TAXATION
DANILO A. LIHAYLIHAY, Petitioner
vs.
THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES ROBERTO C. TAN, SECRETARY
OF FINANCE MARGARITO B. TEVES, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, AND
THE GOVERNOR OF BANG KO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP),
Respondent
G.R. No. 192223, JULY 23, 2018
SUMMARY: The grant of an informer's reward for the discovery, conviction,
and punishment of tax offenses is a discretionary quasi-judicial matter that
cannot be the subject of a writ of mandamus. It is not a legally mandated
ministerial duty. This reward cannot be given to a person who only makes
sweeping averments about undisclosed wealth, rather than specific tax
offenses, and who fails to show that the information which he or she
supplied was the undiscovered pivotal cause for the revelation of a tax
offense, the conviction and/or punishment of the persons liable, and an
actual recovery made by the State. Indiscriminate, expendable information
negates a clear legal right and further impugns the propriety of issuing a writ
of mandamus.
FACTS: Lihaylihay wrote to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(President Macapagal-Arroyo), insisting on the need to recover the Marcos'
wealth that he identified and his corresponding entitlement to an informer's
reward. Acting on Lihaylihay's letter, Assistant Executive Secretary Lynn
Danao-Moreno referred the matter to the Presidential Commission on Good
Government,which eventually referred the matter to the Department of
Finance.
Lihaylihay wrote to then Department of Finance Secretary Teves on August
11, 2009, reiterating his entitlement to an informer's reward.12 On
September 1, 2009, Lihaylihay wrote to both Secretary Teves and Treasurer
Tan, again insisting on his entitlement to an informer's reward.13
On May 31, 2010, without waiting for Secretary Teves' and Treasurer Tan's
official actions on his letters, Lihaylihay filed the present Petition, dubbed a
Petition for "Mandamus and Damages, with a Prayer for a Writ of
Garnishment." Insisting on his entitlement to informer's rewards, he prays
that Treasurer Tan and Secretary Teves be ordered to deliver to him the
amount of P11,875,000,000,000.00; that the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources be ordered to transfer to him several government lands;
and that the Governor of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas be ordered to garnish
in his favor P50,000,000,000.00 worth of jewelry recovered from former
First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Danilo A. Lihaylihay is entitled to the
delivery to him of proceeds and properties representing 25% informer's
reward pursuant to Section 1 of Republic Act No. 2338
RULING: No. The grant of informer's rewards under Section 282 of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended, is further subject to
the guidelines of Revenue Regulations No. 016-10, Section 16 of which
outlines the procedure for processing claims for informer's reward:
Section 16. Claims for Informer's Reward. -
The Informer's Claim for Reward shall be filed with the Prosecution
Division at the BIR National Office or with the Legal Division, Revenue
Regional Office, as the case may be.
Claims for rewards shall be filed within three (3) years from the date
of actual payment, recovery or collection of revenues, surcharges and
fees, and/or the imposition of any fine or penalty or the actual
collection of a compromise amount, in case of amicable settlement.
Under Section 282 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as
amended, an information given by an informer shall merit a reward only
when it satisfies certain formal and qualitative parameters. As a matter of
form and procedure, that information must be voluntarily given, definite,
and sworn to. Qualitatively, that information must be novel and,
subsequently, prove itself effective.
Information is novel when it is "not yet in the possession of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue" and "not refer[ring] to a case already pending or
previously investigated or examined." Information has shown itself to be
effective not only when it leads "to the discovery of frauds upon the internal
revenue laws or violations of any of [its] provisions," but also when that
discovery in turn enables "the recovery of revenues, surcharges and fees
and/or the conviction of the guilty party and/or the imposition of any of the
fine or penalty." In lieu of enabling the conviction of the guilty party and the
imposition of fines or penalties, information is also effective when the
discovery of tax offenses leads the offender to offer "to compromise the
violation." A mere offer, however, is not enough; it must have actually been
accepted and collected. Regardless of whether a compromise or conviction
ensues, actual recovery is indispensable: "should no revenue, surcharges or
fees be actually recovered or collected, such person shall not be entitled to a
reward."
POLITICAL LAW
HEIRS OF ELIZA Q. ZOLETA, NAMELY: SERGIO RENATO Q. ZOLETA,
A.K.A., CARLOS ZOLETA, VENANCIO Q. ZOLETA, AND MILAGROS Q.
ZOLETA-GARCIA, Petitioners, vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD,
respondents.
G.R. No. 205128, August 09, 2017
SUMMARY: A perceived abuse cannot be cured by an abuse. Administrative
agencies, such as the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), are not courts of law exercising judicial power. The power to issue
writs of certiorari is an incident of judicial review. Thus, administrative
agencies may not issue writs of certiorari to annul acts of officers or state
organs even when they exercise supervisory authority over these officers or
organs.
FACTS: Petitioner Eliza Zoleta (Zoleta) filed a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 prayingthat judgment be rendered directing
respondent Department of Agrarian Reform AdjudicationBoard (DARAB) to
dismiss the petition for certiorari filed before it by respondent Land Bank of
thePhilippines.Zoleta voluntarily offered for sale her land to the government under
the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Unsatisfied with Landbank’s valuation, the
case was transferred to the Office of Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(RARAD) which conducted asummary administrative proceeding. Zoleta filed
a Motion for Execution of Judgment before theRARAD, which was granted
and a writ of execution was issued. Landbank filed before DARAB a petition
for certiorari on the ground of grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction on the part of RARAD. The DARAB grantedLand
Bank's petition for certiorari and "annulled" the Writ of Execution. Zoleta,
appealed to the CA alleging that DARAB exceeded its authority when it
granted Landbank's petition. The CA held that DARAB's actions were granted by its
general "supervisory authority" and appellate jurisdiction over rulings of
RARAD.
ISSUE:Whether or not administrative agencies, like DARAB, can issue
a writs of certiorari
RULING: No, jurisprudence has settled that DARAB possesses no power
to issue writs of certiorari. Administrative agencies are part of the executive
branch of the government. Due to their highly specialized nature, they are
not only vested executive powers but also with quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial powers. However, the basic nature of the certiorari power as an incident
of judicial review — an exercise which must be limited to judicial questions
that are beyond the competence of administrative agencies — necessarily
means that administrative agencies have no certiorari powers. Determining
whether an act of an officer or state organ exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial powers was made without or in excess of jurisdiction demands an
examination of the law delimiting that officer's or organ's jurisdiction. It is an
exercise in legal interpretation. It is an exercise that only courts, and
not administrative agencies, are competent to engage. As an administrative
agency exercising quasi-judicial but not consummate judicial power, DARAB
is inherently incapable of issuing writs of certiorari.
LABOR LAW
CELSO F. PASCUAL, SR. AND SERAFIN
TERENCIO, Petitioners, v. CANIOGAN CREDIT AND DEVELOPMENT
COOPERATIVE, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD,
JOSE ANTONIO R. LEE, ATTY. VENANCIO C. REYES, JR., AND NESTOR
P. TINIO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 172980, July 22, 2015
SUMMARY: An appeal of the outright dismissal of a petition for certiorari
against an interlocutory order of a lower court becomes moot and academic
where, during its pendency, judgment on the merits has been rendered in
the main case and has become final and executory. An intra-cooperative
dispute between two officers on one hand and the Board of Directors on the
other falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts, not of the Labor
Arbiter.
FACTS: Petitioners Celso F. Pascual, Sr. and Serafin Terencio were
appointed by the former Board of Directors of Caniogan Credit and
Development Cooperative (CCDC) to act as the cooperative's General
Manager and Collection Manager, respectively, from start of operations until
they reach the compulsory age of retirement of 65.
Despite their retirement on January 9, 1997 and on March 2003, Pascual
continued to serve as General Manager and Terencio as Collection Manager
of CCDC.
On August 13, 2005, the Board of Directors of CCDC passed Resolution Nos.
05-08-127 and 05-08-128, terminating Pascual's and Terencio's services and
declaring that they should serve only until September 30, 2005 and October
15, 2005, respectively. Despite the lapse of these periods given, Pascual and
Terencio refused to vacate their positions. On November 29, 2005, CCDC
and Atty. Venancio Reyes, Jr., the newly appointed General Manager, filed a
Complaint for Injunction with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan. The Complaint was raffled to Branch 12. The Regional
Trial Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Pascual and
Terencio for a period of 20 days from performing the functions of their
offices.
Pascual and Terencio filed a Motion to Dismiss with prayer to defer all
proceedings. They questioned the Regional Trial Court's jurisdiction because
the case allegedly involves a labor dispute in the guise of an injunction.
CCDC filed an Ex Parte Motion to drop Atty. Venancio Reyes, Jr. as party
plaintiff and a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to admit the attached
complaint-in-intervention of Nestor P. Tinio as the newly appointed Acting
General Manager in place of Atty. Venancio Reyes, Jr.
At the hearing of the Motion to Dismiss, counsel for both parties requested
that they be allowed to file their respective oppositions or comments on the
Motions filed. It was then agreed in open court that the running of the 20-
day period of the temporary restraining order would be interrupted and
continued only upon resolution of the Motion to Dismiss. The court also
declared that the Motion to Dismiss should be considered submitted for
resolution upon simultaneous filing of the parties of their respective
memoranda. The parties filed their memoranda and their respective
oppositions/comments to the other motions filed.
Pascual and Terencio also filed a Very Urgent Manifestation with prayer for
the immediate lifting of the temporary restraining order, alleging that the
continued implementation of the order would not help CCDC but would cause
its further degradation and deterioration.
On January 10, 2006, finding that the case involves a dispute between the
Board of Directors and officers of CCDC, the Regional Trial Court issued the
Order referring the case and all its records to the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for re-raffle to branches specifically assigned
to hear and decide intra-corporate disputes. Allegedly without notice to
Pascual and Terencio, the case was re-raffled to Branch 79, and an order
was issued in open court during the hearing on January 30, 2006 to the
effect that pending incidents were deemed submitted for resolution.
However, Branch 79 issued another Order returning the case to Branch 12.
It reasoned that the case is not an intra-corporate dispute but an intra-
cooperative one. The Regional Trial Court issued the Order denying the
Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit because the case involves an intra-
cooperative dispute. However, both the Ex Parte Motion to drop Atty.
Venancio Reyes, Jr. as plaintiff and the Motion for Leave to Intervene were
granted. Finally, the trial court deferred action on Pascual and Terencio's
Very Urgent Motion to lift the temporary restraining order.
Pascual and Terencio challenged the Order before the Court of Appeals
through a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for an issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction and lifting of the
temporary restraining order issued against them.
The Petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals Ninth Division in its
Resolution which held that it was premature because: (1) petitioners did not
file a motion for reconsideration of the impugned Regional Trial Court Order;
and (2) the case involved an intra-cooperative dispute, and there was no
showing that prior recourse to the modes of settlement required in Article
121 of Republic Act No. 6938 and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6939 were
resorted to before seeking judicial relief and intervention. Pascual and
Terencio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was likewise denied by the
Court of Appeals in its Resolution. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: whether the case is one of illegal dismissal of an employee which is
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter or of the National
Labor Relations Commission, not the trial court.
HELD: No. This court found no reversible error in the Court of Appeals'
ruling that the case involved an intra-cooperative dispute which falls within
the jurisdiction of the regular courts. There is evidently no employment
relationship between the parties.
The Court cited In Tabang v. NLRC:
[A]n "office" is created by the charter of the corporation and the
officer is elected by the directors or stockholders. On the other hand,
an "employee" usually occupies no office and generally is employed
not by action of the directors or stockholders but by the managing
officer of the corporation who also determines the compensation to be
paid to such employee.
Here, petitioners were officers of respondent CCDC. They were appointed
directly by the former Board of Directors according to the by-laws of
respondent CCDC, and their salaries were likewise set by the same Board.36
Petitioners do not refute this fact. Their termination or removal is clearly an
intra-cooperative matter. It involves a dispute within the cooperative
between two officers on one hand and the Board of Directors on the other.
Petitioners clarify that they do not take issue on the power of the Board of
Directors to remove them. Rather, they dispute the "manner, cause[,] and
legality" of their removal from their respective offices as General Manager
and Collection Manager. Even so, the Court holds that an officer's dismissal
is a matter that comes with the conduct and management of the affairs of a
cooperative and/or an intra-cooperative controversy, and that nature is not
altered by reason or wisdom that the Board of Directors may have in taking
such action. Accordingly, the case a quo is not a labor dispute requiring the
expertise of the Labor Arbiter or of the National Labor Relations Commission.
It is an intra-cooperative dispute that is within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court, pursuant to Section 121 of Republic Act No. 6938,
which expressly provides:
ARTICLE 121. Settlement of Disputes. — Disputes among
members, officers, directors, and committee members, and intra-
cooperative disputes shall, as far as practicable,' be settled amicably in
accordance with the conciliation or mediation mechanisms embodied in
the by-laws of the cooperative, and in applicable laws.
Should such a conciliation/mediation proceeding fail, the matter shall be
settled in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Likewise, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6939 provides:
SECTION 8. Mediation and Conciliation. — Upon request of either
or both parties, the Authority shall mediate and conciliate disputes
within a cooperative or between cooperatives: Provided, That if no
mediation or conciliation succeeds within three (3) months from
request thereof, a certificate of non-resolution shall be issued by the
commission prior to the filing of appropriate action before the proper
courts. (Emphasis supplied) Besides, petitioners' participation in the
mediation/conciliation proceedings before the Cooperative
Development Authority constitutes their implied acceptance that the
dispute is, indeed, an intra-cooperative one.
CIVIL LAW
CEZAR YATCO REAL ESTATE SERVICES, INC., GRD PROPERTY
RESOURCES, INC., GAMALIEL PASCUAL, JR., MA. LOURDES LIMJAP
PASCUAL, AND AURORA PIJUAN, Petitioners, v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE
ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT ANTONIO
GUERRERO, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 211780, November 21, 2018
SUMMARY: In contract interpretation, courts must first determine whether
a stipulation is ambiguous or susceptible of multiple interpretations. If no
ambiguity is found and the terms of the contract clearly reflect the intentions
of the contracting parties, the stipulation will be interpreted as it is written.
FACTS: Sometime in the 1950s, Makati Development Corporation developed
Bel-Air Village, a residential subdivision in Makati City, and sold lots to
interested buyers. The contracts of sale between Makati Development
Corporation and the lot buyers in Bel-Air Village were subjected to specific
conditions and easements embodied in the Deed Restrictions, which had a
lifetime of 50 years, or from January 15, 1957 to January 15, 2007.
Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (Association), Bel-Air Village's homeowners'
association, was constituted as a non-stock, non-profit association to
promote its members' best interests. Under its by-laws, all lot owners of Bel-
Air Village automatically became members of the Association.
Sometime in 1998, the Association created the 2007 Committee to assess
and propose amendments to the Deed Restrictions, in anticipation of its
impending expiration. The 2007 Committee circulated questionnaires among
the homeowners and held meetings to gather input on the proposed
amendments.
In June 2006, the Association had its annual meeting and discussed the
proposed amendments and revisions to the Deed Restrictions.
In September 2006, the Association circulated copies of the proposed
amendments and revisions to the homeowners.
In October 2006, in a special board meeting, the Association passed a board
resolution calling for the Deed Restrictions' amendment.12 The first of the 10
proposed amendments suggested extending the Deed Restrictions' term to
August 23, 2032.
The Association agreed to set on December 12, 2006 a special membership
meeting to submit the board resolution to the homeowners for their
ratification.
On December 12, 2006, 718 members out of a total of 934 members in good
standing and eligible to vote, attended the special membership meeting. Of
the votes cast, 72% chose to extend the period of the Deed Restrictions, 3%
rejected the extension, and 25% abstained.
On February 8, 2007, Cezar Yatco Real Estate Services, GRD Property
Resources, Masterman Land Corporation (Masterman), Gamaliel, Lourdes,
Sofia Limjap (Sofia), and Pijuan (collectively, the complainants), who had all
voted against the Deed Restrictions' extension, filed a Verified Complaint
before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.
In their Verified Complaint, the complainants alleged that the Deed
Restrictions was only effective for 50 years, or from January 15, 1957 to
January 15, 2007, as it did not provide for its extension. Thus, the
complainants contended that the Association's resolution extending the Deed
Restrictions' effectivity was illegally and arbitrarily approved. They also
averred that no quorum was reached in the December 12, 2006 special
membership meeting.
Finally, the complainants claimed that they had individually resigned from
the Association; however, they feared that the latter would force them to
keep their membership, abide by its illegal regulations, and extract
assessments, which would be considered as liens on their properties.
In its Opposition, the Association maintained that the period of effectivity
was an integral part of the Deed Restrictions as showed by its plain wording.
Thus, it may be extended upon a majority vote of the Association's
members.21 It further denied that the special membership meeting lacked
quorum, pointing out that proxies need not be notarized to be valid.
In its May 21, 2008 Decision, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
Expanded National Capital Region Field Office (Regional Field Office)
declared the extension of the Deed Restrictions as null and void.
The Regional Field Office held that the 50-year term of the Deed Restrictions
could not be classified as a restriction since it merely stated the Deed's
effectivity; hence, the Association's members could not validly amend the
term of effectivity.
The Regional Field Office also declared that the proxies submitted for the
special membership meeting involved the creation of real rights; thus, they
should have been notarized.
The Association appealed this Decision to the Board of Commissioners of the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, to which the complainants filed
their Counter-Memorandum.
In its December 9, 2008 Decision, the Board of Commissioners granted the
appeal, reversing the Regional Field Office May 21, 2008 Decision. It
declared that the Association may extend the Deed Restrictions by a
majority vote
Complainants moved for reconsideration, but their motion was denied in the
Board of Commissioners' January 28, 2009 Resolution. Undaunted, they filed
an Appeal before the Office of the President, to which the Association filed a
Reply.
In its December 29, 2009 Decision, the Office of the President reversed the
Board of Commissioners' December 9, 2008 Decision and January 28, 2009
Resolution, and reinstated the Regional Field Office May 21, 2008 Decision.
It held that the Term of Restrictions of the Deed Restrictions may not be
increased, as the 50-year term was not one of the restrictions that may be
amended by a majority vote of the Association's members
On the issue of proxies, the Office of the President ruled that the Civil Code
should be applied suppletorily to the Corporation Code; thus, the proxy
should be in a public document when the proxy issued is for the conveyance
of real rights over immovable property. In addition, it declared that the
complainants could not be compelled to continue with their membership in
the Association.
The Association moved for reconsideration, which was granted by the Office
of the President in its May 19, 2011 Resolution.
In reversing itself, the Office of the President conceded that the 50- year
term was also subject to the Association's amendment upon a majority vote
of its members, as it was an essential element of the Deed Restrictions.
The Office of the President also noted that Ayala Land, Inc. (Ayala Land),
Makati Development Corporation's successor-in-interest, confirmed that the
50-year term was part of the Deed Restrictions.
The Office of the President swept aside complainants' argument that their
forced membership in the Association violated their right to freedom of
association. It proclaimed that the liberties guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights may only be invoked against the State, not against private
individuals.
Finally, the Office of the President also reversed its earlier ruling that the
lack of notarization of proxies meant that no quorum had been reached in
the special membership meeting. It held that the Corporation Code, a special
law, prevailed over the Civil Code, a general law, and that the former states
that private corporations' by-laws may provide "the form of proxies of
stockholders and members and the manner of voting them."
The Office of the President declared that the Association's by-laws did not
provide a proxy form; thus, the Corporation Code should be applied
suppletorily.
Complainants moved for reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the
Office of the President's August 9, 2011 Resolution.
They filed an Appeal; however, it was denied by the Court of Appeals.
In its September 5, 2013 Decision, the Court of Appeals confirmed that the
Association had the power to extend the Deed Restriction's effectivity, as the
50-year term was an integral part of the Deed Restrictions and was included
among the restrictions that may be amended by majority vote of the
Association members.
The Court of Appeals also adopted the Office of the President's disquisition
on proxies. It held that the by-laws governed the required formality of a
proxy, and that proxies need not be embodied in a public document for their
validity. It further affirmed that a quorum of the Association's members
voted for the extension of the term of restrictions.
Undaunted, complainants filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was
denied in the Court of Appeals March 17, 2014 Resolution. Hence, this
Petition.
ISSUE: whether or not private respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.'s
members can, by majority vote, extend the Deed Restrictions' term of
effectivity
HELD: YES. The cardinal rule84 in contract interpretation is found in Article
1370 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning
of its stipulations shall control.
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the
parties, the latter shall prevail over the former.
Petitioners' interpretation of limiting amendments to so-called restrictions,
then declaring that the term is not a restriction, cannot be upheld. A plain
reading of Part VI, or the Term of Restrictions, would show that the term of
effectivity was not set in stone, and that private respondent was empowered
to cancel it altogether, through its members' majority vote. The contracting
parties' clear intention was to give the lot owners freedom to establish rules
and regulations, under which they could best use their properties and
protect their interests. This is apparent from the second sentence:
"However, the Association may, from time to time, add new ones, amend or
abolish particular restrictions [or] parts thereof by majority rule."
This freedom granted to private respondent was confirmed by Ayala Land,
Makati Development Corporation's successor-in-interest, when it stated that
it was never its intention to prohibit the lot owners from extending the term
of the Deed Restrictions.
The Court of Appeals thus correctly ruled that the term of restrictions was
also subject to amendment by a majority vote of private respondent's
members.
