G.R. No.

213009

BOOKMEDIA PRESS, INC. and BENITO J. BRIZUELA

vs.
LEONARDO* SINAJON** and YANLY ABENIR

Facts:
Bookmedia Press, Inc. (Bookmedia) is a local printing company with Benito Brizuela (Brizuela) as its
President hired Yanly Abenir (Abenir) and Leonardo Sinajon (Sinajon).

On July 20, 1997, Brizuela received a report from one Larry Valdoz (Valdoz), a security guard of
Bookmedia, which claims that respondents, earlier in the day, had left the company premises moments
after punching-in their respective time cards. The report also alleges that Sinajon returned on the
evening of the same day and punched-out his and Abenir's time cards.

Brizuela immediately summoned the employees for explanation and on the next day, the said
employees submitted their explanation letters indicating therein that they both had to attend to
emergencies in their respective home that day. The following day after receipt of their letters,
Bookmedia fired both respondents.

Abenir and Sinajon filed before the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for illegal dismissal, the latter finding
as illegal the dismissal of the respondents due to the failure of the employer to prove otherwise. The LA
pointed out that employer really presented no evidence to support their accusation that respondents
have repeatedly been leaving work early after punching-in their time cards.

Issue:
Whether the actions of the employee on that solitary incident on July 20, 1997 constituted just causes
for their dismissal.

Held:
Supreme Court (SC) held that the actions of the employees on July 20, 1997 do not qualify as just causes
for the latter's dismissal. Such actions, taken with the attendant circumstances of this case, cannot be
considered as serious misconduct, willful disobedience of an employer's lawful order, or fraud.

Based on the previous decision made by the SC, the just causes of serious misconduct, willful
disobedience of an employer's lawful order, and fraud all imply the presence of "willfulness" or
"wrongful intent" on the part of the employee. Hence, serious misconduct and willful disobedience of an
employer's lawful order may only be appreciated when the employee's transgression of a rule, duty or
directive has been the product of "wrongful intent" or of a "wrongful and perverse attitude, but not
when the same transgression results from simple negligence or "mere error in judgment." In the same
vein, fraud and dishonesty can only be used to justify the dismissal of an employee when the latter
commits a dishonest act that reflects a disposition to deceive, defraud and betray his employer.

Hence the act of the employees cannot be said to have the elements of willfulness or seriousness so as
to warrant their dismissal since the employees’ violative act of the company’s policy, based on his
explanation letter, was due to the emergency they had to attend to and not motivated by the wanton
desire to transgress said policy.

Also, the dishonesty committed by one of the employees (Abenir) when he had another person punch-
out his time card may be somewhat mitigated by the fact that he did not really worked until 5PM but as
he explained in his letter that he only forgot to do so. Certainly, given such background, the dishonest
act of Abenir does not equate to the fraud contemplated by the law that could warrant the imposition of
the penalty of dismissal.

Wherefore, the petition of the Bookmedia is denied and since reinstatement would no longer be
feasible, the SC directed the Bookmedia to pay each employee separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.

G.R. No. 209072

ARLENE A. CUARTOCRUZ
vs.
ACTIVE WORKS, INC., AND MA. ISABEL E. HERMOSA, BRANCH MANAGER

Facts:
Arlene A. Cuartocruz (Cuartocruz) and Cheng Chi Ho entered into a contract of employment whereby
Cuartocruz shall work as the latter’s domestic helper for two (2) years through Active Works, Inc. (AWI),
a recruitment agency for domestic helpers in Hong Kong.

On August 3, 2007, Cuartocruz arrived in Hong Kong and proceeded to the residence of her employer,
the following day.

On August 11, 2007, Cuartocruz received a warning letter from her employer, stating that she is required
to improve her attentiveness in performing her work within one month, failing which the letter shall
serve as a written notice of the termination of her employment contract effective September 11, 2007.
On the same day, Cuartocruz wrote a reply, apologizing for giving false information by stating in her bio-
data that she is single when in fact she is a single parent. She also asked for a chance to improve so she
can continue with her work.

However, in a letter dated August 16, 2007, Cheng Chi Ho informed the Immigration Department of
Wangchai, Hong Kong that he is terminating the contract with Cuartocruz effective immediately for the
following reasons: "disobey order, unmatch the contract which she submit before, [and] refuse to care
my baby."

Cuartocruz consequently filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter (LA). The LA
rendered the decision finding the termination of Cuartocruz valid and legal. The NLRC, however,
nullified and set aside LA’ decision stating there is insufficient proof of valid cause of dismissal as well as
compliance with the due process requirement. CA, affirming the decision of NLRC awarding three-
months’ salary in compliance with RA 8042.
Issues:

1. Whether the Cuartocruz was illegally dismissed

2. Whether the CA erred in granting the award of three-months’ salary in compliance with RA 8042
to Cuartocruz

Held:
The SC held that Cuartocruz was not afforded constitutional due process hence considering the matter a
case of illegal dismissal. Also, CA’s award has been modified awarding unpaid salaries for the unexpired
portion of her contract.

On the compliance with the substantive and procedural due process, the employer failed to provide
substantial evidence that there was a just or authorized cause for the dismissal. There was no showing
of particular instances when Cuartocruz supposedly disobeyed her employer and refused to take care of
his baby. With respect to Cuartocruz alleged misrepresentation that she was single when in fact she was
a single parent, there is also no showing how this affected her work as a domestic helper. In fact, being a
mother herself puts Cuartocruz in a better position to care for her employer's child. Where there is no
showing of a clear, valid, and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the
matter a case of illegal dismissal.

Likewise, procedural due process was not complied. In this case, the August 11, 2007 warning letter
would have very well served as the first notice that satisfies the above requirement. However, while the
warning letter states that it will serve as notice of termination effective September 11, 2007 in case
Cuartocruz failed to improve her work performance, since she was terminated immediately thereafter.
Worse, the grounds stated in the August 16, 2007 termination letter were markedly different from the
ground stated in the warning letter.

Ruling on the monetary award, the proviso in Section 10, Republic Act No. (RA) 80422 which prescribes
the award of "salaries for the unexpired portion of [the] employment contract or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" to illegally-dismissed overseas workers has been
declared unconstitutional by the Court as early as 2009, and thus should no longer be a source of
confusion by litigants and the courts.
G.R. No. 232669

COCA-COLA FEMSA PHILIPPINES

vs.
RICARDO S. MACAPAGAL, ENER A. MANARANG, REMIGIO E. MERCADO, DANILO Z. FABIAN, ALBERT P.
TAN, EDUARDO N. ABULENCIA, JR., REYNALDO G. PINEDA, ERIC A. ABAD SANTOS, WILFREDO C. DELA
CRUZ, MANUEL T. CAPARAS, EDGARDO R. NAVARRO, NESTOR L. RAYO, AND INOCENCIO M. ARAO,

Facts:
Coca-Cola Femsa Philippines, Inc.8 (Company) hired thirteen (13) employees at its manufacturing plant
as part of Product Availability Group (PAG). In January 2011, the Company announced its plan to abolish
PAG, together with all of its warehouses and the positions under it, including those held by involved
employees, and outsource its remaining functions to The Redsystem Company, Inc. (TRCI). After receipt
of termination letter due to redundancy, the employees filed a complaint for illegal dismissal arguing
that the redundancy program was done in bad faith.

The Company, on the other hand, averred that it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling
carbonated drinks and other beverage items nationwide while PAG's work involved coordination with
the external distribution channels. To improve operation efficiency and effectiveness, the Company
resolved to outsource all of its distribution and coordination efforts under PAG to an independent
contractor, TRCI. Notices of the redundancy program were given to the respondents on January 31,
2011 as well as to the DOLE at least thirty days prior to the effective date of separation. The Company
added that it also gave more than the required separation pay and other benefits to respondents, who
in turn voluntarily executed their respective notarized Deeds of Receipt, Waiver, and Quitclaim.

Issue:

Whether employees’ termination due redundancy program is valid.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the redundancy program resulting to a valid termination of the
employees.

Redundancy is an authorized cause for termination of employment under Article 29832 (formerly,
Article 283) of the Labor Code. It exists when "the services of an employee are in excess of what is
reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise." It can be due to "a number of
factors, such as the over hiring of workers, a decrease in the volume of business or the dropping of a
particular line or service previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise." The determination
of whether the employees' services are no longer necessary or sustainable, and therefore, properly
terminable for redundancy, is an exercise of business judgment. In making such decision, however,
management must not violate the law nor declare redundancy without sufficient basis. o ensure that the
dismissal is not implemented arbitrarily, jurisprudence requires the employer to prove, among others,
its good faith in abolishing the redundant positions as well as the existence of fair and reasonable
criteria in the selection of employees who will be dismissed from employment due to redundancy.

Similarly, in this case, the Court finds that the termination of respondents was due to the simplification
of the distribution systems in the Company

G.R. No. 225586

THE PENINSULA MANILA and SONJA VODUSEK

vs.
EDWIN A. JARA

Facts:
Edwin Jara worked at the petitioner The Peninsula Manila from 2002 until his dismissal in 2011. He
became a captain waiter in 2009 who is tasked to tally actual cash count with cash transaction receipts
and match the same with the data in micros system.

On July 22, 2011, Jara discovered discrepancy between actual cash count and cash transaction receipts
resulting to cash overage of PhP6,500.00. He reported the same to his superior to whom Jara later
reported that the same had been reconciled knowing it is not. Instead, he made it appear in the micros
system that all amounts are reconciled. The next day, he did not report for work but, however, dined at
Escolta. He did not report again for work the net day as it was his rest day. Upon his return to work, he
reported the same to the auditor who later advised to surrender the cash to his supervisor. Instead of
complying with this directive, Jara turned over the money to the captain waitress instead, for
safekeeping in the safety deposit box.

After due hearing relating to the incident, Jara was informed of his termination for misappropriation or
falsification of hotel receipts and dishonesty in violation of the Hotel's Code of Discipline. Consequently,
Jara filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

Issue:

Whether Jara was illegally dismissed

Held:

The Supreme Court (SC) held in negative.

For dismissal due to cause under subsection C of Article 297 (formerly Art 282) of the Labor Code,
certain requirements must be complied with, viz: (1) the employee concerned must be holding a
position of trust and confidence and (2) there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and
confidence.
As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, there are two (2) classes of positions of trust. The first class
consists of managerial employees. While the second class consists of cashiers, auditors, property
custodians, etc. or those who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle
significant amounts of money or property.

Even though Jara argues that he does not hold position of trust and confidence, Jara indisputably comes
within the second class of employees as he is tasked to handle significant amounts of money from sales
in petitioners' restaurant Escolta. Jara cannot claim otherwise for he would not be entrusted with the
duty to balance the sales transactions and actual cash on hand from restaurant sales if he did not have
the trust of the management.

Loss of trust and confidence to be a valid cause for dismissal must be based on a willful breach of trust
and founded on clearly established facts. Here, with Jara’s actions, record bears significant details
pointing to the willfulness of Jara's action showing the breach of the trust reposed in him by petitioner.
That due to the irreconcilable cash count and transaction receipts, Jara deliberately made it appear that
the same tallied and even misrepresented such fact to his supervisor. To be able to do this, Jara
tampered with the transaction and sales receipts to come up with a balanced cash sales record at the
end of his shift. This is pure dishonesty and clearly a violation of the trust reposed in him by his
employer.

G.R. No. 234436

MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILS., INC., MARLOW NAVIGATION NETHERLANDS B.V., and

CAPTAIN LEOPOLDO C. TENORIO,
vs
PRIMO D. QUIJANO

Facts

On July 11, 2013, Quijano was hired as Cook by petitioner Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc., for its
principal Marlow Navigation Netherlands B.V., on board the vessel M/V Katharina Schepers, for
a period of six (6) months. He was then declared fit for sea duty and boarded the vessel on
August 18, 2013.

On January 30, 2014, Quijano was signed off from the vessel purportedly due to completion of
his employment contract. On February 3, 2014, he reported at petitioners' office and was paid
the balance of his final wages for the period January 1 to 30, 2014, and underwent interview for
debriefing purposes. Thereafter, Quijano was hired anew for the same position, this time, under
a 10-month Contract of Employment dated March 5, 2014. However, his employment did not
materialize due to his confinement at the East Avenue Medical Center (EAMC) on March 18,
2014, where his illness is claimed to be acquired during his last employment and that
petitioners refused to grant his request for medical assistance when he reported on February 3,
2014. Quijano filed against the latter a complaint for disability benefits and other benefits he is
entitled thereto pursuant to CBA agreement which he was a member.
Quijano alleged that this was due to the hostile working conditions which he reported to the
Captain an was relived from his post with his contract cut short to 5 ½ months. He also added
that upon repatriation, he attempted to report for post-employment medical examination and
treatment but was unjustly refused, prompting him to seek medical attention at his own
expense at EAMC. Marlow, on their part, argued that the latter disembarked due to expiration
of contract and denied that Quijano requested for medical assistance.

Issue:

Whether Quijano is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits

Held:

The Supreme Court (SC) held that Quijano is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits

In this case, the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (PVA), as well as the CA, were consistent in
holding that Quijano was able to substantially prove his entitlement to total and permanent
disability benefits, considering that: (a) he was medically repatriated on January 30, 2014 and
reported to petitioners' office within the mandated three (3)-day period for· post-medical
examination; (b) he was suffering from liver abscess, cholecystitis with cholelithiasis, diabetes
mellitus, type II, and panophthalmitis, which were deemed work-related illnesses being listed
occupational diseases under the 2010 PO EA-SEC; and ( c) there was non-compliance by the
company-designated physician of the required final and definite assessment within the
120/240-day treatment period resulting in the ipso Jure grant to the seafarer of permanent and
total disability benefits.

At this juncture, it bears to stress that factual findings of the PVA, which were affirmed by the
CA, are binding and will not be disturbed, absent any showing that they were made arbitrarily
or were unsupported by substantial evidence. Since petitioners failed to show any semblance of
arbitrariness or that the PVA's and CA's rulings were not supported by substantial evidence, the
Court is inclined to uphold the same.
G.R. No. 232522, August 28, 2019

CARISSA E. SANTO

vs.

UNIVERSITY OF CEBU

Facts:

In May 1997, University of Cebu hired petitioner Carissa E. Santo as a full-time instructor. She
continued working for respondent until she got qualified for optional retirement under
respondent's Faculty Manual, viz:

Optional Retirement

A permanent employee may, upon reaching his fifty-fifth (55th) birthday or after having
completed at least fifteen (15) years of service, opt for an early retirement (which is a
resignation with separation pay) considering that separation before reaching 15 years of full-
time service does not entitle an employee to any separation pay, except that which is
contributed by the University to PAG-IBIG), and shall be entitled to the retirement pay
equivalent to a total of fifteen (15) days for every year of service based on the average monthly
salary to the employee computed for the past three years.5 (emphasis supplied)

In April 2013, she applied for optional retirement; she was then only forty-two (42) years old
but had already completed sixteen (16) years of service with University of Cebu. The latter
approved her application and computed her optional retirement pay at fifteen (15) days for
every year of service per provisions of the Faculty Manual. She asserted, though, that her
retirement pay should be equivalent to 22.5 days per year of service in accordance with Article
287 of the Labor Code. University of Cebu refused to accept her computation. Thus, she
initiated the complaint below for payment of retirement benefits under Article 287 of the Labor
Code, damages and attorney's fees against respondent.

Issue:

Whether Santo is entitled to retirement pay pursuant to Article 287 of the Labor Code

Held:

The Supreme Court (SC) held that Santo’s retirement pay should be computed based on Article
287 of the Labor Code.

Retirement benefits are a form of reward for an employee's loyalty and service to an employer
and are earned under existing laws, Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA), employment
contracts and company policies. It is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary
agreement between the employer and the employee whereby the latter, after reaching a
certain age or length of service, agrees to sever his or her employment with the former.

Clearly, the Faculty Manual intends to grant retirement benefits to qualified employees. It
entitles an employee to retire after fifteen (15) years of service or upon reaching the age of
fifty-five (55) and accordingly collect retirement benefits. It even mandates compliance with RA
7641 such that when the computation of its retirement plan is found to be lower than what the
law requires, University of Cebu is bound to pay the deficiency. The optional retirement under
University of Cebu’s Faculty Manual, therefore, should not be taken as anything else but a
retirement benefit within the ambit of Article 287 of the Labor Code.

Now, comparing the optional retirement benefits under the two (2) retirement schemes, it is
apparent that fifteen (15) days' worth of salary for every year of service provided under its
Faculty Manual is much less than 22.5 days' worth of salary for every year of service provided
under Article 287 of the Labor Code. Obviously, it is more beneficial for petitioner if Article
287's retirement plan will be applied in the computation of' her retirement benefits.

G.R. No. 202851, September 09, 2019

FEATI UNIVERSITY

vs.

ANTOLIN PANGAN

Facts:

FEATI University (FEATI) hired Antolin Pangan (Pangan) as a canteen boolckeeper. Pangan was later on
promoted as Assistant Cashier and then as University Cashier in 1995.

Alleging decline in enrolment for the past 25 years, petitioner offered a voluntary early retirement
program to all its employees on August 27, 2002 of which Pangan availed the same. On August 30, 2002,
Panga’s retirement was approved and had immediately received his retirement pay.

Meanwhile, prior to the approval of Pangan’s application to avail of the early retirement program, he
was re-hired as University Cashier on August 28, 2002. Alleging, however, that the functions of the
University Cashier was subsequently transferred to the Accounting Department as part of the cost-
cutting measures that FEATI undertook, it re-assigned respondent as Assistant Program Coordinator of
the Graduate Studies on April 15, 2004.

On August 6, 2005, Pangan was terminated from employment on the ground of redundancy. According
to petitioner, respondent's position became redundant due to the progressive decline of enrolment in
the Graduate Program and as such, the Graduate Program Coordinator can adequately handle the tasks
without a need for an assistant. Aggrieved, Pangan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and other
monetary claims against FEATI.

Issue:

Whether Pangan was validly dismissed

Held:

The Supreme Court (SC) held in negative.

In this case, FEATI justifies Pangan’s dismissal on the ground of redundancy. Indeed, redundancy is a
recognized authorized cause to validly terminate employment. The determination of whether the
employee's services are no longer necessary or sustainable, and thus, terminable has been recognized to
be a management prerogative. The employer's exercise of such prerogative is, however, not an
unbridled right that cannot be subjected to the court's scrutiny.

The Court has laid down certain guidelines for the valid dismissal of employees on the ground of
redundancy, to wit: (1) written notice served on both the employee and the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) at least one month prior to the intended date of termination; (2) payment of
separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher; (3) good faith in abolishing the redundant position; and (4) fair and reasonable
criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant.

In this case, FEATI merely presented financial audits and enrolment lists to justify Pangan’s dismissal due
to redundancy. As correctly held by the NLRC and the CA, at best, these pieces of evidence prove only
the fact of financial losses and decline in enrolment. They do not, in any way, prove that fair and
reasonable criteria were used in determining which position is to be declared redundant or who among
the employees is to be redundated.

In sum, while FEATI may have been able to prove decline in enrolment and financial losses, it severely
failed to prove that it utilized fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining that Pangan's position as
Assistant Program Coordinator, as well as his former position as University Cashier, were redundant
and/or that it was necessarily respondent who should be affected by its cost-cutting measures. Pangan’s
dismissal on the ground of redundancy, therefore, cannot be sustained.

G.R. No. 242875, August 28, 2019

AUGORIO A. DELA ROSA

vs
ABS-CBN CORPORATION

Facts:

Augorio A. Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) was hired by ABS-CBN Corporation (ABS) as a video editor for a
specified hourly rate. He was allegedly rehired repeatedly and continuously for the same position, under
purported fixed-term contracts.

In 2013, Dela Rosa admittedly reported for work and went to ABS editing bay while intoxicated. This led
to an incident where Dela Rosa placed his hands inside a female co-worker's pants and touched her
buttocks. A show cause memorandum was given and his answer accordingly. After hearing, he was
served a memorandum informing him of management’s decision of imposing penalty of dismissal.
However, Dela Rosa claimed it can no longer effect since his program dated August 16, 2013 had already
expired on December 31, 2013 and his current program dated March 16, 2015 to September 15, 2015
no longer covers the incident. Aggrieved, he filed a complaint of illegal dismissal.

ABS averred that Dela Rosa was not illegally dismissed since he was only engaged for a fixed period and
it also claimed that even though Dela Rosa’s employment has not yet expired, Dela Rosa was dismissed
for a just cause for having been found guilty of serious misconduct.

Issue:

1. Whether Dela Rosa is a fixed-term employee

2. Whether Dela Rosa was illegally dismissed

Held:

The Supreme Court (SC) held that Dela was a regular employee but validly dismissed.

According to jurisprudence, for a fixed-term employment contract to be valid, it must be shown that the
fixed period was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, who dealt with each other on
more or less equal terms with no moral dominance being exercised by the employer over the employee.

Applying these standards, Dela Rosa was therefore not a fixed-term employee but rather, a regular
employee. Record shows that Dela Rosa was engaged by ABS, through various contracts, as a video
editor for the latter's several programs. While there are other contracts intermittently spanning the
years 2014 to 2015, it is nonetheless clear from the foregoing that Dela Rosa was employed by ABS for a
period of at least three (3) years without interruption. His employment contracts during said period had
been repeatedly extended or renewed covering the same position, and involving the same duties. Case
law holds that the repeated engagement under a contract of hire is indicative of the necessity and
desirability of the employee's work in the employer's business; and if an employee's contract has been
continuously extended or renewed for the same position, with the same duties, without any
interruption, then such employee is a regular employee.

Also, the incident involving Dela Rosa clearly constitute serious misconduct, as he not only violated ABS’
Code of Conduct but also adversely reflected on the ethics and morality in the company. As pointed out,
Dela Rosa posed a serious threat to company property, considering that the editing bay contained
expensive equipment which he could have damaged due to his intoxication. Further, his inebriated state
at that time posed a serious peril to his co-employees, as in fact, was manifested when he repeatedly
attempted to kiss a female co-worker and eventually, touched her buttocks.

G.R. No. 222710, September 10, 2019

PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION

Vs

COMMISSION ON AUDIT, CHAIRPERSON MICHAEL G. AGUINALDO, DIRECTOR JOSEPH B. ANACAY AND

SUPERVISING AUDITOR ELENA L. AGUSTIN

Facts

On March 25, 1992, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7305, otherwise known as the Magna Carta of Public Health
Workers, was signed into law. Section 23 thereof granted longevity pay to a health worker, to wit:

Section 23. Longevity Pay. - A monthly longevity pay equivalent to five percent (5%) of the monthly basic
pay shall be paid to a health worker for every five (5) years of continuous, efficient and meritorious
services rendered as certified by the chief of office concerned, commencing with the service after the
approval of this Act.

Pursuant to R.A. No. 7305, former Department of Health (DOH) Secretary Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr.,
issued a Certification dated February 20, 2000, declaring PhilHealth officers and employees as public
health workers.

On April 30, 2012, COA Supervising Auditor Elena C. Agustin (Supervising Auditor) issued Audit
Observation Memorandum 2012-09 (11), stating that the grant of longevity pay to PhilHealth officers
and employees lacked legal basis, and thus, should be disallowed.

The Court then later affirmed the COA’s decision stating that PhilHealth personnel's functions are not
principally related to health service because their service pertains to the effective administration of the
National Health Insurance Program, or facilitating the availability of funds of health services to its
covered employees. Stated differently, PhilHealth's function is to help its members pay for health care
services; unlike that of workers or employees of hospitals, clinics, health centers and units, medical
service institutions, clinical laboratories, treatment and rehabilitation centers, health-related
establishments of government corporations, and the specific health service section, division, bureau or
unit of a government agency, who are actually engaged in health work services. Thus, as PhilHealth's
employees are not considered health workers, they are not entitled to longevity pay under R.A. No.
7305.

Issue:

Whether Philhealth personnel are public health workers as defined and determined by RA 7305

Held:

Notably, R.A. No. 11223 provides for a clear and unequivocal declaration regarding the classification
of all PhilHealth personnel, to wit:

SECTION 15. PhilHealth Personnel as Public Health Workers. — All PhilHealth personnel shall be
classified as public health workers in accordance with the pertinent provisions under Republic Act No.
7305, also known as the Magna Carta of Public Health Workers, (emphasis supplied)
Plainly, the law states that all personnel of the PhilHealth are public health workers in accordance with
R.A. No. 7305. This confirms that PhilHealth personnel are covered by the definition of a public health
worker. In other words, R.A. No. 11223 is a curative statute that remedies the shortcomings of R.A. No.
7305 with respect to the classification of PhilHealth personnel as public health workers.

Evidently, R.A. No. 11223 removes any legal impediment to the treatment of PhilHealth personnel as
public health workers and for them to receive all the corresponding benefits therewith, including
longevity pay. Thus, ND H.O. 12-005 (11), disallowing the longevity pay of PhilHealth personnel, must be
reversed and set aside. As PhilHealth personnel are considered public health workers, it is not necessary
anymore to discuss the issue on good faith.

G.R. No. 222455, September 18, 2019

GERRY S. MOJICA

vs

GENERALI PILIPINAS LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC.

Facts:

Gerry S. Mojica (Mojica) used to be a Unit Manager and Associate Branch Manager of Generali Pilipinas
Life Assurance Company, Inc. (the Company). The Company filed a complaint for collection of money
representing unpaid monthly allowances and unpaid premium dues.

The Company alleged that Mojica was an agent and independent contractor granted with monthly
drawing allowance as an advance against the Unit Manager's total expected future override commission
earning but was however subject to meeting monthly validation requirements and performance
standards and must be repaid by petitioner over a period of eighteen (18) months or less by applying his
override commission earnings and commissions on personal business. The Company claimed that Mojica
failed to comply with the premium production and manpower requirements and 3 did not reach the
targets which he himself set in his business plan. As a consequence, respondent stopped releasing
monthly drawing allowances to petitioner, in accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement.

Mojica then submitted his resignation which was accepted by the Company and asserted that he was an
employee of the Company, and not its agent or independent contractor. He insisted that as an employee
of respondent, he had no obligation to liquidate the monthly drawing allowances and that he was
entitled to monthly drawing allowance which was not even enough to cover all his expenses in
maintaining Company’s branch office and the recruitment of insurance agents for respondent. Although
Mojica admitted receiving the monthly drawing allowances, he claimed that he had no obligation to
return such allowances since these were his salaries as full time unit manager.

Issue:

Whether Mojica is an independent contractor

Held:

Supreme Court held that Mojica is an independent contractor as clearly stipulated in the contractual
agreements entered into between them.

The Unit Manager's Agreement dated 19 January 2001 pertinently provides:

xxx. The Unit Manager in performance of his duties defined herein, shall be considered
an independent contractor and not an employee of Generali Pilipinas. He shall be free to
exercise his own judgment as to time, place and means of soliciting insurance. However,
he shall observe and conform to all existing rules and regulations as may be prescribed
by Generali Pilipinas from time to time. Under no circumstance shall the Unit Manager
(and/or his agents) be considered employees of Generali Pilipinas.

The Associate Branch Manager's Agreement dated 24 January 2002 similarly states:

The Branch Manager, in the performance of his duties defined herein, shall be considered
an independent contractor and not an employee of Generali Pilipinas. He shall be free to
exercise his own judgment as to time, place and means of soliciting insurance. However,
he shall observe and conform to all existing rules and regulations as may be prescribed by
Generali Pilipinas from time to time.

As an independent contractor, Mojica earned through commissions and was not paid a fixed salary or
wage. His remuneration on a commission basis is expressly provided under the Unit Manager's
Compensation Schedule which was incorporated in the Unit Manager's Agreement, and the Associate
Branch Manager's Compensation Schedule which formed part of the Associate Branch Manager's
Agreement.

G.R. No. 234296, November 27, 2019

ERNESTO P. GUTIERREZ

Vs

NAWRAS MANPOWER SERVICES, INC., AL-ADHAMAIN CO. LTD., AND ELIZABETH BAWA

Facts:

Ernesto Gutierrez was hired by NAWRAS Manpower Services, Inc. (NAWRAS) to work as respondent Al
Adhamain Co. Ltd.'s "driver vehicle road". He was deployed July 31, 2013.

Upon arrival, Gutierrez claimed that he was initially placed on floating status. He received his first salary
only in November 2013 and received two months' worth of salary on December 2, 2013. He received a
service vehicle on December 3, 2013 but he had to personally shoulder the gasoline expenses going to
Al-Adhamain's asphalt plant. On February 15, 2014, the workshop supervisor informed Gutierrez that he
would be transferred to another site and was made to report to Al-Adhamain's administrator. At the
administrator's office, he was only given a clearance form. In a meeting with Al-Adhamain's owner,
Gutierrez was told that his contract would be terminated and he would be repatriated as soon as he
completes his clearance. He then called NAWRAS about the pre-termination of his contract but was
refrained from filing a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Labor Office in order to allow NAWRAS to
talk to Al-Adhamain. He thus proceeded to submit the requirements for his clearance in the last week of
February 2014. On March 15, 2014, petitioner was given his remaining salary (sans 1-month salary) and
a refund of his two months' salary bond. He was then told to book his own flight back to the Philippines
and that he would be reimbursed later on. However, of the SR3,100.00 that he spent for the airfare, Al-
Adhamain's owner only reimbursed him for SR2,000.00.

Upon repatriation, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Although they claimed that he was legally
dismissed After his three-month probationary period, Al-Adhamain informed him of his unsatisfactory
performance. Gutierrez was thus transferred to a different site to afford him a chance to change his
working attitude. They claimed that he was given several chances to change his work attitude to no
avail. Despite extending several opportunities for petitioner to improve, petitioner opted to request for
his last salary, benefits, termination pay, and return ticket.

Issue:

Whether Gutierrez was illegally dismissed entitling him of salary of the unexpired portion, airfare ticket,
repayment of last salary.

Held:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the NLRC and CA finding Gutierrez to be illegally dismissed
allowing him to receive the following:

1. salary equivalent to the unexpired portion of the contract

This Court struck down the phrase "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less" under Section 7 of R.A. 10022 because the same phrase was already declared
unconstitutional in R.A. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.He is, thus,
entitled to "his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract" - the operative clause of
Section 7.

2. SR1,100.00 as reimbursement for his airfare ticket

This Court is more inclined to believe that petitioner was able to substantiate his claim of paying
SR3,100.00 for his airplane ticket. Aside from the fact that respondents kept silent on the matter in their
appeal before the NLRC, the NLRC pointed out that petitioner presented a ticket receipt as proof that
petitioner paid for the airplane ticket. This is bolstered by the LA's findings that respondents failed to
present any proof of payment for the ticket. A reading of the CA's decision, likewise, reveals that
respondents failed to present any proof to substantiate their claim that they paid for petitioner's ticket.
As such, it is proper to reinstate the LA and NLRC's order for respondents to reimburse petitioner the
excess SR1,100.00 payment.

3. Repayment of his last salary

Gutierrez was not given his November 2013 salary because Al Adhamain withheld it "as his placement
fee." The said salary deduction was improper because an illegally dismissed migrant worker is entitled to
a full reimbursement of his/her placement fee. The LA's directive to refund petitioner's placement fee is
really one for the repayment of petitioner's November 2013 salary because petitioner never paid
respondents a placement fee.