Sabalones VS CA

Facts :

1. Samson Sabalones a diplomatic service assigned in different countries, left his

wife for 15 years.
2. Come back to Philippines in 1985 but not to his legitimate wife and children.
3. File an action for judicial authorization to sell conjugal property.
4. In her answer, wife opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal
separation. She alleged that the house in Greenhills was occupied by her and their 6
kids, and that they were depending for their support on the rentals from another
conjugal property (building and lot in Forbes Park). She also informed the court that
despite her husband’s retirement, he had not returned to his legitimate family and was
instead maintaining a separate residence with another woman and their 3 kids.
5. Wife asked the court to grant legal separation and order the liquidation of their
conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband’s share because of his adultery.

Issue :

W/N a preliminary injunction can be issued by the Court (despite joint administration of
conjugal properties)

   Ruling :

Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife
as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to
continue administering the properties in the meantime without interference from the
petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance with
Article 61 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. It is so ordered.

SIOCHI vs GOZON,et al

GR No. 169900, March 18, 2010

FACTS:

Elvira Gozon filed a case of LEGAL SEPARATION (LSEP) against her husband Alfredo.
Later, she filed a notice of lis pendens (a public notice informing the community that
a particular property is subject to litigation and that will prospective purchasers of the
property will be bound by any judgment affecting it) over a 30, 000 sq.meters lot in
Malaiizbon registered in the name of “Afredo Gozon married to Elvira Gozon”.

While the LSEP case was pending, Alfredo entered into an agreement to sell said lot to
Mario Siochi for 18M. Mario gave a DP of 5M with an agreement that Alfredo as the
exclusive owner of the property, will secure the exclusion of the property in the LSEP
case and secure the removal of notice of lis pendens. After giving the down payment,
Mario took possession of the property.

Later, the LSEP case was granted, the CPG (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) was
declared dissolved and liquidated; the land declared conjugal. Alfredo being the
offending spouse, the net profit of his share shall be forfeited in favor of their daughter,
Winifred.

Alfredo later donated the land to Winifred. Through SPA, Alfredo sold the land to Inter-
Dimensional Realty for 18M wherein the latter obtained the TCT in their name free from
annotation of the notice of lis pendens. Mario Siochi then filed a case for specific
performance, damages and the annulment of the donation and sale.

The CA decided that sale between Mario and Alfredo is void. Share of Alfredo (offending
spouse) was forfeited in favor of his daughter Winifred. Alfredo must pay the 5m DP to
Mario with damages. Winifred has the option of either to dispose of the land or not.

ISSUE:

WON Alfredo’s (offending spouse) entire share of said conjugal property shall be
deemed forfeited as effect of the LSEP case.

HELD:

No. As provided under Art 63 (2) of Family Code— “The decree of legal separation shall
have the ff effects:

(2) the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and
liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the NET
PROFITS earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be
forfeited in favor of common children , or if there are none, to the children of the guilty
spouse in previous marriage, if there are none, to the innocent spouse.

Pursuant to this Article, Alfredo’s share of the conjugal property is not entirely forfeited
in favor of their common child, but only his share of the NET PROFITS earned from said
conjugal property.
Lucilda Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, ET. Al

FACTS:

Cesario Cabutihan was married to Beinvenida Durana, whom he had five children, upon
the death of the wife;  Cesario contracted a second marriage with his former wife’s sister
Victorina.

Private respondents filed settlement over the property of their deceased parents. Trial
Court rendered a decision holding that Victorina Durana had no paraphernal properties
brought to her marriage with Cesario. That the copra business was formed during the
first marriage and Victorina used the same facilities, credit and capital in managing the
business, and the main source of the income not only of Cesario and also of Victorina
during their respective lifetimes was the copra business. Hence, the extent of the Estate
of Victorina shall consist only of her share in the inheritance of the Estate of Cesario
Cabutihan. Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:

Is the marital community of proprietary interest continued to exist in the second

marriage, even after the Cesario-Beinvenida conjugal partnership has been dissolved by
the death of Bienvenida?

HELD:

The first conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved because of death of

Bienvenida and it was converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership. There should
be liquidation of properties before contracting another marriage. Since there was none,
the total mass of the partnership property shall be divided between the different
partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to the property belonging to the
respective spouses. One-half (1/2) of the properties that pertain to the first conjugal
partnership belong to Cesario as his conjugal share therein, while the other half shall be
considered as inherited by him and his five children as the heirs of Bienvenida. The
properties pertaining to the second partnership shall also be equally divided, one-half
(1/2) to belong to Cesario and the other to Victorina as their respective shares in their
conjugal partnership properties. The share of Cesario should then be divided among his
heirs, namely, Victorina and his five (5) children. To recapitulate, the estate of Victorina
for distribution to her heirs shall consist of her one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal
properties of the aforesaid second marriage and her one-sixth (1/6) share in the estate of
Cesario as an heir.
 

Proprietary interests are profits, rights, ownership shares or advantages held by the

full or partial owner of a tangible or intangible asset or property

Paraphernal property refers to property over which the wife has complete control

(nagpahiwatig) Implied Co–ownership is A generic legal term that refers to

various forms of ownership over one asset by more than one person

Carried out-to put into execution

Inevitably- as is certain to happen; unavoidably

Prorated-allocate, distribute, or assess pro rata

SQUARELY- Firmness, directly without evasion

estate: Total of all assets a person possesses and/or is beneficially entitled to

Tumlos v. Fernandez
G.R. No. 137650, 12 April 2000

FACTS:

Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed against Guillerma, Gina
and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez alleged that they are the absolute owners of
an apartment building that through their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos’ to occupy the apartment
for the last 7 years without payment of any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma will pay 1,600 a month
while the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month which was not complied with. Demand
was made several times for the defendants to vacate the premises as they are in need of the
property for the construction of a new building.

Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous relationship and that they
acquired the property in question as their love nest. It was likewise alleged that they lived together in
the said apartment building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that Gullerma administered
the property by collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to
the annulment of their marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.

RULING:

No. It is well settled that Mario is still validly married with Lourdes and actual contribution needs to
be proven.

Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and a woman who is not legally capacitated to marry
each other, but who nonetheless lives together conjugally, may be deemed co-owners of a property
acquired during the cohabitation only upon proof that each made an actual contribution to its
acquisition. Hence, mere cohabitation without proof of contribution will not result in a co-ownership.

SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject property. The claim
was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there was no other evidence presented to validate it
except for the said affidavit. Even if the allegations of having cohabited with Mario and that she bore
him two children were true, the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is validly
married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. The
property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family Code.
Actual contribution is required by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in
the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the
acquisitions of common property by one who has no salary, income, work or industry. Such is not
included in Art 148. If actual contribution is not proven then there can be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares.
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK
vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO
NOVEMBER 11, 2010 ~ VBDIAZ

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO,

G.R. No. 153802
March 11, 2005
FACTS: Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967.
During their marriage the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo
City from a certain Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax assessment
purposes The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one
Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners
Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailo’s house and lot in San
Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. As
security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage
constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned
transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took
place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.[
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the
extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the
highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the property being redeemed,
petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof by executing an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.

In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject property,
Miguela learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean its
premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to
play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject
property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo
City a Civil Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit
of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the latter’s Answer with
Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
the property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision declaring the said
documents null and void and further ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the
property subject of this complaint to the plaintiff,  to pay the plaintiff the sum
representing the value of the car which was burned, the attorney’s fees, moral and
exemplary damages.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s Decision, but deleted the award for
damages and attorney’s fees for lack of basis. Hence, this petition
 

ISSUE:
1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO
DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS
VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.

2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF

THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME
HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.

HELD: the petition is denied.

1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:

ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
shall belong to both spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. . . .

In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the
consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the
conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.

Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence
of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership
of gains governed the property relations between respondent and her late
husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4
on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to
conjugal partnership of gains already established before its effectivity unless vested
rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent
and the late Marcelino even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal
partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife
place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate
properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by
chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership
apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules
on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly
determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their
marriage settlements. Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late husband
shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the
Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In
case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership
apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and
consent of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject
property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of
Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent
of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be
void.

The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse
who makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-
ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate
court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject
property for lack of respondent’s consent.
2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, “[T]he conjugal partnership shall be
liable for: . . .

(1)       Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the
other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . .”

Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain
to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil
Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a
unit.[
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit
probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove).
Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino to
finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of
his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the
principal obligation.
NOTES:
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner
vigorously asserted that the subject property was the exclusive property of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged
that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on appeal,
petitioner never claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When
a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change
his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other
party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due
process. A party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases
thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party
in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory.

Abing v. Waeyan
G.R. No. 146294, 31 July 2006

FACTS:

In 1986, John Abing and Juliet Waeyan cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. Together, they bought a 2-storey residential house. In December 1991, Juliet left for Korea
and worked thereat, sending money to John which the latter deposited in their joint account. In 1992,
their house was renovated and to it was annex a structure which housed a sari-sari store. In 1994,
Juliet returned.

In 1995, they decided to partition their properties as their relationship soured. They executed a
Memorandum of Agreement. Unfortunately, the document was left unsigned by the parties although
signed by the witnesses thereto. Under their unsigned agreement, John shall leave the dwelling with
Juliet paying him the amount of P428,870.00 representing John’s share in all their properties. Juliet
paid John the sum of P232,397.66 by way of partial payment of his share, with the balance of
P196,472.34 to be paid by Juliet in twelve monthly installment.

Juliet, however, failed to make good the balance. John demanded Juliet to vacate the annex
structure. Juliet refused, prompting John to file an ejectment suit against her. John alleged that he
alone spent for the construction of the annex structure with his own funds and thru the money he
borrowed from his relatives. He added that the tax declaration for the structure was under his name.
ISSUE:

Does John exclusively own the property subject of the suit?

RULING:

No. Other than John’s bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds and money he borrowed
from his relatives, spent for the construction of the annex structure, evidence wants to support such
naked claim.

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them
in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

The law is clear. In the absence of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by common-law
spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint efforts
and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-
ownership. And under this regime, they owned their properties in common “in equal shares.”

Being herself a co-owner, Juliet may not be ejected from the structure in question. She is as much
entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as John. Juliet’s failure to pay John the balance of the
latter’s share in their common properties could at best give rise to an action for a sum of money
against Juliet, or for rescission of the said agreement and not for ejectment.

Manotok Realty v. Tecson

MANOTOK REALTY, INC. v. THE HONORABLE JOSE H. TECSON, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila and NILO MADLANGAWA
G.R. No. L-47475 August 19, 1988
Gutierrrez, Jr., J.

FACTS:
In a complaint filed by the petitioner for recovery of possession and damages against the private
respondent, the then Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment declaring the defendant
Nilo Madlangawa as a builder or possessor in good faith; and ordering the plaintiff to recognize
the right of said defendant to remain in Lot No. 345, Block 1, of the Clara Tambunting
Subdivision until after he shall have been reimbursed by the plaintiff the sum of P7,500.00,
without pronouncement as to costs.
Not satisfied with the trial court’s decision, the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals and
upon affirmance by the latter of the decision below, the petitioner elevated its case to this Court
which dismissed the case for lack of merit.

The petitioner filed with the trial court, presided over by respondent Judge Jose H. Tecson, a
motion for the approval of petitioner’s exercise of option and for satisfaction of judgment,
praying that the court issue an order: a) approving the exercise of petitioner’s option to
appropriate the improvements introduced by the private respondent on the property; b) thereafter,
private respondent be ordered to deliver possession of the property in question to the petitioner.

After a denial of its motion for reconsideration, the petitioner filed the present petition for
mandamus alleging that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his
motion to exercise option and for execution of judgment on the grounds that under Articles 448
and 546 of the Civil Code, the exercise of option belongs to the owner of the property, who is the
petitioner herein, and that upon finality of judgment, the prevailing party is entitled, as a matter
of right, to its execution which is only a ministerial act on the part of the respondent judge.

ISSUE:
Should the motion for the approval of the exercise of option be granted?

HELD:
Yes. When the decision of the trial court became final and executory, it became incumbent upon
the respondent judge to issue the necessary writ for the execution of the same. There is,
therefore, no basis for the respondent judge to deny the petitioner’s motion to avail of its option
to appropriate the improvements made on its property.

To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person assert title to the land on which
he builds; i.e., that he be a possessor in the concept of owner and that he be unaware ‘that there
exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. The private respondent’s
good faith ceased after the filing of the complaint below by the petitioner.

Thus, the repairs and improvements introduced by the said respondents after the complaint was
filed cannot be considered to have been built in good faith, much less, justify the denial of the
petitioner’s exercise of option. Since the improvements have been gutted by fire, and therefore,
the basis for private respondent’s right to retain the premises has already been extinguished
without the fault of the petitioner, there is no other recourse for the private respondent but to
vacate the premises and deliver the same to herein petitioner.
Share this:
Partosa-Jo vs CA
Partosa-Jo vs CA
GR 82606, December 18, 1992

FACTS:

The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent.  The latter
admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children.  Prima filed a complaint against
the husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for support
which was consolidated.  RTC decision was a definite disposition of the complaint for support but
none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property.  Jose elevated the decision to CA which
affirmed rulings of the trial court.  The complaint on the separation of property was dismissed for
lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of the
Civil Code.  Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to temporarily live
with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her.  They
never agreed to be separated permanently.  She even returned to him but the latter refused to accept
her. 

ISSUE: WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of conjugal
property.

HELD:

SC is in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary modification instead of
dismissing the case filed.  For abandonment to exist, there must be an absolute cessation of marital
relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation.  The fact that Jo did not accept
her demonstrates that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship.   From 1968 until
1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to Prima.  Hence, the physical separation of the
parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed
to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.
 Wherefore, the petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court ordered the
conjugal property of the spouses be divided between them, share and share alike.  The division will
be implemented after the determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal
partnership including those that may have been illegally registered in the name of the persons. 
 EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent.
G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.

Facts:

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T.

San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During
his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. The first marriage was with Virginia
Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila,
Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
The second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad
San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, with whom he had no children with respondent
but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death.

Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the

settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146.

Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. But the trial court issued an order
denying the two motions to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed
the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo
was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence,
the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also
ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court, and, hence, the
case before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of

administration

Held:

Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in

the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not
denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity
to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under
the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership. In a co- ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired
through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union
is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence,
the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary
is proven.

Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity to file the

subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving
wife of Felicisimo or as his co- owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of
the Family Code.

The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and
its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is
affirmed. It was also REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

Cariño v. Cariño
G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001

FACTS:

SPO4 Santiago Cariño married Susan Nicdao in 1969 without marriage license. They had two
children. He then married Susan Yee on November 10 1992, with whom he had no children in their
almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.

He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with the RTC of Quezon City the
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Nicdao collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received a total of P21,000.

Yee filed an instant case for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively
denominated as “death benefits.” Yee admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took place during
the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, the marriage between
Nicdao and the SPO4. She however claimed that she became aware of the previous marriage at the
funeral of the deceased.

In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed the
decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.
RULING:

No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cariño falls under the Article 148 of the Family
Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous or
concubinage relationships.

As regards to the First marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 Santiago:

Article 147 Family Code-Property Regime of Union without Marriage.

“When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them
in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver
by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.”

As regards to the Second marriage between Yee and SPO4 Santiago:

Article 148 Family Code – Rules on Co-ownership regarding polygamous/ bigamous marriages,
adulterous or combuniage relationships.

“In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to
the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.”

Article 40 of the Family Code – Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

“The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”

Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the
deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the deceased
through their actual joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her
exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the deceased, but belong to the
deceased alone and Yee has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the
said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, Yee, not being the legal wife,
is not one of them.

As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to
absence of a valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased even if
she did not contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling Nicdao
to share one-half of the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the first marriage, she can
claim one-half of the disputed death benefits and the other half to the deceased’ to his legal heirs, by
intestate succession.

The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized
without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under
Article 40, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has
to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said
second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. However, for purposes other than
to remarry, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.