Evaluating The Effects of The Economic Response To COVID 19
Evaluating The Effects of The Economic Response To COVID 19
Evaluating The Effects of The Economic Response To COVID 19
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. Federal government acted with unprecedented
scale, speed, and coordination, surpassing past efforts to mitigate previous crises. The Council
of Economic Advisers finds that these historic policy responses, coupled with a strong pre-
pandemic economy, ameliorated a stark economic contraction while improving expectations
for a recovery in 2021 and protecting the economic well-being of the Nation’s most vulnerable
households and industries.
The CEA further finds that income replacement and cost mitigation cushioned the shock to
household incomes, as disposable income increased 5.4 percent starting in February, largely
due to expanded unemployment insurance (UI) and economic recovery rebates. Low-income
households benefited the most from these measures. Economic recovery rebates were
sufficient to keep a family of four out of poverty for 1.5 months—even if they lost all other
income. Moreover, households in the bottom 10 percent of the income distribution received
enough assistance, on average, to replace 2.8 months of income per household. Without these
provisions under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, a household
at the 10th percentile of the income distribution would have experienced a 13 percent
reduction in income in March and April 2020 compared with its February 2020 level. However,
because of expanded UI and the one-time checks, these households’ monthly income was 165
percent ($1,901) higher in April and 14 percent ($157) higher in May compared with February
2020. UI helped the most vulnerable workers; those industries that were hardest hit by COVID-
induced shutdowns saw the largest share of workers receiving higher compensation from UI
than from employment. More than 9 in 10 workers in the accommodation and food services
industry, which lost 3.9 million jobs from February to June, were eligible to receive more from
UI benefits than from working. In the retail trade industry, which lost 1.3 million jobs from
February to June, nearly 83 percent of workers could receive more from UI benefits than from
working.
Finally, the CEA finds that additional measures to stabilize financial markets—including loan
forbearance, as well as the unparalleled provision of liquidity by the Federal Reserve,
augmented by the Department of the Treasury under the CARES Act—effectively alleviated
emerging stresses in credit markets, averting a financial crisis such as that observed in 2008–9.
It is important to note that the results presented in this report are current as of the middle of
July 2020. As we obtain new data, we will continue to update the report and monitor the
recovery. However, it does appear as of now that the increase in transfer payments resulting in
a marked increase in personal income and savings, and the expanded liquidity measures aimed
at firms, will likely provide a buffer to households and businesses for the next few months,
allowing them to weather the worst of the crisis.
Beginning in February 2020, the United States experienced its worst macroeconomic shock
since the 1930s.1 As a direct result of the arrival of severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and consequent measures to contain and mitigate viral
transmission, real output was on pace to contract by as much as 8 percent in 2020,2 marking
the worst economic contraction since 1932. With the S&P 500 index facing its worst decline
since the financial crisis of 2008–9 from February 19 to March 23 (–33.9 percent), the median
private sector forecaster was projecting that unemployment would reach 19.0 percent in May
2020, its highest level since the Great Depression and almost twice its peak in the aftermath of
the 2008–9 crisis.
In the face of this exogenous economic shock of historically unprecedented scale and speed,
the U.S. Federal government responded with equally unprecedented scale and speed. Within
a week of the first reported COVID fatality, Congress passed, and President Trump signed into
law, the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act. Within
four weeks, Congress passed, and the President signed into law, two further pieces of
legislation, including the CARES Act, which provided $2.2 trillion in direct financial support to
American firms, households, medical establishments, and State and local governments. At the
same time, the Federal Reserve expanded its balance sheet by more than $3 trillion to ensure
sufficient liquidity in financial markets.
In this report, the CEA finds that the historic policy responses to the adverse shock of COVID-19
mitigated what was on pace to be a macroeconomic contraction on par with the Great
Depression. In particular, measures designed to maintain employer-employee relationships,
most significantly the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), played a key role in allowing firms
to retain workers on leave. By limiting eligibility to small and medium-sized enterprises, PPP
targeted this aid to those employers most at risk of having to terminate employees. PPP may
thus have helped avert bankruptcies as well by giving employers the economic cushion they
needed to weather the economic fallout of COVID-19.
The CEA also finds that income replacement and cost mitigation helped to cushion the shock
to household incomes and thereby facilitated a stabilization and recovery in consumer
spending, which alone constitutes 70 percent of the U.S. economy. In particular, expanded
unemployment insurance and pandemic assistance benefits, as well as rebate checks for
households earning below set thresholds, largely offset coincident declines in household
compensation as a result of economic shutdowns. The CEA finds that income replacement
rates were highest at the lower end of the income distribution, indicating that relief was
targeted toward households that were more vulnerable to an adverse income shock.
1
This report reflects data available as of the week of July 13, 2020.
2
In May, the average of the 10 most pessimistic forecasters from the Blue Chip Panel was 8.2 percent.
We begin, in chapter 1, by documenting the timeline of the COVID-19 shock and associated
public health responses, noting that at the peak of the shutdowns, more than 90 percent of
Americans were subject to shelter-in-place orders. Employing high-frequency economic data,
as well as real-time forecasts, we also quantify the magnitude of the economic disruption and
situate it within its historical context, including comparisons with past economic and financial
crises. We then proceed, in chapter 2, to analyze the effects of the CARES Act on halting the
deterioration in the outlook for output and unemployment, as well as attenuating predicted
small business bankruptcy filings and adverse shocks to household incomes, particularly at the
lower end of the income distribution.
In chapters 3 and 4, we examine in greater detail specific provisions of the CARES Act and
contemporaneous policy measures to stabilize labor and capital markets. First, we estimate
income replacement by income percentile and sector, further documenting the targeted
nature of income replacement toward lower-income deciles and sectors. Second, we similarly
quantify the distribution of PPP lending among firms, demonstrating that PPP aid skewed
toward smaller firms and loan amounts. Third, we more closely evaluate the impact of fiscal
and monetary interventions on averting small business bankruptcies and credit market
disruptions more generally.
We conclude by situating the fiscal and monetary responses to the COVID-19 shock within its
historical context, in particular relative to the economic crisis of 2008–9 and attendant policy
responses. We find that along multiple dimensions, the magnitude and speed of the economic
shock adversely affecting the U.S. economy in 2020 exceeded that of the 2008–9 financial crisis,
and likely constituted the most severe economic shock since the 1930s. We further document
that both the speed and scale of the response to that shock were historically unprecedented,
and were furthermore targeted toward firms and households most vulnerable to adverse
income disruptions. This may have helped alleviate the magnitude of the shock for households
and firms, at least in the short run. As the Nation’s economy recovers slowly from this crisis, it
is imperative that we continue to monitor the health of households and businesses to ensure
that all necessary steps continue to be taken to get the country back on track.
On January 7, Chinese researchers announced the discovery of a new virus, severe acute
respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), which causes the disease COVID-19, in
Wuhan, a travel hub city in China.3 On January 21, the first case of a person contracting the new
COVID-19 virus after traveling from Wuhan was reported in the United States.4 By late-February,
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) had confirmed the first possible instance
of community transmission in the United States, and the S&P 500 had begun a sharp sell-off
that continued through March 23, losing 33.9 percent of its value compared with its peak just
before the outbreak.5
Studies of the economic impact of past pandemics have indicated that there are three main
channels through which pandemics affect economic activity:10 (1) increased mortality, (2)
illness and absenteeism, and (3) avoidance behavior to reduce infection. These shocks reduce
the size of the labor force, aggregate productivity, and aggregate demand. Consistent with
those observations, the economy has experienced sudden, large, and simultaneous shocks to
both supply and demand since the COVID-19 outbreak in the United States. On the supply side,
many businesses were shuttered by social-distancing measures that were put in place or
voluntarily adopted by businesses to stop the spread of the virus and “flatten the curve.”11
Those that remained open faced supply disruptions that prevented them from operating
normally. On the demand side, many consumers faced stay-at-home orders or voluntarily
limited their economic activity to reduce the risk of contracting the disease.12 Consumers also
the Administration’s efforts to encourage these voluntary decisions, and only 33 percent to be accounted for by
restrictive State mandates.
10
Jonas (2013); Kilbourne (2006); Burns, van der Mensbrugghe, and Timmer (2006); Verikios et al. (2011); McKibbin
and Sidorenko (2006); CEA (2019); McKibbin (2009).
11
For example, on March 11 (before President Trump’s announcement of COVID-19 as a national emergency), the
NBA had already suspended basketball games indefinitely. The following day, Major League Baseball delayed the
start of its season, the National Hockey League suspended games, and March Madness was canceled.
12
Baqaee and Farhi (2020) model the distinct shocks to supply and demand and study how the combination of
supply and demand shocks explains the data. They argue that without the negative shock to aggregate demand,
the United States could have experienced stagflation, or a combination of rising unemployment and rising prices.
Instead, the negative shock to aggregate demand has limited inflation.
High-frequency indicators that proxy for demand across various economic activities show the
downturn began in early March, in some cases before Statewide social-distancing measures
were implemented, and reached its trough at the end of April. Daily credit card spending
started plunging in mid-March, bottomed out at -30 percent year-over-year growth rate at the
end of March, and has since recovered to slightly above zero percent growth in June (see figure
2). Daily traffic congestion (figure 3) and seated diners (figure 4) across all States had already
dropped over 20 percent compared with the same time a year before when restaurants were
limited and shelter-in-place orders extended, and had begun to recover in late April. However,
recent surges in cases have led seated diners to plateau at about 60 percent below 2019 levels
nationwide. Similarly, weekly hotel occupancy had dropped 56 percent year-over-year in the
week these measures began, and has continued to recover since mid-April (see figure 5).
-30
-40
02/01/20 02/29/20 03/28/20 04/25/20 05/23/20 06/20/20
Source: Proprietary spending data.
Note: "Restrictions" refer to shelter-in-place and dining restrictions. The CARES Act was signed into law on March 27,
2020.
-20
-40
-60
-80
03/06/20 03/20/20 04/03/20 04/17/20 05/01/20
Sources: TomTom; Exante; CEA calculations.
-20
-40
-60
-80
-100
02/24/20 03/16/20 04/06/20 04/27/20 05/18/20 06/08/20 06/29/20
-10
-20
-30
-40
-50
-60
-70
01/04/20 02/01/20 02/29/20 03/28/20 04/25/20 05/23/20 06/20/20
Sources: STR data; CEA calculations.
13
Homebase is a company that provides software to help small business owners manage employee timesheets.
Since the start of the pandemic, Homebase has maintained a database of U.S. small business employment using
data from more than 60,000 businesses that use their software. The data cover more than 1 million employees
that were active in the United States in January 2020. Most Homebase customers are businesses that are
individually owned or operator managed in restaurant, food and beverages, retail and services.
As the indicators discussed above show, the restrictions on mobility and the shift toward social
distancing played a major role in defining the state of economic activity. As restrictions have
eased, and the move toward reopening has begun, employees are returning to work;
businesses that were the hardest hit, such as restaurants, have started to take customers again;
and people are starting to travel, stay in hotels, and spend again.
2
Great Recession peak
1
25
20
15
10
Great Recession peak
5
0
1/1/2020 2/1/2020 3/1/2020 4/1/2020 5/1/2020 6/1/2020 7/1/2020
Sources: Department of Labor; CEA calculations.
Unlike during the Great Depression, however, U.S. GDP is presently projected to rebound the
following year, with the OECD projecting 4.1 or 1.9 percent growth in 2021 in the single- and
double-hit scenarios, respectively. The estimates from the private sector (4.0 percent) and the
CBO (4.8 percent) are much more in line with the single-hit scenario. As a result, the level of
GDP in 2021 would fall below pre-COVID levels to about the level of GDP seen in 2018. This is
consistent with the OECD single-hit, CBO, and private sector estimates, but in the case of a
double-hit scenario, the OECD estimates that GDP would fall near the level of GDP in 2016. Most
forecasters do not provide predictions of GDP growth in 2022. However, based on the initial
decline and rebound predicted by the OECD, an annualized 3.6 percent growth rate would
return GDP to pre-COVID-19 levels by 2022 in the single-hit scenario or 2023 in the double-hit
scenario, while the more optimistic CBO and Blue Chip forecasts suggest that GDP could return
to pre-COVID-19 levels by 2022 if growth is at least 1.7 percent.
The recession induced by COVID-19 is fundamentally different from the Great Recession and
the Great Depression because it had a noneconomic cause. The closest epidemiological
analogue, the 1918 Spanish Flu, had a much smaller effect on GDP, with growth rates of 0.4
percent and –1.5 percent in 1919 and 1920, respectively. Further comparisons with the Spanish
Flu are complicated by the the context of World War I and the changes that the U.S. economy
has undergone in the past century. In terms of the public health response, the
nonpharmaceutical interventions in 1918 and 1919 were in many ways similar to those of
today.
Action was primarily taken at the local rather than the national level, with cities as the primary
actors. In an analysis of 43 cities’ responses, Markel and others (2007) find that all cities
adopted some form of intervention, including 79 percent that implemented concurrent school
closures and bans on public gatherings. This combination of policies was in place for between
1 and 10 weeks, with a median duration of 4 weeks, which is shorter on average than the
CEA • Evaluating the Effects of the Economic Response to COVID-19 12
duration of similar policies put in place for COVID-19. Such interventions were associated with
reductions in excess deaths, with cities that implemented policies earlier and kept them in
place longer experiencing fewer deaths.
100
Great Recession
COVID-19 2007–12
90
2019–21
80
Great Depression
1929–34
70
60
0 1 2 3 4 5
Years after crisis
Sources: FRED; HISTSTAT; OECD; CEA calculations.
Note: Dotted line represents the OECD GDP forecast for a single-hit scenario.
The preceding chapter shows that the immediate U.S. economic losses of COVID-19 were
concentrated in 2020:Q2, when shutdowns were widely practiced in the United States. One way
that short-term damage could stretch into the longer term is if what began as a liquidity crisis
becomes a solvency crisis for many U.S. businesses, resulting in waves of firm bankruptcies, a
stubbornly higher level of unemployment, and, ultimately, a lower level of production.
Evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the timely Federal response to provide
liquidity to households and firms through the prompt passage of the CARES Act mitigated the
damage to GDP and ultimately the livelihoods of all Americans.
3,000
2,800
2,600
Expectations for the
2,400
CARES Act began to rise
2,200 (3/10)
2,000
01/01/20 02/01/20 03/01/20 04/01/20 05/01/20 06/01/20
Source: Standard & Poor's.
While the above-mentioned academic studies did not incorporate the impact of the CARES Act
in their projections, market forecasts do and are frequently revised to reflect changes in
policies. As of June 15, the consensus market forecast is more optimistic than the projections
in those academic studies. The Bloomberg median consensus forecast (out of a sample of 80
to 90 analysts) expect -5.7 percent for 2020 (as of June 15), and the Blue Chip Consensus
forecast (as of July 10) projects –5.5 percent for 2020.
Figure 11 shows the weekly evolution of these market forecasts. The GDP contraction for 2020
primarily reflects analysts’ deteriorating outlook for 2020:Q2, which has been continually
revised down since mid-March as social-distancing practices became prevalent and as analysts
began to take into account new information provided by high-frequency economic indicators
pointing to the steeper depth of the downturn. Conversely, market analysts have continued to
revise the forecasts for 2020:Q3, 2020:Q4, and 2021 upward, particularly since the passage of
the CARES act (figures 11 and 12).
-10
-20
-30
2020:Q2
-40
1/1/2020 2/1/2020 3/1/2020 4/1/2020 5/1/2020 6/1/2020
Source: Bloomberg.
Note: PPP and HCE Act = Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act.
3.5
2.5
Median of major forecasters
Bloomberg consensus
1.5
1/1/2020 2/1/2020 3/1/2020 4/1/2020 5/1/2020 6/1/2020
Source: Bloomberg.
Note: PPP and HCE Act = Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act.
Many are asking how much worse the GDP outlook would be in the absence of the CARES Act.
The evolution of the GDP forecasts by market analysts is consistent with the idea that the
CARES Act helped to raise the GDP outlook. In the weeks preceding the CARES Act vote, as
analysts revised down the forecast for 2020:Q2, they also made only small upward revisions to
2020:Q3 and 2020:Q4, and marked down the growth rate for 2021 (figures 11 and 12).14 This
suggests that analysts were generally pessimistic about the recovery even as they saw a
steeper downturn in 2020:Q2. Once the CARES Act cleared the crucial Senate vote, market
analysts began to sharply revise up GDP growth in 2020:Q3, 2020:Q4, and 2021. In the week
after the bill’s passage, the median market forecast by leading economic forecasters for
2020:Q3 and 2020:Q4 GDP growth was revised up by 6.5 and 3.1 percentage points respectively
compared with just before its passage. The projection for 2021 GDP growth was also revised up
by 1.5 percentage points (from about 2.0 percent to 3.5 percent), corresponding to about $300
billion in dollar terms. Though these upward revisions could in part be due to the rebound
effect from continual downward revisions in 2020:Q2 GDP, we find a positive and significant
effect of the CARES Act on revisions for 2020:Q4 and 2021, even after controlling for the
rebound effect.15
14
The sample in our survey of private banks consists of forecasts reported by the research team of nine major
banks: Barclays, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, UBS, Deutsche Bank, IHS Markit, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase,
and Citigroup.
15
The dependent variables of the regression are the weekly forecast revisions for the GDP growth rate horizon
under consideration. The controls included are concurrent revisions for the previous quarter, changing economic
fundamentals as proxied by weekly credit card spending changes, and a dummy for the passage of the CARES Act.
Figure 13. Consensus Market Forecast for the Unemployment Rate, 2020
Percent
25
Jun-20
20
Survey median
15
Actual
10
0
Jan-20 Feb-20 Mar-20 Apr-20 May-20 Jun-20
Source: Bloomberg.
Note: Gray shading denotes the market forecast range.
16
See: https://af.reuters.com/article/credit-rss/idUSL2N2F00MR
However, issues of reverse causality arise; increasing unemployment could fuel bankruptcies
as income and demand fall and businesses close and lay off workers, but layoffs also help
businesses stay afloat. Moreover, historical relationships between unemployment and
bankruptcies may not hold true during COVID-19 because of social distancing measures that
delay filings, as well as a greater share of unemployed workers that are only temporarily
furloughed. The latter can be seen as a successful consequence of the swift passage of
historically large fiscal relief through the CARES Act. In particular, the combination of expanded
unemployment insurance, loan forbearance provisions, and the creation of the novel PPP
(discussed below) could have helped businesses absorb a shock to cash flows without being
forced to declare bankruptcy.
One way to forecast small business Chapter 11 bankruptcies is through a vector autoregression
estimate of UI claims with three-month lags from January 2006 to December 2019. An
advantage of this approach is that it can determine the lag between the negative economic
shock and its effect on bankruptcies. In figure 14, the gap between actual and predicted
bankruptcies represents “averted bankruptcies.” Small business bankruptcies for the second
quarter as a whole were predicted to increase by 154.9 percent, while actual filings actually
decreased by 1.8 percent. The analysis predicts chapter 11 small business filings would spike
by 307.2 percent in June alone, but the actual change thus far is only 12.2 percent in the month
of June (figure 14). We will continue to monitor Chapter 11 small business filings as more data
become available.
300
250
200
150
100
50
-50
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019
Sources: Department of Justice; Department of Labor; CEA calculations.
Note: Predicted filings are based on vector autoregression results of a three-month lag using initial UI claims.
It is important to point out that this gap between predicted and actual bankruptcies could arise
from a number of factors. First, the social-distancing mechanisms may have affected filing
rates, both for the court systems and debtors. If business owners are unable to connect with
lawyers or face difficulties submitting electronic filings, this could lead to filing delays that
could show up as higher filings later in the data. At the same time, courts’ ability to take on
cases might be affected by State restrictions. A second important factor is the PPP’s role in
enabling businesses to stay afloat. By giving businesses loans that can be forgiven, PPP allows
them to meet expenses while facing a demand shock. With this liquidity, many businesses that
would have filed for bankruptcy are able to sustain themselves.
Finally, other elements of the CARES Act might have helped businesses avoid bankruptcy. For
instance, sole proprietors and small business owners can also claim expanded unemployment
insurance, which also provides liquidity. Their employees would be able to claim expanded UI
as well if they are placed on temporary furlough. The loan forbearance provision additionally
enables businesses to defer certain expenses, such as rental and mortgage expenses. In other
words, the PPP and other elements of the CARES Act have likely played a significant role in
helping businesses avoid bankruptcy. However, with the preliminary data we have thus far, it
is difficult to show exactly how much of the “averted bankruptcies” can be explained by the
PPP and the CARES Act.
The findings presented in this section suggest that the CARES Act will lead to improved
prospects for the U.S. economy over the next year and a half compared with the pre–CARES Act
trajectory. By providing a short-term financial bridge to American households and businesses,
Figure 15 simulates the trajectory of household income at different points on the income
distribution—with and without these two major income replacement programs in the CARES
Act (see the appendix for the methodology). Without these CARES Act provisions, a household
at the 10th percentile of the income distribution would have experienced a 13 percent
reduction in income in March and April 2020 compared with its February 2020 level. However,
because of expanded UI and the Economic Impact Payments, its monthly income was 165
percent ($1,901) higher in April and 14 percent ($157) higher in May compared with February
2020. The spike in income in April under the CARES Act is largely a result of the Economic
Impact Payments, while the continued elevated income in May is a result of expanded UI. While
the impact of the CARES Act is substantial for higher income households as well, it is relatively
much smaller than that for the lowest income households. For example, absent the CARES Act,
the 25th percentile household would have experienced a 6 percent and 5 percent decline in
income in April and May, respectively, compared with February, and the 50th percentile
household would have experienced a 4 percent decline in April and May. However, because of
the CARES Act, their incomes substantially increased, especially in April.
Because figure 15 includes all households, it does not show how important the CARES Act was
in preserving the income of specific households experiencing job loss. Figure 16 provides a
more specific example of an illustrative household with two adults and two children, with one
worker who loses their job starting in April 2020 and where all income is assumed to come
from earnings (see the appendix for the methodology). The worker in the “low-wage”
household is assumed to earn $500 per week, and the worker in the “high-wage” household is
assumed to earn $1,500 per week.
Without expanded UI and the Economic Impact Payment under the CARES Act, the illustrative
low-wage household would have experienced a 50 percent reduction in income in April and
May, while the illustrative high-wage household would have experienced a 68 percent
reduction in these two months. As a result of the CARES Act, the low-wage household instead
experiences a 240 percent increase in income in April and a 70 percent increase in May, relative
to February. The high-wage household instead experiences a 28 percent increase in April and
a 28 percent decrease in May. Thus, the CARES Act provided greater income protection for low-
wage households than high-wage households.
300
200
100
0
Feb Mar Apr May Feb Mar Apr May
Low-wage household High-wage household
Sources: Census Bureau; Current Population Survey Monthly and Annual Social and Economic Supplement; CEA
calculations.
Note: Low-wage household earns $500 per week. High-wage household earns $1,500 per week. See the appendix for
further details.
The examples given above do not account for several other provisions that would have helped
vulnerable households as well, such as expanded funding for SNAP, housing assistance, and
other welfare programs. In the next chapter, we study the impact of CARES on households and
firms in the aggregate.
CHAPTER 3
To ensure sufficient liquidity for households in light of the crisis, Congress put forward several
sources of cash support targeted at those who are the most vulnerable and those who lost their
jobs because of the pandemic lockdowns. These include direct transfers to households in the
form of Economic Impact Payments, an expanded unemployment insurance benefit, and an
extended duration of time over which unemployment benefits could be claimed. In addition,
the PPP helped businesses with cash support to pay rents and other expenses, while providing
incentives for small businesses to retain their employees. Many of these workers were placed
on temporary furlough while businesses were waiting to reopen. The success of this approach
is evident in the latest jobs report. As of the time of writing of this report, the unemployment
rate declined from a high of 14.7 percent in April to an unexpected 11.1 percent in June,
according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, as millions of workers went back to their employers
as businesses reopened. In parallel, there has been a continuing decline in the number of
workers claiming regular UI benefits; and during the first week of June, over 20 million workers
17
We estimate at least 94 percent of the decline in unemployment from April to May was due to a decline in
temporary layoffs, after incorporating those workers who were classified by the Bureau of Labor Statistics as
employed but not at work but who may have actually been on temporary layoff, and including workers who are
not in the labor force but say they want a job.
Mortgage forbearance and credit. Under the CARES Act, borrowers with federally backed
mortgages who experience financial hardship due to COVID-19 can suspend payments for up
to 180 days with the possibility of an extension up to an additional 180 days. During that period,
no interest or fees are accrued. The CARES Act also prohibited foreclosures on homes with
federally backed single-family mortgages for at least 60 days starting on March 18, 2020 (and
prohibited evictions of tenants in certain Federally-supported rental properties for 120 days
starting March 27, 2020). To allow families to borrow money if needed, holders of individual
retirement accounts (IRAs) adversely affected by COVID-19 are eligible under the CARES Act to
take a distribution from their IRA and treat this distribution as a tax-free rollover, provided they
recontribute the amount within three years. The CARES Act also ensured consumers’ credit did
not suffer due to the virus; if consumers have an agreement with their lender to delay payments
or make a partial repayment, they will not receive a negative credit report.
Protection for student loan borrowers. The CARES Act also included provisions to protect
student loan borrowers. Employers were provided with the ability to make up to $5,250 in
student loan payments through December 31 for each employee without incurring taxes. In
addition, through September 30, student loan payments and interest accruals for Department
of Education-held federal student loans are suspended, and involuntary collections related to
student loans through wage garnishments, tax refund reductions, and negative credit
reporting are also suspended for loans held by the Department of Education.
Federal waivers for welfare programs. Through legislation and guidance from Federal agencies,
transfer programs now offer higher benefits to more families. Congress authorized and
provided funding, under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA) and CARES Act,
respectively, for States to electronically issue nutrition benefits via Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) cards to families whose children would ordinarily receive free or
subsidized school lunches, and allowed the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to
temporarily waive work requirements for nondisabled, childless adults. In addition, legislation
allowed the USDA to temporarily raise SNAP benefits up to the maximum level for each
household size. Similarly, the Department of Health and Human Services has encouraged
States to utilize the flexibilities currently available under the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) program to respond to the COVID-19 emergency. These flexibilities include
temporarily increasing cash benefits; recognizing “good cause” exemptions from work
requirements for TANF participants who cannot go to work or training activities because they
are ill, caring for a child whose school or day care is closed, or because the work or training site
is closed; and allowing families who have recently lost income to access benefits through
CEA • Evaluating the Effects of the Economic Response to COVID-19 24
streamlined eligibility determination processes. Congress gave financial assistance to State
Medicaid programs, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has allowed States to
expedite the process of enrolling individuals in Medicaid.
Paid medical and family leave. The FFCRA requires certain employers with fewer than 500
employees to provide their employees with paid sick and family leave, financed through
refundable tax credits. Workers are entitled to 2 weeks of paid sick leave covering up to 100
percent of wages, and to an additional 10 weeks of paid family and medical leave covering up
to 67 percent of wages.18
Yet, according to data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, disposable personal income rose
substantially in April after a large reduction in March and remained elevated above pre-
pandemic levels in May. While employee compensation fell drastically in March and April,
disposable personal income experienced its largest one-month increase on record in April due
to government transfers through the CARES Act. By far, the largest factor in raising disposable
personal income in April were the payments made to individuals under the CARES Act. In May,
disposable personal income remained elevated above pre-pandemic levels, but the boost from
government transfers came primarily from unemployment insurance, though economic
impact payments continued in May (see table 2). Illustrating the extent of support these
programs provided, real disposable income excluding government transfers experienced the
largest one-month decline on record in April and remained suppressed in May. As seen in figure
17, disposable personal income was 5.4 percent above February’s level in May. This was almost
entirely driven by government spending through unemployment insurance and economic
impact payments in response to the pandemic.
18
Workers qualify for up to two weeks of paid sick leave replacing 100 percent of their wages, up to a daily
maximum of $511, if they are currently experiencing COVID-19 symptoms and seeking a diagnosis or are under
quarantine in order to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Workers can alternatively take these two weeks of paid
sick leave with 67 percent of wages replaced, up to a daily maximum of $200, if they are providing care to an
individual with COVID-19 or are caring for a child due to the closing of a school or childcare program. Workers
qualify for an additional 10 weeks of family and medical leave—replacing 67 percent of their wages, up to a daily
maximum of $200—if they are caring for a child whose school or child care program is closed.
19
Some estimates put the rate at higher than the official U-3 rate. See, for example, Fairlie, Couch, and Xu 2020.
1,000
Disposable
personal income
(less transfers)
800
600
Jan-20 Feb-20 Mar-20 Apr-20 May-20
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; CEA calculations.
While incomes grew, real personal consumption saw a dramatic downturn in April, the largest
one-month decline on record.20 Real personal consumption rose in May but remains much
lower than pre-pandemic levels. This could suggest that much of the additional government
transfers acted more as a financial cushion than a household stimulus. This assumption is
reasonable given that the lockdown requirements restricted the number of spending
opportunities, such as meals at restaurants, along with households facing a large amount of
economic uncertainty due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Personal saving saw its largest one-
month increase on record in April, pushing personal saving as a percentage of real disposable
income to 33 percent, a record high. Personal savings saw a decrease in May but remains
elevated.
Direct Economic Impact Payments to individuals, not including the additional extra
unemployment payments to individuals, accounted for $215.7 billion, or 13.8 percent, of April’s
disposable personal income and $50.5 billion, or 3.5 percent, of May’s. Pandemic
Unemployment Compensation Payments accounted for $12.5 billion of April’s disposable
personal income and $70.2 billion in May. PUA, Pandemic Emergency Unemployment
Compensation, and student loan forbearance played much smaller but still-important roles in
increasing personal income in March, April and May, as seen in table 2 below. IRS data through
June 3 suggests that over 60 percent of people over 16 years old have received the Economic
Impact Payments, while the Department of Labor finds 10.8 percent of workers have a
20
A recent paper by Chetty et al. (2020) shows that the largest declines in consumption spending came from the
richest income households. As of June 10, high-income households cut spending by 17 percent while low-income
households cut spending by only 4 percent. This is likely a function of Economic Impact Payments as well as
unemployment benefit receipt.
Expanded unemployment insurance helped the unemployed. As table 2 shows, the combination
of the economic impact payments, the increase in UI benefits, and the extension of benefits to
workers not traditionally covered by these payments was a big factor behind the increase in
disposable personal income. In addition, UI has been particularly beneficial for lower-income
households. Lower-wage workers are relatively more likely to be employed in sectors that have
been the hardest hit due to COVID-19, such as the retail and the leisure and hospitality sectors.
Adding an additional $600 to weekly unemployment insurance benefits has benefited workers
in low-wage industries, particularly those who have seen the greatest job losses (see table 3).
One reason for this is that UI benefits are currently replacing prior earnings at rates above 100
percent for many workers, and this is especially true for workers in lower-wage industries.
Based on a similar analysis, Ganong, Noel, and Vavra (2020) estimate that 68 percent of
unemployed workers receive more from unemployment than they would from working—for
the median worker, 134 percent of earnings are replaced.
During the first week of June, 20.5 million workers were currently receiving regular
unemployment benefits and 11.9 million were receiving either PUA or Pandemic Emergency
Unemployment Compensation, even as States faced administrative challenges in processing
and disbursing benefits. As more workers start to receive benefits, the income support
provided to households will increase. Data from 2013 to 2016 indicate that providing
household liquidity through unemployment benefits significantly smooths consumption (see
Ganong and Noel 2019). However, the current crisis is unique because of the dramatic drop in
consumption coming from social distancing instead of just lost income or precautionary
saving. Deciphering the impact of unemployment benefits on current consumption is therefore
likely to prove more difficult.
Table 4 shows that Economic Impact Payments are especially important for low-income
households. For example, households in the bottom 10 percent of the income distribution
received enough to replace 2.8 months of income. On average, these households have monthly
incomes of less than $1,000. Hence a payment of $1,200 or higher can provide a significant
boost in incomes for over 2 months.
The economics literature also demonstrates how economic stimulus payments especially
supported lower-income households. Research indicates that a significant fraction of
households behave as if they are liquidity constrained and are thus highly responsive to
increases in liquidity (Fuster, Kaplan, and Zafar 2020). Baker and others (2020) show that within
10 days of the receipt of Economic Impact Payments, nearly 30 percent of the payment was
spent on food, rent, bills, and nondurables. The results were most pronounced for those with
low incomes and low savings. During the Great Recession, households spent $0.25 of every $1
on nondurables from the 2008 stimulus payments (Kaplan and Violante 2014). Taking into
account durables, the consumption response in 2008 exceeded $0.50 (Parker et al. 2013).
Compared with that situation, the current consumption response is higher for food but smaller
for durables (Baker et al. 2020). Chetty and others (2020) find that Economic Impact Payments
had a large effect on spending by low-income households, allowing them to return their
spending levels to pre-COVID levels, by May 10 (Chetty et al. 2020).
The Paycheck Protection Program helped keep workers employed. Another reason that workers
have received stable or rising incomes is due to the PPP. Established under the CARES Act, the
PPP authorized $349 billion to support payroll and other expenses for America’s small
As discussed above, the latest jobs report surprisingly showed a decline, rather than an
increase, in the unemployment rate, from the 14.7 percent peak in April to 11.1 percent in June.
This was largely the result of temporarily furloughed workers being recalled by their
employers. We estimate that more than 80 percent of the increase in unemployment from
February to May was due to temporary layoffs and nearly all the decline in unemployment from
April to May was due to workers returning to their jobs from temporary layoff, as stated above.
To the extent that these workers were furloughed by employers that were using their PPP
money to keep workers on their payroll, at least some of this decline in unemployment can be
attributed to the PPP program. Company-specific data on PPP loan receipts and employment
provided an insight into the role the program played in keeping workers attached to their
employers, before which the extent was unclear.21 Recent research by Autor et al (2020) using
administrative payroll data from ADP finds that the PPP saved between 1.4 and 3.2 million jobs
through just the first week of June. However, because PPP has also stemmed business
closures, the total employment effect is likely to be considerably larger over time as those
salvaged businesses re-hire furloughed workers. In total, S&P U.S Chief Economist Beth Ann
Bovino estimates that PPP could have saved upwards of 13.6 million jobs.
After this July 6 release, loan-level data show companies that were approved for a PPP loan
employed just over 51 million workers. This number comes with caveats of the accuracy of the
data, because some businesses claim they were approved for smaller amounts than what the
released data indicate.22 Further, the jobs number comes from businesses that report the
number of employees on their payroll at the time of their application. This is just a box on an
application, and some lenders did not report it to the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA).
The process of loan forgiveness will determine the most accurate estimate of jobs supported
by PPP loans, for it will indicate how many workers stayed on the payrolls of these businesses.
Through July 10, SBA approved more than 4.9 million loans, for a total of more than $517.4
billion. The average loan size was about $105,000. The loans were overwhelmingly distributed
to small businesses with few employees. Over 86 percent of the total approved loans,
corresponding to over one-quarter of the total approved loan amount, were for an amount of
$150,000 or less (table 5). Over 94 percent of the total approved loans, corresponding to more
21
Analysis by Chetty et al. (2020) shows a limited impact of PPP on employment levels at small businesses.
However, their analysis is also constrained by the lack of firm-level data on PPP loan receipt and employment.
22
Multiple media outlets, including Bloomberg and CNBC, have reported on some of these caveats.
Table 5. PPP Loan Size by Amount, First and Second Round Combined
(data as of 7/10/2020)
Approved loans Approved loan total
Loan size (count) amount (billions) Percent of count Percent of amount
$50K and under 3,289,259 58.9 67.0 11.4
$50K - $100K 673,105 47.9 13.7 9.3
$100K - $150K 290,329 35.5 5.9 6.9
$150K - $350K 374,674 84.1 7.6 16.3
$350K - $1M 198,518 112.9 4.0 21.8
$1M - $2M 52,931 73.5 1.1 14.2
$2M - $5M 24,164 71.9 0.5 13.9
Greater than $5M 4,675 32.6 0.1 6.3
Total 4,907,655 517.4
Source: Small Business Administration.
The first round of the PPP, ending April 16 when funds ran out, approved fewer loans but
consisted of a larger share of the total loan amounts (figure 18). Round two has had a change
in the composition of who is receiving the loans, with a shift toward smaller businesses. The
average loan size fell from $185,500 in round one to $61,800 in round two.
Figure 18. Share of Total PPP Loan Counts and PPP Loan Amounts by
Round Round 1 Round 2
Percent
70 64.7
62.1
60
50
37.9
40 35.3
30
20
10
0
Loan count Loan amount
23
This was done by taking the natural log of loan amounts approved by industry and taking the correlation with
the number of jobs gained from April to June divided by job losses from February to April. A strong relationship
exists, showing that a 10 percent increase in loan dollar amounts leads to 2.7 percentage points more jobs
recovered.
77.6% to 85.1%
85.1% to 89.7%
Sources: SBA; Census; CEA calculations.
Note: The amount of payroll comes from Census' 2017
89.7% to 92.9%
SUBS survey adjusted to 2019 dollars then reduced to 2.5 92.9% to 102.9%
months worth. Small businesses are defined as
employment of 1 - 499. Sole-proprieterships also received
PPP loans, so some states received more than 100% of this
payroll.
CHAPTER 4
In this chapter, we focus on provisions specifically aimed at businesses that improved access
to financial resources and allowed businesses to weather the crisis. In a positive development,
the small business optimism index compiled by the National Federation of Independent
Business (NFIB) showed a 3.5 point improvement in May, relative to April. The combined index
is a combination of several subindexes, most of which showed an improved outlook when it
came to sales, capital investment, and hiring. Of the businesses surveyed in May, a net of about
8 percent more businesses were optimistic about creating jobs than not. This represents a 7-
24
An early analysis of the PPP program shows that allocation of loans was largely uncorrelated with the level of
economic distress in the geographic region (Granja et al. 2020).
Federal Reserve Facilities. Federal Reserve facilities are supported by the Treasury Department
to ensure that the Federal Reserve will not have to absorb losses. This collaboration enhances
business liquidity through the establishment of 11 financial facilities. (In the case of the PPP,
the collaboration also includes the Small Business Administration.) In these facilities, various
Federal Reserve Banks lend to private firms or to State and local governments. In general, the
Treasury offers capital under the authority of Title IV of the CARES Act to support the various
macroeconomic facilities established by the Federal Reserve under section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act. The facilities can be divided into two groups: those that are aimed at the supply of
credit to the macroeconomy (which rely on CARES Act capital funding), and those that aimed
at funding markets (which are backed by funding from the Treasury’s exchange stabilization
fund or secured by collateral):
Primary and Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facilities to provide liquidity for
corporate bonds,
the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility that will support the issuance of asset-
backed securities (ABS) backed by student loans, auto loans, credit card loans, and
loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration,
the Municipal Liquidity Facility to help State and local governments manage cash flow
pressures after the municipal bond market showed signs of stress, and
the Main Street Lending Program and the Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity
Facility to support lending to small- and medium-sized businesses.
The Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, the Commercial Paper Funding
Facility (backed by capital from the Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund), and the
Primary Dealer Credit Facility to support the flow of credit to short-term funding
markets (where loans are collateralized).
A recent analysis shows that despite the large increase in liquidity demands by firms on banks
in March 2020, in anticipation of the impending crisis, banks were largely able to meet the need.
This was a consequence of timely funding flowing in from the Federal Reserve and depositors
(Li, Strahan, and Zhang 2020).
In this section, we explore how the availability of forgivable loans and grants has allowed small
businesses to avert delinquencies and bankruptcies, and also track the state of employment,
reopenings, and revenues for small businesses. In a survey of small businesses conducted in
late March and published in April, economists found that of the 5,800 small businesses
surveyed, about 43 percent had temporarily closed, and many businesses had seen
employment decline by 40 percent since January. The survey also found that within the subset
of firms with monthly expenses over $10,000, the median firm had enough cash to cover two
weeks. Many of these firms were looking to seek assistance through the CARES Act (Bartik et al.
2020).
25
When referred to as “small business,” the data reflect businesses that classify themselves as small when they
are filing for a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
26
Subchapter 5 of Chapter 11 makes it easier for smaller businesses to reorganize under Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Under the CARES Act, the threshold debt level for businesses that could apply for Subchapter 5 bankruptcy was
raised further, allowing more small businesses to be eligible for this chapter.
Small business Chapter 11 bankruptcies fell in April compared with a year before, and
remained much lower at an annualized rate than they were during the recovery from the
financial crisis. There was an uptick in filings in May and June, mainly due to the new
Subchapter 5 provision, according to the Department of Justice. This decline in April is counter
to the expected increase in small business Chapter 11 bankruptcies, given historical trends and
current economic conditions, and possibly suggests that the strong pre-COVID economy and
PPP may have helped businesses avoid bankruptcy. However, given the elevated business
uncertainty and potential delays in filing due to social-distancing measures, it may be too early
to draw a definitive conclusion on the overall effectiveness of PPP or its long-term effect on
Chapter 11 bankruptcies.
As shown in figure 20, small business Chapter 11 bankruptcies decreased 23.4 percent in April
compared with the average of April for 2017 to 2019. However, filings increased 14.5 and 18.2
percent, respectively, more than usual in May and June compared with the average of 2017–
19. For February and March, the total was 48.1 and 37.3 percent, respectively, higher than the
average for the same months over the years 2017 to 2019.
18.2
20 14.5
6.0
-20
-23.4
-40
January February March April May June
The higher number of small business Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings in February and March is
likely due to the Subchapter 5 provision of Chapter 11 introduced in February that made it
easier for smaller businesses to reorganize under Chapter 11. There was also a week in May
that saw a large increase that is attributed to the new provision as well. It is interesting that
Table 7 illustrates the percentage of small businesses that have accessed different programs
and liquidity measures since March 13, per the Census survey. In addition to these programs
and liquidity measures, Economic Impact Payments and UI may also have been accessed by
small businesses as well. As stated in chapter 3, April data on personal income show how real
personal disposable income increased 13.6 percent due to public assistance through the
CARES Act. When excluding transfers, disposable income fell 6.3 percent. In May, disposable
income excluding transfers recovered slightly but remained suppressed, while continued
public assistance through the CARES Act allowed real personal disposable income to remain
elevated above pre-pandemic levels.
Many unique aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic and containment measures render it difficult
to assess the reasons for this apparent decline in filings. Some of this difference in small
business Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings may be due to owners being unable to physically go
and file for bankruptcy due to distancing measures, or courts being unable to accept filings for
the same reason (Tett 2020). Businesses may also be waiting until they see how the current
economic uncertainty unfolds before they file for bankruptcy (Keshner 2020). Additionally, the
strong economy pre-COVID may have put businesses in a position to survive for some time,
even with COVID-related disruptions to their business models. Interestingly, a recent academic
paper simulates the effect of a PPP-type program in a general equilibrium model and shows
that that program, along with a Main-Street-Lending-type program, would be successful in
preventing corporate bankruptcies (Elenev, Landvoigt, and Van Nieuwerburgh 2020).
27
This preliminary estimation comes from weekly surveys conducted by the Census Bureau since April 26; see
https://portal.census.gov/pulse/data/.
Figure 21 shows which States have seen an uptick in small business Chapter 11 bankruptcies
so far in fiscal year (FY) 2020 through July 5, compared with their 2017 to 2019 averages. There
are 29 States with higher FY 2020 annualized small business Chapter 11 bankruptcies than their
averages between 2017 and 2019. These States account for 67.4 percent of total small business
Chapter 11 bankruptcies so far in FY 2020.
-57.9% to -14.7%
Sources: Department of Justice; CEA calculations.
Note: Alabama and North Carolina have no data available as -14.7% to 0%
they are not under the jurisdiction of the United States 0% to 81.5%
Trustee Program. The legend shows the 25th and 75th 81.5% to 2,254.8%
percentiles with a break at zero between the two.
28
Official SBA forms have prohibited debtors in bankruptcy that would otherwise qualify from receiving PPP loans
(Parlin 2020).
29
The executive director of the American Bankruptcy Institute argued that Congressional and executive branch
action has staved off an initial wave of bankruptcies due to the pandemic (ABI 2020).
40
30
20
10
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
Sources: Department of Justice; Census Bureau; CEA calculations.
Note: FY 2020 is annualized with data through July 5.
Small business employment is trending back up. Beyond bankruptcies, small businesses may
show other signs of distress, such as an inability to obtain loans, an increase in delinquencies,
and a decline in employment and job openings. Several databases track conditions for small
businesses nationwide. Here, we review data from Homebase and Opportunity Insights. The
Homebase data and Opportunity Insights data indicate that small businesses are beginning to
reopen and more employees are coming back to work.
Homebase is a company that provides software to help small business owners manage
employee timesheets. Since the start of the pandemic, Homebase has maintained a database
of U.S. small business employment using data from more than 60,000 businesses that use their
software. The data cover more than 1 million employees that were active in the United States
in January 2020. Most Homebase customers are businesses that are individually owned or
operator managed in restaurant, food and beverage, retail, and services.
30
The numbers for 2020 are annualized using data provided thus far for this fiscal year.
-10
-20
-30
-40
02/01/20 02/22/20 03/14/20 04/04/20 04/25/20 05/16/20 06/06/20 06/27/20
Source: Opportunity Insights.
Note: All the rates compare that day vs. the median for the day of the week for the period January 4, 2020, to January
31, 2020.
-10
-20
-30
-40
-50
02/01/20 02/22/20 03/14/20 04/04/20 04/25/20 05/16/20 06/06/20 06/27/20
Source: Opportunity Insights.
-7.1% to 38.6%
Sources: Opportunity Insights; CEA calculations. 38.6% to 52.8%
Note: Percent recovered is the percent below pre-COVID
levels on July 8 divided by percent below pre-COVID levels on
52.8% to 69.5%
April 10. 69.5% to 107.4%
90
80
70
60
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020F
Sources: U.S. Department of Agriculture; Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute; CEA calculations.
Note: "F" denotes a forecast; CFAP = Coronavirus Food Assistance Program.
31
Several States have also introduced forbearance provisions, complementing those included in the CARES Act.
See, for example, https://www.mcguirewoods.com/client-resources/Alerts/2020/4/cares-act-states-consumer-
credit-protection.
32
Equifax defines a loan accommodation as “any form of relief that lenders offer to a borrower in times of hardship
(job loss, natural disaster, illness, military deployment, etc.)” In a recent analysis, Equifax categorized loans as
“Possible Accommodations” based on a variety of indicators. For example, if a credit card account has a balance,
but no payment due, that is a “Possible Accommodation.”
Mortgages. Mortgages make up the largest category of consumer debt, accounting for 68
percent of outstanding consumer debt. Since the Great Recession, mortgage debt has
gradually risen to reach new highs, with households with prime credit (those with Vantage
credit scores above 619) holding a larger share when compared with the pre-2008 period. As of
March 2020, prime households held close to 80 percent of total household debt, whereas in
2008 they held less than 70 percent according to internal analysis at the Treasury Department.
Despite the record highs in outstanding mortgage balances, the severe delinquency rate
(defined as the percentage of balances that are either 90 days or more past due in bankruptcy
or foreclosure) has fallen to a new low. According to Equifax data, the severe delinquency rate
for first mortgages has fallen from a high of more than 8 percent in the Great Recession to 0.6
percent as of June 30, 2020 (figure 29). In contrast to the Great Recession, when the mortgage
loan severe delinquency rate spiked, the rate has fallen by 0.2 percentage point since February
2020, our pre-COVID benchmark date. Figure 30 shows that the delinquency rate was relatively
stable in the immediate months leading up to the COVID-19 outbreak in the United States and
only began to decline upon the passage of the CARES Act in late March.
The most likely explanation for this trend is the introduction of the mortgage loan forbearance
option made available by the CARES Act. In the Equifax data, first mortgage loans reported with
possible accommodations increased from 2.7 percent, when the CARES Act was passed, to 8.7
percent as of June 30 (figure 34). The Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) reported that the
share of loans under forbearance rose from 0.3 percent of all loans in early March to 8.6 percent
as of June 7. Much of this increase occurred after the passage of the CARES Act, rising by 5.7
percentage points from April 1 to May 3. The MBA now estimates that 4.3 million homeowners
are in forbearance plans.
Evidence from the Great Recession suggests there are strong dividends from relief measures
such as forbearance that provide liquidity to borrowers in the housing market. Specifically,
liquidity relief is more effective at alleviating defaults and boosting consumption than principal
reductions that affect household net worth but have less impact on budget constraints
(Ganong and Noel 2019). Beyond the impact on individuals, this fact has broader salience for
the housing market as a whole, given evidence that foreclosure activity amplifies house price
declines (Guren and McQuade 2020).
33
If forbearance measures are not taken into account, a mortgage loan in forbearance would first be deemed late,
then deemed 30 day delinquent, then 60 day delinquent the next month, and so on. For an example of a media
outlet report that does not account for forbearance, see
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/07/14/new-mortgage-delinquencies-hit-record-high/.
0
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
Sources: Equifax; CEA calculations.
0.76
0.72
0.68
0.64
0.60
0.56
10/31/19 01/31/20 03/10/20 03/31/20 04/21/20 05/12/20 06/02/20 06/23/20
Sources: Equifax; CEA calculations.
Note: Since these are weekly data, and the CARES Act was signed March 27, it is presented the week of March 31, 2020.
The major categories of nonmortgage consumer debt include student loans (more than $1.6
trillion), auto loans ($1.4 trillion), credit card debt ($797.0 billion), and consumer finance
loans ($118.4 billion). Since February 2020, severe delinquency rates in each of these
consumer debt categories have either remained stable or decreased. The delinquency rate
is also significantly well below that observed during the Great Recession.
3 Credit cards
2 Auto loans
Others and leases
1
0
10/1/19 02/1/20 03/24/20 04/21/20 05/19/20 06/16/20
Sources: Equifax; CEA calculations.
Note: Since these are weekly data, and the CARES Act was signed March 27, it is presented the week of March
31, 2020.
90
Nondeferred
80
student loans
70
60
50
40
10/01/19 12/01/19 02/01/20 04/01/20 06/01/20
Source: Equifax.
Delinquencies Are Down. Less dramatic but still noteworthy, the delinquency rates for auto
balances and credit card balances have also remained stable or even fallen slightly, and remain
significantly below that observed during the Great Recession (figure 33).
Others
4
Auto loans Credit cards
2 and leases
0
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
Sources: Equifax; CEA calculations.
9
8 First mortgage
7
Auto
6
5 Home equity
4
3
Credit card
2
1 Consumer finance
0
10/01/19 12/01/19 02/01/20 04/01/20 06/01/20
Source: Equifax.
Credit is available to households. One important liquidity lifeline for households is the
availability of credit through credit cards. When lenders reduce the borrowing limit of credit
cards, the amount of credit available to households decreases. From 2009 to 2011, lenders
reduced credit limits on credit cards by 30 percent due to concerns about the creditworthiness
of households, causing consumer credit utilization rates (the percentage of one’s credit limit
used) to surge as households were not reducing spending accordingly. In contrast, current data
suggest that lenders have kept borrowing limits stable on credit cards; that, in combination
with the drop in credit card spending due to social-distancing measures, this led to an overall
decrease in consumer credit card utilization rates. Currently, credit card utilization rates stand
at about 19.3 percent, compared with 21.6 percent in February 2020 and just over 25 percent
at the peak of the Great Recession (figure 35). It is possible that the relief measures under the
CARES Act may have indirectly contributed to this trend by providing enough financial cushion
to households to avert delinquencies, which could have caused lenders to be less averse about
lending. One caveat to this finding is that high-frequency data have shown a sharp drop in new
Figure 35. Bank Card Total Monthly Limit and Credit Utilization,
2006–20
Trillions of dollars Percent
3.8 26
Jun-20
3.6 25
3.4 24
Credit limit
3.2 (left axis) 23
3.0 22
2.8 21
2.2 18
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
Sources: Equifax; CEA calculations.
Note: "Credit utilization" refers to the total bank card balance as a share of total bank card credit limit.
The delinquency rates across consumer debt categories were either stable or declined in April,
May, and June, a contrast to what was observed during the Great Recession. Certainly, various
factors other than the provisions of the CARES Act may have contributed to this, such as
reduced spending of consumers due to social-distancing measures and the improved
household balance sheets due to the deleveraging of nonprime households before the COVID-
19 crisis. But the impact of relief measures is also clear. An important open question, however,
is the extent to which the underlying financial stress is being delayed both by lender
forbearance and by the COVID-19 shutdown itself, and whether the current favorable trend in
consumer debt delinquency will continue as the economy reopens.34
34
A recent analysis by the Office of Financial Research in the Treasury Department points to financial
vulnerabilities among highly leveraged households, small business owners with personal debt, and households
with student loans.
While vulnerabilities remain, the CARES Act, together with emergency powers under section
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, authorized the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department to
take action to stabilize the system and prevent a financial crisis like that seen during the Great
Recession. In accord with the Federal Reserve’s Financial Stability Report, the Federal Reserve
took three types of actions: monetary policy actions, actions to stabilize short-term funding
markets, and direct support for credit. In addition, Chairman Jerome Powell testified that the
Federal Reserve “took measures to allow and encourage banks to use their substantial capital
and liquidity levels built up over the past decade to support the economy during this difficult
time.” Below we summarize some of the findings from the Financial Stability Report (Federal
Reserve 2020).
Monetary policy actions. The Federal Reserve lowered its policy rate close to zero to make
borrowing less expensive. The Federal Open Market Committee began buying Treasury
securities and agency mortgage-backed securities after investors moved toward cash and
short-term government securities due to volatility and uncertainty, which had the effect of
smoothing and improving market conditions.
Stabilizing short-term funding markets. Investors’ cash dash also strained businesses’ ability to
fund operations through commercial paper as they stopped accepting commercial paper and
pulled out of money market mutual funds that hold it with other short-term debt instruments.
According to the Financial Stability Report (Federal Reserve 2020), the Federal Reserve
responded by setting up several Federal Reserve facilities. Eight of these facilities are
supported by a CARES Act appropriation to the U.S. Treasury to ensure that the Federal Reserve
will not have to absorb losses. This collaboration with the Treasury enhances business liquidity
through the establishment of 11 financial facilities (in the case of the PPP, the collaboration
also includes the Small Business Administration). In these facilities, various Federal Reserve
Banks lend to private firms or to State and local governments. In general, the facilities can be
divided into two groups: those that are aimed at the supply of credit to the macroeconomy
(which rely on CARES Act capital funding), and those aimed at funding markets (which are
backed by the Treasury’s exchange stabilization fund or are collateralized). The Treasury offers
capital under the authority of Title IV of the CARES Act to support the 8 macroeconomic
facilities established by the Federal Reserve under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.
the Primary and Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facilities to provide liquidity for
corporate bonds,
the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility that will support the issuance of asset-
backed securities (ABS) backed by student loans, auto loans, credit card loans, and
loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration,
the Municipal Liquidity Facility to help State and local governments manage cash flow
pressures after the municipal bond market showed signs of stress, and
the Main Street Lending Program and the Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity
Facility to support lending to small- and medium-sized businesses.
These facilities resulted in a drop in the issuance of overnight commercial paper and
redemptions from money market funds, easing market strains.
Commercial and industrial loans at the Nation’s commercial banks grew $726 billion during
the nine weeks from March 4 through May 6, far in excess of the growth during any similar
interval since records were first collected in 1973. Li, Strahan, and Zhang (2020) argue that
banks were able to accommodate this demand because of Federal Reserve bank liquidity
programs, strong pre-shock bank capital, and coincident inflows from depositors.
A variety of indicators of financial distress spiked early in the COVID-19 epidemic period but
have receded since then. Although many other shocks have hit the economy, including news
about the epidemic itself, one can argue that public policy has mitigated the contagion of the
epidemic into financial markets.
The VIX, an index of expected stock market volatility derived from options prices, spiked from
27 in late February to a peak of 83 on March 16 (figure 36). It has generally fallen since then, but
remains somewhat elevated (as of June 12, the VIX was 36).
Similarly, corporate bond spreads, such as the spread between BBB bonds relative to
Treasury notes, show a similar pattern peaking around March 23 and then receding (figure
37).
Figure 37. BBB Corporate Bond and 10-Year Treasury Note Spread,
2006–20
Basis points
7
06/12/20
6
0
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
Source: Bloomberg.
The trends in these indicators, and others, suggest that these programs have played an
important role in easing market strain and ensuring access to liquidity for businesses,
households, and communities.
CHAPTER 5
In this chapter, we provide a comparison of the current COVID-19 crisis with the Great
Recession of 2007–9. We assess the precrisis macroeconomy vis-à-vis a series of indicators and
then reflect on the policy measures adopted to deal with the situation. As we show, the U.S.
economy entered the COVID-19 crisis in a stronger position than it did before the 2007–9 Great
Recession, when highly leveraged household and bank balance sheets created major
macroeconomic vulnerabilities. In contrast, a potential source of risk in today’s economy is the
growth of nonfinancial business debt in recent years.
Crisis-Driving Forces
The financial crisis of 2008–9 and the resulting Great Recession started with an overheated
housing market. In 2006, housing market weakness began to emerge, first in the form of longer
selling delays—indicating a deterioration in housing liquidity—followed by deceleration and
reversal in house price growth. As discussed by Garriga and Hedlund (2019), the fundamental
causes of this reversal continue to be debated, with some scholars focusing on the role of
subprime lending, others looking at the riskiness of the mortgage products themselves (high
loan-to-value or payment-to-income loans, adjustable rates, balloon payments, etc.), and
others assigning primary blame to housing investors who, as non-owner-occupiers, exhibited
higher propensities to default. Regardless, what is clear is that the weakness in housing spilled
over into the rest of the economy because of the damage it wreaked on household and bank
balance sheets alike.
By March 2007, there were reports that the housing slump had hit some hedge funds hard. In
April of that year, New Century Financial, the largest independent U.S. provider of subprime
mortgages, filed for bankruptcy. In their book First Responders, Bernanke, Geithner, and
Paulson state that “if we had to pick the date that the crisis began, it would be August 9, 2007,
when the French bank BNP Paribas froze withdrawals from three funds that held securities
backed by U.S. subprime mortgages” (p. 12). By late summer of 2007, the investment bank Bear
Stearns was liquidating two hedge funds that were heavily invested in subprime mortgages.
The economic harm wrought by the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent Great Recession
was severe and historic. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco found that “the downturn
profoundly damaged the labor market. Nonfarm payroll employment declined by about 8.5
million jobs from peak to trough. The unemployment rate increased from 4.7 percent in
November 2007 to a peak of 10.1 percent in October 2009.” Moreover, unemployment
remained above 9 percent for two years after the technical end of the recession (i.e. when GDP
stopped contracting), and the average duration of unemployment for jobless workers stayed
near historic highs. Households saw their housing wealth evaporate as prices fell by nearly 30
percent on average—with larger declines on the coasts and in the sand States—at the same
time that their retirement portfolios suffered a 50 percent drop in the Dow Jones from peak to
trough on March 9, 2009. In addition, 3.8 million homes were foreclosed between 2007 and 2010
(Dharmasankar and Mazumder 2016). Even with all the major interventions that were
considered unprecedented at the time, it took years for the U.S. economy to fully recover as
scars from the crisis persisted.
The origins of the COVID-19 recession were quite different. The U.S. economy began 2020 in a
state of historic strength, with record-low unemployment and broad-based GDP growth. The
earliest warning signs came from China, where the virus originated, and where Chinese efforts
to contain the virus had the effect of impairing U.S. supply chains. On January 31, the United
States banned travel from China and later imposed more travel restrictions in late February
after community spread began in the United States. On March 13, President Trump announced
a national emergency, and on March 16 the U.S. government released “15 days to slow the
spread” COVID-19 guidance. Over the next two weeks, most States began instituting lockdown
measures, such as restaurant closures, shelter-in-place orders, and other mandatory social
distancing measures. However, research from Opportunity Insights shows that Americans were
already privately adjusting their behavior in response to perceived risks from the virus, even
before State restrictions were announced or went into effect.
This narrative timeline describes a situation where global supply chain shocks morphed into a
dangerous mix of mutually reinforcing shocks to both the supply and demand sides of the
economy. Social distancing caused people to refrain from going to work—thereby limiting the
economy’s ability to produce goods and services—while simultaneously lowering demand as
people avoided group-based consumption. Although the economic contagion was first most
severe in industries such as travel and hospitality, it quickly spread elsewhere through the
complex interlinkages between sectors in the U.S. economy.
Before COVID-19, researchers ran stress tests on households to examine how negative shocks
to the economy would translate into defaults on household debt. One study simulates a fall in
house prices similar to what occurred in the Great Recession and generates a much smaller
peak in foreclosures; the average shocked stressed default rate—which represents for a
particular loan its expected default rate if it were hit shortly after origination with a replay of
the financial crisis—was 9.7 percent in 2018 compared with 34.8 percent in 2006 (Davis et al.
2019). Another study simulates a large house price decline and unemployment spike meant to
mimic the financial crisis. When faced with the same shocks from 2007 to 2009, the economy
in 2020 generates fewer defaults because of healthier household balance sheets (Bhutta et al.
2019).
Nonfinancial businesses. While households were in good shape before the COVID-19 pandemic,
the nonfinancial business sector had become more leveraged. By early 2020, the aggregate
debt-to-GDP ratio for nonfinancial businesses had reached levels not seen since the financial
crisis (figure 38). This ratio has continued to increase in recent months.
0.6
0.5
2006:Q4 2009:Q2 2011:Q4 2014:Q2 2016:Q4 2019:Q2
One reason nonfinancial business debt has risen, however, is that interest rates are at historic
lows. This reduces the burden of servicing debt. A basic measure of debt burden is the ratio of
company earnings to their interest payments, or the interest coverage ratio. In recent years,
the interest coverage ratio for the median firm has remained high (Federal Reserve 2020). The
sales-weighted shares of nonfinancial public corporations that use more than 30 percent, 40
percent, or 50 percent of their earnings to make interest payments have all been declining, and
as of 2020, these shares were all lower than at the start of the Great Recession (Crouzet and
Gourio 2020).
Despite historically low costs of borrowing, the Federal Reserve and the International Monetary
Fund have expressed concern about the quality of corporate debt. In early 2020, about 50
percent of investment-grade debt was rated BBB, an amount that was near a historical high.
BBB is the lowest rating category for investment-grade debt, and so carries more risk of default
than higher-grade debt. Another concern is that since 2015, loans to large corporations have
increasingly focused on highly leveraged firms. Figure 39 shows the default rate for leveraged
loans over time. In February 2020, the rate was higher than at the start of the Great Recession;
and in the last few months, it has been increasing. (Federal Reserve 2020; IMF 2019, 2020).
Overall, the second quarter of 2020 has had the highest quarterly volume of defaults in
leveraged loans since the first quarter of 2009 (LCD News 2020).
10
0
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
Sources: S&P LCD; Goldman Sachs.
Note: Shading denotes a recession
The number of banks on the FDIC’s “Problem Bank List” leading up to COVID-19 was
exceptionally low. The number of problem banks fell from 76 in 2007:Q4 to 51 by 2019:Q4, the
lowest number of problem banks since 2006:Q4. Total assets of problem banks increased from
$22 billion in 2007 to $46 billion in 2019. The commercial bank sector also entered the crisis
with stable indicators of asset quality.
Monetary and fiscal policy capacity. The U.S. economy entered the 2007–9 financial crisis with
the Federal Funds rate at 5.25 percent and a debt-to-GDP ratio of about 62 percent. At that
time, it was thought that the Federal Reserve had significant ammunition to stabilize the
economy through its usual toolkit of rate reductions, and the Federal government had
considerable fiscal capacity to act through changes to taxes and spending. However, the
consequences of cutting interest rates to the zero lower bound for several years and increases
in deficit spending meant that the U.S. economy entered COVID-19 with the Federal Funds rate
at only 1.6 percent and the debt-to-GDP ratio at 107 percent. In other words, the economy
entered COVID-19 with reduced fiscal and monetary capacity.
Throughout that period, the Federal Reserve employed open market operations and later a
program of large-scale asset purchases (commonly referred to as quantitative easing) after the
Federal Funds rate hit the zero lower bound. The Federal Reserve also took a variety of
approaches to help provide liquidity to various markets and market participants. For example,
beginning in December 2007, the Federal Reserve initiated the Term Auction Facility (TAF),
which provided term discount window loans to depository institutions in sound financial
condition. In March 2008 the Federal Reserve introduced the Term Securities Lending Facility
under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to address funding pressures faced by primary
dealers, who serve as the trading counterparties for the Federal Reserve’s open market
operations. Also in March 2008, the Federal Reserve introduced the Primary Dealer Credit
Facility, which constituted an overnight loan facility for primary dealers. In November 2008, the
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, a joint program of the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury, was introduced to generate demand for certain asset-backed securities—including
those backed by car, student, and small business loans, as well as credit card debt—by
accepting those securities as collateral for loans. The Federal Reserve also introduced a $1.25
trillion Agency MBS [mortgage-backed security] Purchase Program in January 2009 in order to
support the housing and mortgage lending markets.
Besides these and other Federal Reserve interventions, Congress passed significant stimulus
bills over the course of the crisis. In February 2008, in an effort to ameliorate the growing crisis,
the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 was passed, offering tax recovery rebates to individuals and
their dependents, and targeting low- and middle-income taxpayers. The Act also created
incentives for business investment by permitting the accelerated depreciation or immediate
expensing for certain items. In October 2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
was passed, allocating $700 billion to address the financial crisis by purchasing or insuring
troubled assets and attempting to avert the failure of key systemic financial institutions. This
established the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). In 2009, the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was passed, which included tax cuts and government expenditures
totaling over $800 billion, for national infrastructure, energy independence, education, health
care, and tax relief. The Federal Government also stepped in to bail out the auto industry. In
Additionally, the Federal government took several actions to directly aid the housing market.
It instituted the First-Time Homebuyer Tax Credit between 2008 and 2010, with the goal of
stimulating home buying and house prices. The government also created the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP) and Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) to prevent
distressed or underwater borrowers from going into foreclosure. The main distinction between
the two was that HAMP modified a borrower’s existing mortgage contract—often by extending
the term or lowering the rate to reduce payments—whereas HARP loosened underwriting
requirements to allow underwater borrowers with negative home equity to take advantage of
lower interest rates through refinancing.
Relative to the Great Recession, the Federal government has responded with even greater
speed and coordination to COVID-19, and with an even more expansive suite of policies (see
figure 40). The Federal Reserve rapidly cut the Federal Funds rate target range to 0 percent at
the effective lower bound (0.00 to 0.25 percent) and began to reactivate liquidity facilities that
it had set up during the 2007–9 financial crisis. In a matter of just a couple of months, the
Federal Reserve balance sheet has jumped by over $3 trillion compared with the five years it
took to swell by that amount during the Great Recession. The Federal Reserve has also created
Main Street Lending Facilities to direct relief to a larger swath of small and mid-sized firms.
The fiscal response to COVID-19 has also been swifter and larger (figure 40). During the Great
Recession, fiscal stimulus rolled out in phases over the course of a year: the Economic Stimulus
Act in February 2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008, and the
American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) in February 2009. By contrast, the Federal
government during COVID-19 passed the Families First COVID-19 Response Act and the CARES
Act both within March 2020. Moreover, the CARES Act is slated to deliver $2.2 trillion in stimulus
compared with a bit over $800 billion by the ARRA. In terms of composition, both stimulus bills
delivered direct aid to households in the form of rebates and unemployment insurance. The
ARRA also contained a payroll tax cut and direct aid to States to address revenue shortfalls.
Unlike in the Great Recession, however, the CARES Act during COVID-19 established the PPP,
which has authorized up to $659 billion in loans to small businesses to help them maintain
payrolls and avoid insolvency.
The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, passed during the Bush Administration, included an
individual income tax “recovery rebate.” The typical tax filer received a credit of up to $600 or
up to $1,200 for joint filers. Eligible individuals received an additional $300 per dependent
child. Individuals without a net tax liability were still eligible for the rebate, but only if they had
earnings of at least $3,000 annually. The rebate phased out at a rate of 5 percent for incomes
over $75,000, and $150,000 for those filing jointly (the same as the CARES Act).
Under the CARES Act, Economic Impact Payments are larger and more widespread than both
the Economic Stimulus Act and ARRA, which was passed in 2009 under the Obama
Administration. In response to the COVID-19-induced crisis, the U.S. government swiftly passed
a provision that offers Economic Impact Payments to individuals. While the phaseout rate and
income thresholds are the same as they were under ARRA, the CARES Act offers up to $1,200 to
individuals and $2,400 to joint filers (El-Sibai et al. 2020). The CARES Act stimulus payment is
more generous than ARRA was for eligible individuals with children; parents can receive an
extra $500 per dependent child under the age of 17. Unlike the 2008 recovery rebate, the CARES
Act does not require a minimum tax liability to receive the full rebate (Marr et al. 2020).
Of the $787 billion ARRA stimulus package, about $12 billion helped finance various public
workforce programs to accommodate expanded participation (table 8). State unemployment
insurance agencies received $500 million in administrative support funding and $7 billion in
modernization funds in order to address increased demand (BLS 2014). By comparison, the
Families First COVID-19 Response Act authorized $1 billion in additional funding to support UI
administration to assist States with processing increased caseloads and expanded programs
(Emsellem and Evermore 2020; Goger, Loh, and George 2020).
In addition to these funds listed in table 8, Congress funded additional enhancements and
extensions to the UI program. In response to the rise in the number of workers unemployed for
more than 26 weeks, Congress enacted a temporary extension to UI. This Emergency
Unemployment Compensation included additional tiers of benefit weeks to supplement
regular State UI and expanded Extended Benefits programs. In combination, between
November 2009 and September 2012 these programs extended the maximum number of
weeks UI recipients could receive benefits for up to 99 weeks.
The Recovery Act not only expanded UI duration, but also included a Federal Additional
Compensation benefit that funded an additional $25 per eligible worker in weekly UI benefits
through the temporary Emergency Unemployment Compensation. This increased benefit cost
the Federal government $20.1 billion during 2009–11. The permanent Extended Benefits
program became completely federally funded through January 1, 2010, and State eligibility
rules were relaxed to make more unemployed workers eligible. These Extended Benefits cost
the Federal government $24 billion during 2009–11. ARRA also temporarily suspended the
taxation of the first $2,400 of UI benefits.
Under the CARES Act, UI benefits are expanded for up to an additional 13 weeks and States are
allowed to eliminate the mandatory one-week waiting period before benefits can be released
to recipients. It also offers a significant increase in additional UI income—24 times greater than
the additional benefit that was offered during the Great Recession. Workers claiming UI now
receive a $600 weekly supplement. Furthermore, unlike the Recovery Act, the CARES Act added
a new program to expand eligibility for UI benefits to include the self-employed, gig workers,
and other types of workers who would not otherwise qualify for regular UI benefits.
The CARES Act does not increase funding for Reemployment Services Grants or Workforce
Innovation and Opportunity Act formula programs. As outlined in a previous CEA report (2019)
many government training programs lack rigorous evidence based results demonstrating their
effectiveness at training or retraining workers and getting them employed. The CARES Act
does, however, provide $345 million for Dislocated Worker Grants to prevent, prepare for, and
respond to the coronavirus. Additionally, the CARES Act does offer incentives to States to adopt
or make better-use of Short-Time Compensation programs, which would allow employers to
avoid laying off their employees by reducing their hours. Under this program, workers would
still be eligible for UI benefits to make up for their reduced working hours.
Tax Provisions. The ARRA stimulus package included about $14 billion for the Economic
Recovery Payment, a one-time payment of $250 to seniors, persons with disabilities, and
veterans. The Recovery Act also authorized the Making Work Pay personal tax credit for 2009
and 2010. The provision provided a refundable tax credit of up to $400 for single working
individuals and up to $800 per couple. The credit phased out for incomes over $75,000 (or
$150,000 for joint filers) at a rate of 2 percent.
ARRA lowered the refundability threshold of the Child Tax Credit (CTC) and increased the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), thereby allowing more low-income people to claim the credit.
The Recovery Act expanded the threshold for couples claiming the EITC, and raised the
minimum credit claimed by workers with three or more children.
The Recovery Act also subsidized the purchase of cars and first-time homeowners through an
automobile sales tax credit ($1.7 billion total) and a homeownership tax credit ($6.6 billion).
Homebuyers who purchased their property by the end of April 2010 and settled by the end of
September 2010 were eligible for a credit up to $8,000.
The CARES Act does not make any changes to the existing tax credits. However, the CTC was
recently expanded under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, providing enhanced tax relief to families
with children.
Unlike ARRA, the CARES Act is responding directly to the effects of a health-related crisis. As
such, it established the Provider Relief Fund meant to support families, workers, and
healthcare providers in the midst of a pandemic. The CARES Act, through the Department of
Health and Human Services, allotted $100 billion to hospitals and other healthcare providers.
The Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act (PPP/HCE) provided an
additional $75 billion for the Provider Relief Fund to healthcare providers to reimburse
heightened costs and lost revenues that are attributable to COVID-19. In addition, PPP/HCE
provided $25 billion to help increase COVID-19 testing. This includes $1 billion to reimburse the
cost of testing uninsured individuals, in addition to the $1 billion previously appropriate for
this purpose by the Families First Coronavirus Relief Act (FFCRA). The FFCRA also, as amended
by the CARES Act, requires Medicare Part B, State Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance
Programs, and group health plans and health insurance issuers to cover COVID-19 diagnostic
testing without cost-sharing for patients. Uninsured individuals may also obtain COVID-19
diagnostic testing free of charge under the State Medicaid programs, if the State offers this
option. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has made an accessible and easy-to-
use toolkit for states to amend their Medicaid programs in order to offer this service.
COVID-19 also poses a substantial financial cost to hospitals and other healthcare providers.
The American Hospital Association (AHA) estimates that the pandemic has imposed over $200
billion in losses to the American healthcare system in the four-month period between March 1
and June 30. Over 80 percent of this estimated cost is due to revenue losses from canceled
surgeries and other services. This includes both elective and nonelective procedures,
outpatient treatments, and emergency department services. The remaining 20 percent of
estimated losses are based on the direct costs of COVID-19 to hospitals: losses from COVID-19
hospitalizations, additional purchases of PPE, and additional support that hospitals provide to
their front-line workers. This may underestimate the total financial losses to the healthcare
system as it does not include potential losses from drug shortage costs, increased salaries and
wages paid to front-line workers, non-PPE medical supplies such as ventilators, and capital
costs such as setting up additional space for COVID-19 testing tents and additional ICU beds.
With funding allocated by the CARES Act and the Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care
Enhancement Act, the Department of Health and Human Services is set to allocate $175 billion
of aid to hospitals and other healthcare providers to offset these costs. This includes specific
programs to provide relief to safety net hospitals that serve the most vulnerable segment of
Education. The Recovery Act included the American Opportunity Tax Credit, which modified an
existing education credit (the HOPE credit) by making it available to more parents and students
by raising the income eligibility limits. It also expanded the qualifying expenses and allowed
the credit to be claimed not only by two-year institutions but also by four-year higher
education institutions. The maximum annual credit of $2,500 per student was made available
to individuals with a modified adjusted gross income of up to $80,000, or up to $160,000 for
joint filers.
A major difference between the Great Recession and the current crisis is the large amount of
school closures across the country in response to the pandemic. Between the first and third
weeks of March, close to 100 percent of kindergarten, primary, and secondary schools were
shut down. These closures have had a substantial negative effect both on the U.S. economy
and on children themselves. Academic literature finds that children are likely to experience a
persistent 2.3–3.7 percent decline in future earnings as a result of lower human capital
accumulation from the shortened school year.
Meanwhile, parents who miss work entirely because of childcare duties induced by school
closures are likely to experience a persistent 1 percent drop in lifetime earnings because of lost
job experience. The CEA estimates that 18 percent of the workforce may fall into this category.
Overall, the data indicate that only about 30 percent of workers are likely to be able to
telecommute.
Assuming that school closures reduce work experience for even just four months, affected
workers—as a lower bound, 70 percent of the one-quarter of the workforce with young children
at home—will lose 1 percent of lifetime earnings. Furthermore, mothers—and single mothers
especially—are less able to telecommute. Whereas 45 percent of married men with children
can telecommute, the number falls to 42 percent for married women and dramatically to 21
percent for single women. The effects are likely to be particularly severe for early-career single
mothers, who will experience not just lower earnings but also less secure job prospects.
Reopening schools would help boost the economy. The most recent literature suggests that
school-age children are less susceptible to contract COVID-19, less likely to be severely ill, and
The Families First COVID-19 Response Act (FFCRA), which passed in March 2020, provided
authority for work requirement waivers and benefit increases up to the maximum allotment
for households not already receiving the maximum. The CARES Act provided over $15 billion in
additional contingency funding for the increased costs associated with the FFCRA provisions,
as well as anticipated increased participation in SNAP. As provided by the FFCRA and the CARES
Act, the Department of Agriculture also provided waivers of certain requirements so that
nutrition programs could reach families and children during the social-distancing restrictions.
The FFCRA also suspended work requirements for nondisabled, childless adults through the
month after the end of the COVID-19 public health emergency.
Housing assistance programs. ARRA provided $13.6 billion for programs administered by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, including $1.5 billion for the Homelessness
Prevention and Rapid Re-Housing Program.
The CARES Act is even more aggressively assisting these vulnerable populations. Congress has
provided $4 billion for homelessness alone. These funds will support Emergency Solutions
Grants targeted to homeless populations or populations at-risk of becoming homeless. About
$3 billion of these funds are being used to operate emergency shelters (covering food, rent,
security, etc.), make even more emergency shelters available, provide essential services to
homeless populations (including childcare, employment assistance, and mental health
services), and prevent individuals from becoming homeless through rapid rehousing.
President Trump has often referred to this coronavirus as the “invisible enemy,” which all
Americans face. As such, Americans have faced the virus with bravery, optimism, and sacrifice,
while this Administration, working in a bipartisan way, has equipped them with the resources
needed to maintain their livelihoods. Unprecedented legislation and Federal action, enacted
swiftly, has mitigated the effects of this historic adverse shock.
During the pandemic’s peak, over 6 million Americans filed for unemployment insurance in a
single week and 10 million Americans filed in just two weeks, leading to an unemployment rate
in April of 14.7 percent. Immediate action taken by the Administration and Congress, coupled
with a historically strong economy before COVID-19, has allowed millions of Americans to
maintain ties to their workplace through expanded unemployment insurance benefits, PPP
loans for small businesses, and several Federal Reserve facilities that have eased liquidity
constraints on businesses.
Moreover, surges of liquidity and income replacement targeted to the most vulnerable income
groups through economic impact payments have greatly mitigated what was on pace to
become the largest macroeconomic contraction since the Great Depression, increasing
disposable income by 10.7 percent since February. As a further consequence, the consumer
debt and credit indicators for April and May have not shown the deterioration expected as
severe delinquencies on mortgages have fallen to new lows. While we continue to monitor
small business bankruptcies with weekly data, another potential area of concern, the levels for
April and May are still lower than what were observed earlier this year, suggesting that relief
measures may have played an important role in staving off business failures.
This CEA report has documented the successes and effects of these fiscal and monetary actions
thus far, accounting for what may have occurred in the absence of such a response, and finds
that millions of Americans have been provided the liquidity to maintain their livelihoods and
bolster economic recovery. It is important to note, however, that the crisis is far from over. As
the Nation continues its slow path to recovery, the Administration remains committed to
taking the necessary steps needed to make the process as smooth and painless as possible for
all Americans.
Figure 15
Household income is imputed in February 2020 as follows: Each household in February 2020 is
ranked based on the reported family income category of the household head over the past 12
months—rankings within the same income category are assigned randomly. Specific income
values are then assigned to each household in February 2020 according to its rank and the
distribution of household income during calendar year 2018 based on the CPS-ASEC.
The same procedure is used to assign March, April, and May household income values, which
are then modified to incorporate the loss of earnings from job loss, the receipt of
unemployment insurance, and Economic Impact Payments.
Individuals who are unemployed in these three months are assumed to have been employed
in February (this slightly overstates the number of individuals assumed to have lost their job
since February since some were already unemployed in February, but we may also understate
the number of individuals losing their job since some job losers may be out of the labor force
due to temporary layoffs). We then impute the lost earnings for these individuals by regressing
the natural logarithm of weekly wages for workers in all months of the 2019 monthly CPS on
worker characteristics including State of residence, family income, age, sex, race, Hispanic
ethnicity, and educational attainment. We then use these regression results to predict typical
weekly earnings for unemployed workers in March, April, and May of 2020. Monthly estimates
of lost earnings for unemployed workers are formed by multiplying these weekly earnings
estimates by four.
We impute unemployment insurance benefits without the CARES Act by applying State-specific
rules on earnings replacement rates and caps for different family types to the earnings imputed
above. Unemployed self-employed workers are assigned zero unemployment insurance. For
unemployment insurance benefits with the CARES Act, we add $600 weekly to unemployment
insurance benefits, and we assign State and Federal supplement benefits to unemployed self-
employed workers, in both April and May.
Economic Impact Payments are imputed to households on the basis of the reported family
income of the household head, the number of adults and their marital status, and the number
of children. Phase-outs of Economic Impact Payments begin at $75,000 for single adult
households, $112,500 for unmarried, multiple adult households, and $150,000 for married,
multiple adult households. Economic Impact Payments then phase out at $0.05 per $1 of
income above these thresholds. Economic Impact Payments are applied to households in April
2020.
Chapter 1
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The Council of Economic Advisers, an agency within the Executive Office of the President, is
charged with offering the President objective economic advice on the formulation of both
domestic and international economic policy. The Council bases its recommendations and
analysis on economic research and empirical evidence, using the best data available to
support the President in setting our nation's economic policy.
www.whitehouse.gov/cea
August 2020