Petitioners vs. vs. Respondents Benito O. Ching, Jr. Benigno M. Puno Angel A. Daquigan
Petitioners vs. vs. Respondents Benito O. Ching, Jr. Benigno M. Puno Angel A. Daquigan
Petitioners vs. vs. Respondents Benito O. Ching, Jr. Benigno M. Puno Angel A. Daquigan
GEORGE TIU AND ROSALINA TIU , petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, JUAN GO, SPS. JUANITO LIM and LIM YEE SHOW
FONG , respondents.
DECISION
MELO , J : p
Before us is a petition seeking the review and the consequent reversal of the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 249671 entitled, "George T. Tiu and Rosalina Tiu vs.
Juan Go and Sps. Juanito Lim and Lim Lee Show Fong", promulgated on September 30,
1992, which affirmed the summary judgment dated August 21, 1989 and the Order dated
October 30, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 35 in its Civil Case No. 88-
43782. Cdpr
10. That from the date of execution of said documents, Annexes "C" and "D",
to this time of filing, plaintiff GEORGE TIU, with plaintiff ROSALINA TIU, has
remained and continue to remain in possession of the said Condominium Units
as lessee; Cdpr
11. That plaintiff GEORGE TIU, in executing the said DEED OF SALE OF A
CONDOMINIUM WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE, has merely agreed to a mortgage
of the properties, for which reason reformation is proper, pursuant to the
provisions of the Civil Code which state, thus —
13. That the real intention of the parties on the transaction covered by the
DEED OF SALE OF A CONDOMINIUM WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE being a
mortgage, and not a sale, plaintiff GEORGE TIU is entitled to the redemption of the
property as sanctioned by Article 1601 of the Civil Code;
14. That, after the lapse of the lawful period of repurchase stated in the DEED
OF SALE OF A CONDOMINIUM WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE, plaintiff GEORGE
TIU tried to redeem the mortgaged condominium units, but the defendants
refused redemption; LLphil
15. That when plaintiff GEORGE TIU tried to redeem the said properties,
plaintiff ROSALINA TIU also attempted to get back the jewelries and checks given
as additional collateral, but defendant JUAN GO who refused redemption of the
mortgaged properties also refused to return the said jewelries and checks to
plaintiff ROSALINA TIU;
16. That, after the redemption offer was made by plaintiff GEORGE TIU and
the return of the personal properties were asked by plaintiff ROSALINA TIU,
defendant JUAN GO, after filing the blanks in PCIB Check No. 51405 and PCIB
Check No. 51428, presented them to the bank for encashment, but were returned,
for which there is now a demand made upon plaintiff ROSALINA TIU for her to
pay for the value thereof;
17. That defendant JUAN GO and JUANITO LIM have acted with evident bad
faith, unlawfully and contrary to the agreement, and in violation of the plaintiffs'
rights;
18. That by reason of the unlawful acts of the said defendants, the plaintiffs
suffered sleepless nights, anxiety, besmirched reputation and social humiliation,
for which they now seek the sum of not less than P100,000.00 as payment for
moral damages, plus litigation expenses; LLjur
19. That the plaintiffs were forced to litigate in this action and in so doing,
they were compelled to engage the services of the undersigned counsel for an
attorney's fee of P50,000.00;
20. That as corrective measure to those who unlawfully act contrary to their
agreements and in violation of the rights of others, an exemplary damage to be
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determined by the Honorable Court is also sought.
(pp. 25-29, Rollo.)
The Spouses Lim filed a separate answer with counterclaim, denying the material
allegations of the complaint and, as special and affirmative defenses, claimed that by
virtue of George Tiu's failure, as vendor a retro, to exercise his right to repurchase the
condominium units within the period expressly stipulated in the contract, the spouses
thereupon irrevocably acquired the absolute ownership of said condominium units; that
absolute ownership thereof has been consolidated in their names; that the deed of sale is
clear, without any ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection and the deed is and should be the
only repository of the truth of the contractual relations of the parties and no parol evidence
is admissible to alter the stipulations, terms, and conditions of the contract (See CA
Decision, p. 29, Rollo). LLphil
The Tius filed a reply and answer to the counterclaim of the Spouses Lim.
On the other hand, Go, in his answer with counterclaim, alleged that while indeed, the Tius
had incurred various amounts of loans on different dates, the totality is much greater than
the sum of P200,00.00 alleged in the complaint, and which remained unpaid; that the two
checks mentioned in Paragraph 8 of the complaint issued in partial payment on the Tius'
various loans were dishonored when presented by Go for encashment; and that the Tius
had not offered or given any other security to answer for the payment of their overdue
loans and obligations to Go; that he (Go) is merely one of the instrumental witnesses to,
and has nothing to do with, the Tius' transactions with the Spouses Lim, which should thus
be treated separately and distinctly from the various loan transactions between the Tius
and Go; that Go never committed the supposed acts of misrepresentation in the execution
of the deeds as alleged in the complaint.
As compulsory counterclaim, Go alleged that Rosalina Tiu had secured, on different dates,
loan advances in the total amount of P1,060,000.00, which has remained unpaid despite
demands. Cdpr
The Tius filed a reply and answer to the counterclaim of Go, admitting receipt by Rosalina
Tiu of the money stated in respondent Go's counterclaim, but alleging that the loans had
already been paid for by tobacco delivered to Go.
Go subsequently filed a motion for leave to admit third party-complaint for a sum of
money and damages against Joaquin Tiu, alleging that on different dates, the latter had, for
himself and in behalf of the Tius, received the money as loan or advances in connection
with the latter's tobacco business, in the total amount of P700,000.00, for which amount
Joaquin Tiu should be held jointly and severally liable with the Tius.
Over the opposition of the Tius, the motion for leave to admit third-party complaint was
granted by the trial court on June 22, 1988. LibLex
5. Plaintiffs George Tiu and Rosalina Tiu are ordered to pay the costs of the
present action.
SO ORDERED.
(p. 30, Rollo.).
The Tius and Joaquin Tiu (third-party defendant) appealed while the Lims filed a "Motion
for Supplemental/Additional Relief or Decision".
Go filed a motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment.
On October 30, 1989, the trial court issued an order resolving the respective motions of
the Lims and Go, thus: prcd
The Tius, including Joaquin, appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it (1)
accepted the Deed of Sale of Condominium Units with Right of Repurchase as the true
agreement of the contracting parties; and (2) held Rosalina Tiu liable for the total amount
of P1,060, 000.00 claimed by Go. LLpr
Go, who also appealed, on the other hand, lamented the failure of the trial court to hold
George Tiu and Joaquin Tiu jointly and solidarily liable with Rosalina Tiu on the amount of
P1,060,000.00, and for dismissing both his third-party complaint and counterclaim for
moral and exemplary damages, and for attorney's fees.
The Court of Appeals (Paras[P]), Ordoñez-Benitez, Montenegro, JJ.) upheld and affirmed
the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Hence, the instant petition anchored on
the general assertion that the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is not in accord
with law.
We vote to sustain the appellate court. The summary judgment of the trial court was
properly rendered. LLpr
A summary judgment is one granted by the court, upon motion by either party, for an
expeditious settlement of the case, there appearing from the pleadings, depositions,
admissions, and affidavits that there are no genuine questions or issues of fact involved
(except as to the amount of damages) — and that, therefore, the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law (Sections 1, 2, and 3, Rule 34; Justice E.L. Paras, Revised
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Rules of Court, Ann., Vol. I, 1989 Ed., p. 632.).
In the present case, the Tius maintain that there are as yet unresolved questions of fact
that preclude summary judgment, such as whether there was indeed a loan contract
between the Tius and Go, which was secured by a mortgage on the condominium units
owned by George Tiu and a pledge by Rosalina Tiu of her pieces of jewelry and checks;
and, assuming the existence of a loan, whether reformation is feasible in order that the true
agreement of the parties on an equitable mortgage may be reflected in the deed of sale.
In the instant petition, the Tius narrate a series of events and loan transactions between
Rosalina Tiu and Juan Go that would negate, in their opinion, the sale transaction between
the Tius and the Spouses Lim, and would thus necessitate trial on the merits to determine
the true agreement or intention of the parties. The appellate court, however, brushed aside
this argument thusly: LLphil
Under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, summary judgment may be rendered by the
court upon application of a party when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. By genuine issue is meant an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of
evidence as distinguished from an issue which is sham, fictitious, contrived, set
up in bad faith and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue
for trial. The court can determine this on the basis of the pleadings, admissions,
documents, affidavits and/or counter affidavits submitted by the parties to the
Court. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested,
proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. (Paz vs. CA,
181 SCRA 26).
Appellants Tiu admitted not only the due execution, genuineness and authenticity
of the Deed of Sale of Condominium with Right to Repurchase and Contract of
Lease (Exhs. C & D). They also admitted that they read and understood the
contents of said deeds before they signed the said documents (tsn., May 13,
1988, p. 26) which deeds were later annotated at the back of Condominium
Certificate of Title Nos. 4583 and 4584. They failed to offer any counter-affidavit
to controvert the statement of the Notary Public, Florante C. de la Cruz before
whom the parties acknowledged and ratified their agreement that he (de la Cruz)
ascertained the agreement of the parties before preparing the document. In his
affidavit, Notary Public Florante C. de la Cruz swore:
"That on March 25, 1986 George Tiu, together with Sps. JUANITO
LIM and LIM LEE SHOW FONG requested me to prepare a DEED OF SALE
of Condominium Units with a Right to Repurchase and a CONTRACT OF
LEASE over the same CONDOMINIUM Units which I notarized as Doc. No.
412; Page No. 64; Book No. 83; Series of 1986 and Doc. 413; Page No. 64;
Book No. 83; Series of 1986 respectively, both documents signed by the
parties therein and their instrumental witnesses, copies of said Deed of
Sale and Contract of Lease is hereto attached and marked as Annex A & B
respectively; LexLib
In addition thereto, appellants Tiu admitted that they have updated the real estate
taxes due on the condominium only up to the time of the transaction after which
they had never paid anymore the taxes thereon belying their claim that they
continued paying the taxes even after the execution of the deeds (tsn., Nov. 24,
1988, pp. 15 & 16). Also the said appellants admitted that they did not file an
opposition to the petition for consolidation of ownership and that they filed the
present complaint for reformation six (6) days after receipt of a copy of the said
petition (tsn, Nov. 24, 1988, pp. 23 & 26). If it were true that their agreement was
one of mortgage, then, they could have filed at least an opposition to the said
petition.
(pp. 32-34, Rollo.)
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the claim of the Tius that a deed of sale with right
of repurchase was drawn up in favor of the Spouses Lim instead of a mortgage with Go as
creditor-mortgagee because Go can not own real estate being a Chinese citizen, re-
echoing, in the process, the conclusion of the trial court that aliens or non-Filipino citizens
are not disqualified from being mortgagees of real estate property.
Upon the foregoing premises, we agree with the Court of Appeals that summary judgment
was properly rendered by the trial court as there was no genuine issue of fact that would
necessitate formal trial.
On the feasibility of reformation of the deed of sale with right of repurchase, we also agree
with the appellate court, that the Tius' complaint did not aver ultimate facts that would
constitute a cause of action for reformation of instrument despite the Tius' insistence that
paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 of their complaint contain allegations of fraud and
inequitable conduct, upon which reformation may be premised. cdphil
A perusal of these paragraphs (reproduced earlier) would show that indeed, as pointed out
by the Court of Appeals, the allegations therein are mere conclusions of law or opinion;
hence, reformation is not feasible. Section 5 of Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court directs
a party averring fraud or mistake to state with particularity the circumstances constituting
such fraud or mistake, which particularity is conspicuously absent in the complaint.
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Further, in view of Rosalina Tiu's failure to controvert the allegations of the Mario Obar
Trading Center denying any trading partnership with Go, (and in effect, debunking Rosalina
Tiu's claim that payments to the trading firm were payments to Juan Go), summary
judgment holding Rosalina Tiu liable was proper.
We shall also not disturb the ruling of the Court of Appeals that George and Joaquin Tiu
are not solidary liable with Rosalina Tiu on the amount of P1,060,000.00, for apt and
correct are the findings of the appellate court on this point: prcd
The various receipts (Exhs. 1-15-Go) clearly show that the appellant George Tiu
never signed the receipts nor received any money from appellant Go while
appellant Joaquin Tiu signed and received the money for and in behalf of
Rosalina. Consequently, they are not liable solidarily for the said amounts even if
the money were used for their tobacco business. And even if they admitted that
they received the money, both are not liable in solidum because there was no
express provision in said receipts that appellants George and Joaquin Tiu should
be liable in solidum. There is solidary obligation only when the obligation
expressly so states or when the law or nature of the obligation requires solidarity
(Article 1207, NCC).
And there is no truth to the allegation that appellants George and Joaquin Tiu
admitted that they are jointly and solidarily liable for said amount. What they
admitted was that they received said money. Appellants' failure to deny the
allegations in pars. 8, 9, 10 of appellant Go's third party complaint does not
amount to an admission that they are solidarily liable. Be it noted that appellants
Tiu, in their reply and answer to the counterclaim of appellant Go, admitted that
only appellant Rosalina Tiu received the monies. The allegations in appellant Go's
third party complaint is essentially the same with the allegations in the
counterclaim of appellant Go. Thus, it was not necessary for them to deny the
allegations in the third party complaint. cdphil
Assuming arguendo that they admitted their solidary liability, still they are not
liable. As aptly held by the lower court:
At any rate, the doctrine laid down on the case of Un Fak Leang vs.
Nigurra, 9 Phil. 381, falls squarely on the point wherein the Supreme Court
ruled that an admission of two debtors in their brief that their liability in the
contract is a solidary one does not convert the joint character of their
obligation as appearing in their contract, for what determines the nature of
the obligation is the tenor of their contract itself, not the admission of the
parties.
(pp. 56-57, Rollo).
On Go's prayer for attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages, all that has to be said
perhaps is that simply because the Tius did not prevail in their suit against Go would it
necessarily follow that they should be made liable for attorney's fees and damages. An
adverse result of a suit in law does not mean that the same is wrongful as to justify
assessment of damages against the actor (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals , 141 SCRA 488
[1986]).
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. No special pronouncement
is made as to costs. LexLib
SO ORDERED.
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Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ ., concur.