WBstudy TaskC42 Report Finalv07b Formatted
WBstudy TaskC42 Report Finalv07b Formatted
(ISSUE 07A)
14/12/2017
TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
Contents
1 Executive Summary ................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Generation .................................................................................................................. 7
1.2 Transmission.............................................................................................................. 12
1.3 Control ....................................................................................................................... 14
1.4 Medium Voltage ........................................................................................................ 16
1.5 Distribution................................................................................................................ 17
2 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 19
3 Generation .............................................................................................................. 24
3.1 Current status............................................................................................................ 24
3.1.1 Overview ............................................................................................................ 24
3.1.2 Overdue maintenance ....................................................................................... 33
3.1.3 Fuel supply ......................................................................................................... 39
3.1.4 Third party power stations ................................................................................ 40
3.1.5 Generation expansion ........................................................................................ 41
3.2 Energy balance .......................................................................................................... 47
3.3 Points of concern....................................................................................................... 50
3.3.1 Immediate concerns .......................................................................................... 50
3.3.2 Longer term concerns ........................................................................................ 51
3.4 Generation action plan.............................................................................................. 52
4 Transmission ........................................................................................................... 56
4.1 Current status............................................................................................................ 56
4.2 Transmission substations .......................................................................................... 57
4.3 Overhead transmission lines ..................................................................................... 63
4.4 Underground transmission cables ............................................................................ 66
4.5 Points of concern....................................................................................................... 67
4.5.1 Immediate concerns .......................................................................................... 67
4.5.2 Longer term concerns ........................................................................................ 67
4.6 Transmission action plan........................................................................................... 69
5 Control .................................................................................................................... 74
5.1 Current status............................................................................................................ 74
5.1.1 Overview ............................................................................................................ 74
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1 Executive Summary
Libya has invested heavily in its electricity infrastructure over the past decades. Although
these investments have been directly funded by the Libyan government through its
development budget, GECOL, the General Electricity Company of Libya and its sole national
power utility, has been the key player planning and orchestrating these investments. The
combination of an oil rich nation with a policy of universal electrification and a power utility
with stringent criteria on the expansion planning of its system, the result has been a robust
power transmission network and ambitious undertaking of generation plant construction
projects.
Since the events of February 17, 2011, GECOL’s fortunes have taken a turn for the worse,
and this is reflected in the operation of its core business units and of the Libyan electricity
infrastructure. Insecurity and political instability have led to a halt in most projects,
successive assaults on GECOL assets and staff, a large increase in thefts, especially of
conductors and electrical apparatus, and a significant decline in GECOL’s ability to carry out
maintenance activities. The result has been loss of some infrastructure assets, a fall in the
performance of the power network, and a severe shortage in power generation capacity
causing long power cuts in many parts of the country, especially during the summer and
winter peak load periods.
In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say that only the redundancies built into the Libyan
power network and the resilient specifications and design of its systems and components,
coupled with what can only be described as heroic efforts by many of GECOL’s workforce,
has prevented the collapse of the power network and ensured continued supply of power to
the majority of the population the majority of the time.
This report aims to assess GECOL power system assets, to determine their current
capabilities and requirements, and to propose an action plan to GECOL on how to recover
and improve its technical activities and services. This will be done with a focus on each of
GECOL’s technical business units.
Regardless of what is presented in this report, we should point out that GECOL is not
standing still. GECOL is itself making great efforts to resolve its many problems and to deal
with the obstacles and difficulties the current Libyan political and security situation has
created. GECOL has also continued to expand and grow its power network despite the
cessation of most other project activities in Libya and general financing difficulties.
This report does not purport to be an exhaustive analysis of every aspect of GECOL’s
technical activities, nor is it re-inventing the wheel. It has only been possible to collect the
data and information in this report through the strong and total support and assistance of
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GECOL’s management and staff, whom we thank profusely. Thus, the details and results of
the study are not new material and are already well known to GECOL and its management,
who are working hard at resolving the issues discussed. This report attempts to present new
perspectives on these issues, to highlight priorities and some of the urgent actions needed,
and to help GECOL in the decision-making process.
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1.1 Generation
GECOL has some 26 power stations containing 85 generating units of various sizes,
technologies and ages distributed around Libya, with the majority along Libya’s
Mediterranean coastline. GECOL’s official installed capacity as of 2017 is 10.238GW. While
the power available to supply the power network varies continuously in line with external
and internal constraints and maintenance and other works, at the time of this study up to
5.35GW was GECOL’s available power, representing 52% of installed capacity.
In this report we consider at least 19 units of GECOL’s 85 have reached retirement age and
should be decommissioned. Excluding these units, with an installed capacity of 483MW and
which have generally contributed no power to the Libyan system over the past years, would
leave GECOL with an installed capacity of 9.755GW and the realistic available capacity would
become 54.8% of the installed.
• The generation capacity is heavily tilted towards simple cycle and combined cycle
gas turbine units, representing 86% of the installed capacity and 94% of the available
capacity. In fact, until the new Gulf power station’s first unit came online in 2014,
GECOL had not constructed a new steam power station since 1985.
• There is no power generation in the Southern region, causing voltage instabilities
and prolonged power outages compared with other parts of Libya. The new Ubari
power plant will be an important first step in resolving these problems.
• Generation in the eastern region is limited to two aging steam power plants, while
the Benghazi Region has one large power generating complex at Benghazi North.
Between 2015 and 2016, during which the Eastern and Western power networks
were separated due to damage to overhead lines, the Eastern power network
suffered from successive blackouts because of its dependence on Benghazi North as
the single main source of electricity supply. Recently a contract was signed for four
new gas turbine units in Tobruk, and that will help to alleviate this dependence.
• Between 2010 and 2016, weighted average generating unit availability has fallen
from 78.3% to 66.0%, and the available capacity has fallen from 64.6% to 53.7% of
installed capacity, while demand has continued to grow at around 4% per year.
• Between 2010 and 2016 the thermal efficiency of GECOL’s power generation has
increased by 7.3%, mainly due to the introduction of steam units associated with the
combined cycle gas turbine units at Benghazi North and Misurata, and increase
operation of generation on natural gas instead of liquid fuel. The latter grew from
41% of energy produced coming from gas in 2010 to 80% in 2016.
• Despite all the difficulties of Libya’s project environment since 2011, GECOL has
commissioned 14 new generating units between 2012 and August 2017, total an
addition of 2.295GW to the installed capacity.
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The main concerns we have identified constraining optimal operation of GECOL’s generation
assets and causing the current power shortages in the Libyan power network include:
Figure (1-1) shows the growing backlog in major overhauls GECOL is facing.
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2. Fuel supply: Almost all GECOL’s power stations have been adversely affected by the
supply of fuel in one way or another. Fuel affects power production by several
means. Most critical is the very availability of fuel. Insecurity and instability in Libya
have led to fuel sources supplying power plants being repeatedly cut off. However,
this is only one aspect of the supply of fuel. Another is the growing dependence of
power plants on gas as the primary operating fuel. Both the gas pipeline
infrastructure and the production of natural gas are unable to keep up with
demands. In several cases smaller or less important power generating units are being
taken off line to ensure there is sufficient natural gas or sufficient pressure to keep
the larger and more important units in operation. Similarly, less critical or less
sensitive units are being switched to LFO operation so the more critical or sensitive
units can operate on gas. This is despite the higher direct and indirect costs of using
LFO. Several of the plants forced to operate on LFO do not have pipelines for the
liquid fuel and have to be supplied by trucks, which is a logistical difficulty in itself.
We estimate that GECOL regularly loses at least 600MW of its installed capacity
because of constraints imposed by the supply of fuel. If GECOL did recover all
capacity derated or put out of service because of maintenance problems, it is
questionable if sufficient supplies of fuel could be secured to operate them all at full
rating.
3. Third party power plants: There are two power stations owned by third parties that
are connected to GECOL’s power grid. One is a steam power plant located outside
Misurata and owned by the Libyan Iron and Steel Company with 504MW installed
capacity, and the second a gas turbine plant located in the Sarir area and owned by
the Man-made River Project Authority, with an installed capacity of 90MW.Both
plants are old and require major overhauls. The capacity factor for the Misurata
plant has been only 12.5% in both 2015 and 2016 while the Sarir plant has been a
paltry 2.9% and 2.0% respectively. Since neither owner has taken to steps to
overhaul and maintain the units of their power stations, it might be to GECOL’s
advantage to arrange the overhauls of at least 2 to 3 of the units at the Misurata
plant, thereby adding up to 250MW to the network available capacity.
4. Generation expansion plan: GECOL last carried out a major review of its load
forecasts and generation expansion plans in 2007. Since then many factors have
changed in the Libyan context. In addition, circumstances in Libya have led to several
plants being contracted over the past years outside the original generation planning.
It is therefore critical that GECOL carry out new load forecast studies and develop a
new generation expansion plan as soon as possible. In line with currently expected
new generation and the original expansion plan, we have come up with a worst case
and best case scenario for the future growth of the GECOL’s generation and load
expectations to 2030, as shown in Figures (1-2) and (1-3). We can see that in the
worst case (Figure 1-2), with no additional generation other than what has currently
been approved in Tripoli West, Tripoli East, Misurata and Tobruk, and completion of
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Ubari and Gulf power stations, as well as resolving the backlog of maintenance by
2024, power shortages will be resolved by 2021, but will come back between 2022
and 2026. This confirms the need for GECOL to proceed with planning and then
contracting for new generating capacity, in addition to being aggressive in clearing
its backlog of generation maintenance requirements. In the best case scenario
(Figure 1-3), with the maintenance backlog cleared by 2019 and contracting for new
generation by the early 2020’s, GECOL is able to meet the highest forecast load
growth rate, but if no new generation is contracted, GECOL will begin facing new
power shortages between 2024 and 2027 depending on the actual load growth rate.
Figure (1-2): Available power generation against load forecasts – worst case
Figure (1-3): Available power generation against load forecasts – best case
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5. Staff development: GECOL has introduced a large number of new power generating
units, and more are planned and expected over the next 2 to 3 years. However
operations and maintenance staffing numbers in the Generation Department have
not grown in line, nor have sufficient numbers of staff been trained to work on the
new equipment coming into service. GECOL needs to implement a training program
to better prepare its O&M staff to work with the new generating units and to
develop a new generation of O&M personnel. Training should also focus on
increasing capacities for the expected growth in major overhauls and other
maintenance woks.
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1.2 Transmission
Libya has constructed a strong transmission system, with a 400kV backbone and 220kV main
grid. Stringent design criteria were used to ensure a sufficient level of redundancy. The
power of the transmission network was witnessed over the past seven years where, despite
a large number of lines being damaged by armed conflict and vandalism, the transmission
network has continued to be able to supply almost all load centers with their power
requirements.
Despite this resilience, the Transmission Department, like other business units in GECOL, is
suffering from the reduced budgets, from difficult and at times dangerous work conditions,
from scarcities in spare parts and equipment required to maintain key elements of the
transmission system, and from delays in completing planned additions to the infrastructure
such as new substations, overhead lines and cables.
1. Damaged and old substations and switchgear: GECOL has 1 out of 14 400kV
substations and 5 out of 86 220kV substation out of service, mostly due to damage
by armed conflict and vandalism. GECOL also has some 18 220kV substations that
require old 220kV, 66kV and/or 30kV switchgear to be replaced. The absence or age
of these substations poses a threat to the stable and reliable operation of the power
network. In addition, GECOL has a number of damaged 220kV power transformers.
In addition to replacement or repair, the reason for failure of these transformers
must be investigated to help prevent similar failures from happening in the future.
We have also noted that substation battery systems do not last for their expected
lifetimes and suggest battery maintenance needs to be improved and expanded.
2. Overhead lines maintenance and cleaning: GECOL has several overhead lines still
damaged as a result of armed conflict in various parts of Libya, with most currently in
the Benghazi Region. GECOL has been successful in repairing most line damage
quickly after it happens, and a similar effort now needs to be made to repair the
remaining overhead lines not in service. From the 1990s, GECOL has also improved
the availability of its transmission overhead lines by instituting an annual cleaning
program for the line insulator strings. Over the past few years it has been more
difficult to carry out these annual cleaning works because of power network
constraints making it difficult to switch off lines. Local security concerns have also
been a factor in some cases. To maintain the transmission in a reliable working
condition the line cleaning efforts should resume. Overhead line teams need to be
equipped with the vehicles and equipment they need. In the longer term, GECOL can
also consider moving towards live line maintenance and cleaning of the overhead
lines.
3. Staff training and development: GECOL staff require additional training to deal with
key aspects of the transmission systems, such as new DCS systems in modern
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1.3 Control
GECOL has had control centers to monitor and control its generation plants and
transmission system since the 1970s. The modern GECOL control infrastructure includes a
National Control Center (NCC), two Regional Control Centers in Tripoli and Benghazi (TRCC
and BRCC respectively), and Distribution Control Centers (DCC’s) around the country.
By 2011, the NCC (based in Sirt with a backup in Tripoli) and TRCC were operational with full
functionality and the BRCC was in progress of being replaced with a new system to unify the
hardware and software base with the NCC and TRCC. A project was also underway to
establish 10 new DCC’s that would provide modern control facilities to the Medium Voltage
and Distribution networks.
During the events of 2011 the NCC in Sirt was put out of service. DCC buildings and
equipment were also damaged in several areas. The NCC moved to its back up system in
Tripoli.
Subsequent to 2011 the DCC project changed its focus to 5 of the original 10 control centers
in relatively advanced degrees of progress and which could still be put in service. The Tripoli
DCC was almost completely commissioned when work came to a stop again in 2014. Site
tests had also started in Zawia and were planned for Benghazi. Upgrades were also arranged
for the NCC and TRCC and commissioning tests for BRCC.
Currently, we consider the main points of concern in the Control area to include:
1. NCC and TRCC: The hardware and software systems are now over 10 years old and
need to urgently be upgraded. Network data at the control centers is very poor at
only 20%. A concerted effort must be made resolve the problems in the substations
and the communications network causing the deterioration in available data to the
control engineers, without which they are very constrained in their ability to manage
the power system. Particular effort must be made to repair the many fiber optics
that are damaged and that carry the data between the control centers and the
substations. The network is currently operating in a very stressed condition, and it is
important to provide some spinning reserve to add to system security and stability.
Also AGC functionality must be put back into operation. Finally, GECOL should
proceed with establishing a new backup control center for the NCC outside Tripoli.
2. BRCC: Control engineers at the BRCC must contend with two separate control
systems, an old one and a new one, neither of which is fully functional. It is therefore
important to complete and commission the new control system and shift all control
functions to it. Benghazi also suffers to similar data problems as the TRCC, with only
a third of substation visible to the SCADA system and much data missing, and a
similar plan of action is required to resolve the poor data situation. BRCC operators
must also regain their control functionality over network switchgear and not be
dependent on operators at each substation.
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3. DCC’s: Project works have stopped since 2014. Contractual problems may require
renegotiations or new contracts to be put in place, and GECOL should refocus on at
least completing the initial 5 distribution control centers.
4. Staff and control functionality development: It is critical for GECOL to resume a
project similar to that underway before 2011 with the French utility and consultant
RTE, to both develop its control staff capabilities and skills and to develop the
procedures, codes and regulations key in maintain a large and growing system such
as GECOL’s under control and coordinated.
5. Load growth: Despite Libya’s instability and financial difficulties, consumer load has
continued almost unrestrained at some 4% per year since 2011. GECOL should begin
instituting demand side management programs to limit the future growth, especially
when political and financial stability return and the economy begins to recover and
grow, otherwise GECOL will be hard pressed to construct new generation capacity to
keep up with the load demands.
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1. Rising fault rates of 66kV and 30kv feeders: While fault rates were falling up to 2010,
they began significantly increasing again since 2014. In particular fault rates of 30kV
cables seem to be especially high. There appear to be several reasons behind these
high fault rates, such us solidly earthed 30kV networks with the earthing resistors
bypassed, incorrect bonding and sheath earthing of the 30kV cables, and bad
handling and laying procedures during installations works of the cables.
2. Old substations and switchgear: The GECOL network includes old oil type circuit
breaker and some newer vacuum type switchgear for which spare parts are no
longer available, in total about 80 substations and 200 circuit breakers. These
equipment need to be replaced as soon as possible to maintain the reliability of
supply of the power system and safety of personnel of O&M personnel.
3. High transformer fault rates: Over 100 66kV and 30kV substation are operating with
one transformer because of failure of the second transformer. Several reasons have
been identified for these failures, including overvoltages during minimum load times
because automatic voltage regulation is not put in automatic mode to maintain
system voltage through the transformer on-load tap changers. Transformer oil is also
topped up or filled without being treated first, allowing humidity to enter the
transformer. Similarly the silica gel breathers may not be maintained to prevent
humidity entering through the conservators.
4. Large amounts of materials for new substations and overhead lines, part of 66kV and
30kV development contracts that have stopped, are lying in various stores subject to
poor storage conditions, vandalism and theft. If they are not utilized soon, their
value could be lost to GECOL for ever.
5. Skills development: Staff need additional training and development in the areas of
cable jointing and termination, DC supply systems and batteries, system and
equipment earthing, transformer and preventive maintenance, and implementation
and compliance with GECOL’s technical standards.
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1.5 Distribution
The GECOL Distribution system includes almost 95,000km of 11kV and LV lines and cables,
as well as 70,000 11/0.4kV transformers and 12,000 switching stations and package
substations or ring main units (RMUs). We have noted the following points of concern
relating to these networks:
1. High failure rates of ground mounted and pole mounted distribution transformers:
GECOL has amassed large numbers of faulty distribution transformers. These failures
have been due to multiple factors, including network overvoltages during minimum
load hours because AVR’s controlling on-load tap changers are left out of service or
in manual position, thereby not acting to maintain a stable network voltage,
overloaded transformers during peak load hours, poor ventilation of indoor
transformers, lighting and surge protection not installed or incorrectly installed for
outdoor transformers, unsafe and uncovered transformer bushings in many of the
older ground mounted indoor transformers, as well as poor transformer
maintenance and addition of untreated transformer oil. Set up of transformer repair
workshops will help clear the large collection of faulty transformers and reduce the
investments in new transformer supplies.
2. Old switchgear and ring main units, incorrectly installed equipment and modified
switchboards: Old oil type switchgear and ring main units have come to represent a
hazard to the safe and reliable operation of the distribution network and to
operating staff. These need to be replaced with new vacuum based equipment as
soon as possible. It has also been found that most ring main units are installed
without the earthfault alarm and indication apparatus or it is not put in service. This
results in repeated closures on to a fault as operations staff tries to identify the
faulty section of a ring. In many stations the low voltage switchboard has also been
modified, bypassing MCBs to avoid tripping of feeders subject to overloads. All these
result in faults to network equipment, degradation of the distribution system and
poor quality of supply to consumers.
3. High rate of serious and fatal accidents: The distribution department appears to have
the highest accident rates in GECOL, too many of them serious to fatal. It is clear that
there is ignorance of safe work procedures and compliance with safety rules. Staff
are also not equipped with the necessary personal protective equipment that would
help reduce the impact of accidents or prevent them. GECOL needs to work to instil
a safety culture in the company and to provide the equipment and tools necessary to
all staff, to renew its safety rules and ensure they are understood and complied with,
and to develop and communicate a strong safety policy.
4. Skills development: Staff need additional training and development in the areas of
DC supply systems and batteries, equipment earthing, transformer and preventive
maintenance, implementation and compliance with GECOL’s technical standards,
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and safe work procedures, risk assessment and mitigation and use of the correct
personal protective equipment for work environment.
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2 Introduction
GECOL, The General Electricity Company of Libya, is a vertically integrated utility, the sole
provider of electric power services in the country. The core business units of GECOL which
cover its main technical activities are represented in its administrative structure by five
General Departments: the Generation General Department, the Transmission General
Department, the Medium Voltage General Department, the Distribution General
Department, and the Control General Department.
Libya has invested heavily in its electricity infrastructure over the past decades. Although
these investments have been directly funded by the Libyan government through its
development budget, GECOL has been the key player planning and orchestrating these
investments. The combination of an oil rich nation with a policy of universal electrification
and a power utility with stringent criteria on the expansion planning of its system, the result
has been a robust power transmission network and ambitious undertaking of generation
plant construction projects.
On the other hand, the rapid growth of Libya’s population and expansion of its cities and
towns has made it more difficult for the distribution system to keep up with the needs of
the country. Despite large investments in equipment and networks, GECOL has not been
able to keep up with the demands for new supply connections and upgrades to the existing
networks as they no longer meet the requirements of their load centers.
Since the popular uprising of February 17, 2011, GECOL’s fortunes have taken a turn for the
worse, and this is reflected in the operation of its core business units and of the Libyan
electricity infrastructure. Insecurity and political instability have led to a halt in most
projects, successive assaults on GECOL assets and staff, a large increase in thefts, especially
of conductors and electrical apparatus, and a significant decline in GECOL’s ability to carry
out maintenance activities. The result has been loss of some infrastructure assets, a fall in
the performance of the power network, and a severe shortage in power generation capacity
causing long power cuts in many parts of the country, especially during the summer and
winter peak load periods.
The impact on Libyan electricity supply is reflected in the Global Competitiveness Reports
issued by the World Economic Forum (WEF). These annual reports assess the competitive
stance of nations through analysis of a multitude of factors, including quality of electricity
supply. Over the years, Libya’s electricity supply has been ranked 1:
1
The WEF Global Competitiveness Report assesses quality of electricity supply on the lack of fluctuations ad
lack of interruptions. Data was collected through surveys of businessmen in Libya. Libya was not included in
the 2011 report for lack of data and has not been included in the reports issued after 2014.
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In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say that only the redundancies built into the Libyan
power network and the resilient specifications and design of its systems and components,
coupled with what can only be described as heroic efforts by many of GECOL’s workforce,
has prevented the collapse of the power network and ensured continued supply of power to
the majority of the population the majority of the time.
At the same time, Libya has recognized deficiencies in its education system. Libya has one of
the highest literacy rates in the MENA region and among developing countries, but the
quality of education provided and the ability of graduates to meet the needs of potential
employers are inadequate. The latest World Economic Forum’s 2014 Global
Competitiveness Report has ranked Libya’s education system 144th out of 144 countries,
assigning it 1.9 points out of a possible 7 points. Historically, the highest Libya has scored
has been a rank of 121 and a score of 2.6 out of 7. GECOL is greatly overstaffed as a
company, but there are large deficiencies in the capable technical personnel necessary to
carry out the core business activities. GECOL has had to rely on its own training programs,
training as part of new infrastructure projects, and on-the-job training to develop its
technical staff, with inconsistent results. This is further compounded by the large geographic
area of Libya and over the whole of which GECOL must deliver its services.
This report aims to assess GECOL power system assets, to determine their current
capabilities and requirements, and to propose an action plan to GECOL on how to recover
and improve its technical activities and services. This will be done with a focus on each of
GECOL’s technical business units.
This report will focus on the current state of GECOL’s system and business units and looks
forward to what can be achieved. Historical data will be considered only in so far as it gives
perspective and understanding and helps plan the future development of GECOL.
Each of GECOL’s technical business units divides its activities into a different number and
distribution of geographic regions as is best suited to its functions. To provide unity to this
report, while deriving the benefits of regional division and allocation of assets and
operations, we have used the following geographic regions in our analysis of GECOL:
Western region: The area extending west along the coast from Greater Tripoli to the
Tunisian border and southwards to include the Nefousa (Western) Mountains. Major urban
areas include Zawiya, Gharyan and Ghadames.
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Tripoli region: The area covered by the Greater Tripoli Municipality. The main urban area is
Tripoli and its suburbs.
Central region: The area east of Greater Tripoli and extending along the coast to include the
Sirt Municipality up to the town of Ras Lanuf, and southwards to include the Houn
Municipality. The main urban areas are Khums, Misurata, Sirt, Beni Walid and Houn.
Southern Region: The desert area south of the Nafousa Mountain and Houn Municipality, up
to the Algeria, Niger, and Chad borders. The main urban areas are Sabha, Ubari and Ghat.
Wahat region: The area extending from the Agedabia Municipality along the coast
southwards to the Chad, Sudan and Egyptian borders. The main urban areas are Agedabia,
Jalo and Kufra.
Benghazi region: The area covered by the Greater Benghazi Municipality. The main urban
area is Benghazi and its suburbs.
Eastern region: The area east of Benghazi extending to the Egyptian border. The main urban
areas are Marj, Beida, Derna and Tobruk.
Regardless of what is presented in this report, we should point out that GECOL is not
standing still. GECOL is itself making great efforts to resolve its many problems and to deal
with the obstacles and difficulties the current Libyan political and security situation has
created. GECOL has also continued to expand and grow its power network despite the
cessation of most other project activities in Libya and general financing difficulties. Just at
the transmission level and the first half of 2017 GECOL has:
• Brought online 2 new gas turbine unit (Khoms Fast Track and Tripoli West)
• Completed a major overhaul and put back in service Unit 5 and Western Mountain
Power Station
• Put in service 4 new 30kV overhead lines
• Put in service 3 new 220/30kV and 220/66kV transformers
• Put in service 4 new 30/11kV transformer
While we commend GECOL on its continued efforts and activities under the most adverse
conditions, these accomplishments represent only a fraction of what is needed for GECOL to
meet its obligations towards the electricity consumers in Libya.
This report does not purport to be an exhaustive analysis of every aspect of GECOL’s
technical activities, nor is it re-inventing the wheel. The data and information in this report
have been collected with the strong and total support and assistance of GECOL’s
management and staff, whom we thank profusely. Thus, the details and results of the study
are not new material and are already well known to GECOL and its management, who are
working hard at resolving the issues discussed. This report attempts to present new
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
perspectives on these issues, to highlight priorities and some of the urgent actions needed,
and help to GECOL in the decision-making process.
It is our sincere hope we have been at least partly successful in achieving these aims.
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
Figure (2-1): Geographic regions used for GECOL’s electricity assets and services
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
3 Generation
3.1 Current status
3.1.1 Overview
To assess GECOL’s generation assets, we have collected data from GECOL’s Generation
General Department and from the Control General Department, made site visits to Tripoli
South, Khoms and Benghazi North Power Stations , and had discussions and interviews with
GECOL management at various levels.
Depending on how they are tabulated, GECOL has some 26 power stations containing 85
generating units of various sizes, technologies and ages distributed around Libya, with the
majority along Libya’s Mediterranean coastline. Figure (3-1) shows the geographic location
of GECOL’s generation assets and Tables (3-1) and (3-2) present a summary of the GECOL
power plants and their main data.
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
Recently GECOL has carried out a review and revision of the power plants it categorizes as
“in service”, and has officially confirmed an installed capacity of 10.238GW for the year
2017. Of this installed capacity, the actual available capacity is a fluid concept that varies
continuously as maintenance, fuel and other factors reduce some units’ power capability
and other units are taken out of service or brought back into service due to maintenance
activities. The variations in plant availability is clear from Figure (3-2), which is derived from
GECOL’s General Control Department quarterly reports for 2015 and 2016. Our survey
shows an available capacity during the July/August period of 2017 (updated in November
2017 to reflect units with significant change to status) of around 5.345GW, representing
52% of the installed capacity.
Figure (3-2): Availability of different types of generation, from GECOL Control reports
Based on a review of the conditions of GECOL generation assets, it is our opinion that at
least 19 units aged between 33 and 46 years (shown shaded in Table 3-1) are also ready for
retirement and should not be considered part of GECOL’s installed capacity, and we have
not included these units in this assessment. The excluded units from Table (3-1) are:
We note that all these plants do not currently contribute any generation capacity, i.e. they
are all out of service for various reasons, and therefore are not producing power.
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
Excluding these generating units leaves 18 “main” power stations with 66 generating units
and an installed capacity of 9.755GW. The 5.345GW available capacity now represents
54.8%.
In Table (3-2), 2010 has been taken as a reference year, being the last in which operation of
GECOL network may be considered “normal”. 2013 was taken as a comparison year during
which many activities had begun to return to a form of normality after the events of 2011,
and 2016 reflects the current status of GECOL’s assets.
Figures (3-3), (3-4) and (3-5) represent GECOL’s installed and available capacities and their
distribution over Libya’s geographic regions, their split between generation technologies,
and by age of units.
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
Table (3-1): GECOL power plants and generating units sorted by age - general data as at mid 2017
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
Table (3-2): GECOL power plants sorted by age - operational data 2010, 2013, 2016
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
Figure (3-2) shows that there is a fairly reasonable distribution of generation geographically
around Libya, with the following reservations:
• There is no generation in the Southern region. As a result this region has faced
extensive and prolonged power outages compared with other parts of Libya, as well
as voltage instabilities over the past few years. The new Ubari power Station is
expected to be commissioned by the end of 2017 or early 2018 and should be an
important factor in solving the Southern region’s problems.
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
• The generation in the Eastern Region is limited to two aging steam power plants,
both over 30 years old. Their generating units are severely downrated or out of
service pending major overhauls. The absence of any significant generation in the
Eastern Region and the region’s dependence on the Benghazi North power plant as
the sole source of energy when the eastern and western power networks were
isolated was the major reason for successive blackouts over most of the eastern
towns and cities. There have been calls and plans for a new power plant in Tobruk
for many years, but it is only recently, as detailed in the section on Generation
Expansion, that any progress appears to have been made. It is now expected that a
new plant in Tobruk will be contracted and be in operation around 2020/2021.
Figure (3-3) shows that there is a very large imbalance in generation units in favour of gas
turbines. The bulk of GECOL’s generation is currently simple or combined cycle gas turbines.
This, despite the higher operating costs and maintenance requirements of these gas
turbines. As will be discussed later, much of GECOL’s current shortage in generation is
because GECOL has not been able to keep up with the inspection and overhaul schedules of
its gas turbine units. This has led to many units either being completely out of service or
operating but with reduced power capabilities.
The disparity in generation technologies is further reinforced in Figure (3-4) which shows
that almost all GECOL’s steam power plants are over 30 years old. In fact, the new Gulf
(Khaleej) Power Station is the first and thus far only steam power station to be contracted
by GECOL since the early 1980’s.
GECOL has been operating its power stations since 2011 under some extremely adverse
conditions. The effect is clearly seen in the operational data. The weighted average time
availability2 of power generating units has fallen from 78.3% in 2010 to 66.0% in 2016,
despite Khoms Gas 1, Khoms Steam and Misurata Combined Cycle plants having
availabilities exceeding 90%.
Similarly, the average weighted capacity factor 3has fallen from 45.6% in 2010 to 44.3% in
2016, this despite the fact that all available units are being treated as base load because of
the power shortage, operating at full available capacity throughout the day over much of
the year, although this will explain why the change in capacity factor has been so small.
The most striking indication of the situation GECOL’s power plants face is the available
capacity of power generation compared with the installed capacity. This fell from 64.6% in
2
Availability was calculated based on the operating hours of each unit at the power station over the year
∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦
𝑃𝑃/𝑆𝑆 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 =
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛. 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 × 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦
3
Capacity factor was calculated based on the total energy output of each unit at the power station over the
year
∑ 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦
𝑃𝑃/𝑆𝑆 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 =
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 × 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
2010 (5.683GW available out of 8.796GW installed, which includes units put in service
during 2010) to 52% at present, 4.9GW of the 2017 installed 10.238GW 4 capacity being
unavailable. Our survey indicates that up to 2.6GW of that 4.9GW is due to factors related
to maintenance, repair and replacement works. Figure (3-6) gives a breakdown of
unavailable generating power in the GECOL power system.
From Figure (3-6) we see that if GECOL resolved its fuel supply problems and carried out
overdue overhauls and maintenance works of its units, it should be able to theoretically
increase its available capacity from the current figure of around 5345MW to over 7300MW,
about equal to the current peak network demand. Resolving these matters is not a simple
matter, however, as is discussed in more detail in the following sections.
4
Excluding units considered as ready for retirement
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
Notable from the graph is that an average of 1053 MW is unavailable due to ambient
conditions that derate the power capacity of gas turbine units. As a result, and taking into
consideration the units that should be retired from service, GECOL’s existing installed
capacity can generate on average a maximum of 8700MW, even if all units were fully
maintained and in optimal working conditions.
More positively, there have been significant improvements in the thermal efficiency of
GECOL’s generation. While the aggregate improvement in efficiency is 76.1%, the actual
overall improvement in GECOL’s generation efficiency taking into consideration those plants
that were in service 2010 is 7.3%, with Benghazi North 2 and Misurata Combined Cycle
power stations accounting for 4.9%. The largest factor accounting for the increased
efficiency has been the introduction of the heat recovery steam generation (HRSG) units at
these combined cycle plants and the operation of their corresponding steam turbines in
2013.
The second contributing factor has been GECOL’s increased operation of generating units on
natural gas instead of liquid fuel. While in 2010 only 41% of energy produced was from
natural gas, in 2016 this had grown to 80%.
Another positive element we should mention is that GECOL has managed to put in service
some 14 new generating units with a total nameplate rating of 2295MW between 2012 and
August 2017, this despite all the instability, financial difficulties and the almost complete
halt of all other international supply and erection projects in Libya. Several of these units
were arranged ad hoc to deal with the power shortage problem and not part of the original
generation expansion plan. Table (3-3) lists the units added to the Libya network. Further to
this list, at some of the new units at Ubari Gas Power station are also expected to come on
line before the end of 2017, adding up to another 624 MW to the installed capacity.
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
Deep-dive site visits to a number of power stations have also highlighted some practical
aspects of operations that should be taken into consideration. We have noted that many of
the maintenance and operations staff at the power stations are of a similar generation and
approaching retirement age. They have not been supported with enough numbers of
younger engineers and technicians to apprentice under them and learn from their
experience and skills. This can lead to a serious gap in the future, but even in the short term
there do not seem to be enough qualified and capable technical staff at the power plants to
meet all its needs. In one case, At Khoms 2 Power Station, according to plant management
the daily operations shift has about half the number of persons recommended by the new
units’ supplier. This shortage in specific technical positions exists despite the overstaffing in
GECOL overall and the high numbers of people that have been newly employed by GECOL
over the past few years.
Equally important is the training of operations and maintenance staff on the new units that
have come into service over the past five years as well as the units we can expect to be
commissioned in the coming years. The training that has been received is minimal, and may
be sufficient for normal daily activities, but it is doubtful they will be fully capable of
responding to and dealing with unexpected, abnormal and emergency situations.
The full list of overhaul works due, completed and pending are given in Table (4).
We have expanded the analysis of maintenance works required for GECOL’s generating
units, separating the more complex and difficult maintenance needs from the less complex.
The latter are works which are considered routine and regular for the relevant generating
units and/or which would normally require four months or less to complete. Periodic major
overhauls of gas turbines are included in this category. Table (3-5) provides a
comprehensive list of the less complex maintenance works required for GECOL generating
units.
From the table we see that out of an installed capacity of 5374 MW, it should be possible to
regain up to 1700 MW of lost power through these less complex maintenance activities. This
compares with the more complex maintenance requirements which are the cause of up to
1200MW of power lost to the Libyan power network. Most of the more complex works are
major overhauls of steam turbine units which are over 30 years old, and some nearing 40
years. Because of the age and condition of these units, GECOL needs to assess the viability
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
and cost-effectiveness of rehabilitating these units before deciding to invest the required
funds.
It should be noted that GECOL is making great efforts to meet the maintenance needs of its
generation and that over the coming months, as in the past, we can expect GECOL to
continue to work at resolving the existing problems and maintenance needs.
GECOL’s inability to keep up with the major maintenance requirements of its generating
units is not new. GECOL has generally faced a backlog of overhauls and other major
maintenance works as can be seen from the Booz and Co. analysis in 2010 (Figure 3-7).
While there was some catch-up in 2007, the backlog continued to grow in 2008 and 2009.
The events since 2011 have further magnified this problem as can be seen in Figure (3-8).
Figure (3-7): GT unit overhauls analysis by Booz & Co, GECOL Strategic Plan 2010
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
A combination of political and security instability and financing shortfalls have hindered
GECOL in carrying out the overhaul and maintenance works they had planned and needed
to maintain the functional capacity of installed generation. The factors preventing from
implementing the maintenance works are:
• The unbalanced growth of gas turbine generating capacity over the last three
decades. The maintenance requirements of gas turbines is much higher than for
steam turbines and therefore the allocation of sufficient funds on an annual basis to
keep the units in top operating condition is also much greater.
• Overhaul financing under the Libyan development budget. Overhauls are considered
a capital investment and are therefore funded under the Libyan development
budget. Provision of funds is thus not in GECOL’s hands but is subject to government
budget negotiations and approval. Further and repeatedly over the past decades,
even monies allocated in the development budget are not always made available by
Ministry of Finance or the Central Bank of Libya.
• Specialist characteristic of the maintenance works. Carrying out the overhaul works
requires specialist personnel with the proper knowledge and experience. GECOL has
worked to develop this expertise locally, both internally and in its subsidiary
contracting companies, with a certain degree of success. However, even when local
maintenance crews are capable of carrying out the overhaul works, GECOL still
requires supervisors from the equipment manufacture to oversee the overhauls to
guarantee the quality and assume responsibility for the works. The current situation
in Libya has prevented the attendance of these supervisors at the power plants in
Libya to allow the works to proceed.
• Large backlog in required maintenance being carried forward from past years. This
backlog means that GECOL does not only have to find funds for the overhauls that
become due on an annual basis, but also to the large number of units that were not
overhauled on schedule year after year.
• Figure (3-8) indicates that in 2017 there were 34 generating units that were due for
an overhaul. Up to November 2017, GECOL has been able to complete three unit
overhauls. Since 2006, the largest number of overhauls GECOL has been able to carry
out in one year was 10, in 2007, and the average number per year is around 5. To
resolve the overhaul backlog by the end of 2020, GECOL will have to increase its
capacity to carry out overhauls to approach 15 units per year as well as to arrange
the necessary financing.
• It will be noted from Figure (3-8) that GECOL began making headway to clear the
backlog in 2015 and 2016, mainly through a concerted effort by GECOL’s
management. This progress has been offset in 2017 partly by the significant increase
in the number of units per year that require overhaul and by the growing budgetary
constraints Libya finds itself in. The increase in required overhauls is mostly due to
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
5
Available power according to data collected in June/July 2017, updated in December 2017 for units with
significant changes in their status.
6
Exact power lost and can be regained through maintenance is not a fixed figure for GT units and relates to
ambient conditions that vary over time. The estimated lost power is therefore rounded to nearest 5MW.
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
Tripoli
GT-14 1994 Gas 100 MW 85 MW Maintenance
South
Tripoli
GT-15 1994 Gas 100 MW 85 MW Major overhaul
South
Khoms 1 GT-03 1995 Gas 150 MW 100 MW 30 MW Major overhaul
Khoms 1 GT-04 1995 Gas 150 MW 130 MW Major overhaul
Available
Power Year in Unit Nameplate Lost
Unit rating Required maintenance
station service type rating power
(mid 2017)
Western
GT-12 2005 Gas 156 MW 130 MW Major overhaul
Mountain
Western Repair problem with
GT-13 2006 Gas 156 MW 50 MW 85 MW
Mountain support bearings
Western Repair hydraulic oil
GT-14 2006 Gas 156 MW 100 MW 35 MW
Mountain pump
Western
GT-16 2012 Gas 156 MW 130 MW Major overhaul
Mountain
Zweitina GT-11 1994 Gas 50 MW 0 MW 43 MW Major overhaul
Zweitina GT-14 1994 Gas 50 MW 0 MW 43 MW Major overhaul*
Sarir GT-1 2010 Gas 285 MW 190 MW 60 MW Major overhaul
Sarir GT-2 2012 Gas 285 MW 0 MW 250 MW Major overhaul*
Replace damaged
Sarir GT-3 2013 Gas 285 MW 0 MW 250 MW
parts + Major overhaul
Kufra 1 1975 Gas 25 MW 0 MW 22 MW Major overhaul
Misurata 4 1975 Gas 25 MW 0 MW 22 MW Majpr overhaul
TOTAL 33 5374 MW 4004 MW 1700 MW
* Units have limitations due to both fuel supply constraints and maintenance requirements
Table (3-5): Listing of GECOL generation units requiring less complex or routine maintenance
The same factor of power shortages will make it very difficult for GECOL to make rapid
progress in clearing the overhaul backlog, even if all other factors are resolved. Unit
overhauls generally require shutdown of a generating unit for 3 or 4 months, and it will be
extremely difficult for GECOL to arrange simultaneous shutdown of multiple generating
units simultaneously with the increased power cuts that will require, given that most units
are still able to generate into the GECOL power network, even of at a reduced capacity. For
this reason, also, GECOL generally limits its overhaul programs to around 6 months of the
year, in spring and autumn, when power demand is at its lowest and the consequences of
taking units off-line are less severe an easier to manage.
GECOL has made agreements with service providers to help resolve the overhaul backlog. It
has agreements with Algec, a joint venture company in which GECOL has a majority stake, to
carry out overhauls of Alstom/GE turbines. It had been expected that overhauls of at least 2
and possibly up to 4 of these units would start before the end of 2017, although by the time
of this report that has not been the case. Similarly, a service agreement has been signed
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
with Siemens to cover the overhauls of Siemens gas turbine units. Putting these agreements
into effect will require GECOL to ensure the necessary funding from the Libyan government
authorities.
Supply of fuel to power stations is either by pipeline, by ship unloading through sea
terminals, or by truck over land. In the case of supply from the sea, and with the growth in
size and number of units at power plants such Khoms, the fuel storage capacity is a
constraining factor when liquid fuel is being used. The high rates of fuel consumption, the
limited number of fuel shipments that can be made, and the dependence on liquid fuel
because gas supplies are insufficient to operate all the installed units, means that fuel in the
tank farms is almost expended when new fuel deliveries arrive. The newly arrived fuel is
thus consumed almost directly by the operating units without being allowed to settle or
being properly analyzed and checked. Also the need to keep units continuously operating
does not allow for substandard shipments to be refused, since the remaining fuel stock is
insufficient until another fuel shipment can be arranged.
Where deliveries of liquid fuel can only be made by road, the logistics of supply is a further
complicating factor. Large power stations will require a constant stream of trucks arriving at
the plant and unloading. This is both a high cost operation, a cause of congestion on roads
leading to the plant, and in some cases these trucks have to travel hundreds of kilometres in
each direction to load and then deliver the fuel. For large plants this can become
impractical, causing units to be kept off line or at least reducing their available capacity in
accordance with the limited supply of fuel.
The Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) has confirmed that it is committed to supplying
GECOL with the quantities required by all its power plants. NOC has confirmed there is
limited scope to expand the supply of natural gas as a fuel, but LFO and HFO will be supplied
as needed. This implies that more and more generating units in the GECOL system will be
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
forced to operate on liquid fuel rather than natural gas, with the implications on cost of
operations, increased maintenance requirements and lower load capacity of the generating
units. In addition, some GECOL power plants, and in particular Sarir, Kufra and initially Ubari,
do not have fuel pipelines or fuel supply jetties and require fuel to be brought in by road
from great distances, a great logistical challenge as described above.
Over the past few years, the NOC and Brega Oil Marketing Co have had to increase their
dependence on importing both LFO and HFO fuels to meet local needs, including GECOL’s.
This has resulted in another element affecting available capacity. In most cases, fuel is
imported to NOC fuel terminals, where NOC is responsible for quality assurance and
compliance with specifications and standards. However, a number of GECOL power plants
have their own ful supply jetties and tankers unload imported fuel directly into the plants
storage tanks, bypassing the NOC’s fuel supply quality control system. As a result, the
quality of imported fuel at these plants has often not been to the standards required by the
generating units. This leads to downtime for increased maintenance and replacement of
filters and other parts. In the case of one of the new Fast Track gas turbine units installed in
Khoms, the quality of the fuel has been the alleged cause of damage and led the contractor
to decide to replace all the unit’s fuel nozzles.
We note here that GECOL power plants in general do not have the facilities to analyze the
fuel they are receiving. Such analysis can only be made in external laboratories at it is
therefore impractical to confirm the suitability of fuel before accepting a shipment. In fact,
power plant staff are mostly limited to visual and olfactory checks when assessing the fuel
they receive, are unlikely to be able to act on deliveries based on such rudimentary and
subjective checks.
According to the information we have collected, at least 600MW of lost capacity is directly
attributed to fuel supply, but we feel the actual figure is actually higher. Many of the units
that are out of service or operating under reduced load limits because of maintenance
related reasons would also have had to be kept offline or operated at reduced capacity
because of limited availability of fuel.
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
Misurata plant has been 12.5% in both 2015 and 2016 while the Sarir plant has been a paltry
2.9% and 2.0% respectively.
The future of the power stations and their generating units is in the hands of their
respective owners. However, and especially in consideration of the power shortages Libya is
currently facing, GECOL has a direct interest in the operation and maintenance of these
plants. GECOL is therefore seriously assessing the possibility of directly arranging and even
financing major overhauls of the steam turbine units in Misurata. If they can be put back in
service at full capacity, up to an additional 500MW of power can be made available to
GECOL.
Of its existing generation plant contracts, two are still in progress. These are Ubari gas
turbine plant in the Southern Region, and Gulf (Khaleej) steam power station in the Central
Region. Work has recently resumed at Ubari and it is expected the first unit of 156MW will
be in service before the end of 2017. The remaining Ubari units should follow over the
following weeks, and the plant should be fully operational by early 2018.
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
However, the local electricity infrastructure means the plant will be connected to GECOL’s
power network in a suboptimal manner. The first two units to be completed will be
connected to an existing 220kV substation over an overhead line connected directly to the
unit transformers. The last two units will be connected through a substation adjacent to the
plant but currently still under construction. It will be some months before this configuration
is rationalized and all the units are connected through the plant’s new substation.
More important, and a potential source of constraint on the operation of the plant is the
source of fuel. No pipeline currently exists to supply the plant with either HFO or gas. The
plant will therefore have to be supplied by truck until a new pipeline is completed, and the
logistics of supplying 4x156MW units with sufficient HFO to keep them fully operational at
Ubari’s location in the Libyan desert will be large, especially in light of the current security
situation.
Estimated
No. of Nameplate available Year in
P/S Region Type units rating capacity service
Ubari Southern Gas 4 4x156 MW 4x125 MW 2018
Work at the Gulf Power Station has still not resumed. The plant is located just outside Sirt
city, where serious fighting ended only a few months ago. The security situation in the area
is still not fully settled, and it is unknown when the contractor will return to the site to finish
works on the remaining three units. However, considering the continuing developments in
Libya’s political and security situation, we can be reasonably confident that the power
station should be in service between 2018 and 2019.
7
Gulf Power Station has 4 steam turbine generators. However, one is already in service, so only 3 units are
considered to still be under construction.
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Very recently, GECOL has also announced obtaining funding for four new gas turbine power
plants. According to GECOL, these plants will be contracted before the end of 2017 and
projects works are expected to start by the end of 2017 or in early 2018. Plans for these
plants have developed relatively suddenly in response to the power shortages faced by
Libya. Table (3-7) summarizes the generating capacity expected to be completed in the short
term, consisting of the 2 plants currently under construction and the four plants recently
announced.
In these scenarios, we have grouped GECOL’s generation capacity into three categories. The
first is GECOL existing installed capacity. As noted previously, as of 2017 we recognize
GECOL’s installed capacity as 9765MW, of which 5240MW is actually available. In the best
case scenario we assume the unavailable capacity will receive the required maintenance
and overhauls over the period 2018 to 2020. We consider it is available and online by the
end of 2020.
The second category of generation is that detailed in Table (3-7) above. These are plants
that GECOL has confirmed funding is secured and they will be completed or constructed
over the coming years. We have assumed each plant will be in service and supplying the
Libyan network in line with the service dates shown in Table (3-7).
The third category of generation relate to a detailed generation expansion plan developed
in 2007 with the Korean utility and consultant, KEPCO. This plan has been updated by
basically shifting the start dates for new projects forward to reasonable new completion
dates, taking into consideration that none has been tendered yet nor has any funding been
arranged. These new generating units are now assumed to come onto the Libyan network
between 2023 and 2029. The new units and proposed service dates are detailed in Table (3-
8).
We note that GECOL’s original generation expansion plan included a good balance between
generation technologies, but many factors and conditions have changed in Libya and it is
now critical to carry out a new full-fledged generation expansion study and develop a new
comprehensive plan compatible with the new situation on the ground, the new generation
and load profiles that have come into being, and the new forecasts of load growth.
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
In fact, the Libyan load forecast itself will need to be updated through a new detailed study
in the future to reflect the changes in the country’s economic and political conditions. In this
analysis we will use the load forecasts 8 derived in the Task A Rapid Assessment.
The estimated available capacity of the simple cycle and combined cycle gas turbine units in
our analysis takes into account the difference in ambient conditions along the coast and in
the southern desert regions and may be considered an average of the year round expected
available power from these units.
Based on the data in Tables (3-1), (3-7) and (3-8), and using the load forecast figures derived
in the Task Rapid Sector Assessment, Figure (3-9) provides an overview of the expected
generation situation versus forecast load.
Estimated
No. of Nameplate available Year in
P/S Region Type units rating capacity service
Tripoli East Tripoli Steam 4 4x350 MW 4x350 MW 2023-2024
8
Scenario A, “Continuous political instability scenario”, is more conservative and assumes no mega-projects will
be developed, while scenario B “Slow political stability scenario” assumes mega- projects to kick-in in 2022
driving a steeper increase in electricity demand.
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
Figure (3-9): Generation available power against load forecasts – best case
Based on these assumptions, GECOL can expect to have resolved its power shortage crisis by
2019 and by 2020 there is a significant reserve in generation capacity. However, even with
the four new power plants now expected to be contracted and put in service between 2019
and 2020, and taking into consideration the expected retirement of some of the existing
generating units as they age, between 2024 and 2027, depending on the actual rates of
growth of demand and GECOL’s ability to maintain a high rate of availability for its
generation, GECOL will again begin facing a power shortage situation if the contracting of
the next generation of power stations does not begin by the early 2020’s.
If we consider the lead time required to tender and contract for major power plants, the
complicated contracting process in Libya, and the current political and economic situation of
the country, this is an important caveat and concern.
At the same time we also note that the reserve margin is very large, confirming that many of
the new units that have been contracted and installed outside the original generation
expansion plan effectively replace units in the plan. This further emphasizes the need to
renew the generation expansion plan study and bring it up to date with the new GECOL
situation.
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
Category 1 plants, existing 9765MW installed and 5240MW available: We assume GECOL
will be able to carry out at most 4 overhauls per year to clear the backlog of overdue major
maintenance, but will also be able to carry out the overhauls of newly due units to prevent
further growth of the backlog. On this basis, the unavailable capacity will have been
resolved by 2024.
Estimated
No. of Nameplate available Year in
P/S Region Type units rating capacity service
Ubari Southern Gas 4 4x156 MW 4x125 MW 2018
Table (3-9): Under construction and to be contracted generation plants, worst case dates
Category 3 plants, included in original GECOL generation expansion plan but not yet
contracted nor funded: This group of new generation has been excluded from the worst
case scenario. This scenario only considers new plants GECOL has confirmed will be
constructed.
Using the same load forecasts of the Task A Rapid sector Assessment results in a new graph
of generation expectations vs load forecast, as shown in Figure (3-10).
9
Gulf Power Station has 4 steam turbine generators. However, one is already in service, so only 3 units are
considered to still be under construction.
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
Figure (3-10): Generation available power against load forecasts – worst case
In this case, GECOL is able to meet its load expectations by 2021. However, with no new
generation being contracted beyond the current plans, GECOL could begin facing power
shortages again as early as 2022 in the case of the highest demand growth rate. Figure (3-
10) shows that in this case the margin of available power exceeds demand by only around
500MW, which is not sufficient to provide for a spinning reserve and for units outs for
maintenance. Even at the lower demand growth rate, power shortages will appear by 2026.
This confirms that to fully meet expected Libya electrical power needs, GECOL must
continue down a three pronged approach:
1. Resolve the maintenance backlog and fuel supply problems and get the installed
capacity back to a good availability level;
2. Proceed with the construction of the confirmed power generating plants;
3. Update the load forecast and generation expansion studies and proceed with
tendering and contracting for the new plants as soon as possible.
1) Analysis of technical losses, calculation of the losses at each voltage level of the
power network and provide a clear and exact comparison of generated and
consumed power and energy.
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
2) Compare calculated losses with historical data and determining energy losses by
both voltage level and geographic area
4) System reserves calculation from the data on the supply side and consumption side
In addition to analysis of the load profile and peak demand, the system would allow
benchmarking comparisons of current performance with historic data, extracting average
daily profile for aggregate analysis, and correlation with temperature and weather
conditions.
GECOL’s EDM system consists physically of smart energy meters installed at all power
transformers, unit and auxiliary transformers, and on tie lines. The smart meters are
designed to be equipped with GSM communications to transfer data to the telemetry
stations. The project included the following main stages:
a. Meter installation: More than 80% of existing stations have already been equipped
with the smart meters. Work is also ongoing to install meters on new plants and
installations.
b. Establishing central telemetry station: This work is also currently on hold. The meters
have also not yet been equipped with GSM sim’s.
Some new plants have included in their specifications the smart meters and equipment
related to the EDM system, as was the case with Khoms fast Track units and some other
new generation. However, the constant growth of the power network where such
specifications have not been included in the supply and installation contracts, has made it
difficult for the installation of the meters to keep up. There is therefore a significant time lag
between the energizing of new transformers and other equipment and their inclusion in the
energy balance scheme, so any measurements at present are approximate, incomplete and
inexact. The GECOL EDM team is doing its best to follow up on new transformer installations
and to equip them with meters. Much effort is also being put into the replacement of faulty
meters.
The current energy measurements are largely unreliable for the following reasons:
- The meter readings are collected manually, and not all substations are accessible to
GECOL staff due to security issues. Missing measurements are estimated based on
historical readings
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
At present the Customer Services General Department is responsible for the care of the
EDM meters, but the meters are installed on assets belonging to the Medium Voltage,
Transmission, and Generation General Departments. We recommend the relevant meters
should fall under the direct responsibility of the Department in which they are located.
Boundary meters between the departments should be installed on both sides of the divide.
Thus, for example, the Transmission Department will measure the energy exported to the
Medium Voltage Department, while simultaneously the Medium Voltage will also be
measuring the energy it is receiving. This way both accuracy and accountability will be
greatly enhanced, and all departments will be motivated to reduce their system losses.
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
• At the same time, GECOL needs to schedule the maintenance and overhauls of other
operating units that will have major maintenance works due over the coming years
while the backlog is being cleared.
• GECOL is also encouraged to take action to ensure availability of third party plants to
supply the GECOL network, even if that might mean GECOL making initial
investments in overhauling these units, where considered feasible and viable.
• Fuel supply is critical to the continued and reliable operation of existing and new
generation. Increasing the size of tank farms may be one factor to increase the
buffer to cover periods of shortages in supply
• A quick partial solution to the fuel supply problem is completion of the Entisar-Sarir
gas pipeline planned to deliver natural gas to the Sarir Main Gas Power Station. At
the time work was stopped because of the security situation in 2014, commissioning
was about to start. If work was to resume, it can be expected that the pipeline could
be in service within a period of 6 months or less.
• As far as feasible, power plants should be equipped to carry out their own analysis of
the quality of fuel supplied to ensure minimum disturbance of operations due to
substandard deliveries.
• The long lead time in contracting and executing new power plants in Libya requires
GECOL to begin from now the process of specifying and tendering at least the first 2
or 3 plants on which construction needs to start in the early 2020’s to avoid a new
round of power shortages.
• The EDM system needs to be completed and jurisdiction for maintenance and
upkeep more clearly defined.
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
• GECOL should work to fill shortages in particular specialities as well as age gaps in
key fields. GECOL might consider developing 1 or 2 year training programs to qualify
some of its non-technical or unqualified personnel to fill these positions.
• GECOL needs to carry out a new and detailed load forecast study, collecting up to
date relevant information from other stakeholders and parties in Libya, including an
in-depth review of Libya’s development program and its realistic impact on future
load growth. In the current dynamic and quickly changing environment, this load
forecast study should be re-evaluated annually.
• GECOL needs to renew its generation expansion plan in light of the many changes
that have occurred in both the power generation profile as well as in the demand
profile. Again, because of the dynamic environment GECOL now finds itself in, this
plan should be revisited every 1 to 2 years.
• GECOL should review its policy on retirement of older power plants and reassess the
financial viability of their continued maintenance and upkeep
• GECOL has a very large base of gas turbine units which will continue to grow. It is
most likely viable for GECOL to form complete teams certified by the relevant
manufacturers that are capable to carry out the overhaul works of these units.
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
Est. budget
Measures Activities Start date Indicative duration Milestones
(USD Mn)
Plan concentrated 3 year maintenance and
01/01/2018 6 months
overhauling program
Resolve backlog of
Carry out 7 overhauls of GT units, 3 overhauls of ST
overdue maintenance 90% of suspended units
units, 6 maintenance, repair and replacement 01/01/2018 3 years 700
back in service
activities each year
Prioritize operating units based on operating
conditions, maintenance needs and importance to the
grid
01/01/2018 6 months
Plan maintenance of Draft a comprehensive maintenance program for
running units operating units
Allocate the necessary budget
Execute timely maintenance for running units (expect No new build-up of
01/08/2018 2.5 years 400
up to 6 GT units per year) overdue maintenance
Review GECOL's power plants retirement policy 01/01/2019 3 months
Assess the financial viability of old units continued
maintenance and upkeep and set retirement dates for 01/01/2019 4-6 months
non-viable units
Retire old units List of units to be retired
Approve the list of units to be retired 01/04/2019 2 months
approved
Retire all very old and unviable units (i.e. ready for
01/06/2019 ongoing
retirement units)
Write off retired assets from GECOL's books 01/11/2019 2 months
Negotiate with Libyan Steel Co. for overhaul units
Ensure availability of 3rd
(possibly carry out overhauls on their behalf for 2/3 01/01/2018 2 years 250 MW added to grid 75
party P/S
units)
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
Est. budget
Measures Activities Start date Indicative duration Milestones
(USD Mn)
Full implementation of
Provide key power stations with fuel analysis lab
01/07/2018 1.5 years fuel quality control 2
equipment and train staff
procedures
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
Est. budget
Measures Activities Start date Indicative duration Milestones
(USD Mn)
Complete Obari power station and connect to power Obari completed
01/01/2018 6 months
Complete under network ensuring fuel supplies (4x125 MW online)
construction projects Gulf completed
Complete Gulf Power Station 01/07/2018 1.5 years
(3x350 MW online)
Contract to renew 20-year load forecast study and
01/06/2018 Ongoing
regularly update and extend load forecast study
Update load forecast and Based on updated load forecast, contract for 20-year
generation expansion generation expansion study considering also optimal
Updated generation
plan generation mix and regularly update and extend 01/01/2019 Ongoing 0.3
expansion plan
generation expansion plans (first annually and later
biannually)
Tender, contract and execute first generation of new RFP for first round of new
01/01/2019 5 years
plants (either autonomously or through IPPs) projects issued
Tender new generation
Finalize arrangements for 4 new power stations
capacity
(ensure funding, finalize contracts, assess local support 01/01/2018 3 years 2000
needs to secure rapid completion)
Procure any remaining materials or replacement for
01/01/2018 2 months
EDM system
Complete installation of EDM meters and telemetry
Complete EDM system station to ensure new network installation are 01/03/2018 8 months
correctly metered
Define departments responsibilities for maintenance
01/11/2018 2 months Fully functioning EDM
and servicing and for reporting of operating results
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
4. Skills shortage
Est. budget
Measures Activities Start date Indicative duration Milestones
(USD Mn)
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
4 Transmission
4.1 Current status
Since the first 220kV substations and overhead lines were introduced, Libya has followed a
very ambitious development and expansion of its transmission network. Top tier
international consultants have helped GECOL design the transmission system, from Kennedy
and Dunkin in the early 1970’s to Parsons Brinckerhoff in the late 2000’s, with other
consultants such as Hydro Quebec International and CESI along the way.
Stringent criteria were determined and agreed between GECOL and the consultants to
ensure the reliability and robustness of the transmission system. This included an n-1
criteria defined to cover the loss of both circuits on a double circuit transmission line or the
loss of all generation connected to a single busbar.
GECOL standardized the design of the 220kV overhead lines such that all are double circuit
lines with towers capable of surviving some of the most severe environmental conditions
and events. Transmission substations are from reputable world-class manufacturers such as
Siemens, ABB and GE (previously Alstom).
GECOL management also had a strong vision for the development and growth of the
transmission system. Planning was not just based on the requirements to serve the load
needs of the Libyan network, but also considered possible future wheeling of power
between Egypt and Tunisia through the Libyan network, as well as wheeling and supply of
power to Italy.
For these and other reasons, GECOL pushed strongly to introduce a 400kV backbone,
thereby further reinforcing the existing 220kV transmission network.
There have been criticisms that GECOL has over invested in its transmission system.
Experience has proven that GECOL has actually applied very high standards in the design
and execution of its transmission network and ensured an excellent level of redundancy. We
can confidently say that it is mainly because of this redundancy that the GECOL power
network has been able to survive and quickly recover from the loss of transmission lines,
substations, and other key network elements that have been damaged by successive bouts
of fighting and vandalism across many parts of Libya during the events of the past few years.
An extreme example of the resilience of the Libyan network can be seen in the city of
Benghazi. Buatni is a main 220kV substation infeeding to the Benghazi subtransmission
(Medium Voltage 30kV) network. It is also a major node in the transmission grid with several
220kV transmission lines connected to it. During the 2014-2017 fighting in Benghazi, the
substation was completely destroyed and several of the transmission lines damaged.
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
Despite this, GECOL has been able to maintain supply to meet the load demands of Benghazi
through the remaining 220kV infeed points to the city, Libya’s second largest.
Despite this resilience, the transmission network, like other business units in GECOL, is
suffering from the reduced budgets, from difficult and at times dangerous work conditions,
from scarcities in spare parts and equipment required to maintain key elements of the
transmission system, and from delays in completing planned additions to the infrastructure
such as new substations, overhead lines and cables.
Of these substations, GECOL has five 220kV substations and one 400kV substation out of
service, representing 5.8% and 7.7% respectively. These are listed in table (4-1).
It will be noted from the table that almost all major loss of substation assets has been due
to the insecurity situation in Libya. Replacement of a transmission substation is a major and
expensive undertaking, second only to replacement of a power generating unit or plant.
Therefore putting these substations back into service will take time. However, the
redundancies built into the Libyan transmission system have allowed GECOL to overcome
these losses and maintain supply to all regions.
Damage or loss of complete substations is only a small part of the problems faced by GECOL.
More common and just as important is the loss of other key components of substations. The
first element of substations to consider is the switchgear.
The majority of transmission switchgear in GECOL’s system are SF6 gas insulated switchgear
(GIS). These are very reliable and subject to limited environmental effects. Aside from
overhauls every decade or so, they have little maintenance requirements.
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
However, GECOL also has a number of old substations whose switchgear dates back to the
1970’s and 1980’s. These include airblast circuit breakers whose spare parts are no longer
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
easily available, and which have at times had to be produced locally at a lower quality and
lifetime, sometimes lasting only a few months before having to be replaced. GECOL has set
up a plan to replace the equipment in these substations, but the replacement work has
come to a standstill over the past years. These stations are listed in Table (4-2).
In GECOL’s network, nine substations have a damaged power transformer, as listed in Table
(4-3). However, this only represents the tip of the iceberg, as these are only the damaged
transformers that have not yet been replaced. GECOL has faced many other transformer
failures, where the transformer has been replaced.
In fact, the incidence of power transformer failures has been historically high enough for
GECOL to invest in a complete transformer workshop capable of rehabilitating some of the
largest transformers in the network. GECOL has also made several attempts in the past to
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
contract out the operation of the workshop, but has had very limited success. The workshop
is not being utilized at present.
This high level of transformer failures is a major concern. Only two of the transformers have
been damaged due to armed clashes. The remaining transformers all appear to have been
affected by either internal defects or external network events. Both reasons should be
unacceptable to GECOL and the matter requires serious investigation to determine the true
causes and the actions required to mitigate them. Power transformers at the 400kV and
220kV level are an expensive item of plant that is not easily or quickly replaced or restored,
nor can GECOL maintain a large stockpile of spare transformers of this category.
Special attention must be drawn in particular to the number of transformers that appear to
have been damaged by lightning. Transformers have several layers of protection to reduce
the possible voltage surges incurred by lightning strikes, from overhead line earthwires to
arcing horns across insulators to surge arrestors nearest to the transformers. Why have
these not been able to protect the transformers? GECOL has to determine if the problem is
one of design or poor implementation or human interference in the equipment, making it
ineffective.
GECOL has teams specialized in transformer maintenance. Oil treatment machines are
available in all maintenance departments. In fact, most oil treatment capability is
concentrated in the Transmission maintenance units, and they are often requested by other
business units, such as generation, to carry out maintenance and treatment for their
transformers. However, GECOL does not have sufficient preventive maintenance capability,
such as dissolved gas analysis (DGA) instruments, to oversee and follow up the number of
transformers in the network, such that these tests are rarely carried out.
It would also be advisable for GECOL to set up at least two central oil analysis laboratories
which can carry out full analyses of transformer (and other) oils. This will be very important
to GECOL in both preventing equipment failures and analysing failures post mortem.
Another important component in 220kV substations supplying the 30kV networks is the
neutral point earthing resistor. Neutral earthing resistors are used to limit the short circuit
current resulting from earthfaults. GECOL’s standards and specifications for the 30kV
network were designed with the assumption that the system is resistively grounded.
However, this is not understood by operations and maintenance staff working on the
transmission network, and many resistors in transmission substation will be found that have
been bypassed. The result is that high earthfault currents increase the risk of damage and
loss of additional network components, such as cables affected by high sheath currents
during these faults.
Table (4-4) lists the 15 substations where the neutral earthing resistors have been
confirmed to be out of service. It will be noted from the table that many of the transformers
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
missing their neutral earthing resistors serve major urban load centers, which increases the
consequences of the follow-on loss of other network components such as 30kV cables.
The next critical component of substations is the DC supply systems, and in particular the
battery sets. GECOL’s transmission substations use alkaline Nickel Cadmium batteries. 110V
systems supply the substation control and protection, while 48V systems supply the
telecommunications equipment and the RTU’s connecting to the Regional Control Centers.
Battery maintenance is considered a low stature job, and therefore few engineers in the
Transmission Departments are willing to specialize in it. As a result, GECOL has not built up
the experience and know to best maintain its DC supply systems and to keep its battery sets
in optimal working condition. We find at almost all levels of GECOL that battery sets have
shortened lifetimes and are frequently replaced.
Normally, nickel cadmium batteries can have lifetimes of up to 20 years. In the transmission
substations batteries sets are often replaced after some 5 years of operation. There also
seems to be little, if any, effort at rehabilitation of the battery cells before they are replaced.
When replaced batteries are likely not to go through a complete commissioning cycle and
be properly charged up, nor are the charge settings of the battery chargers correctly
adjusted to the specific characteristics of the new battery sets.
Correct and safe operation of the transmission network is contingent on reliable DC supplies
in substations. Without these, protection will not be able to isolate faults, the control
centers will not be able to open and close the switchgear, network status and
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
measurements will not be available to the Control Center Operators, and even local
operations staff will not be able to operate the switchgear except through its local
mechanical control. In fact, in the case of solenoid operated switchgear, even mechanical
operation may be impossible without a DC supply.
It is therefore imperative that GECOL develop its capabilities in the area of battery and DC
system maintenance. This should be a key training target, and staff need to be encouraged
to specialize in the field of work.
We note that in most fields of activity, the Transmission General Department has built up
teams of highly qualified engineers and technicians, capable of dealing with normal as well
as abnormal and emergency situations and events. GECOL has the internal skills to repair,
replace, refurbish and overhaul most of the components of the transmission networks.
These skills need to be maintained, continually developed, keep up with technological
advances, and passed on to new generations. The last point in particular could be enhanced
if GECOL implemented some kind of apprenticeship system, coupling new staff with
experienced older personnel tasked and assessed on training and developing the skill sets of
the younger engineers and technicians.
Maintenance engineers that have been interviewed for this study have all indicated that
they do not possess sufficient knowledge on how to maintain and repair DCS systems.
Discussions with the Control Center staff also point to similar problems; one of the
important reasons given for substation data not being received at the Control Center was
problems with the DCS systems and limited ability to solve the problems.
DCS systems are therefore an additional area where GECOL training programs for
transmission staff should focus. GECL has a limited number of different DCS systems
installed, dependent on the switchgear manufacturer and the generation. Suitably qualified
teams should be developed in each of the relevant Maintenance Departments specialising in
each type of DCS.
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
Part of the 220kV system, in the southern Sarir-Kufra-Tazerbo region, is actually operated at
132kV. The long lines and light loads at this terminus of the transmission system result in
overvoltage problems. The local transmission network was therefore designed to be
operated at 132kV but the equipment designed for 220kV. At some future date when load
levels warrant it, the operating voltage can be raised to 220kV with relatively minor
modifications to the overhead lines and at the substations.
Of this large transmission network, there are currently 10 overhead lines that are
completely out of service (Table 4-5). Almost all the lines are in the Eastern region, mostly
around the city of Benghazi, and out of service due to damage from armed conflict. It was
the security situation that had prevented work on the overhead lines up to the present,
although action is now being taken to repair these lines. Of course, in several instances the
substations to which the lines are connected have also been damaged or destroyed, and
utilization of the lines will be dependent on repair/replacement of the substations or
reconfiguration of the overhead lines to bypass these substations.
From the Table (1) we see that the total length of overhead transmission out of service is
819km at the 220kV level, representing 5.7% of the installed base, and 23km at the 400kV
level, or 1%.
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
Over the past seven years there has been a much higher level of outage of transmission
lines, most due to damage by munitions, others by vandalism and theft of lattice tower
sections leading to failure of the complete towers. GECOL has in each case made concerted
efforts to repair and put these lines back in service, using up its stock of overhead line
spares and even of the tower material imported for new projects. The work has been done
both by GECOL overhead line staff and by local contracting companies.
In addition to existing line outage, GECOL also faces the problem of new transmission line
projects that have not been completed. The construction of a large part of the new 400kV
transmission backbone has not been completed despite progress having reached 80% and
90% on several lines. The most critical at the present moment are the lines of the east-west
interconnection. At present the stability limit of the 220kV link is 530MW, which limits the
amount of power that can be transferred between the eastern and western Libyan power
networks. This is becoming critical with the power shortages faced by the western network
and the excess capacity available in the east. This problem will be further amplified with the
new generation projects expected to be implemented in the eastern network over the
coming 2 to 3 years, maintenance of existing units and resolution of fuel supply problems,
all of which will increase the excess capacity in the east capable of supplying power to the
west.
This and other transmission line projects that have stopped will play an important role in
further improving the transmission system and reducing bottlenecks, and need to be given
priority to resume construction works.
Since the early 1990’s GECOL has established its own overhead line maintenance teams.
Prior to that, all transmission overhead line works were outsourced to international
contracting companies. The GECOL overhead line teams gained experience in all types of
line maintenance and repair. Larger jobs were still outsourced to contractors, but much of
the overhead line work was carried internally by GECOL’s teams.
From the start, a main focus of GECOL’s overhead line teams has been cleaning of line
insulator strings. Before GECOL’s team took over, line cleaning was also contracted out to
international contractors, but on a regular, periodic, or scheduled basis. Once GECOL had its
own overhead line maintenance teams, periodic cleaning of all overhead line became a
standard part of GECOL’s annual maintenance programs. Initially, the aim was to clean each
line once a year, focus on the summer period leading up to the summer peak. Within a few
years, cleaning plans included key lines being cleaned twice a year.
Overhead line teams are still an important part of GECOL’s cadre, but since 2011 have faced
significant impediments in carrying out their works. Security is of course a key concern since
much of the overhead line infrastructure is in open ground far from urban or, very often,
any inhabited areas. Another important element is the aging of GECOL’s linesmen. The
original overhead line technicians, now with GECOL for a quarter of a century, are no longer
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physically capable to do the demanding work of overhead line maintenance. The only other
of generation of linesmen employed by GECOL have been doing the work for over a decade
are also getting old and less able to meet the demands of the job.
For these reasons, GECOL has not been able to keep up with the overhead line cleaning
required to keep its transmission lines in good working condition and maintain reliable
operations of the power network. Polluted insulator strings are subject to flashovers during
periods of high humidity, in addition to increasing system losses and electromagnetic noise
that can cause interference with communications systems. Sources of pollution include
saline deposits from the Mediterranean Sea and dust from rock quarries, which are found
near the routes of transmission lines in many parts of Libya.
Originally, line cleaning used a brute force methodology. The linesmen would climb the
towers to the isolator strings and manually wipe the insulator discs clean, one by one. It
took many days to several weeks to clean each double circuit line. Throughout the work,
both circuits on the tower had to be switched off to ensure the safety of the linesmen.
GECOL has now moved to less labor intensive methodologies in more recent years. Lines are
now mostly cleaned using water tankers equipped with pumps and water hoses. The
tankers can be moved along the line routes, from tower to tower. The pumps are powerful
enough to shoot a jet of water to the heights of the 220kV and 400kV insulator strings.
Linesmen carry the hoses part way up the towers to better direct the water stream at the
insulators.
While this method has been successful at cleaning overhead lines, it is dependent on the
Transmission Maintenance Departments having sufficient water tankers, self propelled or
pulled by other vehicles, equipped with the suitable water pumps and lengths of hosepipe,
to clean the dozens of transmission lines in the Libya power network along the
Mediterranean coast. Unfortunately, GECOL does not have the numbers of equipment it
needs.
Despite these impediments, in the second quarter of 2017 GECOL’s overhead line teams
have managed to clean some 15 overhead lines in line with routine maintenance schedules,
as well some 5 unplanned overhead lines. They also carried out a large number of repairs
and replacement works on overhead lines.
However, several lines could not be cleaned because of difficulties in arranging shutdowns
of the overhead lines. The lines most critical to the power network, and which should
receive the best attention and care by the maintenance teams, are exactly the lines that it is
most difficult to switch off. For this reason it could be worthwhile for GECOL to look again at
the possibility of training its overhead lines teams on live line cleaning and maintenance
works, and to provide them with the equipment and tools necessary. GECOL has made
several efforts in the past to develop a live line cleaning capability, but they have failed for
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various reasons. The last effort was in 2010, but came to an abrupt halt with the 17
February 2011 uprising.
Live line work requires a great deal of discipline and well regulated maintenance routines,
and ensuring that the proper equipment is maintained and on hand to ensure the safety of
the maintenance personnel and security of the power network. GECOL would therefore
have to ensure that its funding and procurement arrangements are streamlined if the effort
to develop live line teams is to succeed.
The equipment and materials specifications of these cable systems, like the rest of GECOL’s
transmission network, have been to the highest international standards and norms. Laying
and jointing of the power cables has been to the exacting requirements and under the
supervision of the manufacturers. The result is that GECOL has not had 220kV cable
breakdowns. The cable system is working and extremely reliable.
As with all new equipment, GECOL developed and trained maintenance teams on the
jointing and termination of 220kV cables. However, with no cable faults on which to
maintain and hone their skills, the technical staff have lost their ability to repair 220kV
cables. Where any work is required on 220kV cables, GECOL finds itself dependent upon the
assistance and support of outside specialists.
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• There have been significant delays in GECOL’s substation rehabilitation projects. The
old transmission switchgear still in service in the GECOL network is a financial burden
because of the amounts of maintenance and replacement of parts required, and
hazard to the reliable operation of the power network because of the increased rate
of failures and outages they cause. The oldest airblast switchgear is in urgent need of
replacement, and the newer GIS installations need either major overhauls and
renewals or replacement.
• The backbone of GECOL’s transmission system is its overhead lines. The transmission
network has been designed to a high standard and level of reliability. To maintain
the reliability if the system, the overhead lines must be kept in best service
condition, despite their exposure to multiple sources of pollution. Overhead line
cleaning requires investment by GECOL, through supply of the equipment the
Transmission maintenance departments need to cover GECOL vast transmission
network, through development of new generations of transmission linesmen, and
possibly through a stable policy of outsourcing that will encourage the private sector
in Libya to develop the necessary capabilities and skills.
• Transmission line and substation projects underway need to be completed and put in
service.
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• Well maintained battery systems are a central element for the reliable operation of
all transmission substations. One of GECOL’s highest priorities must be to develop
the advanced skill sets of the maintenance personnel to maintain the batteries at
their optimal performance level and to rehabilitate battery cells when necessary.
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Est. budget
Measures Activities Start date Indicative duration Milestones
(USD Mn)
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Est. budget
Measures Activities Start date Indicative duration Milestones
(USD Mn)
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Est. budget
Measures Activities Start date Indicative duration Milestones
(USD Mn)
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Est. budget
Measures Activities Start date Indicative duration Milestones
(USD Mn)
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5. Skills shortage
Est. budget
Measures Activities Start date Indicative duration Milestones
(USD Mn)
Improve O&M staff Arrange intensive training for new equipment and
01/07/2018 6 months 0.2
knowledge and technologies, especially DCS
competencies
Set up program to maintain and refresh cable jointing
skills through secondment of cable jointists with 01/01/2019 2 years
contracting companies
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5 Control
5.1.1 Overview
If we were to liken the Transmission system to a skeleton holding up the body and keeping it
together, Generation to the muscles powering the body and enabling it to do work, and
Medium Voltage and Distribution to the blood vessels and capillaries delivering nutrition
and energy to all parts of the body, then without doubt Control is the brain and
Telecommunications the nervous system keeping all parts coordinated and working in
unison. And as the brain takes more than its fair share of the body’s blood supply to keep
working optimally, so does the power network’s control and telecommunications
infrastructure need significant investment to ensure optimal operation and stability of the
power system.
GECOL’s control infrastructure is divided into several levels. At the apex is the National
Control Center (NCC), providing oversight, coordination, and control of the generation
plants, the backbone 400kV transmission network, and 220kV interconnection substations
to Tunisia and Egypt.
The country is then divided west and east between the Tripoli Regional Control Center
(TRCC) and the Benghazi Regional Control Center (BRCC), each responsible for control and
operations of their respective 220kV transmission networks.
Further downstream are Distribution Control Centers responsible for the 66kV, 30kV and
11kV networks. While the NCC, TRCC and BRCC fall under the authority of the General
Control Department, the Distribution Control Centers are under the General Distribution
Department and/or the Medium Voltage General Department.
These control centers are connected to the power stations and substations they control
through an extensive fiber optic system comprising both underground cables and OPGW
transmission tower earthwires, some legacy power carrier links, and microwave links. Since
the 1990’s GECOL has upgraded the earthwires on almost all its existing transmission lines
to OPGW (optical power ground wire) conductors that include an embedded fiber optic
cable. The specifications of all new transmission lines require the earthwires to be OPGW. In
parallel, a legacy power line carrier (PLC) system on many transmission lines provides a
backup communications link, albeit slower and of lower capacity and quality than the fiber
optic links.
Over the past five years, successive damages to transmission lines, mostly due to armed
conflicts, has led to loss of one communications link after the other and a sever degradation
in both the fiber optic-based data and voice communications links between the control
centers and the network substations and power stations.
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The fighting in 2011 put the Sirt National Control Center out of service, and since then
GECOL’s NCC has been operating solely from Tripoli.
While the loss of Sirt National Control Center has meant there is no longer a formal
emergency backup center for the NCC, the security situation on the ground has forced
GECOL to arrange an ad hoc backup system located at some transmission substations in the
Tripoli area. These are still dependent on the main computer systems physically located at
the NCC/TRCC building, the control engineers and their workstations can access the system
via the fiber optic links from several different substations. Thus when the Swani Road area
may become unsafe or staff are otherwise prevented from accessing the control center
building, NCC staff can continue to monitor and control the network from these back up
locations. This situation occurred in 2014 and several times afterwards.
The NCC and TRCC are built around Alstom’s (now part of GE Grid) e-terrahabitat SCADA
software system. The NCC also has additional software modules for EMS (energy
management system), economic dispatch, AGC (automatic generation control), and
resource scheduling. As the installed system is now some 10 years old, efforts have been
made to arrange an upgrade, but have been stalled by the difficulties in opening
documentary credits to the suppliers, and further compounded by the current instability
and insecurity in Libya.
Telecommunications with the controlled stations is actually carried out by the TRCC and
BRCC computer systems. The NCC receives its data from the TRCC/BRCC computers. Some
95% of the controlled stations’ data has been modelled in the NCC/TRCC databases, and all
relevant stations have been linked to the NCC. However, problems with the communications
links, some of the RTUs (remote terminal units) in the stations, etc, make only 20% of the
system actually visible to the NCC (and TRCC) computer system (Figures 5-1 and 5-2),
compared with 98% in 2011. Fortunately, to date that 20% of data covers key network
points that provide a sufficient view of the network status to the control engineers. Some of
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the missing data is further covered by the SCADA software’s state estimator function, and
other data is manually entered to give a reasonably clear network overview.
Figure (5-1): Data availability at NCC/TRCC and causes behind unavailable data
As a result, the NCC is fully dependent on operators at almost all stations and on voice
communication links with those operators in order to actually control the power network.
The NCC control engineers are dependent on the updates they get from the station
operators to complete their picture on the true status of the power network, and can only
dispatch generation and respond to network requirements through the instructions they
give these operators.
Despite on-site contractual activities having come to a halt in 2011 and again in 2014, the
supplier continues to monitor and provide remote support to the SCADA system through a
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secure VPN internet connection, controlled by GECOL’s engineers and only opened for the
limited periods agreed between the two sides.
From a power network viewpoint, the NCC is responsible for dispatching all generation
plants and units in the Libyan network. It also responsible for control and operations at all
400kV substations and main 220kV transmission lines that directly impact and control the
power flow through the transmission grid. The lines and substations in this latter category
are not fixed and change according to network configuration. For example, outage of a
400kV transmission line could make the parallel 220kV transmission lines critical to the
network power flow and put them under the control of the NCC, while putting the 400kV
line back in service will return the 220kV lines to the control of the TRCC or BRCC. Where in
doubt, the TRCC and BRCC control engineers will consult with the NCC before taking action
on 220kV elements that might have network-wide implications.
In time of power shortage, it is the NCC that determines the amount of power that needs to
be shed, and the RCC’s (and sometimes the DCC’s as well) that carry out the actual
disconnection of loads. As part of GECOL’s public relations, transparency, and
communications efforts, GECOL updates its official Facebook page with daily estimates of
the hours of power outage expected. This information is provided to GECOL’s PR
department by the NCC manager.
GECOL now has a project to maintain and upgrade the NCC SCADA system. The contract is in
progress, although the work is on hold because of the security situation and payment
difficulties. At a later stage GECOL will also erect a new back up NCC in another city outside
Tripoli, and consider the Tripoli NCC the main. The final configuration for the Control
hierarchy is shown in Figure (5-3).
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90% of the TRCC’s substations have been connected to the new control center, and 95% of
stations have been modelled in the SCADA database. However, as with the NCC, at present
the TRCC has actual access to only 20% of the system due to problems with the
communications links, RTUs, etc. This compares with 90% data available in 2011.
To help resolve some of the connection problems, those due to RTU problems or
incompatibilities, GECOL plans to replace 20 RTUs with Digital Control Systems (DCS) in the
substations. The project is still in the tendering phase.
GECOL has also contracted to carry out maintenance and upgrade of the TRCC SCADA
system, similar to the work on the NCC. The contract is awaiting the opening of a letter of
credit.
Figure (5-4): TRCC Total System Cost Index according to GECOL audits
An initial audit was done in 2010 and achieved a cost score of 4000. As will be noted from
the graph, GECOL was approaching a “Fair” level of data quality. Subsequent to 2011, GECOL
carried out a new audit in 2013 with the support of the system supplier. At the start of the
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audit the score was found to be 15300, a large degradation from 2010. Concerted effort at
solving the data quality problems over the period of the audit reduced the index to 10000.
This was a significant improvement but still well above the 2010 figure of 4000 and far from
the target of achieving Fair to Good data quality assessments. A large cause of the
degradation has been the loss of good quality data available from the stations due to
failures of the telecommunication system, of the substation RTUs and DCS systems, and of
the measurement transducers and other equipment in the substations. It is clear that over
the past years the problems have continued and worsened rather than being resolved.
BRCC control engineers now find themselves in the peculiar situation of having both systems
operational in the control room with a workstation connected to the old Siemens system
and another to the new Alstom system.
Some 70% of the substations under the BRCC control have been modelled in the new SCADA
database, 55% connected. However after reaching a high of 19 substations being accessible
to the operators, now only 7 are visible. Most have been lost to the system because of
communication system failures, in particular loss of much of the fiber optic network.
The security situation led to the supplier withdrawing from the BRCC site before the Site
Acceptance Tests were completed, and a combination of security and financial issues have
thus far prevented the work being completed. GECOL has now reached an agreement with
the supplier to complete the tests remotely, with the GECOL engineers carrying out the
work locally. It is expected this agreement will be implemented in the coming weeks.
GECOL’s assessment is that the staff working on the hardware and software system have
been well trained in line with the project scope and have gained much additional experience
over the past years the system has been in service.
To help resolve some of the connection problems, namely those due to RTU problems or
incompatibilities, GECOL has contracted to replace 19 RTUs with Digital Control Systems
(DCS) in the substations. The project is currently on hold awaiting opening of a letter of
credit to the supplier.
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The project is not turnkey. While the supplier, Siemens, is responsible for the control center
SCADA and DMS systems, GECOL has agreed with ABB on the telecommunications
infrastructure, which is mostly fiber optic cables paralleling the routes of the 30kV cable
networks between substations, and GECOL is directly responsible for the adaptation and
modification works at the substations to prepare them for connection to the new DCS’s.
This combination of responsibilities and division of roles has led to complex project
management demands on coordination between the parties, and GECOL has generally been
behind schedule in delivering the parts of the works under its responsibility.
Of course, the events post 2011 have further complicated matters, and even several of the
control centers that had advanced in the erection works were damaged by the conflict or
subject to vandalism. As a result, GECOL decided to focus on the 5 distribution control
centers with the greatest possibility of completion within a reasonable timeframe, namely
Tripoli, Benghazi, Zawia, Sebha and Misurata, being the control centres most advanced in
their installation works and/or least damaged by the fighting and hostilities. Of these, the
SCADA systems were put in operation in Tripoli, Benghazi and Zawia. By 2014, when works
by the contractor came to a renewed halt, Site Acceptance Tests were almost complete in
Tripoli, well underway in Zawia, and were planned to begin in Benghazi.
Tripoli is in the most advanced state, having been mostly commissioned, but not
contractually handed over, in early 2014, but even here only 60 out of some 104 substations
in the Central Tripoli area that have been commissioned and connected are currently
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actually working and accessible to the Tripoli DCC. This also compares with the total of some
245 substations that are supposed to be connected to the DCC SCADA system covering
Greater Tripoli and outlying regions. Most of the problems are due to RTUs, others to failure
of communication links. A major constraint on expanding the number of substations
working with the SCADA system is staff capabilities. Most of the persons trained by the
contractor on modelling the substations in the control center and entering the data into the
system have transferred out of the DCC, and no one currently working there has the
knowledge to complete the data entry work. Additionally, the system is Unix-based and DCC
staff are not experienced with the operating system. Since the contractor pulled out of Libya
in 2014, GECOL has only now been able to arrange training for one software engineer, to be
held in Tunis.
Despite this, control and monitoring of the Greater Tripoli Medium Voltage network is
dependent on the substations that are accessible and visible to the control room engineers
and the telemetry data received from those substations. Key parts of the central Tripoli
network are visible to the engineers, from which they can derive a general understanding of
the remaining network. Current power outages in Tripoli that can last six hours or more
have acted as an additional constraint. Batteries at the substations are generally old and
provide power to the substation equipment for only some 3 to 4 hours. In some substations
batteries have been replaced and the new battery sets can provide some 6 to 7 hours. Of
course, with power cuts that last 8 or 9 hours, this is still not sufficient.
Other problems faced have been theft of batteries and damage to switchgear by attempts
to steal copper, even from the contact fingers of circuit breaker trucks.
As with the transmission system, actual switchgear operations are manual and carried out
by GECOL operators in the field. Tripoli is divided into 20 operations points, located in one of
the key substations in the city and manned 24/7, with each responsible for around 10
substations. Operators move from the operation points to the substations where switching
or other operations are required.
In 2007 to 2009, GECOL contracted with the Korea power utility KEPCO to develop a set of
distribution standards covering the 66kV, 30kV and 11kV systems and equipment. This
included operations and safety rules. Discussion with the control engineers indicated that
they had no knowledge of these rules and standards. They operated the system based on
their experience and in line with the documents and forms they had in hand, such as the
Permit to Work forms that specified directly some of the safety precautions that needed to
be in place to allow persons to work on the system.
As with the other planned DCC’s, the Tripoli DCC has a second control room for the 11kV
network. This is currently not in use. 11kV control engineers occupy a small office and
monitor and supervise 11kV network operations using pen and paper. This is the situation at
all other 11kV control points in the Libyan network.
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It is worth noting that management responsibility for the two control rooms at the DCC is
split, with the Medium Voltage General Department responsible for the 30kV control room
and the Distribution General Department responsible for the 11kV control room.
With respect to the remaining priority distribution control centers, Benghazi system
installation has been completed and some 80% of the substation and communications
systems have been put in place. Some of the fiber optic cables have since been damaged
and need repair, and the SCADA/DMS system is also in need of an upgrade. At Zawia, over
85% of the communications and substation works have been completed and the central
SCADA/EMS equipment has been installed. Commissioning was begun but not completed in
2014. Also some of the fiber optic cable links have been damaged and require repair. In
Sebha almost all the substation and communication system works have been completed,
but the central SCADA/DMS system was vandalized after installation. In Misurata over 80%
of communication and substation works are completed and the central SCADA/AMS system
installed but not commissioned, and has not been put in service yet.
• To maintain the safety and stability of power grid despite the major damages the
network equipment has been subjected to, to resolve the bottlenecks resulting from
damage to some parts of the transmission system through modifications to the
operational configurations of the grid.
• Coordination with other GECOL departments to address the bottlenecks in the
transmission network and develop suitable solutions to maintain the stability and
flow of power in a manner that assures the ability to carry out and secure a large
number of emergency disconnections on the 400/220kV transmission, all the while
preserving optimal operations of the power grid.
• Coordination with the General Transmission Department to carry out its periodic and
emergency maintenance of the 400/220kV transmission equipment.
• Coordination with the General Generation Department to carry out its programmed
and emergency maintenance of the generating units at the various power generating
plants.
• Calculation of the energy exchanges between Libya and each of Egypt and Tunisia on
monthly and quarterly basis.
• Prepare the daily load forecasts.
• Carry out energy demand balancing studies weekly, monthly, quarterly and annually.
To carry out these duties, the Control Centers depend on three main assets: the
computerised SCADA systems, described in the previous sections, its human operators, and
the procedures and structures put in place to assist and guide the control function. With the
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limited function of the installed SCADA systems, the quality and capabilities of the control
staff and the procedures they follow become all that more critical to successfully manage
and maintain the Libyan power network.
GECOL has realized this fact and contracted with the French RTE International in the mid
and late 2000s to further develop control function capabilities through assessment, training
and certification, and development of the required control related rules and procedures.
This was to be a multi-phase process, but only the initial stages had been completed when
RTE’s participation came to a halt with the events of 2011.
RTE did manage to make an assessment of the control staff and provide basic training for
the NCC, TRCC ad BRCC. GECOL operators have in general received no formal training in
control of power networks other than the basic training provided by RTE in 2010.
RTE also proposed a new delegation of authority and division of responsibilities between the
national and regional control centers. However, the detailed description of the new
distribution of roles was not completed, and rather than enhancing the function of the
control centers it has led to some confusion and uncertainty.
GECOL acted in 2013 to bolster its operations staff, recruiting the best graduates in Power
Engineering from Tripoli University. The knowledge and experience these young engineers,
who now make up almost 40% of the NCC and TRCC operations staff, have gained over the
past four years have allowed the older and more experienced control engineers to focus on
the more critical activities of the Control Centers, acting as shift supervisors and arranging
and coordinating the manual load shedding programs. As a result, and unlike the situation in
Generation, the Control Centers do not face a dangerous generational gap or deficiency in
capable manpower.
As part of its induction program for new control engineers, the Control Department sends
them for a period of 1 to 2 months to work in Transmission substations and around 4
months in power plants to become acquainted with the network, people and work
methods. More recently, because of various constraints these periods have been reduced
from months to weeks, limiting the knowledge the newest engineers have of the systems
they are dealing with and controlling.
These secondments to their counterpart departments are very important in developing both
a mutual understanding and relationship that will simplify and support cooperation
between the control engineers and the station operators and maintenance teams, and
ensure a better response during emergency and abnormal conditions.
At the present time the control centers and their staff continue to follow the procedures
and practices that had existed in the past without their modernization and development in
line with the best international norms. To a large extent these practices and procedures are
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not formally documented but are understood and have become established between the
control personnel and network operators in the generation and transmission systems.
GECOL has written formal, but not comprehensive, safety rules and operation procedures
documents that provide the basic requirements and conditions that need to be met. Also
inherited from past regulations that had been put in place in the 1970’s is the concept of
“Authorised Personnel”. Authorized Personnel are to be found in the control centers,
generation operations and maintenance staff, substation operators, and network
maintenance teams. They are the persons that are permitted to issue operations
instructions and approve issue of permits to work, to carry out the operations of the
generation and transmission infrastructure, and to issue and supervise maintenance
activities.
GECOL has set up two permanent authorization committees, one in the west of Libya based
in Tripoli, and the other in the east based in Benghazi. The Control, Generation,
Transmission and Medium Voltage departments periodically nominate personnel to be
authorized by these committees. The nominees should, in principle, have at least 3 years
experience. The committees subject the nominees to a general written exam that evaluates
their understanding of the control and safety regulations. Those that pass the written exam
then go through an oral and practical exam specific to the area and activity to which they
are to be authorized. While originally authorizations were limited geographically and in the
types of equipment etc that they were allowed to work, this was subsequently broadened
so that, for example, an authorization to operate 220kV switchgear was valid for all 220kV
switchgear throughout Libya.
We would also note that in none of the locations we have visited, including control centers,
maintenance departments, substations, and power stations, were GECOL’s published safety
rules and operations regulations easily available and on hand when we requested to see
them.
GECOL, with the assistance of its Italian consultant CESI, has also developed a Network
Defense Plan to protect the power network and generation plants and help prevent major
events such as blackouts. This plan was put into operation in 2009 and included automatic
underfrequency load shedding and network islanding schemes. Since then the network has
faced major power shortages, large manual shedding of network loads, network operation
at lower than nominal frequency, changes to the network configuration due to loss of
several transmission lines and substations, and connection of a number of new generating
units. All these significantly infringe on the basic design assumptions of the original Defence
Plan. These developments have required GECOL to reconsider the defence plan and to make
adjustments to the original scheme.
In 2012, CESI undertook with GECOL to carry out an update to the Defence Plan. Events and
circumstances in Libya prevented this work from being concluded. GECOL then proceeded
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to revise the plan on its own. Due to constraints on time and other resources, the changes
to the Defense Plan were made based on network knowledge, operational experience, and a
strong engineering sense rather than on modelling and simulation studies of the power
network.
To ensure secure operation of the GECOL power network, GECOL needs to carry out new
comprehensive studies to develop the defense plan in line with the development and
changes in the power grid, including the impact of new generation, and in particular the
new Ubari power station in the far south west of Libya.
Of course, in the current security environment in Libya a major problem faced by the control
engineers at the control centers is having operators at the substations follow the
instructions to switch off loads as part of the manual load shedding plan to deal with the
acute power shortages. The substation operators are all too often threatened with force by
local militias and others to prevent them switching off the local loads, and they therefore
will not follow instructions. This situation is compounded by the fact that the NCC, TRCC and
BRCC do not remotely operate the switchgear and are dependent on human operators
having access on site to the switchgear to be operated. It has been estimated that external
threats and similar factors influence and prevent load shedding on around 15% to 20% of
network loads. The exact figure can vary from day to day and is subject to negotiations and
agreements with various factions and regions. Recent blackouts have also strongly
supported GECOL’s argument to the general populace of the need to shed load to protect
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the power network from more severe disruptions. This has helped reduce, but not
eliminate, pressure and actions that block operators from shedding load manually.
Shift duty at the control centers is normally on a weekly rotation of 8 hours, moving from
morning, to afternoon to night and then 1 week off. During the current power shortages and
manual load shedding requirements, the NCC and TRCC have moved to a 24 hour rota to be
in line with the shift duty at the substations, to ensure that operators at the substation are
dealing with the same Control Engineer throughout and avoid confusion and errors. The
NCC and TRCC have also temporarily merged into a single control to further focus the
availability of qualified staff to deal with the current circumstances.
Shift engineers and the shift supervisors are delegated with limited responsibilities. They
can deal with routine matters and most daily network requirements, but major decisions
and matters that relate to outages have to be approved by or agreed with the Control
Center Manager. The Manager (or his delegated deputy) is therefore considered on call and
required to be available 24 hours a day, every day.
In our view, the biggest problem control of the Libyan network is facing in the current power
shortage situation is almost continuous operation with no spinning reserve. In fact, this is
not a new situation. We have been informed that through most of the 2000’s the GECOL
network has been operated with little or no slack in its power generating capacity. However,
the current backlog of maintenance works and added ageing of the generating units means
the units are in a worse position to react to network incidents and makes the loss of units in
such events more likely, and also makes it more likely there will be additional difficulties in
getting generating units back on line after they are tripped. This further compounded by the
limited functionality of the control centers’ SCADA systems. The control operators have a
more limited view of developments in the power network and therefore will have a slower
response to deal with situations as they develop.
The greatest indication of the stress the Libyan power network is under and the threat that
represents to network stability is the frequency situation. GECOL has often had to reduce
the network operating to below the nominal 50Hz, at times for sustained periods as low as
49.6Hz. As a result, the Control Dept has had to lower the frequency excursion limit from a
lower limit of 49.75Hz to 49.5Hz. Despite this, the network frequency has exceeded the new
limit some 1,170,104 times in the third quarter of 2016. The reason can be clearly seen in
Figure (5-6), compared with Figure (5-7) and their superposition in Figure (5-8). In the
former the extreme variations in frequency is extreme as loads are shed and reconnected,
the frequency was under 49.5Hz for 3.55 hours, and fell as low 48.86 Hz, all an indication of
the slow manual response of the system to the power shortage and load shedding
conditions. In the latter the frequency is much more stable, never falling to less than
49.75Hz. The frequency variation that is displayed in this case would appear to be a strong
argument for the need to put AGC functionality back in service.
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Figure (5-6): Network frequency over 24 hours during power shortage (14/08/2017)
Figure (5-7): Network frequency over 24 hours during no power shortage (30/09/2017)
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Figure (5-8): superposition of the network frequencies in Figures (6) and (7) above
GECOL has faced a number of blackouts in both the Western and Eastern power networks,
which have been isolated from each other for most of the past three years. All the blackout
events in the western network have been instigated by a transmission network fault. While
each event needs to be studied on its own and the reasons each developed into a blackout
determined, and from that the suitable corrective and preventive actions can be
determined, it is also true that general factors that help maintain network stability and
speed up the response of network control engineers to contain such incidents and prevent
them becoming blackouts almost certainly include:
GECOL is currently lacking both, and priority should be given to putting them back in place.
To fully analyze system events and carry out a detailed post mortem, fault and event
recorders distributed throughout the power network and time synchronised by GPS signals
are critical. GECOL has fault recorders in most substations, but many are not operational.
This is another important action to help deal with the critical system events GECOL has been
facing. We note that GECOL is working to import some 16 new IDM digital fault recorders,
which is an important and commendable first step.
In general, it has been noted that there is difficulty in collecting all information necessary to
properly analyze fault events because of the wide departmental and geographic area that
normally has to be dealt with. It might be advisable for GECOL to consider setting up at least
one interdepartmental team whose members would be senior engineers from all relevant
departments (Control, Transmission, Medium Voltage, Distribution, and
Telecommunications) and geographic regions. The team should have the authority to obtain
records and logs as well as carry out interviews. They should be able to initiate
investigations on their own initiative following system events and not await instructions
from the Managing Director or other GECOL authority. Their remit should be to determine
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the (technical) causes of incidents and provide advice and recommendations to prevent
similar happenings in the future, not to lay blame or cause punishment.
The GECOL Control General Department does, of course, also carry out its own
investigations of system events, through its Operations Studies Departments. Of the four
blackouts that have occurred in 2017 to date, it has noted that:
- Outage of some transmission lines has reduced the operational reliability of the
GECOL power system
- All blackouts were triggered by a fault in the transmission network, followed by loss
of generating units
- The Southern Region has suffered from voltage instabilities
- The power network displayed significant frequency rise following the initial
transmission fault clearance
- The data that could be collected on the frequency and voltage response of the
power system to the initial transmission fault and clearance pointed to the possibility
a phenomenon known as “Fault-induced delayed voltage recovery” (FIDVR) as being
the cause of the frequency rise and loss of generation. This phenomenon has been
noted to occur in networks with very large inductive motor loads, and in particular
air conditioning loads.
That the Libyan network is saturated by air conditioning loads is well known and easily
confirmed by the fact that over a 2 week period in September 2017, with the end of
summer and moderate temperatures prevailing, the Libyan peak load fell by almost
2000MW, mainly because consumers did not need to use their air conditioning. If this is the
main cause of the recent blackouts, there are no confirmed solutions to the problem, and it
deserves more study and evaluation in the Libyan context to determine possible corrective
and preventive measures.
5.1.7 Telecommunications
The impact of the telecommunications system on the SCADA system has been made clear in
the previous sections.
With so little of the telemetry and telecontrol available to the control engineers, voice
communications with on site operators becomes critical, both to be informed of the
situation on the ground and to give instructions to the operators. GECOL has a multi-level
system of voice communications that provides a degree of redundancy.
At the highest level is GECOL’s private telephone network carried over GECOL’s fiber optic
system, mostly OPGW. This provides the best and most secure communications medium. In
parts of the network the fiber optic is backed up by power line carrier (PLC) communications
links.
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At the next level, AlMadar mobile phone company has provided GECOL with a private
mobile communications network, carried on Madar’s public mobile network. User’s on this
network use special mobile handsets that can only call other users with similar handsets.
Mobile VHF radio is also used as a backup communications medium in some towns and
cities. UHF fixed radio is available for communications with far off stations, particularly in
the desert regions.
At the lowest level is the normal public mobile telephone network and fixed line telephones.
In communications with the control centers in the neighboring networks of Egypt and
Tunisia, the NCC uses normal landlines telephones and email. Originally, biannual meetings
were also organized for face to face discussions between the sides, but these have been
discontinued in recent years due to local and international circumstances.
The critical element in the telecommunications setup is GECOL’s fiber optic network. There
are at least 47 complete or partial cuts and breakages in the fiber optic OPGW conductor in
31 of GECOL’s 400kV and 220kV overhead lines.
Reasons for continued outage of so many parts of the OPGW links have included insufficient
experience and knowledge by the overhead crews in working with OPGW conductors and
the difficulties in arranging outages for many of the affected lines because of the disruptions
this will cause in the power network, isolating some power plants and causing additional
power loss to consumers over and above the load shedding they are already suffering.
Demand side management endeavours aim to control or limit the demand for electric
energy. They can be designed to reduce or redistribute the peak demand for power, i.e.
reduce the value of peak load, or to reduce the overall demand for electricity, thereby
reducing the annual energy consumption. While both are important and relevant to GECOL,
the priority in the short to medium term should focus more on reducing peak power
demand.
GECOL implemented the first phases of a Demand Side Management study in 2010. The
study determined the average daily load curve during the summer and winter peak periods
and the contribution of each consumer sector to the load curve, as well as a breakdown of
the end-use contribution to this demand. These results are presented in Figures (5-9) to (5-
12).
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• In the winter peak loads the residential and commercial sectors are the largest
contributors to the peak demand
o Together they constitute 51% of the total demand
• In the summer peak loads residential and public lighting sectors are the largest
contributors to the peak demand
o Together they represent 42% of the total demand
Subsequent reviews cast doubt on the size of public lighting demand, and considered it had
been overestimated by up to 10%.
From the figures we can see that there is considerable potential to reduce peak loads
through promoting the use of more energy efficient equipment such air conditioners, water
heaters and lighting. Encouraging the shift to solar water heating is also an option. Large
irrigation demand could also be replaced with solar powered water pumping and irrigation
systems.
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• Low quality of data received at control centers. In addition to the problems in the
fiber optic network, there are problems at other points of the data chain, from the
transducers, relays and contacts supplying the data at the substations and power
stations, to the RTU and DCS systems of those stations, to the telecommunications
terminal equipment. From GECOL’s own experience, it is not always easy to
determine, or even follow up, the source of the data supply problem, with different
parts of the data chain being the responsibility of different departments. The best
results have been obtained when multi-disciplinary, multi-departmental groups were
formed to follow up, in coordination with the control centers, problem data points
and to determine, as a team, the source of the problem. The relevant member of the
team then takes action to resolve the problem.
• GECOL needs to resume work on the delayed control centers projects. GECOL’s plans
for the NCC, TRCC, BRCC and DCC’s are all important for the efficient, stable and safe
operation of the power system and to provide the best service to GECOL’s customer
base. Fulfilment of these contracts needs to receive as high a management priority
as work towards overhauling power stations and providing new generation capacity.
• Training of staff. Control engineers require additional training on the use of the
advanced EMS functions available in the national and regional control centers and
the DMS functionality of the distribution control centers. Software and hardware
engineers require additional training on the substation DCS systems. Overhead line
teams and telecommunication engineers require additional training to deal with the
problems on the fiber optic network. Training on substation modelling and data
entry is particularly required for the distribution control centers, not least at Tripoli
DCC. Distribution control engineers need complete retraining to be able to use the
11kV control room and facilities at the Tripoli DCC.
• Utilize SCADA control capabilities. GECOL needs to move away from dependence on
human operators for all control operations at substations, and use the control
capabilities of the installed SCADA systems. This will improve reliability, accuracy and
speed of operations and remove one layer of possible human error, and almost
eliminate the external threats operators currently face.
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incidents and events. This should be an accepted part of network operations even
under power shortage situations. It is in fact under these circumstances in which the
network is already stressed and stretched that the spinning reserve could spell the
difference between short time load shedding affecting a limited number of
consumers and longer time recovery from a blackout affecting all consumers.
• Renew the contract with RTE or a new contract along similar lines to help fully
qualify control staff and update or develop the rules and regulations, such as a Grid
Code and formal safety rules, necessary for the most efficient and safe operation of
the power system.
• Implementation of DSM projects can help reduce demand and mitigate the need for
some of the new large power stations and expansion of existing power stations.
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Est. budget
Measures Activities Start date Indicative duration Milestones
(USD Mn)
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Est. budget
Measures Activities Start date Indicative duration Milestones
(USD Mn)
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3. Operational deficiencies
Est. budget
Measures Activities Start date Indicative duration Milestones
(USD Mn)
Utilize SCADA control Utilize SCADA control capabilities at existing control 80%-90% of SCADA system
01/01/2018 Ongoing
functionalities centres to carry system control functions control funct. In use
Reinstate AGC
Reinstate AGC functions at NCC and power stations 01/01/2019 6 months All AGC are operating
functionality
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4. Skills shortage
Est. budget
Measures Activities Start date Indicative duration Milestones
(USD Mn)
Train MV and Distribution control engineers on the MV All control staff trained
01/01/2020 1 year
and Distribution control facilities in the new DCCs and certified
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Table (6-3) shows the GECOL investment in medium voltage overhead lines since 2007:
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The major obstacles delaying the installations of the 16-2002 and 18-2007 contracts are
security issues, reluctance of foreign contractors to come to Libya, and objections of land
owners.
In addition to the above mentioned contracts, GECOL had contracted in 2010 for the
maintenance of about 1500km of 30kV and 66kV overhead lines with one of its subsidiary
companies (contract no. 2/2013), but GECOL couldn't open the LC of this contract due
budgetary constraints.
1 N2XCY 1×400 R/V 8.7/15 kV For connecting the power transformers 66/11kV and
30/11kV to the 11kV main switchboard
2 N2XSAY 1×630 R/V 18/30 kV For sub-transmitting power in high density populated
areas
3 N2XCEBY 3×240 R/V 18/30 kV For sub-transmitting power in low density populated
areas
4 N2XSY 1×500 R/V 36/66 kV For sub-transmitting power in high density populated
areas
Since 2013 GECOL renewed its specification and changed to use Aluminum in the medium
voltage network and the standard cables since then have become as follows:
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1 NA2XS2Y 1×630 R/V 8.7/15 kV For connecting the power transformers 66/11kV and
30/11kV to the 11kV main switchboard
2 NA2XS2Y 1×630 R/V 18/30 kV For sub-transmitting power in high density populated
areas
3 NA2XCEBY 3×240 R/V 18/30 kV For sub-transmitting power in low density populated
areas
4 NA2XS(FL)2Y 1×630 R/V 36/66 For sub-transmitting power in high density populated
kV areas
The most recent investment in medium voltage cables was in 2010 with the following
quantities:
Description Quantities in km
1 36kV, XLPE cable 1x630mm (N2XSAY 1×630 R/V 18/30kV)
2
300
2 36kV, XLPE 3X240mm (N2XCEBY 3×240 R/V 18/30kV)
2
100
3 72.5kV, XLPE cable 1x500mm (N2XSY 1×500 R/V 36/66kV)
2
100
Table (6-6): New investments in MV cables from 2010
Most of these quantities have not been installed according to their original plan, and instead
they have been used as solutions for the war damages. GECOL had called for a tender to
procure 2800km NA2XS2Y 1×630 R/V 18/30 kV cable, and 600 NA2XS(FL)2Y 1×630 R/V
36/66 kV cable, but budgetary constraints stopped the tendering process since 2015.
6.1.2 Description of 66kV & 30kV lines (cables and overhead lines) population
In this section we will consider 66kV and 30kV underground cables and overhead lines
(collectively to be called MV lines). In total there are approximately 21,000km of MV lines:
8853km of 30kV overhead lines and cables and about 12174km of 66kV overhead lines and
cables. These are distributed among regions according to Table (7):
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3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500 30kV feeders
0
66kV feeders
Figure (6-1) shows that all regions except Tripoli have considerable lengths of 66kV feeders
(the majority of which are overhead lines). Tripoli, Western, and Benghazi are characterized
more by 30kV feeders (the majority of which are underground cables).
The sharp increases in fault rates after 2011 are attributed to war damages and difficulties
facing maintenance staffs. Comparing the fault rates in 30kV network, 66kV network, and
the primary 11kV network originating from 66/11kV and 30/11kV substations in the
following Figure (6-3) and chart will shed lights on other issues.
1. The fault rates of the primary 11kV lines are much less than those of 30kV and 66kV
feeders. Considering that numbers and lengths of the primary 11kV feeders are at
least four times the numbers and lengths of the 66kV and 30kV feeders, we conclude
that there are real technical issues with medium voltage lines.
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2. The fault rates per kilometer of the 30kV lines (the majority of which are
underground cables) are, surprisingly, more than the double of the fault rates of the
66kV lines (the majority of which are overheadlines).
Analysis will therefore be focused on the 30kV cables network in the following section.
- Laying the cables with excessive tension, without controlling the tension torque and
without using rolling pulleys (reels). Lack of experienced and capable cable
contractors equipped with the correct tools and equipment in many parts of the
country is the main reason for this incorrect practice.
- Metallic screens of most of single core cables are bonded to ground at both ends
regardless the cable lengths. This causes excessive induced currents in the metallic
screens and overheating. The following photographs were taken in GECOL medium
voltage substations.
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The Ammeter is
clipped on the
earthing tails of
the metallic
screens of the
30kV cable
- Cross-bonding and single-point bonding are proper solutions for the screened single
core cables according to IEEE Std519, but unfortunately were not well practiced at
GECOL as evidenced in the following photographs.
- Another important issue is that the cable screen specification can withstand only 5kA
fault current for one second. This condition is based on grounding the neutral of the
220/30kV transformers via 10 Ohms resistor. In practice many transformers
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supplying the GECOL MV network are solidly grounded and the fault current exceeds
5kA. This has caused fire and damage in many sections of many MV lines.
- Replacement of about 200 minimum oil BBC circuit breakers, retrofitting with ABB
vacuum circuit breakers.
- Replacement of all the protective relays.
- Renewal of control wiring
GECOL also has around 33 GEC 30/11kV substations with type HMX switchgear installed in
the 1990's. The circuit breakers are vacuum type and SF6 insulated. These substations need
spare parts as well as complete new switchgear panels to carry out substation extensions.
These requirements would include:
Finally, GECOL has about 83 old and deteriorated substations that must be completely
replaced with new substations. The details of these substations are:
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- Not-in-service circuit breakers of faulty feeders are usually withdrawn and left
outside their compartments.
Being left outside the protection of its compartment, the circuit breaker is exposed
to dust and moisture accumulation that affect the moving parts of the mechanism.
Moreover, operators sometimes would remove parts from breakers that are outside
their compartments to be used as spare parts for other units.
- Both the substation building specification and the index of protection of the
switchgear are not suitable to protect the breaker mechanism against dust.
The substation doors and windows are often open and cannot prevent entry of dust
even when they are closed. The index of protection according to GECOL
specifications is IP3X or IP4X. These two factors affected dramatically the service life
of the switchgear mechanisms.
These photos show MV switchgear with panel doors left partly open, breakers left racked out.
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- In newer GIS type switchgear such as Schneider GHA and Siemens 8DA10, some of
the above issues have been inherently mitigated by the GIS design. However, even in
these GIS substations there have been multiple bay failures or that are out of service.
This has been attributed to gas leakage and incorrect switchgear erection.
- Un-ordered and even chaotic cable laying in the cable trench without cable cleats
and without cable trays, open trenches left uncovered, the presence of bare
grounding conductors touching the jackets of power cables, and litter collecting
inside the trench all help to initiate fire, burn cable jackets. In addition to potential
damage to cables, rising smoke can infiltrate switchgear and cause flash over on any
exposed HV parts.
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performance improvement. In total there are approximately 1500 such transformers in the
GECOL network with a MEAV of around €337.0 million. The total is broken down into:
On average, isolation or fault of the remaining transformer at these substations will lead to
local loss of supply to around 7.5MW for periods of several hours to several days, depending
on the position of the supply ring connection on the 11kV side, or until the transformer is
replaced.
30/11kV S/S’s with one transformer 66/11kV S/S’s with one transformer
Tripoli 45
Western Region 22 1
Benghazi 12 4
Green Mountain 8 4
Southern 15
Totals 87 24
Table (6-10): MV substations operating with one transformer
In addition, while the events between 2011 and 2017 have led to damage of many existing
power transformers, it has also halted the construction of new substations related to Libya’s
frozen development projects. This has allowed GECOL to exploit the transformers imported
for these new substations as replacements for network’s faulty and damaged transformers.
The ministry of Electricity also contracted in 2014 for 169 20MVA 30/11kV transformers,
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and 63 20MVA 66/11kV transformers. These new transformers began arriving in GECOL’s
warehouses in 2015.
Green
Tripoli Benghazi Western Central Southern Total
Mountain
30/11kV transformers 394 232 198 144 62 0 1030
66/11kV transformers 6 96 72 106 108 136 524
Table (6-11): MV power transformers by region
From Figure (6-4) we note that the 30/11kV transformers are concentrated in coastal areas
and exposed to severe moisture and corrosion. The 66/11kV transformers are located in
more rural areas and many are in southern parts of Libya further from the coast.
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Statistics of failed Medium Voltage Power Transformers in the period 2012 to 2016 are
listed in the tables below.
The average failure rate for 30/11kV transformers is 9% per annum, the average number of
annually failed 30/1kV transformers is 91 transformers, and the average rate of failure for
66/11kV transformers is 11% per annum, with the average number of failed transformers
annually 56 transformers. This is a relatively high failure rate for such transformers. It is
necessary to carry out a more detailed analysis looking at failure rates prior to 2011 to
determine if the cause relates to armed conflict and similar events or if there are innate
reasons related to the power network operations and maintenance regimen.
Table (6-16) provides the failure rates of power transformers in the years 2007 to 2009.
We see that in fact GECOL has high MV transformer failure rates reaching 10% and 13% per
annum for many years. The trend in the annually failed power transformers (Table 6-17 and
Figure 6-5) does not indicate any planned improvement or attempts to reduce the failure
rate. We attempt here to analyze more deeply these failure rates despite the scarcity of
data.
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Figure (6-6) relates transformer failures to seasons through quarterly failure data between
2007 and 2016. There is no clear correlation between seasons or climate and fault rates.
There are also neither temperature rise trips nor overcurrent trips recorded for the power
transformers, which would imply that the transformers are not exposed to any sustained
overloading.
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2008 2009
2007 30 60 40
40 30
20
30kV Series1 20 30kV
10 66kV 20 Series2 10 66kV
0 0 0
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2016 2016 4 2 3 1
50 2015 4 3 1 --
40 2012 1 4 3 2
30 30kV 2011 1 2 -- --
20 2009 3 1 4 2
66kV
10
2008 1 3 4 2
2007 3 2 4 1
0
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
- Transformer Oil:
The specifications of the transformer oils GECOL uses are excellent. They are supplied to
GECOL in drums, but are usually not treated before use. GECOL installation staff and
contractors are used to directly filling the transformers with the untreated oil without
drying first. The moist oil will transfer moisture to insulating papers and lead to damage
of the transformers. Recorded transformer protection trips are mostly by differential
protection and Buchholz protection. These normally are very selective and will only
operate for internal transformer faults. GECOL appears to pay only limited attention to
the transformer installation and commissioning procedures, especially those carried out
by GECOL staff or its domestic contractors. An added problem is the limited number of
oil treatment machines available, which is a further reason for maintenance teams to
add untreated oil to transformers during maintenance works.
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- Voltage Management:
We note that all On-Load Tap Changers of GECOL’s power transformers are set on the
manual position. This means that the medium voltage (30kV and 66kV) networks are
susceptible to overvoltages, especially during off-peak times. Overvoltages greater than
110% of the rated voltage can result in over fluxing and saturation of the magnetic
circuits of the transformers, and hence overheating and damage to the transformer.
Although GECOL's specifications stipulate a flux density of 1.65 Tesla to protect against
overvoltages, GECOL does not actually take any action to guarantee compliance of
manufacturers to this requirement. This requirement can only be confirmed by the
staged inspection of the magnetic circuit including magnetic steel procurement and
magnetic steel shearing.
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• Problems with substation Dc supply systems and batteries lead to shortened battery
lives, loss of substation auxiliary supplies in a relatively short period after loss of
external supplies, and early replacement of battery sets
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7 Distribution
7.1 Introduction
GECOL’s distribution assets include:
We will consider here the availability of these assets, the reasons for non-availability, fault
rates, operating regimens, and recommendations for performance improvement.
Transformers
Pole Mounted
stations
Switching
switchboard
LV main
LV cables *
Total numbers or lengths 15235 53588 10821 40862 1619 11029 11029 43282
Average unit investment
€10,300 €4,800 €60000 €10645 €160,000 €6363 €4500 €36000
cost
Grand Total €3,435,378,917
* LV cables are estimates as 4 times 11kV cables lengths
Table (7-1): Total distribution assets
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protection or is noticeably being overloaded. We cover here the actual strategy for each
type of asset.
GECOL has made an attempt to carry out a recycling plan, replacing the 500kVA overloaded
transformers with the overloaded 1000kVA transformers from other locations, replacing the
1000kVA transformers with 1500kVA transformers, and exploiting the replaced 500kVA
transformers for new connections. This process is known as "Transformer Rotation".
Transformer rotation was unsuccessful in most cases for two main reasons. First, the
overloaded transformers usually had already been exposed to high temperatures over
prolonged periods, leading to increased acidity of the transformer oil and deterioration of
the internal copper connections. Second, the handling during transportation of such
deteriorated transformer was usually sufficient to result in the subsequent failure of the
transported transformer when put in service in its new location.
GECOL’s investment over the past five years (2013 to 2017) in distribution transformers has
exceeded €189.1million, an amount calculated from the transformer procurement invoices
for the period 2013 to 2017). This points to around 46% of GECOL’s distribution
transformers are less than five years old, relatively new. Table (7-2) shows the details of
transformers procured since 2013.
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failure rate, limited current carrying capacity, and the special transition joints they require
were, and continue to be, the main reasons pushing for their replacement.
Low voltage cables remain in service unless the cable is entirely burnt out. In actual practice,
the rate at which low voltage cables are burnt out because of exposure to sustained faults
or severe overloading cannot be ignored. New cables are all installed with good protective
devices (MCCB with overload and short circuit protection), but the multiple trippings of
overloaded cables leads, in many occasions, to the distribution technicians cancelling the
protective device and connecting the cable directly to the switchboard busbar. In addition,
an epidemic of thefts of station materials, including copper elements and MCCB's, were an
indirect cause of damage to many low voltage cables.
Since 2012 GECOL has changed its investment strategy towards aluminum conductors
instead of copper to ward off some of the thefts directed at high-priced copper. GECOL also
changed its insulation material specification from PVC to XLPE to compensate for the lower
current carrying capacity of the aluminum cables. In parallel to this GECOL has changed the
rating of the main low voltage MCCB's from 400A to 320A to further protect the aluminum
cables. The investment by GECOL over the past five years (2013 to 2017) in distribution
cables exceeded €93million. Table (7-3) gives the details of cables procured since 2013.
In recent years, and in consideration of the difficulties being faced in substation building
construction, GECOL’s investment strategy has shifted towards package substations, with
more than 1000 package substations having been procured in the last six years. This is a
positive development. On the other hand, however, GECOL continues to install switching
stations in contradiction to its own design standard. GECOL’s design standards recommend
a simple configuration of distribution circuits. Each circuit originates from and ends at
30/11kV substation and feeds up to 8 distribution substations, with no switching stations in
the ring. This scheme is reliable, flexible, cost effective, and simple to operate and maintain.
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Prior to this design standard, the switching stations were a mainstay of the distribution
network. The network was complicated, it was difficult to coordinate the protections, and
expensive to maintain or to rehabilitate the equipment. While GECOL is phasing out and
replacing old switching stations with RMU’s in some locations, it continues to construct new
switching stations in other locations.
GECOL investment over the past five years (2013 to 2017) in distribution substations,
including package substations and switching stations, has exceeded €78.5million as shown
in Table (7-4). Note that a considerable part of this investment is still not delivered to
GECOL.
Mountain
Tarhoona
Benghazi
Southern
Aljufara
Western
Western
Central
Zlieten
Tripoli
Gurian
Derna
Green
Sahel
Region
No. of transformers 4328 2783 2088 1338 982 797 719 473 437 427 353 261 249
Table (7-5): Ground mounted distribution transformers by region
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4500
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
Middile
Benghazi
Tarhoona
Tripoli
Zlieten
Der na
Western
Southern
Sahel Aljufara
Gurian
Green Mountain
Elmergep
… Western
Fig (7-1): Ground mounted distribution transformers by region
Figure (7-1) shows that a considerable number of ground-mounted transformers are located
in the coastal area and hence exposed to severe atmospheric conditions such as moisture
and corrosion.
Mountain
Mountain
Tarhoona
Benghazi
Southern
Aljufara
Western
Western
Middle
Zlieten
Tripoli
Gurian
Derna
Green
Total
Sahel
Region
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9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
All regions have a larger number of pole mounted transformers than ground mounted,
except for the Tripoli region (Figure 7-3). This type of asset is very important to GECOL and
should receive adequate attention in its design, installation, operation and maintenance.
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
No. of pole mounted
3000
Transformers
2000
1000 No. of Pad mounted
0 Transformers
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Mountain
Mountain
Tarhoona
Benghazi
Southern
Aljufara
Western
Western
Gharian
Middle
Region
Tripoli
Totals
Green
Sahel
Dist. S/S 919 1521 2637 271 834 681 348 3227 211 380 11029
SW S/S 143 260 193 55 54 67 66 691 38 52 1619
Table (7-7): Distribution stations by region
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000 Dist. S/S
500 SW S/S
0
Sahel Aljufara
Tarhoona
Benghazi
Southern
Western
Middle
Region
Tripoli
Gurian
U/G cables [km] 896 1395 2336 87.8 625 1301 169 3446 122 442.4
O/H lines [km] 4735 5990 7326 3277 3531 5121 1962 4674 2046 2200
Table (7-8): Distribution lines by region
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8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000 U/G cables [km[
1000 O/H lines [km[
0
Transformer condition assessment and monitoring plans should equally focus on the
existing units operating in the grid for many years. Thus, a comprehensive transformers
condition monitoring and assessment in addition to the routine maintenance system should
be widely implemented by GECOL’s distributed department to cater for this important
component of the network which will significantly improve supply reliability and reduce
technical losses at the distribution level.
The statistics on failure of ground-mounted transformers in the period 2012 to 2016 are
presented in Tables (7-9) to (7-13).
Region No. of G.M. Tr's in service Failed G.M. Tr's Failed G.M.Tr%
Tripoli 4793 73 1.52%
Green Mountain 1236 18 1.46%
Benghazi 2743 21 0.77%
Western 1693 23 1.36%
Southern 719 7 0.97%
Middle 2299 26 1.13%
Total 13483 162 1.20%
Table (7-9): Failures of ground mounted transformers in 2012
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Region No. of G.M. Tr's in service Failed G.M. Tr's Failed G.M Tr%
Tripoli 4980 46 0.92%
Green Mountain 1236 31 2.51%
Benghazi 2755 37 1.34%
Western 1693 24 1.42%
Southern 719 23 3.20%
Middle 1623 39 2.40%
Total 13006 200 1.54%
Table (7-10): Failures of ground mounted transformers in 2013
Region No. of G.M. Tr's in service Failed G.M. Tr's Failed G.M Tr%
Tripoli 4885 38 0.78%
Green Mountain 1095 14 1.28%
Benghazi 2773 58 2.09%
Western 1674 25 1.49%
Southern 626 14 2.24%
Middle 1644 24 1.46%
Total 12697 173 1.36%
Table (7-11): Failures of ground mounted transformers in 2014
Region No. of G.M. Tr's in service Failed G.M. Tr's Failed G.M Tr%
Tripoli 4210 84 2.00%
Green Mountain 1201 36 3.00%
Benghazi 2737 62 2.27%
Western 1672 67 4.01%
Southern 748 12 1.60%
Middle 1971 37 1.88%
Total 12539 298 2.38%
Table (7-12): Failures of ground mounted transformers in 2015
Region No. of G.M. Tr's in service Failed G.M. Tr's Failed G.M Tr%
Tripoli 3481 39 1.12%
Green Mountain 1240 16 1.29%
Benghazi 2737 53 1.94%
Western 1797 38 2.11%
Southern 748 10 1.34%
Middle 3141 29 0.92%
Total 13144 185 1.41%
Table (7-13): Failures of ground mounted transformers in 2016
The average rate of transformer failures is 1.6% per annum, and the average number of
annually failed ground-mounted transformers is 208 transformers.
The trend of the annually failed ground mounted transformers (Figure 7-6 and Table 7-14)
do not indicate any planned improvement efforts or attempts to reduce the failure rate, and
the random increase and decrease in failure rate would point to the influence of many other
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external factors other than simple aging. Those external factors may include the climatic
conditions, the quality of the newly procured transformers, and other factors.
7.5.1.1 Analysis of ground mounted transformers failures per the quarters of year
An analysis of failure rates per quarter year should point to any seasonal influence on
failures. We will consider the failure rates for the year of 2013 because the data for this year
is readily available for all four quarters. The first quarter represents the winter season which
is very cold in the Eastern region and in the Western Mountain region, the second quarter
represents the spring season which is quite mild and power loading is minimal, the third
quarter represents the summer season which is very hot in the Western and Southern
regions and the power loading is at its peak values, and the fourth quarter represents the
fall season at the end of which lightning storms are noticeable. Table (7-15) and Figure (7-7)
demonstrate the rates of ground mounted transformer failures during the different
seasons/quarters of 2013.
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14
12
10
1st Quarter
8
2nd Quarter
6
4 3rd Quarter
2 4th Quarter
0
Tripoli Green Benghazi Western Southern Middile
Mountain
It is clear from Figure (7-7) that there is a significantly higher rate of failures corresponding
to the winter and summer seasons. This would indicate that failure rates of ground
mounted transformers can be at least partly attributed to the heavy loads of heating in
winter and air conditioning in summer which can often result in overloading of the
transformers. The other seasons also have considerable rates of transformer failures which
we cannot attribute to overloading, but there are many other factors that influence the
failure rate of the transformers as noted from our discussions and site visits to GECOL sites,
and which will be analyzed in the next section.
The majority of ground-mounted transformers procured before 2007 (the year in which
GECOL established the specification standard for the distribution facilities) are equipped
with outdoor bushings and arcing horns and are only suitable to receive bare conductors
from overhead lines. Those transformers were installed in indoor substations and connected
to underground cables. The absence of a cable box leaves the energized conductive parts
exposed, constituting a danger to personnel, and more than one fatal accident has been
recorded. Short-circuits resulting from small animals such as rodents and cats managing to
enter the substation through open doors and windows, unprotected ventilation openings,
and cable trenches, and touching live parts were also the direct cause of many transformer
failures. The photographs below show one example of these exposed transformer
connections, and a large number of such installations still exist in all regions of Libya.
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Transformers procured more recently in accordance with GECOL’s new specifications are all
equipped with elbow type terminals and this issue has been completely resolved.
Transformers complying with the new specification procured after 2013 account for about
6000 transformer installations, i.e. about 39% of the total. However, the remaining older
61% of installed ground- mounted transformers require urgent corrective actions including
removal of arcing horns, and covering the exposed conductive parts.
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
Total installed pad Transformers
mounted installed since 2013
transformers with correct specs
Figure (7-8): Total ground mounted transformers vs transformers complying with new
specifications
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The main issue with the overloaded ground mounted transformers is that they are not
effectively protected against overloading, and not effectively cooled. The transformers
themselves are fitted with thermal protection (thermometer with electrical contacts), but
these are not properly connected to the tripping device to disconnect the transformer,
despite all transformer switches and breakers being fitted with trip coils prepared to
receiving tripping signals from temperature rise thermometers and Buchholz relays. Further,
the ventilation hatches of most transformer buildings are under-sized and don’t provide
adequate natural cooling to the ground mounted transformers. Prolonged overloading of
transformers adversely affects the transformer life, compounded by the poor cooling
conditions and poor protection measures. The photograph below shows how the lower
ventilation hatch is too small compared to the transformer size and how it is unintentionally
closed.
It is noted that almost all on-load tap changers of the power transformers in the GECOL
network are normally set to the manual position. This means they do not automatically
correct for voltage variations and therefore the 11kV network is susceptible to overvoltages
during off-peak times. Table (7-17) shows a portion of voltage profile of one 11kV
substation.
The voltage rises to almost 110% of rated voltage, and this can result in over fluxing and
saturation of the magnetic circuits of the transformers, and hence burning the transformer
out. This can be a main cause of transformer failure in the off-peak season and especially at
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The scarcity of oil treatment machines has forced maintenance teams to add new untreated
oil to the existing transformers, allowing moisture to enter the transformer and be absorbed
by the solid insulating materials, thereby damaging the transformers over time.
From the tables we find the average rate of transformer failures is 4.26% per annum, and
the average number of annually failed pole-mounted transformers is 2094transformers.
The trend of the annually failed pole mounted transformers (Figure 7-9 and Table 7-23) do
not show any planned improvement efforts or attempts to reduce the failure rate, and the
random increase and decrease in failure rate reflects the influence of many other factors,
not just aging. Those external factors may include the climatic conditions, the quality of the
newly procured transformers, and other factors.
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3000
2500
2000
1500
failed PM Tr's
1000
500
0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
14
12
10
1st Quarter
8
2nd Quarter
6
4 3rd Quarter
2 4th Quarter
0
Tripoli Green Benghazi Western Southern Middile
Mountain
It is clear from the chart above that the fall, winter, and summer seasons have the highest
failure rates of ground mounted transformers, and this is attributable to the heavy loads of
heating in winter and air conditioning in summer, which results in overloading of the
transformers. The fall and winter seasons are also characterized by thunder storms.
Lightning is a major cause of pole mounted transformer failure.
1- Lightning:
GECOL standards require the installation of lightning arrestors for all pole mounted
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transformers, and adjustment of arcing horn gaps to 7 cm. Another measure recently taken
by GECOL has been to amend the specification of the pole mounted transformers so that
the BIL and the power frequency withstand voltages become 95kV and 35kV respectively,
rather than the previous 70kV and 28kV.
We have noted that the operation and maintenance staff behave adversely to the lightning
protection measures, and tend to remove the lightning arrestors and bend away the arcing
horns. The reason they give is that these devices cause the lines to trip, and when removed
the line becomes stable. Of course the lightning arrestor and the arcing horn will cause the
line to be tripped by the earth fault relay whenever they operate (correctly) and discharge
the overvoltage to ground. That is normal, and in order to resolve the issue of the frequent
tripping of the line, the solution is to install an automatic reclosing device. Removal of
lightning arrestors and arcing horns causes the lightning strikes to go through the winding of
the transformer and damage the insulation.
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The main issue with the overloaded pole mounted transformers is that they are not
effectively protected against over load by their low voltage CB, which are generally
oversized and sometimes are completely nonexistent at all.
As mentioned for the ground mounted transformers, almost all on-load tap changers in the
GECOL network are set on the manual position. This can subject the 11kV network to
overvoltages during low load periods as previously shown in Table (7-13). As before, this can
be interpreted as the cause of distribution transformer failures in off peak seasons and at
hours of minimum load.
The old GECOL specifications for RMU’s state that it shall consist of two load break switches
for incoming feeders and one Tee-off fused switch for the transformer. GECOL’s new
specifications stipulate that the RMU’s shall be SF6 insulated instead of oil insulated, and
shall consist of Tee-off circuit breaker instead of the fused switch for feeding the
distribution transformer. All RMU's procured after 2008 are in accordance with the new
specification.
Issues with the older RMU's relate to the fuses and the insulating oil. The 11 kV fuses are
somewhat expensive, and the operations staffs always complain of the lack of fuses. There
is significant mismanagement of fuses such as installing smaller fuse sizes for larger
transformers, thereby consumes the stock rapidly as they burn out quickly.
As for the insulating oil, it gets contaminated as it extinguishes the switching arcs, and hence
requires regular testing and maintenance. The oil type RMU's do not receive the proper
level of maintenance and have become a source of hazard. GECOL does not have a proper
DIS (Distribution Information System) with a record of which type of equipment exists
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where, and thus far the asset management module in GECOL's ERP is not fully implemented.
At best, we can confirm that more than 14% of the RMU's are SF6 insulated and equipped
with Tee-off circuit breakers, based on the number of such RMU’s that have been procured
by GECOL, with 1538 RMU's procured since 2013 to the new specifications, equivalent to
14% of the total 11029 RMU's existing in the grid. The most deteriorated and dangerous
RMU's have been reported by all regional departments and are listed in Table (7-26) and
total 557 units. Note that operators try to avoid operating these RMU's under voltage, so
they tend to open the main feeder circuit breaker supplying the RMU from the source
30/11kV substation, cutting of supply to the full ring, and then operating the old RMU at
zero voltage.
Mountain
Mountain
Tarhoona
Benghazi
Southern
Aljufara
Western
Western
Middle
Zlieten
Tripoli
Gurian
Derna
Green
Sahel
Region
- The large mix of RMU's from different manufacturers and different fuse types and
dimensions has resulted in mismanagement of the fuse stocks, and difficulties in
preparing in-time enquires for supply of fuses. This issue is only for the RMU's
procured before establishing the new specifications in 2007. The photo below shows
a sample of the different types of fuses used by GECOL’s old RMU’s.
- Very frequent load shedding and excessive switching operations on the 11kV grid
cause the fuses of RMUS's to be rapidly consumed and blown-out due to the
multiple passage of inrush currents of the transformers
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
- Each 11kV cable ring feeds up to eight distribution substations (8 RMU's), and when
one cable section is faulty, it becomes quite difficult for operation staff to fix the
faulty section, and many cases they switch on to a cable fault more than once in
order to identify and isolate the faulty section by trial and error. This is because
GECOL erection staffs do not install the current transformers for the earth fault
indicators, which come as a basic component with the RMU, and therefore have no
indication of where the fault is located.
CT’s of earth fault indicators were not erected, this resulted in increase
of outage time, and closing on fault current many times
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Low voltage panels are exposed to CB Over loaded cable connected to two
Lack of fuses resulted in replacing it with wire, Lack of fuses resulted in replacing it with wire,
or connecting two conductors together or connecting two conductors together
Only the last two types of switchgear comply with safety requirements with an arc proof
feature. The other types have had many incidents of breaker failures as reported by the
regions in Table (28).
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The following pictures show one of the GEC VMX vacuum type switching stations. In this
switching station circuit breaker chambers are not furnished with doors, and the dust
caused flashover on the circuit breaker.
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The picture below shows one of the ZWAR type minimum oil switching stations. In this
switching station the door of circuit breaker chambers have been left open for entry of dust,
moisture and vermin, potentially causing faults.
Another problem with the GECOL switching stations is the frequent failures in the DC power
supply feeding the control and protection systems of the substation. The DC systems in
switching stations usually fails because improper commissioning of the battery chargers and
charging of the station batteries, lack of experience on how to calibrate the charging
voltages of the battery charger and how to maintain batteries.
Other than some 400km of old oil impregnated cables, the status of the underground 11kV
network may be judged as in good status. The weaknesses of GECOL in the area of
underground cables laying can be summarized in the following points:
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
- Cables are laid directly on the ground, pulled over the ground without rollers and
without tension control measures.
- No proper documentation for cable route maps and joint locations
- No cable route markers, despite that the GECOL design standard stipulates
installation of on ground cable direction markers every 25m along the whole cable
route.
- Cable ends left in stores or in trenches for long time without installing cable end
caps.
The strong points of GECOL’s 11kV cables are the superior cable specification, cable rated
voltage is 15/8.7kV, cables are armored with two galvanized steel tapes, over sheathed with
fire retardant PVC jacket, and both the conductor and the metallic screens are fitted with
swelling tape and swelling powder to secure longitudinal water tightness throughout the
cable length.
- Conductors laid on the ground first, exposed to scratches and mechanical stress
- Conductors strung over the poles without using pulleys, without sag calculations,
without tension control measures, and without considering the temperature at the
time of stringing
- Conductors are not tied well to pin isolators, very short tie wires are used in non-
standard way, and in many occasions one can see conductors touching the cross-
arms
All of these factors contribute tithe high failure rates in both the underground cables and
the overhead lines. Tables (7-29) and (7-30) and Figures (7-11) and (7-12) show the annual
protection trips of distribution feeders and the rate of failure per unit length of feeders for
each region.
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Years
Region
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Tripoli 4833 5010 3686 6377 5219
Green mountain 1009 1107 1251 746 2103
Benghazi 566 1147 697 613 474
Western 2839 4769 3185 4583 4242
Southern 1427 1812 2226 1787 1553
Middle 3270 4544 3845 4438 5127
Total 13944 18389 14890 18544 18718
Table (7-29): Distribution line fault rates by region per year
7000
6000
5000
4000 2012
3000 2013
2000 2014
1000 2015
0
2016
Years
Region
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Tripoli 0.35 0.37 0.27 0.47 0.38
Green mountain 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.18 0.51
Benghazi 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.05
Western 0.27 0.46 0.31 0.44 0.41
Southern 0.22 0.28 0.35 0.28 0.24
Middle 0.44 0.62 0.52 0.60 0.69
Total 0.27 0.36 0.29 0.36 0.36
Table (7-30): Distribution line fault rates per km per year
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0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40 2012
0.30
2013
0.20
0.10 2014
0.00 2015
2016
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
same facility database, and same customer data base that the IRMS tool
usually use, so a proper policy for data population shall be set to avoid
discrepancy and missing data. Success and proper functioning of these tools will
guarantee the success and proper functioning of the IRMS
• Proper implementation and adherence to all operation and maintenance
standards requires a comprehensive review to the standard, fix all ambiguities,
and directive training to all related staff
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146
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Est. budget
Measures Activities Start date Indicative duration Milestones
(USD Mn)
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Est. budget
Measures Activities Start date Indicative duration Milestones
(USD Mn)
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4. Skills shortage
Est. budget
Measures Activities Start date Indicative duration Milestones
(USD Mn)
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With GECOL’s first strategic plan 2006-2010, the Company was introduced to key
performance indicators (KPIs) as a means to measure progress in achieving GECOL’s targets
and goals. At the time, GECOL also introduced an ERP system that, among other functions,
would simplify the data collection and calculation of the KPIs, although uptake of the ERP
system by GECOL has been slow and limited.
The focus on KPIs was reinforced with the second strategic plan 2011-2015. The usefulness
of KPIs in assessing how far GECOL had advanced with its first strategic plan was apparent,
and GECOL worked to have all departments use KPIs to help improve their functions.
The Planning General Department was given the task of overseeing and coordinating the
introduction of KPIs by all departments. Each General Department was required to include
in its periodical reports a Balanced Score Card which included the agreed KPIs for that
department. These reports included the previous period’s KPI assessments for comparison
and to evaluate the direction and degree of progress.
The planning Department, together with each General Department, issued a masterlist of
KPIs to be used. Since 2010/2011, most General Departments have been dutiful in assessing
their KPIs and including them in all their periodic departmental reports. However, the
comprehensiveness and accuracy of the data used to determine the KPI’s has sometimes
been questionable. Also, we note that GECOL management has not really benefitted from
the power and potential of Balanced Score Cards and KPIs to help understand where
Departments were doing well and where there were problems and difficulties, and to help
focus policies and actions to improve and resolve the problem areas.
In the following section we look at the KPIs used by each of the core business units.
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TASK C – REPORT 4.2: IMPROVING GECOL TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE
Figures (9-1) and (9-2) provide graphical representations of Generation Department’s KPIs.
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70
60
50
40
Availability factor
30
Thermal efficiency
20
10
0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Figure (9-2): Generation Availability and Thermal Efficiency Factors 2012 to 2016
From Figure (9-1) we note that power generation fuelled by HFO is almost constant, varying
over the period from 8% to 9%. Quarterly KPI data indicates peaks a high as of 10% usually
occurring in the second quarter, and minimums down to 7%, usually in the third quarter.
Similarly, generation from the steam units of combined cycle plants, which do not require
additional fuel to generate, has grown very slowly over the period, rising from 9% in 2012 to
a peak of 11.25% in 2015 and falling to 10% in 2016 10. The main variation in fuel use is the
balance between LFO and natural gas, as units switch from on fuel to another in accordance
with natural gas availability.
In Figure (9-2), a clear fall in the time availability factor of GECOL’s generation is apparent,
from 62% in 2012 down to 58% in 2016. At the same time, the overall thermal efficiency of
the generating units has significantly improved over the same period, from 31.7% in 2012 to
35% in 2016. This improvement is mostly due to the steam halves of combined cycle plant
being put in service in Benghazi North and Misurata, but also because of the greater use of
natural gas as the fuel and the overhaul and upgrade of several generating units, improving
their efficiency.
The number of employees to installed generating capacity has been constant over the
period 2012 to 2016 at 0.4 FTE/MW. This appears to be questionable if only because of the
large amount of new generation capacity that has been added between 2012 and 2016,
leading to an reduction in the value of the ratio.
10
The figures in this report differ from those presented in the Task A Rapid sector Assessment because of the
difference in fuel definitions. GECOL categorizes the generation from the steam turbines as a separate fuel
category “without fuel”, while the Rapid Sector Assessment includes this generation under the fuel type
powering the associated gas turbines.
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The Generation General Department, like most other General Departments, also includes a
number of non-core business KPIs in its balanced score card. These cover safety, employee
training, and technical (core) vs non-technical (support) staff. We have found these KPIs
reported in the quarterly reports, but not in the annual reports. This indicates that
management does not see these figures as critical in assessing the department. We will not
go into the details of the non-technical KPIs but will make the following basic observations:
• Safety: There have been an average of 1.03 accidents per quarter between 2012 and
2015, the last year for which we have figures, and none were fatal. This equivalent to
4.1 accidents per year. With some 5000 staff, that is a rate of 0.08%. This compares
favourably with US accident rates at fossil fuel generating plants in utilities with
more than 1000 employees of 0.8% in 2015. However, in our interviews with power
plant management there appeared to be no clear criteria of what constituted a
reportable accidents. In addition, power plant management did not feel responsible
for the reporting of accidents and collection of safety statistics or the investigation of
accidents and determination of causes to prevent occurrence of similar accidents in
the future, because that was considered the domain of another department outside
generation’s control. We therefore expect that many accidents go unreported,
including some that may lead to sick leave and loss of work days.
• Training: There is a clear tilt in training for technical staff over that for non-technical
staff. The quarterly average technical and administrative training days per employee
between 2012 and 2015 are 0.025 and 0.017 days per employee per quarter
respectively. More importantly, training ground to a halt in most of 2014 and 2015,
and has been very weak since.
In general, we find the KPI data collected by the Generation General Department to be
reliable and the calculations reasonable. The calculation of employees per MW may be the
exception, and needs to be investigated further.
9.1.1 Recommendations
• In order to provide a more accurate picture of the contributions of the NG, LFO and
HFO fuels to the energy generation mix, they should include the energy produced by
the combined cycle steam units in their calculation. These steam units do not require
additional fuel to generate electric energy, but they are running on the fuel power
their respective gas turbine units. Thus the sum of the KPIs for NG, LFO and HFO
contributions will equal 100%.
Contribution of the combined cycle stem units can remain as an independent KPI to
measure the contribution of these units in increasing generation efficiency.
• Time availability does not represent a sufficient assessment of the utilization of
GECOL’s installed generation capacity. It does not indicate whether the unit, when
operating, is producing at rated capacity, or if there were constraints on its power
output. We therefore suggest that Capacity Factor be added to generation’s KPIs.
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Capacity is a measure of the total energy produced by the unit(s) compared by how
much energy it could have produced if it had been operating at nominal power
output over the whole period. We also suggest that nominal capacity be the ambient
temperature rating of single and combined cycle gas turbine units, and not the
nameplate rating. This is a more complex calculation, but is a better representation
of the performance of GECOL’ generation.
• GECOL’s management must be involved in the selection and approval of each
department’s KPIs, to ensure the KPIs used are accepted by them, help develop a
better understanding of the position GECOL and its assets are in and identify the key
areas that require corrective actions, and be a support tool in taking decisions to
focus resources and efforts at improving GECOL’s functioning and solving its
problems.
• In several instances we have noted that target values for the KPIs appear to be set
haphazardly and not subject to internal review and approval within GECOL. We
suggest that each General Department’s senior management must be involved in
setting and approving the target values for each KPI to ensure it serves GECOL policy
goals and provides a true measure of where GECOL is and where it is trying to get to.
• KPIs are best presented in a dashboard fashion, graphically showing the change in
the KPI over time. The impact of KPI reporting will be greater if these graphs were
included in the department periodic reports.
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80
70
60
50
40 S/S periodic maintenance
30 S/S predictive maintenance
20
10
0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
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120
100
OHL periodic
80
maintenance
60 OHL emergency
40 maintenance
20 OHL cleaning
0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Figure (9-4): % execution of planned overhead line periodic maintenance and cleaning,
and of unplanned emergency maintenance
140
No.
120
100
80
40
20
0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
The Transmission General Department KPIs are focused on the maintenance activities,
indicating mostly percentages of planned works completed.
In Figure (9-3), data was available for predictive maintenance only for the years 2015 and
2016. Over the 2012 to 2016 period, between 55% and 75% of maintenance works have
been carried, with figures for 2014 to 2016 markedly lower than for 2012 and 2013. This is
mostly because of difficulties in arranging substation shutdowns.
Similarly, Figure (9-4) shows that line maintenance works in the latter years have been
dominated by emergency unplanned maintenance works, although line cleaning efforts
picked up in 2016. The focus on emergency works are due to both difficulties in arranging
shutdowns and because of the successive damages to the overhead lines due to sporadic
and local fighting and vandalism in several parts of Libya.
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Figure (9-5) shows the contrast in efforts to replace old and defective equipment in the
transmission network in 2012, when 117 pieces of equipment were replaced, compared
with the subsequent years when only some 11 to 20 items of plant were replaced each year.
Data for the communications system maintenance was only provided for 2012, 2013 and
2014, the figures being 20%, 0% and 50% respectively. No works were included in 2015 and
2016 despite the extreme importance of the communications systems in maintaining a
stable power network.
In general, the KPI figures reflect the efforts of transmission maintenance staff to carry out
their maintenance duties in the face of a difficult and unstable work environment.
However, we note that the KPIs used, while assessing the progress of planned maintenance
works, do not evaluate the quality and appropriateness of the maintenance works executed.
Also, since percentages of planned work executed is almost never 100%, they do not shed
light on whether particular assets are repeatedly not maintained year after year.
We would suggest that fault statistics of the different types of transmission equipment are
one suitable and important measure of the quality of the maintenance works, and should be
added as an additional KPI.
We would also note that no target figures are given for the various KPIs, limiting their
usefulness as a guideline for the direction the Transmission General Department would to
develop along.
With respect to accuracy, the data used for the current KPIs is based on the reports received
from the regional Maintenance Departments detailing the maintenance works carried out
over the relevant period. This is relatively straightforward reporting. We therefore do not
find any reason for concern about the accuracy of the KPIs except for limited periods in
which some regions may not be able to issue their reports because of security related
problems.
With regard to the common and administrative KPIs, the Transmission General Department
only began including them in its annual reports in 2014. We will not go into the details of
these non-technical KPIs but will make the following basic observations:
• Safety: The Transmission department has not provided any safety or accident
statistics in any of it reports. This again emphasizes that the core business
departments do not view safety as a prime concern or responsibility, further
supported by GECOL’s having it report outside the Transmission Department
channels direct to a Safety Department under Support Services.
• Training: Transmission department has been providing the training data in a non-
standard format that cannot be compared directly with other departments. This
would point to KPIs not being properly understood by the reports’ authors.
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9.2.1 Recommendations
• Introduction of fault rate statistics to the Transmission KPIs. The Transmission
General Department can include fault statistics for the main transmission asset
groups (e.g. switchgear, transformers, overhead lines, cables, etc), but the internal
departments in Transmission should breakdown these statistics according to voltage
levels, ratings, geographic location, manufacturer, equipment range or type, age,
etc, to provide more insights where needed on their correlation with high or low
fault rates. This can help resolve problems and direct future procurements to the
more reliable suppliers and equipments and away from the less reliable ones.
• GECOL’s management must be involved in the selection and approval of each
department’s KPIs, to ensure the KPIs used are accepted by them, help develop a
better understanding of the position GECOL and its assets are in and identify the key
areas that require corrective actions, and be a support tool in taking decisions to
focus resources and efforts at improving GECOL’s functioning and solving its
problems.
• Safety needs to be a central concern at all levels and branches of the GECOL
organization. The technical departments should collect and include safety related
data and the accidents KPI in its reports.
• In several instances we have noted that target values for the KPIs appear to be set
haphazardly or not provided at all, and in general are not subject to internal review
and approval within GECOL. We suggest that each General Department’s senior
management must be involved in setting and approving the target values for each
KPI to ensure it serves GECOL policy goals and provides a true measure of where
GECOL is and where it is trying to get to.
• KPIs are best presented in a dashboard fashion, graphically showing the change in
the KPI over time. The impact of KPI reporting will be greater if these graphs were
included in the department periodic reports.
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Figures (9-6), (9-7), (9-8), (9-9), (9-10) and (9-11) provide graphical representations of a
sample of the main KPIs of the Control Department. 2017 data relates to the first half of the
year.
Figures (9-6), (9-7) and (9-8) confirm the instability of network frequency after 2013. The
network is being operated at well below nominal frequency to reduce the amount of load
shedding, bringing operating frequency close to the threshold. Thus the numbers of
frequency grew from 9 in 2010 to a peak of 1,175,324 in 2016. The time spent outside the
acceptable frequency range grew from 690 minutes in 2010 to a peak of 52100 minute in
2015 and 50479 minutes in 2016.
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1400000
1200000
1000000
800000
No. of frequency
600000 excursions
400000
200000
0
2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
60000
50000
40000
10000
0
2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
50.2
50
49.8
49.6 Nominal nework frequency
(Hz)
49.4
Average network freq. during
49.2
period
49
48.8
2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
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120
100
80
Tie line availability (%)
60
40 Participation of imported
energy (%)
20
0
2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
250000
200000
150000
50000
0
2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
80
70 Availability of Main Gas Plants
60 (%)
50 Availability of Combined Cycle
40 Plants (%)
30
Availability of Steam Plants
20 (%)
10
Availability of Small Gas Plants
0 (%)
2015 2016
Load shedding also had a large impact on the loss of supply time (Figure 9-10), although
damages to overhead line and other network equipment also played a role. Loss of supply
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grew from 2365 minutes in 2010 to a peak of 197,822 minutes in 2016, a more than 80 fold
increase.
Figure (9-9) shows that while tie lines with neighboring countries have been kept in service
for much of the time, import from those countries has been very limited from just 0.12% of
system load in 2014 to a maximum of just under 1% in 2016.
Finally Figure (9-11) confirms the limited availability of the (mostly) old steam and small gas
turbine units in supplying the power network and the dependence on the more reliable and
newer main gas plants and combined cycle plants. Data for this availability of plants by type
was only included in the Control Department’s reports for 2015 and 2016. The highest
overall availability achieved in this period was 72.25% for Main Gas Plants.
It can be seen that there is a large number of technical KPI’s provided by the Control
Department. In fact, in various reports other KPIs have been included over limited periods.
The data provided by the Control Department is the most informative to GECOL
management to gain an understanding on the overall power network situation. It is
therefore important for GECOL management to review the large numbers of available KPIs
and determine which are the most important and influential for their decision making, and
for the Control Department to ensure this data is included in all its reports.
Almost all the technical KPIs provided by the Control Department relate to the power
network. More information should also be included on the operation of the Control system
itself, the availability and quality of data, function of the SCADA and IT systems, control over
the network, etc.
Finally, we note that we consider the quality and reliability of the data and KPIs issued by
the Control General Department the best among all of GECOL’s business units. The
information is collected first hand at the time of occurrence, and it is all centrally managed
and processed within the limited confines of the Control Center, making the likelihood of
errors or missing data extremely small.
9.3.1 Recommendations
• The large number of network related KPIs should be reviewed and rationalized to
give management the best overview of the GECOL power network without
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• Introduction of additional KPIs related to the functioning of the control and SCADA
system to assess function of the control centers and determine corrective actions to
keep the control centers in best working condition.
• GECOL’s management must be involved in the selection and approval of each
department’s KPIs, to ensure the KPIs used are accepted by them, help develop a
better understanding of the position GECOL and its assets are in and identify the key
areas that require corrective actions, and be a support tool in taking decisions to
focus resources and efforts at improving GECOL’s functioning and solving its
problems.
• Safety needs to be a central concern at all levels and branches of the GECOL
organization. The technical departments should collect and include safety related
data and the accidents KPI in its reports.
• In several instances we have noted that target values for the KPIs appear to be set
haphazardly or not provided at all, and in general are not subject to internal review
and approval within GECOL. We suggest that each General Department’s senior
management must be involved in setting and approving the target values for each
KPI to ensure it serves GECOL policy goals and provides a true measure of where
GECOL is and where it is trying to get to.
• KPIs are best presented in a dashboard fashion, graphically showing the change in
the KPI over time. The impact of KPI reporting will be greater if these graphs were
included in the department periodic reports.
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The Medium Voltage General Department is the only technical department not to include
common and administrative KPIs in its reports. In particular, no coverage of safety or
accidents is provided.
The Medium Voltage Department has not been able to collect the data related to the first
two KPI's, Operation costs/100km and Stock in days, and no values have been given for
these KPIs.
The KPIs for periodic and predictive maintenance as a percentage of the planned
maintenance are always measured and reported. These KPIs do not reflect the performance,
quality, or effectiveness of the maintenance, just what percentage of the planned
maintenance has been carried out. There are no clear links between maintenance and
outages. These KPI's are valid only for tracking the individual department activities as the
size of maintenance work can range from visual inspection or dust cleaning to stringing
several kilometers of conductors or overhauling of substations. The table below shows KPI
values for maintenance activities carried out in 2013 to 2016. The work included is mainly
inspection of HV bays with respect to planned. Corrective and repair works and battery
maintenance are not included. The value of the KPI in its current state is therefore
questionable.
The Medium Voltage Department assesses network reliability through the number of
outages per 100km length of feeders. The recorded values of this KPI for the period 2013 to
2016 are as follows:
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This KPI combines all protection trips disregarding whether the feeder is a cable or overhead
line. Of course the accepted rate of outages of an overhead line may never be accepted for
underground cable. In this way, the KPI will be of limited benefit in tracking the
performance of the medium voltage network.
9.4.1 Recommendations
• The Medium Voltage General Department should consider including the Common
and Administrative KPIs in its periodic reports, not least to allow assessment and
comparison of Hr related factors. Especially important is the addition of the safety
KPI.
• Safety needs to be a central concern at all levels and branches of the GECOL
organization. The technical departments should collect and include safety related
data and the accidents KPI in its reports.
• The Medium Voltage Department should consider introducing fault rate statistics to
the reliability KPIs. Periodic reports can include statistics for the main Medium
Voltage asset groups (e.g. switchgear, transformers, overhead lines, cables, etc), but
the internal departments in Medium Voltage should breakdown these statistics
according to voltage levels, ratings, geographic location, manufacturer, equipment
range or type, age, etc, to provide more insights where needed on their correlation
with high or low fault rates. This can help resolve problems and direct future
procurements to the more reliable suppliers and equipments and away from the less
reliable ones
• Similarly, outage KPI can be broken down according to the type of feeder
disconnected, cable or overhead line to assess function of each asset separately.
• GECOL’s management must be involved in the selection and approval of each
department’s KPIs, to ensure the KPIs used are accepted by them, help develop a
better understanding of the position GECOL and its assets are in and identify the key
areas that require corrective actions, and be a support tool in taking decisions to
focus resources and efforts at improving GECOL’s functioning and solving its
problems.
• In several instances we have noted that target values for the KPIs appear to be set
haphazardly or not provided at all, and in general are not subject to internal review
and approval within GECOL. We suggest that each General Department’s senior
management must be involved in setting and approving the target values for each
KPI to ensure it serves GECOL policy goals and provides a true measure of where
GECOL is and where it is trying to get to.
• KPIs are best presented in a dashboard fashion, graphically showing the change in
the KPI over time. The impact of KPI reporting will be greater if these graphs were
included in the department periodic reports.
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The Distribution General Department KPIs focus on reliability indices, SAIFI and CAIDI, and
maintenance related activities.
GECOL does not yet have suitable applications in place to effectively record and manage
outages. GECOL consolidates reports from operation offices at each regional department
from which it calculates the SAIFI and CAIDI. It is very important to know the following
constraints on the calculated reliability indices before any comparisons are made:
• The indices reflect only the reliability of the 11kV network. They do not include low
voltage network outages
• Load shedding and source side (Generation, Transmission and Medium Voltage)
interruptions are excluded from calculations
• The indices are calculated at each regional distribution department. Some
departments include both the planned and unplanned 11kV outages, while other
departments include only the non-planned outages.
These limitations mean that GECOL reliability indices may be suitable for tracking the
performance of each individual regional department, but cannot be benchmarked with
other utilities, or even used for comparisons between GECOL departments. Main concerns
include:
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reliability scores simply because not all faults and interruptions were registered
The Distribution reliability KPI's in the period 2013 to 2016 are presented in the following
tables and Figures (12) and (13).
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
SAIFI 0 1.07 6.64 1.01 1.06 CAIDI 0.0 9.8 2.1 172.8 197.3
SAIFI CAIDI
10 300.0
200.0
5
100.0
0 0.0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
The SAIFI scores seem to be inconsistent as the sharp increases in 2014 is met by sharp
decrease in the CAIDI in the same year. In practice, this is impossible since any 11kV feeder
trip will need at least one hour to isolate the faulty section and resume supply through
another section of the ring circuits.
To be meaningful and useful, these KPIs require a thorough investigation of the data used
and unification of the calculation procedures.
The maintenance related KPIs do not reflect GECOL performance nor the quality and
effectiveness of the maintenance works. They simply indicate what percentage of planned
works has been carried out. There are no clear links between maintenance and outages.
These KPIs are valid only for tracking the individual department activities, keeping in mind
that the size of a maintenance activity can range from a visual inspection or cleaning of dust
and dirt, to stringing several kilometers of conductors or overhauling of substations. The
table below shows the maintenance KPIs for the years 2012 to 2016. The KPIs include
protective devices, which are mainly maintenance free, while the auxiliary DC supplies for
those protective devises, and especially of the Nickel Cadmium batteries, is not included.
This type of maintenance is the most important for protection reliability, and as the deep
dive visits have indicated it is not included in the maintenance scope of work.
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With regard to the Common and Administrative KPIs, the Distribution General Department
takes the safety KPI seriously. Accidents recorded per year are presented in the table below
and Figure (9-14).
The high accident rate in the Distribution Department is of immediate concern. It would
appear that there is no follow up or investigation of these accidents to try to determine
underlying causes, and thereby take corrective action to prevent recurrence, otherwise a
year-on-year fall in the accident rates would be observed, rather than the rising slope.
The HR training related KPIs are shown in the table below and in Figure (9-15). As with the
other Core Business departments, training is focused on the technical side, but unlike the
other departments, training activities have continued to grow in recent years.
We note also that in general the training KPIs assess the quantity of training provided, but
not the quality, effectiveness, or impact on productivity of the relevant department.
9.5.1 Recommendations
• Unify the measurement and calculations procedures used for SAIFI and CAIDI in
particular, but also for all KPIs in general
• GECOL’s management must be involved in the selection and approval of each
department’s KPIs, to ensure the KPIs used are accepted by them, help develop a
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better understanding of the position GECOL and its assets are in and identify the key
areas that require corrective actions, and be a support tool in taking decisions to
focus resources and efforts at improving GECOL’s functioning and solving its
problems.
• In several instances we have noted that target values for the KPIs appear to be set
haphazardly or not provided at all, and in general are not subject to internal review
and approval within GECOL. We suggest that each General Department’s senior
management must be involved in setting and approving the target values for each
KPI to ensure it serves GECOL policy goals and provides a true measure of where
GECOL is and where it is trying to get to.
• KPIs are best presented in a dashboard fashion, graphically showing the change in
the KPI over time. The impact of KPI reporting will be greater if these graphs were
included in the department periodic reports.
172