Optimization Methods (MFE) : Elena Perazzi
Optimization Methods (MFE) : Elena Perazzi
Lecture 05
Elena Perazzi
EPFL
Fall 2018
At each date t, xt is the state variable and xt+1 is the choice variable
or control variable.
In general xt and xt+1 n−dimensional: xt , xt+1 ∈ Rn .
Example: optimal growth model
∞ t
V (k0 ) = maxc0 , c1 ,...cT Σt=0 β U(ct )
F2 (xT , xT +1 ) = 0 (∗)
General structure:
are
The sequence {xt∗ , xt+1
∗ , ....} satisfies a Euler equation
F2 (xt∗ , xt+1
∗ ∗
) + βF1 (xt+1 ∗
, xt+2 )=0
ct+1 = βct
ct+2 = βct+1
c0 = (1 − β)w0
ct = β t c0 = (1 − β)wt
F2 (x ∗ , x ∗ ) + βF1 (x ∗ , x ∗ ) = 0
F2 (xt∗ , xt+1
∗ ∗
) + βF1 (xt+1 ∗
, xt+2 )=0
with x0∗ = x0 . We can linearize the Euler equation around steady state
∗ ∗
F1 (xt+1 , xt+2 ) ' F1 (x ∗ , x ∗ ) + F11 × (xt+1
∗
− x ∗ ) + F12 × (xt+2
∗
− x ∗)
F2 (xt∗ , xt+1
∗
) ' F2 (x ∗ , x ∗ ) + F21 × (xt∗ − x ∗ ) + F22 × (xt+1
∗
− x ∗)
F2 (xt∗ , xt+1
∗
) + βF1 (xt∗ , xt+1
∗
) ' (F2 (x ∗ , x ∗ ) + βF1 (x ∗ , x ∗ )) +
F21 × (xt∗ − x ∗ ) + (F22 + βF11 ) × (xt+1
∗
− x ∗ ) + βF12 × (xt+2
∗
− x ∗)
0.3
0.25
0.2
Kt+1
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
Kt
M j = B −1 Λj B
If
B11 B12
B=
B21 B22
where each of the Bij blocks in an n × n matrix, we impose
B21 z1 + B22 z0 = 0
or
−1
x1 = x ∗ − B21 B22 (x0 − x ∗ )
z1
and the optimal sequence is obtained from by recursively
z0
multiplying by the matrix M.
The sequence constructed this way satisfies the Euler equation by
construction and satisfies the transversality condition. Hence it is the
unique solution of the linearized problem.
Elena Perazzi (EPFL) Optimization methods (MFE) Lecture 05 Fall 2018 18 / 28
Blanchard-Kahn conditions
In order
for the solution to get closer and closer to steady state, we
z1
need to be a linear combination of the eigenvectors
z0
corresponding to eigenvalues < 1 (in norm).
If there are n such eigenvalues, given z0 there is a unique way to
choose z1 such that the above is satisfied.
Intuition for n = 1 (1-dimensional state variable and choice variable)
Eigenvector
| |<1
z
0
w01−γ
V (w0 ) = maxθ∈[0,1] E [((R − 1)θ + 1)1−γ ]
1−γ
The optimal θ is independent of wealth.
Call ŵ the wage that makes the worker indifferent between accepting
and rejecting. He will aceept if w > ŵ and reject if w < ŵ .
The Bellman equation is
Z w̄
U w U
V = max , βV dF (w )
0 1−β