provisions of this Title x x x.
25 ART. 277. Miscellaneous provisions.—x x x
 (b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal
except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this
Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice
containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity

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Labor Code, the employer must send the employee who is about to be terminated, a written notice
stating the causes for termination and must give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself. Thus, to constitute valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must concur:
(1) the dismissal must be for a just or authorized
26
cause; and (2) the employee must be afforded an
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
In this case, the Labor Arbiter held that petitioner terminated Palad for habitual absenteeism
and poor efficiency of performance. Under Section 25, Rule VI, Book II of the Implementing Rules
of the Labor Code, habitual absenteeism and poor efficiency of performance are among the valid
causes for which the employer may terminate the apprenticeship agreement after the
probationary period.
However, the NLRC reversed the finding of the Labor Arbiter on the issue of the legality of
Palad’s termination:
“As to the validity of complainant’s dismissal in her status as an apprentice, suffice to state that the findings
of the Arbiter that complainant was dismissed due to failure to meet the standards is nebulous. What
clearly appears is that complainant already passed the probationary status of the apprenticeship agreement
of 200 hours at the time she was terminated on 28 November 1997 which was already the fourth month of
the apprenticeship period of 1000

_______________

to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance
with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and
Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the
validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission. The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the
employer. (Emphasis supplied)
26 Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Maguad, G.R. No. 166363, 15 August 2006, 498 SCRA 639.

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hours. As such, under the Code, she can only be dismissed for cause, in this case, for poor efficiency of
performance on the job or in the classroom for a prolonged period despite warnings duly given to the
apprentice.
We noted that no clear and sufficient evidence exist to warrant her dismissal as an apprentice
during the agreed period. Besides the absence of any written warnings given to complainant
reminding her of “poor performance,” respondents’ evidence in this respect consisted of an
indecipherable or unauthenticated xerox of the performance evaluation allegedly conducted on
complainant. This is of doubtful authenticity and/or credibility, being not only incomplete in the
sense that appearing thereon is a signature (not that of com-plainant) side by side with a date
indicated as “1/16/98.” From the looks of it, this signature is close to and appertains to the
typewritten position of “Division/Department Head”, which is below the signature of
complainant’s immediate superior who made the evaluation indicated as “11-15-97.”
The only conclusion We can infer is that this evaluation was made belatedly, specifically, after
the filing of the case and during the progress thereof in the Arbitral level, as shown that nothing
thereon indicate that complainant was notified of the results. Its authenticity therefor, is a big
question mark, and hence lacks any credibility. Evidence, to be admissible in administrative
proceedings, must at least have a modicum of authenticity. This, respondents failed to comply with.
As such, complainant is entitled
27
to the payment of her wages for the remaining two (2) months of her
apprenticeship agreement.”  (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, it appears that the Labor Arbiter’s conclusion that petitioner validly terminated Palad
was based mainly on the performance evaluation allegedly conducted by petitioner. However,
Palad alleges that she had no knowledge of the performance evaluation conducted and that she
was not even informed of the result of the alleged performance evaluation. Palad also claims she
did not receive a notice of dismissal, nor

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27 CA Rollo, pp. 41-42.

518

518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Century Canning Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

was she given the chance to explain. According to petitioner, Palad did not receive the
termination notice because Palad allegedly stopped reporting for work after being informed of the
result of the evaluation.
Under Article 227 of the Labor Code, the 28employer has the burden of proving that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause.  Petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that
Palad was terminated for valid reasons. In fact, the NLRC found that petitioner failed to prove
the authenticity of the performance evaluation which petitioner claims to have conducted on
Palad, where Palad received a performance rating of only 27.75%. Petitioner merely relies on the
performance evaluation to prove Palad’s inefficiency. It was likewise not shown that petitioner
ever apprised Palad of the performance standards set by the company. When the alleged valid
cause for the termination of employment29
is not clearly proven, as in this case, the law considers
the matter a case of illegal dismissal.
Furthermore, Palad was not accorded due process. Even if petitioner did conduct a
performance evaluation on Palad, petitioner failed to warn Palad of her alleged poor performance.
In fact, Palad denies any knowledge of the performance evaluation conducted and of the 30
result
thereof. Petitioner likewise admits that Palad did not receive the notice of termination   because
Palad allegedly stopped reporting for

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28 Manly Express, Inc. v. Payong, Jr.,  G.R. No. 167462, 25 October 2005,  474 SCRA 323;  Manila Electric Company

(MERALCO) v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 153180, 2 September 2005, 469 SCRA 353.
29 Philippine National Bank v. Cabansag, G.R. No. 157010, 21 June 2005, 460 SCRA 514.
30 The termination notice reads:

DATE: NOV. 22, 1997                    

GLORIA C. PALAD 
105 LOT 1 BLK. 6, PRK. 7 
B. TANYAG, TAGUIG, METRO MANILA

519

VOL. 530, AUGUST 17, 2007 519

Century Canning Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

work. The records are bereft of evidence to show that petitioner ever gave Palad the opportunity
to explain and defend herself. Clearly, the two requisites for a valid dismissal are lacking in this
case.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 12 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 5
April 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60379.
SO ORDERED.

     Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio-Morales, Tingaand Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

Judgment and resolution affirmed.

Notes.—Where the apprenticeship agreement has no force and effect, the worker hired as
apprentice should be considered as a regular employee. (Nitto Enterprises vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 248 SCRA 654[1995])
An “apprentice officer” cannot be considered a “superior of-ficer.” (Wallem Maritime Services,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 263 SCRA 174 [1996])