Facts of The Case:: Schmerber v. California

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Schmerber v.

California
Facts of the Case: 
Schmerber had been arrested for drunk driving while
receiving treatment for injuries in a hospital. During his
treatment, a police officer ordered a doctor to take a blood
sample which indicated that Schmerber had been drunk while
driving. The blood test was introduced as evidence in court
and Schmerber was convicted.

Question: 
Did the blood test violate the Fifth Amendment guarantee
against self-incrimination?

Conclusion: 
No. Justice Brennan argued for a unanimous Court that the
protection against self-incrimination applied specifically
to compelled communications or testimony. Since the results
of the blood test were neither "testimony nor evidence
relating to some communicative act or writing by the
petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds."
Decisions
Decision: 5 votes for California, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process

Case Basics
Docket No.: 
 658
Petitioner: 
 Schmerber
Respondent: 
 California
Decided By: 
 Warren Court (1965-1967)
Opinion: 
 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
Argued: 
 Monday, April 25, 1966
Decided: 
 Monday, June 20, 1966
Issues: 
 Criminal Procedure, Self-Incrimination
Schmerber v. California
348 U.S. 757 (1966)

Facts: Appellant was involved in an accident and he was


taken to the hospital by the police officer where a blood
sample was withdrawn to test for his blood alcohol level. 
Appellant objected to the test and now claims that the blood
sample violated his 4th, 5th and 6th Amendment rights (only
4thand 5th for our purposes).

Procedure:  The Appellate Department of California Superior


Court affirmed appellant’s conviction.

Issue:  Did the withdrawing of the blood sample violate


appellant’s 5th Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination?  Did it violate his 4thAmendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures?

Holding:  No, No

Rationale:  The Court held that the blood test did not
violate the 5th Amendment because this Amendment protects
only against compulsion to give testimonial or communicative
evidence and not physical evidence as is involved in this
case.  The Court further held that the blood test did not
violate the 4th Amendment.  The 4th Amendment clearly
protects the rights of people to be securing in “their
person”.  But in this case, the officer smelled alcohol and
observed that the appellant’s eyes were bloodshot, watery
and had a glassy appearance.  Furthermore, the officer had
the reasonable fear that the evidence will be lost if he
goes out to seek a search warrant.  Therefore, the blood
test was an appropriate measure conducted in a reasonable
manner.

GILBERT V. CALIFORNIA, 388 U. S. 263 (1967)


U.S. Supreme Court

Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967)

Gilbert v. California

No. 223

Argued February 15-16, 1967

Decided June 12, 1967

388 U.S. 263

Syllabus

Petitioner was convicted of armed robbery and the murder of


a police officer. There were separate guilt and penalty
stages of the trial before the same jury, which rendered a
guilty verdict and imposed the death penalty. Petitioner
alleges constitutional errors in the admission of testimony
of some of the witnesses that they had also identified him
at a lineup, which occurred 16 days after his indictment and
after appointment of counsel, who was not notified, and in
in-court identifications of other witnesses present at that
lineup; in the admission of handwriting exemplars taken from
him after arrest, and in the admission of a codefendant's
out-of-court statements mentioning petitioner's part in the
crimes, which statements were held to have been improperly
admitted against the codefendant on the latter's appeal.
Additionally, he alleges violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights by police seizure of photographs of him from his
locked apartment after a warrantless entry, and the
admission of testimony identifying him from these
photographs.
Held:

1. The taking of handwriting exemplars did not violate


petitioner's constitutional rights. Pp. 388 U. S. 265-267.

(a) The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination


reaches compulsory communications, but a mere handwriting
exemplar, in contrast with the content of what is written,
is an identifying physical characteristic outside its
protection. Pp. 388 U. S. 266-267.

(b) The taking of the exemplars was not a "critical" stage


of the criminal proceedings entitling petitioner to the
assistance of counsel; there is minimal risk that the
absence of counsel might derogate from his right to a fair
trial. P. 388 U. S. 267.

2. Petitioner's request for reconsideration of Delli Paoli


v. United States, 352 U. S. 232(where the Court held that
appropriate instructions to the jury would suffice to
prevent prejudice to a defendant from references to him in a
codefendant's statement) in connection with his
codefendant's statements, need not be considered in view of
the California Supreme Court's holding rejecting the Delli
Paoli rationale, but finding that any error to petitioner by
the admission of the statements was harmless. Pp. 388 U. S.
267-268.

Page 388 U. S. 264

3. A closer examination of the record than was possible when


certiorari was granted reveals that the facts with respect
to the search and seizure claim are not sufficiently clear
to permit resolution of that question, and certiorari on
this issue is vacated as improvidently granted. P. 388 U. S.
269.

4. The admission of the in-court identifications of


petitioner without first determining that they were not
tainted by the illegal lineup procedure but were of
independent origin was constitutional error. United States
v. Wade, ante, p. 388 U. S. 218. Pp. 388 U. S. 269-274.

(a) Since the record does not permit an informed judgment


whether the in-court identifications at the two stages of
the trial had an independent source, petitioner is entitled
only to a vacation of his conviction, pending proceedings in
California courts allowing the State to establish that the
in-court identifications had an independent source or that
their introduction in evidence was harmless error. P. 388 U.
S. 272.

(b) With respect to testimony of witnesses that they


identified petitioner at the lineup, which is a direct
result of an illegal procedure, the State is not entitled to
show that such testimony had an independent source, but the
California courts must, unless "able to declare a belief
that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt," grant
petitioner a new trial if such testimony was at the guilt
stage, or grant appropriate relief if it was at the penalty
stage. Pp. 388 U. S. 272-274.

63 Cal.2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, vacated and remanded.

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