DR.

RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

LUCKNOW

2020-21

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

FINAL DRAFT
On
Contempt of Court by Lawyers

Submitted by – Submitted to –
Akash Jain Mr. Manoj Kumar
B.A.LLB (Hon) Semester IX Asst. Professor (Law)
Enroll no. 160101018

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................................................3
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT LAW IN INDIA......................................................................3
 CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1926...............................................................................................5
 CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1952...............................................................................................5
 CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971...............................................................................................7
CONTEMPT OF COURT CLASSIFIED........................................................................................................8
 CIVIL CONTEMPT............................................................................................................................8
 CRIMINAL CONTEMPT...................................................................................................................9
 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT..........................................10
ESSENCE OF CONTEMPT LAW...............................................................................................................11
CONTEMPT OF COURT AND THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION..............................................................13
CONTEMPT BY LAWYERS.......................................................................................................................14
CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................................19

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INTRODUCTION

Contempt of court is a broad, common law. It gives power to Court to punish anyone who does its
contempt. This concept / law developed in Britain, spread through colonialism to protect the
authority and legitimacy of Court power to punish for contempt provided to Judiciary. Our
constitution makers also for the same reasons provided contempt power to our higher judiciary.

Contempt of court is a matter which is concerning the fair administration of justice and the main
aim is to punish whosoever hurts the dignity and authority of courts. According to Lord Diplock,
he defines Contempt of court in a following way:-

Although criminal contempt’s of court may take a variety of forms they all share a common
characteristic: they involve an interference with the due administration of justice, either in a
particular case or more generally as a continuing process. It is justice itself that is flouted by
contempt of court, not the individual court or judge who is attempting to administer it.1

The term contempt of court is a generic term descriptive of conduct in relation to particular
proceedings in a court of law which tends to undermine that system or inhibit citizens from
availing themselves of it for the settlement of their disputes. 2 Our Constitution has granted the
Supreme Court and the High Court with the power to punish any person for contempt of court
under Articles 129 and 215 respectively

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT LAW IN INDIA

The law in India before Independence' and the framing of our Constitution was modeled on the
pattern of the English concept. The English decision, subject to the statutory provisions of the

1
J. Moskovitz, ‘Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal’ (1943) 43 Col. LR 780.
2
Lord Diplock in Attorney General v. Times News Paper Ltd. (1973) 3 All. E.R. 54, 71.

3
Indian law formed the basis for the decisions of the Indian courts. It may be recalled here that law
in England is not codified law but is governed by the principles evolved at common law.
Independence of India and its Constitution, by its very nature have brought about ideological as
also legal changes resulting from the form of government adopted here. But such changes affect
the form and procedure without materially affecting the concept of the law

 CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1926

The first attempt at a comprehensive legislation relating to contempt of courts in India was the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, hereinafter referred to as the 1926 Act. The salutary concept of
limiting the punishment which could be awarded in contempt cases was introduced by this Act.
But it was far from a comprehensive piece of legislation. The Act, as pointed out by the Sanyal
Committee report, had many shortcomings and flaws in the sense that it did not contain any
provision with regarded to contempt of courts subordinate to courts other than High Courts, that
is, chief courts and judicial commissioner’s courts. It was equally silent with regard to the powers
of contempt of courts of judicial commissioners. If subordinate courts or superior courts in one
area required protection, it was obvious that the courts in other areas also required a like
protection. The Act also did not deal with the extra-territorial jurisdiction of High courts in
matters of contempt.

 CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1952

Keeping in mind the shortcomings and flaws in the 1926 Act, it was repealed and replaced by the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, hereinafter referred to as the ‘1952 Act’. The 1952 Act made two
significant departures from the 1926 Act. First, the expression “High Court” was defined to
include Courts of the Judicial Commissioner which had been excluded from the purview of the
1926 Act. Secondly, the High Court (including the Court of a Judicial Commissioner) (was
conferred jurisdiction to inquire into and try a contempt of itself or of any court subordinate to it,
irrespective of whether the contempt was alleged to halve been committed within or outside the
local limits of its jurisdiction and irrespective of whether the person alleged to be guilty of the
contempt was within or outside such limits.
 Commenting on the 1952 Act and the state of the law of contempt as it stood after the 1952 Act,
the Sanyal Committee, observed as follows:

The 1952 Act is sound as far as it goes. While its provisions may be retained, its scope
requires to be widened considerably. The policy of the legislature has so far been to leave
the formulation of the law of contempt to the courts. They only safeguards provided in
the law are that the power to punish for contempt (subject to the limited exception as to
contempt in the face of the court for which provision is made in the Indian Penal Code) is
vested in the superior courts and limits are set to the punishment which may be awarded
by the courts. Before the Constitution came into force there was no statutory provision
for appeals from decisions of High Courts in contempt cases though the Privy Council
after some initial reluctance finally asserted its jurisdiction to hear appeals in contempt
cases. The High Courts and the Supreme Court have interpreted the provisions as to
appeals contained in the Constitution as sufficiently wide to permit appeals in such cases
from High Courts to the Supreme Court.

The Act of 1952, however, was found to be inadequate and vague for want of statutory definitions
of several aspect of the law. Consequently the necessity was realized that a penal law like
contempt of court which should be more precise and definite in its implications, particularly in
view of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by the Constitution
under Article 19(1)(a). In legal remembrance, Bihar v. Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta,3 the validity
of the 1952 Act was challenged on the ground that the expression “contempt of court” has not
been defined and it amounts to unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of a citizen
guaranteed by Article 19(l)(a). But the validity was upheld and it was said that 1952 Act, because
it does not define “contempt” is not an unreasonable restriction. The Court further observed that
the framers of the Constitution considered it unnecessary to define the term as it carries a set
meaning given to it by judicial pronouncements of English and Indian Courts. The Act, therefore,
was not void. The observations made by the court in aforementioned case were quoted with
approval by the Bombay,4 Andhra Pradesh5 and Punjab High Courts.6

3
AIR 1954 Pat. 203. 1
4
Damyanti G. Chandiramani v. Vaney, AIR 1966 Bom 19.
5
Advocate-General ofA.P, v. Ramana Rao, 1967 AP 299.
6
Sher Singh v. Raghupati, AIR Punj. 217.
  CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971

Realizing that the existing law relating to contempt of courts is somewhat uncertain, undefined
and unsatisfactory in the sense that the jurisdiction to punish for contempt touches upon two
important fundamental rights of the citizen, namely, the right to personal liberty and the fight to
freedom of expression. It was, therefore, considered advisable that the entire law on the subject be
scrutinized by a special committee. In pursuance of this, a committee was set up in 1961 under the
Chairmanship of the late Shri H.N. Sanyal, the then Additional Solicitor General. The Committee
was required

(i) to examine the law relating to contempt of courts generally, and in particular, the law
relating to the procedure for the punishment thereof;
(ii) to suggest amendments therein with a view to clarifying and reforming the law
wherever necessary;
(iii) any to make recommendations for codification of the law in the light of the
examination made

The Committee first considered the opinion of Desai, J. in State v. Padma Kant Malviya,7
According to Desai J. legislature had no power to define contempt of court. The court of record
has the exclusive power to define and determine what amounts to contempt and held that the
parliament had the power to legislate in relation to the substantive law of contempt of Supreme
Court and High Courts subject to three limitations.

(i) It (contempt power) cannot be abrogated, nullified or transferred to some other body,
save by an amendment of the Constitution.
(ii) Parliament’s power to legislate as to contempt ought not to be so exercised as to
stultify the status and dignity of these courts.
(iii) Legislation in relation to contempt imposing unreasonable restrictions on the right of
citizens to freedom of speech and expression will be unconstitutional.

The Committee made a comprehensive examination of the law and problems relating to contempt
of court in the light of the position obtaining in our own country and various foreign

7
AIR 1954 All. 523.
countries and realizing the complex nature of contempt of court decided not to attempt defining it.
The recommendations which the Committee made, took note of the importance given to the
freedom of speech in the Constitution and of the need for safeguarding the status and dignity of
courts and interest of administration of justice. Accepting the recommendations of the Sanyal
Committee the new act of Contempt of Courts Act was passed in 1971.

CONTEMPT OF COURT CLASSIFIED

Lord Russell, C.J.8 has defined contempt of court as:

“Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a court or a judge of the Court into
contempt, or to lower the authority is a contempt of court. Further, any act done or writing
published calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of
the court is contempt of Court.”

The object of contempt proceedings is two-fold. Firstly, it ensures a fair trial in judicial
proceedings and secondly, it prevents the bringing of the authority and administration of law into
disrespect.

In India the principle has been followed for a long time. The present law on the subject is
contained in the contempt of Court Act 1971. The Constitution of India also empowers the
Supreme Court and High Courts to punish for its contempt.

Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 define the expression ‘contempt of court’ into two
categories of contempt, viz.,

(i) Civil contempt and

(ii) Criminal contempt.

The two categories can be outlined as:

 CIVIL CONTEMPT

8
R v. Grey (1900) 2 QB 36 40.
Civil Contempt means willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other
process of a court, or willful breach of an undertaking given to a court. Under Section 2(b) of The
Contempt of Court Act, 1971 'civil contempt', is defined to mean willful disobedience to any
judgment, decree, order, direction or any other process of court or willful breach of an
undertaking given to the court. It can basically be held to be any wrong to the person who is
entitled to the benefit of a court order. It is a wrong for which the law awards indemnification to
the injured party; though formally it is contempt of court in fact it is a wrong of private nature.
Civil contempt is a sanction to enforce deference with an order.

 CRIMINAL CONTEMPT

Section 2(c) states - ‘Criminal Contempt’ means the publication (whether by words, spoken or
written or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any
other act, whatsoever which-

(i). Scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any
court; or

(ii). Prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial
proceeding; or

(iii). Interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration
of justice in any other manner.
Criminal contempt includes any act or statement scandalizing or tending to scandalize or lowering
or tending to lower the authority of any court or prejudicially interfering or tending to interfere
with the due course of any judicial proceedings or obstructing or tending to obstruct the
administration of justice in any manner. However, an innocent publication cannot be characterized
as contempt of court. The Act further makes it clear that any publication with respect to a matter
which is not pending will not amount to contempt of court. The act provides for some exceptions
to the offence including a fair criticism of judicial acts.

A libelous reflection upon the conduct of a judge may not always amounts to contempt. Such a
scurrilous attack on a judge will amount to contempt only when it is calculated to obstruct or
interfere with the due course of Justice or proper administration of law. However, the courts time
and again made it clear that a fair criticism of the judgment in good faith would not amount to
contempt of court. Lord Justice Salmon9 has rightly observed:

“The authority and reputation of our courts are not so frail that their judgments need to be
shielded from criticism. It is the inalienable right of everyone to comment fairly on any matter of
public importance. This right is one of the pillars of individual liberty-freedom of speech, which
our courts have always unfailingly upheld. It follows that no criticism of a judgment however
vigorous can amount to contempt of court, providing it keeps within the limits of reasonable
courtesy and good faith.”

 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT

The difference between the two is that of procedure which was clearly held by the Allahabad High
Court in Vijay Pratap Singh v. Ajit Prasad,10 it was held that a distinction between a civil
contempt and criminal contempt seems to be that , in a civil contempt the purpose is to force the
contemnor to do something for the benefits of the other party, while in criminal contempt the
proceeding is by way of punishment for a wrong not so much to a party or individual but to the
public at large by interfering with the normal process of law degrading the majesty of the court.
However, if a civil contempt is enforced by fine or imprisonment of the contemnor for
nonperformance of his obligation imposed by a court, it turns out into a criminal contempt and
becomes a criminal matter at the end. Such contempt, being neither purely civil nor purely
criminal in nature, is sometimes called sui generis.

It is submitted that the differentiating line between civil and criminal contempt is sometimes very
thin and might often considered being same. Where the contempt consists in mere failure to
comply with or carry on an order of a court made for the benefit of a private party, it is plainly
civil contempt. If, however, the contemnor adds defiance of the court to disobedience of the order
and conducts himself in a manner which amounts to abstraction or interference with the courts of
justice, the contempt committed by him is of a mixed character, partaking of between him and his
opponent the nature of a civil contempt.

9
R v. Commissioner of Police (1968) 2 All ER 319.
10
AIR 1966 All. 305.
ESSENCE OF CONTEMPT LAW

The very essence of the contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the law
Courts. The image of such majesty in the minds of the public cannot be allowed to be distorted.
Action for contempt is not for the purpose of placing Judges in a position of immunity from
criticism but is aimed at protection of the freedom of individuals and the orderly and equal
administration of laws.11

The object of proceedings in contempt of Court is to keep the stream of justice unsullied and to
maintain the confidence of the public at large in the fair and impartial administration of justice by
the Court of law. If anybody wrongly casts aspersions on the impartiality and fair dispensation of
justice by a Court, he pollutes the purity of that stream and has to be punished. The object of the
law of contempt is not to vindicate the prestige or position of a Presiding Officer of a Court, but to
maintain the continuity of the crystal clear flow of the stream of justice. The object of the law is
not to provide a cloak for judicial authorities to cover up their inefficiency and corruption, or to
stifle criticism made in good faith against such officers. The law of contempt is intended to be a
protection to the public whose interest would he very much affected, if by the act or the conduct of
any party the authority of the Court is lowered and the sense of confidence which people have in
the administration of justice by it, is weakened.12

The contempt law empowers the Judges to punish contempt to keep the course of justice as free. it
has rightly has been observed that a court of justice without power to vindicate its own dignity, to
enforce obedience to its mandates, to protect its officers or to shield those who are entrusted to its
care, would be an anomaly which cannot be permitted to 'exist in any civilized community.13
Without such protection, Courts of justice would soon lose their hold upon the public respect and
maintenance of law and order would be rendered impossible. Hence it is that the summary power
of punishing the contempt has been given to the Court for keeping a blaze of glory around them
and for deterring people from attempting to render them contemptible in the eyes of the public.
11
Omesh Saigal v. R.K. Dalmai, AIR 1969 Del 214.
12
Brahm Prakash v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 10.
13
R v. Almon, (1765) Wilm 243.
In Vinay Chandra Mishra.14 the Court has observed :

"If the judiciary is to perform its duties and functions effectively and true to the spirit with which
they are sincerely entrusted to it the dignity and authority of the Courts have to be respected at all
costs. Otherwise, the very cornerstone of our Constitutional scheme will give way and with it will
disappear the rule of law and the civilized life in the society, It is for this purpose that the Courts
are entrusted with the extra-ordinary power of punishing those who indulge in acts whether inside
or outside the Courts which tend to undermine their authority and bring them in disrepute and
disrespect by scandalizing them and obstructing them from discharging their duties without fear or
favor. When the Court exercises this power, it does not do so to vindicate the dignity and manner
of the individual judge who is personally attacked or scandalized, but to uphold the majesty of law
and of the administration of the justice. The foundation of the judiciary is the trust and the
confidence of the people in its ability to deliver fearless and impartial justice. When the
foundation itself is shaken by acts which tend to create disaffection and disrespect for the
authority of the Court by creating distrust in its working, the edifice of the judicial system gets
eroded.“
The object of punishing contempt is not to safeguard or protect the dignity of the Judge or the
Magistrate. Its object is to preserve the authority of Court to ensure an ordered life in society.”
In Brahm Prakash Sharma v. State of U.P.15, the Supreme Court has observed that the summary
jurisdiction exercised by the superior courts in punishing contempt of their authority exists for the
purpose of preventing interference with the course of justice and for maintaining the authority of
law and is administered in the Courts.
The contempt power has been given to the Court for preventing any kind of such interference with
the administration of justice. The contempt jurisdiction should be exercised only when there

14
In re Vinay Chandra Mishra, AIR 1995 SC 2348 at p. 2366.
15
1954 Cr LJ 238 at p. 241.
 is real project is which can be regarded as a substantial interference with the due course of
justice. In a case16 the Supreme Court has observed:
"Of late, a perception that is slowly gaining ground among public is that sometimes some judges
are showing over-sensitiveness with a tendency to treat even technical violations or unintended
act as contempt. It is possible that it is done to hold the majesty of court and to command respect.
But judges like everyone else will have to understand they cannot demand respect by the
demonstration of power."

CONTEMPT OF COURT AND THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION

A substantial question as to the source of power of contempt was raised in the sense that does the
Supreme Court and the High Courts in India have power to initiate contempt proceedings,
independently of the Contempt of Courts Act, by virtue of them being courts of record. The
meaning and connotation of the expression “court of record” appearing in article 129 and 215 of
the Constitution of India has a very important bearing on the judicial independence and freedom
of speech. The Constitution or any other statute, however, does not define Court of Record. This
expression is well recognized in the juridical world.

The Black’s Law Dictionary17 defines “Court of Record” as: ‘A court that is required to keep a
record of its proceedings and that may fine or imprison.”

Article 129 and 215 of the Constitution provide. Supreme Court to be a court of record The
Supreme Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including
the power to punish for contempt of itself. High Court to be courts of record Every High Court
shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to
punish for contempt of itself. Thus both article 129 and article 215 expressly characterize the
Supreme Court and the High Courts are as courts of record. Although the law of contempt is
largely governed by the 1971 Act, it is now settled law in India that the High Courts and the

16
Rajesh Kumar Singh v. High Court of Judicature of M.P., AIR 2007 SC 2725.
17
6th ed. at p. 353.
Supreme Court derives their jurisdiction and power from Articles 215 and 129 of the Constitution.
This situation results in giving scope for “judicial self-dealing.

CONTEMPT BY LAWYERS

On account of the nature of duties to be discharged by the lawyers and judges they may get into
heated dialogue which may result in contempt of Court. There are several instances of the
misconduct which have been taken as contempt of Court, e.g., using insulting language against a
Judge,18 making scandalous allegations against a Judge,19 suppressing the facts to obtain favorable
order hurling shoe at the Judge,20 imputation of partiality21 and unfairness against the Judge, etc. A
counsel who advises his client to disobey the order of the Court is also held liable for contempt of
Court. Attacking the Judiciary in a Bar Council Election Manifests is taken as contempt of Court.
If a counsel refuses to answer the questions of the court is also liable for contempt of Court.22

In a case23 the Supreme Court has held that advocate using intemperate language and casting
unwarranted and aspersions on various judicial officers and attributing motives to them while
discharging their judicial functions would be held guilty of gross contempt of Court. In this case
such advocate was sentenced to four months simple imprisonment and fine of one thousand
18
M.B. Sanghi, Advocate v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana, AIR 1991 SC 1834.
19
Pritam Pal v. High Court of M.P., AIR 1992 SC 904.
20
The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Smt. Annatte Remond Uttanwala,1987 Cr. LJ 1038.
21
Court on its own Motion v. Milkhi Ram, 1992 Cr LJ 2130 (HP).
22
In re Vinay Chandra Mishra AIR 1995 SC 2348.
23
In re Ajay Kumar Pandey, Advocate, AIR 1998 SC 3299.
rupees. The Court has observed that it is most unbefitting for an advocate to make imputations
against the Judge only because he does not get the expected result, which according to him in the
fair and reasonable result available to him. Judges cannot be intimated to seek favorable orders.
Only because a lawyer appears as a party in person, he does get a license to commit contempt of
the Court by intimidating the Judges or scandalizing the Courts. An advocate cannot use language,
either in the pleading or during arguments which is either intemperate or unparliamentarily and
which has the tendency to interfere in the administration of justice and undermine the dignity of
the Court and the majority of law.

To resent the question asked by a Judge, to be disrespectful to him, to question his authority to ask
the questions, to shout at him, to threatens him with transfer and impeachment, to use insulting
language and abuse him go dictate the order that he should pass, to create scene in the Court and
to address him by losing temper are all acts calculated to interfere with and obstruct, the course of
justice.24 Such acts tend overawe the Court and to prevent it from performing it's duty to
administer justice.

Where in advocate shouted slogans in the open court and hurled his shoes towards the court and
thereby interrupted the court proceeding, his action both by his words and deeds in the presence of
the court taken as gross criminal contempt of court, and he was punished for contempt of court.
His apology was not accepted as it was not genuine and bona fide and made only to escape
punishment.25

An important issue in his weather boycott of Court or strike by lawyers amounts to contempt of
Court. In a case26 the Court has observed that in boycotting a Court, the advocate violates his
duties not only towards the client but also towards the Court. It has been held that it is not proper
for a pleader to boycott the Court in pursuance of the resolution of the Bar Association and refrain
from appearing in the in the Court without first obtaining the consent of his client.

24
In re Vinay Chandra Mishra, AIR 1995 SC 2348, at p. 2365.
25
In re Nandlal Balwani, AIR 1999 SC 1300.
26
Tarini Mohan v. Pleaders, AIR 1923 Cal 212.
However, the pleader is not guilty of any misconduct if he remains absent from the Court on the
day of a strike in the town and it is not shown that he is engaged in any case fixed on that day.27

In Common Cause v. Union of India a Committee was constituted to suggest steps to be taken to
prevent boycott or strike. The committee suggested that instead of the court going into wider
question, interim arrangements be made to see whether it would be workable. On the basis of the
suggestions given by the Committee, the Court has issued the following interim directions:

“1. In the rare instance where any association of lawyers including statutory Bar Councils
considered it imperative to call upon/or advice members of the legal profession to abstain from
appearing in courts on any occasion, it must be left open to any individual member/members of
that association to be free to appear without let fear or hindrance or any other coercive steps.

2. No such member who appears in court or otherwise practices his legal profession shall be
visited with any adverse or penal consequences whatever, by any association of lawyers and
shall not suffer any expulsion or threat of expulsion there from.

3. The above will not preclude other forms of protest by practicing lawyers in courts such as, for
instance, wearing of armbands and other form of protest which is which in no way interrupt or
disrupt the court proceedings or adversely affect the interest of the litigant. Any such form of
protest shall not however be derogatory to the court or to the profession.

4. Office-bearers of a bar association (including Bar Council) responsible for taking decisions
mentioned in clause (1) above shall ensure that such decisions are not implemented in the spirit
of what is stated in clauses (1), (2) and (3) above.”

In Ex-capt, Harish Uppal v. Union of India28, the Supreme Court has made it clear that lawyers
have no right to go on strike or give a call for boycott not even on a token strike. No lawyer can be
visited with any adverse consequences by the Association for the Bar Council and no threat or

27
Emperor v. Surendra Mohan Maitra and others, 35 CWN 344.
28
2003 AIR SCW 43.
coercion of any nature including that of expulsion can be held out. the court help further that only
in the rarest of rare cases where the dignity, integrity and independence of the Bar and/or the
Bench at stake, the Courts may ignore to a protest abstention from work for not more than one
day. It is being clarified that it will be for the Court to decide whether or not the issue involves
dignity or integrity or independence of the bar and/or the Bench. Therefore, in such cases the
President of the Bar first consult the Chief Justice of the District judge before advocates decide to
absent themselves from Court. The decision of the chief justice of the District judge would be
final and have to be abided by the Bar. The Courts are under no obligation to adjourn the matters
because the lawyers are on strike. On the contrary it is the duty of all courts to go on with matters
on their boards even in the absence of lawyers. Thus, Courts must not be privy to strikes or cause
for boycotts. If a lawyer holding vakalat of a client abstains from attending Court due to strike
call, he shall be personally liable to pay costs which shall be addition to damages which he might
have to pay his client for the loss suffered by him.

It is the duty of every advocate who has accepted a brief to attend trail even though it may go on
day to-day and for a prolonged period. A lawyer who has accepted a brief cannot refuse to attend
Court because a boycott call is given by the Bar Association. It is unprofessional and unbecoming
for a lawyer who has accepted brief to refuse to attend Court even in pursuance of a call for strike
or boycott by the Bar Association or the Bar Council. The Courts are under obligation to hear and
decide cases brought before it and cannot adjourn matters merely because lawyers are on strike. It
is a settled law that if a resolution is passed by the Bar Associations expressing want of
confidence in judicial officers it would amount to scandalizing the courts to undermine its
authority and thereby the Advocates will have committed Contempt of Court.

The Court has held that the Bar Associations may be separate bodies but all Advocates who are
members of such Association are under disciplinary jurisdiction of the Bar Councils and thus Bar
Councils can always control their conduct. Even in respect of disciplinary jurisdiction the final
appellate authority is, by virtue of section 38, The Supreme Court.

It is the duty of the Bar Councils to ensure that there is no unprofessional and/or unbecoming
conduct. This being their duty no Bar Council can even consider giving a call for strike or a call
for boycott. It follows that the Bar Councils and Bar Associations can never consider or take
seriously any requisition calling for a meeting to consider a call for a strike or a call for boycott.
In case any Association calls for a strike or call for boycott the concerned State Bar Council and
on their failure the Bar Council of India must immediately take disciplinary action against the
Advocates who give a call for strike and the Committee Members permitted calling of a meeting
for such purpose against the Committee Members.

The Court has further observed that if the Bar Councils do not perform their duties by taking
disciplinary action on complaint from a client against an advocate for non appearance by reason
of a call for strike or boycott, on an appeal under section 38 the Supreme Court can and will.

Demonstration resulting in the interference with the functioning of the Court will amount to
contempt of Court. In a case29 certain advocates who had stormed into various Court-rooms of the
High Court, raised slogans against the Judges and disrupted the Court's functioning, were held
guilty of contempt of Court.

Allegations made in the application for the transfer of the case may amount to contempt of court
and the counsel who has signed it may be punished for it. In a case 30 an application was made
before one Bench of the High Court for transfer of the case to another Bench. As a ground for the
transfer it was stated in the application that certain observations made by the Judges of the Bench
from which the transfer was sought created a bona fide belief in the applicant’s mind that they
were prejudicial against him and had made up their minds and left no doubt in the applicant’s
mind that he would not receive justice at the hands of the Judges. The application was signed by
the applicant and two advocates as the counsel for the applicant. The Court found the counsel
guilty of contempt. The allegations in the application amounted to scandalizing the Court.

If the contemptuous, allegations against the judicial officer are made in Writ petition, both
petitioner and his counsel can be held liable for criminal contempt of court. However, if the
counsel owns responsibility and says that the petitioner has reposes trust in him and simply has

29
Court on its own Motion v. B.D Kaushik & others, 1993 Cr. LJ 336.
30
M.V Shareef v. Judges of Nagpur High Court, AIR 1955 SC 19.
 signed the petition and the petitioner file affidavit asking for apology, the condemner counsel
alone will be liable for the contempt if it is established that the said act constitutes Contempt of
Court. No one including the advocate who is himself the officer of the Court can claim immunity
from operation of contempt law if his conduct in relation to the court interferes with or is
calculated to obstruct due course of justice.

Statements imputing prejudice or unfairness or corruption to the Judges should not be made,
unless the statements of the client as tested by the legal adviser are found sustainable.
Unfounded allegations of corruption by an advocate31 or imputing unfairness to the Court of
Judge in the grounds of appeal to the appellate court 32 or inducing a client to make false affidavit
and use them to delude the court or false pleading by the advocate 33 amounts to contempt of Court.
Wrongfully withholding the funds belonging to a client 34 or acting as solicitor without being duly
qualified35 is also taken as contempt of Court.

CONCLUSION

Contempt jurisdiction is applied for maintaining the majesty of law and also to assert impartial
and uninterrupted administration of justice. The Constitution gives power to the judiciary and all
public power is held as a trust. If the judges breach this trust they are required to pay for it. The
judicature is a noble and never ending institution. If judges frivolously bring the judicial
institution into shame, they are required to be condemned. The judiciary is a magnanimous
authority, elegant and majestic, and it sustains the belief of the nation. But if the judiciary
behaves as best of the best and disaffirms the rights of the general masses, they have to face
13
Govind Ram v. Sate of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 989.
23
In re D.C Saxena & Dr. D.C. Saxena v. The Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, AIR 1996 SC 2481.
33
Richardson v. Sutton, (1728) 125 ER 925.
43
Re Grey, (1892) 2 QB 440.
accountable criticism.

The best ammunition of a judge is his character of integrity, virtue and learning. Any judge will
hardly require the contempt power if the law of contempt can be more specified. The purpose of
the law of contempt is neither to boastfully condemn a true criticism nor to defend the authority
and dignity of the judges.

Tolerance to criticism is a merit and is a sign of maturity. The Indian Judiciary, though reluctant
and oversensitive in the early periods, now appears to have reached a level of maturity which can
tolerate criticism; but which never allows irresponsible attempts to lower its dignity. This can be
seen as the positive face of the coin but when this power of the judiciary is looked from the angle
of rule of law then this is again a major point of concern.