Do Judges Make Laws?
Do Judges Make Laws?
Do Judges Make Laws?
Of the two agencies of law-making in our legal system, one is thoroughly conscious that it is
making rules and imposing standards, while the other purports to be wholly unconscious of
power to do anything of the sort1. The legislator, holding that law is a conscious product of the
human will, takes it for unquestioned that he has but to ascertain the will of the sovereign with
respect to the civic conduct of individuals and put such will in the form of chapter and section of
the written law. On the other hand, the judge, holding that law is something found, not made, that
it is reason, not will, and believing that in the long run conscious law-making can achieve little
beyond authoritative declaration of what has been discovered in the determination of
controversies, proceeds haltingly. He persuades himself to overlook the law-making function
which everyone who administers justice must necessarily wield. Hence the one is prone to
attempt far too much and to be careless how he carries out the details of what he attempt while
the other is too cautious. This project will explore whether judges create laws and if they do, then
the legal ideals and processes that guide them while doing so.
US YESSS
UK TRADITIONAL
INDIA MEH
doctrine of separation of powers works mischief in confirming to the traditional notion that the law is
always discovered, that decisions are only declaratory, and that when a precedent is overruled the law
is not changed but instead a misinterpretation thereof is corrected.1
In India, the doctrine of checks and balances is being followed. All the three organs have checks on
each other. But the powers that the Judiciary has are much more than that of the other two organs. In
the name of placing checks the Judiciary encroaches upon the territory of the other two organs. In
India, the trend of Judicial Activism that is followed is, the judiciary filling up the grey areas left out
by the laws made by the legislature. The trend of Judicial Activism is said to have developed only
after 1964, when Justice Gajendragadkar was the Chief Justice of India.
Consciously the judge resorts to logic (Lecture I, The Method of Philosophy), precedents, and a
consideration of the end to be served (Lectures II and III, The Methods of History, Tradition and
Sociology). The subconscious elements are dealt with in the last of the four lectures. The overlapping
in this analysis is clearly recognized by the judge: the precedents contain their own logic; stare
decisis has its function; so has the mere logical perfection of a system of rules. Yet this rough
classification proves quite workable. In fact, many an opinion proceeds by discussing the matter "on
principle" and then by "turning to “The Nature of the Judicial Process”, the authorities,
Mr. Justice Cardozo tells us judicial lawmaking is far from being a purely mechanical process, that it
is a matter of minute and delicate adjustments, which in its conscious form is an application of
philosophy, history and sociology, and subconsciously powerful forces direct and help determine
it.23
The historical, sociological, and psychological methods which the author sets forth are really
different in kind. They assist the judge in performing his really judicial task of selecting his major
premise.
SUBCONCIOUS PROCESS
Perhaps the most important contribution of Mr Cardozo’s work is the judge's recognition of the
subconscious element. "Deep below consciousness are other forces, the likes and the dislikes, the
predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions,
which make the man, whether he be litigant or judge.
Historical interpretation
Ambiguities and uncertainties while interpreting the constitutional provisions can be clarified by
referring to earlier interpretative decisions.
Contemporary interpretation
The Constitution must be interpreted in the light of the present scenario. The situation and
circumstances prevalent today must be considered.
Harmonious Construction
It is a cardinal rule of construction that when there are in a statute two provisions which are in such
conflict with each other, that both of them cannot stand together, they should possibly be so
CONCLUSION
Therefore, it can be concluded that Judges create laws. While some believe that the judges create
laws in case of absence of laws, others believe judges do so for public interest and give a liberal, not
literal interpretation to law. However, doctrines such as Balance of Powers and checks and balance
provide a support to the traditional declaratory role for judges. Some limitations are very important
for limiting the legislative function of the judges. The judicial process is based on reason of judges,
not their individual whims and fancies. Therefore the Hypothesis stand proved. The considerations
that go while deciding cases are philosophical, sociological and historical methods as defined by
Starting with purely mechanical modes of ascertaining facts, the law has gradually developed rational
methods. In the immediate past the social facts required for the exercise of the judicial function of
law-making have been arrived at by means which may fairly be called mechanical. It is not one of the
least problems of the sociological jurist to discover a rational mode of advising the court of facts of
Enforcement and application are the life of law. But we have spent our whole energies upon making
rules and have seemed to rely on faith that they would vindicate themselves. More than anything
else, attention to procedure and to the enforcement of rules and their application in practice will
relieve the present tension. The Puritan ideal of judicial machines bound down by a multitude of
detailed rules has proved inadequate. If legal history may be vouched, the way out lies in strong
courts with full powers of doing justice, guided by principles furnished by the law-giver, but not
hampered by an infinity of rules, the full effect whereof in action no one can hope to foresee.