UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The European Theater of Operations

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
OF THE ARMIES

In Two Volumes
Volume I: May 1941–September 1944

by
Roland G. Ruppenthal

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON,D.C., 1995
 Library of Congress Catalog Number: 53–60080

First Printed 1953—CMH Pub 7–2–1

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, D.C. 20402
. . . to Those Who Served
 Foreword
A tank without gasoline or a vital part might better be a pillbox. A rifle-
man without ammunition must use his bayonet or club his rifle. A modern
army without food will not long survive. This book tells, among other things,
how in the European Theater of Operations the tank got its gas (when it
did), how the ammunition went forward, and how the food reached the
troops.
T h e necessity of anticipating events so that the needs of men in current-
day battle can be promptly and continuously met is evident even to a casual
reader. The question whether the modern soldier demands too much on the
battlefield is one for all to ponder.
Man tends to regard the problems with which he is faced as unique. To
guide those faced with the logistic problems of the future, a number of supply
principles have been laid down in regulations. This record of World War II
experience tells how the principles were actually applied. Those who take
the time and trouble to study it will find their efforts well rewarded.
ORLANDO WARD
Maj. Gen., U. S. A.
Chief of Military History
Washington, D. C
15June 1952

V
 Introductory Note
In all the extensive literature of military history there are but few
volumes devoted to the study of logistics. Although the rationalization of
army supply is fairly old in the history of warfare the written record normally
has been confined to the exposition, in field service regulations and manuals,
of how supply, evacuation, and troop movement should be organized,
rather than the narrative account of what actually happened in the course of
wars and campaigns. The term “logistics” is itself of recent coinage. During
World War I, it was confined chiefly to French lexicons, and it remained for
World War II and for the American armed forces to give the term meaning
and wide usage. Even so the definition of “logistics” is subject to wide varia-
tions. As used in the present volume the term covers the supply of armies in
the field and the movement of troops to the combat zone. Little attention is
given the evacuation of the wounded since other Army historians will tell
this story.
When plans were made for writing a series of volumes dealing with U.S.
Army operations in the European theater during World War II, the impor-
tance of the logistical support given the armies in the field literally forced
this subject upon those planning the series. It was decided that the story of
logistics could not be treated as an appendage within the various volumes
dealing with combat operations but would have to be told in the form of a
sustained and independent narrative moving from ports and beaches for-
ward to the combat zone. Months of research led to the conclusion that the
complexity and scope of logistical history demanded more than a single
volume. This volume is the first of two entitled Logistical Support of the Armies.
It is intended that the history herein recounted stand by itself as the com-
plete story of supply operations in Europe. But the thoughtful reader will find
his understanding and appreciation of the role of logistics enhanced by
referring also to those volumes in the European series which deal with the
high command and combat operations.
The author of Logistical Support ofthe Armies, Dr. Roland G. Ruppenthal,
is a graduate of the University of Wisconsin and holds the Ph. D. degree
from that institution. During the war he served with the VII Corps and the
Third Army as historical officer in four campaigns. Subsequently he was
appointed Assistant Theater Historian for the European Theater of Opera-
tions and charged with the direction of historical coverage for supply and
administration within the theater. Dr. Ruppenthal is the author of a combat
history, Utah Beach to Cherbourg, in the AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION
series, and is a lieutenant colonel in the United States Army Reserve.

HUGH M. COLE
Chief, European Section
Washington, D. C.
29 May 1952

vi
 Preface
World War II provided a convincing demonstration of the decisive role
which materiel supremacy can have in modern warfare. But while the im-
portance of logistics is repeatedly asserted, little has been written to indicate
the complexity of the administrative machinery needed to bring the required
logistic support to bear at the proper place and time, or to show the difficulty
of anticipating the requirements of distant battles. This work recounts how
U.S. forces were built u p in the United Kingdom for the great invasion of
1944, and how they were supplied during operations on the European Con-
tinent. The present volume begins with the arrival of the first small group
of U.S. Army “Special Observers” in the United Kingdom in the spring of
1941 and carries the story of logistic support on the Continent to the end of
the pursuit in northern France in mid-September 1944. A second volume
will carry the story forward to the end of hostilities in Europe in May 1945.
The aim throughout has been to relate the problems of logistic support
to tactical plans and operations. While the story of procurement, movement,
and distribution of supplies and manpower is told largely from the point of
view of the theater or SOS-Communications Zone, the agency responsible
for the support of U.S. forces, the focus throughout is on the influence which
logistic support or lack of it had on the planning and conduct of combat
operations by the field armies. The substantial apportionment of space to the
discussion of theater command and organization is explained by the direct
bearing which that problem had on the administrative structure of the
European theater and consequently on the logistic support of U.S. forces.
Except for the period of the U.K. build-up, little attention is given the
logistic support of the Army Air Forces, since the story of that support is told
elsewhere. Limitations of space have made it necessary to exclude from treat-
ment in this volume certain activities normally falling within the definition
of logistics, such as evacuation, hospitalization, and salvage. The importance
of transportation, of port and railway construction, and of shortages of major
items such as ammunition a n d combat vehicles, to the story of logistic diffi-
culties has resulted in an unavoidable encroachment on the histories of the
technical services. The technical aspects of their operations are left to the
histories of those services.
While a n attempt has been made to maintain a chronological organiza-
tion, constantly relating supply to tactical developments, the nature of the
subject has made it necessary to combine the chronological with the topical
treatment. Some trespassing on strict chronology has therefore resulted, as,
for example, in recounting the story of Cherbourg’s reconstruction and per-

vii
formance. That story is postponed to the second volume where the port
problem as a whole is treated at length. Command and organizational devel-
opments of the pursuit period, including the circumstances surrounding the
move of the Communications Zone headquarters to Paris, and an analysis of
the command decisions of early September 1944 in the light of the logistic
situation at that time are likewise postponed to Volume II.
It is a pleasure to acknowledge both the direct assistance and encourage-
ment provided by many persons in the preparation of this volume. It was
mainly through Col. S. L. A. Marshall, theater historian in 1945, that the
author was first initiated into the study of logistics and transferred from the
field to theater headquarters at the end of hostilities in Europe to organize
the research a n d writing of preliminary monographs on the administrative
a n d logistical history of the theater. Since then Colonel Marshall has con-
tinued to provide friendly and expert counsel a n d to give generously of his
time in constructive criticism of the manuscript.
T h e author’s labors have been substantially lightened by the use of
several preliminary studies prepared by members of the Historical Section,
ETO, at the conclusion of the war in Europe. Three of them had particularly
valuable application to this volume and merit special mention: George H.
Elliott’s history of the ETOUSA predecessor commands, SPOBS and
USAFBI, covering the activities of the U.S. Army in the United Kingdom
in the year before the formal activation of the theater; Clifford L. Jones’s
two-volume manuscript on the training of U.S. forces in the logistics of am-
phibious operations and on the activities of the engineer special brigades at
the beaches; and Robert W. Coakley’s two-volume study of theater com-
mand and organization. These three outstanding products of research
carried out under difficult circumstances were a n invaluable and irreplace-
able source in the preparation of this volume.
It is a pleasure to acknowledge the research assistance of Dr. Mae Link,
who aided in the preparation of three chapters on the U.K. build-up, and of
Mr. Royce L. Thompson, whose effective sleuthing for elusive records both
a t St. Louis and Washington and researching on a variety of questions saved
the author much time-consuming labor.
Special thanks are due those individuals who co-operated so generously
and cordially in the final production of the volume: Mr.Joseph R. Friedman,
Chief of the Editorial Branch, made an immeasurable contribution, saving
the author many writing faults through his unfailing tact and expert editorial
judgment. Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff, Chief of the Cartographic Branch, and
his assistants have solved a knotty mapping problem with their customary
imagination and skill. Capt. Kenneth E. Hunter, Chief of the Photographic
Branch, selected and edited the photographs which have added substantially
to the appearance and value of the volume. Miss Gay Morenus ably carried
out the laborious task of copy editing, and the index is the product of many hours
of work by Mrs. Pauline Dodd.
T h e author must acknowledge, in addition, the consistently cheerful
assistance given by Mr. Israel Wice and his staff of the General Reference

viii
Branch of the Office, Chief of Military History; by the records personnel of
the Departmental Records Branch in Washington and of the Records
Administration Center in St. Louis, both of the Office of the Adjutant
General; and by the historians of the technical services. Footnotes attest in
part to the contributions of key staff officers and commanders who generously
provided personal knowledge of the events of the period. GeneralsJohn C. H.
Lee, Raymond G. Moses, Robert W. Crawford, and Ewart G. Plank read
the entire manuscript in draft form.
This volume was prepared under the general direction of Dr. Hugh M.
Cole, Chief of the E T O Section, Office of the Chief of Military History, with
whom the author was privileged to serve in the European theater, and who
has been his constant mentor and most unfailing source of encouragement
in a new field of study.
ROLAND G. RUPPENTHAL
Washington, D. C.
4 June 1952

ix
 Contents
Page
PRINCIPAL COMMANDERS AND STAFF OFFICERS 1

THE UNITED KINGDOM BUILD-UP

Chapter
I . ORIGINS O F T H E EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS.
1941-JUNE 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
(1) The United States “Observes” the War in Europe . . . . . . . 13
(2) The Occupation of Iceland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
(3) American Troops Go to Northern Ireland . . . . . . . . . 19
(4) Establishing an Air Force in the United Kingdom . . . . . . . 26
(5) The Formation of theServices of Supply and theActivationof E T O U S A 31
( 6 ) The Heritage of S P O B S and U S A F B I . . . . . . . . . . . 44
I I . T H E SOS AND ETOUSA I N 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
(1) B O L E R O Is Born . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
(2) B O L E R O Planning in the United Kingdom, May-July) 1942: the
First Key Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
(3) The SOS Organizes. June –July 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . 76
(4) T O R C H Intervenes . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
(5) BOLERO’S Status at the End of 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
I I I . T H E BUILD-UP IN STRIDE. 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
(1) B O L E R O in Limbo. January–April 1943 . . . . . . . . . . 114
(2) The Troop Build-up Is Resumed. May-December 1943 . . . . 120
(3) The Flow of Cargo in 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
(4) Troop and Cargo Reception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
(5) Command and Organizational Changes in 1943 . . . . . . . . 159

PREPARING FOR CONTINENTAL

INVASION
I V . T H E INCEPTION O F OVERLORD AND ITS LOGISTIC
ASPECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
(1) Early Planning f o r Cross-Channel Operations . . . . . . . . 175
(2) Logistic Considerations in the Evolution of the OVERLORD Plan . 178

xi
Chapter Page
V . COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION. AND THE ASSIGN-
MENT OF PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES. JANUARY-
JUNE 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
( 1 ) Formation of the Major Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
(2) Consolidation of E T O U S A and SOS . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
(3) Assignment of Command and Planning Responsibilities . . . . . . 203
(4) Forward Echelon. Communications Zone(FECOMZ) . . . . . . 207
(5) Advance Section. Communications Zone (ADSEC) . . . . . . . 211
(6) Continental Base Sections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
(7) Final Command Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
VI . THE COMPLETION OF BOLERO . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
( 1 ) The Flow of Troops and Cargo.January-May 1944 . . . . . . . 231
(2) Construction and Local Procurement. 1943-May 1944 . . . . . . . 240
(3) TheSOS on the Eve of OVERLORD . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
VII . THE OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN . . . . . . . . . . 269
( 1 ) The Artificial Port . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
(2) Beach Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
(3) Port Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
(4) Troop Build-up and Replacements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
(5) The Supply Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
(6) The Depot Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
(7) Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
(8) The Supply of POL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
VIII . TRAINING AND REHEARSING FOR CROSS-CHANNEL
INVASION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
( 1 ) Earlier Amphibious Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
(2) The Training Schools and First Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . 334
(3) The Assault Training Center and Engineer Special Brigades . . . . 339
(4) Major Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
(5) Final Rehearsals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350

OVERLORD IS SET IN MOTION.

MAY-JULY 1944
IX . MOUNTING THE OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
( 1 ) The Mounting Problem and Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
(2) The Mounting Begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
X . LAUNCHING THE INVASION: ORGANIZING THE
BEACHES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
( 1 ) Tactical Developmentsin June . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
(2) O M A H A Beach on D Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
(3) UTAH Beach on D Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384

xii
Chapter Page
(4) Development of the O M A H A Area . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
(5) Development of the UTAH Area . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
(6) The Beach Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402
(7) The Great Storm of 19–22 June . . . . . . . . . . . . 406
(8) The Build-up to 3 0J u n e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415
(9) Cross-Channel Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 422

XI. T H E LOGISTIC OUTLOOK I N JUNE AND JULY . . . . 427

(1) Tactical Developments, 1–24 July . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
(2) TheNormandy Supply Base . . . . . . . . . . . 430
(3) The Status of Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439
(4) Troop Build-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449
(5) Replacements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458
(6) The Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463

THE LOGISTICS OF RAPID MOVEMENT.

AUGUST–MID-SEPTEMBER 1944
XII. BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475
(1) Tactical Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475
(2)The Logistic Implications of Changing Plans . . . . . . . . . . 481

XIII. “FRANTIC SUPPLY” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489

( 1 )T h e Character of Supply Operations in the Pursuit . . . . . . . 489
(2) Gasoline—“the Red Blood of War” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499
(3) Class I. I I , and IV Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 516
(4) Ammunition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525

XIV . TRANSPORTATION IN T H E PURSUIT . . . . . . . . . . 544

(1) The Railways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 544
(2) Motor Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 553
(3) Supply by Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 572

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 585

CODE NAMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 589

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 591

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 597

xiii
 Tables
NO. Page
1. Troop Build-up in the United Kingdom, January 1942-February 1943. 100
2 . Cargo Flow to the United Kingdom. January 1942-May 1943 . . . . 103
3. Troop Build-up in the United Kingdom in 1943 . . . . . . . . . . 129
4 . Cargo Flow to the United Kingdom in 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5. Troop Build-up in the United Kingdom, August 1943-May 1944 . . 232
6 . Cargo Flow to the United Kingdom, November 1943-July 1944 . . 237
7. Supply Build-up Over the Beaches, 6-30 June 1944 . . . . . . . . 416
8. Vehicle Build-up Over the Beaches. 6-30 June 1944 . . . . . . . 418
9. Troop Build-up Over the Beaches, 6-30 June 1944 . . . . . . . . 420
10 . Gasoline Supply of First and Third Armies, 30 July-16 September 1944 503
11 . Cargo Transported by Air, 20 August-16 September 1944 ...... 581

Charts
1. Early Command and Staff Organization of ETOUSA . . . . . . . 45
2. The BOLERO Administrative Organization in the United Kingdom . 63
3. Organization of the Services of Supply. ETOUSA. 19 August 1942 . . 79
4. ETOUSA and SOS Command and Organizational Structure. August
1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
5. ETOUSA’s Organization After the Consolidation of 17January 1944 . 199
6. Planned Command Arrangements for OVERLORD . . . . . . . 225

Maps
1. European Theater of Operations. 16 June 1942 . . . . . . . . . . 41
2. Regional Organization of SOS in the United Kingdom . . . . . . 85
3. E T O Boundary Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4 . Ports Considered in Invasion Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
5 . The Final OVERLORD Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inside back cover
6. U.S. General Depots and Major Training Sites, May 1944 . . . . . 249
7 . Plan for MULBERRY A at OMAHA Beach . . . . . . . . . . . 279
8. The CHASTITY Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
9. OVERLORD Rail and Pipeline Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
10. The Mounting Plan for Southern Base Section . . . . . . Inside back cover
11 . Tactical Progress, 6-30 June 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
12. OMAHA Beach and Beach Maintenance Area . . . . . . . . . . 378
13. UTAH Beach and Beach Maintenance Area . . . . . . . . . . . 385
14 . Tactical Progress. U.S. Forces. 1-24 July 1944 . . . . . . . . . . 428
15. Tactical Progress, 25 July-12 September 1944 . . . . . . . . . . 476
16. POL Pipelines in Mid-September 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 511
17. Railways in Use. Mid-September 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . 548
18. Routes of the Red Ball Express . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 562

xiv
 Illustrations
Page
The Special Observer Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Headquarters. ETO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
John G . Winant. U.S. . Ambassador to Britain . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Nissen Hut Quarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
General Lee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Crates of Partially Assembled Jeeps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
British “Goods Vans” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
English Railway Station Scene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
General Hawley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Headquarters, SOS. Near Cheltenham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
General Littlejohn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
General Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Deck-Loaded General Grant Medium Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Motor Convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Tenders Alongside the Queen Elizabeth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
U.S.-Built Locomotives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Roadside Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
General Depot at Ashchurch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
Jeep Assembly Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
General Crawford . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
General Lord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
General Moses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
General Plank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
. . . . . .
Stocking Supplies and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
Invasion Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
Typical Medical Installations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
Aerial View of a Station Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
U.S. Airfield Construction in England . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
General Stratton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
Caissons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
Lobnitz Pierhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
Aerial View of Cherbourg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
Column of Dukws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
Waterproofed Tank Recovery Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
Loaded Landing Craft and Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
Discharging at the Beaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395
Partially Completed MULBERRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403
Completed Pier of the MULBERRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
Beached and Wrecked Landing Craft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408
Storm-Twisted Piers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
MULBERRY A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410
Beach Transfer Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
Dried-Out LST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414

xv
 Page
Coaster Being Unloaded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465
The First POL Tanker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 501
General Muller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 506
Brig . Gen . R . W . Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 507
Welding a Section of the POL Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 512
Rations Stacked at aQuartermaster Depot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517
General Rowan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 519
General Rumbough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 520
Handling Supplies in the Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 526
General Sayler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 541
US.-Built World War I Locomotives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 545
Gondola Rolling Out of an LST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 546
General Ross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 554
Directing Traffic Along the Red Ball Route . . . . . . . . . . . . . 561
Tractor-Trailer
Combinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 569

xvi
 Principal Commanders and
Staff Officers
Associated With the Logistic Support of U.S. Forces in the
European Theater *
ADCOCK, Brig. Gen. (subsequently Maj. Gen.) Clarence L.—Born in Waltham,
Mass., 1895. Graduated from the U.S. Military Academy and appointed 2d
lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers in 1918. Held the usual engineer assign-
ments in the first years, including duty in Hawaii, as an assistant PMS&T **
at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, with the engineer office of the First
Corps Area, and later as Executive Officer of the Office of the Chief of
Engineers in Washington. Graduated from the Command and General Staff
School in 1935; from the Army War College in 1939. Went to England as
G–4 of the II Corps in 1942, participating in the North African invasion, and
successively held the same position on the staff of the Fifth Army, AFHQ,
and then 6th Army Group. After the war became G–5 of U.S. Forces in
Europe and subequently held various posts in the Military Government of
Germany. Retired in 1947, but was recalled for temporary duty with the
European Command in 1948, returning to retired status in 1949.

CHANEY, Maj. Gen. James E.—Born in Chaney, Md., 1885. Entered U.S. Military
Academy after attending Baltimore City College for three years, graduating
and accepting appointment as 2d lieutenant of Infantry in 1908. After vari-
ous infantry assignments, including a tour in the Philippines, was detailed to
the Air Service in 1917, serving with the AEF in France and Germany.
Graduated from Command and General Staff School in 1926 and from Army
War College in 1931. Served between the wars as Assistant Military Attaché
for Aviation at Rome, technical adviser on aviation at Geneva Disarmament
Conference in 1932, Assistant Chief of Staff of Air Corps in 1935, and head
of Air Defense Command at Mitchel Field, N. Y. Went to England in 1940
to observe the Battle of Britain, and the following year returned there as head
of the Special Observer Group, forerunner of the later theater headquarters.
Commanded U.S. forces in Britain in the first half of 1942, returning to the
United States in June and becoming Commanding General, First Air Force.
* T h e list is restricted to general officers and includes several who held prominent staff and
command positions in supply in the 6th Army Group and SOLOC, and whose main role in the
logistic support of U.S. forces falls in the period covered by the second volume.
** Professor of Military Science and Tactics.
2 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

Later held commands in the Pacific and served in the Office of the Secretary
of War. Retired in July 1947.

COLLINS,Brig. Gen. Leroy P.—Born in Troy, N. Y., 1883. Entered military service
as enlisted man in 1904, serving with 15th Cavalry until 1907, when ap-
pointed 2d lieutenant in Field Artillery. Graduated from Command and
General Staff School in 1924, from Army War College in 1929, and from
Naval War College in 1930. Served tours of duty in the Philippines, the
Panama Canal Zone, and the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery in Wash-
ington. Was PMS&T at Leland Stanford University, Assistant Commandant
of the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, member of War Plans Division of the
General Staff, and commander of various field artillery brigades. Went to the
European Theater in 1942 and commanded the Northern Ireland Base Sec-
tion, the Western Base Section in England, and later the Loire Section on the
Continent. Retired in 1945.

CRAWFORD, Maj. Gen. Robert W.—Born in Warsaw, N. Y., 1891. Graduated

from U.S. Military Academy and commissioned in Corps of Engineers in
1914. Graduated with degree in Electrical Engineering from Cornel1 Univer-
sity in 1921, from Command and General Staff School in 1929, and from
Army War College in 1936. Served with Corps of Engineers and Chemical
Warfare Service in France in 1917–18. Held various engineer assignments in
the United States and Hawaii, and served with the Public Works Adminis-
tration and the Works Progress Administration in the 1930’s. Between 1939
and 1942 saw duty with the War Department General Staff and with the
Armored Force at Fort Knox. In December 1942 became Commanding Gen-
eral of the U.S. Army Services of Supply in the Middle East. Went to England
in 1943 and served briefly as Chief of Operations, Chief of Staff, and Deputy
Commanding General, SOS, and as theater G–4. Became G–4 of Supreme
Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, early in 1944, remaining in that
position until the end of hostilities. In September 1945 was named Division
Engineer of the Lower Mississippi Valley Engineer Division, with headquar-
ters at Vicksburg, and in 1946 became President of the Mississippi River
Commission. Retired in 1948.
GILLAND, Brig. Gen. Morris W.—Born in Brooklyn, N. Y., 1898. Graduated
from U.S. Military Academy and appointed 2d lieutenant in Corps of Engi-
neers in 1918. Early assignments included duty at Engineer School at Camp
Humphreys, and service as PMS&T at the Virginia Military Institute. Almost
all later assignments in field of engineering, including duty in Panama Canal
Zone and in various engineer districts in United States. In 1942, after serving
briefly as engineer of Southern Base Section in England, went to North Africa
and there became engineer of Mediterranean Base Section, then Chief of
Staff, Headquarters, SOS. After the southern France invasion, became Chief
of Staff, Southern Line of Communications, and, upon that command’s dis-
PRINCIPAL C O M M A N D E R S AND STAFF OFFICERS 3

solution in February 1945, G–4 of Headquarters, Communications Zone,

ETO. In November 1945 became Chief of Staff of Second Service Command
at Governor’s Island, N. Y., and in 1946 was assigned to duty at Fort Belvoir.
Retired in September 1948.

GROWER, Brig. Gen. Roy W.—Born in Richmond, N. Y., 1890. Graduated with
engineering degree from University of Syracuse in 1913. Commissioned as 1st
lieutenant in ORC in 1917 and as 1st lieutenant in Corps of Engineers, RA,
in 1920. Served with the engineers in France in World War I and then in
various assignments, including PMS&T at the University of Cincinnati,
Assistant PMS&T at the Alabama Polytechnic Institute, duty in the Panama
Canal Zone, with the Works Progress Administration, and in the Upper
Missouri Valley Engineer District. Went to the European Theater in 1943,
serving successively with the 351st Engineer General Service Regiment, as a
Base Section Engineer, Deputy Base Section Commander, and Commanding
General, Eastern Base Section, in England. After invasion of France, became
Commanding General of Brittany Base Section and later commander of Bur-
gundy District of the Continental Advance Section. Retired in 1946.

HAWLEY,Maj. Gen. Paul R.—Born in West College Corner, Ind., 1891. Grad-
uated with B. A. degree from Indiana University in 1912, and with M. D.
from University of Cincinnati in 1914. Commissioned 1st lieutenant in the
medical Reserve in 1916 and appointed 1st lieutenant in the Medical Corps,
RA, in 1917. Graduated from Army Medical School in 1921, Command and
General Staff School in 1937, and Army War College in 1939. Served with
AEF in France in 1918–19, in the Philippines in 1924–27, and as Chief
Surgeon of U.S. Army troops in Nicaragua. Became Executive Officer of
Army Medical Center in Washington, D. C., in 1931. Went to England as
Chief Surgeon of the Special Observer Group in 1941, and remained as Chief
Surgeon of the European Theater throughout the period of hostilities. In
1945 became adviser to the Chief of the Veterans Administration, Gen. Omar
N. Bradley, on medical affairs. Retired in June 1946, thereafter serving as
Director of the American College of Surgeons.

HOGE,Brig. Gen. (subsequently Lt. Gen.) William M.—Born in Boonville, Mo.,

1894. Graduated from U.S. Military Academy and appointed 2d lieutenant
in Corps of Engineers in 1916. Received degree in Civil Engineering from
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1922, and graduated from Com-
mand and General Staff School in 1928. Served with AEF in France in 1918
and in a variety of peacetime assignments, including duty as instructor at
Virginia Military Institute, at Engineer School at Fort Humphreys, and at
Infantry School at Fort Benning. Organized the Corps of Engineers of the
Philippine Army, becoming its first Chief of Engineers. Was District Engineer
at Memphis and Omaha. In 1942 commanded engineer units in construction
of the Alaskan Highway, then successively commanded 4th and 5th Engineer
4 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

Special Brigades. In 1944 was selected to command Provisional Engineer

Special Brigade Group, consisting of 5th and 6th ESB’s which supported V
Corps in the landings at OMAHA Beach in Normandy. Subsequently became
commander of 16th Major Port, which‘ first operated the Brittany ports and
then Le Havre. Later in 1944 took command of Combat Command B of 9th
Armored Division, which captured the Rhine bridge at Remagen, and then
was given 4th Armored Division, which he commanded in the final drive
into central Germany. After the war commanded the Engineer School, U.S.
troops in Trieste, and in 1951 the I X Corps in Korea.
JACOBS,Brig. Gen. Fenton S.—Bornin Gordonsville, Va., 1892. Enlisted in the 1st
(Virginia) Cavalry, National Guard, in 1916, and was appointed 2d lieuten-
ant of Cavalry in the Officers Reserve Corps in 1917. Accepted RA commis-
sion later the same year. Served with AEF in France in 1917–18, and on
occupation duty. Was Assistant PMS&T at the University of Arizona. After
graduation from Command and General Staff School in 1936, instructed at
the Cavalry School. In 1942 became Chief of Staff, 91st Division, and in the
following year went to England and served as Deputy Commander and Chief
of Staff of Western Base Section, then as Commanding General of Western
Base. Commanded the Channel Base Section on the Continent. After the war
in Europe served briefly as a base commander in the western Pacific, then as
Commanding General of the Seattle Port of Embarkation.
LARKIN,
Maj. Gen. (subsequently Lt. Gen.) Thomas B.—Bornin Louisburg, Wis.,
1890. Graduated in 1910 from Gonzaga University, Washington, with B. A.
degree, and from U.S. Military Academy with appointment as 2d lieutenant
in Corps of Engineers in 1915. Served with 2d Engineers in Mexico in 1916,
and with AEF in France in 1917–19. Between wars assignments included
duty in Office, Chief of Engineers, Washington, D. C., in Panama Canal
Zone, as Assistant Military Attaché in Tokyo, as Assistant to District Engi-
neer at Pittsburgh, and later as District Engineer at Vicksburg and at Fort
Peck District in Montana. Graduated from Army Industrial College in 1927,
Command and General Staff School in 1929, and Army War College in 1938.
In 1942 went to England with General Lee, becoming the first Chief of Staff
of the SOS, ETO. In November accompanied the TORCH force to North
Africa, becoming successively Commanding General of the Mediterranean
Base Section, of the SOS, North African Theater of Operations, and then of
the Communications Zone, North African Theater. In 1944 went to south-
ern France to command the Southern Line of Communications, and with
that command’s dissolution in February 1945 became Deputy Commander
for Operations of the Communications Zone, ETO, and finally also Chief of
Staff. Returned to United States later that year to take command of Second
Service Command. In 1946 became Quartermaster General, and in 1949
Director of Logistics (subsequently redesignated G–4), Department of the
Army General Staff.
PRINCIPAL COMMANDERS AND STAFF OFFICERS 5

LEE,Lt. Gen. John C. H.—Born in Junction City, Kans., 1887. Graduated from
U.S. Military Academy in 1909, from Army General Staff College at
Langres, France, in 1918, from Army War College in 1932 and from Army
Industrial College in 1933. For other biographical data see Chapter I, Sec-
tion 5. After dissolution of the Communications Zone in 1945, became
Commanding General of the successor command, Theater service Forces,
European Theater. In January 1946 became Commanding General of the
Mediterranean Theater and Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Allied
Forces, Mediterranean. Retired in December 1947.

LITTLEJOHN, Maj. Gen. Robert M.—Born in Jonesville, S. C., 1890. Graduated

from U.S. Military Academy and appointed 2d lieutenant of Cavalry in
1912. Graduated from Command and General Staff School in 1926 and from
Army War College in 1930. First assigned to 8th Cavalry in the Philippines.
Served with machine gun battalion in AEF in France, 1918. In 1919 in
France began to see increasing duty with the Quartermaster Corps, serving
with the Subsistence School, completing a second tour in the Philippines, and
carrying out an assignment with the Office of the Quartermaster General in
Washington. Went to England in 1942 and served as Chief Quartermaster of
the European Theater for remainder of the war, also acting as Chief of Staff
of the SOS for a brief period. Retired in 1946.

LORD,Maj. Gen. Royal B.—Born in Worcester, Mass., 1899. Graduated from

U.S. Military Academy and appointed 2d lieutenant in Corps of Engineers
in 1923. Graduated from Engineer School in 1924 and from University of
California with B. S. degree in Civil Engineering in 1927. Served in the
Philippines and Hawaii, instructed at the Military Academy, and, like many
Army engineer officers, saw duty with various agencies specially created by
the government in the 1930’s, including the Passamaquoddy Project in
Maine, the Resettlement Administration, and the latter’s successor, the Farm
Security Administration. In 1941–42 served as Acting Director of the War
Department Bureau of Public Relations and Assistant Director of the Board
of Economic Warfare. Ordered to England in July 1942, serving first in the
Office of the Chief Engineer. Subsequently became Deputy Chief of Staff,
SOS, then Chief of Staff of the SOS and the Communications Zone and, at
the same time, Deputy Chief of Staff, ETOUSA. In April 1945 became Com-
manding General of the Assembly Area Command, which directed redeploy-
ment of U.S. forces from the European Theater. Retired in 1946 and entered
business in New York.

MOORE,Maj. Gen. Cecil R.—Born at Grottoes, Va., 1894. Graduated from

Virginia Polytechnic Institute with B. S. degree in Electrical Engineering
and was commissioned 2d lieutenant in Coast Artillery Corps, RA, in 1917.
Graduated from the Engineer School at Fort Humphreys in 1924, from
Command and General Staff School in 1933, and from Army War College in
6 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

1938. Saw service in France, England, and Germany in 1918–22and held

various engineering assignments in the United States thereafter, Went to the
Office of the Chief of Engineers in Washington in 1930 and later became
District Engineer at Portland, Oreg. Appointed Chief Engineer of the
European Theater in 1942, serving as such until 1946, when he retired.

MOSES,
Brig. Gen. Raymond G.—Born in Buffalo, N. Y., 1891. Graduated from
U.S. Military Academy and was appointed 2d lieutenant in Corps of Engi-
neers in 1916. Served in Panama Canal Zone before going to France in 1918.
After World War I, attended Massachusetts Institute of Technology, graduat-
ing with a degree in Civil Engineering in 1921. Graduated from Command
and General Staff School in 1931, and from Army Industrial College in 1933.
Held normal engineering assignments, including duty in Mississippi and
Ohio Valley engineer districts. Served with American Battle Monuments
Commission in France and instructed at U.S. Military Academy. In 1941
went to the Office of the Chief of Engineers in Washington, and then to the
War Department General Staff as G–4. I n 1943 went to the European
Theater and became G–4 of 1st (later 12th) Army Group, heading the U.S.
Administrative Staff attached to General Montgomery’s headquarters to
plan the logistic support of the Normandy invasion. Served after war as
Division Engineer, New England Division. Retired in 1949.

MULLER,Brig Gen. (subsequently Maj. Gen.) Walter J.—Born at Fort D. A.

Russel (now Fort Warren), Wyo., 1895. Graduated from U.S. Military
Academy and appointed 2d lieutenant of Infantry in 1918. Postwar infantry
duty in France and Germany, continuing in various infantry assignments
after return to the United States in 1923. Assistant PMS&T at the University
of Florida in 1931; graduate of the Command and General Staff School in
1938. Served increasingly in the field of supply with assignment to Fort Knox
as Assistant G–4 for Armored Force, then G–4 of I Armored Corps. Served as
G–4 of Desert Training Center at Camp Young, Calif., and returned to I
Armored Corps as G–4 for planning and execution of North African invasion.
Became G–4 of Seventh Army in 1943 Sicilian invasion. Continued to serve
General Patton as G–4 of Third Army throughout campaigns of 1944–45.
After war served successively as Military Governor of Bavaria, as G–4 and
Chief of Logistics Section, Army Field Forces. In 1951 became Deputy Chief
of Staff for Logistics and Administration, and Senior Officer U.S. Element,
Allied Land Forces Central Europe.

PLANK, Maj. Gen. Ewart G.—Born in Garden City, Nev., 1897. Graduated from
U.S. Military Academy in 1920, from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in
1922, and Command and General Staff School in 1940. Major peacetime
assignment with Engineer office at Fort Peck, Mont. Appointed commander
of the Eastern Base Section in England in 1942, and served as Commanding
General of the Advance Section throughout the period of operations on the
PRINCIPAL C O M M A N D E R S A N D STAFF OFFICERS 7

Continent in 1944–45. After V–E Day took command of Philippine Base

Section, and in 1946 became Commanding General of New York Port of
Embarkation. Retired in 1949.

RATAY, Brig. Gen. John P.—Born in Posen, Poland, 1893. Enlisted in the Regular
Army in 1914, serving in Coast Artillery Corps, and commissioned a 2d lieu-
tenant in Field Artillery in 1917. Saw duty as a n artillery officer with 2d
Division in France, 1918–21. From 1924 to 1928 served as language officer
and Assistant Military Attaché in Peking, China, and prepared textbooks on
the study of Chinese. Graduated from Command and General Staff School
in 1934. Collected historical material in Berlin for the Historical Section,
Army War College, 1934–38, and in 1939–42 served as Military Attaché in
Bucharest, Romania. Accompanied the Western Task Force as Deputy G–2
in the North African landings, November 1942, and thereafter became suc-
cessively commander of Atlantic Base Section in Morocco, the 20th Port
Training Command in North Africa, the Northern Base Section in Corsica,
and Delta Base Section, Southern Line of Communications, in southern
France. Retired in August 1946.

RICKARD, Brig. Gen. (subsequently Maj. Gen.) Roy V.—Born in Osseo, Wis.,
1891. Appointed 2d lieutenant of Infantry in the O R C in 1917, and com-
missioned a 1st lieutenant, RA, in 1920. After early duty in various provost
assignments, served increasingly with infantry units, including duty in the
Panama Canal Zone and the Philippines, at the Infantry School, and as
Assistant PMS&T at the University of Iowa. Gradually shifted to the field of
supply, beginning with his assignment to the G–4 Section of Ninth Corps
Area at the Presidio of San Francisco in 1940. In 1943 participated in the
Kiska operation in the Aleutians as a landing force commander. In the fall
of the same year became G–4 of the Fourth Army, and in the following year
G–4 of the Ninth Army, serving in the latter position until the end of hostil-
ities. After a brief tour of duty in the United States he returned to Europe,
serving successively as Assistant Inspector General, Provost Marshal, and
Chief of Special Services of the European Command. Retired in 1951.

ROGERS, Brig. Gen. Pleas B.—Born in Alice, Tex., 1895. Entered military service
as enlisted man with 2d Infantry, Texas National Guard, on border duty in
1916–17, and was appointed 2d lieutenant in Infantry, Texas National
Guard, in 1917. Served with AEF in France in 1918–19, and accepted RA
commission as 1st lieutenant of Infantry in 1920. Graduated from Command
and General Staff School in 1935, and from Army War College in 1937.
Infantry duty included service with Philippine Scouts. Commanded London
Base Command (changed to Central Base Section) from 1942 to 1944, when
named to a like assignment as Commanding General, Seine Section (Paris
area), serving in that capacity through end of the war. Senior Instructor,
ORC, in state of New York until retirement in 1948.
8 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

Ross, Maj. Gen. Frank S.—Born at Aspen, Colo., 1893. Entered military service
as enlisted man via Texas National Guard in 1916, serving initially on border
patrol duty. Received Reserve commission in 1917, and, after short tour of
duty in France in 1918, returned to United States and accepted RA commis-
sion in 1920. Had the usual peacetime itinerary: Infantry School, service in
Philippines, PMS&T at North Dakota Agricultural College, duty with
Civilian Conservation Corps. Graduated from Command and General Staff
School in 1931, and from Army War College in 1936. Between 1938 and
1942 served in G–4 Section of War Department General Staff. Essentially a
combat officer, and as late as March 1942 was assigned to command medium
tank regiment in armored division. Shortly thereafter was selected as Chief
of Transportation of European Theater. Held this post until end of the war
except for brief tour in same capacity in North African Theater. Had absorb-
ing interest in marksmanship during his years in the Infantry, holding the
Distinguished Marksman Medal, the highest Army award as a rifle shot.
High-strung, and full of restless, driving energy, Ross, like Hawley and
Moore, was regarded as one of the ablest of the technical service chiefs.
Scornful of formality, and a man for whom only the essentials mattered, he
presented a personality contrasting sharply with that of his superior, General
Lee. Retired in 1946.

ROWAN, Brig. Gen. Hugh W.—Born in Newport, R. I., 1894. Graduated from
Yale University in 1915 (B. S.) and from Harvard in 1917 (M. A.) Commis-
sioned as 2d lieutenant in Coast Artillery Corps, RA, in 1917. Saw action
with 89th Division in France in 1918 as Chemical Warfare officer. Resigned
commission in 1919, and was recommissioned in Chemical Warfare Service
in 1820. Graduated from Army Industrial College in 1925. Held various
assignments in Chemical Warfare Service, including teaching at Chemical
Warfare School and Army Industrial College. Assistant Military Attaché in
Berlin for four years. Served in Office of the Chief of Chemical Warfare from
1938 to 1942; then became Chemical Warfare Officer of European Theater,
holding that position through the war. In 1945 named President of Chemical
Corps Board at Edgewood Arsenal, and in 1951 assigned to Chemical
Training Center at Fort McClellan, Ala.

RUMBOUGH, Maj. Gen. William S.—Born in Lynchburg, Va., 1892. Entered

Army as enlisted man in National Guard, serving with 5th (Maryland)
Infantry in 1916–17. Continued in various infantry assignments, including
duty in France and Germany, until 1920, when transferred to Signal Corps.
Graduated from Signal School in 1924, from George Washington University
in 1927, from Command and General Staff Schol in 1931, and from Army
War College in 1934. Was PMS&T at University of Illinois in 1920, and held
various Signal Corps assignments thereafter, including duty in Hawaii.
Became Chief Signal Officer of the European Theater in 1942, continuing
through end of the war. Retired in 1946.
PRINCIPAL C O M M A N D E R S A N D STAFF OFFICERS 9

SAYLER, Maj. Gen. Henry B.—Born in Huntington, Ind., 1893. Graduated from
U.S. Military Academy and appointed 2d lieutenant in Coast Artillery
Corps in 1915. Served with artillery units in France in 1917–18. Attended
Ordnance School, Watertown Arsenal (Mass.), in 1922, and Command and
General Staff School in 1933. Held assignments as Ordnance Officer of 7th
Division at Camp Meade, Md., Post Ordnance Officer at Fort Riley, Kans.,
and Ordnance Officer of the Fourth Corps Area at Atlanta, Ga. Became
Chief Ordnance Officer, European Theater in 1942, continuing in that post,
like the other technical service chiefs in the ETO, until end of hostilities.
Principal postwar assignment as Chief of the Research and Development
Division, Office of the Chief of Ordnance. Retired in 1949.

STRATTON, Brig. Gen. James H.—Born in Stonington, Conn., 1898. Entered Army
as enlisted man via New Jersey National Guard in 1917. Graduated from
U.S. Military Academy and appointed 2d lieutenant in Field Artillery in
1920. Immediately transferred to Corps of Engineers, graduating from Engi-
neer School in 1921, and from the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute at Troy,
N. Y., with degree in Civil Engineering in 1923. Served in various engineer-
ing assignments, including duty in Panama Canal Zone and in Construction
Division of Office of the Chief of Engineers in Washington. In 1943 became
Chief of Operations of the SOS, ETO, and then theater G–4. Returned to
Office of the Chief of Engineers in Washington early in 1945, subsequently
serving as Chief, Special Engineering Division, in Panama Canal Zone and
then as Division Engineer, New England Division. Retired in 1949.

THRASHER,
Brig. Gen. Charles O.—Born in Paxton, Ill., 1886. Received tempo-
rary commission as 2d lieutenant in 1917, serving with Quartermaster Corps
in France in 1918. Recommissioned as 1st lieutenant in Quartermaster
Corps, RA, in 1920. Graduated from Q M School in 1929, and from Army
Industrial College in 1930. Assignments included duty in Hawaii and com-
mand of Seattle Port of Embarkation and Q M Depot. In 1942 became
Commanding General of the newly created Southern Base Section in Eng-
land which served as main staging area for invasion of Normandy. In 1944
took command of Oise Intermediate Section of Communications Zone in
France. Retired in 1946.

VAUGHAN, Maj. Gen. Harry B.—Born in Norfolk, Va., 1888. Graduated from
Virginia Polytechnic Institute with degree in Civil Engineering in 1912.
Commissioned 1st lieutenant in Engineer Reserve in 1917, and then served
with AEF in France and on occupation duty in Germany. Graduated from
Engineer School in 1923, and from Command and General Staff School in
1930. Assignments included tours of duty in Hawaii, as PMS&T at the
University of Illinois, in the Office of the Chief of Engineers in Washington,
and as District Engineer at Philadelphia. Went to European Theater in 1943,
holding various assignments there, including that of Deputy Commander for
10 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

Forward Echelon, Communications Zone, and then Commanding General

of United Kingdom Base Section. After end of hostilities became Command-
ing General of Bremen Port Command. Retired in 1946.
WHARTON, Brig. Gen. James E.—Born in Elk, N. Mex., 1894. Commissioned 2d
lieutenant in O R C in 1917 and appointed 2d lieutenant in Regular Army
the same year. Graduated from Command and General Staff School in 1933,
from Army War College in 1937, and from Army Industrial College in 1940.
Held usual assignments with infantry units, including tour of duty in the
Philippines, instructed at Command and General Staff School, and became
Assistant Division Commander of 80th Division in 1942. In 1943 went to
England and was later given command of 1st Engineer Special Brigade,
which supported landings of VII Corps at UTAHBeach in Normandy. Killed
in action within a few hours of taking command of the 28th Infantry Division
in August 1944.
WILSON, Maj. Gen. Arthur R.—Born in Cherokee, Calif., 1894. Entered Army as
enlisted man in 1916, first serving on border duty with 2d Infantry, Califor-
nia National Guard, and was commissioned 2d lieutenant in Field Artillery
the following year. Duty between the wars included various assignments with
artillery units, as PMS&T at Colorado Agricultural College and the Univer-
sity of Missouri, service in the Philippines, and with the Works Progress
Administration and the Federal Works Agency. Graduated from Command
and General Staff School in 1934, and from Army War College and Chem-
ical Warfare School in 1935. Went to North Africa as head of service forces
supporting the Western Task Force late in 1942, subsequently becoming
Commanding General of Atlantic Base Section and Mediterranean Base
Section in North African Theater. After the landings in southern France,
commanded Continental Base Section and its successor, the Continental
Advance Section, retaining that command until end of war. Retired in
May 1946.
WILSON,Brig. Gen. Robert W.—Born in Harrisburg, Pa., 1893. Commissioned 2d
lieutenant of Field Artillery in O R C in 1917 after graduation from Yale
University, and accepted RA commission the same year. Resigned the latter
after World War I and reverted to status of Reserve officer. Recalled to
extended active duty in 1941, graduating from Command and General Staff
School the same year and going to European Theater in July 1942 to serve
as G–4 of II Corps in North Africa and Sicily. Returned to England with
General Bradley in September 1943 to become G–4 of the First Army. Held
this position through remainder of the war. Served frequent short tours of
active duty in the years after the war.
THE UNITED KINGDOM BUILD-UP
 CHAPTER I

Origins of the European

Theater of Operations
1941–June 1942
( 1 ) The United States “Observes” the War in an increasingly watchful attitude toward
Europe events in Europe, a n d in 1940 sent more
and more military observers to its embas-
The spectacle of hard-fought air and sies abroad. Among them was Maj. Gen.
ground battles often obscures the vast and James E. Chaney, a n Air Corps officer,
prolonged preparations which must pre- who was sent to England in October to
cede them. When Anglo-American forces observe the air battles which were then
launched the great cross-Channel invasion raging in British skies. By this time the
in June 1944 they did so from an island Nazis had overrun Denmark, Norway, the
base which probably had witnessed more Netherlands, Belgium, and France in
intense and sustained military prepara- quick succession, and Britain stood alone
tions than had any area of equal size in to resist the German aggressor. In Decem-
history. For the American forces partici- ber 1940 General Chaney submitted his
pating in this operation these preparations report to the War Department, making
had been going on for a full three years. several recommendations on the adoption
T h e European Theater of Operations, of British aerial equipment and methods
United States Army (ETOUSA), came of defense, concluding that the Luftwaffe
into being on 8 June 1942, just two years had been overrated, and predicting that
before the D Day of the Normandy inva- Britain would not be defeated.
sion. But this marked only the formal be- Early in 1941 the United States took
ginning of the organization which directed two steps which more positively aligned
the build-up of U.S. troops and supplies in her with Great Britain in the struggle
the British Isles. American soldiers had against the Continental enemies, and thus
already been in the United Kingdom for added a ray of hope to a n otherwise dis-
some time, and earlier organizations had mal outlook. O n 11 March the 77th Con-
furnished the roots from which the tree of gress enacted the Lend-Lease Act, initially
ETOUSA was to grow. allotting a fund of $7,000,000,000 to pro-
After the outbreak of hostilities in Sep- vide war materials for the democracies of
tember 1939 the United States maintained the world. While this measure was being
 14 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

debated, military leaders of the United air tasks a n d listed the forces which each
States a n d Britain met in Washington in nation was to make available. I n accord
the first of several conferences which were with the course of action already outlined
to have tremendous import for the future in a n earlier war plan known as RAINBOW
conduct of the war. O n 29 January 1941 5, the United States, in the event of its
representatives of the U.S. Army Chief of entry into the war, planned to provide one
Staffa n d Chief of Naval Operations and reinforced division to relieve British forces
representatives of t h e British Chiefs of in Iceland, a token force for the defense of
Staff initiated a series of meetings known the United Kingdom, a n d a n air force
as ABC–1 (for American-British Staff command with both bombardment and
Conversations) to establish principles of pursuit squadrons to carry out offensive
joint operations and determine the best operations against Germany and defensive
method of acting jointly against the Axis operations against attempted invasion.
Powers in the eventuality of U.S. entry T h e projected troop basis totaled 87,000
into the war. T h e whole matter of Amer- men in addition to the reinforced division
ican-British collaboration a t this time was for Iceland. 2 Except for the agreement to
a delicate one. T h e United States, main- exchange missions and co-ordinate plan-
taining a technical neutrality, was discus- ning, action on the ABC–1 decisions was
sing war plans with Great Britain, a bellig- contingent on U.S. entry into the conflict.
erent. For this reason President Franklin The United States and Britain took the
D. Roosevelt gave no official sanction to first step by exchanging military missions.
the meetings and avoided all formal com- I n the interest of a tenuous neutrality,
mitments for the time being. T h e conver- however, the U.S. mission to London was
sations were undertaken by military lead- christened the Special Observer Group, or
ers, the chief instigator being Admiral SPOBS, and its chief was given the name
Harold R. Stark, then U.S. Chief of Naval Special Army Observer. General Chaney
Operations, who believed that safety and was chosen to head the group, and Brig.
prudence, as well as common sense, dic- Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, who headed
tated that the United States have some the Joint Planning Committee of the War
sort of initial plan ready in the event it Plans Division and who as a colonel had
suddenlywas plunged intowar. 1 participated in the ABC–1 conversations)
Of most immediate importance) so far became his chief of staff. The entire group
as Anglo-American co-operation was con- comprised eighteen officers and eleven en-
cerned, was the agreement to collaborate listed men. 3 With five of his officers pres-
continuously in planning. T h e United
States a n d Great Britain were each to 1 Ltr, Admiral Stark to Col S.L.A. Marshall, ETO
Historian, 10 Sep 45, E T O Adm 322B SPOBS Ma-
establish a joint planning staff in the terial. See Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Pre-
other's capital. T h e conferees also made war Plans and Preparations, UNITED STATES
the important decision at this time to con- ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1950),
Chapters IV and XII, for the background of the ABC
centrate the principal effort against the meetings.
European enemies should the United 2 Memo, Lt Col John E. Dahlquist for Chaney, n. d.
States be forced into the war with both (Jul or Aug 42), sub: H q Organization, E T O 381
Great Britain, U.S. Troops in U.K.
Japan and Germany. Finally, the conver- 3 In addition, Rear Adm. Robert L. Ghormley
sations formally specified naval, land, and headed a Naval Group as Special Naval Observer.
THE SPECIAL OBSERVER GROUP. Front row, left to right: Colonel Case, Colonel Hinman, Colonel McClelland, Colonel
Davison, General McNarney, General Chaney, Colonel .Summers, Colonel Lyon, Colonel Bolté, Colonel Griner, Colonel Dahlquist.
Middle row: Sheila Yeldham, Br.; Jean MacDonald, Br.; Sergeant Long, Chief Clerk; Sergeant Fulford, A G records; Major Welsh,
Surgeon; Colonel Middleswart, QM; Colonel Matejka, Signal Officer; Colonel Coffey, Ordnance Officer; Major Snavely, Assistant
Air Officer; Major Griffiss, General Chanty’s aide; W O Louprette, General Chaney’s secretary; Lord Gilbey, Br.; Sergeant Bristol,
A G Section; Kay Summersby, Br.; Betty Shore, Br. Back row: Frank Wallace, Br.; Sergeant Casazza; Sergeant Schwaiger, supply
sergeant; Sergeant Paisly, typist pool; Sergeant Rapetti, secretary to AG; Sergeant Christian, messenger; Sergeant Miller, secretary to
CofS; Sergeant Leland, Engineer Section. ( T h e British civilians included in the photograph worked with the Special Observers.)
16 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

ent, General Chaney opened temporary through which American representatives

headquarters in the U.S. Embassy at No. in London presented military matters to
1 Grosvenor Square, London, on 19 May 5
British military officials.
1941. A few days later he occupied per- T o the casual observer SPOBS might
manent quarters across the square at No. have appeared to be merely part of the ex-
18–20,the address that was to remain the panding staff of the U.S. Embassy in Lon-
center of American activity in the United don, for the entire group wore civilian
Kingdom for the remainder of the war. By clothes. But its duties were essentially
the end of June the entire Special Ob- those of a military mission, and it was
server Group had arrived and begun to organized along traditional military staff
operate. lines. General Chaney’s instructions noted
It was clear from the beginning that that he was to be provided with a general
SPOBS was to be more t h a n a group of and special staff designated as special as-
observers. Its larger function is indicated sistant army observers, and gave clear in-
both in the instructions issued to General dications of SPOBS’ possible transforma-
Chaney and in the tasks to which the tion. “Your appointment . . . ,” they
group immediately set itself. SPOBS was read, “is preliminary to your possible ap-
instructed to co-ordinate all details rela- pointment at a later date as Army mem-
tive to the reception and accommodation ber of the United States Military Mission
of American forces sent to the United in London.” T h e British concept regard-
Kingdom under ABC–1; it was to help co- ing the purpose of the London and Wash-
ordinate the allocation of equipment ington missions was similar. They were to
shipped under lend-lease from the United make whatever plans and achieve what-
States; and it was to advise the Army ever co-ordination they found necessary to
Chief of Staff as to the manner in which insure a smooth and rapid transition from
U.S. forces were to be employed in the peace to war in the event that the United
United Kingdom. In short, it was to “deal States entered the conflict.6
with any problem which arose in connec- SPOBS’ first task was to establish liai-
tion with the war plan agreed upon under son with the appropriate British agencies.
ABC–1.”4 Upon their arrival in the United King-
The instructions pointed out the neces- dom General Chaney a n d General
sity of establishing as soon as possible all McNarney immediately called on the
channels of co-operation between the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, which
armed forces of the two countries, and included Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, First
authorized SPOBS to conduct negotia- Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff,
tions with the British Chiefs of Staff on Field Marshall Sir John Dill, Chief of the
military affairs of common interest relat- 4 Min of War Cabinet Conf, 2 7 May 41, cited in
ing to joint co-operation in British areas of [Henry G. Elliott] The Predecessor Commands,
responsibility. All military matters requir- SPOBS and USAFBI, Pt. I of The Administrative
and Logistical History of the ETO, Hist Div USFET,
ing joint decision were henceforth to be 1946, MS (hereafter cited as The Predecessor Com-
taken up through SPOBS (or the British mands), p. 24, OCMH.
military mission in Washington) rather 5 Ltr, Marshall to Chaney, 26 Apr 41, sub: Ltr of
Instructions, Incl to Ltr, Chaney to Chief, Hist Div,
than diplomatic channels, with the result 21 Oct 46, OCMH.
that SPOBS became the sole agency 6 Min of War Cabinet Conf, 27 May 41.
ORIGINS OF T H E EUROPEAN THEATER 17

HEADQUARTERS, ETO, at 20 Grosvenor Square, London.

Imperial General Staff, Air Chief Marshal Col. Homer Case, G–2, examined the
Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, British airdrome defense network; the
and Maj. Gen. Hastings L. Ismay, Chief SPOBS ordnance officer, Lt. Col. John W.
Staff Officer to the Ministry of Defence. In Coffey, inspected British ordnance equip-
the succeeding six months representatives ment; the antiaircraft officer, Lt. Col. Dale
of SPOBS attended eight meetings of the D. Hinman, conferred with British officers
Operational Planning Section of the Brit- on antiaircraft defenses; and so on. Before
ish Joint Planning Staff to discuss such long the special observers were well along
various subjects as liaison with military with their first mission—establishing liai-
agencies, the strategic situation in the son with the British, learning about their
Middle East, Russian requests for lend- equipment and methods of operation, and
lease aid, and problems of an air offensive exchanging information.
against Germany. In addition to establish-
ing this high-level liaison, the general and (2) The Occupation of Iceland
special staff officers of the Special Ob-
server Group made contact with their op- SPOBS had been in the United King-
posite numbers in the British Army and dom only a few weeks and had hardly
Royal Air Force (RAF). Lt. Col. Charles started on these duties when it was called
L. Bolté, Assistant Chief of Staff for War on to undertake a major project—arrang-
Plans (then G–5), for example, and Lt. ing for the American occupation of Ice-
 18 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

land. Even though the United States had under Brig. Gen. John Marston landed at
not entered the war, President Roosevelt Reykjavik on 7 July. One month later the
had negotiated an agreement with the first Army troops landed–the 33d Pursuit
Icelandic Government shortly after the Squadron of the Air Forces–1,200 of its
ABC–1 meetings whereby the protection men arriving via ship. Planes of the squad-
of the country was entrusted to the United ron were brought in by the aircraft carrier
States, and American troops were invited Wasp, whence they were flown to their sta-
to occupy the island. Iceland held a stra- tions under British air escort. Army
tegic position as a vital link in communica- ground troops did not begin to arrive until
tions between North America and the mid-September, when 5,000 men of the
British Isles, and aircraft based there could 10th Infantry Regiment a n d the 46th
cover a portion of the North Atlantic Field Artillery Battalion landed as an ad-
shipping routes. vance detachment of the 5th Division
While the decisions on the shipment of under Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel.
an occupying force were made by the War War Department plans called for addi-
Department, SPOBS immediately became tional shipments to augment the Iceland
involved in a n advisory capacity a n d in force, and General Bonesteel was asked to
providing liaison with the British. Early in establish priorities for the units to be sent,
June it was agreed that a Joint Admiralty- taking into consideration such factors as
War Office-Air Ministry committee should housing, storage, and port facilities. I n the
work with SPOBS in planning the relief of remaining months before the Pearl Harbor
British forces. Seven of the special ob- attack, plans for the reinforcement of the
servers, including Lt. Col. George W. Iceland garrison continued to fluctuate,
Griner, G–4, Lt. Col. Donald A. Davison, and after 7 December were subject to even
Engineer, Maj. Ralph A. Snavely, Assist- more drastic revisions. Late in January the
ant Air Officer, and other special staff first of the Marine battalions sailed for the
officers, immediately made a reconnais- United States, and by early March the
sance tour of Iceland. At the conclusion entire Marine brigade had departed. But
of the tour Colonel Griner went on to the these withdrawals were more than bal-
United States to advise the War Depart- anced by additional shipments of other
ment on such matters as shipping, the pro- ground troops. Approximately 14,000
vision of fighter aircraft, cold weather American troops were added to the Ice-
clothing, housing, and fuel. land force by convoys arriving in March,
Plans for the size and composition of the April, a n d May 1942. As they took over
Iceland force underwent repeated changes more and more of the scattered camps and
in the summer of 1941, partly because of other installations on the island, the relief
the legislative restrictions on employment of the British forces was gradually accom-
of selectees and Reserve officers. In July plished. The first contingent had departed
the War Department actually temporarily in September 1941, although the British
canceled plans to send the 5th Division to force still totaled nearly 12,000 at the end
Iceland. This restraint was finally over- of May 1942. By the end of September it
come by the passage of the Selective Serv- had dropped to less than 800. General
ice Extension Act late in August. Mean- Bonesteel in the meantime had assumed
while a force of approximately 4,400 command of the combined forces on the
marines of the 1st Provisional Brigade island when the commanding general of
ORIGINS OF T H E EUROPEAN THEATER 19

the British forces departed in April 1942. Iceland’s chief importance lay in its posi-
One of the major problems faced by the tion as a vital link in communications, and
occupying force was the dearth of facilities. pointed out that the island could never be
Providing adequate security for Iceland, a used as a base for offensive operations
barren island with 2,500 miles of exposed against the European Continent. Further-
shore line, meant wide dispersal of troops. more, should the island be attacked, rein-
The 5th Division alone had to occupy forcements, naval support, supplies, and
some ninety camps, many of them in pla- replacements all would have to come from
toon strength only. SPOBS was directly the United States. For several months to
involved in arranging for the accommoda- come the U.S. Iceland forces came directly
tion and supply of the Iceland force and under the field force commander at G H Q
negotiated with the British for many items, in Washington (Gen. George C. Marshall).
including construction materials. Partly But General Chaney’s view that Iceland
because reception facilities at Reykjavik belonged strategically to the European
were limited, shipment of Nissen hutting theater eventually won out with the War
lagged, and American units met their Department. T h e island was included in
initial needs by taking over in place much the theater boundaries when ETOUSA
of the equipment of the British troops and was created in June 1942, a n d thus came
U.S. Marines, including motor vehicles, under the theater command for tactical
huts, artillery and antiaircraft weapons, purposes. Administrative and logistical
construction materials, and maintenance matters, however, were exempted from
stocks. Property acquired from the British theater control and were to be handled by
was accounted for through reverse lend- direct contact with the War Department.
lease vouchers. The supply of Iceland was therefore to
T h e question of command and opera- continue from the Boston Port of Em-
tional control of the Iceland force pro- barkation, except for a few items such as
vided the first of several points on which Nissen huts and coal, which could be
General Chaney and the War Department furnished more cheaply from the United
were to disagree. U.S. Army forces in Ice- Kingdom.7
land were under the control of General
Headquarters (GHQ) in Washington, and (3) American Troops Go to Northern Ireland
in August 1941 the War Department pro-
posed to group the Iceland troops with The Special Observers had been called
those of Newfoundland and Greenland for on to arrange for the reception of U.S.
command purposes. Because strategic re- soldiers in Iceland on very short notice,
sponsibility for Iceland rested with the since the troop movement had not awaited
British, even after the relief of their forces U.S. entry into the war. For the eventual
by American troops, General Chaney con- arrival of American contingents in the
sidered Iceland more rightly a part of the United Kingdom SPOBS had more time
British sphere of operation. He thought to prepare.
that American troops stationed in Iceland The ABC–1 agreements had provided
and in the United Kingdom should be for the establishment of four “forces” in
grouped together. Such in fact was the the United Kingdom-a bomber force of
concept agreed to in the ABC–1 conversa- 7 Theabove is drawn from Chapter II of The
tions. G H Q on the other hand, held that Predecessor Commands.
20 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

about 36,000 men, a token force of about both Northern Ireland and Scotland. Ten-
7,500 men for the British Southeastern tative agreement was reached in July on
Command area, a Northern Ireland force the location of airfields north of London,
of 30,000, and a force of 13,500 in Scot- and by September construction was in
land—with a total strength of about 87,000 progress on five 1,000-man camps in
men. A good portion of these troops was to southern England for the token force.
be employed in the defense of naval and A detailed report on a reconnaissance of
air bases used primarily by American Northern Ireland revealed some of the
units, and SPOBS had immediately taken problems and some of the requirements
steps to arrange for the construction of which had to be met to prepare for the
these bases. As early as June 1941 the arrival of U.S. troops. A depot was needed
British Government signed contracts with at Langford Lodge for third echelon re-
a n American firm for the construction of pair, maintenance, and supply of spare
naval bases in Northern Ireland and Scot- parts for American-built aircraft. The
land, the costs to be met through an alloca- quartermaster officer suggested that a gen-
tion of lend-lease funds. Skilled labor from eral depot be established and, to improve
the United States as well as unskilled labor the inadequate baking, laundry, and motor
recruited locally or in Eire was to be em- repair facilities, also recommended an in-
ployed. The first contingent of approxi- crease in the allotment of quartermaster
mately 350 American technicians arrived troops for the Northern Ireland force.
at the end of June, and work on the There were too few freight cars, a portion
projects began immediately. In view of the of the harbor facilities at Belfast had been
U.S. position as a nonbelligerent these destroyed by enemy air attacks, and there
projects were undertaken ostensibly by the was a great need for lumber, trucks, and
British and for the British. International other equipment. In a n earlier preliminary
law did not restrict the nationals of a neu- report to the War Department General
tral state from volunteering for service in Chaney had already apprised it of some of
the employment of a belligerant. Antici- the deficiencies, pointing out the shortages
pating enemy propaganda on this point in both skilled and unskilled labor, and
the British Foreign Office admitted the warning that much of the construction
presence of workmen from the United material needed for the Northern Ireland
States in Ulster, taking pains to emphasize installations would have to come from the
that they had exercised a legal right to United States. In the course of later sur-
become employees of the British Govern- veys it was recognized that the construc-
ment.8 Technically, therefore, American tion of installations and troop accom-
neutrality was not compromised, although modations would undoubtedly be the most
the bases were being built by American troublesome task. Early in December
contractors with American money for the Colonel Davison, the SPOBS Engineer,
eventuality of American use. submitted to the War Plans Division of
At the same time SPOBS began a study G H Q and to the Chief of Engineers in
of the troop needs for the protection of
these bases, the number of pursuit planes 8 John W. Blake, Official War History of Northern
required, and the accommodations needed, Ireland, Draft Ch. VII, T h e Coming of the Americans
and undertook reconnaissance tours to to Northern Ireland, 1941–1944, p. 20.
ORIGINS OF T H E EUROPEAN THEATER 21

Washington a proposed construction plan entered the war, but because American
for Northern Ireland, with recommenda- soldiers had to relieve British troops that
tions on the procurement of labor and were needed in North Africa. RAINBOW 5
construction materials, and a proposed consequently was superseded by a plan
division of planning responsibilities be- called MAGNET, which called for the ship-
tween the War Department agencies and ment of a much larger American force to
those in the United Kingdom. Northern Ireland. I n place of the 30,000
Other SPOBS officers made additional previously planned, a force of four divi-
visits to Northern Ireland in the fall of sions (three infantry and one armored)
1941 to gather information on antiaircraft plus service troops was now contemplated,
defenses, on the military and political situ- totaling approximately 105,000 men.
ation in Eire, and on other matters. By American forces were to relieve mobile
December, when the United States was elements of the British forces in Northern
drawn into the war, SPOBS was thor- Ireland and assume a larger share of the
oughly familiar with the situation in responsibility for defending it against Axis
Northern Ireland and aware of the prob- attack. About 30,000 antiaircraft troops
lems which required solution before Amer- were to be dispatched later to take, over
ican troops could be received there. the defense of Northern Ireland against
Throughout the months before Pearl air attack. American units initially were
Harbor SPOBS walked a tightrope to to be dependent on the British for quarters,
avoid violating U.S. neutrality. I n a n certain types of aircraft, antiaircraft and
early report on his group’s activities Gen- other light artillery weapons, and am-
eral Chaney took pains to point out that munition.
he had scrupulously “emphasized con- The U.S. entry into the war also led
stantly that the Special Observer is not logically to the transformation of SPOBS
authorized to make commitments of any into something more than “special ob-
nature and that all British construction in servers.” On 8January, while SPOBS was
the area is undertaken with a view to making arrangements for the reception of
British utilization and is not contingent the projected troop shipments, the War
upon U.S. participation in the war.” 9 Department took the first step to establish
The situation was radically altered in a U.S. Army headquarters in the United
the days following the Pearl Harbor at- Kingdom by authorizing the activation of
tack. The declaration of war between the the United States Army Forces in the
United States and Germany and Italy on British Isles (USAFBI). General Chaney
11 December 1941 removed the need for was retained as its commander and was
subterfuge and caution, and the War De- also named Army member of the United
partment acted swiftly to put into opera- States Military Mission to Great Britain.
tion the ABC–1 agreements. But RAINBOWThe latter office was short-lived, and the
5, which was to have implemented ABC–1, order establishing the organization was
was never actually put into effect as far as soonrevoked. 10
the British Isles were concerned. The origi-
nal troop estimates and plans for Northern
9 The Predecessor Commands, pp. 68–69.
Ireland now fell short of actual require- 10Cbl 293, AGWAR to SPOBS, 8 Jan 43, ETO
ments, not because the United States Adm 502 Boundaries and Comd.
22 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

Meanwhile the commander of USAFBI USAFBI was eventually to grow into

designated a general and special staff. ETOUSA.
Actually the change initially involved little For tactical purposes the Northern Ire-
more than a change in letterheads, for it land force was organized as V Corps, and
amounted to nothing more than a transfer was planned to consist of the 1st Armored
of the special observers to the same posi- and the 32d, 34th, and 37th Infantry Di-
tions in the new headquarters. It would visions, plus supporting and service troops.
have been difficult to distinguish between Machinery had immediately been set in
the old SPOBS group and the new head- motion in the War Department to assemble
quarters. The staff still consisted of Col. and dispatch the first contingent, but the
John E. Dahlquist as G–1, Colonel Case as plans for its size saw frequent changes. At
G–2, Col. Harold M. McClelland as G–3, one time they called for a n initial ship-
Colonel Griner as G–4, Lt. Col. Iverson B. ment of 17,300 men, which was then re-
Summers as Adjutant General, Colonel duced to 4,100 so that troop needs in the
Davison as Engineer, Col. AlfredJ. Lyon Pacific could be met. The advance party
as Air Officer, Lt. Col. Jerry V. Matejka as of the first MAGNET contingent arrived at
Signal Officer, Lt. Col. William H. Mid- Gourock, Scotland, on 19January 1942.
dleswart as Quartermaster, and Colonel The following day the enlisted men were
Coffey as Ordnance Officer. Colonel Bolté taken to Glasgow and outfitted with civil-
(G–5) was now chief of staff in place of ian clothes at the Austin Reed clothing
General McNarney, who had returned to firm. The seventeen officers meanwhile
Washington, Col. Aaron Bradshaw had went on to London for conferences, most
become Antiaircraft Officer, and Col. Paul of them proceeding to Belfast on 23 Janu-
R. Hawley had become the Chief Surgeon. ary wearing civilian clothes “borrowed
Several staff positions remained unfilled from Londoners for the occasion.”
for lack of officers, for the War Department Despite the weak attempts to keep secret
did not immediately provide General the coming arrival of American troops,
Chaney with the necessary personnel to which even involved discussing the choice
organize even a skeleton headquarters. 11 of the correct moment for notifying the
Nor was the establishment of USAFBI ac- government of Eire, the secret was poorly
companied by a directive assigning kept, and the fact that American troops
Chaney a definite mission. The activation would soon appear in Ulster was well
of the new command was therefore in a known to many who had no official knowl-
sense largely a formalization of the status edge of the plans. O n 26 January the first
of SPOBS. Nevertheless, the creation of contingent of the MAGNETforce—about
USAFBI marked the establishment of an 4,000 troops—debarked at Belfast. Maj.
Army command in the United Kingdom, Gen. Russell P. Hartle, commanding gen-
giving General Chaney command over all eral of the 34th Division, was the first to go
the American forces that soon would be ashore and was met by several high
coming into the British Isles. General officials, including John Andrews, the
Chaney’s duties as a special observer con- Prime Minister of Northern Ireland; the
tinued, a matter which later caused some Duke of Abercorn, Governor General;
confusion, and he lacked some of the
powers of a theater commander. But 11Memo, Dahlquist for Bolté, 22 Apr 46, OCMH.
ORIGINS O F T H E EUROPEAN THEATER 23

General G. E. W. Franklyn, commander USANIF, or V Corps, was initially both

of British troops in Ulster; and Sir Archi- a tactical and administrative headquar-
bald Sinclair, Secretary of State for Air. ters controlling the combat as well as ad-
As representatives of the British Govern- ministrative installations of Northern Ire-
ment they officially welcomed the U.S. land, In order to meet the need for an
troops. administrative base should the V Corps
Plans for the ceremony at Dufferin be assigned a tactical mission, it was de-
Quay had provided that the first Amer- cided to organize a striking force, a force
ican soldier to set foot in Northern Ireland reserve, and a base command. The strik-
should be properly publicized and photo- ing force was to consist of the V Corps; the
graphed, and arrangements accordingly force reserve was to include any other
had been made for a suitable time gap be- troops that might become available; and
tween the arrival of the first and second the base command was to provide for all
tenders. To the horror of the planners, the the administrative and supply details
“first” American soldier was just about to a n d a permanent area command in
come down the gangway when they heard Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland Base
the strains of a band at the head of a col- Command was accordingly established
umn which had already debarked and was on 1 June under Brig. Gen. Leroy P.
marching down the dock road from an- Collins, former division artillery com-
other quay. While the “first” man—Pfc. mander of the 34th Division. The North-
Milburn H. Henke of Hutchinson, Minne- ern Ireland command—that is, V Corps,
sota, an infantryman of the 34th Divi- or USANIF—was of course subordinate
sion—was duly publicized, about 500 had to the command of General Chaney,
actually preceded him.12A second incre- though for operational control V Corps
ment of approximately 7,000 men reached came under the British commander in
Northern Ireland on 2 March. Northern Ireland.
O n 24 January, two days before the ar- T h e problem of housing American
rival of the first MAGNET contingent, the troops in Britain naturally became urgent
first ground force command was estab- after the United States entered the war.
lished in the United Kingdom when crea- On the basis of the ABC–1 plans General
tion of United States Army Northern Chaney quickly resurveyed the accommo-
Ireland Force (USANIF) was officially dations situation in Northern Ireland for
announced. Headquarters, USANIF, was the War Department, listing the British
actually little more than V Corps head- housing already available and indicating
quarters, the highest ground force head- the required construction. In January he
quarters in the United Kingdom. Maj. sent Colonel Davison, engineer member
Gen. Edmund L. Daley, who had com- of SPOBS, to Washington with detailed
manded the V Corps in the United States, data on construction problems in the
had been designated commanding general United Kingdom, and within a month
of the new headquarters. He never came Colonel Davison reported that the War
to the United Kingdom, however, and the Department had approved his basic plans.
command went to General Hartle, who
also retained his command of the 34th 12 OfficialWar History of Northern Ireland, p. 3 3 ;
Division. T h e Predecessor Commands, pp. 91–92.
24 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

JOHN G. WINANT, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO BRITAIN, visiting a camp in

Northern Ireland, accompanied by General Chaney to his left and General Hartle.

They were changed frequently, however, Kingdom, a mutual exchange of Amer-

because of the shifting troop basis. Even ican steel for British Nissen huts was
while Colonel Davison was in Washington arranged in February. While this improvi-
the troop basis for Northern Ireland was sation helped, it did not solve the problem,
more than tripled. Subsequently the size a n d huts for USANIF installations were
of the first contingent was drastically re- scarce from the beginning. Early in March
duced. Fortunately the early shipments General Chaney instructed General Hartle
could be quartered in camps evacuated by to formulate a detailed program of con-
the British. Camp commanders worked struction necessary to accommodate the
closely with the local British garrison offi- proposed MAGNET force, a n d authorized
cers through American utility officers who the extension of contracts which an Amer-
saw to it that existing rules and regula- ican firm, the G. A. Fuller-Merritt Chap-
tions on maintenance were carried out man Corporation, already had with the
and that the necessary services were pro- Navy. The construction undertaken in the
vided. In wartime Britain accommoda- next few months closely approximated
tions were always at a premium because of early plans. Of the projects completed by
one shortage or another. In an effort to June 1942, four were carried out by U.S.
overcome the steel shortages in the United Army engineers (mainly enlargements of
ORIGINS OF T H E EUROPEAN THEATER 25

NISSEN HUT QUARTERS f o r American troops arriving in Northern Ireland, 1942. Note
World War I helmets.

existing British installations), twelve by To the first U.S. troops, arriving in old-
contracting firms, two by British labor, style helmets that brought to mind the
one by the U.S. Navy, and one by the World War I soldier, Britain was a strange
British Air Ministry.13 country where they were quartered in
Accommodating the Northern Ireland oddly constructed buildings, ate strange-
forces was only one of many difficulties tasting English food, drank weak, warm
which SPOBS and USAFBI faced. There beer, and reported for sick call to British
were problems of security, hospitalization, military and civilian hospitals. T h e first
postal service, recreation, maintenance divisions came to Northern Ireland with-
supplies, and even such mundane matters out their 105-mm. howitzers and were
as laundry, dry cleaning, and shoe repair provided with British 23-pounders instead.
services. Lacking their own service organ- To avoid completely retraining the Amer-
ization and their own maintenance sup- ican gun crews, these weapons were
plies, the first American troops in North- adapted so that the U.S. troops could use
ern Ireland relied heavily on the already
overtaxed British for many of these serv- 13 Fieldand Service Force Construction (United
Kingdom), Hist Rpt 7 , Corps of Engrs, ETO, prep
ices and for many items of supply and by Ln Sec, Int Div, OCofEngrs ETO, Aug 45, MS, p.
equipment. 3 5 , ETO Adm.
26 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

the panoramic sights they were accus- (4) Establishing an Air Force in the United
tomed to. Even rations had to be provided Kingdom
by the British, and British Army cooks
were left in camps taken over by USANIF The U.S. entry into the war called for
to acquaint American mess sergeants with fulfillment of still another provision of
the use of British rations and equipment. ABC–1 and RAINBOW 5—the build-up of
The earliest supply ships arrived on 8 a n American air force in the British Isles.
February, and on 18 March U.S. troops The conversations of early 1941 had spe-
ate American rations for the first time. cifically provided for a n air offensive
USAFBI had by this time established against the enemy should the United
priorities for supply shipments to the States enter the war. The force which was
United Kingdom. Included in the early to be sent to the United Kingdom under
requisitions were the usual PX “morale” the ABC–1 agreements was designed al-
supplies, including the inevitable Coca- most entirely for air operations or for sup-
Cola. port of such operations. Plans provided for
Some of USAFBI’s problems in receiv- the shipment of thirty-two bombardment
ing and accommodating the U.S. force- and pursuit squadrons to Britain. The
particularly construction—were partially bombardment force—about 36,000 men—
and temporarily alleviated by the fact that was to be located in England and was to
the full strength of the projected V Corps carry out an offensive mission against the
force never came to Ireland. A third ship- Continent. In addition, both the Northern
ment, comprising additional units of the Ireland and Scotland forces (30,000 and
34th Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions, 13,500 respectively) had large components
arrived on 12 May, and a fourth contin- of pursuit aviation and antiaircraft units
gent of approximately 10,000 troops car- and were designed to defend air and naval
ried in the Queen Mary landed a few days bases. Only the small token force of 7,500
later. With these shipments the Northern in southern England was to have no air
Ireland force reached its peak strength in elements.
1942, totaling 32,202. Plans had changed Air operations were in fact the only sus-
at least twice during the build-up, and by tained offensive operations to be carried
the end of May the V Corps consisted of out from the United Kingdom for some
only the 34th Infantry and 1st Armored time t o come. Preparations for the air
Divisions, plus certain corps troops. Thus, force build-up consequently assumed pri-
the MAGNET plans were never fully devel- mary importance in 1941 and early 1942,
oped. V Corps remained the highest U.S. and the initial prominence given this as-
ground force command in the United pect of the American build-up was re-
Kingdom for some time, though it was to flected in the large representation of air
move from Northern Ireland and its divi- officers in the Special Observer Group, in-
sions were to be withdrawn for the North cluding Generals Chaney and McNarney,
African operation. Instead of becoming a Colonel McClelland, the G–3, and Colo-
ground force base, therefore, Northern nel Lyon and Major Snavely in the Air
Ireland in 1942 developed as a base for Section. Within a few weeks of its arrival
the Air Forces and as a base section of the in the United Kingdom SPOBS had met
Services of Supply. with the British Air Ministry, discussed
ORIGINS OF T H E EUROPEAN THEATER 27

problems of a n air offensive against Ger- be organized into two major commands,
many with the British Joint Planning one for the ground forces and one for the
Staff, and gathered information on air- air forces. General Chaney objected vigor-
craft and British methods of air opera- ously to this counterproposal in a letter
tions. In July tentative agreements were early in December, pointing out that
reached on the location of airfields for the American air units would be operating
use of American bombardment units, and under the British a n d that there was no
several of the observers made reconnais- reason for interposing another headquar-
sance tours of Scotland and Northern ters between the over-all American com-
Ireland to examine potential sites for air mand and the British. He held further
bases and training areas. Further surveys that, with the exception of the small token
in the fall of 1941 resulted in the selection force, the only purpose for the presence of
of eight airfields then under construction American ground troops in the United
in the Huntingdon area, sixty-five miles Kingdom was to contribute to the success-
north of London, for use by the first ful operation of air combat units. General
American bomber units. By the time the Chaney’s concept was based on ABC–1
United States entered the war General and RAINBOW 5, which made no provision
Chaney and his group had made excellent for large American ground forces in the
progress in establishing liaison with the United Kingdom or for any offensive mis-
British and in arranging for accommoda- sion for ground troops. His concept thus
tions for the projected American troop embraced two basic missions for American
arrivals. forces in the United Kingdom—an air of-
General Chaney was considerably less fensive and defense. The air defense of
successful in getting his ideas on command Britain, he maintained, could not be sub-
and organization accepted for the United divided, and American pursuit units
Kingdom. In September 1941, a few would have to be placed operationally
months after his arrival in England, he under the British fighter command. For
proposed to General Marshall a system of offensive operations he favored the crea-
operational and administrative controls in tion of a bomber command under the
the United Kingdom based on the ABC–1 over-all American commander. The rela-
and RAINBOW 5 provision for the several tively small ground forces were to come to
forces for the British Isles. General the United Kingdom primarily to assist
Chaney’s plan called for a series of area the air units in their missions and would
commands, one each for the token force, therefore come under the various area
Northern Ireland, and Scotland, a bomb- commands. 14
er command, and in addition a base com-
mand for supply services in England and
Scotland. A few weeks later, while Chaney 14This section is based on [Robert W. Coakley]
was temporarily on duty in Washington, Organization and Command in the ETO, Pt. II of
T h e Administrative and Logistical History of the
Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, chief of the ETO, Hist Div USFET, 1946, MS (hereafter cited as
Army Air Forces, precipitated a prolonged Organization and Command), I, 16–20, and on
argument over the question of organiza- Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The
Army Air Forces in World War II: I , Plans and Early Op-
tion and command by suggesting that erations, January 1939 to August 1942 (Chicago, 1948),
American forces in the United Kingdom p p . 575–90,618–54.
28 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

With the implementation of R A I N B o W headquarters between bomber headquar-

5 following U.S. entry into the war, ters and the theater commander. General
and with the creation of USAFBI, Gen- Arnold thus proceeded on the assumption
eral Chaney’s position was temporarily that his scheme of command and organ-
strengthened. But the concept of the ization would ultimately be accepted.
RAINBOW 5 plan was almost immediately General Eaker arrived in England on
altered by the revision that provided for a 20 February and immediately presented
greatly enlarged ground force in the his plans for the establishment of a n
United Kingdom. General Arnold was American air force. O n 22 February Gen-
therefore encouraged to revive his scheme eral Chaney ordered the establishment of
for an over-all air command and again a bomber command (shortly to be named
urged the acceptance of his ideas on both the VIII Bomber Command), but found
General Chaney and General Marshall Eaker’s proposal for an air force command
late in January 1942. General Chaney difficult to accept. The USAFBI staff was
once more rejected his arguments, noting anything but receptive to the air force
that Arnold’s proposed structure would plan, and General Chaney continued to
only parallel the British organization and protest it to the War Department. The lat-
use u p badly needed personnel. G H Q ter, in the throes of planning for the sec-
momentarily upheld General Chaney in ond front, at first was disposed to support
this stand; but it was a losing battle, for General Chaney. But the month of March
the trend was now definitely toward the saw several changes in the War Depart-
organization of three co-ordinate forces or ment’s plans for the token force and the
commands in each theater-air, ground, forces in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
and service-and this trend was to be re- These changes in effect nullified the old
flected shortly in the War Department’s RAINBOW 5 plan, and thus rendered
own reorganization along these lines. Gen- Chaney’s plans for area commands obso-
eral Arnold’s arguments were further lete. Early in April he was definitely noti-
strengthened by the Joint Chiefs’ accept- fied that a separate air force would be
ance of the view that pursuit aircraft sent organized and trained in the United States
to the United Kingdom would no longer and transferred to the United Kingdom.
be considered limited to a defensive role. General Chaney therefore had no choice
The headquarters of the Eighth Air but to accede in the matter of the organ-
Force and its component bomber, inter- izational structure thus decided on, and
ceptor, and base commands were acti- he proceeded with arrangements for the
vated in the United States in the last days location of the new command and its
of January. In order to prepare for the bomber, fighter, and service commands.
earliest possible commitment of American O n 2 May Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz was
air units in the United Kingdom, Brig. designated commanding general of the
Gen. Ira C. Eaker was designated bomber Eighth Air Force, although he remained
commander of USAFBI and immediately in the United States until June to organize
sent to England. The instructions he car- his new command and arrange for the
ried stated specifically that he was to pre- movement of its units overseas.
pare not only for the reception of his own Plans for phasing air units to the United
command but also for an intermediate air Kingdom underwent frequent revisions,
ORIGINS O F T H E EUROPEAN THEATER 29

just as in the case of ground units for men a n d planes, via water a n d air, was
Northern Ireland a n d Iceland. T h e lack just beginning at the time the European
of enough trained units, the competing de- theater was activated early in June 1942.
mands from other areas, the frequent Logistical preparations for the recep-
changes in plans in the early months of tion and accommodation of American air
the war, all contributed to make the fu- units had been going on for many months.
ture of the U.K. build-up unpredictable. Considerable spadework had already been
I n January plans called for the dispatch of accomplished by the Special Observer
a total of 4,748 planes to the United King- Group, particularly by General Chaney’s
dom, of which 3,328 would be bombers. air officer, Colonel Lyon, who continued
These figures were amended downward this work after the arrival of the advance
in the following months, and none of the detachment of the VIII Air Force Service
movements of planes or personnel to Brit- Command in the spring of 1942. SPOBS
ain were accomplished as scheduled, in investigated air force facilities shortly after
part because of the shortage of shipping its arrival in England, a n d in November
a n d in part because of a temporary sus- 1941 had presented to the British a survey
pension in the movement of planes occa- of requirements for such facilities as air-
sioned by critical developments in the fields, workshops, ammunition depots,
Pacific. T h e first shipment of Eighth Air bakeries, and storage. In this work SPOBS
Force troops arrived on 1 1 May. had the full co-operation of the Air Min-
Early commitment of the Eighth Air istry, which in February 1942 prepared a
Force units depended largely on the abil- comprehensive statement of policy and
ity to ferry planes to the United Kingdom procedure known as the Joint Organiza-
via the North Atlantic route. T h e Ferry- tion a n d Maintenance (U.S.), providing
ing Command (later renamed the Air a n invaluable guide on problems involv-
Transport Command) had been estab- ing the reception, accommodation, and
lished in May 1941, but the Air Forces servicing of American air force units.
had acquired little in the way of either ex- The task of preparing for the arrival of
perience or facilities in the first year to American air force units naturally fell to
prepare it for the large-scale movements General Eaker and his staff upon their ar-
now projected, and had relied on the Brit- rival in the United Kingdom in February.
ish both for meteorological data and for A few days after his arrival General Eaker
some of the servicing of its planes. Early in was instructed to proceed to the RAF
1942 the Ferrying Command redoubled Bomber Command in order to understudy
its efforts to extend the network of weather its staff, to draw u p plans for the recep-
stations and communications facilities. tion, administration, and supply of bom-
Late in June the first combat planes of the bardment a n d service units, and to make
Eighth Air Force took off from Presque recommendations regarding the training,
Isle, Maine, for Goose Bay, Labrador, and equipment, tactical doctrine, and methods
then proceeded to Greenland, Iceland, of employment of American air units.
and finally Prestwick, Scotland, the east- General Eaker and his staff immediately
ern terminus of the route. T h e first plane set about these tasks, establishing them-
to reach the United Kingdom by air, a selves initially with the R A F Bomber
B–17, arrived on 1 July. Thus, the flow of Command, a n d in mid-April setting up
30 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

their own headquarters near by at Wy- struction program was the problem of pro-
combe Abbey, a n evacuated girls school at viding adequate supply and maintenance.
High Wycombe, about thirty miles west of Here again, fortunately, valuable prelimi-
London. On 20 March General Eaker sub- nary measures had been taken before the
mitted his bomber command plan outlin- United States became a belligerent. The
ing the problems that had to be solved be- RAF had already been flying American-
fore American bombardment units could built aircraft for some time, and the Brit-
start operations. The ideal method, he ob- ish had therefore been faced with the
served, required a substantial build-up of problem of maintenance and repair of
American forces in order to permit oper- these craft. Almost simultaneously with
ations to begin at maximum efficiency the arrival of the Special Observers in
and in order to insure their continuity. An England in the summer of 1941 a small
independent system of supply and main- number of American maintenance crews
tenance would also have to be developed had gone to England to assist the British,
before operations could start. Obviously and in July the British had asked that this
such preparations would delay American aid be greatly expanded. While surveying
participation in the offensive effort. The Northern Ireland that month SPOBS
alternative was to make immediate use of looked for a suitable site where U.S.-built
the eight airfields then ready, committing aircraft could be serviced, and in Septem-
the bomber groups as they became avail- ber General Chaney recommended that a
able a n d making extensive use of British depot be established a t Langford Lodge,
depots, repair facilities, intelligence, and several miles west of Belfast. This recom-
hospitals until the American logistical mendation was endorsed by a special Air
organization could be built up. The latter Forces mission under Maj. Gen. George
course would entail a heavy dependence H. Brett which had been sent to the
on the British and a hand-to-mouth exist- United Kingdom to study the whole prob-
ence in supplies, but it had the obvious lem. I n December 1941 the Lockheed
advantage of allowing earlier inaugura- Aircraft Corporation, already operating
tion of operations a n d was therefore rec- a n assembly plant for the British near
ommended by Eaker. Liverpool, was requested to install a serv-
Agreement had already been reached ice maintenance base at Langford Lodge.
with the British in December 1941 for an The depot was to be manned by American
initial transfer of eight airfields, then civilians. While the War Department did
under construction for the RAF, to the not sign a contract with the Lockheed
first American bomber units expected in Overseas Coporation until May 1942,
England. By May 1942 plans had been Lockheed representatives began to make
made with the British for the construction detailed plans for the base in December
or transfer of 127 fields to the Eighth Air 1941, and General Chaney proceeded to
Force. American participation in the air negotiate with the British Air Ministry on
offensive based on the United Kingdom the provision of buildings, utilities, hous-
thus meant a tremendous expansion in the ing, and other facilities.
construction program in the British Isles, Concurrent with the negotiations over
where the shortage of labor and materials Langford Lodge, SPOBS had taken steps
already pinched a strained economy. to establish a second depot for the repair
Equal in magnitude to the airfield con- of American-operated aircraft at Warton,
ORIGINS O F T H E EUROPEAN THEATER 31

about twenty-five miles north of Liver- Langford Lodge and Warton into opera-
pool. Both the SPOBS engineer, Colonel tion, Burtonwood carried the main burden
Davison, and General Brett agreed on this of air force maintenance for several
selection in the fall of 1941. Early in Jan- months to come, and in fact was to remain
uary 1942 the War Department therefore the principal center of American air force
authorized General Chaney to secure this supply and maintenance in the United
location for the repair of bombers and en- Kingdom.
gines, and he proceeded to arrange with O n 19 May the Headquarters Detach-
the Ministry of Aircraft Production to ment, Eighth Air Force, under General
build the depot and provide accommoda- Eaker, assumed command of all American
tions for about 4,000 men. air units in the United Kindom, and
Since Langford Lodge was not to open General Spaatz took command of the
until September 1942, and Warton not Eighth Air Force on 18June, with head-
until January 1943, it was necessary to quarters at Bushy Park, on the southwest
find some interim facilities to meet the edge of London. By this date important
needs of American air units if their partici- steps had been taken to prepare for direct
pation in operations was not to be delayed. participation by American air units in the
A search was therefore made for existing war against the Axis Powers. Even at this
facilities which could be utilized immedi- time, however, the build-up of American
ately. Late in April, after inspections by forces was only beginning, and their logis-
General Eaker and Colonel Lyon, Gen- tical organization was hardly born. What-
eral Chaney made his recommendations ever influence the American air forces
to the War Department and was author- were to have on the air offensive develop-
ized to negotiate with the British for the ing in these first months was due largely
transfer of the repair facilities already to British assistance.
existing at Burtonwood, about midway
between Liverpool and Manchester. Bur- (5) The Formation of the Services of Supply
tonwood was then operated by the British and the Activation of ETOUSA
Government and employed about 4,000
civilians. After a period ofjoint operation, By the early spring of 1942 the existing
Burtonwood was to be transferred to the U.S. Army organization in the United
exclusive control of the Americans. I n the Kingdom was no longer equal to the tasks
absence of enough skilled American mili- it was called on to perform. One deficiency
tary technicians, both Langford Lodge which had been felt from the very begin-
and Burtonwood were to be staffed ini- ning was the lack of personnel, and Gen-
tially with civilians, although it was in- eral Chaney’s small staff had been asked
tended that they would eventually be to shoulder a n increasing number of re-
operated by military personnel. General sponsibilities. In addition to its other duties
Arnold arranged for the transfer of soldiers it handled the technical aspects of lend-
with the requisite training from Army Air lease to both Britain a n d the USSR; it
Forces depots in the United States. Ar- supervised the Electronics Training Group,
rangements for acquisition of the Burton- a group of American signal, air, and anti-
wood installation were completed in May, aircraft officers sent to England for train-
and joint operation of the facilities began ing in radar maintenance and operation;
in June. Because of the delay in bringing and it operated the Ferrying Command.
32 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

Each new task undertaken by SPOBS not only a theater of operations, with a
required additional manpower and in- specific directive to its commander on his
spired repeated requests to the War De- mission a n d responsibilities, but also a
partment. With the shipment of troops to Services of Supply, providing the vitally
Northern Ireland early in 1942 a n ob- important machinery to handle the sup-
vious need arose for personnel to make up ply and troop build-up in the British Isles.
a n administrative headquarters for these American a n d British military leaders
troops, and for trained officers to fill the had met for the second time in Washington
staff positions General Chaney wished to in December 1941 a n d January 1942 to
fill. I n mid-January there still were only define more specifically the combined
twenty-four officers a n d thirteen enlisted command arrangements, organize a n
men in London, although SPOBS had over-all command agency (the Combined
been transformed into the headquarters of Chiefs of S t a g , a n d confirm existing
the U.S. Army in the United Kingdom. agreements on the priority for the defeat
This small group was temporarily rein- of the European Axis and agreements re-
forced in March when about 260 men— garding the shipment of American forces
military police, signal men, and house- to the United Kingdom. Plans for the con-
keeping personnel—were borrowed from duct of the war were of course under con-
the 34th Division in Northern Ireland to tinuous study in the War Department dur-
begin the organization of a headquarters ing the winter months, and in March 1942
command. But there was no augmentation the Operations Division ( O P D , formerly
of Chaney’s staff from the United States WPD or War Plans Division) produced an
until the first week in April, when six outline plan for the build-up of American
officers arrived. 15 In February a bomber forces in the United Kingdom with a view
command had been activated, forming the toward a n eventual invasion of the Conti-
advance echelon of a n over-all air force nent. I n April General Marshall and
command in the United Kingdom. But Harry L. Hopkins, confidential adviser to
these organizations could hardly do more the President, accompanied by other
than meet the requirements envisaged in officials, went to London to meet with
the ABC–1 and RAINBOW 5 concepts— Prime Minister Churchill and the British
that is, aid in the defense of Northern Ire- Chiefs of Staff. I n a series of conferences at
land and participate in the air offensive Claridge’s Hotel the Americans won ac-
against the Continent. ceptance of the War Department proposal,
I n March General Marshall gave the which came to be known as the BOLERO
first hint that a much larger role was con- plan.
templated for American forces in the T h e acceptance of the BOLEROplan,
European area when he instructed Gen- involving as it did a great build-up of
eral Chaney to formulate plans which American forces in Britain a n d an even-
would permit a large expansion of both air
and ground units in the United King- 15 Memo, Chaney for Hist Div, 23 J u l 46, sub:
dom.16 In April strategic decisions were Comments on MS T h e Predecessor Commands, and
made which had far-reaching effects on Memo, Dahlquist for Bolté, 22 Apr 46, OCMH.
16Ltr, Marshall to Chaney, 18 Mar 42, sub: U.S.
the U.S. Army organization in Britain. Army Forces in British Isles, ETO A G 381 War
The nextfew months saw the activation of Plans-General.
ORIGINS OF T H E EUROPEAN THEATER 33

tual cross-Channel operation, was bound Marshall’s decision was final; General Lee
to have a tremendous effect on the de- was to organize the SOS in the United
velopment of the U.S. Army in the United Kingdom. Thus, as in the matter of the
Kingdom. The first step that reflected the air force command, the War Department
enhanced importance of American activi- now also determined the organization of
ties in the British Isles and presaged the the SOS and was to dispatch it to England
scope of coming preparations was the with little regard for General Chaney’s
formation of the Services of Supply (SOS), wishes in the matter.
the third of the great subcommands which The history of the logistics of the war in
were basic to the theater’s structure. Gen- Europe, so far as U.S. participation is con-
eral Chaney himself took the initiative in cerned, is basically the history of the SOS
this matter and on 2 May 1942 outlined to and its successor on the Continent, the
the War Department his ideas on the or- Communications Zone; and the logistical
ganization of the SOS and requested the story is therefore inseparably associated
necessary personnel. Chaney’s plan with the officer who in May 1942 was
roughly followed outlines given in the designated by General Marshall to com-
Field Service Regulations, which were mand the SOS. General Lee was com-
based on World War I experience. It pro- manding the 2d Division a t Fort Sam
vided for five service divisions: depots, Houston, Texas, when on 3 May Lt. Gen.
transportation, replacement and evacua- Brehon B. Somervell, commanding gen-
tion, construction, a n d administration. eral of the War Department SOS, sum-
Chaney named Donald Davison, now a moned him to Washington for the new
brigadier general, as his choice to com- assignment. General Lee was a Regular
mand the SOS. 17 Army officer, a West Point graduate of
Although General Marshall had dis- 1909, and, like so many of the officers who
cussed the matter of the U.K. build-up were to hold key positions in the European
with Chaney during his trip to London in theater, a n engineer. Between 1909 and
April, it is not clear that he had outlined 1917 his assignments included tours of
the organizational structure he desired. duty in the Canal Zone, Guam, and the
At any rate General Chaney soon learned Philippines, as well as the zone of interior.
that his proposed organization of the SOS During World War I he served first as aide
did not conform with War Department to Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, command-
wishes. General Marshall informed him ing general of the 89th Division and
that the nucleus of the new SOS organiza- former Army Chief of Staff, and then as
tion was being formed in Washington chief of staff of the 89th Division, later
under Maj. Gen. John C. H. Lee, and that going overseas and actively participating
Chaney’s request for personnel would in the planning and execution of the
have to await Lee’s arrival in England. St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensive.
Anticipating a n early build-up of troops, I n the course of his overseas duty he was
Chaney was anxious to have the SOS awarded the Silver Star, the Distinguished
operating without delay, and he therefore Service Medal, and was twice decorated
went ahead with plans a n d even drafted 17Except as indicated, this discussion of command
an order outlining the functions and or- and organization is based on the monograph Organi-
ganization of the SOS. But General zation and Command in the ETO, I, 20–70.
GENERAL LEE, Commanding General, SOS, ETOUSA.
ORIGINS OF T H E EUROPEAN THEATER 35

by the French Government. During most Larkin, Lee’s first chief of staff; Brig. Gen.
of the period between wars Lee held the Claude N. Thiele, initially his Chief of
usual peacetime engineer assignments, Administrative Services; Col. Charles O.
principally on rivers and harbors projects. Thrasher, Chief of Depot Services; Col.
In 1934 he became district engineer of the Douglas C. MacKeachie, Director of Pro-
North Atlantic Division at Philadelphia, curement; Col. Frank S. Ross, Chief of
and in 1938 division engineer of the North Transportation Services; Maj. James M.
Pacific Division at Portland, Oregon. In Franey, Administrative Assistant; Col.
1940 Lee was given command of the San Nicholas H. Cobbs, Finance Officer; Brig.
Francisco Port of Embarkation and pro- Gen. William S. Rumbough, Signal Offi-
moted to brigadier general; a year later he cer; and Brig. Gen. Robert M. Littlejohn,
took command of the 2d Division; and in Chief Quartermaster. O n 14 May Gen-
1942 he was again promoted. 18 eral Lee held the first meeting of his serv-
The choice of General Marshall and ice chiefs, a t which he read the draft of a
General Somervell thus brought to the job directive indicating the lines along which
a man of varied experience and an officer General Marshall and General Somervell
with a reputation as a n able organizer and desired to have the SOS organized. Before
strict disciplinarian. It also brought to the leaving Washington General Lee also met
job a controversial personality, for about with members of the British Army staff
Lee and his position most of the contro- a n d the British Ambassador, Lord Hali-
versies over theater organization and com- fax, to orient himself on reception and ac-
mand were to rage for the next three years. commodation problems in the United
Lee arrived in Washington on 5 May Kingdom.Just before his departure from
and in a series of conferences in the next the United States he flew to New York
two weeks laid the basis for the SOS or- and discussed shipping matters with Maj.
ganization in the United Kingdom. O n 7 Gen. Homer M. Groninger, commanding
May General Somervell held a meeting of general of the port which was to handle
all the service chiefs and chiefs of staff di- the millions of tons of supplies shipped to
visions in the War Department SOS to Europe in the next few years. Finally,
outline the BOLERO plan and point up the acutely aware of the difficulties faced by
major problems which would have to be the SOS in 1917–18, General Lee also
met in building a base in the United King- called on Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord,
dom. Lee’s primary concern was the selec- commanding general of the American Ex-
tion of a “team” which he could take with peditionary Forces SOS in World War I,
him to England. To recruit such a staff hoping to profit from his experience and
General Somervell instructed each chief thus avoid a repetition of the errors of that
in the SOS to recommend the best two period. O n 23 May 1942 General Lee left
men in his branch, one of whom would be the United States with nine members of
selected to accompany General Lee, the his staff a n d with basic plans for the or-
other to remain in Washington. A staff was ganization of the SOS in England.19
selected within the next week. Among
those chosen were many officers who were
18Biographies of General Officers, OCMH.
to become well known in the European 19Tendons of a n Army, prep by Hist Sec, ETO.
theater, including Brig. Gen. Thomas B. 1944, MS, pp. 9–10, ETO Adm 531.
36 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

Meanwhile General Chaney had been The letter announced that while “the or-
informed more specifically of the plans ganization prescribed for the War Depart-
which the Chief of Staff desired to have ment need not be slavishly followed at
carried out in the United Kingdom. O n your Headquarters, it will, in the main,
14 May General Marshall sent a letter di- be the pattern for similar organizations of
rective to the USAFBI commander em- the Services of Supply in the British Isles.”
bodying the ideas already communicated T h e directive of 14 May thus assigned
to General Lee in Washington. The direc- broad powers to the SOS, and for this
tive made it clear that the U.S. forces in reason it developed into one of the most
the United Kingdom were to be organized controversial documents in the history of
along lines parallel to the new War De- the theater. It undoubtedly bore the
partment structure—that is, with three strong influence of General Somervell,
co-ordinate commands, one each for air, who was acutely conscious of the difficul-
ground, a n d services—and described in ties experienced by the SOS in World War
detail the Chief of Staffs desires on the or- I . These he attributed in part to the fact
ganization of the SOS, which was to be that the SOS of the American Expedition-
undertaken a t once. General Marshall ary Forces had had to adopt an organiza-
specified that Chaney’s headquarters tion which did not parallel that of the War
(soon to become the theater headquarters) Department, with the result that there
was to be organized “along the general were no clearly defined command and
pattern of a command post with a mini- technical channels between the two, and
m u m of supply and administrative serv- in part to the poor organizational control
ices.” These were to be grouped under the of the SOS, whereby supply and adminis-
SOS and commanded by General Lee. tration were closely controlled from Gen-
More specifically, General Lee was given eral Pershing’s GHQ, through which all
the following powers: communications with the War Depart-
ment wererouted. 21He now desired that
[He was] invested with all authority neces- the SOS in the theater parallel that of the
sary to accomplish his mission including, but zone of interior, in which the supply com-
not limited to, authority to approve or dele-
gate authority to: mand had just been assigned broad pow-
a. Approve all plans and contracts of all ers. But the attempt to limit the top U.S.
kinds necessary to carry out the objectives of headquarters to a minimum of adminis-
this directive. trative and supply functions and to assign
b. Employ, fix the compensation of, and them to the SOS was the cause of a long
discharge civilian personnel without regard
to civil service rules. struggle between the SOS and the theater
c. Purchase any necessary supplies, equip- headquarters and the basic reason for the
ment, and property, including rights in real several reorganizations which the two
estate practicable of acquirement. headquarters underwent in the next
d. Adjudicate and settle all claims. two years.
e. Take all measures regarded as necessary
and appropriate to expedite and prosecute 20Ltr, Marshall to CG USAFBI, 14 May 42, sub:
the procurement, reception, processing, for- Organization SOS, E T O Adm 311ASOS—General.
warding, and delivery of personnel, equip- 21Memo, Somervell for Maj Gen Dwight D.
ment, and supplies for the conduct of mili- Eisenhower, 22 Jun 42, E T O Adm 129 E T O Organ-
tary operations.
20 ization a n d Comd.
ORIGINS O F T H E EUROPEAN THEATER 37

It is hardly surprising that General tial to the minimum operation of supply

Chaney a n d his staff should have taken and administration” by Headquarters,
issue with the proposed scheme of organ- USAFBI, under the SOS. General Lee be-
ization, for it appeared to go contrary to lieved that virtually all supply a n d ad-
the doctrine in which they had been ministrative functions of the theater should
schooled between the two wars. They were be taken over by the SOS. Such, he
poorly oriented on the entire concept thought, was the intention of General
under which the War Department had re- Marshall and General Somervell, and in
cently reorganized itself, creating three submitting his plan he stated that he was
great subcommands for air, ground, and endeavoring “to comply with the spirit of
service forces.22It is apparent that Gen- the instructions contained in the War De-
eral Chaney a n d his staff had not taken partment letter of 14 May 1942.24
the new organization into consideration in General Lee’s proposal produced a
formulating their own plan. The USAFBI strong reaction in the USAFBI headquar-
commander did not believe that a purely ters. General Chaney’s staff objected to it
functional division of command was feasi- almost to a man, a n d a compromise was
ble, but in this matter he had already eventually reached which satisfied no one.
been overruled and had been forced to ac- All staff sections were given a n opportu-
quiesce by accepting the separate air com- nity to comment on General Lee’s draft,
mand. Now he was to take issue with the and their remarks brought into focus some
Services of Supply aspect of the new or- of the key issues that were to plague the
ganizational scheme as well. SOS in its relations with the theater head-
General Lee a n d his party arrived in quarters and eventually were to involve
London on 24 May. I n his diary for this the armies and the supreme command
day he made the terse entry: “Reported also. Some of the USAFBI staff took ex-
to 20 Grosvenor, offices assigned, program ception to the entire functional organiza-
of initiating the SOS commenced.” 23On tion of the U.S. forces in the United King-
the same day General Chaney’s head- dom into three co-ordinate commands.
quarters published General Order 17, But this was already a lost battle since the
establishing the SOS, USAFBI, and desig- basic organizational structure was already
nating General Lee as its commanding determined by the creation of the ground,
general.
Activating the new command was a 22For the background of this reorganization see
John D. Millett, T h e Organization a n d Role of the
simple matter. Outlining its functions and Army Service Forces, a volume in preparation for this
defining its exact sphere of responsibilities series.
proved more difficult. General Lee and 23Lee Diary, E T O Adm 102.
24Ltr, Lee to Chaney, 28 May 42, sub: Order
his chief of staff, General Larkin, con- Creating SOS, with draft GO, ETO Adm 3 1 1 A
ferred with General Chaney on the prob- SOS—General. T h e arms and services listed for
lem the day after their arrival in England, changeover to SOS by Lee included the Corps of En-
gineers, Signal Corps, Chemical Warfare Service,
and on 28 May Lee submitted a draft of a Ordnance Department, Quartermaster Corps, Med-
general order outlining the functions and ical Department, and the Offices of the Adjutant Gen-
responsibilities of the SOS. The proposed eral, the Chief Chaplain, the lnspector General, the
Chief of Finance, the Judge Advocate General, the
order placed all supply arms and services, Provost Marshal, Special Troops, Special Services,
“excepting so much thereof as are essen- and the Army Exchange Service.
38 LOGISTICAL S U P P O R T O F T H E ARMIES

air, and service commands. More unani- but almost all of them felt that over-all
mous was the chorus of opposition voiced policy making and varying degrees of con-
against the assumption of theater-wide trol over service functions would have to
functions by a subordinate command, the be retained by the higher headquarters.
SOS. Almost every reply developed some T h e G–4, General Griner, for example,
aspect of this fundamental objection and asked how the inspector general could
argued that more control over particular perform theater-wide functions for the
functions should be retained by the high- commanding general if he were placed
est command, USAFBI. under the commander of the SOS. AS
Brig. Gen. John E. Dahlquist, the G–1, later developments were to show, many of
put his finger on the basic difficulty by these arguments were not altogether in-
pointing out that, while the SOS would valid, and the armies and the air forces
procure all supplies for U.S. forces in the were to object strongly to the exercise of
United Kingdom, it would not provide all theater-wide functions by the SOS.
the services a n d supplies in all the com- General Lee's proposal had already
ponents of the command, since many raised the problem of the extent to which
would be provided by service elements the air forces should handle their own sup-
which were integral parts of the various plies. I n the successive steps by which the
task forces or subcommands, such as the Army Air Forces was achieving more and
Eighth Air Force. T h e inspector general, more autonomy, the War Department had
the chief finance officer, the adjutant gen- acknowledged the peculiarities of air force
eral, and others, he noted, could not exer- supply and had established a separate Air
cise theater-wide functions from the SOS, Force Service Command for the Air
which was a command co-ordinate with Forces. This principle was extended to the
the air a n d ground commands. Most of theaters in early 1942, and a n Air Service
the supply arms and services would have Command had been set u p as part of the
to be maintained on a theater level (that Eighth Air Force and was in the process of
is, at USAFBI level), and the top com- movement to the United Kingdom in
mander of the U.S. forces would need his M a y a n d June. Before leaving the United
own special staff. Since a chief of service in States General Lee had met with AAF of-
the SOS, a command co-ordinate with the ficials at Bolling Field a n d had agreed to
air a n d ground commands a n d subordi- a division of supply functions between the
nate to USAFBI, could not exercise super- SOS a n d the Air Service Command. The
vision over the troops of other commands, main provisions were that the Air Service
it was definitely wrong, Dahlquist be- Command would assume complete re-
lieved, to place a theater chief of service in sponsibility for supplies peculiar to the air
the S0S. 25 forces, would place liaison officers at the
Other staff members generally sup- ports to attend to their interests, and
ported this argument, citing specific ex- would leave to the SOS all construction
amples that stressed the impracticability
of the proposed assignment of functions as 25Memo, Dahlquist for CofS USAFBI, 1 J u n 42,
applied to their particular service or de- sub: Comments on Draft O r d e r Establishing. SOS,
ETO Adm 311A SOS—General. The memorandums
partment. Some were willing to see their from the other staff sections on this subject are also in
functions split between USAFBI and SOS, this file.
ORIGINS OF T H E EUROPEAN THEATER 39

a n d the handling of supplies common to a n officer from the Operations Division of

both ground a n d air forces. In his draft t h e War Department. T h e following
proposal of 28 May outlining the respon- month Maj. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower,
sibility of the SOS the only mention made then chief of O P D , visited the United
of this problem was the statement that the Kingdom, a n d Brig. Gen: Charles L.
handling of supplies peculiar to the air Bolté, Chaney’s chief of staff, took the op-
forces would be excepted from SOS con- portunity to outline some of the problems
trol. Brig. Gen. Alfred J. Lyon, the of USAFBI, again urging the “definite
USAFBI air officer, pointed out that it was need for a basic directive to the Com-
the practice of the Air Service Command manding General USAFBI, concerning
to maintain control not only of supplies his authority, responsibility a n d mis-
peculiar to the air forces, but also of cer- sion.” 26 General Eisenhower responded
tain services (such as aviation engineer by presenting a draft directive to General
construction), and he desired a change in Marshall shortly after his return to the
the draft to clarify this point. United States, and on 8 June the War De-
T h e controversy over the position and partment cabled the directive establishing
functions of the SOS was not to come to a E T O U S A , naming Chaney its com-
decision under USAFBI. T h e whole dis- mander and outlining his powers and re-
cussion was interrupted in the first week sponsibilities. It was patterned closely
of June and momentarily postponed. O n 8 after the draft presented by General Dahl-
June USAFBI was officially transformed quist, who in turn had based his draft
into the European Theater of Operations, largely on the one given General Pershing
United States Army. T h e need for such a in World War I.27
transformation had been realized for some The directive charged the Command-
time, particularly in General Chaney’s ing General, European Theater of Oper-
headquarters. Strategic plans for the em- ations, with the “tactical, strategical,
ployment of American forces in the Euro- territorial, a n d administrative duties of a
pean area had been radically altered since theatre Commander.’’ “ U n d e r the prin-
USAFBI had been created early in Jan- ciple of unity of command” he was to
uary. The BOLEROplan agreed to in April exercise planning and operational control
contemplated a n invasion of the Conti- over all U.S. forces assigned to the theater,
nent in 1943, a n d therefore involved the including naval. T h e War Department
shipment of large numbers of troops and instructed General Chaney to “co-operate
great quantities of supplies to the United with the forces of the British Empire and
Kingdom. USAFBI had not been created other allied nations” in military opera-
with BOLEROin mind, a n d General tions against the Axis Powers, but specified
Chaney keenly felt the lack of a specific that in doing so the American forces were
statement of his mission a n d powers. The to “be maintained as a distinct a n d sep-
initiative in obtaining such a directive arate component of the combined forces.”
finally came from Chaney’s own staff. In T h e theater commander was vested with
the course of the Claridge Conference in
April General Dahlquist asked General 26Memo, Bolté for Eisenhower, 29 May 42, as cited
in Organization and Command, I, 46
Marshall for a directive, at the same time 27Interv with Dahlquist, 16Jul 45, ETO Adm 515
submitting a draft to Col. John E. Hull, Intervs.
40 LOGISTICAL S U P P O R T O F T H E ARMIES

all authority over administrative or logis- Brig. Gen. George W. Griner the G–4.
tical matters previously assigned to the Col. R a y W. Barker had been appointed
Commanding General, USAFBI, and was Assistant Chief of Staff for War Plans early
directed to establish “all necessary bases, in April.
depots, lines of communications, and other Assignments to the special staff, on the
arrangements necessary in the operation, other hand, were to reflect the initial solu-
training, administration, maintenance tion to the thorny organizational contro-
a n d reception of the U.S. Army Forces.” versy about the extent of control that the
Finally, the directive gave as the mission SOS was to exert over supply a n d admin-
of the Commanding General, European istration. The activation of ETOUSA had
Theater of Operations, “to prepare for not seriously interrupted the search for a
and carry on military operations in the satisfactory answer to this problem, and a
European Theater against the Axis Pow- compromise solution h a d in fact been
ers a n d their allies, under strategical di- reached by 8 June. The dilemma faced by
rectives of the combined U.S.-British General Chaney and his staff was to find a
Chiefsof staff. . . .” 28 solution which would preserve for the the-
A separate cable on 16June defined the ater headquarters the control of theater-
territorial extent of the newly activated wide services without violating the Mar-
theater. T h e boundaries of the European shall directive of 14 May. I n his memo to
Theater of Operations ( E T O ) included General Eisenhower in May, General
roughly all of western Europe. (Map 1 ) Bolté h a d alluded to the problem of the
Iceland was now also under the theater’s relationship between SOS a n d USAFBI
jurisdiction, although the separate Ice- a n d had noted that, “unless the basic
land Base Command dealing directly with principle that authority and responsibility
the War Department would continue to must go hand in hand is to be abandoned,
handle administrative a n d logistical the commander of the force as a whole
matters. must have the freedom of action to organ-
Outwardly the transition from USAFBI ize, dispose, and employ the personnel and
to ETOUSA was a change in name only. means provided by him under the broad
The War Department directive activating mission assigned him by higher author-
a theater of operations did not change ity.” 29 T h e War Department directive
General Chaney’s duties greatly. But it which followed on 8 J u n e certainly
did constitute a statement of his mission granted the theater commander broad
and authority, which he had lacked as enough powers and left no doubt of Gen-
commanding general of USAFBI, and eral Chaney’s authority over all U.S.
thus gave him a clear-cut conception of forces in the theater. But it had not specif-
his c o m m a n d a n d clarified his position ically released him from previous instruc-
with relation to the other commands in tions, a n d the directive of 14 May there-
the United Kingdom. Chaney’s general fore still held.
staff remained unchanged. General Bolté An unidentified member of the USAFBI
was the chief of staff, General Dahlquist staff in the meantime had recommended
was G–1 and now also deputy chief of 28 Cbl 1120, AGWAR to USFOR London, 8 Jun
staff, Colonel Case was G–2, Brig. Gen. 42, ETO Adm 129 ETO Organization and Comd.
Harold M. McClelland the G–3, a n d 29Memo, Bolté for Eisenhower, 29 May 42.
 ORIGINS OF T H E EUROPEAN THEATER 41

U. Brooks
MAP 1

a division of staff functions, with the senior Hughes, Chief Ordnance Officer, General
officer of most of the services assigned to Rumbough, Chief Signal Officer, and
the SOS and only a portion of the special Colonel Cobbs, Finance Officer. An at-
staff remaining at General Chaney’s head- tempt to clarify the entire matter was
quarters. But on 8June, when the theater made in a circular, dated 13 June, outlin-
was activated, a general order announced ing in detail the responsibilities of the SOS
a complete special staff at theater head- a n d the division of the special staff. It
quarters, made u p of the senior officers in charged the Commanding General, SOS,
the various services, a n d therefore in- with the “formulating of detailed plans for
cluded many of the officers who had been supply, transportation, a n d administra-
chosen for General Lee’s organization. tion, a n d with the operation of all supply
Among them were General Littlejohn, a n d administrative services which serve
Chief Quartermaster, Col. Everett S. this theater as a whole and which are not
42 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

a part of other subordinate forces of the trol of all prisoner of war establishments, ex-
theater. . . .” More specifically, these re- cept those pertaining to other commands.
p. Evacuation and hospitalization of sick
sponsibilities included : and wounded from other commands.
q. Preparation of estimates of funds re-
a. Receipt and delivery to depots of all quired for operation of the theater.
supplies from the zone of the interior or from r. Adjudication and settlement ofall claims
local or foreign sources. and administration of the United States
b. Procurement, storage, maintenance, sal- Claims Commission for this theater.
vage, and basic issues of all equipment and s. Organization and operation of recrea-
supplies, except certain items peculiar to the tional facilities.
Air Force. t. Promotion of sale of war bonds and
c. The establishment. of purchasing and stamps.
contractual policies and procedure.
d. Control of all transportation and traffic The circular named eleven theater spe-
pertaining to the theater except that under cial staff sections to “operate under the
control of other commands. CG SOS.” They included the big supply
e. Construction. services, but these were to maintain sep-
f. Quartering, to include acquiring by such arate liaison sections at theater headquar-
means as may be necessary accommodations
and facilities for all forces and activities. ters. The SOS commander was granted all
g. Operation of all elements of the Army the necessary powers “authorized by law,
Postal Service except those assigned to other Army Regulations, and customs for a
forces. Corps Area Commander” in the United
h. The establishment and maintenance of States; he was allowed direct communica-
a Central Records Office for all army ele-
ments of the theater, including establishment tion with other commanders in all supply
and operation of a Prisoner of War Informa- a n d administrative matters; and he was
tion Bureau. authorized to organize the SOS into what-
i. The acquirement or production and is- ever subordinate commands he saw fit.
sue of all publications, training films, film Beyond this the circular was carefully
strips, and blank forms.
j. Operation of Graves Registration Serv- worded to meet the provisions of the Mar-
ice. shall directive of 14 May and at the same
k. The requisitioning, quartering, training, time retain control of theater-wide func-
and distribution under directives and policies tions for the theater’s highest headquar-
prescribed by this headquarters of all re- ters. It cautiously spelled out General
placements except the operation of Air Force
combat and ground crew replacement center. Lee’s authority. I n an attempt to subordi-
l. The establishment and control of all dis- nate SOS policy making to the control of
ciplinary barracks, and military police con- theater headquarters, for example, it pre-
trol of all members of the theater, outside scribed that the SOS would carry out its
other commands. functions “under directives issued by the
m. The establishment and operation of
such training centers and officer candidate Theater Commander,” and that all meas-
schools as may be directed by this headquar- ures taken would be “consistent with poli-
ters. cies and directives of this headquarters”
n. The operation of centers for reclassifica- (ETOUSA). T h e authorization to com-
tion of officers to include administration of municate directly with subordinate ele-
reclassification boards, appointed by the
theater commander. ments and officers and agencies of the U.S.
o. Evacuation from other commands of and British Governments was restricted to
prisoner of war and administration and con- matters “which do not involve items of
ORIGINS O F T H E EUROPEAN THEATER 43

major policy, which do not affect other made his inspection trip to the United
commands of the theater, or which do not Kingdom in May, a n d upon his return at
affect matters specifically reserved by the the end of the month his suggestion of
theater commander.” It empowered the General McNarney for the command was
Commanding General, SOS, to “issue to rejected by the Chief of Staff, who already
other force commanders instructions on had another important assignment in
routine administrative matters arising di- mind for that officer. Early in June Gen-
rectly from his duties and responsibilities,” eral Eisenhower submitted to General
but in order to make certain that the SOS Marshall the draft directive for the estab-
did not exercise a n improper amount of lishment of ETOUSA and was told for the
authority over other co-ordinate com- first time that he himself might be chosen
mands (the Eighth Air Force a n d V as the new commander of the theater. O n
Corps) the circular stipulated that such 1 1 June Eisenhower was told definitely
instructions were not to interfere with “in- that he had been chosen, a n d on the 17th
herent command responsibilities of other he received orders relieving him from his
force commanders.” 30 duties in the War Department and assign-
T h e circular was therefore guarded in ing him as Commanding General,
its grant of authority to the SOS and was ETOUSA. 31
not as broad a concession as General Lee General Chaney meanwhile was noti-
desired, although it gave him control of fied on 11 June of his impending relief,
eleven of the fifteen special staff sections a n d he departed from the United King-
he had requested. In meeting some of the dom on the 20th.32 I n the three-day
objections of Chaney’s staff it consequently interim after General Chaney’s departure
represented a compromise with the con- the theater was commanded by General
cept contained in the Marshall directive. Hartle, the senior American officer in the
T h e solution was anything b u t final, for United Kingdom. General Eisenhower
the division of responsibility and the split assumed command upon his arrival on 24
in the staffs between SOS a n d ETOUSA June.
produced a long controversy and resulted O n e of the new theater commander’s
in many attempts at reorganization. first tasks was to re-examine the confused
T h e first alterations in the settlement organizational structure which had just
were made within a month, occasioned by come into existence. While he considered
a change in the top American command. the division of functions and staff between
General Chaney served as commanding SOS and ETOUSA as faulty, General
general of the newly activated ETOUSA Eisenhower was not immediately disposed
less than two weeks. T h e man chosen to to make radical changes. For the most
succeed him was General Eisenhower, part he therefore accepted the compromise
chief of OPD. Since General Marshall’s
30Cir 2, Hq ETO, 13 J u n 42, CofS A45–466
trip to England in April, the Chief of Staff Codes—USAFBI.
had not been satisfied that the USAFBI 31 DwightD. Eisenhower, Crusadein Europe (Garden
commander and his staff were familiar City, N. Y., 1948), pp. 49–50.
32Cbl 2543, Marshall to Chaney, 1 1 J u n 42, OPD
enough with the War Department’s plans Exec 10, Folder 33. T h e reasons for Chaney’s relief
for the theater. A successor had not yet are more fully discussed in the following section of this
been chosen when General Eisenhower chapter.
44 LOGISTICAL S U P P O R T OF T H E ARMIES

outlined in Circular 2, although certain separate Transportation Service was added

modifications were made in the interest of to the usual services. Previously divided
clarity. Others were necessitated by an en- between the Corps of Engineers and the
tirely new factor that complicated the Quartermaster Corps, transportation serv-
whole situation—the proposed move of ices were from this time on to be organized
the SOS to Cheltenham, which was some as a separate corps, as recommended by
distance from London. A complete restate- General Somervell. It was to have a vital
ment of the responsibilities of the SOS and role in the logistical operations in the
its position vis-à-vis ETOUSA was the European war, and ably justified its claim
result, a n d was published as General to separate status as a service.
Order 19, dated 20 July 1942. General Order 19 did not alter the posi-
General Order 19 made only one im- tion of the SOS fundamentally. It did not
portant change in the mission of the SOS. give the SOS any additional theater-wide
General Lee now was assigned the addi- control over supply and administrative
tional function of administrative and functions a n d therefore did not enhance
supply planning for operations in the its position. In fact General Order 19 ac-
theater. He also was authorized to com- tually reduced the number of staff sections
municate directly with the War Depart- directly under its control a n d resident at
ment a n d British officials on supply Headquarters, SOS. The retention of more
matters without reference to theater head- of the staff sections at theater headquarters
quarters. Otherwise, his responsibilities was probably the result of the removal of
remained the same. the SOS to Cheltenham. T h e July settle-
Like Circular 2, the new order was care- ment represented the product of prolonged
ful to define a n d delimit the authority of deliberations and contentions over this
the Commanding General, SOS. His knotty problem. It was a compromise solu-
authority as a corps area commander was tion which did not please everyone and re-
restricted in that it was not to apply to sulted in the creation of overlapping
areas where another commander had agencies a n d much duplication of effort.
already been given such authority (for ex- T h e wording of the order indicates that
ample, military police control in North- General Eisenhower considered the whole
ern Ireland), and all orders, policies, and arrangement temporary; b u t more press-
instructions prepared by the chiefs of ing matters in the next few months pre-
services and applying to the entire theater cluded any overhauling of the system,
were to be submitted to the Commanding with the result that General Order 19 re-
General, SOS, and, after approval, pub- mained the constitution of ETOUSA for
lished by the Adjutant General, ETOUSA. about a year.
The order announced eighteen staff sec-
tions, eight of which were to be resident at (6) The Heritage of SPOBS and USAFBI
theater headquarters. (Chart 1) The chiefs
of services were to be located as directed T h e events of June a n d July did much
by the SOS commander. If not located at to establish the general shape and frame-
theater headquarters, they were to have work which the theater command was to
senior representatives there selected by retain for the next few years. ETOUSA’s
the theater commander. At this time a organizational structure was now deter-
 CHARTI-EARLY COMMANDAND STAFFORGANIZATIONOFETOUSA ESTABLISHEDBY
ETO GENERALORDER 1920 JULY 42.

The above services operating under the Commanding General SOS maintained The above sections were primarily administrative
senior representatives a t Headquarters ETOUSA, for the purpose of furnishing and had counterparts in the SOS whose duties
advice on their services to tho Theater Commander. they often duplicated.
46 LOGISTICAL S U P P O R T O F T H E ARMIES

mined; its command relationships were at army command in the United Kingdom
least temporarily fixed; and within a four- was the study of technical developments
week period three commanders arrived— in British aircraft and reporting on the
Lee, Spaatz, and Eisenhower—who were performance of American equipment, par-
destined to be key figures in its future de- ticularly aircraft. For this purpose a Tech-
velopment. These events resulted in the nical Committee h a d been formed in
gradual displacement of the SPOBS and SPOBS in November 1941. This special
USAFBI personnel. General Eisenhower observer mission continued after the estab-
retained General Chaney’s general staff lishment of Headquarters, USAFBI; but
only temporarily, and within a few months in April, apparently to clear u p the ad-
all but one of the positions had changed ministrative confusion over SPOBS’ status
hands. I n the special staff there was more with relation to USAFBI, the Technical
stability of tenure. Committee was reorganized as the Air
Before assessing the accomplishments of Section, USAFBI, under General Lyon.
SPOBS and USAFBI it should be pointed What was left of SPOBS was thus properly
out that the original special observer func- reduced to the position of a staff section in
tion continued to be carried out under one the new headquarters. Henceforth it dealt
name or another even after the activation almost exclusively with aircraft, was given
of ETOUSA. T h e mission of SPOBS had a semi-independent status, a n d was
not ended with the formation of USAFBI allowed to communicate directly with
early in January 1942. That it had not was appropriate War Department agencies on
due mainly to the fact t h a t General purely technical matters. This reorganiza-
Chaney had to deal with many matters tion appears to have clarified the rather
outside the British Isles, particularly de- anomalous position of SPOBS after the
velopments in the Middle East. T h e War formation of USAFBI, although the en-
Department had specified at that time listed men of the Headquarters Detach-
that in addition to taking over as Com- ment of SPOBS were not finally trans-
manding General, USAFBI, General ferred to Headquarters, USAFBI, until
Chaney was to continue as Special Army the end of May.
Observer and was also to act as Army In the organization of ETOUSA early
member of a newly created U.S. Military in June the Air Section became the Special
Mission to Great Britain. As indicated Observer Section. Its mission was now
earlier, the military mission was never defined as including “all matters which do
established, but General Chaney and his not pertain directly to operations of U.S.
staff continued to function as special ob- forces in the ETO.” This involved liaison
servers, with a vaguely understood rela- on all lend-lease matters with the Harri-
tionship to USAFBI which caused consid- man mission, the Munitions Assignments
erable administrative confusion. In March Board, the Munitions Assignments Com-
and April General Chaney protested the mittee (Air), a n d the various British
War Department’s practice of continuing ministries concerned with production and
to assign personnel to SPOBS rather than supply. Procurement of technical data on
to Headquarters, USAFBI. the production and operation of aircraft
One of the most important functions was also included in the mission. In carry-
that remained after the formation of an ing out these duties, however, the Special
ORIGINS O F T H E EUROPEAN THEATER 47

Observer Section came into increasing information on what was transpiring in

competition with other agencies, particu- the War Department as from basic dis-
larly the Eighth Air Force, which wanted agreement on principle. Significant devel-
jurisdiction over the section, and with the opments had taken place in March and
SOS. The Special Observers had always April 1942 which tended to nullify if not
considered their name a n unfortunate to render obsolete the command ideas of
choice, and in July, on General Lyon’s the USAFBI commander. First of all,
recommendation, the section was redesig- strategic decisions at this time resulted in
nated the Air Technical Section. As such a radical alteration of the ABC–1 agree-
it continued to collect and report on ments as they applied to the United King-
British technical developments, but it no dom, and provided for a huge build-up of
longer had any duties involving areas out- U.S. forces there and a greatly enlarged
side the European theater. role for American forces in the European
It is difficult to evaluate the work of area. Perhaps an even more important
SPOBS and USAFBI, for much of what factor which operated to defeat General
they accomplished was intangible. For the Chaney’s ideas on command was the re-
most part their work was preparatory and organization of the War Department
preliminary. The extent of their accom- whereby three co-ordinate subcommands
plishment is certainly not reflected in the had been established. Both the SOS and
size of the U.S. forces brought to the the Air Forces in the United States were
United Kingdom in this period. At the headed by strong personalities who wanted
end of May 1942,just before the activa- to set up parallel commands in the theater
tion of ETOUSA, the U.S. troop strength and to establish direct lines of technical
in the British Isles totaled only 35,668, of control to the theater counterparts of their
which 32,202 comprised the Northern Ire- commands in the zone of interior. In view
land forces. Fewer than 2,000-men of the of Chaney’s lack of knowledge of these de-
Eighth Air Force had arrived. Thus, the velopents, his plans for the organization
build-up of U.S. forces was only beginning, of his command were logical and under-
and the rate of this build-up was not the standable. The War Department’s own
responsibility of SPOBS or USAFBI. early indecision on these matters is re-
As for the basic organizational structure flected in the disposition on the part of
or framework of the theater, it had been O P D to uphold General Chaney initially
established more in spite of General in his views on the separate air force
Chaney and his staff than because of them. command.
Chaney had plumped for an organization But however justified General Chaney
that called for regional rather than func- was in opposing the command arrange-
tional commands, and for an SOS organi- ments imposed from the War Department
zation that occupied a more subordinate and in arguing the merits of his own ideas,
position than that outlined in directives these contentions undoubtedly influenced
from the War Department. On both these the decision to relieve him from his com-
matters he found himself out of harmony mand, In notifying Chaney of his relief,
with current War Department thinking. General Marshall explained the change
This state of affairs probably resulted as by stating that he deemed it urgently im-
much from misunderstanding and lack of portant that the commander in the E T O
48 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

be an officer more intimately acquainted and laid out sites for air units, again with-
with the War Department’s plans and one out the knowledge or consent of General
who had taken a leading part in the de- Chaney. The anomalous position of the
velopments since December.33 It is ap- USAFBI commander is further revealed
parent that other factors entered into the in the questions which the British put to
War Department’s decision. Chaney had General Eisenhower during his visit to the
been overcautious in undertaking any United Kingdom in May. They looked
commitments in the United Kingdom, upon Chaney as something “other than a
even after the United States had defi- Theater Commander,” and were obvi-
nitely joined the ranks of the belligerents; ously puzzled as to the U.S. agencies and
he was thought to lack the necessary drive officials with whom their planners were
to carry out the enlarged program in the to work. It was then that Eisenhower, and
theater; and it was felt inappropriate for Arnold and Somervell, who were also in
a n air force officer to command the large England at this time, realized the neces-
ground forces which were to be sent to the sity of impressing upon the British the fact
United Kingdom. He was out of sympathy that Chaney had complete responsibility
with General Arnold’s ideas, and it is ob- for U.S. forces in the United Kingdom.36
vious that he was not in the highest favor Before this time, however, there was no
with the inner circle of the Air Forces, for real acknowledgment in practice that
he was never given one of its top Chaney possessed such full authority. The
commands. same attitude was reflected in the tend-
General Chaney had held a difficult ency to keep General Chaney in the dark
position both as head of SPOBS and as as to what was being planned in Washing-
Commanding General, USAFBI. His mis- ton and what was expected of USAFBI.
sion had never been clearly defined, and While General Chaney was forewarned of
his authority over U.S. forces in the United the shipment of troops to the British Isles,
Kingdom was indefinite even after his ap- the MAGNET plan itself was not received
pointment as Commanding General, in his headquarters until after the first
USAFBI, in January 1942. In the opinion contingent had already arrived in
of one of his staff, USAFBI was not a Northern Ireland. 37
theater of operations, but rather “one of This situation was inevitably accom-
several forces operating in the theater.” 34 panied by a n overlapping of function, con-
This view is supported by the fact that fusion of authority, and duplication of
Chaney was frequently bypassed in the effort. General Chaney really had a dual
arrangements made by the War Depart- role. Until the War Department reorgani-
ment for the organization of the theater. zation of 1942, as Commanding General,
For example, the War Department cable 33Cbl 1197, Marshall to Chaney, 11 Jun 42, OPD
announcing the appointment of the V Exec 10, Folder 33.
Corps commander went directly to Gen- 34Organization and Command, I, 44.
35Interv with Dahlquist, 16 Jul 45, ETO Adm 517
eral Hartle in Northern Ireland without Intervs.
previous reference to General Chaney for 36Eisenhower’s Rpt, BOLEROTrip, 23–30 May 42,
35Inthe spring of 1942 General
approval. OPD ABC 381 BOLERO, 3-16-42, Sec 1.
37Memo, Chaney €or Hist Div, 23 Jul 46, and
Arnold visited the United Kingdom, met Memo, Brig Gen Homer Case for Hist Div, 19 Jul
with Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal 46, O C M H .
ORIGINS O F T H E EUROPEAN THEATER 49

USAFBI, he came under the immediate War Department did not even begin to
control of the Commanding General, send additional officers to build up the
Army Field Forces (GHQ), which was not headquarters until April, and the neces-
organized or prepared to exercise proper sary housekeeping troops were provided
control over an overseas command. As only by transferring men from Northern
Special Army Observer Chaney reported Ireland.
directly to the War Department.38 The re- SPOBS even considered its name a
sult was that the USAFBI commander handicap. The choice was dictated by con-
received directives from several offices in siderations of security, but as a result
the War Department. There was a definite many officers in the War Department
lack of co-ordination in the assignment were unaware of the true significance of
and control of the various groups of ob- the group and came to look upon it as a
servers sent to the United Kingdom. Some mere information-gathering agency. Ac-
worked under SPOBS, some under tually SPOBS went to the United King-
USAFBI, some under the military attaché, dom as a military mission and “not just to
and some as “special military observers” look at gadgets,” and became the nucleus
sent to the United Kingdom on separate of a headquarters for an operational force
missions. Many reported directly to the 42
in that country.
War Department, working independently Despite their many difficulties and the
of SPOBS and the military attaché, and fact that they were overruled on some mat-
duplicated the work others had already ters, SPOBS and USAFBI made many
done. In this way Northern Ireland was positive contributions toward the develop-
reconnoitered and surveyed at least four ment of the theater. Perhaps the most tan-
or five times, to the bewilderment of the gible of their accomplishments were the
British.39 preparations they made for the first Amer-
Another handicap under which SPOBS ican troop arrivals and the planning they
and USAFBI labored was the lack of ade- carried out for the reception of greater
quate personnel for the many duties they numbers later. The reception of U.S. units
were called on to perform. This became a in Northern Ireland constituted a “pre-
particularly serious drawback after the liminary canter” in which many of the
announcement early in January that problems that were to arise under the
troops would soon arrive in the United BOLERO build-up were resolved in minor
Kingdom. USAFBI initially operated form. In making these preparations
with a headquarters smaller than that of
a regiment. Most of the staff sections con- 38Cbl 293, A G W A R to SPOBS, 8 J a n 42, ETO
sisted of but one officer and one enlisted Adm 502 Boundaries a n d Comd: Interv with Dahl-
quist, 16 J u l 45.
man, and certain staff positions could not 39Memo, Chaney for Hist Div, 23 J u l 46, OCMH;
be filled at all initially. USAFBI was so Interv with Brig Gen Ralph A. Snavely, 17 Oct 45,
shorthanded at the time the reception of a n d Interv with Dahlquist, 16 J u l 45, ETO Adm
5 17 Intervs.
the first Northern Ireland contingent was 40Interv with Brig Gen G. Bryan Conrad, 12 Aug
being planned that officers had to be 45, ETO Adm 517 Intervs.
borrowed from the military attaché,40who 41 Intervwith Dahlquist, 15 Jul 45, ETO Adm
5 17 Intervs.
for some time operated with a staff much 42 Intervs with Dahlquist, 16 Jul 45, a n d Bolté, 4

larger than that of General Chaney.41The Oct 45, ETO Adm 517 Intervs.
50 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

SPOBS and USAFBI established a n early Other staff sections also traced their be-
liaison with the British on all types of mili- ginnings to the days of SPOBS and
tary matters, thus laying the foundation USAFBI, a n d initiated the activities
for one of the most intimate collaborations which later were greatly expanded in the
ever achieved by two allies. much enlarged ETOUSA organization.
Arranging for the accommodation of Agreements were reached with the British
American troops afforded the services, on the handling of mail; the Stars and
particularly the engineers, a n especially Stripes was launched as a weekly in April;
fruitful opportunity to gain experience. and on General Chaney’s recommenda-
While little new construction was actually tion the War Department designated the
completed in the first year, the engineers Red Cross as the sole welfare agency to
under General Davison went far in estab- work with troops in the theater. He also
lishing policy for the transfer of accommo- insisted on the control of press relations
dations and in setting u p standards of a n d censorship as a function of his com-
construction, and had made good progress mand, independent of the British. 44It was
in planning the housing facilities for in the SPOBS period also that discussions
American troops and arranging for the were initiated with the British government
transfer and construction of airfields. The leading to the passage of the Visiting
Chief Surgeon, Colonel Hawley, likewise Forces Act by the British Parliament in
had determined on a scheme of hospitali- August 1942, which gave the Americans
zation agreeable to the British, had estab- full legal jurisdiction over their own forces
lished requirements and standards, a n d a n d exempted them from criminal pro-
had inaugurated an expansion of the hos- ceedings in the courts of the United
pital construction program. The Signal Kingdom.
Corps was probably the first of the services All the varied activities of the predeces-
to acquire practical working experience in sor commands—their work with the Har-
the United Kingdom. Colonel Matejka, riman mission in inaugurating lend-lease
SPOBS Signal Officer, had early estab- aid to both Britain a n d the USSR; their
lished working arrangements with the efforts in connection with the technical as-
British signals organization on the use of pects of lend-lease; their aid in the estab-
British installations a n d equipment, and lishment of bases in the Middle East for
on the schooling of American units in Brit- maintenance of American-built equip-
ish communications procedure. The Quar- ment used by the British; their supervision
termaster Corps also shared in the early of the Electronics Training Group; their
determination of policy for the accommo- collaboration with the British, through the
dation of American troops. Under the Technical Committee, on radar and jet
USAFBI Quartermaster, Colonel Middle- propulsion; their assistance in expediting
swart, a British suggestion that American modifications in American equipment as a
troops draw their food supplies from the result of their reporting of defects in U.S.
same sources as British troops was rejected, airplanes, tanks, and other matériel used
and steps were taken to establish separate
U.S. imports a n d depots to insure that 43S e et h e technical service histories in this series
for more detailed coverage of the SPOBS accom-
American troops would have American plishments.
rations.43 44Memo, Case for Hist Div, 19 Jul 46, OCMH.
ORIGINS OF T H E EUROPEAN THEATER 51

by the British in combat, especially their as one of the special observers has pointed
valuable recommendations on the im- out, ETOUSA insisted on repeating much
provement of fighter planes, notably the of the work of SPOBS and USAFBI, the
P–51 —all these and their many other new headquarters inherited invaluable
services constituted a formidable record of permanent working organizations and the
accomplishment that enriched the legacy hard core of a command structure for the
bequeathed to ETOUSA. Even though, theater.
 CHAPTER II

The SOS and ETOUSA

in 1942
(1) BOLERO Is Born enemy’s strength, a n d to serve as the coup
de grâce to an enemy already near collapse.
T h e first major task confronting the It reflected only too well the meager re-
newly activated ETOUSA, beyond its in- sources then available to the British. The
ternal organization, was to prepare for the conferences at ARCADIA gave more serious
reception of the American forces which consideration to a plan for the invasion of
were scheduled to arrive in the British northwest Africa, known as GYMNAST.
Isles. T h e strategic decision which pro- This also became academic in view of the
vided the basis for this build-up was taken demands which the Pacific area was mak-
in April 1942. ing on available troops and shipping. The
At the ARCADIA Conference in Washing- ARCADIA deliberations therefore led to the
ton in December 1941–January 1942, conclusion that operations in 1942 would
American and British military leaders had of necessity have to be of a n emergency
taken steps to allocate shipping a n d de- nature, and that there could be no large-
ploy troop units, had determined on the scale operations aimed a t establishing a
principle of unity of command, a n d had permanent bridgehead on the European
created the Combined Chiefs of Staff Continent that year.
(CCS) as a n over-all combined co-ordi- I n the first hectic months after Amer-
nating agency. Despite the unexpected ican entry into the war, when the United
manner in which the United States had States was preoccupied with measures to
been drawn into the war, they also reaf- check Japanese expansion toward Aus-
firmed the earlier resolution to give prior- tralia, U.S. planners had not agreed on a
ity to the defeat of Germany. Beyond this, long-range strategy. But a n early decision
however, no decisions were made on how on ultimate objectives was urgently
or where the first offensives were to be car- needed if the American concept of a final
ried out. I n 1941 British planners had decisive offensive was ever to be carried
drawn up a plan, known as ROUNDUP, for out. T h e President urged immediate ac-
a return to the Continent. But ROUNDUPtion on such a guide, a n d in March 1942
was not conceived on the scale required the Operations Division of the War De-
for a n all-out offensive against a strong partment worked out a plan for a full-scale
and determined enemy. It was designed invasion of Europe in 1943. General Mar-
rather to exploit a deterioration of the shall gave the proposal his wholehearted
THE SOS AND ETOUSA I N 1942 53

support and, after certain revisions in force required a long period of intensive
language had been made, presented it to preparation. Supplies and shipping would
the President on 2 April. The Commander have to be conserved, and all production,
in Chief promptly approved the plan and special construction, training, troop move-
also the idea of clearing it directly with ments, a n d allocations co-ordinated to a
the British Chiefs of Staff in London. Gen- single end. T h e shortage of shipping was
eral Marshall and Harry Hopkins accord- recognized as one of the greatest limita-
ingly flew to England immediately and, in tions on the timing and strength of the at-
discussions between 9 and 14 April, won tack, and it was therefore imperative that
the approval of the British Chiefs of Staff U.S. air a n d ground units begin moving
for the “Marshall Memorandum.” The to the United Kingdom immediately by
plan that it embodied had already been every available ship. Because the element
christened BOLERO. of time was of utmost importance, the
It contemplated three main phases: a Marshall Memorandum emphasized that
preparatory period, the cross-Channel the decision on the main effort had to be
movement and seizure of beachheads be- made immediately to insure that the
tween Le Havre and Boulogne, and the necessary resources would be available. 1
consolidation and expansion of the beach- Such a decision was obtained with the
heads a n d beginning of the general ad- acceptance of the BOLERO proposal by the
vance. The preparatory phase consisted of British in mid-April. Despite the succes-
all measures that could be undertaken in sion of defeats in the early months of 1942,
1942 and included establishment of a pre- approval of the Marshall Memorandum
liminary active front by air bombardment instilled a new optimism, particularly
and coastal raids, preparation for the pos- among American military leaders. There
sible launching of an emergency operation now was hope that what appeared to be a
in the fall in the event that either the Rus- firm decision on the Allies‘ major war ef-
sian situation became desperate or the fort would put a n end to the dispersion of
German position in Western Europe was effort and resources. The decision of April
critically weakened, and immediate initia- provided a definite goal for which plan-
tion of procurement, matériel allocations, ners in both the United States and the
a n d troop a n d cargo movements to the United Kingdom could now prepare in
United Kingdom. T h e principal and de- detail.
cisive offensive was to take place in the To implement such planning for the
spring of 1943 with a combined U.S.-Brit- BOLERO build-up a new agency was estab-
ish force of approximately 5,800 combat lished. Within a week after agreement was
aircraft and forty-eight divisions. reached in London, Brig. Gen. Thomas T
Logistic factors were the primary con- Handy, Army member of the Joint Staff
sideration governing the date on which Planners of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the
such an operation could take place. It was suggestion of General Eisenhower, pro-
proposed that at the beginning of the in- posed the establishment of a combined
vasion approximately thirty U.S. divisions U.S.-British committee for detailed
should be either in England or en route,
and that U.S. strength in Britain should 1 Plan,
Operations in Western Europe, n. d., ETO
total one million men. To move such a Adm BOLEROMisc.
54 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

BOLERO planning,2 a n d on 28 April the last day of April, when the Washington
Combined Chiefs of Staff directed the for- committee requested information on Brit-
mation of such a n agency as a subcommit- ish shipping capacities and urged that the
tee of the Combined Staff Planners. This utmost be done to get the movement of
agency was known as the BOLERO Com- troops started promptly in order to take
bined Committee and consisted of two advantage of the summer weather. 5 By the
officers from OPD, two Navy officers, and first week in M a y detailed planning for
one representative from each of the three the movement a n d reception of the
British services. T h e committee was to BOLEROforce was under way in both
have no responsibility for preparing tac- capitals.
tical plans. Its mission was to “outline, For several weeks after the April deci-
co-ordinate a n d supervise” all plans for sion on strategy and the establishment of
preparations and operations in connection the Combined Committees considerable
with the movement to, and reception and confusion arose over the exact scope and
maintenance of American forces in, the meaning of the term BOLERO.The pro-
United Kingdom. This would cover such posal that General Marshall took with
matters as requirements, availability, and him to London had carried no code word;
allocation of troops, equipment, shipping, it was titled simply “Operations in West-
port facilities, communications, naval es- ern Europe.” The code name BOLERO had
cort, a n d the actual scheduling of troop first become associated with the plan in
movements.3 As observed by its chairman, the War Department OPD. In that divi-
Col. John E. Hull, at the first meeting of sion’s first outlines of the plan BOLERO
em-
the BOLERO Combined Committee on 29 bodied not only the basic strategic concept
April 1942, the new agency’s principal of a full-scale cross-Channel attack in
business would be to act as a shipping 1943 but also the preparatory phases, in-
agency.4 cluding the supply and troop build-up in
A similar committee, known as the the United Kingdom and any limited op-
BOLERO Combined Committee (London), erations which might be carried out in
was established in England. The London 1942. Within a few weeks two additional
committee’s main concern was with the code names had come into use for specific
administrative preparation for the recep- aspects of the over-all plan. General Mar-
tion, accommodation, a n d maintenance shall’s memorandum had spoken of a
of U.S. forces in the United Kingdom. “modified plan” which it might be neces-
Working jointly, the two agencies were to sary to carry out on an “emergency” basis.
plan a n d supervise the entire movement By this was meant a limited operation
of the million-man force which was sched- which might be launched against the
uled to arrive in Britain within the next
eleven months. To achieve the closest pos- 2 JPS Min (extract), 13th Mtg, 2 2 Apr 42, OPD
sible working arrangement, a system of ABC 381 BOLERO 3-16-42, Sec 1.
3CPS Dir, Preparation of War Plan BOLERO,CPS
direct communications was set up between 26/2/D, 28 Apr 42, OPD ABC 381 BOLERO
the two committees with a special series of 3–16–42, Sec 1.
cables identified as Black (from Washing- 4 BCC(W) Min, 1st Mtg, 29 Apr 42, ETO Adm
BOLERO Misc.
ton) and Pink (from London). T h e ex- 5 Cbl Black 1, BCC(W) to BCC(L), 30 Apr 42,
change of communications began on the ETO Adm 391 BOLERO1943.
THE SOS AND ETOUSA I N 1942 55

European Continent in the event the Red preparation for their reception therein
armies showed signs of collapse or the Ger- and the production, assembly, transport,
man position in France was materially reception a n d storage of equipment and
weakened. For such an operation the scale supplies necessary for support of the
of possible American participation would United States Force in operations against
be particularly limited because of the theEuropeanContinent.” 7 Thenceforth
shortage of shipping. It was estimated that the use of the name BOLERG was confined
not more than 700 combat planes and to the plan for the great build-up of men
three and a half divisions would have ar- and matériel in the United Kingdom.
rived in England by mid-September, al- The inauguration of the BOLERO build-
though considerably larger forces would up initially posed a fourfold problem: the
be equipped and trained in the United establishment of a troop basis; a decision
States and ready to take part as shipping on the composition of the BOLERO force,
became available. This “emergency” or including the priority in which units were
“modified plan” soon came to be known desired in the United Kingdom; setting
as SLEDGEHAMMER, a name which Prime up a shipping schedule; and preparing re-
Minister Winston S. Churchill had coined ception and accommodation facilities in
earlier in connection with similar plans the United Kingdom. Designating the
made by the British. Similarly, the more priority in which various units were de-
purely tactical aspects of the BOLERO sired and preparing their accommodations
plan—the actual cross-Channel attack— in the British Isles were problems that had
were soon commonly referred to by the to be solved in the theater. Establishing
name which British planners had used in the troop basis or troop availability and
connection with their earlier plans for con- setting up a shipping schedule were tasks
tinental operations, ROUNDUP,even for the War Department. the shipping
though those earlier plans bore little re- schedule more specifically in the province
semblance to the project now in prepara- of the BOLERO Combined Committee in
tion. There already existed in London a Washington. But the four tasks were inter-
ROUNDUP committee engaged in the ad- related, a n d required the closest kind of
ministrative planning for a cross-Channel collaboration between the theater head-
operation. quarters, British authorities, the two Com-
The increased use of SLEDGEHAMMER bined Committees, the OPD, and other
and ROUNDUP in communications pro- War Department agencies.
duced a n inevitable confusion and doubt One step had already been taken to-
over the exact meaning of BOLERO. Late ward establishing a troop basis when the
in May USAFBI pointed out to the War Marshall Memorandum set the goal of a
Department the wide divergency in views build-up of a million men in the United
held in Washington and London,6 and Kingdom by 1 April 1943. In fact, this was
OPD finally took steps to have the term the only figure that had any near-stability
BOLERO defined. Early in July a presiden-
tial directive was issued stipulating that 6 Memo, Bolté for Eisenhower, 29 May 42,
BOLEROwould cover specifically the USFET AG 381 54–40 BOLERO.
7 Memo, OPD for CofS,sub: Code Designators
“preparation for and movement of United for Opns in E T O , 7 Jul 42, with draft presidential
States Forces into the European Theater, dir, WD AG, ETO.
56 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

in the rapidly shifting plans of the first and General Somervell requested OPD to
months. T h e accompanying target of 30 take these figures into consideration in any
U.S. divisions in England or en route by troop planning for BOLERO. 9
April 1943 represented hardly more than T h e earliest breakdown of the BOLERO
wishful thinking at this time. It proved force troop basis provided that approxi-
entirely unrealistic when analyzed in the mately 26 percent of the troop basis be
light of movement capabilities, and War allotted to service forces. T h e Combined
Department planners within a matter of Committee in Washington tentatively sug-
weeks reduced the figure first to 25 divi- gested the following composition of the
sions, then to 20, and finally to 15.8 U.S. force early in May, a n d requested
Meanwhile planners in both the United USAFBI’s opinion on the proportions: 10
States a n d in the United Kingdom had
begun work on a related problem—the
composition of the BOLERO force, and the
priority in which units were to be shipped.
In determining what constituted a “bal-
anced force” there was much opportunity
for disagreement. Ground, air, and service 1( 1 7 divisions plus supporting units).
branches inevitably competed for what
These figures already embodied a small
each regarded as its rightful portion of the
reduction of a n earlier ground force troop
total troop basis. A survey of manpower
basis made to preclude a reduction in the
resources in the spring of 1942 revealed a
service troop allocation.11 Approximately
shocking situation with regard to the
one fourth of the BOLERO force was thus
availability of service units. Only 11.8
allotted to service troops.
percent of the 1942 Army troop basis had
Later in May the War Department
been allotted for service troops, a woefully
established the general priorities for the
inadequate allowance to provide support
movement of American units. Air units
for combat troops in theaters of opera-
were to be shipped first, followed by essen-
tions. Neglect of the service elements in
tial SOS units, then ground forces, a n d
favor of combat troops reflected an atti-
then additional service units needed to
tude which was common before the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870, but which
hardly squared with the proven logistic 8 Memo, Secy WDGS for CG SOS et al., sub:
Troop Basis, 19 May 42, WDAG O P D 320.2
requirements of modern warfare. A study BOLERO.T h e various copies of the BOLEROplan re-
made in the War Department SOS in veal later downward revisions. ETO Adm BOLERO
April showed that, of the total AEF force Misc.
9 Memo, Col Roy C. L. Graham, Deputy Dir of
of nearly two million men in France at the Opns SOS, for Somervell, sub: Proportion of Svc
end of World War I, 34 percent were serv- Troops to Ground Forces, 27 Apr 42, and Memo,
ice troops, exclusive of the service elements Somervell for Eisenhower, 29 Apr 42, WDAG C/S
370.5 4-27-42; Remarks, Col Carter B. Magruder,
with the ground combat and air force Plng Div ASF, ASF Conf, 2 Jun 42, ASF Plng Div
units. O n the basis of the 1917–18 experi- 106 BOLERO.
ence the study estimated that the SOS 10Cbl Black 2, BCC(W) to BCC(L), n. d. (early
May 42), ETO 381 BOLERO1943.
component of the BOLEROforce should be 11 BCC(W)Min, 3rd Mtg, 6 May 42, Annex 1,
at least 35 percent, or about 350,000 men, OPD ABC 381 BOLERO,Sec 1.
 T H E SOS AND ETOUSA I N 1942 57

prepare the ground for later shipments.” placed on them by planned troop deploy-
By the end of the month General Chaney, ments in both the Atlantic and Pacific.
who was still in command in the United War Department planners estimated early
Kingdom, submitted lists of priorities in March 1942 that 300,000 American
within the War Department’s announced troops could be moved to the United
availabilities. 13 Kingdom by October. This prospect was
There still remained the problem of almost immediately obscured by decisions
finding and making available the numbers to deploy additional British forces to the
and types of troop units which the theater Middle East a n d the Indian Ocean area
desired. This presented no insurmountable and U.S. troops to the Southwest Pacific,
difficulty so far as combat units were con- and by the realization that enemy sub-
cerned, since adequate provision had been marines were taking a mounting toll of
made for their activation a n d training. Allied shipping. Late in March the earlier
But in the spring of 1942 few trained serv- optimism melted away in the face of
ice troops were available for duty in over- estimates that large troop movements
seas theaters, and service troops beyond could not begin until late in the summer,
all others were required first in the United and that only 105,000 men, including a
Kingdom. It was imperative that they maximum of three and a half infantry
precede combat units in order to receive divisions, might be moved to Britain by
equipment a n d supplies, prepare depots mid-September.
and other accommodations, and provide British authorities had offered some
essential services for the units which fol- hope of alleviating the shortage in troop
lowed. Certain types of units were not lift by transferring some of their largest
available at all; others could be sent with liners to the service of the BOLERO build-
only some of their complements trained, up as soon as the peak deployment: to the
and those only partially.14 O n the assump- Middle East had passed. But the shortage
tion that “a half-trained man is better of cargo shipping was even more desper-
than no man,” General Lee willingly ac- ate, and the fate of the build-up depended
cepted partially trained units with the on the balancing of cargo and troop move-
intention of giving them on-the-job train- ments. There was particular urgency
ing, so urgently were they needed in the about initiating the build-up during the
United Kingdom.15 As a n emergency summer months, in part to take advantage
measure, the War Department authorized of the longer days which permitted heavier
an early shipment of 10,000 service
troops. 16 12Ltr, Hull to Bolté, 19 May 42, E T O AG 381
Scheduling the shipment of the BOLERO re-40 May–Dec 42.
units proved the most exaspertingprob-42,13and Cbl 839, Marshall to USFOR London, 24 May
Cbl 1761, USFOR to AGWAR, 29 May 42,
lem of all. The shortage of shipping cir- ETO 381 BOLERO1943.
cumscribed the planners at every turn, 14 Remarksby Cot Magruder, ASF Conf, 2 Jun42.
15The remark was made by General Larkin, Lee’s
strait-jacketing
the entire build-upplan chief of staff, in one of the organizational conferences
and forcing almost daily changes in held in the W a r Department before the departure
scheduled movements. U.S. shipping re- for England. Lee Diary, 18 May 42.
16 Memo, Col Griner, G–4 USAFBI, for CofS, sub:
sourceswere limited to begin with, and Breakdown of 10,000 SOS Troops, 22 May 42, ETO
were unequal to the demands suddenly Preinvasion 321 BOLERO.
58 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

unloadings at British ports, a n d in part to short of the total number of troops avail-
avoid the telescoping of shipments into a able. For the moment it again appeared
few months early in 1943 in view of the that a force of only 105,000men could be
unbearable congestion it would create in moved to the United Kingdom by Sep-
British ports. In mid-April, a t the time of tember. Even this number was to be
the Marshall visit to England, American reached only by postponing the evacua-
authorities took some encouragement from tion of British troops from Iceland. T h e
a British offer to provide cargo shipping Combined Chiefs of Staff, in approving
as well as troopships on the condition that these shipments, noted t h a t while long-
American units cut down on their equip- range schedules could be projected it was
ment allowances, particularly for assem- impossible to forecast what the shipping
bled vehicles. But these commitments were situation might be in a few months.20
unavoidably vague, for it was next to im- T h e warning that shipping capacity
possible to predict what shipping would be might fluctuate was soon justified. Within
available for BOLEROin the summer of a week British officials were able to prom-
1942, when the Allies were forced to put ise additional aid for the month of June by
out fires in one place after another.17 diverting troop lift from the Middle East-
T h e hard realities of the shipping situa- Indian Ocean program. They offered the
tion made themselves felt again shortly use of both of the “monsters,” the Queen
after the London conference. O n 9 May Mary a n d Queen Elizabeth, a n d part-time
the War Department issued a “Tentative use of other ships, including the Aquitania,
Movement Schedule” providing for the beginning in August.21 Accordingly in
transfer of about 1,070,000 American mid-May it was possible to schedule a n
troops to the United Kingdom by 1 April additional 45,000 for shipment in June,
1943.18T h e title was immediately recog- July, a n d August, which would bring the
nized as a misnomer, for the figure simply strength in the United Kingdom to ap-
indicated the number of troops which proximately 150,000 by 1 September
would be available for movement and 1942.22Part of the accelerated movement
bore no relationship to actual shipping
capabilities. O n the very day this so-called 17 SeeRichard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coak-
ley, T h e Logistics of Global Warfare, in preparation
movement schedule was issued, the for this series, draft chapter “BOLERO: First Phase,”
BOLEROCombined Committee of Wash- for a full discussion of BOLEROplanning at the War
ington revealed the sobering facts regard- Department level.
18Tentative Movement Schedule, 9 May 42, OPD
ing the limitations which shipping im- ABC 38 1 BOLERO, Sec 1.
posed, notifying the London committee 19 Cbl Black 4, B C C ( W ) to BCC(L), 9 May 42,
that a build-up of not more than 832,000 ETO 381 BOLERO1943.
20 CCSMin (extract), 19th Mtg, 1 2 May 42, OPD
could be achieved in the United Kingdom ABC 381 BOLERO.
by 1 April 1943.19There was even talk of 21Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global War-
lowering the goal to 750,000 a n d so allo- fare, Ch. XII; JCS Min (notes and extract), 15th Mtg,
18 May 42, sub: BOLERO—Rpt of CPS, O P D ABC
cating the various components as to create 381 BOLERO3–16–42, Sec 1.
a balanced force in case a reduction 22Cbl742, AGWAR to USFOR London, 18 May
proved necessary. T h e revised figure 42, ETO BOLEROIncoming Msgs, BOLEROMove-
ments; Memo, Hull, 21 May 42, sub: Troop Move-
would have been 250,000 short of the mil- ment Schedules for BOLERO a n d NABOB,O P D ABC
lion-man target a n d more t h a n 300,000 381 BOLERO 3–16–42, Sec 1.
T H E SOS AND ETOUSA I N 1942 59

was to be accomplished by the overload- mands to make a detailed study of their

ing of troop carriers. The long-range ship- personnel requirements with a view to-
ping schedule now projected a build-up of ward further reducing troop requirements
892,000 by 1 April 1943. and deferring shipments. These steps were
These schedules had no more perma- taken reluctantly, for the theater deplored
nency than those prepared earlier. A fur- deferring the arrival of units which it
ther revision was made early in June, thought should be in the United Kingdom
slightly reducing the shipments for July by the target date, a n d naturally would
a n d August. Later in June, the darkest have felt “more comfortable” with assur-
month of the war, fresh disasters threat- ances that the million-man build-up
ened to upset the entire build-up projected would be achieved. 23
for that summer. A few weeks later the theater headquar-
I n the meantime the theater had at- ters made a new statement of its require-
tempted to reconcile its BOLEROtroop ments for a balanced force. It called for a
allotment with limitations imposed by the force of sixteen divisions and provided for
shipping shortage. Early in June the War reductions in all other components to the
Department had submitted to ETOUSA following numbers:
a troop basis made up as follows:

But the estimate included a new require-

ment for 137,000 replacements, which had
the net effect of increasing the troop basis
to approximately 1,100,000.24The deficit
The deficit in shipping, however, obliged in shipping consequently became greater
ETOUSA to determine whether, within than before. I n attempting to achieve the
the limitations, a force of adequate target of the BOLEROplan the two nations
strength and balance could be built up in thus faced an unsuperable task in the sum-
the United Kingdom. Senior commanders mer of 1942. By the end of July, however,
there had decided that a minimum of fif- a major alteration in strategy was destined
teen divisions out of the twenty provided to void most of these calculations.
for in the War Department troop basis
must be present in the United Kingdom (2) BOLERO Planning in the United Kingdom,
on the agreed target date. Theater plan- May-July 1942: the First Key Plans
ners therefore estimated that 75,000 places
could be saved by dropping a maximum While the War Department wrestled
of five divisions. Another saving of 30,000 with the shipping problem, preparations
could be realized by deferring the arrival 23Memo, Hq E T O for BCC(L), 26 Jun 42, E T O
of certain ground support troops until BCC Bk 1 ; Staff Memo. Col Barker for CofS ETO,
after 1 April. Even these cuts left a deficit 15Jun 42, sub: Troop Basis, E T O Adm 346 Troop
Basis.
of 35,000 places, and the theater therefore 24BCC(L) Progress Rpt 10, 20 J u l 42, E T O BCC
found it necessary to direct its major com- Bk 2.
60 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

for the reception and accommodation of area smaller than the state of Oregon. In
t h e BOLERO force got under way in the the next two years it was to be further con-
United Kingdom. T h e principal burden gested by the arrival of an American force
of such preparation was assumed at first of a million and a half, requiring such
by British agencies, which h a d been facilities as troop accommodations, air-
prompt to initiate planning immediately fields, depots, shops, training sites, ports,
after the strategic decisions made at a n d rolling stock. Great Britain had al-
Claridge's in April, a full month before the ready carried out a far more complete
arrival of General Lee a n d the activation mobilization than was ever to be achieved
of the SOS. British a n d American plan- in the United States. As early as 1941,94
ners had of course collaborated in prepar- out of every 100 males in the United King-
ing for the arrival of the MAGNET force in dom between the ages of 14 a n d 64 had
Northern Ireland, but the BOLERO plan been mobilized into the services or indus-
now projected a build-up on a scale so try, and of the total British working popu-
much greater than originally contem- lation of 32,000,000 approximately 22,-
plated that it was necessary to recast 000,000 were eventually drafted for service
accommodation plans completely. either in industry or the armed forces.25
T h e million troops that the War De- The British had made enormous strides in
partment planned to ship to the European the production of munitions of all types.
theater were destined to go to a n island I n order to save shipping space they had
which had already witnessed two and one- cut down on imports a n d made great ef-
half years of intensive war activity. Now forts to increase the domestic output of
the United Kingdom was to be the scene food. There was little scope for accom-
of a still vaster and more feverish prepara- plishing such a n increase in a country
tion as a base for offensive operations. The where nearly all the tillable land was al-
existence of such a friendly base, where ready in cultivation. In fact, the reclama-
great numbers of troops a n d enormous tion of wasteland was more than offset by
quantities of the munitions of war could losses of farm land to military a n d other
be concentrated close to enemy shores, nonagricultural uses. Raising the output
was a factor of prime importance in deter- of human food could be accomplished
mining the nature of U.S. operations only by increasing the actual physical
against the continental enemy. It was a yield of the l a n d , therefore, a n d by in-
factor perhaps too frequently taken for creasing the proportion of crops suitable
granted, for the United Kingdom, with its for direct human consumption, such as
highly developed industry a n d excellent wheat, sugar beets, potatoes, and other
communications network, and already vegetables.
possessing many fixed military installa- 25Of the total male population of 16,000,000 be-
tions, including airfields and naval bases, tween the ages of 14 and 64, 15,000,000 were mobi-
was a n ideal base compared with the un- lized into the services and industry, and of the total
female population of 16,000,000 between the ages of
derdeveloped a n d primitive areas from 14 and 59, about 7,000,000 were eventually mobilized.
which American forces were obliged to W. K. Hancock, ed., Statistical Digest of the War
operate in many other parts of the world. (History of the Second World War, Civil Series), prepared
in the Central Statistical Office (London, 1951), p. 8;
T h e United Kingdom already sup- British Information Service, 50 Facts about Britian’s
ported a population of 48,000,000 in an War Effort (London, 1944), p. 7.
THE SOS AND ETOUSA IN 1942 61

Despite measures such as these the Brit- little could be spared to meet the demands
ish had accepted a regimentation that in- for both supplies and services which the
volved rigid rationing of food and clothing, reception a n d accommodation of the
imposed restrictions on travel, a n d BOLERO force promised to make upon it. It
brought far-reaching changes in their is not surprising that British planners
working and living habits. For nearly should visualize the impact which the
three years they had lived and worked build-up would have on Britain’s wartime
under complete blackout; family life had economy, and they were quick to foresee
been broken u p both by the withdrawal of the need for a n adequate liaison with the
men a n d women to the services a n d by American forces in the United Kingdom,
evacuation and billeting. Production had and for administrative machinery to cope
been plagued by the necessity to disperse with build-up problems. Planning in the
factories in order to frustrate enemy air United Kingdom began in earnest with
attacks and by the need to train labor in creation of the London counterpart of the
new tasks. Nearly two million men gave BOLERO Committee in Washington on 4
their limited spare time after long hours of May 1942. The BOLERO Combined Com-
work for duty in the Home Guard, and mittee (London) was established under
most other adult males and many women the chairmanship of Sir Findlater Stewart,
performed part-time civil defense and fire the British Home Defence Committee
guard duties after working hours. An al- chairman. Its British membership in-
most complete ban on the erection of new cluded representatives of the Quartermas-
houses a n d severe curtailment of repair ter General (from the War Office), the
and maintenance work on existing houses, Fourth Sea Lord (from the Admiralty),
bomb damage, the necessity for partial the Air Member for Supply a n d Organ-
evacuation of certain areas, and the req- ization (from the Air Ministry), the C-in-C
uisition of houses for the services all con- (Commander-in-Chief) Home Forces, the
tributed to the deterioration of living con- Chief of Combined Operations, the Minis-
ditions. Britain’s merchant fleet, which try of War Transport, and the Ministry of
totaled 17,500,000 gross tons at the start- Home 27
Security.
of the war, had lost more than 9,000,000 U.S. forces in the United Kingdom
tons of shipping to enemy action, and its were asked to send representatives to the
losses at the end of 1942 still exceeded committee. Four members of General
gains by about 2,000,000 tons. A drastic Chaney’s staff—General Bolté, General
cut in trade had been forced as a result. McClelland, Colonel Barker, and Colonel
Imports of both food a n d raw materials Griner—attended the first meeting, held
were reduced by one half, and imports of on 5 May at Norfolk House, St. James’s
finished goods were confined almost ex- Square. Because of the continued shortage
clusively to munitions. Before the war of officers in Headquarters, USAFBI,
British imports had averaged 55,000,000
26 Statistical Digest of the War, pp. 173–74, 175, 180;
tons per year (exclusive of gasoline and Statistics Relating to the War Effort of the United Kingdom,
other tanker-borne products). By 1942 the presented by the Prime Minister to Parliament,
figure had fallen to 23,000,000—less than November, 1944 (London, 1944), pp. 1, 16–17,
19–21,31.
in 1917.26 27BCC(L) Min, 1st Mtg, 5 May 42, ETO Prein-
In an economy already so squeezed, vasion 322.
62 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

however, regular U.S. members were not the Combined Committee through the
immediately appointed, a n d American latter’s subcommittees on supply, accom-
representation varied at each meeting. 28 modation, transportation, labor, a n d
General Lee first attended a session of the medical service, which were shortly estab-
BOLEROCombined Committee with a lished to deal with the principal adminis-
large portion of his staff on 26 May, two trative problems with which the Com-
days after he arrived in the United mittee was concerned. (Chart 2)
Kingdom. 29 O n e of the key members of the Com-
The mission of the London Committee bined Committee was the Deputy Quar-
was “to prepare plans and make adminis- termaster General (Liaison), Maj. Gen.
trative preparation for the reception, ac- Richard M. Wootten. This officer was not
commodation and maintenance of United only the representative of the British
States Forces in the United Kingdom and Quartermaster General on the London
for the development of the United King- Committee and as such responsible for the
dom in accordance with the requirements implementation of the committee’s deci-
of the ‘ROUNDUP’ plan.” 30The committee sions, but also the official agent of liaison
was to act under the general authority of with the American forces. British prob-
a group known as the Principal Adminis- lems with respect to BOLERO were prima-
trative Officers Committee, made u p of rily problems of accommodations and
the administrative heads of the three Brit- supply, which in the British Army were
ish services—the Quartermaster General, the responsibility of the Quartermaster
the Fourth Sea Lord, and the Air Member General (Lt. Gen. Sir Walter Venning). It
for Supply a n d Organization. To this was logical, therefore, that his office be-
group major matters of policy requiring come the c h i e fl i n k between the War
decision and arbitration were to be re- Office and the American Services of Sup-
ferred. Each of the “administrative chiefs ply. To achieve the necessary co-ordina-
of staff,” as they were first called, was tion with the Americans on administrative
represented on the Combined Committee. matters the War Office established a spe-
Sir Findlater Stewart commented at the cial branch under the Quartermaster
first meeting that much detailed planning General to deal exclusively with matters
would be required. But it was not in- presented by the arrival of U.S. forces.
tended that the committee become im- This branch was known as Q (Liaison),
mersed in details. It was to be concerned and was headed by General Wootten.
chiefly with major policy a n d planning. Q (Liaison) was further divided into two
The implementation of its policies and sections, one known as Q (Planning Liai-
plans was to be accomplished by the Brit- son) to deal with the executive side of
ish Quartermaster General through the planning for reception and accommoda-
directives of the Deputy Quartermaster tion, and the other as Q (American Liai-
General (Liaison) a n d carried out by the son) to deal with problems of the relation-
various War Office directorates (Quarter-
ing, Movements, for example) and by the 28Ibid.
various departments of the Ministries of 29B C C ( L ) Min, 6th Mtg, 26 May 42, ETO Pre-
invasion 322.
Labor, Supply, Works and Buildings, and 30Note by Secy, War Cabinet, BCC(L), 4 May 42,
so on. These would co-ordinate plans with ETO Preinvasion 322.
 CHART2—THE BOLEROADMINISTRATIVE
ORGANIZATION
IN THE UNITEDKINGDOM

Representation on the subcommittees varied. For example, the Accommodations Subcommittee had repre-
sentatives from the War Office, the Admiralty, the Ministries of Air, Works and Buildings, and Health, and from
ETOUSA. The Subcommittee on Supply had representatives from the War Office Director of Army Requirements,
the Ministries of Production, Supply, War Transport, and Air, and U.S. representatives. The Transportation Sub-
committee had representatives from the War Office, the Railway Executive committee, the Home Forces, the War
Office Director of Movements, the Ministries of War Transport, Air, and Production, and ETOUSA
64 LOGISTICAL S U P P O R T OF T H E ARMIES

ship between British and American armies for the development of BOLERO,even
in matters of discipline, morale, welfare, though he recognized that these could
and public relations. only be estimates at this time. H e directed
It was through the office of the Deputy that basic planning data and information
Quartermaster General (Liaison) that all be submitted so that a plan for the loca-
the BOLERO planning papers were issued tion of installations a n d facilities could be
in the next year and a half. General Woot- issued within the next few weeks. I n fact,
ten issued his first directive on 5 May General Wootten did not await the receipt
1942, the same day on which the BOLERO of planning estimates. As preliminary
Combined Committee (London) held its steps he announced that the Southern
first meeting. I n it he emphasized strongly Command would be cleared of British
t h e inseparable relationship between troops, a n d t h a t a census of all possible
BOLERO a n d ROUNDUP, a n d sounded the troop accommodations, depot space, and
keynote of the committee’s early delibera- possible expansion in southern England
tions by stressing the need for speed. The was already being made. Certain projects
only purpose of the BOLERO build-up was for base maintenance storage and for per-
t o ready a n American contingent of sonnel accommodation were already -be-
1,000,000 men to take part in a cross- ing studied a n d carried out. Acutely
Channel invasion in April 1943. I n view aware of the limited time available, Gen-
of the necessity to complete all prepara- eral Wootten foresaw the necessity of mak-
tions in less t h a n a year, Wootten noted: ing a large allotment of British civil labor
Every minute counts, therefore there to these projects, and, lacking definite
must be a rapid equation of problems shipping schedules from the United States,
whilst immediate and direct action on de- he proposed to start preparations at once
cisions will be taken, whatever the risks, for a n initial force of 250,000 which he as-
without of course disturbing the defense sumed would arrive between August and
of this country as the Main Base.” Plan- December. These preparations included
ners were enjoined to “produce the great- projects for troop quarters, the construc-
est possible effort in their contribution to tion of four motor vehicle assembly
defeat ‘Time,’s o t h a t the goal might be plants, a n d the clearance of storage a n d
met within the allotted twelve months.” 31 repair facilities for this force. H e then pro:
It was intended, therefore, that the posed to deal with accommodations and
R O U N D Uplan
P would be the governing storage for a second increment of 250,000.
factor in the administrative development General Wootten attacked t h e gigantic
of the United Kingdom as a base of oper- task with vigor and with full comprehen-
ations, although this objective actually sion of the myriad problems and the meas-
proved difficult at first in the absence of a ures which would have to be taken to
detailed operational plan. But the BOLERO receive a force of a million men. In the
Combined Committee planned to work in first planning paper he raised a multitude
close consultation with t h e parallel of questions which he knew must be an-
ROUNDUP administrative planning staff, swered, a n d made numerous suggestions
a n d the Deputy Quartermaster General
31D Q M G ( L ) Paper 1, Administrative Planning
immediately asked for a n outline of re- etc., for BOLEROa n d ROUNDUP 1943, ETO Adm
quirements both in labor a n d materials BOLEROMisc.
T H E SOS AND ETOUSA IN 1942 65

on the most economic use of existing ac- nance of the U.S. Forces in the United
commodations, on methods of construc- Kingdom,” and “to develop [the United
tion, and on the demands which might Kingdom] as a base from which ROUND
have to be made on the civil population.32 UP operations 1943 can be initiated and
Within a few weeks the BOLERO Com- sustained.” 33
bined Committee appointed subcommit- The July edition of the Key Plan re-
tees on accommodations, transportation, iterated that ROUNDUP should be the gov-
and medical service, drawing on the War erning factor in developing Britain as a
Office, the Admiralty, U.S. representa- base. But in the absence of any indication
tives, and the various Ministries of Health, as to how cross-Channel operations were
War Transportation, a n d Works and to develop, and lacking a detailed opera-
Buildings for representation according to tional plan, it was accepted that adminis-
interest and specialty. The Combined trative plans could be geared to ROUNDUP
Committee met six times in May and by only “on broad lines,” and that more de-
the end of the month had gathered suffi- tailed planning must await a fuller defini-
cient information and planning data to en- tion of the type and scope of the operations
able the Deputy Quartermaster General to envisaged. One major assumption was
outline for the first time in some detail the made at an early date, however, and had
problem of receiving and accommodating a profound influence on the work of the
the BOLEROforce. This outline was known BOLERO Committee. This was the assump-
as the First Key Plan and was published tion early in May which determined the
on 31 May 1942. The First Key Plan was location of U.S. forces in the United King-
not intended as a definitive blueprint for dom. The committee noted that the gen-
the reception and accommodation of the eral idea of any plan for a cross-Channel
American forces, the title itself indicating operation appeared to indicate that U.S.
the probability of revisions a n d amend- troops would be employed on the right
ments. But it served as a basic outline plan and British troops on the left, and that
for the build-up which was to get under U.S. forces would therefore embark from
way immediately. T h e Combined Com- the southwestern ports when the invasion
mittee and its subcommittees continued to was launched. Since American personnel
meet and discuss various BOLERO prob- and cargo were to enter the United King-
lems in June and July, and additional dom via the western ports—that is, the
planning papers and directives were issued Clyde, Mersey, a n d Bristol Channel
by the Deputy Quartermaster General ports—it was logical that they be concen-
dealing with specific aspects of reception trated in southwestern England, along the
problems. O n 25 July the more compre- lines of communications between the two
hensive Second Edition of the BOLERO groups of ports. Such a n arrangement
Key Plan was published. would also avoid much of the undesirable
Although issued by the British Deputy cross traffic between American and British
Quartermaster General, the Key Plans forces a t the time of embarkation for the
were confined primarily to a consideration
of U.S. requirements. Their object was 32Ibid.
33DQMG(L) Paper 8, Key Plan for the Reception,
stated as follows: “to prepare for the re- Accommodation, and Maintenance of the U.S. Forces
ception, accommodation a n d mainte- (Second Edition), 25 Jul 42, ETO, DQMG(L) Papers.
66 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

cross-Channel movement. 34 Thus the on the movement of so large a force and

main principle governing the distribution considered some of the “heroic measures”
of U.S. forces in the United Kingdom was which it thought were called for to reduce
that they be located primarily with a view the problem to manageable dimensions.
to their role in ROUNDUP. It was not by ac- These included stringent economy meas-
cident, therefore, that the great concen- ures, such as a further cutting of the U.K.
tration of American ground forces was import program, keeping down reserves
destined at an early date to take place in and freight shipments to the lowest level,
the Southern Command area of the and scaling down vehicle allowances to
United Kingdom, a n d the early BOLERO the lowest possible figures. The problem of
planning dealt almost exclusively with vehicle shipments was given particular at-
that area. tention because of the huge stowage space
The principal concern of the London requirements involved, and the committee
Committee and the Deputy Quartermas- advocated the shipment of as many unas-
ter General was to find housing, depot sembled or partially assembled vehicles as
space, transportation, and hospitalization possible and the construction of assembly
for the projected BOLEROforce. T h e size plants in the United Kingdom.37
of this force had originally been set at a The magnitude of the movement prob-
round figure of one million men. In the lem within the United Kingdom is best
process of breaking down this figure into a illustrated by the tonnage which it was
balanced force of specific types and num- estimated would have to be handled, and
bers of units, ETOUSA had by mid-May the number of trains required for port
arrived at a troop basis of 1,049,000, and clearance. Monthly troop arrivals were
this was the working figure used in the expected to average almost 100,000 men.
First Key Plan.35This figure underwent To move such numbers would require
continuing refinement in the following about 250 troop trains and 50 baggage
weeks. The Second Edition of the Key trains per month. The build-up of equip-
Plan reflected ETOUSA’s upward revi- ment and supplies for these forces was ex-
sions in June and used a troop basis of pected to require 120 ships per month,
1,147,000 men, with eighteen divisions.36 carrying 450,000 tons, in addition to ap-
T h e BOLEROplanners in the United proximately 15,500 vehicles, mostly in
Kingdom, like the Washington Com- single and twin unit packs. To clear this
mittee, were well aware of the shipping 34Note by Secy, BCC(L), sub: Plng Factors Which
shortage and based their program on the Influence Work of BOLERO Com, 8 M a y 42, ETO
assumption that not more than approxi- Preinvasion 322
mately 845,000 of the projected 1,147,000 35DQMG(L) Paper 2, 15 May 42, ETO Adm
BOLERO Misc.
would arrive in the British Isles by 1 April 36DQMG(L) Paper 4 (First Key Plan), 31 May
1943. But to establish a force of even that 42, a n d Second Edition of Key Plan, 25 J u l4 2 , ETO
size presented an appalling movement DQMG(L) Papers.
37Thousands of vehicles eventually were shipped
problem, not only across the Atlantic, but i n single a n d twin unit packs ( S U P a n d T U P ) . A
from British ports to inland accommoda- T U P , for example, consisted of several crates contain-
tions. The London Committee at one of its ing the partially assembled components of two vehi-
cles. Note on Cargo Shipping Involved i n Projected
first meetings foresaw the cargo-shipping American Move, BCC(L), n. d. (early May), ETO
shortage as one of the greatest limitations Preinvasion 322.
 T H E SOS AND ETOUSA I N 1942 67

CRATES OF PARTIALLY ASSEMBLED JEEPS being unloaded at an assembly shop.

tonnage inland from the ports alone would The United Kingdom possessed an ex-
require 75,000 freight cars per month, the cellent rail network and the system was in
equivalent of 50 special freight trains per good condition at the outbreak of the war.
day. 38 At that time it consisted of 5 1,000 miles of
Reception in itself thus posed a formi- track, nearly 20,000 of which constituted
dable problem for the British both because route mileage, and it possessed nearly
of the limitations on the intake capacity of 20,000 locomotives, 43,000 passenger cars,
the ports and because of the added burden and 1,275,000 freight “wagons.” 39Control
on the transportation system. Since the re- of the railways had been greatly simplified
striction on port discharge arose mainly by the consolidation of 123 separate com-
from the shortage of dock labor, ETOUSA panies into four large systems in 1923.
immediately took steps to arrange for the These had come under the control of the
shipment of eight port battalions and three government in 1939 through the Emer-
service battalions by the end of September, gency Powers Defence Act, a control which
and for additional port units in succeeding 38Second Edition, Key Plan, 25 Jul 42.
months to augment the British labor force. 39Statistical Digest of the War, p. 188.
68 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

BRITISH “GOODS VANS” unloading at a quartermaster depot.

extended to docks, wharves, and harbors. degree of control and co-ordination and of
Although the British railways easily with- the density of traffic on the British rail-
stood the first impact of the war with its in- ways in wartime is seen in the scale of
creased demands and enemy bombings, it activity a t Clapham Junction, on the
was hard put to accept the added burden Southern Railway south of London, which
which the U.S. build-up now entailed. The saw the passage of more than 2,500 trains
Movement and Transportation Sub-Com- each day.42
mittee of the Combined Committee esti- The British roads had been suffering
mated that the additional traffic resulting from a deficiency of rolling stock for some
from BOLEROwould require 70 freight time. The shortage of locomotives, in par-
trains per day. By the summer of 1942 the ticular, had necessitated frequent cancella-
railways were already running 5,000 tions of freight movements in the previous
special trains for troops and supplies every
month over and above normal traffic,40 40Facts about British Railways in Wartime (London,
and their net ton-mileage eventually sur- 1944), p. 20.
41Statistics Relating to the W a r Effort of the United
passed prewar performance by 40 per- Kingdom, p. 30.
cent.41 An example of the remarkable 42British Railways in Wartime, p. 6 2 .
T H E SOS AND ETOUSA IN 1942 69

ENGLISH RAILWAY STATION SCENE with U.S. unit waiting to board train.

winter (658 trains in one week in March). British railways. 44I n general, British roll-
For troop and cargo arrivals under the ing stock was small by American stand-
BOLERO program alone the Transportation ards, the average “wagon” having only
Sub-committee foresaw a need for 400 about one-sixth the capacity of freight cars
additional freight engines, and 50 shunting on the American roads.
engines to operate on sidings at U.S. Four major types of accommodations
depots. In June the subcommittee re- were to be found or prepared for the
quested that the United States meet these BOLERO forces: personnel quarters, depot
requirements,43 and orders were subse- and shop space, hospitals, and airfields.
quently placed for 400 freight engines Personnel accommodations and depot
(2–8–0 type) and 15 shunting engines for space were not immediately serious prob-
early delivery to the United Kingdom. lems. Plans were made for the gradual
Measures were also taken in Britain to im- removal of British troops from the South-
prove the rail lines of communications by
providing “war-flat” and “war-well” cars 43Note on Locomotive Position, Movement and
Transportation Sub-Committee, BCC(L), 6 Jun 42,
to facilitate the handling of American ETO Preinvasion 322.
tanks and other awkward loads on the 44Second Edition, Key Plan, 25 J u l 42.
70 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

ern Command area, to be completed by Approximately half of this requirement

mid-December, and the housing of U.S. already existed, and a program was im-
forces thus entailed only a minimum of mediately outlined for the expansion of
new construction a t first. Arrangements existing facilities and for new construction.
were already initiated in July 1942 to pre- But it was estimated that space would
pare for approximately 770,000 of the total have to be turned over to the Americans
force of 845,000 which was expected to ar- a t a minimum rate of one and two-thirds
rive by 1 April 1943. Except for forces in million feet per month, and very little new
Northern Ireland and air force accom- construction was expected to become avail-
modations to be arranged by the Air Min- able before January 1943. There was likely
istry in eastern England, the great bulk of to be a n interim period in November and
the American forces were to occupy in- December 1942 before new construction
stallations in the Southern Command became available, when there would be a
area, with a few going into southern Wales. serious deficiency of covered storage ac-
T h e policy was early established that commodation. To overcome this threat-
American troops would not be billeted in ened deficit the planners concluded that
British homes except in emergency. Com- additional space would simply have to be
bat units were to be organized into divi- found and requisitioned in the Southern
sional areas of 25,000 each and corps areas Command.45U.S. forces also needed facili-
of 15,000, and service of supply troops ties for the storage of 245,000 tons of am-
were to be accommodated in depots, ports, munition. This requirement the British
and other major installations along the also expected to meet by turning over cer-
lines of communications. By July, four tain existing depots from which they
corps areas and fifteen divisional areas would evacuate their ammunition, and by
were already mapped out, and in some expansion a n d new construction. In the
cases the specific locations of higher head- case of currently occupied depots the final
quarters were determined. In general, clearance of ammunition was to be phased
availability of both signal communications with the evacuation of British troops, and
a n d accommodations governed the loca- Americans were to replace British depot
tion of headquarters. With these consid- personnel in easy stages so that the British
erations in mind General Wootten in the could initiate the Americans in the opera-
First Key Plan of May had made a tenta- tion of the depots.
tive selection of sites for several corps head- The provision of adequate hospitaliza-
quarters, had concluded that the SOS tion called for a larger program of new
headquarters should be established at construction than did either personnel or
Cheltenham, and had chosen Clifton Col- depot accommodations. It proved one of
lege, Bristol, as the most suitable location the more troublesome of the BOLERO prob-
for an army headquarters. Both the army lems, and the construction program re-
and SOS locations were eventually utilized peatedly fell behind schedule. Hospital
as recommended. requirements had to be calculated in two
ETOUSA had estimated that approxi- phases. In the pre-ROUNDUP or build-up
mately 15,000,000 square feet of covered phase provision had to be made for the
storage would be required, including
1,228,760 square feet of workshop space. 45Second Edition, Key Plan
T H E SOS AND ETOUSA I N 1942 71

normal incidence of sickness and would hospital beds had to be met by new con-
have to keep pace with new arrivals. In struction. During May the group with
the period of actual operations hospitaliza- which the chief surgeon had been meeting
tion was required for casualties as well as was formally constituted as the Medical
normal illness. The number of beds re- Services Sub-Committee of the BOLERO
quired in the build-up period was based Combined Committee, and by the end of
on a scale of 3 percent of the total force, the month the subcommittee had deter-
with a n additional allowance for colored mined in general the methods by which
troops owing to their higher rate of illness, U.S. hospital requirements would be met.
and an additional provision for the hospi- Most of the new construction was to take
talization of air force casualties. On this the form of hospitals with capacities of 750
basis it was figured that the BOLEROforce beds, and a few of 1,000 beds. As a rough
would need 40,240 beds. Requirements in guide it had been accepted that one 750-
the ROUNDUP period were estimated on a bed hospital should be sited in each divi-
scale of 10 percent of the total force en- sional area of about 25,000 men. By the
gaged plus the accepted rate for sickness time the Second Edition of the Key Plan
of forces remaining in the United King- was issued in July, orders had already
dom. O n this basis a n additional 50,570 been given for the construction of two
beds were needed, or a total of 90,810 beds 1,000-bed Nissen hut hospitals and eleven
for the BOLEROforce after operations 750-bed Nissen hospitals, and for the ex-
began. Before publication of the First Key pansion and transfer of certain British
Plan, negotiations with the British for the military hospitals. Reconnaissance was
acquisition of hospitals was conducted on under way for sites for nine more 750-bed
an informal basis by the theater chief hospitals, and British authorities hoped to
surgeon. By May 1942 Colonel Hawley by obtain approval for a total of thirty-five of
personal arrangements had procured from this type of installation by mid-August so
the War Office and the Ministry of Health that construction could begin in the
five hospitals with a capacity of some 2,200 summer months.
beds. 46Arrangements were also made in To ease the great strain on U.K. re-
May for the transfer to the Americans of sources, the BOLEROplanners hoped to
certain British military hospitals, and in meet the additional requirements of the
addition several hospitals constructed
under the Emergency Medical Service
46Two of these plants—the Churchill Hospital at
program. The latter had been undertaken Oxford, and the American Red Cross Harvard Uni-
in preparation for the worst horrors of the versity Field Hospital Unit at Salisbury-had for some
Nazi air blitz. Thanks to the victory over time been operated by volunteer American units
which had come to England before the United States
the Luftwaffe not all the emergency hospi- entered the war. Administrative and Logistical
tals were needed, and several were now History of the Medical Service Com Z ETO, prep by
offered to the U.S. forces.47 Hist Sec, Office, Chief Surgeon, ETO, 1945, MS
(hereafter cited as E T O Medical Service History),
T h e hospital requirement, unlike that Ch. II, pp. 22–24, E T O Adm 581. See also the history
for personnel and depot accommodations, of the Medical Department now in preparation
could be met only in small part by the. for this series.
47Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, T h e European
transfer of existing facilities. I n the build- Theater of Operations, May 44, MS, p. 8, ETO Adm
up period much of the requirement for 519.
72 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

the July plan, agreement was reached on

the use of two types of military camps—
the militia camp and the conversion
camp—which were to be converted to hos-
pitals after the departure of units for the
cross-Channel operation. T h e militia
camps were already in existence and, with
the addition of operating rooms, clinics,
and laboratories, could be rapidly con-
verted when the troops moved out. Repre-
sentatives of ETOUSA proceeded to rec-
onnoiter all existing camps a n d barracks
with a view to conversion after ROUNDUP
was launched, and found a good number
of them suitable for this purpose. It was
broadly estimated that 25,000 beds could
be provided in this way. T h e conversion
camp was essentially the same type of in-
stallation—that is, a n army barracks—but
was not yet built, a n d could therefore be
designed with the express intention of con-
GENERAL HAWLEY, Chief Surgeon, version after D Day by certain additions.
ETOUSA. (Photograph taken in 1945.) Ten of the 1,250-man camps being built in
southern England accordingly were laid
second phase or ROUNDUP period with a out to make them readily convertible to
minimum of new construction. The Dep- hospitals of 750 beds each, which would
uty Quartermaster General estimated that provide a n additional 7,500 beds. A total
the 54,000-bed program, if provided by of some 32,500 beds was to be provided by
new construction, would cost about $40,- conversions after D Day. To make u p the
000,000, which represented one fifth of the remaining deficit of 18,000 beds the
entire U.K. construction program in terms BOLERO planners had to project new con-
of labor and materials. A proposal was struction. In July plans were under way to
therefore made to use hutted camps, bar- provide 10,000 of these beds by building
racks, and requisitioned buildings to fill ten 1,000-bed Nissen hospitals.48
the need, any deficiency to be made up in Financing the above construction pro-
the form of tented hospitals. Colonel Haw- gram was another of the earliest hurdles to
ley objected strongly to this feature of the be surmounted, and the London Commit-
First Key Plan, insisting that neither tee pressed for quick approval of a block
hutted nor tented camps would be suit- grant of £50,000,000 ($200,000,000),well
able. Faced with a desperate shortage of aware that such a n estimate could only be
labor and materials, however, there was tentative at the time. It is of interest to
little choice but to adopt the basic idea be- 48Ibid., pp. 9-10; ETO Medical Service History,
hind the proposal. Before publication of Ch. II, pp. 29–30, 33-34; Second Edition. Kev Plan.
T H E SOS AND ETOUSA I N 1942 73

record, however, that the construction neer troops in co-operation with the Royal
program eventually was carried out at al- Engineers.51
most precisely that cost.49 While the provision of accommodations
T h e requirements described above were was undoubtedly the foremost preoccupa-
the responsibility of the War Office and tion and worry of the BOLEROplanners,
were outlined in the Key Plan. Independ- the first Key Plans of May a n d July 1942
ent of this program, and involving more were remarkably comprehensive in their
than twice as great an expenditure of anticipation of other problems attending
funds, was that undertaken by the Air the reception of American forces. The
Ministry to provide accommodations for BOLEROplanners foresaw that U.S. troops,
the bulk of the U.S. air forces and the air- coming into a strange land, would be “as
fields they required. Air force plans under- ignorant of our institutions and way of life
went several revisions in the summer of as the people among whom they will be
1942. Originally calling for only 23 air- living are of all things American,” and
fields and personnel accommodations for recognized that one of their most urgent
36,300, the program was momentarily ex- tasks was “to educate each side so that
panded in May to 153 airfields in addition both host and guest may be conditioned to
to workshop and depot facilities. In July each other.” 52They also foresaw that U.S.
the air force program achieved relative forces initially would be unavoidably de-
stability with stated requirements of 98 pendent on the British for many services,
airfields, 4,000,000 square feet of storage a n d the Deputy Quartermaster General
space, 3 repair depots, 26 headquarters went to great lengths to insure that the ar-
installations, and personnel accommoda- rival of American troops would be as free
tions for 240,000.50 of discomfort as possible. Reception par-
By far the largest single task faced by ties were to be formed to meet new arrivals
the BOLERO planners was that of construc- and to minister to all their immediate
tion. Although the U.S. forces were to ac- needs, including such items as hot meals,
quire many of the facilities they needed by canteen supplies, transportation, training
taking over British installations, a substan- in the use of British mess equipment, and
tial program of new construction could not all the normal barracks services. Key Brit-
be avoided. Because of the ever-worsening ish personnel were to remain in existing
shortage
of laborit was impossible
for Brit-
49 The Bolero Project, extract monograph prep by
ish civil agencies to carrythe program to Q (Ops) Hist, War Office, mimeo, O C M H ; Maj.
completion unaided. Foreseeing the diffi- Gen. A. G. B. Buchanan, “Bolero,” The Royal Engi-
culty the BOLERO planners specified that neersJournal, LIX (September, 1945), 188.
50Construction in the United Kingdom, prep by
the military services of both Britain and Hist Sec ETOUSA, Oct44, MS, p. 23, ETO Adm
the United States would assist the British 506; Air Force Construction (United Kingdom), Hist
works agencies. Construction was to be Rpt 6, Corpsof Engrs ETO, prep by Ln Sec, Int Div,
OCofE ETO, Aug 45, MS, p. 7, ETO Adm.
carried out by both British military labor 51For greater detail on the construction program
or civil contract under the supervision of see the history of the Corps of Engineers now in prep-
the Royal Engineer Works Services Staff, arationfor this series.
52Note by Chm, BCC(L), sub: Problems Affecting
throughthe agencyof the Ministry
of Civil Administration, 13 May 42, E T O Preinvasion
Works and Planning, and by U.S. engi- 322.
74 LOGISTICAL S U P P O R T O F T H E ARMIES

depots, wherever possible, for necessary T h e implementation of the Key Plans

operation, a n d British workshops were to required the closest possible co-ordination
be handed over as going concerns. British between U.S. a n d British agencies. U.S.
Navy Army Air Force Institute (NAAFI) staffs had to confirm plans for the locations
workers were to continue to run existing of division and corps areas, and specify
canteens in accommodations occupied by breakdown of storage and workshop re-
U.S. troops until American post exchanges quirements; the British Southern Com-
were in a position to take over. I n short, mand, in collaboration with U.S. officials,
arrangements were made to provide all re- had to allocate space in accordance with
quirements for daily maintenance, includ- American needs, prepare projects for con-
ing rations, water, light, fuel, cooking struction, a n d select sites for hospitals.
facilities, hospitalization, and dental care, British administrative staffs were therefore
and, to include a more somber aspect, to be strengthened in the planning and
even cemetery space. T h e guiding prin- constructional phase (the next several
ciple was to give all possible aid to Amer- months), and the Key Plans provided for
ican units a t the outset and to train them an enlarged machinery of liaison between
so that they would as soon as possible as- the U.S. and British forces. I n addition to
sume full responsibility for their own the liaison between the Deputy Quarter-
maintenance. 53 master General and ETOUSA, a liaison
The BOLEROplanners envisaged a grad- officer was to be appointed from the for-
ual relinquishment by the British of mili- mer’s staff to visit SOS headquarters each
tary responsibilities and activities in the day. U.S. Army liaison officers were to be
Southern Command area. O n the opera- attached to War Office branches as soon
tional side it was specified that the existing as more officers were available for such
chain of command a n d its parallel oper- duty. I n the meantime the War Office at-
ational administrative organization would tached officers to Headquarters, SOS. At
remain in being until the immediate the next lower level a Q (Liaison) branch
threat of a German invasion had receded, was established at Southern Command
and until American forces were in a posi- headquarters, eight U.S. officers were at-
tion to assume operational responsibility. tached to the staff of Southern Command,
O n the administrative side the British and U.S. officers were also to be attached
command was to pass through two phases: to the headquarters of the British districts
the planning and constructional phase, (subdivisions of Southern Command.) 54
which included the reception of increasing To handle the tremendous administra-
numbers of U.S. troops and responsibility tive arrangements entailed by the build-
for all aspects of their daily maintenance; up in the United Kingdom a n d to ensure
and a final phase in which operational that the preparations visualized in the
command had passed to the Americans, Key Plan could be made effective, the
and in which the British would retain re- London Combined Committee felt it im-
sponsibility for only residual functions to-
ward American troops and the control and 53DQMG(L) Paper 5, Movement of U.S. Units
maintenance of the existing Home Guard from Ports of Disembarkation, 1 Jun 42, ETO Adm
50 BOLERO.
organization and a small number of British 54DQMG(L) Paper 6, 2 Jun 42, ETO DQMG(L)
troops. Papers; Second Edition, Key Plan.
T H E SOS AND E T O U S O I N 1942 75

perative that U.S. service units should ar- greatest possible speed. Concurrent with
rive in correct proportions ahead of com- the BOLEROpreparations planning had
bat formations. U.S. units were needed not also been initiated on both the operational
only to assist in the construction or expan- and logistical aspects of ROUNDUP. The
sion of installations and accommodations, first meeting of the ROUNDUP-administra-
but also to receive and build up mainte- tive officers took place within a few days of
nance and reserve supplies and equip- the organization of the BOLERO Combined
ment, to operate depots, and to provide Committee, early in May. I n the absence
local antiaircraft protection for the main of a firm operational plan much of the
depots and installations.55 The BOLERO logistical planning was a t first highly hy-
planners also hoped that every effort pothetical. Nevertheless, in mid-June the
would be made in the United States to dis- ROUNDUP administrative planners issued
patch units in accordance with the priority the first comprehensive appreciation of
lists, but there were difficulties in the way. administrative problems in connection
Bulk sailing figures were not likely to be with major operations on the Continent,
known until shortly before convoys left the dealing with such matters as maintenance
United States, and the breakdown of these over beaches, the condition of continental
bulk figures. into individual units might ports, and inland transportation. The de-
not be available until sometime after the liberations of the first two months were
convoy had actually sailed. The lack of carried on with almost no representation
advance information on these sailings was from the U.S. Services of Supply, for the
regarded as a major difficulty in arranging SOS was then in its earliest stages of or-
quarters. By late June, however, the Lon- ganization. Both General Eisenhower and
don Committee was satisfied that sufficient General Lee appreciated the need for co-
accommodations were being made avail- ordination of ROUNDUP logistical planning
able in bulk, and reception arrangements with BOLERO, particularly with regard to
could be made a t fairly short notice for the procurement planning, and early in July
assignments of specific units to specific ac- took steps to have SOS officers placed on
commodations Once the units were identi- the ROUNDUP Administrative Planning
fied.56U.S. forces in the United Kingdom Staff so that they could participate in the
a t the end of June had a strength of decisions which vitally affected their own
54,845. At the end of July the BOLERO planning. T h e work of the staff by this
build-up had not yet achieved any mo- time had been divided among forty com-
mentum. Shipments were still proceeding mittees which had been formed to study
haltingly and U.S. forces in the United the many administrative aspects of a cross-
Kingdom at the end of the month num- Channel operation.57 Significant prelimi-
bered only 81,273. nary steps had thus been taken by mid-
As indicated earlier, the BOLERO plan July to prepare for a continental invasion.
was a n inseparable part of the concept of 55DQMG(L) Paper 2, 15 May 42, ETO Adm 50
a cross-Channel invasion. T h e Key Plans BOLERO.
pointed toward such a n operation in the 56R p t by Secy, BCC(L), on Reception Arrange-
springof 1943, and assumedthat the ments, 20 Jun 42, with annexes, ETO Preinvasion
322:
build-up
of U.S. forces in the United States 57Progress Rpt 2, RAP Stf, 26 Jun 42; RAP Survey
Kingdom would be carried out with the of Administrative Problems in Connection with Major
76 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

(3) The SOS Organizes, June–July 1942 Office, London naturally became a center
of American activity. T h a t this activity
At the height of the U.S. build-up in the should center about Grosvenor Square
United Kingdom, the American uniform arose primarily from the fact that the work
was to be evident in every corner of the of the Special Observers had brought
land, American ammunition and other them near the American Embassy and the
supplies and equipment were to be stacked military attaché with w h o mthey worked
along every road, and American troops closely. Situated in the heart of Mayfair,
were to occupy more than 100,000 build- Grosvenor Square was one of the exclusive
ings, either newly built or requisitioned, residential areas in London. Surrounding
and ranging from small Nissen huts and it were the multistoried town houses and
cottages to sprawling hangars, workshops, luxury flats which had provided the set-
and assembly plants, in more than 1,100 ting for the dinners a n d balls of the Lon-
cities and villages. don social season. I n the center was a
There was little visible evidence in June private park of hedges and tall trees, once
1942 to portend the future scale of Amer- enclosed by a n iron fence which had since
ican activity in the United Kingdom. At disappeared into the scrap heap of war.
the time the European theater was acti- From behind the dense shrubbery there
vated there were fewer than 35,000 Amer- now arose each evening a barrage balloon
ican troops in the British Isles, most of which swayed gently back and forth in the
them ground force units assigned to the V black of the London night.
Corps in Northern Ireland. I n England Most of the modern buildings in Gros-
the first stirrings of American activity cen- venor Square were untouched by the blitz,
tered around the small air force contingent but many were vacant, their former occu-
a n d in the theater headquarters in Lon- pants having moved to the country. Be-
don. There were at this time only about ginning with the lease of No. 18–20 to
2,000 air force troops in England, hardly SPOBS in M a y 1941, more a n d more of
more than an advance echelon of the VIII the apartments were taken over by the
Bomber Command. This small force was Americans. Stripped of their furnishings
in the process of taking over the first air- they quickly lost their glitter and acquired
fields in the Huntingdon area and prepar- the utilitarian appearance of a n army in-
ing to utilize the first big depot and repair stallation. Grosvenor Square was soon to
installation at Burtonwood. Londoners be transformed into a bit of America, and
were of course already familiar with the the good humor with which Londoners re-
sight of Americans in Grosvenor Square, ceived the increasing evidence of Amer-
and the U.S. headquarters was to grow ican “occupation” was expressed in the
rapidly after the formation of ETOUSA. parody of a popular song: “An English-
As the governing metropolis of the man Spoke in Grosvenor Square.”
United Kingdom and the seat of the War T h e first housekeeping units had ar-
rived in London in March, a dispensary
Operations on the Continent, 1 7 Jun 42; and GHQ was opened, and the first enlisted billet
Home Forces Paper, sub: Assumptions for RAP, 25 was established at the old Hotel Splendide
Jul 42. All in SOS ETO R A P 1942–43. Ltr, Eisen-
hower to Lee, 10 Jun 42, sub: RAP Plng, and 1st Ind, a t 100 Piccadilly. Aside from this halting
Lee to CG ETO, 22 J u l4 2 , SOS E T O AG 381 Plan. expansion of the new headquarters and
T H E SOS AND ETOUSA I N 1942 77

the beginnings of activity at a few airfields, Committee at Norfolk House, London,

there were as yet no operating services and where he learned of the plans British offi-
no depots prepared to receive large ship- cers had already made for the accommo-
ments of either cargo or troop units. Until dation of the projected American force.
April 1942 there was not even a single During the next several weeks General
army storage point in London. The scale Lee spent much of his time inspecting
of supply operations in the London area is ports, depots, and other accommodations
illustrated by the fact that such supplies as offered by the British. O n the first of these
were required in the headquarters were reconnaissance trips he was accompanied
received and handled in a room on the by General Somervell, Brig. Gen. Charles
fourth floor of No. 20 Grosvenor. That P. Gross, the Chief of Transportation, War
month a small warehouse was opened in Department SOS, and Brig. Gen. LeRoy
the former showrooms of the Austin Motor Lutes, Chief of Operations of the SOS in
Company on Oxford Street, and before the War Department, who had followed
long it was necessary to turn over all req- Lee to England late in May. The special
uisitions to a new depot in the East End. train of General Sir Bernard Paget, com-
In the absence of U.S. shipments to fill im- mander of British Home Forces, was put
mediate needs, meanwhile, there was a at the disposal of the party to tour port in-
great scramble to obtain supplies and serv- stallations at Avonmouth, Barry, Liver-
ices in the British market, a n d consider- pool, Manchester, Glasgow, and Gourock.
able confusion was to result from the initial On the basis of the survey, General Somer-
lack of reciprocal aid policy on such local vell reported to General Marshall his
procurement. opinion that administration and supply
The gigantic task of organizing the arrangements for the reception and ac-
Services of Supply was undertaken by commodation of American troops could
General Lee upon his arrival in England be worked out satisfactorily, although he
late in May 1942. There were three major recognized tremendous problems for the
tasks to be carried out in fulfilling the mis- SOS, and foresaw particular difficulties in
sion of the SOS: organizing the reception rail transportation and airfield construc-
of troops and cargo in the port areas, tion. General Somervell at this time
establishing a depot system for the storage stressed the importance of the early com-
and distribution of supplies, and initiating pletion of operational plans so that supply
the construction program, particularly of. and administrative planning could get
airfields. Transforming the SOS into an under way. This was to become a familiar
operating organization, however, pre- and oft-repeated request from the Services
sented innumerable problems which first of Supply.58General Lee later took mem-
required solution. bers of his own staff on a reconnaissance of
Within twenty-four hours of his arrival possible port and depot areas in southern
in the United Kingdom, General Lee was England. including Bristol, Plymouth,
busily engaged in a series of conferences, Exeter, Taunton, Warminster, Thatcham,
first with General Chaney, which led to a and Salisbury, all of which later became
definition of the responsibilities and au-
thority of the SOS (discussed in Chapter 58Tendons of a n Army, prep by Hist Sec ETO,
I), and then with members of the BOLERO MS, pp. 12–13,ETO A d m 531.
78 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

key installations in the SOS network of Col. George E. Ramey, Chief of Special
facilities. Services; Col. Edmund M. Barnum, Chief
Meanwhile General Lee also made of Army Exchange Service. I n addition,
progress in the organization of the SOS Col. Ray A. Dunn was named Air Force
staff which was announced a t the end of Liaison Officer, a n d Col. Clarence E.
June. It included Brig. Gen. Thomas B. Brand was designated President of the
Larkin as chief of staff, Lt. Col. Ewart G. Claims Commission, both on the SOS
Plank as deputy chief of staff, Col. Murray staff.
M. Montgomery as G–1, Col. Gustav B. This organization within the SOS re-
Guenther as G–2, Col. Walter G. Layman flected very closely the organization of the
as G–3, Col. Paul T. Baker as G–4, Lt. SOS in the War Department, the memo-
Col. Orlando C. Mood as Chief, Require- randum outlining the organization of the
ments Branch, and Col. Douglas C. administrative services following virtually
MacKeachie as Chief, Procurement word for word a similar memorandum is-
Branch. sued by the SOS in the zone of interior.
T h e services were at first divided into Within two months, however, several
operating and administrative, the former changes were announced a n d no further
including the normal supply services un- mention was made of the division into op-
der the supervision of the G–4, the latter erating and administrative services. The
the more purely administrative services general division of function continued,
under the Chief of Administrative Serv- with the supply or operating services corn-
ices. The incumbents of the operating ing under the supervision of the G–4, and
services were the following: Col. Everett S. the administrative services passing to the
Hughes, Chief Ordnance Officer; Brig. province of the G–1, who later came to be
Gen. Robert M. Littlejohn, Chief Quar- known as the Chief of Administration. I n
termaster; Brig. Gen. William S. Rum- general, the operating services included
bough, Chief Signal Officer; Brig. Gen. those whose chiefs were also members of
Donald A. Davison, Chief Engineer; Col. the theater special staff and thus served in
Edward Montgomery, Chief of Chemical a dual capacity, maintaining senior repre-
Warfare Service; Col. Paul R. Hawley, sentatives a t Headquarters, ETOUSA.
Chief Surgeon; Col. Charles O. Thrasher, T h e administrative services were those in
Chief, General Depot Service; Col. Frank which counterparts were named at Head-
S. Ross, Chief, Transportation Service. quarters, ETOUSA, and in which the divi-
Brig. Gen. Claude M. Thiele was sion of authority became very troublesome.
named Chief of Administrative Services, Even those staff sections which General
which included the following officers: Col. Eisenhower had decreed should be placed
Roscoe C. Batson, Inspector General; Lt. under ETOUSA—that of the provost
Col. William G. Stephenson, Headquar- marshal for example—were split when the
ters Commandant; Col. Alexander M. SOS moved to Cheltenham. ETOUSA
Weyand, Provost Marshal; Col. Adam and SOS each established its own adjutant
Richmond, Judge Advocate; Col. Victor general, inspector general, provost mar-
V. Taylor, Adjutant General; Col. Nicho- shal, and other special staff officers. The
las H . Cobbs, Chief Finance Officer; Col. inevitable result was an overlapping of
James L. Blakeney, Senior Chaplain; Lt. function a n d a conflict over jurisdiction.
CHART 3—ORGANIZATION
OF THE SERVICES
OFSUPPLY,
ETOUSA, 19 AUGUST1942
80 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

(Chart 3) In varying degrees this tendency Among the other agencies created dur-
also carried over into the supply services, ing the summer of 1942 were a Claims
where the senior representatives at theater Service, the Area Petroleum Board, and
headquarters were inclined to develop an agency to operate training centers and
separate sections a n d encroach on the officer candidate schools. E T O U S A had
functions of the SOS. stipulated that the SOS would be respon-
Following the organizational pattern of sible for the “adjudication and settlement
the War Department SOS, the newly of all claims and administration of the
founded SOS also included a General United States Claims Commission” for the
Depot Service as one of the operating theater. Here still another facet of the
agencies. Colonel Thrasher was named as ever-present problem on the division of
its first chief, and the service was an- authority was to be revealed. The fact that
nounced as an ETOUSA special staff sec- the U.S. Congress had provided that
tion operating under the SOS. Shortly claims be settled by a commission ap-
thereafter, however, again in line with pointed by the Secretary of War compli-
similar War Department action, the func- cated matters. Such a claims commission
tions of the General Depot Service were had been appointed directly by the War
turned over to the chief quartermaster. Department and was already working in
The operation of the depots was eventually close co-operation with British authorities.
shared by the chiefs of services and the The SOS meanwhile had organized a
base sections which were soon to be Claims Service to investigate claims and
formed. The Army Exchange Service, report on them to the Claims Commission,
likewise established as a special staff sec- which alone had the authority to settle
tion of ETOUSA and operated by the them. General Lee hoped to resolve this
SOS, also ceased to be a special staff sec- division by consolidating the two agencies
tion and was placed under the chief and bringing them under the SOS. In-
quartermaster. stead a circular was published strictly de-
From the very beginning it was estab- lineating their respective jurisdictions and
lished policy in ETOUSA that the United authority, placing the operation of the in-
States would purchase as many of its sup- vestigating agencies under the Claims
plies as possible in the United Kingdom in Service of the SOS, and the actual settle-
order to save shipping space. Local pro- ment of claims under the Claims Com-
curement was therefore destined to be an mission.
important function, and to handle such Another field in which special or un-
matters a General Purchasing Board and usual arrangements were necessary was
a Board of Contracts and Adjustments the handling of petroleum products, or
were created in June, both of them headed POL.59While the procurement, storage,
by a General Purchasing Agent. Colonel and issue of fuel and oil was a quartermas-
MacKeachie, former vice-president of the ter responsibility, there was need for an
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company over-all agency to co-ordinate the needs of
and Director of Purchases for the War the Army, Navy, and Air Forces in the
Production Board, had been brought to
59 TheAmericans readily adopted the shorter Brit-
the United Kingdom by General Lee to ish term POL, a n abbreviation for petrol (gasoline),
fill this position. oil, and lubricants.
T H E SOS AND ETOUSA IN 1942 81

theater. Such an agency, known as the istration intended by War Department

Area Petroleum Board, was created in directive, and the division of function and
September as the theater counterpart of splitting of staffs resulted in an unsatis-
the Army-Navy Petroleum Board, recently factory arrangement, which became in-
established in Washington. General Lee creasingly evident as the SOS became an
served as head of the joint board as Area operating organization in the following
Petroleum Officer, and was made respon- months. 61
sible for the co-ordination of all U.S. fuel Another problem with which General
requirements with the British. Theroutine Lee concerned himself in the first weeks
functions of the Area Petroleum Office after his arrival in England was that of
were actually carried out by an assistant, finding a suitable location for the newly
who organized what eventually came to forming SOS headquarters. Office space
be known as the Area Petroleum Service. had been acquired initially in a former
The Area Petroleum Office did not requi- apartment building at No. 1 Great Cum-
sition directly on the Army-Navy Petro- berland Place in London, but it was clear
leum Board in Washington, but rather on that this space would be inadequate to
British authorities. All petroleum prod- house the entire headquarters, and it was
ucts, regardless of origin, were held in a desirable that the SOS should be more
common pool in British storage facilities, centrally located, preferably in southern
all gasoline coming from U.S. sources be- England where the bulk of the American
ing counted as lend-lease aid. Withdraw- troops and installations were to be located.
als from this pool for U.S. forces were then General Lee therefore immediately in-
recorded as reverse lend-lease.60 structed General Thiele, his Chief of
The SOS was also given the responsi- Administrative Services, to conduct a
bility for the operation of training centers reconnaissance for such a headquarters
and officer candidate schools. Accordingly location. Before the end of May General
it established a center for officer candidate Thiele had surveyed possible accommoda-
and specialists schools at Shrivenham, tions in the London area and the War
southwest of Oxford, in August. Col. Office installations at Cheltenham, about
Walter G. Layman became the first com- ninety miles northwest of London. The
mandant of the center, and the schools latter was already under consideration by
began to operate in September. Later in the Deputy Quartermaster General and
the year the Supply Specialists School and was suggested in the First Key Plan as a
the Officer Candidate School were com- suitable location.
bined to form the American School Center. Cheltenham was a fairly modern city of
While administered by the SOS, the about 50,000. It had grown up around the
American School Center was open to Pittville mineral springs, rivaled Bath as a
students from all commands under a quota spa and holiday resort, and was a popular
system. place of retirement for civil servants and
T h e above indicates in general outline army officers. Cheltenham’s adaptability
the staff organization of the SOS and the for use as a military headquarters resulted
scope of its responsibilities. As indicated 60Interv with Col Elmer E. Barnes (Chief Petro-
earlier, the SOS had hardly been given leum Officer. ETO, in 1944), 20 Feb 50, OCMH.
the complete control of supply and admin- 61Organization and Command, I, 79–105.
HEADQUARTERS, SOS, NEAR CHELTENHAM. Benhall Farm, above, and
Oakley Farm, below.
T H E SOS AND ETOUSA I N 1942 83

from the existence of two groups of build- day before that Lord Haw Haw, a rene-
ings, one at Benhall Farm on the Glouces- gade Englishman whose regular broad-
ter Road southwest, and the other at casts in the service of Nazism provided an
Oakley Farm to the northeast. These amusing diversion to the British, had
temporary one-story blocks of offices had already promised a visit by the German
been erected by the British War Office Air Force, and when the special train ac-
and were intended as a n evacuation point tually left Paddington Station it was
in the event that invasion or bombing plastered with signs reading “U.S. FORCES
made it impossible to remain in London. TO CHELTENHAM.” General Lee and the
The members of the War Office adminis- key members of his staff remained in
trative staff that occupied the buildings at London a few days for conferences and
this time were willing to return to London made the transfer to the new headquarters
where the entire establishment could be in on 25 July. Some of the SOS staff re-
one place. The Cheltenham plant pro- mained in London and were housed in the
vided about 500,000 square feet of office annex of Selfridge’s department store, on
space and had one obvious advantage Duke Street just off Oxford.
over other sites in that it required no con- The establishment of the SOS in its new
version. It had a n adequate rail and road location was not accomplished without
network, and signal communications facil- discomfort or dissatisfaction, for some of
ities which could be expanded. However, the disadvantages of the area quickly
it was ninety miles from London, the became apparent. As a vacation spot
center of British and American planning Cheltenham had many hotels, some of
groups, and nearer the western than the which retained their civilian staffs and
southern coast of England, and it had served as officers’ quarters. But barracks
other disadvantages which were to be for enlisted men were almost nonexistent,
revealed later. and the men had to be quartered in tented
General Lee and his chief of staff in- camps around the town and at the near-by
spected the Cheltenham facilities in the Prestbury Park Race Course. Those who
first week of June, and after conferences drew the grandstand, stables, and other
with War Office officials decided to estab- buildings of the race track as billets were
lish the SOS headquarters there. Later in the more fortunate, and as one man (un-
the month a commandant was named for doubtedly a Kentuckian) noted philo-
the new headquarters, and plans were sophically to his stable mate, if the com-
rushed to accomplish the move as quickly modious box stall they occupied was good
as possible. Officer and enlisted personnel enough for a £10,000 thoroughbred, a
for the headquarters command had been $10,000 GI shouldn’t complain. The tent
organized in the United States and upon camps were eventually replaced by hut-
arrival in England went directly to Chel- ments, but it took considerable time and
tenham on 12July. The shipment of sup- work to make the area livable and to
plies and equipment from London began eliminate the early confusions. T h e War
on the 18th, a n d two days later a special Office had made few improvements, and
train carried most of the London personnel the autumn rains created seas of mud. For
to their new home. While the move was many weeks the War Office continued to
intended to be secret, rumors had it on the operate the messes, and only British rations
84 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

were available. When a n enemy plane carried out in given geographical areas.
dropped several bombs near the railway General Lee met some opposition from the
station one morning, someone tartly com- theater staff in insisting on this organiza-
mented that the Germans weren’t aiming tional scheme, but he was convinced that
at the aircraft factory at nearby Gloucester, it was both feasible and necessary and suc-
but at the confusion factory at Benhall ceeded in carrying it out in the summer of
Farm.62 1942.
T h e establishment of the SOS entailed One base section already existed, and
a great deal more than the selection of a consequently received first consideration
staff and headquarters facilities. The real for incorporation into the new system.
raison d’être of the SOS was that it become Northern Ireland Base Command had
a n operating concern, carrying out the been created to serve as a n administrative
various functions of procuring, transport- command for V Corps, or USANIF, and
ing, storing, issuing, and so on. Its func- the service troops of the base command
tional organization was represented by the were in fact part of V Corps. As the highest
chiefs of services, who, in addition to serv- ground force headquarters in the theater,
ing in an advisory capacity as members of and in view of its mission in the defense of
the theater commander’s special staff, Northern Ireland, USANIF had been ac-
supervised the operations of their respec- corded a relatively high degree of self-
tive services in the SOS. The chief quarter- sufficiency and independence, General
master, for example, provided technical Hartle therefore opposed transferring the
supervision over the operation of depots. base command to the control of the SOS.
The direct control of such operations and But he was overruled, a n d Northern
the command of troop units involved, Ireland Base Command was incorporated
however, was decentralized and, with into the SOS.
certain exceptions (notably the Trans- T h e announcement of the regional or-
portation Corps operation of the railways), ganization of the SOS in the United King-
was exercised through the base section dom was made on 20 July. It provided for
commanders. four base sections: the Northern Ireland
In addition to the functional organiza- Base Section under Brig. Gen. Leroy P.
tion, the SOS also developed a territorial Collins, with headquarters at Belfast; the
organization through which service activi- Western Base Section under General
ties were actually carried out. This or- Davison, with headquarters at Chester, in
ganization in the United Kingdom paral- Cheshire; the Eastern Base Section under
leled closely that of the United States, Col. Cecil R. Moore, with headquarters at
where supply and administration were also Watford, Hertfordshire; and the Southern
organized into area commands known as Base Section under Colonel Thrasher, with
corps areas (later as service commands). headquarters at Wilton, near Salisbury.
In General Lee’s concept, the base sections The boundaries of the sections corre-
were to be small replicas of the SOS, con- sponded roughly to those of the British ad-
taining representatives of all the staff sec- ministrative a n d defense commands.
tions and services in a n organization which
62Tendons of an Army, pp. 3–4, 13-15; Robert
would serve as the instrumentality through Healey, personal memoir, MS (hereafter cited as
which SOS policies a n d plans would be Healey Memoir), pp. 22–23, ETO Adm 510.
 V. Brooks
MAP 2
86 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

Northern Ireland Base Section included Devon and Cornwall, contained in its
all of Northern Ireland; Western Base Sec- untilled areas the best training ground, in-
tion included the Scottish and Western cluding British tank and artillery ranges.
Commands of the British Home Forces; Its shore line provided excellent training
Eastern Base Section covered the British sites for amphibious assault exercises.
Eastern and Northern Commands; and Southern Base Section eventually became
Southern Base Section covered the British the great concentration and marshaling
Southern and Southeastern Commands, area for the ground forces and was the
and temporarily also included the Bristol springboard for the cross-Channel opera-
Channel ports. Except for the later in- tion.
clusion of the London Base Command, the At the very start the base sections, laid
general order of 20 July completed the out as they were to include one or two of
basic regional organization of the SOS. the British home commands, were or-
(Map 2) ganized to work closely with the British,
At this time the base sections were mere with liaison firmly established at that
skeleton organizations and relied heavily level. The British had built u p a large
on the British for many services in the static military establishment which was
early months. As they acquired troops and prepared to furnish many services to the
gradually began to flesh out a n d assume American Army. It was basic policy from
heavier responsibilities, they tended to de- the beginning, therefore, to avoid dupli-
velop along different lines in accordance cating services which could be obtained
with the varying types of activity in each. from the British, and the base sections
Because it had been activated earlier than were the logical link with facilities in the
the others and troops had been present for British commands.
the past six months, the Northern Ireland The base sections were organized on the
Base was naturally further advanced. In concept of “centralized control and decen-
1942 it was primarily concerned with tralized operation.” With certain excep-
processing troops moving to England for tions the base section commanders were
participation in the North African inva- intended to have full authority over all
sion. Western Base Section included the supply and administrative activities in
mountainous districts of western England their particular domains. Commanders of
and Wales. With the great ports of western the various combat organizations (the
England in its bounds, it acted as an inter- Eighth Air Force, and later the armies) ac-
mediary, receiving the hundreds of thou- cordingly tended to look to the base sec-
sands of troops that were to pour into the tion commanders rather than to SOS
rest of the United Kingdom. Later it was headquarters for the solution of their
destined to handle vast tonnages of cargo normal logistical problems.
and operate some of the great depots. The exercise of such theoretically full
Eastern Base Section, because of its rela- powers on a regional basis inevitably pro-
tive flatness and its proximity to Germany, duced a conflict with the functional opera-
was the obvious location for the airfields tions of the chiefs of services, who at-
and became primarily a n air force base. tempted to control their services at all
The Southern Base Section area, largely echelons of command and in the entire
rolling terrain, but with rugged sections in theater. By regulation, the chiefs of serv-
T H E SOS AND ETOUSA I N 1942 87

ices had authority to supervise and control T h e system soon revealed its defects.
technical matters, but the dividing line be- Dissatisfaction on the part of the base sec-
tween “technical supervision” and actual tion commanders with the extent of ex-
control was difficult to draw. T h e chief empted activities and with the control
surgeon, for example, in attempting to exercised by the service chiefs over service
control all general hospitals regardless of troops brought the entire problem up for
their location, came into unavoidable con- review in a few months. T h e problem of
flict with the area commanders whose reconciling functional control with re-
command authority was theoretically all- gional or territorial control was as old as
embracing. Similarly, a depot commander, administration itself, and it was to plague
caught between the instructions of the the E T O throughout its history.63
chief quartermaster a n d the base section
commander, could not help but feel that ( 4 ) TORCH Intervenes
he was serving two masters.
I n the first month after creation of the While both ETOUSA a n d the SOS
base sections, the SOS attempted to de- were partially occupied with their internal
fine more precisely the authority and organization in June and July, plans and
functions of the section commanders. In preparations for the BOLERObuild-up
general, they were charged with the com- proceeded apace. O n the operational side,
mand of all SOS personnel, units, and in- meanwhile, Allied staffs were actively en-
stallations located in their sections, and gaged in planning for both ROUNDUP and
made responsible for their training, ad- the emergency operation known as
ministration, discipline, sanitation, and SLEDGEHAMMER. If there was any skepti-
“necessary arrangements for supply, cism as to the feasibility of ROUNDUP, or
and . . . all operations of the SOS in the any lack of conviction that a full-scale
base sections which were not specifically cross-Channel invasion was the best means
excepted by the Commanding General.” of carrying out Allied strategy in Europe,
T h e sections were to be divided into dis- it was not reflected in logistical plans, for
tricts, and actual operations were thus the administrative planners went ahead
further decentralized. T h e relationship with high hopes and expectations of build-
between base section commanders and the ing a base in the United Kingdom and
commanders of tactical units in their areas preparing for the reception of the Ameri-
was to be similar to that of a corps area can forces. So anxious were the Combined
commander in the United States to tacti- Chiefs to push the build-up that they con-
cal commanders in the corps areas. Cer- sidered reducing shipments to the USSR
tain activities were to be exempted from of those supplies which were not essential
the control of the base section commanders to the fighting in 1942 in order to free
and reserved for the chiefs of services. shipping and accelerate the BOLEROmove-
These included the internal management ments. This measure was actually pro-
and technical operation of the transporta- posed to Mr. Molotov, the Russian For-
tion service, port operations, general sup- eign Minister, during his visit to Wash-
ply and repair depots and shops, new con- ington early in June, with the suggestion
struction, general hospitals, and general
laboratories. 63 and Command, I, 108– 19.
Organization
88 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

that it would speed preparations for the and air units to the Near East.
second front which the Russians so T h e compromise was short-lived. It did
ardently 64
desired. not withstand the new setbacks suffered
Troop movements to the United King- by the Allies in the next few weeks. A tem-
dom proceeded approximately as planned porary lift to the morale of the United
in June, and by the end of the month the Nations had been provided by U.S. naval
U.S. strength in Britain stood at 54,845.65 victories in the battles of the Coral Sea
Within another four weeks, however, the (7-8 May) and Midway (6 June), and by
strategic decisions of April were reversed. the first 1,000-plane raid on Cologne by
In July the British and American chiefs the RAF (30 May). But these heartening
decided on the North African operation, events were soon overshadowed by re-
thus placing the entire BOLERO-ROUNDUP verses on almost every other front. In mid-
concept in jeopardy. June had come the disasters in North
T h e factors which contributed most to Africa. Early in July the Germans finally
this reversal in strategy were the growing captured Sevastopol and then unleashed
conviction on the part of President Roose- a drive which carried across the Don to-
velt that there must be some kind of offen- ward Stalingrad and threatened to over-
sive action in the European area in 1942, run the Caucasus. In the North Atlantic,
and the growing misgivings, particularly meanwhile, Allied shipping suffered its
on the part of British officials, about the heaviest losses of the war from submarine
feasibility of SLEDGEHAMMER. O n 18June attacks (nearly 400,000 tons in one week).
Prime Minister Churchill came to Wash- For the Allies June andJuly were truly the
ington with the British Chiefs of Staff, at- darkest months of the war.
tacked both the SLEDGEHAMMER and By mid-July Prime Minister Churchill
ROUNDUP concepts, and asked instead for and the British Chiefs of Staff had defi-
the reconsideration of a plan known as nitely concluded that SLEDGEHAMMER
GYMNAST, providing for a n invasion of could not be carried out successfully and
North Africa. T h e Prime Minister’s argu- would in fact ruin prospects for ROUNDUP
ments were strengthened by the disasters in 1943. Again they recommended con-
which were at this very time befalling sideration of GYMNAST. General Marshall,
British arms in North Africa O n 13 June on the other hand, was equally convinced
(“Black Saturday”) Generaloberst Erwin of the desperate urgency of a cross-Chan-
Rommel had sent British forces reeling nel operation in 1942 to relieve the terrible
eastward after a tremendous tank battle, pressure on the Red armies. The time was
and on 20 June the Prime Minister, while at hand for a showdown, and on 16July
in the United States, learned of the fall of General Marshall, Admiral Ernest J. King,
Tobruk. Despite the persuasive arguments 64Molotov agreed to report the suggestion to
which the Prime Minister thus had for Marshal Stalin. I n one sense the proposal was
diverting the BOLEROforces to ease the academic, however, since a reduction in shipments
pressure in the Near East, the BOLERO- via the northern route was forced shortly thereafter
by the inability to provide adequate convoy escorts.
ROUNDUPidea was temporarily reaf- Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York,
firmed, although the American planners 1948), pp. 569–70,574–75; Winston S. Churchill, The
of Fate (Boston, 1950), pp. 266–75.
made the concession of permitting the Hinge 65Progress Rpt, 4 Oct 43, Progress Div SOS, ETO
diversion of certain tank reinforcements Adm 345.
T H E SOS AND ETOUSA IN 1942 89

and Harry Hopkins left for London as Preparations for the North African op-
representatives of President Roosevelt to eration got under way without delay.
settle the question of strategy. In meetings Chiefly because of the estrangement in
held between 20 and 25 July (sometimes Anglo-French relations, a product of
referred to as the Second Claridge Con- earlier events in the war, TORCH was to be
ference) all thought of a cross-Channel op- fundamentally an American expedition,
eration in 1942 was abandoned at the in- and it was decided early that the com-
sistence of the British, and the decision was mander should also be an American. Be-
made to implement the alternative GYM- fore General Marshall departed for the
NAST plan—now rechristened TORCH—for United States, General Eisenhower was
an invasion of North Africa. General chosen as Allied commander in chief, al-
Marshall, with the Russian situation con- though this choice was not officially con-
stantly in mind, hoped to defer a final firmed until mid-August. U.S. planners
decision until September, but President soon joined British planners to form a
Roosevelt accepted TORCH as a definite combined group at Norfolk House, pro-
commitment and instructed that prepara- viding the nucleus for what was shortly
tions be started at once. named the Allied Force Headquarters
T h e decision to launch the North Afri- (AFHQ). General Eisenhower (now a
can operation was accepted with the full lieutenant general) chose Maj. Gen. Mark
acknowledgment by the top U.S. planners W. Clark, who had arrived in England in
that it would in all probability make the July as commander of the II Corps, as his
execution of ROUNDUP impossible in 1943. deputy commander and placed him in
Planning for an eventual cross-Channel charge of all TORCH planning.
operation was to continue, but the TORCH As finally worked out, the TORCH oper-
operation immediately absorbed almost ational plan provided for landings in three
the entire effort and attention of the Allies areas on the North African coast. A West-
in the European area, and ROUNDUP was ern Task Force, composed entirely of
all but forgotten for several months to American ground, naval, and air forces
come. T h e shift in strategy by no means and coming directly from the United
entailed an immediate negation of the States, was to land in the vicinity of Casa-
BOLERO build-up plans, for movement to blanca on the Atlantic coast of Morocco.
the United Kingdom in fact had to be ac- A Center Task Force, also American, but
celerated in the next few months. But it sailing from the United Kingdom with
did alter the purpose of this build-up, for British naval support, was to land at
the decision to undertake the TORCH oper- Oran. An Eastern Assault Force, predom-
ation transferred the emphasis within inantly British but containing some Amer-
ETOUSA from the construction of a base ican troops and escorted by the Royal
for operations against the Continent in Navy, was to land at Algiers. The TORCH
1943 to the organization of a specific force logistical plan provided that each task
for the TORCH mission in 1942. For several 66Fora fuller discussion of Allied strategy in 1942
months to come the long-range build-up see Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack (Wash-
of ETOUSA was therefore to be subordi- ington, 1951), and Maurice Matloff and Edwin M.
Strategic Planning f o r Coalition Warfare, 1941–42
nated to the interests of the TORCHSnell, (Washington, 1953), both in the series UNITED
operation. 66 STATES ARMY I N WORLD WAR II.
90 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

force should be supplied initially by the the organization and equipping of task
base from which it was launched. The forces several thousand miles apart; it re-
Western Task Force was to be supplied di- quired for the first time the closest com-
rectly from the United States, the Center bined planning and implementation by
Task Force by the SOS in the United British and American staffs; it came at the
Kingdom, and the Eastern Assault Force very beginning of the development of the
by the British. Gradually, however, the SOS in the United Kingdom, when it still
entire support of the American force in lacked adequate personnel and its supply
North Africa was to come directly from procedures and techniques were new or
the United States. T h e SOS in the United untried. Moreover, the operation had to
Kingdom would be relieved of all respon- be prepared in great haste, for the time
sibility, and the North African operation between conception and execution (three
would be completely separated from months) precluded long-range planning.
ETOUSA supply channels. As a result, TORCH was not a model of
A F H Q exercised over-all planning and planning and preparation and necessi-
control over both supply and operational tated many improvisations both in equip-
matters in connection with TORCH.For ment and supply methods.
logistical planning the headquarters T h e largest single task which the SOS
named Maj. Gen. Humfrey M. Gale faced and which caused the greatest anxi-
(British) as Chief Administrative Officer ety as D Day for the operation drew
and Colonel Hughes as his deputy. It nearer was the equipping of the American
would seem logical for A F H Q to have force for the TORCH mission. For this task
worked in close collaboration with both it found itself ill prepared a n d variously
the SOS and E T O U S A in planning the handicapped. Time was already short,
North African operation, but it did not and to make matters worse there was a
work out that way. Rather, A F H Q bor- long delay in the final decision on the tac-
rowed officers from both ETOUSA and tical plan, and therefore in the establish-
SOS for planning purposes and frequently ment of a definitive troop basis. T h e Brit-
left the staffs of those headquarters out of ish at first calculated that a total force of
the TORCH picture. Although the SOS ten to twelve divisions was needed, half of
staff was in general divorced from plan- which should be British, half American.
ning, the principle was followed that each General Marshall and General Eisen-
national force would be responsible for its hower, however, felt that the strategic
own supply and administration. The SOS concept of TORCH was such that, once
was therefore responsible for implement- launched, it would have to be followed
ing a supply program planned by another through with all the resources required,
organization. This situation it regarded as and the Chief of Staff warned that enemy
a distinct handicap.67 reaction might be such as to require the
Operation TORCH came at a critical diversion to the TORCH area of the bulk of
time for supply agencies in both the the forces intended for BOLERO. General
United States and the United Kingdom. Marshall informed the theater com-
While it was by no means the largest oper- mander that a total of seven U.S. divisions
ation undertaken by U.S. forces in World
War II, TORCH involved for the first time 67Organization and Command, I, 143–47, 158.
T H E SOS AND ETOUSA I N 1942 91

was committed to the operation, with British aid, owing in part to the lack of
three more available should they be personnel and in part to the fact that they
needed. Early in September General were strange to British facilities and ways.
Eisenhower estimated that approximately The great bulk of American cargo entered
102,000 American troops would be taken Britain via the Clyde, Mersey, and Bristol
from the United Kingdom for the North Channel ports, on the west coast of the
African operation, 68and the withdrawals United Kingdom. Ports on the southern
eventually exceeded 150,000. The core of coast, such as Southampton and Ply-
this force was to consist of the 1st Armored mouth, had sustained especially heavy
a n d the 1st and 34th Infantry Divisions, damage from German air attacks, as had
already in the United Kingdom. Belfast in Northern Ireland. Consequently
The trials which attended the equip- the western ports had to accommodate the
ping of this force can be attributed to diffi- greater part of Britain’s wartime trade,
culties in both the United States and the her lend-lease traffic, and now the steadily
United Kingdom. T h e SOS in the United expanding stream of personnel, equip-
Kingdom suddenly faced a formidable ment, and supplies for the American forces
task, and because of its undeveloped facil- in the E T O . All of the British ports were
ities could not possibly expect to cope with greatly handicapped by lack of adequate
the increasing tonnages a n d numbers of labor and by the urgency to clear the
men and at the same time handle the quays as rapidly as possible because of the
marshaling and outmovement of the threat of night bombing raids. As a result
TORCH forces. It was therefore forced to convoys were often split, and supplies were
rely heavily on the assistance of the British shipped inland without adequate records
not only in mounting the TORCH force but or segregation.
in port discharge and storage operations. T h e depots were even less prepared to
This was one reason why many supply de- handle the newly arriving shipments of
tails were handled through AFHQ rather military stores. Since there was no time to
than the SOS, since it was in the former construct new facilities, the first general
that the machinery for combined opera- depots were normally set up in warehouses
tions was coming into existence. The or military depots turned over by the Brit-
Americans were particularly handicapped ish. Base depots were activated at Liver-
in the field of transportation, and respon- pool, Bristol, and London in former com-
sibility for movement of all troops and mercial warehouses. In addition, British
supplies leaving the United Kingdom had depots at Barry, Thatcham, Portsmouth,
to be assumed by the British Ministry of and Ashchurch began to receive American
War Transport. For purposes of liaison and supplies and were gradually taken over
co-ordination the SOS established a sec- completely by U.S. troops. Most of the
tion of the Traffic Division of the Trans- early movement of supplies into the
portation Corps, headed by Col. Donald United Kingdom and the outmovements
S. McConnaughy, at the British War Of- for TORCH were handled through these
fice, where priorities and movement orders
were arranged. 68Torch and the European Theater of Operations,
Pt. IV of Administrative and Logistical History of the
In receiving and storing supplies the ETO, Hist Div USFET, 1946, MS (hereafter cited as
Americans were likewise dependent on TORCH and the ETO), pp. 43–45.
92 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

depots. Many of them were not suited to established for troops in the United
the handling of awkward and heavy mili- Kingdom. 72
tary loads, and lacked the necessary cranes Some of the difficulties attending the
and access roadsfor trucks. 69 equipping of the TORCH force were the re-
In all of them adequate military per- sult of the hurried clearance of the ports,
sonnel were lacking. Depot G–25, at Ash- the lack of trained personnel, the undevel-
church, which eventually grew into a oped facilities, and the general immaturity
great general depot for American supplies of the SOS organization in the United
and equipment, acquired a strength of Kingdom. A number of them had their
about 3,000 U.S. service troops in the source farther back in the supply line, in
summer of 1942. As in the case of the the zone of interior. Much of the trouble
ports, operation of the depots required stemmed from the fact that the entire
extensive use of British labor, which was overseas supply procedure had been over-
untrained and unfamiliar with American hauled only recently by the War Depart-
methods and nomenclature. ment and was not yet working smoothly.
The summer months saw increasing The SOS in the United States was hardly
tonnages of American supplies arriving in more experienced in the new procedure
the theater. A total of 570,000 long tons than the SOS in ETOUSA, for the supply
flowed through the U.K. ports in the techniques which later became routine
months of August, September, and Octo- standing operating procedures were still
ber.70But it became evident early in the relatively untested.
preparations for TORCH that there would By the time the United States entered
be serious difficulties in equipping and the war in December 1941 the ports of
readying the U.S. forces earmarked for the embarkation and the zone of interior de-
North African operation. The SOS in the pots were well established. Under the sys-
United Kingdom was simply unable to tem then in operation the War Depart-
cope with the sudden influx of supplies in ment exercised a close centralized control
view of the condition in which they were over the shipment of supplies, and the
arriving and the handicaps under which ports of embarkation served simply as fun-
the SOS was working. More and more nels through which supplies flowed to the
supplies were temporarily lost because overseas commands. With the outbreak of
they could not be identified or located. In war in December it was realized that a de-
some cases the arrival of unit equipment centralization of control was necessary,
lagged seriously. In mid-August it was re- and in January 1942 the entire overseas
vealed that the bulk of the equipment of supply procedure was revised. The main
the 1st Infantry Division, including its feature of this change was the key position
artillery, was still in the United States, and accorded the ports of embarkation. Except
doubts were expressed that the division for the control of certain critical items,
could be employed as planned. 71Not one both automatic supply and the editing
hospital unit earmarked for the North 69 HealeyMemoir, p. 31.
African operation arrived in the United 70T C Monthly Progress Rpts, OCofT, SOS
Kingdom with its complete equipment be- ETOUSA, ETO Adm 450–52.
71Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower
fore the middle of October, and equipment (New York, 1945), p. 53.
therefore had to be drawn from hospitals 72ETO Medical Service History, Ch. IV, p. 10.
THE SOS AND ETOUSA I N 1942 93

and filling of requisitions now became the known in the form of requisitions, includ-
responsibility of the port of embarkation ing certain data regarding the justification
commander, and the great bulk of sup- for the requests. In addition, periodic
plies now flowed overseas without the status reports were submitted as a basis for
necessity for War Department action. The the supply of several types of critical items.
new overseas supply plan had the objec- T h e port of embarkation commander
tive of freeing the War Department of the had a reciprocal obligation to keep the
normal business of overseas supply and of overseas commander informed of ship-
building up adequate reserve levels in the ments (normally by advance air-mailing
theater as quickly as production and ship- of manifests) to enable him to make de-
ping permitted. T h e War Department tailed plans for the receipt of supplies. I n
established the over-all policy on these this respect, as in several others, the new
levels, which were expressed in a mini- supply procedure fell short of its aims, par-
mum and maximum number of days for ticularly in the early months. Overseas
each class of supply, the maximum level commanders complained, for example,
normally being ninety days for most that advance information reaching them
classes. O n the basis of troop strengths in was both insufficient and late. T h e Chief
the overseas theaters and the reserve levels of the Chemical Warfare Service in
prescribed by the War Department, the ETOUSA noted that he had received a
port commander now recommended the manifest for 120 tons of chemical equip-
minimum port reserves and zone of in- ment without any indication of the con-
terior depot credits. Beyond this, the rou- tents. I n July Colonel Hughes, then the
tine supply procedure—editing requisi- chief ordnance officer, visited the United
tions, calling up supplies from the depots, States on supply matters, and reported in
preparing loading plans, a n d estimating an SOS staff conference in London that he
shipping needs—was controlled by the had found complete confusion among War
port commander. Department personnel over requisitions
At the other end of the supply chain the from ETOUSA. 73
main responsibility of the overseas com- Port officials in the United States mean-
mander was to forward timely information while complained that overseas com-
of his requirements. Except for critical manders were failing to report their levels
items, including ammunition, for which of supply, omitted priorities for classes of
allocations and priorities were established supply, were remiss in properly justifying
by the War Department, this information their requisitions, a n d in some cases even
was to go directly to the port commander. failed to submit requisitions. 74Misconcep-
In the case of automatic supply items tions and misunderstandings were very
(Classes I and III, or rations and fuel) this common at first, and many months passed
would include the troop strength, the ac- before theater commanders and zone of
tual levels of these supplies in the theater,
73
Stf Conf, H q SOS, 31 J u l4 2 , USFET 337 Confs
and certain other data on available stor- 1942–44.
age, information which formed the basis 74 Developmentof Overseas Supply and Procedure,
for automatic shipments. In the case of prep by Capt Richard M. Leighton, Hist Br, Control
Div, ASF, 1944, MS, Chs. I, II, and History of Plan-
Class II and IV supplies (mainly equip- ning Division ASF, prep by Plng Div, Office, Dir,
ment) the theater's needs were made Plans and Opns, ASF, 1946, MS, II, 189–91, OCMH.
94 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

interior supply officials fully compre- tion was impossible, and in the depots,
hended the scope of their new responsibil- manned for the most part by inexperi-
ities or the specific procedures involved in enced troops, is easily imagined. Colonel
the new supply system. Until the system Ross, chief of transportation in the ETO,
was set up and functioning there was a described a trip to Liverpool, where he
good deal of lost motion in the supply observed the unloading of a ship and per-
machine. O n e of the fundamental con- sonally noted the condition of cargo being
cepts of the new procedure—decentraliza- discharged. He reported that 30 percent
tion—was long in taking root. Requisitions of the tonnage that came off the ship had
and special requests continued to be sub- no marking whatever and was therefore
mitted to the chiefs of services or other unidentifiable. Of the remainder, about
War Department agencies in Washington, 25 percent of the boxes indicated no ad-
and in July General Lutes found it neces- dressee, and carried only a general desig-
sary to remind the E T O to send requisi- nation that they contained ordnance or
tions through the New York Port of medical supplies. “It meant, in effect,” he
Embarkation and to stop duplications in noted, “that after several ships were un-
Washington. loaded we were unable to send over half
While much of the difficulty in estab- the freight to the particular depot to which
lishing the new supply procedure was due the using services ordered it. T h e result
to lack of comprehension or misconception was that all services were forced to go into
on the part of supply officials, many of the a huddle and to examine practically half
troubles of the summer of 1942 stemmed of the freight they received before they
from the lack of adequately trained per- could distribute that freight to the people
sonnel to assume the new responsibility that needed it.” Boxes frequently marked
thrust upon the ports. This was not only with only a lead pencil or paper label at
true in the offices of the New York Port of the depot of origin were loaded into freight
Embarkation, the port responsible for cars, and bills of lading were made out in-
shipments to the ETO, where trained per- dicating simply that a car contained
sonnel were required to exercise judgment thirty-seven tons of quartermaster sup-
in determining whether or not requisitions plies. These supplies would carry the same
should be honored, but also in the depots, general designation on the manifest when
where the task of packing and marking transferred to a ship in the New York
supplies became one of the most irksome port.75
and trying of all problems to plague the Citing specific examples of the effects of
preparations for TORCH. such practices, Colonel Ross noted that he
Early in the summer ETOUSA supply had seen two new engines mounted on a
officials began to complain of the condi- platform, but with no other crating, both
tion in which supplies were being received of them badly damaged. T h e contents of
in the United Kingdom, and in July and uncrated paper cartons often took a loss of
August the theater received a veritable 75 percent from handling and exposure to
avalanche of equipment, much of it im-
properly marked and crated, some of it 75 Invasion: T h e History of the Transportation
Corps in the E T O , prep by Hist Sec, OCofT, ETO,
with no marking at all. The resultant con- 1944, Vol. III (April-June 1944), Ch. I, pp. 13–14,
fusion in the British ports, where segrega- E T O Adm 582D.
T H E SOS AND ETOUSA I N 1942 95

rain. Thousands of unmarked barracks theater. I n the trying months preceding

bags, some of them intended for Iceland, TORCH this system did not work well. Sol-
were thrown in with other cargo, and re- diers normally made the Atlantic voyage
quired four or five days to retrieve. Late in in swift liners which carried no cargo, and
July Colonel Ross made a vehement pro- their equipment frequently arrived as
test against these practices, strongly indict- much as 80 to 120 days later. Even when
ing the depots in the United States as the troops and equipment departed at the
source of the difficulties which the SOS in same time, the units had to give up their
the United Kingdom was now having in equipment at least a month before sailing
trying to segregate, identify, a n d salvage so that it could be crated, shipped to the
these supplies. In a letter to Brig. Gen. port, and loaded, thus curtailing the unit’s
Robert H. Wylie, Chief of Operations, training. 77Marrying up a n organization
Office of the Chief of Transportation, in with its equipment in the United King-
the War Department, Colonel Ross wrote: dom was a major task, and in the early
You can readily see that this environment days the depots often did not have master
necessitates a revision of ideas from your em- lists of the force-marked code numbers. In
barkation end. If we seem impatient at times the case of TORCH units, which were
because this baggage and equipment is not spending only a short time in the United
marked and sailing cables do not arrive, Kingdom before debarking for North
please remember that the few days that are
being saved in New York in priming a ship Africa, frantic efforts had to be made to
are more than lost here in unscrambling the find organizational equipment when the
mess. . . . You must remember that all of unit’s own equipment was not received or
the warehouses and some of the piers here could not be found. New requisitions had
are completely destroyed, that we must load to be placed on theater depots, with the
from shipside to train and thence to depot
destinations. There isn’t any use in New result that normal stocks were depleted
York, or any other port, raising the human a n d the theater’s supply level was
cry that they cannot spend the time on this. reduced. 78
Either the method must be found to spend T h e confusion in the U.K. depots was
time on it, or our efforts here will collapse. 76 not helped by the inauguration in mid-
There were additional reasons for the summer of a new shipping procedure
difficulties which the SOS in the United which supplemented the force marking
Kingdom experienced in the summer of system. I n the spring of 1942 a proposal
1942. One of them was the procedure in had been made to ship equipment and
shipping organizational equipment over- supplies as fast as available shipping re-
seas. Under the current practice of “force sources allowed, regardless of the rate of
marking,” each unit preparing for over- troop movements. T h e process of building
seas movement was given a “task force” up supplies and equipment in this manner
code number which was used to identify in excess of the normal organizational and
both the unit and its equipment. A unit’s
76Ltr, Ross to Wylie, 28 Jul 42, ETO Adm 341A
equipment was loaded on cargo ships, Transportation—General.
while the personnel traveled on transports, 77Troop and Supply Buildup in the United King-
and the force number was intended to per- dom prior to D Day, Pt. III of T h e Administrative
and Logistical History of the ETO, Hist Div USFET,
mit a rapid “marrying up” of the unit 1946, MS, pp. 154–55, OCMH.
with its equipment upon arrival in the 78Healey Memoir, p. 30.
96 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

maintenance needs of troops in the thea- to General Clark that there was no assur-
ter, and storing them for later issue, was ance of an adequate ammunition supply,
known as preshipment. The new system and he gave his opinion that the job could
promised undeniable advantages. It would not be done within the time limits estab-
permit the fullest possible use of all cargo lished.81
shipping; it would take advantage of the Some of the supply deficiencies reported
long summer days when unloading time by Colonel Hughes were absolute short-
could be increased; and it would prevent ages in that insufficient quantities had
interruptions in the training of units, been received from the United States. But
since they would retain their old equip- the most vexing problem arose from the
ment until embarkation and would be is- temporary loss of items in the United
sued new equipment upon arrival in the Kingdom. They had been received but
theater.79 In the absence of definite plans could not be found. In the spring and
for operations in 1942 the new shipping early summer, when haste in unloading
scheme had real merit. The decision to ships and speeding their turn-round were
launch the TORCH operation, however, the pressing considerations, and when
prevented the full implementation of the poor marking made identification and
preshipment idea in 1942. The shortage segregation impossible, large quantities of
of shipping and the desperate efforts to supplies had been thrown into warehouses
equip specific units for the North African and open storage without proper inven-
operation limited advance shipment to torying. Now there was a sudden demand
such bulk supplies as construction mate- for thousands of items and there were no
rials, rations, and crated vehicles. The re- adequate records indicating their location.
ceipt of even this tonnage only placed an Since inventorying these stocks would
additional burden on the creaking supply require several months, there appeared to
organization in the United Kingdom. be only one alternative—to reorder the
Early in September the entire supply needed items from the United States. On
problem reached a climax and threatened 7 September the theater commander
to jeopardize the TORCH operation. Many cabled the War Department, describing
units reported critical shortages and conse- the situation and explaining that in many
quently were not ready for the North cases SOS troops did not know what was
African operation. Colonel Hughes, the on hand. I n an attempt to prepare the
deputy chief administrative officer of War Department for what was to come
A F H Q estimated that the SOS could and thus soften the blow, he asked that it
meet the food and ammunition require- bear with him if the chiefs of the services
ments of 1 12,000 men in the North African in Washington received requests for items
theater for forty days, and provide twenty 79Memo, Brig Gen Raymond G. Moses, WD G–4,
days of supply in many other categories. for Gen Lutes, 30 Apr 42, sub: Force BOLERO,WD
Because of unbalanced stocks, however, G–4 BOLERO;Memo, Col Carter B. McGruder, Opns
Div SOS, for Lutes, 17Jun 42, sub: Cargo for BOLERO,
serious deficiencies had appeared in some Jun-Aug, ASF Plng Div A47–147 BOLERORequire-
categories, notably in spare parts for ments (Strategic).
weapons and motor vehicles. 80By mid- 80 Butcher,My Three Years with Eisenhower, p. 88.
81Ltr, Hughes to Clark, 14 Sep 42, sub: Estimate of
September Colonel Hughes had become Supply and Adm Aspects of Proposed Opn, USFET
more pessimistic. O n the 14th he reported AG 400 Supplies and Equipment, V.
T H E SOS AND ETOUSA I N 1942 97

which they had already shipped. “Time is were not clear. Units for which equipment
now so critically important,” he added, was requested were not identified, and
“that we cannot always be accurate with maintenance for field artillery units was
respect to these details.” 82 This commu- requisitioned without indicating whether
nication was followed on the very next day they were howitzer or gun units. Such lack
by a lengthy cable requisitioning huge of exactness, reflecting improper editing
quantities of supplies which were urgently and co-ordination in the theater, only
needed for the equipping and support of made the task of the supply agencies in the
the TORCH force. War Department and in the ports more
Naturally it came as quite a shock to the difficult and time consuming. 84
War Department to learn that much of the Additional requests continued to flow to
Class II and I V supplies already shipped the War Department in the following
to the United Kingdom could not be lo- weeks. Late in September there still were
cated and would have to be replaced. In misunderstandings about the length of
a letter to General Lee on 12 September time during which the Center Task Force
General Lutes noted that the War Depart- and Eastern Assault Force could be main-
ment had already made strenuous efforts tained from the United Kingdom. In mid-
to build up stocks in the United Kingdom October, in reply to a late request for
for the ROUNDUP operation scheduled for maintenance supplies, the War Depart-
next spring. After the TORCH decision it ment tartly noted, “It appears that we
was faced with the additional problem of have shipped all items at least twice and
equipping the Western Task Force and most items three times.” 85
then maintaining the North African forces Some organizations destined to join the
from the United States. Now it was being North African forces had little more than
asked to duplicate much of the U.K. 50 percent of their initial basic allowances
build-up. of signal equipment only a month before
We wish to assist you in every way possible the target date. O n the other hand, or-
[Lutes wrote], please be assured of that. How- ganizations frequently did not know the
ever, we have sunk a large quantity of sup- status of their own equipment, and some
plies in the UK, and these supplies,together
with those furnished for Lend-Lease pur- arrived for embarkation with overages.
poses, and those lost by submarine sinkings, The 1st Armored Division, for example,
are putting the staff on this side in an em- arrived in Glasgow with vehicles consid-
barrassing situation. At the moment, we are erably in excess of allowances, and was
having the ammunition implications ana- forced to leave them scattered over the
lyzed. We hope to be able to fill your require-
ments for the task force leaving UK, but it Scottish port when it embarked for North
would be most helpful if this ammunition Africa.
could be located in UK. I realize that at this
great distance, it is difficult for us to fully
82Cbl 187 1 , Eisenhower to OPD, 7 Sep 42, as cited
understand your problems, but it would ap- in TORCH and the ETO, p. 72.
pear that a small group of American officers 83Ltr,Lutes to Lee, 12 Sep 42, copy in Preparations
in each of the British ports could protect the for TORCH, prep in Hist Sec WD, MS, App. C,
American interests on the supplies and OCMH.
equipment we have shipped to the UK. 83 84For the War Department story see Leighton and
Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare.
The letter went on to point out that 85Quoted in Preparations for TORCH,p. 37.
many of the requests made by the E T O 86TORCH and the E T O , p. 75.
98 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

pointed General Littlejohn, the chief

quartermaster, as deputy commander of
the SOS.88
Strenuous efforts on the part of both the
SOS in the United States a n d the SOS in
the E T O overcame the most critical de-
ficiencies in the United Kingdom in the
followingweeks. Needed items were sought
in a variety of ways: local procurement
(emergency production was even started
in local factories); requests on the British
War Office (considerable quantities of am-
munition were obtained in this way from
British stocks); emergency requisition on
the United States; transfer from alerted
organizations with low priority or from
nonalerted units; and a search of stocks
afloat a n d of the depots, where men
worked day and night, receiving, storing,
and issuing supplies. 89
Efforts were also made to alleviate some
GENERAL LITTLEJOHN, Chief of the effects of the poor marking practices,
Quartermaster, ETOUSA.
and to remedy the fault itself. Late in
September General Marshall suggested
Early in September, when the supply that a detachment of three or four men
situation was most chaotic, General Eisen- familiar with the cargo a n d loading plan
hower re-emphasized to General Lee his be placed on each ship to follow through
basic mission of operating the SOS so as to on the discharge and keep track of priority
insure the adequate support of the Ameri- freight so that it would be properly dis-
can expeditionary force then being pre- patched. This procedure became common
pared in the United Kingdom. H e in- practice in the ensuing months.90 Upon
structed the SOS commander to spare no arrival in the United Kingdom more and
effort or expense to accomplish the task of
87 Aide-Mémoire,
Eisenhower for Lee, 10 Sep 42,
sorting and cataloguing supplies that had SOS AG 320. 2 SOS Jun 42–Jul 43.
already been received, a n d he urged Lee 88Littlejohn was relieved of his position as deputy
to utilize to the utmost the proffered assist- commander and appointed chief of staff of the SOS
on 19 October. But as such he continued to exercise
ance of British organizations and to exploit his responsibilities with regard to routine SOS func-
every possible means of avoiding unneces- tions, and also continued as chief quartermaster, two
sary shipments from the United States. jobs that gave him a heavy burden. Early in Novem-
ber, Col. William G. Weaver took over the duties as
Eisenhower asked Lee to devote full per- chief of staff and shortly thereafter Lee referred to the
sonal attention to this task, authorizing colonel as his field deputy commander. Organization
him to delegate responsibility for the nor- and Command, I, 160.
89TORCH and the ETO, p. 75.
mal routine functions of the SOS to a sub- 90 Memo,Marshall for Somervell, 23 Sep 42, ASF,
ordinate.87General Lee accordingly ap- Chief of Staff—GS (2).
T H E SOS AND ETOUSA I N 1942 99

more cargo was moved immediately to gotten in the preparation for the cross-
inland sorting sheds which had been built Channel attack in 1944.
by the British for use in case the ports were
blitzed. In 1942 they served a n emergency (5) BOLERO’S Status at the End of 1942
purpose in receiving cargo which could
not be segregated, and in effect became Besides providing a school of experience
warehouses, since there was little oppor- for the infant SOS, TORCH left its mark on
tunity to redistribute cargo to its original the United Kingdom in other ways. The
destination. They were used to a more North African operation in effect crippled
limited extent as sorting sheds in 1943.91 the great BOLERO design, for it caused not
Meanwhile a n effort was made in the only a sudden drain of U.S. air, ground,
United States to get at the root of the cargo and service forces, supplies, and key per-
shipping problem. The War Department sonnel from the United Kingdom but left
instructed the Chief of Transportation in the European theater the low man on the
Washington to set up an inspection service, War Department’s priority list. As a result
and on the first day of action at the New the entire development of the U.S. estab-
York Port it turned back to the depots lishment in the United Kingdom was re-
14,700 pieces of freight which could not be tarded, and its losses were not recouped
identified.92 for many months to come.
Within a month these efforts had begun After the token shipments of the first
to show results, and the panic subsided. months of 1942 the BOLERO movements of
Early in October General Larkin, the G–4 the summer slowly but steadily had built
of the Center Task Force, reported that the U.S. strength in the United Kingdom to a
loading schedule would be met and that peak of 228,000 men in October. Late that
at least nothing had developed to make month the embarkations for North Africa
the SOS situation any worse. At the same began, the bulk of the outmovements tak-
time General Hughes 93made a tour of the ing place by the end of February 1943, at
depots and returned more optimistic. 94 which time 151,000 troops had been with-
A month later, on 8 November, the drawn. Small additional shipments in the
operation whose preparation was char- succeeding months brought the total di-
acterized by so many doubts and uncer- versions to 153,000. Meanwhile small
tainties and frantic measures was launched numbers of troops continued to flow to the
and eventually carried to a successful con- United Kingdom from the United States,
clusion. The five months between the acti- but the net result of the transfers to North
vation of the theater and the launching of Africa was a reduction of the American
TORCH were a period of hard experience strength in the United Kingdom to 104,-
for the SOS. I n implementing planning in
which it had taken no part the SOS had 91Memo, Col N. A. Ryan, OCofT, for C G SOS,
20 Feb 43, sub: Sorting Sheds, EUCOM 320 Re-
worked under a severe handicap. General sponsibilities of T C 1942; Note by Lt Col George W.
Lee later stated that one of the principal Beeler, SOS, at mtg on inland sorting sheds, 8 May
lessons learned from TORCH was that sup- 43, USFET 337 Confs 1942–44.
ply planning and operations must be 92T C History, Vol. III, Ch. I, p. 14, cited above,
n. 75.
closely co-ordinated with tactical planning 93Promoted to brigadier general on 6 September.
a n d operations. This lesson was not for- 94Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, p. 133.
 100 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

TABLE1—TROOP BUILD-UPIN THE UNITED KINGDOM: JANUARY1942–FEBRUARY1943

a By ship. Excludes movements by air.

b Air, ground, and SOS personnel assigned to Allied Force at the time and earmarked for movement to North Africa.
c Data not available.
d The peak strength of about 228,000 reached in the U.K. during October is not indicated here because embarkation
for TORCH began before the end of the month.
Source: Troop arrivals data obtained from ETO TC Monthly Progress Rpt, 30 Jun 44, ETO Adm 451 TC Rpts. Troop
strength data for June 1942 through February 1943 obtained from Progress Rpt, Progress Div, SOS, 4 Oct 43. ETO
Adm 345 Troops. These ETO strength data were preliminary, unaudited figures for command purposes and, while differ-
ing slightly from the audited WD AG strengths, have been used throughout this volume because of the subdivision into air,
ground, and service troops. This breakdown is unavailable in WD AG reports.

5 10 at the end of February 1943. 95 (Table 1) the Eighth lost nearly 1,100 of its aircraft
T h e drain of personnel was particularly a n d 75 percent of its stock of supplies to
noticeable in the air a n d ground forces. A the new command.96So weakened was the
new air force, the Twelfth, had been acti- Eighth by its contributions to TORCH that
vated to support the TORCH operation, its bombing operations against the Con-
and was eventually constituted largely of tinent virtually ceased for a time and were
units transferred from the Eighth Air severely curtailed for several months be-
Force, which organized and prepared the cause the newly activated Twelfth was ac-
new organization for its North African
95ProgressRpt, 4 Oct 43, Progress Div SOS, ETO
mission. The Eighth Air Force initially lost Adm 345.
about 27,000 of its men to the Twelfth and 96Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds.,
continued to serve as a replacement pool The Army Air Forces in World War II: II, Europe—
TORCH to POINTBLANK, August 1942 to December
for the North African air force for several 1943 (Chicago, 1949), pp. 599-600; 619; TORCH and
months. I n addition, it was estimated that the ETO, p. 119.
T H E SOS AND ETOUSA I N 1942 101

corded higher priority on equipment and

personnel.
The ground forces suffered even heavier
losses to the TORCH operation, reaching
their lowest ebb in the history of the thea-
ter with a strength of less than 20,000. The
V Corps, now transferred from Northern
Ireland to England, continued to serve as
the highest administrative headquarters
for ground forces in the United Kingdom.
But for several months the 29th Division,
which had arrived in October and had as-
sisted in the administrative preparations
of the North African force, remained the
only major ground force unit in the
United Kingdom. Not until May 1943 did
the E T O begin to rebuild its depleted
forces.
T h e North African operation also took
its toll of key officers in the United King-
dom, some of the ablest members of the
E T O U S A a n d SOS headquarters being GENERAL MOORE, Chief Engineer,
selected to serve in the expeditionary ETOUSA. (Photograph taken in 1945.)
force. I n addition to Brig. Gen. Walter B.
Smith, who became General Eisenhower’s ization in North Africa. H e was replaced
chief of staff in AFHQ, Headquarters, by the Eastern Base Section commander,
ETOUSA, immediately lost its G–1, Col. Colonel Moore, who remained the thea-
Ben M. Sawbridge, its adjutant general, ter’s chief engineer for the remainder of the
Col. Thomas J. Davis, and the antiaircraft war. General Davison, who had come to
officer, Col. Aaron Bradshaw, upon the England with General Chaney in 1941,
organization of the new headquarters. became the chief engineer of AFHQ.
Other officers in key positions were trans- Colonel Ross, the chief of transportation,
ferred to North Africa during the fall and went to North Africa in January 1943 but
winter months. The loss of these men, was absent only temporarily, returning to
combined with the constant shifting of as- the United Kingdom in March. General
signments in the United Kingdom, inevi- Hughes, the Deputy Chief Administrative
tably weakened the E T O U S A staff for a Officer, remained in the United Kingdom
time. as deputy chief of staff of E T O U S A
While the SOS retained more stability, through the winter months a n d was not
it also lost several of its top officers. Gen- definitely lost to the theater until the
eral Larkin, who had become one of Lee’s spring of 1943. Among the other losses
most capable assistants, first as chief of which the SOS sustained were its G–4,
staff a n d then as chief engineer, became chemical warfare officer, and judge advo-
the G–4 of the Center Task Force and cate. T h e Eighth Air Force also lost several
eventually headed the entire SOS organ- ofits key officers, including General Spaatz
 102 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

DECK-LOADED GENERAL GRANT MEDIUM TANKS, part ofa cargoshipped

from the United Kingdom to Africa.

himself. All in all, the assignments to North Africa. These shipments affected
AFHQ represented a considerable drain the services in varying degree. The Signal
on the talents of ETOUSA, although some Corps, for example, estimated that 20 per-
of these officers were to return in 1944 to cent of the total signal tonnages received
apply the experience they won in the in the United Kingdom since the first of
Mediterranean area to the preparation of the year was shipped to North Africa. I n
the cross-Channel operation.97 many cases maintenance and reserve
TORCH also cut deeply into the stockpile levels in the United Kingdom were seri-
of supplies and equipment which the E T O ously depleted. The dependence of the
had built up since the first of the year. I n TORCH forces on U.K. stocks was intended
acquiring first priority on all shipping re- to be temporary, of course, a n d the large
sources, it created a famine which lasted shipments came to a n end in M a y 1943,
well into 1943. I n the period from October but the drain had been heavier than
1942 through April 1943 more than 400,- anticipated. 98
000 long tons of American supplies were 97Organization and Command, I, 154–56, 160–61.
dispatched from the United Kingdom to 98TORCH and the ETO, pp. 102–09.
THE SOS AND ETOUSA IN 1942 103

TABLE2—CARGOFLOW TO THE UNITEDKINGDOM:JANUARY1942–MAY 1943

Source: ETO TC Monthly Progress Rpts, Hq SOS, Statistics Br, OCofT, ETO Adm 450–51,

The support of the TORCH force was at- sion resulted from the inadequate ex-
tended by its share of confusions and mis- change of information between the two
understandings over supply procedure. headquarters; part of it undoubtedly re-
General Somervell had rejected a proposal flected the general immaturity of the whole
that requisitions for the Western and supply system and the lack of experience
Center Task Forces be channeled through of all concerned in conducting a large-
AFHQ and ETOUSA to the War Depart- scale operation.99 Here TORCH again
ment. He ordered that they be sent di- taught a lesson which was taken to heart
rectly from the task forces to the New York in the later OVERLORD planning.
Port, with A F H Q exercising over-all con- Meanwhile the flow of supplies from the
trol as to amounts and character of the United States to the United Kingdom was
supplies. But as long as the TORCH forces sharply reduced upon the launching of
were partially dependent on the SOS in TORCH, averaging less than 35,000 long
the United Kingdom there was some du- tons in the seven lean months that fol-
plication of effort and A F H Q and
ETOUSA submitted requisitions for sup- 99Ibid., pp. 75-76; Organization and Command,
plies for the same units. Part of the confu- I, 163.
 104 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

lowed.100 (Table 2) Likewise the flow of basis for U.S. build-up plans in the United
troops from the United States almost Kingdom for the next several months.
ceased in February, March, and April Word from Washington soon made it clear
1943, averaging fewer than 1,600 in those that no equipment or supplies in excess of
months. The mere trickle to which supply the maintenance needs of this force would
and troop movements to the United King- be shipped to the United Kingdom. There
dom were reduced belatedly reflected the would be no stockpiling for some hypo-
relatively unimportant position to which thetical future operation. Finally, the War
the U.K. build-up had been relegated by Department went a step further and re-
the new active theater of operations. duced the authorized levels of supply for
Shortly after the Claridge Conference of most items in the United Kingdom from
July the War Department decreed that 90 days to 60 or 75.106
supplies and equipment would be shipped Despite these signs, the hope that plans
and stocked no longer in accordance with and preparations for the cross-Channel
the old BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan but only operation would continue unabated died
in quantities sufficient to meet mainte- hard in the United Kingdom. There was
nance requirements for troops that were to definitely no intention of abandoning
remain in Britain.101It notified the theater ROUNDUP, and there was little disposition
that all outstanding requisitions based on at first on the part of E T O planners to ac-
the BOLERO build-up were subject to can- cept a slowing of ROUNDUP’S counter-
cellation.102 The War Department was part—the BOLERObuild-up and its com-
serving notice, in other words, that the panion plan for the preparation of the
BOLERObuild-up would not proceed as U.K. base. Preoccupied as he was with
originally planned. A few weeks later it the coming North African operation, Gen-
asked ETOUSA to submit recommenda- eral Eisenhower expressed to General
tions for a reduced troop basis built Marshall the belief that “we should plan
around a ground force of 150,000 men,103 deliberately” for the cross-Channel opera-
and shortly thereafter gave further indica- tion, and urged that the War Department
tion of its plans for the size of the U.K. “make superhuman efforts to build up
force by instructing that requisitions for U.S. strength in the United Kingdom
the E T O tentatively be based on a total after the TORCH requirements have been
force of 300,000.104 Late in September
Headquarters, E T O , determined that a 100T C Monthly Progress Rpts, Statistics Br,
OCofT, SOS ETO.
balanced force with five divisions would 101 Memo,Lutes for Technical Svc Chiefs, 26 Sep
require a total of 427,000 men, made up 42, sub: Shipments to American Forces in U.K., ASF
as follows:105 Plng Div, BOLERORequirements, Strategic, A47– 147.
102Cbl,Marshall to USFOR, 22 Aug 42, USFET
334 Mission for Economic Affairs Progress Rpt 1944.
103Cbl R–248, AGWAR to E T O , 12 Sep 42,
USFET AG 381, 54–40 or BOLERO.
104 Memo, G–4 SOS for CG SOS, 17 Sep 42, sub:
Status of Supply Techniques and Its Effect on This
Theater, USFET 400 Supply I.
105Ltr, Hq ETO to CG SOS, 23 Sep 42, sub: SOS
Over-all Plan, SOS AG 320. 2 SOS Jun 42–Jul 43.
The War Department accepted these 106Ltr, Somervell to Lee, 17 Nov 42, ASF Euro-
figures in October, and they became the pean Theater 1942–43.
T H E SOS AND ETOUSA IN 1942 105

satisfied.” 107General Lee, fully appreciat- of the United Kingdom as a base from
ing the need for long-range supply plan- which U.S. forces could develop and sus-
ning, also urged that, although all effort tain offensive operations, a n d the prep-
at the moment was focused on the North aration for the reception, accommodation,
African mission, planning for ROUNDUPand maintenance of U.S. forces in the
should be resumed and its logistic needs United Kingdom. For its long-range troop
estimated as far in advance as possible.108 basis the Third Edition used the original
The theater commander and the SOS figure of 1,049,000.
commander initially also shared the view The only essential difference between
that the preparation for accommodating the newly revised plan and the Second
U.S. troops and supplies should continue. Edition of July was the assumption that
Early in October General Eisenhower de- the million-man force would now be built
creed that all storage and hospital facil- up by stages, the target of the first stage
ities previously planned be constructed being the build-up of a balanced force of
“without interruption or modification.” 109 427,000 men. General Wootten hoped
General Lee agreed that there should be that the build-up of this first contingent
no alteration or retardation in the BOLERO could be achieved by May 1943, assuming
construction program, on the assumption that the full BOLERO rate of sailings (100,-
that the build-up of the first contingent 000 men per month) would be resumed in
would merely be the first step toward com- January. In this first phase the highest
pletion of the full BOLERO program as out- priority for shipping was expected to go to
lined in the Second Edition of the Key the air forces and to the SOS. The plan
Plan; which, he noted, “remains the assumed that further arrivals of U.S.
measure of the total commitment.” This troops were likely to continue without
policy was transmitted to both General pause toward the completion of the entire
Wootten of the Combined Committee and original BOLEROprogram by the end of
the chiefs of services.110 1943. 111
The determination to continue U.K. Thus, while acknowledging the limita-
preparations for an eventual cross-Chan- tion which TORCH immediately imposed
nel operation found strong expression in on the build-up, the BOLERO planners ac-
the November revision of the BOLERO Key cepted it only as a temporary postpone-
Plan. The Third Edition was published by ment or delay. The Deputy Quartermaster
the British Deputy Quartermaster Gen-
107 Ltrs. Eisenhower to Marshall, 7 and 12 Oct 42,
eral on 11 November. It reflected the un- OPD 381 ETO, I, 1–13, and II, 14–60.
avoidable impact of TORCH on the rate of 108Ltr,Lee to Somervell, 30 Oct 42, ASF European
the U.S. build-up by using the troop basis Theater 1942–43.
109Ltr,Hq E T O to CG SOS, 2 Oct 42, sub: Modi-
figure of 427,000 as a short-term planning fying Plan for BOLERO,as cited in ETO Medical Serv-
figure or build-up target. Beyond this, ice History, Ch. II, p. 46, ETO Adm 581.
however, the Third Edition reflected a ETO 110Ltr, Lee to Wootten, 19 Oct 42, and Memo, Hq
for Chiefs of Svcs, 3 Nov 42, sub: Construction
firm conviction on the part of British and Program, as quoted in ETO Medical Service History,
U.S. planners in the United Kingdom Ch. II, p. 47.
that the original BOLERO program would 111KeyPlan for the Reception, Accommodation,
and Maintenance of the U.S. Forces (Third Edition),
be fully implemented. The object of the D Q M G ( L ) Paper 11, 11 Nov 42, E T O DQMG(L)
plan remained, as before, the development Papers.
106 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

General confidently noted that the devel- man force. They noted that any construc-
opment of the United Kingdom as a base tion beyond those needs must be met from
for offensive operations was therefore to British labor and without lend-lease ma-
continue along the lines originally envis- terials. 114 General
Eisenhower had already
aged. His plan underscored the following tentatively notified the British War Office
statement: “No retardation will therefore that the continuation of the hospital and
be made in the rate of provision of admin- depot construction program would have
istrative installations etc., required in con- to be accepted “by unilateral action” on
nection with offensive operations. The its part,115 and the War Office was now
necessary planning and construction will definitely informed that any projects in
continue with the maximum degree of excess of the revised needs would have to
priority.” be carried out by British labor and
The British Southern Command, antic- materials. 116
ipating the Third Edition by several weeks T h e decision to curtail expansion of
with its own interim plan pertaining to the U.S. facilities in the United Kingdom re-
Southern Base Section area, had also flected a n uncertainty about future action
given expression to the assumption, em- which, curiously enough, was more evi-
phasizing that the “Bolero 2nd Key Plan dent in Washington than in London. Brit-
is not dead.” It bravely asserted that, al- ish officials had consistently pressed for
though the flow of cargo and troops would the earliest possible resumption of full-
be reduced for a time, work would pro- scale BOLEROtroop shipments, the stock-
ceed on all new construction projects in ing of supplies, and an undiminished
the Southern Command under the Second construction program. Throughout this
Edition of the Key Plan, whether already period they maintained that no alterations
begun or not.112 When the Third Edition in the BOLEROproject were admissible
of the Key Plan appeared early in Novem- without a new directive from the Com-
ber it called for a n expansion program of bined Chiefs of Staff, and that the build-
substantially the same magnitude as had up had simply been retarded.117For some
the July plan—15,000,000 square feet of time, therefore, a “Gilbertian” situation
covered storage, 90,000 beds, and so on. existed as a result of the divergent opinions
By that time, however, the theater com-
mander himself began to question the ad- 112Bolero 3rd (Interim) Key Plan, Oct 42, ETO
visability of carrying forward the program DQMG(L) Papers.
113Cbl 4759, Eisenhower to Somervell, 11Nov 42,
at the old rate or of using U.S. materials COfS Papers on TORCH, 8 Nov–9 Dec 42, Smith
and military labor to complete the con- Papers, Dept of Army Library.
struction projects in view of the much 114Cbl R–3 150, Marshall to Eisenhower, 14 Nov
42, CofS Papers on TORCH, Smith Papers; Ltr, Somer-
smaller interim troop basis.113 General vell to Lee, 17 Nov 42, E T O 381 R O U N D UJul-P
Marshall and General Somervell con- Nov 42.
firmed his doubts. The heavy demands for 115Ltr, Hq ETO to Under-Secy of State for War,
WO, 10 Nov 42, sub: BOLERO Third Key Plan, ETO
both supplies and shipping for the North AG 381 5440 May-Dec 42.
African operation prompted them to di- 116Ltr, Hartle to COS Com, 19 Nov 42, sub: Re-
rect that neither construction nor the ship- vised Program for SOS Construction and Opn, Smith
Papers.
ment of supplies to the United Kingdom 117The Bolero Project, extract monograph prep by
was to exceed the needs of the 427,000- Q(Ops) Hist, WO, mimeo, OCMH.
T H E SOS AND ETOUSA IN 1942 107

held regarding the planning figures. Re- tion or planned either would not, be
cent communications from the War De- required at all or would be improperly lo-
partment hinted that the original BOLERO- cated. The reorientation of the ground
ROUNDUPconcept had already been force program was considerably more
modified (presumably by the deep com- urgent than that of the air force since air
mitment in the Mediterranean area), and operations were to continue. Ground force
the theater commander had therefore strength would be the last to be rebuilt.
suggested that a review of the entire stra- Little difficulty had been encountered
tegic situation was necessary in order to in providing troop accommodations. Some
determine whether the present program new quarters were constructed, but for the
should be modified, abandoned com- most part they were obtained either by the
pletely, or pushed forward aggressively. 118 transfer of accommodations as they stood
It was because of this uncertainty that the or by the expansion, conversion, or adap-
theater commander had tentatively cur- tation of existing facilities 122 . The survey
tailed the U.S. participation in the U.K. of personnel accommodations in October
preparations. American doubts about revealed that there would be little diffi-
ROUNDUP were undoubtedly inspired by culty in housing the reduced force, and a
the suspicion that the British concept of a policy of deferring construction of most
cross-Channel operation differed from housing facilities was adopted.123
that held by U.S. planners, and there was In the matter of covered storage accom-
little disposition on the part of General modations, there likewise was little diffi-
Marshall to permit a full-scale build-up in culty in meeting the early requirements.
the United Kingdom until the Combined By the end of August the short-term target
Chiefs agreed on an operation the execu- of 5,000,000 square feet had already been
tion of which was not predicated on a exceeded. 124Early in November the Con-
crack in German morale. The resumption struction and Quartering Division of the
of the full BOLEROprogram therefore de- chief engineer's office in a directive to the
pended on a firm decision and meeting of base sections confirmed the intent of the
minds on combined future strategy. 119 Third Edition of the BOLEROplan that
By the late summer of 1942 work had depot construction would not be halted.
started on a building program (including 118Ltr, Hq E T O to Under-Secy of State for War,
that of the Air Ministry) which the Lon- WO, 10 Nov 42, sub: BOLEROThird Key Plan, ETO
don Combined Committee valued at ap- AG 381 5440 May-Dec 42.
119Min, 322d Mtg, COS Com, 20 Nov 42, Smith
proximately $685,000,000, and which by Papers.
the end of October was estimated to be 120 Memo,Sir Findlater Stewart to Lord Pres of
approximately 18 percentcompleted. 120Council, 23 Nov 42, E T O BCC Bk 2.
121Ltr,Hq ETO to CG SOS, 19 Nov 42, sub: Re-
After the launching of TORCH, in accord- vised Program for SOS Construction and Opn, Smith
ance with instructions from theater head- Papers.
quarters, 121 a resurvey was made of all 122Quartering (United Kingdom), Hist Rpt 8,
Corps of Engrs ETO, prep by Ln Sec, Int Div, OCofE
U.S. requirements, including troop ac- ETO, Aug 45, MS, pp. 12–13, E T O Adm.
commodations, hospitals, depot space, and 123Field and Service Force Construction (United
air force installations. T h e smaller troop Kingdom), Hist Rpt 7, Corps of Engrs ETO, Aug 45,
MS, pp. 75, 148–49, E T O Adm.
basis made it apparent that a large num- 124Min,13th Mtg, BOLEROAccommodations Sub-
ber of installations then under construc- Committee, 25 Aug 42, E T O BCC Bk 2.
 108 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

The division announced that work was to This drastic cut was not desired by the
be expedited on some of the depot sites chief surgeon and was definitely against
and would continue on the remaining the wishes of the British, who argued that
projects which had already been planned there would not be time to carry out a
and approved. Early in December, how- large construction program after the
ever, the chief engineer gave the base sec- build-up was resumed, and that medical
tion commanders a modified program, services would therefore fall far short of
bringing the construction schedule into demands. Construction already lagged be-
line with the immediate needs of the hind schedule in the fall of 1942, and the
427,000-man force.125 chief surgeon became seriously concerned
T h e medical program met much the over the critical shortage of beds, particu-
same fate so far as American participation larly when it was learned that the United
in construction was concerned. By the end Kingdom would have to receive some of
of August almost the entire program as the casualties from North Africa. At the
outlined in the July edition of the BOLERO end of the year there were only 4 general
plan was fixed, and construction had be- hospitals, 4 station hospitals, and 1 evacu-
gun on two 1,000-bed hospitals and ten of ation hospital in operation in the United
the thirty-five 750-bed station hospitals. Kingdom, with a capacity of about 5,000
Ten 1,250-man conversion camps, later to beds. No other accommodation problem
be turned into 750-bed hospitals, were be- caused as much concern at the end of
ing built in the Southern Command. In 1942, and General Hawley repeatedly
addition, eleven militia camps had been brought the problem to the attention of
turned over by the British and their con- General Lee and the BOLERO Sub-Com-
version ordered, the expansion of five mittee on Medical Services. Fortunately,
Emergency Medical Service hospitals had British officials decided to continue the
begun, and four British military hospitals building program without U.S. aid, and
were already occupied. Plans were ready the close friendship and understanding be-
for additional station hospitals and for an- tween the U.S. and British staffs, backed
other type of convertible installation
known as the dual-purpose camp, de-
125 EngrHist Rpt 7, pp. 135–36, cited above, n.
signed primarily to serve as a general hos- 123; Memo, CofS ETO for CG ETO, Dec 42, sub:
pital after D Day, but so planned that the Revised Program for SOS Construction and Oper-
ward buildings could be used as barracks ation, with Ind, 21 Dec 42, USFET 600.1 Construc-
tion of Buildings.
until that time.126 126ETO Medical Service History, Ch. VII, pp.
I n November, however, the chief sur- 10–14.
geon was compelled to revise the program, 127By this time the theater surgeon had altered
somewhat the basis on which bed requirements were
and the total requirements were reduced calculated, raising those for sick and nonbattle casual-
by more than half, from approximately ties from 3 to 4 percent. This increase was justified,
90,000 beds to 37,900.127The reduced pro- General Hawley stated, because the assumptions on
which original estimates had been made had not ma-
gram involved the loss of all the militia terialized. Chiefly, troop accommodation standards
camps except 2, all of the convertible were lower than expected, resulting in overcrowding
camps in Southern Command, and about and therefore more sickness, a convalescent hospital
had not been provided as planned, and the lack of
25 other planned hospitals—a reduction hospital ships had prevented following evacuation
from approximately 130 hospitals to 45. policies. Ibid., Ch. 11, pp. 44–45.
T H E SOS AND ETOUSA I N 1942 109

by a gentleman’s agreement, made some of the SOS which actually executed the
progress possible.128 work. The SOS controlled all engineer
Air force construction plans underwent units, including aviation engineer battal-
frequent changes in the first year, owing ions. The Eighth Air Force regarded this
mainly to fluctuations in the planned arrangement as cumbersome and tending
build-up of air forces in the United King- to delay construction, and in the summer
dom. Nevertheless, substantial progress of 1942 it had a n opportunity to protest.
was made in both airfield a n d air depot During the preparations for TORCH the
construction in the early months. By the British ports were hard pressed to cope
late summer of 1942 a relatively firm with the increasing tonnages arriving in
agreement had been reached with the the United Kingdom, and General Lee
British providing for the transfer or con- diverted 4,500 engineer troops to alleviate
struction of a total of 98 airfields—23 the port labor shortage. Included in this
fighter and 75 bomber. To meet this re- transfer were certain aviation engineer
quirement 61 existing fields were allotted units, which supposedly were taken off air
for transfer from the RAF, many of them force construction projects. The Eighth
requiring alterations or expansion. By the Air Force took the occasion to protest the
end of August contracts had been let for whole arrangement for services to the air
38 extensions, and work was then under forces. It wanted control of the aviation
way on about half of these, the bomber engineers, which it proposed to integrate
installations having first priority. Sites for into the organic structure of the combat
new fields were being reconnoitered and air elements, and based its demand largely
selected.129 While the Eighth Air Force on the argument that air units must have
was to have priority over both the SOS their own service elements as a n organic
and ground forces in rebuilding its part of their team in order to achieve mo-
strength in the United Kingdom, there bility in combat operations. This goal was
was little prospect that it would regain impossible, it argued, if the air forces were
even its former size very quickly, and the dependent on the SOS and if its service
air force construction program, like the units, such as aviation engineers, could be
others, was therefore scaled down to fit the to other duty.131
arbitrarilydiverted
new troop basis. In the fall of 1942 the Actually, the lag in air force construc-
number of authorized bomber airfields tion was only remotely related to the di-
was cut from 75 to 62, and the construc- version of aviation engineers. General Lee,
tion program consequently underwent a
revision, with 49 fields scheduled for 128Ibid.,Ch. VII, pp. 15-19; Min, 12th Mtg, Med
immediate construction.130 Svcs Sub-committee BCC(L), 25 Nov 42, ETO
BCC(L) Bk 2; The Bolero Project, extract monograph
British firms carried out the greater part prep by Q(Ops) Hist, WO, mimeo, OCMH.
of the construction program in the United 129Min, 13th Mtg, BOLERO Accommodations Sub-
Kingdom. Whatever construction, includ- Committee, 25 Aug 42, ETO BCC(L) Bk 2; Air Force
Construction (United Kingdom), Hist Rpt 6, Corps
ing air force needs, was undertaken by of Engrs ETO, Aug 45, MS, p. 7.
U.S. military labor was the responsibility 130
Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces, II, 602.
of the SOS. In the case of air force require- 131 Memo,Maj Gen Walter H. Frank, VIII AFSC,
for CG Eighth AF, 30 Sep 42, sub: Aviation Engr
ments, planning was carried out by the Battalions, with Inds, USFET 600.1 Construction
Eighth Air Force, subject to the approval General 1942.
 110 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F THE ARMIES

while noting the reluctance with which he It was at this time—in the midst of the
had temporarily transferred the aviation TORCH preparations—that the SOS com-
engineers to port duty in the emergency, mander announced his intention to use
pointed out that these engineers had not both SOS and aviation engineers for
even begun work on air force construction temporary relief of the labor shortage. He
projects because their equipment had not took this step reluctantly, realizing that
arrived.132Late in November the aviation vitally important construction projects
engineers were returned to the air force would have to be stopped. The British
projects, but the control of these troops War Office had already provided 2,600
remained with the SOS. 133 civilians and 5,000 soldiers to meet the
T h e curtailment of the U.K. construc- current emergency. 135General Lee had
tion program reflects very well the low foreseen these needs, and in mid-Septem-
position which the BOLEROconcept had ber had submitted a revised SOS troop
reached at the end of 1942. Withdrawals basis to theater headquarters, urging the
of U.S. troops from the United Kingdom highest possible priority for the shipment
were not substantially completed until of engineer construction troops. He now
February 1943, when American strength repeated this request, asking for an im-
in Britain was reduced to less than mediate shipment of 10,000 service troops
105,000, but the full impact of the North in the priority requested and urging that
African operation was evident by the end units not be withheld for lack of complete
of 1942, when prospects for the BOLERO- training. They could complete their train-
ROUNDUP design reached their nadir. ing in the United Kingdom, he pointed
Planning for a cross-Channel invasion out, while performing their assigned serv-
continued on both the operational and ice tasks. 136 Two months later the War
administrative side, but commanded little Department announced a small shipment
enthusiasm or urgency in the atmosphere of service troops, some of them coming
of uncertainty that prevailed.134 The directly from reception centers and with
Combined Committee virtually sus- barely a month's training.137
pended its activities for almost three 132Ibid., 2d Ind, CG SOS for CG Eighth AF, 10
months after the launching of TORCHOct 42.
early in November. In no other period 600.1 133 Memo,Cofs for G–4 SOS, 16 Nov 42, USFET
Construction General.
was the status of the BOLERObuild-up and 134In order that administrative planning could be
the Key Plan more uncertain or vague, carried on, an operational plan calling for the prin-
cipal landings in the Rouen-Dieppe area was used
and in no other period were U.S. forces in as a basis for preliminary planning by the supply
the United Kingdom so restricted in their services. It was highly tentative and served mainly as
activities. a planning exercise in the absence of a firm opera-
For the most part this limitation was tional plan. Gen Griner, G–4 ETO, Directive for
ROUNDUPAdministrative Planning, 7 Oct 42,
imposed by the lack of service forces. EUCOM 334 Misc RAP Papers 1942.
Early in October General Lee warned the 135Ltr. Lee to CG ETO, 6 Oct 42, sub: SOS Troop
and Labor Situation, SOS AG 320.2 SOS Jun
theater commander that the service troops 42-Jul 43.
remaining in the United Kingdom— 136Ibid.; Ltr, Lee to CG ETO, 17 Sep 42, sub:
about 32,000—would be inadequate to Troop Basis and Priorities for SOS Troops, SOS AG
operate essential installations. Further- 320.2.
137Cbl R–3315, Marshall to Eisenhower, 19 Nov
more, they were not balanced as to types. 42. SOS AG 320 2.
THE SOS AND ETOUSA IN 1942 111

At the same time the War Department situation with the aim of effecting econ-
indicated that it was not satisfied that omies. He even suggested closing certain
ETOUSA was carrying out its supply mis- active installations or utilizing them for
sion and criticized the theater for continu- dead storage only, if necessary.141 Less
ing to call on the British without employing than two weeks later two of the base sec-
its own forces to full advantage. Through- tion commanders replied that no savings
out 1942 the United Kingdom remained could be made, and that, if anything,
an indispensable source of both supplies there was need for an expansion rather
and services for U.S. forces. General Lee than a reduction in the number ofinstalla-
reported in October, for example, that, tions. The Southern Base Section com-
because of the continued shortage of serv- mander, Colonel Thrasher, concluded
ice troops of proper types, the British that without adequate troops there was no
Army was feeding approximately 50,000 choicebut to close certain depots.142It
Americantroops.138The War Department
was obviously difficult to accept the loss of
reminded the theater that there was an priority which the United Kingdom had
extreme shortage of service troops through- momentarily enjoyed. But until the impli-
out the world. The 1942 troop basis gave cations of the North African campaign
preference to the activation of combat became manifest, U.S. forces in Britain
units, and little progress had been made were forced to retrench. The uncertainties
in correcting the imbalance. Furthermore, attending the future of BOLERO were not
the War Department felt that on a per- to be dispelled for several months.
centage basis the E T O had its authorized
quota of service troops, and it was there- Early in 1943 the stage was set for
fore difficult to sell the War Department relieving U.S. forces in the United King-
the idea that the ETO required imme- dom from all responsibility for the TORCH
diate remedial action. A few depot operation, and in February a complete
companies were being dispatched, but break was made between the commands
beyond these most service units were ear- of the two areas. General Eisenhower's
marked for theaters with a higher priority appointment as Allied Commander in
than ETOUSA.139In a letter to all thea- Chief in August 1942 had placed him in
ters in December the War Department a dual role, for he continued to be the
issued a threefold admonition which was commanding general of ETOUSA. Since
to be repeated many times: the number of TORCH was to take place outside the limits
service units must be kept to a minimum; of the European theater the question
the theaters were to adopt every expedient
to increase the ratio of combat to service 138Ltr, Lee to CG ETO, 6 Oct 42.
139Ltr, Littlejohn to Lee, 4 Dec 42, sub: SOS
elements; the logistical organization of all Troops, SOS AG 320.2 SOS Jun 42-Jul 43.
forces must be critically examined with a 140Ltr. Secy W a r to Theater Comd. 10 Dec 42.
view toward of sub: Economy of Forces, SOS 320.2 Economy of
eliminating duplication
Forces, Dec 42-Jan 43.
services, over-lappingof fuctions, and 141T W X , Lee to CGs Base Sets, 2 J a n 43, SOS
top-heavy administrative overhead 140 . 320.2 Economy of Forces.
In accordance with this directive Gen- 142Ltrs, Base Sec Comdrs to CG SOS, 31 Dec
42 and 14 Jan 43, a n d Ltr, Lee to C G ETO, 10 Feb
eral Lee orderedthe case section com-43, sub: Economy of Forces, SOS 320.2 Economy of
manders to review their entire personnel Forces.
112 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

V.Brooks
MAP 3

arose as to whether he should continue in and a new theater created as soon as the
his dual role once the operation was TORCH force was firmly established. Esti-
launched. In August it was determined mating that the separation could be
that the boundaries of the theater simply effected about two months after the land-
would be extended southward temporarily ings, he recommended that General Lee
to include the new area of operations. For then be given command of the ETO. This
the first few months of his absence General arrangement was agreeable to General
Eisenhower proposed that General Lee be Marshall, a n d on 18 August the bound-
appointed his executive deputy to handle aries of the European theater were ex-
affairs in the United Kingdom, reserving tended southward to include northwest
for himself the right to intervene where Africa. (Map 3) T h e proposed delegation
necessary. He suggested that the North of powers was eventually carried out after
African area be detached from ETOUSA TORCH was launched, but on General
T H E SOS AND ETOUSA IN 1942 113

Lee’s suggestion the appointment as held dual positions on the A F H Q and

deputy went to General Hartle, the senior theater staffs.
commander in the United Kingdom.143In With the departure of General Eisen-
general, the deputy commander was hower to Gibraltar, his first command
authorized to act on all matters in the post, a rear echelon of A F H Q under
theater except those pertaining to TORCHGeneral Smith continued to handle
and those which according to regulations TORCH matters for a time. By Christmas
required the theater commander’s per- 1942, however, the rear echelon had also
sonal attention. departed and the rear echelon functions
The organization of AFHQ soon left its of A F H Q fell to ETOUSA, which was
mark on the U.S. theater headquarters. considerably handicapped for the reasons
Just as BOLERO was subordinated to the mentioned above. Within another month,
interests of the TORCH operation, so also more or less as planned, ETOUSA began
was Headquarters, ETO, overshadowed to drop out of the picture as the North
by AFHQ. Both General Eisenhower and African forces drew more and more of
his chief of staff, General Smith, were their support directly from the United
residents at AFHQ in Algiers, and since States. The time had therefore come for a
TORCH became the major preoccupation complete divorce of the North African
most of the important business was trans- area from the United Kingdom. Effective
acted at the Allied headquarters. on 3 February 1943 the boundaries of the
ETOUSA, however, was not completely E T O were redrawn to exclude the North
subordinated to AFHQ, and General African area, and also the Iberian and
Smith made it a point to maintain the Italian peninsulas, which were incor-
theater headquarters as a separate organ- porated into the new North African The-
ization, keeping in mind its long-range ater of Operations (NATO) under General
mission in the United Kingdom. It there- Eisenhower. O n 4 February the E T O
fore continued by design to handle all received a new commanding general in
routine matters for U.S. forces in the the person of Lt. Gen. Frank M. Andrews,
United Kingdom, while A F H Q handled who had commanded U.S. forces in the
TORCH matters. The relationship between MiddleEast.144
the two remained somewhat vague, how-
ever, and neither ETOUSA nor SOS was 143Interv with Gen Lee, 8 Aug 51, ETO Adm
517 Intervs.
brought very closely into the TORCH pic- 144Organization and Command, I, 148–54,
ture except through those officers who 156–67,170–74.
 CHAPTER III

The Build-up in Stride, 1943

(1) BOLERO in Limbo, January-April 1943 had remained undecided throughout the
fall of 1942, and the War Department was
January 1943 brought renewed hope not inclined to favor a large build-up in
that the movement of U.S. troops to the the United Kingdom even if shipping
United Kingdom would be resumed. The were available. In January 1943 the Al-
scale of the build-up obviously depended lied leaders met at Casablanca to resolve
on a firm decision on future strategy. Late this uncertainty. By that time the world
in November 1942 President Roosevelt, outlook was considerably brighter than it
encouraged by the initial success of the had been six months before. The Red
TORCH operation, suggested to Prime armies had frustrated the first German at-
Minister Churchill the desirability of a n tempt to break through in the Caucasus
early decision, and a few days later asked and were now on the offensive; Rommel
General Marshall for estimates on the had been beaten in North Africa and the
number of men that could be shipped to Allied vise was closing on the German
both the United Kingdom and North forces in Tunisia; and the land and sea ac-
Africa in the next fourmonths. 1 tions at Guadalcanal had checked Japa-
O P D made a study of shipping capabil- nese expansion in the South Pacific. But
ities and reported that 150,000 troops whatever optimism was inspired by the
could be shipped to England by mid- more favorable situation on these fronts
April, assuming that there was no further was sobered by the gloomy aspect pre-
augmentation of the North African force sented by the war on the seas. In spite of
after the middle ofJanuary.2 The acceler- the rising production figures of the Amer-
ation of movements to the United King- ican shipyards, Allied shipping losses con-
dom depended largely on the demands on tinued to exceed replacements throughout
shipping from North Africa and on the 1942. In the first months of 1943 the
availability of adequate escorts. Demands U-boat attacks reached their full fury.
from North Africa, coupled with a con- The shortage of shipping consequently re-
tinuing shortage of shipping, had caused
a drastic amendment of earlier plans for a 1 Ltr, Roosevelt to Churchill, 30 Nov 42, WDAG
CofS 334 JCS; Memo, Brig Gen John R. Deane for
build-up of the 427,000-man force in the OPD, 10 Dec 42, O P D 370.5 ETO, Sec 1, 1–63.
United Kingdom by the spring of 1943. 2 Memo,Handy for Marshall, 18 Dec 42, sub: Ship-
Current plans called for shipment of only ment of Troops to U.K., O P D 370.5 ETO, Sec 1,
1–63.
32,000 men in the next four months.3 3 Memo, CofS for President, n. d., O P D 370.5
Future Allied strategy to follow TORCHETO, Sec 1, 1–63.
T H E BUILD-UP IN STRIDE, 1943 115

mained the severest stricture to Allied ister expressed disappointment that only
plans and prevented full utilization of the four divisions would arrive by mid-August.
Allied war potential. But the shortage of cargo shipping made
The Casablanca decisions recognized it impracticable to schedule a more rapid
the Atlantic as one of the most important troop build-up at first, since, as it was
battlefields of the war by giving the fight pointed out, there was no point in sending
against the submarine menace the first units without their equipment. 5 After the
charge against United Nations resources. middle of the year it was estimated that
In view of the competing demands of the the rate of shipping could be vastly in-
North African area and the Russian aid creased, and that a total of 938,000 troops,
program on the limited shipping resources including fifteen to nineteen divisions,
it was hopeless to think of a full-scale could be dispatched to the United King-
cross-Channel operation in 1943. The dom by the end of 1943. Added to the
Allied leaders decided instead to continue present strength in Britain, this would
the offensive in the Mediterranean. The result in a build-up of 1,118,000 men.6
invasion of Sicily was to be the major ef- While the Casablanca Conference did
fort of 1943. Regarding operations from not give a definite pledge regarding a
the United Kingdom, the Allied leaders cross-Channel attack, its decision to re-
gave impetus to air operations by assign- sume the BOLERO build-up on such a scale
ing high priority to the inauguration of a reinforced the belief that ROUNDUP even-
combined bomber offensive, but their de- tually would take place. The estimate that
cisions fell somewhat short of a definitive nearly a million men and their equipment
commitment on ROUNDUP. Nevertheless, could be transported to the United King-
two decisions were made which confirmed dom in the next eleven months was highly
the basic assumption that there would still optimistic in view of the chronic shortage
be a cross-Channel operation. It was of shipping and the continued demands
agreed to establish a combined command on Allied resources from the Mediterra-
and planning staff in the United Kingdom nean area a n d the USSR. Nevertheless,
to plan for cross-Channel raids and for a the Casablanca decision on BOLEROwas
possible return to the Continent under welcome news to those in the United
varying conditions in 1943 or 1944, and a Kingdom who once before had begun
corollary agreement was reached to rein- preparations for such a build-up and had
state the BOLERO build-up. Both the Prime then seen the ETO experience a sudden
Minister and the President were anxious bloodletting and loss of priority.
to build up forces in the United Kingdom, Theater officials were fully aware of the
and President Roosevelt urged that a task which a revived program would pre-
definite build-up schedule be prepared so sent. To move nearly a million men with
that the potential effort of Allied forces in their supplies would mean the reception of
the United Kingdom could be estimated 4 2d ANFA(Casablanca) Mtg, 18 Jan 43, JCS Hist
at any time to take advantage of any sign Files.
of German weakness.4 General Somervell 5 3d ANFAMtg, 23 Jan 43.
calculated that shipping capabilities 6 CCS Paper 172, 22 Jan 43. U.S. strength in the
United Kingdom on 1 January stood at approxi-
would permit only small movements in mately 135,000, but was to suffer further losses to
the first six months, and the Prime Min- TORCH.
116 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

about 150 ships per month in the last SOS staffs considerably better prepared to
quarter of the year, with all the attendant plan for the reception and accommoda-
problems of discharge, inland transporta- tion of U.S. forces than they had been six
tion, storage, and construction. General months earlier. Their experience in the
Lee had attended the conference in Casa- summer of 1942 had made them more
blanca, and even before leaving North aware than ever of one essential prerequi-
Africa took the first steps to get planning site to such an undertaking—the advance
under way for the task which he knew the arrival of sufficient service troops to pre-
SOS would have to shoulder. O n 28 Jan- pare the necessary accommodations and
uary he wrote informally to Maj. Gen. facilities. This was even more imperative
Wilhelm D. Styer, chief of staff of the War in 1943 than it had been earlier because
Department SOS, giving him advance of the unavailability of British labor. Brit-
notice of some of the requests for service ish officials had pointed out at the Casa-
troops which he expected to make shortly blanca Conference that the proposed ship-
through official channels.7 A few days ments (150 ships per month at the peak)
later he informed General Littlejohn, who could be handled only if U.S. dock labor
was acting for Lee in the latter’s absence, and locomotives were forthcoming. 12
of the decision to resume the build-up and There was also a shortage of depot space.
instructed him to study the implications The British had stopped construction be-
with Lee's British opposite, Gen. T. S. cause of their own manpower shortages
Riddell-Webster, the Quartermaster Gen- and because of the reduced requirements
eral.8 Before departing for North Africa for the smaller 427,000-man troop basis.
General Lee had instructed his staff to They therefore urged that U.S. service
draw up two supply and accommodation personnel be included in t h e earliest ar-
plans, one based on the current troop basis rivals. 13 It was precisely this problem that
of 427,000, and another for the then hypo- General Lee had in mind when he wrote
thetical force of a million men.9 to General Styer from North Africa late in
The renewed confidence which the SOS January. H e asked for 30 port battalions,
now felt for the build-up of the ETO was 30 engineer regiments, 15 quartermaster
expressed on 5 February in the announce- service battalions, a n d about 30 depot
ment that planning for the movement of companies of various categories. All these
a large force to the United Kingdom would be necessary in order to discharge
would no longer be considered as a staff the 120–150 ships per month, construct
school problem, but would be worked out the needed depots, properly store and is-
as a firm program as expeditiously as pos- sue equipment and supplies, and carry out
sible. Complete plans on personnel, stor- 7 Ltr, Lee to Styer, 28 Jan 43, ASF CofS ETO
age and housing, construction, transporta- 1943, I.
tion, and supply were to be developed, 8 Cbl 8833, Lee to Littlejohn, 4 Feb 43, USFET
with the G–4 co-ordinating all plans.10 381 54–40 BOLERO.
9 Ltr, Hq SOS to Chiefs of Svcs and Stf, 15Jan 43,
The reinstatement of BOLEROalso brought sub: SOS Plng, SOS 381 SOS Plng, Jan-Feb 43.
the BOLEROCombined Committee of Lon- 10Hq SOS, Basic Plng Dir 1, Personnel, 5 Feb 43,
don together for the first time in several ETO 381 Opns Data, Basic Plng Dir 1.
11BCC(L) Min, 18 Feb 43, ETO Preinvasion 322.
months.11 12CCS 1 7 2 , 2 2 Jan 43.
The year 1943 found the ETOUSA and 13CCS Min, 65th Mtg, 21 Jan 43.
T H E BUILD-UP I N STRIDE, 1943 117

the airfield construction program. He immediately been instructed to figure

pointed out that the U.S. forces had been their troop needs, which were to be used
caught short of service troops in the sum- in formulating a service troop basis for
mer of 1942 and had got by only by the presentation to the theater commander.
emergency use of British labor and even Ever conscious of the repeated admoni-
combat units. This remedy could not be tions from the War Department and thea-
tried again. U.S. forces must become more ter headquarters to keep service troop
self-sufficient and the SOS portion of the demands to a minimum, the service chiefs
revived BOLEROprogram must be larger. felt a strong compulsion to offer the fullest
Lee punctuated his argument with a les- possible justification for their stated re-
son from history, quoting General Per- quirements. They had two favorite and
shing who in 1918 had made a similar seemingly indisputable arguments. Almost
appeal for advance shipments of SOS without exception they were able to show
troops for the necessary construction proj- that percentagewise they were asking for
ects. With the experience of August and fewer troops than the SOS of the AEF in
September 1942 fresh in his memory, Gen- 1917–18.The SOS portion of the AEF on
eral Lee noted that the SOS had learned 11 November 1918 had been 33.1 percent.
the hard way in the past seven months, On the basis of a total build-up of
and he was determined that there should 1,118,000 men by December 1943, they
not be a repetition of the frantic efforts of argued, the SOS should therefore have a
the previous summer. 14 troop basis of 370,000. T h e chief of engi-
These arguments were readily seconded neers, for example, maintained that on the
by General Lee's staff in the United King- basis of the practice in World War I, in
dom. General Littlejohn pointed out to which 26.9 percent of the SOS consisted of
the new theater commander that the sup- engineer troops, the present SOS should
port of the new program necessitated the have 99,500 engineer troops. He was ask-
expansion and acceleration of the SOS ing for only 67,000. The service chiefs fur-
construction program and supply opera- ther reinforced their claims by painting out
tions. For this purpose he urged General that the present war was making much
Andrews to ask for a stepped-up ship- heavier demands on the services of supply.
ment of SOS troops. There was sufficient There had been a great increase in mech-
reason for such a plea at this time. The anized transport, in air force supply, and in
SOS was already a reduced and unbal- the fire power of weapons; there were new
anced force as a result of the losses to problems of handling enormous tonnages
TORCH. T h e hospital and airdrome con- of gasoline and lubricants, and of con-
struction programs were seriously behind structing airfields. Furthermore, in the
schedule.15 Finally, the British could not 14Ltr, Lee to Styer. 28Jan 43.
be expected to provide labor on the scale 15Ltr, Littlejohn to CG ETO, 9 Feb 43, sub: SOS
they had maintained in the summer of Manpower Requirements, ETO SOS Manpower
Program
1942, and it was predicted that they would 16 Ltr,Ross to Lee, 6 Feb 43, SOS AG 320.2 SOS
insist that SOS troops arrive well in Jun 42-Jul 42. Approximately 58,000 laborers were
advance of combat units. 16 at this time directly employed either on construction
projects for U.S. forces, or as stevedores. Ltr, Little-
After the Casablanca decision the SOS john to CG ETO. 1 7 Feb 43. sub: Current BOLERO
staff members in the United Kingdom had Plng, SOS AG 320.2 Jun 42-Jul 43.
118 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

war of 1917–18 the U.S. Army had op- hopes for this program were dashed. O n
erated in a friendly country where port 19 February General Marshall wired the
and transportation facilities were already theater that the decision to resume the
available. Operations in Europe would build-up was not firm, and that the sched-
now require landing supplies over beaches ules set u p in September 1942 would be
and restoring ports and railways. Thus, followed until a definite decision was
World War I was not even a fair basis of reached.19 Three days later this bad news
comparison so far as service troop require- was confirmed by a cable from OPD noti-
ments were concerned.17 fying the theater that there were indica-
By mid-February General Littlejohn tions that shipping for the U.K. build-up
had assembled sufficient data on the needs would be “nothing for the months of
of the various services to present the thea- March and April because of the urgency
ter commander with a tentative troop of the situation in another theater.” The
basis calling for a total of 358,312 men. By “other theater” was North Africa, which
far the largest components were those of continued to make unexpected demands
the Corps of Engineers, the Quartermaster on both troops and cargo. Immediately
Corps, and the Medical and Ordnance after the Casablanca Conference the War
Departments, accounting for more than Department had been asked to prepare a
two thirds of the total. In presenting the special convoy with urgently needed vehi-
needs of the SOS to General Andrews, cles and engineer and communications
General Littlejohn noted that every prac- equipment. Only a few days later General
ticable measure had been taken to reduce Eisenhower asked for a n additional 160,-
SOS needs, and he again reviewed the 000 troops to arrive by June. These de-
limited possibilities of utilizing British mands were superimposed on the require-
labor. If it became necessary to reduce the ments for the planned Sicilian operation
SOS troop basis further, he continued, and entailed a great increase in cargo
army and corps service units should be shipments to the Mediterranean.20 The
brought to the theater and made available results for BOLERO were inescapable.
to the SOS. The need for service units was Meeting these demands meant not only a
so urgent that he even recommended se- drain on troops and matériel but the
curing the required manpower by break-
ing u p organizations in the United States. 17 Memo, Lt Col V. A. Rapport, Progress Div SOS,
The SOS desired the highest possible ship- for CG SOS, 7 Feb 43, sub: Comparison of SOS in
1917–18 and Now, ETO Opns Data, Basic Plng Dir
ping priority for its units a n d asked for a 1, Sec II, SOS Troop Program; Ltr, Littlejohn to CG
rapid build-up to a strength of 189,000 by ETO, 9 Feb 43.
the end ofJune. T h e most pressing need 18 Ltr, Littlejohn to CG ETO, 17 Feb 43, sub: Cur-
rent BOLEROPlng, SOS AG 320.2 SOS Jun 42-Jul 43;
was for engineer construction units, and Ltr, Littlejohn to CG ETO, 9 Feb 43; Basic Plng Dir
these were therefore given a priority sec- 1, Annex 4; Cbl 7234, ETO to AGWAR, 13 Feb 43,
ond only to air force units for the bomber SOS AG 320.2.
19 Cbl R-5983, Marshall to Andrews, 19 Feb 43,
offensive. 18But the air units were to be fol- SOS AG 320.2.
lowed by service troops to support the 20[Richard M. Leighton] The Problem of Troop
bomber offensive, and by additional serv- and Cargo Flow in Preparing the European Invasion,
1943–44, prep in Hist Sec, Control Div, ASF, 1945,
ice troops for the BOLERO program. MS (hereafter cited as Problem of Troop and Cargo
It was only a matter of days before the Flow), pp. 15-16; OCMH.
T H E BUILD-UP IN STRIDE, 1943 119

diversion of the limited shipping resources. over all planning. General Andrews ap-
The battle of the Atlantic reached its preciated fully the desirability of proceed-
height in these months, and the competing ing with planning for cross-Channel
claims of Russian aid, the support of oper- operations. In anticipation of a Combined
ations in the Mediterranean, and the Brit- Chiefs directive, based on the agreement
ish civil import program on shipping at Casablanca, he urged that joint plan-
simply precluded an immediate imple- ning should again be resumed, emphasized
mentation of the Casablanca decision on particularly the importance of having a
BOLERO. firm troop basis and a schedule of arrivals,
The inability to rebuild the U.K. forces so that U.K. planners would know what
as planned in January was a bitter pill for they were dealing with, and underlined
the planners in England. General An- the necessity of arranging for production
drews thought it would do no harm as far and procurement of vast quantities of
as ground forces were concerned, since equipment, a task which would require
theater planners had not even been able many months.24 In its never-ending at-
to arrive at a practical plan upon which to tempts to get more specific commitments
set u p a ground force troop basis. In fact, and precise data on which to base its own
upon reflection, he thought there was one preparations, however, the SOS was again
aspect of a slower build-up which might frustrated. The G–4 of the SOS submitted
be a partial blessing. Because training a list of questions to the G–4, ETOUSA,
areas and firing ranges were inadequate early in March concerning future opera-
in the United Kingdom, it was preferable tional plans, the over-all troop basis, and
that American troops get as much training levels of supply. The ETOUSA supply
as possible in the United States. A delayed officer was helpless to offer any specific
build-up would also allow the SOS to information on the size, place, extent, and
build a firmer foundation.21 But the set- timing of future offensive operations. He
back in building a bomber force was a could only reply that the Casablanca pro-
serious blow. Andrews noted that units gram evidently had not been discarded
needed between forty-five and sixty days but only delayed, and added hopefully
to prepare themselves for combat after ar- that directives were expected from the
riving in the theater, and it had been War Department which would “permit
hoped that every available unit in the planning to proceed beyond the present
United States might be brought over early stage of conjecture.” 25
in the year to take advantage of the favor-
able summer months.22 Air force units in 21Ltr, Andrews to Handy, 3 Mar 43, ETO 312.1
England were suffering from both combat Andrews Correspondence 1943.
22Ltr, Andrews to Marshall, 26 Feb 43, ETO 312.1
losses and war weariness. Lacking replace- Andrews Correspondence 1943.
ments, some groups were reduced to a 23Ltr, Gen Eaker to Andrews, 27 Feb 43, and Ltr,
strength of 50 percent, and progressive at- Andrews to Gen Handy, 3 M a r 43, E T O 31 2.1 An-
drews Correspondence 1943; Craven a n d Cate, The
trition was seriously lowering morale Army Air Forces, II, 309.
among the crews that remained.23 24Ltr, Andrews to Gen Ismay, 17 Mar 43, ETO
Cancellation of the build-up had an un- 385 Methods of Conducting War.
25Ltr, Hq ETO to CG SOS, 13 Mar 43, sub: Ques-
avoidable repercussion in the United tions Concerning Operational Requirements, SOS
Kingdom and cast a pall of uncertainty AG 381 Plans.
120 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

T h e SOS meanwhile continued to ana- offensive. Worried by the almost complete

lyze its troop needs with a view toward neglect of the United Kingdom, General
paring its demands even further. Late in Andrews in his last weeks as theater com-
March it completed a troop basis and flow mander pleaded with the War Depart-
chart calling for approximately 320,000 ment not to let the build-up die. If neces-
service troops based on a total force of sary BOLEROshould be retarded, he
1,100,000 men. I n submitting it to the maintained, but not halted. There should
theater commander General Lee asserted be a steady building u p of American forces
that it was the result of a n exhaustive in Britain for a n overseas operation in
study by the chiefs of services and repre- 1944. At the least it was important to
sented the minimum requirements. The maintain the impression that American
reduction of 40,000 in the troop basis was troops were arriving in large numbers and
made possible largely by the decision to to say and do nothing which would ap-
use certain service elements of both the pear inconsistent with this conception.
ground a n d air forces for administrative General Andrews felt that any appreciable
purposes.26At the same time the SOS con- slowing down of BOLERO might even com-
tinued to plead for shipments of service promise a n operation in 1944, since prep-
troops in advance of combat units, under- arations were already behind schedule. 29
lining this need in every communication Fortunately the question of the build-up
with higher headquarters. was soon to be resolved.
For the moment these plans were largely
academic, for the shipping situation made (2) The Troop Build-up Is Resumed, May–
it impossible to implement the Casablanca December1943
decision on the scale expected. I n the first
three months of 1943 only 16,000 of the T h e uncertainty regarding the United
projected shipment of 80,000 men were Kingdom build-up was finally largely dis-
dispatched to the United Kingdom, and pelled in May 1943, when Allied leaders
13,000 of these had already left the United met at the TRIDENT Conference in Wash-
States at the time of the Casablanca Con- ington. Plans for the defeat of the Axis
ference. T h e main effect of the diversions Powers in Europe were embodied in three
to North Africa was felt in February, major TRIDENT decisions: to enlarge the
March, and April, when the flow of troops U.S.-British bomber offensive from the
to the United Kingdom averaged fewer United Kingdom; to exploit the projected
than 1,600 per month.27 T h e effect on Sicilian operation in a manner best cal-
troop movements was most pronounced
because troop shipping was even scarcer 26Ltr, Lee to CG ETO, 22 Mar 43, sub: Proposal—
than cargo shipping at this time. But in Troop Basis and Flow, SOS Troops, SOS AG 320.2;
cargo shipment the record was similar. I n Memo, Lt Col Edgar T. Fell, G–1 SOS, for CofS
the same period the monthly cargo ar- SOS, 9 Mar 43, sub: Ground Force Units for SOS
Use, Basic Plng Dir 1 , Sec XI, SOS Troop Program.
rivals averaged only 35,000 long tons 27Progress Rpt, Progress Div, SOS, 4 Oct 43, ETO
(84,000 measurement
tons). 28 Adm 422.
At this rate the E T O was barely main- 28T C Monthly Progress Rpt, Statistics Br, OCofT
SOS, ETO Adm 450–52.
taining its strength after t h e losses to 29Cbl 8869, Andrews to Marshall, 17 Apr 43, ETO
TORCH, to say nothing of mounting a n air Eyes Only Cbls 1943–44.
T H E BUILD-UP IN STRIDE, 1943 121

culated to eliminate Italy from the war; greatly magnified scale. Together with the
and to establish forces and equipment in freezing of resources in the Mediterra-
the United Kingdom for a cross-Channel nean, it promised to create a tremendous
operation with a target date of 1 May potential for the U.K. build-up.
1944. 30 The TRIDENT planners scheduled a
The resolution concerning a cross- build-up of 1,300,300 American soldiers
Channel attack was not an unequivocal in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944.
commitment, as it turned out, and Allied Of these, 393,200 were to be air force
strategy was to be reargued within an- troops, and 907,100 were to be ground
other few months. Nevertheless, the nam- and service troops, including eighteen and
ing of a date and the designation of the size one-half divisions. By 1 June 1944, the
of such an operation made it the most planners calculated, a force of 1,415,300
definite commitment yet accepted for the (twenty-one divisions) could be estab-
attack which American planners had sup- lished in Britain.33These figures did not
ported for the past year. The likelihood necessarily constitute a troop basis, nor
that the BOLERO build-up would now be did they reflect actual shipping capabil-
carried out was strengthened by a definite ities. It was noted that there were actually
allocation of resources: twenty-nine Allied more divisions available than were sched-
divisions were to be made available in the uled for shipment, and the rate of build-up
United Kingdom for the operation in the was based on what the British indicated
spring of 1944; and there was to be no fur- could be processed through their ports, not
ther diversion of resources to the Mediter- on shipping capabilities. The balanced
ranean. In fact, four U.S. and three British movement of troops and their cargo was
divisions in the Mediterranean area were actually limited by the quantity of cargo
to be held in readiness after 1 November which could be accepted in the United
for movement to the United Kingdom. 31 Kingdom, the maximum practical limit
By May 1943 a n additional factor was being 150 shiploads per month except in
enhancing prospects for the U.K. build- absolute emergency. From this time on
up. After the near-record shipping losses British port capacity was to be a despotic
in March (768,000 tons from all causes),32 factor governing the build-up rate. Once
the battle of the Atlantic took a sudden more, therefore, the Combined Chiefs em-
turn for the better. Beginning in April, phasized the necessity for the early arrival
with the increasing use of long-range and of port battalions to aid in the discharge
carrier aircraft, and of improved detection of ships, a n d engineer construction units
devices and convoy practices, the Allies to complete the needed depots. The wis-
took a mounting toll of U-boats. And as dom of such a policy could hardly be dis-
shipping losses fell off, the increasing out- puted, and at the close of the conference
put of the shipyards was reflected in the Headquarters, ETO, was notified that the
net gains in available tonnage. This turn shipment of service troops was to be given
of events was undoubtedly one of the most
heartening developments of the war, and 30CCS 242/6,25 May 43.
soon made it possible to plan the logistic 31Ibid.
32Samuel E. Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic (Bos-
support for overseas operations with con- ton, 1947), p. 412.
siderably more confidence and on a 33CCS 244/ 1,25 May 43, Annex VII.
 122 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

a priority second only to the air force meetings of the entire committee. The July
build-up. 34 meeting consequently proved to be the
The ETOUSA planners welcomed the only formal session under the new pro-
green light which the TRIDENT decisions gram, although small ad hoc meetings and
constituted, although they had not been informal conferences were called from
idle despite the failure to implement the time to time, and the various specialized
earlier Casablanca decisions. In the early subcommittees continued to meet to solve
months of 1943 the SOS staff had contin- particular 36
problems.
ued to plan for the eventual flow of troops British and American officials in the
and cargo, and had assembled a mass of United Kingdom had already taken cog-
logistical data covering all aspects of the nizance of the reception and accommoda-
build-up, such as manpower, storage and tion problem posed by the new program,
housing, transportation, construction, and had recognized the necessity for
and supply. This information was issued in bringing older plans up to date. But it had
what were known as Tentative Overall been impossible to publish a new BOLERO
Plans which were kept up to date by re- Key Plan earlier because of the tentative
peated revision. To implement the 37 Early in July
statusof the troop basis.
TRIDENT decisions in the United States, Headquarters, ETO, submitted to the
the BOLEROCombined Committee in War Office new build-up figures and data
Washington was now reconstituted as the to be considered in the distribution of U.S.
BOLERO-SICKLE Combined Committee, forces in the United Kingdom. These
the word SICKLE applying to the air force planning figures approximated the TRI-
build-up, which was now planned inde- DENT shipping schedule, indicating a
pendently of the ground and service com- build-up of 1,340,000 men by 1 May
ponents. As before, the Combined Com- 1944. The War Office was asked to use
mittee of Washington was set up as a this total to plan the maximum accom-
subcommittee of the Combined Staff Plan- modations.38 O n the basis of this figure
ners (of the CCS) with the mission of co- the BOLEROKey Plan underwent its last
ordinating the preparation and imple- major revision, the Fourth Edition being
mentation of the BOLERO-SICKLE shipping issued by the Deputy Quartermaster
program. 35Although the London Com- General on 12 July 1943. The British
mittee had never been formally disbanded, Southern Command had already antici-
it had not met since February after the pated the changes and had issued its own
abortive revival of BOLERO. O n 20 July it
once more met under the chairmanship of
Sir Findlater Stewart. Headquarters, 34Cbl R–8870, AGWAR to ETO, 26 May 43.
35 Note by Secy, Principal Adm Officers Corn of
ETOUSA, had made some new appoint- War Cabinet, 18 Jun 43, sub: BOLERO-SICKLE Com-
ments to the committee and the entire bined Com, ETO BOLEROFile 1943.
group assembled at this time primarily to 36Memo for COfS,8 J u l 4 3 , sub: Info on BOLERO
Corns, E T O BOLEROFile 1943; BCC(L) Min, 2d
introduce the new members. Direct con- Mtg, 20 Jul 43, ETO Preinvasion 322.
tacts had long since been established be- 37Ltr, Hq ETO to CG SOS, 12 May 43, sub:
tween appropriate American and British Distribution of US. Ground Force, SOS AG 320.2
SOS Jun 42–Jul 43.
services and departments, and there was 38Ltr, Hq ETO to Under-Secy of State for War,
no longer any pressing need for regular 7 Jul 43, ETO 381 Troop Basis 1943.
T H E BUILD-UP IN STRIDE, 1943 123

plan for the U.S. Southern Base Section before the TRIDENT Conference, and on
area two weeks earlier.39 1 May General Andrews had submitted to
the War Department a list of the units,
During the summer of 1943 the totaling 887,935 men, which he desired
ETOUSA, SOS, and Eighth Air Force shipped to the theater by 31 December. It
staffs devoted a large portion of their was admittedly only a partial list, but pro-
time to the all-important problem of ob- vided sufficient data to the War Depart-
taining a definitive troop basis for the ment for the employment of shipping for
ETO. No single other problem was the the remainder of the year. A complete
subject of so many communications be- troop basis was hardly possible at the
tween the various headquarters and time, since an operational plan had not
between ETOUSA and the War Depart- yet taken shape to determine the precise
ment. Solving it was perhaps the most troop needs.41ETOUSA later submitted
important initial task after the strategic new priority lists, and by the end of the
decisions of the Combined Chiefs which month shipments were beginning to be
assigned the theater its mission. Not only made on the basis of the interim 888,000-
was it essential that the War Department man troop list and the theater’s latest
determine the total allotment of troops to priority requests. 42
the theater. It was necessary to come to an Submitting the partial troop list was
agreement with the theater over the one of General Andrews’ last acts as com-
apportionment of this over-all allotment manding general of the European Thea-
between the air, ground, and service ter. O n 3 May, barely three months after
forces to create a balanced force, and assuming command, he was killed in a n
decide on the specific numbers of each of airplane crash while on a tour of inspec-
the hundreds of different types of units. In tion in Iceland. General Andrews was an
one of the first staff conferences held by air force officer, and his loss was therefore
the SOS to discuss the implications of the particularly regrettable in view of the
TRIDENT decisions it was pointed out that plans then being formulated for an inten-
the over-all troop basis—air, ground, and sified aerial offensive. Lt. Gen. Jacob L.
service—together with the priorities for Devers, commander of the Armored Force
shipment, was a basic factor in the prep- at Fort Knox, was appointed his successor
aration of an accommodation, mainte- and arrived in England on 9 May 1943. 43
nance, supply, and construction plan, and To him now fell the task of bringing to
therefore a necessary prerequisite to the
revision of the BOLERO Key Plan.40 39Joint BOLERO Key Plan (Southern Command),
Had the ETOUSA planners awaited 30 Jun 43, ETO BOLEROSecond Key Plan.
40Min, SOS Stf Confs, 1 Jun 43, ETO 337 Confs
the approval of a firm troop basis, how- 1943, I.
ever, little progress would have been made 4 1 Ltr, Andrews to O P D , 1 May 43, sub: Troop

in preparing for the build-up in 1943, for Basis and SOS Priorities, ETO 381 Troop Basis 1943.
42Min, 20th Mtg, BOLEROCombined Planners
the troop basis continued to be a subject of (Washington), 4 Jun 43, Annex A, Background on
negotiation with the War Department for BOLERO-SICKLE Buildup, 3 Jun 43, ASF Planning
several months to come. Fortunately, Div, Series II, A46–183.
41During the interim period of six days the theater
ETOUSA and SOS planners had begun was commanded by Maj. Gen. William S. Key, the
calculating the theater’s requirements Provost Marshal, as the senior officer in the theater.
124 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

fruition the long-drawn-out and detailed June 1944. The proposal was approved by
work on a definitive troop basis. General Eaker, who had assisted in its
For the first time it was possible to preparation, and by General Devers,
develop the troop basis with somewhat although with certain reservations. On the
more specific missions in mind. The air assumption that the VIII Bomber Com-
force troop basis was now formulated on mand was to be built up at maximum
the basis of the Combined Bomber Offen- speed and to its maximum strength for its
sive, which was in the process of accept- new mission, the plan had been developed
ance by the Combined Chiefs of Staff with little relationship to the theater’s
early in May. The ground force troop other requirements. General Devers
basis, while based on a still nebulous plan thought the air force troop basis was too
for a cross-Channel operation, was never- large compared with those of the ground
theless firmly related to the plans which and service forces then under study in his
were now being formulated by the new headquarters, and he also opposed the
Allied planning staff established in April speed of the build-up which the Bradley
in accordance with the decision made at plan called for. He believed that the pro-
Casablanca in January. Under the leader- posed build-up could be carried out only
ship of Lt. Gen. Frederick E. Morgan at the expense of SOS and ground troops,
(British), who had been named Chief of since there was not enough shipping to go
Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander around. He warned that the air could not
(designate), or COSSAC, this group had operate without SOS support, and that
taken the place of the old ROUNDUP plan- the brunt of any reduction in movement
ning staff and was already putting into schedules would therefore have to be
shape an outline design for continental borne by the ground forces. 44
invasion. T h e War Department approved the
The first of the troop bases to be devel- Bradley plan as a basis for planning, but
oped in detail and submitted to the War with important exceptions. In particular,
Department was that of the air force. For it opposed certain organizational features
this purpose General Arnold sent a special of the plan and insisted on reductions in
mission to the United Kingdom, headed headquarters and service personnel, for
by Maj. Gen. Follett Bradley, Air Inspec- which the plan had made a generous
tor of the Army Air Forces, to study the allocation of 190,000 men in a total of less
personnel needs and organization of the than 500,000. Despite protests from the
Eighth Air Force a n d to prepare a troop Eighth Air Force, a sizable reduction was
basis adequate to the contemplated mis- eventually made in its troop basis. At the
sion of the air force in the United direction of the War Department a second
Kingdom. General Bradley arrived in group of officers went to England in
England on 5 May, at the very time that October to make a new study of air force
the command of the theater was changing needs, and pared the allocation to
hands. After three weeks of studies and 466,600. After a further review by the
conferences he submitted his plan to the War Department, and the decision to
War Department at the end of May, call-
44Ltr, Bradley to CG AAF, 28 May 43, sub:
ing for a n allocation of 485,843 men, Organization of Eighth Air Force, with Inds, OPD
including 113 groups, to be built up by 320.2 Security, Sec II.
THE BUILD-UP IN STRIDE, 1943 125

divert certain groups to the Mediterra- camps, airdromes, and other installations,
nean, the troop basis of the Eighth Air the receipt, storage, and issue of pre-
Force was finally established at 415,000, shipped supplies and equipment, and
with a build-up of ninety-eight and a half other factors all tended to create a unique
groups to be achieved byJune 1944. 45 logistical problem. At the same time, the
Meanwhile Headquarters, ETOUSA, War Department staff noted, from the
and the SOS completed their studies of standpoint of economy it was not desirable
ground and service force needs, and the to ship units merely to meet this abnormal
troop bases for these two components were situation if such units would not be needed
submitted to the War Department in the when the peak load had passed at approx-
month of July. On the 5th General Devers imately D Day. As the SOS troop basis
requested approval of a ground force made its way through the War Depart-
troop basis of 635,552 (to include eighteen ment staff sections it was generally agreed
divisions), a n d on the 18th he submitted that savings could be made. The G–3
the SOS troop basis calling for 375,000 specifically listed certain guard units,
men. I n both cases these figures repre- military police, and Ordnance and Trans-
sented only the “first phase” require- portation Corps units for elimination; and
ments-that is, the forces required to he cast a suspicious eye on certain other
launch an operation on 1 May 1944 aimed special units, the need for which was not
at securing a lodgment on the Continent. considered to be critical, or whose func-
General Devers carefully pointed out that tions could be performed by other units.
additional units in all categories would 45Ltr,Eaker to CG ETO, 15 Oct 43, sub: Imple-
have to augment this force in order to sup- mentation of Bradley Plan (Revised), OPD 320.2
Security, Sec II; Note for record, 3 Nov 43, sub:
port continuing large-scale operations.46 Troop Basis Air Forces ETO, O P D 320.2 ETO, Sec
Troop bases for the “second phase” were IX–A. See also Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces,
then being studied and were to be sub- II, 635–38.
mitted within a few weeks. 46Ltr, Devers to CofS WD, 5 J u l43, sub: Ground
Force Troop Basis ETO, E T O 381 Troop Basis 1943;
As in the case of the Bradley plan, both Ltr, Devers to CofS WD, 18J u l4 3 , sub: SOS Troop
ground and service force troop bases for Basis ETO, OPD 320.2 ETO, Sec V.
47 T h e chief of staff of the Army Ground Forces
the first phase came under careful scrutiny noted, for example, that only 49 percent of the ground
in the War Department. For the most part force troops in the ETOUSA troop basis were com-
the ground force allocation was not seri- bat troops, while i n the North African theater the
ously challenged, although questions were percentage was 59. T h e War Department G–3 took
exception to the ratio of allotments to the various sup-
raised regarding the ratio of various types porting arms. He estimated that the allocation of
of troops.47 Most of the critism was antiaircraft troops should be 19 percent of the total
reserved for the SOS troop basis, just as number in the nondivisional supporting arms, while
the ETOUSA planners had allowed a n allocation of
the service troop allocations in the air 33.9 percent. At the same time the E T O U S A troop
force plan had also been subjected to the basis revealed a smaller allowance of field artillery
heaviest criticism. It was generally con- than was considered adequate by the War Depart-
ment. T h e G–3 recommended a more “normal” ratio
ceded that the supply and maintenance of combat support than was indicated i n the E T O
situation in the E T O before the actual basis. Memo, Brig Gen James G. Christiansen, CofS
start of operations was considerably dif- AGF, for CofS W D , 28 Aug 43, sub: Troop Basis
ETO. and Memo, Brig Gen Ray E. Porter, G–3 WD,
ferent from that in a normal overseas for ACofS OPD, 1 1 Aug 43, sub: U.K. Troop Basis,
theater. The construction program for OPD 320.2 Security, Sec III.
126 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

Among these were forestry companies, gas troop basis to the theater with the charac-
generating units, fire fighting platoons, teristic “approved for planning purposes,”
utility detachments, model maker detach- but with the injunction to effect economies
ments, bomb disposal companies, petro- in the use of service troops. Most of its
leum testing laboratories, museum and recommendations were of a general nature.
medical arts service detachments, radio The theater was instructed to reduce to a
broadcasting companies, and harbor craft minimum the number of fixed logistical
service companies. 48 The G–3 was em- installations in the United Kingdom with
phatic in his assertion that nonessential the idea that certain of these installations
units should not be approved for the ETO would eventually be required on the
or any other theater. It was imperative, he Continent. As a temporary reinforcement
noted, that combat and service units be of the SOS it was asked to utilize to the
required to perform, in addition to their maximum the service units whose regular
normal duties, certain services for which assignment was with the ground forces,
they were not primarily organized or and, if necessary, even to employ combat
trained, for example, fire fighting. The units where training would not suffer too
current manpower shortage made it seriously. Before making more specific
extravagant in his opinion to provide serv- recommendations the War Department
ice troops enough to meet peak loads preferred to await the development of a
which might occur only infrequently. The more detailed operational plan and also
eight-hour day and the “book figures” for asked to see the theater’s administrative
normal capabilities of service units simply plan. 50
had to be abandoned. 49 The return of the troop basis to the
The analysis of the ETOUSA troop theater was followed in a few days by let-
basis was by the War Department’s own ters from both Brig. Gen. John E. Hull,
admission a highly theoretical matter, for the acting chief of OPD, and General
Washington lacked detailed knowledge of Handy, the Deputy Chief of Staff, re-em-
operational plans a n d exact information phasizing the serious manpower situation
on the type of operations to be under- in the United States. The shortage of men
taken. T h e War Department’s study was was placing a definite limitation on the
largely a statistical analysis, based on a size of the Army, with the result that the
comparison of the ETO’s requests with the War Department had been charged with
allotment of various types of units in the sifting all theater troop demands. It there-
over-all War Department troop basis, and fore requested additional information on
on a comparison with a hypothetical which to base its consideration of
thirty-division plan worked out in the War ETOUSA’s troop needs, and again asked
Department, supposedly with a cross- 48Memo, W D G–4 for G–1 and OPD, 5 Aug 43,
Channel operation in mind. There was sub: U.K. Troop Basis, a n d Memo, Gen Porter for
ACofS OPD, 1 1 Aug 43.
great variance between the calculations 49Memo, Gen Porter for OPD, 16 Oct 43, sub:
made in the theater and in Washington, Restudy and Restatement of Troop Basis for 1st
and the War Department was at a loss to Phase. O P D 320.2 Security, Sec III.
50Ltr, Secy War to CG ETO, 25 Aug 43, sub:
make very many specific demands for Troop Basis, Ground and Svcs of Supply, ETO,
reductions. O n 25 August it returned the E T O 320.2 Strength and Troop Basis, I.
T H E BUILD-UP I N STRIDE, 1943 127

the theater specifically to submit an out- of available troop units continued to fall
line administrative plan for the cross- short of the demands of the overseas com-
Channel operation.51 manders. T h e desire to place the largest
To these comments a n d injunctions possible number of combat units, both air
ETOUSA could only reply that it had and ground, in the field inevitably resulted
already taken into consideration precisely in subjecting the service troop demands to
those economy measures which the War the closest scrutiny. Increasingly conscious
Department had listed. Every effort had of the limited manpower resources, the
been made to keep to a minimum the War Department General Staff in Novem-
number of fixed installations. The War ber 1942 not only reduced the total num-
Department, it noted, was apparently ber of divisions in the over-all troop basis,
unaware of conditions in the United King- with corresponding cuts in the service
dom, for the logistical setup there was far units organic to the combat elements, but
from optimum. The British had long since also took steps to reduce the over-all ratio
dispersed most installations because of the of service to combat elements. There was
threat of air attack. These had been no formula for economy which could fit
accepted for use by the Americans largely all the varied circumstances of a global
because the shortage of both labor and war, and it was difficult at best to prove
construction materials precluded extensive that logistical support would be jeop-
building of new and larger depots. The ardized by eliminating one or two depot
rail distribution system and the limited companies or port battalions. In general
capacity of the highways also favored the view persisted in the War Department
more numerous, smaller, and dispersed that the ratio of service to combat troops
installations, all of which tended to in- was excessive, a n d it had become normal
crease the need for service units. ETOUSA to regard the demands of the service forces
further assured the War Department that with a certain suspicion, at times with
it had already counted on the use of serv- some justification.53 Pressed by the man-
ice units of the ground forces wherever power situation in the United States the
possible in formulating the SOS troop War Department apparently felt doubly
basis. ETOUSA admitted certain minor obliged to question the theater’s demands.
changes in its troop lists, but for the most It should be noted that the original SOS
part justified its requests. T h e submission troop demands had already suffered a
of an administrative plan it regarded as very sizable cut. The chiefs of services had
impractical at that time. 52 originally submitted to the theater com-
The problem of striking a n adequate 51Memo, Hull for C G ETO, 7 Sep 43, sub:
and at the same time economical balance Theater Troop Basis, ETO 320.2 Strength and Troop
between service and combat troops was a Basis, I; Memo, Handy for CG ETO, 1 1 Sep 43, sub:
perennial one. Since the War Depart- Plng Info Requested by Cbl, P&O 381 1943–45. See
Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell
ment’s 1942 troop basis had not provided I. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops,
adequate service troop units, it had been UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
necessary to carry out piecemeal activa- (Washington, 1947), o n the U.S. manpower problem.
52 1st Ind to W D Ltr of 25 Aug, Hq ETO to WD,
tions in order to meet the requirements for 25 Sep 43, O P D 320.2 Security, Sec III.
overseas operations. I n 1943 the number 53Problem of Troop and Cargo Flow, pp. 55–58.
128 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

mander a list of requirements totaling

490,000 men, each chief maintaining that
he had asked for only the minimum num-
ber considered essential to do a n efficient
job. General Devers had taken issue with
these demands, and had given a command
decision limiting the total service troop I n the meantime work had also pro-
basis to 375,000 and assigning the various gressed on the troop basis for the second
services specific percentages of this total. phase, the terminal date for which at first
The service chiefs consequently had little was designated as June 1945 and later
choice but to recalculate their needs and moved forward to 1 February 1945. On
bring them within the prescribed allot- 5 August General Devers submitted
ments. Reductions were naturally made the ground force requirements, totaling
where they involved the least risk. The 1,436,444,56and on 26 September the the-
number of hospital beds was reduced by ater notified the War Department that its
refiguring casualty estimates. Require- second phase service troop needs would
ments for port battalions were refigured total 730,247 men.57 Added to the air
on the assumption that greater use could force total, which did not change since it
be made of civilian labor on the Continent, was to achieve its maximum build-up by
and for railway units on the assumption 1 May 1944, the troop basis for the second
that railways would not be restored as phase thus totaled approximately 2,583,-
rapidly as previously planned. In this way 000. T h e second phase figures represented
115,000 bodies were lopped off the orig- the cumulative build-up to 1 February
inal “minimum” estimates. The 375,000- 1945 and therefore included the first phase
man troop basis which General Devers totals. They represented the estimated
eventually submitted to the War Depart- needs for extended operations on the Con-
ment in July was based on an allocation of tinent after seizure of a lodgment area,
25 percent of the over-all theater troop and were prepared at this time primarily
basis to the SOS.54This was certainly not to serve as a guide to the War Department
exorbitant considering World War I expe- in its activation and training program. As
rience and the enlarged services which the before, the War Department made a care-
SOS was expected to perform. Whether a ful examination of ETOUSA’s stated
force thus limited by fiat would prove 54Telephone Conversation, Col Royal B. Lord
adequate to support the ground and air with Gen Weaver, 10 Jul 43, SOS A G 320.2 SOS
elements remained to be seen. At any rate, May 43-Jan 44; Memo, Lt Col George W . Beeler,
Chief of Svcs ETO, for Col E. M. Jones, G–5 ETO,
the theater stood firm on its July troop 12 Jul 43, sub: SOS Troop List—375,000-man Basis,
basis for the SOS, and it was eventually SOS AG 381 Troop Basis and Strength 1943.
accepted by the War Department without 55Memo, Lt Col L. B. Meacham, SOS, for Col
important changes. While the various Beeler, 25 Nov 43, ETO 320.2 Strength and Troop
Basis, I.
component troop bases underwent minor 56Ltr, Devers to CofS WD, 5 Aug 43, sub: Field
alterations from time to time, by Novem- Forces Troop Basis, 1st and 2d Phase, ETO 381
ber the ETOUSA first-phase troop basis Troop Basis 1943.
57 Ltr, Maj Gen Idwal H. Edwards, CofS ETO,
for 1 May 1944 had reached relative to WD AG, 26 Sep 43, sub: Second Phase Troop Basis,
stability with the following composition: 55 OPD 320.2 Security, Sec III.
T H E BUILD-UP I N STRIDE, 1943 129

TABLE
3—TROOPBUILD-UPIN THE UNITEDKINGDOMIN 1943

a By ship. Excludes movements by air.

b Includes 13,608 men assigned to Allied Force for this month only.
c A large portion of these arrivals consisted of units redeployed from North Africa.

Source: Troop arrivals data obtained from ETO TC Monthly Progress Rpt, 30 Jun 44, ETO Adm 451 TC Rpts. Troop
strength data obtained from Progress Rpt, Progress Div, SOS, 4 Oct 43, ETO Adm 345 Troops, and Progress Rpts,
Statistical S e c , SGS, Hq ETO, ETO Adm 421–29. These ETO strength data were preliminary, unaudited figures for
command purposes and, while differing slightly from the audited WD AG strengths, have been used throughout this
volume because of the subdivision into air, ground, and service troops. This breakdown is unavailablein WD AG reports.

needs. Once more it gave its tentative ap- a build-up of forty-seven divisions as of 1
proval, but again pointed out the man- February 1945, stood as follows:59
power ceiling under which the War De-
partment was working, noting that the
ETO’s troop basis would have to be com-
pared with those of other theaters and
weighed against over-all manpower avail-
ability. It returned the troop basis with
recommended alterations and requested
that ETOUSA make certain reductions, The actual initiation of troop move-
in service units.58 In
particularly Novem-ments did not depend on the final ap-
ber, after restudying the theater’s needs, proval of the various troop bases, and the
General Devers made his counterrecom- BOLERO build-up had started on the basis
mendation, restoring some of the cuts, but of flow charts and priority lists worked out
accepting a reduction of more than 125,-
000 service troops. At the end of Novem- 58Memo, Handy for CG ETO, 21 Oct 43, sub:
U.K. Troop Basis, 1st and 2d Phase, ETO 320.2
ber the theater’s over-all troop basis, first Strength and Troop Basis, I.
and second phases combined, calling for 59Memo, Meacham for Beeler, 25 Nov 43.
130 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

earlier in the year. The ETOUSA air that large-scale ground combat operations
force had made a negligible recovery in were not contemplated until the following
the early months of 1943 despite the high spring.
priority accorded it at the Casablanca The progress of the service troop build-
Conference. In April it was able to operate up gave far more cause for concern, par-
only six heavy bomber groups with a daily ticularly in the early months. The SOS
average strength of only 153 planes.60 force in the United Kingdom, like the
Upon the approval of the Combined ground forces, had remained almost sta-
Bomber Offensive plan the build-up of the tionary, with a strength of about 34,000
Eighth Air Force assumed a new urgency throughout the first five months of 1943.
and the means were now finally found to In June the theater repeated a request
carry out the movement of both personnel which had been heard many times be-
and cargo roughly as planned. The re- fore—to speed up the arrival of service
sumption of the BOLERObuild-up first be- troops in order to take advantage of the
came evident in the month of May, when long summer days and good weather to
nearly the entire shipment to the United advance the construction of the needed
Kingdom (20,000 men) consisted of air facilities in the United Kingdom. There
units. The air build-up in fact continued now were additional reasons for a more
to be favored for most of the summer, and rapid build-up, for the decision to reinsti-
from May through August accounted for tute the preshipping procedure resulted in
approximately 100,000 or three fifths of heavy advance shipments of cargo, and it
the 165,000 men shipped to the United appeared that there would be insufficient
Kingdom. (Table 3) By the end of the year British labor to handle more than about
the air force had achieved a remarkable seventy-five ships per month. The theater
growth from 16 groups, 1,420 planes, and was already employing Medical Corps,
74,000 men in May to 46 groups, 4,618 ground combat, and air force troops
planes, and 286,264 men.61 The move- alongside British civilian labor in depots
ment of air combat units actually pro- and ports, and the shortage of labor was
ceeded ahead of the estimated shipping already adversely affecting certain British
schedules set up at TRIDENT. services to the U.S. forces, such as vehicle
The SOS and ground force build-up assembly, tire retreading, and coal deliv-
also achieved a n encouraging record, but ery to North Africa. At one time during
only after a serious lag in the early months. the summer the theater commander con-
Ground force strength in the United sidered using the entire 29th Division as
Kingdom remained almost unchanged labor. 62
from January through May, with fewer From June through August the theater
than 20,000 men (comprising only one received fewer than 46,000 service troops.
division, the 29th), and made only negli- The lag resulted in part from diversion of
gible gains in June and July. By December shipments to another area, in part from
it was built up to 265,325 men. This was the unavailability of the desired types of
far short of the build-up which the theater
commander had originally requested in 60 Cravenand Cate, The Army Air Forces, II, 311.
61Progress Rpt. Progress Div, SOS, 4 Oct 43,
May (390,000 by 31 December), but the Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces, II, 639.
shortage was not serious in view of the fact 62Problem of Troop and Cargo Flow, pp. 69–71.
THE BUILD-UP I N STRIDE, 1943 131

units. Despite the earlier restrictions which activated earlier than had been antici-
the Combined Chiefs of Staff had placed pated to meet ETOUSA’s requirements.67
on any further diversion of resources to the So urgent did the need become in the
Mediterranean, the Sicilian operation had summer of 1943 that the War Department
met with such brilliant success, and pros- finally resorted to the expedient of divert-
pects for an Italian collapse were so favor- ing partially trained ground and air per-
able that the decision was made in July to sonnel to the Army Service Forces (for-
invade Italy. Once more, therefore, oper- merly the War Department SOS, renamed
ations in the Mediterranean area asserted in March) for training as service troops. 68
a prior and more urgent claim to available Shortages in the United Kingdom were
resources. In response to requests from particularly acute in the category of engi-
General Eisenhower approximately 66,000 neer construction units needed to com-
troops were diverted to the North African plete the program for airdromes, hut-
theater, and only 37,000 troops (mostly ments, storage, hospitals, shops, and
air units) out of a projected 103,000 could assault-training facilities. General Lee
be shipped to the United Kingdom in noted that standards had already been
63 Theater officials expected
August. that lowered from those recommended by the
the net loss would be even greater, and chief surgeon for shelter and hospital beds,
would have a cumulative effect on the and airdrome standards were also below
total BOLEROprogram, since the postpone- those of the RAF. 69The SOS commander
ment of the SOS build-up would neces- had asked for twenty-nine engineer gen-
sarily delay the ETO’s readiness to accept eral service regiments by 30 September.
groundand air force units.64 Late in July the War Department in-
General Lee and the Combined Com- formed him that only nineteen could be
mittee of London learned of the prospec- shipped unless certain unit training was
tive diversions early in July.65 The SOS waived. The theater, as in 1942, was will-
commander immediately protested, warn- ing enough to train units in the United
ing the War Department that any further Kingdom, and therefore accepted the par-
postponement or curtailment of the SOS tially trained troops.70 Much the same
troop arrivals would jeopardize the cross-
Channel operation itself, for the theater 63Ibid., p. 73.
64Memo, Ross for Lee, 16 J u l 43, sub: August
was losing unrecoverable time through its Troop Lift, SOS AG 320.2 SOS May 43-Jan 44.
inability to undertake the necessary prep- 65Ltr, Lutes to Lee, 9 J u l4 3 , ETO 381 Opns Data,
Basic Plng Dir 1, Transportation; Cbl Black 7,
arations for the later ground force arriv- BSCC(W) to BCC(L), 15 J u l 43, ASF Plng Div,
als.66 Theinability of the War Department BOLERO-SICKLE Com, Series II, A46–183, Item 22.
to ship service units of the required types 66Memo, Lee for Secy War, 22 J u l 43, sub:
BOLERO-SICKLE Build-up, SOS AG 381 BOLERO Com-
was essentially the fruit of its earlier bined Com.
neglect of the SOS troop basis. Although 67Ltr, Lutes to Lee, 1 2 J u n 43, SOS 381 Troop
the activation of service units had been Basis a n d Strength 1943; Ltr, Lutes to Lee, 9 Jul 43,
ETO 381 Opns Data, Basic Plng Dir 1—Trans-
greatly expedited since the fall of 1942, it portation.
had been a struggle to obtain from the 68Problem of Troop and Cargo Flow, p. 72.
General Staff the men needed to fill out 69 Memo, Lee for Secy War, 22 J u l 43, s :
the units authorized in the 1943 troop BOLERO-SICKLE Build-up.
70Note for record, O P D , 30 J u l43, O P D 321, 2
basis, and the SOS units had had to be ETO, Sec VI.
132 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

situation obtained with regard to air force Troop shipments in the remaining four
service troops, and as a result the build-up months of the year did not quite achieve
of combat units took place at the expense the QUADRANT estimates, although the
of service troops, creating a serious lack of theater received record shipments of air,
balance in the summer of 1943. I n Octo- ground, and service troops from Septem-
ber the Air Forces began shipping thou- ber through December. I n October the
sands of casuals to the United Kingdom, arrivals topped 100,000 for the first time,
where the Eighth Air Force planned to and in November rose to 174,000. At the
give them on-the-job training and organ- end of the year ETOUSA had a total
ize them into various types of service strength of 773,753 men (as against a
cumulative build-up of 8 14,300 projected
Beginning in September the shipment at Quebec), which represented slightly
of service units improved appreciably. In more than half of the authorized first
the last four months of the year the SOS phase troop basis. General Devers was
almost tripled its strength in the United acutely aware of the limited port and rail
Kingdom, rising from 79,900 to 220,200. capacity in the United Kingdom, and had
The Combined Chiefs meanwhile had hopedfora heavierflow.73It was obvious
raised the sights for the U.K. build-up. In at the end of the year, however, that there
August the Allied leaders met in the would have to be heavy shipments in the
QUADRANT Conference at Quebec for a first months of 1944.
full-dress debate on strategy for 1944. By
that time the tide of war had definitely (3) The Flow of Cargo in 1943
turned in favor of the Allies. Italy was at
the very brink of collapse; the German The flow of supplies and equipment to
armies had already been ejected from the the United Kingdom under the revived
Caucasus and the Don Basin, and were BOLEROprogram got under way some-
now being forced to give up the last of their what in advance of the personnel build-
conquests east of the Dnieper. For the up, largely because of the more favorable
most part the Quebec meeting resulted in cargo shipping situation. As a result of the
a reindorsement of the TRIDENT decisions gradual elimination of the submarine
so far as operations in the European area menace and the record-breaking produc-
were concerned. It again gave the air of- tion of shipping, the total tonnage lost
fensive from the United Kingdom the from all sources by the Allies and neutrals
highest strategic priority, approved the since September 1939 was more than re-
first product of the COSSAC planners— placed during 1943. In that year the ton-
the OVERLORD plan for cross-Channel at- nage constructed was four times the total
tack in May 1944—and directed that lost in the same period. 74
preparations should go forward for such Cargo shipping had been allocated on
a n operation. As a result of the diminish- the basis of a build-up of 80,000 men in
ing scale of shipping losses it was also pos-
71Craven a n d Cate, The Army Air Forces, II, 640;
sible to raise the target for the BOLERO Cbl, Handy to C G ETO, 27 Sep 43, a n d Note for
build-up. Troop movement capabilities record, 27 Sep 43, OPD 320.2 ETO, Sec VII.
were now increased from the previous 72CCS 329/2, 26 Aug 43.
TRIDENT figure of 1,300,300 to 1,416,900 AG73Cbl W–2 154, Devers to Marshall, 20 J u l4 3 , SOS
320.2 SOS May 43–Jan 44.
by 1 May 1944.72 74U.S. Fleet Anti-submarine Bulletin, I (Feb 44), 8.
THE BUILD-UP IN STRIDE, 1943 133

the first three months, and 169,000 in the habit of shipping equipment force-
second quarter. The subsequent cancella- marked, precedent indicated the latter
tion of troop movements to the United method. But the instability of the troop
Kingdom freed approximately 150,000 basis in the spring of 1943, and the impos-
ship tons per month from hauling the sibility at that time of accurately forecast-
equipment of these units, and left the ing troop arrivals, reduced to guesswork
Army Service Forces (ASF) with the prob- the planning of advance shipment for spe-
lem of finding cargo for the space. cific units. Bulk shipment, on the other
To both ETOUSA and the ASF this hand, would allow the build-up of depot
situation was ready made for the reinstitu- stocks in the United Kingdom with less
tion of the preshipping procedure which regard for lists of specific troop units and
had been attempted on a limited scale in could thus proceed with relative disregard
1942. ETOUSA in particular wanted for in the troop basis.75
changes
equipment to arrive in advance of troops At the urging of both ETOUSA and the
so that it could be issued to them on their ASF, the General Staff gave a cautious ap-
arrival and loss of training time could proval to the preshipment concept on 16
thereby be avoided. Preshipment would April. As authorized at that time, the plan
also preclude telescoping heavy shipments provided for the shipment of organiza-
in the months immediately preceding the tional equipment, force-marked, thirty
invasion, when British port capacity was days in advance of the sailing of units. In
expected to be a decisive limiting factor. effect, this was not preshipment at all as
In February and March General An- envisaged and proposed by the theater, for
drews repeatedly urged the War Depart- it meant that equipment would arrive, at
ment to adopt this procedure. Early in best, at approximately the same time as
April he came forward with a detailed the units. Moreover, it adhered to the old
proposal requesting that shipments arrive force-marking practice by which sets of
thirty to forty-five days in advance of equipment were earmarked for specific
troops, or, as a less desirable alternative, units and therefore did not embody the
that organizational equipment be shipped idea of shipments in bulk. Advance ship-
force-marked and arrive at least simul- ment was applied only to a selected list of
taneously with the arrival of troops. The items—combat maintenance, boxed gen-
War Department General Staff gave the eral purpose vehicles, and Class IV sup-
request a cool reception. Recalling the plies (items such as construction and
unhappy experience with preshipped sup- fortification materials, for which allow-
plies in the summer of 1942, when much ances are not prescribed)—in which pro-
equipment had been temporarily lost in duction at this time exceeded current
the U.K. depots, the General Staff feared requirements. Established priorities then
that this situation might be repeated. The- in force also limited the application of the
ater officials were fully aware of the dan- program, since North African operations,
ger, and it was for precisely this reason training requirements in the United
that they were at the same time urging the States, the bomber offensive in the United
early shipment of service troops. There Kingdom, and two major operations in
was also a question as to whether equip-
75Except as otherwise noted, the discussion ofship-
ment should be shipped in bulk or in sets ping procedures is based on the monograph, Problem
for “type” or specific units. Because of the of Troop and Cargo Flow, Chs. I and II.
134 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

the Pacific all had more urgent call on that assigned to normal shipments to the
supplies. Applying the force-marking United Kingdom, which was already near
principle even made it difficult to compute the bottom of the priority list of overseas
requirements because of the unstable theaters, but were far down on the priority
troop basis. In general, then, preshipment list of units in various stages of training in
was accorded hardly more than lip service the United States. Only after all the pre-
at this stage, reflecting both the War De- scribed training allowances of units had
partment’s reluctance to go further and been filled as they moved upward in the
the theater’s continued low priority priority scale in preparation for overseas
position. movement could supplies be made avail-
Unsatisfied with this half-hearted ac- able for advance shipment purposes.
ceptance of the preshipment idea, the The preshipment procedure therefore
ASF immediately exerted efforts to obtain began under heavy handicaps. Other
a fuller implementation of the concept. theaters, the training allowances of troops
O n 16 May it succeeded in getting OPD’s in the United States, and high priority
approval of an amended procedure which operations all took precedence. In fairness
overcame one of the most restrictive fea- to those who worked out the emasculated
tures of the original directive. To circum- version of the scheme it should be said
vent the difficulty of computing require- that this was probably the highest position
ments for the very tentative troop basis preshipment could be accorded at the
then in existence, it was decided that time. It was wholly consistent with cur-
equipment would not be shipped for spe- rent strategic aims, for the cross-Channel
cific units, but rather for “type” units. operation was to remain in doubt for sev-
While shipments were ostensibly com- eral months to come. The immediate aim
puted from the troop basis, the troop basis of preshipment, after all, was not to guar-
was recognized as largely fictitious, and antee a n unlimited build-up for BOLERO,
equipment was to be shipped for type in- but to obtain sufficient cargo to fill the
fantry divisions, antiaircraft battalions, available shipping space in the next few
port battalions, and so on, on the safe as- months. In the four months from May
sumption that the theater would even- through August the “surplus” of space
tually need and get these types of units. over the normal requirements of troops
The equipment was to be stockpiled or moving to the United Kingdom was
pooled in U.K. depots for issue to such expected to total 784,000 measurement
units upon their arrival. Thus, while hav- tons. Beginning in September the heavier
ing a definite relationship to a troop basis troop flow was expected to absorb all
of tentative dimensions, equipment was to available tonnage for the cargo which
be shipped in bulk and not earmarked for would normally accompany units. In fact,
particular units. cargo shipping space would fall short of
Even this amendment did not permit a requirements in the fall, and the preship-
full blossoming of the preshipment idea as ment program was therefore anticipating
originally conceived. Supplies intended the heavy cargo requirements of later
for advance shipment still were to be months. These expected developments
drawn only from excess stock or produc- gave the proposal an unassailable logic.
tion. They not only held a priority below Even in the context of its limited objec-
T H E BUILD-UP IN STRIDE, 1943 135

TABLE 4—CARGO FLOW TO THE UNITED KINGDOM IN 1943

Source: Shipment data from [Richard M. Leighton] Problem of Troop and Cargo Flow in Preparing the European Inva-
sion. 1943-44, prep in Hist Sec, Control Div, ASP, 1945, MS, p. 154, OCMH. Receipt data from TC Monthly Progress
Rpts, Scatistics Br, OCofT, SOS ETO, ETO Adm 450–51.

tive, however, preshipment did not achieve to the United Kingdom in the four-month
its goal. Despite strenuous efforts, suf- period from May through August, slightly
ficient cargo could not be found to fill the more than 900,000 tons, or 39 percent,
space released by the reduction in troop represented preshipped cargo. This was a
movements. A total of 135,000 measure- large proportion, but hardly represented
ment tons was shipped to the United a spectacular achievement in preship-
Kingdom before the end of April, but this ment. T h e percentage was this high only
left approximately 100,000 tons capacity because troop sailings to the United King-
which could not be filled a n d was there- dom were small in these months and the
fore turned back to the War Shipping normal accompanying equipment and
Administration.76 T h e same inability to supplies accounted for a relatively small
fill available shipping space continued in portion of the total cargo space. Preship-
varying degree throughout the next four ment was actually failing to achieve its
months. Approximately 1,050,000 tons of immediate purpose, which was to utilize
shipping were made available for May
and June, but less than 800,000 tons of 76A measurement ton, in contrast to a long ton, is
cargo were dispatched. (Table 4) I n July a unit of volume rather than weight, reckoned at 40
cubic feet. Since the density of cargo varies greatly,
780,000 tons of an allocated 1,012,000 there is no fixed conversion factor between measure-
tons of space were utilized, and in August ment and long tons, but in shipments to the ETO
only 730,000 tons were shipped as over a long period one long ton was equivalent
to approximately 2.6 measurement tons. The terms
against the available 1,122,000. Of the “ship ton” and “measurement ton” are inter-
2,304.000 measurement tons shipped changeable.
136 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

all available shipping. Furthermore, full directive of 8 July ordering the advance
advantage was not being taken of the long shipment suspended after 15 August until
summer days when British ports were at the strategic situation was clarified. By
their maximum capacity and relatively early August most of the equipment for
free from air attack. troops scheduled to reach the ETO by the
The failure to achieve even the narrow end of 1943 had been shipped, and it was
aims of the preshipment program is not necessary to reach a decision on preship-
too surprising in view of the status of ment of equipment for troops sailing after
Allied plans in the summer of 1943. the first of January. Fortunately the air
Fundamental to the failure was the low had cleared somewhat by this time, and
priority accorded preshipment cargo. This the list of ground units scheduled to sail
in turn reflected in part the doubts that before 1 May 1944, completing the first
surrounded future strategy. Even the phase troop basis, was complete. O n 13
TRIDENT Conference, with its resolutions August came approval of preshipment on
on the Combined Bomber Offensive, cross- the extended troop basis, thus allowing
Channel attack, and the accelerated advance shipment of supplies to continue.
build-up, did not resolve these doubts. It was only a few days later that the
The temptation still remained to commit QUADRANT Conference at Quebec reaf-
Allied resources more deeply into the firmed earlier decisions on operations in
Mediterranean, and throughout the sum- Europe, dispelling much of the fog of the
mer the possibility remained that there past two months and incidentally reaffirm-
might be no cross-Channel operation after ing the validity of preshipment. The
all. Late in June came the request from conferees again recognized the all-impor-
North Africa for additional personnel, tant problem of U.K. port capacity, which
which further upset planned troop flow to had a significant bearing on the entire
the United Kingdom, and in July there cargo shipping program. British officials
were indications that the entire European had already called attention to the prob-
strategy would be reconsidered. lem at Casablanca and at TRIDENT,
In view of the wavering strategic plans, noting that the maximum practical limit
preshipment definitely involved risks. was 150 shiploads per month, even with
Tying up additional equipment in the the help of U.S. dock labor. At the
U.K. depots might actually make it dif- TRIDENT Conference in May they had
ficult to equip a force for a major opera- agreed to a quarterly schedule of sailings
tion elsewhere except by reshipping the to meet U.S. requirements averaging 90
stocks from the United Kingdom. Logistic ships per month in the third and fourth
plans had been mapped out at TRIDENT to quarters of 1943, and 137 per month in
conform with strategy; but with the stra- the first and second quarters of 1944. By
tegic emphasis subject to change, logistic August, however, it had become evident
plans could hardly be stable. Nothing that the slow rate of troop and cargo
demonstrated so pointedly the necessity movements during the spring and summer
for firm objectives if the logistic effort was would force a tremendous acceleration of
to be effective. movements in the fall and winter, which
The instability of preshipment plans would be beyond the capacity of U.K.
was best exemplified in the Chief of Staff’s ports. British officials were particularly
T H E BUILD-UP IN STRIDE, 1943 137

concerned about the pressure in the North Africa, resulting in smaller troop
months immediately preceding the inva- movements to the United Kingdom and,
sion, when ports would also be taxed by in turn, relatively small normal cargo
out-loading activities. The primary cause shipments. Consequently, of the 730,200
of this limitation was the shortage of labor, tons shipped that month, a n abnormally
and measures were already being taken to large proportion—about 48.7 percent—
dispatch additional U.S. port battalions to represented preshipped cargo, even though
the United Kingdom in anticipation of the the total tonnage was not large. Ship-
deficits. ments in September and October were
At Quebec British officials insisted on a considerably larger, totaling 906,981 and
revision of the earlier sailing schedules, 1,018,343measurement tons, respectively.
calling for an increase to 103 shiploads per In these months, however, troop sailings
month in the fourth quarter of 1943, and were so much heavier that preshipped
a reduction to 119 per month in the first cargo accounted for only 40.4 and 36.5
and second quarters of 1944. 77Advancing percent.
the heavier shipments to the fall of 1943 November shipping also felt the effect
was obviously indicated to relieve the of outside logistic factors. The decision
strain in the early months of 1944, and had been made at TRIDENT, and reaf-
also to make up for the lag during the firmed at Quebec, to transfer four Amer-
summer of 1943. The schedule revision ican divisions from the Mediterranean to
meant a net reduction of 77 ships for the the United Kingdom. This redeployment
nine-month period, however, and placed was largely carried out in November and
a ceiling on U.K. reception capacity which had its repercussion on the U.K. build-up
was considerably below the quantity of by diverting troop shipping and cutting
ships and cargo the War Shipping Admin- deeply into the planned troop sailings
istration and the ASF could provide. So from the United States. Once more the
far as preshipment was concerned, the ASF was suddenly faced with the problem
remaining months of 1943 were to be of finding equipment to fill the cargo ship-
crucial, since the equipment accompany- ping released by this cancellation of troop
ing the heavy troop unit movements in movements. The result was evident in the
1944 would certainly absorb the bulk of tonnage figures for November. Less than
the available shipping after the first of the 850,000 tons were shipped that month,
year. Efforts were therefore bent toward but of this total 457,868 tons, or 54
finding cargo to fill the available shipping percent, were preshipped equipment, the
in the remaining months of 1943. largest advance shipment yet achieved in
Cargo shipments to the United King- both actual tons and percentage of total
dom in August totaled only 730,300 cargo. Even this figure was misleading,
measurement tons, and well reflected the however, for three of the four divisions
numerous logistical problems which could transferred from North Africa had to be
affect the carrying out of BOLERO.Rear- equipped from stocks established in the
mament of additional French divisions in United Kingdom. In December a total of
North Africa, first of all, had drawn off 910,482 measurement tons was shipped to
about 250,000 tons. In addition, August
had seen the diversion of U.S. personnel to 77CCS 329/2, 26 Aug 43, Annex VII.
 138 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

the United Kingdom. Because of the con- Forces. I n September the ASF again
siderably heavier troop sailings with their raised the question, this time with strong
accompanying equipment, however, pre- backing from the theater. ETOUSA was
shipped cargo totaled only 318,314 tons, particularly worried about certain critical
or 35 percent. A comparison of actual ship shortages and pointed out that even mini-
sailings with those scheduled in May and mum requirements of engineer and signal
August is given below: 78 equipment had not been met. There was
need for 125,000 long tons of organiza-
tional equipment for troops arriving in
October alone, and in view of the time
required for distribution, supplies were
neither arriving sufficiently in advance
Actual sailings, therefore, did not even nor keeping pace with the personnel
achieve the ceilings established at the build-up. 80Yet no action was taken to
TRIDENT Conference, much less the accel- change priorities, and in September and
erated schedule agreed on at Quebec for October sufficient cargo was again lacking
the last three months of 1943. A com- to fill available shipping space.
parison of total tonnages shipped with In November the ASF finally succeeded
tonnage allocated likewise reveals the in persuading the General Staff to accord
inability to allocate sufficient cargo to fill cargo for preshipment the same priority as
the available shipping. In the eight-month normal theater shipments (that is, A–lb–8
period from May through December for ground forces and A–lb–4 for air
approximately 1,400,000 tons of shipping forces). But this proved to be a minor
were allocated in excess of the ASF ’s abil- concession. At the end of November, when
ity to provide cargo. The result foreboded the new priority went into effect, it was
serious trouble, for the mounting troop already apparent that available cargo
movements of 1944 were bound to turn space could not be filled for that month.
the surplus tonnages of 1943 into
deficits. 79 78These figures are valid only for purposes of com-
At the heart of the supply build-up parison. The number of sailings was actually expected
to be greater and was in fact considerably greater
problem was the system of priorities which than indicated above. These figures represent ton-
had been necessitated by the inability of nages converted to ships with uniform capacity of
U.S. production facilities to fill all require- 10,000 tons. The total cargo ship sailings actually
exceeded 600 in the fourth quarter of 1943, for
ments simultaneously. Existing priorities example, many of them with loads of less than a
relegated ground force cargo for the Euro- thousand tons.
pean theater to eighth place (priority 79Actually, the world-wide shipping situation was
much tighter than is indicated by the allocations to
A-1b–8)and gave advance shipments to the E T O . T h e “surpluses” for U.K. shipment were
the theater an even lower rating. Fully surpluses only in terms of the available cargo, which
aware of the priority handicap, the ASF was insufficient to utilize the space made available
for the BOLEROshipments. For greater detail on the
in the early stages of the preshipment whole shipping situation see Leighton and Coakley,
program had suggested a revision of pri- T h e Logistics of Global Warfare.
orities for equipment as applied to units in 80 Ltr,Lee to W D , 25 Sep 43, sub: BOLEROSupply
Program, a n d Memo, Col Lord for Lee, 25 Sep 43,
training in the United States, but met sub: Evaluation of Supply Program a n d Present
strong opposition from the Army Ground Supply Status, E T O 390.1 BOLEROSupply Program.
T H E BUILD-UP IN STRIDE, 1943 139

More important, by this time troop move- Fortunately, there was to be no repetition
ments to the United Kingdom had of the unhappy experience of 1942. The
increased to such a scale that the bulk ofServices of Supply was a much more
available tonnage was taken up by the experienced organization by this time, and
normal equipment accompanying troops. 1943 had witnessed a steady improvement
I n other words, the flow of personnel wasin shipping and receiving techniques and
now beginning to catch up with the flow procedures. The goal of the shipping pro-
of cargo, a n d it was no longer possible to
gram was of course to put down in the
advance-ship large tonnages. The stock of United Kingdom adequate supplies in
preshipped equipment in the United such a way that they could be properly
Kingdom was beginning to melt away. Of stored a n d distributed. To achieve this
the estimated 1,040,000 tons of preshippedobjective posed problems for the theater
equipment in the United Kingdom on 1 and the zone of interior which were closely
November, almost half was to be issued to related. The extent to which cargoes were
arriving troops within two months. Some to be segregated in the U.K. ports, for
question even arose as to whether an example, had a direct bearing on the
adequate flow of cargo could be main- marking and manifesting procedure of the
tained to support the scheduled flow of port of embarkation and the zone of
troops. There certainly were doubts about interior depots. Likewise, the marking and
the possibility of meeting the critical documentation system and the degree to
shortages under existing priorities. which cargoes could be broken down
By the end of the year, then, the nub of
when vessels were unloaded largely deter-
the problem was the theater’s priority, mined the nature of the depot system in
which it now became imperative to raise. the theater. Because of the many restric-
Early in December the ASF asked O P D tions on the handling of supplies in the
to raise ETOUSA’s priority for air force theater, however, the theater SOS in most
equipment from 4 to 1, and that for cases was left with little choice in its
ground force equipment from 8 to 2. It methods, thus placing on the zone of
requested the same priority for advance interior the burden of accommodating
shipments. The General Staff approved itself to these difficulties.
this plan and put it into effect before the The importance to the theater of having
end of the year. I n the remaining months cargo properly marked and manifested
before D Day ETOUSA was therefore to had already been demonstrated. Prepara-
enjoy the highest priority for all items tions for TORCH had served as an object
required. Enormous tonnages still re- lesson: the theater must be properly noti-
mained to be shipped to meet the require- fied of the status of its requisitions and
ments of the 1 May troop basis and the shipments, and cargo must be adequately
many special operational needs of the marked. Nothing so stultified plans for
cross-Channel invasion. future action as not knowing what re-
sources could be counted on.
T h e mounting tonnages of supplies T h e need for adequate advance infor-
which began to arrive in British ports in mation was fully recognized. Standing
1943 naturally placed a tremendous bur- operating procedures provided for an
den on the growing SOS organization. elaborate reporting system intended to
 140 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

keep the theater informed of the status of The theater’s need for such a n elabora-
its requests at every stage. T h e key docu- tion of the marking system was dictated
ment in the series was the manifest, which largely by conditions in the United King-
contained the first detailed information dom. ETOUSA had originally planned,
for overseas port agencies regarding a in accordance with normal practice, to
cargo’s contents and stowage, making it have cargo shipped from the port areas to
possible to plan unloading a n d distribu- central base depots in the United King-
tion. Until the end of 1942, however, this dom. There it would be segregated and
system of notification had proved inade- then reshipped to advance or branch
quate. The manifest was often incomplete, depots, which would distribute supplies to
lacked uniformity, was illegible, used a using units. This system was too extrava-
haphazard nomenclature, a n d even gant in the use of transportation and depot
though sent by air mail, frequently did not facilities. British railways were heavily
arrive ahead of the cargo. burdened, a n d depot space was always at
The second aspect of the problem— a premium. To avoid the cross-hauling
proper identification of cargo—was even and back-hauling, and to save labor in the
thornier. Some of the worst marking prac- repeated handling of supplies which this
tices had been eliminated after the frus- system involved, ETOUSA desired a
trating experience in connection with the marking procedure which would so com-
TORCH preparations, but the marking sys- pletely identify specific items of a shipment
tem still fell short of the theater’s needs. with the original requisition that they
As it evolved in 1942, the system of ship- could be routed directly from the port to
ment identification provided only three or specific depots.
four elements of information: a shipping I n 1942 the War Department instructed
designator in the form of a four-letter code the various theaters to work out their own
name which indicated the theater or area codes for this purpose, and ETOUSA of-
to which the cargo was addressed; a n ficials gave the problem careful study. By
abbreviation of the supply service making December 1942 the SOS staffhad worked
the shipment; and the Roman numeral out a plan, and two of its authors, Col. E.
indicating the class of supplies. For ex- C. Goodwin and Maj. Charles Case, were
ample, UGLY-QMIIwas used to mark a sent to Washington to urge its adoption.
crate of quartermaster Class II supplies The UGLYsystem, as it was called, simply
going to the United Kingdom. This mark- expanded on the original identification
ing was unsatisfactory to the ETO, for it procedure, adding the necessary code
failed to allow the identification of sep- symbols so that each item of shipment
arate items of shipment with the cor- could be matched with the original requi-
responding items of the requisition. T h e sition and corresponding items on all sup-
theater desired a series of symbols by ply documents. The specific requisition
which each item in a shipment could be was indicated by a letter and a three-digit
matched with corresponding items on all number. Each service was allocated a
the supply papers and reports, such as the block of numbers. The Quartermaster
requisition, shipping papers, availability Corps, for example, could use any number
notices, packing lists, manifests, loading from 001 to 099, and increased the pos-
cables, and so on. sible number of combinations by adding
T H E BUILD-UP IN STRIDE, 1943 141

a letter to indicate the series of requisi- posed system provided brief, simple code
tions. B019, for example, was the nine- symbols for each shipment, which could
teenth in series B of Q M requisitions, and be transmitted by cable as soon as a ship-
in submitting requisition BO19 the theater ment had been loaded. It virtually assured
would request that all shipments made the theater of receiving a complete listing
against it be marked UGLY–QMII–BO19. of the items in a shipment before it even
This included the basic ingredients of the left the New York Port, and eliminated all
marking code and provided a complete nomenclature references, on which there
oversea address. It was to be stamped on was such confusing lack of uniformity.
all containers in a shipment against a par- Finally, upon a vessel’s departure the
ticular requisition, and thus permitted the cargo loading cable gave the theater even
identification of a particular item, case, or more exact information on the tonnage of
crate of supplies with the requisition cargo for each requisition number and
requesting it. partial shipment.81
There were other refinements and elab- The War Department did not receive
orations. When more than one shipment, the E T O U S A plan with open arms. All
or shipments from two or more depots, agencies concerned subjected it to an
were made against one requisition, addi- exhaustive examination and, while ad-
tional letter and number symbols were mitting its advantages, raised strong
added to indicate the depot making the objections. The Transportation Corps in
shipment and the number of the shipment. particular was critical. The inauguration
When the New York Port received a of the new system involved a complete re-
requisition from London it frequently organization of supply procedures, it
made extracts for filling for the various de- claimed, and a complete reindoctrination
pots where the supplies were stored, and of supply personnel. Furthermore, the
instructed these depots to add the neces- Transportation Corps had recently put
sary code and number to the marking to into effect a more detailed manifest break-
identify its part of the original requisition. down which it hoped would meet the past
The Raritan Arsenal, for example, might criticism by the theater, and desired that
mark its shipment as follows: UGLY- it be given an opportunity to prove its
ORDII-B320RA6. Each of the other ord- worth. Early in January General Lutes
nance depots filling a portion of the B320 therefore asked the theater to withhold
requisition would add its appropriate let- the new plan, but promised to put it into
ter code and shipment number. Addi- operation should the improved manifest
tional abbreviations could be inserted to fail to meet ETOUSA’s needs. A few
indicate specific convoys, priorities, ad- weeks later General Lee held a conference
vance shipments, and so on. From the of his service chiefs, as a result of which he
theater point of view this plan not only reported to the War Department that the
provided a satisfactory means of marking new manifest was proving unsatisfactory.
shipments and matching shipments with The figures compiled by the service chiefs
requisitions, but overcame the persistent indicated that the system had actually de-
difficulties of keeping the theater informed
81 This description of the marking problem is
of the status of its requests. T h e manifest drawn primarily from Chapter V of Problem of
procedure was uncertain at best; the pro- Troop a n d Cargo Flow.
 142 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

teriorated. The manifests still lacked the United Kingdom were not meant to be
type of information needed to indicate the used by the large vehicles of military con-
status of requisitions or to show what sup- voys. So far as the breakdown of cargo in
plies were afloat or e n route. They were the port area was concerned, this was im-
often arriving too late to be of any use to possible unless cargo was adequately
the overseas port commander in giving marked. The SOS had met this problem
disposal instructions. partially by the use of inland sheds where
Once more the authors of the UGLY supplies were segregated and sometimes
plan were sent to Washington, and the ex- stored until shipped to the branch and
perience of December was repeated. The general depots. But General Lee opposed
War Department appeared more opposed the establishment of a complete branch
to the ETOUSA plan than ever. It insisted storage system in the vicinity of the ports
that further improvements had been made because it entailed a far heavier construc-
in the manifest, meeting the theater’s ob- tion program than could be sustained. He
jections, and it now questioned the entire held to the original SOS proposal for a
basis for the detailed system which the marking and forwarding procedure which
theater was demanding. General Lutes would be adaptable to the United King-
felt that the ASF was being asked to ac- dom’s storage and transportation system
commodate all of its shipping procedure and which would facilitate the distribu-
to the U.K. depot system. The theater was tion of supplies within the theater, even if
asking for a detailed advance documenta- it meant changes in zone of interior proce-
tion of shipments so that it could plan the dures. If this could be accomplished
final disposition of every package even be- through a more efficient manifest system,
fore its arrival, and so that it could make well and good. General Lee recognized
a minute breakdown of cargo at the port some good features in the existing manifest
and forward it to the branch and issue de- system and thought it could be improved
pots in a direct single haul. According to even further by the inauguration of a new
General Lutes, this would put the ASF high priority courier service, but it was
into the “retail business.” He thought obvious that ETOUSA did not care to
there was great danger of becoming place its faith in a system which had been
bogged down in such detailed documenta- foundso wantingin the past.83
tion of supplies for the support of a million Late in March the War Department
or more men. The ASF had in mind a approved and put into effect some of the
more “wholesale” handling of supplies, most important features of the UGLY plan
whereby cargo could be broken down by in connection with cargo shipments to the
service near the port and then moved to United Kingdom. Its application at this
interior depots. Since distances were short time represented a compromise, since it
in the United Kingdom, the ASF assumed was intended mainly to supplement the
that much of the redistribution of cargo
82Ltr, Lutes to Lee, 6 Mar 43, USFET AG 400.161
could be handled by trucks. 82 Marking of Supplies 1942–43.
The theater avoided using motor trans- 83Ltr, Lee to Lutes, 1 Apr 43, USFET AG 400.161
port for that purpose, however, until the Marking of Supplies 1942–43. See also SOS ETO
Tentative Overall Plan for Supply a n d Administra-
rail lines became hopelessly burdened. tion, 1 2 Apr 43, Revised Editions of 20 Jun 43 and 1
The narrow and winding roads of the Jan 44, ETO Adm 369.
MOTOR CONVOY waiting to board landing craft during a training exercise, Falmouth,
England, December 1943, above; convoy moving along road in England, below.
144 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

manifest system and therefore to facilitate ships in the United States without much
the notification of the theater about com- regard to destination in the United King-
ing shipments and in the immediate dom. Upon arrival of the ships in U.K.
handling of cargo upon its arrival. It did waters the Ministry of War Transport, in
not implement those portions of the plan so far as possible in accordance with the
which would have given the theater infor- wishes of the SOS service chiefs, allocated
mation on exactly what portions of its vessels to the ports best suited to serve the
requisitions had been filled, on partial destinations of the bulk of the cargo in a
shipments on the same requisition, and on particular ship. The long rail hauls fre-
the shipping depot. T h e result was that quently required to move cargo from the
stock control and record keeping remained port to its ultimate destination thus placed
very complicated a n d constantly in a burden on British internal transporta-
arrears. tion facilities. It would obviously not do to
The problem of stock control and ade- continue this wasteful practice when the
quate supply records concerned the ASF rate of the BOLERO build-up increased to
as much as the theater and was intimately 150 or more ships per month.
related to the problem of transmitting Early in 1943 representatives of the
adequate information about shipments to British War Office, the Ministry of War
the theater. Partly because of the con- Transport, the British Railways, the War
tinuing unsatisfactory system of overseas Shipping Administration, and the SOS
supply records, and partly because of the met to study the problem and worked out
increasingly obvious advantages of the a plan designed to eliminate much of the
UGLY system, the ASF extended the cross- and back-hauling involved in the
ETOUSA plan late in May. Under its current practice. This was the zoning sys-
fuller application the procedure now pro- tem which the War Department approved
vided that separate shipments made in April a n d implemented three months
against particular requisitions would be later. By this plan the United Kingdom
completely identified by the symbols in was at first divided into two zones for the
the third portion of the overseas address receipt of cargo. Zone I, designated by the
already described. I n fact, this particular code word SOXO,included the entire area
feature of the procedure was specifically north of a line of county boundaries
emphasized by the new title which the drawn through London and Banbury, and
ASF now gave it—“Identification of Sep- thus embraced the Clyde and Mersey
arate Shipments to Oversea Destina- River ports (chiefly Glasgow, Liverpool,
tions" (later referred to simply as ISS). In and Manchester) and also the Humber
effect, the system now embodied virtually River ports of Hull a n d Immingham on
the entire UGLYplan. the eastern seaboard. Zone II, known as
Meanwhile the theater persuaded the GLUE,included the southern portions of
ASF to accept still another refinement in England and Wales, and the ports of the
the shipping procedure which further fa- Bristol Channel and Plymouth, South-
cilitated the handling of cargo in the ampton, and London. A third area, Zone
United Kingdom by relieving the strain III, comprising Northern Ireland and
on British transportation. Until the spring named BANG,was added later. It was in-
of 1943 cargo was loaded on available tended that each zone should be served by
T H E BUILD-UP I N STRIDE, 1943 145

its own ports alone and that there should edge of the size, weight, and location of all
be a minimum of hauling from the ports cargo in the ship and the ultimate depot
of one zone into another. 84Service chiefs destination of every item. This informa-
in the United Kingdom were to requisi- tion also enabled transportation officials
tion for a particular zone, a n d ships were to have the required rolling stock avail-
to be loaded in the United States so far as able for movement inland. Clearance of
possible with cargo for that zone. Most the ports always had a high priority on the
cargo henceforth bore the shipping desig- British railways and roads so as to prevent
nator Soxo, GLUE,or BANG,depending on backlogs and congestion in the port areas,
the group of ports to which it was directed, which were frequent targets for the Luft-
instead of UGLY,which was now used only waffe. As the British freight wagons left
on cargo not intended for any particular the ports, depot commanders were imme-
port group in the United Kingdom. Based diately notified by telephone so that they
on an estimated maximum 160 ship ar- could make preparations to receive the
rivals per month, the space and facilities supplies.86
were allocated to handle 65 vessels in The procedure described above was, in
Zone I, 85 in Zone II, and 10 in Zone III. theory a t least, the scheme for theship-
By the end of the year the ports of the ment to and receipt of cargo in the United
three zones were handling 41 percent, 53 Kingdom as gradually worked out in
percent, and 6 percent respectively of the 1943. The system at first appeared highly
incoming cargo, approximately according complex, especially to the ASF, which in
to the plannedloads. 85 the eyes of the theater did not fully com-
Using data from the various shipping prehend the peculiarities of supply prob-
documents, such as the manifests, and the lems in the United Kingdom, and the
cargo loading cables which were dis- ASF was understandably reluctant to
patched from the United States upon the undertake the overhauling of its supply
departure of the ships, the chiefs of services procedures and reindoctrination of thou-
indicated the depots to which they wanted
particular supplies delivered. With this 84Some of the cargo entering the Clyde ports was
be transferred by coaster to the Mersey River ports
information Transportation Corps repre- to in Zone II.
sentatives attended the meeting of the 85Ltr, Lee to C G ASF, 5 Apr 43, sub: Zoning of
Diversion Committee of the Ministry of U.K. for Receipt of U.S. Army Cargo, a n d Memo,
ASF for CofT et al., 27 A p r 43, sub: Zoning of
War Transport at London shortly before Hq U.K. for Receipt of Cargo, ETO 381 Opns Data,
the arrival of a convoy in British waters Basic Plng Dir 1 , Transportation; Memo, Lt Col
and decided on the basis of available W. D. Holland, Asst to COfSASF, for Devers, 7 May
berths, handling equipment, size of the 43, with Incl, Rpt, sub: Résumè of Conf between
Gen Devers and Representatives of CG ASF, Chiefs
ships,and typeof cargo at whichport each of Supply SOS, et al., 7 May 43, ETO Adm 337 1943
vessel was to be discharged. Once these Confs; Troop and Supply Buildup in the United
decisionswere made,the information Kingdom to D Day, Pt. III of The Administrative
was and Logistical History of the ETO, prep by Hist Div
passed alongto the service chiefs, who USFET, 1946, MS (hereafter cited as Troop and Sup-
then determined the final destination of ply Buildup), pp. 192–94, 244, OCMH.
each itemof cargo.By the timea vesselby86Int History of the Transportation Corps ETO, prep
a n d Hist Br, Plng Riv, OCofT E T O , 1944,
berthed,the port commanderwas sup- MS (hereafter cited as History of the T C , E T O ) , I
posed to have in his hands precise knowl- (1942–43), 12–13, E T O Adm 582.
146 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

sands of its personnel. But the new system though the U.S. Transportation Corps by
quickly proved its worth a n d earned the 1943 was given full control of American
almost unanimous approval of all thea- ships in the ports. Movement Control di-
ters. In the fall of 1943 the Transportation rected all transportation inland.
Corps added still another improvement to By far the most important of the points
the procedure. It perfected its so-called of entry for American supplies a n d per-
date-line system, scheduling each step in sonnel were the Clyde and Mersey River
processing requisitions and planning ship- ports and those of the Bristol Channel.
ments by a series of deadlines, all actions T h e Humber River ports (Hull a n d Im-
being geared to a fixed convoy sailing mingham), London, and the southern
date. The result was a n integration of the ports of Southampton a n d Plymouth,
several processes into a synchronized op- while important in peacetime, were for a
eration which eliminated many of the long time unsafe because of both enemy
last-minute changes which had character- submarine and air attacks, and were not
ized the preparation of shipments before. extensively used on American account
The addition of still another symbol—the until the avalanche of supplies began late
time priority or convoy cycle symbol—to in 1943. The Clyde ports—consisting-of
the overseas address removed still more of Greenock, Gourock, and, fifteen miles up
the uncertainty for theater supply offi- the river, Glasgow—were the main points
cials.87By the end of 1943, when the tre- of debarkation for American troops. At all
mendous cargo shipments to the United three ports troops were debarked by
Kingdom were getting under way, the tender, in midstream a t Glasgow, and in
ISS, bearing many of the features of the the broad, deep anchorage known as the
originally proposed UGLYplan, was fully “Tail of the Bank” at Greenock and
developed and in operation. Gourock. They immediately entrained at
quayside for their assigned destinations.
( 4 ) Troop and Cargo Reception Glasgow possessed excellent dock facil-
ities, including the necessary cranes. But
The peculiarities and limitations of the Clyde area was relatively removed
British facilities influenced logistic oper- from the principal U.S. lines of communi-
ations along the entire supply pipeline, cations and was used mainly for troop re-
reaching back to the depots and even the ception, accounting for more than half, or
factories in the zone of interior. In Eng- 873,163, of the 1,671,010 U.S. debarka-
land every service and facility groaned tions to 30 May 1944. 88 It accounted for
under the burden of wartime demands only about 8 percent—1,138,000 measure-
and was subjected to the closest control. ment tons, or 226,000 long tons—of the
For personnel and cargo arriving in the total U.S. tonnage discharged in the
United Kingdom this first became evident United Kingdom through May 1944.
in the field of transportation. Two agen- T h e Bristol Channel ports—Swansea,
cies, both under the Ministry of War Cardiff, Newport, a n d Avonmouth—and
Transport, exercised a tight control over
all water and land transport. Sea Trans- 87See Oversea Supply Policies a n d Procedures,
prep by Richard M. Leighton, ASF Historian, 1945,
port at first controlled the entire working MS, Ch. IV, Sec. 3, OCMH.
of vessels from berthing to unloading, al- 88Statistical Progress Rpt, OCofT ETO, 30 Jun 44.
T H E BUILD-UP IN STRIDE, 1943 147

TENDERS ALONGSIDE THE QUEEN ELIZABETH at Gourock, Scotland.

the Mersey ports—Liverpool, Garston, tractor-drawn trailers. Many improve-

Manchester, a n d Birkenhead—were lo- ments were made in cargo-handling
cated nearer the center of U.S. activity methods, however, including the use of
and tended to specialize in freight dis- special slings for lifting explosives, and the
charge. The two groups of ports accounted construction of floating cranes for han-
for 9,750,000 measurement tons (3,800,- dling tanks and tractors. With the mount-
000 long tons) or 70 percent of all tonnage ing tonnage receipts in the summer of
brought into the United Kingdom for 1943 these ports were hard pressed to pre-
American troops through May 1944. Most vent the formation of backlogs, but by one
of the heavy equipment and supplies, such expedient or another they managed to
as tanks, guns, and ammunition, were keep their quays cleared. The Mersey
brought through these ports, although ports, in addition to discharging about
often with great difficulty. Much of the 4,500,000 measurement tons of freight,
equipment at these ports was outmoded debarked more than a half million U.S.
and inadequate for unloading directly troops.
from ship to rail, or rails were so con- American cargo imports constituted
structed that it was impossible to follow only a fraction of the total volume of
the American practice of moving cargo by freight which flowed through the British
means of pallets and fork-lift trucks or ports. Throughout the war years Britain
 148 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

required an import program to meet its interests of both the employer and em-
civil needs and sustain its war effort which ployees to discharge vessels quickly or in
ran to about 25,000,000 tons per year. In those ports where handling equipment
1943 U.S. imports into the United King- was superior, a n d the company even at-
dom added another 2,500,000 tons to this tempted to dictate the port where ships
volume of traffic. The capacity of the ports were to be berthed. In 1943 this unsatis-
to handle these enormous tonnages was factory situation was resolved by new con-
limited as much by labor difficulties as by tracts whereby it was to HEADLINE’S
the inadequacies of the physical plant. advantage to accomplish a rapid dis-
The fighting services had long since drawn charge and therefore assure a quick turn-
off the younger and more able-bodied round of vessels. 90
men, leaving a labor force both smaller T h e labor problem in Belfast was fur-
and less efficient. T h e average age of ther complicated by the existence of rival
dockers at Liverpool, for example, was Catholic and Protestant unions, one of
52.89Port operations were also plagued by which worked coasters and the other
prevailing employment practices in the ocean-going vessels. Since much of the
United Kingdom. Before the war British cargo discharged at Belfast was trans-
dock work was conducted under a system ferred to English or Scottish ports by
of casual labor, with workers shifting from coaster, a strike started by the union han-
dock to dock and from one employer to dling coasters would also tie up discharge
another. In the summer of 1940 dock of ocean-going freighters since there was
laborers were required to register and sub- little storage space in the port itself. All in
mit to compulsory transfer to any port all, the situation was highly volatile, and
where they were needed. The bombing of disputes over pay a n d other matters fre-
the southern and eastern ports threw an quently involved American port officials
increasingly heavy load on the safer west- in wildcat strikes or threats to strike, and
ern ports and made it imperative to bring a t times delayed the scheduled discharge
these ports to the fullest efficiency, and of ships. Until the summer of 1943 the
therefore also required revisions in the British unions restricted the use of military
employment system which still prevailed. labor to those periods when civilian work-
I n 1941, before the Americans came on ers were unavailable. By that time, how-
the scene, the entire system of dock em- ever, the flow of cargo rose to huge
ployment became more regularized, and proportions and resulted in a n acute
the National Dock Labour Corporation labor shortage, and the ban on the use of
was formed to take over as the employer military labor was lifted. In the Bristol
of all stevedores. Nevertheless, British Channel area the U.S. port commander
labor practices still brought many frustra- had foreseen this shortage and had an-
tions. In Northern Ireland, for example, chored a ship a t Penarth to train a new
port labor was controlled by the stevedor-
ing concern of G. Heyn and Son, Ltd., 89Ltr, Col Walter D McCord and Lt Col Leo J.
Meyer to CofT WD, 18 O c t 43, sub: Report, AG
called HEADLINE, which provided workers Records 320.1–353.9 England 1943.
upon request of the port authorities. For 90History of the T C , ETO, I, 28-29; T h e Local
this service it received a 20 percent com- Procurement of Labor and Supplies, U.K and Con-
tinental, Pt. X of T h e Administrative a n d Logistical
mission on the gross payroll. Under the History of the ETO, Hist Div USFET, 1946, MS, pp.
terms of the contracts it was against the 45–47.
T H E BUILD-UP I N STRIDE, 1943 149

group of fifty Transportation Corps sol- trol. With continental operations in mind,
diers in unloading methods every two when U.S. Transportation Corps units
weeks. This scheme paid off well when the would have to operate their own lines of
critical labor shortages developed in 1943. communications, he felt it was his duty to
At the height of the BOLERO build-up in develop a n organization capable of func-
the spring of 1944 fifteen U.S. port battal- tioning independently. H e therefore in-
ions of approximately 950 men each were sisted that the Transportation Corps in the
engaged in the discharge of cargo from E T O be allowed to assume full responsi-
U.S.-controlled vessels. 91 bilities in transportation operations as
The task of moving personnel and cargo rapidly as permitted by available person-
inland in the United Kingdom fell chiefly nel. At the same time he organized a re-
to the railways. I n addition to the limited fresher course for transportation officers,
capacity of their rolling stock the British referred to by some as a “deflation school,”
railways suffered from other handicaps, since it was suspected of having been de-
such as limited head space and inade- signed as much to deflate any latent
quate tunnel clearances, which impeded chauvinism which U.S. officers might
the free movement of tanks and other have about U.S. transportation facilities
awkward equipment. Colonel Ross, chief and procedures as to orient them in Brit-
of transportation in the ETO, had re- ish railroading methods.93
ported after his first look at U.K. facilities T h e development of a completely sep-
in 1942, that the country was “so cramped arate U.S. transportation system was
and small, the railroad equipment so tiny, hardly feasible, and ETOUSA agreed
the roads so small and crooked and meth- with British officials to establish a joint
ods so entirely different” that a complete control. Under this arrangement the
reorientation of operating methods was American traffic control system paralleled
required. 92By comparison with the rail- the British, American personnel working
roads of the United States the British sys- closely with British transportation offi-
tem was indeed in many ways a Lillipu- cials and assuming a full share of re-
tian one. Nevertheless, it accomplished a sponsibility in the control of movements.
prodigious feat although dangerously By early 1943 American traffic officers
overburdened, and by the tightest control were handling all their own transporta-
handled traffic approaching the crowded tion in areas where U.S. troops were pre-
schedules of the New York subways. ponderant, and American Rail Transpor-
With the first inauguration of the tation Officers (RTO’s) became familiar
BOLERO build-up in the summer of 1942 a figures in the many stations along the
question immediately arose as to the role British rail lines. Railway operating units
of U.S. Transportation Corps personnel in meanwhile trained by performing switch-
the U.K. organization, The British desired
that American troop units should be ab- 91History of the T C , ETO, II (Jan-Mar 44),
Marine Operations; Memo, Col Meyer for Hugh M.
sorbed into the existing system. Colonel Cole, 30 Jul 51, sub: Critique of MS, Sec. I, p. 13,
Ross objected to such complete integra- O C M H ; Ltr, Col McCord and Col Meyer to CofT
tion, and quickly established trained traf- WD, 18 Oct 43, sub: Report.
fic control personnel in the British rail 92Ltr, Ross to Gen Wylie, 28 J u l 42, ETO Adm
314ATransportation—General.
transportation offices in the regional com- 93I. Ross, “Ross of ETO,” Army Transportation
mands to learn the British system of con- Journal, I (April, 1945), 32–36.
150 LOGISTICAL S U P P O R T OF T H E ARMIES

ing service at the depots and operating for the principal consideration being simplic-
short distances on the main lines. Amer- ity of design and construction a n d the
ican units first took over the operation of necessary ruggedness to stand u p under
switchyards at the Ashchurch, Sudbury, combat conditions, since they were even-
a n d Thatcham depots in the fall of 1942, tually intended to be used on the Conti-
a n d in November for the first time oper- nent. T h e first of these utility locomotives
ated a “goods” train on a British main arrived with ceremony befitting their
line, between Sudbury and Egginton.94 importance at Cardiff, Wales, in Novem-
Since distances were short, no attempt ber 1942. T h e program was later ex-
was made to establish the normal staging tended, based on a n estimate that some
system for troops arriving in the United nine hundred locomotives would be
Kingdom. By careful scheduling of troop needed on the Continent in the first six
trains (up to seventy per day) to meet con- months of operations, a n d joint stock-
voys, worked out in advance by represent- piling of Boleros a n d British Austerities
atives of the British railways, Movement was begun. I n 1943 the American-built
Control, a n d the Office of the Chief of engines began to arrive at the rate of
Transportation, E T O U S A , troops could about fifty per month.95 A freight car
be marched directly from boatside to train building program was also undertaken.
and dispatched to their destinations with- Large numbers of cars designed for use on
out delay. T h e entire movement had to be the continental railways were shipped
highly synchronized because passenger knocked down to save shipping space and
cars were in short supply, normal civilian were assembled in England, principally
rail traffic h a d to be accommodated, and a t the Hainault Railway Sheds a n d Sid-
rail facilities at the ports were limited. ing, excellent shops constructed just before
RTO’s a t the port supervised the transfer the war a t Chigwell, Essex, a few miles
of troops from portside to trains, and northeast of London.96
others along the route made arrangements Motor transport moved little cargo
for refreshment halts. until the fall of 1943 mainly because of the
Supplies were moved under the same difficulties of operating large trucks over
general system of control, with regional rural roads and through the often narrow
transportation officers working in close streets of English towns. By that time the
collaboration with British Movement flow of cargo swelled to proportions which
Control. As with troop movements, the the railways could not handle, a n d motor
local RTO’s were responsible for issuing transport therefore came into increasing
the necessary shipping documents, notifi- use, operating under the Motor Transport
cations of departure, and so on. Division of the Transportation Corps and
As indicated earlier, the British rail- under the same regional control system as
ways were desperately short of locomo-
tives, and in 1942 arranged for the 94History of the T C , ETO, 1, 7–8, 49; Troop and
shipment of 400 engines (known as Bo- Supply Buildup, pp. 111-12, 119–24,
201.
leros) from the United States. These 95Memo, AACofT Plng for Col K. F. Hausauer,
2–8–0’s were the equivalent of the British 8 Dec 43, sub: Locomotives and Port Battalion
Requirements for BOLEROa n d R O U N D U PSHAEF
,
“Austerity” class engines. They had been G–4 381 BOLER1I44.
designed in co-operation with the British, 96History of the TC, ETO, 1 49–51.
 U.S.-BUILT LOCOMOTIVES stockpiled in Wales, above. Locomotives, tank cars, and
freight cars are checked at an Amy railway shop before being stockpiledfor use on the Continent,
below.
152 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

was used in co-ordinating movement by necessary space was that of the chief engi-
rail. In the final eight months of the neer. The chief quartermaster exercised
build-up, from October 1943 through staff supervision over all the general
May 1944, trucks of the Transportation depots—that is, depots which stored and
Corps carried approximately 1,100,000 issued the supplies of more than one serv-
long tons (averaging 140,000 tons per ice. Branch depots, which handled the
month) or one third of all supplies cleared supplies of only one service, came under
97
fromthe ports. the technical supervision of the respective
service chiefs.
Limitations of manpower, construction To meet a variety of requirements,
materials, and transportation facilities all depot installations necessarily took a vari-
influenced the type of depot system which ety of forms, ranging from the general and
the SOS was to have in the United King- branch depots to the large vehicle parks
dom. Early SOS plans contemplated the and special storage facilities for such items
establishment of two types of depots: one as petroleum and ammunition. Suitable
to store reserves to meet invasion require- storage space was almost always at a pre-
ments and sited with a view to outmove- mium because of the lag in construction,
ment to the Continent; the other to store the necessity of revising early estimates (a
maintenance supplies. This arrangement larger amount of covered storage was
was soon found to be impracticable, and required because of the damp climate and
reserve and maintenance supplies were poor packing of supplies), and the unsuit-
therefore stored in the same depots. Plans ability of some of the facilities turned over
for base or wholesale and advance depots for American use.
were also abandoned when it was found I n the first flush of the BOLERObuild-up
more desirable to route incoming supplies in 1942 there was no time to construct
directly from ports to their ultimate des- new supply installations. The early needs
tination. T h e only concession to the idea of the U.S. forces were met by taking over
of wholesale depots for the purpose of British depots or various types of ware-
segregating supplies was the expedient of houses. The first installations were estab-
the sorting shed, which prevented the lished in former commercial warehouses
clogging of ports. in Liverpool, Bristol, and London, and in
Control of the U.S. depots in the United existing depots at Barry, Thatcham,
Kingdom was first vested in a General Portsmouth, and Ashchurch. The acres of
Depot Service under the theater G–4. newly constructed Nissen hut storage did
This arrangement was short-lived, how- not appear until the middle of 1943. As in
ever, and in accordance with the trend to the case of the ports, much of the ware-
decentralize SOS operations the depots housing turned over by the British was
eventually came under the direct com- hard to adapt to modern storage methods.
mand of the base section commanders in Materials-handling equipment was lack-
whose particular area they were located. ing, space was often poorly arranged,
Planning storage requirements naturally ceilings were too low, doors too narrow,
took place at a higher level. The responsi- and in many multistoried warehouses
bility for consolidating the needs of all the
services belonged to the chief quarter-
master, and the task of providing the 97Troop and Supply Buildup, p. 204.
ROADSIDE STORAGE of ammunition and vehicles in England.
154 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

elevators were either in poor working Investigations that followed the discovery
order or nonexistent. Fairly typical of the of this situation in the fall of 1942 appar-
facilities taken over in the first year was ently did not solve the problem. I n March
the fourteen-story Stanley Tobacco Ware- of the following year General Somervell
house in Liverpool, which became the site himself wrote to General Andrews, noting
of Depot G–14 (the G indicating a general that he had had reports of losses of shock-
depot). Its elevators were old and slow, ing dimensions through theft. The theater
access to the loading bays was restricted, commander assured him that measures
and all traffic was funneled down Dock had been taken to reduce such losses to a
Road, which also bordered Liverpool’s minimum, and took the opportunity to
miles of quays. A picturesque feature was point out that the trouble obviously was
provided by the widespread use of dray not all at the theater end, for investigation
horses, which clattered up a n d down the of some shipments had disclosed that
main thoroughfare day after day with pilferage had taken place before their
their wagonloads of supplies. arrival in the U.K. ports.99
Finding enough civilian labor to aid in G–14 at Liverpool was a n example of
the operation of the depot was a perennial the conversion of commercial facilities to
worry. T h e U.S. Army at first hired reck- meet the requirement for a general mili-
lessly at American wage scales. British tary depot. A more model installation
officials pointed out the serious conse- could be seen in the depot turned over to
quences of such a policy and offered to the Americans at Ashchurch, only a few
provide workers under reciprocal aid pay- miles north of Cheltenham. Located in the
ments. T h e return to British civil service heart of the Bristol Channel port area,
rates naturally caused some bad feelings. a n d adjacent to the Birmingham-Bristol
T h e eventual arrangements for unskilled line of the London, Midland, and Scottish
labor, such as dock gangs a n d warehouse- Railway, this installation became one of
men, have already been mentioned. the key general depots of the SOS net-
Skilled workers, such as clerks and super- work. It had been recently built by the
visors, were thereafter administered and British and organized as a Royal Army
paid by British Pay and Establishment Service Corps establishment, primarily as
Officers, although many British civilians a n automotive depot. I n accordance with
a t higher headquarters continued to be policies laid down in the BOLERO plan, the
paid at American rates through the U.S. transfer of the Ashchurch installation was
Army Finance Office.98 a gradual process. The first SOS units
T h e problem of pilferage added to the were attached in June 1942 to receive
irritants of G–14 in the early months and motor vehicles discharged at the ports.
was a source of trouble at other depots as British troops were gradually replaced by
well. The Liverpool depot received large U.S. units, and a few months later the
quantities of tempting items such as ciga- command of the depot passed from the
rettes, candy, towels, and canned food. In
the confusion of 1942, when records were 98Healey Memoir, pp. 30–35.
poor and guarding was inadequate, thefts 99Ltr, Somervell to Andrews, 23 Mar 43, and Ltr,
Andrews to Somervell, 6 Apr 43, ETO Adm 391
of these commodities by both civilians and Andrews Correspondence; Healey Memoir, pp.
soldiers continued for several months. 33–34.
GENERAL DEPOT AT ASHCHURCH, above. Engineer construction materials stored
at another depot, below.
156 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

British to the Americans. I n August 1942 dozen other minor assemblies such as
the depot had a U.S. strength of slightly starting motors and generators, although
under 3,000 men and consisted of 158 the “Little Detroit,” as the base shop was
permanent buildings, including 10 hang- called, for various reasons never achieved
ar-type and 5 smaller warehouses. Despite these output figures. Before D Day the
the capacity and size of the installation shop reached its highest production rate
many improvements a n d additions were in May 1944, when it turned out 854
necessary. American troops a t first had to engines.
live in bell tents at a site near the depot Tire repair was another of the Ord-
called Camp Northway, which was devoid nance Section’s duties. The first tire repair
of all normal comforts. U.S. engineers set company arrived in the United Kingdom
to work immediately to build a hutted in the summer of 1942. Lacking equip-
camp. Another project that received high ment and supplies, however, the unit was
priority—extending the network of rail utilized for miscellaneous ordnance duties
spurs—eventually gave the depot an for many months, and could not begin the
excellent system that provided rail access work for which it was trained until July
to about one third of the buildings and 90 1943. After its facilities were expanded in
percent of the open storage areas.100 the fall, the tire repair shop achieved a
T h e Ashchurch installation was a gen- rate of more than 3,000 retreads and 6,000
eral depot, receiving, storing, and issuing section repairs per month. Just before D
equipment and supplies for five of the Day the two tire repair companies oper-
seven services—Ordnance, Quartermas- ated on a twenty-four-hour basis.
ter, Signal, Engineer, and Chemical War- I n 1943 the Ordnance Section a t G–25
fare. But its principal activities continued, undertook another important task—vehi-
as under British operation, to be in the cle assembly. Vehicles were shipped to the
field of ordnance supply, a n d all its com- theater either wheeled, boxed, or cased.
manders were either quartermaster or Wheeled vehicles were sent directly to
ordnance officers. T h e depot’s Ordnance parks and depots and, after a little servic-
Section was responsible not only for the ing, were issued for use. Boxed vehicles
receipt, storage, and issue of ordnance came packed in one crate or box and
general supplies, all types of general, spe- required only the addition of wheels and
cial purpose, and combat vehicles and minor assembly and servicing before issue.
artillery, but also for fourth a n d fifth Cased vehicles, however, came either in
echelon maintenance of ordnance equip- twin unit packs (TUP), two vehicles in
ment. The latter responsibility required from one to five boxes, or single unit packs
the establishment of a base shop capable (SUP), one vehicle in one or two boxes,
of completely rebuilding all types of and required considerably more assembly
engines and heavy units. To meet this need work. General Motors and Studebaker
a regular assembly line was organized. 2½-ton trucks, for example, were shipped
The General Motors schedule for this line in TUP’S, two vehicles in four cases;
called for a daily production of 80 engines,
40 transmissions, 40 transfer cases, 40 100T h edescription of G–25 is based o n History of
G–25, U.S. General Depot G–25 at Ashchurch,
rear-axle assemblies, 40 front-axle assem- England, 1 1 July 1942–6June 1944, prep by Hist Sec
blies, a n d varying capacities for about a ETO, MS, ETO Adm 512.
T H E BUILD-UP I N STRIDE, 1943 157

JEEP ASSEMBLY LINE at an ordnance depot, September 1943.

Diamond T cargo trucks and wreckers by 16 August. The task of actually con-
and Dodge 1½-ton trucks were packed structing the assembly lines fell to Maj.
two vehicles in three cases; jeeps came in William R. Francis, commander of the
SUP’s, one per box. Arrangements had 622d Ordnance Base Automotive Main-
been made with the British in 1942 to tenance Battalion, which was then operat-
have civil contractors assemble all vehicles ing the base shop. Lacking units specifi-
shipped under BOLERO program. By the cally trained in assembly work, lacking
summer of 1943, however, British plants the proper tools, a n d having little infor-
had been able to achieve a rate of only mation from higher headquarters, Major
slightly more than 4,000 assemblies per Francis, after a look a t the British Austin
month, with no prospect of handling Motor Works, nevertheless went ahead
vehicles at the expected rate of import,101 with plans. Assisted by M. Sgt. Leroy Beil,
and the SOS therefore proceeded to estab- a shop foreman and mechanic, and by
lish its own assembly facilities. O n 7 Pvt. George Phillips III, a time and
August the theater’s chief ordnance officer motion expert formerly with the Bethle-
instructed Col. Clarence W. Richmond, an hem Steel Corporation, Major Francis
ordnance officer who had assumed com- succeeded in getting a n assembly line built
mand of Depot G–25 only a few weeks 101Min, Mtg of BOLERO Transport Sub-
before, to begin the assembly of vehicles committee, 5 Aug 43, ETO BOLEROFile 43.
158 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

and in operation by his own battalion by build-up in the summer of 1943 G–25
18 August. A second line was brought into handled an increasing volume of supplies
operation three weeks later, employing a a n d stood out as one of the great general
newly arrived heavy automotive main- depots in the SOS structure. At the peak
tenance company. Production was at first of its capacity the depot had 1,750,000
confined to seven General Motors models, square feet of covered storage space and
a n d the assembly of additional types was more than 2,000,000 square feet of open
undertaken later. In December the plant storage. It had a strength of over 10,000
undertook the assembly of combat vehi- men. G–25 employed a relatively small
cles, artillery, and motorcycles, as well as number of civilians—under 500—partly
general purpose wheeled vehicles. Before because of the location of the depot a n d
D Day the plant assembled 8,500 vehicles the resultant shortage of skilled workers.
a n d 5,800 miscellaneous units such as Many of those who were employed a t the
trailers and antiaircraft guns. Its best day depot had to be transported by U.S. Army
on the truck assembly line was 26 October buses from Cheltenham, Tewkesbury, and
1943, when it turned out 128 General other nearby communities. Ordnance
Motors 2½-ton trucks. activities continued to dominate the busi-
Something of the range and complexity ness of the depot, although its duties were
of activities at G–25 is suggested by the diversified. O n 1 June 1944,6,500 of the
fact that Ordnance alone handled more 10,000 men belonged to Ordnance units,
than 320,000 items of supply, ranging of which there were a total of 43 com-
from tiny jewels for wrist watches to panies organized under 8 battalions and 2
10-ton wreckers. T h e formidable inven- group headquarters. From a small begin-
tory and stock control problem was ning in 1942 the warehouse handling
incalculably complicated in 1942 by a equipment of the Ordnance Service alone
change-over to a different automotive grew to include 32 cranes (up to twenty
parts identification scheme after the re- tons capacity), 64 fork lifts, 35 prime
sponsibility for supply and maintenance of movers, a n d 38 tractors, a n d the service
motor vehicles was transferred from the also supervised a pool of conveyors, 475
Quartermaster Corps to the Ordnance flat cars and auto trailers, and 5 narrow-
Department. Coming in the midst of the gauge diesel locomotives. In the months
hurried preparations for TORCH, the just preceding the invasion the depot
change created an almost hopeless con- processed nearly 5,000 ordnance requisi-
fusion, necessitating as it did the retrain- tions per week.
ing of thousands of supply personnel and By the end of 1943 the SOS depot sys-
civilian workers. The derangement within tem comprised 18 general and 46 branch
the depots plagued SOS supply personnel depots, in addition to 11 vehicle parks and
well into 1943. The accounting and inven- 22 petroleum and 8 ammunition de-
torying practices of E T O U S A were a pots.103 Vehicle parks, many of them
source of embarrassment for a long time
a n d were the subject of more severe 102Min of Conf, Washington, C G ASF and Chiefs
of Supply a n d A d m Svcs, 7 May 43, U S F E T
censure from the War Department than 337 Confs.
was any other shortcoming.102 103SOSETO Installations a n d Operating Person-
With the acceleration of the BOLERO nel in United Kingdom, 1 Jan 44, ETO Adm 449.
T H E BUILD-UP I N STRIDE, 1943 159

established on the grounds of large British that it did not give the SOS control of all
estates, with their row after row of tanks, theater supply and administration. Partly
armored cars, and trucks, gave a particu- because of this unsatisfactory definition of
larly impressive picture of massed might. relationships and powers, and partly
Most of the depots likewise gave such an because the SOS was split between Chel-
impression. But G–25 was one of the tenham a n d London, the hodgepodge of
largest and had by that time become agencies, duplication of effort, and con-
something of a model installation. Because fusion continued.
of its proximity to Cheltenham it became Preoccupation with the TORCH prepara-
the showplace of the SOS a n d was regu- tions prevented a remedying of this unsat-
larly placed on the itinerary of visiting isfactory situation and allowed it to
dignitaries. In characteristic army fashion, worsen. But once the North African oper-
work frequently came to a standstill and ation was launched General Lee and his
many man-hours were lost while brooms staff again took up the struggle to bring
were wielded to prepare for “inspections” the SOS into what they conceived to be its
by high-ranking visitors. proper relationship to ETOUSA—that is,
to secure for it control of all theater supply
and administration. I n November 1942,
(5) Command and Organizational on the basis of an analysis of the existing
Changes in 1943 organization made by the head of his
Progress Branch, General Lee proposed a
The problem of developing an efficient reorganization which would have made
logistical organization with a workable him responsible for all supply and admin-
delineation of authority between the var- istrative functions in the theater and thus
ious staffs and command echelons con- “free the Theater Commander of [these]
tinued throughout 1943. The initial details.” The plan would have permitted
attempt by the SOS to take over theater- the senior officers of the various services to
wide supply and administrative functions continue on the theater staff, but proposed
had resulted in an unsatisfactory compro- that they be under the direct command of
mise with ETOUSA, providing for a the Commanding General, SOS, and that
division of responsibilities between the two all but a few of the chief administrative
headquarters, creating overlapping agen- officers, such as the adjutant general,
cies, and permitting considerable wasted inspector general, theater judge advocate,
effort and confusion.104 and provost marshal, also be stationed at
The crux of the problem from the start the SOS headquarters. The theater staff
was the position of the special staff and the flatly rejected Lee’s proposal, asserting
split of the services between London and that there were certain responsibilities for
Cheltenham. The first attempted clarifica- administration, discipline, and training
tion of the relationship of the two staffs, which the theater commander could not
shortly after General Eisenhower’s as- delegate. 105
sumption of command, was admittedly a
makeshift arrangement and not intended 104Seeabove, Ch. I, Sec. 5, and Ch. II, Sec. 3.
105 Organizationand Command in the ETO, I,
as permanent. It solved nothing in the 194–97. The entire discussion of the organization and
fundamental conflict for the simple reason command problem is based on this monograph.
 160 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

Nevertheless, the existing arrangement At the time General Lee’s proposal was
was recognized as defective and caused being considered at theater headquarters
dissatisfaction in all quarters. The division another plan for the organization of the
of functions between E T O U S A a n d the theater was offered by Col. Royal B. Lord,
SOS had its obvious disadvantages, which an officer who then was assigned to the
were accentuated by the physical separa- Office of the Chief Engineer. His proposal
tion of the two headquarters between had the same objective—that is, to bring
London and Cheltenham. As an example, all supply and administrative functions
the over-all supervision of military police under the control of the SOS—but would
activities was the province of the provost accomplish it in a somewhat different
marshal at ETOUSA; but the military manner. Colonel Lord envisaged a divi-
police officers in the various districts were sion of the theater into three subtheaters,
appointed by and were responsible to the one for North African operations, one for
SOS provost marshal. T h e question of air operations, a n d a combined SOS-
jurisdiction became particularly involved Communications Zone. T h e salient fea-
in the matter of the issuance of directives ture of the scheme was the proposal that
on the regulation of highway traffic, since the theater commander’s staff concentrate
it involved the prerogatives of base section on operational planning, while the SOS-
commanders, the chief of transportation, C O M Z command take over all planning
the military police, the SOS as a whole, and operational aspects of supply and ad-
and the theater. ministration. While this plan does not ap-
There was a n even more inherent pear to have been officially presented to
danger in the separation of logistical plan- the theater headquarters, it is worth men-
ning for future operations from normal tioning at this point in view of the key
SOS operations, the one being carried out positions in the SOS which its author was
by the theater staff a n d the other by the later to have, and in view of the fact that
SOS, for under this arrangement there he subsequently was instrumental in
was the strong possibility of repeating the bringing about a reorganization along the
error made in the preparations for TORCH,lines of the basic principle he advanced at
in which the SOS was largely left out of this time.
supply planning, although called on to Throughout these months the organ-
execute logistical plans. T h e difficulties of izational problem was complicated by the
operating under this arrangement became fact that North Africa still came within
increasingly evident during the winter of the boundaries of the European theater.
1942–43,and the service chiefs in particu- With the severance of the TORCH area in
lar realized the need for integrating func- February 1943, North Africa no longer
tions and concentrating authority in one entered into these considerations, and the
place. But while the need for reorganiza- E T O once more resumed its independent
tion was widely recognized, there was development, although subordinate in im-
little agreement as to what the changes portance to the more active theater of
should be, probably because any funda- operations.
mental alterations inevitably involved sur- Within a month after General Andrews
render of authority by one headquarters assumed command of the E T O General
or another. Lee submitted another plan for reorgan-
THE BUILD-UP I N STRIDE, 1943 161

ization. Basically, it had the same objec- the SOS. But he did not accept the pro-
tive as before, but it embodied a more posal to name General Lee Deputy Thea-
radical change in proposing that the Com- ter Commander, nor the idea of placing
manding General, SOS, be designated the theater G–4 under him. General An-
Deputy Theater Commander for Supply drews believed that the SOS commander
and Administration and that the theater already had sufficient authority to carry
G–4 be placed under him. The proposal out his mission without being named
thus closely resembled British practice, Deputy Theater Commander; and he re-
wherein the theater commander’s deputy garded the proposal with regard to the
exercised direct control of the lines of G–4 as administratively unsound, for it
communication. This arrangement, Gen- would have placed the chief of a general
eral Lee asserted, would remedy one of the staff division a t theater level under a sub-
most serious defects of the existing setup, ordinate headquarters and therefore in a
for it would permit the proper co-ordina- very difficult position. General Andrews
tion of broad operational planning with thought that it was necessary for the
logistical planning and operations by pro- ETOUSA G–4 to guide the SOS “accord-
viding for “the proper presentation of the ing to broad phases of theater and higher
Air and Ground Force needs to the SOS,” plans,” and that the necessary co-ordina-
a n d by insuring “that the capabilities of tion of logistical planning with the SOS
the SOS are considered in the preparation could be accomplished through normal
of operational plans.” 106With the TORCHstaff channels if the SOS a n d the
experience in his memory, General Lee ETOUSA G–4 maintained close liaison.
was obviously concerned over the role of To achieve better co-ordination he sug-
the SOS in future operational and logis- gested rather that the chiefs of the services
tical planning. His latest proposal was in- should move back to London and spend
tended to insure that future planning a t least part of their time there.
would be properly co-ordinated, in addi- T h e theater commander thus rejected
tion to bringing all supply a n d adminis- the more radical innovations embodied in
tration under the control of the SOS. Gen- General Lee’s proposal. But the discus-
eral Lee’s plan was a significant landmark sions nevertheless led to certain improve-
in the history of command and organiza- ments in the organizational structure. O n
tion, for it presented for the first time the 21 March theater headquarters redefined
idea of a Deputy Theater Commander for the whole ETOUSA-SOS relationship.
Supply and Administration, which was General Order 16, which replaced Gen-
eventually adopted, and also pointed up eral Order 19 of July 1942, reiterated the
the fundamental issue of the ETOUSA basic principle that the theater headquar-
G–4’s position vis-à-vis that of the Com- ters was the superior authority regarding
manding General, SOS. the determination of policies, objectives,
General Andrews was not unaware of priorities, and the issuance of orders affect-
the faults in the existing organizational ing two or more commands. Beyond this,
structure a n d indicated a willingness to it described the SOS as its instrumentality
see some changes brought about along the for administration and supply in the thea-
lines of concentrating more authority for 106Ltr,Lee to Andrews, 3 M a r 43, as quoted in
supply and administration in the hands of Organization and Command, 1, 201.
 162 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

ter. The powers and responsibilities of the continued to be handled from Chelten-
SOS were detailed in a separate letter of ham. This division of function in the SOS
instructions. O n the vital matter of the became permanent, and led to the ap-
position of the administrative and supply pointment in April of Brig. Gen. William
chiefs, the order assigned all these to the G. Weaver as deputy commander of the
SOS, with the exception of the inspector SOS in charge of operations.
general, adjutant general, theater judge The reorganization of March 1943 was
advocate, provost marshal, and a few undoubtedly a step in the direction de-
miscellaneous agencies. As if to leave no sired by General Lee, although it did not
doubt regarding the extent of the SOS’s completely resolve the conflict between
authority over these services, the order the theater a n d SOS headquarters. T h e
placed them under General Lee for “co- ETOUSA staff in general disapproved the
ordination, supervision, operational con- SOS’s pretentions to power and its insist-
trol, and direction,’’ thus using the entire ence on a large general staff. General Lee
constellation of magical terms which were had asked for one major general and
such favorites in the military jargon and twenty-nine brigadier generals for the
subject to such frequent misinterpretation. SOS staff and base sections. T h e request
The order also specified that Headquar- did not sit well with the E T O U S A staff,
ters, SOS, a n d the chiefs of services were and evoked an acrid remark about the
to be established in London, where the “high pressure salesmanship” exerted by
latter would be better available to the the SOS to provide general grades for its
theater commander and his staff. I n addi- staff positions.107O n the other hand, the
tion, the London Base Command, until SOS could not see why ETOUSA should
then under ETOUSA, was turned over to retain any of the administrative services,
the SOS for administration, and became and desired to bring the entire special staff
Central Base Section. Its commander, under its control. One explanation for
Brig. Gen. Pleas B. Rogers, was also ETOUSA’s tenacity in retaining certain
named Headquarters Commandant of purely administrative functions for itself
ETOUSA. was the fact that the theater’s functions
The theater’s new order by no means were still limited mainly to administration
fully met the desires of the SOS. Certain and supply. The E T O was not yet really a
of the administrative services still re- theater of “operations” in the sense that it
mained with the theater headquarters, was conducting combat operations (except
against General Lee’s wishes. But the dif- for limited air operations), for the North
ficult position of the technical service African invasion was directed by an Allied
chiefs was considerably improved, for the organization; it was rather in a sense
system of maintaining senior representa- merely an extension of the zone of interior.
tives at theater headquarters was elimi- I n this relatively static situation there was
nated. Headquarters, SOS, and the chiefs consequently a tendency on the part of the
of services now moved to London, where E T O U S A staff to want control over ad-
each service chief established a planning ministration and supply, the principal
division, and a n over-all SOS planning matters that concerned the theater at the
echelon was established. SOS planning time. Even planning for a cross-channel
was now carried out in London, close to
the theater staff, while SOS operations 107 Organizationand Command, I, 212.
T H E BUILD-UP I N STRIDE, 1943 163

operation was still in a n academic stage the SOS was a n anomalous one and made
because of the remote prospects of actually impossible the accomplishment of his
carrying out a major invasion of the goal—complete integration of all supply
Continent. and administration in the theater. What
The March reorganization also left un- General Lee apparently desired was an
settled the whole matter of the relation- organizational setup similar to that in the
ship of the SOS to the ETOUSA G–4. In zone of interior, where General Somer-
General Lee’s view, the theater G–4 vell’s ASF had also gained wide authority
duplicated functions which were rightfully over matters of procurement, supply, and
the province of the SOS. General An- administration, and had all but absorbed
drews, however, held that logistical plan- the War Department G–4’s functions. Ef-
ning must be carried out at the same level forts to secure a more acceptable organi-
as operational planning, a n d that a G–4 zation therefore continued, a n d with the
on his own staff was vitally necessary to assumption of the theater command by
co-ordinate all matters relative to admin- General Devers in May General Lee
istrative support for future operations. made another attempt. This time he was
The result was that, in planning, the serv- more successful, for General Devers was
ice chiefs were in effect under the direction more receptive to General Lee’s proposals.
of the theater G–4, and the SOS, although O n 27 May a new general order (33) was
now controlling most of the special staff issued redefining the relationship between
positions, was left with something less the SOS and ETOUSA. It resolved the
than the complete control of all aspects of problem of the theater G–4 by abolishing
supply a n d administration which it had the position, the duties of the G–4 being
sought. That the possibility for conflict assumed by the Commanding General,
was contained in this arrangement was SOS. I n addition, the SOS acquired con-
immediately foreseen, for the G–4 would trol of still more of the administrative
have to maintain the closest possible con- services, chiefly the Claims Commission,
tact with the service chiefs of the SOS. To the newly created Area Petroleum Serv-
guard against any infringement of the ice, and the offices of the theater judge
authority of the Commanding General, advocate and the provost marshal.
SOS, ETOUSA therefore issued a memo- These changes strengthened the SOS
randum cautioning its staff to observe the immeasurably, combining the planning
proper channels of communication and and operational functions of supply for the
not to short-circuit the SOS commander first time in one agency. They gave Gen-
in communicating with the chiefs of serv- eral Lee great satisfaction, and he later
ices. I n the relationship between the thea- wrote that “this was the first constructive
ter general staff divisions and the SOS move towards the elimination of the sep-
service chiefs the old problem of maintain- arate theater staff and vested in the SOS
ing the distinction between “command” complete supply responsibility for the
and “technical” matters thus took another theater.” 108
form, with each headquarters guarding its To accommodate itself to its enlarged
own prerogatives. functions the SOS now also underwent an
The reorganization effected under Gen-
108Memo, Lee for Col S. L. A. Marshall. Theater
eral Order 16 was short-lived. To General Historian, 15 Oct 45, as cited in Organization and
Lee the position of the theater G–4 outside Command, I, 215.
164 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

internal reorganization. T h e old general to at least part of the staff,109 although

staff divisions were eliminated and the he had the complete confidence of the
activities of the SOS were organized along SOS commander. I n view of the intensi-
functional lines. I n place of the SOS G–4 fied preparations which would now cer-
a Chief of Services was now named, taking tainly attend the revival of BOLEROand
over all supply services in both their plan- COSSAC’s planning for cross-Channel at-
ning and operational aspects, and in place tack, both General Styer, the ASF chief
of the G–1 a Chief of Administration was of staff who was in England in June, and
designated to do the same with regard to General Devers recommended that an-
the administrative services. A new Train- other officer be brought to the E T O for a
ing and Security Division replaced the key role in the SOS. I n accordance with
G–2 and G–3. T h e Chief of Administra- their recommendations Maj. Gen. Robert
tion, Col. Edgar B. Fell, had charge of all W. Crawford, a senior officer destined to
the administrative services now operating hold a high staff position in the Supreme
under the SOS, including the Claims Allied Headquarters, was ordered to Eng-
Commission and the services of the judge land from the Middle East, where he had
advocate, army exchange officer, chief been in charge of supply activities. On 24
finance officer, special services officer, July he was appointed deputy commander
provost marshal, and chief chaplain. of the SOS and Chief of Services, replac-
Colonel Lord became the Chief of Serv- ing both General Weaver and Colonel
ices, and took under his supervision all the Lord in those positions.
supply services, plus the General Purchas- Colonel Lord temporarily assumed the
ing Agent and the Deputy Area Petro- job of Deputy Chief of Services for Plan-
leum Officer. His office was the most ning, and General Weaver retained only
important under the new arrangement, the position of chief of staff to General
and was organized into three echelons to Lee. Once General Crawford had oriented
provide over-all supervision and co-ordi- himself on SOS operations, however, he
nation of supply planning and opera- established his office in London and con-
tions—one at Norfolk House, for planning centrated his efforts on logistical planning,
with Allied planning agencies; one at becoming chief of staff to Lee as well as
Cheltenham for the supervision of supply deputy commander. General Weaver con-
operations; and one at SOS headquarters tinued in charge of operations at Chelten-
in London to exercise general over-all ham and was now officially designated
supervision. General Weaver, who had be- Field Deputy Commander. I n the final
come General Lee’s chief of staff, contin- shakedown of SOS staff assignments Colo-
ued as deputy commander. nel Lord ended up as Chief of Operations,
Within two months the SOS carried out a new name for the Chief of Services, in
still more internal changes. Certain incon- which position he was responsible for staff
sistencies already existed in the SOS per- co-ordination of operations, while General
sonnel assignments as a result of the May Weaver, as Field Deputy Commander,
reorganization. Colonels Fell and Lord exercised actual supervision over field op-
were both junior to many of the officers erations, making inspections and co-ordi-
serving under them, and Colonel Lord 109Ltr, Styer to Somervell, early Jun 43, ASF,
was for various reasons not acceptable Somervell Files, CofS 42–43 (6).
CHART4—ETOUSA AND SOS COMMANDANDORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE,AUGUST 1943
166 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

greatly accelerated flow of American

troops a n d supplies to the United King-
dom. As a result of the stepped-up tempo
of planning for the cross-Channel opera-
tion there was a tendency to bring more
and more of the SOS organization to Lon-
don. Despite the division of SOS activities
between two headquarters the system ap-
pears to have worked fairly well, and
periodic staff conferences were held at
both Cheltenham, attended by the base
section commanders, and London. At one
of these conferences, on 23 August, Gen-
eral Lee expressed considerable satisfac-
tion with the new system. “For the first
time,” he stated, “an American Army
has . . . what we regard as sound organ-
ization, bringing together the G–4 and
SOS functions.’’ 110
Even this arrangement did not last.
Early in October the chief innovation of
GENERAL CRAWFORD receiving the
Distinguished Service Medal from General the August reorganization was temporar-
Devers. ily canceled when the position of G–4 at
the theater level was restored and supply
nating the activities of the base sections. planning was shifted back from the SOS
Finally, Colonel Fell was replaced by Col. to ETOUSA. Partly because of a person-
Earl S. Gruver, whom General Crawford ality clash General Crawford left the SOS,
had brought with him from the Middle having served less than two months as
East, and the office of the Chief of Admin- deputy and chief of staff to General Lee,
istration was moved to London. The entire and moved up to occupy the G–4 position
reorganization was formalized in a series on the theater commander’s staff. While
of SOS general orders appearing between the channels of control were changed,
19 and 25 August 1943. (Chart 4 ) however, the system seems to have func-
The chief effect of all this shuffling of tioned much as before. Moreover, the re-
assignments and titles was that General transfer of the planning function was only
Crawford assumed the planning respon- temporary. In December General Craw-
sibility, thus taking over the function ford moved to COSSAC, which even-
formerly held by the theater G–4, but now tually was transformed into Supreme
carried out within the SOS. With the CCS Headquarters, and with this change in as-
approval of the OVERLORD plan at Que- signment General Lee once more took
bec in August, this aspect of SOS activities over the duties of theater G–4. Several
gained increasing importance, and the other changes in assignment were also
work of all echelons was intensified in the 110Stf Conf Notes, SOS, 23 Aug 43, as cited in
late summer and fall of 1943 with the Organization and Command, I, 223.
THE BUILD-UP IN STRIDE, 1943 167

made within Headquarters, SOS, the

chief one being the appointment of Colo-
nel Lord as chief of staff and deputy com-
mander of the SOS. Colonel Lord thus
became General Lee’s right-hand man
and an influential voice in all future
activities of the SOS.
While the changes brought about in
May and August 1943 undoubtedly repre-
sented an improvement in theater organ-
ization it was partially illusory. The modi-
fications of August had never completely
stopped the duplication of function or
conflict over administrative matters be-
tween the SOS and ETOUSA, and rela-
tions between the two headquarters
continued to be afflicted with trouble.
Earlier in the year General Lee had been
empowered to issue orders within the
scope of his authority, using the familiar
authentication “by order of the Theater
Commander.” In July the Eighth Air GENERAL LORD, Chief of StaffSOS.
(Photograph taken in 1944.)
Force challenged this practice when the
SOS published a circular charging the co-ordinate commands (the Eighth Air
base section commanders with responsi- Force and V Corps) which affected their
bility for control of all troops outside ports command responsibilities, it was to submit
and camps and authorizing them to detail these instructions to ETOUSA for ap-
men from ground and air force commands proval and issuance. In accordance with
to temporary military police duty. The this new procedure the circular which had
Eighth Air Force contended that this was offended the Eighth Air Force was there-
an infringement on its authority and fore submitted to ETOUSA and repub-
raised the old issue of the right of a co- lished word for word over the name of the
ordinate command to issue such orders. theater commander.
General Devers upheld the air force in this This affair demonstrated clearly that
test of strength, asserting that com- the SOS did not yet have the full author-
manders had no authority to issue orders ity which it thought it had acquired, and
in his name outside their own commands. forcibly pointed up the vexing difficulties
The authority of the SOS to issue such attending the attempt by a subordinate
orders was accordingly revoked, and the command to assume theater-wide supply
SOS’s instructions were amended forbid- and administrative functions. The SOS
ding it to “infringe upon the command was obviously displeased with this curtail-
responsibilities of other major com- ment of its authority and did not accept it
manders.,’ Henceforth, when the SOS without protest. Its thinking was reflected
found it necessary to issue instructions to in a study of the whole SOS position writ-
168 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

ten by Col. Charles R. Landon, General command. One pertained to the develop-
Lee’s adjutant general. Colonel Landon ment of its territorial organization, the
asserted that it was necessary that the SOS base sections, and the other concerned its
continue to issue instructions in its own supply and administrative responsibilities
name to the entire theater if it was not to to the Air Forces.
be reduced to the position of a minor staff It will be recalled that in the original
section of a huge G–4 office. He admitted organization of the regional command sys-
the necessity of avoiding delicate matters tem in the summer of 1942 the base sec-
which other commands might consider an tion commanders had been granted fairly
infringement of their rights, but it would broad powers, although certain activities,
be intolerable to have the service chiefs, such as transportation and the operation
for example, in their theater capacity pass of the ports, had been exempted from their
on recommendations from the office of control. In general, the base section com-
their own superior, the Commanding manders possessed complete authority
General, SOS. Colonel Landon therefore over activities confined to their own com-
recommended that the SOS continue to mand; but were restricted in matters
issue instructions within its province to the which were “interstate” or theater-wide in
entire theater in the name of the Com- nature. The chiefs of services therefore
manding General, SOS. This procedure possessed certain powers in addition to the
was adopted, but it resulted only in an in- “technical supervision” which they nor-
crease in the number of matters which mally exercised in matters affecting their
had to be submitted to the theater staff for particular service, and supervised these
review, and therefore increased the dupli- activities through representatives who
cation of effort in the two headquarters 111
. were members of the base section com-
The attempt to bring the supply and manders’ staffs.
administrative activities of the entire thea- This entire arrangement came up for
ter under the control of one headquarters review in October 1942, only two months
thus remained a dilemma which seemed after it had been established. The source
to defy solution. In the fall of 1943 the of greatest dissatisfaction was the extent of
preparations for OVERLORD, including the the exempted activities. Base section com-
creation of a new Allied command, cast a manders complained that the chiefs of
new light on the entire problem of SOS- services had encroached on their author-
ETOUSA relations. T h e subsequent ity, especially with regard to the control
changes in the theater’s command and or- of service troops. T h e whole problem was
ganization were closely tied u p with these discussed at a n SOS staff and command
developments, and the account of these conference on 24 October, at which Gen-
changes is best postponed to a considera- eral Collins of the Northern Ireland Base
tion of their relationship to the command Section was outspoken in his criticism of
developments on an Allied level. the system, asserting that the service chiefs
had abused their powers and that it would
I n the course of the difficulties over its have been impossible to operate in North-
relationship with ETOUSA the SOS also ern Ireland if existing regulations had
made certain adjustments in connection been carried out. Despite these complaints
with two other aspects of organization and 111Organization and Command, I, 227–231A.
T H E BUILD-UP IN STRIDE, 1943 169

no basic change was made in the original Ireland accounting for most of the
division of responsibilities and authority changes. After the TORCH operation,
at that time. Northern Ireland became primarily an
The solution of this basic conflict be- air force base, and most of the activities
tween functional and regional control was there were handled by the new VIII Air
by no means clear, and the vague delinea- Force Composite Command. When V
tion of authority of the base section com- Corps moved to England, SOS activities
manders and chiefs of services persisted for in Northern Ireland were even further re-
a long time. Colonel Weaver, then chief of duced, and in December 1942 Northern
staff to Lee, thought the difficulties could Ireland Base Section was therefore inac-
best be resolved by better co-operation be- tivited and the area was incorporated into
tween the two. He emphasized the obliga- Western Base Section as a district. The
tion of the service chiefs to keep the base number of base sections in the United
section commanders informed of their Kingdom was thus reduced to three. In the
activities. He thought that the base section fall of 1943 Northern Ireland again be-
commanders would seldom find fault with came important as a troop concentration
anything the service chiefs tried to do on area as American units began to flow to
technical matters, but the base section the United Kingdom in large numbers.
commanders naturally resented being by- Northern Ireland Base Section was there-
passed or kept in the dark about those fore re-created on 2 October 1943, and
activities. He therefore urged that the General Collins returned from Western
chiefs of services, so far as possible, issue Base Section to assume command. I n the
their directives on technical matters meantime another base section had been
through their representatives in the base added when the London Base Command
sections; and a new SOS circular on 31 was turned over to the SOS in March
October admonished the service chiefs to 1943, as already mentioned. It was offi-
keep the base section commanders “con- cially designated the Central Base Section
tinually informed.” 112General Lee was a on 29 April. With this addition and the
firm believer in the base section system re-creation of Northern Ireland Base Sec-
and was desirous that it be made to work. tion the SOS therefore consisted of five
Relations between the base section com- base sections at the end of 1943 : Southern
manders and the service chiefs did in fact Base Section (Colonel Thrasher); Western
improve after this, although the exempted Base Section (Col. Harry B. Vaughan);
activities and “interference” by the service Eastern Base Section (Col. Ewart G.
chiefs were a continued source of Plank); Northern Ireland Base Section
annoyance. (General Collins); and London Base Sec-
The year 1943 brought certain changes tion (General Rogers). (See Map2.) 113
in both the territorial structure of the SOS
and in the division of authority. Four base 112Stf Conf Notes, SOS ETO, 24 Oct and 16 Nov
42, and Cir 41, SOS, 31 Oct 42, as cited in Organ-
sections had been activated in the summer ization and Command, I, 119–21.
of 1942—Western,Southern, Eastern, and 113Organization and Command, I, 231A–36,
Northern Ireland. In 1943 the number 238–39. The only boundary change occurred on 8
July 1943, when the Bristol Channel port area was
was first reduced to three and then in- established as a separate district and transferred from
creased to five, the situation in Northern Southern Base Section to Western Base Section.
170 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

Important developments took place in commodations, acquiring quarters, and

1943 toward the solution of the problem receiving supplies a n d American troops
of the division of powers between the base through the ports. In the pyramidal struc-
section commanders and the chiefs of ture of the SOS the base sections now
services. In the first six or eight months of operated substantially according to the
operations there had been a n increase in principle which General Lee had enun-
the number of exempted activities, which ciated—“centralized control and decen-
continued to be a thorn in the side of the tralized operation.” The chiefs of services
base section commanders. Beginning in retained technical control of their services
the spring of 1943 this trend was reversed. in the base sections, exercising this
At the end of May the internal manage- through their representatives on the sec-
ment of exempted activities was given to tion staffs. Since technical control was
the base section commanders, and the always subject to conflicting interpreta-
service chiefs were left with only the nor- tion, however, service chiefs and base sec-
mal technical controls. Three months tion commanders continued to complain
later the system of exempted activities was about interference and infringements of
officially ended, and the base section com- authority. Thus, a fundamental conflict
manders were charged with responsibility remained, and the comments which Gen-
for “all SOS operations” in their sec- eral Weaver—then a colonel—had made
tions.114This development had the effect in October 1942 still applied. Co-opera-
of removing the control of the service tion between the base section commanders
chiefs over their representatives on the and the service chiefs was still the key to
base section staffs, since these officers had. 115
successful operations.
been responsible to the chiefs of services The problem of the division of function
for exempted activities. Base section com- within the structure of the SOS was in
manders were also given a more complete many ways duplicated in the SOS’s rela-
control of personnel assignments. tions with the Air Forces. T h e Air Forces
T h e result of these changes was to en- from the very beginning of the theater’s
hance considerably the powers of the base organization insisted that its supplies, be-
section commanders at the expense of the cause of their peculiar nature, receive spe-
service chiefs. Base section commanders cial handling. An agreement had been
now possessed virtually complete control reached in the summer of 1942 by which
over personnel and depot operations. supplies a n d equipment common to all
Each base section was a miniature SOS the services should be provided by the
duplicating the organization at SOS head- SOS. Supplies peculiar to the AAF, how-
quarters, and the operating instrumental- ever, were to be handled by its own service
ity of the SOS. Its functions included organization, the VIII Air Force Service
issuing supplies to all troops in the base Command, and were to be requisitioned
section, providing complete hospitaliza- directly from the United States. Beyond
tion, policing the entire base section area, this the Air Forces had also hoped to
handling train and road movements in secure control over construction of all air-
co-operation with British agencies, pro-
114Cir 36, SOS, 30 May 43, and Cir 49, SOS, 24
viding entertainment and recreational Aug 43, Organization and Command, I, 240.
facilities, constructing the necessary ac- 115Organization and Command, I, 240–46.
T H E BUILD-UP IN STRIDE, 1943 171

dromes, over local procurement of air own supplies, charging the SOS with de-
force supplies, and over the handling of lays and with requiring too many justifi-
air force supplies at ports of debarkation. cations for Air Force requisitions. Early in
Against its wishes the responsibility for the 1944 an Air Service Command board,
construction of airdromes was assigned to after studying the entire supply system,
the SOS, and the control of aviation en- proposed that certain common supply
gineer construction battalions also re- items be furnished the Air Forces in bulk
mained with the SOS. Local procurement without detailed justification. This idea
was to be handled in the same way as for was rejected. But the SOS agreed that the
the other services, that is, Air Force re- existing system had faults and made cer-
quests would be cleared through the Gen- tain concessions in the requisitioning
eral Purchasing Agent. As far as discharge procedure. These changes still did not
at the ports was concerned, the original meet the Air Forces' objections, and early
agreement provided that the SOS control in February the Air Force Service Com-
all port facilities, although AAF liaison mand again asked that certain supplies be
officers were to supervise the handling of earmarked for the AAF before shipment
air force supplies. This proved unsatisfac- from the United States. This would-have
tory to the Air Forces, which claimed that established an independent supply line to
the SOS was too slow in dispatching the zone of interior for the Air Forces and
cargo, and the Air Forces soon established was consistently opposed by the theater.
intransit depots at the ports to assure Except for the earlier concessions, there-
proper and expeditious handling of its fore, the supply procedure remained as
supplies. before, to the dissatisfaction of the Air
Actually, the Air Service Command Forces. As in the controversy between the
wanted to establish its own independent base section commanders and service
supply pipeline all the way back to the chiefs, successful accomplishment called
zone of interior, and continued to fight to- for a large measure of mutual understand-
ward this goal. Throughout 1943 the Air ing and co-operation.116
Forces urged increased control over its 116Ibid.,I, 250–53.
PREPARING FOR CONTINENTAL INVASION
 CHAPTER IV

The Inception of OVERLORD

and Its Logistic Aspects
( 1 ) Early Planning for Cross- Channel plans the following month and set up both
Operations operational and administrative planning
staffs to begin the study of tactical and
The plan by which Allied forces suc- logistic problems involved in a cross-
cessfully launched a cross-Channel inva- Channel operation. As already indicated,
sion and captured a lodgment on the the plan for a full-scale cross-Channel in-
European Continent eventually bore the vasion was at first referred to as ROUNDUP,
name OVERLORD. 1 Planning for a return the name which the British had already
to the Continent was begun by the British used to designate earlier plans for a con-
shortly after their withdrawal from France tinental operation. As envisaged in 1942,
in 1940. But the scope of such planning as ROUNDUP called for landings on a wide
could be undertaken in the next year or front between Boulogne and Le Havre in
two was severely restricted by the meager the following spring.
resources available, a n d could hardly go ROUNDUP planning had hardly been
beyond such limited-objective schemes as initiated when the decision was made to
large-scale raids aimed at aiding the invade North Africa, and as the prepara-
USSR by diverting enemy forces from tions for the North African landings pro-
eastern Europe, or plans for a rapid move- gressed that summer it became obvious
ment to the Continent to take advantage that offensive operations in northwest
of the enemy’s collapse. Plans for a return Europe in 1942 were out of the question,
to the Continent in force had little prac- since all available forces a n d equipment
ticality until the United States entered the were committed to TORCH. In fact, the
war, a n d even then were long in coming ROUNDUP planners foresaw little possibil-
to fruition. ity of a major operation against the Con-
T h e first major impetus to cross-Chan- tinent even in 1943, and outlined their
nel planning after U.S. entry into the war proposed planning with only limited ob-
came with the approval of the Marshall 1 T h e code name OVERLORD eventually came to
Memorandum in London in April 1942. 2 apply only to the general concept of a cross-Channel
Commanders of the ground, air, and invasion in 1944. For security reasons a n additional
code name, NEPTUNE, was adopted early in 1944 to
naval services of both the British and U.S. refer to the specific operation, and involved a special
forces in the United Kingdom started security procedure known as BIGOT.
holding formal conferences on invasion 2 See above, Ch. II, Sec. 1 .
176 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

jectives in mind for that year—raids to less, the ROUNDUP staffs continued plan-
provoke air battles, capture of a lodgment ning for operations in northwest Europe
or a beachhead preliminary to possible ex- throughout the fall and winter of 1942, al-
ploiting operations (in the Cotentin, for though mainly with limited objectives in
example), a n d a return to the Continent mind. They accomplished a great amount
to take advantage of German disintegra- of spadework a n d assembled invaluable
tion. It was important, nevertheless, that information relating to a cross-Channel
planning continue for large-scale opera- attack.
tions against the Continent in 1944. At the Casablanca Conference in Jan-
For this purpose the ROUNDUP plan con- uary 1943 the Combined Chiefs of Staff
tinued to be used as a basis for administra- were occupied in the European area pri-
tive planning, since it was realized that marily with operations in the Mediterra-
the logistic preparations for such an oper- nean in 1943. 5 Because of the demands of
ation would be tremendous, and would TORCH, plans for an all-out cross-Channel
have to be developed far in advance of the operation remained outside the scope of
detailed operational planning.3 The practicality for 1943. Allied fortunes had
ROUNDUP planning staffs were to a large taken a decided turn for the better, how-
extent sponsored and guided by the Brit- ever, and the Combined Chiefs at that
ish, although their numerous subcommit- time made a decision which proved tre-
tees contained both American and British mendously reassuring to the future pros-
representatives. They had no permanently pects for cross-Channel invasion. They
assigned staff with the exception of a agreed that a combined staff of British
secretariat. T h e various committees met and American officers should be organ-
as the need arose a n d published their ized, preferably under a Supreme Com-
plans and proceedings in a series of re- mander, but if such a n appointment was
ports. O n the national level, planning in not immediately feasible, under a chief of
ETOUSA headquarters was initially the staff, in order to give the necessary im-
responsibility of the G–3. T h e special staff petus and cohesion to planning for future
sections of theater headquarters in Lon- operations. The mission of this staff was to
don a t first did nearly all of the logistical include planning for “an invasion in force
planning for invasion. T h e SOS was little in 1944.” 6
concerned with this planning in 1942, for T h e reference to planning for large-
it was not originally assigned such respon- scale operations on the Continent in 1944
sibilities by higher headquarters. More- occupied little space in the minutes of the
over, it lacked a strong agency on the Casablanca meetings. But the decision to
general staff level to guide over-all plan-
ning, and its planning activities were 3 Combined Commanders Papers (42) 82, 3 Oct 42;
limited by the preoccupation with current Annex 1, OPD.
4 Organization and Functions of the Communica-
service of supply operations in the United tions Zone, Gen Bd Rpt 127, p. 3, OCMH.
Kingdom, and by a shortage of planning 5 CCS 170/2,23 J a n 43, Rpt by CCS to President
personnel. Among the unfortunate cir- and Prime Minister, SYMBOL Conf, SHAEF SGS,
SYMBOL Conf 337/5.
cumstances was the persistent lack of an 6 Ibid.; CCS 169, Proposed Organization of Com-
official troop forecast, always considered mand, Control, Planning, etc., 22 Jan 43; CCS Min,
essential to proper planning. 4 Neverthe- 67th Mtg, 22 Jan 43.
INCEPTION O F OVERLORD AND ITS LOGISTIC ASPECTS 177

create a planning organization was imple- Kingdom for operations against the Con-
mented within the next few months. Late tinent. To get such figures the COSSAC
in April 1943 the British Chiefs of Staff is- staff presented estimates of the needs for
sued the directive establishing the com- an invasion at the Washington (TRIDENT)
bined staff under General Morgan with Conference in May. The proper size of the
the title Chief of Staff to the Supreme Al- assault force was a much-discussed subject
lied Commander (Designate). An Amer- and one on which no final conclusions
ican, Brig. Gen. Ray W. Barker, was could be reached at that time. Allied re-
appointed as his deputy. T h e staff which sources at the moment, a n d even the re-
General Morgan gathered around him sources estimated to be available at a later
came to be known as COSSAC, from the date, were appallingly meager for the type
abbreviation of his title. of operation envisaged. T h e Combined
T h e acceleration of planning which Chiefs of Staff nevertheless gave tentative
now took place at the Allied level was also approval to the idea of a n invasion in
reflected on the national level. The SOS northwest France in 1944 a n d provided
established a planning echelon in London the planners with the first estimates to
to maintain close contact with higher work with in formulating a more detailed
headquarters, and the chiefs of the prin- plan. Uncertainty as to the availability of
cipal technical services thenceforth di- landing craft was already casting its
vided their time between London and shadow over all operational planning. 9
Cheltenham. Planning was at this time Late in June a five-day conference
transferred from the G–3 Section, (known as RATTLE) was held in Scotland
ETOUSA, to a newly organized G–5 to consider the many problems of cross-
Plans Section, headed by General Barker. Channel invasion. It was presided over by
This new general staff section was charged Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten,
with the co-ordination of all U.S. plan- Chief of Combined Operations (British),
ning, both operational and administrative. and attended by COSSAC members and
Its main preoccupation, however, was the commanders of the principal Allied
planning at the Allied level, and the G–5 forces in the United Kingdom. Detailed
Section was for all practical purposes the discussions were held on such subjects as
U.S. component of COSSAC. 7 suitable assault areas, weapons, tactics,
COSSAC was assigned several missions. and enemy defenses. General Morgan had
It was to evolve deception plans to keep already drawn up a n outline plan for
alive the expectation that a n attack was cross-Channel invasion a n d presented it
imminent in 1943 and thus pin down Ger- to the 21 Army Group commander, the
man forces in the west; it was to plan for Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (Desig-
a return to the Continent in the event of nate) of the Allied Expeditionary Air
German disintegration. But its principal Force, the Naval C-in-C (Designate), and
mission proved to be the creation of a plan the Commanding General, ETOUSA, for
for “a full scale assault against the Con- 7 Organization and Functions of the Communica-
tinentin 1944.” 8 tions Zone, p. 3; Logistical Buildup in the British Isles,
First of all, the COSSAC planners had Gen Bd Rpt 128, pp. 11–13, OCMH.
8 COSSAC (43) Min of Stf Conf, 1st Mtg, Annex
to determine precisely what resources the II, 17 Apr 43, SHAEF SGS.
Allies would have available in the United 9 COSSACPapers (43) 13, 28 May 43.
178 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

their consideration.10 I n July COSSAC war-organized economy of Nazi-domi-

prepared a digest of its plan, which re- nated Europe. T h e purpose of the cross-
ceived the approval of the British Chiefs Channel operation itself suggested the
of Staff. In the following month it was pre- vital role which logistics was to have in the
sented to President Roosevelt and Prime course o f t h e battle: the object O f OVER-
Minister Churchill and the Combined LORD, in the words of the plan itself, was to
Chiefs of Staff at the Quebec (QUADRANT)“secure a lodgment on the Continent from
Conference. There the OVERLORD plan which further offensive operations can be
was definitely accepted as the principal developed.”
U.S.-British effort against Germany in T h e objective of the OVERLORD opera-
1944. In some respects the outline plan or tion was not to bring about the defeat of
digest presented at Quebec was more the enemy in northwest Europe, but to
properly a staff study and was so regarded seize and develop an administrative base
by the planners. Not until after the Cairo from which future offensive operations
(SEXTANT) Conference in November–De- could be launched. T h e OVERLORD plan
cember 1943 did General Morgan feel did not even contemplate a decisive battle
confident enough about the future of the west of the Seine. Its objective was a lim-
operation to emphasize to his staff that ited one, therefore, determined by the es-
there was now a t last a firm determination sential logistic consideration that the
that the operation would take place at the Allies would require an administrative
agreed date. OVERLORD and ANVIL(the base with all the facilities, such as ports,
supporting operation to be launched in depots, a n d transportation, necessary for
southern France) were to be the supreme the build-up a n d support of forces on the
operations for 1944. “Nothing,” it was scale required for subsequent offensive
emphasized, “must be undertaken in any operations.
other part of the world which hazards the For U.S. forces the preparation for such
success of these two operations. . . .”11 an operation entailed, first, transferring a
While the detailed planning still remained huge force and its equipment to the British
to be done, and while there still were Isles across a submarine-infested sea route,
many unanswered questions, particularly and, second, funneling this force, against
regarding the scale of the assault and the determined enemy opposition, into a nar-
availability of the means, the plan that row beachhead on the Continent, and
COSSAC presented a t Quebec in August adequately maintaining it. By the summer
1943, refined and amended in the next of 1943 the first of these tasks was finally
nine months, was the plan finally executed well under way.
as Operation OVERLORD in June 1944. Once the decision was firm that an all-
out invasion of the Continent should be
(2) Logistic Considerations in the Evolution of made, two problems of overriding im-
the OVERLORD Plan portance faced the planners: (1) determin-
ing the scale of the initial assult; (2) pro-
T h e continental operations of 1944–45
10COSSAC (43) 9th Rpt, 16 Jun 43.
have frequently been referred to as a bat- 11COSSAC (43) Min of Stf Confs, 38th Mtg, 17
tle of logistics—a contest between the Dec 43; COSSAC Papers (43) 88, Decisions at
industrial capacities of the Allies and the SEXTANTConf, 9 Dec 43.
INCEPTION OF OVERLORD AND ITS LOGISTIC ASPECTS 179

viding a n adequate build-up and mainte- coast of northwest Europe into “port
nance. That these fundamental logistic group” areas. The designation and bound-
considerations weighed heavily is evi- aries of these groups varied somewhat, but
denced in the earliest discussions. The in general there were five: the Belgian
second problem—that of an adequate group (Dunkerque–Antwerp), the Pas
build-up and maintenance-soon resolved de Calais group (Boulogne–Calais), the
itself into the problem of choosing a n as- North Seine (Dieppe–Le Havre–Rouen),
sault area. The ROUNDUP planners had the Cherbourg or Norman (Caen–Gran-
emphasized from the start that the first ville), and the Brittany group (St. Malo–
phase of operations would be devoted to Nantes). (Map 4)
securing a lodgment area, the essential T h e ROUNDUP plans of 1942 were gen-
feature of which had to be sufficient dis- erally based on an assault on a wide front,
charge capacity—that is, facilities for the extending roughly from Calais to Le
reception of personnel, vehicles, and sup- Havre, with a n additional landing west of
plies. T h e primary need, therefore, was the Seine, and the possibility of a n assault
port facilities. Indeed, one of the first esti- on the Cotentin Peninsula. Late in the
mates and drafts of the OVERLORD plan year there was a noticeable shifting away
prepared by the Principal Staff Officers of from these plans for multiple assaults
COSSAC inJune 1943 gave as the mission toward the idea of a more concentrated
of the operation the securing of a lodgment attack on a narrower front.14It was argued
on the northwest coast of France “in order that if the assault was made in two or
to gain sufficient deepwater ports to ac- more widely separated areas simultane-
commodate the landing of large forces ously or on a particularly wide front, Ger-
from the U.S.” 12 This estimate was man reserves would be in action even more
strengthened by the conviction that Ger- quickly. A larger number of routes would
man defense policy was based on holding be available to them and there would
the coast line and, above all, the major probably be some reserves close behind
ports, at all costs. The enemy appreciated each assault area. A faster Allied rate of
that, if all major ports could be denied to build-up would be required. An assault on
the Allies, the already difficult task of a narrower front was therefore preferable.
building up a n d maintaining forces able Reinforcing this conclusion a t the time
to defeat armies backed by a n excellent was the belief that, even if unlimited land-
road and rail system would become im- ing craft were available, the capacity of
possible.13In any assault on the Continent ports and loading points on the south coast
it was essential that the Allied rate of of England would restrict the size of the
build-up should match or exceed the rate force which could be embarked and sailed
a t which the enemy could bring up re- on any one day.
serves, 12COSSAC Papers (43) 22, PSO’s Draft, 22 Jun 43,
Selection of an assault area had been the Operation OVERLORD, Estimate of the Situation
(British appreciation).
main planning consideration all through 13 Ibid.,Annex R.
the winter of 1942–43, and port capacities 14See stf studies, sub: Notes on Factors Affecting
were almost invariably the starting point Selection of Assault Areas and Method of Attack in
a Major Opn in Northwest Europe, Dec 42 to Feb 43,
for the discussion of any area. For purposes SHAEF G–3 370–43, Opn OVERLORD Main Appre-
of study the planners normally divided the ciation, Dec 42, with comments.
180 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

H. Damon

MAP 4

An examination of the discharge capaci- Assuming that the operation was to be

ties of each port group revealed that no carried out by a large force, the planners
group or combination of groups could concluded that two groups of ports were
maintain large forces when ports were first required. The Normandy (or Cherbourg)
opened, a n d that a large number of ports and North Seine groups together possessed
would be required after thirty days’ de- the maximum capacity in the least num-
velopment, even if they could all be cap- ber of ports. T h e Normandy and Brittany
tured simultaneously. After three months, groups together had a larger total capacity,
however, it was estimated that any two but were considered to be less economical
adjacent groups would meet the needs of to develop. T h e other two groups—the
a large force, and that the Brittany group Pas de Calais a n d Belgian—figured less
alone might suffice for a smaller force. favorably in the considerations primarily
INCEPTION OF OVERLORD AND ITS LOGISTIC ASPECTS 181

because they constituted the very pivot of area. There the beaches were of large
the enemy defense system. It followed capacity and sheltered against westerly
therefore that of the possible combinations and southwesterly winds, permitting a
the Normandy–North Seine and the Nor- large force to be put ashore rapidly and
mandy–Brittany groups were preferred. maintained over them.
Since the Normandy group was common The possession of beaches did not elimi-
to both these combinations it was evident nate the necessity of opening a port
that if the Allies captured that area they quickly. No fully equipped force could
could later choose between attacking achieve real mobility for more than a lim-
either of the others. These considerations ited period while maintained solely over
constituted a powerful argument for the beaches. Furthermore, the bulk of the
choice of the Normandy coast for the vehicles and stores would require a quay-
assault. side for discharge if landing craft were
An important additional determinant limited in number and the larger Liberty
in the selection of an assault area was the ships had to be used. Consequently it was
need for suitable beaches. The Combined felt to be imperative that one major port
Commanders’ studies had shown that the be captured quickly. The only port of any
required forces could not be maintained importance in the Normandy area was
entirely through ports until approximately Cherbourg, and to facilitate its capture the
D plus 90 and that some maintenance planners recommended that an assault in
would have to be carried out over the the Caen area should be extended to the
beaches throughout the first three months, eastern beaches of the Cotentin peninsula.
supplemented when possible by air supply. A decision would later be necessary on
The selection of the main assault area whether to take the Seine or the Brittany
therefore depended as much on the char- ports.
acteristics of the beaches as on proximity These were by no means the exclusive
to a group of ports. This would be the case, considerations in the selection of an assault
it was felt, even if the landings were unop- area. The enemy’s beach and coastal de-
posed, for the enemy was certain to de- fenses, his probable rate of reinforcement,
molish the ports before withdrawing. the feasibility of providing fighter cover
Several factors had to be kept in mind in the assault area and of opening air-
in the search for suitable beaches. Of para- fields in the beachhead, inland terrain and
mount importance was their capacity to communications, and the naval problem—
accept and pass vehicles inland, for it all figured in the study of possible landing
would be necessary to put the force ashore areas. But the problems of logistic support
at a rapid rate. T o meet this prerequisite occupied a pre-eminent place in every dis-
they had to be sheltered from prevailing cussion.
winds and have sufficient width. Of vary- The logistic problems of a cross-Channel
ing importance were such features as the invasion held continuing prominence in
gradient, the tide range, the beach exits, the 1943 planning. While considering the
and the terrain overlooking them. With possibilities of carrying out a limited
these requirements in mind the planners bridgehead operation against the Cotentin
concluded that the most favorable beaches in 1943, or the chance of exploiting such
lay in the Caen sector of the Normandy a n operation, the British Joint Planning
182 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

Staff emphasized at the Casablanca Con- ing sheltered anchorages.17 These were
ference in January that success hinged details, he noted, “on w h i c ht h e result of
largely on the possibility of augmenting the entire operation in 1944 may turn.”18
the limited port capacity of Cherbourg by T h e whole problem came into promi-
the capture of additional facilities so that nence at the end of June a t the RATTLE
adequate forces and supply reserves could Conference, at which Commodore John
be built up. Even if German opposition Hughes-Hallett, chief naval planner on
was negligible, it noted, progress would the COSSAC staff, proposed that the Al-
be slow owing to the Allies’ limited re- lies prefabricate their own ports a n d tow
sources in vehicle-carrying craft suitable them to the far shore. Preliminary experi-
for landing over beaches.15 mentation along these lines had already
T h e problem of continental discharge been undertaken by the Chief of Com-
was again underscored after COSSAC bined Operations, the Director of Trans-
took over the study of invasion problems portation, and the Admiralty, and the
in April 1943. In a memorandum to the concept of artificial ports as they later de-
British Chiefs of Staff General Morgan veloped gradually began to crystallize.
reiterated the argument that, in any am- The RATTLEconferees recognized the
phibious operation against opposition, the need of detailing one officer to co-ordinate
rate a t which Allied forces could be built the planning for this project,19 and
up after the initial assault must play a de- COSSAC made such a recommendation
cisive part in the outcome. In the special after the conclusion of the conference.20
case of a cross-Channel operation this T h e findings and conclusions of the
would. depend mainly on the volume of planners finally found formal expression
supplies a n d equipment, especially vehi- in the outline or digest of the OVERLORD
cles, that could be landed from LST’s and plan presented by COSSAC representa-
LCT’s.16 Full use of these specialized ships tives to the Combined Chiefs at Quebec in
and craft could be made only if adequate August. In general the plan echoed the
facilities existed for unloading them on the results of the previous months’ planning
French coast. General Morgan was not with respect to the choice of an assault
satisfied that the berthing facilities on the area, the importance of the availability of
far shore were adequate, observing that if sufficient landing ships and craft, and the
the beaching of landing craft was relied capacities of beaches and ports in the
on until ports were captured and put into lodgment area. Among its conclusions
use the turn-round period would be con-
siderably longer than necessary, and ships 15 CCS 167, 22 Jan 43, SYMBOL Conf, Rpt by British
would be unnecessarily exposed to attack. Joint Plng Stf on Continental Opns in 1943.
Landing Ships, Tank, and Landing Craft, Tank.
Furthermore, the whole operation would 17COSSAC (43), 1 1 t h Rpt, 26 Jun 43.
be excessively dependent on favorable 18 Memo,COSSAC for C O S Corn, sub: Disem-
weather. In June General Morgan asked barkation Facilities on Continental Beaches,
COSSAC (43) 18, Draft a n d Final Copies, SHAEF
his administrative planners to re-examine SGS 800.1 MULBERRY I.
the problem with a view toward augment- 19COSSAC (43), COSSAC Stf Conf, 13th Mtg,
ing port capacities by the use of floating 2 J u l4 3 .
20Min, PSO Corn Mtg, 5 J u l4 3 ; COSSAC (43)
piers and other equipment at the beaches. 12th Mtg, 6 J u l4 3 , SHAEF G–4 825.1 MULBERRY
He also mentioned the possibility of creat- I 44.
INCEPTION OF OVERLORD AND ITS LOGISTIC ASPECTS 183

concerning the main conditions affecting maturely with relatively small resources
the success of the operation it noted that would be to run the risk of defeat. It was
the provision of sheltered waters by artifi- more likely that the Supreme Commander
cial means and of special berthing facilities would find it necessary to capture the
were matters of paramount importance. 21 Brittany and Loire ports first. T h e latter
T h e plan provided for assault landings course would open up sufficient port
by three divisions over the Normandy facilities a n d permit a build-up of forces,
beaches in the vicinity of Caen. Airborne adequately maintained, in preparation for
forces were to seize that city with the line capturing Paris a n d forcing a passage of
Grandcamp–Bayeux–Caen as the D-Day the Seine. T h e successive steps after the
objective. After the beachhead gained initial assault would therefore be to cap-
sufficient depth and additional troops be- ture Cherbourg, then to drive the enemy
came available, Allied forces were to exe- as rapidly as possible far enough eastward
cute a turning movement into the Cotentin to secure the left flank of the beachhead,
to capture the major part of Cherbourg. and under this cover to seize the Brittany
The magnitude of the logistic problem peninsula.22This course would make the
was indicated by the calculation that most economic use of Allied resources. It
eighteen divisions would have to be main- was important, the planners added, that
tained over beaches during the first month the Allied forces not outrun their lines of
of operation, a n d twelve during the sec- communication, a n d it was anticipated
ond month, while every captured port, that after capturing the lodgment they
large and small, was being used. The con- would be forced to halt or limit their oper-
struction of two prefabricated ports ation eastward in order that the lines of
(known as MULBERRIES) eventually be- communications could be properly estab-
came a key feature of the final OVERLORD lished, additional airfields could be
plan. restored or built, and considerable quan-
T h e planners had also come to a tenta- tities of engineer materials sent forward.
tive conclusion about subsequent opera- Equal in importance to the problem of
tions to obtain an additional group of a rapid build-up a n d adequate mainte-
ports. They anticipated that after the cap- nance was the matter of the scale of the
ture of Cherbourg the Supreme Com- assault. Misgivings over the inadequacy of
mander probably would have to make a the force were expressed initially a t the
choice between the Seine ports and the Quebec Conference in August. Prime
Brittany group as the next major objec- Minister Churchill asserted that the scale
tive. Much would depend on where the of the assault was too small and should be
enemy concentrated his strength in reac- strengthened.23 Whether he meant by this
tion to the initial landings. Driving east to augmenting the assault waves or the total
the Seine ports was regarded as a more force lifted was not a t first clear. At any
ambitious undertaking a n d a n unlikely rate, any attempt to enlarge the invasion
choice, for it would necessitate forcing the 21Opn OVERLORD, Rpt and Appreciation, J u l4 3 ,
line of the Seine, capturing Paris, and ad- SHAEF 381, OVERLORD I (a).
vancing as far as the Somme River in 22O p n O V E R L O R D COSSAC (43) 28, 15
Plan,
Jul 43.
order to cover the development of the 23COSSAC (43) Min of Stf Conf, 23d Mtg,
Seine ports. To make this attempt pre- 30 Aug 43.
184 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

force had to contend with the most per- sault, and at the Supreme Commander’s
sistent limiting factor of the entire war— conference on 21 January 1944 General
the shortage of landing craft. This prob- Montgomery pressed for an attack on a
lem had come into sharp focus when the wider front. In addition to tactical rea-
COSSAC staff attempted to formulate de- sons, there was the all-important need for
tailed plans for the size of the assault and the early capture of the port of Cher-
build-up forces for OVERLORD. General bourg. In considering the approaches to
Morgan had found that barely enough Cherbourg the 21 Army Group com-
craft would be provided to mount the mander pointed out that under the cur-
three assault divisions properly, and that rently proposed scheme the marshes and
the immediate follow-up force would be rivers at the base of the Cotentin provided
most inadequately loaded. H e was seri- a natural defensive barrier which would
ously concerned over a dangerous gap on undoubtedly delay the drive on the port.
D plus 1 because of the nonavailability of It followed that a plan to capture Cher-
landing craft and the impossibility of bourg quickly must provide for a landing
combat loading in normal shipping. The on the northern side of the barrier (the
hazards of a n inadequate follow-up had Douve River). For this reason the area of
been demonstrated at Salerno. He felt assault should be extended to include ad-
that there was already “too high a propor- ditional beaches on the east Cotentin. It
tion of our goods in the shop window,” was desirable to widen the landing front
and that there was no provision for a for the additional reason that the beach-
floating reserve formation in the real sense head was likely to become badly con-
of the term. General Morgan’s proposed gested. T h e strongest arguments against
solution therefore was to strengthen the this proposed change were put forward by
follow-up (“stocking the back premises” the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief,
he called it) rather than the assault, and Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay, who
he presented figures on the additional feared that strengthening the assault
craft needed.24 For several months, how- would lead to serious congestion in the
ever, the COSSAC planners were unable Southern English ports and would also put
to obtain specific commitments as to the a heavy tax on naval resources.25 General
resources which would be made available. Eisenhower had already come to the same
Late in September General Morgan com- conclusions as Montgomery, however,
plained that the CCS directive placed at and immediately recommended to the
his disposal a quantity of landing craft Combined Chiefs an extension of the front
which bore little or no relation to the and a n increase in the assault force from
actual requirements of the proposed three divisions to five.26
operation. Broadening the attack only created ad-
Late in the year the OVERLORD plan ditional demands for shipping, and thus
was subjected to additional scrutiny by
Generals Eisenhower a n d Montgomery, 24COSSAC Papers (43) 57 (Final), 30 Sep 43, sub:
the newly designated Supreme Com- Supply of Landing Craft for Opn OVERLORD.
mander and ground force commander for 25Min, Supreme Comdr’s Conf, 21 Jan 44, SHAEF
SGS 337/11.
OVERLORD respectively. Both were dis- 26 Cbl,Eisenhower to CCS, 23 Jan 44, SHAEF 381
satisfied with the proposed scale of the as- BIGOT, OVERLORD-ANVIL.
INCEPTION O F OVERLORD AND ITS LOGISTIC ASPECTS 185

further aggravated the already chronic force must be strong enough to achieve
shortage in landing craft. Allied planners quick success, particularly in capturing
now estimated that a n additional 231 ports. 28
ships and craft would be required to per- Without attempting a n immediate
mit the desired widening and enlargement solution of the landing craft problem the
of the assault. T h e extra shipping could Combined Chiefs of Staff a t the end of
be made available in three ways: cutting January approved the enlargement of
down the scales of vehicles carried in the OVERLORD and postponed D Day by one
assault a n d follow-up to provide lift for month. Early in February the plan there-
additional units; postponing the target fore called for a n assault by five seaborne
date one month to allow for additional divisions on a widened front including the
production; a n d drawing shipping from east Cotentin beaches. T h e U.S. portion
the Mediterranean or other sources. of the assault was to be made by the First
T h e enlargement of the assault had its Army in co-operation with the Western
most profound impact on plans for Naval Task Force, one regimental combat
launching the ANVILoperation from the team landing between Varreville and the
south, planning for which was already Douve River (UTAHBeach), and two regi-
under way. Since the supply of landing mental combat teams landing between
craft was critical in all theaters, a n d re- Vierville and Colleville-sur-Mer (OMAHA
quirements had been figured closely for Beach). One airborne division was to drop
all needs, it was likely that any appreci- behind UTAHin the initial assault. The
able increase in lift for OVERLORD would first major objective was the capture of
have to be made at the expense of the Cherbourg.
southern France operation. ANVILwas de- General Eisenhower was unwavering in
signed primarily to assist OVERLORD by his conviction that OVERLORD must be
creating a diversion to draw off or hold strong enough to preclude any risk of fail-
enemy strength, and the possibility of ure, regardless of the effect on ANVIL.
weakening or eliminating it was a matter Nevertheless, he clung to the hope that
of strategic import. General Eisenhower the resources might yet be found to launch
hoped to avoid either prospect, since he that operation, directing the planners to
regarded the operation as an integral part work out a compromise shipping plan
of the OVERLORD invasion design. It was which would permit the simultaneous
obviously desirable to apply the fullest launching of the two operations, and post-
possible weight of Allied power against poning a final decision until the middle of
the enemy, and the cancellation of ANVIL March. By that time it became evident
would mean that seven American and that any loading plans employing the
seven French divisions would lie idle in available lift were too inflexible for safety
the Mediterranean.27While the Supreme and that OVERLORD itself would be en-
Commander was fully aware of these im- dangered by attempting to carry off both
plications, he also felt the need for a five- operations a t the same time. Late in the
division assault in the north as a mini-
mum to give a favorable chance for suc- 27COSSAC (44) Min of Stf Confs, Mtg convened
by Supreme Cmdr, 21 Jan 44.
cess. Experience in Italy h a d confirmed 28Cbl, Eisenhower to Marshall, 6 Feb 44, SHAEF
the conviction that the OVERLORD landing SGS 381 OVERLORD-ANVIL.
186 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

month the Supreme Commander reluc- sity of capturing Cherbourg and then the
tantly recommended that the southern Brittany and Loire ports in order to secure
operation be canceled as then planned, a lodgment area with an assured mainte-
a n d some of the shipping in the Mediter- nance. T h e attainment of the first objec-
ranean was transferred to England so that tive dictated the greatest possible concen-
OVERLORD could be mounted in the de- tration of strength in the Cotentin, and
sired strength. ANVILdid not die, although the final plan accordingly provided for
its future was highly uncertain for the the employment of two American air-
next few months. Despite that uncertainty borne divisions in the Cotentin to facil-
the boundaries between the European itate the early capture of Cherbourg. In
and North African theaters were shifted Montgomery’s view this would be the
in March to place southern France within “main battle.” 30
the North African theater’s jurisdiction A second revision in the OVERLORD
and responsibility. Switzerland, Hungary, design emphasized even more pointedly
and Austria as well as Vichy France were the planners’ preoccupation with the far-
detached from the E T O . After the Nor- shore discharge problem. While Cher-
mandy invasion, when the pressure on the bourg enjoyed a necessary priority in the
available shipping resources was removed, port development plans, it was the
a way was finally found to launch the Brittany group that U.S. forces expected
operation in southern France.29 to rely on after the first months on the
T h e OVERLORD plan was revised from Continent. T h e second major objective of
time to time until the very date it was OVERLORD was the capture of the Brittany
launched. Two further amendments are peninsula under the cover of the main
worth noting because of the influence of body of Allied forces on the left (east)
logistic considerations. One change, made flank. T h e initial OVERLORD plan antici-
almost concurrently with the extension of pated as the first step in the capture of
the assault area to the east Cotentin, dealt Brittany a thrust southward across the
with the employment of airborne forces. base of the peninsula to seize the ports of
General Marshall had voiced an objection Nantes and St. Nazaire a t the mouth of
to the wide dispersion of airborne forces the Loire River, followed by operations
provided for in the earlier plan, and a t a westward with Brest and the smaller ports
meeting at 21 Army Group headquarters of the peninsula as the main objectives. In
in mid-February this objection was sec- April 1944 this scheme was revised by the
onded by the top American a n d British adoption of a supplementary plan known
ground force commanders. It is evident as CHASTITY, under which the capture of
from their discussion that the importance Nantes and St. Nazaire was to be deferred.
of the port problem was firmly riveted in Instead, a major port of entry for U.S.
their minds. General Bradley considered
that the main object of the early stages of 29 See Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command,
UNITED STATES ARMY I N WORLD W A R II
OVERLORD must be to seize Cherbourg as (Washington. 1953), and Harrison, Cross-Channel
soon as possible and argued that nothing Attack, for fuller accounts of the controversy over
ANVIL.
should be allowed to deflect from that 30Note of Mtg at 21 A G p Hq, 18 Feb 44, SHAEF
aim. His stand was reinforced by General SGS 373/2 Employment of Airborne Forces in Opn
Montgomery, who pointed up the neces- OVERLORD, I.
INCEPTION O F OVERLORD AND ITS LOGISTIC ASPECTS 187

forces and supplies was to be developed at of Liberties, which in turn imposed the
Quiberon Bay, a large well-protected inlet necessity of discharging nearly all of the
on the south coast of Brittany approxi- cargo by lighters and amphibious vehicles
mately midway between the Loire estuary between D plus 42 and 90. It was essential
and Lorient. therefore to have facilities with character-
Several factors influenced this change istics required for lighters or berths for
in plan. I n one respect CHASTITY was a deep-draft ships.
further strategic-economic amendment to The Quiberon Bay area appeared to
OVERLORD in that it precluded the neces- offer a better solution to the problem than
sity for an extensive crossing of a major did any other location on the northwest
obstacle, the Loire, and the establishment coast of France. Preliminary studies re-
of a protective bridgehead south of the vealed that the area had over 3,000 yards
river, which would have been necessary if of hard beach of required slope, a shel-
the ports of St. Nazaire and Nantes were tered anchorage capable of accommodat-
to be utilized. The capture of such a ing about 200 Liberty ships, and four
bridgehead would have required a large minor ports within easy reach suitable for
number of troops, and would have in- high-line discharge a t first a n d for deep-
volved maintenance over a restricted road water piers later. Furthermore, the Allies
line of communications from the northern could make maximum use of personnel
ports. CHASTITY would allow a more a n d equipment by concentrating the dis-
economic use of resources which, at best, charge of cargo in one area instead of dis-
would be limited in the early phases. persing it, and by shortening the haul,
The Quiberon Bay project was also seen thereby decreasing the turn-round of ve-
as the solution to another major logistic hicles and increasing their daily tonnage
problem. A restudy of port capacities on capacity. An excellent road and rail net-
the Continent revealed that the require- work was known to exist within easy reach
ments of the build-up simply would not be of many discharge points around the bay;
met; discharge facilities had to be aug- and the shortened line of haul from the
mented in some way, particularly in the bay direct to army maintenance areas
post-OVERLORDphase, after D plus 90. would increase carrying capacity and re-
Nantes and St. Nazaire would in all prob- lieve the overworked network of roads and
ability be destroyed. Furthermore, the railways from the Normandy region.
Normandy beaches were expected to be The Quiberon Bay project had certain
useful for only a limited period and would tactical disadvantages, particularly from
be completely abandoned with the advent the point of view of air and naval protec-
of bad weather in the fall. Most serious of tion, but the strategic-logistic advantages
all would be the inadequate facilities for of the project outweighed them all, and
discharging Liberty ships. Quayside dis- administrative planners of all the agencies
charge of deep-draft ships such as the involved became convinced that it was a
Liberties would become a growing neces- vital military necessity. T h e shortage of
sity as the operation progressed, for it was rail and motor transportation, the prac-
planned that much of the shallow-draft tical certainty that the rail net from Brest
coaster tonnage would be withdrawn would be destroyed beyond hope of early
about D plus 42. This would force the use repair, the limited capacity of the rail lines
188 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMTES

leading southeast from Cherbourg, the un- ports. These plans had a larger objective,
availability of the Loire ports until a of course—the destruction of enemy
bridgehead was established on the south forces—but the adequate build-up and
bank of that river, and the certainty of proper maintenance of Allied forces were
inadequate port capacity at D plus 90 prerequisite to that end.
under the earlier plans all impelled While the final OVERLORD plan bore
Supreme Headquarters to give its blessing strong resemblance to the outline which
to the scheme, and operational plans were the COSSAC planners presented to the
altered to provide for capture of the area Combined Chiefs of Staff a t Quebec in
by the Third Army.31 Adoption of the August 1943, it had undergone important
Quiberon project in April constituted the revision through enlargement a n d
last major amendment to the cross- strengthening. As finally executed the
Channel invasion plan. plan called for amphibious assaults by five
Adoption of the plan by no means divisions on the Normandy coast between
minimized the importance of Brest. It was the Orne River and the Carentan estuary
intended rather to obviate both tactical a n d on the east coast of the Cotentin
and logistic disadvantages of earlier plans, peninsula, preceded by airborne landings
a n d to boost the total port discharge by one British division near Caen and by
capacity of the Brittany area. The Brittany two U.S. divisions in the Carentan–Ste.
ports were believed to be so vital logis- Mère-Eglise area several hours earlier.
tically that Allied planners began to study (Map 5—inside back cover) American
the possibility of amphibious and com- seaborne forces were to land on UTAH
bined amphibious-airborne operations to Beach, on the east coast of the Cotentin in
capture St. Malo, Brest, and Quiberon the vicinity of Ste. Mère-Eglise, and on
Bay in the event U.S. forces were unable OMAHA Beach, in the vicinity of St.
to advance beyond the neck of the Cher- Laurent-sur-Mer. Assault landing craft
bourg peninsula.32 were to transport three British divisions
T h e evolution of OVERLORD clearly re- with attached Commando units, and two
veals the extent to which logistical factors U.S. divisions with attached Ranger units.
determined the scale of the assault, the Landing craft and ships for two additional
choice of the lodgment area and initial ob-
jectives, and the speed of attainment of 31Ltr, H q FECOMZ to C G FUSAG, 30 Mar 44,
sub: Development of Bay of Quiberon; Ltr, Admiral
those objectives. T h e supply of shipping Ramsay to CAO SHAEF, 13 Apr 44, sub: Port capac-
and the capacity of continental discharge ities, Northwest Europe-Quiberon Bay; Ltr, Gen
facilities were the most recurrent of the Crawford, G–4 SHAEF, to Cof S SHAEF. 22 Apr 44,
sub: Adoption of Quiberon Bay Project; Ltr, Gen
limiting factors, and served as common Smith, CofS SHAEF, to Admiral Ramsay. 24 Apr 44,
denominators in all the deliberations over sub: Quiberon Bay Project All in SHAEF SGS 800.4
the cross-Channel invasion design. Their Quiberon Bay Project. See also History of 12th Army
Group, I, 348–57. T h e plan that eventually evolved
importance was clearly evident in the dis- differed substantially from the original concept, how-
cussions of the Quiberon Bay project. ever. See below, Ch. VII, Sec. 3.
Once the invading forces had secured a 32See below, Ch. XI, Sec. 6, for reference to plans
foothold on the Continent the most im- BENEFICIARY (St. Malo), HANDSUP (Quiberon Bay),
a n d SWORDHILT (Brest). Third Army Outline Plan,
portant single strategic objective was to be 1 2 May 44, a n d Ltr, 21 A G p to FUSA, 28 Apr 44,
the capture a n d development of major SHAEF G–3 G C T 370–291 Plans.
INCEPTION OF OVERLORD AND ITS LOGISTIC ASPECTS 189

divisions afloat were to be provided for the the opening of the Brittany ports and de-
follow-up on the second tide of D Day. velopment of Quiberon Bay. Clearance of
Heavy air and naval bombardment of the area south to the Loire was to com-
enemy forces was to precede the seaborne plete the mission announced in the OVER-
landings. LORD plan—the establishment of the
OVERLORD called first for a rapid ad- lodgment. This was expected to require
vance inland and in the west the early three months (to D plus 90). The plan
capture of Cherbourg, to be followed by made an additional assumption which was
an eastward expansion of t h e beachhead to prove historically significant so far as
to the Eure River from Dreux to Rouen logistic operations were concerned: a
and thence along the Seine to the sea, and pause would probably be necessary upon
the simultaneous seizure of Chartres, the completion of the operation to permit
Orléans, and Tours. Meanwhile U.S. the development of the administrative
forces were to drive south to cut off the base in preparation for an advance beyond
Brittany peninsula and pave the way for the Seine.
 CHAPTER V

Command and Organization—

and the Assignment of Planning
Responsibilities
January–June 1944
( 1 ) Formation ofthe Major Commands came about it is necessary to see first how
the major commands of the theater de-
One result of the increasing tempo of veloped after the planning for OVERLORD
invasion planning in the fall and winter of began in earnest.
1943–44 was that decisions on command In August 1943 ETOUSA had three
and organization took a more definite major subordinate commands: the Eighth
turn. Efforts had continued throughout Air Force (air forces), the V Corps
1943 to work out a satisfactory delineation (ground forces), and the Services of Sup-
of authority in supply and administration, ply (service forces). 1The Eighth Air Force
but the repeated reorganizations had left was already carrying on operations against
the problem far from solved. Merged with the enemy. The SOS had long been active
this struggle late in the year was the need in the field of administration and supply,
to work out a command and organiza- and its importance was naturally en-
tional arrangement for the cross-Channel hanced by the accelerated build-up which
invasion both on the national and Allied now began in preparation for the cross-
levels, and to assign responsibilities for the Channel operation. The V Corps con-
detailed planning of the operation. These tinued to serve as the highest ground
problems were closely related, since the force headquarters in the theater.
necessity for a n adequate command struc- As the various planning and training
ture for continental operations had a di- organizations were formed, it became im-
rect bearing on the duties and authority portant to develop a ground force com-
of the SOS and its relationship to other mand for the assault, and plans for a
commands. T h e efforts of the SOS to im-
prove its position eventually culminated in 1 There were two other commands directly under
Headquarters, ETOUSA, but of less importance to
the consolidation of its headquarters with this discussion-the Iceland Base Command and the
that of ETOUSA. To understand how this American School Center.
COMMAND, ORGANIZATION, AND PLANNING 191

higher headquarters began to take form headquarters. Within the month both
early in the year. The knowledge that the were activated, the 1st U.S. Army Group
British were intending to organize a n (FUSAG) at Bryanston Square, London,
army headquarters during the summer in- and the First U.S. Army (FUSA) at
fluenced these plans. General Andrews Bristol. After the latter took over opera-
recommended that the Americans do the tional control of all ground forces in the
same, partly to help promote the deception United Kingdom from V Corps on 23
that a n Allied attack was being planned October, all ground force troops were as-
for 1943. General Devers pushed the idea signed to First Army rather than V Corps
further when he assumed command, ask- for administration and training. Included
ing that Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, then in the change was the Assault Training
commanding the II Corps in Sicily, be Center, which was the most active agency
sent to the United Kingdom to replace training U.S. troops for the D-Day as-
General Hartle, and also asking that a n sault.3 General Bradley exercised com-
army commander be assigned to initiate mand of both First Army and 1st Army
planning for the invasion operation. 2 Group.
The idea received further impetus in The relationship of the army and army
July when the British proceeded with the group vis-à-vis ETOUSA and SOS was to
skeleton organization of their entire be a matter of considerable confusion, and
ground force command for OVERLORD,produced many conflicts over responsibili-
activating two armies and the 21 Army ties and authority in both the planning
Group. In notifying General Devers of this and execution of the continental opera-
development General Morgan suggested tion. The problem was to come to a head
that the Americans also create a skele- later in the year when the whole subject of
tonized army group headquarters in addi- command and organization in the theater
tion to a n army headquarters. Anticipat- came up for review. Meanwhile 1st Army
ing approval of the OVERLORD plan in the Group devoted itself mainly to planning
following month he believed that these with 21 Army Group, while First Army as-
headquarters should be established so that sumed the position of over-all U.S. field
they would familiarize themselves with force headquarters in the United King-
their duties, prepare to undertake detailed dom, although it was also to have plan-
planning for the invasion, and eventually ning functions connected with its opera-
take over command of the operation. tional mission. The air forces in the United
General Devers was in accord with this Kingdom also expanded in size and
idea and again urged it on the War De- evolved a command organization in an-
partment, but without immediate success. ticipation of the OVERLORD operation. For
Action was finally forthcoming after the a long time the Eighth Air Force acted as
Quebec Conference. General Bradley was the highest air force headquarters in the
relieved of his command in the Mediter- theater, paralleling the V Corps as the
ranean early in September and, after con- highest ground force command. It re-
ferences in Washington, arrived in the covered more quickly than the ground
United Kingdom early the next month.
He immediately undertook the organiza- 2 Organization and Command, I, 270–71.
tion of both a n army and a n army group 3 Ibid., I, 271–78.
192 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

forces from the losses to TORCH,and de- command. Tactical air units previously as-
veloped rapidly during 1943. By August it. signed to the VIII Air Support Command
was carrying on a full-scale air war against were now assigned to the Ninth, and with
Germany. The emphasis within the Eighth the aid of personnel transferred from the
from the start was on bombing, and its Eighth Air Force the Ninth began plan-
operations were carried on in close col- ning and carrying out preinvasion opera-
laboration with the British, though no tions in the United Kingdom.4 I n order to
combined command was set up for the co-ordinate the work of the Eighth and
purpose. Ninth Air Forces and to keep control of
Aside from the question of a combined both in the hands of General Eaker, an
command for strategic bombing, the over-all U.S. air command known as the
projected invasion of the Continent raised United States Army Air Forces in the
the problem of a n air command for close United Kingdom (USAAFUK) was set
support of ground operations. Experience up.
in North Africa had indicated that the air This new headquarters was almost iden-
forces in a theater should be divided into tical with the old Eighth Air Force, and
strategic and tactical commands, and Gen- the VIII Bomber Command eventually
eral Arnold in August 1943 recommended became for the most part the new Eighth
such a division of the ETOUSA air forces. Air Force. Furthermore, the general staff
General Eaker had already foreseen the of USAAFUK for the moment at least was
desirability of this arrangement and had the same as that of the Eighth Air Force,
organized the VIII Air Support Com- and its special staff the same as that of the
mand to operate alongside the VIII VIII Air Force Service Command. The
Bomber Command, both of them under struggle over control of supply and ad-
his command. ministration at theater level had been
T h e matter of separate air commands largely duplicated within the air forces,
for tactical and strategic purposes became and the same transition had taken place as
prominent within a few weeks as a result within Headquarters, ETOUSA. I n Octo-
of the decision of the Combined Chiefs of ber 1943 the functions of the A-4, Eighth
Staff at the Quebec Conference to set up a Air Force (corresponding to G–4,
tactical air command on the Allied level. ETOUSA) had been transferred to the
The U.S. tactical air forces were to be con- Commanding General, VIII Air Force
siderably augmented for the cross-Chan- Service Command (corresponding to the
nel operation, and General Arnold at this Commanding General, SOS), and the
time decided to send Maj. Gen. Lewis H. special staff sections of the Eighth Air
Brereton and the headquarters of the Force were placed under the service com-
Ninth Air Force, which he then com- mand. Called the VIII Air Force Service
manded in the Middle East, to the United Command, the organization in effect
Kingdom to form the U.S. command com-
ponent of the tactical air forces for OVER- 4 At the same time, the VIII Air Force Service
LORD. T h e headquarters of the Ninth Command was divided to form a mobile air service
actually moved to the United Kingdom in command for the Ninth. Brig. Gen. Hugh J. Knerr re-
mained in command of the VIII AFSC, a n d Maj.
September and October, and General Gen. Henry J. F. Miller was named to command the
Brereton arrived early in October to take IX Air Service Command.
COMMAND, ORGANIZATION, AND PLANNING 193

became an over-all air service command forces), the 21 Army Group (ground
and a part of USAAFUK. As in the forces), and the Allied Naval Expedi-
theater command, therefore, the desire to tionary Force (naval forces). The air and
concentrate all administrative and supply naval commands were decided on at the
services in one command, and the adapta- Quebec Conference and were organized
tion to continental operational conditions while the choice of the supreme com-
in anticipation of the invasion, had an mander was still being discussed. In fact,
inevitable influence on the organization the development of an air command had
and control of the U.S. air forces.5 begun in June 1943, when Air Chief
Equally important as a factor in shaping Marshal Portal of the RAF proposed to
the organization of ETOUSA and its General Devers that a tactical air com-
major commands was the development of mander be chosen and his powers defined.
the top Allied command for OVERLORD.Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory
The principle of unified command in each was already tentatively slated for the posi-
area of operations had been agreed upon tion, and at the Quebec Conference he
even before the United States entered the was definitely named to command the
war, and the idea had already been car- Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF) in
ried out in Southeast Asia and North OVERLORD. COSSAC’s directive in No-
Africa. The question of such a combined vember defining the commander in chief’s
command for the European operation was powers gave Leigh-Mallory control over
broached as early as July 1947; But there all the Allied tactical air forces supporting
was no urgency about the matter at the the invasion. These were to consist of the
time, nor was there agreement on the RAF Tactical Command and the U.S.
powers and functions of such a command. Ninth Air Force. Administrative control
The subject was again discussed at Casa- of the latter remained with USAAFUK.
blanca in January 1943, and, while a Efforts on the part of the U.S. Chiefs of
supreme commander was not designated, Staff to have the strategic air forces placed
the principle was definitely agreed to. under a n Allied command met with op-
Shortly thereafter the first step was taken position from the British, and a decision
in the creation of such a command with on this problem was postponed.6
the establishment of a provisional staff An over-all naval command was also
(COSSAC) pending his appointment. The decided on at the Quebec Conference.
main questions that remained in 1943 Since the bulk of the naval forces in OVER-
were those of naming the commander, LORD were to be British, it was a foregone
defining his powers, and determining the conclusion that the naval commander
organization of the Allied forces under would also be British. Admiral Ramsay
him. was appointed Commander-in-Chief,
The organization of the major combined Allied Naval Expeditionary Force
commands which were to function under (ANCXF), in October with complete
the Supreme Commander actually pre- command of the naval forces in the opera-
ceded his appointment. Three major com- tion under the Supreme Commander.
mands were organized during the summer
and fall of 1943. These were the Allied 5 Organization and Command, I, 279–86.
Expeditionary Air Force (tactical air 6 Ibid., I, 295–99.
 194 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

Operational control of U.S. naval forces would be British. All early thinking in
thus passed from ETOUSA to the Allied ETOUSA on the subject was predicated
command. As with the air forces, admin- on this assumption, and in attempting to
istration and supply remained with work out a suitable theater command and
national agencies.7 organization in anticipation of the even-
The Allied ground force command dif- tual creation of an Allied command Gen-
fered from the naval and air commands eral Devers was constantly on guard lest a
in that it was to be only temporary. In command be set u p in such a way as to
November 1943, 21 Army Group was endanger American interests.
finally designated as the over-all ground General Devers’ guiding principle was
command, but it was decided that the what he called the Pershing Principle of
commander-in-chief of 21 Army Group 1917, the essence of which was that the
would be in command of Allied ground integrity of U.S. forces should be pre-
forces only during the early stages of served. One outstanding example of this
OVERLORD, or until such time as the build- thinking can be seen in his insistence that
u p of American forces warranted the the Supreme Commander should not
introduction of a U.S. army group as an report to the Combined Chiefs through
over-all ground command for American the British Chiefs of Staff, which was a
forces. Thereafter the ground forces were feature of some of the early proposals on
to operate under their respective national a combined command. General Andrews
commanders, subject of course to the had insisted earlier that this would be
Supreme Commander, who was to ex- detrimental to U.S. interests, especially if
ercise direct command on the ground. the Supreme Commander were British.
Gen. Sir Bernard L. Montgomery was The central feature of General Devers’
designated commander-in-chief of 21 later proposals was the assurance that the
Army Group and took command late in senior U.S. officer in the theater should
December. retain enough power to protect American
Fundamental to the whole problem of interests. Without knowing what the na-
Allied command and organization and tionality of the Supreme Commander
coloring all the deliberations over it was would be, he felt that the senior U.S. com-
the question of whether the Supreme mander in the theater should command
Commander should be British or Ameri- the U.S. field forces and at the same time
can. While Prime Minister Churchill had continue as Commanding General,
laid down the principle at Casablanca ETOUSA, for in the latter position he
that the nation having the preponderance would have a direct channel of com-
of forces should also have the command, a munication with the U,S. Chiefs of Staff
final decision on the choice of a com- and would be on a level with the British
mander was not to be made till late in the Chiefs of Staff. Devers also suggested that
year. Because the British had had more the Commanding General, ETOUSA,
operational experience than the Ameri- delegate all nonoperational matters to a
cans, a n d because they were more active deputy commander in London so that
in the planning carried on by COSSAC, when his field headquarters was estab-
there was a strong tendency at first to
assume that the Supreme Commander 7 Ibid., I, 299–300.
COMMAND, ORGANIZATION, AND PLANNING 195

lished the theater headquarters would be (2) Consolidation of ETOUSA and SOS
his rear echelon under his deputy.
Most of these proposals were carried out The formation of the 1st U.S. Army
in ETOUSA organization, although they Group and the various components of the
were based at this time on the assumption Allied command was to have a decisive
that the Supreme Commander would be impact on theater headquarters organiza-
British. Drafts and redrafts of papers out- tion. The assumption of a n increasing
lining the proposed command setup con- share of both the planning and operational
tinued to be passed about all through the responsibilities by COSSAC and the com-
summer and fall of 1943. The problem of bined commands gradually reduced
nationality was decided at Quebec in ETOUSA’s role. ETOUSA’s planning
August; the actual choice of General function was definitely on the wane. The
Eisenhower as Supreme Commander was G–5 Plans Section was discontinued in
finally made in the course of the Cairo- October and its chief, General Barker, was
Tehran Conferences early in December. permanently transferred to COSSAC. The
General Eisenhower arrived in England new combined commands stripped
to take command of Allied forces on 16 ETOUSA of other officers in order-to
January 1944, his headquarters being meet the increasing rank and ability re-
designated Supreme Headquarters, Allied quirements for their American compo-
Expeditionary Force, or SHAEF. nents. Over-all control of planning for the
The establishment of the combined air, ground forces was delegated to 21 Army
ground, and naval commands thus ante- Group in November, and the position of
dated the creation of an over-all Supreme 1st Army Group and First Army was also
Command, although SHAEF had a pred- prescribed by COSSAC.
ecessor in the COSSAC organization T h e lines of operational control were
which formed the nucleus of the new also rapidly being withdrawn from
headquarters. COSSAC had been origi- ETOUSA. Theoretically ETOUSA was
nally established mainly as a planning to retain operational control of all U.S.
staff. As the combined commands began units until the Supreme Commander re-
to take shape in the fall of 1943, it began ceived his directive in February 1944. But
to assume more and more of the character- real control was rapidly slipping away to
istics of a supreme headquarters organiza- the Allied commands. First the naval
tion. In September it changed from a command was withdrawn, and in mid-
purely planning agency to a n executive December the operational control of the
one and began to issue directives to the Ninth Air Force also passed from it. The
recently named air a n d naval com- transfer of over-all control of U.S. forces
manders on their responsibilities in the from a strictly American command to an
coming invasion. Basic directives on Allied command raised an obvious ques-
OVERLORD planning were issued at the tion: what was to be done with the organi-
end of November. By mid-January 1944
COSSAC had served its purpose, and 8 Organization and Command, I, 286–300. T h e
with the arrival of the Supreme Com- development of the Allied command structure and
the selection of the Supreme Commander are treated
mander it was transformed into the more comprehensively in Pogue, The Supreme Com-
Supreme Headquarters. 8 mand.
196 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

zation Headquarters, ETOUSA, and planning for the operation, logistical as

what was to be the command role of its well as tactical. This was bound to produce
commanding general? There remained a conflict with the SOS over the control of
the field of supply and administration, supply and administrative support of the
which was to be left under national com- armies, a conflict which carried over into
manders. Furthermore, it was generally the period of active operations on the
felt that some over-all U.S. headquarters Continent. 9
should be maintained. The question of For the time being ETOUSA resolved
whether this headquarters should be the dispute by delineating the planning
ETOUSA was complicated by the intro- responsibilties. It charged 1st Army Group
duction of the 1st Army Group, for it was with all planning for operations on the
assumed by some that the army group Continent by U.S. forces other than air,
would become a n over-all American including administrative planning. The
GHQ, replacing ETOUSA. Commanding General, SOS, was in-
General Marshall made known his con- structed to initiate such planning as was
ception of what the eventual theater or- required by 1st Army Group, First Army,
ganization should be in a letter to the and the U.S. air forces for the logistical
ETOUSA commander in September. In support of operations, a n d the SOS was
it he laid down the principle that there also charged with planning the mounting
should be a continuing over-all U.S. head- of the operation. One point at least was
quarters, although he did not definitely settled in the field of administrative plan-
settle whether it was to be Headquarters, ning in these developments of October
ETOUSA, or a n American G H Q s e t up a n d November: 1st Army Group was to
on the Continent. Further, the letter control planning by the SOS for the oper-
seemed specific in designating the army ation, but ETOUSA outranked 1st Army
group as subordinate to ETOUSA or the Group and could review the latter’s plan.
GHQ, but the idea continued to persist in There now began a n interplay among
some ETOUSA circles that 1st Army the various staffs involved in the command
Group eventually might become the developments of late 1943 — 1st Army
GHQ. I n any event it appears that the Group, ETOUSA, and the SOS—as to
formation of any U.S. headquarters was the disposition of the theater’s functions.
to await the naming of the Supreme Com- Both SOS and the 1st Army Group ap-
mander. But by the time General Eisen- peared desirous of taking over as many of
hower arrived in the United Kingdom these functions as possible. Apparently
steps were already under way to form the visualizing the declining role of Head-
ETOUSA-SOS headquarters, which was quarters, ETOUSA, General Devers re-
maintained as theater headquarters. quested the assignment as commanding
The new 1st Army Group’s pretensions general of 1st Army Group for himself,
in the field of supply and administration suggesting at the same time that supply
had further complicated the whole ques- and administration of the theater could be
tion of theater organization. General controlled most effectively by the army
Bradley had taken command of 1st Army group. But General Devers did not receive
Group on the assumption that his organi- this command. Upon General Eisen-
zation was to take over direction of all 9 Organization and Command, I, 306–11.
COMMAND, ORGANIZATION, AND PLANNING 197

hower’s appointment as theater com- The commanding general of ETOUSA

mander in December, Devers was given was still in a position to decide what the
command of the North African theater future organization was to be, and it was
and left the United Kingdom early in Jan- the last solution which was to win out—a
uary. Had he been given command of the consolidated ETOUSA-SOS, with the
army group it might have developed along over-all direction of supply and adminis-
the lines he indicated. tration from that headquarters. Con-
With the impending transfer of tactical fronted with the loss of its tactical func-
functions to the Allied command the fu- tions, the ETOUSA staff naturally pre-
ture of ETOUSA headquarters seemed to ferred what amounted to absorption by
depend on its role in the field of supply the SOS to delegation of most supply and
and administration. But it was also obvi- administrative functions to the army
ous that in the administrative field group.
ETOUSA soon would only be duplicating The final solution was not arrived at as
SOS functions, or would be relegated to a directly as logic seemed to dictate. But it
relatively minor position vis-a-vis the was crystal clear in all minds that the or-
army group if over-all control of supply ganization known as ETOUSA was soon
were turned over to the latter. That to lose all tactical functions, concerning
ETOUSA should continue to duplicate both planning and operations; and it be-
the activities of the SOS was obviously in- came increasingly clear to all that the
advisable. The main question to be re- ETOUSA and SOS headquarters were
solved, therefore, was whether there should maintaining many officers doing approxi-
be a n over-all control of supply and ad- mately the same work and producing a
ministration from a theater headquarters great deal of delay and confusion in staff
with a deputy commander for supply and channels. T h e division of functions and
administration, or from the field force duplication of work were acutely sum-
headquarters—in essence, whether SOS marized by the ETOUSA adjutant gen-
or army group should exercise the control. eral, Brig. Gen. Ralph Pulsifer. I n a mem-
It seems almost inconceivable now that the orandum to the chief of staff in November,
transfer of these functions should have he pointed out that of the six major re-
been contemplated. The SOS had carried sponsibilities of the theater commander
on most of the supply planning which had the SOS was performing two, First Army
been done for OVERLORD, and was at the one, 1st Army Group another, and the re-
time the main agency carrying on active mainder were divided between SOS and
supply and administrative activities in the ETOUSA with “exceedingly indistinct
theater. Nevertheless there were at this lines of demarcation.” In discharging the
time three possible solutions to the ques- divided responsibilities the SOS was using
tion of future theater organization and the some 750 officers and ETOUSA 400.10An
fate of Headquarters, ETOUSA: General indication of the trend of thinking is pro-
Devers’ conception, with 1st Army Group vided by the fact that some ETOUSA staff
as the main headquarters; the formation officers who had previously opposed con-
of an over-all GHQ; and the continuation solidation now began to urge it.
of a theater headquarters by consolidation 10 Memo,Pulsifer for Brig Gen David Barr, 17 Nov
with the SOS. 43, as cited in Organization and Command, I, 320.
 198 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

During the closing weeks of 1943 the SOS. These two headquarters now ap-
staffs of SOS, ETOUSA, and 1st Army peared agreed that consolidation had be-
Group all considered the problem of divi- come necessary, but they felt that the new
sion of functions in the theater, and nu- headquarters should be the over-all co-
merous memorandums were written and ordinating agency in theater supply and
many conferences held on the subject. An administration and not subordinate to
increasing number of voices began to 1st Army Group or a GHQ, as the army
argue for consolidation. One of the most group plans proposed. T h e feeling of 1st
cogent summaries of the problem was pre- Army Group was that complete control of
sented by Brig. Gen. Henry B. Lewis, the supply in the combat zone should be
adjutant general of 1st Army Group, in a turned over to the field force headquarters
memorandum to the G–1 of the same and that the SOS (later the Communica-
headquarters on 16 December: tions Zone) should not be superior to it in
administrative matters. This conflict was
There are two separate headquarters (ETO
and SOS) with the same special staff. Al- to continue throughout the history of the
though certain services are placed under the theater.
SOS, they remain ETO staff sections. The For the time being the proponents of a
CG, SOS, is responsible for the coordination, combined ETOUSA-SOS won out, and
supervision, operational control and direc- the plan of reorganization as finally car-
tion of these services, but he cannot issue in-
structions in the name of the theater com- ried out favored ETOUSA-SOS as a
mander to accomplish these duties. He is au- higher headquarters than 1st Army
thorized to issue instructions which will not Group. The plan was worked out in detail
“affect command responsibilities of com- while General Devers was still command-
manders.” This appears to be a confusing ing the theater, but General Eisenhower
and meaningless gesture since all military in- had been kept fully advised on the pro-
structions affect command responsibilities.
As a result, observation indicates that often posed consolidation through General
instructions are prepared by a service, ap- Smith, who had preceded the Supreme
proved by the CG, SOS, and sent to ETO. Commander to London, and it was finally
There they may be approved and returned made with his complete knowledge and
for issue by SOS, or issued by ETO itself. On approval.12 T h e reorganization was an-
the other hand they may be revised in ETO
with or without concurrence of the service nounced on 17 January, the day after
concerned or Headquarters, SOS, or simply Eisenhower’s assumption of command.
disapproved. Informal correspondence (car- (Chart 5 )
rier sheet) on detailed operation is conducted The general order announcing consoli-
between SOS staff and services, and between dation of the two headquarters appointed
ETO and SOS staffs, as well as through com-
mand channels, entailing delay, by-passing General Lee deputy commander of the
and duplication. Such procedure appears to theater for supply and administration in
indicate a faulty division of responsibility addition to his duties as Commanding
between the two headquarters.11 General, SOS. As SOS commander his
T h e plans which were offered as solu-
tions to the problem reveal clearly that a 11Memo, Gen Lewis, AG FUSAG, for G–1
new conflict in the field of supply and ad- FUSAG, 16 Dec 43, sub: Proposal for Realignment of
Adm Procedure in this Theater, as cited in Organiza-
ministration was growing up to replace tion and Command, I, 322.
the old one between ETOUSA and the 12Interv with Gen Barker, OCMH.
CHART5—ETOUSA’S
ORGANIZATION
AFTERTHECONSOLIDATION
OF 17 JANUARY1944
200 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

duties included command of the Commu- the over-all U.S. administrative head-
nications Zone, successor to SOS upon the quarters in the ETO, though the possibility
commencement of operations, and con- still remained that an American GHQ at
tinued operation of administration and SHAEF might take over administrative
supply for U.S. forces in the United King- functions once continental operations be-
dom and on the Continent. To fulfill these gan. As it turned out, the January settle-
duties General Lee was authorized to act ment endured. The decision to continue
in the name of the theater commander in the already existing ETOUSA headquar-
all appropriate matters. General Smith, ters as the highest U.S. echelon in the the-
whom General Eisenhower had brought ater was an important one and gave con-
with him as chief of staff of SHAEF, was tinuity to the administrative setup, though
also named chief of staff of ETOUSA, in the end it was to place the theater head-
while Colonel Lord was named ETOUSA quarters in a somewhat peculiar position.
deputy chief of staff in addition to his Theoretically the consolidation placed the
duties as chief of staff of SOS. The reor- new headquarters and General Lee as the
ganization consolidated the separate staffs deputy theater commander in a position
of ETOUSA and SOS into one theater to control all supply and administration in
staff with the customary general and spe- the theater, and to this extent it was a
cial staff sections, thus eliminating the triumph for General Lee's ideas on central-
duplication of work in the two head- ization of those functions. But the fact that
quarters on supply and administrative this theater headquarters consisted almost
problems.13 entirely of officers from the old SOS staff
The consolidation resulted in an inter- also left it in the position of being a head-
esting and somewhat complicated organ- quarters co-ordinate with the 1st Army
ization. While the two headquarters were Group and the air forces, a n d the latter
officially consolidated, the fiction was kept resented looking to it as a higher head-
up of the existence of two separate head- quarters. Furthermore, being physically
quarters. As Commanding General, SOS, separated from the theater commander,
General Lee published general orders, cir- who was resident at SHAEF, the old
culars, and directives to SOS installations ETOUSA-SOS group was to have some
(mainly the base sections). As deputy difficulty in asserting its authority, for
commander of the theater he issued direc- ground and air commanders were inclined
tives applying to the theater as a whole. to look to SHAEF as the next highest
Of particular significance was the au- command echelon. Although the consoli-
thority which the SOS now possessed to dation thus brought new complications in
issue its administrative instructions in its train, the old conflict between
ETOUSA circulars without infringing on ETOUSA and the SOS had ended and
the sovereignty of other commands, as it the theater entered a new period. While
had in the past. And while there no longer the transformation was in part the culmi-
were two headquarters, staff officers nation of the struggle dating from the ori-
now acted in a dual capacity-for both gins of the theater, the formation of the
ETOUSA and the SOS.14
Temporarily at least, the consolidation 13 Organizationand Command, II, 1–3
settled the position of ETOUSA-SOS as 14Ibid., II, 4–5.
COMMAND, ORGANIZATION, AND PLANNING 201

Allied high command had finally forced a especially on tactical matters, supplanted
complete alteration in the nature and the old theater headquarters.16
functions of the theater command, which I n the field of supply and administra-
was now to be subordinate to Supreme tion General Eisenhower had delegated
Headquarters. The SOS component of the his functions to General Lee as the deputy
new headquarters had at the same time theater commander. ETOUSA-SOS also
achieved what it had always regarded as remained the theater commander’s vehicle
its rightful position and function. 15 of communications with the War Depart-
A concomitant to this reorganization of ment on administrative matters, and the
ETOUSA was the almost simultaneous authorizing agency for the activation of all
transformation of COSSAC into SHAEF American commands which were to op-
on 15January 1944. Four weeks later, on erate under SHAEF. It was the one U.S.
12 February, General Eisenhower received organization not under the command con-
the formal directive on his duties as Su- trol of SHAEF, but it was nevertheless
preme Commander. This climactic devel- under the control of General Eisenhower
opment of the Allied high command had as theater commander.
a profound effect on the position of If this setup is difficult to understand,
ETOUSA headquarters, since from this some consolation may perhaps be derived
point onward SHAEF was to exercise con- from the knowledge that it was not always
trol of all tactical planning and operations, completely understood by the people in-
except for strategic bombing. It left volved in it and that in practice it often
ETOUSA headquarters in a position became somewhat difficult to operate.
quite different from the one it had had for After the invasion there was a tendency
the past year and a half. Fundamental to for SHAEF to assume more and more the
the new setup was the fact that the official aspect of a n American theater headquar-
ETOUSA headquarters was not in prac- ters as well as an Allied one, and for Gen-
tice the headquarters of the theater com- eral Lee’s headquarters gradually to be-
mander, General Eisenhower, who re- come a purely Communications Zone
sided at SHAEF. And while the ETOUSA headquarters. But during the preparatory
general and special staffs were in theory phase, from January to June, the consoli-
his staffs, they actually were General Lee’s, dated ETOUSA-SOS headquarters was
and they functioned for him in the supply definitely the theater headquarters, su-
and administrative field. General Eisen- preme in the supply and administrative
hower could of course call on them di- field under the direction of the deputy
rectly for advice, but he normally operated theater commander.
on the Allied level at SHAEF and there- Certain wrinkles had to be ironed out
fore operated mainly through the SHAEF before the consolidated ETOUSA-SOS
staff. The many high-ranking U.S. officers headquarters could function smoothly.
on this staff, organized on the principle of The two staffs had to be integrated, for
opposite numbers, tended to drift into example, At first the general staff of the
what ETOUSA thought was its territory. new headquarters contained a mixture of
The theater commander was at SHAEF
and the major decisions were made there. 15Ibid., I, 328.
For U.S. forces, SHAEF in some ways, 16Ibid., II,8.
202 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

ETOUSA and SOS officers. There were H. Doolittle) and the Fifteenth Air Force in
some changes in the next few months, the Mediterranean (Maj. Gen. Nathan F.
however, and the consolidated headquar- Twining). USSTAF also took over admin-
ters then achieved a stability in personnel istrative control of the Ninth, and thus
which it had not previously enjoyed, for completely replaced the headquarters
there had been constant shifting in the known as USAAFUK. Command of the
preceding year. The special staff had al- new over-all U.S. air organization went to
ready been functioning for the most part Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, who had served as
under the SOS and continued without im- top airman in the Mediterranean a n d
portant changes. For the first time the in- whom General Eisenhower had taken with
tegrated general staff could be set up in him to the United Kingdom. General
closer accord with standard staff organiza- Eaker went to North Africa with General
tion and procedures as set down in army Devers. USSTAF now became the top
manuals. Proper co-ordination of func- command of the American air forces in
tions had been impossible under the old the theater, controlling the Eighth for op-
organization where they were divided be- erations and administration, the Ninth for
tween two or more headquarters. The new administration, and the Fifteenth for. op-
consolidated arrangement proved a much erations. T h e Fifteenth maintained its
more satisfactory one for handling the own administrative organization in the
supply and administrative affairs of the North African theater. General Eisen-
theater, and in the United Kingdom at hower, as Supreme Commander, had con-
least the central command for supply and trol of all the Allied tactical air forces
administration appeared a sound and log- through the AEAF, but he did not yet
ical arrangement. T h e larger problem to have control over strategic bombing and
be faced was that of transferring this or- its co-ordination with the land forces for
ganization to the Continent and adapting OVERLORD,although as theater com-
it to conditions where the field forces were mander he of course controlled USSTAF.
operating in combat.17 The strategic bombing campaign (Opera-
One other reorganization and the acti- tion POINTBLANK) was still being directed
vation of a n additional combat command through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
must be considered to complete the treat- Within the over-all air force command
ment of the U.S. command structure as it a division of function between supply and
stood at the end ofJanuary 1944. Concur- operations was now effected comparable
rently with the theater reorganization the to the changes at the ETOUSA level. The
air forces underwent a very similar trans- VIII Air Force Service Command had
formation. When General Eisenhower been in much the same position with rela-
went to the United Kingdom in January, tion to the Eighth Air Force a n d
the need had arisen for a n over-all strate- USAAFUK as the SOS had been with
gic bombing command to control opera- relation to ETOUSA. Brig. Gen. Hugh J.
tions from both the United Kingdom and Knerr, the commander of the Air Service
Italy. A command known as the United Command, had been striving for the same
States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF) was type of organization which General Lee
formed, made u p of the Eighth Air Force
in England (now under Maj. Gen. James 17 Organization and Command, II, 18–20.
COMMAND, ORGANIZATION, AND PLANNING 203

had been seeking for the SOS. Like Gen- planning for the operations in which it
eral Lee, he had already succeeded in was scheduled to take part when 1st Army
transferring the A–4 and special staff sec- Group became operational. Third Army
tions from USAAFUK to the Air Service was soon busily at work under the super-
Command, and he now succeeded in vision of the army group. With its activa-
bringing about a centralization of supply tion the combat command organization of
and administrative function similar to that U.S. forces for OVERLORD was virtually
effected in ETOUSA-SOS. Headquarters, complete.19
USSTAF, was now organized under two
deputy commanding generals, one for op- (3) Assignment of Command and Planning
erations and one for administration and Responsibilities
logistics, the latter position being held by
General Knerr. Like General Lee, Gen- One of the major factors in the evolu-
eral Knerr continued in a dual position, as tion of the organizational structure for
deputy commanding general of USSTAF OVERLORD was the growing necessity to
(for administration and logistics) and as assign command responsibilities and get
commanding general of the Air Service on with the detailed planning for the op-
Command. The VIII Air Force Service eration. By the end of January 1944 the
Command headquarters, which had also command plan at the top Allied and na-
served as the Air Service Command head- tional levels was almost complete, al-
quarters for USAAFUK, now served as though important additions and changes
the headquarters for the USSTAF Air were made later. O n the tactical side the
Service Command.18 Supreme Command (SHAEF), through
Meanwhile, another major combat its subcommands AEAF, ANCXF, and 21
command was to be added to the U.S. or- Army Group, was to exercise complete
ganizational structure. American ground control of the operation with the one ex-
force organization in January included ception of strategic bombing. General
only the 1st Army Group and the First Eisenhower desired that strategic bombing
Army. In order to complete the headquar- also be brought under his control in order
ters necessary for the invasion it was neces- to co-ordinate it with ground operations
sary to introduce another army headquar- in OVERLORD. Although he met with some
ters into the United Kingdom, since 1st opposition in this endeavor he was finally
Army Group was scheduled to control two given command of the strategic air forces
U.S. armies when it became operational. in April.20
This second army headquarters was the In the meantime COSSAC had also
Third U.S. Army (TUSA), which was con- worked out the method by which the tac-
stituted late in January at Knutsford in tical command would operate in the suc-
Western Base Section under the command ceeding stages of continental operations.
of Lt. Gen. George S. Patton. The haste Plans made in November 1943 provided
with which the Third Army was activated for joint responsibility for planning and
was indicative of the speed with which operations by the commanders in chief of
new divisions were pouring in, and of the
18 Ibid., II, 21–25.
need for an additional army headquarters 19Ibid., II, 40–43.
to administer them as well as to initiate 20Organization and Command, II, 28–29.
204 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

AEAF, ANCXF, and 21 Army Group troops organized as an advance communi-

(usually known as the joint commanders), cations zone section were to be attached to
and provided that the initial assault was 21 Army Group, and 1st U.S. Army Group
to be carried out under the command of was to furnish a staff to the British army
the First U.S. Army, with the necessary group to provide for their administration.
British or Canadian units attached. A The Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army
British army was to become operational Group, was to have over-all direction of
when British units had been sufficiently the line of communications until 1st Army
built up, at which time the 21 Army Group was allotted a n area, and was re-
Group was to take over control of the op- sponsible for the logistic support of all the
eration. When the number of U.S. forces forces under his command. The initial de-
justified the introduction of a second velopment of the American communica-
American army headquarters, 1st Army tions zone 22was therefore to be under the
Group was to assume active direction of 21 Army Group.
U.S. forces, responsible directly to SHAEF. There were to be three stages in the evo-
This plan was later amended and am- lution of command. The 21 Army Group
plified in several respects. The increase in was to be the directing ground force head-
the size of the assaulting forces eliminated quarters in the first two phases. In the first
the stage during which the First U.S. or assault phase, however, the First U.S.
Army was to control the operation. A sec- Army and the Second British Army were
ond command directive in January stipu- to operate somewhat independently and
lated that a British army headquarters handle their own logistic affairs. In the
would be operational from the beginning, second phase the 21 Army Group was to
controlling its own troops, with command take active control of tactical operations
of the two armies resting with 21 Army and of administrative and supply opera-
Group. T h e 1st Army Group was to take tions, exercising control of the latter
over active direction of American forces through the attached staffs of 1st Army
when the build-up justified the introduc- Group and the deputy commander of the
tion of a second American army head- Communications Zone. In the third phase
quarters. In general these were the com- the 1st Army Group was to be allotted an
mand lines as they eventually were fol- area of responsibility and SHAEF was to
lowed. 21 assume active direction of the two army
Fixing the command lines in adminis- groups.23
trative matters was more difficult. SHAEF The assignment of planning responsibil-
first outlined them in detail in a letter of ities generally corresponded to the division
instructions to the joint commanders in of command described above, although
March. In accordance with tactical com- this proved more difficult in the adminis-
mand arrangements, 21 Army Group was trative field than in the operational. Since
charged with command of all ground administrative matters were to be handled
forces engaged in the operation until such as far as possible through national agen-
time as the Supreme Command assigned
an area of responsibility to the 1st U.S. 21 Ibid.,II, 29–32.
22All the territory in the theater outside of the com-
Army Group. I n this initial period the bat zone—that is, back of the a r m y rear boundary.
First U.S. Army and the necessary service 23Organization and Command, II, 32–35.
COMMAND, ORGANIZATION, AND PLANNING 205

cies, they involved E T O U S A command weeks on the Continent. Planning in ad-

channels as well as SHAEF. Administra- ministrative matters from that time for-
tive planning for the combat zone obvi- ward was the responsibility of the 1st Army
ously belonged with the headquarters re- Group, which was to supervise the plan-
sponsible for such a zone, but there still ning by the SOS for the early development
remained the question of the communica- of the communications zone.
tions zone and of over-all administrative ETOUSA-SOS had to be brought into
planning for the U.S. zone as a whole, the picture, since it was to be responsible
which was the responsibility of ETOUSA. for the detailed development of the com-
Complicating the whole problem was munications zone and over-all logistical
General Lee’s dual position as deputy the- planning for maintenance of all U.S.
ater commander and commander of the forces. ETOUSA-SOS had enormous re-
SOS. sponsibilities in connection with the forth-
At the Allied level SHAEF acted as the coming operation. It was already opera-
over-all co-ordinating headquarters, de- tional in a sense that the ground forces
termining interservice and inter-Allied were not, for it was deeply engaged in the
administrative policy, but leaving the de- logistic build-up in the United Kingdom,
tailed implementation of its decisions to receiving and stockpiling supplies, operat-
its subcommands a n d national agencies. ting ports, railways, and depots, quarter-
It was to allocate material resources in ing troops, and performing a multitude of
short supply, co-ordinate policies on req- other administrative duties. The SOS was
uisitioning a n d purchasing, determine also given the task of mounting the inva-
policy on petroleum supply, co-ordinate sion force in southern England—that is,
movement and shipping, and in general marshaling troops, moving them to the
determine Allied administrative and logis- embarkation points, and loading them.
tic policy. COSSAC had already laid Once the operation was launched, the
down policy on planning in these various SOS had to provide support from the
fields in the fall of 1943. 24 United Kingdom for all U.S. forces on the
A more active and direct role in admin- Continent and arrange for continued sup-
istrative planning was to be played by port from the United Kingdom, the
SHAEF’s ground force subcommand, 21 United States, and other sources. At the
Army Group. As the highest ground force same time it had to be prepared to move
command in the early stages of the opera- from the United Kingdom to the Conti-
tion, 21 Army Group was also the highest nent a n d organize the lines of communi-
administrative headquarters for U.S. cations there without interruption in its
forces. It discharged its responsibilities in normal services. Fitting this ETOUSA-
administrative matters by delegating cer- SOS organization into the planning setup
tain functions to 1st Army Group and the of 1st Army Group a n d 21 Army Group
First Army in planning for the various a n d defining its future role on the Conti-
stages of the operation. First Army, as the nent proved to be one of the biggest organ-
highest U.S. headquarterso n the Conti- izational and command problems still
nent initially, was to be in undisputed remaining.
charge of planning and operations, includ- 24L t r , Col Frank M. Albrecht to OCMH, 29
ing the logistical, for the first two or three Jun 51.
206 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

T h e SOS was to be redesignated Com-

munications Zone upon the launching of
the invasion. The change denoted the
shift from operating what was essentially
a n extension of the zone of interior in the
United Kingdom to providing logistical
support for combat operations on the Con-
tinent. Toward the end of February the
term Communications Zone, or COMZ,
came into increasing use in reference to
the SOS, although the redesignation was
not official until the time of the invasion.
The new name actually appeared on let-
terheads as early as 21 February and came
into general use at that time without ben-
efit of christening through official orders.
While 21 Army Group was responsible
for the final co-ordination of planning for
the combined forces, it delegated the plan-
ning task for U.S. forces to 1st Army
Group, the highest American field force
GENERAL MOSES, G–4 of the 1st (later
headquarters. I n mid-January COSSAC the 12th) Army Group.
instructed the army group to attach a
U.S. administrative staff to 21 Army ating closely during the planning period.
Group headquarters to accomplish this Since the mission of the U.S. staff at 21
planning and to carry out the administra- Army Group was one of co-ordination
tion of U.S. forces under 21 Army Group rather than detailed planning, and since
control. Shortly thereafter Brig. Gen. Ray- the army, air, a n d communications zone
mond G. Moses, the 1st Army Group G–4, commanders were to draw u p their own
was designated Deputy Major General of administrative and logistical plans, it was
Administration, 21 Army Group, and took initially felt a t 1st Army Group that a
the entire 1st Army Group G–4 Section small representation by the SOS at 21
with him to General Montgomery’s head- Army Group would be enough to resolve
quarters, where the U.S. staff was to work any problems arising between the head-
closely with its opposite number, the quarters. It soon developed, however, that
British administrative staff. mere representation and liaison would not
ETOUSA-SOS representation was not suffice to co-ordinate the planning of the
immediately provided for, and General various organizations. Early in February
Lee therefore urged immediate assignment Generals Lee, Bradley, Smith, and Colo-
of a n SOS liaison group to this staff, stat- nel Lord conferred at SHAEF and
ing that full logistical support could be reached a decision on the matter of SOS
provided and co-ordination of communi- participation in the planning a t 21 Army
cations zone activities with those of the Group. SHAEF issued a directive on 9
armies could be insured only by co-oper- February which not only specified the
COMMAND, ORGANIZATION, AND PLANNING 207

part which the SOS was to have in the known as Forward Echelon, Communica-
planning at 21 Army Group, but also de- tions Zone (FECOMZ). T h e creation of
fined for the first time the command rela- Forward Echelon was dictated in part by
tionship between 1st Army Group and the the need for a n agency which could plan
Communications Zone, a subject of con- the development of the communications
siderable controversy for some time there- zone on the Continent and co-ordinate
after. For this reason the directive is a that planning with the top U.S. and
basic document in any consideration of Allied field force headquarters. I n part it
the U.S. administrative command organi- was dictated by the command require-
zation. ments of OVERLORD, which called for an
I n it SHAEF stated that General Lee, executive agency to assume active direc-
as deputy theater commander, was ex of- tion of the communications zone’s de-
ficio chief U.S. administrative officer and velopment and operations until Head-
as such was available to SHAEF on all quarters, Communications Zone, itself
U.S. administrative matters. More impor- could move to the Continent. Its role on
tant for the future administrative organ- the Continent was eventually altered by
ization, a planning staff from ETOUSA- events, but in planning the development
SOS was to be attached to 21 Army of the communications zone Forward
Group for the initial planning of the com- Echelon was to make an important con-
munications zone. General Lee was to tribution to Operation OVERLORD.
designate a deputy commander of the Forward Echelon was already in being
communications zone with a n adequate when SHAEF issued its directive on
staff to plan, develop, and operate the 9 February. ETOUSA had activated
U.S. communications zone on the Con- the organization two days before, and
tinent. This staff was to remain attached General Lee had chosen Col. Frank M.
to 21 Army Group until such time as an Albrecht, who had been in charge of U.S.
area of responsibility on the Continent logistical planning with the Norfolk
was assigned to 1st Army Group by the House group in 1943, to organize the
Supreme Commander. At that time the group. Colonel Albrecht gathered the per-
Communications Zone was to be attached sonnel for t h e new staff a n d within ten
to the 1st Army Group headquarters. days got planning under way at his head-
Eventually, when the Supreme Com- quarters in the John Lewis Building on
mander established an advance echelon of Oxford Street, London. A month later, on
t h e theater headquarters on the Conti- 14 March 1944, a Deputy Commander,
nent, the deputy commander of the Com- Communications Zone, was appointed as
munications Zone and his staff were to required by the SHAEF directive, the as-
come under the command of Headquar- signment going to Brig. Gen. Harry B.
ters, ETOUSA.25 Vaughan, Jr., commanding general of
Western Base Section.26Colonel Albrecht
(4) Forward Echelon, Communications Zone 25Organization and Command, II, 44–50. The di-
(FE COMZ) rective under discussion, Ltr, SHAEF to Chiefs of all
Divs SHAEF, 9 Feb 44, is quoted in full on page 50.
26Not to be confused with Maj. Gen. Harry H.
T h e SHAEF directive was the charter Vaughan, who later served as military aide to Presi-
for the activation of a new organization dent Truman.
208 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

was officially appointed chief of staff of tions Zone attached to provide its logistic
Forward Echelon and continued to be an support. In Phase II—D plus 15 to 41—
active director of the new staff’s planning the Advance Section was to be detached
activities. from the army and independently was to
As a planning echelon of ETOUSA- undertake the initial development of the
SOS, Forward Echelon was organized communications zone. In both these
with staff sections paralleling those of its phases Forward Echelon was to be en-
parent headquarters. In effect it consisted gaged mainly in supervising the work of
of t h e planning echelon of the SOS, its the Advance Section. It was to assume di-
staff comprising the planners from each of rect control and operation of communica-
the SOS staff sections. Throughout its his- tions zone activities in Phase III—D plus
tory, furthermore, it was inseparably asso- 41 to 90—and was responsible for the de-
ciated with the ETOUSA-SOS headquar- tailed planning of supply operations for
ters, not only drawing on its staff for that period. Forward Echelon was to plan
personnel, but utilizing ETOUSA-SOS only for the communications zone; 1st
agencies wherever feasible, and carrying Army Group was responsible for the
out its planning in closest consultation combat zone.
with and with constant aid from the The division of the OVERLORD period
ETOUSA-SOS staff sections. It even- into three phases was determined bas-
tually had a strength of approximately ically by estimates on the progress of the
460 officers a n d men.27Although it was operation. D plus I5 or 20, marking the
not intended to be a separate command, end of Phase I, was the approximate date
Forward Echelon was set u p to act as a n at which the planners calculated that it
operating echelon of Headquarters, Com- would no longer be convenient or desir-
munications Zone, when the time came to able for First Army to control logistic op-
assume direction of the communications erations in the base area, a n d the date at
zone on the Continent. which Advance Section should therefore
The duties of Forward Echelon were begin to organize the communications
further outlined in a letter from the SOS zone. By D plus 41 the build-up of U.S.
commander on 21 February. I n general, forces on the Continent a n d the advance
its mission was to perform a n d supervise inland were scheduled to have progressed
both planning and operations in connec- sufficiently to warrant the introduction of
tion with communications zone activities a second army and a n army group head-
for the entire OVERLORD period in close quarters. In addition, the lodgment by
consultation with the 21 Army Group and that time was expected to be large enough
1st Army Group administrative staffs. Its to require the forward displacement of the
tasks varied, however, in the three stages Advance Section a n d the introduction of
through which the development of admin- a base section to take over the port areas.
istrative responsibilities were expected to The Forward Echelon of the Communica-
pass. In Phase I—D Day to D plus 15 or tions Zone would then have to be estab-
20—the First U.S. Army was to have com- lished as a supervisory headquarters.
plete tactical a n d administrative control D plus 90 was the date by which the
in the U.S. zone on the Continent, with
a n Advance Section of the Communica- 27Interv with Col Albrecht, 5 Jul 51, OCMH.
COMMAND, ORGANIZATION, AND PLANNING 209

OVERLORD operation was to have been various Allied commands, and to a lesser
completed, and the earliest date by which degree personal ambitions and distrust,
it was thought feasible to move either contributed to this conflict.
SHAEF or the C O M Z headquarters to Fundamentally, the issue throughout
the Continent. was clear: who was to be responsible for
Since ETOUSA-SOS contemplated over-all co-ordination of logistic support,
that Forward Echelon would eventually both in planning a n d actual operations?
move to the Continent and supervise com- Forward Echelon, as a creature of the con-
munications zone activities there, it was solidated ETOUSA-SOS headquarters
established in physically separate head- reflected the ETOUSA point of view and
quarters, placed under a general officer, tended to assert the over-all position of the
a n d attached to Headquarters, 21 Army theater headquarters. Forward Echelon
Group, where it was to work with the 1st was conceived of as independent and
Army Group administrative staff. With paramount in its own field (that is, plan-
the establishment of the 1st Army Group ning for the communications zone) a t 21
a n d F E C O M Z staffs at 21 Army Group Army Group and not subject to the super-
the U.S. forces received the representation vision of 1st Army Group. General Lee
which they needed at the highest Allied outlined this view in a draft letter to the
ground force headquarters for the co-ordi- deputy commanding general, stating that
nation of logistical and tactical plans in the relationship between the latter’s head-
the period of 21 Army Group control. quarters a n d 1st Army Group was to be
It was characteristic of the entire history one of mutual co-operation a n d co-ordi-
of the theater that directives on command nation, a n d that E T O U S A was respon-
and organization always seemed to fall sible for supervising the staff branches and
short of clear-cut definitions of responsi- services of subordinate organizations, in-
bility a n d authority, leaving much room cluding 1st Army Group. Lee toned down
for contention. True to form, the estab- this claim somewhat in the final version
lishment of the 1st Army Group and of this letter, admitting that the staff sec-
C O M Z staff organizations at 21 Army tion of 1st Army Group at 21 Army Group
Group immediately resulted in disputes headquarters was to exercise the required
over their relationship during the plan- over-all general staff co-ordination be-
ning period and also over their command tween activities in the army areas and
relationship after the Communications activities in the communications zone. He
Zone became operative on the Continent. stated nevertheless that in order to pro-
The latter problem in particular was to be vide for suitable channels of technical
in doubt for some time, partly because of supervision in the theater as a whole the
the different concepts which the two head- special staffs of 1st Army Group and For-
quarters held regarding their roles and au- ward Echelon should carry out normal
thority, and partly because of conflicting special staff functions in the army area
interpretations of the SHAEF directive of and communications zone respectively.28
9 February. The theater’s complicated The halfhearted recognition of 1st
and unprecedented command arrange- Army Group’s over-all co-ordinating posi-
ments, growing out of General Eisen- 28Organization and Command, II, 50-56; Interv
hower’s dual role a n d the position of the with Gen Moses, 13 Aug 51.
210 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

tion did not satisfy the field forces. Gen- Communications Zone was to be attached
eral Bradley, commanding 1st Army to 1st Army Group when the command-
Group, believed it vital for the highest ing general of 21 Army Group relinquished
field force headquarters on the Continent command of U.S. forces, and that the
to retain control of the communications Communications Zone would be de-
zone in the interim period between the tached from the army group only when
date on which 21 Army Group relin- the Supreme Commander himself as-
quished control and the time SHAEF ar- sumed direct command of the ground
rived to take over-all command. The forces on the Continent. General Smith
S H A E F directive h a d not been entirely assured him that his understanding was
clear on this point. It appeared to estab- correct and that by “advance echelon of
lish the army group’s position clearly by ETO” the directive meant an advance
stating that the Communications Zone echelon of SHAEF. It seemed clear, then,
would be attached to 1st Army Group that 1st Army Group would direct the ac-
when the latter was assigned a n appro- tivities of the Communications Zone until
priate tactical command. But the directive General Eisenhower himself assumed
went on to say that the deputy com- command on the Continent. However, the
mander of the Communications Zone problem of the command relationship of
would come under the command of Head- 1st Army Group vis-à-vis Communica-
quarters, ETOUSA, when the Supreme tions Zone was not put to rest with this as-
Commander established a n advance surance. T h e issue was to be raised again,
echelon of the latter on the Continent. a n d the organization F E C O M Z was al-
General Bradley was not satisfied with the ways regarded with some suspicion by the
wording of the directive, fearing that the field force headquarters.29
term, “advance echelon of ETO,” might There were continuing causes for ap-
mean a forward echelon of the ETOUSA- prehension on the part of 1st Army Group
SOS headquarters of General Lee. He be- regarding the Communications Zone’s
lieved the directive might therefore be pretensions to power. When General
interpreted to mean that the establish- Vaughan was appointed deputy com-
ment of a small advance echelon of that manding general of that organization in
headquarters (such as FECOMZ, pre- March a new directive was issued defining
sumably) on the Continent would be suf- the mission of the Forward Echelon but
ficient justification for removal of control making no mention of the 1st Army
of the communications zone from the Group attachment or the relationship be-
commanding general, 1st Army Group, tween the two staffs. It merely stated that
thereby depriving him of the necessary Forward Echelon would be responsible
means of co-ordinating all ground forces for the initial planning and development
in the U.S. sector before another com- of the Communications Zone under the
mander was prepared to take over such direction of the commander-in-chief of 21
functions. Army Group, a n d announced definitely
The army group commander promptly that, when an army rear boundary was
sought clarification of this matter from the drawn by the First Army, Forward
SHAEF chief of staff, General Smith, stat-
ing that it was his understanding that the 29Ibid., II, 50–52.
COMMAND, ORGANIZATION) AND PLANNING 211

Echelon would actually assume command the commanding general of FECOMZ,

of the Communications Zone on the Con- but deputy commanding general of the
tinent for the period it was attached to 21 Communications Zone.30
Army Group. This wording again ap- In retrospect the entire conflict takes on
peared to imply that Forward Echelon the appearance of a storm in a teacup. At
and the 1st Army Group staff at 21 Army the time, however, the points a t issue had
Group headquarters were co-ordinate at- a n urgent importance, particularly to the
tachments, one for the Communications field forces, which lacked confidence in
Zone a n d one for the field forces, with 1st the Services of Supply a n d were anxious
Army Group exercising no supervision to insure that their interests would be
over the former. Some of the C O M Z staff protected so far as administrative support
even conceived of Forward Echelon as a was concerned. Fortunately, the differ-
separate command and wanted it acti- ences did not prevent Forward Echelon
vated provisionally as a separate head- from getting on with its main task, and by
quarters. General Lee, however, preferred early March the staff was busy with the
the arrangement whereby Forward Ech- preparation of the over-all COMZ plan of
elon was to be a branch of his own head- development.
quarters. As such it would have authority
to issue orders in his name and, as a part (5) Advance Section, Communications Zone
of Headquarters, Communications Zone, (ADSE C)
a subcommand of ETOUSA, it would in
the eyes of the Communications Zone at Equally important as Forward Echelon
least enjoy equality with 1st Army Group. in the planning of the continental com-
It was actually possible to conceive of the munications zone and, as it turned out, of
Forward Echelon as a headquarters even much greater importance in its opera-
higher than 1st Army Group if viewed tions, was the organization known as the
from General Lee’s position as deputy Advance Section (ADSEC). T h e concept
theater commander. If such a n exagger- of a n advance section (as distinguished
ated interpretation was accepted, For- from a base section), organized to follow
ward Echelon would be in a position to the armies, develop the lines of communi-
exercise even fuller powers in controlling cations, take over rear-area supply prob-
the whole administrative organization on lems, and co-ordinate these activities with
the Continent. the Communications Zone headquarters,
Whatever thoughts General Lee may was well established in field service regu-
have held about separate command status lations, and the need for such an organiza-
for Forward Echelon, the idea persisted in tion was confirmed b y recent experience
some quarters that it did have such status, in North Africa and Italy. North African
and SHAEF later had to correct this mis- experience had shown that base sections
taken notion. It clarified the organiza- could support armies only when the sup-
tion’s position by stating that the head- ply lines were not too long. The OVER-
quarters was purely and simply what its LORD operation, if successful) would result
name implied—a forward echelon of Gen- in extended lines of communications. It
eral Lee’s C O M Z headquarters—and 30Ibid., II, 5 3 - 6 0 ; Organization and Functions of
that General Vaughan, its chief, was not the Communications Zone, Gen Bd Rpt 127, p. 14.
212 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

an extended operation, it tended to neg-

lect certain logistic aspects, such as the
build-up of reserves and construction ma-
terials, in favor of maintenance tonnages.
Thus, the supply agency taking over from
the army after the initial phase of the op-
eration might find that it did not have
the necessary supplies and equipment.
This experience dictated that the service
agency which was to take over support of
a n army must participate directly in the
planning in order to assure well-co-ordi-
nated and adequate logistical support.
In keeping with this principle,
COSSAC directed the establishment of an
advance section in December 1943, a n d
the organization was provisionally estab-
lished under the command of Col. Ewart
G. Plank, Eastern Base Section com-
mander, at the end of the year. The official
activation of Headquarters, Advance Sec-
GENERAL PLANK, Commanding Gen-
tion, followed on 7 February 1944, and the
eral, ADSEC. (Photograph taken in 1945.)
staff shortly thereafter moved to Bristol to
would therefore be necessary at a n early facilitate close co-operation with the First
stage to create another section between Army. I n the interim period a party of
the army and base section to provide close officers designated for the new staff visited
support. Italy and North Africa to gather informa-
Experience in Italy h a d taught addi- tion on base section operations in the
tional lessons. In the invasion of the penin- Mediterranean area.31
sula a n advance section had been The initial mission of the Advance Sec-
organized a n d attached to the Fifth U.S. tion was to move onto the Continent with
Army until the situation was stabilized at First Army in the earliest stages and suc-
the Volturno River. But when this ad- cessively take over army supply dumps,
vance section became Peninsular Base roads, ports, beach maintenance areas,
Section and reverted to Allied headquar- and railways, operating the supply instal-
ters ( A F H Q ) control the same old diffi- lations in the rear of the combat zone until
culties arose. Again the agency capable of the communications zone was established.
making decisions on matters of supply was Until such time as a n army rear bound-
too far from the army it was intended to ary would be drawn, estimated to be be-
support. Other difficulties arose from the tween D plus 15 and 20, Advance Section
fact that the agency responsible for supply
operations was not the one which had COM 31Operations History of the Advance Section,
Z ETOUSA, prep by Hist Sec ADSEC, 1945,
done the logistical planning. When a tac- mimeo, p. 2, OCMH; Organization and Functions of
tical headquarters handled planning for the Communications Zone, Gen Bd Rpt 127, p. 32.
COMMAND, ORGANIZATION, AND PLANNING 213

was to be attached to First Army. By such on the Continent. There was no question
attachment the Advance Section would of conflicting authority or responsibility in
thus be directly associated with the the first phase of operations. It was clear
agency it was to supply and with which it that in this period there would be no
was necessary to co-ordinate planning. COMZ command operating on the Con-
Once the Advance Section was de- tinent, for First Army, with Advance Sec-
tached from the army, it was to perform tion attached, was to be entirely respon-
its normal missions as the most advanced sible for all supply and administration.
regional organization of the Communica- In the second phase, however—from the
tions Zone. It was to take over area as well time a n army rear boundary was drawn
as supply responsibility immediately to until a second army and another base sec-
the rear of the army, organizing the tion were introduced and 1st Army Group
ground as it was relinquished by the became operational—Advance Section
armies, subsequently moving forward in was to be the operative Communications
the wake of the armies to organize new Zone on the Continent. For this period
areas, and turning over territory, facilities, (D plus 15 to 41) it was obvious that Ad-
and installations in the rear to newly ac- vance Section would have to write de-
tivated base or intermediate sections as tailed plans. But Forward Echelon had
they followed onto the Continent. In been charged with over-all development
short, the Advance Section was to be what of the communications zone and, accord-
its name suggested, a n advance subcom- ing to the directive of 21 January which
mand of the Communications Zone in defined its mission, was to supervise the
close support of the combat forces, provid- planning a n d operations of the Advance
ing them an immediate source of supply. Section in this period.
T h e Advance Section’s planning tasks Delineating the areas of planning re-
were determined by its responsibilities in sponsibilities between the two headquar-
the three phases of OVERLORD’S command ters was the subject of much correspond-
development: preparing for the support of ence and many conferences from late Feb-
First Army during the period of attach- ruary through April. The answers to most
ment to that organization (to D plus 15); of Advance Section’s questions were
carrying out all communications zone finally provided by a F E C O M Z memo-
functions from the time the army rear randum in mid-April, after Forward Ech-
boundary was drawn until the Forward elon had worked out planning and
Echelon took command of operations (D operational procedures with 21 Army
plus 15 to 41); and planning for the sub- Group, 1st Army Group, and ETOUSA-
sequent period when it was to operate, SOS. First Army, as the command which
along with other base sections, under was to be in complete control of operations
the Forward Echelon of Headquarters, and supply in Phase I, was to assemble
Communications Zone. I n defining the tonnage a n d supply requirements for all
Advance Section’s mission, however, a U.S. forces, including field forces, air
problem arose over the division of func- forces, and the Navy, and submit them to
tion with Forward Echelon, since both ETOUSA for implementation. Thereafter
were to be active in planning the initial 1st Army Group was to be the top U.S.
development of the communications zone field headquarters on the Continent, de-
214 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

termining a n d assembling over-all ton- move to the Continent till D plus 90, at
nages and supply requirements. In the which time the Communications Zone
stage between the drawing of an army and 1st Army Group were to become co-
rear boundary and the time that 1st Army ordinate commands responsible to the
Group itself assumed a n active role on the Supreme Commander. The Advance Sec-
Continent (D plus 15 to 41), 1st Army tion and Forward Echelon thus shared
Group was to arrange for implementation responsibility for the initial development
of its requirements with ETOUSA of the communications zone, with Ad-
through Advance Section. It was in this vance Section accomplishing detailed
period (Phase 11) that Advance Section planning for its operations under the lat-
was to have its heaviest responsibilities, for ter’s supervision, and Forward Echelon
as the sole subcommand of the Communi- developing detailed plans for its assump-
cations Zone on the far shore it was to be tion of COMZ command after D plus 41. 33
charged with the actual operation of the Advance Section had already started
communications zone facilities on the on its task when Forward Echelon entered
Continent. Advance Section was to de- the field, but it needed direction from
velop detailed plans for this stage, there- above. Forward Echelon was the only
fore, with Forward Echelon exercising agency other than the SOS itself where
supervision. The latter’s command role in decisions could be made, since it was the
this stage was not yet determined. How- agency responsible for the over-all devel-
ever, it was to arrange for the build-up of opment of the communications zone. It
the communications zone a n d the intro- began to supervise ADSEC planning to-
duction of additional base sections, just as ward the end of February. T h e Advance
1st Army Group was to arrange for the Section’s initial need was to prepare for its
build-up of the combat zone and the operations while it was attached to First
introduction of additional armies. 32 Army, however, and its planning from the
In Phase III (D plus 41 to 90), 1st Army start was closely related to that of First
Group was to continue to assemble the Army. Forward Echelon concerned itself
over-all tonnage requirements but was to mainly with the problem of over-all devel-
implement them through Forward Ech- opment of the communications zone—
elon rather than Advance Section, since particularly after D plus 41 —review and
Forward Echelon was to have active con- co-ordination of plans of the Advance
trol of the communications zone in that Section a n d other C O M Z sections, and
period. Advance Section was to begin its executive arrangements with 1st and 21
role as one of the subcommands of the Army Groups to implement plans.34
Communications Zone on D plus 41, 32Organization and Command, II, 61–66.
moving forward with the armies, relin- 33Ibid, II, 66.
quishing territory and installations in the 34Ibid., II, 67 T h e General Board Report on the
rear to other COMZ sections. While For- organization a n d functions of the Communications
Zone questions the advisability of granting ADSEC
ward Echelon was to command the Com- such wide planning responsibilities. Since ADSEC
munications Zone in this period, it was to had to establish supply facilities and construct instal-
be subordinate to 1st Army Group. lations on the Continent it necessarily had to prepare
plans therefor. O n the other hand, the report points
Neither General Lee’s nor General Eisen- out, the chiefs of services had previously worked out
hower’s headquarters was expected to detailed supply requirements and co-ordinated plans
COMMAND, ORGANIZATION, AND PLANNING 215

T h e whole U.S. administrative setup, The 1st Army Group was charged with
as regards planning responsibilities, was preparing plans for the employment of
somewhat complicated to say the least. At units other than First Army troops after
the risk of some repetition it may be well D plus 15, and with responsibility for
to recapitulate the arrangements as they planning by the Deputy Commander,
stood in mid-April. O n the highest Allied Communications Zone, for the initial de-
command level SHAEF planned the over- velopment of the communications zone on
all administration of all forces involved in the Continent. Forward Echelon was to
OVERLORD, controlling inter- Allied and write the over-all outline plan for the com-
interservice matters and exercising con- munications zone (to D plus 90); Advance
trol over supply of items (for example, Section was to be responsible for its own
petroleum) that required over-all co- phase of operations as the Communica-
ordination at the highest level. Most of its tions Zone on the Continent ( D plus 15 to
administrative planning responsibilities 41), and also for its role in direct support
were delegated to lower commands. The of the armies thereafter. Other COMZ
21 Army Group was made responsible for sections were assigned responsibilities for
over-all planning for the entire lodgment planning their portions of the communi-
during the period when it was the highest cations zone. ETOUSA-COMZ was to
ground force headquarters on the Conti- remain as a rear echelon in the United
nent, or until the 1st Army Group was as- Kingdom to handle supply requisitioning,
signed a n area of responsibility. to mount U.S. forces in Operation OVER-
The 21 Army Group in turn delegated LORD, and to prepare standard service
its planning responsibilities for U.S. forces doctrine for all U.S. forces in the theater.35
to the First Army and the 1st Army Group. The delineation of planning responsi-
To First Army went the responsibility for bilities was fairly clear by mid-April, and
co-ordinating all U.S. forces in the initial the bulk of the various plans began to ap-
assault, including air and naval forces. pear in April and May, although First
Army issued its plan in February. O n 1
April, 21 Army Group published broad
for the operations and were the only agencies posses- instructions on the administration of the
sing the necessary over-all knowledge essential for
working out plans with the combat echelons. In prac- entire zone, and a few weeks later the U.S.
tice both F E C O M Z a n d ADSEC were heavily de- administrative staff at 21 Army Group
pendent on the service chiefs in the preparation of issued a similar outline administrative
supply requirements a n d plans, a n d the General
Board suggests that it would have been better to give plan adapting the army group plan to the
the C O M Z staff responsibility and authority for U.S. zone. The ADSEC plan, covering its
making them in the first place. This would have kept own part in operations from D Day to D
t h e responsibility for supply plans continuously in
one headquarters instead of passing it successively plus 41, was published on 30 April. The
from First Army to ADSEC to FECOMZ to COMZ. over-all U.S. C O M Z plan, covering the
In addition to providing continuity and eliminating development of the communications zone
a n echelon of co-ordination, t h e report asserts, it
would have placed negotiations directly in the hands to D plus 90, was issued by FECOMZ on
of a strong, well-informed staff capable of dealing 14 May. Finally, ETOUSA issued a gen-
with the armies a n d a r m y group on a n equal basis. eral plan for the administrative support
It admits, however, that it was necessary to keep
ADSEC fully informed of all plans as a basis for op-
erations. Gen Bd Rpt 127, p. 35. 35Organization and Command, II, 68–69.
216 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

of U.S. forces from the United Kingdom form the new base sections for continental
in the form of a standing operating pro- missions before SOS troops could be re-
cedure (SOP), the first of a series which lieved of their duties in the United King-
was to be issued by the highest U.S. ad- dom. The rapid influx of troops and sup-
ministrative headquarters governing the plies into the United Kingdom kept most
over-all supply and administration of U.S. of the SOS troops occupied with routine
forces. Except for the ETOUSA SOP, all service of supply functions such as port
these plans were the result of co-ordination and depot operations. In the weeks just
by the various headquarters concerned preceding D Day a n d for several months
under the general supervision of 21 Army thereafter they were to have the additional
Group headquarters. Despite the many task of handling the outflow of troops and
agencies involved, the planning seems to supplies from the United Kingdom. The
have been fairly well co-ordinated, and, same men had to be used on all these ac-
taken together, the plans gave a relatively tivities, and there was no increase in the
complete picture of the projected admin- SOS troop allotment for carrying them
istrative organization on the Continent.36 out concurrently.
Diverting troops to prepare for con-
(6) Continental Base Sections tinental operations was obviously difficult
under these circumstances, and it was
I n addition to organization and plan- clear that complete base section head-
ning at the staff level (Forward Echelon) quarters staffs with their full complements
and planning for the initial development of troops could not be constituted and as-
of the communications zone (Advance sembled in advance of the operation. The
Section), plans had gone forward to create general procedure, therefore, was to form
the Communications Zone’s other sub- only the nuclei of base section organiza-
commands on the continent-the base tions in the United Kingdom, taking a
sections which were to take over territory commanding officer from one of the exist-
surrendered by the Advance Section as it ing U.K. sections to head a planning
displaced forward following the armies. group, a n d giving it a n assigned task on
Planning the expansion of the continental the Continent. Troops were assigned to the
administrative organization was also new base section, although the transfer to
under the supervision of Forward Echelon. the new headquarters was in many in-
Under a plan known as Reverse BOLERO stances simply a paper transaction, for
or ORELOB (later renamed RHUMBA) it was they continued for the most part to per-
contemplated that most of the U.S. logistic form SOS functions in the United King-
machinery would be transferred to the dom within the existing U.K. base sections
Continent, so that American troops and until the time came for their movement to
supplies could enter France directly from the far shore. The commanding officers of
the United States. This meant disbanding the new sections exercised supervision over
the base sections in the United Kingdom, the training of these troops for their future
replacing them with a single U.K. base missions, but their training was carried on
section, and forming base section organi- through the base sections in which they
zations on the Continent. One of the diffi-
culties in carrying out this program was to 36Ibid., II, 70–71.
COMMAND, ORGANIZATION7AND PLANNING 217

were still functioning, and the newly acti- the Continent shortly after a n army rear
vated sections remained skeleton head- boundary was drawn. The Advance Sec-
quarters organizations, the intention being tion was to release to this organization the
to flesh them out with operating troop Rennes-Laval-Châteaubriant area in
units as it became necessary on the Con- eastern Brittany as soon as it was feasible,
tinent. and when the armies turned northeast-
This procedure was worked out first for ward the new command was to take over
ADSEC troops, and then followed later in all of Brittany. I n accordance with this
the formation of other base sections. By assigned mission Base Section No. 1 de-
D Day planning was being carried on as veloped a detailed plan for its operations
vigorously as possible for the administra- in the Brittany area.37
tive setup on the Continent, though only The change in the axis of communica-
two section headquarters in addition to tions from north-south to east-west, ex-
Advance Section had been activated by pected to take place about D plus 41, was
that time and they were simply given to be an important turning point in con-
numerical designations—Base Section No. tinental developments. It was at approxi-
1 and Base Section No. 2. mately this date that a second army and
Planning for the mission of Base Section the 1st Army Group were to become
No. 1 began several months before its operational, and that the Forward Echelon
official activation. Troops for the new sec- of the Communications Zone was to as-
tion were to be provided through the de- sume control of the communications zone
activation of Eastern Base Section. Or- on the Continent.
ganization of the new headquarters was With the development of the Brittany
given increasing attention in March 1944, area and the change in direction of the
when Eastern Base Section made plans to lines of communications the Advance Sec-
disband by consolidating all five of its dis- tion was to displace to a position on the
tricts into one, which was to be incorpo- west-east line of advance, relinquishing to
rated into Western Base Section as a single still another base section the responsibility
district. This step was in line with the for command and operation of the Coten-
Reverse BOLEROprogram which contem- tin area. Early in May it was suggested
plated the gradual closing out of the U.K. that a skeleton headquarters should be
installations and contracting the entire formed for this purpose with personnel
administrative organization there. drawn from the Western and Northern
Eastern Base Section was finally deacti- Ireland Base Sections, and later additions
vated at the end of April and became from Southern Base Section. This union
District VIII of Western Base Section. of forces was not carried out entirely as
Men no longer needed to operate district planned, for the diminishing activities in
headquarters were immediately trans- Northern Ireland Base Section made both
ferred to Base Section No. 1, newly acti- its commanding general and the necessary
vated on 1 May under the command of staff and headquarters troops available for
Col. Roy W. Grower, the former com- the new organization. Late in May the
mander of Eastern Base. This new base headquarters of a second base section was
section was to be held in readiness in the
United Kingdom and called forward to 37Organization a n d Command, II, 84–88.
218 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

formed in Northern Ireland and was T h e mounting of OVERLORD was a

officially activated as Base Section No. 2 tremendous undertaking in itself. For the
on 1June under the command of General most part this responsibility involved no
Collins, the former commander of North- change in the administrative organization
ern Ireland Base. Its mission was to pre- beyond that already made by the January
pare for the assumption of command and consolidation of ETOUSA with SOS, for
operational control of the Cotentin area the new combined headquarters furnished
when relinquished by the Advance Sec- a centralized and integrated apparatus to
tion. Northern Ireland Base Section was carry it out. ETOUSA delegated its re-
disbanded on 15 June and, like Eastern sponsibilities in this field to First Army
Base Section, became a district of Western and the SOS. T h e two headquarters had
Base. to co-ordinate their work closely, both in
In formulating the plans for the con- the planning and operational stages. First
tinental base section organization Colonel Army was responsible for handling the
Albrecht, chief of staff of the Forward movement of troops, embarkation, and
Echelon, suggested that a third base sec- allotment of supplies, and the SOS was re-
tion be formed and also recommended sponsible for maintaining all camps-and
that Central Base Section (then compris- installations in the American sector of
ing the London area) prepare for a conti- southern England and providing trans-
nental mission. These proposals raised the portation. In the mounting phase the SOS
problem of finding sufficient personnel in was to act as housekeeper for First Army,
the existing U.K. sections to staff the new carrying out the mounting arrangements
headquarters and arranging for their through the base sections and technical
transfer without marring the efficiency of services. Since the base sections were most
the U.K. organizations. Both Western and directly involved in the mounting, their
Southern Base Sections were too preoc- commanders were designated as repre-
cupied with the build-up and mounting sentatives of the Commanding General,
tasks to surrender personnel for such a pur- SOS, to deal directly with each other and
pose. Nevertheless, the first steps were with First Army commander and his rep-
taken to organize an additional section to resentatives on matters of administrative
serve as a n intermediate section between facilities and installations, such as the lo-
the base a n d advance sections, handling cation, construction, a n d operation of
communications, transportation, and sup- marshaling, assembly, a n d transit areas,
plies and operating certain fixed installa- roads, and communications facilities. The
tions. A planning staff was recruited, but various base section mounting plans ap-
its mission remained indeterminate, and peared in March 1944. Their execution
the activation of a n additional head- involved a multitude of other responsi-
quarters had to be postponed till after bilities which are described in a later
D Day. Nevertheless the framework of the chapter. 39
continental administrative structure was
already clear, providing for several port 38 Ibid.,II, 84–92.
area base sections, an intermediate section, 39Ibid., II, 37; NEPTUNE:
Training for and Mount-
ing the Operation a n d the Artificial Ports, Pt. VI of
and a n advance section, extending from the Logistical and Administrative History of the ETO,
the ports to the army rear boundaries.38 Hist Div USFET, 1946, MS, I, 123–25, OCMH.
COMMAND, ORGANIZATION, AND PLANNING 219

(7) Final Command Arrangements istrative planning and arrangements for

all U.S. forces on the Continent after First
The determination of the command Army relinquished control. Since
structure for U.S. forces continued to oc- ETOUSA was actually a higher head-
cupy the attention of the SHAEF and quarters, however, it did not consider 1st
ETOUSA staffs until the very eve of OVER- Army Group’s comments binding.
LORD. Most of the problems of command This incident illustrated pointedly the
revolved around the question of Forward vague division of planning functions be-
Echelon’s position and the question of the tween the two headquarters, and revealed
future role of the ETOUSA-COMZ head- a weak link in the whole U.S. command
quarters. and organizational structure for OVER-
From the question of what role Forward LORD. The 1st Army Group was clearly
Echelon was to play on the Continent the headquarters for the control of U.S.
there developed one of the most irksome forces in the Allied line of command.
problems in the whole complicated history ETOUSA, however, was outside that
of U.S. command and organization. The Allied line of command and as an admin-
1st Army Group had definitely been istrative headquarters exercised certain
charged by 21 Army Group with supervis- powers independently. Forward Echelon,
ing Forward Echelon’s planning of the a n echelon of Headquarters, ETOUSA,
initial development of the communica- also represented the consolidated
tions zone, and it was clear that the ETOUSA-SOS staff since the COMZ
COMZ plan as finally written was subject commander, General Lee, was also Dep-
to review by the 1st Army Group admin- uty Commanding General, ETOUSA.40
istrative staff. Forward Echelon persisted Closely related to this problem in the
nevertheless in regarding itself as a n at- planning stage was the matter of Forward
tachment to 21 Army Group co-ordinate Echelon’s future role on the Continent.
with rather than subordinate to the 1st It will be recalled that Forward Echelon
Army Group attachment. To complicate was to supervise the initial development
matters, 1st Army Group had granted of the communications zone. In Phase
authority to Forward Echelon to draw up II—D plus 15 to 41-when Advance Sec-
the plans for certain detailed implementa- tion was the sole Communications Zone
tion of the 1st Army Group administrative section on the Continent, Forward Echelon
staff’s over-all plan which applied to the was not to exercise any active control, ac-
whole U.S. sector rather than solely to the cording to the original plans. It was to re-
communications zone. Forward Echelon main as a staff attached to 21 Army
had decided to have these matters pub- Group, acting in a n advisory capacity on
lished in ETOUSA SOP’S.The 1st Army COMZ matters. Not until the third phase,
Group requested that all proposed pub- when 1st Army Group became opera-
lications on administrative plans and in- tional, was it to assume active direction of
structions applying to the whole sector be the Communications Zone. Late in April,
submitted to it for review. The request however, Forward Echelon again brought
seemed clearly within its authority in view the question of its future role into promi-
of the fact that it had been charged with
responsibility for co-ordinating admin- 40Organization a n d Command, II, 72–74.
220 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

nence when it attempted to change the ceived some clarification by mid-May,

plan for Phase II. It now proposed that it when the C O M Z plan was released. The
should take over direct control of the plan (issued by Forward Echelon) sub-
Communications Zone once an army rear stantially confirmed the scheme for plan-
boundary was drawn (at D plus 15), ning and development of the communica-
thereby eliminating the period when Ad- tions zone in three phases as outlined
vance Section would be the highest ad- earlier. T h e idea that Forward Echelon
ministrative headquarters on the Con- would become a n intermediate headquar-
tinent. 41 ters between First Army and Advance
The suggested alteration in the com- Section and that it would assume control
mand plan naturally produced some con- of the Communications Zone in Phase II
sternation in Advance Section and First was apparently abandoned. The plan suc-
Army, for it conflicted with earlier com- cinctly stated that when a n army rear
mitments to First Army that no interme- boundary was drawn Forward Echelon
diate headquarters would be established would “exercise staff supervision” for the
between the army and Advance Section Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group,
before the introduction of a second base over the operations of Advance Section.
section. T h e ADSEC commander, Gen- Forward Echelon was to assume full super-
eral Plank, promptly sought a n explana- vision a n d operational control of all
tion. GeneralLord,42 the COMZchiefof C O M Z activities only after Advance Sec-
staff, proposed as a workable solution that tion and a second C O M Z section became
Forward Echelon be established in Phase contiguous. When 1st Army Group was
II, as the COMZ commander desired, but allotted a n area of responsibility on the
that it exercise only “supervision and co- Continent, Forward Echelon was to be de-
ordination” over Advance Section, and tached from 21 Army Group and attached
not enter command channels or supply to 1st Army Group. It finally appeared
requisition channels. This attempt to rec- settled, therefore, that in Phase I I this
oncile the opposing desires of the Commu- highly controversial headquarters was to
nications Zone and ADSEC-First Army be, as General Lord had proposed, a staff
had all the earmarks of earlier directives; supervisory agency, operating with 21
it was vague in its demarcation of author- Army Group.
ity and was bound to lead to conflicting This conception was once more under-
interpretation when the test of actual op- lined late in May as a result of an attempt
erations came. For the moment the issue by General Moses, t h e 1st Army Group
was not clarified, a n d the relationship of G–4 and chief of the U.S. administrative
Forward Echelon and Advance Section staff at 21 Army Group, to reopen the
was left up in the air, although there seems whole matter with a new interpretation of
to have been no doubt in the minds of the Forward Echelon’s position, denying For-
FECOMZ staff members from this point ward Echelon a place on the 21 Army
on that they would assume full supervision Group staff. General Moses’ views were
and control of all C O M Z activities at the
time a n army rear boundary was drawn. 41Ibid., II, 74-75; Interv with Albrecht, 5 Jul 51.
42Plank was promoted to brigadier general on 24
The issue of Forward Echelon’s role on February 1944; Lord was promoted to brigadier gen-
the Continent in the second phase re- eral on 22 February 1944.
COMMAND, ORGANIZATION, AND PLANNING 221

rejected, but ETOUSA now definitely To anticipate a bit, the relative status of
abandoned any pretension that Forward the FECOMZ and 1st Army Group at-
Echelon would command Advance Sec- tachments at General Montgomery’s
tion while the latter was the sole section on headquarters was debated once more after
the Continent. I n a letter to General D Day, and agreement was reached once
Moses ETOUSA expressly stated that the and for all at the end of June. The agree-
Forward Echelon would act as a staff of 21 ment gave the 1st Army Group staff under
Army Group for COMZ matters and exer- General Moses primary responsibility for
cise general technical supervision over the co-ordinating the administration of U.S.
sections. Following this reply to General forces as between the field forces on the
Moses a new directive was issued to For- one hand and the service forces on the
ward Echelon officially stating these views. other, but specified that the FECOMZ at-
Even this interpretation of the role of tachment was to be consulted exclusively
Forward Echelon was only temporarily on matters applying solely to the commu-
accepted for, as will be seen from later de- nications zone, a n d recognized the
velopments on the Continent, it was not FECOMZ attachment as the staff agency
acceptable to 1st Army Group. The com- responsible for dealing directly with the
mand arrangement was inherently a diffi- various COMZ sections.44
cult one, and the question of the relative Meanwhile a n attempt was also made
authority of the deputy theater com- to reconcile the views held by the
mander for supply and administration ETOUSA-COMZ staff and the U.S. com-
(General Lee) and the commander of the ponent of SHAEF regarding the evolution
field forces (General Bradley) was still of the top American command on the
only vaguely answered. Shortly before D Continent. Linked with the concept of
Day General Eisenhower himself stepped Forward Echelon as the controlling head-
in and attempted to lay down a modus quarters for the Communications Zone on
operandi for the two headquarters. In a let- the Continent in the second phase was the
ter to General Lee written on 26 May and idea that Forward Echelon would even-
published by ETOUSA on 1June the the- tually merge into a n ETOUSA-COMZ
ater commander specified that the Com- headquarters to take the place of the exist-
manding General, 1st Army Group, in ing ETOUSA-SOS headquarters in the
making recommendations concerning the United Kingdom. Headquarters, Com-
priority of shipment, assignment, and uti- munications Zone, envisaged the old
lization of field forces, and concerning the ETOUSA-SOS as being allowed to die,
allocation of supplies and equipment to with ETOUSA-COMZ taking its place to
units of the field forces, was to deal directly operate in the same way. Forward Eche-
with the deputy theater commander. Any lon, according to this view, would actually
disagreements on matters of conflicting in- be the vanguard of Headquarters,
terest were to be referred to the theater ETOUSA-COMZ, on the Continent,
commander for decision. In short, an at- though it would not be officially consid-
tempt was being made to render workable ered as the theater headquarters until the
by co-operation and co-ordination a com-
mand arrangement in which authority 43Organization and Command, II, 76–83
could not be precisely defined.43 44Ibid., II, 130–32.
222 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

Supreme Commander established SHAEF that time had been the real theater head-
headquarters there. While the ETOUSA- quarters; and SHAEF’s rear echelon in
C O M Z group visualized a transfer to the the United Kingdom was to exercise such
Continent of the basic setup existing in the theater functions in the United Kingdom
United Kingdom, the SHAEF group felt as the theater commander retained under
that the existing ETOUSA headquarters his control. Crawford further suggested
should become merely a Communications that the office of deputy theater com-
Zone headquarters. Thus the tendency, mander be eliminated, that Headquarters,
mentioned earlier, for the American staff ETOUSA, as it then existed be disbanded,
at SHAEF to assume some of the aspects and that as many of its personnel as were
of a theater headquarters found open ex- required to perform the administrative
pression as the time came to clarify the functions of the U.S. theater be transferred
command and organizational structure for to SHAEF. T h e remainder of the staff
continental operations. This development would be available for transfer to 1st Army
had been a product of the ETOUSA- Group or the Communications Zone. All
SOS consolidation and the transformation communications with the War Depart-
of COSSAC into an Allied command. ment were to be channeled through the
The result of these conflicting contentions theater commander at SHAEF, not
was to be a compromise representing through the ETOUSA headquarters,
something of the views of both the where General Lee had handled this bur-
ETOUSA-COMZ and SHAEF groups. den through the planning period.45
General Crawford, the SHAEF G–4, T h e reception that this proposal re-
presented the SHAEF staff’s views to ceived at General Lee’s headquarters can
General Lee in a draft proposal on 28 well be imagined. To the ETOUSA-
May. Among the salient features of Craw- C O M Z staff and the chiefs of services it
ford’s proposal was the provision, already meant a reversion to the same setup that
accepted in earlier plans, that the Com- had existed before ETOUSA and SOS
munications Zone was to be placed under were consolidated. Recalling the difficul-
1st Army Group during the transitional ties of 1943, most of the service chiefs felt
stage before SHAEF moved to the Con- that the separation of C O M Z headquar-
tinent. But the controversial feature of the ters, where they were based, from the
proposal was the provision that SHAEF theater headquarters at SHAEF would
should take over the functions of the the- put them in a situation much like the one
ater headquarters in the final command they had unhappily known at Chelten-
setup both in the United Kingdom and on ham. Such a setup could lead to the same
the Continent. The theater commander, kind of unfortunate conflict as existed in
according to this plan, was to delegate World War I when the American G H Q
much of his administrative authority to (corresponding to theater headquarters)
the major subcommands—1st Army had persisted in maintaining its superiority
Group, the Ninth Air Force, and Commu- over the SOS (corresponding to the Com-
nications Zone. Such powers as he re- munications Zone) in supply and adminis-
tained would be exercised from his own tration and thus frustrated all attempts to
headquarters at SHAEF rather than from
General Lee’s headquarters, which u p to 45Organization and Command, II, 76, 110–12.
COMMAND, ORGANIZATION, AND PLANNING 223

centralize control over these activities. 46 The complexity and magnitude of the
The ETOUSA-COMZ staff saw many U.S. administrative organization pre-
reasons why the proposed solution was not cluded Allied staff integration. By way of
feasible. Among them was the enormous illustration he pointed to the great volume
amount of routine administrative matters, of communications processed by the Sig-
comprising 90 percent of the theater’s cor- nal Service within the theater and to the
respondence with the War Department, War Department-something over 1,700,-
which would have to be handled at 000 words per day—dealing chiefly with
SHAEF headquarters. The objection was logistic matters, and to the complexity in
also raised, with doubtful justification, programing, requisitioning, transporta-
that a n Allied headquarters would have tion, storage, stock control, a n d issue of
jurisdiction over purely U.S. matters while approximately 700,000 different items of
the British War Office would continue to supply. 48
handle its own administrative affairs. I n General Lee’s view the best way to
Since a decision on the whole matter accomplish the administrative support of
rested ultimately with the theater com- all U.S. forces, using the minimum num-
mander, General Lee formally presented ber of headquarters and conserving the al-
his own views to General Eisenhower in ready trained staff and technical officers
a n attempt to demonstrate what he con- and enlisted personnel, was to maintain
ceived to be the basic unsoundness of Gen- the combined ETOUSA and SOS staffs as
eral Crawford’s proposal. In a lengthy, the U.S. administrative headquarters, re-
vigorously stated analysis of the whole porting directly to the theater commander
problem of command he characterized the as at present. He implied that this arrange-
proposal as “so diametrically opposed” to
the views of the Supreme Commander, 46T h e whole long struggle in the E T O was in fact
a n d “so far reaching in its application” strikingly similar to that of 1917–18. At that time the
headquarters were separated, the G H Q a t Chaumont
that he doubted whether General Eisen- and the Line of Communications or LOC (later called
hower or his chief of staff, General Smith, the SOS) a t Tours, with all the wasteful use of per-
had given it careful consideration and sonnel a n d duplication of effort which characterized
administrative a n d logistical operations in the E T O
were fully aware of its implications. Gen- in its first year a n d a half. Until February 19 18 the
eral Lee’s basic argument rested on a chiefs of services, then called bureau chiefs, actually
principle which he had expounded per- resided a t General Pershing’s headquarters, the
G H Q through which all communications with the
sistently ever since his arrival in the the- War Department were routed, and where the G–4 in-
ater, and which had found partial imple- sisted on passing on all SOS requests. Not until July
mentation in the consolidation of January: 1918 was the SOS finally authorized to deal directly
“Control and responsibility for the logis- with the War Department on supply and administra-
tive matters. See Johnson Hagood, The Services of Sup-
tical support of all combat forces must be ply: A Memoir of the Great War (Boston, 1927), and
established at the highest U.S. level.” 47 James G. Harbord, The American Army in France, 1917-
1919 (Boston, 1936).
This he considered a basic principle, and a 47Ltr, Lee to Eisenhower, 29 May 44, as cited in
major lesson from World War I experience. Organization and Command, II, 114.
Control of purely U.S. administrative 48This is a conservative figure. It is estimated that
matters, he contended, was not feasible in the supply services handle between 800,000 and
1,000,000 Class II and IV itemsalone, exclusive ofair
a n Allied organization unless there was a force items. T h e Sears, Roebuck catalogue, by com-
distinct separation between Allied staffs. parison, lists approximately 100,000 separate articles.
224 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

ment had worked very satisfactorily; in- the Continent. In this period, however, the
deed, the only difficulty to date had oc- bulk of the 1st Army Group attachment to
curred when the SHAEF staff had at- 21 Army Group was to be gradually with-
tempted to occupy itself with purely U.S. drawn and the C O M Z attachment,
administrative matters. FECOMZ, completely withdrawn. Third
General Eisenhower’s decisions on the Army would move to the Continent, and
matter of the organization of U.S. forces at the end of this period 1st Army Group
in OVERLORD were made known in a final was to be assigned an area of responsi-
directive to the major American subcom- bility and assume control of the two
mands on 6 June. General Lee’s represen- American armies. All responsibilities pre-
tations on the subject apparently weighed viously delegated to First Army would
heavily with the Supreme Commander, then pass to the army group. At the same
for the final directive met many of the ob- time the Communications Zone would
jections which the SOS chief had raised. also be extended to the Continent, and the
In some respects, however, it may well be control of Advance Section would pass
viewed as a compromise between the two from First Army to the Communications
views involved. Zone. At that time General Lee would be
For purposes of delineating the com- relieved of his responsibilities as deputy
mand the directive divided the operation theater commander. The U.K. organiza-
roughly according to the stages outlined in tion was gradually to be reduced in
the COMZ plan. (Chart 6 ) During the first strength. With these changes the final
stage 21 Army Group was to command all stage would be reached, when the more or
Allied ground forces on the Continent, less permanent command setup would
with a U.S. staff attached for the adminis- come into operation. An advance head-
tration of U.S. troops under 21 Army quarters of SHAEF would move to the
Group’s command. T h e bulk of U.S. Continent at that time and would assume
forces, including Advance Section, was to over-all control of the ground forces, work-
be attached to First Army, the highest ing through General Bradley as com-
field command in this phase. The theater mander in chief of the Central Group of
commander would delegate to the com- Armies (1st Army Group), and through
manding general of First Army, “such Field Marshal Montgomery as the com-
authority and responsibility as may be mander-in-chief of the Northern Group of
practicable or desirable.” Ninth Air Force Armies (21Army Group). The Communi-
was to be under the operational control of cations Zone would then come under the
the AEAF, and under the administrative direct control of General Eisenhower as
control of USSTAF. The SOS was to be theater commander.
redesignated the Communications Zone, The directive also announced the thea-
a n d the theater chiefs of services were to ter commander’s intention to delegate “all
be located at COMZ headquarters. Other- possible authority and responsibility” to
wise the existing U.K. organization was to his subordinate commanders: the Com-
be unchanged. mander in Chief, Central Group of Ar-
During the transition, or second, stage mies; the Commanding General, Ninth
the 21 Army Group was to continue as the Air Force; the Commanding General,
highest Allied ground force command on USSTAF; and the Commanding General,
CHART 6—PLANNEDCOMMANDARRANGEMENTS
FOR OVERLORD

EARLY PHASES

AFTER U.S. FIRSTARMY GROUP BECAME OPERATIONAL

226 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

Communications Zone. Over such theater deputy theater commander in this period.
functions as he would personally retain he The theater chiefs of services were to re-
would exercise control through the U.S. main resident at his headquarters, how-
element of SHAEF. But, and this was im- ever, and his headquarters was to remain
portant, the C O M Z headquarters was to responsible for carrying on all routine ad-
remain the channel of communication for ministrative correspondence with the War
the theater commander to the War De- Department. Actually, the functions and
partment “except for those matters re- responsibilities of General Lee’s headquar-
served by the Theater Commander to ters remained the same, and the change
himself.” In the United Kingdom, in ac- in General Lee’s position had little effect
cord with the liquidation program, the on the existing responsibilities and chan-
base sections were to be consolidated into nels of command.
one U.K. Base under the commanding Some matters were still left in doubt.
general of the Communications Zone. One question which might very logically
The directive was actually something of arise concerned the actual location of the-
a compromise that gave concessions both ater headquarters. Was it at SHAEF with
to the SHAEF and 1st Army Group staff the theater commander, or at Headquar-
and to the ETOUSA-SOS group. For one ters, Communications Zone, where the
thing, it appeared to have clearly and def- general and special staffs of the theater re-
initely accorded to Forward Echelon the sided? Apparently it was divided between
desired and long-argued position as a staff the two. As was to be expected, General
co-ordinate with 1st Army Group at the Lee continued to regard his headquarters
21 Army Group. Further, it did not pro- as theater headquarters for some time to
vide that the communications zone would come, although it tended to become more
come under 1st Army Group in the transi- definitely a COMZ headquarters instead.
tional stage, but that it would come under It might be defined legally as a COMZ
the immediate control of Headquarters, headquarters charged with the perform-
Communications Zone, when Advance ance of certain theater functions. This di-
Section was detached from First Army. vision of function was unique and was to
However, the Communications Zone’s re- call for further clarification shortly after
lationship to 1st Army Group was not en- the launching of the invasion.
tirely clarified even at this time, for 1st Despite these deficiencies, which loom
Army Group was to inherit all the author- large because of the controversy they
ity previously delegated to First Army, in- caused, the command setup for U.S. and
cluding control of the supply and adminis- Allied forces was well outlined by the date
trative support. There was still room for of the invasion. O n 1June General Eisen-
contention, therefore, that the communi- hower had issued a final directive outlin-
cations zone would be under 1st Army ing the command arrangements on the
Group until SHAEF arrived on the Con- Allied level, but this contained no basic
tinent. It seemed that this issue would for- change, Also, on 18 May, General Brad-
ever elude a clear-cut solution. ley had at last been officially designated as
Another decision that seemed unfavor- commanding general of both 1st Army
able to the ETOUSA group was the ter- Group and First Army, with Lt. Gen.
mination of General Lee’s position as Courtney H. Hodges as his deputy, the
COMMAND, ORGANIZATION, AND PLANNING 227

obvious intention being that Hodges activity in the United Kingdom; and the
should take over First Army when the Central Base Section, comprising about
army group became operational. The ful- 700 square miles, had a larger concentra-
fillment of these plans which had been so tion of important personnel, a greater va-
long in the making was finally undertaken riety of installations, and probably more
on 6 June, when the transfer of the U.S. problems per square foot than any other
organization from the United Kingdom to area in Britain.
the Continent was begun. T h e operation The London area witnessed a tremen-
on the Continent was soon to measure the dous growth, the strength of Central Base
wisdom of the command and organiza- Section rising from about 1,000 U.S.
tional arrangements and test the work of troops in May 1942 to 30,000 in the month
the planners.49 preceding the invasion. Nearly 10,000 of
the personnel on duty in the Central Base
In the final months during which the Section were assigned to the ETOUSA-
command and organizational problems SOS headquarters.50 In addition, London
were threshed out and detailed tactical was the principal leave center in the
and logistic plans were written, military United Kingdom, ministering to the wants
preparations reached an unprecedented of a transient population half as large as
tempo in the United Kingdom. Even the its assigned strength. U.S. forces had grad-
smallest hamlets a n d rural lanes did not ually taken over more a n d more accom-
escape the feverish activity that character- modations in the crowded metropolitan
ized the operations of every depot and area. I n April 1942 they had occupied less
training area as well as of the various than 100,000 square feet of office space,
headquarters. A prodigious stocking of plus a n officers’ mess, a sales store, a ga-
supplies and equipment took place in these rage, and several small troop billets. By
months, evoking the comment that the May 1944, in addition to 33 officers’billets
British Isles were so weighted down with (including 24 hotels) and 300 buildings
the munitions of war that they were kept used for troop accommodations, they oc-
from sinking only by the buoyant action of cupied approximately 2,500,000 square
the barrage balloons which floated above feet of space in offices, depots, garages,
the principal ports a n d military installa- and shops, and a variety of installations
tions. The increasing industry was particu- such as post exchanges, messes, a deten-
larly noticeable in London, where the rel- tion barracks, a gymnasium, a n d clinics
atively subdued atmosphere of the first and dispensaries. 51
half of 1943 gave way to a n almost frantic One of the most remarkable of the U.S.
activity in the winter and spring of 1944. installations in London was the fabulous
All roads led to London, for within this Consolidated Officers Mess at Grosvenor
metropolitan area a n d on its fringes lay House on Park Lane, only a few blocks
most of the principal headquarters, in- from theater headquarters on Grosvenor
cluding those of ETOUSA-SOS; the 1st Square. Occupying the Great Ball Room
Army Group; Forward Echelon, COMZ; 49Organization and Command, II, 112–31.
SHAEF; USSTAF; AEAF; and also the 50ETO Progress Rpt XCIX (12Jun 44), Statistics
Sec ETO SGS, ETO Adm 429; History of the Central
top British headquarters. London was Base Section, Station List, ETO Adm 587A.
therefore the nerve center of U.S. Army 51History of Central Base Section.
STOCKING SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT. 155-mm. guns and other artillery, above.
Gravity rollers moving supplies in a quartermaster warehouse, below.
INVASION EQUIPMENT. Combat vehicles, including tanks, half-tracks, and tracked
landing vehicles (LVT’s) at Tidworth, above. Signal communications cables covering a field at
Depot G–22, Moreton-on-Lugg, Herefordshire, below.
230 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

of this large West End hotel, “Willow eventually able to serve between 6,000
Run,” as it was quickly dubbed, had been and 7,000 meals per day.52
opened in December 1943 to accommo- While the Americans used facilities in
date the growing number of officers as- various parts of London, the center of U.S.
signed to duty in London. Operated cafe- activity continued to be Grosvenor Square,
teria style, with a capacity of 26 servings the greater part of the buildings on three
per minute and seating nearly 1,000 offi- of its sides eventually being taken over.
cers at a time, “Willow R u n ” ably lived Most of the billets of the London command
u p to its name a n d was a marvel of effi- were located within walking distance of
ciency to every officer assigned to duty in the theater headquarters. In nearby Hyde
the London area. Its eventual efficiency Park American servicemen and British ci-
gave little evidence of the trials and tribu- vilians found mutual amusement, the
lations which attended its opening. The Americans in listening to the daily ha-
payroll problem connected with its British rangues of the lunatic fringe at the Marble
civilian staff of between 400 and 500 was Arch corner, and the Londoners of the
tremendous in itself, and the services of a West End in “talking it up” at a n Ameri-
French chef were early dispensed with can noon-hour softball game played in
when it was found that his spirit was the shadows of the antiaircraft rocket
crushed by the prospect of serving the con- batteries.
tents of the C Ration can. T h e mess was 52Ibid.
 CHAPTER VI

The Completion of BOLERO

( I ) The Flow of Troops and Cargo, January- Great Britain by 1 May 1944, and ship-
May 1944 ping was subsequently set up to permit
this target to be achieved. In the fall of
The U.S. build-up in the United King- 1943 approximately 50,000 air force
dom was accomplished largely in the troops intended for the E T O were di-
twelve months preceding D Day, having verted to the Fifteenth Air Force in North
received its major impetus from the TRI- Africa, and a t the SEXTANT Conference
DENT Conference of May 1943. T h e held by Allied leaders at Cairo in Novem-
BOLERO operation accelerated noticeably ber-December 1943 the Combined Chiefs,
in the fall of 1943, achieved tremendous on the basis of shipping and unit availabil-
momentum in the early months of 1944, ity, lowered the U.K. troop ceiling to
a n d crescendoed, in the manner of the 1,366,000, a reduction roughly equivalent
Ravel composition for which it was to the diversions to North Africa. Either
named, to its climax in May. I n the five through misunderstanding or through
months from January through May alone ignorance of this reduction E T O officials
the number of American forces in the responsible for the preparation of flow
United Kingdom was doubled, rising from charts continued to plan for a n d request
774,000 in December 1943 to 1,527,000 in shipments considerably in excess of the
May 1944. In cargo shipments the record SEXTANT schedules, 1basing their requisi-
was similar; upwards of 2,000,000 long tion on the first phase troop basis. O P D
tons, or 40 percent of all U.S. tonnage dis- officials honored these requests at first.
charged in U.K. ports in the two and one- They even diverted some 20,000 troops
half years from January 1942 to May from other theaters a n d activated addi-
1944, were received in the five months tional units totaling 30,000 men, although
preceding D Day. This performance was inadequately trained, to meet the ETO's
all the more remarkable in view of the D-Day requirements. In February, how-
serious restriction on both troop and cargo ever, the O P D pointed out the growing
reception imposed by the limited British
port a n d inland transportation facilities, 1 O P D officials suspected that this oversight was
probably due to the fact that individuals preparing
which in the final stages actually threat- the flow charts in the ETO had not even known of
ened to prevent the consummation of the the SEXTANT decisions. O n e O P D officer had found
build-up. theater officials preparing flow charts in November
without any knowledge of the QUADRANT schedules,
At the QUADRANT Conference in August for example, for the reason that security regulations
1943 the Combined Chiefs of Staff had allowed only a limited distribution of those papers.
agreed to have 1,416,900 U.S. soldiers in Note for Record, 29 Feb 44, OPD 320.2, Cases 210–30.
232 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

TABLE
5—TROOP BUILD-UPIN THE UNITEDKINGDOM:AUGUST1943–MAY1944

a By ship. Excludes movements by air.

Source: Troop arrivals data obtained from ETO TC Monthly Progress Rpt, 3 0 Jun 44, ETO Adm 451 TC Rpts. Troop
strength data obtained from Progress Rpts, Progress Div, SOS, 4 Oct 43, ETO Adm 345 Troops, and from Progress Rpts,
Statistical Sec, SOS, ETO Adm 421–29. These ETO strength data were preliminary, unaudited figures for command pur-
poses and, while differing slightly from the audited W D AG strengths, have been used throughout this volume because of the
subdivision into air, ground, and service troops. This breakdown is unavailable in W D AG reports.

discrepancy to the theater a n d asked for Department informed the theater that, in
additional information on the theater’s compliance with its requests, it was mak-
needs so that adequate preparations could ing available and had set u p shipping for
be made for the shipment of units. 2 167,000 men in May, 140,000 in June,
The high rate of troop shipments and 148,000 in July.3 The SEXTANT sched-
created no particular difficulty in the win- ule had provided for the shipment of only
ter months, except for the problem of pro- 122,600 in May, 121,100 in June, and
viding adequate accommodations in the 142,800 in July. The lack of co-ordination
United Kingdom. Record shipments from in the troop flow planning was shortly re-
November through April averaged almost vealed by the reply from the theater that
160,000 men per month, a n d reached a it had planned accommodations for only
peak of 216,700 arrivals in the month of 118,000. T h e War Department then of-
April. (Table 5) Shipping plans for May fered to reduce the shipments for May and
were a more serious matter since outload- asked the theater which units it desired
ing for the cross-Channel operation was to 2 Cbl, OPD to ETO, 29 Feb 44, and Note for
begin that month and was bound to re- Record, OPD, 29 Feb 44, OPD 320.2, Cases 210-30;
strict movements into the United King- Memo, Handy for DCofS, sub: Availability of Units
for U.K., 29 Dec 43, OPD 320.2, Sec III, Cases 65–71.
d o m by limiting port a n d inland trans- 3 Cbl WAR-25883, Marshall to Eisenhower, 20
portation facilities. O n 20 April the War Apr 44, O P D 370.5, Sec XII, Cases 412–47.
T H E COMPLETION O F BOLERO 233

backlogged to later months. The SEXTANTa n urgent need for certain types of units
schedule, answered the theater immedi- the theater had again reluctantly called
ately, did not provide adequate support on the War Department in April to ship
for the operation as then planned. It ar- partially trained units.8 The U.S. force in
gued that at least 151,000 of the 167,000 the United Kingdom on the eve of D Day
set up for May shipment were of vital im- was therefore not as perfectly balanced a
portance to the operation, since they com- force as was desired, and the shipment of
prised many units already overdue. In the certain combat elements had been de-
meantime the British War Office had ferred. But in total numbers the BOLERO
made it known that British port and rail build-up had in fact exceeded the target
capacities in May, June, and July were of not only the SEXTANT but the earlier
capable of receiving only the numbers and higher QUADRANT build-up schedule.
agreed on a t SEXTANT, and stood firm on By 31 May twenty divisions had arrived
those ceilings.4 in the United Kingdom, and the theater's
ETOUSA asked the War Department strength stood at 1,526,965 men, approxi-
to submit the whole matter to the Com- mately 50,000 more than the 1,476,300
bined Chiefs for decision, with the request which SEXTANT schedule had called for on
that it raise the shipping goal to 151,300 that date. The composition of this force
in May, 152,000 in June a n d 152,000 in was as follows:
July. 5 Since the problem was not one of
shipping or availability of troops, and cen-
tered rather on the question of British port
and rail capacity, the War Department
instructed that these difficulties be taken
up by SHAEF and the British Chiefs of
Staff.6 Within a few days the whole matter
was ironed out, and on 28 April ETOUSA T h e cumulative arrivals in the United
informed O P D that the British had Kingdom over the past two and one-half
agreed to maximum shipments of 132,000 years actually exceeded 1,750,000 men,
in May, 125,700 in June, a n d 122,000 in some of whom had been withdrawn for
July, thus raising the SEXTANT schedule
somewhat for May and June. The inabil- 4 Cbl 88589, W O D Q M G (M) to BAS Washing-
ity of the theater to receive the troops ton, 21 Apr 44, SHAEF G–4 381 BOLERO144.
5 Cbl E-25062, CG E T O to WD, 26 Apr 44, and
which the War Department had made Note for Record, BOLEROPersonnel for U.K. in May,
available, and the imposition of these ceil- Jun, and Jul, 26 Apr 44, O P D 370.5, Sec X I I , Cases
ings, had the net effect of creating a cumu- 4 12–47.
6 Cbl W–28487, OPD to ETO, 26 Apr 44, SHAEF
lative deferment of approximately 75,000 G–4 BOLERO144.
troops by August, a n d made it necessary 7 O P D later noted that it had actually set up
for the theater to respecify its priorities for 180,000 for May shipment a n d that the backlog was
even greater. Memo, Col Alexander D. Reid, Chief
shipments of units. 7 European Sec OPD, for Handy, 1 May 44, sub: Revi-
Establishment of these ceilings did not sion of Troop Flow to U.K., O P D 370.5, Sec XII,
in the end have a serious effect on the Cases 412–47.
8 Cbl WAR-26204, OPD to C G ETO, 19 Apr 44,
build-up. As usual, there still were certain and Cbl E-25337, Smith to Handy, 28 Apr 44, P&O
shortages in service units, a n d because of Cbl Files.
234 LOGISTICAL S U P P O R T OF T H E ARMIES

the North African operation. Of this total, Conference. T h e entire problem was more
1,671,010, or about 95 percent, had been fully aired in August 1943, by which time
transported to the theater by ship, the re- the BOLERO build-up had finally become a
mainder by air. Approximately 59 percent definite undertaking a n d was achieving
of t h e total troop movement to the United considerable momentum. T h e reception
Kingdom was carried out by the usual and handling of cargo posed no particular
convoys of slow-moving troop transports. problem at that time. Until early 1944,
But in contrast with the practice of World when the import program reached its
War I, considerable use was made of fast peak, there was every assurance that Brit-
passenger liners converted to troopships, ish labor, with the help of a n increasing
which could cross the Atlantic unescorted, number of U.S. port battalions, could dis-
protected only by their speed, submarine charge t h e tonnages scheduled for ship-
and plane detection devices, and light ment to the United Kingdom.10 T h e pe-
armament. T h e largest and fastest of these riod of greatest danger for the build-up
vessels were the British Cunard White would arrive just before the actual move-
Star luxury liners, the Queen Mary and ment across the Channel, the period in
Queen Elizabeth. The two Queens were capa- which the reception and inland movement
ble of shuttling back a n d forth across the of BOLERO cargo would overlap the move-
Atlantic with a remarkably short turn- ment of men a n d supplies into the mar-
round, each of them making three round shaling camps a n d ports. British officials
trips per month a n d carrying 15,000 pointed out that the resulting strain on
troops on each voyage. These two ships port, railway, and highway facilities might
alone carried nearly 425,000 American well prove unbearable. Competition for
troops to the United Kingdom, account- the use of those facilities would be even
ing for 24 percent of the entire build-up. further aggravated, they noted, by the
Along with several other liners of large necessity of withdrawing coastal shipping
capacity, such as the Aquitania ( a veteran and refitting it for cross-Channel opera-
of World War I), the Mauretania, the Ile de tions, since this would divert additional
France, the Nieuw Amsterdam,and the Ber- traffic to the railways. Moreover, the
gensfjord,they carried about 36 percent of “sterilization” of berths in the southern
the American troops going t o the United ports for the assembly a n d loading of
Kingdom and played a significant and OVERLORD vessels would divert BOLERO
often dramatic role in the prologue to shipping to the northern ports, creating
continental invasion.9
T h e limited port and transportation 9 Troop and Supply Buildup in the United King-
dom to D Day, Pt. III of The Administrative and
facilities in the United Kingdom were to Logistical History of the ETO, prep by Hist Div
have a much more serious impact on USFET, 1946, MS, pp. 97–98, OCMH; [Harold Lar-
cargo shipment than o n personnel move- son] Troop Transports in World War II, Office
CofT, ASF, Mar 45, MS, pp. 20–23, OCMH. The
ment, and in fact acted as a n aggravating story of troop movement techniques from the Trans-
stricture which dominated the course of portation Corps viewpoint is told in Chester Ward-
the supply build-up in the final months low, The Transportation Corps: Movements, Train-
ing, and Supply, now in preparation for this series.
before D Day. British officials had given 10 Memo for Info 2, BOLERO-SICKLE Combined
warning of this potential limiting factor as Committee (W), Incl, Sep 43, ASF Plng Div, BOLERO-
early as January 1943 at the Casablanca SICKLE Com, Series II, A46–183, Item 2.
T H E COMPLETION OF BOLERO 235

a n additional burden on the railways be- imum of only seventy-five BOLEROships

cause of the longer haulsinvolved. 11 per month, and it was agreed by General
T h e increasing strain on inland trans- Ross and General Lord that U.S. port
portation facilities was later illustrated in battalions would be provided to handle
the handling of a single convoy in March all ships in excess of that number. To bring
1944, even before the tempo of invasion in the approximately 150 ships per month
preparations reached its height. This con- desired in the early months of 1944, U.S.
voy included eighteen fully loaded U.S. port labor might therefore have to handle
Army cargo vessels a n d twenty-four part up to one half of all BOLERO imports at the
cargoes loaded on regular commercial peak of the build-up. 13
ships. It contained about 1,500 wheeled For these reasons the British felt it im-
vehicles, tanks, and self-propelled mount- perative that the BOLERO shipments be de-
ings, 2,000 cased vehicles, 200 aircraft and celerated in the spring of 1944. They
gliders, and about 50,000 tons of supplies. asserted that the reduction would have to
All this cargo had to be discharged within start not later than with the March ship-
about eight days, the planned interval be- ments from the United States if OVER-
tween convoys. T h e prompt clearance of LORD was to be launched on 1 May.14At
this cargo from the ports involved the run- QUADRANT and again a t SEXTANT they
ning of 75 special trains with 10,000 had succeeded in imposing a definite ceil-
loaded cars a n d the movement by high- ing on the tonnages (actually expressed in
way of large numbers of wheeled and numbers of ship sailings) which could be
cased vehicles and aircraft. T h e traffic in dispatched to the United Kingdom in the
supplies procured locally from the British, next several months.
a n d the traffic between U.S. depots, in- I n view of the inevitable limitation on
volved the dispatch of another 8,000 cars the reception of BOLEROcargo in the
a n d the running of 27 trains. T h e move- months just preceding the invasion it was
ment of U.S. Army cargo thus necessitated logical that an extraordinary effort be
running a minimum of 100 special freight made to ship cargo to maximum capacity
trains with 18,000–20,000 loaded cars in the fall of 1943. Heavy shipping sched-
weekly, many of them using routes al- ules were in fact set u p for the fall and
ready overburdened with traffic.12 winter months, but the low priority of the
The question of port capacity was pri- European theater, which in turn was im-
marily one of labor shortages, although posed by the unavailability of supplies
the availability of berths was also a con- a n d equipment in the United States pre-
sideration. In the spring months the port vented the complete fulfillment of the pre-
labor problem would inevitably be ag-
gravated. T h e British estimated that all 11 Memo, V Q M G for W O et al., 12 Aug 43,
their military labor would have to be SHAEF G–4 381 BOLERO I 44.
withdrawn on 1 April for operational pur- 12 Info Bull 10, BoleroReception—Accommoda-
tion-Maintenance, Q(L) Br, 1–31 Mar 44, SHAEF
poses, a n d southern ports would require G–4 381 BOLEROI 44.
an augmented labor force for the outload- 13Memo of Mtg at WO, 14 Sep 43, SHAEF G–4
ing for OVERLORD. In September British 381 BOLERO144.
14Paper by Deputy Dir, Mov and Tn Br, BOLERO
officials made it clear that civil labor Repercussion on OVERLORD, 11 Aug 43, SHAEF G–4
could be made available to handle a max- 381 BOLERO I 44.
 236 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

shipment program.15 This most pressing ment, weapons, and vehicles would in-
of the supply build-up problems—prior- crease very rapidly early in 1944, creating
ities—was finally settled in December a difficult shipping problem for the ports
1943, when the European theater was as- of embarkation as well as the U.K. ports
signed top priority for all needed items of and forcing shipments in March and April
equipment. Even so, the solution had no beyond the established ceilings. The situa-
immediate effect in the theater. Not until tion was discussed at that time with Gen-
February did the flood of cargo released eral Lee, who advised that, if necessary,
under the new priorities begin, and even arrangements could be made to exceed
this was not reflected in the receipts at the ceilings, and it was therefore hoped
British ports until the following month. In that, somehow, the cargo would be ac-
March a record 467,824 long tons arrived cepted in the United Kingdom. 18
in the United Kingdom for U.S. forces. Realities soon had to be faced. Initially
Preshipped supplies now enjoyed the same a request was made that the ceilings be
priority as regular shipments, and in lifted, and for March the allocation of
March the preshipment program was for- shipping was first raised from 109 to 120,
mally extended several months beyond and then to 140. In April, as a result, a
the first phase troop basis, thus guarantee- record 496,384 long tons reached the
ing a continued ample availability of sup- United Kingdom. (Table 6) But these
plies and equipment. shipments in excess of the limits agreed to
But it was at precisely this moment that a t SEXTANTwere made possible mainly
port and inland transportation limitations because the cross-Channel operation had
in the United Kingdom inexorably im- by that time been postponed a month (to
posed themselves on the entire build-up June), and the pressure on port and trans-
program, threatening to nullify the favor- portation facilities was temporarily re-
able position which the theater had only lieved.19 Other remedies would have to be
recently attained in the matter of priorities found in succeeding months.
and availability of cargo. A large backlog A partial solution was found in the use
of cargo accumulated in the area of the of shipping to store supplies temporarily
New York Port of Embarkation, making it in U.K. waters until they were required
necessary for the service chiefs in the thea- either in the United Kingdom or on the
ter to establish priorities for movement in Continent. T h e theater made a proposal
order to insure the shipment of cargo con- 15Memo, Magruder for Col Witten, Control Div
sidered most essential for the coming ASF, 18 Mar 44, sub: Shipping vs. Cargo, Plng Div
operation. 16 By 1 May, it was estimated, ASF, A46–371, Shipping File X 44.
there would be a backlog of approxi- 16 Memo,Brig Gen W A. Wood, Deputy Dir for
Plans a n d Opns, ASF, to C G ASF, 13 Apr 44, sub:
mately 540,000 measurement tons a t the Status of Shipments to U.K., Plng Div ASF, A46–371,
New York Port and a shortage of sixty-one Shipping File X 44.
ships to move this cargo, even assuming 17 Memo,Magruder for Witten, 18 Mar 44, sub:
Shipping vs. Cargo.
that it could be received in the United l8 Ibid.
Kingdom.17 19 [RichardM. Leighton]The Problem of Troop
This development was not entirely un- and Cargo Flow in Preparing the European Invasion,
1943–44, prep in Hist Sec, Control Div, ASF, 1945,
foreseen. At SEXTANT it was noted that the MS (hereafter cited as Problem of Troop and Cargo
availability of heavy construction equip- Flow), pp. 160–61, OCMH.
T H E COMPLETION OF BOLERO 237

TABLE
6—CARGOFLOWTO THE UNITED KINGDOM:
NOVEMBER
1943–JULY 1944

a Cumulative totals adjusted in source report with no indication of months in which corrections are applicable.
Source: Shipment data from [Richard M. Leighton] Problem of Troop and Cargo Flow in Preparing the European Invasion,
1943–44, Prep in Hist Sec, Control Div, ASP, 1945, MS. p. 154, OCMH. Receipt data from ETO TC Monthly Progress
Rpts, Hq SOS, Statistics Br, OCofT, ETO Adm 451–2.

to this effect in January, asking that a sys- mats, clothing and equipage, and ord-
tem of “type loading”—more commonly nance supplies, and eleven loads of am-
known as “prestowage”—be instituted. munition, totaling approximately 500,000
Vessels would be loaded with specified measurement tons.
blocks of supplies for use on the Continent, Shortly after the prestowage program
each ship carrying a spread load of se- was accepted, theater representatives of-
lected items of supply somewhat analo- fered a variant of it known as “commod-
gous to a general depot. Deck space was to ity loading.” This called for the loading of
be utilized for cargo destined for the an unspecified number of ships (commod-
United Kingdom. After this deck-loaded ity loaders) either solidly with a single
cargo was unloaded, the ships were to be type of supply or with closely affiliated
consigned to the Continent where they types of supply. Most suitable for com-
could be discharged as needed. The plan modity loading were such items as rations,
had obvious advantages: it would save ammunition, vehicles, and engineer sup-
four handlings in the United Kingdom plies. Commodity loaders were easily and
and would prevent the congestion of port economically loaded. It was intended that
and transportation facilities there.20 As they be held in U.K. waters until called to
finally worked out, the prestowage plan
20Ltr, Lee to CG NYPOE, sub: Type Loading,
provided for the dispatch of fifty-four 2 1 Jan 44, ASF Plng Div, A46–371, Shipping File
ships loaded with subsistence, landing X 44.
238 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

the Continent, where they could serve May and June would be lowered from 140
either as floating depots or for bulk dis- ships to 120.22
charge. Nearly 150 commodity loaders Meanwhile, theater officials for their
and 54 preloaded ships were dispatched to part resisted pressure in the United King-
Britain in the months of May, June, and dom to cut imports any further. Early in
July 1944, providing the theater with May British officials were told that
something like mobile depots which could BOLERO shipments could not tolerate ad-
be moved forward on call to back up any ditional reductions for June. T h e provi-
particular area. Both practices were costly sion of certain items of equipment for
improvisations in that they immobilized combat units was already critically be-
badly needed shipping for long periods of hind schedule, and it looked at that time
time. Commodity loading had a further as though the Third Army would have
disadvantage. If the enemy sank a ship so only 60 percent of its wheeled equip-
loaded, a heavy loss of one particular type ment.23 By the middle of the month, with
of supply resulted. For these reasons the the mounting process in full swing, the
system was discouraged by the New York disparity between ship arrivals and port
Port.21 discharge capacity had become sufficiently
In any event these expedients did not serious to force a showdown on the entire
offer the final solution to the problem of problem. O n 18 May SOS officials re-
cargo reception in the United Kingdom. ported to the New York Port that British
No preloaded or commodity-loaded ships ports simply could not accommodate
were sent to the United Kingdom in BOLERO cargoes at the rate at which they
April. Meanwhile a ceiling of 140 ships were arriving. Between 35 and 40 ships in
had been established for acceptance in the excess of available berths were arriving in
United Kingdom for that month, repre- May, most of them with critically needed
senting approximately 1,310,000 measure- supplies. British officials stood firm in
ment tons. Shipments actually exceeded their insistence that BOLERO arrivals could
this figure by some 325,000 tons, with the be discharged only within the agreed-on
result that many vessels arriving in the monthly totals and that 120 ships was the
United Kingdom were forced to stand absolute maximum that could be accepted
idly by for lack of berthing facilities. In in May.24To meet the increasing outload-
May, as fully predicted long before, the
situation became even worse, for the 21Problem of Troop and Cargo Flow, pp. 154-60;
Ltr, Lord to Lee, 3 Apr 44, sub: R p t on E T O U S A
OVERLORD mounting machinery was set Supply Mission to US., E T O Rpt of ETOUSA Sup-
in motion. T h e rising tide of traffic from ply Mission.
the many depots and camps to the ports of 22Memo, Col Magruder for Gen Wylie, 14 Apr
44, sub: Ships set u p for U.K. in May a n d Jun, ASF
embarkation gradually restricted all im- Plng Div, A46–371, Shipping File X 44; Problem of
portation through these ports a n d taxed Troop and Cargo Flow, p. 162.
to the full the inland transportation sys- 23Memo, Col K. F. Hausauer, Chief Movements
Sec SHAEF, for Maj Gen Charles S. Napier, 4 May
tem. It was inevitable, therefore, that the 44, SHAEF G–4 381 BOLEROI 44.
flow of supplies into the United Kingdom 24T W X Conf, E T O with NYPOE, 18 May 44,
would have to be constricted even more. E U C O M AG 560 Vessels 1 4 4 ; T W X Conf with
Against vigorous opposition from the NYPOE, 2 2 May 44, E U C O M AG 337 NYPOE I
44; Ltr, Lord Frederick Leathers to Philip Reed, U.S.
Army Services Forces, the theater an- Embassy, 19 May 44, EUCOM AG 381 BOLERO; see
nounced that the discharge ceiling for also ASF file, ETO—1st half 1944.
THE COMPLETION O F BOLERO 239

ing requirements for OVERLORD it had al- ing that the United States would provide
ready been necessary to allocate additional assistance later in the year to make up this
berths in the southern ports, which en- loss.28
tailed handling a still greater portion of This adjustment averted the worst ef-
the incoming traffic in the northern ports fects of the port crisis. After June the port
and throwing an additional strain on the capacity of the United Kingdom would
railways. Some British officials feared that gradually be supplemented by and even-
the opportunity was being taken to clear tually superseded by that of the continen-
U.S. ports irrespective of the congestion tal beaches and ports which would receive
thus caused in those of the United King- cargo directly from the United States. But
dom. Plans were even made to dump for the next few months British port ca-
cargo in the streets and open spaces near pacity would definitely be limited, and the
the ports, where storage capacity was Army Service Forces was urged to adhere
already taken up. 25 closely to the theater’s loading requests
Barely two weeks before D Day the im- and priority lists for the ships intended for
passe was finally resolved at the highest both U.K. and continental discharge.
levels in the United Kingdom. On 20 May General Lutes of the ASF, on the basis of
General Eisenhower appealed to the his own observations of the congested
Prime Minister. Admitting that the im- ports in the United Kingdom, accordingly
port ceilings had been exceeded by nearly instructed the New York Port to accede to
forty ships, he cited as the chief reason the theater’s wishes in these matters so
that it had been impossible to ship cargo that the delivery of vitally needed equip-
in the desired quantities during the fall ment would be expedited.29 By other spe-
months of 1943 when the U.K. ports could cial measures it was possible to maintain a
have accepted it. These vessels contained tremendous flow of cargo to the United
large quantities of supplies and equipment Kingdom in the final months preceding
vital to the success of operation OVER- the invasion. T h e crisis over port capac-
LORD. Eisenhower assured the Prime Min- ities nevertheless had illustrated a very
ister that the matter was of grave fundamental logistical paradox: the threat
importance, and stated that it was imper- that the invasion forces might not be
ative that the ships be discharged.26As he equipped in the presence of plenty. The
later reported to the War Department,
“We have simply developed one of those 25Memo, First Sea Lord, on Trans-Atlantic Con-
voys, 23 May 44, SHAEF SGS 540 Shipping Prob-
bottlenecks (for no one is at fault for it) in- lems; History o f the Transportation Corps, ETO,
cident to big operations.”27 A few days prep by Int and Hist Br, Plng Div, Office CofT ETO,
later the Supreme Commander met with 1944, MS, Vol. III (April-June 1944), Movements
Mr. Churchill and Lord Frederick Sec., p. 8, ETO Adm 582.
26Ltr, Eisenhower to Prime Minister, 20 May 44,
Leathers, the Minister of War Transport, EUCOM AG 560 A T Transports, Vessels, etc., 144.
and prevailed upon them to adopt the 27Cbl S–52375, Eisenhower to Marshall, 23 May
only obvious solution—a cut in the British 44, 28 Eyes Only Cbl File, ETO, 1943–45, Smith Papers.
Ibid.; Cbl WAR-4559, JCS to SHAEF, 2 Jun 44,
import program. That program had been P&O Cbl Files.
subject to repeated changes. Now the Brit- 29Cbl EX-29448, Lee to Somervell, 25 May 44,
ish agreed to delay the delivery of 500,000 SHAEF G–4 381 BOLERO1 4 4 ; Ltr, Lutes to Good-
man, 25 May 44, ASF Plng Div, A46–371, Shipping
tons of cargo to make berths available for File X 44; TWX Confs, COMZ ETO with NYPOE,
the BOLERO vessels, with the understand- 25,26, and 27 May 44, EUCOM 337 NYPE, I.
240 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

limiting factor of 1943-shortage of sup- beginning made toward meeting the en-
plies in the United States-was now hav- larged air force requirements, the Amer-
ing its long-range effect on the ability to icans could offer little assistance in the
equip the OVERLORD forces, threatening construction program. Fortunately British
a n artificial shortage in the spring of 1944 officials had continued with portions of it,
because of a new limiting factor—the in- a n d in M a y 1943 the TRIDENT decisions
ability of the British ports to receive the injected new life into the program. I n re-
cargo now becoming available. viving the BOLERO build-up, these deci-
In the final month of preparation 600,- sions inevitably had a corollary impact on
000 long tons of supplies arrived in the U.K. plans for accommodating the
United Kingdom, and cargo continued to BOLEROforce. T h e Combined Chiefs of
arrive in unprecedented volume for an- Staff had noted in their final report to the
other two months. T h e May receipts had President and Prime Minister that “the
the following composition: 30 expansion of logistical facilities in the
United Kingdom will be undertaken
immediately.” 31
Within a few days of the Washington
Conference General Lee and others of his
staff, including his Chief Engineer, Gen-
eral Moore, met with the British Quarter-
master General, Gen. Sir T. s. Riddell-
Webster, and other British officers to
initiate planning for the revived BOLERO.
Six weeks later, on 12 July 1943, the Dep-
uty Quartermaster General (Liaison) is-
sued the fourth and last edition of the
BOLEROKey Plan for the reception, ac-
Of the May total, 567,268 long tons ar- commodation and maintenance of U.S.
rived on 141 regular BOLERO ships, a n d forces in the United Kingdom. The fourth
32,471 tons as part cargoes on 95 other edition of the plan did not differ substan-
vessels. By 31 M a y a cumulative total of tially from the earlier editions except to
5,297,306 long tons, or 14,050,290 meas- bring them u p to date by reflecting the
urement tons had been received in the most recent build-up schedules. It used
United Kingdom. the round figure of 1,340,000for the build-
up expected by 30 April 1944, thus allow-
(2) Construction and Local Procurement, ing a small margin of safety over the figure
1943-May 1944 used a t TRIDENT (1,300,300). 32Finally, in
October the figure was raised to 1,446,100
For more than six months after the
North African operation was launched, 30Info Bull 12, BOLERO,Q ( L ) Br, 1–31 May 44,
the limitations imposed by the War De- SHAEF G–4 381 BOLERO1 4 4 .
partment had circumscribed development 31 CCS242/6, 25 May 43.
32 Key Plan for the Reception, Accommodation
of administrative facilities for U.S. forces and Maintenance of the U.S. Forces, Fourth Edition,
in the United Kingdom. Except for the 1 2 Jul 43, Q(L) Paper 12, ETO, Fourth Key Plan.
T H E COMPLETION OF BOLERO 241

in a n amendment reflecting the new troop Ministry of Supply for materials and to
build-up schedule agreed to at the QUAD- the Ministry of Labor for workers. The
RANT Conference in 33
August. Ministry of War Transport constructed
Since the scheduled U.S. troop build-up railways, roads, hardstandings, and docks.
represented a n increase over that used in The Ministry of Agriculture arranged for
earlier plans, the Fourth Edition also the clearance of land needed for the new
called for an enlarged accommodations installations.
plan, and therefore entailed a larger con- Much of the real work was accomplished
struction program. Within the U.S. Army a t lower levels, Within the Office of the
in the United Kingdom the provision of Chief Engineer, SOS, it was the Construc-
all facilities, by construction or other tion a n d Quartering Division which was
means, was the responsibility of the chief in actual charge of the accommodations
engineer. The requirements of the various program, and had direct contacts with the
services were first co-ordinated and con- various British directorates under the
solidated by the Installations Branch, Deputy Quartermaster General and En-
G–4, SOS, which administered the entire gineer-in-Chief, such as the Directorates
accommodations plan. Once these require- of Quartering, Movement, Transportation,
ments were determined, however, it was Fortifications and Works, and Engineer
the responsibility of the Engineer Service Stores. Once it was determined that the
to acquire the facilities. T h e Engineer necessary labor and materials were avail-
Service, in turn, arranged for the con- able, details of the project were worked
struction of the needed facilities, or for the out between the U S . base section engineer
transfer of existing accommodations, with and the corresponding British command,
the Office of the British Quartermaster and construction could then proceed. The
General (or Q Branch), its principal point procedure for arranging for new construc-
of contact with that agency on policy tion was a cumbersome one, particularly
matters being the Quartermaster Liaison in the early stages, each project requiring
Branch, Q(Liaison), which had been the approval of several agencies in the
specifically set up under General Wootten War Office. The resulting delays often
for that purpose in 1942. tried the patience of American authorities,
When adequate facilities did not exist or for on the U.S. side construction was much
could not be transferred for American more decentralized, the base section and
use, the U.S. base section engineer and district commanders having considerably
the British command concerned selected a more leeway to authorize expenditures for
site where the accommodation could be 34 On the other hand,
constructionprojects.
constructed, and the Q Branch was then British officials were exasperated by the
asked to requisition the property. Once a
project was approved, the actual con- 33Amendment 1 to Fourth Edition, Key Plan, 30
struction of the new facility might involve Oct 43, Q(L) 1/10 Paper 13, ETO, Fourth Key Plan.
34Final Report of the Chief Engineer, ETO, 1942–
several British government departments. 45, prep in Office CofEngrs E T O , 1946, MS (here-
The Ministry of Works and Planning, after cited as Final Engineer Report, ETO), I, 229–32,
which supervised the entire project and O C M H ; Construction in the United Kingdom, MS,
pp. 11–12, ETO Adm 506; Maj. Gen. A. G. B.
constructed the hospitals and many of the Buchanan, “Bolero,” The Royal Engineers Journal, LIX
depots and camps, had to turn to the (September, 1945), 185–86.
242 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

repeated modifications in the plans of the dozers, mobile cranes, paving and trench-
Americans. ing machines, and post-hole diggers where
Virtually all construction in the United U.S. engineers were employed. By the
Kingdom was carried out to meet estab- time U.S. units so equipped arrived in
lished War Office standards on such England many of the larger construction
matters as space scales, types of huts, projects had already been assigned to
methods of flooring in hospitals, layouts British labor, both civil a n d military, and
for buildings, and screening and blackout U.S. engineers initially were dispersed over
facilities. U.S. scales differed from the a number of minor jobs for which they
British, a n d some modifications were were not best suited. Not until the large
made to meet American requirements, but depots a n d airfields were authorized in
U.S. standards had to be relaxed some- 1943 were they utilized to best advantage.35
what to meet accommodations require- BOLEROconstruction policy from the
ments in the fall of 1943 when U.S. troops beginning envisaged that all labor and
began to arrive in great numbers. materials would be provided by the
U.S. War Department construction British, with only incidental help from
designs proved of little use, for they called U.S. engineer units. But it was soon ap-
for a much greater quantity of wood than parent that construction requirements
was available in the United Kingdom. would exceed British capacities. U.S.
British resources and practice dictated a forces were therefore called on to provide
much more extensive use of tile, plaster- a substantial contribution in materials and
board, sheet steel, corrugated iron, and equipment as well as in military labor,
precast concrete, and most facilities there- and it became necessary to requisition
fore took the form of steel Nissen huts, items like lumber, cement, a n d pipe from
curved asbestos or prefabricated concrete U.S. depots.
huts for housing, and various types of steel
huts for covered storage a n d shops. U.S. T h e Fourth Key Plan, as amended in
troop labor was not accustomed to work- October 1943, estimated that the U.S.
ing with these materials a n d required Army would require accommodations for
additional training. The use of these mate- 1,027,400 ground and service troops in the
rials also resulted in the construction of United Kingdom by 1 May 1944. In addi-
more durable structures than was custom- tion, the British War Office undertook a
ary in a theater of war. commitment to provide quarters for 33,000
British and U.S. construction methods U.S. air force personnel, the bulk of the
also contrasted because of the difference air force requirements remaining the re-
in tools and equipment. I n general, U.S. sponsibility of the British Air Ministry.
engineer units were equipped with heavier- T h e War Office program therefore called
duty machinery, best suited for work on for 1,060,400 spaces.36
large projects such as depot a n d airfield This housing was acquired either by
construction in which extensive earth- billeting, by the transfer of existing ac-
moving jobs and concrete construction
were called for. Much of the work that 35Buchanan, op. cit., pp. 185-86; Final Engineer
Report, ETO, I, 232–34.
British labor had to perform by hand was 36Amendment 1 to Fourth Edition, Key Plan, 30
carried out with patrol graders, bull- Oct 43, Q(L) 1/10 Paper 13, ETO, Fourth Key Plan.
T H E COMPLETION OF BOLERO 243

commodations, or by new construction. were built to U.S. designs a n d caused no

Billeting of troops in British homes was great difficulty. A typical 1,000-man
avoided as long as possible and remained tented camp contained about 200 tents
on a voluntary basis until the end of 1943. and covered 34 acres.
Requisitioning was resorted to only when T h e BOLERO housing program met re-
the build-up reached its peak in the winter quirements with remarkable accuracy.
a n d spring months. Although some inci- Available accommodations totaled 1,206,-
dents caused bad feelings between civilian 349 at the end of May, a t which time the
householders and soldiers, most of the ap- ground and service force troop strength
prehensions and anxieties regarding the was approximately 1,100,000. Since only
effect on Anglo-American relations proved about 90 percent of theoretical capacity
unfounded.37 About 110,000 billets were could be counted on because unit strengths
provided for American troops, accounting did not exactly coincide with camp capac-
for a small portion of the total personnel ities, the available housing almost exactly
accommodations. met U.S. needs. At no time was there an
Approximately 60 percent of all troop actual shortage.
quarters were acquired by requisition or The Air Ministry had provided accom-
transfer of existing facilities, the remain- modations, in addition to those under the
ing 40 percent consisting of new construc- BOLEROprogram, for 442,170 U.S. air
tion. Most of the accommodations turned force troops, bringing the total to 1,648,-
over by the British required additional 519. Another substantial addition in the
work to bring them u p to U.S. standards. housing program over a n d above the
Americans were notoriously wasteful in BOLERO needs had been made in the spring
their use of water, for example, and addi- of 1944, when it was decided to prepare
tional facilities had to be constructed to for bivouac camp facilities for 171,250 ex-
provide an adequate supply. New accom- tra troops that would have to be accom-
modations took the form of tented ex- modated in the event of a delay in launch-
pansions of existing camps, hutted camps, ing the OVERLORD operation. Tented facil-
winter tented camps, and summer tented ities were built in the marshaling areas
camps, and did not come into extensive near the ports to accommodate another
use until late in 1943. Since U.S. troop 200,000 troops during the mounting
labor for construction work was lacking phases of the cross-Channel attack. The
earlier in the year, U.S. scales of accom- aggregate of all personnel accommoda-
modation were reduced to scales com- tions provided U.S. troops in the United
parable with the British, and maximum Kingdom just before D Day therefore
use was made of existing facilities. Most totaled 2,021,387. T h e types a n d sources
familiar of the various camp structures of these accommodations are summarized
was the Nissen hut, a utilitarian structure in the table on the following page.38
which was used for living quarters, admin-
istration buildings, hospitals, mess halls, 37Basic Needs of the ETO Soldier, Pt. XI of The
bath houses, and a variety of other pur- Administrative a n d Logistical History of the ETO,
poses. A typical 1,000-man Nissen hut MS, Vol. I, Ch. III, pp. 43ff., OCMH.
38Final Engineer Report, ETO, I, 237–39,250, and
camp contained 123 buildings and covered II, App. 24; Construction in the United Kingdom,
about 40 acres. Tented accommodations pp. 13–15.
244 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

a Not available because of lack of OVERLORD

data.
b Not determined in source report.

Provision of hospital requirements did initially met by the transfer of certain per-
not proceed as smoothly. Hospital con- manent military hospitals and also several
struction had lower priority than either Emergency Medical Service hospitals. But
depot or personnel needs. Its high build- the BOLERO planners had estimated that
ing standards meant detailed supervision the great bulk ofU.S. requirements would
and greater demands for skilled labor and have to be met by the use of militia, con-
scarce materials. Furthermore, it was a version, and dual-purpose camps, and by
considerably larger undertaking because the construction of regular station and
existing facilities met only a small fraction general hospitals. I n 1943 the acquisition
of the total needs, a n d it was thus neces- of hospitals proceeded on the basis of the
sary to provide the great bulk of medical 90,000-bed requirements estimated in the
facilities through new construction. The Second Edition of the BOLERO plan. In
various sources of hospital facilities have order to give some stability to the hitherto
already been described. A small percent- uncertain construction plans, the chief
age of the eventual U.S. requirements was surgeon announced in June 1943 that the
TYPICAL MEDICAL INSTALLATIONS: Interior of ward, above. Nissen hut hospital,
below.
246 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

goal would be to procure facilities with to be set u p in existing wards. By the be-
90,000 to 95,000 fixed beds.39This program ginning ofJune, after many changes, the
remained fairly stable despite the fact that hospital program called for 93,280 fixed
the Fourth Edition of the Key Plan, issued beds and 40,907 tented expansion beds, or
the following month, called for a larger a total of 134,187.41This was a maximum
troop build-up than before and stated a program, however, a n d was not expected
requirement for 103,690 beds. to be completed for several months. The
Hospital capacities had already been fixed bed portion of the program was to be
altered in the Second Edition of July 1942, met as follows: 42
when station hospitals were increased in
size from 750 to 834 beds, and general
hospitals from 1,000 to 1,082 beds. The in-
creased requirements were to be met
largely through expansions of hospitals al-
ready planned. T h e first step in this ex-
pansion was taken in the summer of 1943
when the Surgeon General of the Army
urged that a greater number of 1,000-bed
hospital units be utilized in the United
Kingdom. Such an increase of general T h e hospital construction program
hospitals required the expansion of the lagged from the beginning. As usual, the
834-bed station hospitals. Under new aus- principal reason was the shortage of labor,
terity quartering scales these station hos- particularly in the skilled categories re-
pital plants were able to accommodate the quired in this type of construction. Build-
staff personnel of a 1,000-bed general hos- ing a hospital was a considerably more
pital with but little additional construc- complex undertaking than building a bar-
tion, and some of the station hospital units racks or a warehouse. Special attention
were eventually replaced or expanded to had to be given such matters as the instal-
1,000-bed units.40 lation of special electrical a n d plumbing
In January 1944 plans were made to in- fixtures, steam boilers, and hot-water gen-
crease the patient capacity of all station erating systems. Innumerable complica-
and general hospitals by 30,000 beds. U.S. tions attended the construction and opera-
troop labor was to be used for the job of tion of medical facilities. Mechanical
providing 27,750 beds in tented expan- dishwashers, for example, required addi-
sions, using standard war tents adjacent to tional construction because British-
existing hospital wards, and an additional designed grease traps could not cope with
2,250 beds in three 750-bed, completely the large amount of fats present in Ameri-
tented hospitals. T h e labor force was re-
39Administrative and Logistical History of the
cruited chiefly from medical operating Medical Service, Com Z, ETO, prep by Office, Chief
personnel not immediately needed in Surgeon, E T O , 1945, MS, Ch. II, pp, 48–49, E T O
their assigned role, and the engineer serv- Adm 581.
ice performed
the necessarysiting and 40 Ibid., Ch. II, p. 51, Ch. VII, p. 20.
41Ibid,, Ch, VII, p, 2 6 ; Final Engineer Report,
technical assistance. Plans were also made ETO, I, 240,
for a n additional 10,907 expansion beds 42 Buchanan,op. cit., p. 187.
T H E COMPLETION OF BOLERO 247

AERIAL VIEW OF A STATION HOSPITAL (tented) in England.

can foods. This also created a n additional located on landed estates, miles from a
problem at the sewage disposal plants, railway and requiring completely new
where grease fouled up the filtering beds. water and sewage disposal systems.43
Even the type of flooring used in operating By D Day 59,424 fixed beds of the origi-
rooms took on such importance as to nal BOLEROprogram were in operation,
require high-level policy decision. and 24,786 of the tented expansions were
T h e majority of the newly constructed completed, bringing the available facilities
hospitals eventually consisted of 834- and at that time to 74 hospitals (43 general
1,082-bed installations based on standard and 31 station) with 84,210 beds.44While
layouts designed by British experts and
approved by American engineers and 43Final Engineer Report, ETO, I, 242–43.
medical officers, although there were devi- 44E T O Medical Service History, Ch. VII, pp.
27–29. T h e Final Engineer Report, ETO, I, 43, states
ations to- meet local conditions. While that only 63,389 beds were available on D Day, since
some were built of brick, most hospitals it does not list any tented expansions as completed at
utilized Nissen huts, the standard 1,082- that time. The theater medical history, however, lists
74 hospitals with specific tabulations of normal plant
bed installations requiring about 160 beds and expansion beds in each. The discrepancy is
buildings and 50 acres of land. Many were not explained.
248 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

the completed construction thus fell short vehicle parks for nearly 50,000 vehicles.
of the target of the BOLEROFourth Edi- Not all of these facilities were in use on
tion, the deficiency was not as serious as it D Day. Their source is tabulated above.46
first appears. Shortly after D Day the evac- Insofar as possible, storage facilities, like
uated militia, dual-purpose, and conver- other accommodations, were constructed
sion camps were turned to hospital use. according to standard layouts. A model
General Hawley, the chief surgeon, was general depot was planned a n d first built
satisfied, as D Day approached, that the at Wem, near Shrewsbury in western Eng-
facilities would be adequate, and had par- land. It had 450,240 square feet of covered
ticular praise for the quality of the physi- storage, 1,375,000 feet of open storage, and
cal plant. British construction had main- personnel accommodations for 1,250.
tained a high standard, a n d the program Construction was begun in December
had been carried out at considerably lower 1942 and the depot was completed in June
cost than would have been possible in the of the following year at a cost of $2,360,-
United States.45 000. O n this model five other depots, com-
monly known as “Wems,” were then built,
T h e depot program proved to be the one each at Boughton in Nottinghamshire,
best organized and best executed of all the at Histon near Cambridge, at Honey-
BOLERO accommodation plans, despite the bourne northeast of Cheltenham, at Lock-
fears of 1942 that storage space would fall erly near Salisbury, and at Moreton-on-
short of requirements. Its success was due Lugg northwest of Cheltenham. (Map 6)
in part to the fact that depot construction Those at Histon and Lockerly were built
was accorded the highest priority and did entirely by U.S. troops, a n d all took
not suffer as much from the shortage of roughly six months to complete. The larg-
labor and materials, and also to the fact est depot of all was constructed at Sud-
that existing facilities provided more than bury-Egginton, near Burton-upon-Trent,
two thirds of the required covered storage with more t h a n 1,000,000 square feet of
space. T h e Engineer Corps, either by ac- covered and 9,500,000 square feet of open
quisition or new construction, eventually space. It was built entirely by the British
provided almost 20,000,000 square feet of at a cost of approximately $6,600,000. 47
covered storage and shop space (of which 45Maj Gen Paul R. Hawley, The European Thea-
only 6,500,000 square feet was new con- ter of Operations, May 44, MS, p. 10, E T O Adm 519.
struction), 43,500,000 square feet of open 46Final Engineer Report, ETO, I, 244–45, II,
storage and hardstandings, and additional App. 26.
47Buchanan, op. cit., pp. 186–87. All dollar values
facilities for the storage of 450,000 tons of represent pounds converted at the rate of 4 to 1 ,
ammunition, 175,000 tons of POL, and which was the approximate exchange rate at the time.
 H Damon
MAP 6
250 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

O n e of the biggest problems in depot responsible for meeting the air force as
construction was locating adequate foot- well as ground and service force require-
ing for open storage of the generally heav- ments, and this task was also delegated to
ier American equipment. Soil conditions the chief engineer. T h e only basic differ-
were generally unfavorable in the United ence in carrying out the two programs was
Kingdom, for the water table was very that in the case of air force projects the
close to the surface. This created special chief engineer, on behalf of the air force
problems in drainage and surfacing before engineer, dealt with the Air Ministry
adequate hardstandings were developed. rather than the War Office. The chief en-
Progress was generally good on the con- giner of the air force prepared the state-
struction program, and the British minis- ment of air force construction and quar-
tries made every effort to make available tering needs, transmitted them to the chief
the needed labor and materials. Even so, engineer of the SOS, who then requested
it was necessary to employ U.S. troop la- the Air Ministry to provide the needed fa-
bor to complete the program, and Ameri- cilities, just as he also requested similar
can engineer units in the end accounted implementation of ground and service
for more than half of the total man-hours force needs under the BOLERO program.
expended on new construction. At the end I n the Air Ministry the chief adminis-
of May 1944 the BOLERO storage program trative officer corresponding to the Quar-
was almost 100 percent complete, the only termaster General in the War Office was
deficit being in POL storage. At that time the Air Minister for Supply and Organi-
the ground and service force depot struc- zation (AMSO). Like the War Office, the
ture in the United Kingdom consisted of Air Ministry created a separate liaison
the following major installations in use:48 agency as the chief point of contact with
the U.S. chief engineer. It was known as
the Assistant Directorate of Organization
(U.S.), or ADO(US).
The procedure of implementing the en-
tire air force construction and quartering
program therefore paralleled very closely
the procedure for the BOLEROprogram,
and at lower echelons there was the same
type of direct liaison, in this case between

48SOS ETO Installations and Operating Personnel

in United Kingdom, 1 Jun 44, prep by Statistical Sec,
SGS H q ETO, ETO Adm 449. There is some dis-
crepancy between the totals of depot space as given
Except for hospital facilities and a small by this source and the Final Engineer Report. The
number of personnel accommodations the totals given on page 248, above, evidently represent
the total space made available over a period of two
BOLERO program included none of the air years. T h e periodic ETOUSA-SOS tabulation for 1
force requirements, for these were met al- June indicates that only 18,000,000 square feet of cov-
most wholly by other plans carried out by ered space and 36,000,000 square feet of open space
were assigned to SOS units at that date, and that only
the Air Ministry and the Royal Air Force. 13,000,000 square feet of covered space and 20,500,-
O n the U.S. side, however, the SOS was 000 square feet of open space were then in use.
THE COMPLETION O F BOLERO 251

the base section and Air Ministry field great was the deterioration on airfield
personnel. Once a project was approved in runways that approximately 25 percent of
the Air Ministry, the actual job was car- the gross labor employed was eventually
ried out by the Director General of Works, expended in maintenance. The ruling that
a civilian heading a civilian engineering U.S. air force personnel should be pro-
and clerical staff, who executed the project vided with accommodations on scales
through contracts with civilian firms. identical with those of the Royal Air Force
As with BOLERO, it was fully intended also resulted in certain inequities favoring
that the British should take care of all air air force units over ground and service
force needs. But it became immediately force personnel, for British air force ac-
apparent that British labor, material, and commodation scales were higher than
equipment resources would not be suffi- those for ground units.
cient. As early as May 1942 agreement The air force construction program was
was reached that U.S. forces should as- a victim of substantially the same limita-
sume responsibility for the construction of tions as the BOLEROprojects. An acute
twenty heavy-bomber airfields. Eventually shortage of labor hampered the program
twenty-four aviation engineer battalions at all times; materials were in critically
built fourteen bomber fields and also ac- short supply; and British contractors for
complished a vast amount of construction the most part lacked the heavy construc-
work on other facilities, such as headquar- tion equipment with which the American
ters installations and depots. engineer battalions were favored. Never-
Another early agreement provided that theless, the air force program enjoyed a
Royal Air Force scales would prevail in high priority, and was completed substan-
the construction of U.S. installations. For tially as planned in the spring of 1944 at
all heavy-bomber airfields the Works Di- the height of the bomber offensive against
rectorate of the Air Ministry prepared Germany. After many revisions, air force
standard layouts that specified the num- plans as finally stabilized in November
ber and size of runways, the number of 1943 called for 126 airfields, exactly the
personnel accommodations and repair number occupied by U.S. air forces at the
shops, and the storage facilities to be pro- end of May 1944. I n addition, 6 base air
vided for ammunition and gasoline. depots, 11 ordnance air depots, and 11
Heavy-bomber stations were built at an ammunition depots, and many other in-
average cost of about $4,000,000. Each re- stallations had been made available to
quired more than 400,000 square feet of USSTAF, with a total closed storage and
covered accommodations, and had run- shop space of more than 10,000,000square
w a y s equal to nearly 20 miles of concrete feet. The 442,000 personnel accommoda-
road 20 feet wide. 49 tions have already been mentioned in con-
Rigid adherence to blueprints produced nection with the BOLEROprogram. The
difficulties. American B–17’s and B–24’s cost of the air force construction program
put excessive strain on the six-inch con- came to roughly $440,000,000.50
crete runways of British fields, and all run- With the exception of the deficit in
ways used by the U.S. air forces had to be
49Buchanan, op. cit., p. 189.
capped with a new eight-inch concrete 50Final Engineer Report, I, 250–61, II, App. 28;
slab or resurfaced with other materials. So Buchanan, op. cit., p. 189.
U.S. AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION IN ENGLAND
T H E COMPLETION OF BOLERO 253

medical facilities noted above, the mam- chemical impregnating plants. The esti-
moth construction program, begun two mated value of these installations, either
years before, was virtually complete on transferred to or built for American use,
the eve of the invasion. It was accom- was nearly one billion dollars. Of this total,
plished despite innumerable handicaps, nearly two thirds represented expenditure
the principal limiting factor being the per- for new construction, the breakdown of
sistent deficiency of of both materials and which is shown below: 51
manpower. American requirements were
not the only demand on available re-
sources, and had to be integrated with
British needs. Administrative difficulties,
among them the lack of parallelism in
British and American methods of opera-
tion, and the different standards and
scales also hampered the program, al-
though these were successfully overcome.
At times there was indecision as to
whether to emphasize speed or quality. In
the view of U.S. forces, British labor poli-
cies made for inefficiency. British civilian
workmen had a limited mobility and All facilities turned over to the U.S. forces
adhered to traditional, and often time-con- or specifically built for them remained the
suming, construction practices. The qual- property of the British and were acquired
ity of their work was usually high, how- by the Americans on a rental basis.
ever, and in fairness it must be noted that At the peak of construction activity ap-
the cream of British labor was in the proximately 56,000 civilians and 5 1,000
armed services. The physical condition of troops (both British and American) were
troop labor, army discipline, and the ad- employed, the larger portion of the civil-
vantage of more modern heavy equip- ian labor being employed on air force
ment, all resulted in a higher rate of pro- projects. The total labor expenditure is
duction per man where service engineer estimated to have exceeded 400,000,000
units were employed. man-hours. T h e breakdown of this effort
A summation of the accomplishment is tabulated on the following page.52
provides some impressive statistics. At the Provision of the greater part of the per-
end of May there had been made avail- sonnel quarters, hospitals, depots, and air-
able to U.S. forces in the United Kingdom fields by no means represented the total
accommodations for 1,600,000 persons, British contribution to the logistical sup-
30,000,000 square feet of covered storage port of the American forces in the United
and shop space, 43,500,000 square feet of
open storage space, hospitals with a ca- 51Buchanan, op cit., pp. 188–89. See also the Six-
pacity of 84,000 beds, 126 airfields, and teenth and Seventeenth Reports to Congress on Lend-
many other facilities such as shops for the Lease Operations, Washington, 1944.
52Final Engineer Report, ETO, I, 249–50, 261–64,
assembly of locomotives and freight cars, II, Apps. 24-28; Construction in the United King-
tire, tank, and vehicle repair shops, and dom, p. 1.
254 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

Kingdom. While details cannot be given other with such supplies a n d services to
here, it is apropos to give some indication the extent of their capability for the prose-
of the quantity of supplies and services, as cution of the war.
well as accommodations, which U.S. Following the practice of World War I,
forces procured from British sources under the theater commander in May 1942 des-
reverse lend-lease. ignated a General Purchasing Agent and
Plans written before the U.S. entry into established a General Purchasing Board,
the war contemplated that American consisting of representatives of the service
forces in the United Kingdom, so far as chiefs, the Eighth Air Force, the Army Ex-
practicable, would draw their logistical change Service, and other agencies. To-
support from sources outside the British gether, the General Purchasing Agent and
Isles. A General Purchasing Board was General Purchasing Board acted as a cen-
established in Britain in 1942 on the as- tral agency to negotiate agreements with
sumption that its main function would be British officials, to formulate purchasing
to plan for later procurement on the Con- policies and procedure, and to co-ordinate
tinent. The provision of accommodations and supervise the purchase of supplies by
in the United Kingdom was of course a the various supply services and other agen-
vast program of local procurement in it- cies. Until the General Purchasing Agent
self. But in addition it was found that the stepped in and temporarily stopped al-
British possessed certain commodities in most all local purchases, there was a great
excess of their needs, and that there even deal of haphazard buying early in 1942 to
was surplus manufacturing and processing fill immediate needs. Once the system of
capacity which could be employed. An local procurement was regularized, a vast
even more compelling reason for procur- program of purchasing was begun in
ing supplies locally was the shortage of virtually every class of supply.
shipping. Both facts made it natural and U.S. troops arriving in the United
inevitable that U.S. forces should draw on Kingdom early in 1942 lacked supplies of
local resources wherever practicable. In all kinds and relied heavily on British
the summer of 1942 the theater com- sources for even such basic maintenance
mander asserted that conservation of ship- as rations. The British ration, containing
ping space would be the basic considera- more tea, bread, potatoes, and mutton,
tion in determining the desirability of and less sugar, beef, coffee, fruits, and veg-
procuring supplies locally. T h e basis for etables than Americans were accustomed
such “reciprocal aid” already existed in a to, was unpopular, and efforts were imme-
Master Agreement of February 1942 diately made to add the desired items.
pledging the two nations to provide each Even after U.S. stocks were sufficient for
T H E COMPLETION O F BOLERO 255

the issue of a full American ration, how- even a portion of their own requirements.
ever, large quantities of meats, fruits, con- Initially they lacked equipment; then they
diments, cheese, candy, dairy products, discovered the superiority of British Army
and vegetables (including the lowly Brus- mobile bakeries and decided to adopt
sels sprout, whose popularity was short them for general use in the theater. By
lived) were procured locally to supple- May 1944 the U.S. Quartermaster Corps
ment the canned goods, the boneless beef, in the United Kingdom had acquired fifty-
the dried eggs, and that much-derided two bakery sets from the British a n d was
product in the U.S. Army ration which operating thirty-eight of them, producing
gave the theater its nickname—“Spam- about 500,000 pounds of bread daily, or
land.” Fresh vegetables were obtained in about 60 percent of American require-
part through NAAFI, the quasi-official ments. The remainder continued to be
British organization which operated the furnished by British civilian bakeries and
canteens and post exchanges for the Royal by the Royal Army Service Corps.53
Navy, Army, and Air Force. T h e British In the first half year of the reciprocal
Government, through the Ministry of aid program, from June to December
Food, had greatly intensified its agricul- 1942, U.S. forces procured the equivalent
tural production. In 1942, using British of 1,120,000 measurement tons of supplies
seed, fertilizer, and equipment, American and equipment from the British, with a
troops aided in this program by planting corresponding saving in shipping. By far
7,000 acres in and around camp areas, the largest portion of these supplies—al-
raising mostly corn, beans, peas, onions, most 600,000 tons-consisted of quarter-
and potatoes. I n 1943 this acreage was master items, including subsistence, cloth-
doubled. ing, coal, and other supplies.54 By mutual
For more than a year and a half Ameri- agreement woolen clothing was procured
can units received all their bread through for U.S. troops in the United Kingdom
British Army and civilian bakeries, at first while similar items were shipped from the
using wheat flour shipped from the United United States to British units in the Mid-
States. T h e British had for a long time dle East. Among the other major items
been using “National Wheatmeal Flour,” provided were 1,450,000 square yards of
a blend of English a n d Canadian wheat portable airfield runways, 15,000 bombs,
with a small percentage of barley and 70,000 rounds of artillery ammunition
oats, accepted as a wartime measure. I n a n d several million rounds of small arms
September 1942, fearing the adverse effect ammunition, 250,000 antitank mines,
on civilian morale if American troops con- 500,000 hand grenades, 1,000 parachutes,
tinued to eat white bread in wartime several hundred thousand camouflage
Britain, the Minister of Food requested nets, plus hundreds of other items of all
that the American forces also adopt Na-
tional Wheatmeal Flour, which they did. 53Basic Needs of the ETO Soldier, I, 7–8, 14-17;
T h e bread was not entirely satisfactory in Troop a n d Supply Buildup, 363-66; Info Bull 12,
texture or taste, but experimentation in BOLEROQ(L) Br, 1–31 May 44, S H A E F G–4 381
baking produced a loaf more in accord BOLERO I 1944.
54[Samuel I. Katz] History of the Office of the
with American tastes. Not until the fall of General Purchasing Agent, May 1942-October 1945,
1943 did American units begin to meet prep in Office GPA, ETO, MS, p. 37, E T O Adm 556.
256 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

classes. 55 The transfer of British equip- regulations initially prescribed a system of

ment in some cases aided materially in receipted vouchers for all supplies, with
equipping U.S. units in time for the American and British officers agreeing on
TORCH operation. By the end of the year prices and, in lieu of such agreement,
supplies procured in this way had ac- American officers fixing their own valua-
counted for at least a third of all tonnages tion. This proved completely impractica-
received by U.S. troops in the United ble a n d was largely ignored. British offi-
Kingdom. cials frequently could not furnish cost
Local procurement was plagued with figures on delivery, and there were not
many complications, not the least of which enough U.S. officers qualified to make
was the difficulty with the “common lan- price evaluations. T h e result was that,
guage.” In literally thousands of items of where such evaluations were insisted on,
supply and equipment the American and prices were often pulled out of the air. In
British terminology and nomenclature dif- October 1942 the attempt to keep a mone-
fered. Not only did the American service- tary record of reciprocal aid transfers was
man have to learn to drive on the left side abandoned a n d the War Department
of the road and figure out the intricacies authorized U.S. officers in the United
of pounds, shillings, and pence, but he had Kingdom to maintain only a quantitative
to learn to ask for petrol when he wanted record. For several months U.S. reports
gas, to refer to lorries instead of trucks, therefore indicated only the amounts of
and lifts rather than elevators. To the Brit- goods received, while British quarterly re-
isher a hot-water boiler was a calorifier, a ports gave monetary values in round
garbage can was a dustbin, shoe tacks numbers.
were tingles, burlap was hessian, cheese In June 1943 the War Department once
cloth was butter muslin, and a summer more attempted to establish a procedure
undershirt was a tropical vest. The British of monetary evaluation of locally pro-
stenographer was puzzled to find that to cured supplies, but by that time the quan-
her American employer the last letter in tity of goods supplied under reverse lend-
the English alphabet was “z” and not lease had reached such huge proportions
“zed,” and she insisted on the British that neither the independent evaluation
spelling of such words as “programme” by U.S. authorities nor the provision of
and “tyres” in correspondence which she unit prices by the British was possible. The
prepared in the various U.S. Army offices. estimated monetary values of the British
Wherever Americans came into contact quarterly reports plus the U.S. records of
with Britishers, particularly in the depots quantities were therefore accepted by
and in the local procurement program, ETOUSA as the best possible temporary
where they dealt with or actually handled solution. Under other circumstances the
supplies of both countries it was inevitable valuation procedure followed by the Brit-
that they should at times conclude that ish would not have been acceptable, but
their languages were only nominally the more serious differences did not arise at
same. 55Reportto the 78th Congress on Lend-Lease Operations:
T h e reciprocal aid program also From the Passage of the Act, March 11, 1941, to December
31,1942 (Washington, 1943), submitted by Edward
brought with it a vexing problem of book- R. Stettinius Jr., Lend-Lease Administrator, pp.
keeping and accounting. War Department 50–51.
THE COMPLETION O F BOLERO 257

the time in part because of the realization The Quartermaster Corps obtained 63
that supplies furnished the British through percent of its requirements through 1944
lend-lease would far exceed the British by local purchase, a larger percentage of
contributions via reverse lend-lease. 56In its total needs than any other service. The
the heat of the build-up for invasion the nature of its purchases has already been
important thing was to fill the largest pos- indicated. In addition to subsistence, these
sible portion of American needs by local included camp, laundry, bakery, and shoe
procurement with the hope of effecting repair equipment, soap, office supplies,
savings in shipping; the accounting of 15,000,000 5-gallon cans, 800,000 55-gal-
these purchases was a secondary consider- lon drums, 83 mobile bakeries, toiletries,
ation and could be postponed. and large quantities of woolen socks,
Reciprocal aid, like the build-up, shoes, towels, blankets, and other items of
reached its height in the months just pre- clothing. 59
ceding the invasion. In the first year the Engineer supplies procured in Britain
Air Force was one of the largest benefici- took the form of amphibious and bridging
aries from local purchase, for the United equipment, railway supplies, construction
Kingdom was an indispensable source of machinery, and storage tanks. The Engi-
almost all types of equipment in the neer Corps was one of the largest users of
Eighth Air Force’s early history. From locally procured supplies, acquiring 58
June 1942 through July 1943 the Amer- percent of its needs, exclusive of construc-
ican air forces drew 49 percent of all their tion materials, in this manner.
air force supplies and equipment from Between June 1942 and June 1944 the
British sources, in addition to quartermas- services procured varying portions of their
ter, engineer, medical, and other types of supplies in the United Kingdom, as in-
supplies received indirectly from the Brit- dicated in the table below.
ish through the SOS. 57Air force supplies
included huge quantities of replacement
parts, hand tools, photographic and com-
munications equipment, flying clothing,
parachutes, and Spitfire fighter planes. By
the spring of 1944, to cite only a few ex-
amples, the British had provided 1,100
planes plus several hundred gliders,
32,000 bombs, 7,000 sets of armor plate Ordnance and Transportation Corps sup-
for heavy bombers, 5,000 rubber dinghies, plies did not bulk large in actual tonnage,
10,600 aircraft tires, 35,000 belly tanks for but British manufacturers produced al-
fighter craft, 9,600 pieces of protective most all the waterproofing materials
body armor, 43,000jettisonable gas tanks, needed to prepare vehicles for the am-
44,500,000 yards of Sommerfeld track, 50 56Gen Bd R p t 128, p. 16; History of the Office of
mobile repair shops for the repair of the GPA, pp. 40ff.
bombers crash-landed in the United 57Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces, II, 611.
58The Fifteenth Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Op-
Kingdom, and unspecified quantities of erations for the Period Ending March 31,1944 (Washing-
heated winter flying clothing, radio equip- ton, 1944), pp. 22–25.
ment, and other items. 58 59Troop a n d Supply Buildup, pp. 349, 360–61.
258 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

phibious phase of the cross-Channel oper- new construction. T h e amount of British

ation, and British plants assembled nearly labor employed on U.S. account fluctu-
130,000 vehicles for U.S. forces through ated widely, but during the peak months
June 1944. 60Reciprocal aid to the Trans- in the winter of 1943–44 reached nearly
portation Corps consisted chiefly of facil- 100,000 workers (over 90 percent civilian),
ities, such as ports and rail lines, and serv- including labor employed directly by the
ices, such as labor employed in unloading Americans and on construction projects
cargo and transportation services on for U.S. forces.63
British railways and highways. In the first I n a special report to Congress on re-
six months of 1944 alone British railways verse lend-lease aid, President Roosevelt
operated 9,225 special trains with over noted that “it would have taken 1,000
950,000 cars to move U.S. troops and loaded ships to send from the United
supplies.61 States the supplies provided to our forces
By the end of June 1944 a n estimated by the United Kingdom.” 64I n view of the
6,800,000 ship tons of supplies from Brit- acute shipping shortages during most of
ish sources had been furnished American the build-up, these goods a n d services
forces in the United Kingdom, accounting were an indispensable contribution to-
for approximately 31 percent of all sup- ward the maintenance and equipment of
plies received by E T O U S A forces u p to U.S. forces preparing for the invasion of
that time, exclusive of construction ma- the Continent.
terials and gasoline. More than half of this
tonnage—3,851,000 ship tons-was de-
livered to U.S. forces in the first six (3) The SOS on the Eve of
OVERLORD
months of 1944, as is indicated in the sum-
mary below: In the five months that preceded the in-
vasion supply officials in both the United
States and the theater were concerned not
only with the over-all volume of supplies
being shipped to the United Kingdom,
T h e U.S. Army in Britain received 60At the peak of activity in the second quarter of
without cash payment through reverse 1944 the British operated thirty-nine assembly plants,
52 percent of the output going to U.S. forces. British
lend-lease, or “mutual aid” as the British plants continued to assemble vehicles for the Amer-
preferred to call it, innumerable other icans until October 1944, when the cumulative total
services, such as shoe repair, laundering, of assemblies reached 145,15 1. Ltr, A. B. Acheson,
Hist Sec, Cabinet Offices, to G. W. S. Friedrichsen,
and camp utilities. T h e goods transferred Br J t Svcs Mission, OCCS, 30 Dec 49, O C M H .
and services rendered to U.S. forces with- 61Seventeenth Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Oper-
in the United Kingdom before 30 June ations: Reverse Lend-Lease Aid from the British Common-
1944 had a n estimated value of $1,028,- wealth of Nations (Washington, 1944), p. 12.
62Seventeenth Report on Lend-Lease Operations, p. 9.
787,000. I n addition, the British per- 63O n 1 December 1943, 88,473 civilians and 7,258
formed world-wide shipping services to British troops-a total of 95,731 -were employed on
U.S. forces in the amount of $356,050,- U.S. account. Plan for SOS, ETO, Vol. I (Man-
power), 1 Jan 44, Sec. 6 (Labor), T a b A, E T O , Adm
000,62 and, as summarized earlier, had 347.
expended approximately $664,000,000 on 64Seventeenth Report on Lend-Lease Operations, p. 10.
T H E COMPLETION O F BOLERO 259

but also with shortages in specific items of ply picture for the coming invasion, dis-
equipment. Huge tonnages in themselves cussing such matters as supply levels,
did not insure that all units would be ade- intertheater priorities, emergency requisi-
quately equipped. I n January 1944 the tions, commodity loading, and tonnage
Army Service Forces made a comprehen- allocations. Their most immediate con-
sive survey of the status of the BOLERO cern was with the critical shortages in
build-up. T h e most striking revelation of specific items of supply a n d equipment.
its report was the unbalanced nature of Investigating the status of every important
the shipments of the past months. To cite item, they prepared a “critical item list”
the extreme cases, the Quartermaster which included all supplies whose lack
Corps had already virtually completed its might jeopardize the success of the opera-
shipments for eighteen divisions and their tion. T h e list established deadlines for the
supporting troops, while Signal Corps delivery of the necessary quantities, and
equipment had been shipped for only production schedules, rail shipments, port
five.65 Somevariation was to be expected, receipts, a n d port loading of these items
since under the preshipment program were thereafter followed day by day.
every effort had been made to fill the Their status was reported to the theater
available shipping with whatever supplies by air courier, and when difficulties arose
and equipment were available at the time, or were foreseen, the problem was imme-
and quartermaster supplies had been diately reviewed and remedial action was
available in greater quantities than those taken. Under a system of priorities estab-
of other services. Nevertheless, the ASF lished by the theater, ETOUSA thus
report demonstrated how misleading ton- maintained virtually complete control of
nage figures by themselves could be, for the make-up of shipments to the United
despite the heavy movement to the Euro- Kingdom in the months just before D
pean theater there were many shortages, Day.66
and some of them persisted even to D Day. I n the United States the New York Port
One of the principal reasons was that was instructed to adhere closely to the the-
many items were only now beginning to ater priority lists for loading, and the ASF
become available in sufficient quantity in did everything possible to expedite deliv-
the United States. ery of critical supply items in the final
At the time of the survey forecasts indi- weeks of preparation for OVERLORD. De-
cated that the principal requirements spite these efforts, shortages of both major
would be met by the first of May. By and minor items persisted beyond D Day.
March, however, theater port capacity Among them were amphibious trucks,
and shipping space so restricted the ship- tank transporters, LVT’s, mine-exploding
ment of the mounting tonnages of cargo devices, certain heavy transportation
a t the New York Port that the theater had equipment, and various types of ammuni-
to institute a system of priorities to insure tion. Fortunately, none of these shortages
that the most badly needed items were de-
livered in time. Late in March General 65Problem of Troop and Cargo Flow, pp. 144–45.
Lord and several of the ETOUSA service 66 Ibid., pp. 161-62; Ltr, Lord to Lee, 3 Apr 44,
sub: Rpt on ETOUSA Supply Mission to US., ETO
chiefs journeyed to Washington a n d re- Rpt on ETOUSA Supply Mission; History of Plan-
viewed with ASF officials the entire sup- ning Division ASF, pp. 99– 100, OCMH.
260 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

were serious enough to affect the initial cranes, barges, and dock equipment, and
stages of the operation.67 other T C projects called for diesel electric
Another subject that received consider- locomotives, shop equipment, and ma-
able attention a t the conferences between terials-handling equipment. The Ord-
theater and ASF supply officials in March nance and Engineer Services were also
was “Operational projects,’’ the procedure major users of the operational projects
whereby the requirements of particular procedure to meet their needs for special
operations for certain supplies and equip- undertakings on the Continent. The Ord-
ment were met. Known also as “projects nance Service alone submitted projects for
for continental operations,” or PROCO, more than 300,000 tons of equipment,
this was a method of tailoring the equip- much of it consisting of heavy automotive
ment for a particular job without reference units such as 10-ton semitrailers and
to the quantities authorized in Tables of truck-tractors. The Corps of Engineers,
Equipment or Tables of Basic Allowances. which was responsible for all major con-
Determining the requirements of Class I V struction projects, such as pipelines, rail-
supplies—those for which allowances are ways, a n d port repair, presented bills of
not prescribed—has always been difficult, materials for upwards of 700,000 tons for
there being no standard basis of procure- the first eight months of operations.68
ment or issue of such supplies a n d equip- PROCO, like every other major logistic
ment because the demands vary with each procedure, was attended by many snags
operation. Late in 1942 the ASF Planning and misunderstandings. It was especially
Division initiated a study to determine important that requirements be estimated
what supplies were needed for the con- far in advance of actual need, since pro-
struction of housing and ports and the re- curement of special equipment frequently
habilitation of railways in North Africa. took as long as eighteen and sometimes
Bills of materials were prepared for sup- twenty-four months. The program was
plies and equipment for camps, airfields, not inaugurated until the summer of 1943,
rail bridging, and so on. While no action less than a year before the invasion date.
was immediately taken on the “project,” Even a t that time t h e projects rested on
this estimate was the forerunner of the op- rather tentative operational plans, for the
erational projects system which was in- OVERLORD design was not approved until
augurated for all theaters in June 1943. In August, a n d its details were not worked
the European theater it was obvious that out until early 1944. This initial handicap
huge quantities of special operational was further aggravated, in the view of
Class I I and I V supplies would be needed ETOUSA officials, by the interminable
over and above T/BA and T / E allow- delays in processing operational projects
ances for such projects as pipeline and
airfield construction, the rebuilding of 67Cbl S–52025, Eisenhower to CCS, 17 May 44,
ports a n d railways, a n d the provision of S H A E F A G 381–3 S H A E F to A G W A R Rpts on
OVERLORD; Ltr, Lutes to Bradley, 1 3M a y 44, sub:
hospitals and depots. A project prepared Supply of Critical Material, and Ltr, Maj Gen Harold
by the Transportation Corps, for example, R. Bull to G–4, 10 May 44, S H A E F G – 4 400.192
based on certain assumptions regarding Supply Rpts I 4 4 .
68Memo, Lutes for ACofS Opns WD, 25 May 44,
the destruction of French ports, called for s u b : Operational Projects for E T O , ASF Plng Div
large quantities of construction materials, 400 History of Projects.
T H E COMPLETION O F BOLERO 261

in the War Department. E T O U S A offi- procurement, presumably because they

cials thought the procedure was inexcus- arrived late.
ably slow. I n extreme cases, they noted, it The War Department also took excep-
required seven months before supply ac- tion to the continuing amendments and
tion was initiated on a theater project. revisions of the projects. Most of them
The OPD eventually admitted that the called for increases which the Army Serv-
processing cycle was too long and inaugu- ice Forces in many cases simply could not
rated a system that materially reduced the provide in the short time remaining. But
time, although it did not take effect until these changes could hardly be avoided in
the spring of 1944. The theater also com- view of the many alterations in the OVER-
plained that there were wide discrepancies LORD operational plan. I n the end the
between ASF, New York Port, and Army Service Forces despaired of carrying
ETOUSA records of shipments, the ASF out the P R O C O system as originally con-
figures indicating greater shipments than ceived a n d for the most part accommo-
had actually taken place and been re- dated itself to the existing situation. In an
ceived in the theater. 69 attempt to expedite the delivery of the
O n the other hand the War Depart- materials which the theater requested, it
ment found reason to charge the theater often abandoned the SOP’S established
with misusing the entire P R O C O system. for processing the projects and sought in-
As conceived by the War Department, op- formal recommendations and concur-
erational projects were intended for the rences. Eventually it approved the use of
purpose of initiating procurement (that is, P R O C O for all requirements in excess of
production) in advance for Class II items normal issue, consumption, and expendi-
over a n d above T / B A and T/E, for ma- ture rates. While the program was not car-
terials-handling equipment, and for other ried out in strict accordance with original
Class IV items needed on particular oper- intentions, therefore, it generally accom-
ations. But the E T O had construed the plished its purpose by providing hundreds
intent of the system to include all require- of thousands of tons of supplies and equip-
ments in excess of authorized allowances ment to meet the unusual demands of the
for all classes of equipment, and require- OVERLORD operation.70
ments for maintenance supplies in excess In the final weeks before D Day the
of normal combat usage factors. Under theater’s supply arrangements came
this interpretation requests were submit- under the searching eye of one of the top
ted to meet the losses expected from ship officials of the Army Service Forces. In
sinkings in the English Channel, a n d to April General Lutes, Chief of Operations
meet unusually high expenditures in the
69Study, General Supply Situation in the United
early stages of the attack. Requests went Kingdom, Pt. II, T a b 6 , Procedure for Processing.
in for many common items such as rations Projects in WD, Mar 44, ETO, Outline of Opn
and ammunition—items the War Depart- OVERLORD; Cbl EX–28509, Lee to Marshall, 16 May
44, and Cbl WARX–45069, OPD to SHAEF, 31 May
ment had never intended to be included. 44, P&O Cbl Files.
Furthermore, of the 281 operational proj- 70Memo, Col Carter B. Magruder, Dir Plng Div
ects received from the European theater ASF, for Deputy Dir Plans a n d Opns ASF, 28 Apr
44, sub: History of Operational Projects for ETO,
by April 1944, it was observed that 251 ASF Plng Div 400 History of Projects; Gen Bd Rpt
were of no assistance in planning advance 128. Logistical Buildup in the British Isles, pp. 18–19.
262 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

of the ASF, went to the United Kingdom procurement. The ASF and the theater
and undertook a prolonged examination SOS consistently regarded this as their
of the logistical situation there. His pur- chief problem and repeatedly emphasized
pose was not only to check on the last- it to the headquarters responsible for op-
minute needs of the coming operation, but erational planning. The Army supply
to inspect the entire supply structure in the program had to anticipate requirements
United Kingdom and determine the effi- by a t least twelve to eighteen months.
ciency of the theater’s supply machinery. Likewise, in the theater the operational
As the personal representative of the ASF plans of the G–3’s had to be translated
commander General Lutes was in a n ex- into items of supply and requisitions by
cellent position to take any action neces- the G–4’s. In this regard General Lutes
sary to expedite the administrative prep- thought that SHAEF, one of whose main
arations for the cross-Channel attack; and functions was advance planning, had been
as a n outsider he was in a better position remiss, for the Supreme Headquarters had
than anyone in the theater to judge not carried its operational planning far
objectively the efficacy of its logistical enough forward, with the result that sup-
organization. ply planning also lagged. Even the firming
O n the whole General Lutes found the up of the operational troop basis by the 1st
supply situation satisfactory. Most impor- Army Group and First Army had been
tant, he could report early in May that unduly delayed from the point of view of
the OVERLORD assault forces were ade- supply and movement plans. It was noted
quately equipped. The fact that plans for that the troop basis data on the mounting
the shipment of maintenance supplies to plan, already scheduled dangerously
the Continent were not complete beyond close, had been delivered to ETOUSA-
the first four weeks he did not consider SOS eleven days late, and even then
serious, for there was still time to develop changes continued to be made. All supply
plans for the later phases of the opera- loading and movement plans were com-
tion.71 He was not entirely satisfied, how- pletely dependent on the troop basis and
ever, with the status of advance planning on the tonnage allocations provided by 1st
in general. While the responsibility for ad- Army Group, and both were delayed.72
vance supply planning unquestionably In addition to this fundamental handi-
belonged to the SOS, the delay was at cap General Lutes found certain short-
least partially traceable to higher head- comings within the SOS itself. Most of
quarters. Supply planning must be pre- them concerned supply operating proce-
ceded by operational planning, and the dures which are of too technical a nature
latter had lagged consistently. The high- to be described here. The SOS still lacked
level decision on OVERLORD itself had a n adequately standardized supply rec-
been belated from the point of view of the ords and administrative procedure. While
Army Service Forces, which was respon- the technical services had set up stock
sible for procurement of the needed sup- 71Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 9 May 44, ASF,
plies a n d equipment. No other aspect of ETO—1st half 1944.
logistics troubled the supply services as 72Memo, Lutes for Eisenhower, 13 Apr 44, sub:
Interim Rpt on Supply Matters, ASF, ETO- 1st half
much as getting operational decisions far 1944; Remarks by Lutes, Stf and Comd Conf, SOS,
enough in advance to initiate long-range 17 Apr 44, E U C O M 337/3 Confs, Stf-Weekly I 4 4 .
T H E COMPLETION OF BOLERO 263

control systems, their basic features as well most clamant in its demands. I n both the
as the relative efficiency of the different United States and the theater it had often
systems varied greatly. Nor were the complained that the supply of its units in
documentary procedures of the depots the theater was unsatisfactory. Specifi-
adequate. With regard to the control of cally, it had objected to its dependence on
the depots, even at this late date the re- the SOS organization for the handling of
sponsibilities of the base section com- its supplies, asserting that delivery had
manders were not clearly defined. And in been slow and that the SOS had made
the operation of the ports the respective uncalled-for demands for justification for
responsibilities of the base section com- increased allowances or issues. General
manders, the port commanders, and the Knerr, the USSTAF Deputy Commander
chief of transportation were ambiguous for Administration, thought the decisions
and overlapping.73 These were eternal by the SOS were made more on the basis
problems for the SOS a n d ,had plagued of availability of supplies than on opera-
that organization from its very beginnings, tional need. T h e Air Force still desired to
although great progress had been made take possession of at least 50 percent of the
since the hectic days of 1942. common items of supply and equipment
T h e difficulties were largely internal, before they left the United States, thus in
but they had both a direct and a n indirect effect establishing a separate line of com-
bearing on the relations of the SOS with munications to the zone of interior and to
other commands. Those relations were not this extent freeing itself from theater con-
entirely cordial. I n the competition for trol over its supply. The ASF had consist-
supplies and services it was perhaps in- ently maintained with unassailable logic
evitable that each of the other major com- that the theater commander must control
mands—particularly 1st Army Group and priorities and allocations with considera-
USSTAF—should suspect that it was not tion to their effect on other operations in
getting its share in view of the fact that the the theater. 75 There were other reasons,
SOS, a co-ordinate command, controlled such as the bottlenecks in shipping and the
the allocation of supplies. I n any event, limited port facilities in the United King-
both of those commands expressed dis- dom, which made the Air Force scheme
satisfaction with the manner in which utterly impracticable. In the end General
they believed the SOS was withholding Knerr backed down on his contentions.76
supplies which they claimed were re-
73Memo, Lutes for Lee, 1 2 May 44, sub: Stock
quired for operations,74 and their relations Control, Field Opns and Depot Opns, ETOUSA, and
with the SOS consequently were often Memo, Lutes for Lee, 24 Apr 44, sub: Supply Or-
marred by misunderstanding and mis- ganization and Procedures, ASF, ETO—1st half
1944.
trust. A similar situation had developed in 74Memo, Lutes for CG E T O , 24 Apr 44, sub: Sup-
the Pacific, leading to a deadlock which ply, Organization a n d Procedures, ASF, ETO—1st
was resolved only by the formation of a half 1944.
75Memo, Lutes for Lee, 15 Apr 44, sub: Allocations
Logistical Committee with representatives between Air and Ground Forces, ASF, ETO— 1st half
of all forces. General Lutes hoped to avoid 1944.
resorting to such a device in the European 76Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 11 May 44, ASF,
ETO—1st half 1944; Remarks by Lutes, SOS Stf and
theater. Comd Conf, 1 7 Apr 44, E U C O M 337/3 Confs.
I n this tug of war the Air Force was the Stf-Weekly I 44.
264 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

In order to satisfy himself, however, eral Lee’s long campaign to gain control of
General Lutes made a special effort to all supply and administration for the SOS
question the Air Force liaison officers at had culminated in triumph in January
both the SOS and Southern Base Section 1944 with the consolidation of the SOS
headquarters, and at the various general and ETOUSA headquarters. In gaining
depots which he visited. For the most part for himself the position of deputy theater
he found the Air Force accusations un- commander as well as Commanding Gen-
founded. Without exception he was told eral, SOS, however, Lee had assumed a
that Air Force requisitions for common role which in some respects proved an
items had been promptly filled and their unhappy one. As deputy theater com-
delivery expedited. There had been no mander he spoke for General Eisenhower
delays in the issue of equipment to Air at the highest theater level on such matters
Force depots when supplies were avail- as supply allocations; as commanding gen-
able. The Air Force complaints therefore eral of the SOS he also commanded one
narrowed down to the question of meet- of the three major co-ordinate commands
ing demands for supply and equipment of the theater. This dual role was highly
over and above the authorized allowances. resented by the other commanders, for it
This was a matter for allocation on the was clear to them that as the deputy
part of the theater commander and could theater commander he could hardly act as
not be charged as a delay on the part of the a disinterested party on supply problems
SOS. Regardless of the arrangements for while holding his additional position as
the control of supply in the theater, there commander of the SOS. Such an arrange-
would have to be allocations on the basis ment left them, they claimed, with no one
of need, and the theater commander or to go to for adjudication but SHAEF in
his designated authority would have to the event of controversy.79
make the decisions.77In the E T O General Whatever the validity of or justification
Eisenhower had assigned this function to for these suspicions, there was a definite
General Lee as his deputy for supply and lack of confidence in the SOS staff. A
administration, and General Lutes felt noticeable tension developed in the vari-
that General Lee and his staff were as ous headquarters and permeated even the
competent as any combat staff to decide lower echelons. Some staff officers at
on the basis of operational plans or as a SHAEF and 1st Army Group showed open
result of actual combat conditions whether hostility toward the SOS. This lack of con-
the armies or the Air Force or any other fidence inevitably lessened administrative
unit should be allocated certain items. 78 efficiency. A certain amount of poor ad-
As sound as these arguments may have ministrative practice manifested itself, no-
been from an administrative and com- ticeably in the bad liaison and co-ordina-
mand point of view, the fact remained that
the combat commanders would not accept 77Ltr, Lutes to Knerr, 22 Apr 44, sub: Supply of
Air Force Units by SOS E T O , ASF, ETO—1st half
a denial of their requests from the SOS 1944.
staff. One explanation for this attitude lay 78Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 15 Apr 44, ASF,
ETO—1st half 1944.
in their resentment of the position of the 79Memos, Lutes for Somervell, 1 2 and 15 Apr 44,
SOS commander in the theater’s com- ASF, ETO—1st half 1944; Interv with Crawford, 5
mand and organizational structure. Gen- May 48, OCMH.
T H E COMPLETION O F BOLERO 265

tion between the SOS on the one hand naturally carried their objection one step
a n d SHAEF and 1st Army Group on the further and protested General Lee’s desig-
other. SHAEF and 1st Army Group fre- nation as Commanding General, Com-
quently became excited over reports of munications Zone, for they assumed this
supply shortages which upon investigation meant that the existing arrangements
turned out to be based on information would be carried over to the Continent.
from ETOUSA which was three weeks I n General Lutes’s view there could be no
old, the shortages having been filled in the valid objection to such a n arrangement.
meantime. This obviously indicated that T h e SOS was well established as both a
closer liaison was required within the SOS supply planning and operating agency,
as well as between the SOS G–4 and and was the source of all initial supply for
SHAEF and 1st Army Group. Theoreti- the continental operation. The assignment
cally, the ETOUSA-SOS staff should have of the Commanding General, SOS, as
been used as a working agency of the Commanding General, Communications
SHAEF G–4. It should have been con- Zone, insured continuity of supply respon-
sulted on all important logistical matters, sibility and merely entailed the trans-
particularly on major allocations of sup- formation of the SOS, until now an exten-
plies. SHAEF officers, however, were not sion of the zone of interior, into a Corn-
always satisfied with the information ob- munications Zone in a theater which had
tained from ETOUSA-SOS, and there begun active ground combat operations.
was a considerable amount of direct deal- What the combat commands really ob-
ing between SHAEF and the ETOUSA- jected to, of course, was the prospect of
SOS technical services on matters that General Lee’s continued authority as
should have been channeled through deputy theater commander. General
ETOUSA-SOS headquarters. Einsenhower was not unaware of the dis-
Some of the difficulties could undoubt- satisfaction with the existing arrangements
edly be traced to the feeling that the SOS and, as has been noted earlier, in the com-
did not have a proper appreciation of its mand arrangements which he later laid
duties toward the combat commands, and down for the Continent he deprived the
that it treated their requests purely on the C O M Z commander, at least on paper, of
basis of availability and felt no urgency the title he had held since the reorganiza-
about filling them. I n General Somervell’s tion of January.
opinion, there still was room for mission- While the command and organizational
ary work in the European theater to structure of the theater thus left something
instill in the SOS the idea that it was in to be desired, ETOUSA-SOS was vulner-
the theater for only one purpose-“to sup- able to criticism on other matters. Some of
ply our customers a n d not to tell their the lack of confidence in the SOS unques-
customers what they want.” Once the tionably stemmed from the lack of proper
combat elements were convinced that the co-ordination within its own staff and be-
SOS was making genuine efforts to serve tween its own commands. I n one observer’s
them, he felt that the friction would dis- opinion, the SOS had been functioning
appear. without a real supply man topside to co-
Since the combat commanders resented ordinate the work of its general staff. Gen-
the dual role of the SOS commander, they eral Lee had found it necessary to spend
266 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

and of the officers holding the G posts in

the final planning period only one had
had advanced staff training a t the level of
the Command and General Staff School.
Col. James Stratton was a relative new-
comer in the G–4 position and was only
beginning to learn the supply job and to
grasp the details of the OVERLORD logistic
problems.
T h e special staff, by contrast, had not
only had more stability of tenure and con-
sequently more experience in both the
build-up and in the planning for OVER-
LORD,but more formal training for the jobs
it was performing. T h e technical service
chiefs without exception had attended
higher service schools, most of them hav-
ing graduated from both the Command
and General Staff School and Army War
College. Several had attended civilian
colleges and universities, although only
GENERAL STRATTON, G–4, Com- two were graduates of the Military
munications Zone. (Photograph taken in
1944.) Academy.
The inexperience of the general staff
was generally reflected in its offspring, the
much of his time in the field, supervising Advance Section a n d Forward Echelon,
the discipline, training, and field opera- which had borrowed personnel from the
tions of the service units. General Lord, theater headquarters. It was obviously too
his chief of staff, was adept in dealing with late, however, to make important changes
other headquarters, like SHAEF, but had in key positions with OVERLORD only a few
not had wide experience in the field of weeks away, and General Lee did not
logistics. The result was that the SOS staff favor any shifts in personnel. The respon-
had not been as closely supervised and di- sibility for the operation now rested
rected as it should have been, and that squarely on the shoulders of the existing
command decisions on supply had been group, a n d it was important that General
“kicked about a bit.” Eisenhower place full confidence in the
Moreover, the members of the SOS, particularly in view of the tendency
ETOUSA-SOS general staff were neither on the part of the combat commands to
by training nor experience ideally pre- challenge and dispute its decisions. These
pared to co-ordinate the myriad details in- observations, particularly as to the hostility
volved in building the logistic machine shown by other commands to the SOS, led
required for the unprecedented job which General Somervell to suggest that General
lay ahead. For one thing the staff had Eisenhower might well “knock some heads
undergone many changes in assignment, together and straighten them out,” and to
T H E COMPLETION OF BOLERO 267

express the hope that his lieutenant in the expected others to measure up to his own
theater, General Lutes, might a t least be concept of soldierly qualities.
able to “make all these fellows lie in the The SOS commander was indefatigable
same bed and like it.” 80 in his rounds of inspections of field organi-
The atmosphere of the theater head- zations, a n d was fully aware of the criti-
quarters reflected in a large degree the at- cism generated by his use of a special train
titude toward the commander of the SOS for that purpose. T h e acquisition of such
and deputy theater commander. General a vehicle had been strongly urged on him
Lee continued to be a controversial per- by General Harbord, the SOS com-
sonality throughout the history of the mander in World War I, with whom he
theater, owing in part to the anomalous visited in New York on his way to the
position which he held. But the contro- United Kingdom in May 1942. The train
versy over the SOS was heightened by his was intended as a timesaver, and that it
personal traits. Heavy on ceremony, some- undoubtedly was. General Lee refused to
what forbidding in manner and appear- bow to the criticism, convinced in his own
ance, and occasionally tactless in exercis- mind that the train was fully justified. As
ing authority which he regarded’ to be attested by members of his staff, it was a
within the province of the SOS, General work train, and a n instrument of torture.
Lee often aroused suspicions and created General Lee set a grueling pace on his
opposition where support might have been inspection trips, and it was rare indeed
forthcoming. when a meal was served on the train
It appears, however, that few of his during daylight hours, for most runs were
subordinates, a n d certainly fewer still of made at night. The day’s work, consisting
the persons with whom he dealt in the of inspections and conferences, normally
field commands, got to know him well. began at five in the morning and lasted
Those who did knew him to be kindly, until evening. Most of the staff members
unselfish, modest, extremely religious, and who accompanied the SOS commander
a man of simple tastes, however much this considered the trips agonizing ordeals and
seemed to be contradicted by the picture would have avoided them if possible.
of ostentation presented by the living ar- One other criticism of the SOS com-
rangements of his staff and by his use of a mander was probably more justified. Lee
special train for his comings and goings in assigned some officers to positions of
the United Kingdom. General Lee has authority and responsibility whose quali-
been aptly referred to as a “soldier of the fications were at times obscure. He was
old school,” one who belived firmly in the exceedingly loyal to these subordinates,
dignity of his profession a n d wore the usually placing full confidence in them.
Army uniform with pride. He expected
every other soldier, from general to pri- 80 O n eof the major sources for the above views is
the correspondence between Generals Somervell and
vate, to revere that uniform as he did. Lutes in April and May 1944, filed in ASF, ETO-
Many, without attempting to understand 1st half 1944. See especially the memos from Lutes to
his rigid sense of discipline, were quick to Somervell, dated 12, 13, 15, 24, 26, and 29 April, and
8 and 11 May 1944, letters from Somervell of 18 April
label him pompous and a martinet. There and 1 May 1944, and the memo from Lutes to Eisen-
can be no doubt that General Lee was hower, 1 3 April 1944, sub: Interim R p t on Supply
motivated by a high sense of duty, and he Matters.
268 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

This otherwise admirable trait sometimes headquarters, he finally decided to aban-

put him in difficult positions, and his own don a t least temporarily any thought of
reputation often suffered from their ac- replacing the SOS commander, to put
tions and unpopularity. I n any event, the complete faith in him, and to trust in the
atmosphere a t the ETOUSA-SOS head- ability of his organization to support the
quarters was not consistently conducive to American forces inthe comingoperation. 82
the best teamwork. While the top-level organization and func-
However inaccurately these circum- tioning of the SOS left something to be de-
stances may have reflected the real effi- sired, a n d while there were shortcomings
ciency of the SOS, it is an inescapable fact in the supply procedures within the SOS,
that General Lee a t least gave poor first observers from the Army Service Forces
impressions a n d did not always immedi- generally agreed that its field organization
ately inspire the confidence of the various was functioning well and that the qualms
commanders of the theater. Both General felt by some commanders regarding the
Andrews and General Devers were at first SOS’s ability to support the cross-Channel
disposed to make a change in the com- operations were unjustified.
mand of the SOS when they assumed
81 Ltr, Gen Styer to Somervell, J u n 43, ASF,
command of the theater. The former com- Somervell Files, CofS 1942–43 (6).
manded the theater only a few months. 82Memo, Lutes for Somervell, 2 2 May 44, ASF,
General Devers, after a second look at the Somervell, Plans a n d Opns Files. I n March 1944 the
War Department promoted Lee to lieutenant general
operations of the SOS, was satisfied that without consulting the theater commander. General
General Lee was doing a very satisfactory Eisenhower protested this action, but made it clear
job.81 General Eisenhower's reactions were that he objected only to the manner in which it was
done, a n d not to Lee's advancement itself. H e had
similar. While he initially h a d doubts of postponed approval of such a promotion when he first
Lee's ability to create an efficient supply arrived in England a few months before only because
organization and was fully aware of the he first wished to satisfy himself on the efficiency of
Lee's organization. Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall,
complaints of the combat commanders 3 Mar 44, and Cbl 254, Marshall to Eisenhower,
a n d the tensions between the various 9 M a r 44, Eisenhower personal file.
 CHAPTER VII

The OVERLORD
Logistical Plan
( 1 ) The Artificial Port constituted something of a master plan for
U.S. forces in view of that organization’s
The magnitude of the cross-Channel responsibility for all aspects of the opera-
operation is most fully revealed in its logis- tion, both tactical and logistical, in its
tic aspects. Because it was to be a n am- early stages, appeared on 25 February.
phibious operation OVERLORD’S supply Those of its subordinate commands, V
problems were many times magnified. and VII Corps, were issued on 26 and 27
Moving a n attacking force and its equip- March respectively. O n the logistical side
ment across the Channel in assault forma- the joint commanders’ Initial Joint Plan
tion required, first of all, a highly co- was supplemented on 23 March by in-
ordinated staging procedure in the United structions known as the Joint Outline
Kingdom, large numbers of special craft, Maintenance Project. T h e outline of the
and meticulously detailed loading plans. American logistic plan was issued as the
Following the capture of a lodgment it in- Joint Administrative Plan by the U.S. ad-
volved the rapid organization of the ministrative staff at 21 Army Group on 19
beaches as a temporary supply base, the April. This was followed on 30 April by
quick reinforcement of the forces ashore the Advance Section plan, covering the
and the build-up of supplies, and the sub- period from D plus 15 to 41, and on 14
sequent rebuilding of ports and develop- May by the over-all Communications
ment of lines of communications so that Zone plan issued by the Forward Eche-
sustained operations of the combat forces lon. The SOS mounting plan had ap-
could be properly maintained. peared on 20 March.
T h e detailed planning for the various The extent to which logistic considera-
tasks involved did not begin until after the tions had entered into the deliberations of
establishment of SHAEF and the designa- the COSSAC and SHAEF planners has
tion of the Supreme Commander in Jan- already been pointed out. In the eyes of
uary 1944. In the following month the the planners the successful invasion of
plans of the various headquarters began to France was dependent first on breaking
appear. T h e basic operational plan, through the coastal defenses and establish-
known as the NEPTUNE Initial Joint Plan, ing a beachhead, and second, on the sub-
was issued by the joint commanders—that sequent battle with enemy mobile re-
is, the commanders of the 21 Army Group, serves. The enemy’s main line of resist-
the Allied Naval Expeditionary Force, ance was the coast line itself, and it was
and the Allied Expeditionary Air Force- known that the first objective of the ene-
on 1 February. First Army’s plan, which my’s defense strategy was to defeat the
270 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

invaders on the beaches by the rapid de- to reach 1,300 tons per day in the first two
ployment of his mobile reserves. The out- weeks. According to a later estimate, the
come of this critical battle with enemy capture of Cherbourg was not expected
reserves was seen as depending primarily before D plus 14. Its capacity on opening
on whether the Allied rate of build-up was estimated at 1,900 tons, rising to only
could match the enemy's rate of reinforce- 3,750 tons after 30 days. In any event it
ment, and the degree to which this rein- was not sufficient for the maintenance of
forcement could be delayed or broken up the lodgment forces. The Brittany ports
by air action or other means. The enemy's would not offer a solution before D plus
second defense objective would be to pre- 60. It was clear, therefore, that the initial
vent the Allies from securing ports, for the build-up would have to be over the
capture of a n intermediate port, such as beaches, and it was estimated that eight-
Cherbourg, and of other ports, was a een divisions would have to be supported
prime necessity for the sustained build-up over the beaches during the first month,
of men and supplies. 1 twelve in the second, with the number
In the originalJuly 1943 outline plan of gradually diminishing to none at the end
OVERLORD, which served as a basis for the of the third month as the ports developed
later planning, it was estimated that the greater and greater capacity.
provision of adequate maintenance for the The COSSAC planners considered the
Allied forces in the initial stages, including capacities of the beaches (which at that
the building of minimum reserves, would time did not include the east Cotentin)
require a flow of supplies rising from more than sufficient to maintain these
10,000 tons per day on D plus 3 to 15,000 forces, and believed that tactical develop-
tons on D plus 12, and 18,000 on D plus ments should make possible the opening
18. These figures were based on an assault of additional beaches after D plus 12.3
by three divisions, a build-up to a strength Unfortunately these capacities were
of ten divisions by D plus 5, and the land- largely theoretical, and in this fact lay the
ing of approximately one division per day very crux of the initial build-up problem.
thereafter. 2 Thecapture of the Normandy The Allies had two enemies to reckon with
and Brittany groups of ports was expected in their invasion of the Continent-the
to insure discharge capacity sufficient to
support a minimum of at least thirty divi- 1 Memo, Army Opns Branch (US) for Head Plan-
ners, 4 Oct 43, sub: Secondary Assault on Cotentin
sions, and it was believed that if all the Peninsula, SHAEF 381 OVERLORD, I (a).
minor ports were developed this force 2 COSSAC Digest of Opn OVERLORD, 15 J u l 43,
could be considerably augmented. But Annexure I to App. W, SHAEF, COSSAC (43) 28,
Opn OVERLORD Outline Plan.
frontal assaults on the ports themselves 3 T h e appreciation ofJuly 1943 estimated the ca-
had been ruled out, and Mediterranean pacities of the beaches as 20,000 tons initially, increas-
experience had shown that ports, even if ing to 30,000 on D plus 3 and 50,000 on D plus 13.
These figures were reduced considerably in the more
captured shortly after the landings, would conservative estimates in the final plans. Tonnage re-
be found demolished and would be unus- quirements, conversely, were later revised upward,
able for some time. T h e total capacity of totaling 16,500 tons per day for U.S. forces alone by
D plus 18. 21 A G p Study, Subsequent Maintenance
the minor ports (Grandcamp-les-Bains, of British a n d U.S Forces-Overlord, 13 Mar 44,
Isigny, St. Vaast-la-Hougue, Barfleur) on SHAEF G–4 Maintenance of British and U S . Forces
the front of the assault was not expected 153/2/GDP-I.
THE OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 271

Germans and the weather. By far the more date, therefore, that unless adequate
unpredictable of these—“more capricious measures were taken to provide sheltered
than a woman,” as one observer put it— waters by artificial means the operation
was the weather.4 Meteorological studies would be at the mercy of the weather, and
covering a ten-year period indicated that that a secondary requirement existed for
the month of June was likely to have about special berthing facilities within the shel-
twenty-five days of weather suitable for tered area, particularly for the discharge
the beaching of landing craft. The record of vehicles. They estimated that the mini-
also revealed a n average of about two mum facilities required for discharge un-
“quiet spells” of four days or longer per interrupted by weather were for a capac-
month between May and September. ity of 6,000 tons per day by D plus 4–5,
Forecasting more than four days of fair 9,000 tons by D plus 10–12, and 12,000
weather was difficult, however, and it tons when fully developed on D plus
therefore followed that from D plus 4 on- 16–18.
ward maintenance plans would have to T h e Allied planners proposed to meet
allow for the fact that on some days beach this problem by building their own har-
operations would be impracticable. To bors in the United Kingdom, towing them
compensate for these interruptions it across the Channel, and beginning to set
would be necessary to increase daily dis- them u p at the open beaches on the very
charge by some 30 percent. Furthermore, day of the assault. While their solution
even though it might be physically possi- was in a sense a n obvious one, it was at the
ble to land the necessary tonnages, a great same time as unconventional and daring
problem of movement and distribution in its conception as any in the annals of
forward to the depots and the troops was military operations.
inherent in maintenance on such a large The concept of a “synthetic” harbor
scale in so restricted a beachhead. It was was not entirely a new one, although a de-
therefore necessary to develop discharge tailed blueprint for a prefabricated port
facilities for bad weather in order to re- was not immediately forthcoming. There
duce the peak loads over the beaches on was at least one precedent for the concept
operable days and to even out the flow of of “sheltered water” created for the ex-
traffic through the maintenance areas. I n press purpose of aiding military opera-
addition, naval authorities warned that tions. Mr. Churchill had proposed a
unless steps were taken to provide facilities breakwater made u p of concrete caissons
for the landing of vehicles, the cumulative in 1917 in connection with proposed land-
damage to craft continuously grounding ings in Flanders.6 I n World War II Com-
on beaches might well reduce the avail- modoreJohn Hughes-Hallett, senior naval
able lift and jeopardize the success of the representative of the C-in-C Portsmouth,
whole operation. The provision of special was the real progenitor of the artificial
berthing facilities was considered a matter 4 Rear-Adm.H. Hickling, “The Prefabricated Har-
of such paramount importance, in fact, bour,” T h e Journal of the Royal United Service Institution,
that the naval commander in chief stated X C (August, 1945), 271.
5 Digest of Opn OVERLORD, pp. 1 1 , 20, and
he could not undertake such an operation App. U.
with confidence without them. 5 6 Comdr. Alfred B. Stanford, ForceMULBERRY
T h e planners made it clear at a n early (New York, 1951), p. 40.
272 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

harbor, although the Prime Minister again of the world’s ports were “artificial” in
provided much of the inspiration and the that their sheltered harbors had been cre-
drive in working out the solution of this ated by the construction of breakwaters.
basic invasion problem. I n May 1942 Mr. Cherbourg and Dover were both “made”
Churchill sent his oft-quoted note to the ports in this sense. But whereas it had taken
Chief of Combined Operations directing seven years to build the port of Dover in
that a solution be found for the problem of peacetime, the Allies were now faced with
special berthing facilities on the far shore. the problem of building a port of at least
Suggesting piers which “must float u p and equal capacity in a matter of a few months,
down with the tide,” he ordered: “Don’t towing it across the Channel, and erecting
argue the matter. T h e difficulties will it on the far shore amidst the vicissitudes
arguefor 7
themselves.” of weather and battle. T h e plans as they
Under the direction of COSSAC British were eventually worked out in fact called
engineers carried out experiments in the for the erection oftwo ports within fourteen
spring of 1943 to determine the practica- days of the landings.
bility of constructing a prefabricated port, Two major requirements had to be met:
and they succeeded in building a floating a breakwater had to be provided to form
pier that survived the test of a Scottish sheltered anchorage and thus permit dis-
gale. But the exact form which such a port charge operations in bad weather; piers
should take was not immediately deter- were needed onto which craft could un-
mined, and the digest of OVERLORD pre- load and thus supplement discharge from
sented by General Morgan to the Com- beached craft. Several solutions were con-
bined Chiefs of Staff at Quebec in August sidered in connection with the problem of
1943 consequently included only the most providing sheltered water. I n 1942 Com-
tentative outline plan for such a harbor. modore Hughes-Hallett proposed the use
The sheltered anchorage, this plan “sug- of sunken ships to form a breakwater. To
gested,” would be formed simply by sink- the Admiralty this suggestion at first rep-
ing nineteen blockships to form a break- resented nothing but the sheerest extrava-
water. Berthing facilities would be pro- gance in view of the impossible task it al-
vided by four pierheads, consisting of four ready faced in replacing the shipping lost
sunken vessels, which were to be connected to enemy submarines. The use of floating
to the shore by “some form of pontoon ships had the same drawback, of course,
equipment.” The daily discharge capacity and in addition presented a difficult moor-
of such an installation was expected to be ing problem.9 One of the more novel solu-
approximately 6,000 tons.8 The relatively tions suggested was the creation of an “air
simple form of the harbor thus outlined breakwater.” By the use of pipes on the
hardly suggested the myriad engineering 7 [Clifford L. Jones] NEPTUNE: Training for and
problems that still had to be overcome, Mounting the Operation, and the Artificial Ports, Pt.
and resembled only in its barest essentials VI of T h e Administrative and Logistical History of
the ETO, MS (hereafter cited as NEPTUNE: Training
the harbors which eventually took form. for and Mounting the Operation), II, 110, OCMH.
The difficulties did indeed argue for 8 Digest of O p n OVERLORD,App. X, Annexure to
themselves as Mr. Churchill predicted, for App. X, and sketch SX, atchd.
9 Rpt by Combined Adm Com, CCS, 2 Sep 43,
the magnitude and complexity of the task sub: Artificial Harbors for Combined Opns, CCS
became more and more apparent. Many 307/2, SHAEF G–4 825.1 MULBERRY I 44.
T H E OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 273

ocean floor this scheme proposed to main- designs called for a rubberized canvas air
tain a curtain of air bubbles which theo- bag, and a few units of this type were con-
retically would interrupt the wave action structed. Since they were vulnerable to
and thus provide smooth waters inshore of puncture by small arms fire, however,
the pipe.10This idea was actually not new later designs provided for a steel cruciform
either. Studies along this line had been superstructure, about 25 feet in width.12
carried out in the United States forty years In essence the BOMBARDON breakwater
before, and both Russian and U.S. engi- would consist of a string of huge, air-filled,
neers had conducted model experiments cylindrical floats, moored at each end, but
since 1933, although without conclusive laced together to form a thin screen of air
results. T h e bubble breakwater would which was intended to break up wave ac-
have required such large power and com- tion and thus provide sheltered water.
pressor installations that it was impracti- The BOMBARDONS were believed to have
cal for breakwaters on the scale envisaged, a n advantage over sunken blockships
and the idea was discarded as infeasible since they could be moored in compara-
early in September 1943. 11 tively deep water and thus provide shel-
Meanwhile experimentation was car- tered water for the deeper-draft Liber-
ried on with several other schemes. One of ties. 13Nevertheless, from the very begin-
the earliest to receive attention was a de- ning there were doubts about their effec-
vice called the “lilo,” or “bombardon.” tiveness and feasibility, and they were
Li-lo was the trade name for a n inflated never expected to do more than dampen
rubber mattress used on the bathing wave action and provide anchorage sup-
beaches in England. A British Navy lieu- plementary to the main harbor for deep-
tenant had casually observed at a swim- draft ships.
ming pool one day that the Li-lo had the Meanwhile experimentation had gone
effect of breaking up wavelets formed on forward on another solution to the prob-
its windward side, creating calm water in lem—the caisson, or PHOENIX, which
its lee, and conceived the idea of con- eventually was to constitute the main ele-
structing mammoth lilos for use as a float- ment in the breakwater forming the har-
ing breakwater. The idea was believed to bor. The PHOENIXES were huge, rectangu-
have possibilities, and experimentation lar, concrete, cellular barges designed to
began in the summer of 1943. As first con- perform much the same function as sunken
ceived the lilo—or BOMBARDON, the code blockships. Their main specification was
name by which it was better known-had that they have sufficient weight and
two basic components: a keel consisting of strength to withstand summer Channel
a hollow concrete tube 1 1 feet in diame- weather; at the same time they had to be
ter; and a canvas air bag above, about 12 towable, easily sinkable, and of simple
feet in diameter and extending the entire enough design to be constructed with a
length of the unit. T h e keel could be 10 Memo,Maj Gen G. R. Turner for Lt Gen A. C.
flooded and submerged while the air bag G . McNaughton, 10 Aug 42, SHAEF SGS 800.1
extended above water. The BOMBARDONS MULBERRY I.
were 200 feet long and had a 12-foot beam 11 Rptby Combined Adm Com, 2 Sep 43.
12Seephotograph, p. 414.
and a 13-foot draft, the concrete keel 13 Rptof Combined Adm Com, 2 Sep 43; Hick-
alone weighing about 750 tons. The first ling, op. cit., pp. 274–75.
CAISSONS, usedf o r MULBERRY breakwater, sunken in position off the beaches, above, and
afloat, below.
T H E OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 275

minimum expenditure of labor and ma- this gap consisted of two basic compo-
terials. Five types were eventually built, nents: pierheads, at which vessels were to
varying between 175 and 200 feet in length berth and unload; and piers or roadways
and between 25 and 60 feet in height, the which connected the pierheads with the
largest of them weighing 6,000 tons and shore. Both were designed mainly by the
drawing 20 feet of water. The PHOENIXBritish and involved an ingenious piece of
consisted fundamentally of a reinforced engineering. The Lobnitz pierhead, as it
base with side walls tied together by rein- was called, was a n awesome-looking steel
forced concrete bulkheads. Each was to be structure 200 feet long, 60 feet wide, and
given a 10-foot sand filling to achieve the 10 feet high, weighing upwards of 1,500
proper draft, then towed across the Chan- tons. At each corner of the structure was a
nel, flooded, and sunk at the 5-fathom 4 x 4-foot spud leg 90 feet high, the height
(30-foot) line. The great height of the of which could be adjusted independently
PHOENIXES was dictated by the desire to by means of winches located between the
provide a breakwater at sufficient depth to decks. These spud legs could be retracted
accommodate Liberty ships, which drew during the towing of the structure. Once
as much as 28 feet when loaded. The the pierhead was placed in position the
beaches selected for the assault had a very legs were lowered, their splay feet digging
shallow gradient and tide ranges of more into the sea floor to steady the structure,
than 20 feet. The harbor therefore had to and their height was then adjusted to keep
extend a full 4,000 feet from the shore in the pierhead at uniform height above
order to provide sheltered water for Lib- water at all stages of the tide. The Lob-
erty ships at low tide, and the largest cais- nitz pierheads were intended to provide
sons had to be 60 feet high in order to rest the principal unloading facilities for
on the ocean floor and still provide a suffi- LCT’s and LST’s that were not beached
cient breakwater for deep-draft vessels at and for coasters. They were so designed
high tide.14 that any number could be linked together
Experimentation on the second vital to form an extended berth. To connect
portion of the harbor—the berthing and pierheads with the shore a flexible steel
unloading facilities within the break- roadway, known as the WHALE,was de-
water—had begun somewhat earlier in re- veloped. The WHALEpier consisted essen-
sponse to the Prime Minister’s directive in tially of 80-foot sections of steel bridging,
1942. This was fortunate, for the engineer linked together by telescopic spans which
problems involved proved far more com- gave it the needed flexibility to accommo-
plex than those met in the construction of date itself to wave action, the entire
the PHOENIXES. Once again the gradient WHALEstructure resting on concrete and
of the beaches and tidal conditions largely steel pontons known as “beetles.” At low
determined the requirement. Low tide tide the sections near the shore would
along the Normandy coast uncovered as come to rest on the sand.
much as a quarter of a mile of beach, and In the summer of 1943 the design of the
it was necessary to go out another half artificial harbor had hardly reached the
mile to reach water of sufficient depth—12 finality suggested by the above descrip-
to 18 feet—for the discharge of coasters. 14Hickling, op. cit., p. 275; Stanford, Force MUL-
The equipment developed to bridge BERRY, p. 66.
276 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

LOBNITZ PIERHEAD

tions of its various components. Because PHOENIXES a n d BOMBARDONS without

experimentation had not yet produced awaiting the completion of trials and pro-
conclusive solutions to many problems, totypes of the latter. These projects were
the plan which COSSAC submitted at given the highest priority for labor, equip
Quebec in August was necessarily sketchy ment, shipping space, and supplies, and
and vague. Nevertheless the Combined construction of the first units now began in
Administrative Committee of the Com- earnest.
bined Chiefs of Staff concluded at that T h e respective spheres of responsibility
time that the construction of artificial har- of the United States and Britain with re-
bors was definitely feasible, and approved gard to experimentation and construction
the project in its general outline. Early in were also defined in September. By far the
September it rejected the bubble break- largest portion of the work had to be car-
water idea, but recommended continued ried out in the United Kingdom, and the
experimentation with all the other pro- British consequently assumed major re-
posed solutions—BOMBARDONS, PHOE- sponsibility for the design, testing, and
NIXES, and sunken and floating ships-and construction of the PHOENIXES, BOMBAR-
urged the immediate construction of DONS, pierheads, and WHALEbridging.
T H E OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 277

Trials with floating-ship breakwaters were T h e design of the ports was more
to be carried out in the United States, and clearly established early in 1944. By Jan-
the United States was also called on to uary the concrete caisson or PHOENIX was
provide some of the tugs that would be re- definitely adopted as the principal unit of
quired for towing purposes beginning just the breakwater. It was to be supple-
before D Day. The construction of BOM- mented by sunken ships, the main reason
BARDONS and the provision of ships for the being that sheltered waters were needed
breakwater were Admiralty responsibili- for a large number of craft in the earliest
ties; all other components were to be de- stages of the operation. Staff requirements
signed and built by the War Office. 15 had been amended in January to provide
The principal units under construction facilities for the discharge of 2,500 vehicles
or trial by late November were the BOM- per day (1,250 at each port) by D plus 8
BARDONS, PHOENIXES, sunken- and float- in addition to the tonnage already men-
ing-ship breakwaters, pierheads, and tioned, and for shelter for small craft. The
piers.16 There still was no definite blue- MULBERRIES were still big question marks
print of the harbors at that time, for there at this time, as indeed they continued to
was continuing indecision as to the form be until the very time they began operat-
the harbor should take. The use of sunken ing. In any case, naval authorities were
ships was still being considered, although very doubtful as to whether the harbors
it was realized that they were adaptable could be effective by D plus 4, when a
as a breakwater only in shallow water. break in the weather could be expected.
The use of floating ships as a deepwater They had therefore proposed the con-
breakwater received less and less favorable struction of five partial breakwaters,
consideration because of the mooring known as GOOSEBERRIES, each about 1,500
problem involved.17The relative merits of yards long, formed of blockships (referred
BOMBARDONS and PHOENIXES were still be- to as CORNCOBS) sunk on the 2-fathom
ing discussed, but there was continuing (1 2-foot) line at low water. There was to
doubt as to the practicability of the former. be one GOOSEBERRY at UTAHBeach, one
Despite the indecision on these matters the at OMAHA, and one at each of the three
final COSSAC draft of OVERLORD, pub- British beaches. Seventy ships were to be
lished late in November 1943, specifically used for this purpose, steaming across the
provided for two major artificial ports, one Channel and going into position on D
to be located at Arromanches-les-Bains in plus 1. Ballasted to draw 19 feet of water,
the British sector, with a capacity of 7,000 they were to be prepared with explosive
tons per day by D plus 16 or 18, and one charges which would be fired after the
at St. Laurent-sur-Mer in the American
15Annex to note by Secy J t Stf Mission to COS
sector, with a capacity of 5,000 tons. For Com, 12 Sep 43, sub: Artificial Harbors for Combined
reasons of security the two projects had by Opn, COS 529/0, SHAEF SGS 800.1 MUL-
this time ceased to be referred to as arti- BERRY I.
16CM&SF Monthly Progress R p t 5, for Dec 43,
ficial ports. Late in October they had been 7 Jan 44, COS (44) 17 (0), SHAEF SGS 800.1 MUL-
christened with the code name by which BERRY I.
they were henceforth known, the Ameri- 17Rpt by Combined Adm Com, 2 Sep 43.
18 Ltr,Brig Sir Harold Wernher to COSSAC, 21
can port being designated MULBERRY A, Oct 43, sub: MULBERRY,COSSAC/CMSF/67,
and the British port as MULBERRY B. 18 SHAEF AG 820–1 Artificial Harbors.
278 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

ships were properly planted, blowing holes BOMBARDONS, despite continued misgiv-
below the water line so that they would ings as to their probable effectiveness. 23
sink rapidly. 19 These shallow-water These ungainly looking floats were to be
GOOSEBERRIES would provide early pro- placed about 5,000 feet seaward of the
tection for the large number of tugs, fer- high-water mark to break the swell and
ries, dukws, and landing craft plying form a n additional deepwater anchorage
between the ships and beaches and for the for the discharge of Liberty ships. The
craft which had been beached. At OMAHAUTAHBeach installation was to be much
and Arromanches they would tie in with less elaborate. It was to have only a
the PHOENIXES to form a longer break- GOOSEBERRY breakwater, formed by sink-
water enclosing the entire harbor. 20 The ing ten blockships beginning on D plus 1,
sheltered area formed by the breakwater and the two ponton causeways.
at MULBERRY A was to provide a harbor Over-all command of both MULBERRIES
of about two square miles, with moorings was given to Rear Adm. William Tennant
for 7 Liberty ships, 5 large coasters, and 7 (British). O n the U.S. side Capt. A. Day-
medium coasters. ton Clark was placed in command of
The plans for berthing and discharge MULBERRY A, organized as Naval Task
facilities at the American installation Force 127.1, but usually referred to as
finally called for three WHALEpiers or Force MULBERRY. Brigadier Sir Harold
roadways, one of 40 tons capacity (which Wernher was designated to co-ordinate
could carry tanks) and two of 25 tons ca- the work of the War Office and the civil-
pacity. All three were to extend more than ian Ministries of Labour a n d Supply in
3,000 feet out from the shore to about the the construction of the many components
two-fathom line. There they were to con- of the ports.
verge on six Lobnitz pierheads, grouped The construction and assembly of all
to accommodate both LST’s and coasters. the special port equipment proved a for-
These installations were to give the port midable task, and, along with the many
a capacity of 5,000 tons of cargo and 1,400 other preinvasion preparations, taxed the
vehicles per day. This was regarded as a resources of the United Kingdom to the
conservative estimate, and the capacity of 19 Hickling,op. cit., pp. 273–74.
the harbor was actually believed to be 20Ltr, Brownjohn to Cots SHAEF, 24 Jan 44, sub:
well in excess of this minimum. 21In addi- M U L B E R RStf Y Requirement, S H A E F G – 4 825.1
tion to these facilities, two ponton cause- MULBERRY I 44; Incl to Ltr, Wernher to Secy of Ad-
miralty, 1 2 J a n 44, sub: MULBERRY—Stf Require-
ways were to be constructed at both ments, COSSAC/CMSF/ 181, SHAEF SGS 800.1
OMAHA a n d UTAHBeaches to boost the MULBERRY I. See also Initial Joint Plan, a n d NEP-
N E : Training for a n d Mounting the Operation,
unloading facilities for small craft such as TI.U138.
LCT’s and barges. These causeways were 21Rpt of Combined Adm Com, 2 Sep 43, p. 6.
to be built of 5 x 7 x 5-foot ponton cells, 22NEPTUNE: Training for and Mounting the Oper-
bolted together into sections two cells wide ation, II, 115.
23By December 1943 the rubber-type BOMBARDON
and thirty long, and linked to form a had been abandoned. Meanwhile two of the steel
roadway 14 feet wide and 2,450 feet cruciform prototypes had broken their backs in a half
long.22 (Map 7) gale, and measures had to be taken to strengthen the
remaining units under construction. CM&SF
Both the British and American MUL- Monthly Progress R p t 5, for Dec 43, 7 Jan 44,
BERRIES eventually also included a row of SHAEF SGS 800.1 MULBERRY I.
THE OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 279

H. Damon
MAP 7

very limit in the last months before sand and one problems and fears until the
D Day. Many a sacrifice had to be made ports were finally established, and they
to permit the huge project to go forward, had to make many compromises with the
the Ministry of Labour giving up expert goals originally set. Early in 1944, plans
tradesmen and power equipment, the called for the construction of 113 BOM-
Army temporarily releasing men from the BARDONS, 149 PHOENIXES, 23 pierheads,
colors, the Navy foregoing frigate and air- and 6 roadways, and for the acquisition of
craft carrier production. As General Mor- 74 vessels for the sunken-ship breakwaters.
gan later observed, “Half of England The towing problem involved in the as-
seemed to be working on it and a lot of sembly and movement of the 600-odd
Ireland as well.” 24Despite the high prior- major units involved was unprecedented.
ities covering all phases of the project, It was estimated at first that 200 tugs
planners and commanders responsible for 24Sir Frederick Morgan, Overture to Overlord (Gar-
the MULBERRIES were haunted by a thou- den City, N. Y., 1950), pp. 263, 264–65.
280 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

would be needed for the task and that instead of the desired 23. Plans for the
they would be occupied a full three U.S. MULBERRY, which had called for 8 of
months. these units, were therefore altered to pro-
These requirements soon proved be- vide for only 6. Because of prior commit-
yond the capabilities of U.K. resources. ments for the manufacture of landing craft
The construction of PHOENIXES had begun and heavy engineering equipment it was
at the end of October 1943. Within two necessary, as with other components, to
months the work had already fallen three split up the contracts among a large num-
or four weeks behind schedule, partly be- ber of structural steel works in all parts of
cause the design of the caissons was al- the country and to prepare entirely new
tered, partly because the proper types of shipbuilding sites for the launching of the
freight wagons to deliver steel were in pierheads. The same was true in the con-
short supply, and partly because contrac- struction of the WHALE bridging for the
tors were unable to obtain the allocation roadways, and because of the wide distri-
of enough laborers, particularly in certain bution of the contracts it was almost im-
skilled categories. By 1 December 15,000 possible to obtain details of the manufac-
workers were supposed to have been as- turing progress. About 240 firms were
signed to the PHOENIXES, but less than half eventually involved in fabricating the ma-
this number were on the job at that date. 25 terials for these units, using 50,000 tons of
To meet the labor requirements it was steel.27 When construction
fell behind
eventually necessary to hire large num- schedule in March and April, a U.S.
bers of Irish workers—a measure that in- Naval Combat Battalion (the 108th) was
volved additional security risks. Finding assigned to assist in the manufacture of
construction sites alone was a tremendous this equipment.28
problem, for each caisson was equivalent Shortages of one type or another also
in size to a five-story building. Some of the forced a reduction in the number of BOM-
caissons were built at the East India docks BARDONS and in the number of ships for
in London, but dry docks were not avail- the GOOSEBERRIES. The number of BOM-
able for the entire project, and special BARDONS was eventually cut from 113 to
basins had to be dug behind river banks 93. In the case of the blockships the orig-
along the tidal stretches of the Thames, 25Memo, Capt C. R. Johnson, USN, for Jt Log Stf
where the work was partially completed. Com ETOUSA, 15 Dec 43, sub: U S . MULBERRY A
The banks were then dredged away and Progress to 15 Dec 43, EUCOM 334 Jt Log Stf Com
I; Ltr, J. W. Gibson, Ministry of Supply, to Brig
the units floated to wet docks for comple- Wernher, 29 Nov 43, SHAEF AG 820–1 Artificial
tion. Construction of the PHOENIXES was Harbors; Rpt on MULBERRY A, prep by Capt Clark
farmed out to some twenty-five contrac- and Col John R. Hardin, Deputy Chief Engr, 15Jan
44, ETO 800.1 Harbors; Ltr, G. W. S. Friedrichsen to
tors and eventually required about 30,000 author, 21 Sep 51, giving data on planned construc-
tons of steel and 340,000 cubic yards of tion provided by Hist Sec, Cabinet Offices, OCMH.
concrete in addition to other materials.26 26Note by Jt Parliamentary Secy, Ministry of Sup-
ply, 30 Jan 44, COS (44) 103 (0), SHAEF AG 820–1
In the construction of the Lobnitz pier- Artificial Harbors, 2.
heads, which got under way somewhat 27Memo, Johnson for Jt Log Stf Com, 15 Dec 43;
earlier, bottlenecks developed also. In De- Note by Jt Parliamentary Secy, Ministry of Supply,
30 Jan 44.
cember 1943 it was announced that only 28NEPTUNE: Training for and Mounting the Op-
15 pierheads could be delivered by D Day eration, II, 116.
T H E OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 281

inal request for about 80 had brought sembly on the south coast of England, and
loud protests from the Admiralty. When the movement of 600-odd units to the far
the admirals began to ponder the proba- shore within a two-week period posed the
ble alternative, however, and visualized biggest tow job of all. The construction de-
their landing craft smashing against the lays that developed in the spring only
beach for lack of sheltered waters, they re- aggravated the problem, for the failure to
considered, and more than 70 vessels— complete units on schedule had the effect
“mostly old crocks”—were eventually of compressing all towing commitments
provided, about 25 of them by the U.S. into a shorter period. There was little
War Shipping Administration and the re- point in meeting construction schedules,
mainder by the Ministry of War in other words, if tugs were unavailable to
Transport.29 tow units across the Channel. Here was
T h e towing problem finally proved as another example of a single shortage or
onerous as any of the other procurement shortcoming creating a bottleneck which
difficulties, and in the final months before threatened to frustrate the successful exe-
the invasion it was touch and go as to cution of an entire plan. It was estimated
whether the lag in construction or the in February that 200 tugs would- be
shortage of tugs would be the greater needed for all invasion commitments, of
limiting factor. Until the end of April con- which 164 were required for the MUL-
struction was the main worry, and in that BERRY units. An allocation of 158 tugs was
month the Ministry of Production even made for the artificial ports sometime
provided a labor reserve to meet any during the spring; but despite the round-
emergency demands.30 But anxiety over ing up of every suitable vessel that could
the construction schedule was eased some- be spared in both the United Kingdom
what in May, and all the essential units and the United States, only 125 were
were in fact ready by the time of the inva- made available by the time of the inva-
sion, although it was after the middle of sion. Of these, 24 were taken for tempo-
May before the first operational Lobnitz rary service with various types of barges,
pierhead was turned over to its U.S. Navy leaving a bare hundred to meet the MUL-
crew at Southampton. Fortunately the BERRY requirements. I n light of this short-
commander of the American Force MUL- age it was necessary on the very eve of the
BERRY ordered a thorough test of the pier- invasion to set back the target date for the
head that included discharging a fully completion of the MULBERRY installations
loaded LST. The trial run disclosed on the far shore from D plus 14 to D plus
numerous defects, and men struggled 21. 32
night and day under the relentless driving
29Ltr, Morgan to Secy COS Com, 21 Jan 44, sub:
of the indefatigable Captain Clark to MULBERRY and GOOSEBERRY, Annex, SHAEF SGS
make the necessary modifications.31 800.1 MULBERRY I; Rear Adm H. Hickling and Brig
No amount of last-minute effort could I. L. H. MacKillop, Story of the Mulberries, MS, and
Ltr, Friedrichsen to author, 21 Sep 51, OCMH.
surmount the towing problem, and in the 30Ltr, Ministry of Production to Secy COS Com,
end it proved to be the most critical bottle- 25 Apr 44, sub: Provision of Artificial Harbors, COS
neck. As each piece of equipment was (44) 370 (0), SHAEF SGS 800 MULBERRY I.
31Stanford, ForceMULBERRY, Ch. VII.
completed it had to be towed, in some 32TWX, ANCXF to SHAEF et al., 2 Jun 44,
cases hundreds of miles, to the place of as- SHAEF G–4 825.1 MULBERRY II 45.
282 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

I n the months just before the invasion ports during the summer so that they
the question of how long the artificial might withstand the winter gales. General
ports were to be kept in operation received Gale also requested that spare blockships
increasing attention. This matter was be provided to replace any that might
closely related to the estimates as to when break up. The necessity for prolonging the
the deepwater ports could be captured life of the MULBERRIES was immediately
and brought into operation. The original accepted, and in March construction of an
plans for the artificial ports provided that additional 20 PHOENIXES was therefore
they were to remain effective for ninety approved.33
days, by which time deepwater ports were
expected to be restored and able to handle (2) Beach Organization
the required tonnages. As early as March,
however, after the tactical plan was re- While the artificial ports represented
vised, further logistical studies of the one of the most ingenious engineering ac-
maintenance problem after D plus 90 re- complishments and one of the invasion’s
vealed that the capacity of the ports would most expensive investments of resources,
almost certainly have to be supplemented they were to remain largely untried expe-
by that of the MULBERRIES for an addi- dients and therefore unknown quantities
tional thirty days (to D plus 120) and, until they were subjected to the twin tests
unless operations went extraordinarily of battle a n d weather off the Normandy
well after D plus 120, even through the coast. Of equal importance to the logistic
winter months. Even if the Loire and Brit- preparations for the operation was the
tany ports were captured by D plus 45, it organization of the beachs, across which
was concluded, the difficulties likely to be all equipment and supplies would have to
met in restoring and operating the lines of pass in the initial stages regardless of
communications made it doubtful that whether they were discharged at the pier-
U.S. forces could be supported entirely heads and brought ashore via the road-
through those ports by D plus 90, and the ways or were discharged from landing
British would not be able to have the sole craft at the water’s edge.
use of Cherbourg after that date, as Beach organization was to have special
planned. I n any case, Cherbourg and the importance in OVERLORD because of the
smaller Cotentin ports did not have suffi- magnitude of the forces to be built up over
cient capacity in themselves to maintain the Normandy beaches and because of the
the British forces after D plus 90. Thus, if extended time during which the beaches
the Seine ports were not captured and put were to serve as major points of entry for
into operation by D plus 120 it would be both troops and supplies. The OMAHA and
essential to keep the MULBERRIES operat- UTAHBeach areas were to be the bases for
ing to maintain British forces. T h e chief
33Ltr, Gale to COfS ANCXF, 9 Mar 44, sub: Con-
administrative officer at SHAEF, Lt. Gen. struction of MULBERRIES, SHAEF SGS 800.1 MUL-
Sir Humfrey M. Gale, therefore urged BERRY, Case A ; Ltr, Smith to Secy COS Com, Mar
that measures be taken to extend the use- 44, s u b : Construction ofMULBERRIES,and Min of
Mtg, I 7 Mar 44, to consider means to prolong life of
fulness of these ports. This entailed the MULBERRIES into winter months, 21 Mar 44, Office
construction of additional PHOENIXES as of ANCXF, X/091/14, SHAEF SGS 800.1
reserves and also the strengthening of the MULBERRY I.
THE OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 283

the first continental lines of communica- the beaches in support of a landing opera-
tions. The initial organization of these tion. By “the beaches” was normally
areas was therefore a vital preliminary meant an area known as the “beach
step in the transition to the normal ad- maintenance area,” which included the
ministrative organization provided by the beach, the first segregated supply dumps
Communications Zone. inland, and the connecting road net, an
Responsibility for developing and oper- area which usually did not extend more
ating the first supply installations on the than three miles inland. At OMAHA the
far shore was assigned to the engineer spe- beach maintenance area included MUL-
cial brigades: the 1st Engineer Special BERRY A a n d the minor ports in the
Brigade at UTAH,and the Provisional vicinity.
Engineer Special Brigade Group, consist- T h e mission defined above involved a
ing principally of the 5th and 6th Brigades formidable list of tasks. Among them were
and the 11th Port,34at Omaha wherethe the following: marking hazards in the
MULBERRY was to be located. As attach- vicinity of the beaches a n d determining
ments to the First Army in the first stages the most suitable landing points; making
of the operation these units were required emergency boat repairs; establishing med-
to prepare plans based on the engineer ical facilities to collect, clear, and evacuate
special brigade annex to the First Army casualties to ships; controlling boat traf-
plan, and the brigades accordingly car- fic; directing the landing, retraction, and
ried out detailed planning for the early salvage of boats; maintaining communi-
organization of the beach areas. cations with naval vessels; marking land-
In the next chapter more will be said ing beach limits; constructing and main-
about the origins and development of the taining beach roadways a n d exit routes;
engineer special brigades. These organ- establishing and marking debarkation
izations, mothered by the necessities of the points and landing beaches; unloading
frequently recurring amphibious opera- supplies from ships and craft; assisting in
tions of World War II, were specially the removal of underwater obstructions;
trained and equipped to handle the tech- clearing beaches of mines a n d obstacles;
nical organization of the beaches. As out- erecting enclosures for guarding prisoners
lined by a First Army operations memo- of war, and later evacuating them to
randum, their general mission was “to ships; establishing army communications
regulate and facilitate the landing and within the brigade and with other bri-
movement of personnel and equipment on gades and units ashore; constructing land-
and over the beach to assembly areas and ing aids; maintaining liaison with senior
vehicle parks, to unload cargo ships, to commanders ashore and afloat; maintain-
move and receive supplies into beach ing order and directing traffic in the
dumps, to select, organize, and operate beach maintenance area; providing biv-
beach dumps, to establish a n d maintain ouac, troop assembly, vehicle parking,
communications, and to evacuate casual- and storage areas in the beach mainte-
ties and prisoners of war over the beach to
ships and craft.” 35 In short, it was their 34See below, n. 48.
35FUSA Opns Memo 5, 13 Feb 44, in Operation
duty to insure the continuous movement Report NEPTUNE,OMAHA Beach, prep by Hist Sec
of personnel, vehicles, and supplies across ETOUSA, Sep 44, p. lxiii OCMH.
284 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

nance area for units crossing the beach; therefore, without standard composition.
regulating and facilitating the movement But it was exactly this feature which gave
of unit personnel a n d equipment across it the desired flexibility and permitted it
the beach and insuring the rapid move- to be tailored to any task in an amphibious
ment of supplies into dumps; selecting, operation.
Organizing, and operating beach dumps Portions of the brigades were scheduled
for initial reception and issue of supplies; to follow closely on the heels of the initial
selecting, organizing, and operating beach assault waves. Within the first two hours
maintenance area dumps until relieved by of the landings they were expected to com-
the army; maintaining records showing plete the initial reconnaissance and beach
organizations, materials, and supplies marking preliminary to the development
which had been landed; providing for de- of the beaches. In that period advance
contamination of gassed areas in the parties of engineer shore companies, signal
beach maintenance area; maintaining an teams, and naval units were to come
information center for units landing; op- ashore, survey beach and offshore ap-
erating emergency motor maintenance proaches, plan the layout of beaches for
service to assist vehicles and equipment landing points, roadways, and exits, in-
damaged or stranded in landing and re- stall ship-to-shore signal stations, and erect
quiring de-waterproofing assistance; pro- beach markers. Within the next two hours
viding local security for the beach mainte- additional elements of the brigade would
nance area; and co-ordinating offshore arrive, remove mines and beach obstacles,
unloading activities. decontaminate beach areas, lay beach
Many of these tasks obviously called for roadways, complete exits, establish col-
troops other than engineers. In this re- lecting and clearing stations, start control-
spect the name “engineer special brigade” ling traffic, build stockades for the control
is misleading, for while the core of the bri- of prisoners of war, assist stranded craft,
gade consisted of engineer combat battal- control boat traffic, reconnoiter initial
ions, each brigade normally contained a dump areas, and establish motor parks for
body of Transportation Corps troops, such first aid to water-stalled vehicles. By the
as amphibian truck companies and port end of the first day the brigade was to
companies, exceeding the size of the engi- have established the brigade command
neer component, plus quartermaster serv- post, a signal system, and assembly areas
ice and railhead companies, and ord- for troops, sign-posted all routes to the
nance, medical, military police, chemical, dumps, repaired roadways to the dumps,
and signal troops. In addition, depending opened beach exits, organized antiaircraft
on its mission, each brigade was aug- defense, organized initial dumps for the
mented by the attachment of a host of receipt, sorting, stacking, inventory, and
other units and special detachments such issue of supplies, and to have started un-
as bomb disposal squads, naval beach loading supplies. Initial beach dumps
units, maintenance and repair companies, were to be in full operation by the end of
fire-fighting platoons, and surgical teams, the first day. Within the next few days
which might raise its total strength to supplies were to be routed to new dumps
15,000 or 20,000 men. T h e engineer spe- established farther inland in the beach
cial brigade was a hybrid organization, maintenance area.
T H E OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 285

Brigade units were so grouped for the planned to relieve the engineer special
assault that they could operate independ- brigades of responsibility for operating the
ently in support of specific landing forces. dumps in the beach maintenance area as
Each brigade was broken down into bat- early as possible, using its own service
talion beach groups, each consisting of an units for this purpose. Eventually, of
engineer combat battalion reinforced with course, an army rear boundary would be
the service elements necessary to support drawn, and the rear areas and the bri-
the assault landing of a regimental combat gades themselves would be turned over to
team. T h e battalion beach groups were the Advance Section, which would as-
further subdivided into companies, each sume full responsibility for operating the
of which was to support the landing of a embryo Communications Zone until the
battalion landing team and operate a arrival of the Forward Echelon of that
beach of about 1,000 yards frontage. Once organization itself. 37
a beachhead had been won and the build- The brigades were thus destined to play
up began, service troops of the battalion an essential role in initiating the develop-
beach groups were to revert to their par- ment of the far-shore logistic structure.
ent units and operate under brigade con- Since they were to land in the first hours
trol. At this stage the brigades would of the invasion, while the beaches were
move out of the narrow confines of the still under fire, they were expected to per-
beach itself and begin to develop the form both combat a n d service missions.
beach maintenance area. 36 That they were aware of their dual role is
The beach maintenance areas in effect indicated by their reference to themselves
would be microcosms of the future Com- as “the troops which SOS considers com-
munications Zone, for the brigades per- bat, and the combat troops consider
formed there most of the functions which SOS.”
the expanded Communications Zone later (3) Port Reconstruction
carried out in its base a n d advance sec-
tions. Each brigade was organized to While the organization of the beaches
move 3,300 tons of supplies per day from a n d the MULBERRIES was important for
ships and craft into segregated dumps, the initial supply a n d build-up of forces
and to provide the technicians and labor on the Continent, the major burden of
necessary to operate those dumps. As ton- logistical support was expected to be pro-
nage requirements increased, the capacity gressively assumed by the larger deep-
of the brigades was to be increased by the water ports as they were captured and
attachment of additional service troops, restored to operation. The Normandy
the improvement of beach facilities, and area had been chosen as the site of the
the development of local ports. As the landings not only because it possessed the
MULBERRY was completed and the minor 36NEPTUNE: Training for and Mounting the Op-
eration, I, 141-42; Operation Report NEPTUNE,
ports were rehabilitated, other service OMAHA Beach, App. A (Troop List), App. C (Jt
troops were to be utilized under brigade Agreement between CG FUSA and Cmdr Task
attachment to operate them. This initial Force 122 for Amphibious Opns), and App. D (FUSA
Opns Memo, 5, Engr Special Brigades Reinforced),
development of the continental supply OCMH.
structure was to be carried out directly 37 FUSARpt of Opns, 20 Oct 43 to 1 Aug 44,
under the control of the First Army, which Annex 1 1 (ESB Plan), Bk. IV, p. 26.
286 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

best combination of features required for ized and equipped engineer port construc-
a n assaulting force, including proximity tion companies reinforced by engineer
to the port of Cherbourg, but also because general service regiments, and suggested
it lay between two other groups of ports— that they be organized with personnel
the Seine and Brittany groups—permit- from large U.S. construction firms in the
ting operations to develop toward one or same way that American railways spon-
the other. The OVERLORD planners actu- sored railway operating battalions. These
ally expected to rely completely on the proposals were forwarded to the War
Normandy and Brittany groups to de- Department, and the theater’s needs in
velop the required discharge capacity for this respect were later met by the forma-
the Allied forces to D plus 90, and their tion of units substantially along these
plans for the rehabilitation of the ports in lines.
the lodgment area were made accordingly. Shortly thereafter preliminary studies
Operating the continental ports was to were undertaken of the problems involved
be a Transportation Corps function, re- in reconstructing particular continental
storing them was the responsibility of the ports. No operational plan was available
Corps of Engineers. I n the final Com- a t this early date, and the North African
munications Zone plan this reconstruction invasion intervened to detract somewhat
work was given a priority second only to from planning for continental operations.
the development of beach installations.38 But the ROUNDUP planning staff con-
Planning for this task fell mainly to the tinued its work throughout the winter of
Construction Division of the Office of the 1942, and early in 1943 a subcommittee
Chief Engineer, ETOUSA. U.S. partici- on port capacities in northwest Europe
pation with the British in this planning for was organized under the chairmanship of
port salvage and repair began in July a British officer, Brigadier Bruce G.
1942, immediately after the activation of White. This committee eventually ex-
the European theater, when American tended its investigations to the ports along
representatives attended meetings of the the entire coast of northwest Europe from
ROUNDUP Administrative Planning Staff. the Netherlands to the Spanish border.
General Davison, chief engineer of the With the establishment of COSSAC in
theater, suggested the magnitude of the 1943 the port committee was renamed,
task of rehabilitating the European ports but its membership remained virtually
when he said that it could “best be visu- unchanged. U.S. engineers still did not
alized by imagining what would have to know definitely which ports they would be
be done to place back in operation the responsible for, but a great amount of
ports of Baltimore, Md., Portland, Me., preliminary planning was accomplished,
Portland, Oreg., Mobile, Ala., and Savan- and a mass of pertinent data was collected
nah, Ga., plus ten smaller shallow-draft on the various ports. Procedure for the
U.S. ports, assuming that these ports had initial occupation of ports was worked out,
been bombed effectively for two years by
the R. A. F., then demolished and blocked 3 8 Communications Zone Plan, issued by Hq

to the best of the ability of German FECOMZ, 14 May 44, Sec. XII, ETO Adm 376.
39Ltr, Davison to CofS ETOUSA, 13Jul 42, cited
Engineer troops.” 39He recommended at in Port Construction and Repair, Hist R p t 11, Corps
that time the creation of specially organ- of Engrs ETO, p. 4, ETO Adm.
THE OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 287

and spheres of authority were defined, fix- T h e equipment requirements for port
ing responsibility for the Engineers, the reconstruction were difficult to estimate in
Navy, and the Transportation Corps. In advance, and little attempt was made to
October 1943 a Joint U.S.-British Assess- analyze and determine the requirements
ment Committee drew up an analysis of for individual ports. Instead a stockpile of
capacity for each port in western Europe. materials was created, and estimates were
This included draft, tonnage, operating made of the necessary repair and con-
plant, and weather data. For example, a struction materials for a fixed length of
port reconstruction estimate for Brest, quay, assuming a certain degree of de-
which was expected to be one of the major struction. These estimates were used to
American points of entry as it had been in develop standard methods of repair that
World War I, contained a full description would be generally applicable to all types
of the port, statistics on its prewar opera- of repair work in French ports. Apart
tions, estimates of probable demolitions from an initial representative list of basic
and obstructions and of the port’s capac- materials and equipment accompanying
ity, plans for reconstruction, including a the repair groups, reconstruction mate-
timetable for such work, a schedule for the rials were to be ordered to the Continent
intake of cargo, and a mass of technical after the capture and reconnaissance of
data, including graphs, charts, maps, and each port.
photos. The Office of the Chief Engineer The reconnaissance was to be an impor-
eventually prepared detailed plans before tant preliminary to the rehabilitation of a
D Day for eighteen ports in the Normandy port, and the composition of the recon-
and Brittany areas.40 naissance party and its specific mission
T h e actual work of rehabilitating the were planned long in advance. Normally
captured ports was to be. assigned to the reconnaissance team was to consist of
organizations specifically designed for this representatives of the COMZ G–4, the
purpose—port construction and repair Advance Section, the chiefs of engineers
groups, or PC&R groups. The head- a n d transportation, and occasionally
quarters and headquarters companies of SHAEF. Upon capture of a port this team
these groups comprised a nucleus of spe- had the mission of surveying it for damage
cialists trained in marine construction, and to facilities, locating sunken ships and
included a pool of heavy construction other obstructions, preparing bills of
equipment together with operators. This material, deciding the extent and methods
nucleus was to be supplemented by engi- of repair, determining the availability
neer service troops and civilians to provide of local or salvageable materials, and
the necessary labor and, according to arranging for the phasing in of the re-
need, by dump truck companies, port quired PC&R units for the actual recon-
repair ships, and dredges. T h e port con- struction work. The reconnaissance team
struction and repair group with its attach- would therefore determine the degree of
ments thus constituted a task group,
tailored for the specialized mission of 40Ibid., pp, 10–11. These were Barfleur, Binic,
restoring ports, much as the engineer Brest, Cherbourg, Cancale, Concarneau, Grandcamp,
Granville, Isigny, Le Croisic, L e Pouliguen, Lorient,
special brigades were organized for the Morlaix, Quiberon Bay, St. Brieuc, St. Malo, St.
task of developing the beaches. Nazaire, and St. Vaast.
288 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

rehabilitation to be undertaken and the ville, all the others were very small and
initial course of the reconstruction possessed discharge capacities of only a
program. 41 few hundred tons per day. Another
Several factors had to be taken into Normandy port—Carentan—had been
consideration in planning the reconstruc- rejected as having a potential too meager
tion of a port and arriving at its estimated to warrant the effort required for its
capacity. Among them were its prewar rehabilitation. All were scheduled to be
capacity and use, the known and assumed opened by D plus 30, and their restoration
damage to the port when captured, and was therefore the responsibility of the
the ability a n d availability of Army and Advance Section. The schedule for the
Navy Engineer units. T h e damage factor opening of these ports and their estimated
was by far the most variable and unpre- initial discharge capacities were as
dictable. For planning purposes, however, follows: 43
certain assumptions had to be made. It
was figured, for example, that u p to 90
percent of the existing suitable quayage
would be initially unusable. Of this, half
was expected to be in such condition that
it could be repaired fairly quickly or in a
matter of days, and the remainder was
expected to require varying amounts of
work or be beyond repair in any reason-
able time. It was also assumed that all
craft in the harbors would be sunk, cargo- Headquarters, Communications Zone,
handling equipment destroyed and tipped meanwhile made plans for the later recon-
struction of the Brittany ports, the
into the water, most of the buildings in the
schedule for which was as follows:
port area demolished, road and railway
access blocked with debris, entrances to
ports and lock chambers blocked and all
locks demolished, and water and electric
services broken. In addition, it was antic-
ipated that extensive dredging would be
necessary in some cases to allow the Although plans were made for phasin
entrance of anything but the shallowest- equipment and the required Engineer and
draft vessels into waters that had under- T C units into the Brittany ports and a
gone four years of silting.42 schedule was written for their opening,
By D Day detailed plans were complete the ports of Normandy naturally enjoyed
for the rehabilitation of Cherbourg,
Grandcamp, Isigny, St. Vaast, Barfleur, 41Engr Rpt 1 1 , pp.11, 16.
42ADSEC NEPTUNEPlan, 30 Apr 44, Annex 6
and Granville in the Normandy area, and (Engrs), ETO Adm 3 7 7 .
of St. Malo in Brittany. (See Map 4 . ) 43Sources for these figures are: FUSA NEPTUNE
Cherbourg was the only large port in this Plan, App. I to Annex 1 1 (ESB Plan), in FUSA Rpt
of Opns, 20 Oct 43–1 Aug 44, Bk. IV, p. 46; ADSEC
group and was the first major objective of Engineer Plan; COMZ Plan, App. N and Annex 13
the American forces. Except for Gran- (TC).
THE OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 289

the first priority in development, and the Although the movement of craft into
plans for its six ports plus St. Malo were and out of these “minor” ports would be
worked out in much greater detail before restricted by the tide, they at least offered
D Day. some protection from stormy weather, and
Of these seven ports all except Cher- the desperate need for discharge capacity
bourg were tidal, drying out completely in the early phases appeared to warrant
at low water. Most of them had a mud- or bringing them into use. T h e total dis-
sand-bottomed basin and two or three charge capacity of these six minor ports
quays which were entirely tidal, and at was not great. At D plus 30 it was sched-
high water they could accommodate only uled to be 4,500 tons per day. At D plus
vessels drawing a maximum of thirteen or 60, with the small Brittany port of Lorient
fourteen feet. 44In this respect they were added, they were to develop a capacity of
typical of the French ports along the 7,700 tons, and at D plus 90, 10,650 tons.46
English Channel and the Bay of Biscay, As for clearance facilities, all the ports had
where tide and weather conditions had good road connections, but only Granville
required the construction of massive had first-class rail clearance. All the other
breakwaters, locked basins, and channels, minor ports would have to be cleared by
in contrast with ports in the United motor transport.
States where such elaborate paraphernalia T h e division of responsibilities and the
were unnecessary. procedure for restoring and operating the
St. Malo was known to have a large ports were defined in minute detail. Work
amount of locked quayage, but it could be of a more strictly marine nature was as-
blocked easily and had poor rail clearance signed to the British and U.S. Navies, the
facilities. Consequently it was considered former assuming responsibility for mine-
suitable only for operations employing sweeping the harbors, and the latter for
amphibian trucks (dukws) for at least the removing obstacles such as sunken block-
first ninety days. Granville, on the west ships in the channels and along quays and
coast of Normandy, had somewhat better for making hydrographic surveys. Recon-
facilities than the other ports. I n addition struction or enlargement of discharge fa-
to quayage in its Avant Port, where vessels cilities was a n Army Engineer responsibil-
could “dry out’’ (that is, beach at ebb tide, ity, and the plans for the first six weeks
unload, and then float out on the next were written in full detail by the Advance
tide), Granville had a locked or “wet” Section. T h e ADSEC plan provided that
basin with berthing facilities that could a reconnaissance party should debark on
accommodate seven 4,000-ton ships of D plus 3 and successively examine the con-
14-foot draft simultaneously. The Allies dition of port facilities at all the minor
did not count on immediate use of the wet ports, beginning at Isigny. As these pre-
basin, for the enemy was expected to liminary surveys were completed, the com-
destroy the lock gates and sink blockships manding officer of the port construction
in the chamber. But with the removal of and repair group was to draw up a definite
obstacles they planned to dry out coasters
at the inner quays and to utilize Granville 44ADSEC Plan, Annex 6 (Engrs), App. A (I), Six
Minor Ports; Engr Rpt 11, Ch. III.
for the reception of coal and ammuni- 45ADSEC Plan, Annex.6 (Engrs).
tion.45 46COMZ Plan, App. N.
290 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

reconstruction job schedule to meet the never intended to be more than a stop-gap
planned port capacity. T h e first repair measure designed to meet a portion of the
work was to get under way on D plus 6 at discharge requirements in the period be-
Isigny and Grandcamp with the arrival of fore the full potential of the larger ports
the headquarters of the 1055th PC&R was realized. Plans for their restoration
Group and work parties consisting of ad- were completely overshadowed by those
vance elements of the 342d Engineer Gen- made for Cherbourg. This port was ex-
eral Service Regiment. Upon completion pected to handle 6,000 tons at D plus 30,
of its task the entire group was to proceed 7,000 at D plus 60, and 8,000 at D plus 90,
in turn to St. Vaast, Barfleur, Granville, and was to exceed in capacity the com-
47
andSt. Malofor similar projects. bined tonnage of the six minor ports
While repair and construction might throughout the first 60 days. Even Cher-
continue for several months, as at Cher- bourg was to have but a temporary im-
bourg, the Transportation Corps was to portance for U.S. forces, for plans were
start operating the ports as soon as the un- tentatively made to turn the port over to
loading of cargo could begin. For this pur- the British after a short time, and to route
pose the 11th Major Port was attached to the major portion of American cargo
the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade through the Brittany ports and later
Group at OMAHAto handle pierhead op- through others farther up the Channel.
erations at the MULBERRY and to operate Cherbourg, however, played a wholly un-
the small ports of Isigny and Grand- expected role in the support of U.S. forces
camp.48 It was also to furnish a detach- and eventually ranked as one of the big
ment to the 1st Engineer Special Brigade three of the continental ports.
to operate the small port of St. Vaast (and The relatively high tonnage targets for
eventually Carentan, as it turned out) in Cherbourg appear optimistic in view of
the UTAHarea. The operation of Barfleur, the port’s peacetime performance. Cher-
Granville, and St. Malo was to be super- bourg, home of the French luxury liner
vised by the 4th Major Port at Cherbourg. Normandie, had been primarily a passenger
Another major port, the 12th, was to take port and a naval base. It had handled an
over the operation of Granville and the average of less than 900 tons per day,
ports in the vicinity of St. Malo. T h e Al- ranking twenty-second among all the
lies hoped that St. Malo itself could be de-
veloped to a capacity of 3,000 tons per
47ADSEC Plan, Annex 6 (Engrs), App. A (I), Six
day, and the St. Malo area, including Minor Ports.
Cancale and St. Brieuc, to 6,000 tons, and 48A “major port” consisted basically of a port
thus relieve beach operations at OMAHAheadquarters and headquarters company and a vary-
ing number of port, truck, and amphibian truck com-
and UTAH.They counted on the St. Malo panies, but it usually also had many special units. The
development to provide all the tonnage 11th Port, for example, consisted of a headquarters
capacity necessary to sustain the Third and headquarters company, 12 port companies, 11
QM service companies, 6 QM truck companies (TC),
Army, and possibly even to debark some 3 amphibian truck companies (dukws), an ordnance
of its personnel.49 medium automotive maintenance company, a port
Since the minor ports possessed only signal company, a harbor craft company, and a
finance disbursing section. Operation Report NEP-
limited capacities and were rather uneco- TUNE, App. A.
nomical to operate, their development was 43ADSEC Plan, Annex 14 (TC).
THE OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 291

AERIAL VIEW OF CHERBOURG. Digue de Querqueville, I ; Naval Arsenal, 2;

Nouvelle Plage, 3.
French ports in cargo tonnage. Warehouse bor consisted of tanker berths along the
and storage facilities were correspondingly Digue de Querqueville, the western arm
small, and cargo-handling equipment was of the outer breakwater, which the Allies
in keeping with a port that specialized in intended to restore for the bulk reception
passenger trade rather than freight. 50 of POL. Otherwise the outer harbor was
Built up over a period of two hundred chiefly an anchorage, affording some pro-
years, Cherbourg’s port facilities were es- tection to shipping, but too rough in
sentially completed in the early 1920’s, stormy weather to permit lighterage op-
but at the outbreak of World War II they erations. The inner roadstead was work-
were still undergoing improvements de- able in all weathers. Both had sufficient
signed to facilitate the berthing of the depth at all variations of the tide to receive
largest ocean liners. Cherbourg’s harbor the largest ocean liners.
is artificial, consisting of a double set of The Petite Rade, or innerharbor, con-
breakwaters which form both an inner tained almost all of the port's berthing
and outer roadstead, one known as the
50 Cherbourg—Gateway to France: Rehabilitation
Petite Rade a n d the other as the Grande and Operation of the First Major Port, prep by Hist
Rade. The only facilities in the outer har- Sec ETOUSA, 1945, MS, p. 5, OCMH.
292 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

facilities, most of which were concentrated able for the reception of additional vehicle-
along the western and southern sides. The carrying LST’s.
entire western side of the port was oc- I n all, the port was expected to provide
cupied by the great Naval Arsenal, con- berths for 12 Liberty ships, 18 LST’s (6 of
sisting of repair shops, drydocks, and which would deliver rolling stock), 56
maintenance facilities grouped around its coasters, 2 tankers, 3 colliers, and 1 train
three basins—the Avant Port, Bassin ferry. I n addition, the harbor of course of-
Charles X, and Bassin Napoléon III—and fered alternative anchorage for other ship-
including additional berthing facilities at ping which could be worked by lighters—
the Quai Homet and along the Digue du either dukws or barges. When these facili-
Homet, the western jetty enclosing the in- ties were fully developed the port was ex-
ner harbor. This area alone was expected pected to attain a daily discharge capacity
to provide discharge facilities for 5 Liberty of 8,000 tons.51
ships, 2 train ferries, 24 coasters, a n d 2 Despite the assumption that the enemy
colliers. would carry out a systematic destruction
Just south of the main arsenal installa- of Cherbourg before surrendering it, Al-
tion lay the seaplane base and its three lied planners hopefully scheduled the
small basins-the Bassin des Subsistences, opening of the port and the start of limited
Avant Port, and Port de l’Onglet—which discharge operations three days after its
were expected to provide berths for 13 capture. T h e procedure for restoring
coasters. Adjoining this area to the south- Cherbourg and bringing it into operation
east was a broad bathing beach known as was similar to that described for the minor
the Nouvelle Plage, believed to be ideal ports. In the three days following its cap-
for unloading vehicles from LST’s. Imme- ture the Royal Navy was to sweep mines
diately to the east of this beach and di- from the harbor, and U.S. naval salvage
rectly in the center of the harbor lay the units were to begin removing blockships.
entrance channel to the Port de Com- Rehabilitation of the port’s inshore facili-
merce, consisting of two basins (the Avant ties meanwhile was to be undertaken by
Port de Commerce and the Bassin à Flot) the 1056th Port Construction and Repair
which jutted deeply into the heart of the Group, with attached elements of an engi-
city. These two basins were planned to ac- neer general service regiment, an engineer
commodate 17 coasters and 2 LST’s with special service regiment, and a n engineer
tracks for the discharge of railway rolling dump truck company. A reconnaissance
stock. party of this organization was scheduled
Dominating the entrance to these basins to debark at UTAH Beach on D plus 5,
was the large Darse Transatlantique, the proceed to the port on D plus 8, and im-
deepest portion of the harbor, where the mediately establish priority of debris clear-
Quai de France and the Quai de Norman- ance in the port area. In conjunction with
die provided berthing for large passenger the Navy salvage party, it was to establish
liners, and where discharge facilities were priority for ship salvage and removal op-
now to be provided for 7 Liberty ships, 2 erations for approval of the port com-
LST’s carrying rolling stock, and a train mander. It would also decide on the
ferry. A large tidal basin in the southeast
corner of the port was believed to be suit- 51ADSEC Plan, Annex 6 (Engrs), App. A (11).
THE OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 293

schedule for initial quay repair jobs and needs. The length and width of every
examine locations where initial cargo dis- quay, the depth of water alongside, the
charge from dukws, barges, and LST’s nature of the harbor bottom, the number
could begin. and types of cranes, the capacities of
The actual rehabilitation work was to berths, road and rail clearance facilities,
begin the second day after capture (D plus all were set down in inclosures to the plan.
10),early priority being assigned to such Next, every reconstruction project was de-
projects as debris clearance from the Quai fined and given a priority, and units were
Homet area, preparation of LST landing phased in to undertake these jobs in pre-
sites on the Nouvelle Plage, and construc- scribed order on specific days. O n the
tion of a tanker berth at the Digue de basis of the above data, the ADSEC plan-
Querqueville on the west side of the outer ners estimated the type and number of
harbor. By D plus 11 progress on these craft that could be accommodated and
first projects was expected to be sufficient the tonnage discharge targets that should
to permit the unloading of about 1,600 be met on each day by the beaching of
tons of cargo by a combination of dukws vessels, by dukw, coaster, and barge dis-
and barges unloading from Liberties and charge, and by direct unloading from
coasters, the unloading of at least one either coasters or deep-draft ships. In me-
docked coaster direct to a usable quay, ticulous detail they drew up lists of mate-
and the discharge of 840 vehicles per day rials needed in the reconstruction, specify-
from LST’s at the Nouvelle Plage. By the ing the exact quantities of hundreds of
fourth day the Allies planned to boost un- items from bolts and nails, ax handles,
loading to about 3,800 tons, and by the valves, washers, and turnbuckles in quan-
tenth to about 5,000 tons. The great bulk tities weighing only a few pounds, to heavy
of this discharge was to be carried on by hoists, tractors, sandbags, and cement,
dukws and barges working Liberty ships weighing many tons. The ADSEC plan
a n d coasters at anchor. In fact, only one scheduled twenty-one projects to be
coaster berth and four Liberty berths were started by D plus 31, establishing the days
expected to be in use at the end of the first and priority in which they were to be un-
month of operations, and direct ship-to- dertaken, specifying the crews available
shore discharge consequently was ex- for each job, and the time in which they
pected to account for only a fraction of were to be completed. While it was un-
total discharge in these early weeks. likely that this clocklike schedule would
Some conception of the minute detail be followed to the minute in view of the
and scope of preparations for the rehabili- many unforeseeable circumstances, plans
tation of the ports can be gained from a nevertheless had to be made on the basis
glance at the engineer reconstruction of the most optimistic forecast of tactical
plans. In sheer bulk the ADSEC engineer progress in order that logistical support
plan outweighed that of all other services should not fall short of requirements.
combined, comprising two thick volumes A picture of the personnel and equip-
of data on the Normandy ports. These in- ment required to operate the ports is af-
cluded an analysis of their facilities, a forded by the Transportation Corps plan.
schedule of reconstruction, and a detailed For the beach areas alone, including the
catalogue of equipment and material minor ports in the vicinity, the basic units
294 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

allotted included 1 major port headquar- opment of St. Nazaire, Morlaix–Roscoff,

ters (the 11th), 10 port battalion head- St. Brieuc, Concarneau, and Le Pouliguen
quarters, 48 port companies, 1 harbor in addition to St. Malo, Lorient, and
craft service company, 7 quartermaster Brest. With the acceptance of the Qui-
truck companies, and 19 amphibian truck beron Bay (CHASTITY) project early in
companies. Cherbourg was assigned 1 April the final C O M Z plans provided for
port headquarters (the 4th), 6 port bat- the restoration of only Lorient, Brest, and
talion headquarters, 20 port companies, 2 St. Malo with its adjacent beaches at Can-
harbor craft service companies, 1 port ma- cale, and the development of Quiberon
rine maintenance company, and 4 am- Bay. These four ports were planned to de-
phibian truck companies. Floating and velop a daily capacity of about 17,500
nonfloating equipment needs at the tons.53
beaches included 950 dukws, 16 tugs, 7 The plan that finally evolved for the de-
sea mules, 66 barges, and varying num- velopment of Quiberon Bay differed sub-
bers of cranes, tractors, trailers, and vari- stantially from the original concept. A
ous types of boats. Cherbourg was to be study of the area revealed that while the
furnished 200 dukws, 176 barges, 38 tugs, bay itself provided ample anchorage ofre-
11 sea mules, a floating drydock, and vari- quired depth, and while the inland trans-
ous crane barges, landing stages, and portation net could be developed to
boats. These items were solely for harbor needed capacity, bad weather conditions
use. O n shore there were additional re- barred the use of lighters to unload ships
quirements for 69 cranes of various sizes in the winter. T h e development of deep-
and types, 30 derricks, plus conveyors, water berths was likewise found to be im-
trailers, and tractors.52 I n addition to practicable since the wide tidal range and
these elaborate plans for the development the gentle slope of the sea bottom near the
of the port’s discharge capacity the Com- shore would have required the construc-
munications Zone plan scheduled the in- tion of extremely long piers. T h e answer
troduction of railway equipment to meet to the problem lay rather in the Auray
the corollary requirement of developing River, which flows into Morbihan Gulf
Cherbourg’s clearance facilities. a n d Quiberon Bay from the north. This
Plans for the rehabilitation of the Brit- estuary had scoured a narrow channel al-
tany ports were written in far less detail, most eighty feet deep near the small fish-
since the final decision regarding the de- ing village of Locmariaquer, providing
velopment of that entire area was to de- deep and sheltered water where large
pend on circumstances following the bat- ships could lie alongside piers or landing
tle of Normandy. No specific units were stages and discharge their cargo, and an-
named to handle reconstruction and op- chorage from which lighterage operations
eration of the Brittany ports, although es- could be safely conducted. (Map 8 )
timates were made as to types of units and As finally evolved the plan called for
quantities of equipment needed to bring moorings for thirty deep-draft vessels in
Brest, Quiberon Bay, and Lorient into op- the deepwater “pool,” and a landing stage
eration. Plans for the Brittany ports had designed to float up and down with the
undergone several alterations. Before 52ADSEC Plan, Annex 13 (TC).
April 1944 they contemplated the devel- 53 COMZ Plan.
 R. Johnstone

MAP 8
296 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F THE ARMIES

tide providing berths for five Liberty ships had been restudied with a view toward
at the edge of the deepwater anchorage. making u p the recognized deficiencies.
Two fixed-construction causeways were to T h e substitution of the CHASTITY project
extend across the tidal flat from the shore for St. Nazaire and the other minor Brit-
to the landing stage. I n addition a floating tany ports was a partial solution. But the
pier, constructed of naval lighterage pon- Brittany ports were not scheduled to come
tons, was planned south of the landing into use until after D plus 50. Measures
stage, and an existing mole with rail con- were also taken in March to prolong the
nections farther north was to be extended life of the MULBERRIES. I n addition, esti-
into deep water to make possible the mates were revised, first, of the time re-
handling of heavy lifts. These facilities quired to capture the ports, and second,
were expected to give the port a capacity of the time required to open the ports. At
of 10,000 tons per day. the same time the estimates of their ton-
The CHASITY project had much to com- nage capacities were increased. Cher-
mend it. Among its attractive features was bourg’s maximum capacity, for example,
the fact that it made the most of a n exist- was boosted from 5,000 to 8,000 tons. Its
ing natural advantage—that is, sheltered capture was more optimistically scheduled
water—and that it required only a frac- for D plus 8 instead of D plus 10, and the
tion of the labor and materials that were time required for its opening changed
to go into the artificial ports or MULBER- from ten to three days. Cherbourg was
RIES. Furthermore, no special design or thus scheduled to receive cargo on D plus
manufacturing problems were involved, 11 instead of D plus 20, and in greater vol-
for all the components of the piers and ume. As a result of similar alterations in
landing stage consisted of standard mate- the schedule for the other ports the
rials and equipment already available.54 planned tonnages of the Normandy ports
T h e port capacities given above were were increased by over 4,000 tons per day.
those embodied in the final OVERLORD Two encouraging developments made
plan, and represented substantial revisions these revisions possible. Experience in the
made in March and April 1944, when it Mediterranean, particularly at Philippe-
was realized that additional discharge ca- ville and Anzio, indicated that ports could
pacity would be needed. As plans stood at be brought into operation and capacities
that time the port situation remained very developed much faster than had been orig-
tight for both the OVERLORD and post- inally believed possible. I n addition, both
OVERLORD periods and imposed a consid- the British and Americans had greatly im-
erable rigidity in logistical plans, for every proved their equipment and engineering
port and beach would be forced to work to techniques for the reconstruction of de-
capacity. In fact, it was estimated in stroyed ports. All these developments were
March that port capacities would actually reflected in the final plans. T h e Nor-
fall short of U.S. tonnage needs at D plus mandy and Brittany port plans as they
41. By that date the daily requirements 54Col. S. A. Potter, Jr., “Quiberon Bay,” Military
would total approximately 26,500 tons, Review, XXXI (September, 1951), 45–53.
while discharge capacities were estimated 55Memo, 2 I A Gp Plans, 13 Mar 44, sub: Subse-
quent Maintenance of British and U.S. Forces-
to reach only 20,800.55 OVERLORD, SHAEF 1 2 A Gp 400.402 Maintenance,
In March and April the entire problem Equipment, and Supplies.
T H E OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 297

Beach and Port Plans for Operation OVERLORD

were written into the final C O M Z and (4) Troop Build-up and Replacements
ADSEC plans in May are summarized
above.56 Closely related to the problem of port
These final estimates were regarded as and beach capacities was the matter of the
adequate to meet the needs of U.S. forces continental troop build-up. The OVER-
in the first three months. But even these LORDoperational plan prescribed that in
schedules were subject to last-minute re- the American zone the assault and imme-
vision. With the discovery in May of an diate follow-up would consist of three in-
additional German division in the Coten- fantry and two airborne divisions, to-
tin peninsula the tactical plans of the VII gether with the necessary supporting
Corps had to be amended only a few days troops, and that additional preloaded
before D Day. The estimated capture date forces were to land on D plus 1 and 2.
of Cherbourg was changed from D plus 8 56T h e port capacities as estimated in the COMZ
to D plus 15, with a resultant loss of ton- plan in May were apparently adequate to meet the
nage, estimated to total 34,820 tons for needs of U.S. forces. However, the records contain
the period D plus 11 to D plus 25.57 many conflicting figures on the whole subject of port
capacities and their estimated capture and opening
Unfortunately the anxieties and uncer- dates, and there were many changes in these estimates
tainties attending port planning were not between the time of the OVERLORD estimates ofJuly
1943 and the final COMZ plan of May 1944. In no
to end with the establishment of a lodg- one place are enough figures gathered together on the
ment on the Continent. Port discharge was estimates of U.S. tonnage requirements and port ca-
to become one of the most frustrating lim- pacities to justify comparisons and conclusions as to
iting factors of the continental operation the adequacy of the port plans for any one date. The
table figures are based on the C O M Z Plan, Appen-
and was to persist as a major logistic prob- dix N, with the following exceptions: estimated open-
lem for fully six months after the landings. ing dates and tonnages for the beaches and minor
298 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

Thereafter the transfer of forces to France 6,800 vehicles. 59They were to be loaded
was to be accomplished by the shuttling of in ships and craft along the coast of south-
ships and craft between the United King- ern England and were to land on the
dom and the Continent and would be de- French beaches on the first tide. Force B,
pendent on the repeated use of the same with a strength of about 26,500 men and
lift and on the speed with which this ship- 4,400 vehicles, formed a follow-up force
ping could make the round trips between with various reinforcement units for the
the two shores. In the first three months V Corps in the OMAHA Beach area. This
an American force of nearly 1,340,000 force was to be assault-loaded in ships and
men and 250,000 vehicles was scheduled craft in the southwestern English ports
to be moved across the Channel, the and was to land on the second tide of
build-up target calling for 12 U.S. divi- D Day and and on D plus 1. I n addition,
sions on the Continent by D plus 30, 16 a preloaded build-up force of 43,500 men
by D plus 60, and 21 (14 infantry and 7 and 6,000 vehicles, containing units for
armored) by D plus 90, together with sup- both beaches, was to embark in the Bristol
porting combat troops, elements of two Channel ports and cross the Channel on
tactical air commands, and service D plus 1 and 2. A total of more than 130,-
troops.58 000 men and 17,300 vehicles was thus
The preloaded forces were organized as loaded in all the available ships and craft
follows: Forces O (for OMAHA) and U (for before D Day.
UTAH),approximately equal in size, con- The remaining OVERLORD forces, sched-
stituted the initial assault forces, and to- uled to enter the Continent by D plus 90,
gether totaled about 60,000 men and constituted the build-up proper. This
movement depended on the availability of
ports through D plus 20 are from the more conserva-
shipping. A statistical summary of the
tive FUSA figures in Annex 1 1 , Appendix I of the plan is given in the table at top of page. 60
FUSA NEPTUNE Plan. Data for the period D plus 21 After D plus 90, divisions were to arrive in
to D plus 41 are from ADSEC Plan, the remainder
from COMZ TC plan and Appendix N of the COMZ France at the rate of from three to five per
Plan. The general practice followed has been to ac-
cept the plans of the headquarters which was respon- 58COMZ Plan, Sec. VI (Troops); T h e Control of
sible for the particular period: FUSA for the early the Buildup of Troops in the Cross-Channel Amphib-
period; ADSEC for the intermediate phase to D plus ious Operation OVERLORD, Gen Bd Rpt 22, pp. 3–4.
41; and COMZ for the subsequent period to D 59Airborne units are not included in these figures.
plus 90. 60FUSA Rpt of Opns, Bk. II, p. 142, for period D
57Memo, Vaughan, CG FECOMZ, for C-in-C 21 to D plus 14. Figures for D plus 15 to D plus 90 are
A Gp, 1 Jun 44, sub: Delay in Capture of WATSON, from C O M Z Plan, Sec. VI (Troops), and do not in-
SHAEF 12 A Gp 825 WATSON. clude 204,800 replacements.
THE OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 299

a Two airborne divisions withdrawn.

month, the majority of them directly from argument as to the proper ratios of combat
the United States. and service troops. One facet of this eter-
Determining the make-up of the force nal conflict has already been seen in the
and the order in which the various units competition between ground and service
should be phased into the Normandy forces for larger shares of the theater troop
bridgehead posed another problem. The basis. In view of shipping limitations, the
composition of the build-up as between competition was bound to continue in the
field, air, and service forces is shown in the allotment of lift and in the preparation of
schedule tabulated at the top of this page.61 the build-up priority lists.
It can be seen that the most rapid build- Desirous of having their forces made up
up of divisions was to occur in the first two of as many “fighting” elements as possible,
weeks of the operation, and that the field field commanders naturally resisted the
forces as a whole made up 75 to 80 percent demand that a larger and larger portion
of the assault and initial build-up forces of the troop basis consist of service troops.
through D plus 15. 62 It was natural that But modern warfare had brought about a
the assault and initial build-up forces relentless encroachment on the long-
should be composed primarily of combat favored position of the combat forces in
units, for the first mission was to secure a the troop basis, assigning an ever-expand-
beachhead. The field forces, consequently, ing role to service troops and consequently
were allotted the preponderant share of demanding for them a larger and larger
the available lift in the early stages, and share of the “division slice.” 63Not only
whatever service forces other than those did growing mechanization require larger
organic to the divisions crossed the Chan- numbers of technicians and multiply the
nel in these first days, such as the units
61COMZ Plan, Sec. VI (Troops).
with the engineer special brigades, were 62The term field forces rather than ground forces is
attached to the assaulting corps. used throughout the plans to refer to all forces in the
While the prior claims of the field forces combat zone, and included service units with the
combat commands.
in the early stages were fully recognized, it 63 Theterm “division slice” is used to express the
was obviously desirable that service forces relationship between the total theater strength and
should be introduced as early as possible. the number of divisions supported, and represents
the total number of men involved in maintaining a
The need for them would mount rapidly division in the field. It is determined by dividing the
as ports were captured a n d as tactical theater strength (minus air forces) by the number of
progress required the development of the divisions in the theater. The normal division slice of
40,000 was made up as follows: 15,000 in the division
lines of communications. In allocating the itself, 15,000 corps and army troops, and 10,000
available lift there arose the ever-recurring COMZ troops.
300 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

tonnages and the number of supply items; was actually higher, since the field forces
the growing destructiveness of modern themselves contained substantial numbers
warfare, toward which the heavy bomber of organic service units. I n the first days
had made a large contribution, made it C O M Z troops were to comprise only 16
necessary to rebuild a country’s lines of to 18 percent of the total force landed.
communications as armies moved along. T h e build-up of service troops was to be
The competition between combat and stepped up in the second week and would
service troops for the available lift was comprise 21 percent of the total on D plus
pointedly illustrated in January 1944 15, rising to 26 percent on D plus 25 and
when the Supreme Command was consid- 30 percent on D plus 40. O n the eve of the
ering a major alteration in the OVERLORD invasion the troop basis provided for a
plan that provided for a n enlargement of division slice of 40,000 men, of which
both the assault area and the size of the at- 10,000 or 25 percent comprised the
tacking forces. One of the officers at a C O M Z portion.
Supreme Commander’s conference at that Logistic planners regarded neither the
time expressed apprehension lest, with the current division slice nor the rate of serv-
changes, the service forces would also re- ice troop build-up as satisfactory. Acutely
quest an increase in strength in the early aware of the logistic demands of the oper-
stages. He believed such demands should ation, they observed that between D plus
be resisted. A representative of the service 50 and 90 U.S. service forces would be
forces thought it necessary to re-emphasize called on not only to support operations
that the requirements for service elements then in progress, but to establish bases and
in the early stages must not be under- lines of communications to support future
estimated nor neglected. General Eisen- operations and increasing numbers of
hower recognized immediately that with troops. Their tasks would include the de-
a wider bridgehead the Allies would also velopment of port capacities, the creation
have a wider road for the supply of the op- of a large depot system, the improvement
eration, and he thought it was logical that of roads, and the reconstruction of rail-
the strengthening of the assault forces ways. These jobs were considered abnor-
should be accompanied by a correspond- mally difficult in OVERLORD because of
ing strengthening of the administrative the physical shape of the area, the antic-
64
components. Whateverforce was placedipated change in the direction of advance
on the Continent had to be a balanced (south, and then both west and east), and
one, and any attempt to introduce exces- the approach of winter weather. Because
sive combat forces without an adequate the demands on the Communications
build-up of service forces and an increase Zone would be particularly heavy, the
in supply build-up capacity would reduce planners recommended that in the period
the division slice and lessen the support D plus 50 to 80 the build-up of COMZ
capabilities of the Communications Zone. troops should take priority over the build-
In the final plans a force of 340,000 up of field forces. 65
COMZ troops as compared with about 64Min of Supreme Comdr’s Conf, 24 Jan 44,
665,000 field force troops was scheduled SHAEF SGS 337/11 Supreme Comdr Conf.
65Adrn Stf Study 1 1 , G–4 SHAEF, 3 Jun 44, sub:
to be built up in the first three months. Logistical Situation U.S. Forces D plus 41-D plus 90,
The proportion of service troop strength SHAEF 12 A Gp 370 SHAEF Plans, Adm Stf Studies.
THE OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 301

Whether such priority would actually centrated in a small area required a large
be given depended largely on the course number of antiaircraft units and the early
of operations. Meanwhile, the rate at establishment of advance airfields.
which both combat and service units were Many compromises eventually had to
to be shipped to the far shore was at least be made. I n practice the field force, air
tentatively prescribed in what were force, and COMZ planners were allotted
known as Buildup Priority Lists. The U.S. a proportion of the expected daily lift and
forces in the OVERLORD operation con- were directed to name specifically the
sisted of several thousand units and de- troop units which they desired included in
tachments of varying size, many units each day’s build-up. Finally, these re-
being broken into two or more echelons quirements were arranged in a single list
for the movement across the Channel. for priority of embarkation and move-
Scheduling their shipment in the order ment.
best designed to meet both tactical and Partial lists were prepared initially by
logistical needs was itself a vital element the two assault corps, the V and VII.
of the operational plan. Since the assaults were to be carried out
To prepare these lists, essentially a re- several miles apart, a more than normal
sponsibility of the tactical commands, was responsibility for the conduct of the oper-
a laborious task involving many consider- ation in its early stages devolved upon the
ations. The basic limiting factor governing corps commanders. The two corps accord-
the speed at which U.S. forces could be ingly were given considerable independ-
built up on the Continent was the avail- ence in their planning, and troops
able lift. Estimates on the course of oper- following the assault waves were to be
ations, particularly the rate of advance, phased so far as practicable according to
further determined the types and propor- priorities desired by the corps command-
tions of combat and supporting troops ers, The task of integrating the two corps
required on the far shore. Similarly, a lists and extending them for the later
forecast of areas progressively to be occu- build-up was performed by the planning
pied by U.S. forces in France was a factor staffs of First Army and 1st Army Group.
in determining the number of advance First Army’s list, called List A, established
airfields to be established by the air forces. the sequence of movement only through
These estimates, by indicating the num- D plus 14 and, since First Army was in
ber of troops requiring logistical support, complete control of the entire beachhead
provided a basis for calculating the build- in this phase, included only the units as-
up of service units. A number of other signed or initially attached to that head-
considerations bore heavily: the initial quarters. T h e list for the subsequent
lack of port and rail facilities called for build-up of U.S. forces assigned to First
heavy reinforcement in Engineer and Army, Third Army, the Ninth Air Force,
Transportation Corps units; the initially and the Communications Zone, which
independent operations of the V and VII were expected to move to the Continent
Corps in the assault necessitated that siz- between D plus 15 and 90, was prepared
able service elements be assigned to the by 1st Army Group and was known as
corps in the early stages; and the threat of List B. The completed lists showed in
enemy air attack against large forces con- their anticipated order of movement pri-
302 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

ority all units or portions of units which its ability to support the operation.66The
were to move separately, their personnel change was made, nevertheless, and
and vehicle strength, and their assign- proved to be but the first of many alter-
ment. The preparation of the lists in- ations in the build-up schedule.
volved some of the most agonizingly It was realized from the beginning that
detailed co-ordination of the OVERLORDsuch alterations would have to be made,
planning, for there were endless changes particularly after the operation got under
in the designation, type, number, and way. The projected build-up was based on
composition of units. While the First certain assumptions as to the course of the
Army list was firm early in April, it was operation. However carefully these esti-
not until much later that agreement with mates might be made, the actual flow of
the various headquarters involved was troops to the Continent would have to
reached on the 1st Army Group list. meet the changing requirements dictated
Late in May the receipt of information by the course of the battle, and in all
concerning added enemy strength in the probability would differ from the planned
Cotentin set off a chain reaction that il- phasing. Provision for such departures
lustrated how last-minute changes in tac- from the planned build-up was made in
tical plans could affect all aspects of the creation of separate control machinery
logistic arrangements. Anticipating in- known as the Buildup Control Organiza-
creased resistance in the VII Corps sector, tion, or BUCO, the planned operation of
the planners concluded that progress which is outlined in the next chapter.
would probably be slower, that Cher- Meanwhile the staff of 1st Army Group
bourg would be captured later than orig- also prepared a n alternative build-up list
inally estimated, and that there would be to be used in the event that the progress of
a delay in developing the discharge capac- U.S. forces in Normandy was consider-
ity of UTAHBeach to the maximum. It ably slower than promised in the opera-
was all the more imperative that commu- tional plan. This alternative list provided
nications between the two corps be estab- for the assignment of a n appreciably
lished at a n early date. The expected higher proportion of the available lift to
delay in the capture of Cherbourg made combat units and consequently a more
it possible to phase back by five to seven rapid build-up of combat forces at the ex-
days the units scheduled to open that port. pense of supporting and service troops. It
This in turn freed sufficient lift to permit provided for the movement of twenty-one
the earlier transfer of an additional infan- divisions to the far shore by D plus 65 in-
try division. To meet the expected need for stead of D plus 88 as scheduled in the
additional combat strength, therefore, the accepted list, on the assumption that if
First Army commander directed that the 66Ltr, Col Hugh Cort, CofS ADSEC, to Deputy
service troops in question be phased back CG C O M Z , F E C O M Z , 27 May 44, sub: Effect of
and that another division (the 79th) be New Phasing of Opn NEPTUNE on COMZ Plan,
EUCOM 381 NEPTUNE, I; Rpt, 21 A Gp to G–3
brought in over UTAHBeach at about D SHAEF, 4 Jun 44, sub: Status of Plng, SHAEF G–3
plus 8. The Advance Section opposed the GCT Ops ‘A’ 21 A Gp—General; Ltr, Plank, CG
change, and warned that the resultant de- ADSEC, to DCofS FECOMZ, 26 May 44, sub:
Changes in Tactical Plan FUSA, 12 A Gp 370 Plan-
lays in the reconstruction of Cherbourg ning—ADSEC; ADSEC Operations History, p. 23,
and of the railways might seriously affect ETO Adm.
THE OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 303

progress was slower the lines of commu- on the Continent; two battalions were to
nications would be shorter and fewer be brought in for the support of the Third
service troops would be required.67 Army; and an armored force replacement
battalion was to be established to form the
The movement of replacements and the nucleus of a n armored force depot. The
establishment of a replacement system on phasing in of the remaining replacement
the Continent constituted an essential installations, including three more depots
part of the OVERLORD build-up plan. The with eleven battalions, was to be com-
responsibility for drafting such a plan pleted in Phase III (D plus 42 to 90). All
rested with the Replacement System, a depots were not of the same type, nor in
separate theater command headed by Col. direct support of the armies. Some served
Walter G. Layman. The lack of a plan as as replacement stockage depots, some as
late as the end of April caused some ap- reception depots, and others were for
prehension in higher headquarters.68But casuals or for training.70All were to move
a plan to guide the movement of replace- to the Continent according to a prear-
ments and replacement installations to the ranged schedule, although this was sub-
Continent was published in mid-May as ject to change as were all build-up plans.
an annex to the Communications Zone Long before D Day the theater worked
plan. It provided for the transfer of more out a requisitioning procedure for the nor-
than 200,000 replacements to the Conti- mal operation of the replacement system.
nent in the first ninety days. But this procedure was not counted on to
The replacement plan followed the fulfill the needs of the initial stages of the
three-phase scheme which was common invasion, for it was believed to be incapa-
to all OVERLORD planning. During Phase ble of responding quickly enough to the
I (D to D plus 14) the replacement system demands which heavy initial casualties
on the Continent was to be operated by were expected to cause. Large numbers of
First Army. Three separate replacement replacements would be needed quickly,
battalions were to be attached to First and the existence of a water barrier be-
Army initially, one in support of each tween the stockage pools and requesting
corps (V, VII, and X I X ) , to handle the units, causing both transportation and
processing of replacements requisitioned communications difficulties, was expected
in advance. On about D plus 10 a replace- to create a great handicap to the expedi-
ment depot with two additional battalions tious filling of requisitions. Even the estab-
was to cross to the Continent and assume lishment of three replacement battalions
control of all five battalions operating within the first week was not expected to
with the First Army. An operational re- meet the earliest demands.
serve of 5,000 replacements was to be 67Control of the Buildup, Gen Bd Rpt 22, p. 5;
shipped to the depot immediately from FUSAG Alternative Troop Priority List B, Tenta-
the replacement pool in the United King- tive, 18 June 44, EUCOM Jt OpnsPlan-Alternative
Troop Priority List B, FUSAG.
dom.69In Phase II (D plus 15 to 41) the 68T h e Procurement and Use of Manpower in the
over-all control of the replacement system European Theater, Pt. IX of T h e Administrative and
Logistical History of the ETO (hereafter cited as Pro-
was to be exercised by the Advance Sec- curement and Use of Manpower), p. 17, OCMH.
tion. In this period an additional depot 69FUSA Rpt of Opns, Bk. II, p. 181.
with four battalions was to be established 70COMZ Plan, Annex 23 (Replacement Plan).
304 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

Two methods were devised to meet the they were intended, some being made up
problem in the first fifteen days. To pro- entirely of infantry, others of mixed
vide for replacement needs in the first five branches, and each package was ear-
days of the operation a n initial over- marked for specific division or corps units.
strength of 2,500 men was authorized After D plus 14, replacements were to be
each assault division, and proportional obtained by the normal requisitioning
overstrengths were also authorized the en- procedure, by which they would be proc-
gineer special brigades. These over- essed by the various replacement battal-
strength increments were attached to the ions then operating 71
on the far shore.
units in the United Kingdom and under- To stock even approximately correct
went training with them. At invasion time numbers of each type of replacement be-
they were held in readiness on the near fore D Day was a difficult task, for it de-
shore to be sent forward on a prearranged pended entirely on the accuracy of loss
schedule. estimates. Estimates had to be made sev-
Beginning on D plus 5, when the over- eral months ahead of actual need so that
strengths were expected to be exhausted, the War Department could plan its train-
and continuing through D plus 14, re- ing program sufficiently in advance a n d
placements were to be provided in “pack- establish the necessary shipping priorities.
ages” made u p in advance. Each package Initially the War Department authorized
was to contain 250 men organized into a specific allowance in the theater troop
platoons and squads and commanded by basis in order that a n adequate stockage
officers and noncommissioned officers who of replacements might be on hand for the
were also replacements. Members of the invasion. O n the basis of estimated losses
ETOUSA adjutant general’s staff had from all causes in the first sixty days the
conceived the idea, proposing that the theater was permitted to build up its pool
packages be formed by arm or service, of replacements to 84,110 men by 1 June
a n d that their make-up be based on 1944. O n that date the Replacement Sys-
casualty experience in North Africa. An tem actually had a total of 76,026 men
infantry package, for example, would con- plus the 5,300 allocated to overstrength
sist entirely of infantrymen of varying increments for assault units, making a
specialties, such as riflemen, cannon crew- total of 81,326.
men, mechanics, antitank gunners, heavy T h e army group commander had been
weapons crewmen, and so on. called on to submit replacement require-
T h e basic idea of the package system
was eventually adopted, although in 71 Ltr, Hq ETO to CG FUSA, 30 Mar 44, sub:
Simplified Combat Replacement Procedures, and
modied form. First Army substituted its 1st Ind, FUSA to CG ETO, 8 Apr 44; Memo, Chief
own estimates on casualties, and rejected Field Force Replacement System for AG Classifica-
the idea of standardized packages. In- tion Div, 10 Apr 44; Memo, AG Replacement and
stead, advance requisitions were submit- Classification Div for G–1, 21 May 44, sub: Package
Shipments of Replacements; Memo, Col R. L. Gil-
ted, based on estimated losses by unit, and lespie, Ex O Replacement System, for G- l ETO, 3
replacements were then grouped into in- Jun 44. All in ETO GFRC 370.092 Reinforcements
crements of 250 men for processing and May 44 to Apr 45. Procurement and Use of Man-
power, pp. 30-33; History of the Ground Force Re-
shipment. T h e packages varied therefore, placement System, ETO, Pt. I, Ch. III, ETO Adm
depending on the type of unit for which 571.
THE OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 305

ments for OVERLORD in January 1944. Be- partment warned the theater in January
fore submitting his figures he first had to 1944 that the manpower situation was al-
estimate casualties—a process that in- ready critical and that conservation would
volved some complex calculations. The have to be practiced. There was a short-
average losses of any one campaign could age of several hundred thousand men in
not be used, for example, since casualty the planned strength of the army, a short-
rates fluctuated in the course of opera- age that had been aggravated by the
tions, with the heaviest losses occurring in tendency to discharge men who were still
the assault period. For purposes of calcu- capable of rendering useful service. Gen-
lation the first 150 days of the operation eral Marshall urged at that time that men
were therefore divided into five thirty-day who were not physically perfect be re-
periods. Among the factors involved in tained in limited-assignment positions
estimating casualty rates in these phases where possible and that able-bodied men
were the strength of the enemy and esti- be released for combat duty.73The kind
mates of his capabilities, the type of action of deficiency that had developed is illus-
expected, the terrain and weather, the trated by the paratroop replacement
probable number of drownings in the first shortage. Because of the lack of qualified
days, and the expected nonbattle casual- volunteers, two parachute infantry regi-
ties. Additional estimates had to be made ments and two glider regiments had to be
of the percentage of men that would be deactivated in the United States in order
killed, wounded, and missing, and of the to meet the theater’s requirements in these
percentage of wounded that could be ex- catagories. 74
pected to return to duty in 30, 60,90, or The manpower situation saw no im-
120 days. Finally, it was necessary to esti- provement as D Day approached. In
mate the need for replacements in each March the War Department considered
branch and in each occupational spe- phasing back by one month the flow of re-
cialty. Studies made in October 1943 con- placements to the United Kingdom. But
cluded that 62 percent of all replacements after a restudy of manpower needs the
would have to be infantrymen. In Feb- theater concluded that all personnel
ruary 1944 this figure was raised to 64.3 requisitioned would be needed if OVER-
percent, and shortly before D Day it was LORD was to be launched as planned. In
again raised. 72Obviously the problem of fact, the theater estimated that even with
determining personnel requirements was the current flow of replacements a pool
full of unpredictables, and only the ex- adequate for only 60 days could be built
perience of actual combat would test the up, and that the reserve would be com-
validity of these calculations. pletely exhausted in 120 days. First Army
The replacement problem did not end thought the flow of men should be in-
with the acceptance of working estimates creased rather than curtailed. Meanwhile
of casualty rates and ratios for the various the theater complied with War Depart-
branches. Obtaining the needed number 72Procurement and Use of Manpower, pp. 43–47.
of replacements was not a simple matter 73 Ibid.,pp. 60ff.
of requisitioning, for the supply of man- 74T h e History of the 12th Army Group, March
1945, draft MS, I, 205, SHAEF 12 A G p 370.2; Cbl
power on which the theater could draw 4335, Marshall to Eisenhower, 6 Dec 43, P&O Cbl
was by no means unlimited. The War De- Files.
306 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

ment directives and initiated a conserva- by the scale of logistic support which
tion program that stressed the economical could be provided. The Allies knew that
use of manpower and extensive utilization for several months after D Day more divi-
of limited-assignment personnel. sions would be available than could be
The War Department again applied maintained on the Continent, and one
the spurs to this program in April, and in student of the problem estimated that ad-
the following month both the theater and ministrative considerations would govern
the zone of interior took further economy the rate of the build-up as late as D plus
measures. I n May all SOS replacements 270.76
were frozen in the 10th Replacement De- Essentially, the problem was to gear the
pot in the United Kingdom in order to build-up of troops with the flow of sup-
screen out men suitable for duty with the plies in order to insure that both daily
field forces. In addition the theater com- maintenance needs and adequate reserves
mander ordered that all physically quali- were provided. Maintenance require-
fied infantry officers and enlisted men in ments alone for a division slice were esti-
noninfantry units not required for staff mated to total approximately 900 tons per
positions be made available as infantry day in the early stages. Estimates of what
replacements. At the same time the War constituted adequate reserves were altered
Department cut in half the allotment of as the invasion day approached. The Joint
basic privates in T/O organizations to re- Administrative Plan of 19 April 1944 pre-
lease qualified men to the replacement scribed that a n over-all reserve of 14 days
system. Physical qualifications were also of all classes of supply except ammunition
relaxed to make more men eligible for and 5 units of fire of the latter be laid
combat duty. Replacement depots ap- down in the Communications Zone for all
pointed boards to review the classification troops by D plus 41.77This objective was
of all men previously listed as limited-as- found to be unattainable, and subse-
signment and recommended the type of quent modifications provided for a build-
assignment for which the men were quali- up of 7 days of supply of rations, 3 days of
fied.75The first weeks of combat on the all other classes except ammunition, and
Continent were soon to reveal the inade- 75Procurement and Use of Manpower, pp. 60–64;
quacy of these measures. Ltr, W D AG to C G E T O , 23 May 44, sub: Reduc-
tion of Basic Privates in T / O Units, E T O G F R C
200.3 Personnel Requisitions, File B.
(5) The Supply Plan 76Rpt, T . S. Riddell-Webster to C O S Com, War
Cabinet, n. d., SHAEF SGS 370.01 Rate of Build-up
The build-up of U.S. forces was for Continental Opns; Memo, 21 A G p (Plans), 15
M a r 44, sub: Build-up Policy, a n d Brief for CofS 1
planned with the idea that there should A Gp, for Mtg, 15 M a r 44, S H A E F 1 2 A G p 370
be put onto the Continent the maximum Build-up, Dec 43 to Mar 45.
force that could be administratively sup- 77T h e term “day of supply” is defined as the esti-
mated average daily expenditure or consumption of
ported under full operational efficiency. an item, normally figured on the basis of pounds per
Consequently the planned build-up of man per day. It is used mainly for procurement pur-
troops was inseparably related to planned poses and in expressing the level of supply reserves in
a theater or its major subdivisions. T h e term “unit of
flow of supplies to the far shore. The size fire” was a n additional unit of measure for ammuni-
of the force that could be built up on the tion (Class V) supply. It was used for tactical pur-
Continent was limited from the beginning poses only, either to indicate stock levels in army de-
THE OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 307

2 units of fire.78 The priorities for the required holding the troop build-up to a
build-up of these levels were in the follow- force which could currently be maintained
ing order: antiaircraft ammunition, Class by two thirds of the supplies landed, the
I (rations), Class V (ammunition), and balance being added to the reserve. 82
then Classes III (POL), II, a n d IV. An Since daily maintenance requirements
additional 7 days of supply of rations and were expected to average about 800 tons
5 units of fire were to be built up after the per division slice in the D plus 41–90
foregoingpriorities had been met. Supply period, approximately 1,200 tons of sup-
levels in the army zones at D plus 41 were plies per slice would have to be landed
to total 7 days of all classes other than am- every day for maintenance and normal
munition, and 7 units of fire.79 reserves alone. Adding various other ton-
To achieve these reserve levels and at nages such as coal, civil affairs supplies,
the same time meet daily maintenance boxed vehicles, preshipped equipment,
requirements plus air force supply needs and air force needs brought the total dis-
and various other tonnages not included charge requirement to about 45,000 tons
in the foregoing, such as coal and civil af- per dayat D plus 90.83
fairs supplies, planners estimated that re- In the detailed arrangements made to
ceipts would have to total approximately meet the above requirements, particularly
26,500 tons per day by D plus 41, assum- in the early stages of the operation, little
ing a build-up of fifteen divisions and a was left to chance. Supply shipments were
total troop strength of about 770,000 at prescheduled for the entire first three
that date.80At D plus 90, when there were months in order to guarantee the delivery
to be twenty-one divisions on the Con- of the minimum requirements of supplies
tinent and a total troop strength of 1,334,- and equipment. Daily requisitions for
000, they planned that theater reserves in these predetermined needs were made for
the Communications Zone should be built the entire ninety-day period on the basis
up to a level of 21 days for most classes of tonnage allocations made to the various
and 5 units of fire. Army levels were to be requisitioning headquarters. Following the
maintained throughout at 7 days of
supply and 7 units of fire.81 78Except for antiaircraft a m m u n i t i o n , which
would be built up to 7 units.
Logistic planners at Supreme Head- 79Ltr, FUSAG to CGs FUSA, TUSA, et al., 19 Apr
quarters estimated that these levels could 44, sub: Allocation of Tonnages, SHAEF 12 A Gp
be attained only if supplies were landed at 370.2 FUSAG Allocation of Tonnages.
80Draft Memo, 21 A Gp, Mar 44, sub: Subsequent
a rate 50 percent in excess of current Maintenance of British and U.S.Forces-OVERLORD,
maintenance requirements. In other SHAEF 1 2 A G p 400.402 Maintenance, Equipment
words, the build-up of the desired reserves and Supplies.
81 COMZ Plan, App. L; Ltr, FUSAG to Armies,
pots, or as a means of specifying the expenditure of 19 Apr 44, sub: Allocations of Tonnages; J t Adm
ammunition permitted in the initial stages of a n op- Plan, 19 Apr 44; Mechanics of Supply in Fast Mov-
eration, and represented specified numbers of rounds ing Situations, Gen Bd Rpt 27, p. 18.
of ammunition per weapon, varying with the types 82Adm Stf Study 11, G–4 SHAEF, 3 Jun 44, sub:
a n d calibers of weapons. For the 105-mm. howitzer, Logistical Situation U.S. Force, D plus 41–D plus 90,
for example, it was 125 rounds, for the 155-mm. SHAEF 12 A G p 370, SHAEF Plans, Adm Stf
howitzer, 75 rounds, and for the 8-inch howitzer, 50. Studies.
T h e two terms are not synonymous, and a unit of fire 83Adm Appreciation, G–4 SHAEF, 17 Jun 44, sub:
cannot be translated into days of supply. The former Post-NEPTUNE Opns, SHAEF 21 A G p 370.2 Adm
was abandoned as a yardstick after the war. Appreciation Post-NEPTUNE Opns.
308 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

OVERLORD three-phase scheme, First taken to insure an adequate flow of sup-

Army assembled all data on its require- plies to the far shore. All supply shipments
ments through D plus 14, the Advance in the first two weeks were to be prestowed
Section (under the supervision of 1st Army and tactically loaded as specified by First
Group) assembled data on the period D Army. The result was a tremendous strain
plus 15–41, and the Forward Echelon of on depot, transportation, and port facili-
Communications Zone compiled the re- ties, particularly the last, for cargo did
quirements for the remainder of the not always arrive at the port in the order
ninety-day period. The assembled requisi- in which it was to be stowed, and in order
tions were sent to Headquarters, Com- to comply with stowage plans it often was
munications Zone, the agency responsible necessary to hold cargo on cars in the port
for preparing and shipping supplies in ac- so that it could be loaded in accordance
cordance with established schedules. with discharge plans. The entire process
One of the major problems in this plan- was complicated by the necessity to as-
ning was the allocation of shipping. It was semble partial shipments from two or
necessary, first of all, to co-ordinate the more depots intended for loading on one
available tonnage lift with the estimated vessel. Since the holding capacity of the
day-to-day receiving capacities of the ports was very limited, port officials were
beaches and ports. The capacities of the frequently forced to depart from stowage
beaches were limited, and the Navy im- plans.85
posed certain restrictions on the manner Headquarters, SOS, issued detailed in-
in which shipping was used. Further, it structions on supply movements early in
was necessary to allocate the lift to the May to insure that loading could be car-
major commands by supply services and ried out in accordance with prepared
classes of supply. The lift originally allo- stowage plans and that supplies would be
cated for carrying supplies was insufficient moved to the ports with the shortest possi-
to meet the minimum requirements of the ble rail haul and the fewest bottlenecks.
forces at the rate of the build-up allowed From D Day to D plus 8 (designated as
by the allotted troop and vehicle-carrying the prestowed period) supplies were to be
craft. Shipping limitations consequently shipped in M T ships (Liberties adapted
forced a reconciliation of the size of the for motor transport hauling), coasters,
force and rate of build-up with the main- LCT’s, LCV’S,86 and barges. Coasters
tenance capacity of the supply-carrying varying in capacity from 200 to 2,000 tons
craft. Eventually these difficulties were were to begin arriving on the second tide
overcome and a balance was arrived at on D Day, and were to constitute the
between the tonnage requirements of the backbone of the lift in this period. One
force, the capacities of the beaches, and hundred and twenty-six of these vessels,
the shipping allocations. Requisitions for carrying about 90,000 tons, were pre-
supplies, phased by days, were then pre- loaded as directed by First Army, some of
pared on this basis and submitted to the 84 12 A Gp Rpt of Opns, Bk. VI (G–4), p 16;
SOS late in April and early in May.84 FUSA Rpt of Opns, Bk. I, pp. 31–32, Bk. V, pp.
139–40.
Most of the conditions that dictated 85Mounting the Operation OVERLORD,
Gen Bd
special arrangements for the troop build- Rpt 129, p. 18.
up also determined the special measures 86 Landing craft, vehicle.
THE OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 309

them solidly with ammunition, some with the United States, were to bear the main
engineer supplies, others with ammuni- burden of the build-up, supplemented by
tion and rations, In all cases composition a reduced coaster fleet from the United
of the cargo was kept as simplified as pos- Kingdom. 88
sible to insure immediate access to needed Scheduling supply requirements as
items and to permit rapid sorting and dis- much as three months in advance, and
tribution by the shore brigades.87 Once preloading the first two weeks’ shipments,
the supplies were unloaded the coaster necessarily imposed a considerable rigidity
fleet was estimated to have a theoretical in the entire supply movement program,
capacity of 17,000 tons per day, but this just as the Buildup Priority Lists did in the
was expected to suffer attrition from movement of personnel. No one could
enemy action and normal marine hazards. predict with complete accuracy the precise
From D plus 9 to 21 (called the build- needs of the forces ashore for even a short
up phase) supply movements were to con- period. Fully aware of this weakness in the
tinue via MT ships and coasters, and a supply plan, logistic planners devised sev-
limited number of commodity-loaded eral expedients to achieve a degree of flexi-
Liberty ships were to be dispatched to the bility in the phasing of supplies in the
far shore. But coasters were to continue as early stages of the operation. They also
the major carriers in this period. Com- took special measures to set up emergency
plete prestowage was expected to end reserves as an insurance against interrup-
during this phase because of the varying tions in the flow of supply.
capacity of ships returning from the far One of the expedients devised to pro-
shore and because of the impossibility of mote flexibility
was the Red Ball Express, 89
predicting what ships would be available a kind of “special delivery” service under
once the shuttle service began. Instead, which 100 tons of shipping space was set
tonnages would be consigned to the load- aside each day beginning on D plus 3 to
ing port and the stowage plan determined meet emergency requests from the far
there by the port commander. shore. All supplies requisitioned under the
As handling facilities on the Continent Red Ball procedure were to be given top
became capable of unloading the larger priority in packing, marking, and docu-
ships there was to be a progressive transfer mentation, in movement to the port, and
to the use of deeper-draft vessels. From D in handling and loading. Under another
plus 22 to 41 (which the SOS referred to procedure, known as GREENLIGHT, 600
as the maintenance movement period) tons of ammunition and engineer fortifica-
coasters were to continue to move supplies tion materials could be substituted on de-
from the United Kingdom, but there mand, depending on tactical needs, for
would also be an increasing use of ocean- scheduled shipments of engineer Class IV
going ships, with more and more pre-
stowed and commodity-loaded Liberties 87Ltr, Brownjohn to CAO, 26 Mar 44, sub: Emer-
gency Supply, SHAEF G–4 400 Supplies, General, II.
coming directly from the United States. It 88Hq SOS, Opn OVERLORD Supply Movement
was also planned to commodity-load all (U.S.) Instructions, 6 May 44, EUCOM 381 OVER-
craft leaving the United Kingdom. Finally, LORD, Supply Movement; Mounting the Operation
OVERLORD, Gen Bd Rpt 129, pp. 12–17.
beginning on D plus 42 (the change-over 89Not to be confused with the Red Ball motor
period) ocean-going ships, largely from transport express later established on the Continent.
310 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

supplies on any day. Requests for such load its supplies above the high-water
substitutions were to allow six days for de- mark. In addition, eighty-seven LBV’s 92
livery. The GREENLIGHT procedure was (each with a capacity of 50 tons) were to
not to become effective until D plus 14. As begin arriving on D plus 1 for use in ferry-
in the case of Red Ball, priority was to be ing supplies from the coasters to the beach.
given in the handling of all such shipments They were preloaded with ammunition,
at the depot, in movement to the port, and POL, and engineer construction materials
in dispatch to the Continent. so that upon arrival they would be ready
Both Red Ball and GREENLIGHT pro- for immediate discharge without waiting
vided a measure of flexibility in the type for coasters to arrive. Since they were self-
and quantity of supplies to be shipped to propelled they could be phased in as de-
the far shore, although their purposes sired. Lastly, twenty 500-ton barges
differed. Red Ball was established to pro- loaded with ammunition, POL, rations,
vide for purely emergency shipments of and engineer construction materials were
items the need for which could not be fore- to be towed across the Channel within the
seen in setting up scheduled movements. first four days to serve as a n additional
It was also a means of speedily replacing bad-weather reserve. These provided a
highly critical items lost in operations, controlled floating reserve over and above
items that the normal supply build-up planned maintenance a n d were to be
could not deliver in time. GREENLIGHT, on beached a n d unloaded only in the event
the other hand, was based on the recogni- that scheduled shipments broke down.93
tion that the prescheduled shipments of a T h e above measures did not dispel all
very limited tonnage and type of supply worries about the adequacy of the supply
might not meet tactical requirements.90 arrangements. General Moses, the G–4,
An additional degree of flexibility was was not satisfied that they would give the
provided through supply by air. Certain needed flexibility in supply movements,
supplies were set up in advance for de- and he was even more concerned over the
livery on semiautomatic basis to the two matter of building u p adequate reserves
airborne divisions, and parachute-packed on the Continent. Only a few weeks before
supplies were also prestocked for emer- D Day he recommended that the theater
gency delivery to isolated units. In addi- G–4 consider the establishment of ma-
tion, as soon as continental landing fields
were available, delivery of 6,000 pounds 90FUSA Rpt of Opns, Bk. V, p. 140; Mounting the
Operation OVERLORD, Gen Bd Rpt 129, p. 14; 1st
per day within forty-eight hours of request Ind, Stratton to U.S. Adm Stf at 21 A Gp, 15 Jun 44,
was provided for.91 EUCOM 400.22 Shipments General, I. The Red Ball
Certain emergency reserves were also procedure was specified in ETO SOP 8, the GREEN-
LIGHT procedure in SOP 41.
set up. Initially eighteen preloaded LCT’s 91 FUSARpt of Opns, Bk. V, p. 140. Procedure for
(of 140 tons capacity each) were to be air supply was laid down in ETO SOP 9.
beached at the tail end of the first tide on 92 A landing barge which could carry either sup-
plies or vehicles and could be beached.
D Day. They were loaded primarily with 93Ltr, Brownjohn, Deputy G–4 SHAEF, to CAO,
ammunition and engineer bridging mate- 26 May 44, sub: Emergency Supply, SHAEF G–4 400
rials for which there was expected to be a Supplies, General; FUSA Rpt of Opns, Bk. V, pp.
139–40. The barges were requisitioned from the
demand early on D Day. Each LCT car- United States in the spring of 1944 and were towed
ried a truck and sufficient personnel to un- to the United Kingdom by large tugs.
T H E OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 311

chinery paralleling the organization which would be capable of receiving and clear-
was intended to control the troop build- ing from the ports and beaches. Receipts
up. However, the C O M Z staff believed a t this scale would permit no improve-
that an additional monitoring agency was ment in the small reserve position in the
neither desirable nor necessary. While ad- Communications Zone, and would pro-
mitting that prescheduled shipments in- vide no operational reserves a t all for the
evitably entailed a certain degree of rigid- field forces. 95 In the view of the army
ity, it nevertheless believed that the vari- group G–4 this limitation would create an
ous means of making emergency ship- impossible situation for the Communica-
ments a n d displacing scheduled ship- tions Zone. While the prospect was admit-
ments outlined in theater SOP’S provided tedly unfavorable, the logistical planners
the needed flexibility, and that it would be nevertheless proceeded on the assumption
possible to cope with any special demands that the administrative situation would be
made by commanders on the far shore. assessed in the early stages of the operation
Moreover, these procedures did not ex- and that changes would be made in the
haust the means that could be utilized to troop build-up lists and planned cargo
meet serious emergencies. Virtually the tonnages if necessary.
entire daily supply lift, the C O M Z staff Assuming that the higher tonnage ca-
argued, was available at all times for pacities could be utilized, the planners es-
emergency loading, the only limit being timated that reserves would gradually
the capacity of rail a n d truck facilities in start to build u p so that by D plus 90 all
the United Kingdom to move supplies to the required reserves for the air forces
94
the ports. would be established, and 5 units of fire
General Moses had even graver misgiv- a n d tonnages equal to about 10 days of
ings on the subject of the reserve build-up. supply in the Communications Zone
There appeared to be no question that would be available for all troops ashore.
maintenance requirements could be met But even this build-up would not meet the
satisfactorily, at least in the first six weeks. planned levels, which called for 21 days of
The difficulty was that tonnage discharge supply for all forces in the Communica-
was to be limited in the early phases, prin- tions Zone by D plus 90.
cipally because port facilities for the recep- These unencouraging prospects led
tion of large ships would be lacking, and General Moses to state that from the G–4
it was therefore impossible to plan for the point of view the logistical support of the
build-up of large reserves. There was little operation after D plus 41 was precarious,
prospect that the situation would im-
prove after D plus 41. SHAEF planners 94Ltr, Moses to G–4 ETO, 20 May 44, sub: Con-
trol of Supply Build-up, with 1st Ind by Lord, 1 Jun
had estimated that port capacity would 44, and Stf Study by Col G. S. Speidel, G–4
reach 45,000 tons by D plus 90, but there FECOMZ, 21 May 44, sub: Control of Supply Build-
was no assurance from the Communica- up—In Answer to Inquiry of Deputy MGA, 21 A Gp,
EUCOM 400 Supplies, Services and Equipment,
tions Zone that it would be able to utilize General, IIIB; Draft 1st Ind, Stratton to C-in-C 21 A
it. The supply build-up, according to Gen- Gp for U S . Adm Stf, 15 Jun 44, EUCOM 400.22
eral Moses, was expected to be limited to Shipments General, I.
95Operational reserves are defined as supplies held
30,000 tons per day, the tonnage which by an army to insure continuity of distribution and
the Transportation Corps estimated it issue to its subordinate elements.
312 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

if not impossible. There were many inde- a higher degree of order into the handling
terminate factors involved, of course, and, of supplies by organizing the beach main-
in spite of the gloomy paper prospects at tenance areas. Service troops from each of
the moment, no immediate changes in the technical services in the First Army at-
plan were contemplated. Hopefully, the tached to the brigades were to supervise
G–4 surmised that maintenance require- the establishment and operation of segre-
ment estimates might prove excessive, and gated dumps. As enough of these men be-
reserves might be built u p from the sur- came available, the installations were to
plus maintenance brought to the Conti- be taken over and operated by army serv-
nent. Progress might also be slower than ice units, the engineer brigades remaining
anticipated, with resulting cuts in support- responsible for the movement of supplies
ing and service troops and the creation from the beaches to the army dumps.
thereby of greater reserves for the troops Then, as beach and port operations were
ashore. developed and First Army moved forward
O n the other hand, there was the possi- and organized its own maintenance area,
bility that conditions might be even less more and more installations in the base
favorable than expected. If supplies were area were to be turned over to the Ad-
lost, for example, the build-up of troops vance Section, which was responsible for
might be retarded for lack of maintenance. the initial organization of the communica-
In any event, he concluded, it was imper- tions zone on the Continent. Eventually
ative that administrative developments the Advance Section in turn would relin-
be watched closely from the start and quish control of the coastal area as other
that the logistic potential be frequently C O M Z sections arrived to take over the
reappraised. 96 administration of the base area. For the
first six weeks, however, the Advance Sec-
(6) The Depot Structure tion, as the first echelon of the Communi-
cations Zone, made detailed plans for the
Still another aspect of the OVERLORD lo- entire administrative structure. 97
gistic plan which had to be given careful Theater headquarters issued instruc-
consideration was the Continental depot tions in February 1944 for the establish-
structure. Like other portions of the sup- ment of depots on the Continent, and the
ply system, the network of base, interme- Advance Section and Forward Echelon,
diate, and advance depots, base mainte- Communications Zone, followed later with
nance shops, vehicle parks, assembly detailed plans specifying the exact loca-
plants, and bulk POL storage facilities, tions of all types of installations, the
was to have its rudimentary beginnings on amount of covered and open storage re-
the beaches a t OMAHA and UTAH.After quired, and the tonnage capacities of all
the landings of the assault forces the first storage facilities. Storage was planned in
supplies were simply to be dumped into all the towns in the vicinity of the landing
fields immediately behind the beaches, 96Memo, Moses to CofS FUSAG, 16 May 44, sub:
with only a rough attempt at segregation OVERLORD Supply Situation, D plus 41–D plus 90,
by classes. As soon as the combat forces SHAEF 12 A Gp G–4 Memos 1944.
97Ltr, FUSA to Stf Secs and Svcs, 23 May 44, sub:
had expanded the beachhead sufficiently, Control of Beach Area Dumps, FUSA 370 Employ-
the engineer special brigades were to bring ment and Opn of Troops, FUSA–16, Drawer 4.
THE OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 313

beaches, those figuring most conspicuously 4 10,000 square feet of covered and 440,-
being Cherbourg, Ste. Mère-Eglise,Caren- 000 square feet of open hardstandings. It
tan, Valognes, Trévières, La Haye-du- calculated that storage of 35,000 tons of
Puits, and St. Lô. Some of these locations ordnance Class II supplies, plus a park for
were to serve as depots for two or more of 2,000 vehicles would require 560,000
the technical services, but most sites were square feet of covered facilities, 360,000
selected for a single specific use, such as square feet of open storage, and 125,000
third, fourth, and fifth echelon mainte- square feet of open hardstandings. Storage
nance shops, vehicle assembly plants, space for 130,000 tons of ammunition was
Class I storage, or vehicle parks. Since all sited along 260 miles of road. Vehicle as-
sites had to be selected on the basis of map sembly at the rate of 100 vehicles per day
reconnaissance it was to be expected that was to be initiated in this period and
there would be many changes once they would require 15,000 square feet of cov-
were examined. ered and a like amount of open hard-
Planning the depot structure involved standings.98
estimating the amount of space required The above figures represent the require-
as well as selecting the most suitable sites. ments only for the first six weeks, the
Each service had to calculate its needs for period during which all supply installa-
covered and open storage, and, depend- tions were the responsibility of the Ad-
ing on its mission, for covered and open vance Section and all administrative in-
hardstandings, vehicle parks, ammunition stallations of necessity had to be in the
storage along roads, and bulk POL tank- Normandy area. After D plus 41 there was
age. In many cases it was important that to be a noticeable shift, with the main
storage be located near railway spurs and storage and maintenance facilities there-
sidings. after concentrated in the Rennes-Laval-
Space requirements ran into astronomi- Chateaubriant triangle. This shift was to
cal figures. In the first six weeks alone the coincide with the change in direction of
technical services of the Advance Section operations from north-south to east-west
estimated they would need approximately as U.S. forces drove into the Brittany pen-
2,200,000 square feet of covered storage, insula and at the same time east toward
15,000,000 square feet of open storage, the Seine. Important installations were to
420,000 square feet of covered hardstand- remain in operation in the base areas, par-
ings, and 2,000,000 square feet of open ticularly at Cherbourg and St. Lô, but by
hardstandings. Because Ordnance listed D plus 90 about two thirds of all storage
what were probably the most varied of all was to be located in Brittany and farther
the technical service requirements, its cal- east.99Plans for the depot structure, like
culations serve well to illustrate the types others, however, were subject to altera-
of administrative facilities for which plans tions dictated by tactical needs. As events
had to be made. In the first six weeks the turned out they proved the least stable of
ADSEC Ordnance Section planned to all plans and were completely upset by the
provide third, fourth, and fifth echelon course of battle.
maintenance for 52,500 vehicles, 2,400 98ADSEC NEPTUNEPlan, technical service an-
weapons, and 5 antiaircraft battalions, for nexes.
which it estimated space requirements at 99COMZ Plan.
314 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

(7) Transportation Some of these figures were obtainable from

experience in the Mediterranean theater,
Movements enter into virtually every some were secured from tests in the United
aspect of supply. No other function does Kingdom. The Allies did not have full in-
more to make a living organism of the lo- formation on the condition of roads in the
gistic structure. The OVERLORD planners lodgment area. France had a traditionally
spent long hours on the problem of rail fine road network, however, and main
and motor transport on the Continent and roads were hard surfaced and suitable for
suffered strong misgivings in the preinva- year-round traffic. The principal restric-
sion months over the adequacy of their tion to the easy flow of traffic was expected
preparations. That the lack of transport to come in the bottlenecks created by the
could become a limiting factor of critical narrow streets of the older towns. In the
dimensions was amply demonstrated dur- early stages of the operation the limited
ing the pursuit across northern France in size of the lodgment would undoubtedly
the summer of 1944. present difficulties, particularly a t the
Railroads and motor transport, the lat- base of the Cotentin, where egress from
ter bearing a much greater share of the the peninsula was limited to a few cause-
burden than ever before, were to be the way-type highways across the low,
chief carriers on the Continent, as they swampyDouvevalley.100
had been in World War I. I n the earliest Enemy-inflicted damage to highways
stages of the operation all movements were was not expected to be great. Most of the
to be carried out by truck, and very little early repair and reconstruction would un-
rail mileage was expected to be placed in doubtedly be required on bridges, and
operation before D plus 41. As in the case First Army engineers would have to do
of the ports, restoring transportation facili- these initialjobs. As areas were released by
ties, particularly the railways, was pri- the army, the Advance Section would as-
marily the responsibility of one service— sume responsibility for the continued re-
the Corps of Engineers—and operating pair and maintenance of roads. One engi-
them was the responsibility of another— neer general service regiment was believed
the Transportation Corps. The latter had capable of reconstructing 10 to 12 miles of
been created as recently as 1942, taking road per day and properly maintaining
over the operation of motor transport from about 170 miles. To meet estimated needs
the Quartermaster Corps and of railways in the first six weeks, five general service
from the Corps of Engineers. regiments and two dump truck companies
The Corps of Engineers began planning were to be assigned to road maintenance
the road repair and highway bridging re- and repair for that period. Additional
quirements for OVERLORD almost two plans were drawn by another COMZ sec-
years before the invasion. For this purpose tion for the repair and maintenance of the
it established working figures on the ca- Brittany roads. 101
pacities of roads of particular widths, The mission of the Transportation
made assumptions on the degree of de-
struction that could be expected, and esti- 100Road Maintenance and Highway Bridging,
Hist Rpt 14, Corps of Engrs ETO, Ch. I, ETO A h ;
mated the amount of construction mate- ADSEC NEPTUNE Plan, Annex 6 (Engr), App. D.
rials and number of repair units required. 101 ADSECPlan, Annex 6 (Engr), App. D.
T H E OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 315

Corps with respect to the operation of tons at that date.102But there was serious
motor transport was to carry out all motor apprehension in several quarters over the
transportation connected with port clear- adequacy of motor transportation after
ance, static interdepot operations, and the first six weeks. Logistical planners at
line-of-communications hauling. This en- SHAEF noted that the shortage of truck
tailed traffic regulation, both at the ports companies was one of the chief factors
and along the lines of communications, likely to limit the development of the lines
and the establishment of regulating sta- of communications even if operations pro-
tions to control movement into the army ceeded as planned,103 a n d it was this
areas. For several months after the inva- shortage which led General Moses to ex-
sion the Transportation Corps was handi- press misgivings over the prospects of ade-
capped by the lack of a centrally con- quately supporting operations after D
trolled motor transport service, although plus 41.
the Advance Section organized a provi- Important as motor transportation was
sional motor transport brigade to provide to be in operation OVERLORD, it was not
centralized field control over its own trans- expected to sustain the mounting volume
portation shortly before D Day. Most of of supply movements after the first few
the theater’s truck companies had actually weeks. From the beginning the Allies
been activated as Quartermaster units, counted on the railways-a far more eco-
and many continued to carry the designa- nomical carrier over long distances-
tion “ Q M Truck Company (TC)” for eventually to bear the larger portion of the
some months. transportation burden. Restoration of the
To accomplish its motor transport mis- French rail lines took on added impor-
sion the Transportation Corps estimated tance in view of the anticipated shortage
that, in addition to the vehicles furnished of truck transport.
the field forces, 240 truck companies Lack of a final operational plan made it
would be needed in the Communications impossible for a long time to prepare ac-
Zone, and that two drivers should be pro- curate estimates of matériel requirements.
vided each vehicle to permit round-the- Nevertheless, requisitions for special Class
clock operation. It also requested that a IV equipment had to be placed far enough
large percentage of the truck units be in advance to insure procurement and de-
equipped with the large 10-ton flat-bed livery in time for the operation. Supply
semitrailers and truck-tractors.Just before planners found it necessary therefore to es-
D Day theater headquarters granted the timate needs on the basis of hypothetical
additional drivers, but it had authorized operational plans, assuming a rail line of
only 160 truck companies for the opera- communications of a certain length and
tion, and only a small percentage of the assuming certain scales of destruction.
larger capacity truck-tractor-semitrailer In the meantime studies were made to
units could be furnished. The smaller 102ADSEC Plan, Annex 14 (Transportation); Op-
2½-ton 6 x 6 truck had to be substituted. eration, Organization, Supply and Services of the
Plans called for moving 130 companies to Transportation Corps in the European Theater of
Operations, Gen Bd Rpt 122, pp. 42, 99–100.
the Continent by D plus 41.This number 103Ltr, Chief Log Plans Br G–4 SHAEF to G–4
of units was expected to meet the daily SHAEF, 17 Apr 44, sub: Log Plans Progress Rpt 7,
forward movement requirement of 23,700 SHAEF SGS 3 19.1/4 G–4 Rpts.
MAP 9
 317

determine the exact condition of the

French railway net. The lack of intelli-
gence on European rail lines handicapped
planning at first. This was remedied when
the British turned over to ETOUSA engi-
neers considerable information on the
French railways.104Engineer studies cov-
ered such matters as the state of track
maintenance, grades, carrying capacity,
number, type, and size of bridges, the kind
of water and coal facilities, and the size of
yards. Estimates of damage to the rail sys-
tem were considerably higher than for
highways. For planning purposes it was
assumed that 75 percent of the track and
all bridges would be destroyed. A portion
of this trackage and bridging was ex-
pected to be salvageable, but reconstruc-
tion of the lines was estimated to require
55 percent new ties and rail and 90 per-
cent new bridging. These estimates were
based on the enemy's performance in the
Mediterranean theater, where demoli-
tions had been extensive. I n Italy the
Germans had employed a tie-breaking
machine which systematically tore ties
from the roadbed and automatically
dropped a charge which broke the rails at
regular intervals.105
ADSEC engineers made all the de-
tailed plans for railway reconstruction as
far south as Rennes, although this in-
volved projects which were expected to re-
quire almost three months to complete.
(Map 9 ) First priority was given to the re-
construction of the yards at Cherbourg.
Port clearance facilities were of first im-
portance, and rail operations were logi-
cally based on Cherbourg as a starting
point, for that port was the only suitable
point of entry for locomotives and rolling
104Railroad Reconstruction and Bridging, Hist Rpt
R Johnstone
12, Corps of Engrs ETO, p. 21, ETO Adm.
105Ibid.,pp. 23–24.
 318 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

stock, and the only port capable of han- gram was worked out for the engineer
dling awkward equipment. Rail line res- general service regiments assigned to this
toration was to be completed only as far work, they had very little experience in
as Lison Junction, a few miles southeast of railway reconstruction before the inva-
Isigny, by D plus 41. By D plus 90 a total sion. Two of the regiments—the 332d and
of only 245 miles was scheduled to be in 347th—had attended the joint U.S.-
operation, consisting mainly of a trunk British railroad bridging school in the
line along the route Cherbourg-Lison United Kingdom. They were the only
Junction-Folligny-Dol-Rennes. 106 units that received any measure of special-
T h e rail plan thus fitted into the gen- ized training for their continental mis-
eral logistic scheme to develop the lines of sion.108
communications southward to the Rennes In all the planning for reconstruction of
depot area, but it was a modest one con- the continental railways, the engineers
sidering the size of the OVERLORD lodg- maintained close liaison with the Trans-
ment area and the eventual course of op- portation Corps, which organized the 2d
erations. ADSEC engineers developed Military Railway Service to operate the
plans to reconstruct roadbeds, culverts, lines. T h e 2d M R S was commanded by
and bridges, reclaim salvageable track Brig. Gen. Clarence L. Burpee, who had
materials, relay tracks, install yards and come into the service from the Atlantic
sidings, and rehabilitate or construct water Coast Line. I n the early stages of the op-
and coal supply facilities. With character- eration the Railway Service was to be lim-
istic thoroughness the Corps of Engineers ited primarily to reconnaissance of cap-
made detailed studies of the work involved tured rail lines, and the Corps of Engi-
in the repair of each bridge, culvert, arid neers was to determine what alterations in
spur, and prepared bills of materials list- plans, if any, should be made in restora-
ing every need from rock crushers and tion of lines. To operate the lines the 2d
concrete mixers to ties a n d spikes. I n the Military Railway Service organized rail-
47-mile stretch from Cherbourg to Lison way grand divisions, intended to handle
Junction alone the plan listed eighty roughly the area of a base section. A grand
bridges which might require rebuilding. division was normally capable of operat-
It was estimated that 47,500 tons of con- ing from 250 to 450 miles of railway, de-
struction material would be needed for the pending on the number of units assigned
reconstruction of the mileage outlined to it, For early operations, to D plus 41,
above. This included steel bridging and the Transportation Corps provided one
culverts, track materials, and miscellane- railway grand division, with two railway
ous items such as cement, lumber, and pil- shop battalions and two railway operating
ing, all phased to arrive at certain ports or 109 Not until after this period,
battalions.
beaches in specific amounts, within daily however, would operation of the lines
tonnage allocations. 107 become extensive.
The troop units provided for this mis-
sion totaled five engineer general service 106ADSEC Plan, Annex 6 (Engr), App. C.
regiments, three engineer dump truck 107Engr Rpt 12, pp. 25–26.
108Ibid., p. 27.
companies, and one engineer heavy pon- 109 MilitaryRailway Service, Gen Bd Rpt 123, pp.
ton battalion. Although a training pro- 4, 11.
THE OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 319

(8) The Supply of POL initially frustrated by the TORCHopera-

tion. Experimentation continued, how-
The magnitude and importance of the ever, not only with an overland pipeline,
movement problem are nowhere better but with submarine pipelines and ship-to-
illustrated than in the separate plans shore lines. POL planners had much to
which were made for the transportation of learn about the handling of equipment
petroleum products. Arrangements for and the training and organization of per-
POL supply enjoyed a pre-eminence in sonnel. They attempted to establish sound
the planning and preparation for OVER- bases for estimating the POL needs for a
LORD matched only by the plans for port continental operation, and found it neces-
reconstruction. POL alone accounted for sary to requisition enormous amounts of
one quarter of all the tonnage transported special equipment. Their efforts were par-
to the European Theater of Operations— tially negated by the lack of a firm troop
a convincing statistical token that gasoline basis and by the lack of figures on the
had become the lifeblood of modern ratios of vehicles to troops. Nevertheless
armies. the later OVERLORD planners profited by
The extraordinary demands for POL the plans and experimentation of the
which the cross-Channel operation was ROUNDUP period. For want of adequate
expected to make called for extraordinary experiential data, the P O L planners ini-
preparations. From the very start of inva- tially placed considerable reliance on
sion planning provision for adequate POL British estimates, particularly for require-
supply focused on the use of some kind of ments. Estimates as to the earliest date on
a light pipeline which could be laid down which POL could be supplied in bulk to
quickly so that gasoline could be trans- the Continent were pessimistic at first. Be-
ported economically over long distances. cause all shipping was preoccupied with
British experimentation with this idea be- the movement of supplies and equipment
gan shortly after Dunkerque, and the pro- essential to combat operations in the early
duction of such a pipeline figured in the stages, there was little hope that bulk sup-
early ROUNDUP planning. American inter- ply could be initiated before D plus 30.
est was quickened by the appointment of Planning a POL distribution system
a special Petroleum Committee in the also posed an administrative problem
United Kingdom to study the problem in since there were several interested parties
July 1942, shortly after the European the- or services. POL was a quartermaster
ater was activated. At about the same item of supply. But any system entailing
time the Chief of Engineers in Washing- construction of bulk facilities and pipe-
ton outlined a P O L distribution plan lines involved the engineers. Transporta-
which provided for lightweight pipelines tion of POL products, whether by tanker,
which could be laid a t the rate of twenty railway tank cars, or tank trucks, was the
or more miles per day.110 job of the Transportation Corps. Ord-
Planning for continental P O L supply nance was involved as the designer and
thus got under way a t a n early date, al- supplier of much of the equipment such as
though definitive plans were long in tak-
ing shape. Attempts to requisition mate- 110Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants, Hist Rpt 13,
rials for a POL distribution system were Corps of Engrs ETO, pp. 3–6, ETO Adm.
320 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

vehicle-loading pumps and hose. The air there was no definite basis for figuring the
forces were interested as the consumer of requirements of motor or aviation fuel,
aviation gasoline, for which special provi- which was a prerequisite for sound plan-
sion had to be made. Co-ordinating the ning by the Quartermaster Corps and the
interests and responsibilities of these vari- Corps of Engineers. There was continued
ous parties was a difficult task in view of lack of co-ordination between the services,
the initial lack of a single agency for that and there were not enough men trained
purpose. for this type of operation. Before adequate
POL plans began to assume a clearer planning data were agreed on, confusion,
outline late in 1943. COSSAC plans at disagreement, overlap of authority, and
that time called for a n intake installation loss of time attended plans for the estab-
a t Port-en-Bessin to receive POL in bulk lishment of POL sections in the various
from tankers in the harbor and via ship- services and echelons of command.
to-shore lines, for storage facilities farther The lack of an agency at the general
inland, and for a single 4-inch pipeline to staff level which could settle jurisdictional
St. Lô and Coutances. Contrary to earlier differences and co-ordinate the responsi-
conclusions concerning the availability of bilities and interests of the several services
tanker shipping for the transport of bulk involved in POL supply was finally reme-
POL, the COSSAC plans now called for died in February 1944, when a POL
work to begin on bulk installations as Branch was established within the G–4
early as D plus 5. The initial receiving and Section, ETOUSA, under Col. Freeman
storage installations were scheduled to be W. Burford. In the next two months a con-
completed by D plus 10, and the entire certed effort was made to arrive at defin-
line was to be completed by D plus 20. itive data on requirements so that lower
The possibilities of meeting such a sched- echelons could write detailed plans. In
ule were viewed with considerable pessi- this planning technical advice was fur-
mism until the achievements in the nished mainly by officers who had served
Sicilian operation became known. with the big oil companies such as Stand-
The Port-en-Bessin installations and in- ard, Shell, and Humble. 111By the end of
land pipeline were only part of the P O L March the estimated pipeline and storage
plan developed by the COSSAC planners tank requirements were established for
in 1943. A similar bulk receiving system OVERLORD. They provided for a consid-
was contemplated at Cherbourg, and two erably higher estimate of POL consump-
pipelines were to reach south from Cher- tion rate, a larger proportion of reserves to
bourg along the axis La Haye-du-Puits- be held in bulk storage, and a more exten-
Avranches-Laval. They were to be sup- sive coverage of the operational area with
plemented by additional lines from the bulk distribution lines than originally an-
Brittany ports inland to Laval. Construc- ticipated. The revised estimates were
tion of this system was scheduled to begin immediately reflected in higher matériel
immediately after the capture of Cher- requirements and made the whole prob-
bourg and was to be completed by D lem of supply of construction equipment
plus 90. 111Interv with Col. Elmer E. Barnes, former Chief
Preparing to implement these plans was Petroleum Officer ETO, 20 Feb 50; Ltr, Burford to
another matter. Until the end of the year author, 3 Apr 50, OCMH.
THE OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 321

a critical one. Much additional equip- and troops were placed in the depots who
ment, particularly 6-inch pipe, had to be were unfamiliar with the nomenclature of
requisitioned. The fact that much of it items and could not identify articles of
had to be obtained from British sources equipment. Worse still was the poor care
meant some sacrifice of standardization. given some of the equipment. Items such
In the meantime the delivery of con- as elbows, tees, and valves often lay in the
struction materials already on order open or were stored in uncovered barrels
through P R O C O requisition was disap- which collected rain water. Some of these
pointingly slow, and alarming shortages abuses and deficiencies had been noted on
developed as D Day drew nearer. One of inspections in 1943, and corrective meas-
the missions of General Moore, chief en- ures were taken.
gineer of the theater, on his trip to the T h e final U.S. plans for a P O L distri-
United States in March 1944 was to im- bution system on the Continent were
press upon the Procurement Section of the based on a plan issued by the POL
Office of the Chief of Engineers the Branch, G–4, ETOUSA, on 14 April
urgency of filling requisitions promptly. 1944. Participating in this planning were
In the last months before the invasion representatives from the Quartermaster
there were times when it was very ques- Corps, the Transportation Corps, the Air
tionable whether enough materials would Forces, and the Corps of Engineers. The
be available by D Day to carry on the Advance Section, in turn, used this out-
contemplated construction in the first line as the basis of its more detailed plan,
weeks on the Continent. Even the training which set forth the organization and oper-
program for engineer petroleum distribu- ation of the major portion of the pipeline
tion units suffered from such deficiencies. system in the first six weeks of the opera-
Shortly before D Day high priorities tion. Of the various ADSEC technical
were given to the shipment of the most service annexes, by far the most detailed
urgently needed materials. A survey of the plan was written by the Corps of Engi-
stock status of POL equipment in May neers, even though POL was a quarter-
revealed that with certain exceptions all master supply item and the Quartermaster
items listed as critical by the Advance Sec- Corps had the responsibility of receiving,
tion could be supplied for the period up to storing, and issuing all packaged POL
D plus 14, and it was believed that new products at Class III supply points and
stocks arriving in depots would be suffi- performing all decanting of POL from
cient to meet requirements from D plus 15 bulk to packages. The Transportation
to D plus 41. By 1 June preparations for Corps had a large measure of responsibil-
the P O L plan were adequate to meet all ity in transporting POL, first in tankers
the needs of the operation. and finally at the opposite end of the sup-
Problems had also arisen in connection ply line in cans and in tank trucks. But it
with the proper handling of the materials was the Corps of Engineers which had the
on hand. Removal of packing lists from most extensive mission. The engineers not
boxes often made it difficult to determine only had to construct all bulk POL facil-
the contents of individual crates. POL ities, but they had to operate them—a
equipment was scattered over a large area task that entailed the reception, trans-
rather than concentrated in one depot; portation, and storage of the great bulk of
322 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

all POL products needed by U.S. forces.112 on D plus 15, although a small percentage
T h e final POL distribution plans were of MT80 shipments was to continue in
based on estimated maintenance needs packages in order to build u p and main-
plus certain reserves. Maintenance re- tain the can population on the Continent.
quirements were based on an assumed The entire POL plan for Operation
rate of consumption for various vehicles OVERLORD centered on the two big pipe-
per operational day. First Army assumed line systems, designated as the Major and
a 25-mile operational day for the first two Minor Systems. (See Map 9.) The Minor
weeks and a 50-mile operational day System, scheduled to be constructed first,
thereafter. Consumption per 50-mile day included facilities for receiving, storing,
was taken as 8 gallons per wheeled vehi- and dispensing bulk POL products in the
cle, 24 gallons per half-track, and 52 per Port-en-Bessin-Ste. Honorine-des-Pertes-
full track. Beyond this certain allowances Balleroy area. It was to consist of tanker
were made to provide for powered equip- berthing facilities and unloading lines,
ment. Using these basic working figures, onshore booster stations, inland tank
and the number of vehicles scheduled to farms (for storage), pipelines, pumping
be phased into the Continent, planners stations, and dispensing facilities. Tanker
estimated that the following daily ton- deliveries were to be discharged through
nages of POL products would be required two receiving points. British and Amer-
at D plus 14, D plus 41, and D plus 90: 113 ican forces jointly were to use Port-en-

These requirements assumed a strength Bessin, a British-controlled port with

of approximately 67,000 vehicles on the berthing facilities, as a discharge point for
Continent on D plus 14, 183,000 on D tankers carrying both motor vehicle and
plus 41, and 263,590 on D plus 90. To aviation gasoline. Discharge was to be
meet their goal, the Allies had to intro- through two 6-inch lines, delivering both
duce a total of 271,158 tons of POL prod- to the British and, through booster pumps,
ucts in the first 42 days. This included the to the U.S. tank farm at Mt. Cauvin (near
aviation gasoline (Avgas) requirement, Etreham), about two miles distant from
but the bulk of the tonnage (183,233 tons) the port. Ste. Honorine-des-Pertes, two
was allocated to motor vehicle (MT80) miles to the west and convenient to suit-
gasoline. These amounts would provide a able offshore anchorage, was to be the
required reserve level of 7 days on D plus other receiving point, used for the receipt
14, 14 days on D plus 41, and 21 days on
112See COMZ and ADSEC Plans, with Engr, QM
D plus 90. and T C annexes and App. P (POL) to the COMZ
For the first twenty-one days of the Plan. The above is based primarily on Historical Re-
OVERLORD operation all POL needs were port 13 of the Corps of Engineers, ETO.
113COMZ Plan, App. P. These figures are mixed
to be shipped packaged—that is, in cans. net and gross—gross in the case of packaged, net in
Bulk deliveries were scheduled to begin the case of bulk tonnages.
THE OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 323

of motor vehicle and diesel fuel for U.S. outstanding features of the Major System
Army and Navy use. Discharge at that were the large discharge capacities at
point was to be effected via two 6-inch Cherbourg, the long pipelines, and the
ship-to-shore submarine lines (called enormous storage capacities to be devel-
TOMBOLAS), and delivery was to be made oped along the pipeline route.
to the Ste. Honorine storage system, and Deliveries at Cherbourg were to be
by pipeline to the Navy fueling station at made principally via tanker discharge
the site of the MULBERRY. The Ste. Hon- alongside the Digue de Querqueville. Five
orine storage capacity was to total 20,000 6-inch lines were planned to handle these
barrels, the Mt. Cauvin tank farm 24,000 deliveries. In addition, one 6-inch line was
barrels. This much of the Minor System to receive fuel directly from cross-Channel
was to be completed and in operation by submarine lines. The latter project was an
D plus 10. Within the next six days pipe- even more novel feature of the invasion
lines were to tie in the Ste. Honorine stor- operation than the MULBERRIES. The
age system with the lines at Mt. Cauvin, Allies had seriously considered the idea of
and from this point a 4-inch line was to be submarine pipelines throughout the plan-
constructed to Balleroy, about thirteen ning period, and after extensive experi-
miles to the south. Terminal storage tanks mentation the British developed cables
with a capacity of 6,000 barrels were to be that could be laid underwater and would
erected at Balleroy, which, like Mt. Cau- carry POL under high pressures. The
vin a n d Ste. Honorine, was to have dis- Corps of Engineers also conducted experi-
pensing facilities both for canning and for ments in the United States, but this proj-
loading tank trucks. The entire project ect was abandoned in December 1943
involved the construction of twenty-seven because it could not be completed in time
miles of pipeline with the necessary to justify the enormous expenditure of ef-
booster stations and fittings, and tank fort that was required.115The cross-Chan-
storage, for 54,000 barrels. Since there nel underwater pipeline plan which was
were no known commercial facilities in adopted was therefore exclusively a Brit-
the area the entire system was to be newly ish project. Known as P L U T O (for pipe-
constructed. 114 line under the ocean), it provided for the
While the Minor System was designed laying of ten 3-inch cables from the Isle of
to meet the Allies’ needs for bulk POL in Wight to Cherbourg, the first line to ar-
the initial stages of operation OVERLORD, rive on D plus 12.116At a distance of sixty
the biggest share of bulk POL deliveries miles each line had a theoretic delivery
was eventually expected to be made capacity of over 300 tons of gasoline per
through the larger and more permanent day. Because P L U T O was substantially
system based on Cherbourg, known as the an untried project until after it started
Major System. This, like the Minor, was
to consist of discharge points, storage 114 ADSECPlan, Annex 6 (Engrs); Engr Rpt 13,
Ch. II.
facilities, and pipelines, but it was con- 115Ltr,Devers to Stark, Cmdr U S . Naval Forces
ceived and planned on a much larger in Europe, 16 Dec 43, sub: Cross-Channel Submarine
scale and, when completed, was to have Pipeline, and Cbl WL-2729, Lee to A G W A R , 16
Dec 43, E T O AG 678 Pipelines; Engr Rpt 11, pp.
many times the capacity of the earlier de- 31–33.
velopment east of OMAHABeach. The 116ADSECPlan, Annex 6 (Engr).
324 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

actual operation, all POL planners con- were to carry the major portion of bulk
sidered deliveries via the submarine sup- P O L projects to U.S. forces. The 6-inch
ply line as a bonus, over and above the lines had a rated capacity of 1,825 tons
total requirements which, for planning per day, and the 4-inch lines a capacity of
purposes, were to be delivered by the more 825 tons. For planning purposes, however,
orthodox tanker method.117 factors of 1,515 and 650 tons respectively
To carry bulk fuel inland plans were were used.
made for the construction of three 6-inch Another vital feature of the Major Sys-
pipelines from the Digue de Querqueville tem was the storage plan. I n writing the
in Cherbourg south to Laval and then POL plan for operation OVERLORD the
eastward to the vicinity of Etampes, south planners did not lack intelligence on the
of Paris. In addition, tactical conditions existing facilities in the Cherbourg and
permitting, it was hoped that other lines Brittany peninsulas. They knew, for ex-
could be built from the Brittany ports, ample, that Cherbourg had extensive
either from Vannes (in the vicinity of tankage capacity, since it had been a
Quiberon Bay) to Châteaubriant, run- naval base; but, as in the case of the ports,
ning northeastward to join the Major they assumed that such facilities would be
System at Laval, or preferably a supple- destroyed. 119 They therefore planned a
mentary line starting at Donges at the tremendous storage program, particularly
mouth of the Loire, and running eastward at Cherbourg, where thirty-eight tanks
through Angers, Tours, and Orléans.118 were scheduled, most of them of 10,000-
The Advance Section, as the command barrel capacity, with a total capacity of
responsible for detailed plans through D 33 1,000 barrels. They were to be built on
plus 41, made definite plans to extend the the high ground southwest of Querque-
lines only to the Brittany area, where the ville, concealed and dispersed, but so
big depots were to be established. Two of interconnected as to permit complete flex-
these lines were to carry motor vehicle ibility of operation. In order to provide
fuel and the third was to carry aviation the inland reserve storage, both for local
gasoline. The three lines were to be laid dispensing when pipelines were shut down
side by side as far as Fougères, a distance and for operational storage, tanks were to
of 101 miles. From Fougères a 4-inch be built all along the route of the pipe-
branch line (for MT80) was to be ex- lines, at La Haye-du-Puits, Coutances,
tended to Rennes (28 miles) for local dis- Avranches, Fouèkres, Rennes, and Laval,
tribution. From Fougères southeast two all within the first forty-two days. By
6-inch lines were to continue to Laval D plus 46, when the Craon and Château-
(also 28 miles from Fougères). In addition, briant additions were to be completed, a
by D plus 41 a branch line was to have total of eighty-three tanks would have
been started from Laval southwest to been constructed, with a capacity of
Châteaubriant, partially for the purpose 536,000 barrels.120As part of these plans,
of connecting with lines from the Loire dispensing facilities were to be provided at
River ports.
The three 6-inch lines from Cherbourg 117Ibid., p. 40.
118COMZ Plan, App. P.
were to constitute the major pipeline sys- 119Ibid.
tem running to the south and east, and 120 ADSECPlan, Annex 6 (Engr).
T H E OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 325

every storage area, consisting of both packaged maintenance to bulk mainte-

truck-filling and canning facilities. nance could be made by D plus 21. Any
The construction of the Major System delay in the capture of Cherbourg set the
followed a schedule, as did all construc- POL plan back proportionately. A week's
tion projects in the OVERLORD operation. delay would cause a shortage of 31,400
By D plus 21 storage and pipeline con- tons of estimated maintenance and reserve
struction was to have progressed suffi- requirements. 122
ciently to permit dispensing and storage To make up this deficit either addi-
to begin a t La Haye-du-Puits. By D plus tional quantities of packaged POL would
26 a single pipeline was to extend as far as have to be introduced to offset the delay in
Coutances, and by D plus 31 to Av- bulk deliveries, or additional bulk-receiv-
ranches, with storage and dispensing ing facilities would have to be provided.
facilities. Meanwhile, work was also to After discussing several possibilities G–4
proceed on the second and third pipelines officials decided on 29 May that the best
and on storage facilities, so that by D plus solution was to increase the bulk capacity
41 the system was to have been completed of the Minor System. Meeting mainte-
and in operation as far as Rennes and nance requirements with packaged POL
Laval. A total of 513miles of pipeline was would have required adjustments of the
to be laid in the Major System up to this whole supply phasing program. They
point. Adding the facilities of the Minor decided rather to increase both the receiv-
System in the Port-en-Bessin and Balleroy ing a n d storage capacity in the Port-en-
area (27 miles of pipe and 50,000 barrels Bessin–Ste. Honorine-Balleroy area, and
of storage) a total of 540 miles of pipeline made a special allocation of shipping to
and 586,000 barrels of storage capacity bring an additional 700 tons of POL con-
was to be completed and in operation by struction materials over the beaches for
D plus 46.121 this purpose a t an early date.123
Modest as was the Minor System as The vital importance of the OVERLORD
compared with the one based on Cher- POL plans is reflected in the meticulous
bourg, it assumed enhanced importance detail in which they were written. They
as D Day drew near. Mention has been resembled the port plans in the multitude
made of the change in tactical plans made of considerations that the planners had to
only a week before D Day when assault take into account. Certain basic assump-
units were already marshaling for the tions had to be made, including the aver-
cross-Channel movement. This change age mileage of an operational day, the
not only affected the plans for the phasing
in of combat and service units but also 121Ibid.
122Ltr, Col Cort, CofS ADSEC, to Deputy CG
caused a revision in the estimated capture COMZ, 27 May 44, sub: Effect of New Phasing of
date of Cherbourg, setting it back one Opn NEPTUNEon COMZ Plan, SHAEF 1 2 A Gp
week to D plus 15. It therefore had a spe- 370 Plng–ADSEC.
123Rpt of conf of adm officers, 12 A Gp, 26 May
cial significance for the supply of POL. 44, 12 A Gp G–4 Ltrs, Memos, Assorted 1944; Rpt
The POL plan relied heavily on the cap- on conf to discuss alterations in POL plan, 29 May
ture of Cherbourg and the early construc- 44, SHAEF 12 A Gp 3 3 7 Confs and Mtgs, VI; Ltr,
Vaughan to U.S. Adm Stf at 21 A Gp, 1 Jun 44, sub:
tion of receiving and dispensing facilities Delay in the Capture of WATSON,USFET 381 Opns
there so that the scheduled transfer from Documents.
326 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

rate of consumption for each type of vehi- adequate can population? Such matters as
cle, and an estimated rate of advance. To draft, port rehabilitation, turn-round
arrive at estimates of total requirements time, and loading time entered into the
the planners had to know both the troop planners’ consideration of what type of
and vehicle population on the Continent tankers should be used. To co-ordinate all
at different stages. Beyond this fundamen- the facts and the informed guesses and to
tal information the ability to construct an synchronize the plans of the various serv-
adequate POL distribution system on the ices were tasks of almost infinite complex-
Continent depended on both the supplies ity. They were tasks, however, on which
and equipment and the specially trained the success of the invasion depended.
units which were to be available for such
a project. A mass of technical data had to The very bulk and detail of the OVER-
be gathered and applied. T h e computa- LORDlogistic plans indicate that the plan-
tion of pipeline construction alone in- ners were determined that every need
volved consideration of all the problems should be anticipated, and that no re-
of surveying, clearing the right of way, quirement, down to the proverbial nail,
stringing pipe, connectingjoints, installing should be wanting. The logistic plan was
pump stations, testing and filling the pipe- based on a deliberately optimistic forecast
line, building a communications system, of tactical progress to insure a timely
and erecting and connecting storage. build-up of troops and supplies, and to in-
Assuming that the construction work sure that the combat forces should never
was completed, the planners still faced a suffer from want of adequate logistic sup-
formidable array of computations and cal- port. O n the other hand, operational
culations. What, they had to estimate, was plans, including the rate of the troop
the capacity of Q M units to decant and to build-up, were so drawn as to utilize the
distribute? What was the capacity of T C full potential of the supply organization.
trucking companies to transport? To an- The entire plan, therefore, represented an
swer the latter question they had to deter- attempt to balance requirements with
mine what types of transportation and capabilities.
container-can, drum, tank truck, skid Whether the logistic structure would
tanks on cargo trucks, or 2,000-gallon prove sufficiently flexible to accommodate
trailer trucks-were best suited to various itself to changing conditions, and whether
areas in various stages of the operation. the capacities of the various facilities
How much should they allow for delays along the supply pipeline could be bal-
from traffic blocks a n d breakdowns, for anced so that strictures did not develop,
interruptions in loading a n d unloading, remained to be seen. The repercussions
for difficulties in locating dumps? What which late intelligence concerning enemy
should be the ratios of motor vehicle, avia- strength in the Cotentin could have on
tion, a n d diesel fuel, of kerosene, a n d of both tactical and logistic plans had al-
lubricants; what percentages of reserves ready demonstrated the need for resilience
should be maintained in package and bulk in the supply organization. Logistic plan-
at various times; what would the turn- ners had long been haunted by the spector
round time be; what losses of containers of “limiting factors” which might choke
should be expected in maintaining an the lines of communications a t one point
THE OVERLORD LOGISTICAL PLAN 327

or another. The smooth flow of supply re- met: the front line at D plus 90 must not
quired that all parts of the system operate be any farther advanced than the planned
approximately according to rated capac- line of the Seine-Loire; the build-up must
ity. The limiting factor at one time might be limited to troops absolutely essential to
be a shortage of shipping, at another the the operation; the Allies must be able to
capacities of the French beaches and maintain a considerable portion of re-
ports. In trying to anticipate the limiting serves in the vicinity of the ports, and full
factors the planners had been handi- operational reserves must not necessarily
capped initially by the fact that all be kept in the most advanced depots; a
branches of the staffs started planning at rail net must be developed as planned
the same time, and decisions were taken with adequate rolling stock. There was a
before reliable statistical data were avail- distinct possibility, the G–4 surmised, that
able or the limiting factors determined. In some factors, such as port capacity or the
mid-April the limiting factors which logis- extent of rail damage, might be less favor-
tic planners appeared most concerned able than assumed. The failure of only
about were the transportation facilities on one important function—port clearance,
the Continent, in which the chief deficien- for example-might create a bottleneck
cies were expected to be the shortage of which could alter the entire course of the
truck companies, the limited capacity of operation. In essence, the G–4 study
the road net in the early stages, and the seemed to say that the operation could be
slow rate of rail reconstruction. These supported provided everything proceeded
deficiencies, it was thought, might well as planned, and that there was no margin
limit the scale of operations after D of safety in the logistical arrangements for
plus 90.124 OVERLORD. 125
The SHAEF G–4 found little reason for
complacency regarding the prospects for
124Ltr, Chief Log Plans Br G–4 SHAEF to G–4,
even the first three months. In an 1 7 Apr 44, sub: Log Plans Progress Rpt 7, SHAEF
eleventh-hour assessment of the logistic SGS 3 19.1/4 G–4 Rpts.
preparations for OVERLORD he concluded 125AdmStf Study 11, Log Plans Br, G–4 SHAEF,
3 Jun 44, sub: Logistical Situation U.S. Forces D plus
that the operation would be logistically 41–D plus 90, SHAEF 12 A Gp 370 SHAEF Plans,
feasible only if certain conditions were Adm Stf Studies.
 CHAPTER VIII

Training and Rehearsing for

OperationOVERLORD
( I ) Earlier Amphibious Experience Once the beaches have been cleared and
secured they cease to be a battlefield and
One of the outstanding features that become a logistic base whose main func-
distinguished U.S. operations in World tion is to insure a steady flow of supplies
War I I from those of 1917–18 was the ex- and reinforcements.
tent to which the technique of the am- The U.S. Marine Corps had prepared a
phibious assault was developed and em- “Tentative Manual for Landing Opera-
ployed. The high degree of perfection tions” in 1934, much of which later found
achieved in both the tactical and logistical its way into the Army field manual titled
aspects of amphibious operations in World “Landings on a Hostile Shore” (FM
War II was the more remarkable in that it 31-5). I n conjunction with the Navy the
represented progress made chiefly after Marines had conducted a series of fleet
the war began. At the start of the conflict landing exercises in the thirties to test their
there was little in the way of training cen- amphibious doctrine, and U.S. Army
ters, proven techniques, or special equip- units participated in those of 1937 and
ment designed for the amphibious type of 1938, and again in 1941 and 1942.
operation, particularly for its logistic Throughout the exercises the main em-
aspects. phasis was on the tactical aspects of
This lack was serious indeed, for an am- amphibious assaults, and the doctrine of
phibious assault is as much a supply oper- beach organization and techniques of sup-
ation as a tactical one. Perhaps at no point ply handling got only secondary consid-
in modern warfare do tactics and logistics eration.1 Shore party organization was
rub elbows so intimately as in the initial particularly faulty, and there was no clear
stages of a landing operation. Assault for- division of authority between ground and
mations of necessity travel light, carrying naval units. While the exercises un-
only the most essential maintenance items doubtedly profited the Army units taking
such as rations and ammunition. Sustain- part, they left much to be desired so far as
ing and reinforcing them require the im- the logistic aspects of amphibious warfare
mediate—in fact, the almost simultane- were concerned, and the entrance of the
ous—organization of the assaulted beaches
for supply, For a brief moment tactical 1 J. A. Isely and P. A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines and
and supply operations may almost merge. Amphibious War (Princeton, 1951), pp. 64–66.
TRAINING AND REHEARSING FOR OVERLORD 329

United States into the war in December the Army Ground Forces to select a site
1941 found amphibious supply techniques for an amphibious training center, and the
in a relatively early stage of their evolu- Corps of Engineers was instructed to train
tion. enough boat crews and maintenance
Japanese successes in the Pacific gave units to allow divisional and joint training
added impetus to the development of under the Army Ground Forces to begin
amphibious techniques and equipment in that summer. Three months later Col.
the United States. In the winter of 1941– Daniel Noce (promoted to brigadier gen-
42 the Japanese launched a series of am- eral in July) organized the Engineer Am-
phibious operations which carried them phibian Command at Camp Edwards,
into the Philippines, New Guinea, the Mass. The Army Ground Forces mean-
Aleutians, the Malay Peninsula, and the while established the Amphibious Train-
Netherlands Indies. These landings were ing Command (later renamed Amphibi-
either on a small scale or unopposed, how- ous Training Center), also concentrating
ever, with ports being captured intact, its activities initially at Camp Edwards.
and they gave little indication of the com- The Engineer Amphibian Command
plex problems connected with large-scale was activated principally to train boat
assaults on well-defended shores. Never- crews which the Army Ground Forces ex-
theless they underscored the necessity for pected to use in instructing divisions in
devoting greater effort to the development amphibious landings. But this concept of
of amphibious warfare and to the produc- engineer responsibilities was immediately
tion of special equipment. The U.S. Navy broadened, and steps were taken to com-
took steps to increase the production of bine all the units needed to provide trans-
landing craft, while the Army devoted portation, organize the beaches, evacuate
additional effort to the development of wounded and prisoners of war, and handle
equipment such as the amphibian truck. the build-up of supplies for a division in a
The British gave particular attention to shore-to-shore operation. In this way a
commando training and to operations em- boat regiment, a shore regiment, and vari-
ploying landing craft.2 The first Allied ous service units were combined to create
amphibious operations were undertaken the 1st Engineer Amphibian Brigade,
in August 1942, when U.S. Marines which was activated on 15 June. The shore
landed on Guadalcanal and a predomi- regiment, its key unit, was to be trained to
nantly British-Canadian force raided the assume responsibility for all supply and
German Atlantic Wall at Dieppe. Both engineering functions in the beach area,
landings provided experience in landing and the engineer boat regiment was to
techniques but were on a scale barely sug- operate small landing craft and carry out
gesting the scope of a full-scale invasion other shore-to-shore operations. An am-
operation. phibian signal company was added to
Early in 1942, meanwhile, the Army handle communications, a medical battal-
had embarked on its own amphibious
training program, although it again had 2 Except as otherwise indicated this chapter is based
units take part in Marine-sponsored ex- on the monograph [Clifford L. Jones] NEPTUNE:
Training for and Mounting the Operation, and the
ercises in January and during the summer. Artificial Ports, Pt. VI of The Administrative and
In March the War Department directed Logistical History of the ETO, OCMH.
330 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

ion to evacuate the wounded, a quarter- quarters and to train American Rangers
master battalion to operate supply dumps, with the British Commandos.
and an ordnance platoon, a boat main- The development of supply methods
tenance company, and a depot platoon and far-shore organization proceeded
from a base shop battalion to repair ve- more haltingly. The 531stEngineer Shore
hicles and craft. Regiment, one of the key units of the 1st
Formation of the 1st Brigade by no Brigade, received some basic instruction
means crystallized amphibious supply at the British Amphibious Training Cen-
doctrine. The composition of the brigade ter at Inveraray in Scotland, but most of
was still tentative, and its functions were the units of the brigade were scattered
not yet clearly defined, partly because the upon arrival in England, and for some
respective spheres of responsibility of the time its role in a cross-Channel operation
Army and Navy in a landing operation was indeterminate. In the United King-
had not yet been clearly defined. While dom all U.S. amphibious training was
the brigade was designed to provide both turned over to the Navy, as was the re-
logistical and combat support, the tactical sponsibility of providing boat crews for
role received the main emphasis at first. shore-to-shore movements. Consequently
Since it had barely a month to ready itself the boat regiment, one of the brigade’s
for joint training with the Army Ground basic units when first organized, was dis-
Forces, the brigade could not form its banded. The brigade’s responsibilities
many units into an integrated team and henceforth were limited strictly to ship-to-
had little training in the actual movement shore and shore operations, and its combat
of supplies. The 1st Brigade actually re- engineers, who had become boatmen, now
ceived little training in the United States became stevedores.4 In fact, there was op-
beyond boat operation, beach develop- position from the Navy to the retention of
ment, and hasty road construction. In July any organization higher than a battalion,
it was made available to the Amphibious and the 1st Brigade itself narrowly escaped
Training Command of the Army Ground extinction.5 Before the North African op-
Forces for joint exercises, but its training eration in 1942, therefore, no standard
was again cut short, for it was almost im- amphibious doctrine had been developed,
mediately alerted for movement to the and few amphibious techniques had been
United Kingdom, and special efforts had tested. Landing rehearsals conducted in
to be made to fill its equipment shortages. 3 Scotland just before the convoys sailed af-
In the United Kingdom up to this time forded no training in the vital problem of
developments in amphibious warfare were unloading vehicles and supplies.
confined largely to its tactical aspects and
were carried on by the Commandos under 3 H. H. Rosenthal, Troops and Supplies, Vol. I of
Admiral Mountbatten, who took com- the Corps of Engineers history in preparation for this
series, MS, Ch. VIII, pp. 21–30. Three additional
mand of Combined Operations Head- brigades were subsequently activated and trained at
quarters late in 1941. American interest in Camp Edwards under General Noce’s direction.
commando training was evident from the 4 This practice differed from that followed in the
start, and in the spring of 1942 arrange- Pacific, where the brigades retained responsibility for
the shore-to-shore movement in short-range opera-
ments were made to create an American tions.
section at Combined Operations Head- 5 Rosenthal, Troops and Supplies, p. 31.
TRAINING AND REHEARSING FOR OVERLORD 331

Operations in the Mediterranean inau- a large amphibious training school where

gurated a more extensive schooling in the experiments could be carried out and key
logistic aspects of amphibious warfare, units could be given training in ship-to-
with TORCH providing the first lessons. shore operations. During the winter such a
When that operation was finally launched, training center was constructed by the 2d
the lack of training and experience was Battalion, 53 1st Engineer Shore Regi-
much in evidence. Critiques of it pointed ment, at Port-aux-Poules, Algeria, and
to many errors and underlined the need was activated as the Fifth U.S. Army
for great improvements in training, plan- Invasion Training Center. On the logisti-
ning, and equipment. Many of the criti- cal side the center afforded training in
cisms applied particularly to the faulty loading and unloading vehicles and per-
supply operations, the major weaknesses sonnel from various types of landing craft.
being poor co-ordination between the var- By the end of May 1943 it had trained
ious forces, undeveloped amphibious tech- many units for the Sicilian invasion, in-
niques, divided authority, insufficient cluding those of the 1st Brigade.
training, poor staging, and bad combat Planning for the Sicilian invasion (Op-
loading. The need for better landing craft eration HUSKY)was far more complete
and the need for training in the actual than for TORCH and was built on a much
handling of supplies across beaches were sounder foundation. Units were better
emphasized, for the time it took to land trained and there was better equipment.
supplies exceeded all estimates. In one way the operation was to resemble
The North African operation can hardly the later OVERLORD operation much more
be regarded as a prototype of the later closely because it was to be made across a
OVERLORD operation. It involved a much short stretch of sea, and was not launched
longer sea voyage, and the amphibious from such widely separated points as was
phase of supply operations was actually TORCH, for which one task force had to
very short, for the ports were quickly cross the Atlantic. HUSKYwas also to be a
brought into operation and the beaches landmark in the development of amphib-
abandoned. But TORCH did point the way ious logistic support, both in far-shore or-
with the practical experience it gave in the ganization and in equipment. For the first
handling of landing craft, unloading, the time a naval beach battalion was utilized
establishment of beach dumps, improve- to achieve closer co-ordination between
ment of exit roads, and so on.6 the Navy afloat and the Army ashore. In
Efforts were immediately made to rec- addition, the make-up and responsibilities
tify the deficiencies of the TORCH opera- of the amphibian brigade emerged more
tion, particularly in landing craft, combat clearly.
loading, and amphibious techniques and Through most of the winter the 1st En-
training. Developments in the United gineer Amphibian Brigade had existed in
Kingdom, which included the setting up name only, its units scattered and per-
of a planning school, will be covered later. forming a variety of duties. Their assign-
In North Africa itself the first major ments included unloading cargo, operat-
change came when the Army dropped its
control over landing craft. A more impor- 6 NEPTUNE: Training for and Mounting the Opera-
tant development was the organization of tion, I, 11–26.
332 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

ing smoke pots, running quartermaster operation, it was concluded, the organiza-
depots, and constructing warehouses. The tion of such a base required the establish-
organization was now redesignated the 1st ment of the beach group with its essential
Engineer Special Brigade and was quad- components. 8
rupled in size for the purpose of operating The Sicilian operation also provided a
four beaches and a large beach mainte- good test of landing craft. LCT’s were
nance area. Three engineer combat regi- used more extensively than ever before
ments in addition to the 531st Engineer and, in general, performed well, although
Shore Regiment were attached and used defects in some types were discovered. An
as the basis of engineer regimental beach innovation that proved very useful was the
groups, each of which was attached to a U.S. Navy's ponton causeways—easily as-
combat division. The regimental beach sembled piers used to unload all types of
groups in turn were broken down into bat- smaller craft. They were used so success-
talion beach groups, each placed in sup- fully that they became standard equip-
port of an infantry or armored regimental ment for all future operations of a similar
combat team for the landings. With all its nature.
attached and assigned units, the 1st Bri- Perhaps the two most noteworthy reve-
gade numbered about 20,000 men for the lations of the operation were, first, the
Sicilian operation.7 feasibility of operating beaches over an ex-
The operation was not without its er- tended period of time and, second, the
rors, and new flaws appeared which called success of a new piece of equipment—the
for correction. Moreover, elation over the dukw. Until the Sicilian operation it was
success of the landing was tempered by doubted whether open beaches could be
the realization that the lack of resistance used for a n extensive period without de-
was to a large extent responsible. Observ- teriorating. The HUSKY experience proved
ers cautioned that the standard of training this fear groundless by showing that they
would have been severely tested had there would not cut up a n d deteriorate under
been strong opposition on the beaches. intensive use. Even relatively poor beaches
HUSKY had also had the advantage of tide- proved capable of being efficiently used
less water, a condition which would not with certain engineer improvisations. This
favor an operation in the English Chan- was a welcome revelation in view of the
nel, where tides of twenty to thirty feet extensive use of beaches which would have
had to be reckoned with. Nevertheless, to be made in the cross-Channel opera-
from the standpoint of supply the Sicilian tion.
operation was a gold mine of experience. The success of the dukw was phenom-
Once more it underscored the importance enal. Essentially the dukw was a 2½-ton
of a highly developed beach organization. 6 x 6 truck chassis with a boat hull, propel-
As one observer remarked, the faster an ler, and rudder enabling it to operate with
army intended to advance and the more about a 5,000-pound load in moderate sea
violent the blows it desired to strike, the and surf. The first shipment of these am-
larger must be its administrative tail. Only phibians had arrived in North Africa in
by the quick establishment of a logistic April. Experienced operators accom-
base could the combat forces develop their 7 Ibid., I, 27–32.
full striking power, and in an amphibious 8 Ibid., I, 38–41.
COLUMN OF DUKWS, during training exercise off Cornwall.
334 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

panied them and set up a school that tion actually far surpassed the hopes of the
trained a thousand men to operate them. planners, thanks largely to an unantici-
The amphibians were used for many pur- pated development—the quick restoration
poses, including some not intended. They of the small port of Anzio, which the Navy
carried stores far inland to forward dumps, had thought worthless. The 540th Engi-
evacuated casualties and prisoners, and in neer Combat Regiment developed the
at least one emergency were used to trans- port’s discharge capacity to the wholly un-
fer a Ranger battalion to meet a sudden expected figure of nearly 8,000 tons per
enemy counterattack. Their versatility day at the end of March.10 The operation
was immediately recognized, and heavy therefore produced the very significant
demands were made on them, with the re- realization that the performance of small
sult that they were frequently overloaded ports might be improved tremendously, a
and misused. Lack of maintenance equip- possibility which had been minimized
ment and spare parts also contributed to heretofore.11
their rapid decline in efficiency. But they Although conditions in the Mediter-
demonstrated their usefulness in a hun- ranean may have differed in many ways
dred ways and proved themselves one of from those in the English Channel, and al-
the most valuable ((weapons”in the Allied though none of the Mediterranean opera-
arsenal. From HUSKY on no landing oper- tions served as an exact model for the later
ation was to be attempted without them.9 cross-Channel undertaking, North Africa,
Two later amphibious operations in the Sicily, and Italy provided a school of prac-
Mediterranean gave additional experience tical experience in which to test amphib-
to American units in logistical operations. ious equipment, planning, organization,
These were Operations AVALANCHE (the and training. Out of these proving grounds
southern Italy landings of September came the basis for much of the planning
1943) and SHINGLE (the Anzio assault of conducted in the United Kingdom for
January 1944). The southern Italy inva- OVERLORD, and a number of the units that
sion contributed relatively little to am- were later to participate in the Normandy
phibious doctrine or techniques. There invasion gained invaluable experience.
were few major supply difficulties in the
operation of the beaches, and because the (2) The Training Schools and First Exercises
ports were opened early the importance of
the beaches declined rapidly after they During the period of the Mediterranean
had served their initial usefulness. Addi- operations developments in the field of
tional uses were found for the dukw, but amphibious operations were of course tak-
otherwise there were no true innovations. ing place in other areas as well. In the
The Anzio operation contributed little Pacific smaller but important landings
more to amphibious doctrine except to were being carried out, and in the zone of
underscore the practicability of long-term 9 Ibid., I, 39–44.
operation of beaches. The prospects for the 10It averaged about 4,000 tons per day as against a
success of operation SHINGLE were gloomy predicted 600.
for several reasons, among them the re- 11 NEPTUNE: Training for and Mounting the Oper-
ation, I, 44–50. It will be recalled that the OVERLORD
ported inadequacy of the beaches. But planners revised estimated port capacities as a result
from the standpoint of supply the opera- of this experience.
TRAINING AND REHEARSING FOR OVERLORD 335

interior training developments were also designated the 6th and 5th Engineer Spe-
to have their influence on amphibious cial Brigades respectively) received train-
doctrine and practice. Direct exchange of ing on this pattern, which was quite unlike
information and personnel between the anything later attempted in the Nor-
European and Pacific areas was rather mandy invasion. Both groups regarded
negligible, although there was correspond- the principles they were taught as unsound
ence between the two, as for example be- and set about developing a new solution,
tween the 1st Engineer Special Brigade in similar to the battalion beach group idea
Europe and the 2d Brigade in the Pacific. developed for the Sicilian landing. In ad-
Several key officers who had taken part in dition, experiments and training were
the Aleutian Islands landings, among conducted at Fort Pierce by several engi-
them Col. Benjamin B. Talley, later to neer combat battalions in the destruction
command the OMAHA Beach organization of underwater obstacles, which was ex-
for a time, were brought to London to pected to be one of the most hazardous of
assist in cross-Channel planning. all invasion tasks. Schools were also set up
More evident was the effect of courses, in the United States for the training of
given in the United States, where several dukw operators and mechanics. 12
agencies were engaged in amphibious The sum of most of this experimenta-
training. All units intended for assault tion, training, and actual practice was
missions and sent to the United Kingdom eventually gathered together and applied
after January 1943 were given advanced in the United Kingdom. Little specialized
training in the assault of fortified positions, training, amphibious or otherwise, was
much of it at the Engineer School at Fort given American troops in the United
Belvoir, Va., under doctrine developed by Kingdom until late in 1943, however,
the Corps of Engineers. since the policy had been laid down that
Meanwhile, training in various aspects training in the overseas theater should be
of amphibious supply operations was car- held to a minimum. For various reasons it
ried on at several installations. The Engi- was felt that all specialized training should
neer Amphibian Command at Camp Ed- be given in the United States, and the
wards continued to train shore service ETOUSA G–3 specifically announced in
parties and boat crews, and developed July 1943 that the theater would proceed
techniques for shore-to-shore movements. on the assumption that troops arriving in
At Fort Pierce, Fla., and later at Camp the United Kingdom had been properly
Pickett, Va., specialized instruction was trained before their departure from the
given to engineer units under the direction United States. But the pronouncement of
of the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet. such a policy was no assurance that it
These experiments and exercises usually would be followed, or that any reliance
involved an engineer combat battalion could be placed on its assumption regard-
with attached service troops in support of ing the adequacy of the training of units
a regimental combat team. At first there shipped from the United States. The need
was no specialized equipment and little for specialized training facilities in the the-
conception of the use to which the service ater became evident as early as 1942.
troops were to be put. The 1116th and 12NEPTUNE: Training for and Mounting the Oper-
1119th Engineer Combat Groups (later ation, I, 53–57.
336 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

Units could not be shipped back to train- been met, and the school was discontinued
ing centers in the United States for re- in September.
training there. As invasion plans pro- The Supply Specialists School, which
gressed, therefore, and as new equipment had a longer life, planned courses in such
became available, new techniques were miscellaneous subjects as fire fighting, mo-
learned, and the specific requirements of tor transport, radio operation, mess man-
the invasion tasks were defined, it became agement, medical field service, counterin-
increasingly obvious that the theater telligence, and unit administration. In the
would have to conduct its own specialized spring of 1943 the school was removed
training.13 from SOS direction and placed under the
The first step in the establishment of direct control of the theater commander.
such specialist training in the United Late in the year General Devers ordered
Kingdom was taken in 1942 when the the school to give first priority to civil af-
American School Center was organized. fairs instruction, and the school was ex-
The theater commander at first authorized panded to accommodate much larger
the Commanding General, SOS, to set up classes. In May 1944,just before the inva-
two separate schools, one for the training sion, instruction was being given in eight-
of officer candidates, the other for special- een courses, ranging from a few hours to
ized training which had been neglected in thirty days in length. In the meantime
the United States or forgotten through dis- Colonel Layman, the director of the
use. After the inspection of several possible school, had assumed additional duties as
sites, the Officer Candidate School and chief of the Field Force Replacement Sys-
the Supply Specialists School were acti- tem. In the last weeks before the invasion
vated at Shrivenham, in Berkshire, where the school was gradually transformed into
modern barracks, conference rooms, drill a ground force replacement training cen-
and recreation areas, and space for expan- ter and devoted itself almost exclusively to
sion were available. Col. Walter G. Lay- the training of limited-assignment person-
man was named commandant. The two nel. While the Supply Specialists School
schools were to accommodate 250 students did not offer any specialized training in
at one time. They began their activities amphibious operations, it had some influ-
late in 1942 and later were combined and ence on various supply and service func-
redesignated the American School Center. tions common to the coming beach opera-
The Officer Candidate School was de- tions and on other normal supply opera-
signed primarily to train men whose pro- tions. Both the Supply Specialists School
fessional qualifications fitted them for di- and the Officer Candidate School were
rect commissions, but who lacked the later established on the Continent.14
necessary military background and train- Of more significance to the logistic
ing. Other men, not qualified for direct preparations for OVERLORD was the train-
appointment, had to be sent to officer can- ing given to Allied officers in administra-
didate schools in the United States. The tive planning. British and American offi-
Officer Candidate School at Shrivenham cers were poorly acquainted with the
operated for only about one year. In April
1943 Headquarters, ETOUSA, an- 13Ibid., I, 57–59.
nounced that officer requirements had 14Ibid., I, 59–66.
TRAINING AND REHEARSING FOR OVERLORD 337

planning procedures in each other’s forces. administrative problems arising out of the
This deficiency was particularly notice- planning and organization of combined
able at the staff level, where a high degree amphibious operations. This entailed also
of co-ordination and understanding was the study of the organization, staff duties
necessary in the planning of joint opera- and procedures, and maintenance systems
tions. T h e lack of mutually understand- of the two Armies.
able procedures was sharply evidenced in The experimental courses were held
the confusion attending the planning of from 5 to 12 December 1942 in the British
the North African invasion. To solve the General Staff College at Camberley. Both
problem the Commanding General, SOS, British and American staff officers served
in October 1942 requested the theater as instructors, a n d officers from both
commander’s approval of a plan to estab- armies attended the courses. So confident
lish a joint British-American “Q” school, was General Lee that the justification for
the objective being to form a reservoir of the school would be borne out by the ex-
trained American and British administra- perimental course that he meanwhile
tive officers who were thoroughly familiar drew up plans for establishing the school
with each other’s staff procedures and who on a more permanent basis. By the time
would thus be better equipped to work to- the final plan was outlined (January 1943)
gether in the detailed planning for the the Camberley experimental courses had
eventual cross-Channel operation. The been given and General Lee could state
name Q school derived from the British that they had been sufficiently successful
Quartermaster General or Q staff, which to justify the continuation of the school.
was the equivalent of the G–4 on U.S. T h e Joint Q Planning School opened
staffs, and indicated that the field of study on a more permanent basis on 25 January
would be logistic planning. 1943at Norfolk House, St.James’s Square,
Approval was at first requested only for London, with a ten-day course for thirty
an experimental trial course to determine officers, half of them British and half
its practicability. With such approval American.15Key officers in the SOS staff
granted, General Lee completed arrange- sections and services and representatives
ments for the school with his opposite of the Eighth Air Force were directed to
number, General Riddell-Webster, the attend the first course. The school was
British Quartermaster General. Col. placed under the joint supervision of the
George A. Lincoln, a former West Point British Quartermaster General and the
instructor and Rhodes scholar, and Brig- Commanding General, SOS. Subjects ini-
adier R. A. Riddell of the British Quarter- tially studied included staff procedures,
master General’s staff were designated co- preliminary planning for an amphibious
directors. They carried out the detailed operation, landing tables, mounting,
work on the curriculum and actually beach maintenance, maintenance prob-
launched the courses. The idea of the Joint lems of the assault and later stages, civil
Q Planning School was to have a special administration, and a host of other prob-
significance for logistical planning, for, lems. These subjects were grouped into
while both operational and administrative three general categories and the course
problems were to be considered, the course
was to be devoted primarily to the study of 15It was later moved to No. 63 St. James’s Street.
338 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

was presented in three parts: (1) a com- tablish supply installations on the far
parison of the organization of the British shore. 16
and American Armies, with emphasis on The training afforded by the American
functioning of supply services and admin- School Center and the Joint Q Planning
istration; (2) background of planning, School was initiated in what may be
ships and craft, beach organization, naval roughly termed the early training phase.
and air aspects of overseas movement, I n this period, from the activation of the
mounting, far-shore brigades, division of theater in June 1942 to the fall of 1943,
Army and Navy functions, and civil ad- there were relatively few American com-
ministration; and (3) planning methods bat or amphibiously trained supply units
for an amphibious operation, including in the United Kingdom, for the big build-
scales of equipment and maintenance, loss up had not yet begun. Consequently, un-
estimates, special features of operations in til the fall of 1943 invasion training was
northwest Europe, and specimen direc- largely a matter of experimentation in-
tives. volving British units and the 29th Infantry
From the very beginning the school op- Division, the only large American ground
erated on the assumption that it was pre- force combat unit stationed in the United
paring for the invasion of France, and Kingdom for many months after the de-
in the year during which it functioned it parture of units for North Africa. In many
was a most important training organiza- respects the 29th Division was a sort of
tion for officers who participated in the trial horse for training methods. It carried
OVERLORD planning. Changes were made out a rigorous training program, which in-
from time to time as new techniques were cluded trying new assault methods, am-
developed or new topics became more phibious landings, testing new equipment
apropos, and as specialists became avail- such as amphibious tanks, and new tech-
able as instructors. The program evolved niques such as the waterproofing and
into a series of twelve-day courses, and swimming of vehicles. This experimenta-
classes grew in size to about seventy offi- tion had its primary effect on later train-
cers, half British and half American, and ing of combat units, and had only an in-
most of them of field grade. Both SOS and cidental or indirect bearing on supply op-
Headquarters, ETOUSA, sent officers to erations. Special courses, such as those
the school, the SOS allotment being dis- conducted by the Engineer School at Wal-
tributed to the staff, services, and base sec- lingford, in Oxfordshire, had a more di-
tions, and the ETOUSA allotment being rect influence on logistics. Supply prob-
made up from theater headquarters, the lems received more attention in the various
air forces, and the field forces. In the year exercises which were held throughout this
between January 1943 and January 1944, early period. These exercises were a vital
when the last course was offered, 460 stage in the development of both tactical
American officers attended the school. and logistical doctrine as later applied.
Most of €he officers who took the courses Most of them were experimental in nature
either held key positions or played active and were designed more to develop and
roles in the various planning agencies and test techniques than to train troops.
in the staffs of units which were scheduled 16 NEPTUNE: Training for and Mounting the Oper-
to assault the Normandy beaches and es- ation, I, 66–77.
 TRAINING AND REHEARSING FOR OVERLORD 339

Most important of the early exercises loaded, and the bulk of the troops returned
from the point of view of amphibious op- to their stations without embarking. Exer-
erations and also in the development of cise HARLEQUIN was held along the south
supply practices were two known as and southeast coast of England, where
JANTZENI I and HARLEQUIN. The first of mounting installations, including concen-
these was held by the British Western tration areas and reception and marshal-
Command in the Carmarthen area of ing subareas, were established. American
southern Wales inJuly 1943. The purpose officers participated only as observers, and
of JANTZEN II was to practice the mainte- learned a great deal about the mounting
nance of a corps and supporting troops procedure and about housekeeping prob-
over beaches for a period of two weeks. It lems in the concentration and marshaling
involved the movement of troops from con- areas. Perhaps more significant was the
centration areas through assembly and basic change in planning concept which
transit areas, embarkation, the loading the exercise produced regarding move-
a n d unloading of coasters, the organiza- ment and loading. HARLEQUIN revealed
tion of beaches and a beach maintenance that, contrary to previous opinion, the
area, the establishment of a bulk fuel sup- loading of assault forces, even though pre-
ply installation, and so on. Only adminis- planned, was much more difficult a prob-
trative and supply troops took part, and lem than the loading of build-up forces.
there was as yet no special amphibious The exercise thus had a direct bearing on
equipment, but the exercise produced val- the estimated needs of mounting and
uable information on staging problems loading facilities.
and on the whole matter of supply main- JANTZEN I I and HARLEQUIN were British
tenance in an amphibious operation. exercises and were only two of several held
Even more important was Exercise in 1943. American units participated in
HARLEQUIN, held early in September un- many other exercises designed to test spe-
der the direction of the Commander-in- cific doctrines or solve particular prob-
Chief, 21 Army Group, and the com- lems. These practice operations dealt with
manders ofthe First Canadian and Second such varied problems as communications,
British Armies. HARLEQUIN was actually the use of smoke, the training of naval
part of a larger deception scheme planned forces in combined operations, embarka-
for the summer of 1943, and therefore had tion, and turn-round of shipping. All had
several purposes. Most useful from the their influence on invasion planning and
point of view of training for the later cross- later training of American units, although
Channel operation was the testing of the results were hardly definitive.17
mounting procedures—that is, the ma-
chinery to move troops from concentration (3) The Assault Training Center and Engineer
or assembly areas through marshaling Special Brigades
camps to embarkation points. Complete
landing tables were worked out, and the Training activities between the fall of
bulk of the forces involved moved to as- 1943 and the date of the invasion fall
sembly areas, formed into craft loads, and roughly into four categories: the highly
then moved to embarkation points. Only
a small number of vehicles were actually 17Ibid., I, 84–94.
340 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

specialized training given to assault units the section, its principal mission being to
and beach engineers; the minor exercises study and report on the conduct of com-
used to test portions of the OVERLORDbined operations and to provide battle
plan; the training program worked out by training for as many American troops as
the various assault units themselves; and practicable. T h e section was established
the major exercises or dress rehearsals held in May, and in the succeeding months
just before D Day. Neither the many U.S. Rangers trained with British units in
minor exercises nor the independent train- commando tactics.18
ing programs of the various units are The training of U.S. assault units even-
within the province of this volume. Space tually took a different form, however.
limitations prohibit a detailed description Americans participated in British com-
of the many specialized exercises; as for bined operations training on the assump-
unit training programs, which were tion that the training of assault units for
undertaken by nearly all American units the cross-Channel operation would in
in the United Kingdom, they had no spe- general follow the principle of Commando
cial bearing on the unusual problems con- a n d Ranger training. Before long it was
nected with the assault, for in most cases realized that this would not be the case.
they followed training instructions as laid Rangers were selected, trained, and
down in the manuals and were a contin- equipped for special missions, usually
uation of training given in the United striking swiftly and then returning to their
States. Of more particular significance base. Assault troops in the invasion were
were the highly specialized training given to be normal infantrymen, organized on a
the assault units and beach brigades, and division basis, and were to remain ashore
the big dress rehearsals immediately for sustained offensive action after the
preceding the invasion. capture of a beachhead. I n the winter of
In view of the type of resistance ex- 1942–43 thinking on this matter had ad-
pected at the Atlantic Wall, which bristled vanced to the idea of an independent as-
with steel and concrete, it was evident that sault training center. The ETOUSA G–3
assaulting forces would need special train- Section, under General Barker, had in
ing and organization. This realization fact made plans for the establishment of
eventually led to the establishment of the such a training center and took steps to
most important U.S. invasion training obtain a n officer to head the project. Late
center in the European theater—the As- in January 1943 Lt. Col. Paul W. Thomp-
sault Training Center. Its establishment son of the Office of the Chief of Engineers,
was the direct result of steps taken as early War Department, was transferred to the
as 1942, when a n American section was European theater and a few weeks later
set up in the British Combined Operations was assigned to the G–3 Section to take
Headquarters. Arrangements to attach charge of the new project. Described by
such a staff to the Chief of Combined General Lee as “our best informed engi-
Operations had been made after General neer officer on German organization,
Marshall’s visit to England in April 1942. technique a n d tactics,” Colonel Thomp-
Col. Lucian K. Truscott,Jr., who as a lieu-
18Except as noted, this section is based on Chapter
tenant general later commanded the Fifth VI and pages 145–63 of NEPTUNE:Training for and
U.S. Army in Italy, was selected to head Mounting the Operation, Vol. I.
TRAINING AND REHEARSING FOR OVERLORD 341

son was a logical choice for the assign- ETOUSA, and its activities were co-ordi-
ment. He had been trained as an engineer, nated with the G–3 Section, which was re-
had served with a German engineer bat- sponsible for training. The center’s over-all
talion and studied hydraulic engineering mission was to develop the special tactics
at the Technische Hochschule in Berlin- and techniques necessary for an assault of
Charlottenburg, and had served with the a heavily defended shore and to train
Intelligence Branch of the Office of the units to be employed in such an operation.
Chief of Engineers. His assignment fore- This involved not only the development of
shadowed the large role which engineers assault doctrine and workable methods for
were to play in the invasion. the assault of enemy-held shores, but the
Meanwhile members of the ETOUSA training of demonstration troops, the stag-
G–3 Section began a search for a training ing of demonstrations of approved tech-
area large enough to accommodate regi- niques, and the instruction and supervision
mental combat teams and possessing shore of all assault units expected to participate
and beachhead terrain generally similar in the operation. For this purpose the cen-
to that of northern France. After inspect- ter was to assemble and organize a special
ing several locations they finally chose an assault battalion combat team to act as a
adaptable site on the western coast of test unit. It was assumed that all units
Devon between the towns of Woolacombe training a t the center would have had
and Appledore. The area embraced 25 either basic amphibious training in the
square miles of land, 8,000 yards of beach United States or training similar to that
on the Bristol Channel, and 4,000 yards of the 29th Division in the United King-
on the Taw estuary. (See Map 6.) Inspect- dom, or actual battle experience in the
ing officers noted several disadvantages, Mediterranean.
but in general the area had the character- In some respects the center began from
istics of the northwest French coast, scratch as far as amphibious techniques
including the vitally important tidal range were concerned. At the time of its activa-
which was absent in the Mediterranean tion in April only the limited lessons of
landings. It was thought at first that the the TORCHlandings were at hand, and
area would not have to be evacuated, even TORCH showed little resemblance to the
though about 10,000 acres of farmland type of landings envisaged in the cross-
were taken from cultivation. The limita- Channel operation. To begin with, the
tions in space meant that all firing would Americans relied heavily on British ex-
have to be tightly controlled. It later be- perience in formulating the training pro-
came necessary to move some of the civil- gram, and the center was authorized to
ian population for reasons of security establish liaison with both British and
and safety. The Assault Training Center American agencies in the field and with
was activated on 2 April 1943, with British Combined Operations Headquar-
Colonel Thompson named as comman- ters. That assault techniques were in the
dant. Target date for the opening of the formative stage is indicated by the many
center and the start of training was set for discussions and proposals initially put
1 September. forth on the subject of the organization
The Assault Training Center was and arming of assault units, some officers
placed directly under Headquarters, recommending that special assault divi-
342 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

sions and assault regiments be formed, in August the 156th Infantry arrived at
others recommending that the normal the center to assume these duties, testing
battalion structure be retained but that various techniques developed by planning
special assault platoons be constituted. officers, and later demonstrating them
General Noce, who had organized the En- and instructing other units.19
gineer Amphibian Command in the Training at the center was organized
United States, had an active part in these mainly with the combat units in mind,
early decisions as the new ETOUSA G–3. and was concerned primarily with such
The organization of the center and the matters as the development of the most
writing of specific plans for its operation effective assault team, the best combina-
received additional impetus from the tion of weapons, the use of tanks, and the
RATTLEConference of late June, where best techniques to overcome coastal forti-
the need for assault training was again fications, although the logistic aspects of
noted. By the end of July considerable amphibious operations also received at-
progress had been made in formulating a tention. Beginning in September 1943 the
training program. Assault unit organiza- 29th, 28th, and 4th Divisions, and a por-
tion was tentatively agreed to, plans were tion of the 1st Division, despite its battle
made for the construction of full-scale experience in the Mediterranean, all com-
German-type beach obstacles and fortifi- pleted the training course at the center.
cations, obstacle courses, and combat The 2d and 5th Ranger Battalions and
ranges, and arrangements were made for parts of the 101st Airborne Division also
the Navy to provide landing craft and to took the courses, as did specialized artil-
participate in the preparation of training lery, antiaircraft, chemical warfare serv-
schedules and field exercises. By mid- ice, quartermaster, and engineer units
August the center had moved from its which had missions in the assault. All
temporary headquarters in Grosvenor units were rated on their performance.
Square, London, to Woolacombe, and Training was hard, and a number of acci-
work was pushed on the new quarters and dents occurred, as could be expected in
on the various assault and firing ranges exercises which included the use of live
and courses. Five administrative divisions fire. But the need for realistic training
were set up, including a headquarters and undoubtedly justified the risks.
staff, a station complement, a school troop More important for the logistic aspects
section, an assault training section, and an of the invasion operation was the training
amphibious section. The amphibious sec- given the engineer brigades which were
tion was to organize training for the scheduled to organize the Normandy
purely amphibious phase of operations, beaches for supply. The infantry partici-
from embarkation to landing, while the pation in the amphibious phase of the
assault training section was responsible for operation would be limited to a few hours;
operations after the touchdown on the
19T h e 156th Infantry, a Louisiana National Guard
beaches. School troops were to provide unit forming part of the 31stDivision, had been de-
task forces and combat teams for demon- tached from its parent organization after training at
stration and for the development of tac- Camp Blanding, Fla., and was shipped to the United
Kingdom in October 1942. History of the 156th Inf,
tics, for controlling and umpiring exercises, 25 Nov 40–31 Dec 42, INRG–156–0.1 ( 1 1 2 7 ) AG
simulating enemy forces, and so on. Early Opnl Rpts.
TRAINING AND REHEARSING FOR OVERLORD 343

the engineer brigades were to perform Group arrived in November 1943, it was
service functions for an indefinite period. designated the 5th Engineer Special Bri-
The 1st, 5th, and 6th Engineer Special gade and began the process of building up
Brigades all were given specialized in- to invasion strength in the same manner
struction at the Assault Training Center, as the 1st Brigade. The 1116th Engineer
and were among the most highly trained Combat Group arrived in January 1944,
of the invasion units. was immediately redesignated the 6th En-
Each of the three brigades consisted gineer Special Brigade, and its strength
basically of three engineer combat battal- was similarly augmented by attachment
ions, a medical battalion, a joint assault of the necessary units. Both groups had
signal company, a company of military had amphibious training in the United
police, a dukw battalion, an ordnance States.
battalion, and various quartermaster In view of the large supply organization
units, numbering 4,000-odd men. But envisaged for OMAHABeach, engineer
eventually all three were built up to a far planners of the First U.S. Army recom-
greater strength. T h e 1st Brigade was mended the organization of an over-all
transferred to England in December 1943 headquarters to provide a unified com-
with only 3,346 men. In the OVERLORD mand at OMAHA. Plans for it were drafted
operation it was assigned the mission of in February 1944, and First Army head-
supporting the VII Corps and organizing quarters immediately authorized the
UTAHBeach, and in the spring of 1944 its grouping of the two brigades under one
strength was greatly augmented by the command. T h e final form which the
attachment of a large number of units. OMAHA supply organization would take
These included quartermaster service was not immediately clear, but in March
companies, T C port companies, military the new headquarters was formed, using
police escort guard companies, and several personnel from both brigades, First Army,
small special units, some of which were to and V Corps, and was named the Provi-
land well after D Day and required no sional Engineer Special Brigade Group.
special amphibious training. By the time Group headquarters eventually became
of the invasion the brigade again had a a n organization far beyond the size origi-
strength of over 15,000. nally contemplated. The idea of a small,
A considerably larger and more com- compact headquarters, concerned pri-
plicated organization was evolved for marily with planning, was gradually
OMAHA Beach. OMAHAwas to have the abandoned as the demands of the job
important MULBERRY installation and was made apparent the need for a much-ex-
to develop a substantially larger discharge panded organization. I n the course of the
capacity than UTAH.Two brigades—the planning it was realized that the two bri-
5th and 6th—were therefore formed to gades by themselves would not be able to
handle the larger volume of supplies in handle the OMAHAsupply operation,
support of the V Corps. Both the 5th and which included not only the organization
6th Brigades were newly organized from of supply over a wide beach, but the oper-
engineer units which arrived in the ation of an artificial port with a discharge
United Kingdom in the winter of 1943–44. goal of 5,000 tons per day, and of two
Shortly after the 1119th Engineer Combat minor ports (Grandcamp and Isigny). To
344 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

meet these latter needs the 11th Port, in the training of engineer units for their
which had been operating the Bristol mission on the Normandy beaches.
Channel ports, was attached to the group Besides serving as a training ground the
in April. The 11th Port, numbering more Assault Training Center also tested and
than 7,600 men, included four port battal- made alterations in amphibious doctrine
ions, five amphibious truck companies, and techniques. In connection with supply
three quartermaster service companies, operations, for example, new uses were
three quartermaster truck companies, an found for the dukw, and improvements
ordnance medium automotive mainte- were made in the use of these amphibians
nance company, and a utility attachment. in ship-to-shore operations. Early in No-
By D Day the entire Provisional Engineer vember 1943 a demonstration of coaster
Special Brigade Group, with all its attach- unloading went very badly, revealing
ments, had a strength of nearly 30,000 weaknesses particularly in the stage when
men. 20 the dukw was held alongside the coaster
While the Assault Training Center was to receive cargo. In the following weeks
set u p primarily to develop assault tech- new types of gear were devised to remedy
niques and train infantry combat units, it this defect, and when the exercise was re-
provided an important training ground peated a month later great improvements
for all three of the engineer special bri- had been made in the transfer operation.
gades. The 6th Brigade carried out the The Assault Training Center thus had
most strenuous program, ending with two an important role in the development of
beach exercises for groups of 1,600 men. amphibious techniques and in the train-
These included landing, setting up dumps, ing of units, not only in methods of assault,
clearing beaches, and constructing exits. but in the vital beach supply operations,
This training was conducted largely under on which theOVERLORD operation was to
the direction of officers from the brigades be so dependent. Thousands of troops
themselves, employing their own school were run through one or more of the
troops. In November 1943 the 234th En- courses at the center, and by the end of
gineer Combat Battalion had been as- April the major portion of the center’s
signed to the center for the training of training was completed. As the invasion
other engineer units. This battalion main- date neared, key personnel at the center
tained beaches, gave indoctrination lec- were gradually recalled for assignments in
tures and demonstrations, and assisted in units with missions in the assault. Colonel
exercises employing engineer brigades in Thompson was given a new assignment
the organization of beaches, preparation early in March, and in the next two
of exits and dumps, maintenance of road months there followed several changes in
nets, preparation of traffic plans, salvage command. On 1 May the buildings and
of drowned vehicles, and movement of training areas were, with a few exceptions,
supplies. For the training of the beach or- turned over to a Field Force Replacement
ganization, therefore, the center was to a Depot, and on 15 May the center was offi-
large extent actually organized as a far- cially deactivated.
shore beach, with the 234th Engineer 20Operation Report NEPTUNE,OMAHA Beach,
Combat Battalion carrying on the func- prep by Hist Sec ETOUSA, Sep 44, App. A (Troop
tions of a far-shore brigade and assisting List), OCMH.
TRAINING AND REHEARSING FOR OVERLORD 345

( 4 ) Major Exercises summer of 1943. Later its scope was ex-

tended to cover all phases a n d aspects of
While the Assault Training Center of- a n amphibious operation, and the actual
fered specialized training to assault forma- planning of the exercise was begun early
tions and beach organizations, the Allies in November. T h e final decision to hold
were holding a series of exercises that con- the exercise was made later in the month
stituted a second major category of train- by representatives of V Corps, SOS head-
ing. Beginning in January 1944 and quarters, the Navy, Southern Base Sec-
continuing until marshaling for the inva- tion, X I X District (a subcommand of
sion itself began, an almost unbroken suc- Southern Base Section), the British South-
cession of such exercises took place, two ern Command, and the British Southwest-
or more often being conducted simul- ern District. Because DUCKI was to
taneously. There was, first of all, a series of interfere as little as possible with either the
very specialized exercises involving rela- preparations or the facilities ofOVERLORD,
tively small numbers of troops of one type. the Slapton Sands area, a few miles south-
These were mainly of the technique-test- west of Dartmouth, was selected as the site
ing variety, the details of which cannot be of the exercise. Although this thinly popu-
described here. More important from the lated area, relatively removed from the
point of view of training in the co-ordina- BOLERO and OVERLORD installations, had
tion of combined arms and services were some disadvantages, it bore a general re-
the large scale exercises and final rehears- semblance to the Normandy coast, even
als. The major exercises-known as DUCK possessing a lagoon separating the beach
I, II, and III, Fox, andBEAVER—brought from the mainland, approximating the
together all elements of a force in a com- features of the UTAHarea. (See Map 6.)
bined assault and supply action, including Participants in the exercise were to in-
all phases and aspects of the mounting clude a regimental landing team built
a n d launching of a n amphibious opera- around the 175th Infantry (29th Divi-
tion, Finally, two big dress rehearsals— sion), units of the 1st Engineer Special
named FABIUS I and TIGER–attempted to Brigade, and such attachments as a Ninth
duplicate as nearly as possible the condi- Air Force beach party and a headquarters
tions expected in the cross-Channel group from V Corps. The Services of Sup-
invasion.21 ply was to provide the mounting installa-
Of the major exercises DUCKI was tions and the supplies and equipment
probably the most important. It was the replacements in co-ordination with V
first attempt to bring together the various Corps, and was responsible for the mar-
arms and services in a co-ordinated am- shaling and embarkation of units. As in
phibious operation approximating the the later OVERLORD operation, this re-
conditions of the later assault. Being the sponsibility was delegated- to Southern
first, it revealed many defects, and their Base Section, and the latter in turn dele-
elimination greatly affected the training gated the task to XIX District, the area in
and planning for the exercises which fol- which the exercise was to be held, al-
lowed. Exercise DUCKI was first conceived 21This section is based o nChapter VII of NEP-
as a mounting exercise for the Services of TUNE: Training for and Mounting the Operation,
Supply, and was discussed as early as the Vol. I.
346 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

though Southern Base Section staff officers 10,000 men made up the assault force in
aided in the planning and execution of the the exercise, and approximately an equal
service functions. Troops were to move number were involved in performing the
from their camps near Plymouth, Taun- SOS functions.
ton, Barnstaple and Land’s End to em- D Day was originally set for 3 January
barkation points a t Falmouth and 1944. On D minus 10 the loading of coast-
Dartmouth. The 11th Amphibious Force ers was begun at Bristol. T h e movement
was to move them from the embarkation of troops and vehicles to assembly areas
points to the assault beach at Slapton began on D minus 8. LCT’s began load-
Sands with the help of British naval units ing on D minus 6, LST’s on D minus 4,
and protect the convoy from enemy at- a n d LCI(L)’s on D minus 3, which was
tacks, and the Ninth Air Force was to 1 January. At this time H Hour was
provide air protection. To give additional definitely set as 1000hours, and D Day was
training in the mounting process, troops of changed to 4 January. Including the as-
the 28th Division were also to be processed sault troops that cleared the marshaling
to the embarkation points, and then re- areas and embarked and the 28th Division
turned immediately to their stations with- troops that moved through the various
out actually boarding craft. mounting stages, a total of 26,400 men
The detailed planning of the exercise were marshaled.
began late in November when the DUCKI The assault phase proceeded largely as
staff held its first meeting at X I X District scheduled, although the landings did not
headquarters near Taunton. The adminis- go entirely according to plan. Consider-
trative and tactical headquarters involved, able trouble was caused by the runnel that
X I X District and V Corps, respectively, separated the beach from the mainland,
worked closely in formulating the plan, for bridging equipment failed to arrive on
and the first steps in the implementation time. But in general the landings were
of the plan were taken immediately. The smooth, with assault troops, following a
exercise was to be of immense value to the pre-H-Hour bombardment, storming
Services of Supply because for the first simulated enemy defenses and pushing
time the whole mounting procedure was rapidly inland. Most important from the
to be tried out in a co-ordinated opera- supply standpoint were the experiences of
tion. The SOS was to have the primary the 1st Engineer Special Brigade. Brigade
responsibility in the eventual mounting of troops began landing at D plus 25 min-
Operation OVERLORD, and its activities in utes, demined one beach, cleared a sec-
this phase included planning, construct- ond, set up three supply beaches, opened
ing housekeeping installations, assembling beach exits, and began unloading supplies.
troops and supplies, marrying the auxil- Coasters began arriving within a few
iary units to their respective combat hours and were unloaded by dukws and
teams, processing troops through the mar- landing craft, and dumps were then estab-
shaling areas, moving them to the embar- lished inland. Engineers tested methods of
kation points, loading the landing craft, track laying to improve beach roads and
loading and dispatching coasters, and tried new packing and waterproofing
transporting and feeding troops on their methods. Quartermaster units experi-
return to their home stations. More than mented with pallet loading, and the Signal
TRAINING AND REHEARSING FOR OVERLORD 347

Corps tested skid loading and new and the areas might quickly turn into
packaging methods.22 quagmires. If used prematurely, they
The exercise lasted two days, after would hamper the later mounting of the
which the mounting process was reversed invasion. To avoid this danger Col. Theo-
and troops were returned to their home dore Wyman, Jr., commandant of XIX
stations by XIX District. In the meantime District, evolved a plan in which marshal-
observers completed their note taking, ing areas were built along secondary hard-
and a series of critiques followed. As could surfaced roads. Camps were established in
be expected in a first trial, errors and defi- wooded areas along the edges of the roads,
ciencies aplenty were found. Criticisms and the roads themselves were blocked off
were directed a t varied weaknesses, from to civilian traffic and used as hardstand-
poor Army-Navy co-ordination and in- ings. Because of their elongated shape on
adequacy of planning to poor traffic con- maps these areas came to be called “sau-
trol and discipline, slow movement, sages.” Hardstandings intended for the
overloading of both troops and vehicles, OVERLORD mounting were thus saved, and
and violations of security.23The inexperi- the success of the plan made other exer-
ence of many of the 1st Engineer Special cises possible and also provided a means of
Brigade units was clearly demonstrated. supplementing the marshaling installa-
The brigade commander, Col. Eugene M. tions in the OVERLORD operation.
Caffey, took special note of this, emphasiz- One result of the DUCKI critiques was
ing the need of the brigade to build up its the establishment of a permanent plan-
internal structure and to co-ordinate more ning group for exercises, and after the last
closely the work of its heterogeneous units. critique late in January this group imme-
More specifically, the unloading of LCT’s diately set about planning additional tests.
had taken double the time planned, load- Two sequels to DUCKI—known as DUCK
ing priorities had been difficult to follow, II and DUCKIII—were scheduled for Feb-
and stowage plans had failed to arrive for ruary. They were intended to give experi-
unloading crews. ence to units in both the 29th Division and
For a first attempt the exercise had the 1st Engineer Special Brigade which
actually come off quite smoothly. The did not participate in the first exercise.
marshaling procedure, which will be de- D Day for DUCKII was finally set for 14
scribed in more detail in the next chapter, February. Movement tables were pub-
worked so well in DUCKI that it formed lished on the 7th, and movement of the
the basis for the mounting of all later exer-
cises and for the invasion operation itself. 22Skid and pallet loading were methods of loading
An improvisation had been adopted blocks of supplies to facilitate easy handling. Both in-
volved the use of low wooden platforms to which
which proved most effective. British supplies could be lashed a n d which could be either
authorities had objected to the holding of fork-lifted or transferred by crane. T h e skid load,
large-scale exercises on the southern coast which had runners like a sled, could be towed by a
tractor. This technique was best adapted to packaged
because of possible damage to hardstand- supplies, like rations, ammunition, a n d gasoline in
ings, the areas scheduled for later use as 5-gallon cans.
vehicle parks in the mounting of OVER- 23Despite the lessons which DUCKprovided in the
overburdening of both men a n d vehicles, these
LORD. Many of these could be used only a errors were repeated, often with tragic consequences,
short time, for the turf was easily torn up in the invasion itself. See below, Ch. X, Sec. 2.
348 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

task force personnel into the assembly area camps. Tactical units taking part were the
began two days later. Some units moved 16th Regimental Combat Team (1st Divi-
directly from their home stations to the sion) and the 116th Regimental Combat
embarkation points. Loading was com- Team (29th Division), operating in turn
pleted on 12 February, and the assault under the commands of the 1st Division
was carried out on the 14th and 15th. and V Corps. T h e two teams were to be
DUCKIII followed the same general pat- supported by engineer combat battalions
tern, with the D-Day assault coming on 29 from the 5th and 6th Engineer Special
February. Brigades. Each of the battalions was rein-
I n most respects these two exercises forced with dukw and truck companies,
went off more smoothly than DUCKI, medical and signal detachments, and
although the principal problems encoun- quartermaster and port troops to com-
tered were much the same as in the first prise a battalion beach party. The make-
exercise. There still were difficulties over up of the assault force therefore bore a
traffic control, over co-ordination between strong resemblance to that of the V Corps
the services, and over the Navy’s handling in Operation OVERLORD, although on a
of craft. Although the three DUCKexercises smaller scale.
gave training to most of the units of the By the time Exercise Fox was planned
29th Division and the 1st Engineer Special the mounting procedure was quite firmly
Brigade, these two organizations did not established. Units moved to marshaling
team up in OVERLORD. The 1st Brigade areas according to a schedule and began
eventually supported the 4th Division at embarkation at the ports of Plymouth,
UTAHBeach, and the 29th Division was Weymouth, Dartmouth, and Portland on
supported by the 6th Brigade at OMAHA. 7 March. Nearly 17,000 men and 1,900
A fourth exercise held in March more vehicles were processed through the system
closely paralleled the final OVERLORD as- and embarked on naval craft. Some of the
sault plan. This was Exercise Fox, the last craft, scheduled for early landings, as-
big training exercise before the final re- sembled and departed for Slapton Sands
hearsals. The initiator again was V Corps, the night before D Day, escorted by Brit-
which ordered the planning to begin early ish destroyers. Air cover was provided by
in February. Since the exercise was in- both the RAF and Ninth Air Force.
tended to be modeled on the OVERLORD The landings took place on 9 March,
operation, detailed planning was held up preceded by naval gunfire employing live
so that it could parallel the work on OVER- ammunition. In general, the assault was
LORD, and did not get under way until the satisfactory. Its failures and weaknesses
First Army Operation Plan NEPTUNE was were attributable primarily to the inex-
published late in the month. The exercise perience of the units participating, al-
suffered somewhat from the resultant though the operation also suffered from
tardiness and once more pointed up the hasty planning and preparation and from
vital importance of adequate planning. the repetition of errors of the previous ex-
Exercise Fox was held at Slapton Sands, ercises. Co-ordination between the Army
but the mounting of the exercise was this and Navy and between other headquarters
time accomplished by XVIII District and was still faulty, and there were other diffi-
involved entirely different personnel and culties of a more tactical nature. So far as
TRAINING AND REHEARSING FOR OVERLORD 349

the supply and service aspects of the ex- which were to support them a t UTAH
ercise were concerned, neither the mount- Beach, another series of exercises was there-
ing nor beach operations went off as well fore planned for the last two weeks of
as hoped. The XVIII District had had in- March. Four of these exercises—named
sufficient time to ready the marshaling OTTER I and II, and MINKI and 11—were
camps for transient troops, and lack of battalion landing team tests held in the
experience on the part of camp personnel Slapton Sands area. Two exercises—MUSK-
was also apparent. But camp operation RAT I and 11-involved regimental combat
improved as troops gained practice. The teams and engineer detachments in bat-
major criticism centered about the supply talion exercises in the Firth of Clyde in
operations, most of it concerning ship-to- Scotland. Finally, a seventh exercise,
shore movements. There had been too few known as BEAVER, was a combined test for
loading points for the number of craft in- two regimental combat teams (the 8th and
volved; there was poor co-ordination be- 22d of the 4th Division) with a large beach
tween the beachmaster and coasters, re- party from the 1st Engineer Special Bri-
sulting in the delayed arrival of supplies gade, plus two companies of engineers
on the beach; unloading equipment on from the 1106th Group, the 502d Para-
the coasters was in poor condition, and chute Infantry, and elements of the Ninth
coaster captains had no orders. Commu- Air Force. BEAVER was directed by VII
nications were generally bad between Corps and was mounted by X I X District
beach headquarters and the dumps. In of Southern Base Section. The force mar-
addition, it was found that too many shaled and embarked in the Brixham–
dukws had been allotted each coaster for Plymouth area and was then moved to
unloading; troops were landed in the Slapton Sands by the 11th Amphibious
wrong order; and there consequently was Force. The exercise was held on 27–30
improper marrying up of troops with their March and in general followed the DUCK
equipment. There were bright spots, how- pattern. Assault units secured a beach-
ever, and this exercise, like others, con- head, pushed inland, and were then re-
tributed its lessons and proved the value supplied and reorganized for continued
of several new techniques. One of these operations.
was the use of dukws preloaded with bal- In the meantime several small special-
anced loads of ammunition for emergency ized exercises were held by artillery, anti-
use. This proved so satisfactory that it was aircraft, tank destroyer, airborne, and air
incorporated into invasion plans. Satis- force units, and by medical and signal
factory progress was also made in the use units. Among them were also several mar-
of new methods and materials in the shaling and loading exercises having a
waterproofing of vehicles. direct bearing on the build-up and logisti-
The DUCKand Fox exercises were all cal support of U.S. forces. Of the mar-
conducted by the V Corps and, with the shaling exercises the most important were
exception of the 1st Engineer Special Bri- three called CHEVROLET, JEEP, and
gade, involved units scheduled to land at JALOPY.The first was carried out mainly
OMAHA Beach. In order to give experience by troops from the 5th Engineer Special
to the 4th Division assault units along with Brigade and was planned and directed by
the 1st Engineer Special Brigade units XIX District headquarters. It was de-
 350 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

signed to train troops and supply staffs in held in March, the loading and landing of
the outloading of supplies from the United personnel and vehicles from LST’s were
Kingdom, to train chemical warfare units also tested.
in screening a harbor and beach area by A more specialized loading exercise,
the use of smoke, and to test the feasibility called CELLOPHANE, was conducted by
of extended operations in a completely X X I X District of Western Base Section
smoke-screened harbor and beach. The late in April in the Oxwich Bay area. This
exercise was carried out in the Port Talbot was an SOS exercise designed to demon-
and Port Eynon areas at the end of Feb- strate skid-loading techniques to the First
ruary. Exercise JEEP, conducted by XV Army. It included the loading of skid
Corps and Northern Ireland Base Section loads and loose cargo onto coasters at
in March, was designed to give training in ports, offloading into dukws and LCT’s,
the mounting of build-up forces. Elements transferring loads from dukws to trucks at
of the 2d Division moved from their sta- beach transfer points, discharging direct
tions in Northern Ireland to Belfast and from dukws to dumps, offloading LCT’s to
went through the entire mounting process trucks, and discharging trucks at dumps.
with the exception of actual embarkation. Exercise CELLOPHANE was a comprehen-
Personnel went only as far as quays, simu- sive demonstration of specialized types of
lated loading, and then returned. From loading and unloading, showing the ex-
this training experiment came several tent to which certain types of mechanical
recommendations on marshaling proce- equipment, such as fork lifts, would be re-
dures which were later adopted in OVER- quired. It pointed the way to the organi-
LORD. A third mounting exercise, called zation of transfer points as they were even-
JALOPY,was essentially a repetition of tually set u p at the OMAHA and UTAH
JEEP, using units of the 5th and 8th Divi- beaches. In addition to these marshaling
sions, also in Northern Ireland. and loading exercises a number of small
Meanwhile a series of loading exercises tests were run off by the engineer special
was held, involving the 1st, 5th, and 6th brigades. Among them were two series,
Engineer Special Brigades and various known as CARGO and TONNAGE, involving
SOS units under the XVIII and XIX Dis- beach battalions in the handling of sup-
tricts of Southern Base Section. Their pur- plies over beaches.
pose was simply to arrive a t the most effi-
cient loading procedures for the cross- (5) Final Rehearsals
Channel invasion. The first of the series—
NUDGER—was held in December 1943 by Of the major combined exercises de-
SOS and Canadian units at Southamp- scribed above—that is, the DUCKseries,
ton. Its main object was to determine the Fox, a n d BEAVER—the three DUCKexer-
time required to load and unload LST’s cises had been planned and carried out
in both daylight and darkness and to de- before the OVERLORD plan was made final
termine the speed of turn-round. The re- and the composition of its task forces was
sults were not final, and later exercises established. The DUCKforces were there-
developed speedier methods. The same fore mixed, containing some units later
problems were further tested in Exercise scheduled for UTAHBeach, and some for
SNIPE in February 1944. In Exercise GULL, OMAHA. After publication of the First
TRAINING AND REHEARSING FOR OVERLORD 351

Army NEPTUNE Plan at the end of Febru- Beach differed from those for OMAHA in
ary the exercises followed the pattern of that they included extensive airborne op-
the actual invasion operation, exercise erations by the 82d and 101st Airborne
Fox involving the units of the V Corps in- Divisions. I n was desirable, of course, for
tended for the assault on OMAHA Beach, the TIGER exercise to include the partici-
and the BEAVER force comprising VII pation of airborne units in order that the
Corps units scheduled for the UTAHland- exercise could duplicate as closely as pos-
ings. These two exercises led logically to sible the actual D-Day operation. The
the two big rehearsals for the invasion— unavailability of aircraft, however, and
FABIUS and TIGER.24 the technical difficulties involved in mak-
FABIUS constituted a whole series of ex- ing drops in the Slapton Sands area cut to
ercises in which all the assault forces a very limited scale the participation of
scheduled to land in the Isigny–Caen airborne units. They took part in the exer-
area—American, British, and Canadian— cises, but the landings were simulated by
were to participate. A separate rehearsal the arrival of airborne troops in trucks.
known as TIGER was to be held for the VII This participation involved principally the
Corps operation at UTAHBeach. Both 101st Division, with which the 4th Divi-
were “dry runs” of the actual invasion, sion was to establish immediate contact
which was to follow very shortly. They behind the beaches at UTAH.
were in a sense the climax of all the long Exercise TIGER was held between 22
months of training and they were the most and 30 April, with D Day on the 28th. Six
realistic and comprehensive simulations of of the nine days were taken up by mar-
OVERLORD which were held. shaling and embarkation. As in previous
Preliminary planning for TIGER was ini- exercises there were traffic jams and con-
tiated early in February 1944, but not un- fusion when co-ordination failed and
til April were VII Corps and the SOS schedules were not kept. The fault
given definite instructions to prepare for stemmed partly from the late arrival of
the exercise, which was to be held late that naval craft at embarkation points. In some
month. Exercise TIGER was to involve all cases loading tables had to be rewritten.
three regimental combat teams of the 4th But in general the mounting process
Division and its supporting 1st Engineer showed improvement, particularly in the
Special Brigade, and was to be mounted operation of camps, and the force was
by XIX District on the same pattern as successfully embarked.
the earlier DUCKand BEAVER exercises. Only a few hours before H Hour a por-
Slapton Sands was again to be the scene of tion of the seaborne force experienced a
the landings. T h e assault force was to be tragic encounter with German warships,
mounted in the Plymouth-Dartmouth which seriously marred the build-up and
area, embarked in the Dartmouth–Brix- supply phases of the exercise. An hour or
ham-Torquay area and at Plymouth. The two after midnight on the night of 27–28
2d Group of the 11th Amphibious Force April, German E-boats discovered eight
was to provide the lift for the sea voyage.
A total of 25,000 men and 2,750 vehicles
24This section is based on Chapter VII of NEP-
was to be embarked. TUNE: Training for a n d Mounting the Operation,
T h e plans for the assault on UTAH Vol. I.
352 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

LST’s in convoy off Portland. The enemy as planned, although build-up and supply
torpedoed and sank two and caused a loss plans were upset, and the beach party was
of life greater than that later suffered by almost reduced to its assault phase ele-
units in the initial assault on UTAHBeach. ments. Following a naval bombardment
At the time of the attack the LST’s were of simulated enemy defenses, 4th Division
proceeding westward toward the assault assault troops went ashore, reduced pill-
area, carrying troops of the 1st Engineer boxes and cut wire, and made their way
Special Brigade, the 4th Division, and VII inland to make contact with elements of
Corps headquarters, which were sched- the airborne division. Units of the 1st En-
uled to participate in the build-up phase gineer Special Brigade meanwhile went
of the exercise. Little was known about the ashore, swept mines, opened beach exits,
enemy except that the attack was believed laid tracked roads, and established the
to have been made by E-boats. The enemy first dumps. Supply operations were
craft launched several torpedoes, some of watched closely by First Army, which had
which failed to explode, and the Germans ordered 2,200 tons of stores unloaded in
strafed the decks of the LST’s and fired on the first two days. As scheduled, two
men who jumped into the water. Several LCT’s unloaded on the first tide, two
of the LST’s escaped, although at least coasters on the second, and on D plus 1
one later picked up survivors. the mission was accomplished with the un-
The attack inflicted its heaviest damage loading of six barges. Experiments with
on supply units. Army records list 749 fa- skid loading were again carried out and
talities and more than 300 injured. Most proved successful enough for some classes
of the casualties were from one LST, No. of supplies to be incorporated in the
531. The unit suffering the heaviest losses OVERLORD supply plan.
was the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, While the VII Corps was engaged in its
which listed 413 dead and 16 wounded. rehearsal, the U.S. V Corps, the three
Other units sustaining heavy losses were British assault forces, and certain build-up
the 3206th Q M Service Company, which forces carried out the FABIUSexercises.
lost 201 killed or wounded of its total These exercises, numbered I through VI,
strength of 251, and the 557th QM Rail- were planned independently by the vari-
head Company, which suffered 69 casual- ous commands concerned, but were car-
ties. The E-boat attack was a complete ried out more or less simultaneously and
surprise, and men on the LST’s reacted in were co-ordinated at the level of 21 Army
different ways. Some thought at first that Group. They were all held in the period
it was all part of the exercise, and some 23 April–7 May. Like TIGER, they were
even kept a sense of humor and leaped patterned after the OVERLORD operation
over the sides of the craft shouting “Dry and the forces had the same general make-
run!” The attempts to cope with the emer- u p as in the actual invasion. Only two of
gency met with considerable confusion the exercises involved American units.
and disclosed a number of deficiencies in FABIUSI was the rehearsal for Assault
connection with safety devices and regu- Force O and included primarily elements
lations. of the1stand 29th Divisions and the Pro-
Except for the costly run-in with the visional Engineer Special Brigade Group,
enemy the exercise proceeded substantially under the command of V Corps. FABIUS
TRAINING AND REHEARSING FOR OVERLORD 353

VI was a marshaling exercise for certain tactical progress is of no concern here.

of the build-up units in the Southern Base Four beaches were opened and given the
Section area. The primary purpose of same designations as the Normandy
these exercises was to give the entire inva- beaches, and battalion beach groups
sion machinery an opportunity to function quickly opened beach exits and roads.
as a whole in a trial run. Every attempt Some engineer units, including the 5th
was therefore made to duplicate the condi- and 6th Engineer Special Brigades head-
tions expected in the Normandy invasion. quarters and the Provisional Group head-
The over-all plan for FABIUSI was quarters, did not make the sea voyage but
drafted by First Army headquarters, but moved via motor to Slapton Sands and set
the more detailed planning began with V up installations there. Token supplies were
Corps and continued through the various landed just as in exercise TIGER.
lower echelons. Approximately 25,000 FABIUS I probably came as close to fol-
troops from Force O were involved, in- lowing a plan as any of the exercises held
cluding three regimental combat teams thus far. Once more, however, it disclosed
(from the 1st and 29th Divisions), two flaws, some of them old defects, some new.
Ranger battalions, two tank battalions, Perhaps the most applicable of the earlier
and three engineer combat battalions with criticisms was the one concerning poor
various attachments from the Provisional traffic regulation, which resulted mainly
Engineer Special Brigade Group. Pat- from the tardy arrival and inadequate
terned after the tactical plan for OVER-numbers of properly briefed military po-
LORD, the exercise provided for preliminary lice. There also were difficulties over main-
air and naval bombardments (the former taining proper supply unloading records,
simulated), landings a t H Hour by am- and over the proper number of dukws re-
phibian tanks and infantry at Slapton quired per coaster and their loading ca-
Sands, followed by engineers who were to pacity. Certain units, particularly signal
blow underwater obstacles, open beach troops, made the usual errors in their
exits, and remove mines. Other infantry scheduled landing. Some attempts were
troops and Rangers were also to land, with made to rectify these deficiencies but the
assignments similar to those in OVERLORD, time was now short and many of the criti-
and additional engineer and service troops cisms of FABIUSI were later applied to the
were to organize the beach, unload cargo, Normandy operation.
and set up supply installations. Meanwhile FABIUSVI was held to test
The operation proceeded generally as the organization that would call forward
planned. Marshaling was smooth, the op- and marshal the early build-up forces
eration of the camps encountered no out- in Southern Base Section. About 50 per-
standing difficulties, and embarkation also cent of the first three days’ build-up sched-
went successfully. With most of the craft uled to move through Portland and
loaded, D Day for all the FABIUS exercises Southampton were actually marshaled.
was postponed 24 hours (to 3 May) by 21 These included mainly elements of the 2d
Army Group because of unfavorable Armored and 9th Infantry Divisions and
weather, as was later necessary in the ac- the 187th Field Artillery Battalion. About
tual launching of OVERLORD. Thereafter 35,000 men and 5,000 vehicles were called
the assault was launched as planned. Its forward to the embarkation points and
354 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F THE ARMIES

then returned to their home stations with- stituted the first step in the execution of
out embarking. In general the machinery the cross-Channel operation.
worked quite smoothly, but while the mar- FABIUS and TIGER had little of the ex-
shaling of assault units had been refined perimental in their make-up. They were
through the many exercises, the marshal- the final rehearsals. With D Day a month
ing of the build-up forces still left some away, there was little time for drastic re-
room for improvement. There was the vision of either the plan or the training of
ever-present trouble over traffic control, units, or for correction of errors and de-
the co-ordination of which was difficult at fects. TIGER a n d FABIUS climaxed a long
best. It was found, for example, that the period of study, experimentation,tests, and
speed limit of twelve miles per hour im- exercises, bringing together the lessons of
posed on motor convoys was too slow. Loss past experience and the fruits of planning
of command control in the mashaling ingenuity. Had the men who participated
camps resulted from the splitting of battal- in these exercises known that these were
ions a n d companies, and there was some the last dry runs before the invasion they
overcrowding in the camps. Measures might have breathed a sigh of relief. Every
were taken to correct these deficiencies training action taught new lessons. But to
before OVERLORD was launched. the participating units the exercises had
As the units from FABIUS VI completed already become routine and monotonous.
their marshaling exercise and moved to The 1st Engineer Special Brigade, for ex-
their home stations, FABIUSI units re- ample, had taken part in fifteen in the
turned from the assault area and re- preceding four months. There was a tend-
entered these camps. There they remained ency on the part of some personnel, there-
until called forward to embark for OVER-fore, to regard TIGER or FABIUS as just an-
LORD. The movement into the marshaling other in a n endless series of training
areas for FABIUS I in a sense therefore con- exercises.
OVERLORD IS SET IN MOTION,
MAY–JULY 1944
 CHAPTER IX

Mounting the Operation

( 1 ) The Mounting Problem and Plan build-up echelons alone. After these forces
were deposited on the far shore the build-
It is unlikely that the average observer up machinery was to move another 1,200,-
in the United States who learned of the 000 men across the Channel within the
Allied invasion of Normandy from his first ninety days. For an indefinite period
newspaper or radio on 6 June 1944 had thereafter it was to continue to handle
much appreciation of the multifarious and whatever additional formations passed
almost frenzied activities which occupied through the United Kingdom on their
the American and British forces in the way from the United States to the Conti-
United Kingdom in the months just pre- nent.
ceding the assault. I n that period the de- Allied planners had long been aware of
tailed plans were written, the flow of the magnitude and complexity of staging
troops into the United Kingdom reached a seaborne invasion, and the theory and
its height, the big training exercises and techniques of mounting had developed
rehearsals were held, eleventh-hour efforts through a long period of trial a n d error.
were made to fill the supply and equip- Exercise HARLEQUIN, held in September
ment shortages, and the coastal areas of 1943, had set the pattern for the eventual
the United Kingdom were prepared for development of the mounting procedure,
the staging of the operation. Finally, in the establishing the concept of mounting as a
weeks just before D Day the vast adminis- series of steps by which units would be
trative machinery was set in motion by brought to a more and more advanced
which units were organized for their far- stage of preparation and formation for the
shore missions and moved from their home assault and finally embarked for the sea
stations to the embarkation points. The voyage. For most units the process in-
initiation of this hushed and extremely volved three successive steps—assembly or
complex process, known as the mounting, concentration, marshaling, and embarka-
marked the first stage in the execution of tion. T h e mounting process normally be-
the great invasion design. gan with the movement of troops from
The staging of OVERLORD proved by far their home stations to the concentration
the most complexfeature of the operation, area. T h e purpose of this step was to reas-
and called for meticulous planning and an semble units which for one reason or an-
unprecedented degree of co-ordination other had been split u p in the United
and control. O n its U.S. side the operation Kingdom, and to replace equipment and
involved the loading of 130,000 men in the supplies which had been lost, damaged, or
assault, initial follow-up, and preloaded consumed in their training or in carrying
358 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

out earlier tasks. In practice a unit’s con- areas, and in part by the fact that equip-
centration area might actually be its home ment would have been packed. SOS troops
station if this was located within reason- provided by the base sections were to carry
able distance (fifty to seventy-five miles) of out all housekeeping functions such as
the embarkation area. Troop units arrived messing and quartering for troops passing
intact and self-sufficient in the concentra- through the marshaling areas.
tion area and took the first steps in prepar- The final step of the mounting would be
ing for the sea voyage. They carried out taken when units were called forward to
the preliminary waterproofing of their ve- the embarkation points, usually only a few
hicles, acquired additional supplies, and miles distant. 1
packed their equipment. At this stage as- Preparation for the mounting got under
sault units also shed their “residues.” Be- way in earnest in the fall of 1943 after Ex-
cause of the limitations in shipping space ercise HARLEQUIN. Responsibility for
it was necessary to move most units in the mounting the U.S. forces in Operation
assault and early build-up at reduced OVERLORD was assigned to the SOS. Gen-
strength, or at “assault scale.” All admin- eral Lee in turn delegated this task to the
istrative personnel a n d overstrength, base section commanders, authorizing
troops whose services would not be needed them to deal directly with the command-
during the initial stage of the invasion, ing general of the 1st Army Group and
were therefore detached from their units with one another on all matters concern-
in the concentration stage. These detach- ing the administrative facilities and instal-
ments, unlike the main bodies of the units, lations required. They were charged with
were for the most part administratively a formidable list of responsibilities: locat-
self-sufficient; they were concentrated in ing a n d constructing concentration and
separate residue camps under the direc- marshaling areas, feeding and housing
tion of the base section commander and troops, waterproofing vehicles, issuing
were to be called forward later for embar- emergency supplies, planning the move-
kation and movement to the far shore, ment of troops, locating and constructing
where they would join their units. the necessary roads, embarking personnel,
After the concentration or assembly, equipment, and supplies, preparing ports
troops moved to the marshaling areas. At and approaches, providing hardstandings
this stage units were briefed on their mis- for thousands of vehicles, supplying recre-
sion in the coming operation, were issued ational facilities for troops during their
their prescribed supply of rations, lifebelts, stay in the marshaling areas, setting up aid
maps, and other necessities, carried out stations and hospital facilities for the care
final waterproofing, and were organized of the sick a n d wounded, a n d operating
into the formation which they were to depots and dumps for the storage and last-
have for the assault—that is, broken down 1 [Clifford L. Jones] NEPTUNE:Training for and
and formed into craft loads. Beginning Mounting the Operation, and the Artificial Ports, Pt.
IV of the Administrative and Logistical History of the
with this phase of the mounting, troops ETO, MS, I, 281–84, OCMH; Mounting the Opera-
were to be relieved of all administrative tion OVERLORD, Gen Bd Rpt 129, pp. 6-7; History of
responsibility by static service personnel. the Transportation Corps, ETO, prep by Int and Hist
Br, Plng Div, Office Cof T ETO, 1944, MS, II, Near
This step was necessitated in part by the Shore Troop Movements, E T O Adm 582; Southern
shedding of residues in the concentration Base Section History, pp. 6–8, ETO Adm 601.
MOUNTING T H E OPERATION 359

minute issue of supplies. After the start of bled, rising from approximately 360,000
the operation the base section command- to 720,000. This sudden growth in strength
ers were to be responsible also for the re- made it necessary not only to build new
ceipt, treatment, and evacuation to fixed camps but to convert old buildings which
hospitals or concentration areas of casual- had been rejected earlier as unsuitable for
ties, refugees, and prisoners of war, as well military purposes.
as for the continued mounting of troops. Mounting all the seaborne assault forces
All these missions were to be performed was a tremendous task for Southern Base
under operational procedures already es- Section. The assault elements first had to
tablished by and with the British districts, be mounted for the rehearsals, TIGER and
with which the Americans maintained FABIUS I, which took place at the end of
close liaison.2 April and in the first days of May. Those
U.S. forces were allotted all marshaling troops were then to return in mid-May to
and embarkation facilities in southern the marshaling areas where they would re-
England west of Poole, inclusive, and main awaiting final embarkation two or
shared facilities with the British eastward three weeks later. 3 When they finally
as far as Southampton. Almost the entire moved out to the ports their places would
staging area thus fell within the Southern be taken by the initial build-up forces in
Base Section, which was to handle by far accordance with priorities established by
the largest share of the mounting, includ- the First Army. Once that process had be-
ing the staging of all the seaborne assault gun it was expected that the marshaling
forces. Western Base Section was to handle camps would always contain about two
the preloaded build-up forces and para- days’ flow of troops and that troops would
troop elements of the airborne divisions, spend only from eighteen to thirty-six
a n d was to share in the mounting of the hours in them.
later build-up. I n actual practice the re- Southern Base Section had been di-
sponsibility for the mounting was further vided into four districts, numbered XVI,
delegated by the base sections to their dis- XVII; XVIII, and X I X . The entire
tricts, which became the principal admin- coastal zone from Southampton westward
istrative agencies for handling the move- was divided between the latter two, how-
ments. ever, and those two districts were respon-
Of the two base sections, Southern had sible for the mounting of all assault ele-
by far the more complex task. It had to ments except the airborne troops. XVIII
provide the bulk of the accommodations District (Col. Paschal N. Strong), to the
for the flood of troops arriving in the east, was to handle Force O, the OMAHA
United Kingdom from the United States Beach task force, and X I X District (Col.
in the spring of 1944, and at the same time Theodore Wyman, Jr.) to the west, was to
it had to prepare for the mounting of all handle Force U, the UTAHBeach force.
the seaborne assault forces. Eight U.S. di- T h e entire coast in the Southern Base
visions were quartered in the Southern 2 NEPTUNE: Training. for and Mounting the Opera-
Base Section area byJanuary 1944. Within tion, I, 122–24, 287-88; Mounting the Operation
OVERLORD, Gen Bd Rpt 129, p. 8.
the next five months the number rose to 3Hq ETO, T h e Concentration Plan, 15 Apr 44,
fourteen, and the total U.S. military pop- EUCOM 381.1 16 Mounting the Operation, Service
ulation of the Southern Base Section dou- Plan.
360 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

Section zone, extending from Portsmouth cies were also taken over. The XIX
westward, was divided into nine marshal- District contained fewer large and com-
ing and embarkation areas, four of them pact camps, and was harder put to find
falling within the XVIII District and five accommodations for the flood of units
in the X I X . (Map 10)* Of the four in the which arrived in the spring of 1944. It
former, one area in and around Ports- therefore had to make much more exten-
mouth and Gosport was operated entirely sive use of the sausage camps described
by the British, two around Southampton earlier. These small tented camp areas,
were to be used by both the British and straddling from five to ten miles of road-
Americans and were jointly operated, and way and containing a dozen or more small
a split area around Weymouth, the Isle of 230-man camps, had their drawbacks, for
Portland, and Poole was operated solely they required more personnel for efficient
by the Americans. All five areas in X I X operation, and the wide dispersal of units
District were U.S. operated. T h e nine made control difficult. But they also had
areas (lettered from A to D in XVIII Dis- their advantages, for camouflage was easy,
trict and from K to O in X I X District) a n d they were quickly constructed, and
had a total of ninety-five marshaling since speed and ease of construction were
camps with a capacity of 187,000 troops important they eased the accommodations
and 28,000 vehicles. The number and size problem considerably.5
of the camps in each area were determined T h e differences in accommodations in
by the outloading capacity of the adjoin- the two districts resulted in differences in
ing embarkation areas, of which there was mounting techniques as well. American
a total of nineteen. 4 For the organization observers at the HARLEQUIN exercise had
of Area M, a typical marshaling and em- expressed the belief that the mounting
barkation area lying between Plymouth procedure, which used one installation for
and Fowey, see Map 10. concentrating and another for marshaling,
The other two Southern Base Section was unnecessarily complicated. T h e two
districts—XVI and XVII—were to processes, they felt, could be accomplished
mount glider elements of the 82d and in one area. I n XVIII District, where
101st Airborne Divisions. facilities were more adaptable, such a con-
Because of the differences in facilities in solidation was begun quite early and
the eastern and western portions of the adopted as more or less standard practice.
Southern Base Section area the two dis- T h e X I X District, because of its limited
tricts mainly responsible for the mount- facilities, planned to concentrate troops in
ing-the XVIII and XIX—met the one area and marshal them in another
problems of accommodation in different near the port wherever necessary.6
ways. T h e XVIII District to the east con- *Inside back cover.
tained many large camps, most of which 4 Area A, with eighteen camps and two embarka-
had been constructed by the British and tion areas (and a capacity of 30,000 men and 4,500
vehicles) was reserved entirely for British use, as were
were easily converted. They had capacities portions of Areas B and C.
ranging from 1,500 to 9,000 men, pos- 5 NEPTUNE: Training for and mounting the Opera-
sessed large messes and recreation halls, tion, I, 284-86; Southern Base Section History, p. 18,
ETO Adm 601.
and could be expanded fairly readily. Sev- 6 NEPTUNE: Training for and Mounting the Oper-
eral large buildings used by civilian agen- ation, I, 291.
MOUNTING THE OPERATION 361

Providing the needed accommodations of the stepped-up program, 4,500 cooks, in

entailed much more than acquiring build- addition to many mess managers, were
ings or erecting tents. Early in the year trained in the first three months of 1944.
there was a severe shortage of beds, and it T h e mounting of the assault forces en-
was necessary for Southern Base Section tailed a great amount of construction be-
to buy lumber, wire, nails, and tools on sides that involved in the provision of the
the open market and to build 50,000 marshaling camps. Additional loading
double-tiered bunks. Later in the spring facilities were vital to the embarkation
an acute shortage of operating personnel plan, for the ports were unequal to the
developed, which promised to become task of simultaneously loading hundreds
worse once the mounting machinery was of ships, particularly landing craft. This
set in motion. SOS officials foresaw this requirement was met largely by the con-
deficiency as early as February and at that struction of concrete aprons known as
time indicated that it would be necessary “hards” along the water’s edge, some
to use field forces to perform service func- within the ports and others along river
tions during the mounting of the opera- banks, where landing craft could nose in
tion. General Lee estimated that at least and drop their ramps to take on personnel
15,000 field force troops would be needed, and supplies, and particularly vehicles.
in addition to some 46,000 SOS troops Other installations such as engineer de-
that were to be taken off other work for pots, advance shops, supply distributing
this purpose.
7 points, railheads, and ordnance recovery
The necessity of calling on combat points had to be built. Southern Base Sec-
troops to perform housekeeping duties was tion alone increased the number of engi-
fully confirmed with the mounting of the neers employed on such projects to 47,500
two rehearsals, TIGER and FABIUS, in April. in May. To service the invasion units, to
I n fact, the original estimates proved too equip them properly, and to facilitate
small. At that time the Southern Base their movement to the ports, hundreds of
Section was given use of the entire 5th still other installations were needed, in-
Armored Division in the concentration cluding dispensaries, sterilization and
and marshaling areas of the XIX District. bath facilities, field bakeries, POL and
I n addition, the 29th Infantry Regiment water distributing points, post offices,
and the 6th Tank Destroyer Group were ration dumps, traffic regulating points,
assigned similar duties in the XVIII Dis- military police installations, and all types
trict. Even these measures did not meet of supply distributing points. 8
all requirements, for there was an unfilled Mounting in Western Base Section,
demand for specialists in certain catego- which held six U.S. divisions at the end of
ries. There was a persistent shortage of May, proved considerably simpler than in
cooks, for example, despite the fact that the southern coastal area, primarily be-
attendance quotas at the Cooks and cause seaborne assault units were not in-
Bakers School were increased early in the 7Memo, Stratton for DCofS ETO, 26 Feb 44, and
year in Southern Base. SOS units were Ltr, Lee to Gen Leven C. Allen, CofS FUSAG, 27
ordered to double the normally allotted Feb 44, ETO 381/320 Troops, OVERLORD.
8 NEPTUNE; Training for and Mounting the Oper-
number of cooks to meet the housekeeping ation, I, 292-95; Southern Base Section History, p.
needs of the marshaling areas. As a result 18, ETO Adm 601.
362 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

WATERPROOFED TANK RECOVERY VEHICLE moving from a “hard” onto a

landing craft.

volved. Western Base’s initial responsibil- a more centralized administration. West-

ity was to mount the preloaded build-up ern Base Section constructed only twenty-
through the Mersey ports and Bristol and four marshaling and four residue camps to
to marshal the paratroops of the two air- accommodate its seaborne build-up forces
borne divisions at airfields in eastern and generally located them farther from
England. The base section then had to the embarkation points than in the South-
handle a portion of the later build-up via ern Base Section. Reduced scales of ac-
the shuttling of ships between the United commodations were adopted, and existing
Kingdom and the far shore. Because its camps were expanded by the use of tents
units did not have to be broken up and where necessary. They were operated by
formed into assault teams and craft loads, two engineer general service regiments—
they were for the most part embarked the 360th and 373d—augmented by
from quays in the normal manner, which camouflage, fire-fighting, depot, and vari-
required little of the meticulous planning ous other detachments, rather than
necessary for the assault forces. T h e less through the district headquarters. There
complicated marshaling process permitted was no resort to the sausage camps, al-
MOUNTING T H E OPERATION 363

though such areas were surveyed and held accordance with tactical requirements in-
in reserve. Part of Western Base’s build-up sofar as the available shipping would
forces were to be staged in Northern Ire- allow. I n other words, machinery was
land, and a small emergency staging area needed which would regulate the move-
was constructed for this purpose on the ment of troops through the mounting
outskirts of Belfast. process and also permit alterations in the
The mounting of airborne units was a course of the build-up. In addition, a cen-
separate and somewhat special problem. tralized control of ships and craft shuttling
Both paratroops and glider troops were between the United Kingdom and the
marshaled at their departure airfields, Continent was needed to insure flexibility
where marshaling camps known as “eggs” and economy in the use of shipping.
were constructed, each camp having a For this purpose the Buildup Control
capacity of about 200 men. 9 Organization (short title, BUCO), consist-
ing of British and American ground,
(2) The Mounting Begins naval, and air representatives, was estab-
lished at Fort Southwick, near Ports-
The SOS mounting plan was issued on mouth, under the joint direction of the
20 March 1944, and the plans of the base Allied Army, Naval, and Air Command-
sections and subordinate echelons fol- ers-in-Chief. Maj. Gen Charles S. Napier,
lowed soon after. Under the plan Task Director of Movements in the War Office
Force O was to marshal in the Portland– and later Chief of Movements and Trans-
Poole area, Task Force U in the Torquay– portation, G–4, SHAEF, had conceived
Dartmouth sector, and Force B (follow-up) the basic idea for BUCO and had worked
in the west country around Falmouth and out many of the details personally.
Plymouth. Preloaded build-up units were Through representatives of the Allied
to be embarked through the Bristol Chan- Naval Commander, the British Ministry
nel ports, and the earliest build-up divi- of War Transport, and the U.S. War Ship-
sions via the shuttle service through ping Administration BUCO was to con-
Southampton. trol the movements of ships and craft;
Months of toil had gone into the army through the representatives of the War
and army group Buildup Priority Lists, Office, the Air Ministry, and Headquar-
which specified the order in which hun- ters, ETOUSA, it was to control the
dreds of units and detachments were to movement of personnel and vehicles to the
embark for the cross-Channel voyage in embarkation points.
the first ninety days. Allied planners BUCO was not an agency of the
nevertheless had foreseen the need for an Supreme Commander. It was to operate
effective movement control organization directly under the tactical commands
which would see to it that marshaling and most immediately concerned with the
embarkation were carried out in the order build-up of troops. Under the chairman-
and speed which made the best possible ship of Brigadier G. C. Blacker (Br.), who
use of shipping without clogging the represented the Commander-in-Chief, 21
camps, roads, and embarkation points, Army Group, BUCO had both U.S. and
and, more important, would permit the 9 NEPTUNE.I. 296-99: Western Base Section His-
modification of priorities in shipments in tory, Ch. IX, G–4, ETO Adm 603.
364 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

British zone staffs. T h e U.S. Zone Staff areas, and their loading times, thus giving
consisted of a chairman (Col. Eli Stevens), the base sections and embarkation areas
representatives of the major U.S. com- an indication of movements that could be
mands involved in the build-up, and an expected. T h e final movement schedule
advisory representative of the War Ship- took the form of a daily movement table
ping Administration. In practice, the U.S. issued by U.S. MOVCO to Headquarters,
Zone Staff functioned directly under the Southern Base Section, the marshaling
senior American tactical commander on areas, and the embarkation areas covering
the far shore (the Commanding General, a twenty-four-hour period of flow. In
First Army, until 1 August and the Com- effect, the daily table was an extract from
manding General, 12th Army Group, the loading forecast brought up to date
thereafter). Supervision by the representa- with the latest amendments in priorities,
tives of the joint commanders in chief was and was the basis for a detailed allocation
limited mainly to decisions affecting the by the embarkation area headquarters of
allocation of shipping between U.S. and personnel and vehicles to individual craft
British forces. and ships. It also served as instructions to
Two subordinate organizations were the transportation agencies in the base
established to act as executive agencies in sections, enablingthem to issue road and
carrying out BUCO’s decisions. These rail movement tables for the movement of
were Movement Control (MOVCO) and units forward into the marshaling areas.
Turn-Round Control (TURCO). O n its T U R C O was organized to assist naval
U.S. side MOVCO was in effect an commanders in controlling the movement
agency of the ETOUSA chief of transpor- of ships and craft so as to achieve the op-
tation and had the mission of supervising timum rate of turn-round of vessels be-
the movement of troop units from their tween the far shore and loading points.
home stations to the embarkation points. O n instructions from BUCO it was re-
It planned to accomplish this roughly as sponsible for bringing the prescribed num-
follows: O n the basis of the over-all troop ber of ships and craft into designated
Buildup Priority Lists, prepared and embarkation points.10
amended from time to time by First Army In co-ordinating the actual marshaling
and 1st Army Group, BUCO prepared ap- and embarkation with these two agencies
propriate lists for each embarkation area the two base sections again developed dif-
indicating the order in which units were ferent methods. Western Base Section set
to embark for the next three weeks, and in up a simpler and more centralized system
addition periodically released a forecast of of control. All movement orders were the
loadings. O n the basis of this information responsibility of the Transportation Corps,
MOVCO in turn was enabled to prepare which controlled the location and move-
a periodic “force loading forecast,” pro- ment of all units through a headquarters
jected ten days in advance, and finally a established at Newport and a subsection
daily “force movement table.” It issued
force loading forecasts for each embarka- 10 Controlof the Buildup of Troops i n a Cross-
Channel Amphibious Operation as Illustrated in Op-
tion area, indicating the allocation of craft eration OVERLORD, Gen Bd Rpt 22, pp. 5–1 1 ; Mount-
and shipping to units, the approximate ing the Operation OVERLORD, Gen Bd Rpt 129,
time of arrival of units in marshaling pp. 22–24.
MOUNTING T H E OPERATION 365

headquarters a t Swansea in the Bristol originally planned. There were other de-
Channel area. T h e district headquarters fects in these initial stages of the mounting.
had no intermediary role in this system. Traffic did not move smoothly in the em-
Southern Base Section set up a more barkation stage, and there was poor liaison
elaborate supervisory agency known as between Army and Navy officials.
Embarkation Control, or EMBARCO, I n XVIII District the marshaling of
which was intended to serve as a nerve Force O, which consisted mainly of ele-
center for the entire Southern Base Sec- ments of the 1st a n d 29th Divisions and
tion mounting complex. EMBARCO the 5th and 6th Engineer Special Brigades
planned to maintain a record of the loca- a n d totaled 29,714 men a n d 3,241 vehi-
tion and capacity of all concentration and cles, also encountered difficulty, owing
marshaling area camps, a n d to keep in- principally to the complicated movement
formed at all times as to the location of schedule. Some units were misdirected; a
every unit in the mounting process. For few could not be located immediately;
this purpose enormous boards were set up and the dissemination of information and
in a large Nissen hut at Southern Base instructions was faulty, in some cases as a
Section headquarters near Salisbury, result of an overemphasis on security.
where the strength and location of all Portions of the build-up forces, includ-
units were charted. Through this agency ing the 9th Infantry a n d 2d Armored
Southern Base Section hoped to exercise Divisions, rehearsed their marshaling and
detailed control over every movement movement to the point of embarkation,
from concentration area to embarkation and then returned to their concentration
point, issuing the necessary movement in- areas. Upon the completion of these re-
structions to the districts. T h e system hearsals and the return of assault units to
proved difficult to operate, as will be their marshaling areas the movement of
shown in the next chapter. 11 Force B, the follow-up force of 26,492 men
T h e machinery in Southern Base Sec- and 4,431 vehicles, also got under way.
tion was set in motion late in April with In the weeks just before D Day a tre-
the mounting of forces participating in the mendous increase in movements took
final rehearsals. Force U, consisting prin- place in England, particularly in the
cipally of the 4th Division and the 1st En- coastal areas. The transportation network
gineer Special Brigade and totaling 30,452 became alive with trucks, combat vehicles,
men and 3,569 vehicles, was marshaled by and train after train of foot troops, and
the X I X District. In mounting Exercise cities like Gloucester, Cheltenham, Ciren-
TIGER, however, a procedure was followed cester, and Oxford became critical traffic
which was contrary to established prac- bottlenecks. In many areas, particularly
tice. Units were broken down into craft where the sausage camps had been estab-
loads at their home stations before their lished, embargoes on all traffic were im-
briefing, a step that caused considerable posed, creating hardships on the local
confusion in the marshaling camps. inhabitants and in some cases causing re-
SHAEF intervened and ordered troops to sentment. O n all other highways move-
be briefed by unit rather than by craft
11NEPTUNE,I, 301-02; Cross Channel from South-
load in the future, thus making manda- ern Base Section, prep by Southern Base Sec, ETO
tory the standard mounting procedure Adm 601.
366 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

ments were rigidly controlled, with intended to protect him against chemical
military police guiding all convoys in their warfare. Perhaps the most convincing sign
movement through the mounting process. that this was not to be just another dry
The Transportation Corps assigned 478 run was the payment of 200 francs in the
officers and 2,583 men from group regu- new French currency issued by the Allied
lating stations and traffic regulating military government.
groups to Southern Base Section alone for Once these details were out of the way
the control of troop movements.12 Upon the soldier might ease the long wait with a
arrival at the regulating points convoys game of baseball or poker, he might go to
were checked for their make-up by base a movie, he might read the Stars and Stripes
section personnel, and then were escorted Yank, or the special issue of Army Talks
to the designated camps. Assignment of a called “Achtung,” specifically written for
camp area depended on the type of vehi- the men scheduled to enter combat on the
cles in the unit, the roads it was to travel, Continent. Extraordinary efforts were also
and the time schedule. At the edge of the made to indulge the men’s taste and ap-
camp the units were met by a representa- petite in these last few days in the United
tive of the c a m p commander, who indi- Kingdom. Fresh meat and white bread
cated parking areas. Vehicles were then were regular items on the menu in this
parked, camouflaged, a n d “topped off” period, and special precautions were taken
with gasoline, and guards were posted. to guard the diet against foods conducive
The troops then marched into the camp, to seasickness in the case of seaborne as-
which was usually less than a mile distant. sault forces, and against gas-forming foods
There the unit was once more checked which might induce stomach cramps in
against the movement forecast, and troops the case of paratroops. In an unaccus-
taken to the quarters areas and assigned tomed display of kindness, the Army even
blocks of tents. After being briefed, units allowed some troops to sleep through
were broken down into craft loads. There- breakfast and then served them a n extra
after they awaited the final embarkation large noon meal.14 Mobile bakeries pro-
signal. 13 vided fresh bread; laundry a n d shoe re-
I n the vital marshaling phase of the pair units provided other essential services.
mounting the assault forces were placed in Ordnance patrols circulated through the
final readiness, in both supply and organ- areas, checking waterproofing, making
ization, for the cross-Channel movement minor repairs, and occasionally replacing
and actual assault of the enemy beach. It vehicles or other equipment.
was in the marshaling area that the soldier Maintaining adequate security was an-
was issued the items which probably first other vital aspect of the mounting, entail-
impressed him with the real nature of
coming operations. For there, during the 12History of the TC, E T O , Vol. III, Ch. VI, p. 3,
E T O Adm 582.
waiting period, he received such items as 13Southern Base Section History, pp. 41–43, 47,
anti-seasickness pills, water-purification ETO Adm 601.
tablets, emergency rations, heating units, 14Basic Needs of the E T O Soldier, Pt. XI of the
Administrative a n d Logistical History of the ETO,
vomit bags, dusting powder, and a life- Vol. I, Ch. I, p. 43, OCMH; Quartermaster Supply
belt, and there he donned the impregnated in the ETO, prep by QM School, Camp Lee, Va., II
clothing and applied to his shoes the paste (Subsistence), 44, OCMH.
MOUNTING T H E OPERATION 367

ing protection against air attack as well as paint, and also repainted much sand-
against the leakage of information. Once colored equipment originally designed for
the briefing began a t the end of May a Operation TORCH.The goal of the battal-
complete security seal was imposed on all ion was to render marshaling areas un-
marshaling camps, wire was strung recognizable at 10,000 feet.16I n Western
around the perimeter of each camp, all Base Section preparations were made for
contact with the outside was controlled the smokescreening of some of the big gen-
through gates, and more than 2,000 coun- eral depots, like G–40 at Barry in southern
terintelligence corps personnel ceaselessly Wales. 17
covered their beats to prevent strays from Two onerous problems-making up
entering or leaving the camps without supply deficiencies, and waterproofing
authorization. vehicles-added greatly to the adminis-
Because it was impossible to conceal trative burden of the mounting. I n theory,
completely from enemy eyes the tremen- every American unit in the United King-
dous concentration taking place in south- dom should have been properly equipped
ern England, both on land and along the either before departure from the United
shores, the Allies expected the Germans to States or from preshipped stocks shortly
send bombers over the marshaling and after arrival in the theater. I n actual prac-
embarkation areas. To provide air protec- tice many units lacked portions of their
tion against such attacks a n antiaircraft basic equipment for varying periods of
brigade was attached to Southern Base time after they arrived in the United
Section, the heavy antiaircraft artillery Kingdom. Such shortages should have
being manned by the British, and the light been made u p at their home stations by
guns by Americans.15 Camouflage was an- normal requisitioning. But again practice
other logical protective measure. Instruc- often fell short of theory. Either because
tions on camouflage measures in the the equipment simply was not available,
marshaling areas were issued in March, or because late arrivals in Britain had too
and camouflage discipline began even little time, emergency issue of many items
with the selection of mounting installa- was necessary in the last weeks before the
tions. New construction was carried out invasion. This continued after the mount-
with the minimum of disturbance to the ing had already begun, and therefore at a
ground pattern; and there were periodic time when the SOS administrative
inspections by both visual and photo- machinery was already heavily taxed.
graphic aerial reconnaissance. Both dis- Deficiencies within the assault units
tricts of Southern Base Section were given were attended to first, for they had been
engineer camouflage units (from the 604th noted in the course of the exercises. By the
Engineer Camouflage Battalion). Officers time those units returned to the marshal-
from these units gave standard camouflage ing areas after the final rehearsals most of
instruction to the task forces as they passed their shortages had been eliminated. The
through the camps, erected model camps
for demonstration purposes, and enforced 15T h e tactical command in the mounting areas
camouflage discipline. The 604th Camou- was British.
16NEPTUNE,I, 320–24.
flage Battalion painted 18,000 tents in the 17Western Base Section History, C h . I X , G–3.
sausage camps with reclaimed camouflage E T O Adm 603
368 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

build-up divisions, however, started the in advance of the operation, thus exhaust-
marshaling process with serious shortages. ing surplus stocks. Some of the needed
The Ordnance Service was particularly equipment was known to exist in First
hard pressed to meet late demands, for it Army dumps, but it could not be obtained
already had many responsibilities in the for lack of the necessary authority on the
mounting. Troops were scheduled to ar- part of the base sections. Sufficient priority
rive in marshaling areas with ordnance was eventually given the base section
equipment checked and with complete requisitions, and the situation began to
combat loads of ammunition. Base section clear up rapidly at the end of May. I n the
mounting installations were to provide end almost all needed equipment and sup-
only the day-to-day maintenance and re- plies were obtained.
placements normally required while units Similar situations developed in connec-
were in the camps, and certain services tion with medical and signal supply.
connected with the mounting. The Ord- There were critical shortages of some
nance Service accordingly set up field de- signal equipment until the very date of the
pots a n d field service points to issue invasion, and in the case of medical sup-
limited quantities of new equipment and plies the Western Base medical officer and
ammunition and to repair or replace vehi- depot personnel intervened in the last
cles. It also provided teams to test water- weeks to get vitally needed items released
proofing and wreckers to clear highways and issued to the using units.
in case of accidents. Many an emergency was attributed to
But many units began the marshaling the failure to follow existing instructions.
process with little or no ordnance equip- Procedures for handling supplies and
ment, a n d for a time the supply of these equipment in a n amphibious operation
units was badly snarled. Meeting eleventh- had long since been laid down in a guide
hour deficiencies of equipment therefore known as “Preparations for Overseas
proved an unexpectedly heavy burden. Movement, Short Sea Voyage” ( P O M
Nondivisional units made the heaviest de- SSV). Had more of the field force units
mands, and the condition of their vehicles followed this bible, many crises and
and other equipment was inexcusable in anxious weeks could have been avoided.18
many cases. One unit with a T/E calling I n some instances transient units left
for 136 carbines arrived in the marshaling camps in a deplorable condition. Some
area without a single weapon and without camps were below standard, creating
ammunition, creating a problem which sanitation hazards. Fortunately, medical
the Ordnance Service was neither pre- troops were able to expand their facilities
pared nor expected to cope with during and prevent serious threats ofepidemic. 19
the mounting process. Many showdown Waterproofing of vehicles was an ines-
requisitions had been submitted but had capable requirement. That stage in the
not been filled. In some cases they were landings when vehicles left the ramps of
canceled without notice to the requisi- landing craft a n d entered the water was
tioning unit. Providing the initial issue of expected to be a crucial point in the
T / E equipment was made difficult in 18 WesternBase Section History, Ch. IX, G–4,
many cases by the fact that First Army Ordnance and Surgeon Sections; NEPTUNE, I, 327–31.
had been permitted to draw replacements 19Western Base Section History, Ch. IX, G–3.
M O U N T I N G THE OPERATION 369

assault. Unless adequate precautions were classes for the training of instructors and
taken, not only might many vehicles be inspectors in December. Under specifica-
drowned in the sea but vehicles stalled at tions laid down by the ETOUSA G–3, the
the end of a craft's ramp could effectively Amphibious Division of the Ordnance
prevent the unloading of other vehicles at Service trained more t h a n 3,500 men as
that spot. This threat was a great deal waterproofing instructors a n d inspectors
more critical in the OVERLORD landings by July 1944.
than in the Mediterranean operations be- T h e basic material adopted was a Brit-
cause of the greater tide ranges in the ish product known to the Americans as
Channel. A rising tide could block salvage asbestos waterproofing compound, which
efforts for many hours. consisted of grease, lime, and asbestos
With these problems in mind great fibers. Metal tubing was used to extend air
efforts were made both in the United vents in gas tanks a n d crank cases, and
States and the United Kingdom to de- flexible tubing for carburetor air intake
velop satisfactory waterproofing tech- extensions and exhausts. Metal stacks and
niques. Essentially, the problem was one adapters and ventilating ducts were built
of developing a compound which would for armored vehicles to enable air to be
effectively seal the vital parts of vehicles drawn in a n d exhaust to be blown out, a
and yet be easily stripped off after the release mechanism permitting the stack to
vehicles were landed. British experiments be jettisoned by the driver after the tank
begun early in 1942 led to the develop- reached shore.
ments of a compound which was used by T h e actual waterproofing was to be ac-
both the British and Americans in the complished in three steps. T h e biggest
North African landings. Experimentation portion of the j o b was done in the home
continued after TORCH, a n d in the spring camps. Vital parts of the motor a n d wir-
of 1943 a n experimental station was ing were left exposed at this stage, since
opened at a n American ordnance depot in they could not withstand sealing for any
the Southern Base Section where shop extended driving. Additional work was
facilities and beaches for wading exercises accomplished in the marshaling areas,
were available. I n January 1944 the sta- and the final sealing was done after vehi-
tion was given full responsibility for devel- cles had been loaded. I n a reversal of the
oping a n adequate waterproofing tech- process, a minimum of de-waterproofing
nique. This included the development of was to be accomplished immediately after
proper methods of handling all ordnance the vehicles left the water on the far shore,
equipment in amphibious operations, de- and the larger job of stripping the com-
veloping a satisfactory waterproofing pound was handled later. Standardized
material, a n d the co-ordination and procedures were developed and publicized
supervision of all training and experimen- for all vehicles and for other special equip-
tation in waterproofing. I n the meantime ment such as Signal Corps radios.
trials with jeeps a n d trucks were held off Until March 1944 field force units sent
a beach near Plymouth, and a training representatives to the experimental station
film was prepared by the Army Pictorial in Southern Base Section to be trained in
Service. Progress was satisfactory enough waterproofing methods. It was decided at
by the summer and fall of 1943 to start this time, however, that waterproofing in-
370 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

spection should be performed by specially troops were untrained in many of the as-
trained personnel provided by the Ord- signments they were called o n to perform,
nance Service. I n addition to carrying out and latecomers even among the SOS units
the responsibilities already listed, Ord- were seriously handicapped by inexperi-
nance now had to furnish inspectors, it ence a n d lack of adequate orientation in
had to send welding teams to mount stacks the plan and all its intricacies. Men were
a n d shrouds on tanks, it had to prepare called on to work long shifts to meet the
and circulate instructions on salvaging demands of the mounting schedule. South-
waterproofed equipment on the far shore, ern Base Section alone employed 43,000
and it had to do the actual waterproofing men in the process, 20,000 in XVIII Dis-
of all replacement ordnance vehicles. An trict a n d 23,000 in X I X District, exclud-
ordnance base automotive maintenance ing troops used in mounting the airborne
battalion a n d a base armament mainte- forces. 21To make matters worse, many
nance battalion provided personnel to act units, choosing to ignore instructions, need-
as waterproofing inspectors in Southern lessly added to the burden of the mount-
Base Section. I n Western Base Section ing machinery by arriving in the marshal-
First Army provided over a hundred men ing areas with overstrengths and residues
for inspection teams, and qualified ord- in addition to their assault echelons.
nance waterproofing detachments from Others arrived with equipment in excess
the SOS were also stationed at each camp. of that which could be accommodated on
Actual waterproofing was carried out by unit vehicles or on landing craft and ships,
field forces units, many drivers having at- on which space had been carefully allo-
tended the Ordnance training schools in cated. The excess baggage had to be
the two base sections. Materials were shipped to the proper port for loading on
issued for 137,041 wheeled and semi- cargo vessels, a n d its delivery to the far
tracked vehicles, 4,217 full-tracked vehi- shore consequently was delayed. Such
cles, and 3,500 artillery pieces. Water- practices were in clear violation of mount-
proofing of vehicles of the build-up forces ing instructions a n d caused unnecessary
continued for a month after the invasion, confusion in the marshaling areas.22
after which it became feasible to land T h e briefing of officers in Forces O and
vehicles dry shod.20 U finally began on 22 and 23 May respec-
Both base sections suffered acute short- tively. I n the case of the 1st Engineer
ages of manpower in operating the mount- Special Brigade, headquarters staff officers
ing machinery. T h e demands for service visited all field units a n d briefed unit
personnel actually compounded a pre- officers who, in turn, briefed the men
existing shortage, and some units found under their command. Some headquarters
themselves with overlapping missions— formed briefing teams, which moved from
attached to a base section in the United unit to unit and outlined the plans. In
Kingdom to assist with the staging, a n d many cases they used excellent visual aids,
assigned to the Advance Section and
scheduled for early movement to Nor- 20NEPTUNE, I, 307–15.
mandy. Diverting combat units to service 21 SouthernBase Section History, p. 27, ETO Adm
601.
duty undoubtedly eased the situation but 22 Mounting the Operation OVERLORD,
Gen Bd
was not a n unqualified success. Combat Rpt 129, p. 10.
MOUNTING T H E OPERATION 371

such as sponge rubber models of the beach scheduled for delivery on the far shore in
areas as well as large-scale maps and aerial approximately the first fifteen days were
photographs. Security precautions were loaded before the operation was actually
doubled, and marshaling areas were pa- launched. Several ports specialized in
trolled night and day. In this critically im- loading certain commodities. Llanelly,
portant period a few well-executed enemy Sharpness, a n d Port Talbot, for example,
air raids might easily have disrupted plans. were used exclusively for POL; Penarth
But only a few minor raids took place, the and Fowey were primarily ammunition
most serious of which occurred on the ports; heavy engineer a n d other out-of-
night of 30 May, when German planes gauge equipment was handled at Cardiff;
dropped several bombs in the bivouac area and a fleet of 112 vehicle-loaded Liberties
of a n ordnance battalion near Falmouth operated mainly out of Southampton. 23
in Cornwall. Twelve men were killed and In this way equipment that had crossed
nineteen wounded; but replacements were the submarine-infested Atlantic in 1943,
obtained immediately and the unit was at and cargo that more recently was piled on
its former strength when it embarked. the wharves of the New York a n d Boston
Just the problem of maintaining com- ports—oil from wells in Texas, jeeps from
munications with the many units was a Detroit, M1’s from Massachusetts, radios
tremendous one. Because marshaling from Pennsylvania, artillery shells from
camps were scattered throughout south- Illinois, K-ration cheese from Wisconsin,
ern England, it was often difficult to locate blood plasma from a town in Tennessee-
units to inform them of changes in plan, found their way into the holds of vessels
plans which were highly classified and had which soon would converge on the Nor-
to be delivered by courier and then dis- mandy shore.
seminated to subordinate echelons. One Late in May the build-up of certain
major change in the tactical plan was combat units was moved forward, and a
made only a few days before embarkation. last-minute accommodation had to be
This was the change resulting from the dis- made to meet the new supply require-
covery of additional German strength in ments. Since shipping was closely allocated
the Cotentin, which prompted the VII and loading was already well under way,
Corps to shift the drop zones and area of special measures had to be taken to find
operation of the 82d Airborne Division so space for additional supplies. Part of the
as to assure the winning of the beachhead. requirement was met by the acquistion of
The change had no effect on the mounting extra barges which could be beached on D
of units scheduled for the D-Day assault, plus 1. More space was acquired by the
but certain follow-up and build-up units expedient of loading the vehicles of certain
were now given new priorities and phased truck companies which had been left
forward. empty for just such an emergency. Nearly
I n the meantime the “mounting” of 4,000 tons of supplies were carried in this
supplies had also begun. T h e loading of manner. 24
vehicle ships, coasters, LCT’s and barges As the marshaling of men, vehicles, and
got under way in the second week of May, 23I. Swerdlow, “Forgotten Ports,” Army Transports-
most cargo being prestowed to meet the tion Journal, I (October, 1945), 23–25
desires of the First Army. All supplies 24FUSA Rpt of Opns, Bk. I, p. 33.
372 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

LOADED LANDING CRAFT AND SHIPS for the cross-Channelvoyage.

supplies of the assault forces began, the lift a n d support for the UTAHforce. Ele-
warships and landing craft which were to ments of both forces participated in the
carry and escort these forces were also TIGER and FABIUS I rehearsals and then re-
being assembled by the Navy. The as- turned to port for final repairs and refit-
sembly of craft for the assault forces began ting. Force B (Commodore Campbell D.
after the Allied Naval Commander, Ad- Edgar), with about 500 ships and craft,
miral Ramsay, issued his operation order constituted the follow-up force for OMAHA
a t the end of April. T h e American naval Beach.
forces were organized as the Western For the cross-Channel movement Task
Naval Task Force, commanded by Rear Force O was organized into five convoys.
Adm. Alan G. Kirk, and comprised the Most of its craft were assembled a t Port-
two assault forces and one follow-up force. land a n d Weymouth, and the remainder
Assault Force O (Rear Adm. John L. Hall, a t Poole. Assembly was completed by 30
Jr.), totaling nearly 1,200 ships and craft, May, and loading began the following
provided the lift and necessary naval gun- day. Task Force U was organized into
fire support for the OMAHA force, and As- twelve convoys. Its loading ports were
sault Force U (Rear Adm. Don P. Moon), more widely scattered, extending all the
totaling nearly 800 vessels, provided the way from Falmouth, in Cornwall, to
MOUNTING THE OPERATION 373

Poole, a n d the assembly of the force was the follow-up force was completed on 3
therefore more difficult. Force U was given June, and the marshaling of the remainder
somewhat greater fire power, since it was of the OVERLORD forces was in full swing.
to operate on the right flank of the inva- With the loading of the assault forces com-
sion force and counter enemy naval attacks pleted and the task force convoys as-
from Cherbourg and the Channel Islands. sembled along the southern coast of Eng-
Its craft were assembled and ready to load land, the cross-Channel movement now
on 30 May. awaited only the signal from the Supreme
Embarkation of both assault forces and Commander.
 CHAPTER X

Launching the Invasion:

Organizing the Beaches
( I ) Tactical Developments in June 1 tain vessels of the Force U Fire Support
Group sailed from Belfast the same day,
O n the morning of 6 June 1944 five task other convoys getting under way that
forces, three British and two American, evening. The night of 3–4 June was clear,
under continuous air cover and following but the wind was rising a n d the Channel
air and naval bombardment, assaulted the was choppy.
coast of Normandy a n d won continental General Eisenhower was given an un-
beachheads. O n four of the beaches opposi- favorable forecast for D Day that evening,
tion ranged from light to moderate. O n and early on the morning of 4 June he
the fifth, OMAHA,unexpectedly strong made the difficult decision to postpone the
enemy forces delayed the V U.S. Corps in assault twenty-four hours. Convoys that
its advance inland and inflicted heavy had already departed were immediately
casualties. In the UTAHsector the VII U.S. notified by prearranged radio signal, and
Corps, assisted by two airborne divisions destroyers were also dispatched to over-
dropped six hours before the seaborne at- take them. Some of the ships and craft
tack, secured a firm beachhead by the end were forced to return to ports; others
of D plus 1. At the eastern end of the as- simply reversed their course and back-
sault area British and Canadian forces tracked for the next twenty-four hours.
initially enjoyed rapid success and pushed The decision to postpone D Day was
inland toward Caen a n d Bayeux. based on a forecast of more moderate seas
Although the two American landings re- a n d more favorable flying conditions be-
mained unlinked for several days, it was tween the afternoon of the 5th and the
apparent by the end of D plus 1 that the afternoon of the 6th. But the forecast for
Allies had succeeded in the initial assault. the subsequent period was not encourag-
The Supreme Commander had made a ing, for it promised an indefinite period of
significant change in the scheduled land- unfavorable weather. The Supreme Com-
ings at the eleventh hour. T h e date for the mander was therefore faced with the
attack had been set as 5 June, when moon necessity of making a further decision on
and tidal conditions most satisfactorily met whether to initiate the operation on 6
the requirements of all components of the
invasion force. Loading of the assault ele- 1 For the full story of tactical operations see
ments was completed on 3 June, and cer- Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack.
LAUNCHING T H E INVASION: ORGANIZING T H E BEACHES 375

June or order a further delay. To order a River and to the rear of the inundated
delay would have meant a postponement areas to seize the causeway exits and thus
of two weeks, since the required conditions facilitate the later landings of the 4th In-
of tide a n d moon would not occur again fantry Division in t h e UTAHsector. Im-
until that time. T h e invasion had already mediately preceding the seaborne land-
been postponed a month in order to per- ings came t h e preparatory naval and
mit enlargement of the assault forces and aerial bombardments. At H minus 40
widening of the assault front. Another minutes warships of the bombardment
delay of two weeks would shorten the groups began firing on enemy shore bat-
summer campaign season still more. Fur- teries on both OMAHA and UTAHBeaches,
thermore, some of the assault forces were a n d as the assault craft started for the
already on t h e Channel, others were beaches the naval bombardment was aug-
briefed a n d embarked, a n d additional mented by the fire from fire-support craft,
follow-up units had already moved into variously equipped with rockets and small
the marshaling areas. T h e entire mount- guns. In the meantime aerial bombard-
ing machinery was already in full opera- ments hit both beaches. At UTAHBeach
tion. Early on the morning of 5 June medium bombers of the Ninth Air Force
General Eisenhower directed that the struck at specific beach targets without de-
assault be launched the following day. stroying beach fortifications. The bombing
O n the morning of 5June the seventeen by the Eighth Air Force planes a t OMAHA
convoys of Forces O and U, comprising meanwhile was foiled by bad weather.
nearly 2,000 ships and craft, started across Forced to use blind-bombing equipment
the English Channel. T h e voyage itself a n d to take special precautions against
was uneventful, although the weather con- hitting friendly troops in the assault craft,
tinued unfavorable. T h e convoy routes led bombers at OMAHA released their loads
through minefields, but well-marked lanes too far inland to be of any direct assistance
had been swept through them. Convoys to the assaulting infantry.
began arriving in the transport area, ap- U.S. forces in the OMAHA sector badly
proximately twelve miles off the beaches, needed a n effective air effort. Initial as-
about midnight. The moderate sea, greater sault units of the V Corps, comprising ele-
a t OMAHA than at UTAH, created some dif- ments of the 1st a n d 29th Infantry Divi-
ficulty in transferring assault teams from sions a n d Rangers, touched down on
the transports to the small landing craft, OMAHA Beach at approximately 0635, and
and there was much seasickness. By dawn met unexpectedly heavy opposition. As a
of 6 June hundreds of craft in the invasion result of the rough sea many craft foun-
a r m a d a lay off the French coast, as- dered, amphibian tanks were swamped,
sembled in the transport area. At approxi- a n d landing craft missed their assigned
mately midnight, 5–6June, RAF bombers beaches. Heavy enemy fire prevented the
had ranged along the entire invasion coast proper clearance of beach obstacles. The
striking at heavy coastal batteries and landings lost all resemblance to the plan,
other specific targets. Shortly thereafter, a n d the beaches soon became congested
beginning at H minus 6 hours, paratroops with disabled a n d burning vehicles and
of the 82d a n d the 101st Airborne Divi- with troops immobilized by enemy fire.
sions began dropping astride the Merderet Landing operations were finally halted
376 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

until enemy fire could be neutralized. other units, and some of its elements were
With the help of close-range naval fire the completely isolated west of the Merderet
situation was gradually brought under River.
control and landings were resumed. Units Both V and V I I Corps pressed forward
gradually reorganized themselves and on D plus 1, the V I I Corps clearing out
pushed up the slopes to destroy enemy po- scattered enemy holdings a n d rounding
sitions behind the beaches. But for many out its lodgment, the V Corps enlarging
hours the situation at OMAHA was uncer- and securing its precarious toe hold. I n the
tain, and at the end of D Day units of the next few days the V Corps pushed inland
V Corps clung precariously to a hard-won to capture the high ground between the
strip of land less than 3,000 yards deep. beaches and the Aure River, and by 10
At UTAHBeach, meanwhile, seaborne June it had pushed west to the Vire and
elements of the VII Corps carried out their south just beyond the Forêt de Cerisy. In
landings with contrasting ease. Troops of the UTAHsector the V I I Corps extended
the 4th Division touched down on UTAH its beachhead north, west, a n d south. I n
a t approximately 0630, rapidly overcame the north the 4th Division fought through
relatively weak enemy opposition, crossed heavily fortified headland batteries toward
the causeways spanning the inundated Montebourg; in the west the 82d Airborne
areas, a n d pushed inland as much as Division established a bridgehead over the
10,000 yards on D Day. The initial success Merderet after hard fighting; and in the
of the 4th Division was partly attributable south the 101st Airborne Division crossed
to the naval and air bombardment, which the lower Douve and established contact
was more effective than at OMAHA, but with the V Corps. Carentan, vital commu-
also to the assistance rendered by the air- nications link with the eastern beachhead,
borne units that had dropped during the was not captured till 12June.
night. Both airborne divisions suffered After the capture of Carentan VII
heavy losses in men and matériel and were Corps turned its attention to its major ob-
able to bring only a portion of their full jective, Cherbourg. Its first move was to
strength to bear in the fighting on D Day. strike westward to cut the peninsula and
By striking suddenly in the enemy’s rear, prevent the enemy from reinforcing his
however, the airborne infantry created forces in the north. The stroke was accom-
confusion in the enemy’s ranks and secured plished by the veteran 9th Division during
the western exits of the inundated area, the night of 17–18June. T h e corps then
thus rendering much easier the initial task quickly organized its attack toward Cher-
of the seaborne elements. bourg a n d on 19June pushed rapidly to
But there was little cause for optimism the north its three divisions (the 4th, 79th,
on either beach as D Day drew to a close. and 9th) converging on the port. Tempo-
T h e V Corps held only a tenuous beach- rarily checked at the prepared defenses
head a t OMAHA. At UTAH,in spite of the which ringed Cherbourg on the south, the
successful landings of the seaborne ele- three divisions, with the aid of an intensive
ments, heavy fighting with high losses had air preparation on 22 June, finally broke
been going on inland. Both airborne divi- through and captured the port on the
sions had had scattered drops, the 82d Di- 27th.
vision had not linked up with the seaborne No full-scale attacks had been at-
forces a n d had no communications with tempted on the remainder of the Ameri-
LAUNCHING T H E INVASION: ORGANIZING T H E BEACHES 377

H Damon
MAP 11

can front after 20 June, a n d only minor the beaches, all three corps assumed an
advances were made in efforts to deepen active defense, and only minor gains were
the lodgment southward. Two additional made toward the city of St. Lô.
corps meanwhile joined First Army forces. At the end of June, although advances
The VIII Corps, becoming operational on were somewhat behind schedule, the First
15June, assumed control of the divisions U.S. Army was firmly established on the
released from V I I Corps (90th Infantry, Continent. (Map 11) It had cleared the
82d and 101st Airborne) at the base o fthe Cotentin, captured a major port, and ex-
Cotentin peninsula on 19June and under- tended its holding inland from OMAHA
took to clear the area southward toward Beach to a depth of about seventeen miles.
La Haye-du-Puits. Meanwhile the XIX Nowhere on the American front had the
Corps took over a sector between V and enemy been able to gather sufficient
VIII Corps on 14June, with the 29th and strength to threaten the continental
30th Infantry Divisions under its com- beachhead seriously.
mand. It immediately took steps to consol-
idate the beachhead junction in the (2) OMAHA Beach on D Day
Carentan-Isigny area, and then drove
southward astride the Vire River. O n The story of supply operations in the
about 21 June, their supply limited by the first weeks of the continental operation is
priority given the Cherbourg operation almost exclusively that of the organization
and by a n interruption of unloadings at of the beaches and beach maintenance
378 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

V. Brooks

MAP I2

areas, and of the part played by the engi- low tide and had built his defenses to
neer special brigades. 2 guard against a high-tide assault. These
I n the V Corps sector the beach known defenses consisted of rows of obstacles cov-
as OMAHA was a 7,900-yard flat stretch of ering the tidal flat, including bands of steel
sand running from Pointe et Raz de la hedgehogs, heavy log stakes driven into
Percée to Colleville-sur-Mer, backed by the sand at an angle pointing seaward, and
hills a n d flanked by steep rocky cliffs ris- huge iron gate barriers known as Element
ing from the water's edge. (Map 12) It had C or Belgian gates, often with Teller mines
a great tidal range a n d a large tidal flat. lashed to them. They were no barrier to
Between the low- a n d high-water marks men landing a t low tide, but they created
the flat consisted of hard, well-compacted a great hazard for craft approaching shore
sand, with shale outcroppings on the after the tide began to rise. For this reason
flanks. Its average width was 300 yards, the Allies planned a low-tide assault,
a n d it was broken in places by a series of counting on heavy air a n d naval bom-
runnels, two a n d a half to four feet deep, bardment to neutralize shore defenses suf-
located 50–100 yards from the high-water ficiently so that men could cross the
mark. This wide tidal flat was a key fea- beaches and demolition teams could de-
ture of OMAHA and figured importantly in
both the invasion plans of the Allies and 2Description of the beaches a n d supply operations
the defensive plans of the Germans. T h e is based on [Clifford L. Jones] NEPTUNE: Training for
a n d Mounting the Operation, and the Artificial Ports,
enemy had assumed that the width of the Pt. V I of T h e Administrative and Logistical History
beach was too great to permit a landing at of the ETO, Vol. II, Chs. IX–XII, OCMH.
LAUNCHING T H E INVASION: ORGANIZING T H E BEACHES 379

stroy the obstacles before the tide again assaulting forces. They were well defended,
came in. therefore, with gun emplacements set into
Above the tidal flat the OMAHA terrain the sides of the hills, together with pill-
varied greatly. Along most of its length the boxes, dugouts, and interlocking trenches
beach sloped upward sharply for about designed to cover the exits as well as the
twenty-five yards. O n the eastern half this beaches themselves. Artillery and mortar
rise ended in a n extended shingle pile of positions were placed well behind the high
small rounded stones. O n the western end ground.
a wood and masonry sea wall rose from six Inland from these hills and bluffs a roll-
to twelve feet high. Concertina wire was ing plateau extended two to four miles,
strung along both the shingle pile and the descending to the low, swampy Aure River
wall. A road ran along most of the beach, valley. T h e road network of this area was
hard-surfaced at the western end, but based on two highways. O n e (Route B),
hardly more than a trail through the less than a mile from and roughly parallel
dunes farther east. Two of the roads lead- to the beach, ran through the three prin-
ing inland off the beach were blocked by cipal villages immediately back of the
antitank ditches, a n d fields were sown beaches (Vierville, St. Laurent, and Colle-
with mines or falsely marked with warning ville). T h e other was the Isigny–Bayeux
signs. road, roughly parallel and a few miles far-
Just beyond this strip above the tidal ther south. T h e area from the beaches to
flat the ground rose more precipitously, the Aure River comprised the planned
particularly at the western end, with most beach maintenance area, and its organiza-
of the beach backed by hills of from 80 to tion for supply was the responsibility of the
130 feet. Bisecting these hills and cliffs Provisional Engineer Special Brigade
were several draws which served as natu- Group.
ral exits from the beaches. Starting at the Infantry assault teams were scheduled
western end of OMAHA they were desig- to land in the first wave to overcome resist-
nated with letter-numbers as follows: D–1, ance on the beaches. Joint Army-Navy
which had one of the best roads from the demolition teams were to follow closely be-
beach, leading to the town of Vierville- hind and, under the infantry’s protection,
sur-Mer, about 600 yards behind the blow gaps in the maze of obstacles on the
beach; D–3, which also had a good road, tidal flat. But plans went wrong from the
leading to St. Laurent-sur-Mer, about one beginning. Most of the initial landings
mile inland; E- 1, which had a narrow cart took place too far to the east, and some
track leading u p a steep hill on the west demolition teams landed before the infan-
a n d also southwest to St. Laurent; E-3, try. The first waves suffered heavy casual-
which had a dirt road winding through ties from enemy automatic small arms fire
thick scrub growth a n d trees to the small a n d artillery, a n d the infantry were thus
town of Colleville; and the easternmost unable to afford the necessary protection
exit F–1, which had only a cart track and to the demolition teams. Assault engineers
was the poorest of all. consequently were forced to work on a
As the logical routes of advance from tidal flat drenched with fire. Only five of
the beaches inland, these exits had great the sixteen teams came in on their assigned
importance to both the defenders and the beaches, a n d they had only six of the six-
380 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

teen tank dozers scheduled to land, five of and enemy opposition were greatest, and
which were shortly knocked out. They survivors of the landings there were virtu-
were able to clear only five narrow lanes ally unanimous in their judgment that
instead of the sixteen 50-foot gaps planned, they had been overburdened with unes-
a n d of the five only one proved very use- sential impedimenta. 4 Battle shock and
ful. Through these inadequately cleared fear in themselves are known to induce
gaps the succeeding waves tried to pour physical weakening, a n d every extra
onto the beach. pound which the soldier carried only re-
T h e landings of assault elements were duced his tactical capabilities still further
unnecessarily marred by the repetition of a n d in many cases prevented men from
a n error which had been detected as early ever reaching the beach. 5
as the first DUCKexercise in January. In the midst of mounting confusion and
Troops as well as vehicles were overloaded congestion came the first elements of the
in the assault, often with tragic conse- engineer special brigades, which were to
quences. While there is no precise record organize the beaches for supply. First to
of the load men carried, it is clear that the land was a small reconnaissance party
equipage of the individual rifleman from the 37th Engineer Combat Battalion,
weighed at least sixty-eight pounds. The which came ashore at exit E-3 within a
additional personal items not specified in half hour of the first assault wave. Within
orders which many men are known to another thirty minutes eight other groups
have carried brought the load of even the from the engineer brigades reached the
most lightly equipped rifleman to seventy beach, but it was immediately clear that
or more pounds. BAR-men and heavy their planned work was impossible. The
weapons crewmen carried even greater tidal flat was becoming littered with dead
burdens. 3 a n d wounded, a n d the infantrymen who
Planners had taken early cognizance of
3 T h e figure of sixty-eight pounds is derived from
the weight problem. In the critique of orders a n d historical accounts a n d includes the in-
DUCKI, the director of umpires had rec- trenching tool. which was not specified in orders but
ommended that the load of the infantry- which other evidence indicates was carried. Royce L.
Thompson, D Day Personal Loads, a compilation and
men in the initial assault be kept under study of data on the equipment a n d supplies carried
forty-four pounds. In subsequent exercises, by individuals in the assault waves on D Day, MS,
however, these good intentions were grad- OCMH.
ually submerged as more and more “essen- 4 Ltr,AG 29th Div to AG WD, 1 Aug 44, sub: Bat-
tle Lessons, 29th Inf Div Battle Lessons 320–0.4
tial” items were added to the soldier’s (5451); Thompson, D Day Personal Loads, Apps. IA5
pack, with the result that the load he car- and 7.
ried in the OVERLORD assault eventually 5 After the war Col. S. L. A. Marshall, chief his-
torian of the E T O a n d respected military journalist,
included several items not allowed for in first drew attention to the dire effects which overload-
recommendations of earlier conferences ing has on the individual’s effectiveness in combat in
a n d critiques, such as grenades, T N T , a a n article in the Infantry Journal (October, 1949) en-
titled “ T h e Mobility of O n e Man,” later published as
lifebelt, a n d a raincoat, which added a book, T h e Soldier’s Load and the Mobility of a Nation
about fifteen pounds to the load carried in (Washington, 1950). Colonel Marshall showed that
the exercises. the load which a man can carry on a road march is no
measure of what he can bear in battle, a n d proposed
Overloading had particularly serious that the infantryman’s load in combat be kept under
consequences a t OMAHA, where both surf Forty pounds. The experience at the Normandy
LAUNCHING T H E INVASION: ORGANIZING T H E BEACHES 381

had succeeded in reaching the sea wall or Most of the landings in the first two
the shingle pile on the eastern end of the hours were made near exits D–3 and E–1,
beach formed only a thin line of fire, in approximately the center of OMAHA
which was inadequate to silence the enemy Beach, creating increasing congestion and
in his hill emplacements. Initially, there- a profitable target for the enemy. The
fore, engineers from the special brigades beach soon became littered with wrecked
devoted themselves to aiding the wounded vehicles and landing craft, a n d to add to
a n d building up the line of fire. these difficulties the tide began to rise,
Landings continued in the second hour, forcing the gap assault teams to come
but most of the men and vehicles were ashore. This made the landing of all craft
confined to the beach. A few small groups more and more hazardous and inspired
of infantrymen worked their way u p the the commander of one unit in the 6th En-
hills, but their penetrations were initially gineer Special Brigade to radio offshore
insufficient to reduce the enemy fire. The command ships to stop sending in vehicles.
result was additional congestion and con- In the next two hours the number of
fusion. Engineer brigade troops landing in landings was greatly reduced. T h e fire
the second hour, mostly on the wrong from the hills continued to be heavy, and
beaches, joined the others in aiding the many of the engineer troops continued to
wounded and building up fire power. In a aid the infantry. One sergeant in the 37th
few cases they helped to blow gaps in the Engineer Combat Battalion led a mine de-
wire obstacles. Some units lost a large part tector crew into an open field in the face
of their equipment. Signal Corps troops, of enemy fire and cleared a path up a defile
unable to use their transmitters, turned between exits E - 1 a n d E–3, opening the
them over to the infantry who had lost first personnel trail. Infantry units were
their radios in the water. then organized and urged to advance in-
land on this trail, and between 0830 and
beaches indicated that any substantially larger bur- 1030 infantry parties managed to clear
den only hastened bodily exhaustion and seriously im-
paired, if it did not completely destroy, the individ- enough of the area around E-1 to enable
ual’s mobility. I n 1950 a special Army Field Forces elements of the 37th and 149th Engineer
board at the Infantry School at Fort Benning further Combat Battalions to begin opening that
examined the entire problem. T h e board concluded
that the policy by which the soldier had been over- exit. A company from the 37th cut one
loaded with supplies a n d equipment to meet every road from the tidal flat east of the exit, and
conceivable contingency had been wrong, for it had another company from the 149th cleared a
made the soldier a vehicle for the transportation of
cargo beyond his immediate needs. It accepted forty road to the west with dozers. Men from
pounds as the optimum load for the rifleman operat- both battalions helped fill the antitank
ing under the most trying conditions, but saw little ditch blocking the exit a n d cleared mines
possibility of reducing the load to that figure. The In-
fantry School at that time submitted minimum lists of from the road and a field to the west. Near
equipment, the weight of which ranged from 44.88 D–3 elements of the 147th Engineer Com-
pounds (for the rifleman) to 65.26 pounds (for the bat Battalion cut through wire entangle-
BAR-man) in the rifle squad, not including the cloth-
ing worn (7.88 pounds) and water carried in the can- ments, blew gaps in the sea wall, and
teen (2 pounds), which brought the minimum load for cleared the beach with dozers.
men in the rifle squad to a range of between 54.76 At 1030 the prospects for the beginning
and 75.14 pounds. Rpt of Army Field Forces Bd 3,
Project 2053A, 5 Aug 50, sub: Loads Carried by the of orderly landings and the organization of
Soldier and Means for Carrying Same, OCMH. the beaches still appeared very dim. The
382 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

tide reached its peak a t that time, landings Elements of the engineer special bri-
had almost come to a halt, and except at gades played a large role in resolving the
E–1 enemy fire appeared as heavy as in confusion and congestion, although hardly
the beginning. Infantry troops, however, according to plan. Beach clearance had
were beginning to filter over the hills to been assigned first priority. But in some
get a t enemy positions to the rear of the sectors such work was impossible and even
beaches, and two fortuitous events helped pointless. First things came first. In some
change the future. Two landing craft (an cases this meant clearing the ramps of
LCT and a n LCI(L)), unable to find a LCT’s so that undamaged vehicles could
safe landing place, suddenly drove full come ashore. In others it entailed remov-
speed through the obstacles in front of ing damaged tanks and half-tracks which
E–3, firing all their weapons at the enemy were clogging the beach exits. Shortly
emplacements. Both craft beached and after noon all exit strongpoints were neu-
landed their men. One of them was dam- tralized a n d a bulldozer began clearing
aged and could not withdraw, but several the beach road. An attempt to cut a new
enemy positions had been silenced, and road directly south from E–1 to the high-
the beach obstacles were found to be less way (Route B) proved premature, for
formidable than expected. Observing the Germans still held the ground north of the
success of this daring experiment, other road. But vehicles began moving off the
craft began to follow suit. beach and over the hill, thus escaping the
The second event to give heart to the at- artillery fire that was falling on the beach,
tackers occurred at about the same time. a n d at 1400 tanks began to use exit D–1.
A destroyer neared shore, swung broad- Exit F–1 had been cleared, but was of no
side, and, beginning at D–3, fired on the use to vehicles because of the poor road.
German emplacements at that exit and In the middle of the afternoon exit E–1 , at
then continued down the beach hitting all the center of OMAHA, was still the focal
defenses spotted. Lack of communications point of beach operations.
with the beach had prevented calling for Late in the afternoon, as the tide
naval fire, and naval officers until that dropped, the gap assault teams returned
time had refrained from firing on beach to the tidal flat to carry out the mission
targets because of the vague situation on that they had found impossible at H Hour,
the beaches and the fear of hitting friendly With salvaged explosives a n d detonating
troops. equipment a n d dozers borrowed from
These two events unquestionably influ- other units they resumed the work of
enced the more rapid progress which fol- clearing the beach of obstacles and debris.
lowed. Men readily moved forward under The task proved difficult even at this time.
the destroyer’s support to take the high Artillery fire still covered all exits and con-
ground, a n d in the next two hours, from tinued to fall on the beach, and the almost
1030 to 1230, more a n d more troops ex- continuous arrival of new waves of infan-
ploited the penetration inland, particu- trymen hampered the demolitions. By late
larly on the eastern half of the beach. afternoon, however, five large and six
Additional combat units also landed to small gaps were cleared and marked.
reinforce those already ashore, and some In the meantime the situation in the
degree of order gradually emerged from center of the beach continued to improve.
the earlier chaos. Fighting in the vicinity of St. Laurent-sur-
LAUNCHING T H E INVASION: ORGANIZING T H E BEACHES 383

Mer delayed the opening of through traf- and used as dump areas, the first deliveries
fic in that area, but late in the afternoon being made in dukws preloaded with gas.
1st Division engineers pushed a branch Additional fields near the exit were
road through from E–1 to the highway so cleared for use as bivouacs.
that vehicles could be driven up from the Toward evening the situation also im-
beach and shunted off into fields adjoining proved at exit E–3. Enemy small arms fire
the highway. The exit road was thus was finally silenced about 1630. Men of
cleared and some of the congestion on the the 348th Engineer Combat Battalion be-
beach was relieved. Meanwhile brigade gan sweeping the lateral beach road for
engineers cleared minefields and opened mines, completing the task by 1700. For
u p transit and bivouac areas where units some time, continued artillery fire on the
could pause and reorganize. O n the beach beach prevented work on the exit road,
they continued to aid the wounded and but by 2000 hours it slackened sufficiently
clear wreckage. Enemy small arms fire to permit beach engineers to work on this
gradually slackened and died out as the road also. They made the most of the un-
infantry and engineers mopped up more usually late hours of daylight, but sniper
and more of the hill area. fire stopped work after darkness fell. Tanks
Organization of the eastern end of the began using the exit shortly after 0100.
beach also got under way late in the after- By the end of D Day, then, the pros-
noon. Advance units of the 5th Engineer pects for systematic organization and op-
Special Brigade landed between exits D–1 eration of the beaches at OMAHA were
and D–3,4,000 yards from their assigned much more encouraging. Brigade engi-
beach, and made their way eastward. The neers had opened enough beach exit
first men from the 336th Engineer Combat roads to accommodate all incoming vehi-
Battalion arrived at Exit F–1 at 1700 and cles and had made a good start on clear-
found that good progress had been made ing obstacles from the tidal flat. Three
in the removal of obstacles. Because the exits—D–1, E–1, and F–1 —were in oper-
condition of the exit road had been mis- ation, the first dumps were open, and units
calculated some changes in plan were of the Provisional Engineer Special Bri-
necessary, but demining teams and trac- gade Group were ready to reorganize and
tors immediately started work on another begin their planned missions. Logistic
route and built a through road to the operations on the first day had been
highway. Antitank ditches were filled, limited chiefly to such tasks as removing
fields were cleared of mines, and a number obstructions and cutting trails to permit
of LCT’s and other craft were ordered to the movement of men, vehicles, and a few
land on the beach opposite F–1 in antici- supplies away from the congested beaches.
pation of the opening of the new exit. The Tonnage targets had to be forgotten, and
exit was actually opened at 2000 hours only a negligible quantity of stores could
when two tanks passed through, although be landed and placed in the hastily im-
succeeding tanks struck mines and were provised dumps. Personnel build-up, on
disabled. A path around the tanks was the other hand, fared quite well in view
cleared, and by 2230 other tanks were pas- of the heavy fighting on OMAHA Beach. Of
sing through to aid in clearing the enemy the two loaded forces intended for
from the Colleville area. Two small fields OMAHA—ForceO, with 29,714 men, and
on the high ground were then demined Force B, the follow-up force of 26,492
384 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

men, only part of which was expected to the northwest. Otherwise weather and
land on D Day—more than 34,000 are tidal conditions were about the same.
estimated to have crossed the beach on the Deep anchorage for task force vessels was
first day. provided about two and a half miles off-
All engineer special brigade operations shore. UTAH,like OMAHA, had a wide
on D Day were under the direction of the tidal flat. In some places it was even wider
commanding officer of the 5th Brigade, than the one at OMAHA, and in the south-
Col. Doswell Gullatt. In midafternoon the ern sector, near the mouth of the Douve,
command party of the Provisional Engi- it was so wide and the gradient so slight
neer Special Brigade Group arrived at that it was useless for landing craft.
Exit E–1 and set up its first headquarters The UTAHtidal flat had the usual type
in a beach pillbox. At midnight the com- of beach obstacles, which were thicker
manding general of the group, Brig. Gen. toward the northern end of the beach. Be-
William M . Hoge, took command of all yond the high-water mark was a stretch
units ashore. Those of the 6th Brigade, of loose sand about twenty-five yards
which had been under the control of the deep, backed by a concrete sea wall about
5th, then reverted to their parent head- five feet high which extended the entire
quarters. The commander of the 6th Bri- length of the planned assault beaches.
gade, Col. Paul W. Thompson, became a Gaps existed for exit roads at two places,
casualty on D Day and was succeeded by but all other outlets were blocked off. Im-
Col. Timothy L. Mulligan. mediately to the rear of the wall were sand
dunes, in some places barely extending
(3) UTAHBeach on D Day above the wall, in others reaching a height
of perhaps twenty-five feet. I n this respect
While operations at OMAHA were going UTAHcontrasted sharply with OMAHA, for
badly, those at UTAH proceeded more there was no sudden rise immediately be-
nearly according to plan and provided hind the beaches. Physically the dunes
one of the bright spots of the day. In many constituted no hazard to assaulting troops.
respects t h e physical characteristics of But built into them were the enemy de-
UTAHand OMAHA were similar, but in fenses-field fortifications consisting of fire
some ways they differed as sharply as did and communications trenches, machine
D-Day operations o n the two beaches. gun emplacements, and some field guns.
UTAHBeach was a 9,000-yard stretch of Concrete pillboxes were built into the sea
flat sandy beach extending from the wall itself and thus were tied in with the
mouth of the Douve River north and other fortifications. T h e strongest of these
northwest to Quinéville. (Map 13)The as- were on the northern half of the beach, at
sembly, or transport, area for Force U was Les Dunes de Varreville and beyond.
the same as for the OMAHA forces, ten to The grassy sand dunes extended inland
twelve miles offshore, and partially shel- from 200 to 600 yards, sloping downward
tered from westerly storms by the Cotentin and becoming flat pasture land and culti-
peninsula. UTAHBeach itself, lying on the vated fields. T h e fields were small in size
eastern shore of the peninsula, enjoyed and distinctly outlined by their tall border
even better protection than either OMAHAhedges, drainage ditches, and tree lines.
or the British beaches against storms from Behind the actual assault beaches, in the
 V. Brooks

MAP13
386 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

southern sector of UTAH,the flat pasture ern shore of this area, and particularly the
land extended inland about 1,000 yards. road exits, would be defended. The antici-
Farther north it gradually decreased in pation of difficulties in crossing this barrier
width and almost disappeared, becoming was one of the chief reasons for the deci-
only a narrow spit of solid ground between sion to use airborne troops. These troops
Ravenoville a n d Quinéville. Beyond this were to drop behind the inundations, dis-
solid ground lay an inundated area. This rupt communications, capture strategi-
feature of UTAHBeach, plus the absence cally important objectives, and secure the
of hills behind the beaches, formed the western exits to facilitate the crossings of
most striking contrast with OMAHA, and the seaborne forces. The roads and cause-
created a n entirely different problem. ways that led from the beach inland and
The flooded area extended from Quiné- across the inundations were therefore an
ville south to the Douve River and aver- important feature of the area. Infantry
aged 1,500 to 2,000 yards in width. In the troops might with difficulty be able to
area of the assault opposite La Grande wade through the shallower parts of the
Dune the water started 1,000 yards be- inundations; but the area was honey-
hind the beach and extended 1,800 yards combed with deep drainage canals and
inland, its depth varying from two to four tributary ditches, which presented a haz-
feet. This water barrier was an artificial ard to any movement inland, and the
one, created intentionally by the enemy to causeways were vitally necessary to the
prevent, or at least hinder, an advance in- movement of vehicles and artillery.
land. The flooding was controlled by ob- The roads leading across this artificial
struction across several small streams lake in the area of the assault varied as to
south of Quinéville, and in the southern type and state of repair. The following
sector additional inundations could be ones were the more important, from north
created by the control of certain locks, for to south: S–9, which was flooded along its
the land was slightly below sea level at entire length; T–7, which was also flooded
high tide. Beyond these inundations the for most of its length, but hard surfaced
terrain was similar to that behind OMAHAand usable even though under water;
Beach. It consisted of gently rolling coun- U–5, leading directly inland from the
try and offered no unusual difficulties to center of the assault area, narrow but hard
the attackers except for the hedgerows surfaced and in good condition, and the
that sharply limited observation. The en- first to be used by troops on D Day; and
emy built heavily fortified casemated bat- V–1, at the southern extremity, which was
teries on the headlands overlooking the almost completely dry, but in poor condi-
inundated area. tion and without a beach exit. All of the
The flooded area posed a special prob- causeways were narrow, and their shoul-
lem in the UTAHarea. Even if the assault- ders had been softened by the water. The
ing troops overcame opposition on the importance of gaining immediate control
beaches they would still have to cross the of them was obvious.
flooded area. There were only a few roads Plans for the landings at UTAHBeach
or causeways across these inundations, were very similar to those for the landings
down which the attacking forces would be at OMAHA. Infantry assault teams were to
channeled, and it was likely that the west- constitute the first wave, followed closely
LAUNCHING THE INVASION: ORGANIZING T H E BEACHES 387

by the gap assault teams which were to the wall and on the dunes. Four gaps were
clear avenues through the obstacles on the soon blown in the wall to provide exits for
tidal flat. T h e initial landings by two bat- vehicles, and two Belgian gates were
talions of the 8th Infantry (4th Division) blown from the exit at the terminus of
took place approximately on time, but route U–5.
about 2,000 yards to the left (south) of the Elements of the 1st Engineer Special
planned beaches. T h e error actually Brigade, including its commander, Brig.
proved fortunate. Beach fortifications at Gen. James E. Wharton, began to cross
the planned landing spots were stronger, the beach at about H plus 60 minutes.
and the tidal flat was mined and had Initially the brigade was to organize two
many more obstacles than farther south. beaches, known as Uncle Red and Tare
The actual assault beach had only one less Green, each with a width of 1,000 yards.
favorable feature. T h e distance between To the north of Tare Green a third beach,
the low- and high-water marks was Sugar Red, was to be opened on the sec-
greater, creating a wider tidal flat, forcing ond tide. When the assault forces landed
craft to remain farther offshore, thus too far south these beach designations
causing some beaching difficulties. were simply shifted to correspond to the
The first landings were made astride actual landings. Uncle Red and Tare
route U–5, rather than T–7 as planned. Green therefore lay approximately south
Some of the amphibian tanks were late in and north respectively of the U–5 exit.
arriving, but almost all of them landed The first elements of the brigade to land
and aided in reducing the opposition came from the 531st Engineer Shore Regi-
along the beach. T h e gap assault teams ment and the 286th Joint Assault Signal
which had been scheduled to land in sep- Company. When they landed (H plus 60
arate waves-the Army-Navy teams to minutes) there was no longer any small
clear the underwater obstacles, and the arms fire on the beach except from a few
Army teams to clear those above water- snipers, although there was intermittent
actually landed almost at the same time. shelling from inland batteries. There was
This departure from plan also proved for- none of the congestion that prevailed at
tunate, for all obstacles were found to be OMAHA. Units arriving in the succeeding
dry, and the demolition teams therefore waves had no difficulty getting off the
found it possible to clear complete lanes beach, and there was very little wreckage.
by placing their charges on all bands and The initial tasks of the engineers included
blowing them simultaneously. And since the building of exit roads through the sea
the obstacles were not as thick as had been wall and dunes, and the clearing of mines
expected, they cleared the entire assault from roads, dump sites, and transit areas.
beach on the first tide instead of blowing Few areas in the immediate vicinity of the
only fifty-yard gaps as originally planned. assault beaches were actually mined, but
A wide avenue of approach was therefore the enemy had marked many fields as
open at an early hour, allowing uninter- mined and they had to be combed thor-
rupted landings on a relatively broad oughly. While the fields were being
front. Other engineers meanwhile pro- checked, brigade engineers widened the
ceeded to blow gaps in the sea wall and to gap at U–5 and blew additional gaps in
destroy barbed wire obstacles in front of the sea wall. They improved the existing
388 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

beach road with wood a n d wire matting throughout the day, and the sequence of
known as chespaling. U–5 was found to be landings was not strictly followed. The re-
usable, and troops a n d tanks began cross- moteness of the transport area and defects
ing the flooded area via the causeway. in ship-to-shore communications and co-
Meanwhile General Wharton redesig- ordination contributed to these difficulties.
nated the beaches, a n d markers were pre- O n e of the chief tasks of beach engineers
pared to aid incoming craft in locating the was to rescue drowned vehicles. Because
beaches, exits, and various installations as of the shallow gradient, landing craft
they were completed. Officers also recon- tended to discharge their loads in deep
noitered the area north of Tare Green, and water, a n d many vehicles stalled as they
the beach was partially cleared in prep- left the ramps.
aration for its operation (as Sugar Red) Nevertheless the build-up continued
by the 531st Engineer Shore Regiment. steadily and in a much more orderly man-
The 1st Brigade command post was estab- ner than at OMAHA.Causeway U – 5 had
lished about 700 yards behind the dune at been placed in service during the morning
the small hamlet of La Grande Dune. after some difficulty with a n enemy anti-
With the arrival of other brigade units, tank gun on the west bank of the inun-
such as elements of the 1106th Engineer dated area, and engineers had quickly
Combat Group, work also began on the installed a treadway bridge to replace a
causeway roads across the flooded area, culvert which had been blown. U–5 was
a n d on the sluice gates which controlled the best of t h e causeways a n d soon bore
the water in the inundations. The most the main burden of vehicle traffic inland.
important of the locks were the northern By noon it was clogged with vehicles, and
gates near Quinéville, the central gates two-way traffic became almost impossible
north of Sugar Red beach, a n d the locks because of the trucks and guns which had
southeast of Pouppeville. Neither the slipped halfway off the soft shoulders and
northern nor central locks could be mired in the mud and water that came
reached on D Day, but elements of the within a foot of the road’s surface.
1106th worked their way down the beach Development of the beaches themselves
to the Pouppeville area, removed booby continued as additional elements of the 1st
traps, and demined and opened the locks Brigade landed. Work on the third beach,
there to begin draining the southernmost Sugar Red, was stepped u p with the arrival
area. of the 3d Battalion of the 531st Engineer
The organization and operation of Shore Regiment, although the job was
UTAHBeach proceeded, but not without hindered somewhat by the continuing
difficulties. Enemy shelling continued shellfire and by the late arrival of road
with varying intensity and hampered construction equipment. As the tide again
beach work to some extent. Perhaps more ebbed later in the day gap assault teams
important were the navigational difficul- returned to the tidal flat they had cleared
ties, changes in naval landing orders, and on the first low tide. They resumed the
beaching troubles, which contributed to a demolition and removal of obstacles on the
general slowing down of the landings. The flanks and thus cleared a still greater ex-
planned phasing of troops fell behind panse of beach. Eight major gaps were
schedule quite early, vehicles arrived late blown in the sea wall, and Sommerfeld
LAUNCHING T H E INVASION: ORGANIZING T H E BEACHES 389

track 6 was laid to the existing lateral therefore reorganized and bivouacked in
roads. About nightfall route T–7 was a n initial assembly area immediately be-
opened, although the road was still under hind the dunes, thus causing some conges-
water. tion and hindrance to engineer operations
Unloading operations also proceeded toward the end of the day. Military police
more satisfactorily than on OMAHA, al- units began to land within the second
though hardly according to plan. Because hour of the landings, their principal task
every craft scheduled to land and dis- being to keep traffic moving inland so that
charge on D Day was combat loaded, all troops and vehicles would be dispersed
unloading was confined to the offloading and other units could cross the beaches.
of trucks and the unloading of engineer As at OMAHA, brigade units worked late
road-building equipment from preloaded on D Day (until 2300). Enemy planes
LCT’s. Only six of the twelve LCT’s came raided the beach after darkness, but they
i n on D Day, a n d one of the six was lost inflicted no damage, and the end of D Day
after it beached when it received a direct saw a fairly high degree of organization
hit from a n enemy shell. Two others were and security despite landing difficulties
hit but managed to transfer their loads to and enemy fire. The tidal flat was clear of
other craft. T h e remaining six beached obstacles, exit roads had been established,
and unloaded on D plus 1. Dumb barges 7 the beach area had been demined, two
were also beached on D Day, but were causeway roads were in use, and a few
kept in reserve and not unloaded. Only dumps were established and in operation.
limited use was made of dukws on the first There are no estimates as to tonnages of
day. Four of the amphibians came ashore supplies landed, but approximately 23,000
with their cargoes at 1330 and during the of the 32,000 men in Force U crossed the
rest of the day were used to evacuate beach on D Day.
casualties. Since the dukws were not yet
greatly needed, most of them were held ( 4 ) Development of the OMAHA Area
offshore until D plus 1 to prevent losses.
The establishment of dumps and transit At both OMAHA and UTAHvarious dif-
areas also began on the first day, but could ficulties hampered beach development,
not proceed as planned because some of and discharge performance was erratic for
the chosen areas remained in enemy pos- some time. UTAHwas subject to enemy
session. Beach dumps were established on artillery fire for a full week. T h e Germans
Tare Green for ammunition and medical shelled OMAHA only until about noon of D
supplies, and brigade officers reconnoi- plus 1,but sniping from scattered enemy
tered inland dump sites. Class I, III, and troops plagued the beach maintenance
engineer Class I V sites were in the hands area for several days. The engineers were
of the 4th Division, but still under the fire under the initial disadvantage of having
of enemy snipers. None of the other to clear a great amount of wreckage. Ship-
planned locations had been captured. The
same situation prevailed for the transit
areas. One was overrun but was under en- 6 A matting made of wire netting reinforced with
steel, used in the same manner as chespaling.
emy fire; another remained in enemy 7 Unpowered LBV’s which had a capacity of 100–
hands throughout the day. Incoming units 200 tons and could be beached.
390 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

to-shore operations did not go smoothly at on the edge of Vierville a n d St. Laurent.
either beach at first. But the advance south of Colleville was
These troubles were gradually over- more rapid. O n D plus 2 the Americans
come, and tonnage discharge improved entered both Formigny a n d Mosles and
steadily. Beginning with a n estimated made a rapid advance westward almost to
capacity of 2,400 tons on D Day, the daily Grandcamp. On D plus 3 they entered
discharge rate at OMAHA Beach was Isigny, and with the taking of Trévières on
scheduled to reach 10,000 tons by D plus D plus 4 all of the area north of the Aure
12 rising to 15,000 tons in about two River, the proposed beach maintenance
months. UTAHwas estimated to have a area, came under V Corps control.
starting capacity of 2,250 tons, leveling off One of the chief concerns of the beach
at 5,700 tons by the end of the first week brigades was the protection of the beach
and ultimately attaining a maximum of area against enemy activity. Elaborate
10,000 by the end of the second month. precautions were taken, particularly
There are no records of actual unloadings against air attacks. In addition to taking
on D Day and D plus 1. Available figures normal measures, such as providing anti-
indicate that UTAHexceeded its planned aircraft artillery and camouflaging instal-
intake of 3,300 tons on D plus 2. But the lations, the Americans made plans for the
chaotic situation at OMAHA in the first day use of deceptive lighting to represent such
or two and the shipping and unloading things as convoys and beach exit roads,
difficulties at both beaches permitted a and also for the use of smoke. But the de-
total discharge of only 26.6 percent, or ception plan was abandoned as unfeasible,
6,614, of the planned cumulative 24,850 first, because capture of the area in which
tons at the two beaches in the first three it was to be used was delayed and, second,
days.8 because the bright moonlit nights made its
Marked improvement was made in the success doubtful. Nor were smoke gen-
next few days at OMAHA, where the target erators used, inasmuch as air attacks never
of 7,000 tons was actually exceeded on D became serious. The few enemy planes
plus 5. At that time 28,100 tons or 46.6 that appeared over the beach every night
percent of the planned cumulative 60,250 inflicted only slight damage on installa-
tons had been discharged on the two tions a n d troops. Enemy activity was di-
beaches. Vehicle build-up continued to rected mainly against ships anchored off-
lag at both beaches, with only 20,655 or shore and consisted primarily of dropping
65.7 percent of the planned total of 31,424 mines, which caused some sinkings. The
tons unloaded at this date. Personnel most serious damage in the beach mainte-
build-up fared considerably better. By D nance area occurred on the night of 13–14
plus 5, 88 percent, or 184,119, of the 8 First Army build-up figures, as given in FUSA
planned cumulative build-up of 207,771 Rpt of Opns (Bk. V, p. 147) do not agree with those
had been achieved, with eight and a half of the brigades. T h e statistics given here are derived
from a comparison of actual build-up, as given in
of the planned nine divisions ashore. NEPTUNE: Training for a n d Mounting the Opera-
The progress of the OMAHA area was tion, II, Apps. A, B, and C, based on brigade records,
made possible partly by the rapidly mov- with planned personnel and vehicle build-up as given
in the FUSA Troop List (FUSA Rpt of Opns, 20 Oct
ing tactical situation. O n the morning of 43–1 Aug 44, Bk. II, pp. 142ff.) and planned tonnage
D plus 1 enemy troops were still fighting discharge as given in NEPTUNE, II, App. A.
LAUNCHING T H E INVASION: ORGANIZING T H E BEACHES 391

June, when fifteen tons of ammunition was further subdivided into three sub-
were destroyed in a dump near Formigny. beaches known as Green, White and Red.
Beyond this sporadic and relatively in- The beaches were marked with large
effectual air activity the enemy did little panels, and with colored lights at night.
to disrupt the organization of the beach. Another task which had high priority
The development of the beach mainte- was beach clearance. O n the morning of
nance area and port area therefore D plus 1 the tidal flat was still littered with
proceeded relatively free of interruption. wrecked ships, drowned vehicles, obsta-
Plans had outlined three phases in the cles, and equipment. Scores of craft lay
development of the beach areas after the beached at the high-water mark, some un-
assault. In the first phase, known as the damaged, but many torn by shellfire. The
initial dump phase, the beaches were to be clearance of the flat was obviously neces-
marked and cleared of wreckage, and sary to allow the beaching of additional
temporary supply dumps were to be estab- craft and the movement of men and sup-
lished on the beach itself. The second plies. Special brigade units applied them-
phase, called the beach maintenance area selves to this task at first light at D plus 1.
dump phase, was to begin when the dumps In addition, survivors of the demolition
were moved farther inland. The third, or teams returned to remove the remain-
port phase, would begin with the opening ing obstacles, and dozers towed away
of the MULBERRY. These designations were swamped vehicles. Some craft were
established simply for convenience in patched u p enough to be floated again.
planning, and no schedule was written for Several days were required to complete
the beginning and ending of the phases. this cleaning up. In the meantime work
The transition from one to another was also proceeded inshore of the high-water
expected to be gradual, with certain mark. Gaps through the shingle pile and
installations closing as new ones were sea wall were widened, chespaling was
opened. laid on the soft sand to provide a firmer
The initial dump phase may be said to footing for vehicles, beach exit roads were
have begun on the morning of D plus 1, improved, and mines were swept from
the first beach dumps having been opened fields needed as bivouac areas or parking
late the first night. One of the first tasks on and dump sites.
D plus 1 was marking the beaches so that Preoccupation with preliminary work
incoming craft could locate the proper un- such as clearance delayed the planned de-
loading points. The few markers that had velopment of the beaches. One result was
been erected on D Day were shot down by that LCT’s and preloaded barges intended
enemy artillery. Beaches were designated as an insurance against bad weather were
in accordance with the British “World the only means of supply on both beaches
Wide System” of marking. Under this sys- in the first days, and larger vessels could
tem the entire 7,900-yard stretch of beach not be berthed inshore until late on D plus
was divided into sectors, named after the 1. By D plus 2 a n enormous pool of un-
phonetic alphabet, beginning with Able loaded ships lay offshore, and the debar-
at the western extremity. What is usually kation of personnel and unloading of
referred to as OMAHA Beach consisted of supplies consequently fell far behind
beaches Dog, Easy and Fox. Each of these schedule.
392 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

Other conditions contributed to this lag. loaded in this manner at OMAHA in the
Certain methods of discharge of the vari- first two weeks, all without damage. The
ous types of ships a n d craft had been discovery that the beaching and drying
specified and a system of calling in and out technique could be applied to LST’s
berthing of craft had been worked out. was a n important factor in the accelerated
Both plans had to be radically altered be- build-up of troops and vehicles.
fore unloading met requirements. Troops A second important modification was
and vehicles continued to go ashore on D necessitated by the partial failure of the
plus 1 via two methods. Under the first, plan for calling in and berthing ships and
landing craft, except LST’s, beached and craft. Supply plans for OVERLORD had laid
when necessary “dried out.” The craft down a procedure by which stowage and
would beach on a falling tide, discharge sailing information could be transmitted
after the water had receded, and then wait to the First Army, enabling the latter to
to be refloated on the next tide. Vehicles establish unloading priorities in accord-
and men could thus go off the ramps onto ance with immediate a n d foreseeable
a dry beach instead of wading through needs. Times of departure, identities of
several feet of water. Only the smaller ships, and manifests showing their content
craft used this procedure. MT coasters, and stowage plans all were supposed to be
M T ships, APA transports, and LST’s communicated to the First Army in ad-
were unloaded onto ferry craft and dukws. vance by a combination of radio and air-
But it became evident on D plus 1, when plane or fast surface craft. First Army was
unloadings fell behind, that the process to consolidate this information and send it
had to be speeded up. One solution was to to the beach brigades, assigning priorities
beach LST’s and dry them out, as was be- for unloading. Upon the actual arrival of
ing done with smaller craft. This method ships at the far shore, the Naval Officer in
was urged by ground force commanders Command (NOIC) at the beach was to in-
in both the V and VII Corps, for there form the brigades, which would indicate
was growing concern over the lag in the the time and place of berthing according
build-up. Naval authorities had not fa- to priorities established by the army.
vored this procedure for LST’s because This plan broke down in actual opera-
ground inequalities on the beaches might tions, mainly as the result of poor com-
cause hogging damage. Larger craft had munications. The inability of planes to get
been successfully beached in the Mediter- through, a n d the tardy arrival of courier
ranean, where tides were small, but it was launches, plus other failures in communi-
feared that they might break their backs cations, meant that ships would arrive and
if dried out on the Normandy beaches. no agency ashore or afloat would know
When landings fell behind schedule, how- their identity or their contents. Stowage
ever, and when the Americans realized plans were not received, and ships arrived
that scores of smaller craft had been lost in without being seen by the NOIC. I n addi-
the assault, they decided to take the risk.
Experimentation with several vessels re- 9 Operation, Organization, Supply and Service of
the Transportation Corps in the ETO, Gen Bd Rpt
vealed no damage to the ships,9 and, 122, pp. 28-29; Ltr, Col Charles F. Howard to CG
beginning on D plus 2, LST’s were dried AGF, 27 Jul 44, sub: Observer’s Rpt, WDGDS
out regularly. More than 200 were un- 319.1, A47–2, Rpts, I.
LAUNCHING T H E INVASION: ORGANIZING T H E BEACHES 393

tion, there was a shortage of ferry craft to order of their arrival, and on the following
transfer cargo from ship to shore. The lack day it ordered all ships and craft unloaded
of orderly control of allocation and berth- without delay a n d without regard to
ing of ships resulted in considerable con- priorities. Another expedient which aided
fusion afloat and ashore. Lacking instruc- in speeding u p unloading operations was
tions, ships’ masters frequently made their the relaxation of blackout restrictions.
own decisions on where to anchor their Because opposition was slight, vessels were
ships, some going to the wrong beaches, authorized on 12 June to use hooded lights
many of them anchoring too far offshore, to permit unloading to proceed at full ca-
thus necessitating long round trips for ferry pacity throughout the night. By that date
craft and dukws. a shortage in some types of ammunition
First Army initially insisted on adhering had developed, particularly in 155-mm.
to the system of selective unloading and shells, and ammunition was therefore
unloading on a priority basis, even though given unloading priority for a time. The
manifests were unavailable and the names new plan quickly solved the problem, and
of the ships offshore were unknown. For a the backlog of ships was cleared by D plus
time Navy and Transportation Corps 9 (15 June). 10
officers had the impossible task of going In ship-to-shore operations, cargo was
about in small boats to determine what moved by a variety of ferry craft, includ-
ships were present and what cargo they ing lighters, barges, dukws, a n d landing
carried. Armed with this information First craft of the smaller types, principally the
Army would then indicate the vessels it LCT, which was considered one of the
wanted unloaded. Since unloading priori- most useful of the naval craft. By plan, the
ties and allocations were often made late deputy assault group commanders were to
or not at all, the brigades likewise resorted direct the use of ferry craft until the NOIC
to expedients and adopted the practice of was ready to take control. After the as-
scouting for ships awaiting discharge, and sault, however, the landing craft were
then working whatever vessels were ready scattered, it was difficult to concentrate
and eager to unload. them at the designated rendezvous points,
The subsequent provision of radio com- and the deputy assault group commanders
munication between the offshore naval were not equipped to operate the large
control craft and beach headquarters numbers of craft. Consequently the transi-
made it possible to identify craft on ar- tion of control to the NOIC was “not
rival at the control point and to make notable for its orderliness,” and the em-
arrangements with the beach brigades for ployment of ferry craft was not efficient in
berthing. But these improvements in com- the early stages. I n many instances craft
munications were not made in time to pre- were unavailable when needed, and some-
vent the formation of a large backlog of times they were as much as forty-eight
loaded ships and craft. A more immediate hours late in responding to requests. While
although temporary remedy was found in 10 OperationReport NEPTUNE,OMAHA Beach, prep
abandoning the priority system. After re- by Hist Sec ETOUSA, Sep 44, pp. 175–78, 188,
peated requests by naval authorities, First OCMH; Operations History of the Advance Section,
C O M Z ETOUSA, prep by Hist Sec ADSEC, 1945,
Army finally agreed on D plus 4 (10June) mimeo (hereafter cited as ADSEC Operations His-
to order LST’s and LCT’s unloaded in the tory), pp. 31, 38, OCMH.
394 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

their first-priority mission was to unload of trucks forced the dukws to carry a
vessels carrying vehicles, in which a back- major portion of the supplies the entire
log developed, it became necessary to shift distance from the ships to the initial
the ferry craft to certain coasters loaded dumps. They had originally been in-
with critical supplies. tended to carry their cargo only to beach
One of the most useful of the various transfer points, where it was to be lifted
types of craft was the Rhino ferry, a barge onto trucks and transported to dumps.
made up of ponton units and propelled by The practice of having dukws carry their
outboard motors. Rhino ferries were towed cargo beyond the beaches was uneconom-
across the Channel, their crews riding on ical, for their ship-to-shore function was a
the open and unprotected decks, and then highly specialized one. They had a rela-
used to unload LST’s and MT ships. They tively slow speed in the water, and the
enjoyed several advantages over other added mileage only increased their turn-
craft, for they had a large load capacity round time and thus reduced their over-
(two could normally empty an LST), their all capacity. Nevertheless they continued
cellular construction made them almost to make the complete round trips to the
unsinkable, and they could discharge ve- dumps until enough trucks became avail-
hicles on beaches of almost any gradient. able and transfer points were established.
Even when they were poorly beached and T o make matters worse, many of the
broke their backs the undamaged sections dukws were discharged as far as twelve
could readily be joined with others to and fifteen miles from shore in the first two
build a new ferry. I n the early stages, days. Many exhausted their fuel in the
before LST's were beached, these craft long run, in maneuvering, in searching for
brought in a large percentage of the ve- the proper beach, or in awaiting a n op-
hicles, and their crews displayed a high portunity to land. When they ran out of
quality of seamanship in handling the un- fuel they sometimes sank, for the bilge
wieldlycraft. 11 pumps stopped when the motor went
Much of the initial cargo unloading was dead. In addition, most of the amphibians
accomplished by dukws. These 2½-ton preloaded for the assault were overloaded.
amphibians were called on to bear a heavy Their normal load was three tons, but
burden in the early ship-to-shore opera- most of them carried at least five tons, and
tions and, as in the earlier Mediterranean some as many as six and seven, a burden
operations, proved their versatility and that caused many to swamp. While main-
endurance. The first dukws were scheduled tenance of the dukws was generally good,
to land within the first hour on D Day. there was a serious lack of spare parts,
One unit attempted to land at that time, which had to be salvaged from sunken ve-
but its officer was killed and none of the hicles and from 2½-ton cargo trucks,
amphibians reached the beach. Others many of the parts being interchangeable.
went ashore early in the afternoon, but Despite excessive periods of operation and
most of the dukws scheduled to land on special maintenance problems the dukw
D Day were held offshore until D plus 1. again demonstrated its usefulness and de-
Once they were available great demands pendability. Its unique ability to trans-
were placed on them because of the short-
age of both ferry craft and trucks. The lack 11Operation Report NEPTUNE,pp. 199–201.
DISCHARGING AT THE BEACHES. Landing craft, above, and Rhinoferry, below.
396 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

port cargo both from ship to shore and brought ashore and piled on the beach,
overland to dump contributed immeasur- and the 37th Engineer Combat Battalion
ably in meeting the problem posed by the cleared a few small fields for emergency
shortage of trucks, cranes, and transfer rigs dump and transit areas, at which pre-
during the first days, In the words of one loaded dukws discharged the first am-
observer, “It converted this beach opera- munition. These emergency dumps in the
tion from what might have been a random 5th Brigade area operated through D plus
piling of supplies on the beach to an 2, and then were consolidated with larger
orderly movement from ship to dump.” 12 dumps. In the 6th Brigade area on the
Landing hazards had reduced the num- western half of OMAHA Beach emergency
ber of trucks available, and many were Class V dumps were established as late as
either lost or held offshore longer than D plus 1 and 2, and one continued to issue
planned. The losses resulted more from ammunition till D plus 5. Meanwhile the
drowning than enemy fire. Landing craft first planned dumps were opened in the
often beached in front of deep runnels and 5th Brigade area on D plus 1 and in the
sometimes lowered their ramps in four to 6th Brigade area on D plus 4. They were
six feet of water. Waterproofing failed to located behind the cliffs, inland from the
protect vehicles in such depths, and many beach. Sniper fire hampered operation of
were either swamped or mired in sand the 5th Brigade’s initial dumps until D
after leaving the craft. The 5th Brigade plus 3, and in the western sector the
alone lost forty-four trucks in the first two dumps were still so near the front lines
days, mainly in this way. At no time were when they opened on D plus 4 that shells
there enough vehicles to meet the great were taken from their boxes at the dump
demand for them on the beach. The and carried by hand to the artillery bat-
critical period in operations came at low teries. Very little segregation of supplies
tide when trucks were needed for hauling was possible, and it was difficult to locate
the cargo brought ashore by ferry craft as required items. In these first days priority
well as the cargo brought to transfer points of cargo unloading was generally given to
by dukws. Maintenance work on trucks ammunition, and on D plus 4 a special air
was therefore restricted to high-tide peri- shipment of 200,000 rounds of small arms
ods, and available vehicles were pooled ammunition was made to overcome a de-
under brigade direction and allotted to the veloping shortage in this category. The
engineer battalions in accordance with reserves of Class I and III (rations and
needs. gas) carried by the units in the assault
Quartermaster and Ordnance units, at- tided them over the critical first stages
tached to the brigades to set up the first when supply was difficult.13
dumps, began landing at D plus 90 min- O n D plus 6 (12 June) the initial beach
utes, but they found it impossible to carry dump phase ended and the beach mainte-
out their assigned tasks because of enemy nance area dump phase began. O n that
fire. Elements of the 95th Quartermaster 12Ibid., pp. 199–203, 207-08; ADSEC Operations
Battalion, for example, suffered sixteen History, pp. 34-37; Ltr, Hq C O M Z to CG ADSEC,
casualties coming ashore, others were 21 Jun 44, sub: Inspection of UTAHBeach—Misuse
of Dukws, with Ind, Col Cort, CofS, ADSEC, 26 Jun
forced to dig in on the beach, and still 44, EUCOM 45 1.94 Amphibian Vehicles 1944.
others were held offshore. Despite the 13Operations Report NEPTUNE, pp. 225–31; FUSA
situation on the beach some supplies were Rpt of Opns, 20 Oct 43–1 Aug 44, Bk. II, p. 55.
LAUNCHING THE INVASION: ORGANIZING T H E BEACHES 397

day the inland dumps began to function, rectly or to a platform where it could be
although a few had actually begun to issue sorted and reloaded. Later, when more
supplies the day before. T h e dumps were trucks were available, a highly organized
located very much as originally planned, transfer system was worked out with care-
except those for Class V (ammunition), fully co-ordinated control, closely regu-
which were consolidated near Formigny. lated traffic, and an efficient communica-
It became evident early in the operation tions system connecting traffic control
that ammunition would offer the biggest towers, truck pools, and transfer points, to
supply problem, since stocks were not built facilitate the most economical use of all
u p as rapidly as had been hoped. The vehicles.
Americans decided to open only one Class I n contrast to the confusion and chaos
V dump, the one near Formigny, and First of D Day, activities at OMAHA Beach by
Army almost immediately took charge of the end of the second week resembled the
it. O n D plus 7 First Army decided to take operations of a major port. Except for
control of all inland dumps from the beach three or four wrecked craft, beaches were
brigades in order to tighten control over clear, and minefields behind the sea wall
the issue of critical items. The responsi- were slowly being cleared. Additional
bility of the special brigades was thereby roads were pushed through the shingle
limited to unloading supplies from ships pile, and exits were blasted through the sea
a n d craft a n d passing them across the wall. The discharge and inland movement
beach to the army supply points. In the of cargo a n d the evacuation of casualties
next few days engineer, signal, and medi- a n d prisoners of war were highly organ-
cal dumps were opened, and existing in- ized. O n e of the most encouraging devel-
stallations were expanded. Most of the opments for the engineer special brigades
dumps were located in the small Nor- was the build-up of trucks, for every ad-
mandy fields, with supplies usually stacked ditional truck increased the amount of
along the hedgerows which provided par- cargo which could be unloaded and moved
tial concealment. I n many cases it was forward. By the end of the second week the
necessary to fill ditches and punch gaps in limiting factor in supply build-up was no
the hedgerows to permit truck movements. longer the number of trucks, dukws, and
T h e fields were well turfed and provided ferry craft, but the arrival of ships. At that
a firm footing for storage, but there was time the daily tonnage discharge at
considerable trouble with mud during OMAHA averaged nearly 9,000 tons, about
rainy spells. 95 percent of its target, and approximately
While the beach maintenance area 11,000 men and 2,000 vehicles were cross-
dumps were being established, the first ing the beach every day and moving for-
transfer points were opened on the beach ward to add their weight to the offensive.
in order to speed deliveries to the dumps
and to save dukws the long trip inland. (5) Development of the U T A H Area
The transfer points were simple, consisting
mainly of crane facilities to swing nets of UTAHBeach likewise developed into an
cargo from dukws to trucks. They were set important logistic base within the first two
up so that dukws and trucks approached weeks, although on a smaller scale than
the cranes in parallellanes on either side, OMAHA. I n the first few days UTAHwas
with the cargo being transferred either di- actually able to receive greater tonnages
398 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

than its neighbor (a total of 7,541 tons in areas made this impossible. At OMAHA the
the first four days as against OMAHA’Ssigns were placed well u p on the hills and
3,971) and in the second week of opera- were clearly visible to incoming craft. Since
tions it began to achieve a daily discharge there was no high ground at UTAH,mark-
of between 5,000 and 5,500 tons, which ers were initially erected along the sea wall
roughly approximated the planning where they could not be seen from very far
figures. offshore. The addition of barrage balloons
I n developing that rate UTAHexperi- as markers remedied the situation on D
enced difficulties not unlike those encoun- plus 1,The balloons, appropriately colored
tered at OMAHA, despite the initial advan- a n d numbered, were flown at the beach
tages enjoyed as the result of the more boundaries, and on the cables holding the
orderly landings. Although the beachhead balloons naval signal flags were flown to
at UTAHwas relatively deep, its flanks guide incoming craft. The system proved
were not immediately extended sufficiently very successful, although there was suspi-
to secure beach operations from enemy ar- cion in some minds that the balloons pro-
tillery fire. Expansion of the lodgment was vided a convenient target marker for
slow in the first week, and in the north the enemy artillery in the first week.
limited progress had special importance While the removal of debris and obsta-
because of the strongly fortified headland cles from the beach of necessity held first
batteries in that sector. Observed artillery priority at OMAHA, supply clearance was
fire fell on the beach until D plus 5, and the main problem at UTAHbecause of the
sporadic unobserved fire continued until inundations. The 1st Engineer Special Bri-
12June and had a noticeable effect on un- gade had to give immediate attention to
loading operations. O n that day the 4th drainage of the flooded area and improve-
Division finally overran the last enemy ment or construction of exit roads. The en-
battery able to fire on the beach. gineers began drainage at once and at the
T h e UTAHinstallations were also sub- southern end of the beach did the job rap-
jected to enemy air attacks, but, as at idly. The central gates north of Sugar Red
OMAHA, the Germans made their raids en- were opened on D plus 2, but they required
tirely at night and concentrated on ship- constant maintenance and had to be closed
ping and on mining the harbor. Several during periods of high tide. The northern
casualties resulted, but no damage was gates could not be opened until after D
done to beach installations. Activity was plus 8 because the enemy occupied the
hampered more by the slow progress in Quinéville ridge. Even in the southern
broadening and deepening the beachhead. area, where drainage was effected, the
The 1st Engineer Special Brigade’s units fields remained saturated and could not be
were confined to a much smaller area than used as transit areas or dumps. T h e chief
planned. During the first week five battal- effect of the drainage on military opera-
ions of engineers were restricted to an area tions was to make some of the previously
which was scheduled to have been op- flooded roads usable. Route T–7, although
erated by two. completely under water, was used begin-
T h e UTAHbeaches were to have been ning the night of D Day, but the heavy
marked like the OMAHA beaches, but dif- traffic quickly made it impassable. O n D
ferences in the physical features of the two plus 3 it was closed, and troops of the 531st
LAUNCHING T H E INVASION: ORGANIZING T H E BEACHES 399

Engineer Shore Regiment worked con- elements of the 38th Engineer General
tinuously for thirty-six hours to improve it. Service Regiment landed and began de-
By that time the water was drained off and veloping the area. The principal route
the road was graveled, and it proved one (S–3) serving Roger White had been
of the most useful of all routes leading flooded, like S–9 to the south, but the
from the beach. opening of the gates drained it sufficiently
To relieve pressure on the lateral road to make it usable. The engineers mean-
which paralleled the beach about 700 while proceeded with their usual tasks of
yards inland, and also to speed traffic preparing the beach for unloading opera-
along the beach itself, engineers quickly tions. Beach obstacles, which included
laid Sommerfeld matting along the base of tetrahedra and mined stakes in this area,
the dunes and parallel to the sea wall they either blew or pulled off the tidal flat,
about 125 feet inland. They blew addi- and they blasted gaps in the sea wall. By
tional gaps in the wall, improved the exits 12June the beach was announced ready
by dozing and grading, and laid matting for operation. No dukws were on hand at
in these exits and also along stretches of the that time, however, and no coasters were
beach itself. At the southern extremity of ready for unloading. Furthermore; the
the beach, route V–1 was improved and beach was still subject to enemy fire. Its
carried some traffic beginning the night of opening was postponed, therefore, and it
D Day. To provide access to it the engi- was not put into operation till later.
neers extended a lateral beach road south- While unloading operations got off to a
ward from U–5. By D plus 1 UTAHBeach better start at UTAHthan at OMAHA,
had several exits through the sea wall, two build-up targets were not met in the VII
lateral beach roads, a n d three outlets Corps sector for several days. The unload-
across the flooded area. ing of the first tide convoy was not com-
Throughout the first weeks the three pleted until D plus I . Of the twelve pre-
beaches opened on D Day—Uncle Red, loaded LCT’s scheduled to land on D Day,
Tare Green, a n d Sugar Red—continued six came in on the second tide, and the re-
to serve as the principal landing points. mainder did not beach until the morning
Initially the most important was the of D plus 1. Some of the LBV’s landed at
southernmost of these beaches—Uncle OMAHA by mistake. By D plus 2 all sixteen
Red. It was free from shellfire and had the supply coasters were located and were un-
best exit and road, U–5. O n e battalion of loading, but discharge proceeded slowly
the 531st Engineer Shore Regiment was because the dukws had to make such long
originally supposed to move north on D trips from the transport area to the dumps.
plus 1 and open a fourth beach south of T h e initial refusal to beach LST’s com-
Quinéville. Since the area was not cleared pelled all unloading to be accomplished
for several days, such a move was impos- by dukws, by ferry craft such as LCT’s and
sible. LBV’s, and by the dumb barges intended
Instead, plans were made to open an as a bad weather reserve. Unloading soon
additional beach north of Sugar Red, fell behind schedule, and the lag created
known as Roger White. T h a t beach was apprehension on the part of the ground
reconnoitered on D plus 2, while still un- commanders. I n this respect UTAH’Sex-
der enemy artillery fire, a n d on D plus 4 perience was similar to OMAHA’S. A back-
400 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

log of shipping developed and was not re- cation and berthing of all vessels. At UTAH
lieved until the decision was made to the N O I C was finally ordered ashore at
beach LST’s. Once this decision was the request ofthe VII Corps commander.17
made, as many as fifteen LST’s were A further stumbling block to the smooth
brought ashore at a time. functioning of the beach port was the dis-
Other factors contributed to the slow agreement between the Navy and the bri-
start. Neither trucks nor dukws were plen- gade over the former’s policy of holding
tiful. Three dukw companies came ashore ships offshore to prevent damage from
on D plus 1, and a n additional four com- shelling. Once these various difficulties
panies came in within the next five days. 14 were ironed out and lines of control were
But the shortage of trucks made it neces- clearly established, discharge at UTAH
sary for dukws to carry cargo the entire proceeded more smoothly. O n the whole,
distance to the inland dumps. Some vessels co-operation between the 1st Engineer
carrying hatch crews from the United Special Brigade and the Navy was close,
Kingdom failed to arrive on schedule. And since the 2d Naval Beach Battalion had
before the first week had passed, a partial operated with 1st Brigade in the Mediter-
breakdown of the loading arrangements ranean. Brigade headquarters eventually
at Southampton set back the movement of established a close control over all units in-
troops and supplies still further.15 volved in cargo unloading; it notified the
Additional difficulties arose from the NOIC of its requirements, and the NOIC
initially imperfect functioning of the bri- allocated ferry craft through the Navy’s
gades and the temporary disorganization Ferry Craft Control.
of ship-to-shore operations. While some Similar difficulties were experienced at
units of the special brigades had trained OMAHA, where dissatisfaction quickly de-
together, the beach organizations were veloped over the way in which the NOIC
really put together for the first time on the discharged his responsibilities, particularly
beaches and did not immediately achieve with regard to the location of ships. The
their highest efficiency. A loose control of brigades, anxious to control shipping once
certain units of the brigades, such as the it arrived at the far shore, soon got into the
dukw companies, at first resulted in habit of ordering vessels moved without
wasted effort and inefficient ship-to-shore reference to the NOIC. T h e initial diffi-
operations. Furthermore, the early lag in culties a n d confusion were undoubtedly
unloading created a natural anxiety in the the product of poor preparation, and were
minds of the corps commanders, who in- 14One load of dukws, unaware of the enemy situa-
tervened in the beach organization in an tion, tried to land near Quintville. As the ramp of the
effort to hasten the discharge of supplies.16 LST went down, enemy artillery found the craft, and
three dukws were lost.
Part of the trouble lay in poor co-ordi- 15See Section 9 of this chapter.
nation between the Army and Navy at the 16Comments on the early functioning of the special
beaches. Control of shipping at both brigades are contained in a n aide-mimoire by General
Moses, 30 June 1944, in 1 2 A G p G – 4 Misc Ltrs,
OMAHA and UTAHleft much to be desired, Memos by chiefs of divs in G–4. Moses was critical of
and close co-operation with the Navy was higher commanders’ interference with the brigades,
delayed by the late arrival of the Naval the operations of which he thought they did not fully
understand.
Officer in Command, who was responsible 17Ltr, Col Howard to CG AGF, 27 J u l 44, sub:
for the control of ferry craft and for the lo- Observer’s Rpt, WDGDS 3 19.1, A47–2, I.
LAUNCHING T H E INVASION: ORGANIZING T H E BEACHES 401

aggravated by complicated channels of OMAHA and UTAHareas. O n 13 June it

control and poorly defined lines of respon- took direct control of all dumps, although
sibility. They revealed many of the diffi- brigade units continued to operate them.
culties inherent in joint operations. Im- O n the same date it took over direct con-
provement was marked after NOIC head- trol of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade
quarters was reorganized on 10June, and from the VII Corps. Five days later the
within two weeks the difficulties were brigade was attached to the Advance Sec-
largely resolved and an effective port or- tion, which in turn remained attached to
ganization was in operation.18 the army. Control of motor transportation
Development of the UTAHarea was to was concentrated in the 537th Quarter-
be carried out in two roughly defined master Battalion.
phases: first the initial dumps were to be The week of 13–19 June was one of
established; then the beach maintenance steady development and consolidation of
area was to be organized. Initial dumps the beach maintenance area. I n that
were actually established somewhat earlier period the beachhead was expanded to the
than at OMAHA,and the transition to the Quinéville ridge in the north and beyond
beach maintenance area phase also took Carentan in the south. In the west, corps
place sooner. Demining activities delayed units drove all the way across the penin-
the opening of the dumps somewhat, but sula, thus giving Advance Section consid-
this was a minor hindrance inasmuch as erably more elbow room in which to de-
supplies did not begin arriving in any velop a supply base. Unloading operations
great quantity until late on D plus 1, when also proceeded more smoothly in the sec-
initial dumps for ammunition, gasoline, ond week, and the movement of supplies
and salvage were opened back of Uncle inland from the beaches was facilitated by
Red and Tare Green. a n increasing number of trucks. Conges-
Within the first week it became possible tion in the dumps actually became a major
to move dumps farther inland and to or- problem for a time. O n the night of 15
ganize the beach maintenance area. Sites June the tie-up in the Class V dumps was
had been selected in advance by map re- so great that drivers had to unload their
connaissance. Most of them were found to own trucks. A similar congestion occurred
be satisfactory as they were uncovered, with gasoline, and in the next few days ad-
and for the most part the beach mainte- ditional dumps were established to relieve
nance area therefore developed as this situation.
planned. When the Class V dump was By D plus 12 (18June) the movement
reconnoitered on D plus 1 and found to of both troops and supplies over UTAH
be under artillery fire a n alternate area Beach was proceeding approximately ac-
was selected. Meanwhile dumps for Classes cording to plan. Daily tonnage discharge
I and II, signal, engineer, medical, chemi- was averaging 5,500 tons (about 97 per-
cal warfare, and air force supplies were cent of the target), and 7,000–8,000 men
also established in the beach maintenance and 800 vehicles were crossing the beach
area, all within the first few days. every day.
Beginning with the second week the
First Army established a more centralized 18Operation Report NEPTUNE,pp. 135-39; Ltr,
control over supply operations in both the Col Gullatt to OCMH, 17 Jul 51.
402 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

(6) The Beach Ports beyond the line of blockships, was com-
pleted, and debarking troops began using
T h e two methods of unloading that it. A third causeway, not in the original
have been described—discharge directly plans, was built later. 19
onto the beach from landing craft, and un- Construction of the larger port at
loading from larger vessels moored off- OMAHA also began on schedule. The first
shore into ferry craft and dukws—were in- units of MULBERRY A to get under way
tended primarily for the early stages of the were the blockships which were to form the
invasion in the absence of adequate port breakwater. These included both mer-
facilities. Construction of the beach ports chantmen and warships, sailing under the
made possible a third method of dis- flags of many of the United Nations. Either
charge-to pierhead, or quayside. The obsolete or war damaged, some more than
progress made in completing these ports forty years old, all were destined to render
contributed in large measure to the im- one last useful service. Because of their age
proved discharge performance in the and slowness they had to leave British
second week. ports as much as six days before D Day,
At UTAHthe planned harbor installa- and were therefore the first units of the in-
tion was relatively small, consisting simply vasion fleet to sail. Surveys for the pro-
of two ponton causeways and a GOOSE- posed harbor and the actual siting of the
BERRY made up of ten blockships, which blockships were begun on D plus 1 with
were to provide shelter for landing craft. the arrival of the commander and staff of
The emplacement of these ships was begun Force MULBERRY. Three ships were sunk
on D plus 2, when British tugs towed three in position the same day and immediately
of them into position. Siting of the GOOSE- came under enemy artillery fire, which
BERRY had to be accomplished under caused some casualties among the mer-
enemy artillery fire, and the troops at chant marine crews. O n D plus 2 three
UTAHthought it a good joke when the more blockships were sunk, three PHOE-
Berlin radio announced that two Allied NIXES were emplaced to begin the caisson
ships had been sunk off that beach. Two breakwater, and the first BOMBARDONS
of the breakwater ships had been hit by were moored. By D plus 4 the GOOSEBERRY
the enemy and obligingly sunk in approxi- was completed, 10 PHOENIXES were em-
mately their correct positions, although placed, 12 BOMBARDONS were moored, 19
slightly too far apart. The enemy fire did additional moorings were laid, and all
hamper operations, however, and a third breakwater surveys completed. Within an-
blockship was also spaced incorrectly other week (by 17 June) all 24 BOMBAR-
when the tug that was towing it cut loose DONS were moored, 32 of the 51 PHOENIXES
too quickly in its eagerness to escape. The had been sited, and moorings for 2 Lib-
remaining ships were sited properly and erty ships were completed. Meanwhile,
the UTAHbreakwater was completed on D work on the 3,000-foot piers had also pro-
plus 7 (13June). gressed rapidly. By 16June the center LST
Meanwhile work had begun on the pon- pier was completed and in operation, both
ton causeways. The first was laid off Uncle western and eastern piers were well under
Red and was opened on D plus 7. Three 19 NEPTUNE: Training for and Mounting the Oper-
days later a second causeway, extending ation, II, 129–30, OCMH.
PARTIALLY COMPLETED MULBERRY off OMAHA Beach. Portion of breakwater,
above; piers and pierheads, below.
404 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

way, and two of the big Lobnitz pierheads bined daily discharges at the two beaches
were installed. 20On the first day the cen- were averaging approximately 14,500
ter pier was used LST’s spent an average tons, which was only slightly below expec-
time of 64 minutes in discharging, disgorg- tations. The combined target was actually
ing their vehicles at the rate of one every exceeded on D plus 9 (15 June) when
1.16 minutes. nearly 15,000 tons of supplies and equip-
The 2,450-foot ponton causeways were ment were unloaded at the two beaches,
also built on schedule. Naval construction as against a target of 13,700. Such occa-
workers started on one causeway on D sional performance in excess of estimated
plus 2, building it twice the width origi- capacities had not sufficed to overcome the
nally contemplated, and completed it on initial lag, of course. On 18June the total
D plus 4. The causeway enabled almost cumulative discharge still stood at about
all troops coming ashore thereafter to land 72.8 percent of planned unloadings (1 16,-
dry shod and it was also used for unload- 065 as against 159,350 tons). First Army
ing various types of craft. A second cause- estimated that it had accumulated a stock-
way was started on D plus 5. Although it age of 9 days of rations, 5 days of POL,
was completed in three days, it was not im- and about 3 units of fire of ammunition. 22
mediately put into full operation. MUL- Vehicle discharge continued to cause con-
BERRY A was not scheduled to be com- cern, for only 40,541, or 66 percent, of the
pleted until D plus 18 (24 June), but planned 61,367 vehicles had been deliv-
unloading profited increasingly from the ered to the far shore. The troop build-up
partially constructed port. The lengthen- continued at approximately 88 percent of
ing line of blockships and PHOENIXES af- scheduled debarkations.23 By D plus 12 a
forded considerable protection for small total of 314,504 of the planned 358,139
craft and coasters and small craft were men had crossed the American beaches,
unloaded more rapidly than they could and eleven of the planned build-up of
have been had the roadstead been left twelve divisions were ashore.24 At both
open.21 beaches evacuation of casualties and pris-
At the end of the second week, then, oners of war proceeded without difficulty.
there was every reason to feel encouraged As of that date, 18June, a total of 14,500
by the discharge situation. Even though
the minor ports of Grandcamp and Isigny 20Weekly Logistical Summary, 6–18 Jun, SHAEF
had not been opened as scheduled, the G–4 W a r Diary, Jun, Exec Br, App. 3 , SHAEF G–4.
21Operation Report NEPTUNE, pp. 141–51, 157–58,
performance at both beaches offered hope 186.
that the planning targets would soon be 22FUSA Rpt of Opns, 20 Oct 43–1 Aug 44, Bk. V,
reached. Tonnage discharge had lagged at p. 142.
23Landings at OMAHAconsistently achieved a
first and ground forces had not made as higher percentage of the build-up target, with 93 per-
rapid progress as had been hoped for, but cent of its planned debarkations completed o n D
there were favorable factors as well. Total plus 12.
24As compared with the British build-up of eight
casualties thus far had been unexpectedly a n d two-thirds divisions out of a planned nine and a
low, the expenditure of materiel was less third. British and U.S. Buildup Progress Rpts for 18
than preinvasion estimates, and the build- Jun, S H A E F G–4 3 19.1 Buildup Rpts, I. Personnel
landing figures given above do not take into account
up of men and supplies was now picking the two airborne divisions included in the total of
up speed. By 18June (D plus 12) the com- eleven U.S. divisions ashore.
COMPLETED PIER OF THE MULBERRY in operation. Loaded vehicles coming
ashore, above, and leaving Lobnitz pierhead, below.
406 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

casualties had been evacuated via the mark and could not be refloated for many
beaches, an additional 1,300 by air, and days; others were thrown against the
an estimated 10,000 prisoners of war had UTAHsea wall or onto the OMAHA shingle
also been shipped to the United King- pile and damaged beyond repair.
dom.25 Danger threatened the MULBERRY not
only from the heavy sea, which tore the
(7) The Great Storm of 19–22June breakwater units from their moorings, but
from the many craft which tossed about
Hopes had soared on 16June when the helplessly and crashed into the piers. To-
first vehicles and personnel debarked onto ward evening an American salvage barge
the MULBERRY pierheads. Three days later a n d five British LCT’s struck the center
nature struck a devastating blow to the in- pier, damaging beetles and mooring
stallations which the Allies had so carefully cables. The strong winds continued on 20
planned and laboriously constructed, and June, thwarting attempts to keep craft un-
threatened to disrupt the entire invasion der control, and many vessels drifted
design. Beginning on 19June and continu- against the bridging and pierheads. By the
ing for three days, high winds pounded the evening of the second day the eastern
French invasion coast, wrecking scores of mooring cables were cut, and one pier
craft and smashing the artificial harbor. drifted westward, damaging adjacent
When the gale finally subsided on the 22d bridging.
much of the work of the first two weeks At the same time both the Lobnitz pier-
had been demolished, and MULBERRY A heads and some of the PHOENIXES showed
was never to be reconstructed. signs of breaking up, and personnel had to
A northeast wind had freshened early be removed from the former. The floating
on the morning of the 19th, immediately BOMBARDONS broke from their moorings,
hampering unloading operations, and the a n d all twenty-four went adrift, some of
rising sea shortly halted all dukw and them washing into the piers, some piling
ferry craft operations at both OMAHA and up on the beach, and others threatening to
UTAH.Within a few hours antiaircraft crash into ships offshore. During the night
crews were forced to abandon their guns WHALE bridging of the piers was further
on the PHOENIXES in the outer breakwater damaged by drifting shore ramps and
at OMAHA because of the heavy seas that pontons, and a telescopic section connect-
swept away handrails and shelters at the ing two of the pierheads was carried away.
base of the gun platforms. Inside the west- By the morning of 21 June only eight of
ern breakwater, pier bridging soon began the thirty-two PHOENIXES that had been
to break away from mooring cables. Be- sited remained effective. The day brought
fore long all normal port operations more damage, and on the night of the 21st
ceased, and almost all available men were the two pierheads were carried away and
diverted to whatever rescue and salvage driven into shallow water. By that time all
work was possible. Late in the day condi-
tions worsened. The winds increased in 25Medical evacuation figures from FUSA Rpt of
Opns, Bk. VII, Medical Annex, Apps. 20, 21, pp.
velocity and began to drive scores of craft 169–70. Prisoner of war evacuations are estimated
onto the beach. Some were thrown un- from total captures. FUSA Rpt of Opns, Bk. V, G–1
damaged beyond the normal high-water Annex, Chart 7.
LAUNCHING T H E INVASION: ORGANIZING THE BEACHES 407

pier bridging was badly twisted, and land- eight ammunition coasters to be beached,
ing craft of all sizes and descriptions were and directed the brigades on both beaches
piled on the beach, entangled with the to give first priority to ammunition dis-
bridging of the piers. charge and second priority to gasoline. To
The storm finally abated somewhat on fortify the ammunition position further,
22June, although normal operations were five prestowed Liberty ships lying in U.K.
still impossible. But on the 23d dukws waters were also called forward.26Normal
were again able to operate, and unloading discharge was impossible, but several
was resumed. At UTAHBeach the NOIC small coasters were beached and unloaded
estimated that 60 percent of the ferry craft at low tide. These were worked only with
there would be inoperative for thirty-six great difficulty, and, where necessary,
to forty-eight hours even after normal holes were cut into the sides of the craft in
unloading began again. order to reach cargo. 27
Of most immediate concern throughout T h e cumulative effect of the four-day
the storm was the almost complete stop- storm can be seen most readily in the fol-
page of unloading, which promised to lowing figures: of a planned stores dis-
nullify the gains of the preceding week charge of 64,100 tons, only 12,253 were
and again widen the gap between planned unloaded; of a projected 13,337 vehicles,
and actual discharge. O n 19June, when only 4,205 were brought ashore; of a
the storm began, approximately half of scheduled 77,081 troops, only 23,460 were
the discharge targets were met. The bri- debarked. Percentages of cumulative
gades managed to unload more than 8,300 planned build-up targets achieved conse-
tons of supplies and 3,000 vehicles, and quently fell considerably behind. Whereas
about 17,750 troops debarked. But the full on 18June 72.8 percent of the projected
effect of the storm was felt the following build-up of supply tonnages had taken
day. Only 1,000 tons of supplies, 738 vehi- place, on 22 June this had fallen to 57.4
cles, and 3,300 troops were brought ashore percent; vehicle build-up had fallen from
on the 20th. On the 21st 1,000 tons were 66 percent to 57 percent; and the person-
discharged, and on the 22d only 500. nel build-up had dropped from 88 to 77.7
The inability to unload supplies threat- percent. 28
ened to produce a grave situation. Some OMAHA Beach presented a chaotic pic-
types of ammunition were already in short ture as the weather moderated on 22 June.
supply and were urgently needed ashore, Nearly a hundred LCVP’s and LCM’s
particularly by the VII Corps, which had were lost, in addition to a large number of
just started its drive up the Cotentin and LCT’s and larger craft. Of twenty Rhino
in the next few days was to launch its final ferries only one remained operational. All
assault against Cherbourg. The situation types of craft were strewn along the entire
at the beaches prompted First Army to beach, partially blocking every exit. E–3
direct that expenditures be cut to one-
26FUSA Rpt of Opns, Bk. V, p. 142.
third unit of fire per day. Shortages in 27 ADSEC Operations History, p. 32.
critical calibers were met chiefly by spe- 28 NEPTUNE:
Training for and Mounting the Oper-
cially arranged air shipment, 500 tons be- ation, II, Apps. A, B, and C; FUSA Troop List, FUSA
Rpt of Opns, Bk. II, pp. 17 1-74; FUSAG Buildup
ing flown in daily over a period of three Priority Tables. List B, BUCO Tables FUSAG,
days. Meanwhile, First Army also ordered EUCOM Hist Files, AG Hist Records.
BEACHED AND WRECKED LANDING CRAFT smashed during the storm of 19–22 June.
STORM-TWISTED PIERS. Lobnitz pierheads are visible in the background.
410 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

MULBERRY A as seenfrom the air after the storm.

was complete disorder. A tentative check of the beach. One of the piers was com-
revealed that eighty craft, including 35 pletely ruined. Its center span of bridging
LCM’s, 11 LCT’s, 9 Rhino ferries, 3 was bent and twisted in a great arc curv-
LCI’s and various smaller craft, were ing to the west, and its beetles were either
piled opposite the exit. Near by a n LCM broken loose and beached, or smashed
straddled the deck of an LCT, a coast and filled with water. The other pier was
guard cutter had cut into a nest of LCM’s not as badly damaged, but was also bent
and wound up sideways on the sand, and in a great arc. It was difficult at first to
four LCT’s were piled together deck to estimate the damage because ships and
deck. The MULBERRY was a total loss with craft had crashed into the causeways,
the exception of the blockships, and even obscuring their condition.
these had been pulled out of line, and half The brigades at both beaches had con-
had broken their backs. Many of the tinued their efforts throughout the storm
PHOENIXES had likewise broken, and one to salvage craft and equipment, and par-
had piled on the cliffs at the western end ticularly to clear openings so that craft
LAUNCHING T H E INVASION: ORGANIZING T H E BEACHES 411

could beach. They also opened emergency Most important were the erection of new
exits from the beach and cleared some of transfer points and the improvement of
the salvaged material in trucks. Thus it the whole traffic organization, which sub-
was possible for LCT’s to continue beach- sequently made it possible to handle a
ing and keep a trickle of supplies coming record volume of supplies without devel-
in. O n the 22d all the craft on the beach oping a bottleneck. In addition, engineers
had been completely unloaded, and there opened the northern locks and completed
was the very hopeful prospect when the the drainage of the inundated area behind
weather cleared that day that many of the UTAH,they repaired beached craft, and
craft could be taken off the beach in good they cleared away wreckage.
condition. The brigades had also made During the storm, and for a few days
plans and preparations to facilitate the thereafter, certain loaded ships had been
discharge a n d movement of cargo upon held at U.K. ports owing to the difficulties
the return of favorable weather. They of unloading at the far shore and to the
checked and repaired equipment, moved fact that there were numbers of loaded
supplies left on the beach to the inland M T ships still off the beaches. O n 23 June
dumps, and built some new installations, sailings were resumed on a limited basis,
the most important of which were the im- and on the 26th normal sailings were re-
proved transfer points. Consequently, al- stored, though planned loadings were not
though the beaches, particularly at reached in most categories owing to the
OMAHA, were a mass of wreckage when nonreturn of M T ships and craft from the
the storm subsided on 22 June, inshore in- far shore. LCT’s, a n d even LST’s, were
stallations and facilities were much im- held at the beaches to unload the accumu-
proved. Roads were in better condition, lation of M T ships 29 A reallocation of
dumps cleared, and trucks and dukws in craft between U.S. and British forces
good repair. Beach clearance again be- partly alleviated the shipping shortage,30
came a tremendous problem at OMAHA,but the effects of the storm continued to be
but efforts were also immediately made to felt in the U.K. ports in the succeeding
resume the unloading of cargo. O n 22 days when loading was delayed for lack of
June five coasters with ammunition were adequate lift.
beached and dried out so they could un- Despite these disruptions in the ship-
load directly into trucks, and other ping program, and in spite of the destruc-
coasters were taken in as close as possible tion of the piers and the wreckage which
to reduce dukw and ferry craft travel. cluttered the beaches, discharge opera-
UTAH had not suffered as badly as tions showed a remarkably quick recovery
OMAHA, and by the afternoon of 23 June when unloading was fully resumed on 23
coasters were again being beached rapidly June. O n that day OMAHA unloaded
and unloaded directly into trucks and 10,000 tons and UTAH unloaded 6,400
dukws. Many craft were strewn along the tons, both beaches surpassing all their pre-
beach, but since UTAHhad virtually no
limits and could expand to either side the 29Col Brooke, SHAEF representative on BUCO,
Report of Bad Weather 19–23 June 1944, 27 Jun 44,
congestion was not serious. As at OMAHA,App. 7 of Exec Br, SHAEF G–4 W a r Diary, Jun,
the 1st Brigade had improved inshore SHAEF G–4.
cargo-handling facilities during the storm. 3012th A G p Rpt of Opns, VI (G–4), 21.
BEACH TRANSFER POINTS. Pool oftrucks waiting to be loaded, above. Crane trans-
ferring cargofrom a dukw, below.
LAUNCHING T H E INVASION: ORGANIZING T H E BEACHES 413

vious performance. In the last week of met with the commander of the Western
June OMAHA averaged 13,500 tons per Naval Task Force and accepted this rec-
day, 115 percent of planned capacity, and ommendation. Two days later General
UTAHaveraged 7,000 tons, or 124 percent Gale, the chief administrative officer of
of capacity. This record was achieved over SHAEF, and other top administrative
open beaches a n d without the benefit of officers gave their concurrence, and the
the MULBERRY facilities, although the recommendation was approved by the
sunken ship breakwaters still afforded Supreme Commander. More specifically,
some protection to craft at both beaches. 31 it was agreed that the GOOSEBERRY at
The failure of MULBERRY A to with- OMAHA should be reinforced with twelve
stand the storm of 19–22 June gave additional blockships; that a 25-ton pier
definite warning that the artificial ports for unloading coasters should be con-
could not be relied on in winter weather. structed within the breakwater; that no
By normal standards the storm actually attempt would be made to replace the
had not been a very severe one. Winds BOMBARDON breakwater; that pier bridg-
had reached velocities of 25–32 knots ing should be salvaged for use in the
(29-36 miles a n hour), and had therefore British MULBERRY; and that the capacity
never exceeded half-gale force. 32General of Cherbourg should be increased.35
Eisenhower thought it one of the fortunate The decision to abandon MULBERRY A
results of the storm that a timely warning and to strengthen the GOOSEBERRY instead
had been given, and hoped for the quick was buttressed by the demonstration of
capture of Cherbourg.33 what could be accomplished over open
Immediately after the storm the com- beaches. Despite the loss of the MULBERRY
mander of the Western Naval Task Force, a n d despite the fact that the 25-ton pier
Admiral Kirk, surveyed the damage at was never built, OMAHA handled tonnages
OMAHA and concluded that no attempt
31T h e OMAHA Command changed hands in the
should be made to reconstruct MULBERRY last week of June, Colonel Talley replacing General
A. 34 BOMBARDONS had been a complete Hoge.
failure, and rebuilding them would have 32Memo, Capt Robert C. Lee, USN, Mov and T n
Br, G–3 SHAEF, for Crawford et al., 26 Jun 44, sub:
served no useful purpose. The PHOENIXESBuilding U p Load and Discharge, SHAEF G–4 825.1
had sustained heavy damage and revealed Piers, Wharves, Docks a n d Berths 1944,II.
an inability to withstand heavy sea action 33Ltr, Eisenhower to Somervell, 25 J u n 44, Hq
ASF–European theater last half 1944; Cbls, Eisen-
and scouring. Piers appeared to be im- hower to Marshall, 20 Jun 44, S–54240, and 21 Jun
practical under weather conditions which 44, S–54306, P & O Cbl Files.
destroyed the PHOENIXES. The GOOSE- 34 It is worth noting that on the very day the storm
had broken—19 June—the ANCXF made proposals
BERRIES had also tended to weaken in the
to SHAEF advocating that the MULBERRIES be
face of northerly gales, although it was strengthened against autumn gales by extending the
concluded that they offered the one means breakwater a n d double-banking the ends with addi-
tional PHOENIXES. Ltr, A N C X F to SHAEF, 19 Jun
of affording shelter to small craft. These 44, sub: Completion of MULBERRIES, S H A E F AG
observations led Admiral Kirk to recom- 820–1 Artificial Harbors April–July 44.
mend that the MULBERRY be abandoned 35Min, Mtg held at SHAEF, 26 Jun 44, Gale pre-
siding; Ltr, Gale to Smith, 26 Jun 44, sub: Recon-
and that the GOOSEBERRY be reinforced. struction of MULBERRIES; TWX S–54648, Eisenhower
O n 24 June the commander of Task Force to A N C X F a n d 2 1 A G p , 2 7 J u n 44. All in SHAEF
MULBERRY and other high Navy officials SGS 800.1 MULBERRY O/CS, II.
414 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

DRIED-OUT LST discharging its cargo at OMAHA Beach. Portion of a BOMBARDON

washed ashore during storm may be seen at left.

far beyond the most optimistic forecasts, drifted and smashed it, or if the BOMBAR-
overshadowing Cherbourg as an intake DONS had held. It is of course impossible to
port for several months to come. say what might have been accomplished
T h e destruction of MULBERRY A by a with the artificial port had it withstood the
single storm and the subsequent success of storm of 19–22 June. Some indication
the build-up over open beaches at first of its probable worth may be derived
sight would appear to discredit the whole from the performance of the British port.
idea of the artificial port. Several U.S. of- MULBERRY B did not take the full brunt of
ficials had in fact been dubious of the the storm, for the Calvados reef, lying off-
project from the start and had withheld shore, gave it some protection by breaking
their criticisms only because of the high- the main force of the waves. It suffered
level support which the project was known considerable damage, nevertheless, and
to have.36 A few had predicted that the many craft were driven ashore. I n addi-
synthetic ports would not withstand bad tion, many components of the harbor,
storms. MULBERRY A might well have held 36Intervs with Talley, 6 Mar 51, and with Lord,
together if craft in the harbor had not 9 Aug 51, OCMH.
LAUNCHING T H E INVASION: ORGANIZING T H E BEACHES 415

such as PHOENIXES and sections of pier, have had equal success had it withstood
were lost or damaged when caught by the the storm which struck before the harbor
storm while they were still being towed. was even complete, or had it been recon-
But most of the partially completed har- structed. It is important to remember,
bor remained intact, and with the sal- however, that MULBERRY B was substan-
vaged units and equipment from OMAHAtially reinforced with units salvaged from
it was far easier to complete the British the American harbor a n d that the
port at Arromanches than to reconstruct PHOENIXES were pumped full of sand to
the American harbor at OMAHA. Despite give them greater stability, measures that
the decision regarding the American undoubtedly explain the extended service
MULBERRY, great importance was still at- which the British port was able to render.
tached to the completion of the British Furthermore, the planners obviously un-
port. derrated the capacities of open beaches.
To finish it and to put it in first-class The tremendous tonnage capacities subse-
condition by the end of September so that quently developed at both UTAH and
it might withstand the autumn gales, ad- OMAHA were without doubt one of the
ditional WHALEand PHOENIX units had to most significant and gratifying features of
be constructed. These General Eisenhower the entire OVERLORD operation.
requested from the British immediately
after the storm. In his requests he had the (8) The Build-up to 30 June
full support of the Prime Minister, who
had a great personal interest in the MUL- While the value of the beaches was not
BERRY and was convinced of its vital role. yet fully appreciated at the end of June,
Mr. Churchill was determined that all both OMAHA and UTAH had already
necessary steps be taken to make the port begun to handle cargo considerably in
fully secure and effective. H e assured the excess of planned estimates, a welcome
Supreme Commander that everything augury in view of the unsatisfactory port
would be done to meet the requirements.37 situation. Together the two beaches
Not only did MULBERRY B prove useful; handled a total of 161,507 tons in the eight
it exceeded its targets. The British port days following the storm. By 30 June a
was expected to handle 6,000 tons of cargo total of 289,827 tons of supplies had been
per day after reaching its capacity on D moved to the Continent. While this
plus 14. For more than three months it amount represented 80.5 percent of the
actually averaged 6,765 tons, handling 48 cumulative tonnage (360,000) that plan-
percent of all the tonnage landed for Brit- ners had estimated should be landed over
ish forces. British observers have specu- the beaches by that date, it represented
lated that, but for the MULBERRY, opera- 37Ltr, Eisenhower to Churchill, 29 Jun 44; Note by
tions might have been halted at the Seine Minister of Production, 12 Jul 44, sub: Provision of
or the Somme, and that without it the 21 Additional MULBERRY Equipment, DC (S) (44) 27
Defence Corn; Min, Stf Conf, Defence Corn of War
Army Group probably would have had to Cabinet, 6th Mtg, 13 Jul 44, DC (S) (44). All in
ask for a n allocation of a portion of the SHAEF SGS 800.1 MULBERRY O/CS, Vol. II. Ltr,
capacity of Cherbourg. 38 I n the light of Churchill to Eisenhower, 1 Jul 44, SHAEF SGS 800.1
MULBERRY Case A.
the British experience, it would appear 38Rear-Adm H. Hickling and Brig I. L. H. Mac-
that the American artificial port might Killop, Story of the Mulberries, MS, OCMH.
416 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

TABLE7—SUPPLY OVERTHEBEACHES:6–30 JUNE 1944

BUILD-UP
[Long Tons Daily]

a No record.
Source:NEPTUNE:Training for and Mounting the Operation, II, ADP. A, Pt. VI, of The Administrative and Logistical
History of the ETO, OCMH.

only 71 percent of the total tonnage that beginning with a capacity of about 1,600
was to have been moved to the Continent tons per day. As events turned out, how-
(408,550tons). (Table 7) ever, Cherbourg made no contribution to
Both Cherbourg and the minor Nor- the logistical support of the American
mandy ports were supposed to have been forces for at least another month. Two
opened before the end of June. According minor ports—Grandcamp and Isigny—
to plan, Cherbourg was to have been cap- had been captured within the first four
tured about 20 June and expected to re- days, and after Carentan was seized on D
ceive cargo within a few days of its capture, plus 6 the Allies decided to utilize that
LAUNCHING T H E INVASION: ORGANIZING T H E BEACHES 417
7—SUPPLYBUILD-UPOVERTHE BEACHES: 6–30 JUNE 1944—Continued
TABLE
[Long Tons Cumulative]

aNo record.
b Includes 4,558 long tons discharged at Isigny and Grandcamp, for which distribution figures by day of arrival are
not readily available.

port also. Port structure was found intact promised an early, if limited, augmenta-
in all three. But there were mines to be tion of beach discharges.
cleared, sunken craft and other obstruc- Together the two ports of Grandcamp
tions and debris to be removed, and and Isigny were expected to have an
dredging and lock repair to be accom- opening capacity of but a few hundred
plished. Port construction and repair units tons, and to develop a n ultimate capacity
started work after a reconnaissance, and of 1,000–1,500 tons per day. Isigny was to
the speedy rehabilitation of these ports have been opened on D plus 10 (16 June)
418 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

TABLE OVERTHE BEACHES: 6–30 JUNE1944

8—VEHICLEBUILD-UP
[Daily]

aForces O and U.
b Force B or follow-up.
c Preloaded build-up.
d Includes 3 , 2 4 2 vehicles in preloaded build-up.
e Data not readily available.

and Grandcamp on D plus 14 (20 June). an average of about 280 tons per day.
Grandcamp was ready for operations on Isigny was finally opened on 24 June and
17 June, ahead of schedule; but too few averaged 475 tons per day in the first
troops were available to operate it, and week. At the end of the month it was
not till 23 June did the first craft, a Dutch estimated that with additional troops and
coaster, enter the basin. During the re- equipment the combined capacity of the
maining week in June the port discharged two ports could be raised to 3,500 tons.
LAUNCHING T H E INVASION: ORGANIZING T H E BEACHES 419

TABLE
8—VEHlCLE BUILD-UPOVERTHE BEACHES: 6–30 JUNE1944—Continued
[Cumulative]

e Data not readily available.

Source: Planned build-up data from First Army Revised Consolidated Troop List (List A), FUSA Rpt of Opns (20 Oct 43–
1 Aug 44), II, Annex 2a, and FUSAG Buildup Priority Tables, List B, in BUCO Tables FUSAG, EUCOM Hist Files, AG Hist
Records. Actual data from NEPTUNE Training for and Mounting the Operation, II, ADP. B.

But their initial tonnages were negligible. In vehicle unloadings and personnel de-
Together with the delay in the restoration barkations the records of the beaches were
of Cherbourg, these deficits explain the not as spectacular in the week following
over-all lag of approximately 30 percent the storm. About 26,165 vehicles were
in the cumulative build-up, despite the landed at the two beaches against a
encouraging performance of the beaches. planned 31,217, and a cumulative total of
420 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

TABLE9—TROOP BUILD-UP : 6–30 JUNE 1944

OVERTHE BEACHES
[Daily]

Forces O and U.
b Force B or follow-up.
c Preloaded build-up.
d Includes 2 1 , 7 3 4 troops in preloaded build-up.
e Includes 3,581 planned arrivals at Cherbourg.
f Includes
5,284 planned arrivals at Cherbourg.
g Data not readily available.

only 70,910 as compared with the sched- The troop build-up likewise had not re-
uled 109,921. The vehicle build-up there- covered from the setback occasioned by
fore continued to fall short of expectations, the storm, although the lag had not been
with only 64.5 percent of the target as serious. In the week following the storm
achieved, and was estimated to be about a total of 114,496 troops debarked at the
thirteen days in arrears. (Table 8 ) two beaches, compared with the originally
LAUNCHING T H E INVASION: ORGANIZING T H E BEACHES 421

TABLE
9—TROOP BUILD-UPOVERTHE BEACHES
: 6–30 JUNE 1944—Continued
[Cumulative]

g Data not readily available.

Source: Planned build-up data from First Army Revised Consolidated Troop List (List A), FUSA Rpt of Opns (20 Oct
43–1 Aug 4 4 ) , II, Annex 2a, and FUSAG Buildup Priority Tables, List B, BUCO Tables FUSAG, EUCOM Hist Files, AG
Hist Records. Actual build-up data from NEPTUNE: Training for and Mounting the Operation, II, App. B.

scheduled 143,751. O n 30 June the cumu- totaled 452,460, which represented 78

lative U.S. troop build-up in Normandy percent of the planned 578,971.39(Table9)
39Comparative statistics a r e compiled from NEP- from those in FECOMZ R p t 21, for 30 J u n 44, l n -
TUNE: Training for a n d Mounting the Operation, II, formation re Logistical Buildup on the Continent, 3
Apps. A, B, and C, and from FUSAG Buildup Prior- J u l 44, EUCOM 38 1 Rpts General-Logistical Build-
ity Tables, List B, E U C O M Hist Files, A G Hist up on the Continent. See also 12th A G p Rpt of Opns,
Records, BUCO Tables. These figures differ slightly VI (G–4), 21.
422 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

Evacuations through 30 June totaled ap- number of ammunition ships, for example,
proximately 27,000, 40 bringing actual were only partially unloaded in the search
strength down to about 425,000. The lag for comparatively small quantities of par-
in personnel build-up consisted entirely of ticular types of shells, and then remained
a lag in service and supporting troops. The idle off the Normandy 42
coast.
combat strength of the First Army was ac- T h e failure to receive ships’ manifests
tually greater than originally planned— at the beaches also contributed to the tie-
eleven divisions as scheduled, plus the two up of shipping. Many vessels arrived at
airborne divisions which were to have the far shore with their contents unknown
been withdrawn to the United Kingdom to shore personnel. One example of the re-
but which were retained on the Continent sults is seen in the search for 81-mm.
through June. 41 mortar shells, which were urgently needed
in the Normandy hedgerow fighting. Be-
(9) Cross-Channel Movement cause the troops on shore did not know
where this type of ammunition was lo-
The difficulties attending the reception cated in ships lying offshore, they called
and discharge of ships at the Normandy forward a large part of the ammunition in
beaches constituted only part of the con- U.K. waters. Even then they had to con-
tinental build-up problem. Several other duct a ship-by-ship search to find the de-
closely related difficulties plagued the sired items.43Late in June, after hearing
build-up from the start. many complaints on the subject of mani-
The whole movements machinery was fests, General Eisenhower became impa-
put to a severe test in the first days of the tient with the poor performance and
invasion, for the shipment of men, and promised that heads would roll if no
particularly supplies, was almost imme- improvement
was shown. 44
diately thrown off schedule for lack of The admittedly wasteful practice of se-
shipping at the embarkation points. The lective unloading was in part the result of
immediate cause of this shortage was the unusual demands for certain types of sup-
failure of ships to return from the far shore plies, the need for which could not be ac-
for the planned shuttle service. Shipping curately foreseen. Without adequate
simply did not complete the round trip to records of the status of supplies in conti-
the beaches in the time originally esti-
mated. This failure was directly attribut- 40FUSA Rpt of Opns, Bk. VII, Apps. 20, 21.
able to discharge difficulties on the far 41The British build-up at this time stood at thirteen
shore and to a wasteful use of craft. Not divisions as against a planned fifteen. It was planned
only did the entire procedure for calling in to be slower than the American build-up initially, and
actually achieved its targets more nearly on schedule
and berthing ships at the beaches have to in the first week, after which it fell behind slightly.
undergo a shakedown before it was effi- T h e U.S. build-up, on the other h a n d , lagged for
ciently organized, but cargo discharge about ten days, then accelerated, a n d achieved its
planned strength of eleven divisions by 30 June.
points did not always come into operation 42Mounting the Operation OVERLORD, Gen Bd
as planned. Vessels were not always un- Rpt 129, p. 19.
loaded as they arrived and they were often 43G–4 History, COMZ ETO, prep by Hist Sec G–4
COMZ, 1945. mimeo, Sec. I, p. 22, ETO Adm 553.
subjected to a “selective” discharge to ob- 44Ltr, Eisenhower to Bradley, 2 7 Jun 44, Diary
tain certain urgently needed supplies. A Office CinC.
LAUNCHING T H E INVASION: ORGANIZING T H E BEACHES 423

nental dumps and depots or lying offshore, of marshaling lost all meaning, and all
and without adequate experience factors flexibility of control temporarily disap-
on consumption and expenditure, it was peared. Each day’s craft assignment con-
not immediately possible to make adjust- tinued to differ both in quantity and in
ments in the scheduled shipments. I n the type from the planned movement.
early weeks, therefore, it was natural to The confusion reached its height about
rely on emergency requisitions such as 12 June, when units became so badly
Red Ball, GREENLIGHT, and air shipment, scrambled that troops could not be identi-
and to unload the most urgently needed fied and sorted into craft loads at all. For
supplies where and when they could be a brief period the clogging of the marshal-
found.45 ing areas prevented the flow of troops to
In addition, the whole discharge pro- the ports in numbers sufficient to load the
gram at the far shore was affected by such available ships, and the U.S. Zone chair-
factors as bad weather and the shortage of man, Colonel Stevens, on his own author-
ferry craft, tugs, and barges. T h e total ef- ity diverted vessels to the British in order
fect of these difficulties and practices was to avoid wasting precious shipping which
to slow up the turn-round time of shipping otherwise would have remained idle.47
and consequently create a shortage of ves- The log jam was finally broken by simply
sels for the scheduled movement across the funneling troops into the ports and onto
46
Channel. ships and craft as fast as possible and with-
T h e nonreturn of shipping had an im- out regard to craft-loading plans. It was
mediate impact on the outloading ports in doubly fortunate that no shipping losses
the United Kingdom. Its worst effect was occurred in this period, for no record was
felt in Southampton, where backlogs of kept of many of the embarkations. 48
both men and supplies immediately began T h e burden on the outloading sectors
to form. In fact, the backing up of person- became so heavy at this time that stowage
nel had begun earlier for another reason. and loading plans made on the basis of ex-
The movement of troops, like the ship- pected movements simply had to be aban-
ment of supplies, was prescheduled, and doned. The number and type of craft be-
the entire mounting process was already coming available in no way conformed to
in full swing when D Day was postponed the embarkation and loading plans. Lack
twenty-four hours. As men continued to of advance information about actual craft
pour into the ports even though embarka- availability added to the difficulties, and
tions had halted, the ports quickly be- loading was either hastily worked out on
came clogged. The situation was further paper within a few hours’ notice that ves-
aggravated when outloading fell behind
45Gen Bd Rpt 129, p. 21.
for lack of shipping. It soon had its reper- 46Military Shipments Priority Mtg, SHAEF, 1 Jul
cussions farther back along the lines of 44, SHAEF AG 337–18.
movement. Apparently disregarding force 47Interv with Col Stevens, 15 Feb 50, OCMH; G–4
Plans Diary, 7, 10, 13 Jun, including Memo for Col
movement tables and the slowdown in Potter, OCofT, 13 Jun 44, sub: Rpt of Inspection of
embarkations, Southern Base Section con- Areas C [Southampton] and D [Portland], SHAEF
tinued to move units into the marshaling G–4 Plans Diary.
48Interv with Lt Col Ivan L. Brenneman, U S .
areas. Before long, camps were so over- member, SHAEF liaison stf, BUCO, 8 Feb 50,
crowded that the original craft-load basis OCMH.
424 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

sels had arrived, or was improvised on the as intended. I n the desire to work out a
ground. At the height of the confusion a uniform system with the British, in view of
few devoted and experienced men worked the possible disruption of the mounting
round the clock, keeping up a grueling process by enemy air attacks and the
schedule of improvisations to unscramble possible necessity of handling British troops
the mixed units and maintain the best through U.S.-controlled areas or vice
possible volume of shipments across the versa, the control of movements had been
Channel. More than one officer collapsed somewhat decentralized. While the de-
from exhaustion during this trying centralization apparently caused little dif-
period. 49 ficulty in the British zone, it was definitely
Beginning on 13 June a concerted a hindrance to efficient operations in the
“clean-up”effort was made, and by the U.S. zone, at least at the beginning.
time of the storm the chaotic conditions BUCO occupied a rather anomalous posi-
of the first week were largely eliminated. tion with respect to command, for it was
But the experience had been a harrowing not a formal agency of either the First
one. Some units were “lost” for several Army, 1st Army Group, or Supreme
weeks. O n one occasion Maj. Gen. Leon- Headquarters. Because of divided respon-
ard T. Gerow, the V Corps Commander, sibility for preparing the build-up priority
personally visited the United Kingdom to lists and preparing and executing the
locate a unit which the Southern Base mounting plan, BUCO found it necessary
Section insisted had been shipped to the to deal with numerous authorities and ex-
Continent, and found that it had not even perienced difficulties in taking timely ac-
moved out of its assembly area.50 tion to correct mistakes in the mounting of
Logistical operations require as high a the operation.
degree of co-ordination as tactical opera- M O V C O was charged with executive
tions, and the difficulties that beset the supervision of the whole process. But
movement of men a n d supplies from the powers were dispersed a n d the demarca-
U.K. camps a n d depots to the front lines tion of authority was ill defined. The
in Normandy were the result of a failure authority to order units forward to the
to gear capacities with one another along ports and hards was vested in U.S.
the entire line of communications. The MOVCO; the control of movements into
principal single cause of the trouble in the marshaling areas, on the other hand,
personnel movements had been the lack of was assumed by the base section. 51
balance between movements in and out of T h e SOS had never been sympathetic
the marshaling areas and the failure to to the joint movement plans and instruc-
match these movements with ,the capabil- tions issued by SHAEF,52and, to compli-
ities of the ports to outload. The OVER- cate matters, established an agency of its
LORD planners had foreseen the need for
exercising detailed control over the
49Intervs with Stevens, 15 Feb 50, and Lt Col Leo
mounting process, and it was precisely for J. Meyer, then C O 14th Port (Southampton), 8 Nov
this purpose that they had established 49, O C M H .
BUCO. 50Ibid.
51 Intervwith Meyer.
I n practice, however, the movement- 52Ltr, Ross to H. Larson, 5 Dec 49, Note A,
control machinery did not initially operate OCMH.
LAUNCHING T H E INVASION: ORGANIZING T H E BEACHES 425

own for the control of the mounting-that priority units were processed past them.
is, Embarkation Control, or EMBARCO. Even so, much of the congestion could
In a n already intricate setup, “Embargo,” have been prevented. Southern Base Sec-
as it was derisively referred to by other tion had been advised to hold 25 percent
agencies, was generally regarded as an en- of the marshaling camp capacities free for
cumbrance to the whole machinery, and such contingencies, and had failed to do
the Southern Base Section and the SOS so. 54The result was that the lines of com-
were warned that it would not work under munications became choked, and elasticity
the pressure of the inevitable last-minute of control was nullified. To aggravate
changes occasioned by tactical needs. The matters, units were occasionally called for-
base section persisted, nevertheless, with ward on short notice and without regard
full confidence that it could control the for their “readiness date,” and were found
location a n d movement of the hundreds to lack most of their equipment.55
of units involved. 53 Events proved other- Turn-round performance continued to
wise. fall far short of expectations, with the re-
EMBARCO performed a useful func- sult that neither cargo nor troops could
tion to the extent that it confined itself to always be dispatched as rapidly as they
its original purpose—that is, keeping an became available in U.K. ports.56 Since
up-to-date record of the location of all the nonreturn of ships was in part due to
units in the mounting process, thus the practice of selective unloading at the
enabling the Southern Base Section com- far shore, the SOS urged the First Army
mander to keep abreast of all movements to complete the discharge of ships and re-
in his command. But it came in for severe lease them so that better use could be
criticism for attempting to exercise actual made of the limited lift. 57 Of particular
control over those movements, for in doing concern were the lag in the movement of
so it encroached directly on the authority vehicles and the lack of a deepwater port
of BUCO and its executive agency, for the reception of larger vessels. The
MOVCO. latter handicap made it especially im-
T h e entire movements machinery was portant that the maximum number of
under constant compulsion to accom- shallow-draft, coaster-type vessels be re-
modate itself to changes in the build-up tained in the Channel shuttle service to
schedule or to the unpredictable shipping permit the fullest utilization of the beaches
situation. Build-up priority tables were and small ports. The storm had already
closely followed only in the first few days,
after which BUCO issued frequent changes 53Interv with Stevens.
in priorities. Despite the fact that such 54Interv with Brenneman.
55 Historical Critique of the United Kingdom Over-
changes were anticipated they caused lord Movements, prep by Lt Col M. J. Frechie,
great confusion. There was no reversing OCofT, 1 Nov 45, p. 37, OCMH.
the marshaling process. Once a unit 56Memo, Col Meyer for Dir of Opns, 14th Port,
8 J u l 4 4 , and TWX, 14th Port to OCofT COMZ, 8
moved forward, its place was immediately Jul 44, ETO OCOT 563.512 14th Port; Ltr, Napier
taken by another, and every change in the to Smith, 24 Jul 44, sub: Release of Berths Occupied
priority for embarkation necessitated hold- by MONTCLARE at Southampton, SHAEF G–4 825.1
Piers, Wharves, Docks and Berths 1944,II.
ing other units in the marshaling areas 57TWX E-33816, Lord to FUSA G–4, 19 Jun 44,
like a train on a siding, while higher EUCOM 560 Landing Craft.
426 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

aggravated the shipping position by its the theater secured a postponement of the
destruction of LCT’s.58 planned reduction in the coaster fleet
Before the end of June theater head- which was to have occurred after D
quarters took steps to end its embarrass- plus 42. 60
ment in shipping. Immediately after the
storm, with the U.S. vehicle build-up Jun 44, S–54625, and 14J u l4 4 . FWD–12397, and Cbl
WAR-61920, JCS to SHAEF, 7 Jul 44, P&O Cbl
about 35,000 in arrears, General Eisen- Files; Memo, COS Com to CofS SHAEF, 5 Jul 44,
hower appealed to Washington and suc- C O S Brief and Action Rpt, 2 7 Jul 44, sub: OVER-
ceeded in getting additional allocations of LORD—MT Shipping Requirements; Cbl W–75 165,
CCS to SHAEF, 3 Aug 44. All in SHAEF SGS 540
both MT ships and LST’s.59 In addition, Shipping Problems.
60Ltr, Ross to Continental Movements and Ship-
ping Com, 30 Jun 44, sub: Retention of Coaster Fleet
58Cbls S–54240 a n d S–54306, Eisenhower to beyond D plus 42, EUCOM 560 AT, Transport,
Marshall, 20, 21 Jun 44, P&O Cbl Files. Vessels, Boats; Supply Movement (U.S.) Instructions,
59Cbl OZ-3538, AMSO to JCS, 6 J u l4 4 , SHAEF H q COMZ, Supplement 2 (Coaster Revision), 22 Jul
Cbl Log, Smith Papers; Cbls, Eisenhower to JCS, 27 44, E U C O M 381/12 OVERLORD, I.
 CHAPTER XI

The Logistic Outlook in

June and July
( I ) Tactical Developments, 1–24 July line of departure for a general offensive.
(Map 14)
After the capture of Cherbourg on 27 After considerable regrouping which in-
June the First Army reoriented its re- cluded the transfer of the VII Corps from
sources for a general drive southward. At Cherbourg to a position between VIII and
the end of June the lodgment in the XIX Corps, and after minor preliminary
OMAHA sector reached a depth of about operations in the zones of the two latter
seventeen miles, extending south to Cau- corps designed to improve their positions,
mont and almost to St. Lô. From there the First Army wasready to launch its attacks
American lines arched sharply northward on 3 July. Its objective was the general line
and westward, and in the vicinity of Coutances–Marigny–St. Lô. First Army
Carentan, vital communications link be- at this time comprised the VIII, VII, XIX,
tween the U.S. forces in the Cotentin and and V Corps, in line from west to east,
those east of the Taute River, the lodg- with a total of twelve divisions operation-
ment had a depth of only five miles. Far- ally available. Since the attainment of the
ther west the enemy still held the base of objective involved the greatest advances
the Cotentin to St. Lô-d’Ourville. Con- on the right (west), the army planned to
fined in a relatively small area and con- have VIII Corps make the initial attacks
fronted with difficult terrain and an in- southward along the coast. The offensive
adequate road network, First Army would then widen progressively eastward
needed elbow room and more advanta- in a succession of blows b yt h e VII and
geous ground in which to employ its X I X Corps, each attacking on army
growing forces more effectively. Farther order, with the whole front pivoting on V
south the terrain became increasingly Corps, east of St. Lô.
favorable for offensive maneuver, but to In accord with these plans the VIII
reach it the American forces had to pene- Corps (82d Airborne and 79th, 90th, and
trate a belt ten to twenty miles deep which 8th Infantry Divisions) opened the First
continued to favor the defender. For four Army offensive on 3 July with a three-divi-
tortuous weeks the First Army fought sion attack toward La Haye-du-Puits and
through this Normandy hedgerow country the Forêt de Mont-Castre hills. The three
to win additional maneuver room and to divisions encountered strong resistance
gain the terrain considered essential as a from the start. Favored by the terrain, the
428 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

V. Brooks
MAP 14

enemy met the attacks with heavy ma- There First Army ordered its men to halt
chine gun a n d mortar fire from well dug their advance, and they consolidated their
in positions on the hills that dominated positions while awaiting the outcome of
the approaches to La Haye-du-Puits. In action farther east. I n twelve days of severe
addition to the inevitable hedgerows, rain fighting the corps had advanced approxi-
plagued the attackers almost every day, mately eight miles, and was still twelve
confining movement to the roads, limiting miles short of its objective, the high ground
air support, and restricting observation. at Coutances.
Persisting in their attacks, and repeatedly The hard experience of the VIII Corps
counterattacked, VIII Corps units inched was typical of the fighting which took
forward, covering about 6,000 yards in the place along the entire front. O n army
first three days. They finally captured La order the VII Corps (4th, 9th, and 83d
Haye-du-Puits on 8 July. Beginning on Divisions) joined the attacks on 4 July.
the 10th the attacks began to move faster Hemmed in on one side by the Prairies
against diminishing resistance, and by 15 Marécageuses and on the other by drain-
July VIII Corps units had reached the age ditches and tributaries of the Taute
northern slopes of the Ay River valley. River, the V I I Corps attack was channel-
THE LOGISTIC OUTLOOK IN JUNE AND JULY 429

ized down a narrow corridor only a few bring all these operations between the
miles wide which offered no room for Vire and Taute under one command, First
maneuver and first permitted the employ- Army now shifted the VII Corps bound-
ment of only one division (the newly ar- ary still farther east—to the Vire—thus
rived 83d). Moving generally astride the bringing the 30th Division also under VII
Carentan–Périers highway, the attacks ran Corps control. In the next few days the 9th
into defenses organized in great depth by and 30th Divisions extended their gains a
an enemy expecting the major effort in few miles more, almost reaching the St.
this sector. As in the VIII Corps area, Lô-Périers highway. While these positions
gains were measured in yards. were several miles short of the objective
By 6 July it was possible to commit an originally assigned at the beginning of
additional division—the 4th—on the VII July, VII Corps units had at least ad-
Corps front, and three days later the corps vanced through the worst of the maze of
left boundary was shifted eastward so that rivers, marshes, and canals which had
the 9th Division could also be employed. hindered movement on every side.
Fighting for every field against determined East of the Vire the last of the series of
resistance, the 4th and 83d Divisions drives .along the army front got underway
gradually pushed the enemy back along on 11 July. The attack of the XIX Corps
the axis of the Carentan-Périers highway (29th and 35th Divisions), in which the 2d
and by 15 July captured the slightly Division of the V Corps also took part, was
higher ground at Sainteny. From there the aimed at the capture of the ridges along
approach to Périers narrowed into a corri- the St. Lô-Bayeux highway and finally at
dor less than two miles wide, with streams St. Lô itself. Both the 29th and 2d Divi-
on both flanks restricting all maneuver. sions made satisfactory gains on 11 July
Further advance in this sector was there- and won positions on the ridge that dom-
fore halted. inated St. Lô from the east. In the next few
Meanwhile in the eastern sector of the days the corps encountered the same de-
corps front the enemy launched a strong termined resistance which had been met
counterattack with armor and momentar- in other sectors. It plodded forward suffer-
ily forestalled the 9th Division’s threat- ing heavy losses in routing the enemy from
ened breakout from its constricted area well-prepared positions. After a temporary
east of the Taute. After repulsing the Ger- lull on 14 July the corps resumed its at-
man attack, the 9th Division made sub- tacks and with unrelenting pressure forced
stantial gains and fought its way across the the enemy to give way. Finally on the 18th
Tribehou–St. Lô highway, putting still an- the two divisions of the XIX Corps closed
other tributary of the Taute behind itself. in on St. Lô from both the north and east,
At the same time the 30th Division (of and a special task force from the 29th
the XIX Corps) had been advancing Division captured the city the same day.
abreast of the 9th just west of the Vire The fall of St. Lô concluded a period of
River. The 30th had inaugurated the XIX the most difficult fighting the American
Corps attack on 7July by seizing a bridge- forces had seen thus far. Favored by end-
head over the Vire and, followed by ele- less lines of natural fortifications in the
ments of the 3d Armored Division, had characteristic Normandy hedgerows, and
expanded its crossing west and south. To aided by almost daily rains which nullified
430 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

Allied tactical air support and reduced By 25 July the Allied lodgment was to
observation, an enemy inferior in numbers have extended southward to the Loire,
and deficient in supplies a n d equipment eastward to a line running roughly
was able to contest virtually every yard of through Le Havre and Le Mans, and
ground. For the American forces the westward into the Brittany peninsula as
period proved costly in the expenditure of far as Lorient–St. Brieuc, covering an area
ammunition and in casualties among their of almost 15,000 square miles. Instead, the
infantry. lodgment on that date consisted of only
the Cotentin peninsula and a shallow
(2) The Normandy Supply Base beachhead with a n average depth of
twenty miles south of OMAHAand the
While the problem of maintaining an British beaches. It covered an area of only
adequate flow of men and supplies across 1,570 square miles, smaller than the state
the Channel was due chiefly to difficulties of Delaware and only one tenth of the
at the beaches, which resulted in a short- planned size. The flow of men and sup-
age of shipping and played havoc with the plies had continued apace, and the troop
entire marshaling process in the United strength on 25 July was only slightly
Kingdom, the logistical problems in the smaller than the planned build-up.
continental lodgment area were due The first effect of the restriction in space
chiefly to the lag in tactical operations. was felt in the development of the depot
Progress had not been as rapid as hoped, system. OVERLORD administrative plans
and on 1July the front lines were approxi- specified that the Advance Section should
mately sixteen days behind the phase lines assume responsibility for the development
drawn into the OVERLORD plan. of the supply base in Normandy after the
The retarded advance had inevitable initial two weeks of First Army control. In
repercussions on logistic plans. Because accord with these plans the Advance Sec-
Cherbourg had not been captured and put tion, after careful map reconnaissance,
into operation as scheduled, port plans had tentatively chosen sites for every in-
had to be reconsidered. Because lines of stallation and unit and had allocated
communications were short and the fight- space so as to minimize conflict between
ing in Normandy had become a struggle the various services and facilitate the or-
for hedgerows, requirements for both sup- derly development of a maintenance area.
plies and troops differed from those origin- With a few exceptions the selected loca-
ally anticipated. Because the lodgment tions worked out successfully in the upper
area throughout June and July remained Cotentin, which was evacuated by the tac-
small and congested, neither the continen- tical units and made available to the Ad-
tal administrative organization nor depot vance Section shortly after the capture of
structure could be developed as planned. Cherbourg.
In short, the lag in tactical progress di- The development of the areas inland
rectly influenced the whole development from the beaches proved more trouble-
of the Normandy supply base in the first some. The principal difficulty arose be-
weeks and determined not only its physical cause the front lines were too close to the
appearance but the nature of its operations beaches. Contrary to plan, it was impos-
and its organizational structure. sible to establish an army service area for-
T H E LOGISTIC OUTLOOK IN JUNE AND JULY 431

ward of the beach maintenance areas. used as a n ordnance Class II and I V de-
Truckheads, ammunition supply points, pot, and by a large dirigible hangar near
and advance dumps were moved forward Montebourg, which was used as an ord-
as the situation required, south from nance maintenance shop. A small amount
OMAHA and west and southwest from of inside storage for rations was also avail-
UTAH,but the beach maintenance areas able in Cherbourg. Supplies received at
continued as the main depot areas OMAHA Beach, Isigny, Grandcamp, and
throughout the first two months of oper- Carentan flowed into a dump area south
ations. While the intake capacities of the of Trévières. UTAH'S intake was generally
beaches were enlarged, the maintenance sent to the Chef-du-Pont area. But to the
areas remained relatively static in their casual observer it appeared by the end of
growth because the lodgment could not be July that almost every field in the lodg-
expanded. The result was that division, ment was occupied by some type of supply
army, and ADSEC units and installations or service installation. 1
were telescoped into a n area only a frac- T h e crowding and congestion affected
tion of the size planned, and supply oper- supply operations in various ways. The
ations suffered a n increasingly chronic storage of ammunition, for example, was
congestion. a matter of special concern since Class V
Development of the depot plan conse- supplies had to be adequately dispersed.
quently was not as orderly as it was In mid-July an explosion and fire de-
planned to be, and it was necessary to use stroyed more than 2,000 of the 50,000 tons
open fields for storage to a far greater ex- of ammunition held in the large depot
tent than was desirable. Fortunately the near Formigny.2 T h e delayed capture of
ground was for the most part well turfed. Cherbourg, meanwhile, had its effect on
But the fact that most of the Normandy the handling of Transportation Corps sup-
terrain was divided into small fields by plies. Plans had been made for the estab-
thick earth embankments topped with lishment of T C depots in Cherbourg
hedges made it necessary to punch holes in rather than in the beach areas, with sep-
the hedgerows in order to provide access arate installations for railway supplies such
for trucks. T h e usual practice at first was as locomotive and car parts, and for ma-
to stack supplies along the edges of fields rine supplies, including hand tools, rope,
to take advantage of the partial conceal- cable, and lifting gear. This equipment
ment which the hedges and trees afforded. was scheduled for early shipment to the
The congestion became so bad in July, Continent, and when it arrived too soon to
and the almost daily rain during that be received at Cherbourg it was taken into
month created such muddy conditions, engineer and ordnance depots. A consid-
that more and more supplies were simply erable quantity of equipment for both the
stacked in the middle of open fields to sim-
plify the handling problem. Most camou- 1 G–4 History, COMZ, I, 8-9; Mechanics of Sup-
ply in Fast-Moving Situations, Gen Bd Rpt 27, pp.
flage efforts were abandoned in view of the 33-34; Operations History of the Advance Section
light enemy air activity. Covered storage COM Z ETOUSA, prep by Hist Sec ADSEC, 1945,
mimeo (hereafter cited as ADSEC Operations His-
was largely nonexistent. Virtually the only tory), pp. 29, 38, 65, ETO Adm 583.
such facilities were provided by the Amoit 2 ADSEC Operations History pp. 64-65; Ltr, Plank
Aircraft Plant at Cherbourg, which was to OCMH, 10 Ju1 51.
432 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

4th and 11th Ports was landed on the from the beaches to St. Lô crossed the
wrong beaches or at Barfleur and Isigny principal lateral artery, a n d at the main
and lay there for a month before being re- junction point between Isigny and Caren-
covered from an engineer dump. Poor tan, there was a n hourly flow of almost
documentation and improper packing 1,700 vehicles during the most active
contributed to the misdirection and even period of the day in mid-July. O n 18July
loss of some equipment. With the estab- a traffic count revealed that the bridge be-
lishment of a T C depot at Bricquebec tween Carentan and Isigny accommo-
about D plus 30 this situation gradually dated 14,434 vehicles in the hours between
began to improve. 3 0600 and 2100. 4
Traffic congestion was a natural con- Normal stoppages to permit cross traffic
comitant of the confinement to the shallow at important intersections often backed up
lodgment area. The road net in Nor- traffic bumper to bumper for a mile or two
mandy was extensive enough, but was and made it necessary to construct traffic
hardly suited to heavy military traffic. circles and establish one-way routes
Most of the routes were narrow country through such bottlenecks as Ste. Mère-
roads with deep ditches and hedges that Eglise and Isigny. Choked with vehicles,
hampered two-way traffic, particularly in the Normandy roads would have pre-
rainy periods. There were six or seven sented a remunerative target for a more
good hard-surface (macadam) routes lead- active enemy air force. Only because of
ing southward from the Cotentin and from Allied air supremacy was it possible for
the OMAHA area, and there were good this tremendous volume of traffic to con-
lateral routes in both beach maintenance tinue relatively unmolested a n d in open
areas. Even the metaled roads were often violation of normal road discipline.
narrow, however, their edges soon crum- Trucks handled nearly all transportation
bling under the constant pounding of the in the lodgment in June and July. At the
2½-ton 6 x 6’s, and required constant end of July nearly 30,000 tons of supplies
mending by engineer road repair crews. were being cleared from the beaches and
Traffic was particularly heavy in the small ports every day, mostly by the truck
OMAHA area because of larger tonnages companies of the provisional Motor Trans-
discharged there. Many of the supply port Brigade which the Advance Section
dumps lay astride the main lateral high- had organized just before D Day. Rail
way, which was a few miles inland from transportation played a negligible role in
the beach a n d was intersected by all the these early months, although not because
routes leading inland. As the principal of any failure to rehabilitate the existing
connecting link with the UTAHarea at the network. The delay in capturing and re-
base of the Cotentin, this highway bore a storing Cherbourg ruled out the plan to
tremendous volume of traffic. There were
at least four intersections in the lodgment 3Operation, Organization, Supply and Services of
the Transportation Corps in the ETO, Gen Bd Rpt
area where more than a thousand vehi- 122, p. 101.
cles passed a given point every hour dur- 4 Memo, Col Norman H. Vissering for DACOS
ing the periods of peak activity. At For- G–4, Mov and T n Br, 13J u l44, sub: Rpt of Visit to
Continent, SHAEF G–4 319.1 Rpts (General) I 45;
migny, the site of the large ammunition FUSA Rpt of Opns, 20 Oct 43–1 Aug 44, Bk. V, pp.
depot and the point where the main road 143–44, Bk. I, p. 81.
T H E LOGISTIC OUTLOOK IN JUNE AND JULY 433

have that port receive railway equipment was considerably short of the 130 com-
and rolling stock by D plus 25, but recon- panies planned for that date, it was more
naisance of portions of the main line run- than ample for the hauling requirements
ning from Cherbourg to Carentan and on the relatively short lines of communica-
southeastward began within a week of the tions at that time. 8
landings, sometimes under fire. The 1055th The disappointingly slow tactical ad-
Engineer Port Construction and Repair vance in July and the resulting claustro-
Group began to rehabilitate the Carentan phobic confinement of the lodgment also
yards on 17June, shortly after the capture had a direct bearing on the development
of the town. A few days later repair work of the administrative command and or-
was undertaken at Lison Junction to the ganizational structure on the Continent.
southeast, and later at Cherbourg, where One of the key factors in the evolution of
the destruction had been the greatest. By the logistic structure was the question of
the end of July four rail bridges had been when the army rear boundary should be
repaired and 126 miles of rails were in drawn, for it was at that point that the Ad-
operating order, including the double- vance Section would be detached from the
track line from Cherbourg to Lison Junc- army and begin to operate as an advance
tion, and single-track branch lines from echelon of the Communications Zone. In
Barfleur and St. Vaast and from St. Sau- the plan it was assumed that the switch
veur-le-Vicomte. (See Map 17.) The first would occur between D plus 15 and 20.
scheduled run between Cherbourg and Another important factor was the matter
Carentan was made on 11July by a train of the introduction of a second COMZ sec-
operated by the 729th Railway Operating tion, which was to take over the Rennes–
Battalion, a unit sponsored by the New Laval–Châteaubriant area from the Ad-
York, New Haven, and Hartford Rail- vance Section and eventually organize
road.5 Brittany as a base, for this step was to
Although the supply of rail equipment bring the Forward Echelon into active
and construction materials was not en- command of the Communications Zone.
tirely satisfactory, restoration of existing Both steps were of direct concern to the
lines had progressed as far as the tactical tactical command, for they involved the
situation permitted.6 Until the end ofJuly, progressive surrender of its control over
however, conditions in the lodgment made supply operations and the rear areas.
the use of railways uneconomical. Dis- With the launching of OVERLORD the
tances were short, and rail transportation command structure agreed upon for the
would have involved multiple handling first phase had gone into operation, with
and initial hauls by trucks in any event. First Army in command of all U.S. ele-
No freight of any consequence, therefore, 5 “Job Well Done: From D Day to VE Day with

was hauled by this means.7 the Transportation Corps,” Quartermaster Review,

Except for the congestion on the high- XXV (July-August, 1945), 108.
6 ADSEC Operations History, pp. 54-55; Oper-
ways, transportation posed no serious ations, Organization, Supply and Services of the
problem in the first two months. At the Transportation Corps in the ETO, Gen Bd Rpt 122,
end of July the Advance Section had p. 101.
7 History of the TC, ETO, Vol. IV, Ch. IV, p. 2,
ninety-four truck companies available for ETO Adm 582.
use on the Continent. While the number 8 Gen Bd Rpt 122, p. 43.
434 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

ments, including the Advance Section. along the beach to Advance Section for its
ADSEC troops and headquarters person- operations, but retained command of all
nel began arriving on the far shore as early forces on the Continent, with the Advance
as D plus 1, and on 16June the Advance Section continuing to function as a major
Section announced the opening of its subdivision of the field army. While this
headquarters on a n operational basis. Its did not accord with C O M Z wishes, the
staff maintained close liaison with opposite Advance Section itself had no objection to
numbers in the First Army headquarters the arrangement. It had established a close
to prepare for the assumption of supply re- a n d friendly working relationship with
sponsibility in the rear. First Army during the planning period,
The question of drawing a n army rear and, although a subcommand of the Com-
boundary arose almost immediately as the munications Zone, actually felt a closer
result of a request from General Eisen- affinity with the armies throughout opera-
hower for information as to when it would tions than with its parent headquarters.9
be practicable to establish the Communi- Had the plan been followed, an army
cations Zone on the Continent. General rear boundary would have been drawn
Lord promptly advised the theater com- between 21 and 26 June (D plus 15-20),
mander that the transition could be made and the Forward Echelon would have as-
at any time, and that it was dependent sumed active command of the Communi-
only on General Bradley's drawing of a cations Zone about 17 July (D plus 41).
rear boundary. He recommended that O n the latter date, however, First Army
this be done at a n early date, arguing that was still attempting to break out of the dif-
the Advance Section could relieve the ficult hedgerow and marécage country west
army commander of a heavy administra- of the St. Lô–Périers highway, 125 miles
tive burden, and that the change would from the Loire. T h e crowded conditions
also result in better co-ordination of sup- which had militated against carrying out
ply and service functions between the the arrangements for even the first phase
United Kingdom and the Continent. still obtained.
But the First Army was reluctant to re- The designation of a rear boundary was
linquish control of supply operations at so again considered in mid-July, and tenta-
early a date and delayed action on the tive plans were made to release most of the
matter. The result was that the transition upper Cotentin and the UTAHBeach area
to ADSEC control of the rear area supply to Advance Section. But action was again
operations was very gradual, the army postponed, and instead the additional ter-
making piecemeal delegations of functions ritory was assigned to the Advance Section
a n d transferring control of only a few in- by a n extension of its forward boundary.
stallations at a time, meanwhile retaining The drawing of an army rear boundary in
over-all command of the entire lodgment. fact was not carried out until after the
Instead of designating an army rear bound- breakout from Normandy at the end of the
ary First Army on 20 June established an month. 10
ADSECforward boundary, running along
the road between Vierville-sur-Mer and 9 Interv with Col Alvin G. Viney, successively
Deputy Engr, G–4, a n d Deputy Comdr of ADSEC,
Port-en-Bessin. By this ingenious device 24 Feb 50, and Interv with Plank, 28 J u l50, OCMH.
First Army assigned a narrow strip of land 10Memo, Eisenhower for COfS,SHAEF, 16Jun 44,
T H E LOGISTIC OUTLOOK IN JUNE AND JULY 435

The above developments had also al- the headquarters of Forward Echelon,
tered the role of the Forward Echelon, which officially opened on 15July.
Communications Zone, whose position in By that time the question of Forward
the command structure had occasioned so Echelon’s role on the Continent had be-
much debate. Plans provided for the estab- come closely tied up with the matter of
lishment of Forward Echelon in two groups drawing an army rear boundary, which
on the Continent—an advance group at the First Army had resisted in its desire to
St. Lô for the period when Forward Eche- retain control of the lines of communica-
lon functioned as part of the 21 Army tions as long as possible. As time went on,
Group staff, and a second group at Rennes however, the control of the increasingly
for the later phase when Forward Echelon complex supply operations on the Conti-
assumed actual control of the Communi- nent became a weighty responsibility, and
cations Zone. The two were to merge into the Communications Zone exerted in-
a single headquarters when the main creasing pressure to be allotted a definite
C O M Z headquarters arrived about D sphere of responsibility. I n a n obvious at-
plus 90. The movement of Forward Eche- tempt to allay First Army’s fears of any
lon was to take place in six parties and was disadvantage attending Forward Eche-
to be completed by about D plus 40. The lon’s control of the lines of communica-
actual movement was delayed somewhat, tions, C O M Z headquarters early in July
but the first echelon arrived on the Conti- drew u p a memorandum suggesting a
nent on 18 June and eventually located delineation of function between the army
itself at Château Servigny, near Valognes. commander and the Communications
Additional increments crossed the Chan- Zone. It stipulated that the senior field
nel early in July and moved to Château force commander would continue to con-
Pont Rilly, also near Valognes. On 12July trol priorities in troop movements, that the
Col. Frank M. Albrecht arrived and as- Communications Zone would on request
sumed direction of the group, General make available detailed information on
Vaughan having been relieved as deputy the status of supplies, that the field force
commander for the Forward Echelon and commander would retain control of alloca-
given a new assignment. This did not com- tions of scarce items of supply, that First
plete the displacement of the headquar- Army would remain in control of all sup-
ters, however, for the operating party had ply depots and distributing points in the
by then been phased back for arrival early beach area until separate army depots
in August. In view of the course which could be established, and that the Ad-
tactical operations had taken, the original vance Section would continue to be the
plans with regard to headquarters loca- direct representative of the Communica-
tions could not be followed, and the two tions Zone in all dealings with First Army.
châteaux near Valognes therefore became While nothing came of this proposal,
SHAEF stepped in in mid-July to institute
with note on action taken by staff, SHAEF SGS the transitional phase in the command
300.6/6 Supreme Comdr’s Memo of 16 June; [Robert setup without drawing a n army rear
W. Coakley] Organization and Command in the boundary. O n 14 July Advance Section
E T O , Pt. II of T h e Administrative a n d Logistical
History of the ETO, II, 141-44; ADSEC Operations was finally detached from First Army and
History, pp. 26–27. turned over to the control of the Com-
436 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

manding General, Communications Zone, the desire to be closer to the scene of action
with the stipulation, however, that until and thus be able to guide the development
SHAEF was established on the Continent of the expanding rear areas made good
General Bradley was to have final author- sense.
ity in all matters except conflicts over Actually, the decision to advance the
troop and supply priorities for the air transfer of that headquarters to the Conti-
forces. Thus, over-all control was to con- nent was strongly influenced by another
tinue to rest with the senior field force consideration. Despite the pretensions
command on the Continent, and, contrary which the Communications Zone once
to the view it had consistently held to permitted its offspring, Forward Echelon,
before, the Communications Zone was at to have, it began to grow apprehensive
least in a transitional phase to be subordi- toward the end of July of the independence
nated to the field force commander (at the and authority which the Forward Echelon
moment the Commanding General, First was beginning to display at Valognes. 11
Army, later the Commanding General, Accordingly, late in July Colonel Albrecht
12th Army Group, but in both cases the was ordered to prepare for the immediate
same person, General Bradley). Actually reception of Headquarters, Communica-
the SHAEF directive of 14 July did not tions Zone. In the next few weeks the
materially affect the status of Advance headquarters at Valognes was greatly en-
Section, for its units were not officially re- larged to accommodate the main body of
lieved from attachment to First Army the COMZ staff, and signal facilities were
until 30 July. First Army therefore re- installed to permit communications with
tained control of the entire U.S. zone until the United Kingdom, the United States,
1 August, when the Third Army and the the subcommands on the Continent, and
12th Army Group were introduced, the field forces.
although Advance Section was in effect In the end, therefore, to carry the story
the real Communications Zone on the forward a bit, the organization whose au-
Continent after mid-July. thority and role had occasioned so much
Since the immediate administrative con- controversy and aroused so many suspi-
trol of Advance Section had passed to cions was destined to be merged with
Headquarters, Communications Zone, it Headquarters, Communications Zone,
would appear that the Forward Echelon without ever becoming operational as in-
should have become operational and taken tended, chiefly because the main head-
control of the Advance Section at this quarters moved to the Continent in the
time. But Forward Echelon’s continental first week of August, a full month earlier
mission was now radically altered. For- than planned. So far as its continental ac-
ward Echelon had been formed in part to tivities were concerned, Forward Echelon
meet the expected interim need for an was a stillborn organization.
operational headquarters on the Conti- At the end of the war a board of officers
nent in the belief that the main COMZ rendered a harsh judgment on Forward
headquarters could not be moved across Echelon, asserting that its establishment
the Channel before D plus 90. In mid-July “createdconfusion and misunderstanding
it was decided that there was no need for at all levels and interfered with logistical
interposing such a command. In fact, with
a breakout from Normandy a possibility, 11Interv with Lord, 9 Aug 51,OCMH.
T H E LOGISTIC OUTLOOK IN JUNE AND JULY 437

planning for Continental operations.” But channels of responsibility and authority.

Forward Echelon, as shown earlier, made General Lee at that time still held the
a significant contribution in co-ordinating position of deputy theater commander, for
the logistical planning for OVERLORD, and this arrangement had not been terminated
although its performance on the conti- on 7June when the SOS officially became
nental stage was restricted to a walk-on the Communications Zone. The designa-
role, that role was the useful one of ad- tion was finally dropped on 19July, when
visory agency for Headquarters, Com- General Eisenhower further amplified his
munications Zone, and insurer of con- earlier directive regarding the relative po-
tinuity of action for that headquarters on sitions and authority of Headquarters,
the Continent.12 COMZ-ETO, and SHAEF. Except for
Attempts were also made in the first two this change the delineation of authority
months of operations to clarify the rela- did not differ materially from that of ear-
tionship between C O M Z - E T O and Su- lier pronouncements. Under it the theater
preme Headquarters. General Eisen- commander, as before, noted that he
hower’s directive of 6 June had not defi- would from time to time delegate to the
nitely settled the issue of the role of the U.S. three major commands of the theater—the
component of the SHAEF staff vis-à-vis 1st Army Group, the Communications
the COMZ-ETO staff.13 The continued Zone, and USSTAF—responsibility and
assumption by American officers at authority for certain matters normally re-
SHAEF that they were to be the theater served to himself. The determination of
commander’s staff and carry out theater broad policies, objectives, and priorities
functions led to several conferences after affecting two or more of these commands
D Day. O n 9 June Maj. Gen. Everett S. was to be reserved to the theater com-
Hughes, as the personal representative of mander under all circumstances, and in
General Eisenhower, met with General exercising these functions he announced
Lord and reaffirmed the principle an- that he would utilize the U.S. element of
nounced earlier that the theater functions SHAEF and the chiefs of the special staff.
assumed by the SHAEF staff should be The latter were to be located as directed
kept to a minimum. General Hughes as- by the Commanding General, Communi-
sured General Lee’s representative that the cations Zone, however, and they were to
intention of the Supreme Commander’s report to the latter and be responsible to
letter of 6 June was to reduce the U.S. or through him for the execution of all
activities at SHAEF to the point where the COMZ and theater duties. The Com-
Communications Zone would be para- munications Zone remained the theater
mount within the defined sphere of admin- channel of communications with the War
istration and supply. General Smith had Department on all technical and routine
agreed, observing that the American staff matters.
officers at SHAEF had all they could do to Since the July memorandum terminated
carry out their duties in connection with General Lee’s position as deputy theater
Allied matters. General Eisenhower ex- 12Organization and Command, II, 130–34,
pressed the same views in a personal con- 138–40, 144–48, 150-52; Organization and Functions
ference with General Lee, and on 20 June of the Communications Zone, Gen Bd Rpt 127, p. 19;
Ltr, Albrecht to O C M H , 29 J u n 51, with comments
he issued an additional memorandum en- attached.
joining the two staffs to observe established 13Seeabove, Ch. V, Sec. 7
438 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

commander it appears that one of its pur- pletely to separate American from Allied
poses was to take away from the C O M Z interests, and in the interests of economy
commander his theater prerogatives and in the use of personnel he announced that
establish the Communications Zone as co- he would continue to use the senior U.S.
equal with the other two major commands. officers in each of the various staff sections
Although General Lee no longer exercised at Supreme Headquarters as advisers on
his prerogatives as deputy theater com- U.S. matters that required the theater
mander, however, the change did not alter commander to take personal action. These
existing responsibilities or channels of com- officers he regarded as convenient agents
mand nor the manner of doing business, for advising him when necessary, and for
and General Lee continued to regard his following up on matters of particular im-
headquarters as theater headquarters even portance, but the SHAEF general staff
after movement to the Continent. The officers were not to be regarded as part of
Communications Zone still remained the the theater general staff. Finally, General
channel of communications with the War Eisenhower thought it essential that
Department on technical and routine mat- “whenever any subject pertaining to
ters, the chiefs of services continued their American administration comes under
residence at the COMZ headquarters, and consideration by the SHAEF staff, careful
General Lee’s general staff was still offi- coordination with General Lee and his
cially the theater general staff except that staff be assured,” particularly when com-
the U.S. officers at SHAEF were to advise munication with the War Department was
General Eisenhower on problems which he contemplated.14
reserved for himself. That the relationship thus outlined was
General Eisenhower apparently was de- not so clear cut as might have been desired
sirous of preserving as far as possible the was probably an unavoidable result of the
established integration of supply and ad- dual position which General Eisenhower
ministrative matters in the theater, and he held. Basically, the theater commander
spelled this out in even greater detail in a was using the staff of the Communications
memorandum issued a few days later. To Zone to do the normal job of a theater
avoid confusion in the utilization of the staff. The smooth functioning of this setup
special staff at Headquarters, Communi- unquestionably required a high degree of
cations Zone, he cautioned that “all of us mutual co-operation and co-ordination
in SHAEF must channel our communica- between the two headquarters. In passing
tions through General Lee, or through his General Eisenhower’s memo on to the U.S.
general staff, if he prefers it that way. Since element of the SHAEF staff General Smith
we impose upon the Commanding Gen- underscored this point in noting that every
eral, L[ine] of C[ommunications], all thea- precaution must be taken to insure that
ter duties except those of decision and the C O M Z staff be “kept well in the gen-
policy wherein some major difference eral picture,” and that “short cuts which
arises between two of our principal com- might confuse or militate against the effec-
mands, we must carefully avoid interfering
with his methods and subordinates.” 14Memo, Eisenhower for CofS, SHAEF, 21 JuI44,
as cited in Organization and Command, II, 127–28.
O n the other hand, the Supreme Com- A copy of this document may also be found in
mander noted that it was impossible com- E U C O M 371 Theater of Opns, I.
T H E LOGISTIC O U T L O O K I N JUNE AND JULY 439

tive use of the L of C staff in its administra- were lower than expected, helping offset
tive functions must be carefully avoided, deficits in planned discharges.
and full coordination must be assured.” 15 There was no difficulty with Class I
The C O M Z staff was likewise asked to be supply in the first two months, although
careful to consult the SHAEF staff on all the issue of rations was not in the propor-
matters of Allied interest. tions planned and not to everyone’s taste.
The delineation of responsibilities ap- American troops had read many times
pears to have been as distinct as could that they were the best-fed soldiers of all
be made at the time. It was admittedly not time. But while their rations differed
a n ideal arrangement, and there was con- vastly from the hard tack and beef stew
tinuing friction between the C O M Z and issued to the soldier in the Spanish-Amer-
SHAEF staffs over jurisdiction in supply ican War, and from the corned beef, baked
and administrative matters, and between beans, bread, and canned vegetables of
the Communications Zone and the field World War I, American soldiers were
commands over the handling of supply in hardly convinced of their palatability.
general. 16 Army cooking was something they wrote
home about, but not always in a compli-
(3) TheStatusof Supply mentary vein.
By the time of the Normandy invasion
Despite the difficulties over cross-Chan- the Quartermaster Corps was issuing five
nel movements, the delay in the capture of major types of combat rations. T h e C
Cherbourg, a n d the congestion of the ration, as developed up to that time, con-
lodgment, the actual delivery of supplies sisted of six cans (each of twelve fluid
to the combat forces in June and July was ounces’ capacity), three containing meat
generally satisfactory. T h e shortages that combinations (either meat and vegetable
developed did not reach critical propor- hash, meat and beans, or meat and vege-
tions in these first seven weeks, and cer- table stew), and three containing biscuits,
tainly were not serious when compared hard candy, cigarettes, and either soluble
with the difficulties that developed in later coffee, lemon powder, or cocoa. The entire
months. Fortunately, the unfavorable de- ration (three meals) weighed approxi-
velopments of this period were at least in mately five pounds, could withstand a
part offset by factors that proved much temperature range of 170°, and could be
more favorable than anticipated: lines of eaten either hot or cold. Although touted
communications were short; the lack of as “a balanced meal in a can,” the C
interference from the Luftwaffe obviated ration was not popular until new combi-
the requirement for elaborate camouflage nations were added early in 1945 to give
and dispersion measures in the rear areas; it considerably more variety.
destruction, except at Cherbourg, was con- The K ration was better packaged and,
siderably less than expected, particularly according to the theater chief quartermas-
of the railways; the utilization of captured ter, more popular in the early months of
supplies, especially signal and engineer
items, helped considerably to compensate 15 M e m o ,S m i t h for S H A E F stf, 2 2 Jul 44, sub:
Adm of American Theater, as cited in Organization
for the lag in receipts; a n d consumption a n d Command, II, 128.
rates of certain items, particularly POL, 16Organization a n d Command, II, 122–29.
440 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

fighting, although the validity of this con- was chocolate, although it also contained
clusion is debatable. As finally standard- powdered skim milk, sucrose, added cacao
ized it consisted of a breakfast unit, made fat, oat flour, and vanillin. Strictly an
up of meat and egg product, soluble coffee, emergency food, the D ration was in-
and a fruit bar; a dinner unit, containing tended to sustain men for only very short
cheese product, lemon powder, and periods of time under conditions in which
candy; and a supper unit with meat prod- no means of resupply was possible.
uct, bouillon powder, and a small D-ration Finally, mainly as a result of British ex-
chocolate bar. In addition, each unit had perience in North Afirica, and suggested
biscuits, sugar tablets, chewing gum, and by the successful British 12-in-1 composite
a few cigarettes. The idea for the K ration pack, two types of composite rations
was suggested by a concentrated food of known as 5-in-1 and 10-in-1 had also been
the American Indian known as pemmi- developed, each unit containing sufficient
can, made up of dried lean venison mixed food for five or ten men. These rations
with fat and a few berries pressed into a contained a considerably greater variety
cake. Variants of pemmican had been used of food and were put up in five different
by Arctic and Antarctic explorers, and ex- menus. A sample 10-in-1 menu contained
perimentation with a similar product, be- premixed cereal, milk, sugar, bacon, bis-
ginning with tests at the University of cuits, jam, and soluble coffee for breakfast;
Minnesota in 1940, eventually resulted in ten K-ration dinner units; and meat stew,
a standardized ration in 1942. The ration string beans, biscuits, prunes, and coffee
was originally designed for airborne and for the supper meal. The 10-in-1’s also
armored units and for other troops en- contained a preserved butter which, in
gaged in highly mobile operations. It was deference to a well-known brand of lubri-
well packaged, each meal’s perishable cants, the troops quickly dubbed “Marfak
component being hermetically sealed in a No. 2.” Considerable controversy over the
small can, and the other items in a sealed adequacy of its caloric content attended
bag. Each unit was enclosed in an inner the development of the composite ration.
carton dipped in wax, plus an outer card- It was developed for use over longer peri-
board box, and the three packages were of ods than either the C or K ration, for
convenient size to be pocketed. Both the troops in advance areas that could not be
C and K rations were individual rations served by field kitchens, and for troops in
and were intended to be used only for highly mobile situations. It was well suited
short periods of time when tactical condi- for bridging the gap between the C and K
tions prevented better arrangements for rations and the B ration, the normal bulk
feeding. ration which was intended to be served
Meanwhile, experimentation begun be- over long periods of time in the field. The
fore World War I had resulted in the B ration was essentially the garrison or A
adoption in 1939 of a supplementary field ration without its perishable components.17
ration, the D ration. This was known at The OVERLORD administrative plans
first as the Logan Bar, named for Capt. provided that men in the assault stages
Paul P. Logan, who had developed it in
17Quartermaster Supply in the ETO in World
1934–36while head of the Quartermaster War II, OQMG, 1948, II (Subsistence), 64–68, Apps.
Subsistence School. Its main component XXVII-XXXIII.
T H E LOGISTIC OUTLOOK IN JUNE AND JULY 441

would personally carry one D and one K vegetable hash, meat and beans, and meat
ration. Their organizations were to carry and vegetable stew. But whether the C or
an additional three rations per man, either the K was least popular is debatable. The
C or K. Maintenance shipments in the demand for one or the other was influ-
first few days were to consist wholly of C enced at least in part by convenience in
and K rations, but after the fifth day 50 handling. The K ration was the handiest
percent of the deliveries were to be in 10- for the man on foot; headquarters organ-
in- 1’s. After the first month of operations izations and units with adequate transpor-
half the subsistence was to be in B rations, tation and heating facilities tended to
about one quarter in 10-in-1, and the re- prefer the C ration. All three had one
mainder in C and K. I n actual practice component which was the subject of uni-
there was considerable departure from the versal derision—powdered lemon juice.
plan after the first few days. Rations were Showing little concern as to whether they
delivered to the Continent principally in received the proper amount of ascorbic
prestowed ships loaded in New York weeks acid in their diet, troops consistently dis-
before the invasion, each vessel containing posed of the powder in ways not intended
from three to eight 500-ton blocks. In this by quartermaster dietitians, either. dis-
way approximately 60,000,000 rations carding it or combining it with liberated
were delivered in the first four weeks of spirits in new tests of inventiveness.
operations. The shift to 10-in-1 rations, Early in July the almost universal de-
however, was more rapid than contem- mand for more coffee in the menus, and
plated, and in the first four weeks approx- for improvement of the biscuits, particu-
imately 77 percent of all issues were of this larly in the C and 10-in-1 rations, led the
type, at the expense of the less popular C’s chief quartermaster of the E T O to request
and K’s. Early in July, as planned, came improvement in the packaged rations, in-
the shift to the B ration, starting with is- cluding a n augmentation of their nutri-
sues to about 57 percent of all troops on tional value. Eventually all rations were
the far shore. By that time the operational greatly improved in palatability by the in-
ration was already being augmented by troduction of a considerable variety of
the issue of freshly baked white bread, foods, but these changes were not to
which began on 1 July, with one static appear until early in 1945.19
bakery (at Cherbourg) and seven mobile
bakeries in operation. As was the case with Difficulties in Class II and IV supply
the 10-in-1’s: the change-over to type B arose either from shipping delays or from
was more rapid than planned. By mid- unexpected maintenance and consump-
July more than 70 percent of all troops tion factors in the fighting of the first two
were receiving the B ration.18 months. Engineer supply was generally
Experience with the C, K, and 10-in-1 adequate, though only because captured
rations in the first two months of oper- stocks of construction materials were ex-
ations produced mixed reactions. The 18Ibid. pp. 26-27; ADSEC Operations History, p.
10-in-1 was undoubtedly the best liked 61; FUSA Rpt of Opns, 20 Oct 43 to 1 Aug 44, An-
initially. Troops found the C ration mo- nex 14 (QM), App. 14 (rations issued), Bk. VI.
19Quartermaster S u p p l y In the ETO in World
notonous with its indestructible biscuits War II, II, 68; Basic Needs of the ETO Soldier,
and its constant repetition of meat and I, 44–45.
442 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

tensively used. Delivery of construction ations. Enemy action and mishaps in un-
materials suffered from the initial lag in loading at the beaches caused immediate
tonnage discharges, a n d receipts also fell shortages in 105-mm. howitzers, medium
behind because of the inability to receive tanks, jeeps, and multigun motor car-
them at Cherbourg, where mine clearance riages. Some of the lacks were rectified by
took much more time than expected. For- priority call on the United Kingdom for
tunately a large portion of the construc- replacements. Perhaps the most unex-
tion materials required in the rehabilita- pected shortages occurred in mortars, light
tion of Cherbourg could be procured machine guns, BAR’s,23 and grenade and
locally or from captured stocks. Large antitank rocket launchers.
quantities of cement, lumber, concrete The Normandy hedgerow fighting took
mixers, and small items of equipment and a n unprecedented toll of these weapons.
supplies were found in the Cotentin.20 T h e heavy losses in BAR’S—835 in First
Huge rafts of timber piling were towed Army in June, or one third of the total
across the Channel for use in the recon- number authorized—were attributed
struction of the ports. mainly to the special effort which enemy
One engineer supply shortage that infantrymen consistently made to elimi-
could not be solved locally was in maps. nate the BAR man in the American rifle
Allowances were found to be quite inade- squad.24The shortage of grenade launch-
quate, partly because of the slow tactical ers was laid to the fact that the M1 rifle
progress, for the relatively static conditions could not be fired automatically with the
of July occasioned demands beyond all ex- launcher attached. Many launchers were
pectations for large-scale (1:25,000) maps. lost when they were removed, and in mid-
Most of these demands were met by air July First Army reported a shortage of
shipments from the United Kingdom. 21 2,300.25
Signal Corps supply followed the same The delay in the arrival of ordnance
general pattern as Engineer supply. The troops and bulk shipments of supplies was
delivery of Signal Corps construction ma- felt keenly, especially since a n accelerated
terials also lagged because of transporta- build-up of combat units caused available
tion difficulties. But the deficiency was reserves to be expanded at rates far greater
largely made u p by the capture of con- than anticipated. T h e shortage of at least
struction supplies and the discovery of one item, the 2.36-inch rocket launcher,
enemy equipment in only slightly dam- was met by having service organizations
aged condition. Shortages developed in
certain types of radios because of losses in 20ADSEC Operations History, p. 44.
21 FUSA Rpt of Operations, Bk. V, p. 220.
the landings, but these were made good by 22Ibid., Bk. VI, pp. 17-18; ADSEC Operations
express shipments via both air and water. History, p. 59.
The major supply problem was lack of in- 23Browning automatic rifles.
24Ltr, Col John B. Medaris, FUSA Ord Officer, to
formation as to location of Signal Corps Chief Ord Officer, ETO, 3 Jul 44,Weekly Ord Ltr 2,
supplies aboard ships arriving off the AGF Bd Rpt 4–3.
114, 114/44(4202) 14 Jul44, Opns
beaches.22 Rpts.
25Ltr, Col Charles H. Coates, W D Observers Bd,
Shortages of ordnance Class II and IV 14 Jul 4 4 , sub: AGF Rpt 114-Ammo and Weapons
equipment resulted either from losses in for First Army, AGF Bd Rpt 114,4–3.114/44 (4202)
the landings or from the nature of oper- 14 Jul 44, Opns Rpts.
THE LOGISTIC O U T L O O K IN JUNE AND JULY 443

turn their weapons over to combat units. a n d Weapons Section, was called to the
Vehicle maintenance was not a serious Continent to meet with senior combat
problem in the first weeks, undoubtedly commanders and determine the details of
because most vehicles were new. But short- their requirements. Shortly thereafter he
ages of spare parts began to give trouble went to the United States to obtain ex-
as early as July, when First Army had its pedited shipment of the maximum num-
first troubles with cannibalization, par- ber of both the 105-mm. and 90-mm.
ticularly of certain types of tires.26At the weapons. Meanwhile General Eisenhower
end of July, on the basis of its first two himself reported the inferiority of Amer-
months’ experience, First Army recom- ican tank armament to the War Depart-
mended upward revisions of replacement ment, and made a n urgent request for im-
factors for forty ordnance items.27 proved ammunition and weapons. The
The first weeks of fighting also produced War Department agreed to expedite the
reports on the quality of U.S. equipment, shipment of the new 90-mm. gun tank de-
particularly combat vehicles. The inferior- stroyer and released the first hundred to
ity of the 75-mm. gun on American tanks t h e New York Port early in July. I n the
was recognized before the invasion, and meantime the only immediate actionthat
remedial measures had already been could be taken within the theater was to
taken. Before D Day the theater had re- dispatch to the far shore fifty-seven of the
ceived 150 tanks mounting the 76-mm. new medium tanks equipped with 105-
gun, which had somewhat better armor- mm. howitzers, which had just been
penetrative power, and more shipments received in the United Kingdom. 28
were expected during the summer months.
In addition, there had been a limited The status of POL (Class III) supply in
authorization of tanks mounting the 105- June and July was entirely satisfactory.
mm. howitzer. General Bradley, aware of Plans for the delivery of gasoline and other
the limitations of both the 75-mm. and petroleum products proved quite adequate
76-mm. gun, had indicated in April that in view of the slow rate of advance, the
the 105-mm. howitzer and the still newer short lines of communications, and the re-
90-mm. gun motor carriage (the M36 sulting low consumption. Bulk deliveries
tank destroyer), which was not yet avail- of gasoline were scheduled to begin on D
able, might well become the logical suc- 26FUSA Rpt of Opns, Bk. VI, pp. 99-100; Bk. I,
cessors to the 75 and 76 respectively to p. 95.
meet the dual requirement for a gun with 27Ltr, Hq FUSA to CG ADSEC, 30 Jul 44, Fore-
cast of First Army Requirements for D plus 50 to D
superior high-explosive qualities and an plus 140, EUCOM 475 Equipment of Troops.
armor-piercing weapon capable of engag- 28 Ltr, FUSAG to CG ETO, 25 Apr 44, sub: Char-
ing hostile armor. acteristics of Medium Tanks for 1945 Production, 12
A Gp 470.8 Tanks; Stf and Comd Conf, COMZ, 2,
The first few weeks of combat on the 9 Jul 44, EUCOM 337/3 Confs Stf-Weekly, I; TWX,
Continent made it abundantly clear that Eisenhower to Smith, 3 Jul 44, SHAEF Cbl Log IN
1944–45, Smith Papers; Ltr, Marshall to Eisenhower,
the 75-mm. and 76-mm. guns were no 13JuI 44, ASF Plans and Opns, 201.04 Requirements
match for the enemy’s Panthers (Mark and Stock Control, A47–289; SHAEF G–4 War
V’s) a n d Tigers ( M a r k VI’s), a n d on 25 Diary, VI Jul); Final Hist Rpt, Armored Fighting
Vehicles and Weapons Sec, Hq ETO, pp. 21–22,
June Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Holly, chief of ETO Adm 540. See also 12 A Gp 472 Cannons and
the ETOUSA Armored Fighting Vehicles Field Pieces, and SHAEF G–3 O&E 370.8 Tanks.
444 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

plus 15, but construction of the Minor at Ste. Honorine also proceeded, although
Pipeline System was delayed by difficul- plans for a third TOMBOLA were canceled
ties in delivering construction materials, because of terrain difficulties. Operation
all of which had to arrive over the beaches of the two underwater lines was actually
or through Port-en-Bessin. POL construc- restricted to fair weather because of diffi-
tion materials were mixed with other culties in mooring tankers and connecting
cargo on several vessels and, in the early pipeheads in rough seas. Reconnaissance
confusion a n d competition for priorities, of the port areas shortly after the landings
did not arrive as scheduled. A limited also resulted in some change in the siting
quantity of materials was gathered to- of the tank farms. Many of the sites
gether very shortly, however, and, the selected from contour maps before the
359th Engineer General Service Regiment landings were unsuitable, primarily be-
began work on D plus 7, although many cause of unfavorable gradients. The num-
needed fittings were still unavailable. Just ber and size of tanks placed at the ports
before D Day, when the discovery of addi- were therefore held to a minimum, and
tional enemy forces in the invasion area the main storage was sited on better
indicated that the capture of Cherbourg ground at Mt. Cauvin, near Etreham.
would be delayed, thus enhancing the im- Construction of the pipeline inland from
portance of the Minor System, 21 Army Ste. Honorine was delayed somewhat by
Group had fortunately made a special al- the necessity of clearing thickly sown
location of LCT lift to bring in additional minefields in the area. Several casualties
construction materials. This cargo began were sustained in this operation, but losses
arriving on D plus 9 and was routed to were undoubtedly kept down thanks to in-
Port-en-Bessin, where it was promptly formation provided by a former French
unloaded. 29 Army captain on the location of mines
The POL plan benefited by another both inland and offshore. H e had wit-
favorable development. Previous intelli- nessed the sowing from his home near the
gence had indicated that only the east beach. 30
mole at Port-en-Bessin could be used for Construction of the Minor System pro-
discharge a n d that only small tankers of gressed steadily and was far enough along
350 tons capacity could be handled. O n for the 786th Engineer Petroleum Distrib-
arrival the Allies found that both the west uting Company to begin operations on 25
and east moles could be used, one for the June, when the first bulk cargo of MT80
British and one for the Americans, and was received, about nine days behind the
that tankers of up to 1,300 tons’ capacity planned schedule, at the Mt. Cauvin tank
could be received. Eventually it was there- farm. (See Map 16.) More than enough
fore possible to develop intake capacity of packaged gas was on the far shore to
some 2,000 tons per day instead of the 700 bridge the gap, inasmuch as vehicular
originally estimated. This was most for- mileage had been much less than expected
tunate in view of the increased burden put
on the Minor System during the prolonged 29Hist Rpt 13, Petroleum, Oils, a n d Lubricants,
Corps of Engrs ETO, pp. 54–55, E T O Adm.
period required to clear the port of Cher- 30Hist Rpt 13, Corps of Engrs E T O , p. 57; Com-
bourg. pletion Rpt Bulk POL Installations Minor POL Sys-
Meanwhile construction of the facilities tem, 1 Oct 44, ADSEC Engr Completion Rpts.
T H E LOGISTIC O U T L O O K I N JUNE AND JULY 445

in the limited area of the lodgment.31 tion (Class V ) supply was a repeated cause
Because of the delay in the capture of of concern in this period and came nearest
Cherbourg the Minor System assumed being a “critical?’ shortage in the sense of
even greater importance than expected. It jeopardizing the success of operations, al-
was expanded beyond the original plans though, disturbing as it was, the situation
after the port was captured because the was not serious when compared with later
number of obstacles in the harbor prom- difficulties. Most of the trouble over am-
ised to delay still further the use of the munition supply arose not so much from
Querqueville digue for tanker deliveries. excessive or unexpected expenditures as
Pipelines were extended from the Mt. from difficulties in delivery of adequate
Cauvin tank farm to St. Lô for both MT80 tonnages to the Continent.
and Avgas, and a branch line for Avgas Ammunition supply became serious at
was laid to Carentan to take advantage of the very start of the operation, particu-
existing facilities there. Eventually the larly at OMAHA Beach. Scheduled land-
Minor System had seventy miles of pipe- ings of supplies had been upset by the loss
line instead of the planned twenty-seven. of key personnel, vehicles, and equipment
Additional tankage was also constructed of the beach brigades. Fortunately the ar-
to give the system a storage capacity of tillery, except for separate armored battal-
142,000 barrels instead of the planned ions, had not engaged in particularly
54,000. Because of rough sea conditions at heavy firing in the first days, and naval
the OMAHA beach fueling station, the Ste. gunfire had given good support to ground
Honorine-des-Pertes installation was not units. Expenditures had actually been be-
used by the Navy as intended, but was low estimates.36But ammunition was not
turned over to the Army to be used exclu- arriving at planned rates, a n d it was al-
sively as a n MT80 receiving and storage most immediately necessary for the First
Army commander to take emergency ac-
The Minor System was intended to de- tion in order to give high priority to the
liver a total of about 6,000 barrels per day
of MT80 and Avgas combined. By the end 31 Comd and Stf Conf, COMZ, 25 Jun 44,
ofJuly the output was double that figure. 33 EUCOM 337/3 Confs Stf-Weekly, I.
32Rpt on POL Plans and Construction to 8 May
At that time the First Army was consum- 45, n. d., ADSEC Engr Completion Rpts Bulk POL
ing about 400,000 gallons (9,500 barrels) Installations; Interv with Col Alvin G. Viney, Deputy
of motor fuel alone each day.34 Though Engr of ADSEC in this period, 24 Feb 50, OCMH.
33Hist Rpt 13, Corps of Engrs ETO, pp. 61–62.
originally scheduled to have served its Port-en-Bessin alone had received 35,000 tons of
purpose by D plus 41, the Minor System MT80 and 8,160 tons of Avgas at the end of the
was compelled by tactical conditions to month. Ltr, COMZ to ADSEC, 10 Jun 45, sub: Bulk
POL Stock Transactions from D Day to 31 Jul 44,
continue in operation at maximum capac- and 1st Ind, 15 Jun 44, ADSEC 463.7 Gasoline and
ity for many weeks to come. For a twelve- Motor Oil.
day period in September its daily issues 34FUSAG Rpt of Opns, Vol. VI, Annex 14 (QM),
App. 15.
averaged 18,000 barrels.35 35ADSEC Rpt on POL plans and construction to
8 May 45.
While the over-all supply situation was 36 Memo, Col Martin F. Hass, Chief Supply Br
G–4 12 A Gp, for C/MGA, 21 Jun 44, sub: Ammo
generally satisfactory in June and July, Expenditures D to D plus 5, Opn OVERLORD, 12 A
there was one major exception. Ammuni- Gp Ammo.
446 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

beaching of ammunition vessels. By 10 what by employing tank destroyer and an-

June the situation had already improved tiaircraft battalions in their secondary role
somewhat.37 as field artillery to perform long-range har-
Nevertheless the ammunition supply assing a n d interdiction, for the expendi-
picture was subject to frequent ups and ture of 90-mm. and 3-inch gun ammuni-
downs in the first weeks. The initial short- tion was not restricted.42
ages had developed in small arms ammu- With the general improvement in the
nition and hand grenades, of which there entire build-up after the storm, First
was an unusually large expenditure in the Army on 2July temporarily lifted the re-
hedgerow fighting. These shortages were strictions on expenditures. At the same
relieved by air shipments from the United time, however, army presented a table of
Kingdom.38By the middle of the month expenditures which, on the basis of experi-
ammunition stocks in general were far be- ence, it regarded as ample enough to allow
low planned targets, and steps were taken its corps to accomplish their respective
to give Class V supply, particularly field missions, and it directed that units con-
artillery ammunition, the highest priority, form on a corps-wide basis to expenditures
replacing scheduled shipments of POL.39 at rates not to exceed one unit of fire in the
O n 15 June restrictions on expenditure initial day of a n attack, one-half unit of
were imposed for the first time when First fire on each succeeding day of a n attack,
Army rationed ammunition by limiting and one-third unit of fire for a normal day
the number of rounds per gun which could of firing. Any expenditure in excess of
be fired each day by the two corps. Stocks these rates had to be justified to First
were low in part because of nondeliveries. Army within twenty-four hours. The new
But rationing was resorted to mainly be- system eased the previous rigid restriction
cause corps and divisions had violated on the basis of rounds per gun per day
army directives in creating excessive un- a n d gave the corps more leeway in plan-
reported unit dumps at artillery positions. ning their operations, but the army
Lower units had stocked excessive amounts warned that any abuse would result in a
forward, reducing reserve stocks in army return to strict rationing.43
dumps and therefore under army control.40 This limitation was in force for the next
A more serious threat to the whole am- two weeks, during which the army made a
munition position came in the period of the succession of limited attacks with all four
storm, when unloading virtually ceased. corps through the difficult terrain already
Special measures were taken at that time 37 FUSA Rpt of Opns, Bk. VI, pp. 69–70.
both to limit expenditures and to expedite 38FUSAG Rpt of Opns, VI, 69–70.
deliveries of items in critical supply. First 39Memo, Eisenhower for CofS, SHAEF, 16Jun 44,
SHAEF SGS 300.6/6 Supreme Comdr’s Memo of
Army immediately limited expenditures to 16 Jun.
one-third unit of fire per day, and then ar- 40FUSA Rpt of Opns, Bk. V, p. 184; Ltr, Bradley
ranged for air shipments of 500 tons per to CGs dim and corps, 19Jun 44, sub: Ammo in Ex-
cess of Basic Load, FUSA 471 Ammo, ORB.
day for three days, ordered ammunition 41FUSAG Rpt of Opns, I, 80; ADSEC Operations
coasters beached, and called forward from History, p. 32.
U.K. waters five U.S. Liberties prestowed 42FUSA Rpt of Opns, Bk. I, pp. 123–24.
43Ltr, Maj Gen William B. Kean, CofS FUSA, to
with ammunition.41 The shortage of field CGs Corps, 2Jul 44, sub: Field Arty Ammo Expen-
artillery ammunition was alleviated some- ditures, FUSA 471 Ammo.
T H E LOGISTIC OUTLOOK IN JUNE AND JULY 447

described. In effect, the army directive im- the expenditure of ammunition, for com-
posed very little restriction on firing, and bat units consistently sustained fewer
“morale” firing by new divisions, plus in- casualties and made better progress when
creased depth and width of concentrations artillery support was ample.48Undoubt-
fired to compensate for poor observation, edly these restrictions did not represent
tended to increase expenditures. The re- the wishes of the army commander either.
sult was a period of the most continuous The difficulties in replenishing the sup-
heavy firing in the first two months. Re- ply of ammunition were not at this time
serves were depleted at the rate of .2 unit the result of shortages in the theater, al-
of fire per day, and depot stocks became though such shortages were to develop
insufficient to sustain the army’s allowed very soon. They were due rather to inade-
expenditure rate. T h e depot level of 105- quate arrivals and discharges at the
mm. howitzer ammunition dropped to beaches. 49 In mid-July ammunition was
three and a half units of fire after having being unloaded at the rate of only 3,000
been built u p to six units of fire earlier in tons per day. First Army asked the Ad-
the month.44The stocks of 81-mm. mortar vance Section for a daily discharge of
ammunition, which was the most critically 7,500 tons, the amount which it insisted
short of all, were reduced to .3 unit of fire was necessary to maintain a n adequate
on 16July.45 supply for the combat forces then on the
Aware that the situation was worsening, Continent. 5o
First Army on 13 July issued warnings After rationing was imposed in mid-July
about expenditures in hopes of avoiding a the ammunition situation improved rap-
return to rationing. In a letter to the divi- idly. From the 16th to the 24th expendi-
sion and corps commanders, Maj. Gen. tures were actually less than rationing
William B. Kean, the army chief of staff, permitted. Firing was light, for the bulk of
noted that expenditures had been far in the artillery was held silent in new posi-
excess of the replacement capabilities of tions in preparation for the attack of 25
the supply services. He expressed doubt July.51The shipping and discharge situa-
that the results had justified the heavy fir-
ing of the past few days.46 44FUSA Rpt of Opns, Bk. V, p. 184.
45FUSA AAR. Ammo Officer to Ord Officer for
His warnings were insufficient. Three Jun and Jul, Gen Bd files 471/1 A/A Rpt FUSA.
days later, on 16 July, army imposed a 46Ltr, Kean to CGs Divs and Corps, 13 J u l4 4 , sub:
Field Arty Ammo Expenditures, FUSA 471 Ammo.
strict rationing system in order to rebuild 47FUSA Rpt, Bk. I, p. 125; Ltr, Bradley to Corps
reserves for the offensive operation then CGs, 1 7 J u l 44, sub: Ammo Allocations, FUSA 471
being planned. It now made detailed allo- Ammo.
cations that differed for each corps on the 50 AmmunitionSupply for Field Artillery, Gen Bd
Rpt 58, pp. 16-17; Ltr, Brig Gen Raymond S.
basis of the estimated scale of combat McLain 30th Div Artillery to C G 30th Div, 15 J u l
activity during the period covered by the 44, sub: Ammo Expenditures, FUSA 471 Ammo.
allowance. Initially the allowance was for 49Memo, Maj Gen Henry B. Sayler for CG
COMZ, 18 J u l4 4 , and Memo, Col Hugh Cort, CofS
specific numbers of rounds per weapon on ADSEC, for CG ADSEC, 16 J u l 44, ADSEC 471
a day-to-day basis and permitted no ac- Ammo.
cumulation from one day to the next.47 50Ltr, Kean to Plank, 18 Jul44, sub: Ammo Sup-
ply, and Memo, Cort for Plank, 16 J u l 44, ADSEC
Combat commanders objected strongly, 471 Ammo.
arguing that it was false economy to limit 51FUSAG Rpt, I. 94–95 and V, 184.
448 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

tion also improved in this period, and as a ated satisfactorily to meet emergency re-
result of the calling u p of additional am- quirements on the far shore, the supply
munition ships there were approximately system as a whole developed a n undesir-
twenty-nine vessels with a capacity of able rigidity and thus tended to bear out
about 145,000 tons awaiting discharge off the misgivings voiced before D Day by
the beaches at the endof the month. 52 General Moses, the army group G–4. 55
Several factors contributed to its inflexi-
The special express shipping services to bility, some of them inherent in the supply
the far shore to meet unexpected or un- plan, some of them resulting from difficul-
usual demands by the combat forces ties on the far shore. The prescheduling of
proved a farsighted provision. Arrange- supply shipments for the entire first three
ments had been made for shipments by months imposed a n initial strait jacket,
both air and water, the latter being han- for it placed a great burden on the U.K.
dled either as GREENLIGHT shipments, con- depots and also resulted in the building up
sisting of 600 tons per day of ammunition of unbalanced stocks on the Continent.
or engineer Class IV supplies, or as Red The U.K. depots were hard put to prepare
Ball shipments, under which 100 tons of shipments of small quantities of many
supplies could be rushed to Southampton items for each day’s requisition and also
by truck a n d dispatched by daily coaster meet sudden priority demands for ship-
to the far shore. In the first eleven days of ments via GREENLIGHT, Red Ball, and air.
operations four GREENLIGHT, fourteen Red O n the Continent, meanwhile, the receipt
Ball, and ten emergency air shipments of prescheduled shipments led to the crea-
were made to the Continent, ranging in tion of unbalanced stocks. Record keeping
size from small boxes of penicillin to on the far shore was not sufficiently ac-
fifteen 105-mm. howitzers. In the first curate to provide a true picture of supply
month more than forty special ammuni- stocks there. Since actual consumption
tion shipments were made, approximately rates and depot balances were not known,
one third of them by air. It had been esti- no attempt was made to alter requisitions
mated that requests for Red Ball ship- to reflect real needs. Under these circum-
ments would be filled in from three to five stances the far-shore commands found it
days. At the end of July General Ross re- easier to have their urgent requirements
ported that u p to that time the average met by the various express services.
elapsed time from receipt of requests to Selective unloading on the far shore
delivery had been eighty-nine hours (three created additional inflexibility, for it pro-
days, seventeenhours). 53 Althoughship- moted forced idleness of shipping at the
ment by air was still in its early stages of beaches, lengthened the turn-round time,
development and did not account for a and reduced the number of vessels return-
large portion of the over-all tonnages, it
was particularly useful in meeting urgent 52Operation, Organization, Supply and Services of
the TC in the ETO, Gen Bd Rpt 122, p. 29; Ltr, Cort
demands for certain types of ammunition to Kean, c. 20 J u l4 4 , ADSEC 471 Ammo.
in the period of the storm. Approximately 53Comd and Stf Conf, C O M Z , 18 Jun, 9 a n d 30
6,600 tons of supplies were flown into the J u l4 4 , EUCOM 337/3 Confs, Stf-Weekly, I, 44.
54 12 A G p Rpt of Opns, V I (G–4), 20, O C M H ;
lodgment area during June and July.54 Supply and Evacuation by Air, Gen Bd Rpt 26, p. 29.
While the various express services oper- 55See above, pp. 310–12.
THE LOGISTIC OUTLOOK IN JUNE AND JULY 449

ing to the U.K. loading points. The net that laid down in the priority lists. After
result was to increase the intransit time for the operation was launched the prospect
all supplies and to place a larger portion of accelerating the flow of troops, first from
of the theater's supplies in the pipeline. the United Kingdom and then from the
Once committed to movement an item United States, was examined repeatedly.
was not available for issue until it was The theater first sounded out the War
stocked in a depot on the far shore. The Department early in June an the possi-
tonnages thus committed to the pipeline bility of advancing the shipment of divi-
sometimes constituted a substantial per- sions. Through the chief of OPD, General
centage of the available theater stocks of Handy, who was then in the theater, it
certain items. suggested that under favorable circum-
The ability of the supply system to re- stances the build-up might be accelerated,
spond to requirements depended largely and it asked the War Department for an
on movement capabilities, which were estimate of its ability to speed up the flow
always limited. Committing a large por- of units after D plus 30. O P D replied that
tion of the lift to prescheduled shipments, no additional divisions could be shipped
some of which were unnecessary, elimi- in July and noted that it also was toolate
nated whatever cushion there might have to preship equipment for any in addition
been. In a post-mortem of the OVERLORD to the four already scheduled for August.57
supply plan after the war critics agreed Three additional divisions could be
that the shipments of supplies on a daily shipped with their equipment in August,
basis could have been discontinued much however, and could go directly to the Con-
earlier, and that the prescheduling of tinent. The War Department also held out
shipments for three months imposed an the possibility of shipping two divisions in
unnecessary rigidity on movement capa- September by advancing one scheduled
bilities in view of the large percentage of for movement in October. It emphasized
theater stocks which were tied u p as a re- that the big problem in accelerating the
sult. Furthermore, had the turn-round flow of divisions was not one of readying
time of shipping been shorter, and had an them from the standpoint of training, but
accurate running inventory of depot stocks finding sufficient equipment.58
been kept so that predetermined ship- Meanwhile logistics officers at both the
ments could have been adjusted to reflect
Mounting the Operation OVERLORD, Gen Bd
actual consumption, a greater degree of Rpt5 6 129, pp. 17–22.
flexibility in the use of shipping would 57The 17th Airborne, 9th Armored, and 94th and
have been achieved, and the demands of 95th Infantry Divisions, whose equipment was al-
the combat forces could have been met ready on the way.
58Cbl S–53541, Handy (at SHAEF) to Hull, 10
more promptly. 56 J u n 44, and Cbl W–49325, Hull to Handy, 11 Jun
44, SHAEF G–4 Troop Flow 121/1 GDP–1, 69;
Memo for record, OPD, 10Jun 44, OPD 370.5, XIII.
( 4 ) Troop Build-up T h e arrival of the 80th Division in England early in
July would bring the total number of divisions in the
Even before D Day the OVERLORD theater to 22 (14 infantry, 6 armored, and 2 airborne).
planners had hopefully considered the No shipments were scheduled for that month, but the
4 divisions scheduled for early August shipment
possibility of carrying out the continental would bring the theater strength to 26 (16 infantry,
troop build-up at a greater speed than 7 armored, and 3 airborne).
450 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

SHAEF and ETO headquarters also Zone were in general agreement, for the
studied the problem, considering both the moment at least, that a n acceleration of
theater’s ability to receive and equip addi- the flow of divisions would be unsound. At
tional divisions and the prospect of main- any rate, it was rather academic to plan a
taining them on the Continent. For one more rapid build-up on the Continent
thing, they noted, the theater would not until the trend of operational develop-
yet be ready to receive divisions on the ments could be seen more clearly.59
Continent directly from the United States The importance of the whole matter was
in August. To process them through the accentuated by the initially slow tactical
United Kingdom would create added ad- progress, with its attendant danger of a
ministrative burdens since a number of strong enemy build-up on a relatively
divisions were already scheduled to re- narrow front. The nature of the early
main in the United Kingdom until D plus fighting led General Bradley to order the
180 because of the inability to support first major alteration in the build-up
them on the Continent. Furthermore, the schedule on 15June, advancing the move-
reception of additional divisions would en- ment of the 83d Division by nine days,
tail a drain on existing stocks of supplies, from 30 June to 21 June. He also ordered
for there was no surplus equipment in the that a study be made as to the possibility
United Kingdom. of similarly advancing the movement of
As far as receiving the divisions on the the entire XV Corps (three divisions),
Continent was concerned, it was admitted across the beaches if necessary.
that the rate of build-up might be in- The army commander was extremely
creased “under favorable conditions”— conscious of the necessity to keep the situa-
that is, if supply requirements were mate- tion in Normandy from “solidifying” in
rially less than anticipated, or if port ca- view of the increased resistance building
pacity and enemy railway demolitions up, and he felt that it might be necessary
proved more favorable than expected. But to bring in additional divisions to enable
the very opposite might well be true, and
the maintainable build-up therefore actu-
ally less than forecast. Logistical planners 59Adm Study 1 1 , S H A E F G–4, sub: Logistical
Situation U.S. Forces D plus 41 to D plus 90, Pt. I-
felt that the pre-D-Day forecasts were General, 3 J u n 44, Pt. 11-Movements, 1 J u n 44,
not unduly conservative to begin with, SHAEF G–4 Adm Stf Study 11. Ltr, Col William
and were in fact based on far lower sup- Whipple to Lt Col William L. Barriger, Deputy G–4
FUSAG, a n d Col Albrecht, C O B FECOMZ, 9 Jun
ply levels than were desirable. They had 44, sub: Logistical Situation U.S. Forces D plus 41 to
already considered that the support of the D plus 90; Ltr, H q COMZ to U.S. Adm Stf 21 A Gp,
current troop list would be critical in the 1 2 J u n 44, sub: Build-up—D plus 60–D plus 90;
Memo, Moses for G–3 FUSAG, 13 Jun 44, sub:
period from D plus 60 to 90, and had con- Build-up D plus 60–D plus 90; Ltr, FECOMZ to U.S.
cluded that limitations in both beach and Adm Stf 21 A Gp, 23 Jun 44, sub: Build-up D plus
port capacity and in transportation facili- 60–D plus 90. All in 1 2 A G p 370 Build-up Tables
Memo, Whipple, 14Jun 44, sub: Build-up of Forces,
ties would be a major restriction on the SHAEF G–4 381 Bolero I 44, and draft of 7 Jun 44,
maintenance of a force larger than the SHAEF G–4 Log Plans Br 1062/4/GDP Post-OVER-
one currently planned. Early in June, LORD Availability of Forces, 66; Memo, Current Opns
Br G–4 for Exec Sec, 20 Jun 44, sub: Progress of
therefore, supply planners at SHAEF, 1st Build-up of Major Combat Units, G–4 SHAEF 381
Army Group, and the Communications BOLERO 144.
T H E LOGISTIC O U T L O O K IN JUNE AND JULY 451

the army to continue the attack along the disproportionately small in deference to
entire front. This view was fully shared by combat units.
the Supreme Commander, who took steps I n their analysis of the problem both
to advance the shipment of fighting units the G–3 and G–4 of SHAEF at first recom-
and ammunition at the expense of service mended caution in attempting any further
personnel and other types of supplies.60 acceleration in the build-up of combat
The administrative implications of such forces or reduction in maintenance scales.
rephasing were fully appreciated. 61While Some acceleration had already taken
developments on the Continent could fully place, with the result that the preponder-
justify the acceleration at the moment, ance of combat elements was already
there was an inherent danger that the de- greater than planned. As of 27 June, for
velopment of an imbalance of combat and example, eleven divisions were ashore, as
service forces might at some future date planned, plus the two airborne divisions
jeopardize over-all operations. For this which had not been withdrawn as sched-
reason the advisability of further accen- uled, although the over-all U.S. build-up
tuating the disparity in forces was seriously on the Continent was behind by more
questioned. 62 than 100,000 men. Only 63,000 of the
At General Eisenhower’s request, mean- troops ashore were service troops of the
while, the whole matter of accelerating the line of communications, the great bulk of
long-range build-up from the United the forces consisting of divisions, corps, air
States was again investigated, prompted force units, and army overheads. The divi-
in part by questions submitted by the sion slice at the time was only 31,000.
British Prime Minister. Mr. Churchill had Some disparity had been planned for in
expressed disappointment, both to the the initial phases, but the continued land-
Supreme Commander and to President ing of combat elements more or less on
Roosevelt, over the great preponderance schedule while the build-up as a whole fell
of service troops over combat troops in the in arrears, and the phasing in of some ele-
forces scheduled for shipment from the ments (notably the 83d Division) ahead of
United States. He pointed out that the schedule had created a n even greater
553,000 men arriving from May through disparity. Changes in the movement dates
August included only seven divisions, for certain service elements, predicated on
which would indicate a division slice of the early fall of Cherbourg, had been post-
about 79,000 men. I n his opinion the “ad-
60Memo, Smith for Chief Historian ETO, 22 Feb
ministrative tails” were too long, a n d he 45, sub: Document for Inclusion in Hist Records,
desired that there be more “fighting divi- SAC’SDecision on Opn OVERLORD, Smith Papers.
sions” a t the expense of service units.63 61Memo, Lt Col Edwin N. Clark, Current Opns
Br, for Exec Sec, 20 Jun 44, sub: Build-up on Con-
The protest was hardly warranted, for tinent, SHAEF G–4 381 BOLERO1 4 4 ; Memo, Cur-
the shipments in this particular period rent Opns Br for Exec Sec, 20 Jun 44, sub: Progress
bore little relationship to the apportion- of Build-up of Major Combat Units, S H A E F 381
Build-up of U.S. Forces I 44. See also papers in 12 A
ment of combat and service forces planned Gp 370 Build-up Tables.
for the theater— that is, a division slice of 62Memo, Bull for CofS, SHAEF, 21 Jun 44, sub:
40,000. Service force shipments in these Increase in Rate of Build-up, SHAEF G–3 War
Diary.
months were abnormally large only be- 63Cbl, Churchill to Roosevelt, 28 Jun 44, P&O 381
cause those of earlier months had been 1943–45.
452 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

poned when the capture of that port was break-through occurred a n d a rapid ex-
delayed. 64 ploitation became possible, the maximum
Several developments to date had ad- number of service troops would be re-
mittedly been favorable, resulting in re- quired to develop the lines of communica-
duced scales of logistical support and tions. H e noted further that the build-up
therefore indicating the possibility of a was already restricted by the available lift
more rapid build-up of combat forces. for vehicles and by the over-all supply
Casualties had been fewer than expected; situation, a n d that the reduced require-
demolitions had been on a small scale and ments for antiaircraft defense did not
most rail lines had been captured intact; allow any material reduction in air force
the small scale of enemy air activity had needs, for these were designed largely for
reduced the need for antiaircraft defenses; offensive operations.
and the food situation in Normandy was O n balance, therefore, not only the
good. G–4, whose responsibility for supply in-
There were unfavorable factors as well. clined him to conservatism, but also the
Bad weather had interfered with ship- G–3 felt that neither previous estimates as
ping and unloading, particularly retard- to the number of divisions which could be
ine the discharge of motor transport; supported on the Continent (twenty-one
the U.S. MULBERRY and many landing by D plus 90) nor the planned allocation
craft had been destroyed by the storm; of service troops, already low, should be
and the capture of Cherbourg had been altered at this time. In fact, as one officer
delayed. Referring to the Prime Minister’s pointed out, once the already augmented
observations on reducing logistic require- combat forces developed momentum did
ments, Maj. Gen. Harold R. Bull noted it not follow that the build-up would per-
that it had become “a favorite pastime . . . force have to revert to an accelerated serv-
to compare the excessive American ton- ice troop movement in order to develop
nage required per divisional slice to that the lines of communications?
required by the British.” He thought it The achievement of a proper balance
might be appropriate to point out the dif- was indeed an elusive matter, and any dis-
ference in the respective tactical missions proportionate preponderance of combat
of the American and British army groups. units over service troops could be a tem-
U.S. forces would have by far the longest porary one only. The initial examination
lines of communications in their advance of the problem of a n accelerated flow of
westward into Brittany, south to the Loire, combat elements therefore resulted in the
and then on the outer edges of the huge tentative conclusion that no drastic alter-
wheeling maneuver toward the Seine, ation in the planned proportion of combat
which would add immeasurably to their and service troops was either desirable or
logistical problems. feasible on the basis of experience thus far.
The G–4, General Crawford, noted that In the view of both the G–4 and G–3 the
while it was true that administrative re- build-up plan was sufficiently elastic to
quirements had been low thus far as a meet changing needs. Some alteration had
result of the slow advance, it was by no already been made, and tentative plans
means certain that tactical progress would 64T h e Procurement and Use of Manpower in the
continue at such a slow pace, and if a ETO, p. 29.
T H E LOGISTIC O U T L O O K I N JUNE AND JULY 453

existed whereby divisions could be brought tain the additional forces. Answering the
in up to twenty days ahead of the present latter half of this question required a
schedule for the first three months. Con- thorough examination of the first month’s
versely, additional service troops could operations. The SHAEF G–4 was already
also be made available if the demands for gathering data on port a n d beach capac-
logistic support required, so that the forces ities, on the availability of equipment, on
could be balanced to meet any situation maintenance factors, on the ratio of serv-
likely to arise.65 ice and supporting troops to combat divi-
Despite these counsels the Supreme sions, on the reception capacity of staging
Commander immediately took steps areas on the Continent, and on the reper-
which would a t least permit the theater to cussions of an accelerated build-up on
take advantage of any favorable develop- railway plans and the reserves and storage
ments. At the end of June General Eisen- program.
hower instructed that measures be taken O n 6 July, although these studies were
to have four divisions available in the by no means complete, the logistical plans
United Kingdom at all times up to D plus chief, Col. William Whipple, set down his
150 instead of the three then provided, so first tentative conclusions. Preliminary in-
that an adequate number would be on vestigation indicated that logistical con-
hand in the event logistic limitations later siderations would permit the maintenance
permitted their movement to the Con- of a larger number of divisions after D plus
tinent.66Arrangements were accordingly 60 than had been thought possible. The
made with the War Department for the first available statistics on maintenance in
first acceleration in the build-up, four the initial thirty days of operations were
divisions instead of three being scheduled encouraging. Consumption and expendi-
for shipment in the month of September.67 ture figures on POL a n d ammunition
T h e movement of a n additional division were reported to have been so far below
to the United Kingdom was not an imme- expectations as to raise doubts about the
diate worry so far as its support on the validity of previously accepted planning
Continent was concerned, but it did entail
a sacrifice of a n equivalent number of re- 65Ltr, Bull to Chief Plans Sec G–3 SHAEF, 27 Jun
44, sub: Analysis of Build-up from D to D plus 90,
placements, for which there was soon to SHAEF G–3 17100/4/0ps Complete Plng for
be a critical need. 68 OVERLORD Build-up; Stf Study, SHAEF G–4, 29 Jun
The problem of accelerating the build- 44, sub: Analysis of Build-up from D to D plus 90
(6 Sep), S H A E F G–4 Log Plans Br 1062/4/GDP
up was under continuous study in July. At Post-OVERLORDAvailability of Forces; Memo, Bull
its root lay such basic questions as the for Eisenhower, 30 Jun 44, sub: U.S. Build-up on
adequacy of shipping, the availability of Continent, SHAEF G–3 370.01 Troop Build-up, II.
66 Ltr,Bull to CofS. SHAEF, 30 Jun 44, sub: US.
equipment, the status of training of divi- Build-up on Continent, SHAEF G–3 1 7 100/44/Ops
sions in the United States, the theater’s Complete Plng for OVERLORD Build-up.
ability to receive them both on the Con- 67Cbl S–55316, Smith to Handy, 1 1 Jul 44,
SHAEF Cbl Log OUT 1944–45, Smith Papers;
tinent and in the United Kingdom, and, Memo, Lt Col Alfred D. Starbird for Lt Col Chuck,
finally, the practicability of maintaining 1 2 J u l4 4 , sub. Availability of Divisions, OPD 370.5,
them on the Continent. T h e theater was XIII.
68Ltr, Lt Col Frank A. Osmanski to Whipple, 1 J u l
of course primarily concerned with the 44, sub: U.S. Build-up, S H A E F G–4 Log Plans Br
question of its ability to receive and main- 1062/44 GDP Post-OVERLORD Availability of Forces.
454 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

figures. Estimates on requirements for lay in the capture of the Brittany penin-
construction materials and coal might also sula where they were to have been re-
be revised. While the data were far from ceived and staged. And there was no
complete, and while operations to date chance of increasing the total number of
were not believed to be truly representa- divisions on the Continent by the end of
tive, logistic planners at SHAEF neverthe- August, since all divisions operationally
less expressed a guarded optimism over available were already scheduled for early
the possibility of maintaining additional movement to the Continent.70 A long-
forces on the Continent despite the knowl- range acceleration could not begin until
edge that there were inadequate service September, when additional divisions
a n d supporting troops to accompany the might be brought from the United King-
additional divisions.69 dom, assuming that they could be main-
A more detailed and definitive staff tained. Accelerating the flow from the
study, completed two weeks later, gener- United States could not begin until
ally confirmed these conclusions, although November.
it embodied important revisions of earlier For planning purposes logistical officers
views on supply requirements. A closer in July had developed three (later four)
study of the experiential data on the first alternative build-up schedules labeled W,
month’s operations had revealed that X, and Y, which were later re-christened,
maintenance planning figures had been P, R, and O, since they represented the
verified more closely than originally be- “pessimistic,” “realistic,” and “optimistic”
lieved. T h e only reductions in divisional views as to the build-up possibilities.
maintenance tonnages which now seemed Under all three plans the total theater
justified or desirable were in engineer con- build-up would remain as originally
struction supplies. T h e consumption of scheduled until November—that is, 24
POL had been extremely low, but in view divisions by D plus 90,29 by D plus 120,
of the slow rate of advance and short lines a n d 34 by D plus 150. They differed only
of communications, no revision in con- in the rate a t which divisions might be
sumption was predictable for long-range transferred to the Continent from the
forecasts. Ammunition expenditures, it United Kingdom. T h e pessimistic Plan
was now revealed, had actually been W, predicated on a delay in the capture of
slightly higher than forecast, but were ex- Brest, provided that as many as four divi-
pected to drop as operations became more sions (other than airborne) would be kept
mobile. While the first month’s supply ex- in the United Kingdom until February
perience was not quite as favorable as first
believed, however, it did not alter the 69 Memo,Whipple for Crawford, 6 J u l 44, sub:
U.S. Build-up on Continent, SHAEF G–4 Log Plans
earlier conclusions that a speed-up in the Br 1062/4/GDP Post-OVERLORDAvailability of
build-up was feasible. Forces.
The question of accelerating the flow of 70 Becauseof arrears in build-up, Movements and
Transportation Branch, G–4, SHAEF, had believed
divisions really did not enter into any dis- that even the movement of divisions from the United
cussion of the period before D plus 90. Kingdom was out of the question. Ltr, Napier to Col
There was no possibility of receiving divi- Hamilton A. Twitchell, 6 J u l4 4 , sub: Projected Move
of Additional Divisions, With Note on Shipping Im-
sions on the Continent directly from the plications, S H A E F G–4 Mov a n d T n W a r Diary
United States, especially in view of the de- 3014/22 Mov.
T H E LOGISTIC O U T L O O K I N JUNE AND JULY 455

1945. Plan X represented the original and Zone troops, and requiring a prolonged
current schedule, which provided for a maintenance of ports, depots, a n d other
build-up of 21 divisions on the Continent installations. Processing units through the
by D plus 90, 25 by D plus 120, and 30 by United Kingdom would also require
D plus 150. Plan Y called for a n acceler- double handling and therefore entailed a
ation in the transfer of divisions to the decided waste of effort. Bringing addi-
Continent in September, with a build-up tional divisions onto the Continent would
of 27 instead of 25 by D plus 120 (4 not necessarily tax administrative facilities
October), 34 instead of 30 by D plus 150 there unduly if the number of divisions in
(3 November), and would have resulted in combat was not increased. It was esti-
the complete evacuation of divisions from mated that four divisions held quiescent
the United Kingdom by November, in- consumed no more supplies t h a n one in
cluding the four which were then expected combat. They could be held in staging
to be held in the United Kingdom on the areas near ports or, preferably, in reserve
assumption that they could not be main- nearer the front where they could be ro-
tained in France. I n view of actual devel- tated with combat divisions. Such was the
opments it is worth noting that all admin- theory a t least, and it was therefore con-
istrative planning had proceeded on the sidered most desirable to hold additional
assumption that forces on the Continent divisions quiescent on the Continent
would remain generally on the offensive, rather than in the United Kingdom.
with periods of intense activity followed by Under Plan Z the number of U.S. divi-
pauses for regrouping, a n d that approxi- sions on the Continent would be increased
mately 25 percent of the divisions would to 35 by D plus 150, and to 41 by D plus
always be held in reserve. 180.
Consideration was also given in this O n the matter of service troops, the
study to an increase in the flow of divisions planners now concluded that the COMZ
from the United States, known as Plan Z. units currently scheduled for movement to
This was a n even more optimistic alterna- the Continent should prove adequate for
tive, which was believed possible either if the limited increase in the build-up. While
( 1 ) the reserve in the United Kingdom the C O M Z portion of the divisional slice
was reconstituted for subsequent shipment (10,000 of 40,000 in the current troop list)
to the Continent, or if (2) additional divi- was considered low in view of the ultimate
sions were brought to the Continent and length of the lines of communications, the
held as a “quiescent reserve” in addition C O M Z estimates of supply tonnages were
to the normal reserve of 25 percent. There somewhat higher than were now believed
were disadvantages and advantages in necessary for even the increased build-up.
both courses, but the disadvantages of the T h e service troops originally provided for
former appeared to outweigh those of the were therefore believed adequate to
latter. Holding large numbers of troops in handle the supplies for the accelerated
the United Kingdom would not tax main- build-up, although there would be short-
tenance facilities on the Continent but had ages of certain types of units. 71
the disadvantage of necessitating a large
71 Memo, Whipple for Crawford, 29 Jul 44, sub:
administrative organization in the United Availability of Divs, a n d Memo, Col Osmanski to
Kingdom, dispersing Communications Chief Log Plans Br, 31 J u l 44, sub: U.S. Build-up,
456 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

From the above estimate it is seen that regard its objections as valid.73 Much
the SHAEF logistic planners were fairly depended on still-unknown factors, of
optimistic in mid-July that additional course, among them the important pre-
divisions could be maintained on the Con- requisites of capturing the Brittany penin-
tinent after D plus 90, a n d that a further sula, preparing a staging area, and im-
acceleration could be carried out after 1 proving port capacities. But in mid-July
October if the additional units were held the S H A E F planners appeared inclined
in “quiescent reserve.” T h e planners at to recommend the acceleration. As of 25
General Lee’s headquarters had reached July no decision had yet been made.
quite different conclusions and were con- Meanwhile, the theater had requested
siderably less sanguine on the matter. the War Department to allocate for the
They pointed out that the War Depart- European theater all divisions in the un-
ment allocation of shipping for September deployed reserve in the United States and
was already short of the requirements to also asked that the War Department pro-
maintain the existing troop basis. The vide the necessary supporting and service
equipment for a n infantry division re- units to accompany them. T h e War De-
quired about 60,000 measurement tons of partment acceded, earmarking all nine
shipping for movement from the United divisions then in the reserve—one light
States. Bringing in two additional divi- mountain division, one armored division,
sions plus 50,000 supporting troops would and seven infantry divisions. It warned,
necessitate canceling the shipment of sup- however, that this was a tentative alloca-
plies a n d equipment urgently needed to tion, for one or more of the units might be
support operations and to equip troops diverted to other areas, and that the thea-
already scheduled for arrival. Further- ter would have to provide most of the
more, the use of continental ports for serviceand 74
supportingtroops.
bringing in additional divisions would cut Until this time the ETO troop basis
into their capacity to receive supplies. The provided for 47 divisions (30 infantry, 14
opening of the Brittany ports had already armored, and 3 airborne), which were to
been delayed. In view of all these unfavor- arrive by early 1945. With the tentative
able factors it was the opinion of the earmarking of nine divisions from the un-
C O M Z planners that a more rapid build-
u p could not be supported, a n d they 72Memo, Requirements Sec G–4 SHAEF for Opns
therefore opposed the proposal to acceler- Br G–4 ETO, 6 J u l 44, sub: U.S. Divisional Build-up,
and Memo, G–4 Plans E T O to Requisition Sec G–4
ate the flow of divisions.72It is clear that SHAEF, 10 J u l4 4 , same sub, S H A E F G–4 Troop
the two headquarters were using conflict- Flow 1 2 1 / 1 GDP–1; Memo, Co; Potter E T O for
ing data in their calculations, for the logis- Whipple, 14J u l4 4 , sub: Reception of Troops on Con-
tinent D plus 90 to D plus 120, SHAEF G–4 Stf Study
tic officers of SHAEF rejected the Com- VIII, Logistical Implications of Rapid Exploitation
munications Zone’s contention that ship- on Seine River 142/13/GDP–1.
ping would not be adequate and did not 73Memos, Potter for Whipple, 14 J u l 44, and
Whipple for Stratton, 1 7 J u l 44, with draft of Stf
SHAEF G–4 Troop Flow 1 2 1 / 1GDP- 1, Folder 64; Study 12, SHAEF G–4 Stf Study VIII, Logistical Im-
Stf Study 1 2 (Second Draft), Log Plans Br, G–4 plications of Rapid Exploitation on Seine River
SHAEF, 19 J u l 44, sub: U.S. Personnel Build-up, and 142/ 13/GDP–1.
Note, Summary of Plans for U.S. Build-up, no date 74Cbl W–69670, Marshall to Eisenhower, 24 J u l
a n d no signature, SHAEF G–3 370.01 Troop Build- 44, SHAEF G–3 370.01 Troop Build-up, II; Note for
up, II. record, OPD, n. d., OPD 370.5, XIII.
T H E LOGISTIC O U T L O O K IN JUNE AND JULY 457

deployed reserve, the theater had a pros- continued to be brought to the Continent
pective strength of 56 divisions (37 infan- via the beaches, and between 1 and 25
try, 15 armored, 3 airborne, and 1 light July a total of 415,202 men debarked, 96
mountain), to be built u p by March or percent of the planned 430,949.78Since
April 1945.75 arrivals continued to lag slightly, the ini-
While planners deliberated the question tial deficits of June were not overcome. By
of accelerating the long-range build-up, 25 July the cumulative U.S. arrivals since
the cross-Channel movement of divi- D Day totaled 867,662 troops, or 86 per-
sions already available in the United cent of the build-up of 1,009,920 sched-
Kingdom went on apace. The 83d Divi- uled in the build-up priority lists. 79
sion was phased forward about nine days actual strength on that date was approxi-
as General Bradley ordered and, contrary mately 8 12,000 owing to evacuations of
to the originally planned sequence, pre-
ceded the 3d Armored Division, whose
arrival was delayed about five days. The 75The ANVIL force, entering the Continent via
southern France, was to add another three divisions
XV Corps units gained only a day or two to the U S . troop basis later in the summer.
over previously planned schedules. But 76T h e planned and actual build-up of divisions
after the middle ofJuly a significant accel- from 6 June to 25 July was a s follows:
eration took place in the movement of
three divisions intended for later arrival.
The 6th Armored Division landed on 22
July, 14 days earlier than planned; the
28th Infantry Division was brought in on
23 July, gaining 24 days on its scheduled
arrival; and, finally, two other divisions
(the 7th Armored and 80th Infantry) were
passed over in the priority list to advance
the shipment of the 5th Armored Division,
which arrived on 25 July, 47 days earlier
than originally scheduled and 31 days
earlier than the date set for the 7th
Armored Division, which it replaced.76As
a result of this sudden speed-up there were
eighteen U.S. divisions on the Continent a Both airborne divisions had been withdrawn to the United
Kingdom for refitting by 25 July.
on 25 July instead of the planned fifteen.77
Source: Planned arrival column from Ltr, Smith to Secy COS
The build-up was therefore a full month Com, 12 Jun 44, sub: Rate of Build-up, Opn OVERLORD,
SHAEF G–3 17100/44/Ops Opns OVERLORD, Bundle P A 1889.
ahead of schedule. Actual arrival column from listing in SHAEF G–4 Troop
The over-all troop flow to the Conti- Flow l21/1 GDP–1, Folder 64.
nent in July meanwhile more nearly ap-
77The two airborne divisions had been withdrawn.
proached the scheduled build-up than in 78The millionth Allied soldier crossed the beach on
June. O n 1 July, as summarized earlier, 4 July, Cbl FWD-12346, Eisenhower to Marshall, 4
the cumulative arrivals on the far shore Jul 44, P&O Cbl Files.
79NEPTUNE: Training for a n d Mounting the Op-
totaled 452,460 against a planned 578,- eration, II, App. B, OCMH; FUSA and FUSAG
971, or 78 percent of the target. All troops Build-up Priority Lists.
458 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

about 55,000.80With the 640,000 British tem served its purpose very satisfactorily,
troops, this brought the Allied strength on although the prearranged schedule of
the Continent to 1,452,000 (thirty-six shipment was not followed strictly. It was
divisions) on 25 July.81 soon found that the solid infantry detach-
Shipments in July did much to redress ments were in greater demand than ex-
the imbalance between combat and serv- pected, a n d after the scheduled order of
ice troops at the end of June, when the movement had been followed for about
division slice was only 31,000. In the mid- four days packages were dispatched ac-
dle of July the division slice rose temporar- cording to need. Officers in the divisions,
ily to more than 45,000. With the sudden corps, and in First Army had high compli-
influx of combat divisions between 22 and ments for both the quality and immediate
25 July the proportion of service troops fell availability of replacements. I n the view
again, but the slice of 42,000 a t that time of one observer, the greater assurance
represented a considerable gain over the which the package system gave that re-
previous month.82 placement needs would be met relieved
much of the anxiety of combat command-
(5) Replacements ers and conclusively demonstrated its
value to the morale and efficiency of
The replacement plan, like other as- u n i t s84
. T hsystem
e proved so convenient
pects of the OVERLORD logistical plan, re- and efficient, in fact, that the practice of
ceived its initial test in the first two months
80 Nearly20,000 of the evacuations were by air.
of operations. In general, the machinery FUSAG Rpt of Opns, VII, Apps. 20, 21. Figures on
organized to meet the needs of the assault actual build-up a n d evacuation vary slightly from
forces was entirely adequate, particularly source to source, but the discrepancies are not large.
All above figures are from beach brigade and FUSA
in its semiautomatic provision of replace- records rather than from the daily logistical bulletins
ments in the earliest stages of the invasion. or weekly logistical summaries of the SHAEF G–4.
As in the matter of estimated supply re- T h e latter may be found as follows: Daily Logistic
Bulletins in S H A E F G–4 Log Plans Br 1 – 1 7 / 8 / 1
quirements, however, the experiential GDP Progress of Build-up, and Weekly Logistic Sum-
data of the first two months dictated im- maries in SHAEF G–4 War Diary.
portant revisions in replacement planning 81 OPD320.2, XVII.
82 O n21 July the division slice was reported to be
factors. 40,345, with the following breakdown: 15,600 men in
As planned, the initial losses were met an average basic division (including normal tank de-
by the 5,300 men allotted to the assault stroyer and antiaircraft attachments), 14,958 in corps
and army overhead (6223 combat a n d 8,735 service
units as overstrengths. While the over- troops), and 9,787 C O M Z troops. Memo, Lt Col R.
strength increments were not intended to Lutes, of G–4 SHAEF, for Whipple, 5 Aug 44, sub:
accompany the divisions in the landings, U.S. Troops on Continent-Interim Rpt 5, SHAEF
G–4 Troop Flow 121/1 GDP- 1 . This computation is
in actual practice some of them were believed to be in error since it is based on a strength
“smuggled” across with the assault forma- of seventeen divisions, whereas there were only six-
tions. teen divisions on the Continent on that date. Use of
the latter strength figure would result in a larger divi-
After the overstrengths were exhausted, sion slice.
replacement needs were met for a short 83 T h eProcurement and Use of Manpower in the
time by the 250-man packages, of which E T O , pp. 30-34; History of the Ground Force Rein-
forcement Command, E T O , Gh. VI, pp. 250–51,
142 had been formed with a total of E T O Adm 571.
35,500 men. 83In practice the package sys- 84Ltr, Lt Col D. V. Scofield, H q FUSA, to CG
T H E LOGISTIC OUTLOOK IN JUNE AND JULY 459

organizing men into 250-man detach- lodgment area as chief of the advance
ments was continued after the supply of echelon on 18 June. Both the theater G–1
prepared packages was exhausted.85 and the commander of the Replacement
Replacements arriving in the first three System were dissatisfied with some of the
weeks were handled exclusively by the unbusinesslike practices of the army in the
three battalions attached to the V, VII, handling of replacements.87 But First
and XIX Corps and were initially con- Army was not yet ready to relinquish con-
trolled by those headquarters. T h e first trol of the system on the Continent. It re-
battalions arrived within a day or two of tained control of the 14th Depot and the
the dates scheduled and served their re- battalions serving the corps, and used the
spective corps very successfully. O n 16 Advance Echelon of the GFRS simply to
June First Army assumed direct control of forward its requirements to the United
these battalions and established a normal Kingdom and keep the continental re-
requisitioning procedure, in part because placement installations stocked. First
of the delay in establishing a replacement Army therefore retained control of the re-
depot, which was about a week behind placement system on the Continent just as
schedule, and in part because of one corps' it retained control of all supply in the
extravagance in directing its supporting lodgment until a rear boundary was later
battalion to release 1,500 replacements to drawn. 88
a division which was already over- The build-up of the replacement system
strength. 86While the battalions continued proceeded substantially as planned. By 25
to operate in support of the corps, the June the system comprised one depot and
army shortly thereafter required that all five battalions and, in addition to filling
requisitions be processed through the all requirements, had built up a pool of
army G–1, who directed the replacement 9,000 replacements, considerably above
battalions to fill them and in turn pre- the planned target. One month later there
pared a consolidated requisition for the were three depots and fifteen battalions on
Ground Force Replacement System theContinent. 89
(GFRS) in the United Kingdom in order While the organization and machinery
to maintain the stocks in the battalions on of the replacement system thus served ad-
the Continent. mirably to meet the initial needs of the in-
With the establishment of the first re- vasion forces, one important aspect of re-
placement depot (the 14th) on the Con- placement planning was rudely upset by
tinent late in June the GFRS hoped to the experience of the first two months:
establish a more centralized control of the
processing of replacements on the Conti-
85Procurement and Use of Manpower, pp. 33,35.
nent through its deputy commander, Col. 86Ltr, Scofield to CG GFRS, 5Jul 44, sub: Detailed
Robert S. Miller, who had arrived in the Liaison Rpt, FUSA AG 200.3 Personnel Reinforce-
ments.
87 Memo, G–1 E T O for DCofS, 6 Jul 44, ETO
GFRS, 23 Jun 44, sub: Liaison Rpt First U.S. Army, GFRS Replacements; Ltr, Col Albrecht, DCofS
FUSA A G 200.3 Personnel Reinforcements; Memo, C O M Z , to Lord, 2 7 J u l 44, E U C O M 322 Replace-
Col Harvey W. Wilkinson, G–1 U.S. Adm Stf 21 A ment Units, IIa.
G p for major comds, 4 J u l4 4 , sub: Inspection of G–1 88 History of the Ground Force Reinforcement
Activities on Continent, S H A E F G–1 322.2 Rein- Command, Ch. VI, pp. 256–60.
forcement Units. 89Procurement and Use of Manpower, p. 19.
460 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

the requirements for particular categories uisitions were confined almost exclusively
of men had been miscalculated. to infantry rifle and heavy weapons per-
After repeated revisions of the planning sonnel. Not only had the requirements for
factors the percentage of total replace- infantry been miscalculated, but the
ments allotted to the infantry had been breakdown within infantry had also been
raised to 70.3 only shortly before D Day.90 wrongly estimated. Experience thus far
Requisitions on the zone of interior were had shown that 95 percent of the infantry
adjusted accordingly, but it was already replacements should be rifle and heavy
too late to alter the flow of replacements weapons trained,95rather than the 76 per-
for the month of May, and plans were im- cent which the War Department had used
mediately made to convert some 2,500 in its apportionment in May.96
men of other branches to infantry.91 But To make matters worse, only 39.7 per-
only 52 percent of the 76,000 replace- cent of the infantry replacements arriving
ments in the theater pool on D Day were in the theater were rifle trained, according
infantry-trained replacements.92 to the Replacement System commander,97
The first month of operations on the in contrast with the 60 percent called for
Continent failed to confirm the planning in the War Department breakdown. The
estimates. It was found that the percent- result was that the stockage of replace-
age of total losses was considerably higher ments trained as rifle and heavy weapons
in infantry-85 percent as compared with troops was being rapidly exhausted, while
the planning factor of 70.3-and lower in overages in field artillery, tank destroyer,
other branches. 93 This discovery
did not and antiaircraft replacements were build-
cause immediate concern, for over-all ing up.
casualties had not been excessive. In fact, Colonel Layman expressed serious con-
they had been lower than expected, and cern over these developments and consid-
there still were sufficient replacements, al- ered the measures which might be taken
though continued losses in the proportions to meet the inevitable deficits. It was ob-
experienced thus far promised to create vious that the percentages on which
an improper balance in the various arms.
As late as 11 July the theater asked the
90 It was estimated that 88.4 percent of all casual-
War Department to delete 15,000 replace- ties would occur in the combat arms (infantry, artil-
ments from its September allocation so lery, cavalry, etc.) and 11.6 percent in the services.
that the shipment of divisions could be 91Memo, G–1 E T O for G–3, Apr 41, sub: Infan-
try Replacements, ETO G F R S Replacements; Pro-
advanced. 94 curement and Use of Manpower, pp. 47, 65.
Only a few days later the theater real- 92History of the GFRS, Pt. I I , Annex II.
ized that it was faced with a potential 93Memo, Col Wilkinson to major comds, 4 Jul 44,
sub: Inspection of G–1 Activities on Continent,
manpower crisis. The tortuous hedgerow SHAEF G–1 322.2 Reinforcemrnt Units.
fighting of early July resulted in continu- 94Cbl E-37383, ETO to AGWAR, 11 J u l 44, P&O
ing infantry losses out of all proportion to Cbl Files.
95Ltr, Layman to Deputy Theater Cmdr, 1 7 J u l
the factors used by planners in arranging 44, ETO G F R C 200.3 Personnel—Assignment,
for the flow of replacements. In mid-July Transfer, etc.
the GFRS commander, Colonel Layman, 96Cbl. AGWAR to ETO. 9 May 44, E U C O M 322
Replacement Units IIa.
reported that 90 percent of the casualties 97Comd and Stf Conf Notes, 23 J u l 44, E T O Adm
were infantry and that First Army's req- 459 Stf Conf Notes.
T H E LOGISTIC OUTLOOK IN JUNE AND JULY 461

earlier requisitions had been made needed try losses of June and July the theater had
correction. Steps were also being taken to asked not only that the September ship-
convert to infantry the surpluses in head- ments consist almost wholly of infantry re-
quarters and service personnel and in placements, but that they should be 85
arms other than infantry. But these meas- percent rifle trained and 10 percent heavy
ures did not promise early returns of any weapons trained. This apportionment was
consequence. To meet the threatened expected to be temporary, a n d once the
shortages in the immediate future there current deficiency was remedied the thea-
appeared to be no other course but to ask ter estimated that subsequent shipments
for emergency shipments from the United of infantry replacements could be made
States. Colonel Layman accordingly rec- up of 70 percent riflemen, 20 percent heavy
ommended that 25,000 infantry rifle re- weapons personnel, and 10 percent other
placements be shipped to the theater by infantry types.
the fastest available transportation, to ar- The War Department could not meet
rive before the end of the month. 98 the demand for riflemen in the propor-
In the following two weeks the critical tions desired. It was prepared to ship
replacement situation was a topic of great 25,000 riflemen in September, which was
urgency in the theater's communications approximately 75 instead of 85 percent of
with the War Department. Beginning on the total of 33,825 infantrymen; but to
26 July the theater requested first that the send more, the War Department G–1 ex-
War Department expedite the shipment of plained, would require the stripping of
infantry replacements scheduled for move- five divisions, which would set them back
ment in July and August by every possible from three to four months in their training
means, including the cancellation of fur- and would affect the War Department's
loughs, and then asked the War Depart- ability to provide replacements in later
ment to restore to the September requisi- months.101
tion the 15,000 replacements only recently The shortage in replacements did not
canceled. The theater also asked that vir- actually reach critical proportions in July,
tually the entire September requisition of although on the 23d of the month there
36,750 be made up of infantry replace- were only 12,985 rifle-trained replace-
ments—33,825 infantry, 2,175 para- ments in the entire system a n d as few as
troops. and 1,750 medical. 99 750 immediately available on the far
At this late date it was impossible to
98Ltr, Layman to Deputy Theater Comdr, 1 7 Jul
speed up the shipment of the July and 44.
August requisitions by cancellation of fur- 99Memo, G–1 ETO for G–3, 24 J u l4 4 , E U C O M
loughs, since the requisitions for these 322 Replacement Units, IIa. Cbl EX-39873, Eisen-
hower to W D , 26 J u l4 4 ; Cbl E-39908, Lee to Mar-
months had either departed already or shall, 26 J u l4 4 ; Cbl EX-40655, E T O to WD, 3 l J u l
were en route to the port, and the theater 44. All in O P D 370.5 E T O , Sec X I . Cbl W–71022,
was so informed.100But the War Depart- A G W A R to E T O , 26 J u l4 4 , a n d C b l EX-40659,
G–1 C O M Z to A G W A R , 31 J u l4 4 , S H A E F G–3
ment did agree to meet the demand for 370.092 Reinforcements 44
33,825 infantrymen in September, al- 100Cbl WAR-74630, Marshall to Eisenhower, 1
though not in the breakdown desired. In Aug 44, O P D 370.5 E T O , Sec XI.
101Telephone Conf, Leeet al. of E T O a n d Maj
hopes of correcting the imbalance in its Gen Miller G. White, W D G–1 et al., 2 Aug 44,
stockages resulting from the heavy infan- SHAEF G–3 370.092 Reinforcements 44.
462 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

shore.102Stockages were sufficient to meet necessary manpower procurement and

all the needs of the combat forces in the training could be carried out in the United
first two months, however, and operations States. Once that process was begun, it
in August were soon to relieve the dispro- was almost impossible to make sudden
portionately heavy drain on infantry- changes in shipments. Major alterations to
trained personnel. But there was no way meet an emergency would mean stripping
of knowing at the end of July what the divisions in training in the United States
future might bring, and the experience of and robbing other theaters. Consequently
the first two months therefore gave cause the War Department was anxious to know
to consider the entire manpower problem. immediately if the theater expected to be
Early in August the theater G–1, Col. in desperate straits for replacements in
James M. Franey, reported that the casu- later months so that it could make the
alties in June and July had totaled slightly necessary decisions.
more than 100,000 (85,000 battle casual- But accurate predictions and advance
ties and 16,000 nonbattle). Of these, 85 planning were only part of the problem.
percent had been infantry losses, a n d of The experience of July provided an op-
the infantry casualties 63 percent were portune time to examine the larger aspects
riflemen. The latter percentage had been of the manpower problem as it applied to
increasing during July, and was expected the European theater. T h e War Depart-
to go up to 70 percent. Colonel Layman ment had long since become acutely aware
thought the War Department should plan of the critical manpower situation, and
for an even greater percentage of riflemen, General Marshall had advised the theater
and recommended that 90 percent of the in January 1944 of a shortage in the
infantry replacements be rifle and heavy planned strength of the Army a n d of the
weapons troops, leaving only 10 percent necessity for conservation.103The theater
for other components. commander complied by directing that a
The planning miscalculations for the constant study be made with a view to
first two months were understandable in effecting economies and a wider utilization
view of the extreme difficulty in predict- of limited assignment personnel. The War
ing the course of operations, although the Department repeatedly urged more dras-
War Department felt that the theater tic action on this program, asking for a
should have foreseen the shortage in rifle- continuous personnel audit for the pur-
men earlier than the seventh week of oper- pose of putting physically qualified men
ations. It was particularly perturbed over into combat units and finding jobs for
the theater’s apparent assumption that the limited assignment personnel.
War Department could in a matter of a In the month before the invasion Gen-
few days or weeks fulfill the theater’s eral Eisenhower took additional steps to
sudden and unusual demands. T h e War screen out men suitable for the field forces,
Department now made it clear that re- and by June the theater headquarters had
placement problems could not be met on laid down policy intended to make the
an emergency basis; replacement require- most effective utilization of limited assign-
ment figures could not be juggled and
altered every few days. Firm planning fig- 102Comda n d Stf Conf Notes, 23 J u l 44,ETO Adm
459 Stf Conf Notes.
ures were needed, with requisitions made 103Ltr,Marshall to Eisenhower, 6 J a n 44, ETO
several months in advance, so that the G F R C Plng File.
T H E LOGISTIC OUTLOOK IN JUNE AND JULY 463

ment personnel. But the indefinite state of avoid a repetition of that sad experience.
the final C O M Z structure on the Conti- The War Department G–1 took pains to
nent, involving the withdrawal of per- point out repeatedly that the War Depart-
sonnel from the old base sections to cre- ment’s plans of necessity had to be made
ate new ones, made it difficult for the far in advance and could not be altered
theater to take drastic measures at this overnight to satisfy sudden demands which
stage. Furthermore, in the midst of a tre- had not been anticipated. He called on the
mendous build-up for continental opera- theater to do everything possible to em-
tions, for which the E T O enjoyed the ploy its personnel economically and to de-
highest priorities and for which nothing termine more definitely what its future
was being spared, there was little inclina- needs would be. General White did not
tion to change personnel policies, and it accuse the theater of maladministration or
was easier to postpone such distasteful of poor planning or of excessive demands,
work. 104 a n d he professed not to criticize. But the
Until July the manpower problem had implication was clear: the theater had not
obviously not become as urgent a matter heeded the War Department’s warnings,
to the ETO as it had to the zone of in- and it was not making the best possible
terior, and in the course of the theater’s use of its manpower. 105
urgent appeals for more infantrymen the
War Department G–1, Maj. Gen. Miller (6) The Ports
G. White, endeavored once more to im-
press upon the theater the necessity of Any thought of altering the rate of the
using its personnel more economically. In build-up in the continental lodgment area
a transatlantic telephone conference with eventually involved a problem which was
General Lee and Colonel Franey, General basic in all logistical planning for the
White made pointed reference to the OVERLORD operation—port discharge ca-
theater’s overstrength of 70,000 men, pacity. I n July, mainly as the result of the
32,000 of whom were overhead. Its im- course of operations in the first weeks, and
mediate problem was therefore not a because it was inseparably connected with
shortage of bodies, but a shortage in a cat- the proposal to accelerate the flow of divi-
egory—riflemen. The theater would have sions, the port problem dominated the
to recover this overstrength and the over- thoughts of logistical planners.
ages in replacements in other branches The OVERLORD plan had anticipated
a n d get them retrained a n d into combat meeting the initial requirements of U.S.
units. It would have to convert the general forces on the Continent by the develop-
service men in the Communications Zone ment of the beaches a n d MULBERRY A,
and get them into combat, and replace and had envisaged the capture and de-
them with limited assignment men. Gen- velopment of Cherbourg and six smaller
eral White notified the theater that man-
power was simply no longer available to 104Ltr, Maj Gen Ray W. Barker, SHAEF G–1, to
Col Franey, ETO G–1, 15 Jun 44, sub: Utilizationof
tolerate big overstrengths. Recalling the Limited Assignment Personnel; Memo, Lee for COfS,
experience in North Africa, where man- 9 JuI 44, sub: Manpower Bd; Memo, Franey for Lee,
power utilization had been particularly 13 Jul44. All in ETO GFRS Replacements.
105Telephone Conf, Lee and Franey, ETO, and
wasteful, he warned the theater that vig- White et al., WD, 2 Aug 44, SHAEF G–3 370.092
orous action had to be taken in order to Reinforcements 44.
464 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

ports by D plus 30. Taken together, these are tabulated on this page.106
facilities were planned to have a discharge As shown earlier, the discharge per-
capacity of about 27,000 long tons per day formance had been erratic in June, chiefly
by that date, which would be sufficient to because of the vagaries of the weather, and
support twelve divisions on the Continent. the cumulative deliveries to the far shore
Within another month (by D plus 60) at the end of the month totaled only 71
Brest, Lorient, and Quiberon Bay were to percent of planned capacities. The lag was
have been captured and brought into use not entirely due to difficulties at the
and, added to the Normandy facilities, beaches, which handled more than 98 per-
were to have brought the total capacity to cent of all supplies and equipment brought
approximately 37,000 tons per day. Of in during the first month. Cherbourg was
this, 33,000 tons would be allocated for planned to have a capacity of 5,000 tons
U.S. use to provide the 30,700 tons re- per day by the end of June, and the
quired for the maintenance and reserves smaller Normandy ports at least 2,500
build-up for sixteen divisions. tons. At the end of the month the port of
Cherbourg still lay in ruins, and the ports
of Isigny and Grandcamp had received a
total of less than 5,000 tons. Instead of the
planned capacity of approximately 25,000
tons, therefore, discharges at the end of
June were averaging 19,000 tons per day.
The planned port capacity and actual
tonnage discharged from 6 June to 30 June
a Including MULBERRY A and beaches. are summarized below.
b A portion of these tonnages was to be allocated to the
British.
Planners had pinned their hopes on
c Exclusive of bulk P O L , which in mid-June was estimated Cherbourg; it was the first major objective
to total 5,232 tons at D plus 60, 8,248 tons at D plus 90, and
8,520 tons at D plus 120. Bulk P O L tonnages normally do not
of the U.S. forces. Because it required an
enter into estimates of port discharge requirements or enormous amount of reconstruction, how-
capacity.
ever, the port could not begin operations
By D plus 90 total discharge capacities until 16 July, a full three weeks after its
in the U.S. sector were planned to reach capture. By 25 July it had been expected
46,000 tons per day, of which 40,000 tons to discharge upwards of 150,000 tons. But
would be allocated for U.S. use to meet on that date it had received only the first
the requirements of 37,600 tons for the trickle of supplies, totaling less than 18,000
support of twenty-one divisions. The total tons. 107
U.S. requirements and estimated port ca- T h e minor ports naturally assumed a
pacities in long tons for the early months greater importance than anticipated, and

a Included in OMAHA
Total.

106 SHAEFG–4 Post-NEPTUNE Adm Appreciation, 107T h e story of Cherbourg’s reconstruction is de-
1 7 Jun 44, SHAEF G–4 381 NEPTUNE
44, I. ferred to Vol. II.
THE LOGISTIC O U T L O O K I N JUNE AND JULY 465

COASTER BEING UNLOADED at the minor port of Isigny on 24 June 1944 after
coming up the canalfrom the Channel coast.

steps were taken to develop all of them St. Malo, scheduled to begin operations by
beyond the capacities originally planned. about D plus 27, were still in enemy hands
Even Carentan, originally ruled out at D plus 49 (25 July). As a result, the
because of its very limited facilities, was great bulk of supplies and equipment con-
cleared and put to use. But these efforts tinued to be brought to the Continent via
did not lead to very spectacular perform- the beaches. Of a total of 447,000 tons of
ance. Isigny and Grandcamp occasionally supplies landed between 1 and 25 July,
topped the 1,000-ton mark in July, but for 392,000 tons, or 88 percent, were brought
various reasons, among them the lack of across the open beaches. The planned ca-
materials-handling equipment and the pacity and actual discharge from 1 to 25
fact that these ports could receive only cer- July are tabulated on next page.
tain types of vessels, they averaged only OMAHAand UTAHtogether averaged
600 tons per day and accounted for a total 15,680 tons per day, almost exactly as
of only 30,000 tons in the period from 1 to scheduled despite the fact that the MUL-
25 July.108St. Vaast made no contribution
before the middle of July. Granville and 108ADSEC Operations History, pp. 34, 42–43.
466 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

a Of which 26,180 tons are included in the OMAHAtotal for July. Figures on minor ports from ADSEC Operations History
and Summaries of Operations, OMAHA Beach Command, prep in Control Sec, OMAHA Beach Comd, ETO Adm 230 OMAHA
Beach Comd.

BERRYhad been destroyed and aban- about the prospect of meeting require-
doned. But while the beaches thus more ments in the future.
than lived u p to expectations, it was ap- I n studies made before D Day and with-
parent that they could never overcome the in the first weeks after the launching of
lag in discharge which had developed. The OVERLORD logistic planners generally
average daily discharge in July, beaches agreed that port capacity would be suffi-
and ports combined, was 17,875 tons, cient to support the planned build-up to
which had actually been adequate to meet D plus 90, but only by a very narrow
the maintenance requirements of the margin, and only if the ports were cap-
forces ashore. I n fact, it had sufficed to tured as forecast. Beginning at D plus 120
build up reserves at approximately the port capacity was actually expected to fall
scale planned—fourteen days by 17 short of requirements, with a serious defi-
July. 109 But this feat had been possible ciency continuing for several months. This
only because of the low rates of consump- unsatisfactory situation was therefore rec-
tion attending the slow advance a n d the ognized from the beginning, and the
unexpected low scale of demolitions. Re- planners appreciated that every effort
examination of future operations in the would have to be made to increase ca-
light of current experience gave no assur- pacity.110But the first month's experience
ance that maintenance tonnages of the upset even this forecast. By early July the
future could be reduced, slow tactical progress had already post-
O n 25 July the beaches and ports were poned the capture of Granville and St.
receiving supplies at the rate of approxi- Malo and made it almost certain that the
mately 22,000 tons per day. This did not other Brittany ports would not be taken
accurately represent total capacity, since as scheduled. The deficits in discharge
the minor ports actually had a higher ca- capacity threatened to become even
pacity than could normally be utilized. greater than anticipated.
Furthermore, the port of Cherbourg had
just begun operating and was expected to
improve its performance steadily. The sup- 109Ltr, Smith to Secy COS Corn, War Cabinet, 19
Jul 44, sub: Shipping for OVERLORD,SHAEF SGS 540
port of U.S. forces was therefore not in Shipping Problems.
immediate jeopardy. But in view of the 110
Post-NEPTUNE Opns Adm Appreciation, SHAEF
uncertainty as to the dates by which addi- G–4, 17 Jun 44, SHAEF G–4 381 NEPTUNE44, I;
Memo, Napier for MOWT, 23 Jun 44, sub: Port Ca-
tional ports would be captured, and the pacities on Continent, SHAEF G–4 825.1 Piers,
certainty that good weather could not be Wharves, Docks and Berths, 44,II; Ltr, Hq COMZ to
depended on indefinitely for the operation U.S. Adm Stf 21 A Gp, 23 Jun 44, sub: Build-up D
plus 60 through D plus 90, SHAEF G–4 Stf Study 1 1 ,
of the beaches, the slow tactical progress Opn NEPTUNE,Pts. I and II, U.S. Forces D 41/90
thus far gave sufficient cause for misgivings 142/11 GDP–1.
T H E LOGISTIC O U T L O O K IN JUNE AND JULY 467

T h e importance of Brittany in the were considered paramount in impor-

OVERLORD plan can hardly be exagger- tance. 111
ated. T h e very success of OVERLORD Early in July the Allies considered an
seemed predicated on the organization of alternate plan, known as LUCKYSTRIKE,
that area as the principal U.S. base of which called for an eastward drive with
operations. Cherbourg had been planned maximum strength in an effort to defeat
to develop a capacity of no more than the enemy forces west of the Seine, fol-
8,000 to 9,000 tons. The minor ports were lowed by a forcing of that river and the
from the start intended only to provide capture of the Seine ports. Neither the
stopgap aid until the capacities of the Communications Zone nor the SHAEF
major ports could be developed. Brittany planning staffs regarded this scheme favor-
was intended to have a much greater role. ably. While they agreed that any deteri-
The first big depot area was planned to be oration in enemy resistance would have to
organized in the Rennes–Laval region; the be exploited, and admitted that a n east-
main flow of troops and their organiza- ward drive could be supported up to a
tional equipment was planned to take point, both staffs insisted that such an
place through Brest; and Quiberon Bay operation must not unduly interfere with
was to be developed into one of the princi- the early capture of the Brittany ports,
pal supply ports, with a n eventual capacity for on the development of those ports all
of 10,000 tons per day. These plans were subsequent operations by U.S. forces were
now threatened to be voided by the delay then believed to depend. The early cap-
in the advance. ture of the Seine ports, they held, would
The need for adequate port capacity by no means compensate for the abandon-
had had a continuing influence on all tac- ment of the Brittany ports, and they there-
tical plans. Consideration had already fore concluded that the proposed opera-
been given in May to a 21 Army Group tion would fit current strategic concepts
plan (known as AXEHEAD) which argued only if the capture of the Brittany ports
that for administrative reasons the Allied was not appreciably delayed thereby.112
forces should aim at securing the Seine The full import of the port problem
ports as early as possible. It suggested that, came to be appreciated early in July, when
after establishment of the lodgment, alter- the possibility of an accelerated build-up
nate thrusts should be made eastward and was being considered, a n d occupied the
southwestward in an attempt to deceive minds of top commanders increasingly
the enemy and compel him to disperse his
forces, and that the Allied forces should 11121 A G p Appreciation on Possibility of Opera-
then take advantage of the most favorable tions to Secure a Lodgment Area, 7 May 44, 12 A Gp
G–3; Ltr, Vaughan to C-in-C 2 1 A Gp, sub: Opn
circumstances to drive either eastward to AXEHEAD-capture of Seine Ports at Expense of Se-
the Seine or toward Quiberon Bay. The curing Biscay Ports, 15 Jun 44, E U C O M 381/2 War
Communications Zone opposed the plan Plans General.
112 Outlineof possible developments, Operation
on the basis that simultaneous drives in L U C K YSTRIKE,U.S. Adm Stf, H q 21 A Gp, 30 Jun
both directions could not be supported 44, a n d Appreciation of LUCKYSTRIKEfrom COMZ
H q FECOMZ, 2 JuI 44, EUCOM LUCKY
logistically, and it did not favor any oper- standpoint,
STRIKE381, I; Operation Lucky Strike, Beneficiary,
ation that would be carried out at the ex- and Hands Up, Examination by Plng Stf, SHAEF. 3
pense of the Brittany objectives, which J u l4 4 , SHAEF SGS 381 LUCKYSTRIKE.
468 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

throughout the month as tactical opera- crease in the capacity of the beaches
tions continued to drag and the prospec- through September, and a n increase in
tive capture dates for the Brittany ports the capacityof the minor ports.115 But
became more and more distant. Both these estimates had been made on the as-
General Eisenhower and General Mont- sumption that the Brittany ports would
gomery repeatedly stressed the necessity of still be captured according to original
capturing the Brittany ports, and captur- schedules, and as Maj. Gen. N. C. D.
ing them soon. Both recognized that with- Brownjohn (Br.), the deputy G–4, pointed
out them the Allied forces would be greatly out, “We can rest assured that this will not
handicapped in developing their full po- in fact happen.” 116
tential.113
Consideration was even given to By mid-July the original estimated cap-
plans for combined airborne and amphib- ture dates were frankly recognized as un-
ious operations designed to “loosen up the realistic, and in the case of Quiberon Bay
right flank” and capture St. Malo (plan a n d Brest were postponed as much as
BENEFICIARY), Quiberon Bay (plan HANDS thirty days (to D plus 85 a n d D plus 90
UP), and Brest (plan SWORDHILT). All respectively). 117Consequently, capacities
were considered extremely hazardous, were again scaled down. I n their studies of
however, and it was agreed that such oper- the port problem in July it was normal for
ations would be attempted only in the the planners to examine logistic capabil-
event complete stalemate occurred in the ities in the light of the different courses
Normandy bridgehead area and the ad- which operations might take. They con-
vance was so delayed that the Brittany sidered three alternate cases: operations
ports could not be captured before 1 Sep- might go according to plan, with both the
ternber.114 Brittany and Seine ports being captured
Throughout the month of July the esti-
mated dates of capture and the capacities 113Ltr, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 7 J u l 44, and
Ltr, Montgomery to Eisenhower, 8 J u l4 4 , SHAEF 381
of the various ports were refigured again OVERLORD.
and again on the basis of alternate assump- 114Operation Lucky Strike, Beneficiary and
tions regarding the rate of advance, the Hands Up, Examination by Planning Staff, SHAEF,
3 J u l 44, SHAEF SGS 381 L U C K YSTRIKE;Memo,
possibility of raising the capacities of ports Eisenhower for Smith, 6 J u l4 4 with atchd G–3 study,
already captured, reduced requirements, 11 Jul 44, sub: Opns in Brittany, and Outline Plan for
and the availability of various types of Air Landing Operation in the Brittany Peninsula,
Memorandum for the Planning Staff, SHAEF Plng
shipping. I n the first week of July the Stf PS-SHAEF (44) 29 (Final) S H A E F G–3 War
Movements and Transportation Branch of Diary.
G–4, SHAEF, submitted revised estimates 115Memo, Col C. Ravenhill, Log Plans Br, for G–4,
of port capacities in which the previous 8G–4 Jul 44, sub: PortCapacities—Post-NEPTUNE,SHAEF
Log Plans Br, 1062/6/Log. P Post-OVERLORD—
deficits were met on all dates and in which Port Capacities.
a sizable surplus was actually forecast for 116Memo, Brownjohn for Mov and T n Br G–4, 11
D plus 90. These upward revisions were Jabove, u l 44, sub: Port Capacities Post-NEPTUNE, file cited
n. 115.
made possible by a proposed increase in 117Memo, Col Vissering, Mov and T n Br G–4
shallow-draft shipping (making it possible SHAEF, for Brig Blakey, 1 Jul 44, sub: Estimated
to take fuller advantage of the smaller Chief Dates of Capture of Ports, a n d Memo, Whipple for
Mov and T n Br G–4, 15 Jul 44, same sub,
ports), a n increase in the capacity of Cher- SHAEF G–4 825.1 Piers, Wharves, Docks and Berths,
bourg from 8,800 to 15,000 tons, an in- 44, II.
THE LOGISTIC OUTLOOK I N JUNE AND JULY 469

in accordance with the latest forecasts; Brest would now have to debark else-
operations might be stalemated at the where. Consequently, it was necessary to
Seine; a n d under the gloomiest assump- prepare staging facilities in the Cherbourg
tion the bridgehead might congeal on the area and to develop beach discharge ca-
Avranches–Vire; line, in which case no ad- pacities to the maximum in order to give
ditional ports would become available in adequate support to operations and build
the near future. up sufficient reserves.120
Both port capacities and tonnage re- These basic changes in reception facil-
quirements would be different in each ities were bound to have their repercus-
case. Paradoxically, because of the heavy sions on other aspects of the logistical plan.
requirements under conditions of ex- For example, as a result of the lag in tac-
tended lines of communications, deficien- tical operations, tentative plans were now
cies in port capacities were expected to be made to develop a temporary major depot
greater and appear earlier if ports were area in the vicinity of Lison–St. Lô, a
captured on schedule than if the armies logical choice because of the continuing
were rendered immobile in a limited importance of the beaches for the recep-
bridgehead. In the latter case there would tion of cargo, and because of the location
be no deficiency until D plus 180 because of the main-line railway. Furthermore,
of lower maintenance requirements, while consideration was now given to establish-
an advance as scheduled threatened to ing the first permanent depot area farther
create a deficit in port discharge capacity eastward at Le Mans rather than at
on D plus 120.118In any event, the outlook Rennes as originally contemplated.121
was not particularly hopeful. In a tele-
phone conversation with General Lutes in
118Stf Study, Col Whipple, 13 J u l 44, sub: Port
mid-July General Lord appeared quite Requirements for AEF, SHAEF SGS 800.1 MUL-
sanguine regarding the future, reporting BERRY Case A: Ltr, Napier to Log Plans Br G–4, 17
that the beaches had recently handled J u l4 4 , sub. Port Capacities, SHAEF G–4 Log Plans
Br 1062/6/Log P, Post-OVERLORD—PORT Capacities;
more than 20,000 tons in a single day, and Shipping Note for CAO, 15 J u l4 4 , SHAEF G–4 Mov
predicting that Cherbourg’s capacity and T n War Diary 3014/22 Mov. C O M Z believed
would reach 8,000 tons in August and that the deficiency would develop as early as D plus
90 in the event of a prolonged stalemate on the line
later rise to 20,000.119But this optimism Avranches-Vire-Caen unless the loss in the capacities
was not widely shared, a n d forecasts for of the beaches a n d small ports at the start of bad
the most part reflected varying degrees of weather in September was compensated for by the
progressive development of Cherbourg. Ltr, Hq
pessimism. Colonel Stratton, the COMZ FUSAG to C G COMZ, 15J u l44, sub: Adm Implica-
G–4, was frankly alarmed over the limited tions in Event of Prolonged Delay, and Ltr, Hq
facilities presently available because troop COMZ to CG 1 2 A Gp, 31 J u l4 4 , sub: Maintenance
of U S . Forces on Continent, ETO 381/430 Tonnage
strength on the Continent was increasing OVERLORD.
and Cherbourg's full capacity would not 119 TelephoneConf, Lord with Gen Lutes, 15 Jul
be developed until October. In his opinion 44, E T O 319.1 Transportation-Telephone Con-
versations 1944–46.
it was no longer advisable to count on the 120Ltr, Stratton to Plank, 15 J u l 44, EUCOM
Brittany ports to receive a large influx of FECOMZ 322.
troops and supplies by 1 September as 121Ibid.;Memo, Stratton for Chiefs of Svcs ETO, 15
J u l4 4 , sub: Additional Cargo for Movement Through
originally planned. Troops scheduled for Period Ending D plus 90, ADSEC ASD 563.591 Ton-
direct shipment from the United States to nages, Estimates of.
470 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

In the plans for the development of weather would create towing difficulties
Brittany high hopes had been held for the later in the fall. These considerations be-
Quiberon Bay, or CHASTITY,project. gan to worry SHAEF officials a t a n early
Brest, because of its location at the very tip date. O n 3 July General Crawford, the
of the peninsula and because of the ex- G–4, General Gale, the chief administra-
pected destruction of the railways, was tive officer, General Bull, the G–3, a n d
intended to be used only for the reception other staff officers held an informal meet-
of personnel and vehicles, and for supplies ing at Southwick House, Portsmouth, to
and equipment needed in staging. Qui- consider, for one thing, the date by which
beron Bay, however, was depended on to the Quiberon area must be secured if it
handle large tonnages of freight. Its devel- was to be developed to its maximum ca-
opment had been favored over existing pacity, a n d whether substitute capacity
ports, like Nantes on the Loire, because it could be made available. T h e first ques-
would provide deepwater anchorage. The tion was not definitely answered at this
development of additional shallow-draft time, although General Crawford's Plans
capacity would have been pointless, since Branch had estimated that D plus 60 was
port capacity of this type was already the latest date by which the development
greater than could be served by the avail- of the Quiberon Bay area could be started.
able coasters. The possibility of capturing Le Havre and
It was estimated in June that even with Rouen before the weather deteriorated
Quiberon Bay in Allied hands, port ca- was discussed, but the staff officers agreed
pacity would not be sufficient to maintain that while these ports would add materi-
all the troops available in the theater until ally to discharge capacities they would not
after D plus 180. Without this capacity provide a secure base from which U.S.
the Allies were faced with a reduction by forces could operate and could not be
as many as eight divisions in the forces looked upon as a suitable alternative to
maintainable on the Continent by D plus the Brittany peninsula.123
150, and a loss in discharge capacity CHASTITY was still regarded as a n essen-
amounting to 10,000 tons per day by that tial part of the administrative plan to sup-
date. Quiberon Bay's early development port the maximum build-up of forces, and
had therefore been accepted almost as a its importance was thus reaffirmed, al-
sine qua non for the support of operations in though it was apparent that the first
southern Brittany, for the maintenance of doubts had already appeared as to the
the planned build-up, and for the attain- possibility of capturing the area in time to
ment of the maximum rate of advance make it worthwhile.124
eastward across the Seine. 122 The course of tactical operations in the
CHASTITY consequently received marked next two weeks was not very heartening,
attention in the July discussions of the port
problem. There was a n added reason for 122Aide-Mémoire on Quiberon Bay Project, Mov
and T n Br, SHAEF G–4, 15 Jun 44, SHAEF G–3 War
concern over the project because of the Diary.
time element involved. Naval require- 123Min of Informal Mtg, 3 J u l4 4 , SHAEF G–4 334
C A O Mtgs.
ments dictated that Brest be captured be- 124Memo, Crawford for CofS, SHAEF, 19 J u l 4 4 ,
fore any attempt was made to sail convoys sub: CHASTITY Project, SHAEF SGS 800.4 Quiberon
to the Quiberon Bay area, and bad Bay Project.
T H E LOGISTIC O U T L O O K I N JUNE AND JULY 471

and by mid-July it was accepted that the naval officials noted that its beaches,
Brittany ports would not be captured until which were flat a n d muddy at low tide,
a month later than planned. By that time could hardly be described as good,126but
the weather was expected to break, a de- its location actually gave it certain advan-
velopment that would render the beaches tages over the CHASTITYarea. The
less serviceable and would also complicate weather hazard would be largely elimi-
the towing problem around the Brittany nated, the towage problem materially
peninsula. An additional factor now en- lightened, the rail haul eastward short-
tering considerations was the possibility ened, and the rail construction problem
that major port reconstruction tasks, in- reduced.
stead of being spaced at intervals as orig- The committee also felt that additional
inally planned, would overlap a n d com- capacity might be developed a t Brest.
Pete for allocation of engineer and trans- With all its disadvantages, militating
portation resources. T h e various factors against its use for anything but personnel
affecting the development of the CHASTITYand vehicles, the committee thought that
project were becoming even more unfa- necessity might dictate that the sheltered
vorable, a n d the SHAEF staff therefore roadstead be used for the discharge of
asked the Communications Zone on 12 Liberties, particularly if coaster tonnage
July to initiate a thorough reconsideration fell below a certain minimum and further
of the project . 125 restricted the use of the smaller ports, and
Within the next week an E T O commit- if the capture of Le Havre (originally
tee, made up of both Army and Navy scheduled for D plus 110) was postponed
representatives, made a study of the entire and demolitions were severe.
Brittany port problem a n d submitted its The committee was reluctant to rule out
conclusions to the SHAEF G–4. CHASTITYCHASTITY completely. It still thought that
was by no means abandoned. But the in- a capacity of about 6,000 tons could be de-
creasingly unfavorable conditions sur- veloped b y early November. But even a
rounding the project convinced the logis- limited program would require high-level
tical planners that they had to look decisions and overriding priority for tow-
elsewhere to develop the needed capacity. age. T h e lateness of the season appeared
The recent experience with German dem- to rule out the probability that the project
olitions a t Cherbourg and the limited would be worthwhile. Cancale, on the
availability of coasters persuaded them other hand, appeared to require a more
that there was little point in seeking addi- economic outlay and to promise quicker
tional facilities in the Loire ports. The results, and the committee therefore rec-
most promising possibility appeared to be ommended its full development as an arti-
the development of Cancale, on the north ficial port, wherein lighters could dis-
coast of Brittany, where deepwater an- charge Liberties to newly constructed
chorage was available for Liberty ships.
125Ltr, Napier to COB E T O , 12 Jul 44, sub:
The Rade de Cancale could accommodate CHASTITY, SHAEF G–4 Mov and T n War Diary
twenty Liberties, was protected from south 3014/22 Mov; Min, Port Spearhead Plng Com Mtg,
and west winds, and could be used 15 J u l4 4 , 12 A G p 337 Confs
126Memo, Cmdr J. R. A. Seymour for Mov and T n
throughout the winter. Its capacity would Br G–4 SHAEF, 31J u l4 1 , sub: Brittany, SHAEF G–4
not be as great as Quiberon Bay, and 825.1 Piers, Wharves, Docks and Berths, 44, II.
472 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

pierheads. It also recommended that the reconsider the proposed abandonment of

chief engineer and the chief of transporta- Quiberon Bay. T h e Logistical Plans
tion be directed to prepare plans for addi- Branch was definitely of the opinion that
tional discharge at Brest and for adequate the decision to cancel CHASTITY should not
rail facilities to carry supplies to the be confirmed unless the project was
Rennes depot area.127General Napier, the proved clearly infeasible.129This view was
SHAEF Deputy G–4 for Movements, had also supported in the ETOUSA head-
meanwhile examined the whole port prob- quarters. General Lord, writing to the
lem and arrived at almost identical con- SHAEF G–4 at the end of July, asserted
clusions. 128 that the development of alternate facilities
As a consequence of these findings it at Cancale and Brest would not satisfy re-
was necessary to revise somewhat the quirements. H e saw no administrative
earlier estimates regarding an accelerated reasons which warranted the abandon-
build-up. O n 24 July, in accordance with ment of the project, and he therefore
General Crawford's instruction, the Logis- recommended that efforts be made to
tical Plans Branch, G–4, of SHAEF made overcome every obstacle in the way of a n
a significant addition to its recently writ- early implementation of the CHASTITY
ten staff study on U.S. personnel build-up. plan. 130
Based on the more sober estimates result- In the atmosphere of uncertainty which
ing from the recent port studies it pre- prevailed at the end of July no final deci-
dicted a deficiency of about 12,000 tons sions were made regarding either the can-
per day for the support of the accelerated cellation of CHASTITY or the speed of the
build-up (Plan Y ) ,beginning in October build-up. At the end of the month repre-
when beach discharge was expected to fail. sentatives of the SHAEF G–3, the Com-
Capture of the Seine ports, it estimated, munications Zone, and the War Depart-
would ameliorate this situation somewhat, ment tentatively decided that preparations
but not for some time. Crossing the Seine should be made to dispatch divisions to
would extend the lines of communications the E T O to meet the accelerated build-up
and raise maintenance requirements tre- under the optimistic Plan Y, but that the
mendously, and additional port capacity Communications Zone should be pre-
to offset such demands would not be forth- pared to accommodate a n d administer a
coming for perhaps two months after the reserve of divisions in the United King-
river was crossed. Consequently the build- dom in accord with the more realistic Plan
up from October through December could X. Since the build-up would be deter-
not be accelerated as a result of a success-
ful crossing of the Seine. Even assuming 127Ltr, Col Hugh A. Murrill, OCofT C O M Z to
G–4 SHAEF, 19 J u l 44, sub: CHASTITY Project,
that the resources intended for the devel- SHAEF G–4 825.1 Piers, Wharves, Docks and Berths,
opment of Quiberon Bay were shifted to 44,II.
the northern Brittany ports, it concluded 128Ltr,Napier to Log Plans Br G–4, 21 JuI 44, sub:
Brittany, file cited above, n. 127.
that the postponement of the capture of 129Stf Study 12, Pt. II, Delay in Capture of Brittany
the Brittany and Seine ports would reduce and Seine Ports, 24Jul 44, SHAEF G–4 825.1 Piers,
by six the number of divisions which could Wharves, Docks and Berths, 44, II.
130 Memo,Lord for G–4 SHAEF, 30 Jul 44, sub:
be maintained by December. This de- CHASTITY Project, ETO 381/800 Ports, Harbors, and
pressing prediction gave cause enough to Beaches-OVERLORD,
T H E LOGISTIC O U T L O O K I N JUNE AND JULY 473

mined largely by the date of capture of the tion of railway spurs to those dumps to
last of the Brittany ports, it would become permit more efficient support of the armies
evident by D plus 90, they thought, which as they displaced forward. 134
of the various plans could be consum- Meanwhile, as a hedge against the
mated.131 threatened logistical difficulties, top ad-
Although hope still remained in late ministrative officials had agreed in mid-
July that the original plans could be car- July that the planned build-up of supplies
ried out, the search for new ways to meet would henceforth be disregarded in favor
the threatened deficits continued. Besides of delivery to the Continent by every pos-
deciding to develop Brest to the maximum sible means of tonnage to the full capacity
capacity feasible and considering Cancale, of U.K. outloadings and far-shore accept-
the planners made studies of other Brit- ance. Because of the low tonnages re-
tany ports, such as St. Brieuc, Binic, Mor- quired in the first month the British Chiefs
laix, and Roscoff.132Meanwhile, they ex- of Staff had asked the Supreme Com-
plored every possibility of expanding the mander to review maintenance needs with
capacity of existing facilities. General Lee a view toward easing the burden on ship-
urged an increase in the U.S. allotment of ping a n d the U.K. ports. General Gale,
coaster tonnage, a n d advised a substitu- the chief administrative officer, did not be-
tion of LST’s and LCT’s for M T ships in lieve that a reduction in maintenance was
the shuttle service between the United warranted simply on the first month's ex-
Kingdom a n d the Continent in order to perience, and the proposal was therefore
permit a better use of both dock labor and rejected in favor of the policy of continu-
ferrying craft on the far shore and thereby ing the maximum flow of supplies. Gen-
enhance the performance of the small eral Crawford announced that an attempt
ports and the beaches. Preparations were would be made to transfer to France some
made to raise Cherbourg's capacity to at million a n d a half tons of U.S. reserves
least 20,000 tons per day,133and still then being held in the United Kingdom.135
greater attention was now given to the de- Thus the port problem for the moment
velopment of the smaller ports. The minor at least appeared to constitute the very
ports had already had their targets raised root of future logistical difficulties. Experi-
at the end of June. Following additional
studies in July, plans were made for their 131Memo, Osmanski for Chief Plans Br, 31 JuI 44,
maximum development—to a combined sub: U.S. Build-up, SHAEF G–4 Troop Flow 121/1
GDP–1.
capacity of 17,000 tons—involving several 132 Memo, Mov a n d T n Br G–4 S H A E F for
months of work and the expenditure of DACOS G–4, Mov a n d T n Br, 25 J u l4 4 , sub: Port
considerable amounts of labor and ma- Capacities, SHAEF G–4 825.1 Piers etc.
133Ltr, Lee to U.S. Adm Stf at 21 A Gp, 26 J u l4 4 ,
terials. Pending the development of ade- sub: Increased Beach and Port Capacity, ADSEC
quate capacity in the larger ports it was 323.3 Mil Depts a n d Divs—Ports.
also decided to risk bad weather and ex- 134Memo, Lord for G–4 SHAEF, 30 J u l 44, sub:
CHASTITYProject SHAEF G–4 Quiberon Bay
tend the use of the beaches beyond Sep- (CHASTITY) 146/3 GDP–1.
tember. Beach dumps at both UTAHand 135Min, C A O Mtg, 15 Jul44, SHAEF G–4 334
OMAHA were in a good position to give C A O Mtgs; Draft Ltr, Gale to Smith, 19 J u l 1 4 , sub:
Maintenance–Opn OVERLORD, and Ltr, Smith to
close support to the combat forces, and Secy COS Com, 19Jul 44, sub: Shipping for OVER-
consideration was given to the construc- LORD, SHAEF SGS 540 Shipping Problems.
474 LOGISTICAL S U P P O R T OF T H E ARMIES

ence had revealed that estimates as to the wrote to the 21 Army Group commander
time by which ports could be captured late in the month: “We must get the Brit-
a n d p u t t o use had been too optimistic. tany Peninsula. From a n administrative
This was balanced in part by the fact that point of view this is essential. We must not
the ultimate capacity of all the ports cap- only have the Brittany Peninsula-we
tured thus far h a d been underestimated. must have it quickly. So we must hit with
In any event, Brittany s importance in the everything. 136
administrative scheme h a d by no means
diminished a t t h e end of July in the eyes 136Memo by Gen Smith re the part played by Gen
Eisenhower in early days of OVERLORD, p. 9, Notes on
of t h e logistical planners. This view was Establishment of Lodgment Area, Gen Bd Item 46,
reinforced by General Eisenhower, who Box 47.
 CHAPTER XII

Breakout and Pursuit

( I ) Tactical Developments armored elements of both the VIII Corps
(which also had a strength of four infantry
For most of the month of July the First and two armored divisions) and VII Corps
U.S. Army had been preoccupied with a converged on Coutances. They captured
series of attacks designed to win additional the town on the same day, completing the
maneuver space and to gain the more fa- major part of the COBRA operation.
vorable terrain—the higher ground be- Taking full advantage of the enemy’s dis-
tween Coutances and St. Lô—considered organization, the VII Corps turned south-
essential as a line of departure for a gen- ward and together with the VIII Corps
eral offensive. These attacks were halted vigorously pressed the attack. By 31 July
on about 18July, at which time the front the Americans had captured both Gran-
line lay just north of the Lessay–Périers– ville a n d Avranches, thus unhinging the
St. Lô highway. This was somewhat short enemy’s left flank a n d opening the door
of the objective assigned early in the into Brittany.
month. Nevertheless, the time now ap- O n 1 August, with a total of eighteen
peared propitious to launch a n all-out U.S. divisions available on the Continent,
attack to break through the enemy de- the 12th Army Group became operational
fenses in Normandy as a prelude to a drive under the command of General Bradley,
into Brittany. Postponed for a week be- taking control of both the First Army
cause of unfavorable weather, Operation (eleven divisions on 1 August), now com-
COBRAwas finally launched on 25 July. manded by General Hodges, and the
Following an air bombardment on an un- Third Army, which also became opera-
precedented scale, the heavily reinforced tional at this time under the command of
VII Corps (four infantry and two armored General Patton. The Third Army initially
divisions) initiated the offensive on a nar- consisted of the V I I I Corps, which was
row front between Périers and St. Lô. taken over in place, and the newly arrived
( M a p 15) In the face of devastating blows X V Corps, and had seven divisions at its
from the air and on the ground the enemy disposal.
lines soon gave way. O n the second and T h e attacks continued without inter-
third day of the attack telling strokes by ruption on 1 August. While the First Army
the V I I Corps ripped a n ever-widening drove back the enemy’s center southeast-
breach in the enemy’s positions. Mean- ward toward Vire, the Third Army struck
while, beginning on 26 July, the attacks southward through the Avranches gap
were joined first by the VIII and V Corps, with the mission of clearing Brittany. By 3
a n d then by the X I X Corps. O n 28 July August Rennes was captured, and ar-
476 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

MAP 15
mored units had already knifed more than of Vire. South of the Sélune River, how-
80 miles into the heart of the peninsula, ever, the enemy’s defenses had been com-
reaching Loudéac. pletely shattered by the breakout at
At that date the enemy still presented a Avranches, and resistance was for the most
cohesive defense in First Army’s sector and part un-co-ordinated, with some units in
offered stubborn resistance in the vicinity flight. I n addition, warm, clear weather
BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT 477

R Johnstone

enabled the Allied air forces to take full Brittany of all its mobile units, and a
advantage of their superiority, providing strongly organized French resistance now
continuous cover to friendly armored came forward to hasten the enemy’s dis-
columns and relentlessly attacking all ene- integration in the peninsula. Conse-
my movements and concentrations. Fur- quently there was little to impede the ad-
thermore, the enemy had already denuded vance of U.S. forces in the area.
478 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

This very favorable combination of cir- enemy persisted in his attacks for several
cumstances led to the first major alteration days, attempting to isolate the Third
in the tactical plan. O n 3 August the Army, this threat was not considered seri-
Third Army was directed to employ the ous enough to alter the latter’s mission. In
minimum forces necessary to clear the fact, it was decided to capitalize still fur-
Brittany peninsula and protect the south- ther on the enemy’s weakness and disor-
ern flank along the Loire, and to make its ganization in the south and his deep com-
main effort eastward to the Mayenne mitment at Mortain without awaiting the
River. I n accordance with these new in- outcome of the action on First Army’s
structions the X V Corps drove eastward, front. T h e spectacular advances of Gen-
capturing the city of Mayenne on 4 Aug- eral Patton’s forces appeared to offer the
ust and Laval on the following day. Mean- glittering prospect of trapping and de-
while the V I I I Corps continued to push stroying the entire German Seventh Army
westward in Britanny. By 5 August the west of the Seine. O n 8 August, therefore,
Quiberon Bay area was almost completely in accordance with instructions from 12th
cleared and St. Malo was under attack. Army Group, the Third Army captured
Faced with the inviting prospect of de- Le Mans and then directed its main effort
livering a decisive blow to German forces north toward Argentan while the 21 Army
west of the Seine the 12th Army Group Group attacked southward toward Falaise
commander on 6 August directed the in a huge double envelopment of the Ger-
Third Army to continue its eastward drive man forces. Armored elements of the X V
to secure crossings over the Sarthe in prep- Corps reached Argentan on 13 August,
aration for an advance to occupy the where the advance on the southern edge of
Chartres plain and close the Paris- the pocket was halted on instructions from
Orléans gap between the Seine and the General Montgomery. T h e First Cana-
Loire. Motorized infantry and armor ac- dian Army met determined enemy resist-
cordingly pushed beyond the Mayenne, ance in the vicinity of Falaise, and the trap
and on 7 August advanced to within was not closed until 19 August, at Cham-
twelve miles of Le Mans. By that time bois, only a few miles northeast of Argen-
VIII Corps units had overrun most of the tan. The delay enabled the enemy to
Brittany peninsula and prepared to invest withdraw considerable forces, although
the major ports, including Brest and the Allied air and ground forces inflicted
Lorient. In the south the Third Army was heavy losses in personnel and even more
reinforced by an additional corps (the severe losses in materiel.
X X ) , which took over the protection of As early as 14 August, meanwhile, tak-
the southern flank, twenty to thirty miles ing advantage of the enemy’s mounting
north of the Loire. confusion, the Third Army was ordered to
O n the same day, 7 August, in a desper- resume the advance eastward. Leaving
ate attempt to sever the narrow Avranches elements of the XV Corps on the southern
corridor and restore a cohesive defense edge of the pocket at Argentan to be taken
line anchored on the coast, the enemy over by First Army, the Third Army re-
launched a violent counterattack against initiated its attacks eastward, with the XV
the First Army westward from Mortain, Corps driving on Dreux, the XX Corps
employing many armored units. While the driving on Chartres, and the newly ar-
BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT 479

rived X I I Corps advancing on Orléans. LORD in the capture of bridgeheads across

These objectives were captured within two the Seine. Plans had contemplated a halt
days, and on 19 August, as Allied forces at this barrier. But with enemy forces in
were closing the gap at Chambois, the France greatly weakened and in flight
Third Army established a bridgehead there appeared to be little reason for ad-
across the Seine at Mantes-Gassicourt, hering to original plans.
thirty miles below Paris. Leaving British To exploit this favorable situation the
units to mop u p the encircled enemy forces Supreme Command on 19 August made
in the Argentan-Falaise pocket, the First the decision to continue the pursuit of the
Army now also moved eastward and on 23 disorganized enemy forces at the maxi-
August took over the Mantes-Gassicourt mum rate which logistical capabilities
bridgehead and the X V Corps and started would allow. First Army’s initial task after
across the Seine. South of Paris other crossing the Seine was to encircle Paris,
Third Army units pressed eastward and the intention being to avoid a battle for its
forced additional crossings near Melun possession. An uprising of partisans in the
and Fontainebleau on the 24th. city, combined with reports of grave food
Meanwhile, between 250 and 350 miles shortages, brought a change in plans,how-
from the scene of these dramatic events, ever, and on 25 August French and Amer-
the battle continued for possession of the ican forces entered the capital to assist in
Brittany ports. At Lorient, Nantes, and St. its liberation.
Nazaire activity was limited to containing At the same time both First and Third
the enemy garrisons, and at Morlaix to the Armies, now comprising nine and six divi-
protection of the beaches. At St. Malo the sions respectively (an additional five divi-
enemy stubbornly resisted the siege for two sions were engaged in Brittany and along
weeks, finally surrendering the citadel on the Loire), began their drives northeast-
17 August. In the middle of the month ward beyond the Seine. Continuing its
some of the armored units which had giant strides, the Third Army by 29 Aug-
spearheaded the race for the Brittany ust had crossed the Marne and captured
ports began to be released for employment Reims and Châlons-sur-Marne. Then,
in the Third Army’s eastward drive, and turning eastward, it advanced rapidly to
the VIII Corps received in their place the Meuse, crossing at Verdun, St. Mihiel,
some of the First Army infantry divisions and Commercy on 31 August.
pinched out in the closing of the Argen- North of Paris, where the enemy had
tan-Falaise pocket. These divisions were larger forces and where his retreat had
transferred to Brest, where the attack on been more deliberate a n d orderly, Allied
the port finally got under way on 25 advances were not initially as rapid, al-
August. though the First Army right flank units
Except for the Brittany ports the “initial (VII Corps) made spectacular gains,
lodgment area,” embracing the entire reaching Soissons on 29 August and Mont-
area between the Seine and Loire rivers, cornet a n d Rethel on the last day of the
had been cleared by 24 August (D plus month.
79), virtually completing Operation The pursuit of the retreating enemy
OVERLORD. I n fact, operations had al- forces was pressed by the Allied armies in
ready gone beyond the objectives of OVER- the first days of September, although the
480 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

pace of the advance was now noticeably enemy had succeeded in stabilizing the
affected by lack of supplies, particularly front after a near-disastrous rout in north-
fuel. O n the extreme left the 21 Army ern France.
Group crossed the Somme and captured The VIII Corps continued to engage
Amiens on 31 August. Three days later the enemy in Brittany. O n 5 September
British forces entered Brussels a n d on 4 Third Army was relieved of further
September captured Antwerp, with its responsibility for operations in that area
port facilities for the most part intact. The and for security along the Loire, the VIII
enemy clung tenaciously to Le Havre until Corps now coming under the direction of
12 September and then surrendered a the newly arrived Ninth U.S. Army, com-
badly damaged port. By mid-September manded by Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson.
British forces stood at the Dutch border. Fully appreciating the value which the
First Army continued its drive north- Allies attached to the ports, the enemy
eastward until Mons was captured on 3 successfully resisted the attacks on the
September, and then reoriented its attacks Brest fortress for almost four weeks. When
directly eastward. Two days later First the siege finally came to a n end on 18
Army units crossed the Meuse, and on September ( D plus 104) he surrendered a
11 September made the first pentrations thoroughly shattered port.
of the German border. By 12 September Meanwhile in southern France Allied
almost all of Luxembourg was cleared, forces struck still another blow in an oper-
and with the exception of the left flank the ation subsidiary to OVERLORD. O n 15
entire First Army now held a line gener- August the Seventh U.S. Army, with
ally along the German border. French forces attached, under the com-
Farther south the Third Army contin- mand of Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch,
ued to press eastward, and on 7 September launched Operation DRAGOON, assaulting
established the first bridgehead over the the Mediterranean coast of France be-
Moselle near Metz. In the next few days it tween Cannes and Toulon. I n co-ordina-
made additional crossings near Metz and tion with an airborne drop by British and
in the vicinity of Nancy. American paratroops the assaulting forces
Stiffening enemy resistance character- quickly won a beachhead. Striking both
ized the fighting of all the Allied armies in westward and northward, Allied forces
the second week of September, and the captured Marseille on 28 August and by
momentum of the pursuit was abruptly the end of the month closed in on Lyon,
reduced. By 12 September it was apparent more than 200 miles up the Rhône valley.
that the sustained drive which had begun Matching the lightning sweeps of the 12th
early in August had come to an end. In Army Group in northern France, the
the north the enemy now faced the First Seventh Army advanced more than 300
Army from the formidable defenses of the miles by 10 September, when it captured
Siegfried Line; farther south, increasingly Dijon. O n the following day armored
favored by the terrain, the enemy fought reconnaissance elements operating west of
desperately to halt the Third Army that city made the first contact with forces
advances at the barrier of the Moselle, of the 12th Army Group when they met a
launching many counterattacks. In the patrol from a n armored unit of the Third
entire area of the 12th Army Group the Army, and within the next few days a
BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT 481

link-up between the two armies was made ture of Brittany as a prerequisite to the
in force. By mid-September, therefore, proper support of operations eastward, the
virtually all of France, Belgium, and Allied planning staffs in May and June
Luxembourg had been cleared of the had considered alternate schemes of ma-
enemy, and a continuous front from the neuver which might be implemented
North Sea to Switzerland had been should a weakening of the enemy to the
established. south and east permit a drive on the Seine
ports in place of the expected advance into
(2) The Logistic Implications of Brittany. In LUCKY STRIKE an exploitation
Changing Plans was proposed taking the form of a drive
toward the Seine with maximum forces in
I n their pursuit of enemy forces across a n effort to defeat enemy forces west of the
northern France and Belgium the Allied river, followed by a forcing of the Seine
armies began to feel the full impact of and capture of Le Havre and Rouen. 2
logistic limitations. The detailed descrip- The reaction to both LUCKY STRIKE and
tion of the supply problems of August and the earlier plan known as AXEHEAD had
early September is reserved for the next been lukewarm, mainly for logistic rea-
chapter. To understand the basic causes sons. Granting the desirability of such an
for the difficulties and to appreciate the operation, the SHAEF planning staff was
magnitude of the logistic feat of this not very optimistic over logistical capabili-
period, it is helpful to recapitulate the ties. It estimated that a highly mobile force
forecasts and estimates of capabilities of only six divisions could take part in the
made by the OVERLORD planners in the exploitation. Three divisions would be left
months before the actual pursuit. in the vicinity of Le Mans to protect the
The OVERLORD plan had contemplated flank, and a n additional six operating at
a more or less steady rate of progress reduced scales of maintenance a n d a
which would have taken the U.S. forces to smaller allocation of motor transport
the line Avranches–Mortain by D plus 20, would open St. Malo and continue opera-
would have uncovered a n area southward tions in Brittany. Even this plan would
to the Loire a n d extending from Lorient require that the exploiting force be given
to Le Mans by D plus 40, and would have first priority on supplies, and-movements
completed the capture of the OVERLORD of reserves to support the forces in Brittany
lodgment area by D plus 90. There was would have to be virtually suspended.
some skepticism concerning the possibility Exploitation across the Seine would
of supporting the operation on the desired obviously be desirable, but it was almost
scales, but it was generally held before D completely ruled out so far as U.S. forces
Day and throughout June that the opera-
tion was logistically feasible provided 1Adm Stf Study 1 1 , Logistical Situation of U.S.
certain conditions were met, in particular Forces D plus 41 to D plus 90, Log Plans Br G–4
SHAEF, 3 Jun 44, SHAEF G–4 Adm Stf Study 1 1 ,
that the operation should not proceed Item 14; Ltr, Hq COMZ to U.S. Adm Stf, 21 A Gp,
faster than scheduled a n d that the 23 Jun 44, sub: Build-up D plus 60–D plus 90, SHAEF
build-up be limited to the size then G–4 SS 11 Opn NEPTUNE,142/11 GDP–1.
2 H q 21 A Gp, U.S. Adm Stf, Outline of possible
planned. 1 developments Operation LUCKY STRIKE,30 Jun 44,
While the plan had regarded the cap- EUCOM LUCKYSTRIKE381, I.
482 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

were concerned. The staff believed that it At the start of the COBRA
operation on
would be logistically infeasible to main- 25 July the front lines were approximately
tain anything but the smallest American forty days behind the phase lines forecast
forces east of the Seine until the lines of in plans. At that time the Movements and
communications were organized and Transportation Branch of G–4, SHAEF,
stocks built up in forward areas. British again analyzed the possibility of support-
and Canadian forces would be in a much ing U.S. forces at the Seine, assuming that
better position to seize bridgeheads east of they could still complete the capture of the
the river, but it was concluded that the lodgment area by D plus 90 as originally
participation of U.S. forces should be planned. Since this would require an
limited to protection of the British right advance from the D-plus-15 to the
flank in such operations. British and D-plus-90 phase line in only forty-one
Canadian forces might in fact be able to days (from D plus 49 to D plus 90), a con-
launch an armored thrust to the Seine siderable acceleration was required.
before U.S. forces were ready to partici- Movements and Transportation officers
pate, a n d the planners concluded that if concluded that in such a n advance U.S.
enemy resistance weakened sufficiently to forces would be certain to experiencesup-
permit this, or if the enemy began to with- ply difficulties by the time they reached
draw before U.S. forces could be ready, it the D-plus-80 phase line, for they pre-
would actually be unnecessary for Ameri- dicted a shortage of about twenty-nine
can forces to participate even in the truck companies. This difficulty might be
advance to the Seine. U.S. participation overcome if a n intensive effort was made
in LUCKYSTRIKE,it was noted, would immediately to move U.S. reserves well
interfere with the rate of development of forward to temporary dumps in the
an adequate base and line of communica- vicinity of St. Lô. T h e accumulation o fa
tions. It would therefore actually entail an large stock of supplies in that area would
administrative handicap which, it was reduce the length of haul later when trans-
vaguely hinted, might have serious conse- portation resources were fully extended.
quences later. The prime consideration T h e only other alternatives were to bor-
was that such a n operation must not row trucks from the British or carry out
unduly interfere with the early capture of additional rail reconstruction. At the
the Brittany ports.3 D-plus-90 phase line (the Seine) the plan-
While the possibility of assigning a ners estimated that there would be a
higher priority to the eastward drive and shortage of 127 truck companies, which
the capture of the Seine ports thus con- could be compensated for only by addi-
tinued to be examined just before and tional rail reconstruction.4 At the end of
after D Day, there was no alteration in the 3 Ltr, G–3 SHAEF to SHAEF Stf, 4 Jul 44, sub:
basic assumption that the possession of the Opns LUCKYSTRIKE,BENEFICIARY and HANDSUP,
Brittany ports was a prerequisite to sus- with atchd study, Operations Lucky Strike, Bene-
ficiary and Hands Up, Examination by Planning
tained operations eastward. During July Staff, 3 JuI 44, SHAEF G–3 War Diary.
this concept became even more hardened 4 Total requirements at that time would be equiva-
as a result of the painfully slow tactical lent to 462 companies; actual facilities would total 227
truck companies and an equivalent of 108 in rail
progress and in view of the predicted transportation, or total facilities of 335, leaving a
deficiencies in port capacity. deficit of 127.
BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT 483

July, therefore, it was estimated that ing a decisive blow to the enemy west of
transportation facilities would probably the Seine, and the decision was now made
be inadequate to supply U.S. forces even to execute the enveloping maneuver
on the D-plus-90 phase line a t D plus 90.5 already described. O n 14 August, after
This was indeed a pessimistic view of reaching Argentan, the Third Army was
logistic capabilities. ordered to continue eastward, a n d a few
When U.S. forces suddenly lunged for- days later its mission was still further
ward a t the beginning of August the speed extended to the seizure of bridgeheads
of their advance almost immediately upset across the Seine.
all the calculations of the staffs, and Supply planners had been quick to
brought the planners face to face with the realize the administrative implications of
problem they so recently had been debat- pursuit operations. As early as 2 August, a
ing. O n 3 August, with Third Army forces day after the break-through, Colonel
streaming through the Avranches corridor Whipple, chief of the Logistical Plans
and fanning out to the south and west, Branch, G–4, SHAEF, noted that logistic
General Bradley made a major alteration limitations would shortly assume major
in the tactical plan when he directed the importance. Anticipating the questions of
Third Army to make its main effort east- the operational planners, his group imme-
ward, leaving only the minimum forces diately began a study to determine the
necessary for operations in Brittany. The maximum rate of exploitation which
importance of Brittany was by no means might be supported eastward concurrent
minimized by this decision; the rapid with operations in Brittany, a n d the
occupation of the peninsula, in the Su- logistic implications of an early drive to
preme Commander’s view, remained a capture Paris. 7 Providing answers to these
primary task. 6 While the redirection of the questions involved a thorough review of
Third Army’s effort was expected to delay such factors as port capacities, scales of
the capture of the Brittany ports some- maintenance, a n d transportation re-
what, such a delay was expected to be a sources.
minor one and therefore acceptable. By 11 August the G–4 Plans Branch
Nevertheless this decision marked the first had completed a tentative survey. At that
step in a repeated subordination of logistic date its estimate of logistic capabilities
considerations to prospects of immediate continued to be guarded. It concluded
tactical advantage. that four U.S. divisions could be sup-
During the next few days the easy suc- ported in an exploitation to the Seine by
cesses of the Third Army opened up even 20 August (D plus 75) on the condition
greater possibilities. T h e sequence of that U.S. forces in Brittany were main-
events and circumstances which developed
in the first week of August was remarkably 5 Ltr, Vissering to Deputy G–4, Mov and T n Br, 23
like that upon which the LUCKYSTRIKE J u l44, sub: Review of Stf Study 11, SHAEF G–4, Stf
Study 11—Opn NEPTUNE, U.S. Forces D plus 41/90,
plan was premised—namely, a n open 142/11 GDP–1.
flank had been created in the absence of 6 Cbl S–56667, Eisenhower to Marshall, 2 Aug 44,
appreciable enemy forces either in Brit- Eyes Only Cbls, Smith Papers.
7 Ltr, Whipple to G–3 Plans et al., 2 Aug 44, sub:
tany or in the region of the Loire. These Log Plng Preparatory to Crossing Seine, SHAEF G–4
conditions offered the prospect of deliver- 381 W a r Plans General, I, 44.
484 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

tained entirely through Brittany ports or which it was based were invalidated by
beaches by that date. Those four divisions the time it was completed. Within two
could participate in a crossing of the Seine weeks the advance to the Seine was an
by 7 September if four British truck com- accomplished fact, and it had been car-
panies, currently on loan to U.S. forces, ried out with a total of seven divisions
remained attached until that time, if instead of four.
British engineers assisted in rail recon- With the clearance of the left bank of
struction, and if all rail transport was the Seine on 24 August (D plus 79) Oper-
allocated to U.S. forces. The construction ation OVERLORD was virtually completed,
of a 6-inch POL pipeline would have to be eleven days earlier than planned. The
speeded and completed to Dreux by 30 decision to drive rapidly eastward follow-
August. If, in addition, a n average of ing the Avranches breakout instead of
1,000 tons of supplies could be made avail- employing large forces in Brittany as
able by air in a n advanced area from 20 originally planned resulted in a major tac-
to 30 August, a n d again after 7 Septem- tical victory. But it had already involved
ber, 8 it was estimated that the attack a t least a temporary subordination of
across the Seine could be carried out three logistic factors, and the difficulties over
days earlier and with six U.S. divisions supply which the armies began to experi-
instead of four. Even these estimates were ence as they crossed the Seine foreshad-
made with caution, for it was noted that owed serious complications later.
there were various uncertainties owing to That the lodgment area was cleared
lack of information and possible variations eleven days earlier than planned was in
in the tactical plan. For example, an early itself no measure of the difficulties caused
capture of Paris would impose an added by the rapid advance. More significant
burden because of the necessity of provid- was the explosive manner in which the
ing civil relief supplies, and would severely lodgment had expanded following a
handicap a general offensive. The G–4 seven-week confinement in the cramped
Plans Branch recognized that U.S. forces beachhead. In thirty days (D plus 49 to
had by far the most difficult supply prob- 79) an area had been uncovered which by
lem because of the greater distances plan was expected to require seventy-five
involved, and would require assistance if (D plus 15 to 90). While the combat forces
they were to participate in the offensive in could easily accelerate their advance, there
strength. Rehabilitation of the railways were definite limitations to the speed with
was expected to prove a major factor which the lines of communications could
affecting the speed of the advance, and be developed. By 25 August U.S. forces
the most rigid economy in the use of were beginning to feel the full effect of the
all transportation resources would be sudden extension of the lines of com-
necessary.9 munications, and the forewarnings which
I n view of the developments of the next the SHEAF planning staff had made
few days it would appear that logistical
planners had certainly not overestimated 8 Assuming a n interruption because of a planned
the Allies’ administrative potential. Tac- airborne operation.
tical developments took place so rapidly 9 Adm Stf Study 13, Logistical Implications of
Rapid Exploitation to the Seine River, Log Plans Br
during the time in which the above study SHAEF G–4, 11 Aug 44, SHAEF G–4 381 War Plans
was being considered that the premises on General, I, 44.
BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT 485

regarding the effect of U.S. participation was to be made along the axis Amiens–
in an early drive eastward on the develop- Maubeuge-Liége-the Ruhr, and a sub-
ment of a firm base and lines of communi- sidiary effort with smaller forces on the
cations already appeared to be coming line Verdun-Metz-Saarbruecken.
true. As usual, logistic factors figured prom-
But the Allied armies were not to stop inently in determining this course of
at the Seine, and the supply lines were action. The two-pronged advance had
destined to be stretched even farther and initially been ruled out because of the dis-
faster. In mid-August it was decided to advantage of maintaining forces on two
continue the pursuit across the Seine—a widely separated lines of communications.
decision which was to have considerably It had finally been adopted in the belief
more far-reaching effects than that of 3 that success along one axis would force
August. Plans had originally contem- enemy withdrawals in both areas, leaving
plated a pause of at least a month a t the adequate lateral communications between
Seine, so that a n adequate administrative the two axes.
organization could be developed to sup- The requirement for ports was also a
port further operations. The Allies had major determinant, since the capacity of
never intended to carry on a sustained those in the OVERLORD lodgment area was
drive into Germany, nor had they envis- believed to be inadequate to build up and
aged a decisive battle west of the Seine. maintain forces required for the final
Operation OVERLORD had been planned defeat of Germany. The acquisition of
as a preparatory stage, its objective being additional port capacity before the onset
the capture of a lodgment from which fur- of autumn gales was particularly essential
ther operations could be carried out. The to the support of British forces since the
planning of the entire operation had been usefulness of the beaches and MULBERRY,
dominated by logistic considerations such on which they were initially dependent,
as the capture of ports, the construction of was certain to come to an end in Septem-
pipelines, and the rehabilitation of rail- ber. Logistical requirements therefore
ways. While the Allies hardly expected to pointed to the earliest possible seizure of
capture the lodgment area ahead of the ports of Le Havre and Rouen. Even
schedule, particularly in view of the early with these, however, it was estimated that
delays, much less did they expect to the available capacity would continue to
support a drive beyond the Seine before D limit the forces which could be main-
plus 90. tained, and it was believed necessary to
Planning for operations beyond the seize the Channel ports as far east as
Seine (referred to as post-OVERLORD plan- Antwerp to ensure satisfactory mainte-
ning) had been initiated before D Day, nance of the Allied forces. These can-
and the broad course of action in the post- siderations consequently supported the
OVERLORD period had been determined argument for a major effort northeastward
by the time the invasion was launched. paralleling the Channel coast. 10
With the Ruhr, the industrial heart of
Germany, as the primary objective, the 10 SHAEFPlng Stf Study, Post-Neptune, Course of
Allies had decided to make the advance Action After Capture of Lodgment Area, Sec. I: Main
Objective a n d Axis of Advance, 3 May 44, Sec. 11:
into Germany along two routes. The main Method of Conducting the Campaign, 30 May 44,
effort with the bulk of the Allied forces SHAEF 12 A Gp 370.2 Post-NEPTUNEG–3 Studies.
486 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

I n outlining the course of action to fol- The planners had not changed their
low the capture of the lodgment the plan- views appreciably by early August. At
ners had concluded, furthermore, that that time they still estimated that, because
logistic difficulties precluded the mount- of transportation deficiencies on the long
ing of an offensive south of Paris at an U.S. lines of communications a maximum
early date. For a long time U.S. forces of not more than four U.S. corps could be
would have very extended lines of com- supported as far east as the Seine–Mantes–
munications, based in part on Cherbourg Loire line. Any advance beyond that line
and the Brittany ports even after Le Havre before October could be achieved only by
was transferred to American use. Delays reducing the road transportation commit-
in the reconstruction of damaged rail lines ment of other U.S. forces to the minimum
were expected to limit the rate of advance by stationing resting divisions near depots
for some time after the initial crossing of and ports, by limiting the expansion of the
the Seine. Consequently the possibilities American right flank to the southeast,
were considered best for mounting an and by utilizing airborne maintenance.
offensive first across the lower Seine, Even then it was thought that only two
between Paris and Le Havre. 11Because of U.S. corps could be maintained in an
the handicap under which the U.S. forces assault north or south of Paris in Septem-
would be operating, it was held that they ber. Furthermore, the capture of Paris
would probably be unable to make their before late October would mean burden-
main thrust from the lodgment area ing transportation with additional com-
before D plus 120, when the U.S. advance mitments for civil affairs supplies (food,
base would be firmly established in the coal, medical supplies) and would thus
Rennes-Laval area, with subsidiary depot impose a severe limitation on the mainte-
areas in the vicinity of Chartres and nance of operating divisions. For this
Le Mans in addition to those in the reason it was desirable to postpone the
Cotentin.12 British forces were expected capture of Paris until rail facilities could
to be able to renew the offensive about one be developed from the ports in Brittany
month earlier. and Normandy and until the Seine ports
Allied planners continued to examine were captured. From the above factors the
the various possibilities for launching an planners concluded that any advance in
offensive from the lodgment in the weeks strength east of the Seine-Mantes-Loire
following the launching of the cross- line before October would have to be con-
Channel operation. I n the middle of June ducted mainly by British forces and would
they momentarily gave thought to a pro- have to be made along the lower Seine,
posal to force a n early battle west of the between the Oise a n d Rouen. In fact, in
Seine and exploit across the river without view of the urgency of opening the Seine
waiting for the development of the longer ports they thought that it might be neces-
U.S. lines of communications. This plan sary to employ one to three U.S. corps
called for a concentration of the major
Allied effort west of the lower Seine and a 11Ibid.
crossing of the river below Paris. Mainte- 12SHAEF G–4, Post-Neptune Administrative Ap-
nance of both British and American forces preciation, 17J u n 44, SHAEF G–4 381 NEPTUNE 44.
13SHAEF Plng Stf Study, Post- Neptune, Sec. III:
under this plan would be effected mainly T h e Crossing of the Seine, 17 Jun 44 first draft,
along the British supply routes.13 SHAEF G–3 SHAEF/18008/Plans 44.
BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT 487

north of the Oise if delays in operations support could be provided to maintain the
were to be avoided.14 advance on the scale a n d a t the speed of
Toward the end of the month, with the past few weeks and carry the Allied
Third Army units already across the Sine armies to the German border. They
a t Mantes-Gassicourt a n d preparing for assumed, for example, that only eleven
additional crossings above Paris, the plan- U.S. divisions (four armored and seven
ners began to consider bolder actions than infantry) could take part in a continued
they had thought possible a few days drive, all others remaining in defensive
before. O n 22 August they analyzed the positions along the Loire or in Brittany, or
capabilities of supporting a drive across entirely static in the Alençon–Le Mans
the Seine near Mantes to seize Amiens area. Scales of maintenance would have to
and Abbeville, employing thirteen U.S. be drastically reduced for even the eleven
divisions in the main effort and thirteen divisions participating—to 162 tons per
British divisions in a secondary attack. day for infantry divisions and 241 tons for
Such a n operation they regarded as armored divisions fully engaged, and 108
feasible, but only by ruthlessly subordinat- and 141 tons per day respectively for
ing all considerations other than the sup- divisions not fully engaged. Advancing
port of the main effort. T h e attack would divisions, furthermore, were to take with
have to be launched with less than the them none of their heavy artillery and
normal scale of reserves; maintenance in only 50 percent of their medium artillery,
army areas was to be partly a t normal and ammunition expenditures were to be
rates ( 5 3 5 tons per division including limited to one third of the normal expend-
POL) and partly a t reduced rates (407 itures of divisions in the line. Reserves
tons); the rail system would have to be were to be reduced to half of normal, and
reserved for U.S. support; two U.S. divi- accumulated only for divisions actively
sions were assumed to be immobilized in engaging in the advance.
the Brittany peninsula, and were to give O n these “iron rations” and through
up their organic truck companies plus various expedients, such as the organiza-
improvised companies; and a loan of tion of provisional truck units from inac-
forty-nine British truck companies was tive divisions, the planners thought that
assumed. Deficiencies in rail transporta- the advance could be continued and sup-
tion, which was expected to reach Dreux ported by road and rail. Should actual
and Chartres by 1 September, were requirements prove heavier than those
expected to be met by air supply or by estimated, especially in ammunition and
temporarily pushing trucking units beyond in engineer and civil affairs supplies,
their rated capacities.15 maintenance by air would definitely be
O n the following day G–4 officers at necessary. The margin was therefore
Supreme Headquarters, envisaging more admittedly closely drawn, and support of
ambitious plans for a rapid advance the operation was made additionally
beyond the Seine, issued an estimate of the precarious by serious shortages of service
special measures which would be neces-
sary to insure the maintenance of forces 14SHAEF Plng Stf Study, Post-Neptune, Sec. III,
engaged in such an advance. Even at that 1 7 Aug 44, SHAEF G–3 SHAEF/ 18008/Plans 44.
15StfStudy, Logistical Support of a Major Envelop-
date, however, it was inconceivable to the ment, Log Plans Br G–4 SHAEF, 22 Aug 44, SHAEF
administrative planners that sufficient G–3 S H A E F / 18008/Plans 44.
488 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

units, particularly ordnance depot com- Between 25 August and 12 September

panies and heavy truck maintenance they had advanced from the D plus 90 to
companies, engineer truck companies and the D plus 350 phase line, thus covering
maintenance companies, and quarter- 260 phase-line days in 19 days. The record
master truck units. With the above scales was actually more phenomenal than these
of support the planners foresaw an figures indicate, because in the earlier
advance only to the Somme River and dash to the Seine the armies had overcome
slightly beyond Laon, Châlons-sur-Marne, a n initial lag of 30 days. Moreover, Paris
and Troyes by 20 September, and just had become a n additional supply liability
beyond Sedan, Metz, Nancy, and as the result of its liberation 55 days ahead
Chaumont by 20 October.16 of schedule, and whereas it had been esti-
In the midst of these calculations the mated that only 12 U.S. divisions could be
Supreme Command decided that Allied supported as far east as the Mantes-
forces would cross the Seine without Orléans line at D plus 90, 16 divisions
pause, and subsequently extended the were being maintained in the vicinity of
objectives of the armies farther and far- the Seine at D plus 79, and an additional
ther eastward. Furthermore, the earlier 5 divisions in Brittany. In mid-September
plan providing for a secondary effort 16 U.S. divisions were being maintained
along the Reims–Verdun–Metz axis by 200 miles beyond the Seine, albeit inade-
only a small force was now expanded to quately, plus several divisions on combat
provide for an advance in considerably scales in Brittany. By unusual exertions
greater strength along the subsidiary axis. this feat was accomplished despite the fact
Early in September the Third Army was that few of the conditions laid down in ad-
directed to continue eastward with the ministrative estimates, such as the main-
mission of occupying that portion of the tenance of Brittany forces via the Brittany
Siegfried Line covering the Saar, and then ports and beaches, or extension of POL
crossing the Rhine to capture Frankfurt. pipelines to Dreux, were met.
A comparison of the administrative ap- Supporting the advance to the German
preciations of this period with the actual border and the Moselle by mid-September
course of operations presents sharp con- in a gamble for a quick victory entailed a
trasts. The progress of the Allied armies in ruthless disregard for an orderly develop-
the six weeks following the breakout on 1 ment of the communications zone. The
August appears to have invalidated the cost at which this overexertion was made
conservative estimate of logistic capabili- was to be fully revealed in succeeding
ties. Ignoring even the most optimistic esti- months.
mates of what was possible, the armies by
D plus 98 (12 September) advanced to the 16Adm Stf Study 14, The Logistical Implications of
a Rapid Advance by AEF Beyond the Seine, Log
line which the forecasts had indicated they Plans Br G–4 SHAEF, 23 Aug 44, SHAEF G–4 381
would reach on approximately D plus 350. War Plans General, I, 44.
 CHAPTER XIII

“Frantic Supply”
( I ) The Character of Supply Operations in Advance Section had taken over all army
the Pursuit installations in its area except POL dumps
in the beach maintenance area, and also
A German general is once said to have had begun to take over the army mainte-
remarked that blitzkrieg is paradise for the nance area in the vicinity of St. Lô and La
tactician but hell for the quartermaster. Haye-du-Puits. Emphasis had been placed
Ernie Pyle, the popular wartime news- on the storage of supplies as far forward as
paper columnist, described the operations practicable-in the OMAHA Beach–St. Lô
of August and early September as “a tacti- area. 1
cian’s hell and a quartermaster’s purga- The supply situation was regarded as
tory.” Whatever the sentiments of the tac- good at the beginning of August, although
tician with regard to pursuit warfare, there reserves were not evenly distributed in the
can be no doubt of the appropriateness of army area and there were certain shortages
these observations as applied to supply in Classes I I and V. Neither of the armies
operations. As the Allied armies crossed had anything like the authorized 7 units
the Seine and outran their supply lines of fire, but the Communications Zone had
toward the end of August logistical sup- a minimum of 9 days of supply of ammuni-
port became more and more “frantic” in tion (11.1 days of artillery ammunition),
nature, the needs of the combat forces and there was no critical shortage in
being met almost wholly on a hand-to- any category. There was no shortage of
mouth basis. With final victory believed to rations (Class I), and the Communications
be almost within grasp in the first days of Zone had approximately 16 days of sup-
September, small wonder that the logistic ply of POL (Class 111). Army reserves were
limitations became exasperating. badly distributed because a large portion
As of 25 July the development of the of the supplies were still under the control
rear areas in Normandy had progressed as of First Army, which had stocks of certain
far as possible except for port reconstruc- supplies in excess of authorized levels. On
tion. Discharge was being developed to 6 August First Army had 10.5 days of sup-
maximum capacity at the beaches, the ply of P O L as against Third Army’s 1.3
minor ports, and Cherbourg; a double- days. But there were no over-all shortages,
track railway was in operation from Cher- and no immediate difficulties were antici-
bourg to Lison Junction, and single-track
lines connected Barfleur and St. Sauveur- 1 Operations History of the Advance Section,
C O M Z ETOUSA, prep by Hist Sec ADSEC, 1945,
le-Vicomte with the main trunk line. In mimeo (hereafter cited as ADSEC Operations His-
preparation for the coming offensive the tory), pp. 67–70.
490 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

pated. 2 Third Army presented the most once they began their rapid advance it
immediate problem, but while General shortly became difficult to move even daily
Patton’s forces by this time had penetrated maintenance supplies forward, to say
deep into Brittany the Advance Section nothing of establishing authorized reserve
commander, General Plank, felt that they levels in the army areas. O n 27 August the
could be supplied without embarass- army group took belated cognizance of this
ment.3 situation and reduced the authorized army
I n the first few weeks in August de- levels of Class I and III supplies to 5 days
liveries to the armies were indeed substan- and the Class V level to 3 units of fire. This
tial, the heaviest shipments going to Third was a meaningless gesture in view of the
Army in an effort to effect a more equita- difficulties of moving even daily mainte-
ble distribution of reserves. I n the ten days nance forward.6
between the 7th and 16th the Communi- At that time the decision had already
cations Zone recorded average daily de- been made to continue the advance as far
liveries of 6,144 tons to the First Army and as it could be sustained. T h e army group
13,250 tons to the Third Army, more than fully recognized that supply capabilities
half of the latter's receipts consisting of had become the governing factor, and that
POL.4 By the fourth week in August, how- the Communications Zone might not be
ever, when it became necessary to main- able to keep up with the rate at which the
tain American forces at the Seine a n d at combat elements were moving forward.
the tip of Brittany, deliveries to combat Nevertheless it was decided that the armies
units fell off rapidly. Forced to carry their should continue their advance as far as
loads farther and farther forward, trucking practicable, using every available means
units required more and more time to of transportation at their disposal to sup-
complete round trips between the Nor- plement C O M Z deliveries, and that they
mandy depots and front-line units. I n the should pause only when it became neces-
last few days of August deliveries to the sary to rebuild supply stocks. 7
armies dwindled to a few thousand tons,
and the logistical support of U.S. forces 2 12 A Gp G–4 AAR for Aug, 6 Sep 44, Opns Rpts
reached the most precarious state during AGO; 12 A Gp G–4 Periodic Rpt for 1–6 Aug,
operations in northwest Europe. SHAEF G–4 400.192 Supply Rpt, I, 44. Another
source states that the corresponding levels of POL
Difficulties in supplying the American reserves in First and Third Armies on 5 August were
forces in the pursuit did not suddenly ap- 20.2 and .9 days respectively. Ltr, 12 A Gp to SHAEF,
pear in the final week of August. They had 1 1 Aug 44, sub: Reserve Supplies Available in Army
Areas as of 5 Aug, SHAEF G–4 Maintenance Factors
begun almost simultaneously with the 153/4 GDP–1.
breakout at the beginning of the month, 3 Comd and Stf Conf, COMZ, 6 Aug 44, EUCOM
for it was impossible from the start to 337/3 Confs, Stf-Weekly, I, 44.
4 Ltr, COMZ to CG 12 A Gp, 19 Aug 44, sub:
maintain the armies on the run at desired Average Daily Tonnages, EUCOM 400 Supplies, Svcs
scales. When the 12th Army Group, be- and Equipment, General, 44, IV.
came operational on l August it had issued 5 12 A Gp Adm Instruction 1, 29 Jul 44, SHAEF
G–4 322 Twelfth Army Group Adm Inst, I.
administrative instructions authorizing 6 Mechanics of Supply in Fast Moving Situations,
the armies to establish reserve levels of 7 Gen Bd Rpt 27 (hereafter cited as Mechanics of Sup-
days of rations and POL and 7 units of ply), p. 19:
7 FUSA Rpt of Opns, Bk. I, p. 36; 12 A Gp Adm
fire.5 Even at that time the armies did not Instruction 13, 27 Aug 44, SHAEF G–4 322 Twelfth
have their full allowances, however, and Army Group Adm Inst, I.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 491

At the end of August First Army esti- General Moses met with General Stratton,
mated its daily average tonnage require- the COMZ G–4, to survey the entire situ-
ments as 5,500 tons (including 2,200 tons ation and to assess prospects for the im-
of POL and 1,100 tons of ammunition); mediate future. General Stratton esti-
Third Army requested daily maintenance mated that by 2 or 3 September the Com-
of 6,000 tons (1,411 of POL and 2,545 of munications Zone could deliver 11,400
ammunition), and in addition requested tons per day to the Chartres area (6,000
12,500 tons of ordnance Class I I and IV tons by truck and 5,400 by rail). After the
supplies to complete its authorized T/E deduction of minimum requirements for
allowances and 15,000 tons of ammunition the air forces, the Communications Zone,
to build up a reserve. 8 The delivery of and civil affairs, the net tonnage available
these tonnages was out of the question at for the armies was expected to be 7,000.10
the moment, not for lack of supplies, but On the basis of these predicted move-
because of the limited transportation facil- ment capabilities the army group com-
ities. In the drive across northern France mander made an allocation of this ton-
the Communications Zone gradually de- nage to the armies. Third Army was to re-
spaired of developing the lines of com- ceive a minimum of 2,000 tons per day;
munications at the speed of the armies' the balance up to 5,000 tons was to go to
advance, and emphasis necessarily shifted the First Army; anything in excess of 7,000
more and more to moving the barest es- tons was to be divided equally between the
sentials forward to using units on a day-to- two until First Army's total requirements
day basis. The armies had quickly ex- were met, the remainder going to the
hausted their meager reserves, and it be- Third.11 General Moses seriously doubted
came impossible to establish stocks in the Communications Zone’s ability to
advance depots. Sustained operations be- place 7,000 tons of useful supplies in the
came entirely dependent on daily replen- forward areas. 12 He had become thor-
ishment from the rear. By the end of oughly vexed with the failure of supply
August 90 to 95 percent of all the supplies and tended to fix the blame for the cur-
on the Continent lay in the base depots in rent crisis on the Communications Zone.13
the vicinity of the beaches, and there were Unfortunately his pessimism was at least
virtually no stocks between Normandy partly justified, for General Stratton’s
and the army dumps 300 miles away. 9
The precariousnessof conducting opera- 8 Ltr, FUSA to 25th Regulating Station, 27 Aug M,
tions under these conditions was keenly sub: Maintenance Supplies for Period 29 Aug–7 Sep
44, and Ltr, TUSA to CG 12 A Gp, 28 Aug 44, sub:
felt at all echelons in both the communica- Estimated Daily Tonnage Requirements, 12 A Gp
tions and combat zones, and particularly 400 Supplies, III.
at the various tactical headquarters. The 9 Memo, Hass for G–4 SHAEF, 29 Aug 44, sub:
Availability of Supplies in ADSEC, COMZ, SHAEF
inability to take advantage of a favorable G–4 Maintenance Factors 153/4 GDP–1; 12 A Gp
tactical situation produced an under- Rpt of Opns, VI (G–4), 34.
standable frustration as supply deterio- 10 Memofor record, Moses, 30 Aug 44, sub: Conf
held by Gen Bradley, 12 A Gp Memos 1944.
rated in the last days of August, and this 11 Memo for record, Moses, 30 Aug 44; TWX,
helplessness was only heightened by the Bradley to Armies, 31 Aug 44, FUSA 400 Supply.
lack of information as to what actually was 12 Memofor record, Moses, 30 Aug 44.
13Ltrs, Moses to Col William L. Barriger, Deputy
being delivered to the forward areas. On G–4 12 A Gp, 29 and 30 Aug 44, SHAEF 12 A Gp
30 August General Bradley and his G–4, G–4 Memos for Record.
492 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

commitments were not immediately within improve in the week of 10–16 September
the COMZ capabilities. when the Advance Section claimed aver-
The picture of actual accomplishment age movements of 5,700 tons to First Army
in these critical weeks is obscure. Poor and 3,700 tons to Third.14
bookkeeping, lack of standardized report- These figures indicate that in the second
ing, the diversion of supplies, all becloud week of September the armies for the first
the record of shipments. Third Army left time received tonnages approximately in
no record at all of its daily tonnage receipts. accord with the latest allocations. O n 14
In the week of 27 August–2 September, September 12th Army Group had once
the darkest period of the pursuit, the Ad- more altered the allocation, continuing
vance Section recorded average daily ship- the equal sharing of the first 7,000 tons,
ments of about 3,700 tons to First Army. but favoring First Army with a priority for
The latter indicated deliveries of only any additional supplies up to 1,500 tons.
15
2,225 tons, although it was able to record But even these tonnages failed to meet the
total daily receipts of about 3,000 tons by minimum requirements stated by the
employing its own trucks for line-of-com- armies early in September, First Army
munications hauling. O n 3 and 4 Septem- having requested a minimum of 6,202
ber, by which time the Communications tons, and Third Army a minimum of
Zone was committed to the delivery of 6.665. 16
5,000 tons per day to the First Army under The record of actual shipments is further
the army group’s recent allocation, the confused by charges and countercharges,
Advance Section was able to lay down an the Communications Zone claiming that
average of only 3,600 tons in the army it was forwarding the tonnages requested
area. O n 5 September the army recorded within allocations and the armies insisting
receipts in excess of 7,000 tons via ADSEC as early as 2 September that the Advance
transportation. O n that day 12th Army Section’s shipments were far short of
Group altered its allocation, dividing the allocated tonnages.17 Still worse, the
available tonnage equally between the two armies claimed they were receiving useless
armies (3,500 tons each). First Army thus items which they had not requisitioned
lost the priority which it had temporarily and for which they had no need, and
enjoyed. But the record of actual deliveries which were therefore wasting precious
in the following week is again contra- transportation.18 Such contradictions and
dictory. First Army recorded average daily frictions reflected only too well the ex-
deliveries of 3,700 tons via ADSEC trans-
portation from 3 to 9 September plus 2,640 14FUSA G–4 Periodic Rpts 5–7, 12 A Gp G–4
tons through use of its own transport. The 3 19.1 G–4 Kpts; ADSEC Operations History, p. 80.
15Mechanics of Supply, p. 79.
Advance Section indicated daily deliveries 16 Ltr,FUSA to 25th Regulating Station, 27 Aug
averaging 4,500 tons. In any case the vol- 44, sub: Maintenance Supplies for Period 29 Aug–7
ume of movement met the prescribed ton- Sep, with atchd requirements for 6–15 Sep, and
Memo, Col Muller, T U S A G–4, for 1 2 A Gp, 4 Sep
nage allocations. Deliveries to the Third 44, 1 2 A Gp Estimate of Daily Maintenance by Div
Army, according to the Advance Section, Slice.
meanwhile averaged only 2,620 tons in 17 Memo,Col Thomas F. Taylor for Col Barriger,
2 Sep 44, SHAEF 12 A G p G–4 Memos for Record.
this period despite the equality of status it 18Mechanics of Supply, p. 79; FUSA Monthly
supposedly enjoyed. Deliveries began to AAR, Sep 44, p. 60.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 493

asperations and tensions attending supply were to be replenished either by prear-

operations which had been reduced to a ranged shipments or by requisition on the
hand-to-mouth and catch-as-catch-can Communications Zone.
basis. In its effort to meet the demands of The planned depot structure and meth-
combat forces over the stretching supply od of operation were upset from the start.
routes the Communications Zone almost The initial difficulties arose from the
from the start of the pursuit was forced to lengthy confinement in the restricted Nor-
abandon all thought of developing the mandy beachhead area, which caused a
lines of communications as planned. crowding of installations. These difficulties
Under the continued pressure to sustain were unnecessarily compounded by the
the momentum of the pursuit supply oper- belated transfer of rear-area installations
ations were soon characterized by the to the Communications Zone. The First
unorthodox and the expedient. After sev- Army persisted in retaining control of the
eral weeks of overexertion and overexten- bulk of all supply stocks until the end of
sion, which were attended by many irreg- July, and even after the breakout claimed
ularities in procedure shared in by both possession of dumps no longer in its own
the Communications Zone and the armies, area. T h e Communications Zone conse-
the logistic organization inevitably de- quently had had little time in which to
veloped weaknesses. Most of them are di- assume control of the base structure, and
rectly traceable to the forced accommoda- took over its operations just as it was about
tion to the emergency conditions of the to be subjected to the severest stresses and
period which prevented the proper or- strains. T h e refusal to turn over the base
ganization of the Communications Zone. organization earlier was considered un-
An examination of some of the more conscionable by the Communications
prosaic aspects of logistic organization Zone, and could only be interpreted as a
illustrates the effect which these forced de- lack of confidence on the part of the field
partures from orthodox procedures could forces, which, as it developed, were them-
have on supply operations. selves the heaviest sufferers from the later
One of the main elements of a n ade- logistic difficulties.19
quate logistic structure is a good depot The explosive manner in which the lines
system. The Communications Zone had of communications were suddenly ex-
recognized this need, providing for the tended in August voided the planned
establishment of the principal storage area expansion of the depot system. The estab-
in the Rennes-Laval-Châteaubriant area, lishment of a depot system in depth, con-
where the theater's main reserve stocks sisting of properly stocked forward and
were to be accommodated. Because of intermediate depots, became impossible,
limitations in storage space and trans- for the immediate task of delivering daily
portation a n d because of the need for maintenance supplies quickly absorbed all
mobility, the Advance Section was author- transportation resources.
ized to maintain only a relatively small These developments had a recurring
portion of the total theater reserves in its impact not only on the development of the
depots, although balanced as to type and
19 lnterv with Viney, 24 F e b 50; Ltr, Potter to
sufficient to meet the daily anticipated OCMH, 30 Jun 51; Interv with Lord, 9 Aug 51;
needs of the armies. The ADSEC depots Interv with Moses, 13 Aug 51. All in OCMH.
494 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

Communications Zone but on the develop- dumps at Senlis, beyond the Seine, but so
ment of the army service areas. The diffi- rapid was the advance of the V I I Corps in
culties of the First Army quartermaster t h e final days of August that a decision
service afford a good example. Early in was finally made in favor of the La
August the army quartermaster turned Capelle-Hirson area, 140 miles northeast
over the army quartermaster installations of Arpajon, and the first installations were
in the OMAHA beach maintenance area to opened there on 6 September.
the Advance Section and chose a new site Within a month, therefore, the army
for a depot in the planned army service service area had leaped approximately
area north of St. Lô. So rapidly did tactical 300 miles. By the end of August hope was
developments change in the succeeding abandoned of establishing the authorized
days that the army abandoned all thought levels of supply in the service areas, and ef-
of stocking Class I, II, or IV supplies there. forts were concentrated on bringing the
It immediately selected the Vire-Ville- daily maintenance needs forward. Once
dieu area as the next service area and the pursuit. began, the army’s own cup-
began to receive supplies there. But the board quickly became bare, and by early
First Army tactical situation changed even September the army had corralled every
more rapidly after mid-August, and the available truck by immobilizing engineer
Vire area had to be abandoned almost as d u m p truck companies, heavy a n d light
soon as it became operational. After ponton companies, and artillery and anti-
briefly considering Alençon as the next aircraft units to make the long trips back
service area, the army opened new Class I to the base depots and thus supplement
and III dumps at La Loupe, 100 miles east the deliveries being made by the Com-
of Vire, and placed demands on the Ad- munications Zone.20The opening of a suc-
vance Section for the movement of 62,000 cession of service installations inevitably
tons to this area over a ten-day period. placed heavy demands on army service
This was already beyond the capabilities troops, which became widely dispersed in
of C O M Z transportation, and the army the process. By mid-September, for ex-
therefore resorted more and more to using ample, the 471st Quartermaster Group
its own truck units in a n attempt to make was operating a n army d u m p at L a Ca-
up the deficiency, in addition to carrying pelle, the remnants of the dump at Sois-
out heavy troop movements. sons, and a railhead twelve miles north of
I n a matter of days La Loupe was far to that city at Coucy. 21 As the new dumps
the rear. Awaiting the selection of a new were established farther forward, installa-
service area, the army quartermaster re- tions in the rear were allowed to exhaust
ceived permission to establish temporary their stocks and then close. I n this process
dumps at Arpajon, about sixty miles away. the armies frequently left supplies behind
Shipments to this area began in the first which they still considered their own but
days of September, and so urgent was the which were taken over by ADSEC. Some
need for P O L that issues from this dump of the discrepancies in the figures of ton-
were made on the same day it was opened.
But Arpajon, like the other sites, had only 20FUSA Rpt of Opns, 1 Aug 44–22 Feb 45. IV, 45–
47, I, 28–29, 37; FUSA Monthly AARs, Aug, pp.
a short utility as a service area. Meanwhile 47-50; Sep, 55–56.
the army briefly considered plans for new 21FUSA Rpt of Opns, IV, 47.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 495

nages forwarded are probably explained until 7 September, by which time the
by the confusion in accounting for these army was already operating east of the
stocks. Moselle, 200 miles away, although the
Third Army’s experience was similar. Advance Section had begun to deliver a
For more than a week after the breakout portion of Third Army’s gasoline to a sup-
army and ADSEC trucks picked up sup- ply point in Fontainebleau forest on 31
plies near the beaches or in the Cotentin August. Army vehicles thus had to cover
and delivered them directly at forward distances of u p to 250 miles just to reach
supply points without laying them down the transfer point, and supply points were
in the army maintenance area. All sup- almost nonexistent.23
plies for the Third Army initially had to The Third Army’s supply lines had also
be funneled through the narrow and con- extended westward to the extremities of
gested Avranches bottleneck, where a Brittany. Nourishing the fast-moving
single highway had to bear the main bur- armored columns in the fluid operations
den of supply and troop movements, 22and in that area subjected many a truck con-
where gas- and ration-carrying trucks fre- voy, both in bivouac and in column, to at-
quently ran a gantlet of fire from the air tacks by detached enemy groups.24
until the enemy finally abandoned his at- The experience of the Communications
tempts to choke off Third Army’s lifeline. Zone closely paralleled that of the armies.
By the second week the distance from the Following First Army, the Advance Sec-
beaches to Laval (135 miles) and Le Mans tion had planned to establish a mainte-
(175 miles) had become prohibitive for nance area in the Vire–Villedieu area.
army transportation, and it was clear that This area was soon too far to the rear to be
another link was needed in the supply of much value, and it was utilized only for
chain. Arrangements were accordingly small quantities of ammunition and quar-
made with the Advance Section to open a termaster supplies. The Advance Section
forward transfer point at Laval on 13 next chose Le Mans as a forward depot
August, the intention being that ADSEC area. This area was also out of reach with-
transportation would deliver to the trans- in a short time and was used only tem-
fer point and that army trucks would op- porarily by the ordnance, engineer, and
erate only forward of Laval to the supply quartermaster services. An attempt was
points. then made to develop a maintenance area
A week later the transfer point was in the vicinity of Chartres, where consider-
moved another 50 miles eastward, to Le able quantities of supplies of all classes
Mans, but the new site was already too far were stored in the open, and further at-
to the rear when it opened, since one corps tempts were made to establish installations
had already crossed the Seine, 100 miles at Soissons, Sommesous, and Reims. But
beyond. Third Army meanwhile began
negotiations to have the transfer point
22Col. T. H. Nixon, “Across the Beachheads,” Army
moved to Fontainebleau,
or preferably
to Ordnance, XXVIII (May–June, 1945), 398.
the east bank of the Seine. Instead it was 23Col. Everett Busch, “Quartermaster Supply of
established
at Alibis,20 miles east of T h i r d Army,” The Quartermaster Review, XXVI
(November-December, 1946), 71–72.
Chartres, still about 100 miles to the rear 24Jnl, 3803d QM Truck
Co, 31 Jan–31 Dec44,
of the advancing front. There it remained QMCO–3803–0.3 (12718) Opns Rpts.
496 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

the constant pressure on transportation prescribed in SOP 7 became impracti-

precluded the establishment of stocks in cable.
the forward areas, and during the worst In an effort to relieve the critical supply
period of the pursuit the advance depots situation in the forward areas, the long-
served primarily as distributing points for distance, through-highway system known
the ADSEC, Ninth Air Force, and 12th as “Red Ball” was inaugurated late in
Army Group units.25 August with a large number of truck com-
The inability to organize a depot system panies organized to move supplies from
properly and to establish reserve stocks the Normandy depots to the forward
forward had its repercussions on the entire maintenance areas. 27 This necessitated
mechanics of supply. The basic supply certain modifications in the supply proce-
procedures for operations on the Conti- dures of SOP 7. Requisitions continued to
nent had been outlined in theater Stand- be submitted through the regulating sta-
ing Operating Procedure 7.26This docu- tions but usually bypassed the Advance
ment had provided that, after a n army Section when the requested supplies were
rear boundary had been established, the known to be unavailable there. Instead,
Advance Section was initially to receive they were processed directly to Headquar-
requests and arrange for the supply of the ters, Communications Zone, which in turn
armies, issuing supplies from designated ordered the items released from the base
depots within its own area so far as pos- depots. In such cases the supplies were for-
sible and extracting the unfilled items to warded directly from the rear depots
the base section designated to support it. through the regulating stations to the
Shortly thereafter the Advance Section armies. 28
was to establish regulating stations as the Under the system of tonnage allocations
principal links with the armies, and these instituted by 12th Army Group the supply
were to process the armies’ requests and services of each army (and other com-
arrange for the flow of supplies. mands such as the Ninth Air Force) made
U p to the time the armies reached the daily bids for a portion of the available lift,
Seine the requisitioning process developed the actual allocation within each com-
approximately as contemplated. But the mand being made by the G–4. The ap-
sudden extension of the lines of communi- proved requisitions were then submitted to
cations in August had made it impossible the Advance Section’s regulating stations,
to move forward all the supplies requisi- which arranged for the shipment of items
tioned or to establish planned reserves in available in ADSEC depots, and extracted
the Advance Section. T h e Advance Sec- those items not available in the forward
tion met the armies’ requests for Class I areas to the Communications Zone for ap-
and III supplies as far as possible from its
own depots. Since the great bulk of all 25ADSEC Operations History, pp. 74-75; Mechan-
stocks on the Continent was still in the ics of Supply, pp. 34–35.
26 ETO S O P 7, Supply Procedures on the Con-
Normandy depots, other items on the tinent (Revised), 7 Jun 44.
requisitions had to be extracted to Head- 27T h e operations of the Red Ball Express are de-
quarters, Communications Zone, and scribed below, Ch. XIV, Sec. 2.
28Mechanics of Supply, pp. 66–67; ADSEC G–4
filled from rear depots if available at all. Periodic Rpt for quarter ending 30 Sep 44, ADSEC
Under these circumstances the procedure 319.1.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 497

propriate action. Supplies furnished from combat zone. To do his job he had to be
ADSEC stocks were subtracted from the fully advised at all times of changes in the
requisition and the weight of these sup- status of supplies, in the location of units
plies charged against the day’s tonnage and installations, and in military plans,
allocation.29 and he had to receive full information on
Because of the scarcity of transportation the allocation of credits in COMZ depots,
this system required the closest kind of priorities for supply, the status of rail
co-ordination, and after it had been in equipment, the availability of rolling
operation for a time refinements were stock, a n d so on. With t h e aid of a small
necessary. The army G–4, for example, staff, including a representative of each
did not always check the weight of requi- supply service, the regulating officer con-
sitioned items against tonnage allocations, solidated all requests for transportation
with the result that many items could not and finally made the necessary arrange-
be shipped because the total weight of the ments for shipments of supplies and re-
consolidated requisitions exceeded the al- placements forward and for evacuation to
location for the day. Later in September the rear.32
the army G–4’s were required to accom- During the planning of OVERLORD there
pany their requisitions with a detailed had been divided opinion, first as to
breakdown of the tonnage by service. 30 whether to employ regulating stations at
One vital agency of the logistic structure all on the Continent, and then as to what
whose functions were affected by the criti- headquarters would exercise command
cal developments of August was the regu- over them. The theater had finally de-
lating station. T h e regulating station was cided to use regulating stations, but it
essentially a traffic control agency, organ- made a major departure from Field Serv-
ized for the purpose of insuring orderly ice Regulations, which specified that the
and systematic movements into and out of stations be agencies of the theater com-
the combat zone. It was not intended to mander, by assigning them to the Com-
act as a supply depot, to maintain any im- munications Zone. 33The theater SOP’s on
mobile reserves, or to make any transfer of supply procedure on the Continent pro-
supplies except for mail a n d a few small vided that regulating stations were to be
articles. As the nerve center for all traffic agencies of the Advance Section and that
into and out of the combat zone, however, they were to be established at the earliest
it was intended to perform a n important practicable date.34Beyond this the organ-
function in the supply organization of the ization and function of the regulating sta-
theater. tions were to conform in general to Field
T h e regulating officer in command of Service Regulations. They were to be
the station was, by Field Service Regula- established close to the army rear bound-
tions,31 the direct representative of the ary, and the regulating officers were to
theater commander. As such he was ex-
pected to control all rail movements 29ADSEC Operations History, p. 76.
forward of advance depots of the Commu- 30Mechanics of Supply, p. 67.
nications Zone; to establish a n d enforce 31 FM 100–10, FSR (Administration).
32Ibid., pars. 85–96.
all traffic priorities; and to designate the 33Mechanics of Supply, pp. 46–47.
location of railheads and truckheads in the 34SOP 7.
498 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

receive and process all requests submitted with the combat commands. The regulat-
by the combat forces and to control the ing officers thus performed a n important
movement to and from the combat zone. function in co-ordinating the logistic activ-
The ADSEC plan assigned responsibility ities of the Advance Section and the
for the establishment of the stations to the armies and provided the vitally important
Transportation Corps. 35 link between the combat and communica-
During June and July, when First Army tions zones.
was the only U.S. army on the Continent Although the 24th and 25th Regulating
and in effect controlled ail resources in the Stations had been activated several months
lodgment through its control of the Ad- before, they had received little or no tech-
vance Section, there was no need for a reg- nical training in the United Kingdom
ulating station, and none was established. until early in July and crossed to the Con-
When the Advance Section was finally de- tinent just before the breakout operation
tached from First Army, and a second was launched. Consequently they received
army was introduced, two stations were little indoctrination in ADSEC procedures
placed in operation by the Advance Sec- before they became active and had only
tion, the 24th Regulating Station in sup- the vaguest notion as to how they should
port of the Third Army and the 25th in function.36 Even the concept of
support of the First. Both organizations fol- their role went out the window when they
lowed the policy of operating from the were faced with the tactical conditions of
most logical traffic control centers in closest August. Their mission and method of op-
proximity to the army headquarters which eration as laid down in Field Service
they supported. In a deviation from Field Regulations were based largely on experi-
Service Regulations, however, the regulat- ence in World War I, in which operations
ing officers were designated as the direct were largely static and in which rail trans-
representatives of the Advance Section portation was the principal means of ship-
with the armies and operated from the ment to and from the combat zone.37But
office of the G–4 section of the respective rail traffic was virtually nonexistent in the
armies. forward areas in August 1944, and the
The Advance Section of necessity had a main problem in connection with motor
much closer working relationship with the traffic was one of expediting rather than
armies than any of the other C O M Z sec- regulating. In the highly fluid situation of
tions or the C O M Z headquarters itself. It late August, when communications were
not only was the immediate supplier or bad and shipments were poorly docu-
“jobber” to the armies. It also determined mented, the armies above all needed in-
the initial development of the communica- formation as to what they could expect in
tions zone and performed other tasks in-
cidental to supply such as planning the 35Ibid.; Mechanics ofSupply, p. 47.
extension of the railways, pipelines, and 36Historical Report, 25th Regulating Station, pp.
5–7, ETO Adm 586; Rpt, Col G . S. Speidel, Regulat-
signal communications and the location of ing Officer, to CO 24th Regulating Station, 22 Jun
future service areas. For obvious reasons 45, sub: Opns of 24th Regulating Station During
the Advance Section had to keep itself in- Period 1 Aug 44–22 Jun 45, ETO Adm 585; Ltr, Col
Speidel to Hist Div, 17 Apr 50, OCMH.
formed on the armies’ future plans and 37Interv with Plank, 28 Jul 50, O C M H ; Ltr, Col
therefore established a n intimate liaison Potter to OCMH, 30 Jun 51.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 499

the way of supplies, and turned to the frequently received supplies they had
regulating stations to get it. T h e regulat- neither requested nor needed.
ing stations helped meet the emergency Impatient with the confusions and un-
needs in a variety of ways. They sent per- certainties which attended the tumultuous
sonnel to railheads, truckheads, a n d air- events of these days, the armies frequently
heads, and established traffic control took matters into their own hands and
detachments at strategic points of diver- “hijacked” convoys far from their desti-
sion. These detachments served a useful nations, and in many cases “diverted”
function by furnishing information on C O M Z truck companies to their own use
routes to convoy commanders and to driv- in the army areas.39The Third Army was
ers of straggler vehicles, a n d by maintain- particularly notorious for the latter
ing information on the location of supply practice.
depots. They reconnoitered supply routes, By hook or crook, therefore, a flow of
furnished guides for the convoys, and in- the bare essentials, however inadequate
augurated a courier system to overcome and unpredictable, was maintained to the
the inadequacy of signal communications. armies. By the end of August, however,
O n administrative orders from ADSEC the armies were being kept in motion by
a n d frequently on verbal orders from the deliveries of only limited amounts of those
army G–4’s they also diverted supplies essentials, such as fuel, rations, a n d am-
from one point to another. After the in- munition. In the first days of September
auguration of the Red Ball Express the the maintenance of combat elements at
ADSEC G–4 established a control group scales required to permit a continuation of
at the diversion point—initially Chartres, the aggressive pursuit became impossible.
then Dreux, and later Versailles—where Whether the armies might have main-
convoys were separated and dispatched to tained the speed of their advance if ade-
the proper army. In the rapidly stretching quate supplies (particularly gasoline) had
lines of communications in this period been available is another question and will
road discipline was poor a n d many con- be considered later. I n any event, the time
voys arrived at the diversion point without was fast approaching when the combat
destination instructions or proper docu- forces would require more normal mainte-
mentation. At this point the convoys were nance and the repair or replacement of
stopped a n d destination instructions re- their rapidly deteriorating equipment.
viewed, and by the use of check lists the
ADSEC control group attempted to main- (2) Gasoline—“The Red Blood of War”
tain the proper allocation of supplies. In
this way the regulating stations aided ma- Until the Allied armies crossed the
terially in expediting the movement of Seine supply shortages had not become
supplies and attempted to keep the armies 38Mechanics of Supply, pp. 49–50, 89-90; History
a t least partially informed as to what they of the 25th Regulating Station, a n d Report of Oper-
ations of the 24th Regulating Station.
might expect to receive. Despite these ef- 39Memo, Barriger for Moses, 3 Aug 44, sub: Sup-
forts, many shipments arrived at their port of Future Opns, 1 2 A Gp G–4 Ltrs, Memos As-
destination so poorly documented that it sorted 1944; Intervs with Plank, 28 J u l 50, Viney, 24
Feb 50, and Lt Col Loren A. Ayers, 16 Aug 50,
was almost impossible to connect deliv- O C M H ; Ltr, Col Robert C. Tripp to O C M H , 3 JuI
eries with requisitions,38 and the armies 51.
500 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

serious enough to restrict their operations. survey eventually revealed storage capac-
But the cumulative effect of the various ity for nearly 500,000 barrels—far above
logistic difficulties created by the pursuit the amount planned for the Cherbourg
eventually began to be felt in the last days area—which could easily be rehabilitated
of August as the armies attempted to con- and used. 40In a struggle in which victory
tinue their rapid advance beyond the was determined largely by overwhelming
OVERLORD lodgment area. While short- material supremacy the capture of Cher-
ages developed in nearly all categories, the bourg’s storage facilities essentially intact,
first to reach critical proportions in the like the later capture of Antwerp, was a
sense of threatening the success of tactical fortune of war which, though less drama-
operations was the shortage of gasoline, a tic, might well be ranked with the seizure
commodity which now dramatically of the Remagen bridge.
demonstrated its claim to the role so aptly Much of the captured storage consisted
described by the French as “le sang rouge de of underground tanks grouped in three
guerre.” main tank farms about a mile west of the
Contrary to plan, all P O L requirements city of Cherbourg and directly south of the
until the time of the breakout were met Digue de Querqueville. Many of the
either by packaged deliveries or by the tanks had been used for diesel a n d other
bulk system based on Port-en-Bessin and types of oils and had to be scoured and
Ste. Honorine-des-Pertes. Construction flushed before they could be used for gaso-
and rehabilitation of the Cherbourg area line. But this task entailed only a fraction
were supposed to have progressed suffi- of the work expected to be necessary, and
ciently to permit bulk reception by the the use of existing facilities therefore
Major System by D plus 18, and plans had meant a tremendous saving in both labor
called for the completion of a t least one 6- and materials—resources which could be
inch pipeline to La Haye-du-Puits and used in port reconstruction. The only stor-
several tanks at that location by D plus 21. age construction initially contemplated
But this schedule, like others, was voided was a single 10,000-barrel balance tank. 41
by the delay in the capture of Cherbourg, The major construction task involved in
and the construction of intake and storage the Cherbourg P O L installation was the
facilities at the port had not even begun laying of the many connecting lines be-
on D plus 21. tween the tank farms and the laying of in-
Cherbourg was captured on D plus 21, take lines from the Digue de Querqueville.
and ADSEC officers began reconnaissance Most of the supplies and equipment for
o f the area on the same day to determine these projects were brought in via UTAH
the condition of existing facilities. It was Beach a n d the minor Cotentin ports and
known that considerable French commer- sent to a special POL supply dump on the
cial and naval facilities existed in the area, western edge of Cherbourg. The supplies
but it had been assumed that they would were generally ample, except for certain
be destroyed, and that any storage cap-
tured in a usable condition would be a 40Cbl E-37496, Lee to ANPB, 13 Jul 44, SHAEF
bonus. The Allies were happily surprised, G – 4 463.7 Gas a n d Motor Oil; Hist Rpt 13 of the
Corps of Engrs ETO, p. 73, state’sthat existing storage
therefore, to find that existing facilities exceeded 635,000 barrels.
were far from completely demolished. The 41Hist Rpt 13, Corps of Engrs ETO, pp. 70–73.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 501

THE FIRST POL TANKER alongside the Digue de Querqueville, Cherbourg, 25July 1944.

fittings, and shortages were met either by Querqueville on 25 July, exactly four
improvisation or by special airlift from the 43
weeksafterthe fallof the port.
United Kingdom. Approximately thirty- Meanwhile the construction of the pipe-
eight miles of pipe were laid in the area, lines inland had also begun. By mid-July
and one 12-inch and ten, rather than six, one 6-inch line had been completed to La
6-inch unloading lines were laid from the Haye-du-Puits, twenty-nine miles to the
tanker berth to storage. 42 south, and two storage tanks with a capac-
The provision of tanker docking facil- ity of 15,000 barrels had also been con-
ities proved far more onerous and time structed there. But on 25 July, the date on
consuming than the onshore construction which Operation COBRAwas launched,
projects, for the outer harbor was heavily the bulk distribution system in operation
mined and the planned berths were ob- on the Continent was still limited to the
structed by many sunken vessels. The de- Minor System. 44 At that time the import
mining of the harbor waters and the re- of POL on the Continent consequently
moval of obstacles were perilous tasks and
accounted for most of the prolonged delay 42 FinalReport of the Chief Engineer. ETO, 1942–
in bringing the Major System into oper- 45, I, 3 11, OCMH.
ation. Navy units eventually cleared the 43Hist Rpt 13, Corps of Engrs ETO, pp. 77–80.
44Ltr, Col C. G Irish, Area Petroleum Ln Officer
area sufficiently to permit the first POL FECOMZ, to Col Barnes, Chief Petroleum Officer
tanker to dock alongside the Digue de ETO, 25 J u l4 4 , sub: Rpt 2, E T O 463, POL 44.
502 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

lagged considerably behind planned re- long delay and the loss of thousands of
ceipts. By D plus 41 daily receipts were tons of intake capacity during this period
planned to average 7,350 tons (4,663 of the level of P O L stocks was actually
which were to consist of MT80 gasoline) almost exactly as projected, and the sup-
and a cumulative total of 216,000 tons of ply of POL consequently was no cause for
POL was to have been delivered on the far concern on the eve of the breakout. It had
shore, about 180,000 tons of the total con- been planned that ten days reserve stock
sisting of MT80.45O n that date, however, of P O L would be built up on the Conti-
daily receipts were averaging only 4,100 nent by D plus 41 based on an operational
tons owing to the delay in bringing the day of fifty miles for all vehicles. O n this
Major System into operation. More than basis the stocks in mid-July already rep-
half the P O L tonnage was still arriving in resented a reserve of eleven days. But daily
packaged form via the beaches. A fairly consumption had actually been equiva-
large and steady flow of packaged POL lent to about thirteen miles per day rather
had been provided to meet all P O L re- than the maximum fifty-mile planning
quirements in the first three weeks and factor, so that existing stocks represented
later to build up the continental can popu- far more than the eleven days’ supply
lation. This flow had been maintained ap- unless suddenly accelerated operations ac-
proximately as planned. In mid-July an tually led to a much higher rate of con-
average of 2,600 tons of packaged prod- sumption. 48 First Army’s consumption of
ucts was being shipped to the far shore gasoline had been low in June, totaling
each day, and a cumulative total of less than 3,700,000 gallons, and averaging
142,702 compared with a planned 147,703 about 148,000 per day, or approximately
tons had been dispatched to the Conti- 55 tons per division slice. I n July, with the
nent.46 The Minor System, meanwhile, employment of larger forces, the total con-
had by this time almost doubled its sumption rose to 11,500,000 gallons, aver-
planned output, but its performance could aging about 372,000 gallons per day, or 75
not begin to compensate for the large ton- tons per division slice.49But this was still
nages that had been expected to be im- considerably below the consumption fac-
ported through Cherbourg. tor of 121 tons accepted for planning pur-
T h e Major System was to have begun poses before D Day.50Fortunately the low
receiving bulk gasoline on D plus 18 at the rate of consumption in these early weeks
rate of about 3,400 tons per day, and by D
plus 41 was expected to average about 45Communications Zone Plan, issued by Hq
4,000 tons. By D plus 41 (17 July) the FECOMZ, 14 May 44, App. P, E T O Adm 376.
Cherbourg installation was to have re- 46ETO Progress Rpt CVI, 3IJ u l4 4 , Statistical Sec,
SGS ETO, ETO Adm 430.
ceived a cumulative total of more than 47Memo, 21 A G p for SHAEF G–4,22 May 44.
85,000 tons of MT80 gasoline in bulk and 48Ltr, Col Irish to Barnes, 20 Jul 44, sub: R p t 1
POL Stock Positions on Continent, ETO 463 POL 44.
more than 100,000 tons of P O L products 49FUSA R p t of Opns, Annex 14, App. 15, VI,
in all.47 But on that date it had yet to 224–25.
receive its first gallon of bulk POL. 50POL plans for OVERLORD had been made on the
basis of 2 14 tons per day per division slice of 40,000
The Major System finally began operat- men and 7,500 vehicles. Just before D Day this factor
ing in the last days of July—almost six was changed to 153 tons, of which 79.08 percent, or
weeks later than scheduled. Despite the 121 tons, was allotted for MT80 gasoline.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 503

TABLE10—GASOLINESUPPLYOF FIRST AND THIRDARMIES:

30 JULY–16SEPTEMBER1944

(Number of Gallons)

a At end of period.
b Data not available.
c Based o n assumption that 8 5 percent of total gasoline received was motor vehicle gas and resultant tonnage converted at
368 gallons per ton.
d Stored i n First Army depot, but not available for issue because of distance to rear.
e Lessthan 0.1.
f Figure for 10–16 September based o n tonnage received converted to gallons.
Source: FUSA receipts from FUSA AARs. TUSA receipts, through 19 Aug, from TUSA G–4 Periodic Rpts; 2 0 Aug–2 Sep
receipts from TUSA AAR. II, QM, 4–6, and i n part estimated; 3–9 Sep receipts from Summaries of Activities, G–4 Periodic
Rpts; 10–16 Sep figures based o n tonnages received, converted to gallons. FUSA issues from FUSA G–4 Periodic Rpts, 12 A
GP 319.1 G–4 Rpts. FUSA consumption figures from FUSA Rpt of Opns, 1 Aug 44–22 Feb 45, IV, 86–87. TUSA figures
o n daily issues and consumption from TUSA G–4 Periodic Rpts, 12 A Gp 319.1 G–4 Rpts. Balance o n hand and days of
supply from army G–4 periodic rpts. Army group reports indicate higher levels of Class III in the armies.
504 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

tended to cancel out the deficiency in Army’s 306,000. I n this period the great
planned receipts at Cherbourg. Stock disparity between the levels of supply in
levels were quite satisfactory and were be- the two armies was partially eliminated.
lieved sufficient for whatever contingencies By arrangement with the Advance Sec-
might arise. 51 Furthermore, the Major tion, First Army’s excess stocks weregrad-
System, with its pipeline to La Haye-du- ually reduced a n d on 19 August stood at
Puits, was destined to begin operations 3.9 days of supply.54This was undoubtedly
within a few days. a conservative estimate, however, for First
The supply of gasoline was entirely ade- Army’s balance on hand on that date still
quate for a full month after the launching totaled almost 3,500,000 gallons. 55 Third
of COBRAon 25 July, and at no time in the Army’s on-hand balance had reached a
next four weeks did the lack of fuel low of less than 200,000 gallons, a n d was
threaten to hamper operations. This is not estimated to equal .28 day of supply. 56
to say that there were no difficulties in the But by mid-August the Third Army had
supply of this vital commodity. Third become accustomed to operating on a slim
Army was forced to operate with the most margin, and the critical state of its fuel
meager reserves from the very start of its stocks evoked no expression of alarm a s
commitment on 1 August and was almost long as requirements continued to be met
wholly dependent on uninterrupted daily from day to day. Thus far the 12th Army
deliveries. It had planned to hold 1,500,- Group G–4 weekly periodic reports had
000 gallons of gasoline as a reserve for consistently included the reassuring state-
emergency use. Instead it immediately ment: “There are no critical shortages
plunged into a highly mobile type of war- which will affect operations.”
fare and quickly exhausted its small re- T h e week of 20–26 August, which for
serve. 52 O n 5 August Third Army had the first time saw most of the elements of
only 515,400 gallons of motor fuel on both armies simultaneously in pursuit and
hand, representing 1.3 days of supply. included the crossings of the Seine, brought
First Army, although it had at last drawn the highest daily consumption of motor
a rear boundary and relinquished control fuel to date-well over 800,000 gallons per
of the Advance Section, at that time still day.57On 24 August the First Army alone
controlled
a of 10.5 days,53a fact
reserve
which caused some bitterness. (Table 10)
Despite the hand-to-mouth character of 51Ltr, Irish to Barnes, 20 J u l4 4 .
52TUSA AAR, II, QM, 4.
supply, however, the Third Army did not 53 1 2 A G p G–4 Periodic R p t 1 (1-6 Aug 44), 8
actually suffer any want of fuel for its fast- Aug 44, 1 2 A Gp 319.1 G–4 Rpts, I.
moving vehicles. For two weeks—from 6 54 1 2 A G p G–4 Periodic R p t 3 (13-19 Aug 44),
21 Aug 44.
to 19 August—Third Army, operating at 55FUSAG G–4 Periodic Rpt 3 (13-19 Aug 44), 21
greater distances and setting a faster pace Aug 44.
than the First Army, got the larger share Aug 56T U S A G–4 Periodic Rpt 3 (13-19 Aug 44), 21
44.
of the gasoline brought forward, its re- 57According to army G–4 periodic reports, FUSA’s
ceipts averaging 382,343 gallons per day figures on issues and consumption are at variance, its
as compared with First Army’s 286,337, G–4 Periodic Report 4 indicating a daily average
issue of 453,000 gallons, and its Report of Operations
and its issues (and presumably consump- (Bk. IV, pp. 86-87) recording an average daily con-
tion) 336,500 gallons as against First sumption of 50 1,500 gallons.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 505

burned up 782,000 gallons (2,125 tons) of and 49,930 gallons on 30 August and 2
gasoline. 58By comparison, consumption of and 3 September respectively.64
gasoline by U.S. combat forces in the Meanwhile the Third Army instituted a
Meuse–Argonne battle in October 1918 conservation program and began to ration
had reached the “enormous figure” of fuel. O n the 30th it notified the XV Corps
150,000 gallons per day. 59 While the that there was no gas available for issue,
lengthening of the supply routes made de- a n d held out no hopes for the following
liveries more and more difficult, there was day.65The XII Corps alleviated its short-
as yet no indication that the supply of age to some extent by the fortuitous cap-
gasoline was failing to meet needs. O n 27 ture of about 115,000 gallons of enemy
August General Lee, in discussing the gasoline in the region of Châlons on 29
theater’s P O L situation a t a staff and and 30 August, 66and the army as a whole
command conference, could state with utilized a total of nearly 500,000 gallons of
understandable pride, “I think it is fair to capturedfuel.67 The Third Army even
report that at no time in the fighting on resorted to commandeering the extra gaso-
the Far Shore has there been a shortage.” 60 line which Red Ball trucks carried for
This claim, while warranted at the mo- their return trips to the base areas. As a
ment, could not have been made twenty- result of this shortsighted practice some
four hours later, at least so far as supply of convoys were stranded and available
front-line units was concerned. By 28 transportation facilities were consequently
August the transportation resources of the reduced. 68 It is hardly surprising that the
Communications Zone were spread so Communications Zone, which was already
thin and the lines of communications were losing entire truck companies through
so extended that daily deliveries could no “diversions,’’
became wary of sending its
longer be relied upon with certainty. First truck units into the army area.
Army now reported that the Class III sup-
ply situation was critical, 61 and Third 58FUSA Rpt o f Opns, 20 Oct 43–1 Aug 44, Bk. IV,
Army indicated that P O L was no longer pp. 86-87; T h e FUSA G–4 Periodic Report for this
being received in sufficient quantities to period (No. 4) records that 898,050 gallons of MT80
maintain adequate operating stocks in the were issued on that date.
59Report ofthe Military Board of Allied Supply (Wash-
Class III supply points. 62Both armies had ington, 1924), I, 220.
reported less than one day’s supply on 60Stf and Comd Conf Notes, C O M Z Rear, 27 Aug
hand on 26 August, a n d in the following 44, EUCOM 337/3 Confs, Stf-Weekly, I.
61FUSA G–4 Periodic Rpt 4, 30 Aug 44.
week the level fell to .31 day in First 62TUSA G–4 Periodic Rpt 4, 29 Aug 44.
Army and .007 in the Third.63 O n 28 63 FUSAGG–4 Periodic Rpt 5 ( 2 7 Aug–2 Sep),
August the Third Army reported a defi- 6 Sep 44: TUSA G–4 Periodic Rpt 5 (27 Aug–2 Sep),
5 Sep 44.
ciency of 97,510 gallons against its daily 64TUSA AAR, II, Q M ,4 , 6.
telegram requesting 450,000 gallons. In 65T U S A G–4 Periodic Rpts 5 a n d 6, with daily
summaries of activities.
the succeeding days these deficits grew 66XII Corps AAR, Sep 44, Sec. III, as cited in
worse. On the 29th deliveries to the Third Royce L. Thompson, E T O Field Commands Gasoline
Army were short by 141,520 gallons of the Status, August-September 1944, p. 65, OCMH.
67TUSA AAR, II, QM, 6.
325,000 gallons requisitioned, and in the 68Ltr, Hq E T O to CG TUSA, 15 Sep 44, sub:
next critical week deliveries dropped to Commandeering of Gasoline Supplies, 12 A Gp 463.7
token size, totaling a mere 3 1,975, 25,390, Gasoline and Motor Oil, I.
506 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

eventually influencing the tempo of opera-

tions. Reversing the situation west of the
Seine, where Third Army had made the
wider and longer sweep on the outer edges
of a huge envelopment while the First
Army advanced on a shorter inside arc,
the First now found itself tracking the
longer routes in the turning toward the
German border. I n t h e first days of Sep-
tember notice after notice reading “no
gasoline” went u p in the war room tents of
tactical headquarters, as unit after unit
reported the critical state of its fuel supply.
With the freezing of truckheads divisional
motor convoys were forced to return as far
as L a Loupe, 250 miles to the rear, to pick
up supplies.70Early in September the First
Army quartermaster instituted reconnais-
sance flights by cub planes to scout for
forward-moving gasoline trains,71 a n d at
least one division, the 5th Armored, ad-
GENERAL MULLER, Third Army mitted resorting to hijacking gasoline, a
G–4. (Photograph taken in 1946.)
practice of which other units were also
guilty. 72
In the seven lean days from 29 August The acute shortage of gasoline in the
to 4 September there was a rising chorus First Army had developed despite the fact
of appeals from combat units, many of that that organization had consistently
them expressing anxiety over the extent to held a more advantageous position than
which the fuel famine was hampering Third Army's with regard to P O L supply.
operations. In some areas motorized re- I n the last ten days of August the First
connaissance continued only by the ex- Army managed to get the lion's share of
pedient of draining the tanks of other the available gasoline, partly because it
vehicles. As the situation worsened in the possessed more truck transportation than
last days of August army trucks had to the Third Army, and partly because it was
make longer a n d longer trips to the rear,
for while it had been the policy to keep 69Memo, Muller for G–4s XII and XX Corps, 31
Aug 44, as cited in Thompson, ETO Field Commands
supply points as far forward as possible, Gasoline Status, p. 79. Other references to the effect
the Third Army G–4, Col. Walter J. of the shortage on combat units are also from this sur-
Muller, on 31 August ordered a delay in vey of the operational records of the field units, pp.
79–80, 93.
their displacement in order to give the 70S–4 Jnl and AAR, Combat Comd Reserve, 5th
Communications Zone a n opportunity to Armd Div, Sep 44, and V Corps Q M AAR, Sep 44,
improve its position. 69 as cited in Thompson study, pp. 86 and 53.
71FUSA Rpt of Opns, 1 Aug 44–22 Feb 45, I, 46.
I n the area of the First Army the experi- 72S–4 Jnl and AAR, CCR, 5th Armd Div, 5 Sep
ence was similar, the shortages of gasoline 44, as cited in Thompson study, p. 86.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 507

day and Third Army 202,382 gallons. 76

While the reliability of all POL statis-
tics for this period is highly suspect, these
figures would indicate that the First Army
was considerably better off in the matter
of Class III supply. But its needs were
greater, for it was consistently the larger of
the two organizations operating east of the
Seine and, contrary to popular impres-
sion, possessed, a substantial preponder-
ance over the Third Army in all types of
armored units, including armored divi-
sions, separate tank battalions, and mech-
anized cavalry, in the critical days a t the
end of August and the beginning of Sep-
tember. I n armored divisions alone in this
period the First Army’s preponderance
was two to one, for it employed four divi-
sions in the pursuit as compared with
Third Army’s two.77
T h e disparity in armored strength be-
BRIG. GEN. R. W. WILSON, First tween the two armies was even greater
Army G–4. (Photograph taken in 1945.)
than is indicated by this comparison, since
two of the First Army’s armored divi-
accorded a general priority in initial re- 73 12 A Gp Adm Instructions 13, 27 Aug 44,
serves and maintenance for the northeast- SHAEF G–4 322 Twelfth Army Group Adm Instr, I.
ward drive beyond the Seine,73 an ad- 74First Army’s consumption figures exceed the
issues. Comparative issue figures for the two armies
vantage which it continued to enjoy for a are not available.
short time after tonnage allocations were 75Compare daily telegram requests, as given in
instituted at the end of the month. From 20 T U S A AAR. II, QM, 4, with daily consumption as
reported in G–4 periodic reports. This strange
to 26 August the First Army consumed an phenomenon appears to have been borne out on a
average of 501,500 gallons of gasoline per larger theater-wide scale. O n 2 September an officer
day as compared with Third Army’s in the Area Petroleum Office, ETO, pointed out that
forward demands for gasoline on the far shore totaled
350,000. 74 Strangely enough, however, only 1,358,238 gallons of MT80 per day for the period
Third Army at that time was asking for 16 August-4 September, while the average issues in
only 250,000 gallons per day in its daily the period 21–23 August and on 28 August were at
the rate of 2,030,364 gallons per day, indicating that
telegram requests despite a considerably using organizations simply were not requisitioning
higher consumption rate, indicating that enough gasoline. Memo, Lt Col H. C. Ferrell for G–4
its unfavorable position was in part self- POL, 2 Sep 44, sub: Forward Demands Far Shore-
MT80, USFET 200.42B Capacity for Bulk P O L on
imposed. 75 Continent.
The disparity in consumption between 76FUSA figures from Rpt of Opns, IV, 87; TUSA
figures from G–4 Periodic Rpt 5.
the two armies continued in the more 77Third Army possessed a n additional armored
critical period which followed, First Army division, but it was occupied with operations in Brit-
burning an average of 485,190 gallons per tany under the VIII Corps.
508 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

sions—the 2d and 3d—were organized on stantly accelerating demand for gasoline

the basis of the older T/O&E and con- must be explained rather by the round-
tained a substantially larger number of the-clock hauling operations of not only
combat vehicles t h a n the more recently the regular QM truck units but the many
activated units. provisional organizations formed with the
T h e shortage of gasoline in front-line vehicles of artillery, engineer, a n d other
units resulted less from any breakdown in types of units, and by the tremendous in-
supply than from the inability to meet crease in mileage involved in lateral com-
ever-mounting demands. Deliveries to the munications behind the greatly expanded
forward areas actually did not fall off army fronts. Not only had the lines of
precipitately in the crucial weeks. Where- communications been extended several
as the Third Army’s consumption had de- hundred miles, but the armies had fanned
clined from 397,000 gallons per day in the out as they advanced beyond the Seine,
week of 6–12 August to 200,120 gallons in widening the army group front from less
the week of 27 August-2 September, First than 100 miles in mid-August to 200 miles
Army's receipts had correspondingly risen in mid-September. The inevitable result
from 234,760 to 434,857 gallons per day was to a d d to the already heavy burden
(or rather 485,200 as indicated by con- on transportation.
sumption figures). Deliveries had in- The armies had developed an insatiable
creased steadily each week through most thirst for gasoline and had demanded an
of August, permitting daily consumption ever-rising scale of deliveries. T h e First
to rise from about 605,000 gallons in the Army had raised its demands early, esti-
second week to 851,500 gallons in the mating its requirements at 567,000 gallons
fourth. Deliveries had indeed fallen off per day beginning on 15 August. 78After
somewhat in the crucial week bridging the institution of tonnage allocations its
August and September, but they were still bid for upwards of 2,000 tons per day of
large enough to permit the consumption Class III supplies constituted more than
of about 688,000 gallons per day, approxi- 60 percnt of its total tonnage allocation.79
mately the daily consumption of mid- Third Army’s daily telegram requests re-
August. mained at 250,000 gallons per day until
The fact was that the momentum of the 26 August, when they were almost dou-
pursuit could no longer be maintained bled.80 These soaring demands were be-
with the amounts of fuel which the armies yond the capabilities of the Communica-
had received in mid-August. The reason tions Zone, and could not be met even by
was not that the daily advances by the the use of army transport. Nevertheless,
combat elements were greater than before, sizable quantities of gasoline were moved
nor that a larger number of divisions were forward even in the most crucial week.
employed. As a matter of fact, only sixteen Meanwhile consumption of gasoline in the
divisions were operational in the two rear areas had also risen as a consequence
armies on 12 September as compared with 78Ltr, ADSEC to C G C O M Z , 1 1 Aug 44, sub:
twenty-one in mid-August, the VIII Estimate of POL Requirements, ADSEC 463.5 Gaso-
Corps having been detached from the line and Motor Oil.
79FUSA AAR, Sep 44, Sec. 4, Exhibit I (Daily
Third Army and placed under the control Tonnage Bids).
of the Ninth Army in Brittany. The con- 80TUSA A A R , I I ,Q M , 4 , 6 .
FRANTIC SUPPLY 509

of round-the-clock use of all available tonnages than anticipated—about 90 per-

transportation. Daily requirements for the cent rather than 80. 84These trends even-
refueling of Red Ball trucks alone were tually led to a revision of the POL mainte-
estimated at more than 300,000 gallons. 81 nance factors. Actually, despite the soaring
At no time during the period of the pur- rate of consumption toward the end of the
suit was the gasoline shortage attributable month the average consumption of POL
to inadequate stocks on the Continent. per division slice for the entire month did
Despite the long delay in bringing the not exceed planning factors, and the tem-
Major System into operation, approxi- porary drop in the continental stock posi-
mately eleven days of supply of POL tion apparently was not serious at the
based on a fifty-mile day had been built moment and had no bearing on the short-
up by mid-July. At the end of the first ages currently being experienced in the
week in August a stock of 25,851,000 gal- forward areas. O n 3 September, when the
lons of gasoline was held in Normandy, gasoline supply situation in the forward
representing fourteen days’ supply at the areas was at its worst, Colonel Barnes re-
current rate of issue of 1,809,000 gallons ported that stocks of all types of POL
per day and based on the current troop products on the Continent had actually
strength.82Two weeks later, on 19 August, increased despite the high consumption
continental holdings had actually risen to rates. 85
27,000,000 gallons of MT80, which was It is clear from the foregoing that the
now equivalent to between eleven and gasoline shortage can be explained only
twelve days of supply.83 by the deficiency of transportation facil-
That continental reserves of POL finally ities. Inadequate transport was in fact the
did shrink in the fourth week of August chief limiting factor in the logistic support
was not immediately attributed to greatly of the American forces throughout the
increased consumption. The Chief Petro- period of the pursuit, and when the First
leum Officer, Col. Elmer E. Barnes, Army first reported a critical quartermas-
thought at first that the “apparent” drop 81Memo, Capt A. M. R. Jacobs of G–4 Petroleum
in reserves had been caused not by heavy SHAEF for Col W. C. Pew, 1 1 Sep 44, SHAEF G–4
consumption but by heavy withdrawals Tonnages-Class III, POL 137/5/GDP–1.
82Memo, Chief Statistical Sec SGS ETO, 18 Aug
made to fill newly constructed pipelines, 44, USFET 400.42B Capacity for Bulk POL on Con-
by the transfer of mobile reserves in cans tinent.
to the armies, and by laying down depot 83This was equal to about 75,000 tons. I n addition,
there were 10,800 tons of Avgas a n d 17,800 tons of
stocks in the combat zone, none of which diesel oil on hand. Note for record, Col Irish, 19 Aug
would be reported as stocks. When the 44; 12 A G p G–4 Periodic Rpt 3 (13–19 Aug 44),
trend continued, however, it was realized 21 Aug 44.
84Memos, Lee for Chief Petroleum Officer, 26 Aug
that this explanation was not valid, and it 44, Col Carl E. Cummings, Deputy Chief Petroleum
became apparent that the abnormally Officer for Lee, 26 Aug 44, Barnes for Lee, 28 Aug
high issues of mid-August represented a 44, and Barnes for G–4, 28 Aug 44, sub: Actual Issues
vs. Estimated Requirements POL, USFET 400.42B
rising rate of consumption, one which to- Capacity for Bulk POL; Memo, J. M. D. Heald, Chief
ward the end of August was greatly ex- Plng and Requirements Br to Chief Petroleum
ceeding the planned maintenance factors. Officer, sub: Plng Logistics, 25 Sep 44, USFET
400.42B Petroleum.
In addition, gasoline was accounting for a 85Stf a n d Comd Conf, C O M Z Rear, 3 Sep 44,
much higher percentage of the total POL EUCOM 337/3 Confs, Stf-Weekly, I.
510 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

ter supply situation on 26 August it recog- above or below Paris and continuing on to
nized that the major difficulty was not so the northeast. The new route had the ob-
much one of inadequate supply levels as it vious advantage of being considerably
was a problem of moving supplies forward shorter and thus involving less labor and
into the army area.86 fewer materials. T h e construction of an
P O L was carried forward by all of the additional line eastward from Quiberon
principal means of transportation—motor, Bay was no longer contemplated.87
rail, air, and pipeline. Since the last was Construction continued to be pushed
designed specifically and exclusively to vigorously after the above decision. In the
meet the special problem of bulk POL second week of August the pipeline
movement it is apropos to describe at this reached St. Lô, where the Major and
point the extent to which the pipeline sys- Minor Systems were linked. Construction
tem was brought to function in this period. then proceeded simultaneously on various
With the launching of the COBRAoper- segments of the line. O n 8 August work
ation on 25 July ADSEC engineers had began on all three lines forward from St.
immediately resumed the extension of the Lô, two of the lines, each seventeen miles
major pipeline southward from La Haye- long, reaching Vire on the 29th. Mean-
du-Puits. Upon reaching Lessay, however, while construction of two lines from Vire
a major alteration was made in the to Domfront, a distance of twenty-five
planned route. O n the assumption that miles, was undertaken on 19 August and
large forces would be employed in Brit- completed on the 23d. T h e extension of
tany the original plans had contemplated these lines forward to Alençon, another
running the pipelines southward through thirty-nine miles, was begun on 22 Aug-
Avranches to Fougères (whence a branch ust, one of the lines reaching that point by
line was to be extended to Rennes), to the end of the month. By the end of Aug-
Laval (where the Major System would be ust, therefore, one M T 8 0 line had been
joined by a line running u p from Qui- pushed to Alençon, eighty-one miles for-
beron Bay), a n d thence to Le Mans and ward of St. Lô, a second was completed to
eastward. (See Map 9.) In accordance with Domfront, and a third (for Avgas) was
General Bradley's decision of 3 August, by also nearly complete to the latter loca-
which relatively small forces were allotted tion. 88
Brittany and the main effort was shifted U p to this time the pipelines were ex-
eastward, the pipeline route was now also tended at a good pace, with more than
shifted to bring it into closer support of the 7,200 troops a n d at least 1,500 prisoners
main forces operating to the east. Begin- of war employedon the 89 But
projects.
ning at Lessay the pipeline was redirected both the construction and operation of the
southeastward to St. Lô and then pro- 86FUSA G–4 Periodic Rpt 4 (20-26 Aug 44), 30
jected south and southeastward to Vire, Aug 44.
Domfront, and Alençon, generally paral- 87Hist R p t 13, Corps of Engrs E T O , pp. 8 1-82;
P O L Plan, POL Br G–4 E T O , 4 Aug 44, EUCOM
leling the earlier route but from twenty- G–4 POL Plan ETOUSA 14 Apr 44.
five to thirty-five miles farther inland. 88Monthly Rpt, Construction and Quartering Div
(Map 16) From Alençon the lines were OCofEngrs ETO, Aug 44, ADSEC Files. See also 12
A G p G–4 Periodic Rpt, overlays of supply instal-
planned to extend eastward to Chartres lations.
a n d the Seine, crossing that river either 89Monthly Rpt, Construction and Quartering Div.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 511

H. Damon

MAP 16

pipelines were attended by increasing dif- draw all gasoline at St. Lô, eighty miles
ficulties forward of Vire, and the progress farther to the rear, until repairs could be
of the lines was hardly a n accurate meas- made. Consequently the turn-round dis-
ure of their usefulness. Partly because of tance which trucking units were forced to
the inexperience of personnel, and partly cover between the forward areas and the
because of the pressure for speed, the lines pipeline dispensing points was increased
were not always properly constructed. by a n additional 160 miles. Such breaks
Rather than take the time it often would reduced the amount of gasoline which
have required to break through hedge- could be forwarded to the armies and ag-
rows and remove mines in order to lay the gravated the fuel shortage in the most
pipe on the far side of drainage ditches, critical period of the pursuit.91
the troops regularly laid the lines on road Lack of a n adequate communications
shoulders and in some cases in ditches. As system prevented maximum efficiency in
a result there were numerous breaks and the operation of the pipeline. POL plan-
pipeline failures . 90I n addition, there was ners had appreciated the importance of
much indiscriminate tapping of the lines communication facilities along the pipe-
by the simple process of punching holes in line and had recommended a permanent
the pipe, a small part of which was at-
tributed to sabotage. O n 29 August, for 90 Final Report of the ChiefEngineer, ETO, p. 312,
OCMH.
example, breaks occurred in the lines 91 12 A Gp Daily Jnl, Transportation Sec, 27–30
north of Domfront, making it necessary to Aug 44.
512 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

WELDING A SECTION OF THE POL LINE as it is extended eastward across France.

type of telephone system which would per- in ignorance of what was being done at
mit conversation betwen any two instal- the other end, and as the pipeline was be-
lations. Such facilities had not been made ing extended toward Alençon the inter-
available, and the troops therefore relied ruptions in deliveries became frequent.
on the organic equipment of engineer Late in August the decision was finally
units, which proved quite unsatisfactory. made to install a semipermanent tele-
Communication between extremities of phone network, and Signal Corps troops
the line and even between tank farms was eventually built such a system.92
largely impossible, and communication Meanwhile the forward extension of the
between on-the-line pump stations was pipeline had itself begun to lag. It had
only indifferently successful. Pump sta- long since become apparent that the pipe-
tions a n d maintenance crews frequently lines could not keep pace with the fast-
could not be informed of line breaks ex- moving armies. I n mid-August, however,
cept by dispatch riders using jeeps, and even the normal speed of pipeline con-
gasoline was often lost while word was 92Report on POL Plans andConstruction to 8 May
transmitted by this slow means. Operating 45, ADSEC Engr, ADSEC Completion Rpts Bulk
crews at one end of the line were normally POL installations.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 513

struction was retarded by a lack of con- to the Alençon-Chartres area each day.95
struction materials. As was the case with These measures permitted construction to
most other supply shortages the deficiency continue, but they did not help alleviate
was caused not by a shortage of pipeline the fuel crisis which was already upon the
equipment, but by the inability to bring armies. By 2 September one 6-inch line
the available equipment forward. Para- had reached Nogent-le-Rotrou, about
doxically, pipeline construction, itself de- thirty-eight miles east of Alençon, and
signed to provide an added transportation within the next week the line was ex-
facility, felt the impact of the one limiting tended another thirty-five miles to Char-
factor which was determining the extent tres.96 But the dispensing of gasoline did
of all logistic support—that is, transporta- not begin with the arrival of the pipeline
tion—and found itself in sharp competi- at these points. After the shutdown of the
tion with supply movements for the lines west of Alençon for repairs on 29
limited rail and motor transport available. August, First Army did not begin to draw
Faced with a choice between the certainty gasoline at Alençon again until 2 Septem-
or long-term savings through the allot- ber. Third Army at that time was receiv-
ment of a portion of the transport for con- ing its fuel via motor transport from Dom-
struction purposes, and the more urgent front.97At the height of the fuel crisis,
needs of the moment, the Communica- therefore, the armies were approximately
tions Zone tended to choose the latter and 250 miles from the operating pipehead.
divert truck units to the higher priority The fuel situation began to improve on
forwarding of gasoline, rations, and am- 4 September. The supply of gasoline was
munition. Indeed, so persistent was the by no means ample after this date, how-
demand for gasoline that the use of for- ever, and current receipts did not allow
ward dispensing points on the completed the build-up of reserves. The G–4’sof both
pipeline was frequently delayed by the armies continued to complain that quan-
continued withdrawals from pipeheads tities coming into the truckheads were is-
farther to the rear, for such withdrawals so sued as fast as they were received and that
exhausted the supply of gasoline that it they did not meet daily maintenance re-
was impossible even to fill the most re- quirements.98 Nevertheless, deliveries in
cently completed portion of the pipeline.93 the following week were sufficient to per-
O n 22 August General Plank, the Ad- mit a record average daily consumption
vance Section commander, pointed out to of more than 863,000 gallons. Third Army
the COMZ staff that the pipeline had as- twice in this period received amounts well
sumed a n overriding importance in the in excess of 700,000 gallons and took ad-
support of the armies and urged that addi-
93Engineer Rpt 13, p. 88; Report on POL Plans
tional rail transportation be allotted for and Construction to 8 May 45, ADSEC Engr.
the movement of pipe, tanks, pumps, and 94T W X R–50025, Plank to C O M Z CofT, G–4,
fittings so that construction could be ac- a n d Engr, 2 2 Aug 44, E U C O M 825 Tunnels and
Pipelines, Decks, Piers, Jetties, etc.
celebrated.94High priority was given to the 95ADSEC Completion Rpt; S H A E F G–4 War
movement of POL engineer materials at Diary/Jnl, 30–31 Aug 44, SHAEF War Diary.
the end of the month, and for a period of 9612 A Gp G–4 Periodic Rpts 5 and 6, overlays.
9712 A Gp Daily Jnl, Transportation Sec, 3 Sep 44.
about ten days between 500 and 1,500 98FUSA G–4 Periodic Rpts 6 (3-9 Sep) and 7 (10–
tons of equipment were hauled by railway 16 Sep); TUSA G–4 Periodic Rpt 6 (3-9 Sep).
514 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

vantage of these receipts to build up a re- portation continued to present something

serve of about 1.1 days on the basis of of a dilemma. Lack of a pipeline extend-
estimated daily needs of 650,000 gallons. 99 ing far enough forward already meant a
In this period deliveries by air substan- costly use of motor transportation to bring
tially enhanced the tonnages moved by gasoline from the base areas; on the other
rail and motor transport. In the following hand, adding to the Major System meant
week—10–16 September—the two armies using precious rail tonnage for the move-
made daily average issues of more than ment of construction materials over a dis-
1,000,000 gallons of gasoline. tance of about 250 miles from the Nor-
In the meantime the pipeline had been mandy ports. Because rail transportation
advanced still farther and was dispensing was more urgently needed to move other
considerably farther forward. By mid- supplies to the forward areas, the use of it
September one line had reached Dourdan, for pipeline construction materials was no
about twenty miles from the Seine, and longer felt to be justified. A re-evaluation
was dispensing at Chartres. I n addition, of the POL situation at Headquarters,
the Major System at this time comprised Communications Zone, led to the conclu-
a second MT80 line extending beyond sion that the Major System should be ter-
Domfront and dispensing at that city, and minated at approximately the line of the
a third line, for Avgas, completed to Alen- Seine, and planners now considered con-
çon and dispensing there.100This progress struction of shorter lines based on the east-
represented an improvement over the ernmost of the north coast ports, prefer-
situation two weeks earlier, but it was ably Antwerp.102
largely illusory, for the bulk distribution The Major System was actually ex-
system was far from adequate. The dis- tended to Coubert, about ten miles be-
tance between the forward dispensing yond the Seine, although construction was
points and the armies was still as great as carried on at a much reduced pace and
before—270 miles in the case of the First the first line was not completed to that
Army and 200 in the case of the Third. point until early October. By interesting
Furthermore, the pipehead at Chartres coincidence, the overriding importance
was capable of delivering only about one which the supply of gasoline had held for
third of the estimated needs east of the several weeks was already diminishing
Seine—that is, 400,000 of a required when the above decision was made, for in
1,215,000 gallons. A minimum of 815,000 the second week of September the pursuit
gallons had to be obtained farther to the came to an end. Although POL require-
rear, a portion of it at Domfront, the great
bulk of it at St. Lô and Etreham, and 99TUSA G–4 Periodic Rpt 6 (3-9 Sep).
some of it even as far back as Cherbourg. 100Memo, Capt Paul A. Ludolph, Chief Highways
This was obviously an unsatisfactory ar- Br, for Lt Col Mack, 13 Sep 44, sub: Gen Ross's Buck,
a n d Ltr, Ross to Gross, 15 Sep 44, E U C O M 319.1
rangement in view of the uneconomical Rpt—Misc.
use of truck transportation which it 101Memo, Capt Jacobs of G–4 Petroleum SHAEF
entailed.101 for Col Pew, 11 Sep 44, S H A E F G–4 Tonnages—
Class III, POL 137/5/GDP–1.
Nevertheless it was decided to suspend 102TWX E–46157, Hq C O M Z to SHAEF, 11 Sep
temporarily a further extension of the 44, SHAEF AG 463.7–1 P O L Tankers a n d Targets
pipelines. The acute shortage of trans- 1944.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 515

ments continued to be large, it became in- continue their advance until their tanks
creasingly evident as operations became ran dry, in spite of all the risks entailed.
more static and plodding in nature that Measuring the end effects of the gaso-
the demand for other classes of supply, line shortage is a more speculative matter.
particularly ammunition, would grow At the time of the shortages there was
more and more urgent and that they strong belief in some quarters, particularly
would compete for a larger and larger the Third Army, that the pursuit might
portion of the available tonnage allocated. have continued unabated and might have
Such a shift was portended in the first led to decisive results had there only been
week in September by the bloody battles sufficient fuel to power the vehicles. Lack
which the Third Army fought to win of gasoline, however, was not the only fac-
bridgeheads over the Moselle. As early as tor influencing the speed and extent of the
8 September Colonel Muller, the army eastward advance. By design, the main ef-
G–4, pointed out to General Stratton and fort was still being made in the north, and
General Plank that changes in the tactical General Bradley repeatedly placed re-
situation might necessitate a sudden shift strictions on the Third Army’s operations,
in demand from P O L to certain types of authorizing only limited advances with
ammunition,103 and two days later the the thought that General Patton’s forces
G–4 actually took measures to increase the should not overextend themselves and
supply of ammunition at the expense of possibly jeopardize the accomplishment of
equal tonnages of POL.104A similar shift the army group's mission.106
in emphasis was made in the First Army Furthermore, while it was true that the
about a week later.105 Third Army encountered relatively weak
The total effect of the gasoline shortage delaying forces as it forced crossings of the
is difficult to assess, although its imme- Meuse on the last day of August, captured
diate consequences for the conduct of documents later revealed that the enemy
operations are quite apparent. Since each had already begun building u p substan-
day’s deliveries were consumed and the tial forces along the Moselle. Certainly the
establishment of reserves was out of the deceleration of the advance occasioned by
question, tactical operations became the gasoline shortage gave the Germans
wholly contingent on day-to-day deliv- additional time for these preparations, but
eries. The crisis came when these could no the formation of the Moselle defenses had
longer be depended on, a n d the unpre- already proceeded farther than was real-
dictability of deliveries acted as a depres- ized by U.S. forces.107 Similar develop-
sant on all planning and cast a pall of ments had taken place in the area of the
uncertainty over all operations, even as
much as twenty-four hours in advance. In
the closing days of August the mobility of 103T U S A G–4 Periodic R p t 6 (3–9 S e p ) , with
Summary of Activities, 8 Sep.
the American forces was noticeably re- 104T U S A G–4 Periodic Rpt 7 ( 10–16 Sep), with
duced, with the result that they could not Summary of Activities, 10 Sep.
take full advantage of their potential strik- 105FUSA AAR, Sep 44, Sec. IV, Supply, Exhibit I
ing power and could not maintain the (Daily Tonnage Bids).
106Ltr, Moses to Hist Div, 18 Nov 50, OCMH.
momentum of the pursuit. In the period of 107For details of this build-up see Hugh M. Cole,
the shortage some units were allowed to The Lorraine Campaign (Washington, 1950), pp. 47–48.
516 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

First Army farther north. There the ene- proximately 75 percent of all the troops on
my had already begun to man the pre- the Continent were receiving the B ration
pared fortifications of the Siegfried Line with its greater variety and palatability.108
while delaying forces, aided by the fuel Plans had also been madeto add perish-
shortage, slowed the advance of the Amer- able items to the diet and thus gradually
icans. Although the gasoline shortage was to convert the B ration into a type A. Is-
a decided handicap in pressing the pursuit sues were to begin on D plus 30 to approx-
with full vigor, therefore, it is certain, in imately 40 percent of the troops and
the light of developments on the enemy eventually were to extend to all troops on
side of the hill, that the American forces the Continent. By mid-July the Quarter-
would have encountered increasing resist- master Corps indicated its readiness to in-
ance regardless of the fuel situation. augurate this program. But the sudden
change in the tactical situation, plus diffi-
(3) Class I, II, and IV Supply culties over the handling of perishable
foods, made it impossible to implement
While the supply of gasoline assumed this plan fully. The provision of refriger-
overriding importance in the pursuit, ated transport and cold storage created a
shortages developed in every other class of special problem along the entire line of
supply, again not primarily because of the communications. Because of the shortage
lack of stocks in the theater or on the Con- of coastal reefers (refrigerated vessels), in
tinent, but because of inadequate transpor- which perishable foods were to be trans-
tation. The limited lift available to meet shipped to the Continent, and because of
the urgent demand for gasoline and the the lack of cold storage facilities in France,
strong rivalry for transportation among all the chief quartermaster had insisted that
supplies meant that not even the barest es- refrigerated ships be sent directly to con-
sentials of many items would be moved tinental waters where they could serve as
forward. floating storage until the foods could be
Since rations are consumed in fairly accepted ashore.
uniform amounts regardless of tactical The War Department refused to permit
conditions, Class I requirements placed a such a practice. insisting that reefers must
minimum daily demand on transportation be discharged promptly and returned.
resources. But shortages developed even in Furthermore, there were not enough re-
this class of supply, and the character of frigerated rail cars to handle shipments of
operations had a definite effect on the type perishables inland. About thirty American
of rations issued. In the first month follow- cars were supposed to move to the Conti-
ing the landings in France Class I issues nent in July, but they did not arrive until
consisted almost wholly of operational mid-August and constituted only a frac-
rations—that is, the packaged C, K, and tion of the requirements. In the critical
10-in-1, with a much higher consumption days of the pursuit cross-Channel lift
of the last than anticipated. Beginning in could not be spared to move refrigerator
the second week ofJuly a fairly rapid shift
was made to the bulk-type B ration, in
108 QuartermasterSupplyin the ETO in World
part to offset the heavy drain on 10-in-1 War II, QM School, Camp Lee, MS, II (Subsistence),
stocks, and by the end of the month ap- 101–02, 250, OCMH.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 517

RATIONS STACKED AT A QUARTERMASTER DEPOT near Chartres.

cars, nor could precious inland transport August.111Thus, as in the first month of
be used to move materials for the purpose operations, U.S. troops subsisted mainly
of constructing cold storage facilities.109 on the C, K, and 10-in-1 rations, and the
Besides being circumscribed by these goal of providing a large percentage of the
limitations the ration plan was upset by troops with fresh foods was not realized.
the nature of tactical operations. Pursuit Class I deliveries had the same difficul-
operations did not lend themselves to the ties as the forward movement of other
issuance or preparation of either the A or types of supplies. Rations were regularly
B ration, and the movement of large requisitioned by the daily telegram which
quantities of bulk supplies would only gave the strength of the command, with a
have added to the burden on transport. normal delivery expectancy of three days.
Consequently the breakout was accom- With supply lines being extended many
panied by a rapid shift back to operational miles every day, the time lag lengthened
rations. No B rations were drawn by the to as much as ten to seventeen days.112
Third Army after the second week of Aug- Third Army had its first warning of Class
ust, and thereafter its heaviest issues were I difficulties in the second week of August.
of the 10-in-1 type.110 In a period of three days shipments fell
In the First Army the shift was more short by 350,000 rations. As a result of the
gradual, reflecting the more static charac-
ter of its operations in the first few weeks 109Ibid., II, 113–22, 127–29.
of August, a n d the complete reversion to 110TUSA G–4 Periodic Rpts.
111FUSA Rpt of Opns, 1 Aug 44–22 Feb 45, IV,
operational rations—mostly 10-in- 1’s— 81.
was not effected until the last week of 112Ibid., IV, 47.
518 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

interruption in the flow of supplies, the Rations, POL, and ammunition—

army’s reserves and even a portion of the Classes I, III, and V respectively—can be
unit reserves were temporarily exhausted. referred to as the “staples” of combat
For the remainder of the month the daily maintenance, and for obvious reasons had
deliveries were sufficient for maintenance the highest priorities in the forward move-
and for reconstituting unit reserves. The ment of supplies. Taken together, these
army’s reserves remained precarious, al- three classes of supply placed a steady and
though at no time during August did they fairly fixed daily demand on transporta-
drop below 2.7 days. tion facilities. Rations imposed the most
Shipments were again short in the sec- unvarying demand on movement capabil-
ond week of September, when the average ities. The changes in the course and na-
daily receipts totaled only 152,580 rations ture of tactical operations resulted in
against a troop strength of about 265,000 fluctuations in the demand for POL and
men, and when the level of supply tem- ammunition, but an increase in the re-
porarily dropped to .59 day. This was quirements for one was normally balanced
actually the only period of the pursuit in by a decrease in the demand for the other.
which the Third Army judged its ration A highly mobile type of warfare, made
situation critical. The shortages were par- possible by a low scale of enemy resistance,
tially relieved by the use of captured food, resulted in enormous demands for fuel
particularly canned and frozen beef. Cap- and relatively small quantities of ammu-
tured flour was also used by the field nition; conversely, static operations
bakeries, which continued to bake bread brought about a higher expenditure of
at each of the Class I supply points, aiding ammunition and an accompanying reduc-
considerably in relieving the monotony of tion in the consumption of fuel.
the C and K rations. 113 I n August and early September the
Experience in the First Army was simi- minimal requirements for rations, gaso-
lar, although its position was slightly bet- line, and ammunition could easily have
ter throughout August. The Class I supply absorbed all available lift, and it is not
level reached its lowest point in the second surprising, therefore, that Class I I and IV
week of September, when it dropped to supplies had to bear the brunt of the sacri-
.43 day based on a troop strength of fice, as is clearly revealed in both the allo-
400,000. O n the 11th and 12th deliveries cation of the available tonnage and in the
had to be supplemented by 75,000 and actual deliveries to the armies. In the first
52,000 captured rations.114Despite the oc- week of September, after tonnage ration-
casional interruption in the flow of rations ing began, First Army permitted less than
and the hand-to-mouth nature of supply, one seventh of its 3,500-ton allocation to
and although U.S. troops for short periods be devoted to Class II and IV supplies.
were forced to eat captured rations, the The record of receipts actually shows that,
most unpopular component of which was of the 20,742 tons of supplies delivered to
a tasteless canned fish which American the army by the Communications Zone in
Army cooks were unprepared to cope with, the first week of September, only 1,643
the supply of food for the most part was
113 T U S AAAR, II, QM, 3–4, 6 ; TUSA G–4 Peri-
adequate and never seriously threatened odic Rpt 6 (3–9 Sep).
to affect the conduct of operations. 114FUSA G–4 Periodic Rpts 4–7 (20 Aug–16 Sep).
FRANTIC SUPPLY 519

such as decontamination companies and

chemical processing companies, could not
be employed in the special functions for
which they were trained, many were uti-
lized in related roles, such as fire fighting,
laundering of salvaged clothing, and pro-
viding showers, depending on the adapt-
ability of their equipment and person-
nel. 117
Medical supplies constituted but a
small fraction of the tonnages moved for-
ward, and deficiencies could be alleviated
fairly easily by air shipment from the
United Kingdom. One of the unique fea-
tures of medical supply in World War II
was the provision of whole blood, a n item
which performed a n incalculable service
in saving human life. T h e distribution of
refrigerated whole blood was organized
by a theater blood bank, consisting of a
base depot and advance blood depots for
GENERAL ROWAN, Chief Chemical the Communications Zone a n d the field
Warfare Officer, ETOUSA.
armies. I n the first three months all blood
was flown from the base depot a t Salis-
tons constituted Class II and IV.115 I n the bury, England. Whole blood was not plen-
Third Army Class II a n d I V supplies re- tiful in the early stages of continental
ceived early in September averaged less operations; it became the most critical
than 300 tons per day, less than one tenth item of medical supply early in August
of the total allocation.116 and had to be allocated to the armies by
Of the thousands of items furnished by the army group surgeon. The shortage
the six services, Medical and Chemical came to a n end in mid-August, when in-
Warfare Service supplies were certainly creasing quantities of blood began to
the least critical in the period of the pur- arrive from the United States. 118
suit. In fact, they were the only supplies of The shortages of various types of signal,
which fairly consistently adequate levels quartermaster, and engineer equipment
were maintained in the armies throughout developed primarily as a result of the in-
the period. This good record in the case of
chemical supplies was due in part to the 115These figures from the AAR for September. The
fact that chemical warfare had not been G–4 periodics show total deliveries via army and
C O M Z transportation of 36,956 tons, of which 2,783
resorted to, although the Chemical War- tons were Class II and IV items.
fare Service was responsible for the main- 116TUSA G–4 Periodic Rpt 7 (10-16 Sep).
tenance and supply of the effective and 117 ADSECOperations History, p. 88.
118ADSEC Operations History, pp. 90-91; 12 A
popular 4.2-inch mortar and its ammuni- G p Rpt of Opns, VI (G–4), 31; TUSA AAR, II,
tion. Since some Chemical Warfare units, Medical, 12.
520 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

had a n even lower priority for movement

than most other equipment. In view of the
more urgent needs for other supplies there
was a tendency, therefore, to postpone the
replacement of quartermaster equipment
to a later date, with the result hat quar-
termaster supply became increasingly
critical toward the end of August. There
was virtually no replacement of clothing,
for example, in the very period when the
replacement factor reached a n unexpect-
edly high rate, and in the Third Army ap-
proximately 80 percent of all issues before
mid-September were made from reno-
vated salvage. 121
The limitations of transport had an
acute effect on the movement of engineer
supplies because of the bulkiness and
weight of major engineer items. In order
to carry out their most important engineer
functions, therefore, such as bridging, the
GENERAL RUMBOUGH. Chief Sig- armies attempted to “travel light” and
nal Officer, ETOUSA.
eliminated as much tonnage as possible
from their forward dumps. The Third
adequate means of transportation. In Army met its transportation problem in
Signal Corps equipment the First Army’s part by converting a n engineer combat
position was relatively satisfactory in Aug- group consisting of four heavy ponton bat-
ust, but the Third Army was badly in talions into a provisional transport group
need of many items, particularly field wire a n d using it throughout August to move
and radio parts. On 10 August representa- heavy equipment and supplies forward
tives from the major commands met with from the beaches. Even so, there were
General Rumbough, the theater chief sig- critical shortages of treadway bridging,
nal officer, and agreed that Third Army's water purification equipment, and other
shortages should be alleviated by trans- items. 122
fers from First Army's stocks. 119Air ship- Ordnance Class I I and I V supply, nor-
ment from the United Kingdom, whose mally accounting for a major portion of
depots held considerable stocks of signal tonnage movement, likewise felt the full
equipment, met some of the most critical brunt of the limitations of transport, al-
needs at the end of August. But forward
movements from the base areas were 11912 A G p G–4 Periodic Rpt 2 (7- 1 2 Aug 44).
small, and there was extensive use of cap- 120ADSEC Operations History, p. 96; TUSA
tured enemy equipment as well as a con- AAR, II, Signal, 7.
121TUSA AAR, II, Q M , 6.
siderable amount of cannibalization. 120 12212thA Gp Rpt, VI (G–4), 29; TUSA AAR, II,
Quartermaster Class II and I V supplies Engr, 5.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 521

though ordnance supply was further ag- agreed that Third Army was to be given
gravated by the unexpectedly high de- preference until it had built u p a reserve
mand for many replacement items. The equal to that held by First Army.126 This
Normandy hedgerow fighting had taken a policy led to some improvement in Third
heavy toll of such items as 60-mm. mor- Army’s supply position. But both armies
tars, grenade launchers, and automatic were by this time outdistancing the ca-
rifles (BAR’s), creating shortages which pabilities of the available transport, and it
persisted after the breakout. T h e mobile became increasingly difficult to bring for-
warfare of August now created additional ward the items in stock in the rear depots.
problems of maintenance and replace- Consequently many of the shortages of the
ment through the heavy wear on both previous month-of mortars and BAR’s,
general purpose and combat vehicles. for example-continued throughout the
Part of the difficulty over spare parts period of the pursuit.
a n d replacements in August stemmed In the meantime the hard driving of
from the inability to provide both armies August created even more critical short-
with full authorized loads before D Day. ages in major items such as tanks and gen-
In the preparation for the OVERLORD op- eral purpose vehicles, and a severe mainte-
eration the First Army, as the force desig- nance problem demanding greater
nated to launch the assault and secure the quantities of tires, tank motors, and other
initial beachhead, was given first priority spare parts.127 The Communications Zone
for both its T / E requirements and its re- was fully aware of these shortages and
serves of major items a n d spare parts. many of the items needed in the combat
These requirements, together with the units were available in the rear depots or
various special authorizations for the as- in ships lying offshore. Because of trans-
sault so drained theater reserves that it portation limitations and unloading diffi-
was impossible to meet all the Third culties, however, equipment could not be
Army’s needs for operating reserves or its laid down at the point where it was
basic loads of spare parts a n d In needed.128
July, during the build-up of Third Army Other factors besides transportation
units in the Cotentin, efforts were made and unloading inadequacies were at work
by direct representation at Cheltenham to as well. The unexpectedly heavy attrition
expedite the shipment of spare parts and of many items in the first three months of
tools, and some of the army’s deficiencies invasion had caused shortages in the thea-
were eventually made up in this way.124 ter. At the end of August General Eisen-
Measures were also taken to eliminate
the discrepancy in the supply positions of Ordnance Class II and I V Supply in the ETO,
Gen Bd Study 99, pp. 5-6; TUSA AAR, II, Ord, 6 ;
the two armies. On August at a confer- Statement by Col Thomas H. Nixon, TUSA Ord Of-
ence at ADSEC headquarters, the COMZ ficer, cited in History of the General Purpose Vehicle,
(G–4, General Stratton, decreed the im- II,303, OCMH; 12th A Gp Rpt of Opns, XII, 128.
T U S AAAR, II,Ord,6.
mediate release to Third Army u p to its 1 2 5 12th A Gp Ord Jnl, Aug 44,
requirements of all stocks in C O M Z de- 126 Ibid., 14 Aug 44.

127 FUSA a n d TUSA G–4 Periodic Rpts, Aug;

pots of those in which First Army FUSA Rpt of Opns, IV, 6–8; 12 A Gp Rpt of Opns,
reported excesses above its T / E and XI], 128–30.
P R O C O needs.125 Two weeks later it was 12 A Gp O r d Sec Jnl, 15 Sep 44
522 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

hower highlighted some of the more out- and to release several hundred additional
standing losses for the commanding tanks to meet the anticipated shortage.131
general of the ASF in response to the lat- The theater’s fears were not unfounded,
ter’s request for forecasts of future matériel as was indicated by the loss experience of
needs. H e noted that in the first seventy the first two months. O n 15 August the
days of operations more than 2,400 BAR’s, Communications Zone informed the War
1,750 ¼-ton trucks (jeeps), 1,500 mortars, Department that its reserves of medium
2,000 planes, and 900 tanks had been tanks were exhausted. Current War De-
swallowed into the maw of battle, and em- partment policy allowed the theater a re-
phasized the imperative need for more serve of 75 days (based on the 7 percent
and more “trucks of all kinds and sizes.” 129 replacement factor) plus a shipping factor
One of the major items in which an of 60 days (the time required for deliv-
ominous shortage had begun to develop ery)—a total of 135 days’ supply. But
was the medium tank. First Army had sus- against the 75-day reserve requirement of
tained large tank losses in the assault and 435 tanks there was no reserve in the thea-
in the subsequent hedgerow fighting in ter at all at that time, although against the
Normandy. In June it reported 187 casual- shipping factor requirement of 371 there
ties, or 26.6 percent of its average T/O&E were currently 336 on manifest a n d 425
strength of 703, and in July it reported 280 on release.
lost, equivalent to 24.4 percent of the aver- Theater reserves had thus been elimi-
age authorized strength of 1,153. These fig- nated by heavy losses, and shipments from
ures indicated that losses were running at a the zone of interior had not kept pace with
rate a t least three times as great as the 7 them. Reserve and shipping factors based
percent replacement factor authorized by on current War Department replacement
the War Department, with the result that factors, the theater claimed, were ob-
the theater reserve was quickly drained.130 viously too low to provide an adequate
Theater officials had predicted such cushion if normal editing procedures in
a development even before the experi- the War Department were relied on to ef-
ence of the first months had shown this fect resupply. ETO officials felt that the
trend. Insisting that tank casualties in the
129Cbl S–58776, Eisenhower to Somervell, 30 Aug
assault would be higher than normal, they 44, SHAEF G–4 400.192 Supply Rpt, I.
had stated before D Day that the existing 13012th A G p AAR, XI (Armored), 67. T h e evi-
reserves did not constitute a safe margin dence on this subject is conflicting. The 12th Army
Group figures are cited for the sake of consistency,
for support in the initial stage of the inva- but they appear to exaggerate the percentage loss
sion, a n d had asked for a 20 percent re- rate. One source lists losses of only 6.4 percent in June
placement factor for medium tanks. An and 7 . 3 percent in July, and a report prepared at the
end of the war gives losses of 15 percent in June and
analysis of the medium tank position early 5.8 percent in July. See Memo, Maj Gen W. A.
in June revealed a potentially dangerous Wood, Actg Dir Plank and Opns ASF, for Somervell,
stock position by 1 August, and a shortage 4 Jan 45, sub: E T O Replacement Factors or Days of
Supply for Tank, Medium, Mortars, Radio Sets, and
of almost 600 tanks by 1 September was Ammo, with incls, H q ASF notebook of memos, Itrs,
predicted if current replacement policy etc., on supply, Somervell file; Final Hist Rpt,
was followed. T h e theater had therefore AFV&W Sec ETO, App. G, E T O Adm 540.
131Ltr, Lord to AG WD, 9 J u n 44, sub: Supply
asked the War Department to expedite Status of Medium T a n k s This Theater, 12 A Gp
the shipment of tanks already released, 470.8 Tanks and Armored Cars.
 FRANTIC SUPPLY 523

135-day total would afford a n adequate By that time not only were reserves almost
reserve only if the pipeline was kept filled nonexistent, but it was becoming increas-
by prompt weekly releases and shipment ingly difficult to maintain armored units
of losses as reported to the War Depart- at their T / O & E strength. This situation
ment. The theater therefore asked that its was destined to become even more critical
loss reports, rather than the inadequate before it began to improve.
replacement factor, be accepted as a firm I n the meantime continuing efforts were
basis for immediate release and shipment. also made to overcome the other major
Allowing eight weeks from the theater’s handicap under which U.S. armored units
cabled loss reports until delivery, the 135 operated-the recognized inferiority of
days’ reserve would just about cover the U.S. tanks to the German Panthers and
anticipated loss rate of 20 percent per Tigers in both armament a n d protective
month, and the theater noted that the ac- armor. Early in August the 12th Army
curacy of this loss rate was being fully con- Group commander requested theater
firmed by experience. Further adjust- headquarters to take immediate action to
ments would be needed if deliveries could convert M4 tanks by replacing the
not be made in eight weeks. 132 75-mm. gun with the British 17-pounder,
I n mid-June the War Department had a weapon of superior penetrative power.
raised the replacement factor from 7 to 9 It was hoped that sufficient conversions
percent on the basis of loss figures from the could be accomplished initially to provide
North African Theater, but had refused to one 17-pounder gun tank for each me-
grant the theater’s request for a 20 percent dium tank platoon engaged on the Conti-
factor in view of the lack of experiential nent, pending the arrival of the 90-mm.
data a t the time. The War Department gun tank, then under production in the
had also announced that it was expediting 132Cbl,EX-43321, Lee to AGWAR, 15 Aug 44,
the flow of tanks already released, as re- a n d Ltr, E T O to WD, 23 Aug 44, s u b : Supply of
quested, but that it could not ship addi- Medium Tanks, EUCOM 470.8 Combat Armored
Cars and Tanks.
tional tanks without taking them from 133
Ltr, Gen Holly, Chief AFV&W Sec E T O , to
troop units destined for the theater.133 Lord, 20 Dec 44, sub: Chronological Analysis of At-
Meanwhile tank losses continued high. tempts Made by This Theater to Improve Supply of
75-mm. a n d 76-mm. Medium Tanks, with remarks
For the month of August they totaled 432, by Maj Gen W. A. Wood, Actg Dir Plans and Opns
or 25.3 percent of the average T/O&E ASF, Hq ASF Notebook of Memos, Ltrs, etc., re Sup-
strength of 1,709 in the two armies, thus plies, Gen Somervell.
134This total is from the 12th A G p AAR, XI, 67.
more than bearing out the rate predicted First Army reported 223 casualties, Third Army 210.
by the theater.134Nevertheless, by one ex- Other evidence again indicates that the percentage
pedient or another, including the diver- loss rate was exaggerated. Theater later reported a
loss rate of only 20.6 percent for August, and a n aver-
sion of certain tank shipments directly to age cumulative loss rate of only 14.7 for the first
the Continent and the utilization as re- eleven weeks of operations. Memo, Wood for Somer-
placements of tanks earmarked for units vell, 4 Jan 45. See Volume II, Chapter IV, Section 3,
of Logistical Support of the Armies, now in preparation,
arriving later, it was possible to keep all for the later history of this problem.
armored units close to their authorized 13512 A Gp Rpt of Armored Sec Activities for Aug
strength throughout August.135 On 15 4 4 ,4 Sep 44, AAR Armored Sec 1 2 A G p 99/ 12–38
(7659) Aug, Opns Rpts AGO.
September the tank status in the armies 136 T W X22080, 1 2 A G p to SHAEF, 29 Sep 44,
stood as reflected in table on page 524.136 SHAEF G–3 O&E 370.8 Tanks, I.
524 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

United States, or until ammunition with properties so badly needed. The first ship-
performance a t least equal to the 17- ment of the new ammunition arrived in
pounder became available in quantity.137 August. Firing tests proved the new am-
Nothing came of the proposal at the time, munition greatly superior to that used in
primarily because its implementation the obsolescent 75-mm. gun, although it
would have required withdrawing tanks was still no match for the front armor
from the already meager reserve, a step plate of even the Panther (Mark V) at
which could not be risked in view of the ranges over 300 yards. Unfortunately the
current operational requirements. production of the new round was ex-
Additional shipments of the new 105- tremely limited, and the quantities re-
mm. howitzer tank arrived in August, but ceived in Europe restricted its use to purely
even though this weapon had a high-ex- 138 Thus, the re-
emergency situations.
plosive round superior to the 75-mm. quirement for an adequate armor-piercing
gun's it did not meet the need for a tank weapon, as well as the problem of provid-
fighter. Meanwhile, heartening news had ing adequate tank replacements a n d re-
been received that a new type of high-
velocity armor-piercing (HVAP) round 137Ltr, 1 2 A G p to C G E T O , 13 Aug 44, sub: 17-
Pounder Tank Guns for M4 Series Tanks, 1 2 A Gp
was being produced for the 76-mm. gun 470.8 Tanks.
which would provide the penetrative 13812th A Gp Rpt of Opns, XI, 39–40.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 525

serves in the E T O remained unsolved as levels were steadily decreased, as they had
the U.S. armies came to a halt in mid- been for other classes of supply.139Later
September. in the month these reductions in the army
(4) Ammunition reserves resulted more from the inability
to deliver ammunition than from an
The problem of Class V supply, like the actual shortage on the Continent. Limita-
tank problem, was two sided. Chiefly be- tions on expenditure actually came to
cause insufficient quantities of ammuni- have little meaning, for not enough am-
tion were being unloaded on the Conti- munition was available to fire at even the
nent, limitations on expenditures had restricted rates. 140
been imposed within the first weeks of the Because of the great amount of labor in-
invasion, long before it became necessary volved in handling ammunition, both
to superimpose tonnage allocations be- armies attempted to keep their Class V
cause of the shortage of inland transporta- stocks as mobile as possible. To secure the
tion. Rationing of ammunition had there- maximum efficiency in the use of its trans-
fore become the rule rather than the portation the First Army centralized the
exception. operational control of all truck units as-
During the pursuit the uncertainty of signed to ammunition hauling under the
ammunition deliveries was heightened by commanding officer of the 71stOrdnance
lack of exact knowledge as to the ade- Group. At the end of August this group
quacy of continental stocks a n d as to the consisted of two ammunition battalions
quantities arriving in the theater. I n view (six companies each), two quartermaster
of the unpredictable status of ammunition truck battalions (three companies each),
the 12th Army Group, when it became and a provisional field artillery truck bat-
operational on 1 August, therefore con- talion (with four companies of thirty-four
tinued the policy of rationing which had trucks each), and was supported by a me-
been initiated by the First Army. This dium automotive maintenance company
took the form of restrictions on expendi- attached for the sole purpose of servicing
ture of the more critical types, published this transportation. All trucks were to
every eight days on the basis of the best carry double their rated capacity and be
information obtainable as to future avail- capable of making a daily round trip of
ability. While this was not as orthodox or 160 miles. In order to meet the needs of
desirable as a credit system, it was con- the fast-moving VII Corps, which paced
tinued in part because it was already in the First Army’s advance beyond the
operation, a n d because any other proce- Seine, a motorized ammunition supply
dure was impracticable until sufficient de- point (ASP) was organized. This rolling
pot stocks were available against which supply point carried approximately 500
credits could be established. tons of ammunition, limited for the most
I n making its allocation the 12th Army part to a minimum number of fast-moving
Group a t first hoped to maintain reserves items in accordance with anticipated ex-
of seven units of fire in the armies. But the penditures, a n d was protected by two
unsatisfactory continental stock position
13912th A Gp Rpt of Opns, XII, 13 132.
made this goal impossible, and in the suc- 140FUSA, TUSA, and 12 A G p G–4 Periodic Rpts
ceeding allocations the authorized army for Aug and FUSA Rpt of Opns, III, 24.
HANDLING SUPPLIES IN THE FIELD. Ammunition being sorted, above, and
stacked in open fields, below.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 527

batteries of self-propelled antiaircraft period a t the end of August when trans-

artillery. While somewhat wasteful of portation was almost immobilized because
transportation, this supply point on wheels of the gasoline shortage. This threat was a
was extremely economical of labor and temporary one, a n d the army’s inability
provided close support for the corps in its to keep its reserves mobile was in part
drive across northern France.141 compensated for by authorizing combat
Meanwhile, the First Army attempted units to carry ammunition in excess of
to establish new ASP’s farther forward. At their basic loads and to the limit of their
the end of August its ammunition supply carrying capacity.144
was based on the L a Loupe service area, Fortunately heavy firing was not re-
although ASP’s were already established quired in this period, with one or two ex-
in the vicinity of Paris and Soissons. On 5 ceptions. Throughout August the daily
September a new ASP was established at expenditure in the First Army averaged
Hirson, 230 miles beyond La Loupe. But only 100 tons per division slice.145The con-
within a few days even this point was far trast between operations in July and Au-
to the rear. O n 11 September an ASP was gust is reflected in the record of First Army
opened near Liége, and fortunately rail expenditures tabulated on page 528.146
service to this point was available almost T h e comparison given in the table is not
immediately. But the task of moving the wholly accurate, for while the expenditure
army’s ammunition stocks forward, first in rounds per gun per day was in several
from La Loupe and then from Hirson, re- cases higher in August than in July, it was
quired the constant use of nearly a thou- made by a considerably smaller number
sand trucks. On one occasion every avail- of guns, and by artillery units which in
able ordnance vehicle was employed to several cases were in action only ten or
move 3,000 tons of ammunition in one lift twelve days in the month. The contrast
from a depot on the south bank of the between the two months is more accu-
Seine (ASP 117 in the vicinity of Corbeil) rately revealed by comparing the total ex-
to Hirson.142 Despite these efforts First penditures, which were lower in all
Army’s stocks were reduced from 157,000 categories in August, substantially so in
to 12,000 tons by the end of August.143 most, although some allowance must be
The Third Army also tried to maintain made for the fact that the First Army was
a rolling reserve of ammunition and for a somewhat smaller in size that month.
time in September established a mobile
ASP for XX Corps, but the Third Army’s 141Ltr,Lt Col John E. Ray, Ammo Officer, FUSA
meager transportation resources made the Ord, to O r d Officer, FUSA, 13 Sep 44, sub: Ammo
use of this expedient less feasible. As in the Supply Rpt, Western Europe, 1–30 Aug 44, Gen Bd
Files, Ammo Supply for Fld Arty, Entry 31.
First Army, ammunition companies were 142FUSA Ammo Officer's Rpt for 1–30 Sep 44,25
augmented by the formation of provisional Oct 44, file cited above, n. 141.
truck companies (utilizing the vehicles of 143FUSA Ammo Officer's Rpt for Aug.
144TUSA AAR, II, Ord, 10–12.
ordnance maintenance units, for ex- 145Ibid.
ample), and the army’s ammunition 146FUSA Ammo Officer's R p t for Aug, Gen Bd
stockage a t times remained on wheels for Files, Ammo Supply for Fld Arty, Entry 3 1 ; FUSA
Ammo Officer's Ammo Supply Rpt, France, 1–31 Jul
three or four days. T h e army’s stocks fell 44, 11Aug 44, Gen Bd Files 471/1 Arty Sec, Entry
to their lowest point in one four-day 39.
528 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

No tabulation of expenditures of course of 11–12 August for lackof ammunition.147

serves as a reliable guide to actual ammu- Far more serious was the experience of
nition requirements. Ammunition was ra- the VIII Corps in Brittany, where a com-
tioned almost from the beginning, and the bination of circumstances produced one
armies had not been able to fire at desired of the most critical supply shortages to
rates in June or July, or even at the date and one which had a decided bear-
rationed rates later in August. Restrictions ing on the conduct of operations. Short-
on firing had already hampered the con- ages in the Brittany area were not limited
duct of operations in July, although some to Class V. As the lines of communications
commanders had ignored them in what extended into the peninsula the VIII
they regarded as “emergency” circum- Corps, like the units racing eastward,
stances. suffered shortages in all classes. Artillery
Despite the generally low scale of re- battalions, for example, were reported
sistance in August, in at least two instances unable to move out of danger when taken
relatively heavy expenditures of ammuni- under fire because of the lack of gaso-
tion were required, and the limited alloca- line. 148T h e siege type of operation which
tions had adverse effects. T h e first was the the VIII Corps was soon forced to under-
counterattack at Mortain, in which the take against such fortified places as St.
First Army did its only heavy firing of the Malo and Brest, however, quickly made
month. While the effects of the ammuni- lack of ammunition rather than gasoline
tion expenditure restrictions were not of the severest limiting factor. The experience
major consequence, the First Army artil-
147 Memo,Brig Gen John H. Hinds, 12 A Gp Arty
lery officer reported that important inter- Officer to CofS 12 A Gp, 17 Aug 44, sub: Ammo Sup-
diction fire by certain155-mm. gun bat- ply, 12 A Gp 471 Ammo General.
talions designed to prevent reinforcement 148Lt Col William H. Harrison, Ex O G–4 TUSA,
Rpt of Lt Col R. J. Campbell, 543d Q M Gp, repre-
or withdrawal of the enemy forces east of senting T U S A QM with VIII Corps, 24 Aug 44,
Martain had to be canceled on the night ADSEC AG 400 General.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 529

of the VIII Corps in Brittany provides a would have for the operation, since only
case study rewarding in its lessons in two divisions and ten corps artillery bat-
military supply. talions would be allotted. (Actually, three
Shortages of artillery ammunition had infantry divisions, a separate task force,
already begun to hamper the corps on 6 and eighteen corps artillery battalions
August, when the attacks on St. Malo were employed in the attack on Brest.)
were initiated. Enemy strength there had Second, army stated that corps had over-
been greatly underestimated by the Third estimated the strength of the enemy gar-
Army staff (the citadel held out for ten rison at Brest. Despite the experience at
days),149and inadequate allocationsforcedSt. Malo, army believed that Brest would
severe curtailment of the fire plans. For surrender after a show of force, and set 1
several days some of the heavy corps artil- September as the target date for comple-
lery battalions were reduced to expendi- tion of the mission. To the dismay of the
tures of four rounds per gun per day. With corps staff the army allotted only about
this experience in mind, corps warned 5,000 tons of ammunition for the opera-
army as early as 10 August of the heavy tion, the bulk of which was already laid
ammunition demands anticipated for the down in ASP’s in the vicinity of Pontorson
reduction of Brest. A week later, at the in- and Dinan, near St. Malo.150
vitation of Colonel Muller, the Third T h e VIII Corps supply position was by
Army G–4, the VIII Corps G–4, Col. this time beginning to suffer the adverse
Gainer B. Jones, a n d the corps ordnance effects of a rapidly changing tactical situa-
officer, Col. John S. Walker, drove to the tion. The bulk of the Third Army was
army command post near Le Mans and already engaged in the eastward drive,
submitted more formal estimates of the with a portion of the command about to
corps ammunition requirements for the cross the Seine. While General Patton was
Brest operation. They asked that three still vitally concerned with the army's
units of fire be laid down before the attack mission in Brittany, the main attention of
and that five additional units be set up for the army naturally was concentrated on
delivery for the first three days of the at- the pursuit, and it was becoming apparent
tack. Translated into tonnages, this request that the Third Army was not willing to
called for a n initial stockage of 8,700 tons, divert a large portion of its meager logistic
plus maintenance requirements totaling support to a n operation which had defi-
11,600 tons for the first three days. These nitely become subsidiary to, or at least far
estimates were based on the expenditure removed from, the main effort. Control
experience at St. Malo and on the ex- and support of the Brittany operation,
pected employment of one armored and furthermore, were daily becoming more
three infantry divisions and thirteen bat- difficult because of the increasing distance
talions of corps field artillery. between the several commands involved.
The Third Army ordnance officer, Col. On 17 August, the day on which the corps
Thomas H. Nixon, refused to approve the
corps request for these amounts on the 149Ltr, Lt Gen Troy H. Middleton to author, 19
grounds that they were excessive. He Jun 50, OCMH.
150VIII Corps AAR, Aug 44, AG Hist Records
noted, first of all, that the corps had been 208-0.3; Ltrs, Col Walker to author, 15 May 50, and
misinformed as to the number of troops it Col Jones to author, 9 Jun 50, OCMH.
530 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

supply officers met with members of the munications Zone’s transportation facili-
army staff, the army headquarters was ties were already committed to the fullest
already in the vicinity of Le Mans, 100 extent it was recognized that delivery
air-line miles from the corps command could not be made unless a proportionate
post near St. Malo. Within a few days the amount of lift was diverted from the main-
two headquarters were 270 miles apart, tenance of the armies. This proposal did
the Third Army having moved eastward not meet with the approval of the Third
to the vicinity of Chartres and VIII Corps Army. When informed of it the ordnance
to the northwestern tip of Brittany. officer, Colonel Nixon, asserted, first of all,
At the meeting of 17 August Colonel that the requisition had not been for-
Muller called attention to the increasing warded through command channels; fur-
difficulty in handling the supply of the thermore, it was his opinion that the VIII
Brittany forces as a result of the great dis- Corps had ample ammunition available
tance between the army and the corps, and for its task, a n d that if additional am-
informed the corps officers that the Brit- munition was required it could be sup-
tany Base Section was being organized plied by the Third Army. He therefore
with headquarters at Rennes to provide requested that the army group take no ac-
administrative support for the corps. tion on the corps requisition and that the
Whatever the army's intention may have request be forwarded to the army as a
been in this regard, the V I I I Corps staff, matter pertaining to that headquarters,
either from what it was told at this meet- Colonel Muller supported the ordnance
ing or shortly thereafter, concluded that officer in his recommendation, and the
from then on it was to look to the Brittany army group accordingly advised the Com-
Base Section for supply support and that munications Zone to take no action on the
it had been granted authority to deal di- corps requisition.152
rectly with the new base section on such The fate of VIII Corps’ requests thus far
matters.151At any rate, on 20 or 21 Au- had already led some officers to conclude
gust, corps submitted a new requisition to that there had been a misunderstanding
the Communications Zone for additional concerning the supply responsibility for
ammunition to meet the requirements of the Brittany forces. Brig. Gen. John H.
its troop allotment which had been aug- Hinds, the 12th Army Group artillery
mented beyond the strength on which officer, located at the rear headquarters
army had based its allowances. The requi- and lacking adequate contact with the
sition was also sent to 12th Army Group forward echelon, was not even certain
headquarters, where it was reviewed by whether VIII Corps was still operating
the Artillery, Ordnance, and G–4 Sec- under Third Army command. H e had
tions. With the approval of the G–3 these favored the immediate shipment of at least
sections decided that the corps require- one half of the VIII Corps’ requisition so
ments could be filled from the Third Army that there would be no question about ade-
allocation and agreed that about 3,500
tons should be released immediately. 151Ltrs, Walker and Jones to author, 15 May and
Allocation of the ammunition was only 9 Jun 50.
152 Memo,Col Hass, Chief Supply Br G–4 12th A
part of the problem. Getting it to the VIII Gp, for G–4, 21 Aug 44, sub: VIII Corps Requisition
Corps was another matter. Since the Com- for Ammo, 12 A Gp 471/1 Ammo Allocations.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 531

quate support of the attack on Brest. 153 tion of23 August. There were insufficient
The army group G–3, Brig. Gen. A. quantities to sustain the attack which had
Franklin Kibler, also emphasized the im- already begun. On 28 August, to add to
portance of the VIII Corps mission, and an already frustrating situation, it was dis-
on 22 August he discussed the Brittany covered that there was a basic misunder-
operation with General Patton, who again standing between the army group head-
gave assurances that there would be suffi- quarters and the corps as to the latter’s
cient ammunition.154 ammunition requirements. On that day
As a precaution, meanwhile, it had two officers from the corps appeared at the
already been decided to send an officer 12th Army Group headquarters, report-
from the army group G–4 Section to the ing that deliveries of ammunition had still
VIII Corps to investigate the ammunition not begun and, obviously suspicious that
situation, and at about the same time Gen- the corps’ needs were being neglected, as-
rals Bradley and Patton themselves flew to serting that they wished to establish “firm
the corps command post. In consequence requirements” for Class V supply. They
of this visit the army group decided on 23 were then shown the army group directive
August to relieve the Third Army of all to the Communications Zone of 23 August
supply responsibility for the Brittany area, and told that it had been issued on the as-
and authorized the VIII Corps to deal di- sumption that the requests made on 21
rectly with the Communications Zone on August to the officer from the army group
supply matters. Tactical control remained G–4 Section, a Maj. Joseph Peters, repre-
with the Third Army for the time being.155 sented the corps’ full requirements. It was
Army group then sent a courier to the then learned from the two corps emissaries
Communications Zone with instructions that that request actually represented only
to ship approximately 8,000 tons of am- the minimum requirements which the
munition immediately. This allocation corps regarded as necessary to have on
was believed to be large enough to provide hand before the launching of the attack.
the corps a reserve of three units of fire in Since the ammunition allocated earlier
addition to maintenance for six days, the had not yet begun to arrive, the misunder-
time which the Artillery and G–3 Sections standing was not immediately serious. But
estimated would be required for accom- it was now necessary for one of the corps
plishment of the mission.156 officers to draw up new requirements that
While these actions removed all doubts included both reserves and daily mainte-
regarding the responsibility for supply in nance needs. These were reviewed by the
the Brittany area they by no means con- army group G–3 and artillery officer, who
stituted a guarantee that the needed am- scaled down the requests for the more
munition would be delivered. On 25 Au-
gust, with assurances that adequate resup- 153Memo, Hinds for G–3, 21 Aug 44, sub: Ammo
ply was on the way, VIII Corps launched for VIII Corps, 12 A Gp 471/1 Ammo Allocations.
154Ibid., 1st Ind, Gen Kibler, 23 Aug 44.
its attack on Brest. Two days later, how- 155Ltr, Gen Middleton to author, 19 Jun 50,
ever, General Hinds, who had gone to the OCMH; Memo, Muller for ADSEC, 25 Aug 44, sub:
corps to check personally on the supply Supply of VIII Corps, ADSEC 400 General.
156Memo,Col Hass for G–4, 31 Aug 44, sub:
situation, reported that no ammunition Ammo Requirements for VIII Corps for Brest Opns,
had been received as a result of the alloca- 1 2 A G p 471/1 Ammo Allocations.
532 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

critical items and increased the allocation creasing anxiety in the final days of
of items in less critical supply. The revised August. In a message to General Lee on
allocation provided for a 7,700-ton reserve the 28th General Bradley expressed great
and 1,400 tons per day for maintenance.157 concern at the possibility that the Brest op-
Based on these computations a new direc- eration was being hampered by lack of am-
tive was dispatched via an officer courier munition.161Lt. Gen. Troy H. Middleton,
to the Communications Zone on 29 August VIII Corps commander, made repeated
with the stipulation that the shipments appeals for the means to carry out the VIII
were to have the highest possible priority Corps mission. On the 29th he re-empha-
for transportation. 158 sizedthe desperate straits of the corps in a
The courier who brought the latest di- radio message to the 12th Army Group
rective to the Communications Zone was commander. Because of the bad state of
informed by General Stratton, the G–4, communications he took the precaution of
that the shipment of 8,000 tons of am- repeating his message via letter. In it he
munition had already been arranged for was unequivocal in his statement of the
as a result of the allocations of 23 August. corps supply position and its effect on
Approximately 3,000 tons had been dis- tactical operations. “Our ammunition situ-
patched on six trains, and the shipment of ation is critical,” he noted, “due to failure
another 5,000 tons had been arranged for to meet our initial request. If something is
in eleven LST’s which were to sail between not done immediately I will have to stop
the 26th and 29th.159These vessels were to offensive action.” Thus far, he said, sup-
deliver their cargoes to a beach which had ply had not kept pace with a unit of fire
been opened at St. Michel-en-Grève, per day, with the result that the corps in
about fifteen miles northeast of Morlaix, some cases had eaten into its basic loads.
through which the corps had already been Once more he repeated his earlier request
receiving a portion of its supplies for the for three units of fire maintained in the
past two weeks. Unfortunately the am- corps ASP in addition to basic loads.162
munition allocated on 23 August had not At the close of his letter he re-emphasized
arrived in the quantities scheduled. Some that the VIII Corps was battering against
arrived by both rail and LST on 27 Au- a strongly fortified area and that progress
gust, but the LST’s were lightly loaded, had been extremely slow. Ammunition
three of them carrying less than 100 tons was therefore the prime requirement;
each, and in the period 27–30 August the without it he believed the struggle could
corps received only 5,300 tons, which was drag on indefinitely, for he was convinced
insufficient to sustain its attacks. Because that the German commander, General der
of the inadequate receipts, and because of
the uncertainty of replenishment, expendi- 157Memo, Hass for G–4, 31 Aug 44.
tures were necessarily reduced after the 158Ibid.; Ltr, 12 A Gp to COMZ, 29 Aug 44, sub:
first two days of the attack. Fires were re- Ammo Requirements for VIII Corps, 12 A G p 471
Ammo, III; 12 A G p Ord Sec Jnl, 28 Aug 44.
stricted mainly to counterbattery, support 159Memo, Hass for G–4, 31 Aug 44.
of local operations, and defense against 160VIII Corps AAR, Aug 44.
counterattack. 160 161Cbl QX–30047, Bradley to Lee, 28 Aug 44,
EUCOM 471 Allocation of Ammo.
The delay in providing satisfactory 162A unit of fire for the corps as then constituted
logistic support to the corps had caused in- weighed 2,000 tons.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 533

Fallschirmjaeger Hermann B. Ramcke, days. These shipments were to be in addi-

would expend all his resources before tion to those already authorized in the
capitulating. 163 allocation of 23 August. Of the ammuni-
By this date (29 August) the exaspera- tion requested, stocks were not even on
tion of the VIII Corps commander and his hand in the rear areas to satisfy the re-
staff was quite evident, and understand- of certain types.167
quirements
able. Repeated assurance from higher Pending the arrival of the scheduled
headquarters had not been followed by shipments the VIII Corps commander
adequate deliveries. Furthermore, in the continued to send urgent requests for items
view of the corps commander the entire which were most critically needed. On 31
problem had become unnecessarily com- August, for example, the corps made a
plicated by red tape and excessive chan- special request for 90-mm;. gun ammuni-
nels. The VIII Corps had been authorized tion and for air shipment of one million
to deal directly with Brittany Base Section rounds of caliber .30 ball cartridges (in
at Rennes, which in turn dealt with its eight-round clips). 168Both requests were
superior headquarters, Communications approved, but the supply of the corps con-
Zone. But the Communications Zone tinued to be plagued by endless difficulties.
would deal with the corps only through the The air shipment proved impossible be-
12th Army Group. General Middleton cause of bad weather and had to be trans-
could only conclude that the corps was ferred to trucks. In the meantime Supreme
being given the runaround.164 I n view of Headquarters also became involved in the
the many delays, plus the suspicion that its problem and sent officers to both the Com-
operation had become something of a side- munications Zone and VIII Corps to
show, 450 miles from the principal theater check on the supply situation and do what
of battle, it is not surprising that the corps they could to expedite matters. Discus-
should regard its position as little better sions with both General Stratton and the
than that of a stepchild.165 corps commander on 2 September re-
Upon the receipt of the second allocation vealed that the progress in meeting the
on 29 August General Stratton had im- corps’ requirements was still discourag-
mediately ,taken steps to arrange the addi- ingly slow. Receipts of ammunition up to
tional shipments by asking 12th Army that date had either been expended or
Group for five LST’s per day for seven were included in the stock position which
days, plus three per day thereafter until the corps commander on 2 September had
the shipments were completed. As an indicated amounted to less than one unit
added insurance the G–4 directed that
three trains per day for four days be dis- 163Memo, Middleton for Bradley, 29 Aug 44, in
“VIII Corps Ammunition Supply During Brest Cam-
patched to the Brest area beginning on 31 paign, 25 August–18 September 1944,” a collection
August, loaded to capacity with the same of documents of the combat units made by Royce L.
types of ammunition. As of 30 August, Thompson, OCMH.
164Ibid.
then, arrangements had been completed 165That this feeling prevailed is suggested in the
for shipment via water of 2,500 tons of am- memo of 31 August from Hass to Moses.
munition per day for seven days and 1,500 166O n the basis of 500 tons per vessel.
167Memo, Hass for G–4,31 Aug 44.
tons per day thereafter,166 and an addi- 168Cbls, Middleton to 12th A Gp, 3I Aug 44, 12th
tional 1,500 tons per day by rail for four A G p 471 Ammo Allocations and Credits, I.
534 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

of fire. Stocks of some items were com- of fire and the assurance that an addi-
pletely exhausted. tional unit would be delivered on each
One of the troubles, it was revealed, succeeding day. LST arrivals thus far had
arose from the failure to follow through on been sporadic, vessels had arrived without
shipping orders. In the opinion of Lt. Col. manifests, and the loadings had averaged
Joe M. Ballentine, the SHAEF officer who only 300 tons as against the planned 500.
had gone to COMZ headquarters, the Receipts had therefore barely sufficed to
Communications Zone had assumed that meet daily maintenance needs. 172
its orders were being executed, while ship- Most exasperating of all was the lack of
ments actually were not being accom- information as to what could be expected.
plished as scheduled. There was no way of On 5 September Colonel Clark had at-
knowing, he noted, whether deliveries tempted to arrange a radio conference
were being madeor not. 169 with General Stratton but had received no
One of the best illustrations of the lack response to his message to the Communi-
of follow-through was the experience with cations Zone. Impatient with the latter's
a special truck convoy which General silence he addressed a second message to
Stratton had scheduled for the shipment both General Lord and General Stratton
of approximately 2,000 tons of critical the following morning. Re-emphasizing
items. On 6 September it was revealed that the urgency of the Brest situation, he
the ten truck companies which a regulat- noted: “Getting ammunition out here is
ing officer had designated to fall out of the vital matter which your office does not
Red Ball run had not been dispatched to seem to understand. We must have not
OMAHABeach for loading, as scheduled. only ammunition but also information
They had been instructed by the Advance relative thereto. . . . What in the name
Section not to leave the Red Ball under of Pete is wrong with Com Zone?”173
any circumstances, and they had complied Under the authority delegated him by
with those orders. Since the situation had Generals Crawford and Smith of the Su-
gone undiscovered for eighteen hours still preme Commander's staff, Colonel Clark
another delay had resulted.170 then requested complete information on
Despite all the efforts to expedite the all shipments.
flow of ammunition the entire problem The doubts and uncertainties over the
continued uncertain. A big air effort supply of the VIII Corps reached their
against the enemy fortifications was made
on 3 September, but an all-out attack
169Memo, Col Ballentine for Col Clark, 3 Sep 44,
which was planned for the following day sub: Ammo Shipments to VIII Corps, SHAEF G–4
was again deferred because of the ammu- 471 Ammo.
nition shortage.171O n 6 September both 170Memo, G–4 SHAEF for Col McCarthy, 6 Sep
44, 12th A G p 370.2 Post-NEPTUNEOperations—h-
of the officers sent out from SHAEF, Lt. gistic Studies; Rad FWD–139 14, Crawford to Clark
Col. Edwin N. Clark and Colonel Ballen- a t VIII Corps, 6 Sep 44, SHAEF G – 3 O&E Ammo
tine, were at the VIII Corps headquarters 471.
171Ninth U.S. Army Operations: (I) Brest–Crozon,
and on the basis of performance thus far Sep 44, MS, 4th I&H AG Hist Records.
were pessimistic about the prospects of 172Msg, Clark and Ballentine to Crawford, 6 Sep
building up the quantities which General 44, 12 A G p 370.2 Post-NEPTUNE Opns—Logistic
Studies.
Middleton insisted he must have before 173
Rad, Clark to Lord and Stratton, 6 Sep 44,
resuming the attack—that is, three units SHAEF G–3 O&E Ammo 471.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 535

height on 6 September. O n that date still the corps ASP, much of which later had to
another officer sent to investigate the corps be reshipped.178
supply difficulties—Lt. Col. Leander H. The VIII Corps, which on 5 September
Harrison from the Ordnance Section of had come under the operational control of
the 12th Army Group—reported his find- the newly arrived Ninth Army headquar-
ings. He noted that General Middleton ters (Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson com-
and his staff were of the opinion that so manding), finally captured Brest on the
many people and agencies had become in- 18th. T h e port had been completely de-
volved in the ammunition problem that molished and was never put to use. To the
the whole matter was hopelessly entangled Supreme Command the capture of Brest
and beyond clarification. They were con- had continued to hold high priority in
vinced, Colonel Harrison reported, that September, a fact which Colonel Clark,
no one really knew how much ammuni- one of the SHAEF representatives sent to
tion was actually available or en route or VIII Corps, suspected was not fully ap-
o n o r d e174
r . O nthat date, however, Gen- preciated by General Lee’s staff. A basic
eral Stratton at last gave specific advance divergence of opinion as to the advisability
information regarding deliveries to the of pressing the attack on Brest had in fact
VIII Corps. His assurances to Supreme developed between logistical and oper-
Headquarters that the corps supply situa- ational staffs. Believing that the need on
tion would soonbe in a healthierstate175which Brest’s capture was originally
were shortly substantiated. Receipts on premised had been invalidated by the
7 September raised the ammunition stocks capture of Le Havre and Antwerp,
in the corps ASP to an average level of two C O M Z planners regarded the costly siege
units of fire. While this was below the of Brest as a wasteful and unnecessary
minimum which General Middleton had campaign carried out in blind obedience
specified as a prerequisite for the resump- to an outdated plan. They had been ready
tion of the attack, he nevertheless ordered i n the first week of September to recom-
the attack on Brest launched on 8 Septem- mend that it be abandoned except for a
ber on the assurance that a steady stream small containing force. 179
of ammunition was now on the way.176 T h e S H A E F staff was not so ready to
One of General Crawford’s representa- write Brittany off in light of the vulner-
tives had promised the VIII Corps com- ability of Antwerp to blocking and min-
mander that ammunition would soon 174Memo, Col Harrison for Col Harold A. Nisley,
pour into the corps ASP in such quantities 10 Sep 44, sub: Status of Ammo Supply to VIII
that General Middleton would cry Corps, G e n Bd Files 471/1 A m m o Supply for Fld
Arty.
“Uncle.” In the succeeding days the am- 175TWX J–14489, Stratton to Crawford and Clark,
munition picture did brighten consider- 6 Sep 44, SHAEF G–4 471 Ammo.
ably, and on 12 September the corps ASP 176VIIICorps AARs, Aug and Sep 44.
177Rad, Ballentine to Clark, 8 Sep 44, SHAEF G–3
held more than 13,000 tons, with a mini- O&E Ammo; TWX, Ballentine to Crawford, 9 Sep
mum of three units of fire in all types. Ad- 44, and Memo, Col Fulton G. Thompson, Chief
Requisition Sec to Clark, 12 Sep 44, SHAEF G–4 471
ditional shipments were en route via LST, Ammo.
rail, and truck, guaranteeing sufficient 178Conquer: The Story of Ninth Army, 1944–45 (Wash-
Class V supply to support sustained oper- ington, 1947), p. 53.
ations.177 By the date of Brest’s capture G p179 Memo, Col Watson for Moses, 5 Sep 44, 1 2 A
G–4 Memos for Record; Interv with Lee, 8 Aug
nearly 25,000 tons of ammunition lay in 51, and with Lord, 9 Aug 51, OCMH.
536 LOGISTICAL S U P P O R T OF T H E ARMIES

ing, a n d the consequent unpredictability purely command a n d administrative na-

as to when that port could be brought into ture. There was no assurance t h a t ship-
use. General Bradley of the 12th Army ments had actually been made once orders
Group, looking at the problem from a were issued, a n d the corps was left in the
more strictly operational point of view, dark as to the logistic support it could de-
justified the battle for the port on the pend on. Plaguing the entire operation,
grounds that the containment of the furthermore, was the bad state of com-
fanatical Brest garrison would have re- munications. General Bradley’s urgent
quired a n even more prohibitive diversion message to General Lee on 28 August re-
of badly needed troops.180 garding the support of the VIII Corps, for
T h e difficulties over ammunition sup- example, required two days for delivery,
ply in Brittany were a vexing and harrow- and a message to Brittany Base Section at
ing experience for everyone concerned. I n Rennes requiredsixty hours.182Fora time
some respects they simply evidenced the Third Army had no telephone connec-
overextension of the entire logistic struc- tions with either the Advance Section or
ture which had accompanied the sudden the Communications Zone.183
successes of August. T h e difficulties in Not least important was the initial con-
filling the V I I I Corps’ requirements cen- fusion produced by the ambiguity con-
tered largely on the by-now chronic lack cerning the supply responsibility for VIII
of transportation. Competition for over- Corps. In view of a statement purporting
land transport was at its height at the to come from the 12th Army Group com-
time, the ammunition shortage occurring mander assuring the corps a n ample sup-
i n precisely the same period as the gaso- ply of ammunition, General Middleton
line shortage. Transportation by water was did not consider the so-called rationing of
also beset with difficulties, principally bad expenditures as applying to him. The
weather and the problem of loading LST’s Third Army’s denial of the corps’ requests
at the beaches. Additional complications was therefore regarded as an arbitrary
resulted from the diversion of vessels from one, a n d in the opinion of the corps chief
Normandy. Loaded in the United King- of staff constituted a confusion of tongues
dom and intended for discharge at OMAHA which was never entirely cleared up.
or UTAH,these ships had often been bulk Colonel Harrison, one of the last officers
loaded with the separate components of sent to the VIII Corps by the army group
heavy artillery ammunition, the shells on to investigate the ammunition situation,
one a n d the propelling charges on an- probably made the fairest assignment of
other. Sudden diversions to the emergency “blame” for the sad experience. He noted
beach near Morlaix caused confusion and that the recent difficulties had been due to
resulted in unbalanced stocks, so that the lack of proper planning for the oper-
many a heavy caliber shell lay unfired for
want of the proper propelling charge. 181 180Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York,
1951), p. 367.
Many vessels arrived off the beach at St. 181 Conquer:The Story of Ninth Army, p. 29.
Michel-en-Grève with only a partial load 182Memo, Lee for Rumbough, Theater Chief Sig-
and without manifests. nal Officer, 30 Aug 44, EUCOM 471 Allocation of
Ammo.
I n addition to transportation difficul- 183Memo, Muller for ADSEC, 25 Aug 44, sub:
ties, however, there were failures of a more Supply of VIII Corps, ADSEC 400 General.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 537

ation by all agencies, lack of proper sup- tion of 105-mm. caliber and larger, and
ply co-ordination by all agencies, lack of that it contemplated allocating production
proper follow-through by the Communi- to the various theaters. 187
cations Zone, hysterical requisitioning by I n anticipation of the shortage the thea-
VIII Corps, overoptimistic promises of im- ter immediately instituted a survey of its
possible deliveries by the Communications ammunition position. O n 5 May the Com-
Zone, and “too many parties giving in- munications Zone (or SOS) submitted
structions and too few parties carrying ammunition availability figures to the 1st
them out.”184 Army Group and asked that the combat
T h e experience of the VIII Corps high- requirements for critical types of ammuni-
lighted a problem which was to reach seri- tion be reviewed to determine whether
ous proportions in the coming months. the theater’s resources were adequate for
While the immediate cause of the difficul- OVERLORD. 188T h e upshot of this request
ties in Brittany and elsewhere was the in- was a complete review of the ammunition
adequacy of transportation, behind it lay situation by representatives of First Army,
the potentially more serious matter of the Forward Echelon Communications Zone,
actual shortage of ammunition in the the- Headquarters, ETO, and the 1st Army
ater. For this reason ammunition con- Group at the army group’s headquarters
tinued to be a rationed item throughout o n 9–10 May. T h e meeting produced a
the period of the pursuit, and the special rather shocking discovery: the theater and
allocations which were made two or three the tactical commands had been calculat-
times in August were in reality command ing ammunition requirements on quite
decisions to commit portions of the thea- different bases. The theater, for one thing,
ter’s reserves. T h e extra shipments of had been using an obsolete troop basis;
heavy caliber ammunition to the VIII furthermore, the two had been employing
Corps at Brest placed a severe drain on different measurements for their calcula-
army group reserves, and in the case of 8- tions—the army and the army group cal-
inch gun ammunition reduced them al- culating daily requirements on the basis
most to the vanishing point.185 of one-third unit of fire, the theater using
The origin of the ammunition problem the day of supply as a measure. One thing
actually antedated the invasion. Theater was clear. T h e Communications Zone and
ordnance officers had begun planning am- the tactical commands had to arrive at
munition requirements in the fall of 1943 mutually acceptable factors a n d then re-
on the basis of data provided by COSSAC. calculate the ammunition requirements
I n January 1944 ETOUSA submitted for the operation.
estimates of its needs to the War Depart-
184Memo, Harrison for Nisley, 10 Sep 44.
ment. Two months later these estimates 185Ltr, Gen Hinds, Arty Officer 12th A Gp, to AG
underwent a radical upward revision—in 12th A Gp, 9 Sep 44, sub: Monthly Rpt of Sec Activ-
most cases doubled—on the basis of recent ity, 12th A Gp 319.1 Rpts.
186Ammunition Supply for Field Artillery, Gen Bd
experiential data from Italy a n d revised Rpt 58, pp. 4–9.
activity factors for artillery weapons.186In 187Memo, Lt Col James H. Reynolds for Col Clark,
mid-April, however, the War Department G–4 SHAEF, 17 Apr 44, sub: Arty Ammo, SHAEF
G–4 471 Ammo.
informed the theater that there were 188Ltr, Lord to Bradley, 5 May 44, sub: Ammo, 12
shortages in all types of artillery ammuni- A Gp 471 Ammo.
538 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

Ordnance and artillery officers imme- ton, the theater G–4, even assured the
diately worked out expenditure rates after armies and the army group that their total
carefully considering the role of each requirements “of virtually all types” for
weapon. These were accepted at the meet- the period D Day to D plus 70 could be
ing on 10 May, and it was agreed that re- laid down on the far shore when desired.193
quirements would be refigured and The War Department had made im-
compared with data on availability, and portant exceptions to its ability to meet the
that steps would then be taken to obtain theater’s needs. There were shortages in
whatever ammunition was needed to over- several categories, but the most critical
come any shortages. 189 were in 60- and 81-mm. mortar ammuni-
Representatives from the tactical com- tion, a n d in 105-mm. howitzer ammuni-
mands had been especially perturbed by tion. Production in the United States
the theater’s request that they review their simply could not meet the demand which
predicted expenditures in the light of the theater had made for those types.194
“availability,” a n d that they offer “justi- Within the next month the Communica-
fication” for any increases. General Moses tions Zone realized that War Department
who attended the meeting as a representa- releases were falling short of the theater’s
tive of 1st Army Group, felt that the esti- needs and asked for accelerated ship-
mates of their needs ought to serve as ments.195I n July after a month’s combat
justification enough. General Bradley sec- experience,the theater reported that cer-
onded this reaction, asserting that it was
189Confon Ammo, 9 May 44, 12 A G p 337 Confs;
hardly the responsibility of the tactical 12 A Gp Ord SecJnl, 9– 10 May 44.
commands to try to revise their needs to 190Memo, Bradley for Eisenhower, 14 May 44,
match reports on availability. Such a Gen Bd Files 471/1 Ammo Supply for Fld Arty.
1911st Ind to 5 May Ltr, 20 May 44, 12 A G p 471
practice would only be self-deluding. 190 Ammo.
T h e army group nevertheless checked 192Chl, A G W A R to E T O , 29 May 44, 12 A Gp
its rates thoroughly to make sure that it 471 Ammo; Cbl E-29855, Eisenhower to Marshall, 26
May 44, Eyes Only Cbls, Hq ETO.
had not requested more ammunition than 193T W X EX-3069 1 , Stratton to armies a n d 1st A
was actually needed. O n 20 May it sub- Gp, 31 May 44, Gen Bd Files 471/1 Ammo Supply
mitted its revised estimates, based on the for Fld Arty; Memo, Col Twitchell, O&E Sec
SHAEF, for G – 3 ,5 Jun 44, sub: Ammo, SHAEF G–4
“agreed rates” of expenditure, and asked 471 Ammo.
that it be informed whether its require- 194O n the basis of stocks on hand a n d releases up
ments could be met.191T h e recalculation to 31 May the theater informed the 1st Army Group
that there would be shortages in 60- a n d 81-mm.
of the theater’s requirements had resulted mortar, 105-mm. howitzer, 8-inch howitzer, 240-mm.
in increases in many categories, a n d the howitzer, and 155-mm. gun ammunition a t D plus 30.
Communications Zone accordingly sub- At D plus 60 the main deficiencies were expected to
be in mortar ammunition, 4.5-inch gun, 155-mm.
mitted requests for additional ammunition gun, a n d 8-inch howitzer ammunition. 2d I n d to 5
to the War Department. Less than a week May Ltr, E T O to 1 A Gp, 31 May 44, 12 A G p 471
before D Day the War Department ap- Ammo.
195Cbls, WARX–55848, ASF to E T O , 24 Jun 44,
proved the requests except for certain a n d CX–81426, E T O to W D , 5 J u l 4 4 , SS&P Plng
items in critically short supply. 192 Div Cbls, 201.02 Ammo; Extract from E T O G–4
O n the very eve of the invasion, there- Periodic Rpt for quarter ending 30 Jun 44, Tab C to
Memo, Crawford for COfS, SHAEF, Stock Position of
fore, the ammunition picture appeared Certain Types of Ammo, 6 Aug 44, SHAEF G–4 471
much more hopeful. a n d General Strat- Ammo.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 539

tain items, including 105-mm. howitzer, charge sufficient ammunition on the far
155-mm. gun, 8-inch, and mortar ammu- shore. At the end of July the theater ord-
nition, were already in the critical cate- nance section was not particularly worried
gory, and that continental levels were not about supply in the next thirty days ex-
being built up as planned. Failure by the cept for two items—155-mm. howitzer
War Department to ship the quantities re- M1 and 81-mm. light mortar ammuni-
quested, it noted, had made it necessary to tion. The only recourse on these items ap-
meet all continental needs from U.K. peared to be additional requisitions on the
stocks with the result that the balances in War Department, 200and on 6 and 8 Aug-
the United Kingdom were insufficient to ust respectively both General Lee and
provide units with their basic loads before General Eisenhower requested additional
crossing the Channel and had dropped so shipments of both types. 201General Eisen-
low that training even had to be cur- hower considered it imperative that the
tailed.196 There was particular concern tactical commanders’ requirements for the
over the shortage of 81-mm. mortar am- next thirty days be met in full, and he re-
munition, and the War Department quested General Somervell’s personal as-
shortly thereafter acceded to the theater's sistance in arranging for the quickest
repeated requests to increase the day of possible shipments of the additional quan-
supply rate. The upward revision was tities as well as the unshipped balances of
meaningless at least for the moment, since the July releases. The personal appeal by
the quantities required to meet the new the theater commander brought imme-
resupply rate could not immediately be diate assurances from the ASF that addi-
made available because of shortfalls in
production occasioned by a shortage of 196Cbls, EX-37085, E T O to WD, 9 J u l 44, and
EX-3901 1, E T O to W D , 21 J u l4 4 , SS&P Plng Div
propellent powder. 197 Cbls 201.02 Ammo.
As an additional argument for expedit- 197Cbls,C–84056, E T O to W D , 30 J u l 44, and
ing ammunition shipments the theater re- WAR-76148, ASF to ETO, 5 Aug 44, SS&P Plng Div
Cbls, 201.02 Ammo.
ported that the full continental port and 198Cbls,EX-3901 1, E T O to W D , 2 1 J u l 44, and
beach capacity for discharging ammuni- EX-4166 1, E T O to WD, 5 Aug 44, SS&P Plng Div
tion was not being used, and soon there- Cbls.
199First Army in fact established new “desired
after it again asked for additional ship- rates” which raised the agreed rates still further in
ments in order to take maximum many categories. Memo for record, J.C.C., n. d., sum-
advantage of expected continental han- marizing correspondence since 27 Jul, and 2d Ind, 16
Sep 44, to Ltr, FUSA to COMZ, 27 J u l44, 12 A Gp
dling capacity in September and Octo- 471 Ammo; Memo, Col L. Wilkinson, Ord SCC
ber.198 In making this request it was COMZ, to Sayler, Chief Ord Officer E T O , 3 Aug 44,
certainly being overoptimistic if not sub: Ammo Supply, Gen Bd Files 471/1 Ammo Sup-
ply for Fld Arty.
actually exaggerating its own capabilities. 200Memo, Col Wilkinson for Sayler, 3 Aug 44.
At the end of July a tabulation of the 201T h e theater asked for 270,000 rounds of
First Army’s expenditures revealed the ex- 155-mm. howitzer a n d 250,000 rounds of 81-mm.
mortar ammunition before 1 September, the amounts
tent to which the rationing of ammunition required to permit firing the two types at the rates of
had kept the expenditure rate from equal- forty-eight and nineteen rounds per weapon per day
ing the “agreed rates” of 10 May.199But respectively, a n d to permit a reserve of seven units
of fire. Cbl EX-4 1797, Lee to Somervell, 6 Aug 44,
the initial restrictions in June and July SS&P Plng Div Cbls; Cbl FWD–12707, Eisenhower
had been imposed by the failure to dis- to Somervell, 8 Aug 44, P&O Cbl Files.
540 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

tional ammunition would be released. 202 able to provide. In an attempt to meet this
The ASF response promised only tem- deficiency the army group in mid-August
porary relief, however, for it dealt with asked the Communications Zone to send a
August shipments. T h e picture for suc- representative to attend all ammunition
ceeding months became more a n d more allocation meetings for the purpose of fur-
clouded with uncertainties. Most disturb- nishing information on stocks in the rear
ing from the theater’s viewpoint were the areas and of giving a forecast of quantities
doubts which the War Department ex- becoming available in the succeeding
pressed regarding the theater’s stated forty-fivedays. 204But even assuming that
needs. In August and early September the the Communications Zone could indicate
War Department repeatedly questioned the total theater resources as of any given
the theater’s demands, stating in one in- date (and this prediction was becoming
stance that the quantities of certain items more and more difficult in view of the un-
requested appeared to be out of line with certainty of War Department releases), it
the weapons reported in the hands of could not necessarily give assurances that
troops, and asserting another time that the ammunition would be in depots on the Con-
theater’s required level in most instances tinent when required. As one officer
exceeded that approved by the War De- pointed out, “You can’t shoot manifests or
partment. The theater’s requests were ac- releases.’’205
cordingly cut, the War Department justi- Meanwhile the theater determined its
fying its “editing” of requisitions on the policy on expenditure of the limited re-
ground that it was necessary in order to sources available. Tactical commanders
effect proper distribution of available re- had naturally chafed under the restric-
sources among theaters and to prevent the tions on expenditures and protested an
accumulation of excesses in the ETO.203 economy which to them seemed illogical.
Such action on its requests was not likely I n July some commanders had in fact
to reassure the theater despite protesta- taken advantage of a proviso in the alloca-
tions by the War Department that all con- tions which permitted expenditures in ex-
cerned were keyed to the urgency of the cess of allowances in emergency situations.
theater’s needs. ETOUSA wanted ap- The 30th Division, for example, expended
proval of its demands and releases of am- three times the authorized allowances of
munition, not merely sympathetic consid- medium artillery ammunition and double
eration of its requests. the ration of light artillery ammunition
I n the meantime the theater had to 202Chl WX–78272, Lutes to SAC, 9 Aug 44,
meet the purely internal problem of how SHAEF G–4 471 Ammo.
203Cbls, WARX–79973, ASF to E T O , 12 Aug 44;
to distribute and apportion its inadequate WARX–84862, ASF to ETO, 2 2 Aug 44; and
resources. One problem which persistently WARX–26353, W D to ETO, 6 Sep 44. All in SS&P
vexed tactical commanders in connection Plng Div 201.02 Cbls, Ammo, A 4 6 – 3 7 1 .
with scarce items of supply was the diffi- 204T W X Q–20456, 12th A G p to COMZ, 16 Aug
44, E U C O M 471 Allocation of Ammo, II; Ltr, 12th
culty of getting accurate information on A G p to CG COMZ, 20 Aug 44, sub: Arty and Mor-
both present and future availability. Such tar Ammo Requirements for 12th A G p , a n d Ltr,
FUSA to 1 2 t h A Gp, 18 Aug 4.4, sub: Allocation of
information was essential for long-range Ammo. 1 2 t h A G p 471 Ammo, III.
planning, a n d it was information which 203Memo, Col Hass for SHAEF G–4, 20 Aug 44,
the Communications Zone was not always sub: Status of Ammo, SHAEF G–4 471 Ammo.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 541

during one week in July. First Army’s in-

evitable inquiry into these excessive expen-
ditures evoked a vigorous defense by the
division’s artillery commander, Brig. Gen.
Raymond S. McLain. Sixteen enemy
counterattacks against the division in a
period of seven days, he noted, had
created situations which he had consid-
ered emergencies and which fully justified
the extra expenditures. He also accepted
responsibility for the expenditures by ele-
ments of the 3d Armored Division which
had fired in excess of allowances chiefly at
the 30th Division’s request. General
McLain re-emphasized that the casualties
had always been considerably lower when
the ammunition supply was plentiful and
expenditures were unrestricted.206
The army group nevertheless had de-
cided to continue First Army’s rationing
policy, having little choice in view of the
current availability data. In the first weeks GENERAL SAYLER, Chiefof Ordnance,
ET O USA.
of August it restricted expenditures of
some types to rates as much as 50 percent
below those agreed to on 10 May.207 word, and challenged the necessity for the
Meanwhile the Communications Zone, restrictions which the army group G–4
apparently encouraged by the ASF’s ad- laid down. Arguing that the tactical situa-
ditional releases in the two critical cate- tion dictated allocations at least equal to
gories, saw no reason for worry and the average agreed rates, General Hinds
repeatedly assured the field commands succeeded in persuading the G–3 and G–4
that there was plenty of ammunition. to authorize expenditures at those rates.
General Sayler, Chief Ordnance Officer, Allocations up to this time had been made
actually predicted a “surprise for the peo- with a view toward building up twelve
ple back home,” certain that the theater
would soon be able to cable stop orders on 206Ltr, Gen McLain to CG 30th Div, n. d., sub:
ammunition as well as other ordnance Ammo Expenditures, Incl to 12th A G p Observers
Rpt 10 of 1 Aug, atchd to Memo, Hinds for CofS 12th
supplies.208The army group, on the basis A Gp, sub: Ammo Supply, 17 Aug 44, 12th A Gp 471
of its own reading of availability figures, Ammo General.
put little faith in the Communications 207T h e lowest rates were for 60-mm. mortar, 8-inch
howitzer, 155-mm. gun, and 105-mm. howitzer M3
Zone’s estimates. Rather than risk disaster ammunition. Ltr, Deputy G–4 12 A G p to FUSA, 31
as the result of a n unnecessary limitation J u l 44, sub: Ammo Expenditures, 1 2 A G p 371
on expenditures, however, General Hinds, Ammo, I I I ; Memo, Hinds for CofS 12 A Gp, 17 Aug
44, 1 2 A G p 481 Ammo General.
the army group artillery officer, decided 208Stf and Comd Conf, C O M Z (Rear), 20 Aug 44,
to take the Communications Zone at its E U C O M 337/3 Confs.
542 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

units of fire on the Continent. But this had of one staff officer who reviewed the de-
become clearly impossible, and any at mands, Third Army was asking for the
tempt to attain that target was now aban- moon. 213
doned.209It was known even at this time Although such exorbitant demands
that expenditures at the higher rates could not be met, the 12th Army Group
would leave many items in the critical nevertheless continued to make relatively
category within a period of a month. 210 large allocations of ammunition consider-
Nevertheless the policy for the remainder ing the theater’s worsening stock position.
of August was to recommend the maxi- When the next allocation meeting was held
mum expenditures possible without com- on 8 September (covering the period from
pletely dissipating reserves. 211This was the 11th to the 19th) it was realized that
one way of determining whether there ac- the current expenditure policy was result-
tually was a shortage of field artillery am- ing in a gradual but certain depletion of
munition in the theater. reserves. Both the army group artillery of-
Despite the risk which this policy in- ficer and the G–3, General Kibler, never-
volved, the rates were renewed on 30 theless advocated a continuance of the
August when the next army group alloca- current expenditure policy on the ground
tions committee meeting was held to set that it would be much easier to penetrate
the expenditure policy for the period 3–11 the Siegfried Line at this time than later.
September. 212 Only a few days later the The G–4, General Moses, was understand-
entire ammunition situation assumed an ably hesitant to approve such a policy be-
even gloomier aspect as a result of the sud- cause of the dangerous level to which it
denly increased demands from the armies. would reduce reserves, and he was there-
On 7 September the Third Army asked fore constrained initially to withhold his
for a sizable augmentation of both its concurrence. 214
transportation and ammunition alloca- In the end he did not object to the high
tions so that it might cope with both the expenditures, but he made certain that
increasing enemy resistance along the the risks which they involved were fully un-
Moselle, where it was already heavily en- derstood. The entire matter was referred
gaged, and the anticipated opposition at
209Ltr, Hinds to AG 12 A Gp, 9 Sep 44, sub:
the Siegfried Line. One corps (the XX) Monthly Rpt of Sec Activity, 1 2 A G p 319.1 Rpts on
had requested nearly 10,000 tons of am- Arty Matters; Ltr, Col Thomas B. Hedekin, Asst A
munition for stockage in its ASP, and esti- G p Arty Officer at the time, to O C M H , 20 Jun 51;
Ltr, Hinds to OCMH, 6 J u l 51.
mated that its expenditures would reach 210Memo, Hinds for G–3 1 2 A Gp, 15 Aug 44, sub:
3,000 tons per day when it arrived at the Ammo Allocations, 1 2 A G p 4 7 1 / 1 Ammo Alloca-
Siegfried Line. At this time the transpor- tions; 12 A G p Ord Sec Jnl.
211Ltr, Hinds to AG 1 2 A Gp, 9 Sep 44.
tation allocated to the entire Third Army 21212 A G p Ord SecJnl, 30 Aug 44.
totaled only 3,500 tons per day for all 213Ltr, TUSA to 12 A Gp, 7 Sep 44, sub: Ammo
Requirements for Attack on Siegfried Line, with 1st
classes of supply, and of this total only Ind from 12 A Gp, 24 Sep 44, a n d Memo, O r d Sec
1,280 tons were allocated to ordnance. 12 A G p for G–4, 13 Sep 44, 1 2 A Gp 471/1 Ammo
The desperate shortage of transportation Allocations.
made it obviously out of the question to 214Memo, Hinds to G–3 and G–4, 8 Sep 44, sub:
Recommended Allocation for Period 11–19 Sep, with
meet the demands of the XX Corps, much comments by the G–4, 1 2 A G p 471/1 Ammo Allo-
less those of the entire army. In the words cations.
FRANTIC SUPPLY 543

to the chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Leven C. on ammunition supply was indeed pessi-
Allen, for decision. Influenced by General mistic. O n 16 September the 12th Army
Bradley’s known desire for a quick break- Group estimated that all reserves of 81-
through of the Siegfried Line, the chief of mm. mortar, 105-mm. howitzer, and
staff accepted the recommendations of the heavier-caliber artillery ammunition
artillery officer and the G–3 for a con- would be depleted by 10 October, and in
tinuance of the relatively high expenditure a few types before the end of September. 216
rates with full knowledge of the policy’s Nor were the long-range prospects any
implications.215The decision was admit- brighter. The Communications Zone re-
tedly a calculated risk. ported at this time that, although large
The logic of the above decision is better quantities of ammunition were en route to
appreciated when viewed in the light of the Continent, much of it would not be
the unbounded optimism which pervaded available for at least thirty days because
the American forces at the time. In the of inadequate discharge facilities. I n the
area of the First Army the enemy was still case of the heavier calibers it revealed that
in headlong retreat, and while the Third not only was there insufficient ammuni-
Army was encountering increasing resist- tion available or en route, but that the
ance along the Moselle a quick penetra- War Department had failed to release
tion of the enemy's main defense positions adequate quantities for the next two
along the German border was still hoped months. 217There was little cause for com-
for and expected. Should the desired early placency as the armies entered the long
break-through fail, it was certain that period of static warfare in mid-September.
logistic limitations would force a pro-
longed waiting period during which de- 21512 A G p Ord Sec Jnl, 8–9 Sep 44.
pleted stocks would have to be rebuilt. 216Ltr, 12 A Gp to CG COMZ, 16 Sep 44, sub:
Items of Ammo in Critical Short Supply, Gen Bd File
The gamble had not succeeded by mid- 471/1 Ammo Supply for Fld Arty.
September, and at that time the forecast 21712 A G p Ord Sec Jnl, 15 Sep 44.
 CHAPTER XIV

Transportation in the Pursuit

( I ) The Railways divided into seven big systems (two of
them state owned). I n that year these were
At the end of July the main concern of combined into a single national system
the logistical planners had still been the know as the Société Nationale des Chemins de
threatening deficit in port discharge ca- Fer Français. T h e densest concentration of
pacity. T h a t problem was no nearer solu- lines was in the north and west, a n d Paris
tion in the first week of August. But the was the hub of the entire network. In phys-
sudden expansion of the lodgment area ical characteristics and method of opera-
brought with it a n inevitable shift in tion the French system was similar to
emphasis. For the next six weeks transpor- others on the Continent. I n general, its
tation was the lowest common denomina- equipment, including rolling stock and
tor of supply operations, as the Transpor- loading and unloading facilities, was light
tation Corps found it increasingly difficult in weight and small in capacity, and it
to carry out the injunction which had relied heavily on manual labor. Rolling
become so familiar to all movement orders: stock built in the United States for use on
“The T C will furnish the necessary trans- the continental lines h a d to be specially
portation.” designed. 1
With the extension of the lines of com- Although the OVERLORD logistic plan-
munications the railways a t last began to ners did not expect to have a n elaborate
play their intended role. They had moved rail network operating on the Continent
only negligible tonnages in June and July, in the first few months, they hoped to open
in part because rail operations were uneco- at least one line along the main axis of ad-
nomical over short distances, in part vance. Plans had been made to rehabili-
because Cherbourg, the terminus of the tate a north-south line from Cherbourg
main line, was not yet receiving supplies via Lison Junction, St. Lô, Folligny,
in great volume. But the logistical planners Avranches, and Dol to Rennes, where the
always intended, and in fact deemed it first big depot area was expected to be
necessary, that the railways bear the main established. From there one line was to be
burden of long-distance hauling, and with opened south and westward to the vicinity
the deepening of the lodgment in August of Quiberon Bay, a n d a double-track line
the way was finally opened for them to eastward from Rennes to Le Mans was to
assume that task. be reconstructed. (See Map 9.)
France possessed a good rail network,
totaling nearly 26,500 miles of single- and 1 History of the TC, ETO, Vol. V, 2d MRS Sec.,
double-track lines. Until 1938 it had been pp. 1–3, ETO Adm 582.
TRANSPORTATION I N T H E PURSUIT 545

U.S.-BUILT WORLD WAR I LOCOMOTIVES at the roundhouse in Cherbourg.

At the time of the breakout at the end of operated the existing lines under the direc-
July rail lines had been rehabilitated as far tion of the 707th Railway Grand Division.
as tactical progress permitted. T h e main The movement of equipment was like-
double-track line from Cherbourg to Lison wise delayed, and the first rolling stock, a
Junction was in operation, a few branch work train consisting of a 25-ton diesel
lines in the Cotentin had been restored, engine and ten flatcars, was mounted on
and construction was about to start on two heavy trailers, ferried across the Channel
large marshaling yards south of Cherbourg on an LST, and brought in across the
in anticipation of the heavy shipments beaches early in July. T h e movement of
from that port. 2 rolling stock to Cherbourg by train ferry,
Railway operating units had been seatrain, and LST did not get under way
scheduled to enter the Continent via until the end of the month. The seatrains
Cherbourg within the first three weeks of Texas and Lakehurst brought in the first
the landings. Because of the delay in open- heavy equipment, including diesel and
ing the port, however, the first units were steam locomotives, tank and box cars,
brought in across the beaches. They con- trucks, and bulldozers. Even then the con-
sisted mainly of the three operating bat- 2 History of the TC, ETO, Vol. IV (Jul-Sep 44),
talions and two shop battalions which Sec. IV, pp. 2, 7.
546 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

GONDOLA ROLLING OUT OF AN LST, specially equipped to curry rolling stock,

Cherbourg, July 1944.

dition of the port was such that the ships and put to work on the line running south
could not be berthed, a n d the heavy from St. Lô immediately after the break-
equipment had to be transferred to barges, out from Avranches.4 Within a few days it
transported to the quay, and then hoisted was apparent from the speed of the ad-
to the quayside tracks by crawler cranes.3 vance that extraordinary efforts would be
A large portion of the rolling stock was required to provide rail facilities in sup-
eventually ferried across the Channel in port of the army, and additional engineer
LST’s which had been fitted with rails. regiments were therefore assigned to re-
The first important demand for de- store the lines south a n d east of Folligny.
liveries by rail resulted directly from the (Map 17)
Third Army’s forward lunge at the begin- The reconstruction of damaged rail lines
ning of August. Rail transportation sud- could hardly keep pace with the advance
denly became economical and essential, of the combat forces. Nevertheless, every
for the long hauls to the army area im- 3 Ibid., p. 13; ADSEC NEPTUNE Plan, 30 Apr 44,
mediately placed a heavy strain on motor Annex 14 (Transportation), E T O Adm 377.
transport. I n anticipation of the need for 4 Operations History of the Advance Section,
C O M Z ETOUSA, prep by Hist Sec ADSEC, 1945,
rail facilities one engineer general service mimeo (hereafter cited as ADSEC Operations His-
regiment was withdrawn from Cherbourg tory), p. 69, ETO Adm 583.
TRANSPORTATION IN T H E PURSUIT 547

effort was made to meet a request made by inevitable shortage of empty freight cars
the Third Army on 12 August to open a developed at the loading points in the base
line to Le Mans, where the army wanted areas.
delivery of approximately 25,000 tons of The difficulties at Le Mans were ag-
ammunition and P O L within the next gravated by the severe damage to the
three days. T h e decision of 3 August by yards. Here was a pointed example of the
which the main effort was directed east- effect which Allied air bombardment
ward rather than into Brittany made it could have on Allied ground operations,
desirable to develop other lines in addition for the big terminal at Le Mans had been
to the one already planned. But much of almost completely demolished by air raids.
the parallel line farther north, which ran One roundhouse was completely de-
from Vire eastward to Argentan and stroyed, the other badly damaged, and
beyond, was still in enemy hands. the machine shop about two-thirds de-
The line running southward to Rennes molished. In addition there were the usual
a n d then eastward could not be restored torn-up tracks and damaged locomotives.
to operation quickly because of time-con- Lack of tools and equipment necessitated
suming bridging jobs at both Pontaubault, a high degree of improvisation. I n the
on the Sélune River south of Avranches, absence of a signal system, for example,
a n d Laval. Fortunately the condition of flagging of trains during darkness was at
secondary lines made it possible to select first accomplished largely with flashlights,
an alternate route for temporary use pend- cigarette lighters, and even lighted ciga-
ing the reconstruction of the main lines. 5 rettes. Blacksmiths immediately went to
The temporary route ran eastward from work fashioning badly needed hand tools.
Avranches to St. Hilaire-du-Harcouët, Meanwhile, French railway workmen
south to Fougères, east to Mayenne, and gradually began to appear with tools and
then south to join the main line at La missing parts from repair and mainte-
Chapelle. T h e reconstruction of even this nance machinery which had been hidden
route required several major bridging from the enemy. In some instances the
projects, the largest one at St. Hilaire, 6 men made use of spare parts that had been
a n d beginning on 12 August elements of brought to France by the Americans dur-
eleven engineer general service regiments ing World War I.9
were assigned to work on it. 7 On 17 August, The condition of the Le Mans rail yards
after many delays, the first of a scheduled was typical of the destruction which the
thirty-two trains bearing supplies for the Allied air forces had inflicted on all im-
Third Army arrived at Le Mans. 8 portant rail centers, junctions, and choke
The first major movements of cargo via points in their efforts to isolate and pre-
rail were carried out under something less
than ideal conditions. Most of the route 5 Historyof the TC, ETO, Vol. IV, Sec. IV, pp. 12,
restored to operation thus far was single 17.
6 Railroad Reconstruction and Bridging, Hist Rpt
track, and there was virtually no signal 12, Corps of Engrs ETO, pp. 57–58.
system. Since two-way traffic on single- 7 ADSECOperations History, p. 69.
track lines was prohibited it was not long 8 Ltr, Moses to Graham, 1 7 Aug 44, 12 A G p Sup-
ply, Transportation of.
before congestion developed between 9 History of the TC, E T O , Vol. IV, Sec. IV, pp.
Avranches a n d Le Mans. Meanwhile the 18-20; Sec. V, p. 8.
MAP 17
R Johnstone
550 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

vent enemy reinforcement of the lodgment reconnaissance parties had pushed on

area. Folligny had also suffered extensive from Le Mans to examine the lines farther
destruction, a n d its yards were a mass of east. As could be expected, they found the
burned cars and twisted steel. Enemy de- railways between Chartres and Paris
struction of rail lines, in contrast, was not heavily damaged, for the Allied air forces
extensive, and rehabilitation was much had made special efforts to cut enemy lines
simpler than expected. In the demolition of communications along the Seine. Once
of bridges the enemy was more methodical, again, however, by circuitous routing it
although even there the amount of dam- was possible to push a line eastward
age was only about half as great as ex- beyond Chartres. O n 30 August the first
pected.10 Enemy-inflicted damage to American-operated train arrived at the
equipment was also less than expected, Battignolles Yards in Paris, only four days
and much rolling stock was captured and after the surrender of the city. The open-
put to use. Nevertheless, the shortage of ing of this line did not immediately permit
freight cars soon became a serious limiting heavy shipments to the French capital,
factor because of the delay in moving however, and aside from engineer supplies,
equipment to the Continent and because hospital trains, and civil affairs relief, little
of the losses resulting from Allied bomb- tonnage actually went forward.13 Most of
ing of marshaling yards and locomotives. the Seine bridges had been destroyed, and
Destruction by the Allied air forces in fact the Paris yards, which had only limited
threatened to have a more disastrous capacity at the time, provided only a nar-
effect on the Allied logistic capabilities row funnel for the supplies required be-
than on the enemy’s operations. Beginning yond the Seine.14 By the end of the
late in June supply a n d transportation month the northern as well as the southern
officials repeatedly asked that railway line was open to rail traffic, and Dreux
bridges, tunnels, and viaducts, whose re- and Chartres were for the moment at least
pair entailed large expenditures of effort, to become the important railheads for the
be spared in the hope that the enemy First and Third Armies respectively. 15The
would not destroy them in retreat. 11 volume of traffic to these points was not
At about the time the first trains entered initially large, however. Between 24 Au-
Le Mans the Allies completed their en- gust and 2 September only seventy trains
velopment of the enemy forces in the with slightly more than 30,000 tons were
Falaise area, making it possible to begin
work on the northern line eastward via 10Ibid., Sec. V. p. 7 ; Final Report of the Chief En-
Argentan, Laigle, and Dreux. Reconstruc- gineer, ETO. 1942–45, I, 283, OCMH.
tion of that line was particularly important 11T h e results are unknown. CAO Mtg, 26 Aug 44,
SHAEF AG 337–14 CAO’s Mtgs; Ltr, Plank to
in view of the necessity of supporting an O C M H , with comments on MS, 10Jul 51.
additional army over extended lines of 12 Ltr,Mov and T n Br G–4 SHAEF to COMZ, 12
communications, and the project was A Gp, a n d 21 A Gp, 18 Aug 44, sub: Rail Develop-
ment, 12 A Gp Rolling Stock 106.
given a high priority. 13Memo, Maj Edward G . Wetzel for Col Calvin L.
The opening of the main route east of Whittle, 6 Sep 44, 12 A Gp Transportation Sec Daily
Rennes still awaited the reconstruction of Jnl, 4 Sep 44.
1412 A G p AAR, VI, 34–35.
a rail bridge at Laval.12 This was com- 15T W X JX–13704, Stratton to Base Secs, 31 Aug
pleted at the end of the month. Meanwhile 44, EUCOM 520 Transportation of Supplies, I.
TRANSPORTATION I N T H E PURSUIT 551

dispatched from Le Mans to Chartres, and rail net to the east, was a major recon-
at the latter date the daily movements to struction project.19 Only two or three
Chartres were averaging 5,000 tons.16 trains per day moved forward from Char-
The sudden need to rebuild the railways tres at first, and only small tonnages could
in August had made it necessary to aug- be forwarded eastward through the nar-
ment greatly the work force employed in row bottleneck of Paris beginning on 4
reconstruction and to reorganize the work September. 20As long as the extension of
of the ADSEC engineers. Until mid-Au- rail operations attempted to match the
gust the Railway Division of the ADSEC speed of the pursuit operating units had to
Engineer Section directly handled all forego many of the facilities normal to rail-
reconnaissance, planning, matériel pro- roading and adopt makeshift arrange-
curement, and project assignment to vari- ments, particularly in connection with sig-
ous engineer units. I n order to relieve this naling. Operations often resembled those
division of some of the details three provi- of a third-class Toonerville Trolley more
sional engineer groups, designated as A, than model railroading. Under those con-
B, and C, were activated late in August ditions the ghost of Casey Jones shadowed
with the sole mission of railway reconstruc- many a n engineer on the forward runs; as
tion. Each group included an experienced it did on 5 September a t Maintenon,
engineer general service regiment as a northeast of Chartres, where a blacked-
nucleus, plus additional regiments and out trainload of high-octane gas roared
other detachments. Two groups were im- around a downgrade curve and crashed
mediately given the task of opening the into another train, sending flaming Jerri-
railways behind the two armies; the third cans into the night. 21
was initially placed in support of the other Beyond the Seine the entire railway pic-
two and later assigned to support the ture was considerably brighter. For one
Ninth Army. In this way close engineer thing, a much more extensive network ex-
support in railway reconstruction was pro- isted to the northeast, including many of
vided for each army, while the Advance the main lines of the French system, and
Section continued to exercise over-all di- it had been kept in much better repair.
rection of the reconstruction. 17 At the end More important, the railways in that area
of August more than 18,000 men, includ- were not as badly damaged. Allied planes
ing 5,000 prisoners of war, were engaged had not attacked them as persistently, par-
in rail reconstruction projects. 18 ticularly in recent months, as they had the
Despite the addition of limited rail lines in the OVERLORD lodgment area, and
transport to Chartres and Dreux the rapid the enemy had had even less opportunity
extension of the lines of communications
1612 A Gp Transportation Sec Jnl, 3 Sep 44.
in the first days of September continued to 17ADSEC Operations History, p. 70; Gen Bd Study
outdistance the transportation resources. 122, pp. 53–54.
It was not immediately possible to move 18Final Report of the Chief Engineer, ETO, App.
41A.
large tonnages across the Seine by rail be- 19Railroad Reconstruction a n d Bridging, Hist Rpt
cause of damage to the bridges and lines in 12, Corps of Engrs ETO, p. 67.
that area. O n the southern edge of Paris 20 Historyof the TC, ETO, Vol. IV, Sec. IV, p. 22,
and Sec. V, p. 7.
the bridge a t Juvisy-sur-Orge, a vital link 21“Destination Berlin,” Army 'Transportation Journal,
connecting the area west of Paris with the I (March, 1945), 31.
552 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

to destroy them in the rapid retreat to the By mid-September upwards of 3,400

German border. East of Paris the railways miles of track had been rehabilitated and
therefore offered every prospect of being more than forty bridges had been rebuilt.
restored to operation quickly and of being Nearly all of this work was accomplished
able to handle a large volume of traffic. after the breakout from St. Lô.25 By the
I n order to make the best possible use of end of the month rail lines had been
this network while the through lines along opened eastward as far as Liége in the
the Seine were being restored, logistical north and Verdun and Toul in the south,
planners decided to continue the move- and bridge reconstruction was in progress
ment of as much tonnage as possible by a t all three places. T h e rehabilitation of
truck to the Seine and to transfer supplies the railway had therefore proceeded far
to the railways, which could then carry beyond what had been planned by that
them forward to the army areas. Transfer date.
points were eventually established just This progress was reflected in the in-
outside Paris, where the cargoes of the Red creasing tonnages forwarded by rail. As of
Ball convoys were transferred to the rail- 1 August cumulative rail shipments had
ways for movement to the armies. 22At the totaled only one million ton-miles. A
railheads another transfer of supplies was month later the total had risen to 12,500,-
necessary, this time to army transporta- 000, a n d by mid-September shipments
tion. While this entailed additional han- were averaging nearly 2,000,000 ton-miles
dling of supplies, it promised to effect great per day. Beginning with the first driblet
savings in the use of motor transport. of supplies forwarded via rail east of Paris
I n the meantime ADSEC engineers had on 4 September, the daily tonnages han-
set about making the necessary repairs to dled beyond the Seine by the middle of
the rail lines extending eastward. I n the the month averaged 5,000 tons and con-
First Army area Engineer Group A tinued to rise. 26
quickly opened a line from Paris north- Though the railways thus assumed a
east through Soissons, Laon, Hirson, and greater and greater portion of line-of-com-
via secondary lines to Charleroi and munications hauling, the burden on motor
eventually to Namur a n d Liége. Farther transportation was not immediately re-
south Group C opened a route to the
Third Army from Juvisy to Sommesous, 22 Historyof the TC, ETO, Vol. IV, Sec. IV, p. 21;
where a transfer point was established, Gen Bd Rpt 122, p. 5 5 .
23T h e Third Army, utilizing personnel from the
and then on to Commercy and Toul.23An 6811th Traffic Regulating Group, who were experi-
additional line was then opened from enced in railway operations, plus French personnel
Laon (on the northern line) via Reims a n d equipment, quickly organized a Railway Divi-
sion of its own and took the initiative in opening and
eastward to Verdun a n d Conflans. Later operating this line to expedite the movement of badly
in the month a better route was opened needed supplies which it had laid down in the vicinity
still farther north in support of the First of Paris. T h e line made the first deliveries to Som-
mesous on 7 September. 12 A G p Transportation Sec
Army, running north a n d northeast from Jnl, 21 Sep 44; TUSA AAR, I I , G–4, 18, 20–22.
Paris to Compiègne, St. Quentin, and via 24 ADSEC Operations History, p. 79; History of
Cambrai to Mons and then to Namur and the TC, ETO, Vol. IV, Sec. IV, p. 25.
25ADSEC Operations History, p. 79
Liége. 24 In all this work the Americans 26History of the TC, ETO, Vol. IV, Sec. I V , p. 22,
made extensive use of captured materials. and Charts 1 and 2.
TRANSPORTATION IN T H E PURSUIT 553

lieved, for requirements in the forward mitted to the War Department as a special
areas were also increasing. The demands procurement project (PROCO).28
of the armies consistently absorbed all The scaling down of its request was only
available lift, and transportation resources the first of the handicaps under which
were to fall short of needs for some time to Transportation Corps labored in its at-
come. I n mid-September bottlenecks in tempt to provide adequate motor trans-
the Paris area and shortages of rolling port for the continental operation. I n two
stock still constituted serious limiting fac- other important features the procurement
tors, and the railways were only beginning plan fell considerably short of its target.
to come into their own as the principal The theater chief of transportation had
long-distance carriers. originally directed that the vehicle pro-
curement project be based on a proportion
(2) Motor Transport of two heavy-duty trucks to one light. The
heavier transport, such as the 10-ton semi-
Because the transition from rail to truck trailer and truck-tractor combination, was
was necessarily a gradual process, motor desired for long-distance hauling, while
transport inevitably played a much larger the lighter types, like the 2½-ton 6 x 6,
role than originally anticipated. It was a were to be used for static interdepot move-
role for which the motor transport facili- ments, for clearance of railheads, and on
ties of the theater were neither well suited the poorer roads in the forward areas. In
nor prepared. Logistical plans had been the project which the theater submitted to
consistently based on the assumption that the War Department, using the 160-com-
trucks would not be used for supply haul- pany basis, the two-to-one proportion was
ing at distances greater than 150 miles on not adhered to. Almost all of the com-
the lines of communications. 27 Nor had panies were to be specially equipped for
the Transportation Corps been able to ob- specific missions, however, arid the request
tain, even on this assumption, either included a sizable allotment of heavy-duty
enough vehicles of any kind, let alone the transport. Only 25 companies of standard
types which it had requested, or enough 2½-ton 6 x 6 trucks were provided. The
properly trained drivers. remainder were to be made up as follows:
Using troop basis and logistical plan- 36 companies were to have the long-
ning factors of that period, the Transporta- bodied 2½-ton COE (cab over engine)
tion Corps had calculated in the summer trucks, best adapted to hauling light but
of 1943 that the Communications Zone bulky engineer equipment such as Bailey
would require 240 truck companies to bridging and POL pipe; 27 companies
meet the needs for the three main types of
27Ltr, Lee to Chiefs of Supply Svcs, 24Jun 43, sub:
hauling—port clearance, static interdepot Projects for a Continental Opn, SOS ETO AG 381
operations, and long-distance line-of-com- Troop Basis and Strength 1943; Special Info for Cur-
munications transportation. Theater head- rent Conf, Nov 43: Projected Operations, European
and Mediterranean Theaters, OPD, Office of Div of
quarters rejected this estimate and in Planning, ASF, prep by Strategic Log Br OPD ASF,
November 1943, after attempting to cut 28 Oct 43, Rpt 11, Pt. I, OCMH.
the requirement to 100 companies, finally 28History of Motor Transport in the European
Theater of Operations, prep by Motor Transportation
approved an allocation of only 160 com- Svc, OCofT ETO, Ch. VII, p. 2, T C Hist Sec; Interv
panies, This requirement was then sub- with Col Ayers, 16 Aug 50, OCMH.
554 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

the fulfillment of the theater’s needs. At

the end of March 1944 the theater had on
hand only 66 of the 10-ton semitrailers
against a requirement of 7, 194. It had re-
ceived none of the 4,167 4- to 5-ton truck-
tractors required for towing. O n this com-
bination of semitrailer a n d truck-tractor
General Ross, the theater chief of trans-
portation, had depended to bear the prin-
cipal burden of line-of-communications
hauling. 30
In April the theater G–4 decided to
pool all P R O C O projects and issue trucks
on the basis of priorities, further dimming
the Transportation Corps’ prospects. Since
equipment such as the truck-tractor was
a n item common to several other services
there was no guarantee that the Transpor-
tation Corps would get what it needed, re-
gardless of the foresight it might have
GENERAL ROSS, Chief of Transporta- shown in the early submission of its pro-
tion, ETOUSA. gram. T C project equipment was issued to
other services, and also to the armies in
the spring of 1944, with the inevitable re-
were to have 750-gallon tank trucks; 9 sult of limiting the movement capabilities
companies were to have 2,000-gallon
of the Transportation Corps. 31
semitrailer tankers; 2 companies were to
As D Day drew nearer the delay in the
have 5-ton refrigerator vans (reefers); 2
shipment of vehicles made theater officials
companies were to have 45-ton tank trans-
increasingly fearful that serious shortages
porters, which were suitable for port clear-
in cargo-hauling capacity would develop,
ance of heavy out-of-gauge equipment in
and the whole problem of motor transport
addition to the purpose for which they became of major concern. Early in April
were designed; and 59 companies were to
have the tractor-drawn 10-ton semi- 29Eventually a reduction in engineer requirements
trailer.29 eliminated some of the 2½-ton COE trucks, and the
The production and delivery of this adoption of a 750-gallon skid tank which could be
loaded on an ordinary 2½-ton 6 x 6 reduced the need
equipment was another matter. As the for the small 750-gallon tank truck. T h e number of
winter of 1943–44 passed it became in- standard 2½-ton truck companies was correspond-
creasingly doubtful that even the scaled- ingly increased from 25 to 66. But this alteration in the
P R O C O project bore little relation to what the War
down program would be met. The War Department in the meantime was able to provide the
Department approved the request for theater. History of Motor Transport in the ETO, Ch.
heavy-duty vehicles in December, but VII, p. 3.
30History of the TC, ETO, Vol. II Wan-Mar 44),
production difficulties in the United States M T Sec., p. 2.
thereafter proved the major hindrance to 31Ibid., pp. 5, 7–8.
TRANSPORTATION IN THE PURSUIT 555

the chief of transportation submitted de- ordination of all planning and adequate
tailed data to the War Department sup- liaison between the various staffs, but
porting his claim that the theater would General Ross was not even represented at
require all of the vehicles requested in 21 Army Group headquarters and found
order to carry out its missions. 32By that that reliance on the theater general staff
time it was obvious that the vehicles re- for planning data was not satisfactory.35
quested by the theater could not be made The theater chief of transportation and
available. Late in April the War Depart- the Forward Echelon, Communications
ment therefore took steps to meet the Zone, had repeatedly asserted that the
deficiency by ordering the release of a planned allocation of motor transport
variety of substitute types of equipment would be inadequate unless the planned
from the Army Ground Forces, the Army build-up of reserves was scaled down, the
Air Forces, and the Army Service Forces. build-up was reduced, or a larger portion
Included were several hundred 1½-ton of both reserves and troop units was held
truck-tractors with 3- to 6-ton semitrailers, in the rear areas. T h e Forward Echelon
4- to 5-ton truck-tractors with 25- and 40- had recommended a n increase in the
foot 12½-ton wrecking-type semitrailers, motor transport allocation of about a hun-
and other miscellaneous types. In addi- dred companies. 36 The ETOUSA G–3
tion, the ASF was ordered to divert from had disallowed these requests.
production 1,750 4- to 5-ton truck-tractors Meanwhile, the SHAEF G–4 instituted
and 3,500 5-ton semitrailers which had his own studies of transportation needs,
been intended for the Ledo Road project branding the theater staff’s computations
in Burma.33By this last-minute roundup as “unreliable” and “worthless.” Accord-
and diversion of transport Washington ing to the S H A E F planners, the theater
hoped to tide the theater over the critical had based its studies on much higher ton-
period pending the arrival of the project nage requirements than they considered
equipment it had requested. Finally,
where it was impossible to issue heavy- 32Memo, Brig Gen Robert H. Wylie, Asst Cof T
duty vehicles, units were equipped with ASF, for Dir P&O ASF, 1 1 Apr 44, sub: Motor Ve-
the standard 2½-ton 6 x 6 truck. Theater hicle Requirements for ETOUSA, SHAEF G–4 Stf
Study 8, Operation Neptune and Inland Transporta-
transportation officers later were of the tion.
opinion that the War Department’s in- 33Memo, Handy for Crawford, 29 Apr 44, sub:
ability to deliver heavy-duty vehicles con- Motor Vehicle Requirements for ETOUSA, SHAEF
G–4, Stf Study 8.
tributed materially to the bogging down 34 History of Motor Transport in the ETO, Ch.
of operations in the first days of Sep- VII, pp. 6, 13.
tember.34 35Ltr, Col Vissering to OCMH, 19 Jun 51.
36Memo, Albrecht to G–4 FUSAG, 5 Apr 44,
Planning for the theater’s transporta- EUCOM 320.2 Strength Rpts, FECOMZ File I; G–4
tion requirements, like the planning for FECOMZ Study? Estimate of Supply Situation Oper-
ammunition supply, was characterized by ation OVERLORD, D–D plus 41, 1–7 Apr 44, ETO
381.400 Estimate of Supply Situation D–D plus 41;
the absence of mutually acceptable plan- G–4 FECOMZ Study, Estimate of Supply Situation
ning factors and by disagreement between Operation OVERLORD D plus 41 to 90, 24 Apr 44,
the various headquarters concerned as E T O 381.400 Estimate of Supply Situation D plus
41-90; Rpt of Mtg, OCofS FECOMZ, 1 7 Apr 44, sub:
late as a month before D Day. Elaborate Truck Company Requirements on Continent, Opn
precautions had been taken to insure co- OVERLORD, E T O 381.45 1 Vehicles (OVERLORD).
556 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

necessary.37Estimates of transport capabil- ficial training could be given in the short

ities naturally varied depending on the time that remained. Its inadequacy was
assumptions as to port capacities, the dis- eventually revealed by the damage which
tribution of reserves, the type of motor the heavy equipment suffered at the hands
transport available, and other factors. of inexperienced 40
drivers.
By mid-May, after a recalculation of In still another vital aspect—adequate
transportation requirements, the area of numbers of drivers—plans for a satisfac-
disagreement had narrowed somewhat. tory motor transport system were at least
General Crawford reported to the War partially voided by failure to take timely
Department at that time that all head- action on the chief of transportation’s
quarters were satisfied that the minimum recommendations. British experience in
motor transport requirements up to about North Africa had long since demonstrated
D plus 50 could “just be met” if truck the value of having enough extra drivers
companies and vehicles became available to permit continuous operation of vehicles.
as then scheduled.38 Some staff officers With this knowledge theater T C officials
were less sanguine, predicting a shortage had requested as early as August 1943
as early as D plus 30. They believed that that a n additional thirty-six drivers be
the deficit could be eliminated only if the authorized for each truck company so as
railways assumed a portion of the move- to provide two drivers per vehicle (ninety-
ment burden at an early date. 39Beyond D six per company) and thus make it pos-
plus 50 the theater’s position was even sible to carry on round-the-clock oper-
more unpredictable because of the uncer- ations. The ETOUSA G–3 initially disap-
tainty over the receipts of heavy equip- proved the idea, insisting that it was
ment. unnecessary.
The lag in delivery of motor transport To the Transportation Corps the neces-
equipment had a direct bearing on an- sity to plan for twenty-four-hour oper-
other important aspect of T C prepara- ations was clear from the beginning, and
tions-the training of drivers. As it did in the need for extra drivers became even
the case of other types of service units, the
theater agreed to accept partially trained 37Memo, Whipple for Clark, ChiefQ “ A ” Br, and
Vissering, Chief Mov and T n Br, SHAEF G–4, 4 May
truck units with the hope of completing 44, sub: Motor Vehicle Requirements for ETOUSA;
their training in the United Kingdom. Replies by Clark, 4 May, and Vissering, 5 May;
The lack of vehicles—particularly the Memo, Whipple for Napier, Mov and T n Br, 11 May
44, sub: U.S. Tonnages at D plus 60. All in SHAEF
special heavy-duty equipment—made this G–4 Stf Study 8.
all but impossible. The small depot stocks 38Memo, Crawford for Handy, 1 7 May 44, sub:
which existed in the theater were ear- Truck Companies, SHAEF G–4 Stf Study 8; Ltr,
Vaughan to C-in-C 21 A G p for MGA, 17 May 44,
marked as T / E equipment for high-prior- E T O 381.45 1 Vehicles (OVERLORD).
ity units. In the fall of 1943 the Transpor- 39 Memo,Vissering for Director General of Military
tation Corps requested that at least a few Railways, 20 May 44, sub: Road Transportation,
S H A E F G–4 Mov a n d T n War Diary; Memo, Col
of these vehicles (one or two semitrailers Wilbur S. Elliott, Deputy Chief Mov and T n SHAEF
and truck-tractors for each company G–4, to G–4, 18 May 44, 2d Ind to Memo, Whipple
scheduled to operate them) be issued for to Chief Mov a n d T n Br, 1 5 M a y 44, sub: Truck
Companies, SHAEF G–4 Stf Study 8.
training purposes. The proposal was not 40History of the Motor Transport Service in the
approved until May 1944, and only super- ETO, Ch. II, pp. 18–19, Ch. IX, pp. 2–4.
TRANSPORTATION IN THE PURSUIT 557

more urgent as the prospect of obtaining the fourteen companies remained inoper-
the original allocation of truck companies ative as late as mid-August. Meanwhile,
began to wane. It therefore persisted and the loss of the fourteen units was tempo-
at the end of the year succeeded in getting rarily compensated for by the transfer of
another hearing, this time buttressing its their vehicles to two engineer general serv-
earlier arguments with additional experi- ice regiments, 42which were converted into
ential data from the Mediterranean thea- trucking units. By a n involved administra-
ter. Early in 1944 General Lee personally tive sleight of hand, the results of which
interceded in support of the T C proposal, were not entirely satisfactory, the deacti-
and approval was finally obtained from vation of these units was therefore avoided,
the theater to request the additional per- a n d the two organizations retained their
sonnel. By that time the War Department designation as engineer regiments, al-
had established a ceiling for the theater though they were used as truck units by
troop basis and refused to furnish addi- the engineer special brigades at the Nor-
tional men without making corresponding mandy beaches. 43 By such expedients
reductions elsewhere. Left with no other some of the most urgent requirements
choice, the theater therefore took steps to were met, but the failure to furnish ade-
make the necessary personnel available quately trained men had its inevitable
from its own manpower resources. In mid- effect later, particularly in poor vehicle
April General Lee was ordered to transfer maintenance. Thus, still another of the
5,600 men from units in the SOS in order Transportation Corps’ farsighted pro-
to provide an additional 40 drivers for posals was largely negated.
each of 140 companies. In ordering the re- The delay in implementing the Trans-
lease of the men General Lee warned portation Corps’ recommendations on
chiefs of services and installations com- motor transport fortunately did not affect
manders that he would not countenance supply support in the first two months of
any unloading of undesirables. Despite operations. Despite the fact that only 94
this familiar injunction the truck com- of the scheduled 130 truck companies had
panies were saddled with many individ-
uals who could not be trained as drivers. 41Ibid., Ch. II, pp. 14–15, Ch. VI, pp. 1-7; Ltr, H.
Lehneis, formerly of Motor Transportation Svc, to H.
The search for men, furthermore, fell short Larson, 10 Jan 50, Inquiries, TC Hist Sec; Interv with
of the goal, and was too belated to permit Ayers, 16 Aug 50; Ltrs, E T O to Base Secs, 15 Apr 44,
adequate training before the units were sub: Overstrength for SOS Truck Companies, ADSEC
320.2 Strength, I.
called to perform their mission on the 42The 1323d and 388th.
Continent. 41 43Ltr, Plank to CG C O M Z , 7 May 44, sub: T C
To compensate for these inadequacies Situation, Advance Section . . . as of 1600 hours;
Ltr, Hq E T O to CGs U.K. Base Secs, 16Jun 44, sub:
the Transportation Corps resorted to still Amalgamation of Q M T r u c k Companies (TC) and
other expedients. Shortly before D Day Engr General Svc Regiments; Memo, Col Eugene F.
most of the men in fourteen existing col- Cardwell, ADSEC G–4 for COfS, 1 3 J u l 44; Memo,
Col Hugh Cart, CofS, for ADSEC G–1, 14Jul44; Ltr,
ored truck companies were transferred to Col Clarence W. Richmond, C O MTB ADSEC, to
other colored motor transport units, the Col Percy S. Haydon, 467th QM Gp (TC), 8 Aug 44,
intention being to fill the stripped units sub: Reconstitution of Q M Truck Companies (TC).
All in USFET 322 Amalgamation of Q M Truck
with other white troops. This did not Companies and Engr General Svc Regiments; Interv
prove immediately possible, however, and with Ayers, 16 Aug 50, OCMH.
558 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

been brought to the Continent at the end the 21 Army Group for a full month, and
of July, the available motor transport were used mainly to carry supplies from
proved entirely ample for the short-dis- railheads forward to Third Army depots. 47
tance hauling requirements in the period I n the armies, meanwhile, replacements
during which U.S. forces were confined to were also used as relief drivers in order to
the Normandy lodgment. 44 make fuller use of available vehicles. 48
The breakout at the end of July quickly By taking such measures and by in-
eliminated any existing cushion. The sud- creasing the use of army transport facilities
den success of early August brought heavy for long-distance hauling, it was possible
demands on all the available transport, for to support the forward elements at fairly
the amount of transportation in effect adequate scales for the first three weeks of
shrank with every extension of the lines of August. The decision to cross the Seine
communications because of the longer and press the advance eastward at this
turn-round required between the rear de- time, however, constituted a n important
pots and forward dumps. Outstanding departure from the OVERLORD plan and
among the immediate tasks were move- presented the Communications Zone with
ments of gasoline to the Third Army. On a much more serious logistic problem. To
11 August the daily POL hauling require- support the armies beyond the Seine the
ment for Advance Section was raised from Communications Zone announced as its
300,000 to 600,000 gallons. O n 5 August initial target the placing of 100,000 tons
72,000 tons of ammunition were ordered of supplies (exclusive of bulk POL) in the
to a dump forty miles inland from OMAHAChartres–La Loupe–Dreux triangle by 1
Beach. A few days later a 10-ton flat-bed September. It assumed at first that ap-
company was assigned a four-day haul of proximately one fifth of this tonnage could
POL pipeline material. By mid-August be delivered by rail, leaving 82,000 tons to
hauling missions were more and more ex- be movedby truck.49 The plannersim-
clusively devoted to the movement of the mediately realized that meeting this de-
barest essentials.45
In the second week of August the first 44Gen Bd Study 122, p. 43. A letter from the
steps were taken to meet the growing de- ADSEC adjutant general reported ADSEC as having
Q M truck companies on 31 July, but this figure
mands by augmenting the lift capacity of is157highly improbable a n d is in conflict with the
the Advance Section’s Motor Transport ADSEC Operations History. Ltr, AG ADSEC to CG
Brigade. O n 10 August two companies of E T O , 10 Aug 44, sub: Order of Battle, ADSEC 381
of Battle; ADSEC Operations History, p. 71.
45-ton tank transporters were converted Order 45History of the T C , E T O , Vol. IV, M T B Sec.,
to cargo carriers. A few days later ten ad- p. 14.
ditional trucks were distributed to each of 46Ibid., p. 13.
fifty-five companies equipped with the III,47History of Motor Transport in the ETO, Ch.
p. 9 ; Note by Lt Col A. Warhurst, 21 A G p His-
2½-ton 6 x 6, and 1,400 replacements were torian, 30 Sep 49, OCMH.
obtained for temporary duty to handle the 48T U S A A A R , II, G–4,p. 14.
49One source states that 75,000 tons would have to
additional equipment. 46 be moved by truck. See Memo, Stratton for Technical
During August the Advance Section Svcs, 24 Aug 44, sub: Ltr of Instructions for Loading
also had the use of three British com- at Depots and Dumps, SHAEF T C 505 Loading and
Unloading (40); Plan, Col R . C. Tripp, Transporta-
panies. Between 300 and 360 trucks, of 3-, tion Officer ADSEC, Red Ball Freight Haul, 26 Aug
6-, a n d 10-ton capacity, were loaned by 44, ADSEC 523.091 Red Ball—XYZ Routes.
TRANSPORTATION IN T H E PURSUIT 559

mand required a more effective marshal- carried out a test run of this procedure on
ing of transportation resources. Out of this the night of 3–4 June, but the trial was of
necessity the famed Red Ball Express was very limited duration, and while it re-
born. vealed many defects it hardly served as a
Taking its name from railway parlance, test of the type of continuous a n d large-
the Red Ball Express was planned as a fast scale motor transport operations which
“through freight” which would have ex- were now attempted.51
clusive use of a one-way loop highway, op- T h e urgency of the mission allowed
erating round the clock a n d utilizing all little time for deliberation or planning,
available motor transport. Unfortunately a n d the R e d Ball Express therefore was
there was little in the way of either plan or largely a n impromptu affair. Not until 23
precedent which could be used in organ- August was the Advance Section ques-
izing the system. T h e Transportation tioned concerning its ability to make the
Corps had given some thought to the desired deliveries. 52 Two days later the
problem during the planning period in the convoys began to roll eastward. T h e Red
United Kingdom a n d had wanted to Ball plan was worked out jointly by offi-
make a test run of continuous long-dis- cers of Headquarters, Communications
tance hauling for purposes of experimen- Zone, and the Advance Section, two of the
tation and training. It had planned to op- officers most instrumental in its imple-
erate truck-tractor-semitrailer combina- mentation being Lt. Col. Loren A. Ayers,
tions over a 300-mile stretch continuously chief of the Motor Transport Service,
for several weeks with assumed stops for Headquarters, Communications Zone
loading a n d unloading, regular halts for (later deputy commander of the Motor
rests, meals, and maintenance, a n d alter- Transport Brigade), and Maj. Gordon K.
nating drivers. Such a trial run undoubt- Gravelle, also of C O M Z headquarters.
edly would have produced valuable data T h e plan called for the pooling of almost
on such matters as maintenance, driver all of the Communications Zone’s motor
fatigue, requirements for various types of transport facilities in one organization—
equipment and for drivers, and therefore the Advance Section’s Motor Transport
would have aided materially in the prep- Brigade (MTB), then commanded by Col.
aration of SOP’s for operations of this Clarence W. Richmond. It was agreed
type. But neither the equipment nor the that the Advance Section should be given
manpower was available in time for such 141 truck companies with the understand-
a test.50T h e only training exercise which
even faintly resembled the conditions of 50History of Motor Transport in the ETO, Ch. IX,
the later express system was a test run con- p. 6.
51Ltr, CWS COMZ to Supply Officers, Chemical
ducted to determine the efficiency of an- Secs General and Ord Depots, and COS CWS Depots,
other Red Ball system—the shipping pro- 16 Jun 44, sub: Red Ball Express, with Incl, Ltr, Hq
cedure devised to handle emergency ETO to CGs Southern Base Sec and Western Base
Sec, 13 Jun 44, sub: Red Ball Test 1 , ETO Adm 281
shipments of supplies from the U.K. de- Red Ball Express.
pots to t h e far shore. This procedure in- 52There is disagreement concerning this date. One
volved both rail and motor movements source states that T C officers at Headquarters,
COMZ, did not discuss the mission until 24 August.
from the depots to the U.K. ports as well Ltr, Col Ayers on the MTS to H. Larson, Hist Div, 6
as cross-Channel shipping. Trucking units Dec 49, TC Hist Sec.
560 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

ing that all would be placed on line-of- Col. Ross B. Warren replaced Colonel
communications hauling with the excep- Richmond as commander of the Motor
tion of five companies reserved for railhead Transport Brigade. Deliveries in the first
distribution in the Le Mans–Chartres days had averaged approximately 7,400
area.53Initially 118 companies were desig- tons. I n addition, however, trucks of the
nated for Red Ball use. Motor Transport Brigade hauled about
More than seventy companies were al- 48,000 tons forward from railheads at Le
ready operating under the Advance Sec- Mans, Chartres, and Dreux.56
tion, which on the first day was able to I n this initial phase the Red Ball route
place sixty-seven companies in operation consisted of two parallel highways be-
a n d deliver 4,482 tons of supplies to the tween St. Lô a n d Chartres, one for out-
Dreux–Chartres area. An additional bound traffic and one for the return.
forty-one companies were immediately al- (Map 18) R e d Ball trucks actually trav-
located to Red Ball from the motor trans- eled northward to t h e base depot in the
port of the recently activated Normandy vicinity of the beaches a n d even to Cher-
Base Section. T h e speed with which the bourg to pick u p their cargo, but St. Lô
system was organized is indicated by the was the control point from which the con-
fact that the Red Ball reached its peak voys were dispatched forward. The entire
performance within the first five days of express highway route was marked with
operation. O n 29 August 132 companies the characteristic red ball marker which
with a strength of 5,958 vehicles were pointed the way for drivers. Because of the
committed and on that day 12,342 tons of density of traffic, and in order to assure
supplies were delivered forward, a record the most efficient control of traffic, specific
which was not again equaled in the suc- rules were laid down to govern the oper-
ceeding eleven weeks during which the ex- ation of Red Ball trucks. Use of the high-
press service continued to operate. Some way, for example, was reserved exclusively
of the initial confusion attending the or- for Red Ball vehicles; all traffic was to
ganization of the express route is indicated move in one direction; all trucks were to
by the fact that traffic control personnel be organized into convoys which in turn
were sent to Verneuil, west of Dreux, only were divided into serials; the maximum
to find after three days of waiting that the allowed speed was to be twenty-five miles
route had meanwhile been altered. 54 per hour; convoys were not to halt except
Red Ball fell slightly short of its objec- for the specific ten-minute “break” at
tive of 82,000 tons to be delivered by 1 exactly ten minutes before each even
September. T h e time was then extended hour; a sixty-yard interval was to be main-
several days, and the tonnage target was tained between all vehicles and there was
also increased because of the inability of to be no passing; stragglers were to fall in
the railways to move the tonnage origin- at the end of convoys hauling similar com-
ally assigned them. By 5 September, the modities and eventually rejoin their own
date at which the Red Ball’s original mis- 53Plan, Col Tripp, Transportation Officer ADSEC,
sion was considered completed, approxi- 26 Aug 44, sub: Red Ball Freight Haul, ADSEC
mately 89,000 tons of supplies had been 523.091 Red Ball-XYZ Routes.
54C O M Z G–4 History, III, 3, 10.
delivered to the Dreux–Chartres service 55Ibid., I I I ,3 ; Gen Bd Rpt 122, App., p. 23.
area via motor transport.55 O n that date 56COMZ G–4 History, III, 3.
DIRECTING TRAFFIC ALONG THE RED BALL ROUTE. Sign shows tonnage
targetf o r the day, 5 September 1944.
562 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

MAP 18

units upon return; disabled vehicles were voys were freed from the usual restrictions
to pull to the side of the road until evacu- regarding the use of “cat eyes” and were
atedor repaired
by 57
ordnance patrols. permitted to employ full headlights, ini-
Such regulations were obviously needed tially as far east as Alencon and later
if the stream of traffic was to be kept flow- throughout the Communications Zone.
ing smoothly and without congestion. Op- This relaxation of normal blackout regu-
erations were to continue twenty-four lations was made possible by the almost
hours per day, a n d in order to allow the 57History of the TC, ETO, Vol. IV, Sec. III, pp.
best possible speed a t night Red Ball con- 15–16.
TRANSPORTATION I N T H E PURSUIT 563

H Damon

total absence of the German Air Force Operating the Red Ball Express proved
west of the Seine. Bivouac areas for the a tremendously complex affair entailing
truck companies assigned to the Red Ball much more than simply driving trucks, for
Express were located south of Alençon, it required a multitude of ancillary serv-
approximately midway along the express ices provided by services other than the
system and astride the outgoing and re- Transportation Corps. In addition to ac-
turning routes, thus permitting a change tually operating the convoy the Transpor-
of drivers at the halfway mark on each 58COMZ G–4 History, III, 5; Min, CAO Mtg,
run. 58 SHAEF, 9 Sep 44, SHAEF AG 337–14 CAO’s Mtgs.
564 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F THE ARMIES

tation Corps, in co-ordination with mili- in its early stages, left much to be desired.
tary police units, regulated the movement Many of its difficulties centered around
of traffic. Traffic control points were ini- t h e problem of traffic control. From the
tially established in all the main towns to beginning Red Ball suffered a chronic
record the movement of convoys, check shortage of MP’s to police the route, with
their destination a n d cargo, a n d inform the result that it was next to impossible to
convoy commanders on the location of re- reserve routes for the exclusive use of Red
fueling and water points a n d of ordnance Ball trucks and supporting vehicles. First
maintenance units. Military police units Army, Third Army, and the Ninth Air
aided in this control by regulating traffic Force all ran convoys over the routes with-
at intersections and defiles, enforcing the out clearing with the Advance Section,
restriction on the use of the Red Ball and other vehicles, both military and
route, directing casual vehicles and strag- civilian, attempted to move against the
glers, checking improper use of lights, and stream of traffic.61Red Ball drivers regu-
in general policing and patrolling the larly disregarded convoy discipline and
routes. Maintenance of the routes was a the twenty-five-mile-per- hour speed re-
responsibility of the Corps of Engineers, striction. The latter was a common viola-
which designated two general service regi- tion of convoys attempting to make up lost
ments for the task a n d assigned specific time, and of stragglers determined to catch
sections of the highway to platoons bivou- up with their convoys.62 Among British
acked along the routes.59 Engineers also units gossip had it that to avoid a U.S.
made several thousand road markers and convoy one must “not only get off the road
additional signs in both French and Eng- but climb a tree.” 63
lish warning unauthorized vehicles to stay Meanwhile vehicles were often used un-
off the Red Ball routes. Ordnance units— economically, both through loading to less
mainly automotive maintenance com- than capacity and through delay and loss
panies—were initially stationed at eight of of time in loading and unloading. Only a
the principal towns along the route to few days after Red Ball began operations
afford repair facilities a n d provide re- Colonel Ayers, following a study of the
placement vehicles. I n addition, ordnance first tonnage reports, asked the COMZ
maintenance shops sent patrols and G–4 to set minimum tonnages for each
wreckers out along the route. Signal Corps type of vehicle, in some cases 50 to 100
units provided radio communications be- percent above rated capacity.64 In the
tween bivouac areas and diversion points, early stages the loss of time resulted in
a n d a courier service was established be-
tween regulating stations and the forward 59Hist Rpt 14, Corps of Engrs ETO. p. 46; ADSEC
Operations History, p. 72.
dumps. Finally, the Medical Corps estab- 60C O M Z G–4 History, III, 8–10.
lished a n aid station in the bivouac area 6112 A G p Transportation Sec Jnl, 3 Sep 44.
and provided ambulance service for 62History of the T C , E T O , Vol. IV, M T B Sec.,
p. 16.
the evacuation of casualties to near-by 63Annex to Ltr, Whipple to G–4 SHAEF, 21 Sep
hospitals. 60 44, sub: Advance Across the Rhine, SHAEF G–4 381
The Red Ball plan was thus a well-con- War Plans General, I.
64Memo, Ayers for COMZ G–4 Mov Div, 28 Aug
ceived one. Unfortunately the actual op- 44, sub: Insufficient Loading of Trucks, Red Ball Ex-
eration of the express service, particularly press, SHAEF T C 505 Loading and Unloading (40).
TRANSPORTATION I N T H E PURSUIT 565

part from the scattered location of dumps sisted that ADSEC drivers were not pre-
at both ends. Even in late September an pared to deliver supplies that far forward,
analysis in Normandy Base Section re- that they were unfamiliar with routes in
vealed that the fastest loading time for a the forward areas, and that such a practice
convoy was 11.5 hours, while in a few slowed the turn-round of trucks, entailed
cases 34 to 39 hours were required. Un- a loss of time, and generally limited the
loading in the forward areas was equally Communications Zone’s ability to meet
unsatisfactory. There were other factors the armies’ requirements.67 But that prob-
which contributed to the delays in the lem was soon put in the shade by the
base areas. Trucks were often sent to de- necessity to travel greater and greater dis-
pots in advance of the time loading could tances to put down supplies even as far
begin, sometimes arriving before the depot forward as the army maintenance areas.
received the order to ship. In other cases Convoy movement instructions were
the number of trucks sent to the depots issued at the base depots in Normandy
was inadequate to take loads with high Base Section, which designated the regu-
bulk ratios. This difficulty was eventually lating station through which cargoes were
remedied by requiring the chiefs of serv- to be routed. The regulating station in
ices to furnish cubage as well as tonnage turn designated the dumps at which con-
estimates on requisitions so that traffic voys were to unload their supplies and
control regulating points could allot the notified the dumps of the approach of the
proper number of vehicles.65 convoy. 68 Thisplanned co-ordination and
Maintenance of motor transport equip- synchronization often broke down in prac-
ment also fell far short of the ideal. I n tice. Regulating stations frequently did
mid-September it was discovered that no not get advance information from the
ordnance service was available on the re- bivouac area of the approach of convoys,
turn route between Chartres and St. Lô, and the dumps consequently often re-
and that twenty-seven companies of one ceived notice of the approach of a convoy
truck group had been without mainte- only a few minutes before its arrival in-
nance between 10 and 1 2 September. In stead of the six or seven hours intended.
one survey eighty-one loaded vehicles The Communications Zone attempted to
were found unserviceable along the high- correct this deficiency by directing the
way between Vire and Dreux. 66The lack agencies dispatching convoys to inform
of such service was particularly noticeable regulating stations twice daily by TWX of
after the Red Ball route was extended on the number of convoys and class of supply
10 September. dispatched.
Another difficulty that plagued Red Such measures met only part of the dif-
Ball operations was the “losing” of con- ficulty. Convoy commanders found within
voys through diversion to points other only a week of the establishment of the ex-
than ordered. The Communications Zone
65COMZ G–4 History, III, 8.
had complained as early as the first week 66Ibid., p. 18.
in August about the armies’ practice of 67Ltr, Hq COMZ to CG 1 2 A Gp, 8 Aug 44, sub:
asking ADSEC drivers to deliver supplies Movement of Supplies and Equipment by Motor
Transportation, EUCOM 400 Supplies, Svc and
to division supply points, admittedly an Equipment, General, IV.
abnormal procedure. C O M Z officials in- 68COMZ G–4 History, I I I ,4 .
566 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

press that they had to travel farther and into convoys as complete company units
farther to reach the army dumps, and in before being cleared for the run forward of
some cases could not even find them. St. Lô.72
Despite the fact that Chartres had been Part of the early confusion undoubtedly
designated as the terminus of the Red Ball, arose from the haste with which the Red
convoys were regularly diverted from the Ball enterprise had been organized and
dumps west of the Seine to new ones the lack of experience in conducting such
farther east, with the result that within the a n operation. T h e fluid conditions in the
first ten days of the operation the turn- army areas also contributed to the diffi-
round time was increased by 30 percent. culties, for the constantly shifting mainte-
Convoys often traveled an additional 50, nance area resulted in longer and longer
60, or even 100 miles before locating an turn-rounds, increased the difficulties of
appropriate dump, and after the Red Ball control, stretched the meager resources of
route had been extended to Hirson and the maintenance service, and upset all
Sommesous, in support of the First and schedules of delivery.
Third Armies respectively, they sometimes I n addition, the operation was con-
went as far as Maastricht, Verdun, and ducted under what the Transportat-ion
even Metz, far beyond the official termini Corps regarded as a n unsatisfactory con-
of the Red Ball routes. 69At times army trol arrangement for motor transport. The
dumps actually closed while convoys were organization of motor transport on the
en route from the regulating station. Continent presented no great problem as
Commodity-loaded convoys, which were long as the command and organizational
ordered to dumps of a particular class of structure remained fairly simple. Until
supply, were often forced to “peddle” early August all hauling was carried out
their loads until their cargoes were finally by the truck units of either First Army or
accepted.70 the Advance Section, and centralized di-
I n the initial stages of the operation rection was achieved by virtue of First
the control of Red Ball vehicles was ex- Army’s command of the entire lodgment
tremely loose. T h e original injunction area. Anticipating the time when it would
that convoys move in company strength have a role independent of the armies the
was immediately violated, and was then Advance Section, barely a month before
relaxed to permit convoys of platoon D Day, had organized its truck units into
strength. 71But detachments of a few ve- the provisional Motor Transport Brigade
hicles were frequently sent to the base in the firm conviction that centralized
depots to pick up small consignments control of motor transport was desirable.
and then dispatched forward. Early in In the early phases the MTB did not ac-
September Normandy Base Section noted tually control truck units assigned to the
that less than one third of all trucks were
moving in organized convoys, a n d in the 69Ltr, Col Ayers to H. Larson, 6 Dec 49, T C Hist
Sec; ADSEC G–4 Periodic Rpt for quarter ending 30
middle of the month the Communications Sep 44, ADSEC 3 19.1 G–4 Periodic Rpts.
Zone again forbade this practice. It di- 701 2 A G p Transportation Sec Jnl, 4 Sep 44, with
rected that where the dispatch of a full Memo, Maj Wetzel for Col Whittle, 6 Sep 44.
71Ltr,Plank to OCMH, with comments on MS, 10
company to the loading points was not Jul 51.
warranted trucks were to be marshaled 72COMZ G–4 History, III, 11.
TRANSPORTATION I N T H E PURSUIT 567

beach brigades or those assigned to port (in support of the First Army) and return-
clearance at Cherbourg. After the draw- ing via Fontainebleau, Etampes, and
ing of the army rear boundary, centralized Alenqon, and the other branching off from
control of motor transport in the base area Versailles eastward to Rozay-en-Brie and
was in effect for only a short period early Sommesous (in support of the Third
in August during which the Advance Sec- Army) and also returning via Fontaine-
tion was the sole base section on the Con- bleau. O n 20 September the northern
tinent. 73 route was extended still farther to Hirson,
When the Red Ball Express was or- and there were other minor alterations in
ganized later in the month, centralization the routes followed. 74
was achieved to the extent that the MTB, In the course of these changes additional
operating under the command of the Ad- base sections were also created and given
vance Section, was assigned responsibility area command. By early October Red
for carrying out the mission and given the Ball convoys were required to pass through
use of the bulk of the motor transport re- as many as five sections, with all the delays
sources in the Communications Zone. The entailed in the co-ordination of changes in
brigade’s control of movements was not route, supply, and traffic control. Even
actually complete, however, for a second though the Motor Transport Brigade, an
C O M Z section—Normandy Base Sec- ADSEC organization, continued to oper-
tion—had been activated in the mean- ate the express system, many aspects of the
time, and the brigade theoretically did not enterprise, such as the provision of road
have control beyond the Advance Sec- and vehicle maintenance, policing, signal
tion’s boundaries. This limitation was not communications, and other services, were
serious at first, for the Advance Section divided among the various base sections.
initially controlled the entire area between The proper co-ordination of all these ac-
St. Lô and the army rear boundaries. Nor- tivities created a n impossible administra-
mandy Base Section controlled the area tive burden. T h e new sections did not
north of St. Lô and was responsible for always immediately assume responsibility
loading convoys and issuing movement in- for all these functions. In some cases they
structions. But the control of motor trans- lacked military police or signal or engineer
port operations became considerably more troops; often the new sections were not in-
complex as commands were further multi- formed of the most recent operational
plied, as the Red Ball route was extended, instructions. Attempts were made to elimi-
and as ADSEC responsibility was shifted nate these difficulties by issuing clearer
farther eastward. instructions to base sections, but the con-
The Red Ball completed its original fusion and misunderstandings about the
mission on 5 September, but necessity extent of control and responsibility of one
dictated that its life be extended, and the base section vis-à-vis a n adjacent one did
following day it entered its second and not immediately clear up. Contrary to the
lengthier phase of operations. Five days
later the Red Ball route was altered some- 73History of Motor Transport in the ETO, Ch. III,
pp. 4–5, and Ch. XIII, pp 8–9.
what and extended eastward through 74 ADSEC T C Periodic Rpt to G–4 ADSEC, 26
Versailles, where it diverged into two Oct 44, ADSEC Supplements to G–4 Periodic (Quar-
routes, one extending northeast to Soissons terly) Rpts; COMZ G–4 History, III, 21.
568 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

theory on which the base section system the Communications Zone had to resort to
had been established, the Advance Section many expedients, among them the elimi-
meanwhile attempted to exercise over-all nation of all unessential hauling a n d the
supervision of movements along the entire temporary creation of provisional truck
Red Ball route and only incurred the companies out of a variety of both service
criticism of other commands for its pains. and combat organizations. At the very
Late in September the Seine Section start forty companies were transferred
(comprising the Paris area) complained from the Normandy Base Section to the
that ADSEC representatives were making MTB, and both base sections had to ex-
unauthorized diversions and changing ercise the most stringent economy. The
consignments a t truck-to-rail transfer Communications Zone immediately called
points which were within Seine Section for surveys of all organic cargo-carrying
territory. Not until December, after the vehicles of every unit assigned or attached
Red Ball had come to a n end, was a sys- to static or semistatic units and ordered
tem of uniform traffic regulations that all vehicles, with drivers, that could
adopted.75 be spared for four or more hours per
T h e difficulties inherent in decentral- day be made available on a temporary
ized control of a n intersectional activity basis to base section transportation officers
such as motor transportation illustrated for interdepot hauling and for port and
an age-old problem—the conflict between beach clearance. 78I n a further effort to
the functional and regional division of re- meet requirements for line-of-communica-
sponsibility. T h e Transportation Corps tions hauling the Communications Zone
had fully recognized that jurisdictional reduced the activities at the beaches and
problems would inevitably arise in a sys- ports by 50 percent and forbade the ship-
tem of regional control and repeatedly ment of any supplies from the U.K. depots
advocated centralized control of opera- for which there was not a n urgent need.79
tions which traversed sectional boundaries. To augment the available transporta-
But its recommendations had not been tion, provisional truck companies were
approved.
By the end of the pursuit in the middle 75COMZ G–4 History, III, 23-24; Interv with Col
Ayers, 16 Aug 50, OCMH.
of September Red Ball had delivered a 76Gen Bd Rpt 122, Red Ball App. Since it con-
total of 135,000 tons to the army service tinued to operate another two months, the bulk of its
areas. 76T h e number of truck companies activities fall in the succeeding period, a n d its ac-
complishments will be summarized in Volume II.
available to the MTB for the Red Ball 7712 A G p Transportation Sec Jnl, 3 Sep; Memo,
runs fluctuated considerably, a n d the Capt Ludolph, Chief Highways Br, for Col Mack, 13
average was far below the peak strength of Sep 44, sub: General Ross’s Buck, E U C O M 319.1
Rpt—Misc; COMZ G–4 History, III, 26; Cbl FWD–
132 attained within the first few days. In 14583, Lee to Somervell, 12 Sep 44, P&O Div files.
the first weeks of September approxi- 78Ltr, Hq COMZ to COs Brittany and Normandy
mately 115 truck companies were used, Base Secs, 28 Aug 44, sub: Critical Shortage of Motor
Transportation, ADSEC 537 Automobiles a n d M T
although the MTB sometimes had up- Transportation.
wards of 130 companies assigned and the 79 Ltr, 12 A G p to Armies, 25 Aug 44, sub: Con-
Communications Zone as a whole had 185 servation of Transportation, 12 A G p Supply, Rpts of
Status of; C O M Z Stf a n d Comd Conf, 3 Sep 44, as
companies on the Continent.77 cited in William M. Hines, Sr., History of the General
To muster this amount of transportation Purpose Vehicle, 1941 to 1945, II, 350, OCMH.
TRACTOR-TRAILER COMBINATIONS used on the Continent: 4–5-ton, 4 x 4,
truck tractor, COE, with 2,000-gallon gasoline semitrailer, top; 1 ½-ton,
4 x 4, truck tractor with
3½-ton stake and platform semitrailer, center; 12-ton, 6 x 4, truck with 45-ton trailer (tank
transporter), bottom.
570 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

organized in the meantime from both of units. By the end of August the First
service and combat units. I n Normandy Army was using engineer tactical trans-
Base Section two engineer general service portation—three heavy ponton battal-
regiments were reorganized into seven ions, two light ponton battalions, and two
truck companies each, and a chemical dump truck companies—for supply move-
smoke generating battalion was reor- ment. 84Within another two weeks it was
ganized as a truck battalion, its four com- using a total of eighteen battalions of its
panies being equipped with standard 2½- artillery, with approximately 450 trucks of
ton 6 x 6 trucks. 80An additional ten com- the 2½-ton type or larger and more than
panies were organized from antiaircraft 200 lighter vehicles (¾-ton). By the end of
units. Finally, three infantry divisions September these converted field artillery
recently arrived on the Continent—the battalions alone had hauled 17,200 tons of
26th, 95th, and 104th—were immobilized supplies. 85 Meanwhile 340 trucks were
and their vehicles were used to form pro- taken from antiaircraft artillery units to
visional truck companies. More than forty form provisional truck companies, and
companies were organized in these divi- units of other services also assigned their
sions with the aid of 1,500 vehicles which organic transport to hauling army sup-
the Communications Zone drew from plies. In this way vehicles were drawn
stocks intended for issue to other units.81 from evacuation hospitals, gas treatment
The Red Ball Express by no means ac- battalions, mobile refrigerator companies,
counted for all the hauling during the salvage and repair companies, engineer
period of the pursuit, nor even for all the camouflage units, signal depot and repair
long-distance hauling. A considerable companies, ordnance maintenance com-
amount of transport was used in clearing panies, and other types of units.86Third
ports, and the MTB devoted a sizable por- Army resorted to similar expedients.
tion of its transport to hauling forward of There is no doubt that but for these
the railheads. 82The armies also accounted special measures in marshaling the trans-
for a substantial portion of long-distance portation resources in both the communi-
hauling, although the extent and volume cations and combat zones the advance of
of it are not recorded. Like the Communi- the armies could not have been sustained
cations Zone, the armies took special as far as it was. Throughout the period of
measures to marshal all transportation re- the pursuit motor transport, contrary to
sources and pressed every cargo-hauling all expectations, bore the preponderant
vehicle into service. Both First and Third
Armies made progressively greater use of 80 History-Normandy Base Section D Day to VE
both combat and service units that could Day, issued by Hq C H A N O R Base Sec, Aug 45, p.
34, ETO Adm 595.
be spared for cargo hauling. O n 22 August 8112 A Gp G–4 AAR for Sep, dated 7 Oct 44, p. 2,
General Bradley instructed both armies to Opns Rpts AGO 99/12-4.
leave their heavy artillery west of the Seine 82COMZ G–4 History, III, 13–14.
83Memo for record, Kibler, 2 2 Aug 44, sub: Notes
and to use the freed cargo trucks for sup- on Conf held by A Gp Comdr at 2100 hours, 12 A Gp
ply movement, and the Communications G–4 Memos for Record.
Zone was asked not to move heavy-caliber 84FUSA Rpt of Opns, 1 Aug 44–22 Feb 4 5 ,III,
145.
ammunition beyond the Seine.83There- 85Ibid., p. 6 .
after extensive use was made of all types 86FUSA AAR, Sep 44, p. 58.
TRANSPORTATION I N T H E PURSUIT 571

burden of supply movement over distances at Aberdeen, Maryland, were not always
u p to 400 miles. By far the most lavishly duplicated on the grueling runs in north-
publicized for this feat was the Red Ball ern France. In tires alone the replacement
Express. T h e campaign by which praise figure for the 8-ply 750 x 20 tire, the type
was heaped on the Red Ball driver in such most commonly used, rose from an average
public organs as T h e Stars and Stripes and of 29,142 in preceding months to 55,059 in
Yank and in commendation from Head- September, and in mid-September 40,000
quarters, Communications Zone, un- of that type awaited repair.” Theater
doubtedly served a useful purpose, drama- stocks of tires were rapidly nearing ex-
tizing the urgency of moving supplies haustion, as were spare parts and tools.
forward and enchancing the morale of Repair facilities simply were not equal to
men performing a duty which was monot- the task suddenly thrown upon them.
onous, devoid of glamor, and normally A similar strain was felt by personnel.
unpublicized. Although his later per- Extreme fatigue not only resulted in ac-
formance in the X Y Z operation, the ex- cidents but also led to sabotage and
press service organized to support the final malingering. In some instances drivers
drive into Germany in the spring of 1945, tampered with motor mechanisms with
far surpassed that of September 1944, it the express purpose of incapacitating their
was for the latter that the Red Ball driver vehicles and falling out of a column. 91 The
was to be remembered and even memori- Red Ball Express had even more sordid as-
alized in song in a Broadway musical show pects. In the absence of enough MP’s for
entitled “Call Me Mister.” 87 traffic and convoy control, the least scru-
But Red Ball was carried out at a terri- pulous drivers sold their cargo on the
ble cost. As early as mid-September the French black market.92
mounting strain on both personnel and Red Ball bore many of the defects of an
equipment was already clearly evident. operation hastily organized under the
T h e almost continuous use of vehicles pressure of events to meet an emergency:
without proper maintenance could have there had been insufficient time for plan-
only one result—rapid deterioration of ning; extensive use had to be made of
equipment. Just such a deterioration was hastily organized provisional units, with
reflected in the rise in major repairs, from all the disadvantages inherent in such
2,500 in mid-September to 5,750 by the practice; a n d there was a costly attrition
end of the month. 88 Contributing to this
increasingly dangerous maintenance prob- 87Written by Harold Rome a n d first produced in
lem was the constant abuse of vehicles. 1946.
Drivers habitually raced their trucks at 88 Hines,History of the General Purpose Vehicle,
II, 387, citing a report of the Transportation Section,
double the established twenty-five-mile Normandy Base Section.
per hour speed limit, and overloading by 89Ibid., II, 388n, citing testimony of Maj. Gen.
Everett S. Hughes; History of the TC, ETO, Vol. III,
100 percent was an accepted practice as a Ch. XII, p. 3.
result of authorization granted before 90Hines, History of the General Purpose Vehicle
D Day by the War Department. 89But the II, 394–95, citing Normandy Base Section report.
conditions under which overloading had 91Ibid., II, 381, citing G–4, COMZ, report on Red
Ball, and 382n, citing a Normandy Base Section
been tested and approved by the Ord- history of Red Ball.
nance Department over improved roads 92Ibid., II, 381.
572 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

of equipment due to the necessity of tem- supply and evacuation. At the end of April
porarily suspending many of the normal 1944 Supreme Headquarters set forth the
precautions of maintenance. Red Ball was conditions a n d procedures for supply by
part of a gamble, part a n d parcel of the air. It specified two types of supply—
tactical decision to cross the Seine and ex- scheduled and emergency. T h e former
ploit to the full the existing tactical advan- was defined as supply by air provided to
tage. T h a t gamble had prospects of great meet predetermined commitments nor-
rewards, a n d in the light of the optimistic mally anticipated a n d planned for in ad-
tactical outlook a t the time the all-out vance of a n operation, such as the resup-
logistic effort was undoubtedly justified ply of a n airborne unit for a short period
despite its great cost. But the result was following a drop. Emergency supply was
debilitating to the logistic structure, and defined as that provided to meet demands
the effects were to be felt for several resulting from unforeseen situations re-
months to come. quiring urgent movement of either sup-
plies or personnel. 94
(3) Supply
by Air SHAEF also outlined the entire proce-
dure by which bids for air supply were to
To alleviate the desperate shortage of be submitted and aircraft were to be allo-
transport in the period of the pursuit it cated, and directed the Allied Expedition-
was natural that air transport, like other ary Air Force to establish a n agency to
movement facilities, should be exploited control all air transport which might be
as fully as possible. Supply by air was no allocated for supply and evacuation. In
magic solution, however. T h e advantages accordance with this directive the air com-
it had of speed and freedom of movement mander in chief directed that the Com-
were offset by many limitations, including bined Air Transport Operations Room
low volume and tonnage capacity, uncer- (short title, CATOR) be established at
tain availability of suitable aircraft, inade- Stanmore, England, as a special staff sec-
quate ground facilities a t both loading tion of Headquarters, AEAF.
points and landing fields, enemy interfer- I n effect C A T O R was to serve as a
ence, and hazardous weather. In recogni- regulating station for the control of all air
tion of the costliness involved in using traffic involving the use of Allied troop
troop carrier a n d transport aircraft for carrier a n d transport aircraft on supply
routine large-scale supply, field service missions other than those for airborne
regulations specified that supply of ground forces. T h e employment of all craft for
units by air was intended only as an emer- such purposes was actually subject to the
gency expedient. T h e normal mission for control of the Supreme Commander, who
air transport as a medium of supply for determined t h e allocation of craft in all
other than airborne units included only cases of conflict between demands for
the resupply of units which had been cut emergency air supply and for airborne op-
off from normal channels of supply by ter-
rain, distance, or enemy activity. 93 93FM 31–40, Supply of Ground Units by Air, pars.
Subject to these restrictions the OVER- 4, 5, 8.
94SHAEF Operational Memo 29, Supply by Air, as
LORD administrative plans had definitely cited in Gen Bd Study 26, Supply and Evacuation by
contemplated the use of aircraft for both Air, pp. 2–3.
TRANSPORTATION IN THE PURSUIT 573

erations.95 Subsequently both ETOUSA dropped to a n antiaircraft artillery unit

and 1st Army Group also issued instruc- isolated on the Iles St. Marcouf offUTAH
tions to their respective commands outlin- Beach. Emergency deliveries by parachute
ing the procedure to be followed in were again necessary early in August
requesting air movement of supplies. when a n infantry battalion was cut off by
The use of air transport in June and the enemy counterattack a t Mortain. Lack
July barely indicated the extent to which of marking panels a n d prearranged drop
it was later to be developed, although the procedure made it extremely difficult to
movement of both supplies and personnel locate the battalion accurately. O n 10
by air filled an important gap in the meet- August twelve aircraft successfully
ing of emergency needs even in the first dropped loads of food, ammunition, and
two months. The first supply by air in medical supplies on a hilltop east of Mor-
the OVERLORD operation consisted of pre- tain, b u t of twenty-five craft dispatched
scheduled movements to the airborne on the following day less than half made
units in the Cotentin and immediately re- successful deliveries, the remainder drop-
vealed some of the difficulties inherent in ping their cargo a mile a n d a half short of
the use of air for that purpose. Of 208 craft 97
the area as the result of poor visibility.
dispatched to the 82d Airborne Division I n the meantime aviation engineers
on D plus 1, 64 were forced to return to opened emergency landing strips in the
base with their loads by the sudden de- beachhead area, the first of them within
velopment of bad weather en route. Of the t h e first week of the invasion, making it
250 tons dispatched, 155 were dropped, of possible to air-land supplies and personnel
which 90 percent was recovered by the on a larger scale. Small shipments of sup-
ground units. plies began in the third week of June. Air
Supplies for the 101st Airborne Division transport was used most heavily during
were set up on an “on call” basis, but a the period of the storm, a total of approxi-
misreading of ground panels by reconnais- mately 1,400 tons of supplies, mostly am-
sance aircraft led to the dispatch of 118 munition, being shipped in the week of
planeloads of cargo which, it later devel- 18–24 June. By the end of July the IX
oped, had not been requested and which Troop Carrier Command had flown ap-
the division was not prepared to receive. proximately 7,000 tons of supply to U.S.
How large a portion of these supplies was forces on the Continent.98 Meanwhile air
recovered is unknown. Other aircraft flew transport was increasingly employed for
successful on-call missions to the 82d Air- the evacuation of casualties. By the end of
borne Division in the first week, however, July about 20,000 troops, approximately
delivering supplies by either parachute or one fifth of all U.S. casualties, had been
glider, the gliders carrying mainly 105-
mm. howitzers and heavy machine guns. 96
Twice in June supplies were flown to 95Ibid.; Directive, Hq AEAF, 2 Jun 44, sub: Supply
by Air—Organization and Functions of CATOR,
units other than airborne forces. O n 8 SHAEF G–3 G C T 373.5-1/Ops(A) Air Lift for
June fifteen pounds of ether were dropped Movement of Supplies and Personnel.
to a field hospital in the vicinity of Caren- 96Supply by Air, prep by IX TCC, I (20 Nov 44),
2, SHAEF AG 581.2–1 Supply by Air 1945.
tan, a n d two weeks later, during the 97Ibid., pp. 4–5.
period of the storm, food and water were 98Ibid., p. 3.
 574 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

evacuated to the United Kingdom via directed the 21 Army Group commander
air. 99 and the Commander-in-Chief, AEAF, to
Although the cumulative tonnage trans- provide the airfields and other facilities as
ported to the Continent in the first two early as possible.101 By mid-July, then,
months was not large, air transport had plans had been initiated to provide land-
definitely proved its worth. First Army, ing facilities on the Continent capable of
having tasted its advantages, was anxious receiving a total of 3,000 tons per day, half
to establish air service on a scheduled in the British sector a n d half in the
basis, In fact, there was suspicion in July American. 102
that the army was already making unau- This goal had not yet been reached at
thorized use of air transport, for the First the end of the month, but the Allies in-
Army supply services in mid-July began to tended shortly to test the expanded organ-
call regularly for delivery of over 400 tons ization to the extent of a 500-ton lift to
per day by that means. By informal agree- each sector.103The desirability of develop-
ment with the Ninth Air Force these de- ing the largest possible airlift potential
mands were reduced to a maximum of 250 became even more apparent within the
tons. But CATOR began to question the next few weeks. Only a few days aftert h e
“emergency” nature of the army’s re- breakout at Avranches logistic planners at
quests, and both the U.S. administrative SHAEF began to study the possibility of
staff at 21 Army Group and SHAEF supporting a rapid advance to the Seine.
shortly thereafter issued reminders that air Included in their calculations was a con-
shipments were to be called for only when
supplies were urgently needed and no 99FUSA Rpt of Opns, Annex 16 (Medical), App.
other means of transportation was avail- 20; ADSEC Operations History, App. E; Supply by
4 i r , IX TCC, p. 3 . Statistics on air evacuation vary
able. They gave instructions that all items from 18,000 in the IX T C C report to 28,000 in the
not in the emergency category be stricken ADSEC history.
from supply-by-air demands (known as 100Gen Bd Study 26, p. 14. Memo, Maj Harry D.
Henshel of 12 A Gp Movements Br for Chief Move-
SAD’s). 100 ments Br G–4, 28 J u l4 4 ; Ltr, Viney, ADSEC G–4, to
As this attempt was made to keep the G–4 ETO, 27 J u l4 4 , sub: Supply by Air; Memo for
use of air transport within prescribed record, Henshel, n.d. All in I 2 A G p Supply by Air
133.
bounds, steps were taken to develop the 101Ltr, Smith to AEAF, 17 Jun 44, sub: Emergency
theater’s airfreight capacity to its full po- Supply by Air; Ltr, AEAF to Smith, 20 Jun 44, sub:
tential. I n mid-June Supreme Headquar- Emergency Supply by Air Plan; Ltr, Crawford to
Smith, c. 22 Jun 44, sub: Supply by Air; Ltr, SHAEF
ters directed the AEAF to prepare and to Air C-in-C, AEAF, and C-in-C 21 A Gp, 11 J u l4 4 ,
submit plans for supply by air at the rate sub: Supply by Air. All in SHAEF G–3 GCT/373.5/
of 1,500 tons per day by D plus 30–35, and Ops(A) Air Lift for Movement of Supplies and Per-
sonnel. Cbl S–54454, Lee to Lord, 24 Jun 44, SHAEF
3,000 tons per day by D plus 45. The main G–4 Supply by Air 1–1.
problem involved in developing such ca- 102The average landing strip was assumed capable
pacity lay in the provision of landing fields of handling 500 tons per day. Three strips would
therefore be required in each sector. T h e delivery of
on the Continent, a n d within a few days 1,500 tons required 600 sorties using C–47 aircraft.
the AEAF responded with a plan outlin- 103Memo, AEAF Stf at SHAEF Forward for Brig
ing the requirements for fields and the Gen Edmund C. Langmead a t SHAEF, 29 J u l4 4 ,
sub: Supply by Air, SHAEF G–4 Supply by Air 1-1;
supplies and units needed to build them. Ltr, Bull to Smith, 1 Aug 44, sub: Airlift, SHAEF
SHAEF approved the plan and on 11July G–3 GCT/373.5–1/Ops(A).
TRANSPORTATION I N T H E PURSUIT 575

sideration of the extent to which such a later shifting to the region of Chartres-
drive might be supplied by air. At that Dreux. 106One day later SHAEF approved
time there were plenty of aircraft that the immediate expansion of deliveries by
could be utilized to deliver the 3,000 tons air up to 2,000 tons per day to the Le
per day to the Continent, the only ques- Mans area, although it had little expecta-
tion being whether they should be used in tion at first that deliveries could average
planned airborne operations. more than 1,000 tons. SHAEF tentatively
Far more serious a limiting factor was limited the use of aircraft for this purpose
the inadequacy of reception facilities on to ten days—that is, until 25 August.107
the Continent. To make full use of the The SHAEF offer proved timely in-
available airlift six strips, each with an deed. O n 15 August Third Army was
estimated capacity of 500 tons per day, already nearing the Seine and was experi-
would have to be either captured or con- encing critical shortages of many items,
structed. At the beginning of August the particularly gasoline. On the very day on
Allies had only one administrative field on which the SHAEF authorization was
the Continent, at Colleville, near OMAHAmade it therefore requested daily air ship-
Beach, and the airlift organization had ment of at least 1,500 tons of supplies di-
thus far been tested only to the extent of rectly to airfields in the army area.108In
delivering about 500 tons per day to the view of its extended position and the speed
U.S. sector.104 of its advance, Third Army’s needs were
There was little doubt that air supply obviously the most pressing, and it was
would add substantially to Allied offensive natural that the expanded airlift capacity
capabilities. It was estimated that the de- should be devoted initially to meeting that
livery by air of 1,000 tons per day would army's requirements. Shipments under
expedite by several days the accumulation the new program did not get under way
of reserves necessary for crossing the Seine until 19 August, when the first deliveries,
a n d would increase by two divisions the consisting of rations, were made to a newly
force that could be supported in a n offen-
sive across that river. O n 12 August 1041 2 A G p Rpt of Opns, VI (G–4), 28; Stf Study,
SHAEF announced to the major subordi- G–4 Div SHAEF, Notes on Supply by Air, 7 Aug 44,
SHAEF G–4 Supply by Air 1-1; Cbl ASCZC–485,
nate commands its intention of making air ADSEC to 12 A Gp, 7 Aug 44, and Draft Ltr, SHAEF
transport available up to 1,000 tons per to A Gps and AEAF, early Aug 44, sub: Movement
day to the forward areas should the army of Stores, Supplies by Air, SHAEF G–4 58 1.2 Trans-
portation by Air of Supplies and Equipment.
groups desire such support. It indicated 105Cbl S–57489, SAC to A Gps, AEAF, COMZ,
that aircraft would be withdrawn tempo- CG Allied Airborne Forces, 12 Aug 44, Cbl (out) Log
rarily for contemplated airborne oper- 1944–45, Smith Papers; Memo, Crawford for CAO,
10 Aug 44, sub: Supply by Air in Advanced Areas,
ations, but could thereafter be released in SHAEF G–4 581.2 Transportation by Air ofSupplies
larger quantity for the support of U.S. and Equipment 1944, I.
forces beyond the Seine.105T h e 21 Army 106Cbl, 21 A G p to SHAEF, 14 Aug 44, SHAEF
G–4 581.2 Transportation by Air of Supplies and
Group accepted the offer with alacrity, re- Equipment, II.
plying on 14 August that it desired, sub- 107Cbl FWD–12901, SHAEF to 2 1 A Gp, 15 Aug
ject to a small lift for British account, more 44, SHAEF G–4 581.2; 1 2 A G p G–4 Periodic Rpt 3
(13-19 Aug).
than 2,000 tons per day for support of U.S. 108Gen Bd Study 126, p. 15; TUSA AAR, II, G–4,
forces, initially in the Le Mans area and 12.
576 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

opened field at Le Mans.109 In the next duced capacity. On 25 August it directed

few days deliveries averaged less than 600 the First Allied Airborne Army to prepare
tons per day, and it soon became apparent to make a daily allotment of 200 aircraft
that the critical supply situation in the with a daily lift capacity of 500 tons begin-
forward areas would not be appreciably ning on 26 August. T h e allotment was to
relieved by 25 August, the date up to be increased to 400 craft with the return of
which the enlarged airlift h a d been au- aircraft (425 planes) which had been
thorized. loaned to Allied forces in the Mediterra-
The entire logistic situation was actually nean for the southern France airborne
worsening. On 20 August the Third Army operation. 112
had already started across the Seine and U p to 25 August the performance of the
was operating with less than two units of airlift had been something less than spec-
fire and less than one day's reserve of tacular, although the 4,200 tons delivered
rations and gasoline under its immediate in the first week undoubtedly aided in
control. Both Third and First Armies were maintaining the momentum of the pur-
getting only the barest daily maintenance suit. Several factors had operated to frus-
forward. The increasingly acute supply trate the development of the airlift's full
situation impelled Third Army on 22 potential. The lack of continental airfields
August to ask that the airlift be extended imposed the greatest restriction at first,
an additional ten days.110 a n d backlogs of both loaded planes and
In forwarding this request to Supreme requisitions developed. O n 22 August 383
Headquarters, the 12th Army Group took loaded C–47’s were held at U.K. air-
the occasion to reinforce it with additional dromes for lack of forward terminal air-
argument. It described the dire supply fields, and CATOR was forced to ask the
situation in both its armies a n d asserted army group G–4 to indicate priorities for
that regardless of the bad weather and the supplies ready for air delivery. 113
construction difficulties at Le Mans, which Scarcities bred scarcities. Airfields for
had prevented full use of the available lift, both tactical and administrative use were
supply by air had already been of unques- urgently needed. To restore captured fields
tionable value. The army group was hope- and to build new ones, engineer materials
ful that some of the initial handicaps— had to be shipped in transport that was
particularly the scarcity of landing fields— already desperately inadequate. Army
would soon be overcome, for deliveries group at one time found it necessary in the
were shortly expected to begin a t newly midst of the pursuit to allocate as much as
opened fields a t Orléans. General Moses
estimated that the need for air-transported 109TUSA G–4 Periodic Rpt 3 (13-19 Aug).
110Cbl 3613, TUSA to COMZ, 22 Aug 44, SHAEF
supplies would continue at least until 10 G–4 581.2 Transportation by Air of Supplies and
September. 111 Equipment, I.
Fully aware that the continued alloca- 111Cbl QX–20630, Moses to Bull, 23 Aug 44,
SHAEF G–3 Resupply by Air 245 18/Ops.
tion of troop carrier and transport aircraft 112Cbl FWD–13231, SHAEF G–3 to First Allied
would hamper the training and prepara- Abn Army, 25 Aug 44, SHAEF G–3 Resupply by Air
tions of the Allied airborne forces, SHAEF 245 18/Ops.
113CblQ–241, CATOR to Ninth AF, 22 Aug 44,
nevertheless decided to permit the airlift SHAEF G–4 581.2 Transportation by Air of Supplies
of supplies to continue, although at re- and Equipment.
TRANSPORTATION IN T H E PURSUIT 577

2,100 tons per day of the meager trans- additional sacrifices, and the army group
portation resources for forward fighter therefore authorized the Communications
field construction.114 The air forces were Zone to divert 1,500 tons per day to Paris
naturally reluctant to release tactical fields regardless of the cost to the military
needed for their operations, and supply effort. 117
operations were therefore restricted to Just as this extra burden on transporta-
fields not occupied by tactical air units, or tion resources developed, the Allied air-
to fields which they had abandoned or borne forces renewed their demand for the
which were unsuitable for tactical air- return of their aircraft. The SHAEF direc-
craft.115 Meanwhile, imperfect “mount- tive of 25 August ordering the continu-
ing” arrangements in the United King- ation of the airlift met with a strong
dom, aggravated by a shortage of trucks, protest from General Brereton, com-
created delays in the loading of planes, mander of the First Allied Airborne Army.
further hindering the optimum develop- The difficult airborne operations then
ment of the airlift in its early stages. being planned, General Brereton argued,
Toward the end of August a limiting made it essential that all resources under
factor that heretofore had been almost his command should be freed from all
nonexistent threatened the potentialities duties not directly connected with the
of supply by air. Competing demands for preparations for those operations, and he
the supply support of the armies, for the made a vigorous plea that the added com-
civil relief of Paris, and for airborne oper- mitment of aircraft to supply missions be
ations suddenly eliminated whatever sur- canceled. 118
plus in aircraft had existed in the preced- The SHAEF G–3 was won over to this
ing weeks. The capture of Paris ahead of view and reversed his recent decision. On
schedule aggravated the entire supply and 28 August Supreme Headquarters notified
transportation shortage, for the relief re- the 12th Army Group that because of
quirements of 2,400 tons per day in the other operational requirements all troop
days immediately following the city's carrier aircraft assigned to the First Allied
liberation cut deeply into Allied resources. Airborne Army were being withdrawn
The needs of Paris presented the 12th from supply missions effective that date.119
Army Group commander with a difficult SHAEF did not intend that supply by air
decision, for with him rested the deter- should be completely discontinued, how-
mination of priority between military and ever, and took measures the same day to
civil supplies. O n 27 August he allocated 114CblQX–20630, Moses to Bull, 23 Aug 44,
500 tons of the available airlift to meet the SHAEF G–3 Resupply by Air 25418/Ops.
city’srelief requirements. 116Two days later 115 Supplyby Air, IX TCC, p. 18.
116Cbl Q–227, C A T O R to 1 2 A Gp, 2 7 Aug 44,
the army group requested the Communi- S H A E F G–4 58 1.2 Transportation by Air of Sup-
cations Zone to take action at once to meet plies a n d Equipment 1944, II.
at least 2,000 of the 2,400-ton requirement 117Cbls QX–21026 and QZ–21043, 12 A G p to
COMZ, 29 Aug 44, SHAEF G–4 581.2 Transporta-
for Paris, and authorized the diversion of tion by Air of Supplies and Equipment 1944, II.
500 tons at the direct expense of military 118CblV–25048, Brereton to SHAEF, 26 Aug 44,
supplies. Later the same day additional SHAEF G–3 Resupply by Air.
119Cbl FWD–13357, SHAEF G–3 to Moses, 28
information indicated that the civil relief Aug 44; Cbl FWD–13337, SHAEF to Brereton, 28
of Paris was sufficiently urgent to require Aug 44, SHAEF G–3 Resupply by Air.
578 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT O F T H E ARMIES

find substitute airlift capacity to replace limitation for safe landing.122In almost all
that returned to the airborne forces. In- respects the C–47 was the more adaptable
structions were immediately sent to the and versatile plane for cargo-carrying pur-
Commanding General, USSTAF, to make poses.123Nevertheless on about 24 August,
available for supply operations on the fol- as a precautionary measure, SHAEF
lowing day, 29 August, all C–47’s assigned ordered twelve bombers placed at the dis-
to the VIII and IX Air Service Com- posal of CATOR to make comparative
mands not required for operations. In ad- tests of their usefulness as supply trans-
dition General Spaatz was instructed to ports, and preliminary measures were also
convert 100 B–17’s or B–24’s for use as taken to obtain the necessary materials for
cargo planes, a n d to prepare to increase the possible conversion of 100 bombers. 124
this commitment to 200. 120 By 28 August there was no longer any
The use of bombers for supply purposes question of the necessity to use bombers
had been considered earlier, although for supply purposes in view of the urgent
somewhat unfavorably. O n 17 August, call for aircraft from all quarters, and
when additional troop carrier aircraft were orders were therefore sent out to convert
first being diverted for the expanded air- combat aircraft.
lift, General Brereton had proposed that By the use of bombers, supplemented
250 B–24’s be used instead. But SHAEF by C–47’s of the air force service com-
had rejected the proposal, in part because mands, SHAEF planned that supply by
it did not favor the diversion of combat air should continue at the rate of 500 tons
aircraft from normal commitments, 121and per day. Meeting the increasingly urgent
in part because it thought then that the requirements for civil relief supplies for
need for air supply might be only tempo- Paris, however, soon left little lift available
rary. Furthermore, there were definite dis- for the support of the armies. Air ship-
advantages in using bombers for supply ments had reached their peak on 26 and
purposes. Airdromes had to be much 27 August, when deliveries totaled nearly
larger and better surfaced to accommo- 2,900 tons for the two days (including ton-
date the big B–17’s a n d B–24’s; because ~~

of the size a n d speed of t h e bombers the 120Cbl FWD–13351, G–3 SHAEF to CG USSTAF,
28 Aug 44, SHAEF G–3 Resupply by Air.
interval between landings was much 121Cbls, V–25003, Brereton to SHAEF, 17 Aug 44,
longer than for the C–47’s; and the time a n d FWD–12988, SHAEF to Brereton, 18 Aug 44,
required to load and unload the bombers, SHAEF G–3 Resupply by Air.
122Supply by Air, I X T C C , p. 25, App. A, p. ii.
either for bulk gasoline or other supplies, B–24’s were capable of carrying from 1,545 to 1,836
was considerably longer because they car- gallons of gasoline in bulk, depending on the types of
ried greater loads and because, with their tanks installed. Supply by Air, App. A, p. iv. Com-
parisons of tonnages of all supplies carried by the
bomb bay doors and hatches and cut-up bombers and the number of sorties, as given in
interiors, they were not designed to carry C A T O R reports, indicate that the loads carried by
cargo. The bombers had to undergo con- the bombers averaged only slightly higher than those
of the C–47’s–2.7 tons as against 2.2 tons.
siderable modification—their gross weight 123 C–47’sconsumed about 4 tons of gas in deliver-
in particular had to be reduced—before ing 10 tons of cargo from U.K. fields to Paris; bombers
additional fuel-carrying tanks could be in- consumed about 4.5 tons of gas carrying that amount
of cargo the same distance.
stalled and the maximum amount of gaso- 124Ltr, Bull to Smith, 24 Aug 44, sub: Supply by
line carried without exceeding the weight Air, SHAEF G–3 Resupply by Air.
TRANSPORTATION IN T H E PURSUIT 579

nage to Paris). Thereafter they fell off transportation at its disposal in the United
precipitately as a result of the withdrawal Kingdom would be drastically curtailed
of the C–47’s on the 29th, and depended in the near future. 128
largely on the capabilities of the converted The result of all these difficulties was in-
bombers. To the armies this loss was of evitable— a n increasing backlog of sup-
major importance, as attested by the First ply-by-air demands that could not be
Army, which on 30 August made a strong filled. I n the week of 27 August-2 Septem-
appeal that the airlift to the forward areas ber deliveries to the 12th Army Group
be continued at the maximum rate pos- reached their lowest ebb, averaging barely
sible.125SHAEF responded promptly by 250 tons per day. By that time it was ob-
directing USSTAF to provide air trans- vious that the airlift supply requirements
port up to 500 tons per day to the 12th could not be met by bombers alone. O n 4
Army Group.126But for the next week the September 12th Army Group again out-
airlift was incapable of meeting either the lined its desperate supply needs a n d re-
Paris relief needs or the requirements of quested immediate action to provide C–47
the armies in the volume desired. craft then frozen for the airborne army.
The deficiency resulted in part from the The Communications Zone in turn re-
tactical allocation of C–47 aircraft. In ad- ported to SHAEF that it had been unable
dition, however, both the U.K. loading to develop the full capabilities of air trans-
and the continental reception facilities portation and supported General Brad-
continued to constitute limiting factors ley's request for a daily 3,000-ton lift to
which made it impossible to employ to move gasoline both from the United King-
maximum effectiveness even the aircraft dom and from the base area on the Con-
available. USSTAF had made 200 bomb- tinent to the forward areas.129
ers available for civil affairs supply by 1 Supreme Headquarters had in fact al-
September, but reception capacity at Paris ready decided to restore at least a portion
was such that only 70 planes per day of the aircraft strength which the lift had
could be dispatched. Airfield accommoda- lost by the order of 28 August. O n 3 Sep-
tions for bombers were also insufficient to tember SHAEF advised the First Allied
receive the 500 tons authorized the Airborne Army that one half of its air
armies. 127 125CblQ–21068, FUSA to SHAEF, 30 Aug 44,
Inadequate truck transportation at the SHAEF G–3 Resupply by Air.
U.K. base had contributed to the difficul- 126Cbl, SHAEF G–4 to USSTAF, 31 Aug 44,
SHAEF G–3 Resupply by Air.
ties of the airlift. The main burden of pro- 127Cbl QMSB, AEAF to SHAEF, 1 Sep 44,
viding transportation to the U.K. depar- SHAEF G–3 Resupply by Air; Cbl S–58996, SHAEF
ture airfields had been borne by the to G–3 SHAEF FWD, 2 Sep 44, SHAEF G–3
GCT/373.5–1/Ops (A) Airlift for Movement of Sup-
British War Office, which in the first week plies and Personnel.
of September daily transported about 200 128Ltr, C. M. Smith, Deputy G–4 SHAEF, to CG
tons of the P O L intended for shipment to ETO Rear, 4 Sep 44, sub: Emergency Supply by Air,
and Memo, Col Thompson, Chief Requisition Sec,
the Third U.S. Army, and also 50 to 100 Air Opns Supply Installations for Airfields in the
tons of supplies set u p for delivery to Paris. U.K., 6 Sep 44, SHAEF G–4 581.2 Transportation by
The War Office obviously had not bar- Air of Supplies and Equipment 1944, II.
129Cbls,QX–21280, 12 A Gp to SHAEF, 4 Sep 44,
gained for this added responsibility, and and JX–14045, Lee to SHAEF G–4, 4 Sep 44,
there was every prospect that t h e truck SHAEF G–3 Resupply by Air.
580 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

transport resources must be released and ing 220 craft to the Continent.134To carry
made available to CATOR for the support out this portion of the plan the airfield at
of the ground forces.130 This allocation Querqueville (serving Cherbourg) had to
amounted to 600 planes, which were re- be used as a refueling point and the run-
leased for use beginning 5 September.131 ways had to be improved rapidly in order
By then the combined 12th Army Group to handle the heavily laden transports. On
bids for airlift totaled 4,000 to 4,500 tons the morning of 6 September the 342d
per day exclusive of the Communications Engineer General Service Regiment was
Zone’s own bid for 3,000 tons of P O L for assigned the task of laying pierced steel
the Paris and Reims areas. Neither the plank on a 4,600-foot runway and was
aircraft nor the loading and receiving ordered to complete the task by the fol-
facilities were capable of handling such lowing morning. By utilizing several crews
tonnages. SHAEF therefore notified the starting at different points, by improvising
major commands that all bids would be means of joining the various sections as the
considered on a priority basis and the crews met, a n d by working through the
available lift allocated according to oper- night, the engineers readied the runways
ational needs. SHAEF aimed at a lift of for use in fourteen hours.135
about 2,000 tons per day. It was the inten- The enlarged airlift got under way on 6
tion of the Supreme Commander that the September and on the first day delivered
airlift now be employed solely for the approximately 1,200 tons to the 12th
movement of supplies essential to the ad- Army Group. Bombers employed in the
vance of the Allied forces into Germany. movement of relief supplies to Paris were
Relief needs for Paris were henceforth to allowed to continue the lift at a diminished
be met by rail or motor transport if at all rate until 9 September when they were
practicable, a n d bombers heretofore al- made available to haul bulk gasoline to
located for that purpose were to be di- the 12th Army Group.136 The release of
verted to the transportation of supplies the bombers and the augmentation of the
needed by the tactical forces.132 130CblFWD–13709, S H A E F to G–4 to First Al-
O n 8 September SHAEF allocated the lied Abn Army a n d C A T O R , 3 Sep 44, SHAEF G–3
available aircraft to the major commands Resupply by Air.
as follows: 200 C–47’s to the 21 Army 131Cbl Q–2496, C A T O R to SHAEF, 8 Sep 44,
SHAEF G–3 Resupply by Air.
Group and 400 to 12th Army Group, the 132Cbl FWD–13994, SHAEF to major comds,
latter aircraft to be used jointly by the 6 Sep 44, SHAEF G–3 Resupply by Air; Ltr, Nevins
army group and Ninth Air Force.133to G–3 SHAEF, 6 Sep 44, sub: Air Transport for Sup-
ply, S H A E F G–3 GCT/373.5–1/Ops(A) Airlift for
About half of the U.S. allotment was to Movement of Supplies and Personnel.
operate from the United Kingdom and 133Cbl S–59456, SHAEF to major comds, 8 Sep 44,
half from fields on the Continent. The SHAEF G–3 Resupply by Air.
134Cbls,J–14491, G–4 C O M Z to SHAEF, 6 Sep
Communications Zone a few days earlier 44, a n d FWD–14144, SHAEF G–4 to COMZ, 7 Sep
had asked that 200 C–47’s be moved to 44, SHAEF G–3 Resupply by Air.
the Continent to carry packaged POL 135History of Normandy Base Section, D Day to
VE Day, 1945, p. 57, E T O Adm 595.
from airfields in the Normandy area to 136CblS–49456, SHAEF to major comds, 8 Sep 44,
Reims because stocks in the United King- S H A E F G–3 Resupply by Air; Cbl EX–46189,
dom were insufficient, and the SHAEF G–4 C O M Z to armies a n d ADSEC, 1 1 Sep 44, SHAEF
581.2 Transportation by Air of Supplies and
G–4 had subsequently authorized the Equipment 1944,II; C A T O R R p t for week ending 9
transfer of two troop carrier groups total- Sep, SHAEF G–4 580 Transportation by Air.
TRANSPORTATION IN T H E PURSUIT 581

TABLE BY AIR: 20 AUGUST–16 SEPTEMBER

11—CARGO TRANSPORTED 1944
(Number of Tons)

a In addition to this four-week tonnage, 14,213 tons were transported prior to 2 0 August, a total of 37,429 since D Day.
b Includes 2,603 transported for 2 1 Army Group.
c 2,314 transported for 21 Army Group. A IX Troop Carrier Command study shows 8,334 tons transported in
Includes
this week.
d A 12th U.S. Army Group study shows 4,100 tons received in this week.
Source: CATOR Weekly Rpts, SHAEF G–4 581.2 Transportation by Air of Supplies and Equipment 1944, I and II, and
SHAEF G–4 580 Transportation by Air 1944, I.

C–47 lift permitted the movement of a the 600 tons per day of the preceding two
considerably greater volume, although the weeks. The great bulk of this tonnage was
airlift continued to be beset by physical carried in U.S. planes, most of them drawn
handicaps and had a n uncertain future. from the IX Troop Carrier Command.
O n 10 September SHAEF again notified (Table 11) By no means all of this tonnage,
the major commands that aircraft of the which consisted principally of rations,
First Allied Airborne Army (C–47’s) POL, ammunition, medical supplies, and
would not be available for supply move- civil relief food, found its way to the com-
ments after the 11th.137But on 12 Septem- bat units. While the cargo flown in by U.S.
ber it rescinded this order and instructed planes in the week of 3–9 September
the airborne army to allot all available totaled 7,100 tons, half was for British
aircraft to CATOR for resupply purposes forces (2,603 tons) and for the relief of
until further notice.138 T h e extension 137CblFWD–14479, S H A E F to major comds, 10
proved short lived, for the C–47’s were Sep 44, SHAEF G–3 Resupply by Air.
again recalled two days later in prepara- 138Cbl FWD–14676, S H A E F to major comds, 12
Sep 44, SHAEF G–3 Resupply by Air.
tion for the Holland airborne operation. 139 139CblFWD–14794, S H A E F to major comds, 14
In the two weeks from 3 to 16 Septem- Sep 44, SHAEF G23 Resupply by Air.
ber,140Allied planes were able to deliver 140This period rather than that of 5 to 14 Septem-
ber is used because it corresponds to the weekly sta-
a n average of 1,000 tons of supplies per tistical reports of C A T O R . Daily figures are not
day to the Continent, as compared with available.
582 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

Paris (975 tons), leaving an average of only trucks for delivery. I n other cases supplies
500 tons per day for the 12th Army Group. were located in depots so far from loading
In the week of 10–16 September U.S. air- fields that the emergency sometimes ceased
craft delivered a total of 5,535 tons; but, to exist before delivery, loading, a n d the
while the supply lift to Paris had by this actual flight could be made. 142
time been terminated, a large portion There were similar shortcomings on the
(2,314 tons) was again flown in support of far shore. The reception of supplies re-
the British, who received in addition the quired a highly co-ordinated ground or-
tonnage delivered by their own 46 Group ganization to insure immediate unloading
(RAF). The result was that the average of craft and removal and distribution of
tonnage received by the First and Third supplies as landed, and fully trained air-
Armies was well under 500 tons. In the en- field control personnel on reception fields.
tire period from 19 August, when the air- Such a n organization was not at first
lift was undertaken in earnest, till mid- available, a n d for several days early in
September, when the pursuit came to an September either too few service troops
end, U.S. planes carried a total of 20,000 were on hand to handle supplies or, as was
tons of supplies, of which approximately frequently the case, they reported to one
13,000 tons were delivered in support of field prepared to unload cargo only to find
the 12th Army Group.141 that plans had been changed and that
All the supplies delivered via troop car- planes had landed at another field fifty or
rier and transport aircraft in these weeks more miles away. In the circumstances
were items of vital importance to the plane crews themselves often performed
armies in sustaining the momentum of much of the unloading. 143
their drive toward the German border. These deficiencies plagued the opera-
T h e airlift had not measured up to ex- tion throughout the period and demon-
pectations, however, for it had fallen far strated pointedly that supply by air de-
short of the early goal of 3,000 tons per manded the same high degree of advance
day. The failure to develop the full poten- planning and synchronization of effort
tial of air transport can be attributed in that any other logistic activity did. It was
part to developments over which there was 141 C A T O Rweekly reports show that the total ton-
little control, but also to inexperience and nages flown to the Continent by both British and U.S.
inadequate planning. I n the initial stages aircraft were divided as follows among U.S. and Brit-
ish forces and Paris relief
administrative difficulties constituted as
serious a limiting factor as the lack of con-
tinental landing fields. The entire pro-
cedure by which supplies were requisi-
tioned proved cumbersome, and in the 142Supply by Air, I X T C C , p. 15; Cbl E-46027,
early stages of operations it underwent C O M Z to SHAEF, 8 Sep 44, SHAEF G–4 591.2
serious growing pains. Likewise the co- Transportation by Air of Supplies and Equipment.
143Ltr, Moses to C G TCC, 11 Sep 44, sub: Supply
ordination of movements often left much by Air, 12 A G p Supply by Air 133; Gen Bd Study
to be desired. Supply agencies frequently 26, Supply and Evacuation by Air, p. 15; Air Supply
announced the availability of supplies and for Advance into Germany after Occupation of the
Ruhr, study prep by AEAF, 18 Oct 44, SHAEF G–4
the approximate time of arrival at loading S u p p l y by Air 1-1; Interv with Plank, 28 J u l 50,
fields without verifying the availability of OCMH.
TRANSPORTATION I N T H E PURSUIT 583

obvious in the early stages that the admin- formations might have to remain non-
istrative machinery was not equal to the operational and on a reduced diet in the
task presented by the sudden expansion. rear areas. Vehicle maintenance was
The inadequacies of air transport were of becoming more burdensome by the hour
course compounded in the last days of as the result of the ceaseless driving of the
August when competition for the available past six weeks. Serious shortages were de-
aircraft reduced the supply lift capabili- veloping in field artillery ammunition,
ties. Tactical allocation of the C–47’s for armor, and spare parts. And bad weather
projected airborne operations, which had was approaching inexorably, promising to
first call on troop-carrier aircraft, and the close down the beaches.
necessity to meet the emergency needs of Many of the weaknesses of the admin-
the Paris area combined to reduce the de- istrative structure were the product of the
liveries to the armies to the lowest volume pursuit itself, and were not to be resolved
at the very time (27 August to 2 Septem- overnight. T h e decision to cross the Seine
ber) when other means of transportation and continue the pursuit had constituted
were most desperately short. a radical departure from plans so far as
logistic support was concerned. The Com-
While the difficulties over both air and munications Zone had undergone a sort
motor transport supply gave unmistakable of forced growth at the sacrifice ofa sound
evidence of the tautness of the entire ad- administrative structure, and at the end of
ministrative fabric, the Allies only partly September logistic difficulties presented
appreciated the implications of these dif- certain imperatives which could no longer
ficulties in mid-September. At that time be ignored.
there was as yet no admission that the The crippling impact which logistic
pursuit had come to a n end. A heady difficulties were to have on plans for future
optimism, tempered only by exasperation operations was only gradually realized,
over supply shortages, pervaded the Allied but it was fully comprehended by the end
forces, and as late as 12 September the of September, when the 12th Army Group
Supreme Commander decided to permit began to dole out supplies to the armies
the simultaneous offensives of both the through a strict rationing system based on
U.S. armies to continue.144 assigned missions. The shortages experi-
The optimism of mid-September was enced during the pursuit had provided
understandable in view of the unchecked only a foretaste of the real difficulties to
advances that followed the enemy’s futile come. For the next two months supply
attempt at Mortain early in August, but limitations were to dominate operational
it hardly squared with the logistic facts of plans, and the Allies were now to learn the
life. After the momentary elation over the real meaning of the tyranny of logistics.
capture of Antwerp the threatened port
144T h e effects of the decisions of August and early
deficit loomed more ominous than ever. September can be better appreciated when viewed in
The Allies had already found it impossible the light of later developments. At the risk of tres-
to maintain all of their available divisions passing o n chronology, therefore, a more searching
discussion of the logistic situation of September and
at the front, and within the next few weeks its implications for operational plans is postponed to
they realized that additional combat the second volume.
 Glossary
A-4 Assistant Chief of Staff for Supply on air staffs, corresponding to
the G–4 on other Army staffs
AAR After action report
Abn Airborne
ACofS Assistant Chief of Staff
Adm Administrative
ADO(US) Assistant Directorate of Organization (U.S.)
ADSEC Advance Section, Communications Zone
AEAF Allied Expeditionary Air Force
AF Air Force
AFHQ Allied Force Headquarters
AFSC Air Force Service Command
AG Adjutant general
AGF Army Ground Forces
A Gp Army group
Ammo Ammunition
AMSO Air Minister for Supply and Organization
ANCXF Allied Naval Commander Expeditionary Force
ASF Army Service Forces
ASP Ammunition supply point
Avgas Aviation gasoline
Bailey bridging Military bridging designed by British engineers
BCC(L) BOLERO Combined Committee (London)
BCC(W) BOLERO Combined Committee (Washington)
Bd Board
Belgian gates Steel gates used either as barricades or beach obstacles. Also
known as Element “C.”
Br Branch; British
BSCC BOLERO-SICKLE Combined Committee
BUCO Buildup Control Organization
CAO Chief Administrative Officer
CATOR Combined Air Transport Operations Room
Cbl Cable
CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff
CinC Commander in Chief
C-in-C Commander-in-Chief (British usage)
Cir Circular
CG Commanding General
Chespaling A wood and wire matting laid on beaches wherever needed to
provide footing for vehicles
586 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

Classes of Supply
I Rations
III Fuels and lubricants such as gasoline and coal
V Ammunition and explosives
I I and IV All other supplies and equipment for which allowances may
(Class II) or may not (Class IV) be established, as, for ex-
ample, clothing, weapons, construction and fortification
materials
Cof Engrs Chief of Engineers
CofS Chief of Staff
CofT Chief of Transportation
Com Committee
Comd Command
Comdr Commander
COMZ Communications Zone
Conf Conference
COS Com British Chiefs of Staff Committee
COSSAC Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate)
CPS Combined Staff Planners
CWS Chemical Warfare Service
DCofS Deputy Chief of Staff
Dir Directive; director
Div Division
DQMG(L) Deputy Quartermaster General (Liaison) (British)
Dukw 2½ ton 6 x 6 amphibian truck
Dumb barge An unpowered barge that could be beached
Engrs Engineers
ETOUSA European Theater of Operations, United States Army
EUCOM European Command, successor to USFET
Exec Executive
ExO Executive Officer
FECOMZ Forward Echelon, Communications Zone
FUSA First U.S. Army
FUSAG 1st U.S. Army Group
G–1 ACofS for personnel
G–2 ACofS for intelligence
G–3 ACofS for operations
G–4 ACofS for supply
Gen Bd Rpt General Board Report
GFRS Ground Force Replacement System
GHQ General Headquarters
GO General Order
GP Group
GPA General Purchasing Agent
Hedgehog Portable obstacle, made of three crossed angle irons
Hist Historical
Incl Inclosure
GLOSSARY 587

Ind Indorsement
Int Intelligence
Interv Interview
ISS Identification of Separate Shipments to Overseas Destinations
JPS Joint Staff Planners
Jt Joint
LBV Landing barge, which was capable of carrying either supplies
or vehicles and could be beached
LCI(L) Landing craft, infantry (light)
LCM Landing craft, mechanized
LCT Landing craft, tank
Liberty ship A cargo ship of approximately 10,000 tons which was designed
for speedy construction early in the war and served as the
work-horse in ocean shipping
Ln Liaison
Lobnitz pierheads Huge steel structures towed to the Normandy beaches to pro-
vide the unloading facilities for LCT’s, LST’s and coasters in
the MULBERRIES
Log Logistical
LST Landing ship, tank
LVT Landing vehicle, tracked
Min Minutes
Mov and Tn Br Movements and Transportation Branch
MOVCO Movement Control
M T ship Liberty ship converted for maximum vehicle-carrying purposes
MT80 Motor transport gasoline, 80-octane
MTB Motor Transport Brigade
Mtg Meeting
MTS Motor Transport Service
NAAFI Navy Army Air Force Institute (British)
NATO North African Theater of Operations
NOIC Naval Officer in Command
NUSA Ninth U.S. Army
NYPOE New York Port of Embarkation
OCof Engrs Office, Chief of Engineers
OCof T Office, Chief of Transportation
OCMH Office, Chief of Military History
OPD Operations Division, War Department
Opn Operation
OQMG Office of the Quartermaster General
ORC Organized Reserve Corps
Ord Ordnance
P&O Plans & Operations Division, WD, successor to OPD
PC&R Gp Port construction and repair group
Plng Planning
PLUTO From “pipeline under the ocean”—a cross-Channel underwater
pipeline planned for bulk POL deliveries to the far shore
588 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

PMS&T Professor of Military Science and Tactics

POL Petrol, oil, and lubricants
prep prepared
PROCO Projects for Continental Operations, a system of requisitioning
supplies and equipment for special operations
PSO Principal Staff Officers
Q(L) Quartermaster (Liaison)
QM Quartermaster
RA Regular Army
RAF Royal Air Force
RAP ROUNDUP Administrative Planners
Rhino ferry A barge constructed of bolted ponton units and propelled by an
outboard motor
RTO Rail Transportation Officer
SAC Supreme Allied Commander
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
Sommerfeld track A matting made of wire netting reinforced with steel, used in
the same manner as chespaling
SOP Standing operating procedure
SOS Services of Supply
SPOBS Special Observer Group
Stf Staff
SUP Single unit pack, a method of crating vehicles
Svc Service
T/BA Tables of Basic Allowance
TC Transportation Corps
TCC Troop Carrier Command
Teller mine A German land mine
Tetrahedra Pyramid-shaped obstacles made of angle iron
TUP Twin unit pack, a method of crating vehicles
TURCO Turn-Round Control
TUSA Third U.S. Army
T/E Tables of Equipment
T/O&E Tables of Organization and Equipment
TWX Teletype message
USAAFUK United States Army Air Forces in the United Kingdom
USAFBI United States Army Forces in the British Isles
USANIF United States Army Northern Ireland Force
USFET United States Forces in the European Theater, successor com-
mand to ETOUSA
USSTAF United States Strategic Air Forces
WD War Department
WO War Office
WPD War Plans Division, War Department, predecessor of OPD
 Code Names
ABC–1 The agreements resulting from the Anglo-American military
staff conversations held in Washington in January–March
1941
ANVIL Plan for the Allied invasion of southern France, finally
executed as Operation DRAGOON in August 1944
ARCADIA First of the major U.S.–British staff conferences following
U.S. entry into the war, held in Washington in December
1941–January 1942
BEAVER A training exercise held in the Slapton Sands area in Eng-
land in March 1944, employing elements of the VII Corps
and simulating the later assault on UTAHBeach
BOLERO The build-up of U.S. troops and supplies in the United
Kingdom in preparation for the cross-Channel invasion
BOMBARDONS Cruciform structures designed for mooring off the Nor-
mandy beaches to provide floating breakwaters in deep
water
CHASTITY Plan for the construction of an artificial harbor in the Qui-
beron Bay area on the southern coast of Brittany
COBRA The operation launched by First U.S. Army on 25 July 1944
designed to break out of the Normandy lodgment
DRAGOON See ANVIL
DUCK I, II, and III First in the series of training exercises held in the Slapton
Sands area in England to test all aspects of an amphibious
operation, including mounting, assault, and logistic sup-
Dort. The DUCKexercises involved mainly elements of the
V Corps and were held in January and February 1944
FOX Last of the major training exercises conducted by V Corps,
held in March 1944
FABIUS I–VI A series of final rehearsals for the cross-Channel operation,
involving the U.S. V Corps and British forces, carried out
in April and May 1944
GOOSEBERRIES Partial breakwaters formed off the Normandy beaches by
the sinking of blockships known as CORNCOBS
GREENLIGHT One of the special OVERLORD supply procedures designed to
expedite the delivery of ammunition and engineer fortifi-
cation material in lieu of scheduled shipment of other sup-
plies in the first phases of the cross-Channel operation.
HARLEQUIN A British mounting exercise held in September 1943 to
establish marshaling and embarkation procedures for a
cross-Channel operation
590 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

LUCKY STRIKE A plan calling for an eastward drive and the capture of the
Seine ports as an alternative to plans for the earlier cap-
ture of Brittany, considered by planning staffs in May and
June 1944
MAGNET The plan that superseded RAINBOW–5 after U.S. entry into
the war, providing for the shipment of American forces to
Northern Ireland
MULBERRIES The artificial harbors constructed off the Normandy beaches
NEPTUNE Code word for the cross-Channel operation, naming the
specific assault area and target date, and for which a
special security procedure known as BIGOTwas developed
OVERLORD Code word which came to be applied to the general concept
of a cross-Channel invasion in 1944
PHOENIXES Concrete caissons towed across the English Channel and
sunk to form the main breakwaters for the artificial
harbors
QUADRANT The first Quebec Conference, August 1943
RAINBOW-5 A U.S. military plan of action designed to implement that
portion of ABC–1 which applied to the United Kingdom
in the event of U.S. entry into the war
RHUMBA Plan for reversing BOLEROand transferring U.S. forces, sup-
plies, and logistic structure from the United Kingdom to
the Continent
ROUNDUP The name by which plans for cross-Channel invasion were
known until the summer of 1943
SEXTANT The Cairo Conference of November 1943
SICKLE The name which in 1943 was given to the U.S. air force
build-up in the United Kingdom to distinguish it from the
ground and service force build-up, known as BOLERO
SLEDGEHAMMER Plan for a limited-objective attack across the Channel in
1942
TIGER T h e final rehearsal for the UTAHBeach assault by units of
the VII Corps
TOMBOLA A flexible 6-inch underwater pipeline designed to discharge
POL tankers anchored offshore at Ste. Honorine-des-
Pertes
TORCH The Allied invasion operation in North Africa, November
1942
TRIDENT The Washington Conference of May 1943
WHALE Flexible steel roadway, made up of bridge spans and resting
on pontons, forming the piers for the artificial harbors
 Bibliographical Note
The task of the administrative historian tion of this volume by seeking the testi-
is probably made somewhat easier than mony of the principal commanders and
that of the historian reconstructing the staff officers who by reason of their partic-
story of tactical operations by the fact that ipation possessed first-hand knowledge of
the records of the relatively more settled events. Their testimony was secured
headquarters were physically better pre- through personal interviews conducted by
served, and by the fact that fewer impor- the author, through correspondence on
tant decisions were lost through having specific questions, and through com-
been transmitted orally. But these advan- ments made at the author’s request on the
tages are at least partially offset by the manuscript in its first draft.
manner in which administrative records
were scattered after hostilities ended, and Primary Sources
by the almost complete absence of the type
of interview material which was collected Primary sources consist mainly of the
from combat units in the field during the official records of the various headquarters
war and which helped fill important gaps involved. They take the form of corre-
in the record. spondence, interoffice memorandums,
T h e official records of the various ad- staff studies, cables, plans, minutes of con-
ministrative headquarters in the European ferences, journals, diaries, message files,
theater were never collected under one and various periodic reports filed in ac-
roof and, to make matters worse, were re- cordance with the AGO decimal classifi-
tired to U.S. repositories in piecemeal cation system. For the theater the main
fashion over a period of several years. Re- collections are those of SHAEF (princi-
search in ETOUSA records consequently pally those of the Adjutant General, Secre-
was also piecemeal, proceeding neither by tary of the General Staff, and the G–3 and
subject nor by chronology. Army regula- G–4 Sections, including the War Diary of
tions to the contrary, moreover, the rec- the last with key documents attached),
ords of the various technical services were and the papers of its predecessor,
not handled consistently. Some were sent COSSAC; ETOUSA, SOS, and their
to the main Army repository a t St. Louis, successors ETOUSA-SOS and ETOUSA-
Mo.; some were retained by the technical COMZ; 12th Army Group; and the Ad-
service chiefs and transferred directly to vance Section. After the end of hostilities
the respective technical service schools or the U.S. Army command in Europe was
camps in the United States. A number successively renamed U S F E T and
of officers retained official records for E U C O M , a n d some of the wartime rec-
personal use. ords are filed under those designations.
The deficiency in interview material The records of SHAEF, 12th Army
was remedied in part during the prepara- Group, and the operational records of the
 592 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

armies are in the custody of the Operations diary kept for General Eisenhower by his
Reports Section, Departmental Records naval aide, Capt. Harry C. Butcher, and
Branch, AGO, in Alexandria, Va. The cited in this volume as Diary Office CinC.
records of the more strictly administrative Excerpts from this diary were published
headquarters—ETOUSA, SOS, and their by Captain Butcher in the volume My
subordinate commands such as the Ground Three Ears with Eisenhower (New York,
Force Reinforcement Command, the Ad- 1946). The author had complete access to
vance Section, and certain of the technical all official records relevant to this history
services—were consulted at the Records regardless of classification.
Administrative Center in St. Louis, Mo.,
but have since been transferred to Kansas
City, Mo. Certain planning files of First Secondary Sources
and Third Armies were also consulted in
An extensive body of unpublished sec-
St. Louis. The COSSAC papers are in the
ondary material exists covering the activi-
SHAEF SGS files.
ties of the U.S. Army in Europe, the most
Two “unofficial” collections which
important of which are the following:
proved valuable in reconstructing the
history of the war in Europe were the files (1) Histories of the technical serv-
referred to in footnotes as ETO Adm and ices, the staff sections of Headquarters,
ETO Preinvasion. These consist of miscel- ETOUSA-COMZ, the base sections, and
laneous planning papers, cable files, and the Ground Force Reinforcement Com-
correspondence, which for the most part mand, all required by E T O regulation.
were rescued from destruction by per- These vary in quality, the most useful
sonnel of the Historical Section, ETO, and being those of the Office, Chief of Trans-
were transferred intact to the Depart- portation, Office of the Chief Engineer,
mental Records Branch, AGO, in the War Office of the Chief Surgeon, the COMZ
Department in 1946. G–4, the Ground Force Reinforcement
Two bodies of primary source material Command, the Advance Section, and
originating in the War Department and Normandy Base Section. They are filed in
proving highly useful were the correspond- the E T O Administrative File, Operations
ence files of the Army Service Forces, Reports Section, Departmental Records
which threw particular light on the role of Branch, AGO, in Alexandria, Va.
Generals Somervell and Lutes in the sup- (2) The Administrative and Logistical
port of the U.S. forces in Europe, and files History of the European Theater of Oper-
in the War Department Operations Divi- ations, eleven studies on logistics and ad-
sion, including logs of incoming and out- ministration, prepared in the Historical
going cables and decimal files on the sub- Section, E T O , under the author’s super-
ject of the troop basis and troop flow. The vision, and based for the most part on
author had access also to the papers col- primary source materials available in the
lected by Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, theater in 1945–46. The most useful of
consisting mainly of “Eyes Only” cables, these preliminary histories consulted in
which have been deposited with the De- the preparation of the present volume are
partment of the Army Library in the The Predecessor Commands: The Special
Pentagon. Limited use was made of the Observers (SPOBS) and United States
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 593

Army Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI), historians of the ASF, the Transportation
by WOJG Henry G. Elliott; Organization Corps, and the Quartermaster Corps. In-
a n d Command in the European Theater cluded are such studies as Overseas Supply
of Operations, by Robert W. Coakley; and Policies and Procedures, by Richard M.
NEPTUNE: Training for and Mounting the Leighton, and those on Quartermaster
Operation, and the Artificial Ports, by 1st supply in the E T O prepared at the
Lt. Clifford L. Jones. All are on file in the Quartermaster School, Camp Lee, Va.
Office, Chief of Military History. Published histories, including memoir
(3) General Board Reports, 131 studies literature, have had occasional usefulness.
covering all aspects of the war in the T h e principal works cited are: Butcher’s
European theater by a special board of My Three Ears with Eisenhower; General
officers appointed after V-E Day. These O m a r N. Bradley’s A Soldier’s Story (New
are uneven in quality, but some are ex- York, 1951); Robert E. Sherwood’s Roose-
tremely helpful, particularly in their criti- velt and Hopkins (New York, 1948); Lt. Gen.
cal analyses of plans, preparations, and Frederick Morgan’s Overture to Overlord
methods and techniques of operations. (New York, 1950); and Wesley F. Craven
They are on file in the Office, Chief of and James L. Cate (editors), The Army Air
Military History. Forces in World War II (Chicago, 1948– ).
(4) After Action Reports of the First T h e service journals of the United
and Third Armies, the 12th Army Group, States and Great Britain contributed first-
and in some cases of the divisions. They hand accounts of experience as well as
were consulted for the supply story from research articles. Most important were
the point of view of the field commands. The Journal of the Royal United Service Insti-
(5) Miscellaneous monographs on a tution, Royal Engineers Journal, Military
wide range of subjects prepared by per- Review, The Quartermaster Review, Army
sonnel of the Historical Section, ETO, by Ordnance, and Army Transportation Journal.
 UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press :

The War Department
Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations
Washington Command Post: T h e Operations Division
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941–1942
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943–1944
Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940–1943
Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943–1945
T h e Army and Economic Mobilization
T h e A r m y and Industrial Manpower
The Army Ground Forces
T h e Organization of Ground Combat Troops
T h e Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops
The Army Service Forces
T h e Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces
The Western Hemisphere
T h e Framework of Hemisphere Defense
Guarding the United States and Its Outposts
The War in the Pacific
T h e Fall of the Philippines
Guadalcanal: The First Offensive
Victory in Papua
C A R T W H E E L : T h e Reduction of Rabaul
Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls
Campaign in the Marianas
T h e Approach to the Philippines
Leyte: T h e Return to the Philippines
Triumph in the Philippines
Okinawa: The Last Battle
Strategy and Command: T h e First T w o Years
The Mediterranean Theater of Operations
Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West
Sicily and the Surrender of Italy
Salerno to Cassino
Cassino to the Alps
The European Theater of Operations
Cross-Channel Attack
Breakout and Pursuit
T h e Lorraine Campaign
T h e Siegfried Line Campaign
T h e Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge
T h e Last Offensive
 The Supreme Command
Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I
Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II
The Middle East Theater
The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia
The China-Burma-India Theater
Stilwell’s Mission to China
Stilwell’s Command Problems
Time Runs Out in CBI
The Technical Services
The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War
The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field
The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat
The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment
The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan
The Corps of Engineers: T h e War Against Germany
The Corps of Engineers: Military Constructionin the United States
The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation, Zone of Interior
The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor
Theaters
The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War
The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply
The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront
The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume Z
The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume II
The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan
The Quartermaster Corps: Operationsin the War Against Germany
The Signal Corps: The Emergency
The Signal Corps: The Test
The Signal Corps: The Outcome
The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organizations,and Operations
The Transportation Corps:Movements, Training, and Supply
The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas
SpecialStudies
Chronology:1941–1945
Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939–1945
Rearming the French
Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt
The Women’s Army Corps
Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors
Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces
The Employment of Negro Troops
Manhattan: The U.S.Army and the Atomic Bomb
Pictorial Record
The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas
The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas
The War Against Japan
 Index

Abbeville, 487 Air Force Service Command, 38-39

ABC–1.See American-British Staff Conversations. Air Force units
Aberdeen, Md., 571 Air Force, Eighth, 28, 29,30,31, 38,43,47, 86, 100,
Ablis, 495 101, 109, 125, 130, 132, 167, 190,191-92, 202,
Adcock, Brig. Gen. Clarence L., 1 251, 375. See also Spaatz, Lt. Gen. Carl.
Admiralty (Br.), 277,281 Air Force, Ninth, 192, 194, 195, 202,222,224,301,
ADSEC. See Advance Section. 345, 346, 348, 349, 375, 496, 564, 574, 580. See
ADSEC Engineer Section, Railway Division, 551 also Brereton, Maj. Gen. Lewis H.
Advance Section, Communications Zone (ADSEC), Air Force, Twelfth, 100
211-16. See also Communications Zone; Forward Air Force, Fifteenth, 202,231
Echelon; Plank, Brig. Gen. Ewart G. Air Force Composite Command, VIII, 169
depot structure planning, 312-13 Air Force Service Command, VIII, 29, 170-71,
depot system development, 430-31,493-97 192, 202-03, 578
early planning for, 208 Air Force Service Command, IX, 578
established, 212 Air Support Command, VIII, 192
experience in North Africa and Italy, 212 Bomber Command, VIII, 28,76, 124, 192
mission, 212-15 Pursuit Squadron, 33d, 18
motor transport (Red Ball), 566-67 Air forces, strategic, 192-93. See also United States
opposes change in build-up schedule, 302 Strategic Air Forces.
Ordnance Section, 313 Air forces, tactical, 192-93
plan, 30 April 1944, 215, 269, 289-90, 293, 296-97 Air Ministry (Br.), 26-27, 29, 30, 70, 73, 107, 242,
POL pipeline plan, 321, 324 243, 250-51
preparation for offensive, 25July 1944,489 Air Section, SPOBS, 46-47
railway reconstruction plans, 317-18 Air shipments, 448
reconnaissance of Cherbourg facilities, 500 Air supply, 310,572-83
Red Ball planning, 559 Air Technical Section. See Air Section, SPOBS.
regulating stations, 497-99 Airborne Divisions
relationship to base sections, 217-18 82d, 351, 360, 371, 375, 376, 377, 427, 457n, 573
relationship to First Army, 212-14, 214-15n, 101st, 342, 351, 360, 375, 376, 377, 457n, 573
433-36, 441, 492-95 Airfields in United Kingdom, 20, 27, 30, 76
relationship to Forward Echelon, 208, 212-14, Albrecht, Col. Frank M., 207-08,218,435,436
219-20 Alençon, 487,494,510,512,513,514,562
relationship to Third Army, 492,495 Algiers, 89, 113
and replacement system, 303 Allen, Maj. Gen. Leven C., 543
responsibility for port restoration, 288 Allied air bombardment of French railways, 547-50
transportation plans, 314,315 Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF), 193, 202,
truck companies, 432,433 203, 224, 269,572,574
in UTAHarea, 401 Allied Force Headquarters ( A F H Q ) , 89,90,91, 101,
Air attacks, enemy, 390,398 102, 103, 113,212
Air bases on Continent. See Continental airfields. Allied Naval Expeditionary Force (ANCXF), 193,
Air bases in United Kingdom. See Airfields in United 203, 204, 269,413n. See also Ramsay, Admiral Sir
Kingdom. Bertram H.
“Air breakwater,” 272-73 American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), 36
Air Force, U.S. See also Air Force units; United States American Red Cross Field Hospital Unit, Salisbury,
Army Air Forces in the United Kingdom. 71n
establishment of strategic and tactical air com- American School Center, Shrivenham, 81, 190n, 336,
mands, 192-93 338
establishment in United Kingdom, 28-31 American-British Staff Conversations (ABC–1), 14,
relationship to SOS, 263-64 16, 18, 19-20, 21, 23, 26, 27, 32, 47
reorganization, 202-03 Amiens, 480,485,487
 598 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

Ammunition, 93, 96, 97, 98, 152, 261, 306, 307, 309, Armored Divisions—Continued
310, 313, 328, 393,396, 397, 404, 422, 431, 448, 3d, 429,457,507-08, 541
453, 454,489, 490,491, 515,518, 524,525-43, 5th, 361,457,506
547,558 6th, 457
60-mm. mortar, 538 7th, 457
81-mm. mortar, 447,538,539 Army Air Forces, 38-39. See also Air Force, U.S.; Air
90-mm. gun, 446 Force units.
105-mm. howitzer, 447, 538,539 Army Exchange Service, 80
155-mm. howitzer, 539 Army Field Forces Board, Fort Benning, Ga., 380-81n
3-inch gun, 446 Army Finance Office, 154
antiaircraft, 307, 307n Army Ground Forces (AGF), 138,329
dumps, 396,397,401 Army Group, 1st U.S. (FUSAG), 203, 217, 219,222,
early planning for, 537-38 262, 364,437,450, 537, 538n, 573. See also Army
meeting at 1st Army Group headquarters, 9-10 Group, 12th; Bradley, Lt. Gen. Omar N.
May 1944,537-38 activated, 191
shortage,June 1944,410 command responsibilities, 204,206,224-26
shortage,June-July 1944,445-48 List B, 301
shortage at Brest, 529-37 planning responsibilities, 205, 206
shortage at St. Malo, 529 relations with ADSEC, 213-15, 308
transportation difficulties, 536 relations with ETOUSA, 195-98, 200
Ammunition Supply Points (ASP’s), 525-27, 529, 535 relations with FECOMZ, 208-11, 213-14, 219,
Amoit Aircraft Plant, Cherbourg, 431 220-21, 226
Amphibious exercises, 339, 345-54. See also BEAVER; relations with SOS, 196-98, 200, 263, 264-65
CELLOPHANE; CHEVROLET; DUCK;FABIUS; Fox; relationship to COMZ, 207, 209, 224
GULL; HARLEQUIN; JALOPY;JANTZEN II; JEEP; staff, 209, 221, 226, 302
MINK; MUSKRAT;NUDGER;OTTER; SNIPE; Army Group, 12th, 436,478,480,490,496,530,576,
TIGER. 583. See also Army Group, 1st; Bradley, Lt. Gen.
Amphibious Force, 1 1 t h , 346, 349,351 Omar N.
Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, 335 and air supply, 577, 579-82
Amphibious operations, 328-54. See also Amphibious and ammunition shortage at Brest, 530,531,533,
exercises. 536
early experience, 328-34 becomes operational, 475
German E-boat attack, 351-52 rationing of ammunition, 525
Amphibious Training Center (Br.), 330 supply allotments to First and Third Armies, 492,
Amphibious Training Command (Amphibious Train- 496-97, 541-43
ing Center), AGF, 329, 330 Army Group, 21, 186, 191, 195, 213, 214, 215, 224,
Amphibious training program, 329-44 269, 352,353, 415,444,480, 555,558,574,575,
Amphibious training schools, 331, 334-38 580. See also Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir
Andrews, Lt. Gen. Frank M., 113, 119, 120, 123, 133, Bernard L.
154, 160-61, 163, 191, 194, 268. See also activated, 191
ETOUSA. command responsibilities, 203-04, 219
Andrews, John, 22 organized, 193, 194,215-16
Angers, 324 plan (AXEHEAD), 467
Antwerp, 480,485,500,514,535-36, 583 planning responsibilities, 205-07, 215
ANVIL,178, 185-86,457. Seealso DRAGOON. relationship to FECOMZ, 208-11, 219, 220-21
Anzio, 296,334 Army Invasion Training Center, Fifth Army, 331
Appledore, 341 Army-Navy Petroleum Board, 81
Aquitania, 58, 234 Army Pictorial Service, 369
ARCADIA Conference, 52 Army Service Forces (ASF), 1 3 1 , 137, 238, 239,262.
Area Petroleum Board, 80,81 See also Services of Supply, USA; Somervell, Lt.
Area Petroleum office, 81 Gen. Brehon B.
Area Petroleum Officer. See Lee, Lt. Gen. John C. H. on ammunition, 539-40
Area Petroleum Service, 81,163 and preshipment, 133, 137-38
Argentan, 478, 479, 483, 547, 550 and PROCO, 260-61
Armies, U.S. See First Army; Third Army; Fifth on shipping procedures to ETOUSA, 142-46
Army; Ninth Army. survey of BOLERObuild-up, January 1944,259
Armored Divisions Army Service Forces, Planning Division, 260
1st, 22, 26,91,97 Army Talks, “Achtung,” 366
2d, 353,365,507-08 Arnold, Gen. Henry H., 27,28,31,48, 124, 192
 INDEX 599

Arpajon, 494 Batson, Col. Roscoe C., 78

Arromanches-les-Bains, 277, 278, 415. See also MUL- Battignolles Yards, 550
BERRY B. Bayeux, 183,374,379,429
Artificial ports. See Ports, artificial. Beach. See also OMAHA Beach; UTAHBeach.
Ashchurch. See Depots, Ashchurch. capacity, 270, 270n, 308, 450
Assault Force, Eastern, 97 clearance, 39 I
Assault Force O. See Task Forces, O. dump phase, 391,396-97, 401
Assault Force U. See Task Forces, U. maintenance area, 283, 285,312,401
Assault Training Center, 191, 339-44 marking, 284, 391
Assembly plants (Br.), 258n. See also Vehicles, assem- organization, 282-85, 328
bly. phases, 391
Auray River, 294 Beach and port plans (OVERLORD), 297
Aure River, 376,379,390 BEAVER, 345, 349,350,351
Austin Motor Company, 77, 157 Beil, M. Sgt. Leroy, 157
AVALANCHE, 334 Belfast, 20, 22, 84, 91, 148, 350, 363, 374
Avgas. See Gasoline, aviation. BENEFICIARY, 188n,468. See also St. Malo.
Aviation gasoline (Avgas). See Gasoline, aviation. Benhall Farm, 83,84
Avonmouth, 146 Bergensfjord, 234
Avranches, 320, 325, 469,475, 476, 495,510,544,547 Berthing facilities. See also Beach, capacity; Port
Avranches breakout, 484, 546, 574 capacity.
Avranches corridor, 478,483 at Arromanches, 278
AXEHEAD, 467,481 on French coast, 182,271-72, 275
Ayers, Lt. Col. Loren A., 559, 564 at OMAHA and UTAH,400, 422
in United Kingdom, 238-40
B–17’s, 29,251, 578 BIGOT,175n
B–24’s, 25 1,578 Billeting, 242-43. See also Troop accommodations in
Baker, Col. Paul T., 78 United Kingdom.
Bakeries, 255, 441, 518 Binic, 473
Ballentine, Lt. Col. Joe M., 534 Birkenhead, 147
Balleroy, 322, 323, 325 “Black Saturday,” 88
Banbury, 144 Blacker, Brigadier G. C., 363
BANG,145 Blakeney, Col. James L., 78
Barfleur, 270, 288, 290, 432, 433, 489 Blockships. See also CORNCOBS; Ports, artificial.
Barker, Brig. Gen. Ray W., 40, 61, 177, 195, 340 at OMAHA, 402-04, 410,413
Barnes, Col. Elmer E., 509 at UTAH,402
Barnstaple, 346 BOLERO. See also Build-up; Cargo; Construction; Local
Barnum, Col. Edmund M., 78 procurement; Marshall Memorandum; Preship-
Barry. See Depots, Barry. ment; Shipping; Supply flow; Troop basis; Troop
Base Sections, 84-87, 168-70, 216-18 build-up; Troop flow.
Brittany, 530, 533, 536 completion of, 231-68
Central, 162, 169, 218, 227. See also London Base defined, 55
Command. origin of, 52-59
Commanders, 168-70, 358-59 BOLERO Combined Committee
Continental, 216-18 Medical Services Sub-committee, 71, 108
Eastern, 84, 86,169,217 Movement and Transportation Sub-committee, 68
London, 169 BOLERO Combined Committee (London), 54, 55, 58,
Normandy, 560, 565, 567,568, 570 61-66, 71, 72, 74, 75, 77, 107, 110, 116, 122, 131
Northern Ireland, 84, 86, 169, 217-18, 350. See also BOLERO Combined Committee (Washington), 54,55,
Northern Ireland Base Command. 56, 58, 66, 122
No. 1, 217 BOLERO Key Plans, 65, 110, 123
No. 2, 217, 218 First, 65, 66, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 81
Peninsular (Italy), 212 Second (July edition), 65, 66, 71, 73, 74, 75, 105,
Southern, 84, 86, 106, 123, 169, 217, 218, 264, 106, 108, 244
345-46, 350, 353, 359-61, 362, 364-66, 367, Third (November revision), 105, 106, 107
369-370, 423, 424, 425. See also Southern Base Fourth, 122,240, 242,246, 248
Section Districts; Southern Command. BOLERO-ROUNDUP concept, 88, 104, 107, 110
Western, 84, 86, 169, 203, 217, 218, 359, 361-63, BOLERO-SICKLE Combined Committee, 122
364,367, 368, 370 Bolté, Brig. Gen. Charles L., 17, 22, 39,40,61
Bath, 8 I BOMBARDON, 276-77, 278, 278n, 279, 280, 402, 406,
 600 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

BOMBARDON—Continued Build-up—Continued
413, 414. See also “Lilo”; Ports, artificial. British, 404,404n, 422n
Bomber Command, VIII. See Air Force units. cancellation of, 118-19
Bombers used as cargo planes, 578,578n, 579 on Continent, 404,415-22
Bonesteel, Maj. Gen. Charles H., 18 enemy, 450
Boston Port of Embarkation, 19,371 impact on British economy, 61
Boughton, 248 schedules, 450,454-55
Boulogne, 53,175 troop. See Troop build-up.
Bradley, Maj. Gen. Follett, 124 in United Kingdom, 29, 31, 32, 33, 47, 59, 60, 97,
Bradley, Lt. Gen. Omar N., 358, 364, 443, 483, 510, 114, 118, 121, 132, 137,231
523, 531, 538, 543, 570, 579. See also Army Buildup Control Organization (BUCO), 302, 363-64,
Group, 1st; Army Group, 12th; First Army. 424,425
alters build-up schedule, 450-51, 457 Buildup Priority Lists, 301-02, 309, 363, 364, 457
on ammunition shortage at Brest, 532,536 Bull, Maj. Gen. Harold R., 452,470
assumes command of First Army and 1st Army Burford, Col. Freeman W., 320
Group, 191,226-27 Burpee, Brig. Gen. Clarence L., 318
assumes command of 12th Army Group, 475 Burtonwood, 31, 76
on Cherbourg seizure, 186 Bushy Park, 31
on control of COMZ, 210
places restrictions on First and Third Armies, 491, C–47’s,578-79, 578n, 580-81, 583
514 Caen, 181,183, 188,351,374
relations with SOS, 196, 206-07 Caffey, Col. Eugene M., 347
on releasing supply control to ADSEC, 434,435-36 Cairo Conference. See SEXTANT Conference.
Bradley plan. See Bradley, Maj. Gen. Follett. Caisson, 273-75, 280. See also PHOENIX.
Bradshaw, Col. Aaron, 22, 101 Calais, 179
Brand, Col. Clarence E., 78 Calvados, 414
Breakwater, 271-79, 413, 413n. See also “Air break- Cambrai, 552
water”; BOMBARDON; PHOENIX; Ports, artificial. Camouflage, 367
at OMAHA, 402-04, 406 Camp Edwards, Mass., 329, 330n. See also Engineer
at UTAH,402 Amphibian Command.
Brereton, Maj. Gen. Lewis H., 192, 577, 578. Seealso Camp Northway, England, 156
Air Force Units, Ninth Air Force; First Allied Camp Pickett, Va., 335
Airborne Army. Cancale, 290, 294,47 1,472,473
Brest, 186, 188, 287, 288, 294,454,464,467,468,469- Cannes, 480
70,471-73, 478,479,480, 528-37 Cannibalization of equipment, 443,520
Brett, Maj. Gen. George H., 30, 31 Capelle, La, 494
Bricquebec, 432 Cardiff, 146, 150, 371
Bristol, 191, 212, 346. See also Depots, Bristol. Carentan, 188, 288, 290, 313, 376, 377,401,416, 427,
Bristol Channel area, 148, 341, 365 429,431,432,433,445,465,573
Bristol Channel ports, 65, 86, 144, 146, 169n, 298, 344, Carentan estuary, 188
362,363 Cargo, 120, 137, 140, 147-48, 308, 581. Seealso Cargo
British Chiefs of Staff Committee. See Chiefs of Staff flow; Shipping.
Committee (Br.). CARGO, 350
British War Office. See War Office (Br.). Cargo flow, 121-22, 132-46, 148-49,234-40. See also
British wartime shortages, 24,60-61 Shipping.
British-American ‘‘Q” school, 337 Carmarthen, 339
Brittany Base Section. See Base Sections, Brittany. Carston, 147
Brittany ports, 183, 186, 188, 189, 217, 270, 282, 286, Casablanca Conference, 114-16, 117, 118, 119-20,
287, 288, 296, 313, 320, 324, 430, 433, 452, 454, 122, 124, 130, 136, 176, 181-82, 193, 194, 234
456, 466-69, 470-74, 475-79, 481-84, 486, 487, Case, Maj. Charles, 140, 142
488, 490,495,507n, 508,510,528,547 Case, Col. Homer, 17,22, 40
Brittany ports, plans for, 296-97 Casualties, 305,404-06, 460, 460n
Brixham, 349,351 Caumont, 427
Brownjohn, Maj. Gen. N. C. D., 468 CELLOPHANE, 350
Bryanston Square, London, 191 Central Base Section. See Base Sections, Central.
Brussels, 480 Central Group of Armies, 224. See also Army Group,
Build-up. See also Logistical plans for troop build-up; 1st.
Supply. Châlons-sur-Marne, 479,488, 505
air force, 26-27, 130 Chambois, 478, 479
INDEX 601

Chaney, Maj. Gen. James E., 1-2, 24, 26,30, 7 7 Chespaling, 387-88, 391
as commander of ETOUSA, 39-43 Chester, England, 84
as commander of USAFBI, 21-39, 46, 57 CHEVROLET, 349
dual role as Commanding General, USAFBI, and Chiefof Combined Operations (Br.), 61,272,340
Special Army Observer, 48-49 Chief of Engineers, 319
ideas on command and organization, 27,32,33,47 Chief of Staff, U.S. See Marshall, Gen. George C.
relations with SOS, USAFBI, 37-38 Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander. See
relations with War Department, 13, 19, 20, 22, 23, COSSAC; Morgan, Lt. Gen. Frederick E.
27-28, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37,47-48 Chief of Transportation, 99
as Special Army Observer, 14-21,46,50 Chiefs of Staff Committee (Br.), 16-17, 32, 53, 88,
Channel Islands, 373 177,178, 182, 194,233,473
Channel ports, 485 Chigwell, 150
Chapelle, La, 547 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston S., 32, 55,88, 114,
Charleroi, 552 115, 178, 183,194,239,271-72, 275,415,451
Chartres, 189, 478, 486, 487, 491,495,499, 510,513, Churchill Hospital, Oxford, 71n
530,550-51, 558,560,565,566,575 Cirencester,365
CHASTITY, 186-87, 296, 470-72. See also Quiberon Claims Commission, 80, 163,164
Bay. Claims Service, SOS, 80
Château Pont Rilly, 435 Clapham Junction, 68
Château Servigny, 435 Claridge Conference, 32, 39,60
Châteaubriant, 217, 313, 324, 433, 493 Claridge Conference, Second, 89, 104
Chaumont, 488 Clark, Capt. A. Dayton, 278,281
Chaumont G H Q (1917-18),
223n Clark, Lt. Col. Edward N., 534,535
Chef-du-Pont,431 Clark, Maj. Gen. Mark W., 89,96
Cheltenham, 44,70,78,81-83, 159-60, 162, 164, 177, Clifton College, Bristol, 70
222, 365, 521. See also Services of Supply, head- Clyde River ports, 65,91, 144, 145n, 146
quarters. Coasters, 275, 399, 407, 411, 425-26, 446, 471, 473,
Chemical Warfare Service, 156,419 516
Cherbourg, 181, 182, 184, 270, 272, 286, 288, 289, Cobbs, Col. Nicholas H., 35,41,78
290-93, 294, 296, 297,312-13, 317-18, 320, 373, COBRA, 475, 482, 501, 504, 510
407, 413, 416, 419, 427, 430, 444, 471, 486,489, Coffey, Lt. Col.John W., 17,22
544, 545, 546, 560, 567 Colleville-sur-Mer, 379, 383, 390, 575. See also
Avant Port, 292 OMAHA.
Avant Port de Commerce, 292 Collins, Brig. Gen. Leroy P., 2, 23,84, 168, 169,218
Bassin à Flot, 292 Combined Administrative Committee, CCS, 276
Bassin Charles X, 292 Combined Air Transport Operations Room
Bassin des Subsistences, 292 (CATOR), 572, 574, 578, 580, 581
Bassin Napoleon III, 292 Combined Bomber Offensive, 124,130
capture of, 376-77, 427, 430, 431-33, 439, 445, Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), 32, 40, 52, 54, 58,
451-52 87, 106, 107, 121, 123, 124, 131, 132, 176, 177,
Darse Transatlantique, 292 178, 182, 184, 185, 188, 192, 194, 202,231, 233,
Digue du Homet, 292 240,272
Digue de Querqueville. See Digue de Querqueville. Combined Operations Headquarters (Br.), 330,340,
Grande Rade, 291-92 341
Nouvelle Plage, 292, 293 Combined Staff Planners, CCS, 54, 122
Petite Rade, 291 Command and General Staff School, 266
pipeline system, 500-502 Commandos, 188,330,340
and POL delivery, 323-24, 325,500-504, 514 Commands (Br.). See Western Command (Br.); South-
plans for capture of, 183, 185-86, 188-89, 270,282, eastern Command (Br.); Southern Command
302, 463-64 (Br.).
port capacity, 413-14, 415,464-66, 468,469,473 Commercy, 479,552
Port de Commerce, 292 Commodity loading, 237-38,309
Port facilities, 291-93 Communications, 371, 536
Port de l’Orglet, 292 Communications Zone (COMZ). See also Advance
Quai de France, 292 Section; Forward Echelon; Lee, Lt. Gen. John C.
Quai Hornet, 292,293 H.; Services of Supply.
Quai de Normandie, 292 and ammunition shortages, 530-32, 533-34,536-
reconstruction of, 464n 42,543
storage facilities, 500-501 beach organization, 282-85
602 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF T H E ARMIES

Communications Zone—Continued Corps, XV, 350,450,457,475,478,479,505

as channel of communications to the War Depart- Corps,XIX, 377,427,429,450,459,475
ment, 437-38 Corps, XX, 478,527,542
and CHASTITY project, 471 Corps of Engineers, 118, 248, 257, 260, 286,314,318,
command and organization, 207, 209-11, 219-22, 321, 323,564
224,226,433-36 COSSAC, 124, 132, 164, 166, 201, 203-04, 205, 206,
headquarters, 208, 209, 226, 288, 308, 435, 436, 212, 222, 269, 270, 276, 286, 320, 537. Seealso
437,514 Morgan, Lt. Gen. Frederick E.; Supreme Head-
on LUCKY STRIKE, 467 quarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
origins of, 33, 198-200, 201,204, 206 command and organization, 193-94, 195
plan, 14 May 1944, 215, 219, 220, 224, 269, 294, missions, 177
296-97, 297n, 303 OVERLORD plan, 179, 182-83, 184, 188, 277. See
planning responsibilities, 213-15 also OVERLORD.
and POL shortage, 508,514 Cotentin, 176, 179, 181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 188,217,
port reconstruction, 286 270, 282, 297, 302, 314, 326, 371, 377, 384, 407,
regulating stations, 497-99 427, 430, 432, 434, 442, 486, 495, 500, 521, 545,
relationship to 1st Army Group, 206-07, 209-11, 573
226 Coubert, 514
relationship with SHAEF, 437-39 Coucy, 494
staff, 209, 311, 438-39 Coutances, 320, 324, 325,427, 428, 475
supply build-up, 306-07, 308,310-11 Craon, 324
supply in the pursuit, 490-97 Crawford, Maj. Gen. Robert W., 2, 164, 166, 222,
and tank shortage, 522 452,470,472,473,534,556
and transportation, 553, 565, 567,568,580
troop build-up, 300-301, 455,456
troops to be used in combat, 463 Dahlquist, Brig. Gen. John E., 22,38, 39,40
Compiègne, 552 Daley, Maj. Gen. Edmund L., 23
COMZ. See Communications Zone. Dartmouth, 346,348,351
Concarneau, 294 Date-line system, 146
Concentration area, 357-58 Davis, Col. Thomas J., 101
Conflans, 552 Davison, Brig. Gen. Donald A., 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 31,
Consolidated Officers Mess, Grosvenor House, Park 33, 50,78,84, 101, 286
Lane, 227-30 Days of supply, 306-07, 306-07n
Construction, 125-26, 240-54, 361 Demolition teams, 379
air force, 73, 109-10, 117, 131, 242, 250-51 Depots, 70,91-92, 116, 152, 158-59, 250, 250n, 263,
assembly plant, 64-65 432. See also Construction, depot.
depot, 70, 106, 107,242,248-50 Ashchurch (G–25), 91,92, 150,152,154-59
differences in American and British methods, 241- Barry (G–40), 91, 152,367
42,253 Bristol, 91, 152
hospital, 70-73, 105, 106, 108, 117, 131, 244-48 continental, 3 12-13, 430-32, 493-96
Construction and Quartering Division, Office of the East End (London), 77
ChiefEngineer, 107,241, 286 Egginton, 150,248
Continental airfields, 574-75, 576-77, 579 G–14.See Depots, Liverpool.
Continental Base Sections. See Base Sections, Con- G–25.See Depots, Ashchurch.
tinental. G–40. See Depots, Barry.
Cooks and Bakers School, 361 Langford Lodge, 20,30,31
CORNCOBS, 277. See also Blockships. Laval, 467
Cornwall, 86 Lison–St.Lô, 469
Corps, II, 89 Liverpool (G–14), 91, 152, 154
Corps, V, 22, 23, 26, 43, 76, 84, 101, 167, 169, 190, London, 91, 152
191, 269,301,343, 345, 346,348-49, 351, 352, Mans, Le, 469,495
353, 374, 375-77, 378, 390, 392, 427, 429, 459, Normandy, 496
475 Portsmouth, 91, 152
Corps, VII, 269, 297, 301, 302, 343, 349, 351, 352, Rennes, 467
371, 374, 376, 377, 392, 399, 400, 401, 407,427- replacement (14th), 459
29,459,475,479,494,525 Sudbury, 150,248
Corps, VIII, 377, 427-28, 475, 478, 479, 480, 507n, Thatcham, 91, 150, 152
508,528-37 United Kingdom, 152-59, 448
Corps, XII, 479,505 Warton, 30,31
INDEX 603

Depots—Continued Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D.—Continued

Wem, 248 201, 202,203, 209,210, 214,221, 224-26, 264,
Deputy Area Petroleum Officer, 164 300,373,374-75,434,443,451,462,473,483,
Deputy Quartermaster General (Liaison) (Br.), 62, 521-22, 539. See also ETOUSA; Supreme Head-
64, 65, 73, 74, 81, 105-06, 240, 241. See also quarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
Wootten, Maj. Gen. Richard M. on ANVIL,185-86
Deputy Theater Commander for Supply and Admin- appeal to Churchill on port congestion, 239
istration, 161. See also Lee, Lt. Gen. John C. H. on BOLEROCombined Committee, 53-54
Devers, Lt. Gen. Jacob L., 123, 124-25, 128, 129, on Brittany ports, 468, 474
132, 163, 164, 167, 191, 193, 194-95, 196-97, as chief of OPD, 39
198, 202, 268,336. Seealso ETOUSA. chosen Commanding General, ETOUSA, 43-44
Devon, 86,341 chosen Supreme Allied Commander, 195
De-waterproofing, 369. See also Waterproofing. on construction, 106
Dieppe, 110n, 329 directive, 1 June 1944, 226
Digue de Querqueville, 291, 293, 323,324,500, 501. directive, 6 June 1944,223-26, 437
See also Querqueville. directive, 19July 1944,437
Dijon, 480 on MULBERRIES and storm, 413, 415
Dill, Field Marshal Sir John, 16 on OVERLORD, 185-86
Dinan, 529 relations with Lee, 98, 112-13, 201, 221, 223, 264,
Districts. See Southern Base Section Districts. 265-67, 268, 268n, 437-39
Division slice, 299–300, 299n, 306, 307,458,458n on ROUNDUP, 75,104-05
Dol, 318,544 on shipping tie-up, 422, 426
Domfront, 510, 511, 513, 514 onTORCH,90-91, 113, 118, 131
Donges, 324 on troop build-up, 45 1,453
Doolittle, Maj. Gen. James H., 202 Electronics Training Group, 31, 50
Dourdan, 514 Embarkation area, 357-58
Douve River, 184, 185,376, 384, 386 Embarkation Control (EMBARCO), 365, 424-25
Douve valley, 314 Emergency Medical Service hospitals, 108, 244
Dover, 272 Emergency Medical Service program, 71
DRAGOON, 480. See also ANVIL. Emergency Powers Defense Act, 67-68
Dreux, 189, 478, 487, 499, 550, 551, 558, 560, 565, Enemy air attacks. See Air attacks, enemy.
575 Engineer Amphibian Brigade, 1st, 329-30. See also
Driver shortage, 556-57 Engineer Special Brigade, 1st.
Driver training, 556 Engineer Amphibian Command, 329, 335, 342
DUCK,347n, 348,350 Engineer Camouflage Battalion, 604th, 367
I, 345-47, 380 Engineer Combat Battalions
II, 345, 347-48 37th, 380,381,396
III, 345, 347-48 147th, 381
Dukws, 289,332-34, 344, 349, 389,394-96, 399, 400, 149th,381
400n, 402,406,407,411 234th, 344
Dufferin Quay, 23 336th, 383
Duke of Abercorn, 22 348th, 383
Dumb barges, 389, 389n Engineer Combat Groups
Dunes de Varreville. Les, 384 1106th, 349,388
Dunkerque, 319 1116th, 335,343. Seealso Engineer Special Brigade,
Dunn, Col. Ray A., 78 6th.
1119th,335,343. Seealso Engineer Special Brigade,
Eaker, Brig. Gen. Ira C., 28, 29, 30, 31, 124, 192,202 5th.
East India docks, London, 280 Engineer Combat Regiment, 540th, 334
Eastern Base Section. See Base Sections, Eastern. Engineer Corps. See Corps of Engineers.
E-boats, German, 351-52 Engineer General Service Regiments
Edgai, Commodore Campbell D., 372 38th, 399
Egginton. See Depots, Egginton. 342d, 290,580
“Eggs,” 363. See also Marshaling camps. 359th, 444
Eighth Air Force. See Air Force units, Air Force, 360th, 362
Eighth. 373d, 362
Eire, 20, 21, 22 388th, 557n
Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D., 40, 48, 78, 89, 1 1 1 , 112, 1323d, 557n
118, 159, 183, 184, 193-95, 196-97, 198-200, Engineer Group A, 552
604 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

Engineer Group C, 552 Etreham, 444,514

Engineer Petroleum Distributing Company, 786th, Eure River, 189
444 European Theater of Operations. See ETOUSA.
Engineer Port Construction and Repair Groups
1055th, 289,433 FABIUS, 345,351, 352-54, 359, 361,372
1056th, 292 Falaise, 478,479, 550
Engineer School, Wallingford, Oxfordshire, 338 Falmouth, 346,363,371,372
Engineer Service, 241, 260 FECOMZ. See Forward Echelon, Communications
Engineer Shore Regiment, 531st, 33 1,332, 388 Zone.
Engineer Special Brigades, 283,284,342-44. See also Fell, Col. Edgar B.: 164, 166
Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group. Ferry craft, 393-94, 400, 402, 406
1st, 283, 290, 332, 335, 343, 345, 346-50, 351-52, Ferrying Command (Air Transport Command), 29
354, 365, 370, 387, 388, 398, 400, 401, 411. See Field Artillery Battalions
also Engineer Amphibian Brigade, 1st. 46th, 18
2d, 335 187th, 353
5th, 283, 343, 348, 349, 350,353,365, 383,384,396 Field Force Replacement Depot, 344
See also Engineer Combat Group, 1119th. Field Force Replacement System, 336
6th, 283, 343, 344, 348, 350, 353, 365, 384, 396. See Field forces, 299n
also Engineer Combat Group, 1 1 16th. Field Service Regulations, 33,497-98
Engineer Shore Regiment, 531st, 330,332,387,398- Fifteenth Air Force. See Air Force units Air Force,
99 Fifteenth.
Etampes, 324,567 Fifth Army, 212,340
ETOUSA (European Theater of Operations, United First Allied Airborne Army, 576, 577, 579-80, 581.
States Army), 67, 70, 72, 74, 115, 132, 219, 226, See also Brereton, Maj. Gen. Lewis H.
264, 471. See also Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D.; First Army (FUSA), 185, 195, 196, 197, 203, 262, 304,
ETOUSA-COMZ; ETOUSA-SOS; Special Ob- 305, 314, 343, 350, 352-53, 359, 364, 370, 371,
server Group; United States Army Forces in the 377, 397, 401, 404, 422, 427-29, 475-80, 498,
British Isles. 521, 522. See also Bradley, Lt. Gen. Omar N.
command and organization, 190-230 activated, 191
decline of power and control, 195-97 ammunition, 407,445-48,525-28, 539, 541,543
G–1,40,459 Class I I and IV supplies, 518-20
G–2,40 command responsibilities, 204-05, 208, 218, 219-
G–3,40, 176, 177 20,224-26, 301, 303,308
G–4. See Crawford, Maj. Gen. Robert W.; Stratton, List A, 301-02
Brig. Gen. James H. NEPTUNE Operation Plan, 348, 3350-51
G–5, 177, 195 ordnance equipment shortage, 368,442-43
headquarters, 196, 197,201,219,222,312,363,472 plan, 25 February 1944,269, 283
and misplaced supplies, 96-97 planning responsibilities, 215
origins of, 13-51 POL, 322,445,490n,502-08,509-10,514,515-16
predecessor commands. See Special Observer rations, 517-18
Group; United States Army Forces in the British rear boundary, 210-11, 433-36
Isles. relationship to Advance Section, 212-13, 214,214-
relationship with SOS, 40-43, 78-80, 195-203. See 15n, 430,433-36
also ETOUSA-SOS. replacements, 459-60
relationship with War Department, 59, 93,96-97, service troops, 312
123, 127-29, 141-42, 233, 260-61, 449,461-63, supply in the pursuit, 489-95
522-23, 538-39, 540. 553-56 transportation, 550, 552, 564, 566, 567, 570, 574,
staff, 40, 101, 116, 219 576, 579,582
Standing Operating Procedure 7,496 unloading procedures, 392-93
Standing operating procedures (SOP’s), 216, 219, First Army Quartermaster Service, 494
261, 311 First Canadian Army, 339, 478
subordinate commands, 190 Firth of Clyde, 349
ETOUSA-COMZ, 215, 219,221-22, 223 Flanders, 271
ETOUSA-SOS, 195-203, 205, 213, 218, 222, 226, Folligny, 318, 544; 546, 550
262, 265-66 Fontainebleau, 479,495, 567
general staff, 266-67 “Force loading forecast,” 364
headquarters, 196, 201-02, 210 “Force marking,” 95, 133-34
reorganization plan, 198-201 “Force movement table,” 364
staff, 201-02, 219, 223 Forêt de Cerisy, 376
 INDEX 605

Forêt de Mont-Castre, 427 Grandcamp-les-Bains—Continued

Formigny, 390, 391, 397,431, 432 404,416-18, 465
Fort Belvoir, Va., Engineer School, 335 Grande Dune, La, 386,388
Fort Pierce, Fla., 335 Granville, 288, 289, 290, 465, 466, 475
Fort Southwick, England, 363 Gravelle, Maj. Gordon K., 559
Forward Echelon, Communications Zone GREENLIGHT, 309-10, 423, 448
(FECOMZ), 207-11, 216, 266, 285, 308, 312, Greenock, 146
555. See also Advance Section; Communications Griner, Brig. Gen., George W.. 18, 22, 38,40, 61
Zone. Groninger, Maj. Gen. Homer M., 35
continental role, 219-21, 433, 434-37 Gross, Brig. Gen. Charles P., 77
organization, 207-08 Grosvenor Square, 16, 37, 76, 77, 230, 342
responsibilities,208-09, 213-15, 217, 219-21, 224- Ground Force Replacement System (GFRS), 459
26 Ground forces, 299n
staff. 209 Grower, Brig. Gen. Roy W., 3, 217
Fougères, 324, 510,547 Gruver, Col. Earl S., 166
Fowey, 360,371 Guenther, Col. Gustav B., 78
Fox, 345, 348-49, 350-51 GULL,350
Francis, Maj. William R., 157-58 Gullatt, Col. Doswell, 384
Franey, Col. James M., 35,462,463 GYMNAST, 52,88, 89. See also TORCH.
Frankfurt, 488
Franklyn, Gen. G. E. W., 23 Hainault Railway Sheds and Siding, 150
Freight cars, 150, 547, 550 Hall, Rear Adm. John L., Jr., 372
French railways. See Railways, French. HANDS UP, 188n, 468. See also Quiberon Bay.
French Resistance, 477 Handy, Brig. Gen. Thomas T., 53, 126, 449
French road network. See Motor transport; Roads, Harbord, Maj. Gen. James G.. 35, 267
French; Transportation. Harbors, artificial, 271-72, 275-76. See also Ports,
Fuel. See POL. artificial.
Fuller-Merritt Chapman Corporation, 24 “Hards,” 361
Hardstandings, 347
Gale, Lt. Gen. Sir Humfrey M., 90, 282; 413, 470,473 HARLEQUIN, 339, 357, 358,360
Gasoline, 401, 499-516, 575, 576. See also POL. Harriman mission, 46,50
aviation (Avgas),322, 445, 510, 514 Harrison, Lt. Col. Leander H.. 535, 536
motor vehicle ( M T80), 322, 324, 444. 445,502, Hartle, Maj. Gen. Russell P., 22, 23, 24, 43, 48,84,
509, 510,514 113, 191
General Board Report on COMZ, 2 14-15n Hass, Col. Martin F., 533n
General Depot Service, SOS, 80, 152 Havre, Le. 53, 175, 179, 430, 470, 471, 480. 481, 485,
General Headquarters (GHQ), 19, 20. See also Mar- 486, 535
shall, Gen. George C. Hawley, Maj. Gen. Paul R., 3, 22, 50, 71, 72, 78, 198,
General Order 19, 20 July 1942,44 108n, 248
General Purchasing Agent. 80, 164, 171, 254 Haye-du-Puits, La, 313, 320, 324, 377, 427-28, 489,
General Purchasing Board, 80, 254 500,501, 504,510
German Air Force, 563 HEADLINE, 148
German Panthers, 443,523, 524 Hedgerows. See Normandy hedgerows.
German Tigers, 443,523 Henke, Pfc. Milburn H., 23
Germany, planned advance into, 485-88 Heyn, G., and Son, Ltd., 148
Gerow. Maj. Gen. Leonard T, 424 Hinds, Brig. Gen. John H., 530, 531,541
G. Heyn and Son, Ltd. (HEADLINE), 148 Hinman, Lt. Col. Dale D., 17
Ghormley, Rear Adm. Robert L., 16n Hirson, 494, 527, 552, 566, 567
Gilland, Brig. Gen. Morris W., 2-3 Histon, 248
Glasgow, 22, 97, 144, 146 Hodges, Lt. Gen. Courtney H., 226-27, 475
Gloucester, 84. 365 Hoge, Brig. Gen. William M., 3-4, 384, 413n
GLUE,145 Holly, Brig. Gen. Joseph A., 443
Goodwin, Col. E. C., 140, 142 Home Guard (Br.), 61,74
GOOSEBERRIES, 211, 278, 280, 402, 413. See also Honeybourne, 248
OMAHA Beach, GOOSEBERRY; UTAH Beach, Hopkins, Harry L., 32, 53, 89
GOOSEBERRY. Hospitals. See Construction, hospital.
Gosport, 360 Hotel Splendide, 100 Piccadilly, 76
Gourock, 22, 146 Housing of American troops in United Kingdom. See
Grandcamp-les-Bains, 183, 270, 288, 290, 343,390, Troop accommodations in United Kingdom.
 606 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

Hughes, Maj. Gen. Everett S., 41, 78, 90, 93,96,99, JANTZEN II,339
101,437 JEEP,349, 350
Hughes-Hallett, CommodoreJohn, 182, 271, 272 Jerricans, 551
Hull, 144, 146 Joint Administrative Plan, 19 April 1944, 269, 306
Hull, Brig. Gen. John E., 39,54, 126 Joint Admiralty-War Office-Air Ministry committee,
Humber River ports, 144, 146 18
HUSKY, 331-34 Joint Assault Signal Company, 286th, 387
Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S., 28, 193
Iceland, 14, 17-19, 40 Joint commanders’ Initial Joint Plan, 269
Iceland Base Command, 40,190n Joint Outline Maintenance Project, 269
“Identification of Separate Shipments to Oversea Joint Organization and Maintenance, U.S., 29
Destinations” (ESS), 144, 146 Joint Planning Staff (Br.), 17, 27, 181-82
Ile de France, 234 Joint Q Planning School, 337-38
Iles St. Marcouf, 573 Joint U.S.-British Assessment Committee, 287
Immingham, 144, 146 Jones, Col. Gainer B., 529
Infantry Divisions Juvisy-sur-Orge, 551, 552
1st, 91, 92, 342, 352, 353, 365, 375, 383
2d, 350: 429 Kean, Maj. Gen. William B., 447
4th, 342, 348, 349, 351, 352, 365, 375, 376, 389, Key, Maj. Gen. William S., 123n
398,428,429 Kibler, Brig.Gen. A. Franklin, 53 1,542
5th, 18, 19,350 King, Admiral Ernest J., 88
8th, 350,427 Kirk, Rear Adm. Alan G., 372, 413
9th, 365,376,428,429 Knerr, Brig. Gen. Hugh J., 192n, 202-03, 263
26th, 570 Knutsford, 203
28th, 342, 346,457
29th, 101, 130, 338, 341, 342, 345,347, 348, 352, Labor. See Local Procurement; Troop labor.
353,365,375,377,429 Laigle, 550
30th, 377,429, 540, 541 Lakehurst, 545
31st, 3421n Landing craft. See Coasters; Dukws; Ferry craft;
32d, 22 LBV’s; LCI’s; LCM’s; LCT’s; LCVP’s.
34th, 22, 26, 32, 9 I Landing rehearsals. See Amphibious exercises; Am-
35th, 429 phibious operations.
37th, 22 “Landings on a Hostile Shore” (FM31-5), 328
79th, 302, 376,427 Landon, Col. Charles R., 167-68
80th, 457 Land’s End,346
83d, 428, 429, 450, 451, 457 Langford Lodge. See Depots, Langford Lodge.
90th, 427 Laon, 488,552
95th, 570 Larkin, Maj. Gen. Thomas B., 4, 35, 37, 57n, 78,99,
104th, 570 101
Infantry Regiments Laval, 217, 313, 320, 324, 325, 433, 478, 486, 493, 495,
8th, 387 510, 550,
10th, 18 Layman, Col. Walter G., 78, 81, 303, 336,460-61, 462
29th, 361 LBV’s, 310,310n, 389n, 399
90th, 377 LCI’s,410
156th, 342, 342n LCM’s, 407
175th, 345 LCT’s, 182, 182n, 310, 332, 389, 391, 393, 399,407,
Installations Branch, G–4, SOS, 241 410,411,426,473
Inveraray, 330 LCVP’s, 407
Isigny, 270, 288, 289, 290. 318, 343, 351, 377, 379, Leathers, Lord Frederick, 239
390, 404,416-19, 431, 432, 464, 465 Lee, Lt. Gen. John C. H., 5,33-36, 46,62, 75,77,80,
Isle of Portland, 360 97, 98, 98n, 219, 224, 226, 240, 337,358, 361,
Isle of Wight, 323 463, 557. See also Communications Zone; Services
Ismay, Maj. Gen. Hastings L., 17 of Supply.
Italian experience as Area Petroleum Officer, 81
with advance section, 211-12 on base sections, 84
effect on OVERLORD planning, 185 at Casablanca Conference, 116
on construction, 105, 108, 109-10
Jacobs, Brig. Gen. Fenton S., 4 on Crawford proposal, 222-24
JALOPY, 349,350 on marking procedure, 141-42
INDEX 607

Lee, Lt. Gen. John C. H.—Continued Local procurement

organization of SOS, USAFBI, 35-39 oflabor, 20-21, 116-18, 130, 137, 148-49, 154, 158,
organization of SOS, ETOUSA, 41-43, 77 234-35, 246, 251, 253, 254,258, 280
on partially trained troops. 57 of supplies, 80,98, 170-71, 254-58
personality, 267-68 Lockerley, 248
on POL situation, 505 Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, 30
as possible commander, ETOUSA, 112-13 Locmariaquer, 294
powers under SOS, ETOUSA, 42-44 Logan Bar, 440. See also Rations.
relations with Bradley, 209-11, 221, 532 Logan, Capt. Paul P., 440
relations with Eisenhower, 98, 112-13, 268n, 438 Logistical Plans Branch, G–4, SHAEF, 470,472,483-
reorganization proposals, 159-63, 166 84
request for ammunition, 539 Logistical plans for troop build-up. See also Build-up.
request for joint “Q” school, 337 W (pessimistic),454
requests for service troops, 116-17, 120, 131 X (realistic), 454, 455, 472
responsibilities and problems as deputy theater Y (optimistic), 454,455,472
commander-SOS commander, 198-202, 206-07, Z, 455
264-65, 437-38 Loire estuary, 187
on ROUNDUP, 104-05 Loire River, 183, 187, 189, 324, 327,430,434,452,
selection of SOS headquarters, 81-83 470,478,479,480,481,483,486,487
on shipping problem, 1944, 236 Loire River ports, 186, 282,324,471
on shortageof service troops, 110-11 London, 144, 146, 159, 160, 162, 177,227-30. Seealso
staff, 35, 78, 265-66, 535 Depots, London.
on TORCH, 99, 104-05 London Base Command, 86, 162, 169. See alsoBase
Leigh-Mallory, Air Marshal Sir Trafford, 193 Sections,Central.
Lend-lease London Base Section. See Base Sections, London.
reverse (“mutual aid”), 81, 254, 256, 257, 258 London, Midland, and Scottish Railway, 154
to Russia, 17, 31,50 Lord Halifax, 35
to the United Kingdom, 16, 20, 31, 46, 50, 91,97, Lord Haw Haw, 83
257 Lord, Brig. Gen. Royal B., 5, 160, 164, 167, 200, 206,
Lend-Lease Act, 13 220, 235, 259,266,434,437,469,472, 534
Lessay, 475,510 Lorient, 187, 289, 294,430,464,478,479,481
Lewis, Brig. Gen. Henry B., 198 Loudeac, 476
Liaison, US.-British, 61, 62-64 Loupe, La, 494,506,527,558
Liberty ships, 181, 187, 273, 275, 407,446,471 LST’s, 182, 182n,392,393, 394, 399-400, 400n, 404,
Liége, 485, 527, 552 411, 473, 532, 533, 534, 545, 546
“Lilo,” 273. See also BOMBARDON. LUCKY STRIKE, 467,481,482,483
Lincoln, Col. George A., 337 Lutes, Maj. Gen. LeRoy, 77, 94, 97, 141, 142, 239,
Line of Communications (LOC), 223n. See also Serv- 261-64, 265, 267,469
ices of Supply. Luxembourg, 480,481
Lines of Communications. See also Transportation. Lyon, 480
and beach organization, 282-83 Lyon, Brig. Gen. Alfred J., 22, 26, 29,39
French railways as, 315-18
lack of co-ordination of, 424,425 Maastricht, 566
Normandy, 430,439 McClelland, Brig. Gen. Harold M., 22, 26,40,61
and POL delivery, 505,508 McConnaughy, Col. Donald S., 91
in the pursuit, 491,493 MacKeachie, Col. Douglas C., 35, 78, 80
and Seine crossing, 472,481-82,484-86, 508 McLain, Brig. Gen. Raymond S., 541
shortage of truck companies, 315 McNarney, Brig. Gen. Joseph T., 14, 16, 22, 26,43
Transportation Corps responsibilities, 314-15 MAGNET, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 48, 60
and troop build-up, 299,300,452 Maintenance area. See Beach, maintenance area.
LisonJunction, 318,433, 489, 544, 545 Maintenon, 551
Littlejohn, Maj. Gen. Robert M., 5, 35,41, 78,98, Major System. See Pipeline systems, Major.
98n, 116, 117, 118 Manchester, 144, 147
Liverpool, 30, 144, 147. See also Depots, Liverpool. Manifest system, 139-42, 144
Llanelly, 371 Mans, Le, 430,469,478,481,486,487,495,510,529,
Loading exercises. See Amphibious exercises; CELLO- 530,544, 547, 550,551,560,575-76
PHANE; GULL;NUDGER; SNIPE. Mantes-Gassicourt,479, 487
Lobnitz pierheads, 275, 278, 280, 281, 404, 406. See “Marfak No. 2,” 440. See also Rations.
also MULBERRIES. Marigny, 427
 608 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

Marines, 1st Provisional Brigade, 18 Molotov, V. M., 87,88n

Marking procedure. See Date-line system; Force Mons, 480,552
marking. Montcornet, 479
Marne, 479 Montebourg, 376,431
“Marrying up,” 95, 349 Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L., 184, 186,
Marseille, 480 194, 206, 224, 339,468,478,574. See also Army
Marshaling Group, 21.
areas, 357-58, 423,425. See also Sausage camps. Montgomery, Col. Edward, 78
camps, 359-60 Montgomery, Col. Murray M., 78
exercises, 349. See also CHEVROLET; JALOPY; JEEP. Mood, Lt. Col. Orlando C., 78
process, 367-68, 425 Moon, Rear Adm. Don P., 372
Marshall, Gen. George C., 19, 27, 28, 77, 104, 114 Moore, Maj. Gen. Cecil R., 5-6, 84, 101, 240, 321
at Claridge Conferences, 32, 39, 88-89 Morbihan Gulf, 294
designates Lee SOS commander, 33 Moreton-on-Lugg, 248
directive, 14 May 1942,36,40,42,43 Morgan, Lt. Gen. Frederick E., 124, 177-78, 182, 184,
on ETOUSA build-up, 118 191,272,279. See alsoCOSSAC.
on ETOUSA organization, 196 Morlaix, 294, 473, 479, 536
on marking procedures, 98 Mortain, 478,481,528, 573, 583
on OVERLORD, 186 Moselle River, 480,488, 495, 515, 542, 543
relieves Chaney as ETOUSA commander, 47-48 Moses, Brig. Gen. Raymond G., 6,206, 220, 221,310-
on ROUNDUP,107 12, 315,400n, 448,491,533n, 538,542
on TORCH, 90-91, 106 Modes, 390
on troop replacements, 305 Motor transport, 150, 314, 315, 396, 400, 411, 432,
warns ETOUSA of manpower shortage, January 553-72, 579. See also Red Ball Express (motor
1944,462 transport on the Continent); Transportation.
Marshall, Col. S. L. A., 380-81 n Motor Transport Brigade (MTB), 432, 558, 559, 560,
Marshall Memorandum, 53-56, 175. See also BOLERO. 566-67, 568-70
Marston, Brig. Gen. John, 18 Motor Transport Division, Transportation Corps,
Master Agreement (reciprocal aid), February 1942, 150-52
254 Motor vehicle gasoline ( M T 80). See Gasoline, motor
Matejka, Lt. Col.Jerry V., 22, 50 vehicle.
Maubeuge, 485 Mt. Cauvin, 322, 323,444,445
Mauretania, 234 Mountbatten, Vice Adm. Lard Louis, 177, 330
Mayenne, 478, 547 Movement Control (MOVCO), 146, 364, 424, 425
Mayenne River, 478 Movements and Transportation Branch, G–4,
Mediterranean theater experiences SHAEF, 454n, 468,482
in amphibious landings, 334 MT 80. See Gasoline, motor vehicle.
with ports, 270, 296 M T ships, 394,41 I, 426,473
with transportation, 557 MULBERRIES, 183, 277-82, 283, 285, 290,296,323,
Melun, 479 391, 413n, 452, 465–66,485. See also Ports, artifi-
Merderet River, 375, 376 cial; Storm, 19-22 June 1944.
Mersey River ports, 65,91, 144, 145n, 146, 147,362 A, 277,278, 280, 283, 290, 343,402, 404,406,413-
Metz, 480,485,488,566 14,463
Meuse River, 479,480,515 B, 277,415
Middleswart, Lt. Col. William H., 22, 50 Muller, Col. Walter J., 6, 506, 515, 529, 530
Middleton, Lt. Gen. Troy H., 532-36 Mulligan, Col. Timothy L., 384
Military Railway Service, 2d, 318 Munitions Assignments Board, 46
Miller, Maj. Gen. Henry J. F., 192n Munitions Assignments Committee (Air), 46
Miller, Col. Robert S., 459 MUSKRATI and II, 349
Million-man force, 55-56,58, 59, 60, 64, 66, 105, 116. “Mutual Aid.” See Lend-lease, reverse.
See also Marshall Memorandum; Troop basis;
Troop build-up. Namur, 552
Ministry of War Transport (Br.), 91, 144, 241, 281, Nancy, 480,488
363 Nantes, 186, 187,470,479
Diversion Committee, 145 Napier, Maj. Gen. Charles S., 363,472
Movement Control. See Movement Control. National Dock Labour Corporation, 148
Sea Transport, 146 “National Wheatmeal Flour,” 255
MINKI and II, 349 Naval bases in United Kingdom, 20
Minor System. See Pipeline systems, Minor. Naval Beach Battalion, 2d, 400
INDEX 609

Naval Combat Battalion, 108th, 280 Office of the Chief Engineer, SOS, 241,287
Naval Task Forces. See Task Forces. Office of the Chief of Transportation, ETOUSA, 150
Navy engineer units, 288 Officer Canditate School, Shrivenham, 81, 336
Navy Ferry Craft Control, 400 Oise River, 486
NEPTUNE, 175,269 OMAHA Beach, 290, 298,312,323,348,349,350,351,
New York Port of Embarkation, 94,99, 103, 141,236, 372, 375-76, 404n, 427, 431-32, 445, 489, 534,
238, 239,259,261,371, 443 536, 558. See also Beach.
Newport, 146,364 air support at, 375
Nieuw Amsterdam, 234 ammunition supply, 445
Ninth Air Force. See Air Force units, Air Force, Ninth. beach clearance, 411
Ninth Army, 480,508,523,535,551 berthing of ships, 393-96
Nissen hospitals, 72, 247 brigades, 410-11
Nissen huts, 19, 24, 152, 242, 243, 247. See also Con- command, 413n.
struction; Troop accommodations. D Day, 377-84
Nixon, Col. Thomas H., 529, 530 development of, 389-97
Noce, Brig. Gen. Daniel, 329, 330n, 342 draws (exits), 379
Nogent-le-Rotrou, 5 13 dumps, 396-97, 473
Norfolk House, St. James’s Square, London, 61, 89, as first continental line of communications, 282-83
164,337 GOOSEBERRY, 277-78
Normandie,290 lack of communication, 392-93
Normandy, 285-86, 287, 464, 475, 489, 490, 491, 509, landing craft, 392-96
580 location of: 188
beaches, 183, 187,422,493 maintenance area, 283,494
coast, 188,275 MULBERRY, 283,343
hedgerows, 427,430,43 1,442 NOIC (Naval Officer in Command), 392-93, 400-
port plans, 296-97 401
ports, 270, 288-89, 416, 486. See also individual port ponton causeway, 278
names. storm, 19-22 June 1944,408-15
supply base, 430-39 supply organization, 343
Normandy Base Section. See Base Sections, Nor- tonnage capacity, 343, 390,397: 407,411-13, 415-
mandy. 16,464,465-66
North Africa. See North African Theater of Oper- transfer points, 397
ations. unexpected enemy resistance, 374
North African Theater of Operations (NATO). 21, OPD. See Operations Division, War Department.
26,523. See also TORCH. Operational projects. See Projects for continental
detached from ETOUSA, 160 operations (PROCO).
effect on ADSEC, ETOUSA, 211-12 Operations Division, War Department (OPD), 32, 52,
effect on BOLERO, 89,99-106, 110-15, 118, 120, 137 54, 55,56, 114, 118,231-32, 231n, 233n
effect on ROUNDUP, 175,286 Ordnance Base Automotive Maintenance Battalion,
experience with air forces, 192 622d, 157
experience with amphibious landings, 331 Ordnance Group, 71st, 525
experience with transportation, 556 Ordnance Service, 156-57, 158, 257, 260, 368, 370,
experience with vehicle waterproofing, 369 564,571
holds up construction in United Kingdom, 240 ORELOB. See Reverse BOLERO.
manpower waste, 463 Orléans, 189, 324,478,479,488, 576
supplies for, 96 Orne River, 188
use of BOLERO troops, 233-34 OTTER I and II,349
Northern Group of Armies (21 Army Group), 224 OVERLORD
Northern Ireland, 19-26, 28, 30, 32,48, 49, 60, 70, 84, command and organization for, 190-230
148, 169,363 completed, 479,481, 484,485, 500
Northern Ireland Base Command, 23, 84. See also logistical plan, 269-327
Base Sections, Northern Ireland; Corps, V; logistical problems, 178-89, 234-40, 259-62
Northern Ireland; United States Army Northern mounting of, 357-73
Ireland Force. origin of, 132, 166
Northern Ireland Base Section. See Base Sections Phase I, 208,213,303
Northern Ireland. Phase II, 208, 214, 219-20, 303
NUDGER, 350 Phase III, 208, 214,219,303
training and rehearsing for, 328-54
Oakley Farm, 83 Overstrengths, 458,463
610 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

Oxford, 365 POL—Continued

Oxwich Bay, 350 transportation deficiencies, 509-16
POL Branch, G–4, ETOUSA, 320
P–51, 51 POL Branch Plan, 14 April 1944,321
Package system. See Replacements, package system. Pontaubault, 547
Paddington Station, 83 Ponton causeways, 278, 332,402-04
Paget, Gen. Sir Bernard, 7 7 Pontorson, 529
Pallet loading, 346, 347n Poole, 359. 360, 363,372, 373
Panthers. See German Panthers. Port battalions, 235
Parachute Infantry, 502d, 349 Port capacity. See also Cherbourg, port capacity;
Parachute supply, 573 OMAHA Beach, tonnage capacity; UTAHBeach,
Paratroop replacement shortage, 305 tonnage capacity.
Paris, 183,478, 479, 483,484, 486, 487, 488,510,544, continental, 296-97, 297n, 308, 311, 450, 463-70:
550,552,552n, 553,577-83 473,482,544
Passenger liners, 234 United Kingdom, 121, 132, 136-37, 147-48,231,
Patch, Lt. Gen. Alexander M., 480 233-39, 259
Patton, Lt. Gen. George S., 203, 475, 478, 490,515, Port Construction and Repair Groups. See Engineer
529, 531. See also Third Army. Port Construction and Repair Groups.
Penarth, 148,371 Port Eynon, 350
Périers, 429,434,475 “Port group” areas, 179-81
Pershing, Gen.John J., 39, 117, 223n Port reconstruction, 285-97
Pershing Principle of 1917, 194 Port Talbot, 350,371
Peters, Maj. Joseph, 531 Portal, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles, 17,48,193
Petroleum. See POL. Port-en-Basin, 320,322, 325,434,444
Petroleum Committee, 319 Portland, 348, 352, 353, 363,372
Phases (I, II, and III) of OVERLORD. See OVERLORD,Ports, 463-74. See also individual port names.
Phase I, Phase II, Phase III. artificial, 269-82, 414-15. See also MULBERRIES.
Philippeville, 296 beach, 402-06
Phillips, Pvt. George, III, 157 deepwater, 282, 285
PHOENIXES, 276-78,279-80, 282, 402, 404,406, 410, Ports (Major), 290n
413, 413n, 415 4th, 290,432
Pier bridging, 413 11th, 283,290, 290n, 344,432
Pierheads, 277, 279,402. See also Lobnitz pierheads. 12th,290
Piers, 272, 277,402 Ports of embarkation, 92, 93, 236, 238. See also Boston
Pipeline systems, 319, 320,449, 501, 509, 510-15. See Port of Embarkation; New York Port of Embar-
also POL. kation.
Major, 322,323-25, 500-502, 504, 510, 514 Ports of embarkation commanders, 93
Minor, 322-23, 325,444-45, 501,502,510 Portsmouth, 271, 360. See also Depots, Portsmouth.
Pittville mineral springs, 81 Post-OVERLORD planning. See Seine River, advance
Plank, Brig. Gen. Ewart G., 6-7, 78, 169, 212, 220, beyond.
490, 513, 515. See also Advance Section, Commu- Pouliguen, Le, 294
nications Zone (ADSEC). Pound, Admiral Sir Dudley, 16
PLUTO,323-24 Pouppeville, 388
Plymouth, 91, 144, 146, 346, 348, 349, 351,360, 363, Prairies Marécageuses,428
369 Preloading, 298,309
POINTBLANK. 202 “Preparations for Overseas Movement, Short Sea
Pointe et R a z de la Percée, 378 Voyage” (POM SSV), 368
POL, 93, 152, 291, 307,310, 396,404,439,446,453, Prescheduling of supply shipments, 307,448
454,484: 487,488,496,499-516, 518,527,528, Preshipment, 95-96, 130, 133-37, 138-39, 235-36,
547, 558. See also Gasoline; Pipeline systems. 259
air supply of, 579, 580 Presque Isle, Maine, 29
creation of Area Petroleum Board, 80-81 Prestbury Park Race Course, 83
dumps, 389, 401, 494 Prestowage, 308-09. See also Type loading.
for First Army, 504-09, 515-16 Prestwick, 29
OVERLORD plans for, 319-27 Principal Administrative Officers Committee, 62
shortage affects transportation, 527,528 PROCO. See Projects for continental operations.
status of,June–July 1944,443-45 Procurement Section, Office of the Chief of Engineers,
supply in the pursuit, 489-91,499-516 321
for Third Army, 490,495,504-09, 513,515-16, 527 Projects for continental operations (PROCO), 260-
INDEX 611

Projects for continental operations—Continued Raritan Arsenal, 141

61,321, 553, 554, 554n Ratay, Brig. Gen.John P., 7
Provisional engineer groups, A, B, C, 551 Rations, 93, 255, 261, 306, 307, 309, 310, 328, 389,
Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group, 283, 396, 401, 404,439-41, 489, 490, 494,496, 499,
290, 343,344, 352, 353,379, 383, 384 516-18, 575-76
Provisional Transport Group, 520 A, 440,516,517
Pulsifer, Brig. Gen. Ralph, 197 B, 440,441,516, 517
Pursuit aviation, 26, 27, 28.See also Air force, U.S.; bread, 255
Air force units. British, 83-84, 254
Pyle, Ernie, 489 C, 439, 441, 516, 517
composite (5-in-1 and 10-in-1), 440-41, 516, 517
Quadrant Conference, 132, 136-38. 178, 231, 231n, D, 440-41
233,235,241. See also Quebec Conference. K, 439-41, 516,517
Quartermaster Battalions Logan Bar, 440
95th, 396 RATTLE,177, 182, 342
537th, 401 Ravenoville, 386
Quartermaster Corps, 44, 50, 118, 158, 257, 259: 314, Reciprocal aid, 256, 258. See also Lend-lease.
321,439,516 Red Ball Express (motor transport on the Continent),
Quartermaster General, Deputy (Br.). See Deputy 309n: 496,496n, 499,509, 534, 552, 559-72. See
Quartermaster General (Br.); Wootten, Maj. also Motor transport; Transportation.
Gen. Richard M. command and organization, 566-68
Quartermaster General, Q (Liaison) (Br.). See Dep- cost of, 571
uty Quartermaster General (Br.). diversion of convoys by the armies, 565
Quartermaster General (Br.), 61,62, 337. See also Rid- maintenance of equipment, 565
dell-Webster, Gen. Sir T. S. publicity, 571
Quartermaster Group, 471st, 494 regulations, 560-63
Quartermaster Railhead Company, 557th, 352 route, 560,566-68
Quartermaster Service Company, 3206th, 352 traffic control problems, 564
Quebec Conference, 137, 178; 182, 183, 188, 191,192, trucks lose gasoline to Third Army, 505
193, 195, 272, 276. See also QUADRANT Confer- turn-round time, 566. See also Turn-round.
ence. uneconomical use of vehicles, 564-65
Queen Elizabeth, 58, 234 Red Ball Express (shipping service), 309-10, 309n,
Queen Mary, 26, 58, 234 423,448
Querqueville, 324, 445: 580. See also Digue de Regimental Combat Teams
Querqueville. 8th (4th Division), 349
Quiberon Bay, 187-89, 294-96, 464,467, 468,470- 16th (1st Division), 348
72,478, 510, 544 22d (4th Division), 349
“Quiescent reserve,” 455,456. See also Troop build-up. 116th (29th Division), 348
Quinéville, 384,386, 388, 398-400, 400n, 401 Regulating officer, 497-98
Regulating stations, 497-99
Rade de Cancale, 471 24th (Third Army), 498
RAE See Royal Air Force. 25th (First Army), 498
Rail transportation officers (RTO’s), 149, 150 Reims, 479,488, 495, 552, 580
Railway Grand Division, 707th, 545 Remagen bridge, 500
Railway Operating Battalion, 729th, 433 Rennes, 317, 324, 325, 435, 472, 475, 486, 510, 533,
Railway reconstruction, 551, 552 545,547,550
Railways. See also Transportation. Rennes-Laval-Châteaubriant triangle, 217, 313, 433,
in France, 314, 315-17, 432-33, 484, 487,489,544- 493
53 Replacement Depot, 1 0 t h 306
in United Kingdom, 132, 144, 149-50, 233,311 Replacement System, 303-04
RAINBOW 5, 14, 21, 26. 27, 28, 32 Replacements, 303-06, 458-63
Ramcke, General der Fallschirmjaeger Hermann B., infantry, 460-61
532-33 overstrength system, 304
Ramey, Lt. Col. George E., 78 package system, 304,458-59
Ramsay, Admiral Sir Bertram H., 184, 193, 372 riflemen, 461
Ranger Battalions Rethel, 479
2d, 342 Reverse BOLERO (ORELOB) (RHUMBA), 216,217
5th, 342 Reykjavik, 18, 19
Rangers, 188, 330, 340,353, 375 Rhine, 488
612 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

Rhine ferry, 394,410 Salvage work, 401, 406

Rhône valley, 480 Sarthe, 478
RHUMBA. See Reverse BOLERO. Sausage camps, 347, 365, 367. See also Marshaling,
Richmond, Col Adam, 78 areas.
Richmond, Col. Clarence W., 157, 559,560 Sayler, Maj. Gen. Henry B., 9, 541
Rickard, Brig. Gen. Roy V., 7 Sawbridge, Col. Ben. M.. 101
Riddell, Brigadier R. A., 337 Scotland, 20, 26, 28
Riddell-Webster, General Sir T. S., 116. 240, 337 Seatrains, 545
Roads. See also Motor transport, Red Ball Express Second Army (Br.), 204,339
(motor transport on the Continent); Transporta- Sedan, 488
tion. Seine River, 179, 189, 327, 415, 452, 470. 478, 479,
in France, 314,432 481-82, 483-84, 486-87, 490, 494, 495, 496, 499,
in United Kingdom, 142 504, 506,510,529, 550, 552,574-76
Roger White, 399 Seine River, advance beyond(post-OVERLORDplan-
Rogers, Brig Gen. Pleas B , 7, 162, 169 ning), 485-88, 489, 507, 508, 558
Rommel, Generaloberst Erwin, 88, 114 Seine River bridges, 550-52
Roosevelt, President Franklin D.. 14, 18, 52-53, 88, Seine River ports, 183, 282, 286, 467. 468-69, 472,
89, 114, 115, 178,451 481, 482,486
Roscoff, 294,473 Seine Section, 568
Ross, Maj. Gen. Frank S., 8, 35, 78,94-95, 101, 149, Selective unloading, 422-23, 448-49
235, 448,554,555 Sélune River, 476
Rouen, 110n, 189, 470,481,485,486 Senlis, 494
ROUNDUP. 52, 55, 62, 64-66, 70-72, 75, 87-89, 97, Services of Supply (SOS), ETOUSA, 116, 119-20,
104-05, 107, 115, 175-76, 179,319 130-31. 132, 157, 190, 206, 262-63, 269, 308,
ROUNDUP Administrative Planning Staff, 75, 286 424. See also Communications Zone; Lee, Lt.
Rowan, Brig. Gen. Hugh W., 8 Gen. John C. H.
Royal Air Force (RAF), 17, 29-30, 88, 193, 250,251, base sections, 84-87, 168-70, 216-18
348 and Circular 2, 13June 1942,41-44
Royal Air Force Group, 46,582 command and organization. 41-44, 76-87, 159-71,
Royal Army Service Corps, 154 190
Royal Engineers. 73 consolidation with ETOUSA, 195-203, 264. See also
Royal Navy, 292 ETOUSA-SOS.
Rozay-en-Brie, 567 formation of, 31-43
Ruhr, 485 and General Order 16, 161-62
Rumbough, Maj. Gen. William S., 8, 35, 78, 520 and General Order 19,44
and General Order 33, 163
Saar, 488 headquarters, 81-84, 162, 166. See also Cheltenham.
Saarbruecken, 485 number of service troops compared to AEF 1917-
St. Brieuc, 290,294,430,473 18, 117-18
St. Hilaire-du-Harcouët, 547 relations with Air Forces. 170-71
St. James’s Square. See Norfolk House. relations with ETOUSA, 159-63, 166-68, 198-201
St. James’s Street, No. 63, 337n relations with 1st Army Group, 196-97
St. Laurent-sur-Mer, 188, 2 7 7 , 379,382-83, 390 reorganization, 163-64
St. Lô, 313, 320, 377, 427, 429, 432. 434, 435, 445, responsibilities, 42-44, 80-81
475, 482, 489, 494, 510-11, 514, 544, 546, 552, staff, 42, 78-80, 83, 101, 116
560,565,566,567 Tentative Overall Plans, 122
St. Lô-d’Ourville, 427 and TORCH.89-99
St. Malo, 188, 188n, 288, 289, 290, 294, 465, 466,468, troop basis, 110, 118, 123-28, 131-32
478,479,481,528,529,530 Services of Supply, USA, 35, 56, 98. See also Army
St. Michel-en-Grève, 532,536 Service Forces (ASF); Somervell, Lt. Gen.
St. Mihiel, 479 Brehon B.
St. Nazaire, 186, 187, 294,296,479 Services of Supply in World War I, 36, 223,223n
St. Quentin, 552 Seventh Army, 480
St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte,433,489 Seventh Army, German, 478
St. Vaast-la-Hougue, 270, 288, 290, 433, 465 SEXTANT Conference, 178, 195, 231-33, 235, 236
Ste. Honorine-des-Pertes, 322, 323, 325,444,445 SHAEF. See Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expedi-
Ste. Mère-Eglise, 188, 313,432 tionary Force.
Sainteny. 429 Sharpness, 371
Salisbury, 365,519 SHINGLE, 334
INDEX 613

Shipping, 57, 114, 132-34, 138n, 234-35, 238,258- Stephenson, Lt. Col. William G., 78
60,307-08, 423-24, 559 Stevens, Col. Eli, 364,423
losses, 88, 114-15, 121, 132 Stewart, Sir Findlater, 61, 62, 122
shortage, 53,55,57,58,66. 114-15,422 Storm, 19-22 June 1944,406-15, 446
Shrivenham, 81 Stratton, Brig. Gen. James H., 9, 266, 469, 491-92,
SICKLE, 122 515, 521,532, 533-35, 538
Siegfried Line, 480,488,516, 542-43 Strong, Col. Paschal N., 359
Signal Corps, 50, 102, 259, 381,442, 520, 564 Styer, Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D., 116, 164
Signal Service, 223 Submarine menace, 115, 132. See also Shipping, losses.
Simpson, Lt. Gen. William H., 480,535 Sudbury. See Depots, Sudbury.
Sinclair, Sir Archibald, 23 Sugar Red, 387-88, 398,399
Skid loading, 347, 347n Summers, Lt. Col. Iverson B., 22
Slapton Sands, 345, 346,348-49, 351, 353 SUP (Single Unit Pack), 66n, 156-57
SLEDGEHAMMER. 55,87,88 Supply, 139,254-56, 300, 307, 308-09, 401,431-32,
Smith, Lt. Gen. Walter B., 101, 113, 198, 200, 206, 439-49, 452,489-500, 516, 519, 521
210,223,437,438-39, 534 Class I. See Rations.
Snavely. Maj. Ralph A., 18,26 Class II, 93, 97, 223n, 260, 261, 307, 313, 441-43,
SNIPE, 350 489,491,494,518-25
SociétéNationale des Chemins de Fer Français, 544 Class III. See POL.
Soissons, 479, 494, 495, 527,552, 567 Class IV, 93, 97, 223n, 260, 261, 307, 309-10,315,
Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B., 33, 35, 36. 44,48,56, 389,441-43, 448, 489, 491, 494,518-25
77, 103, 106, 115, 154, 163, 265, 266-67, 522, Class V. See Ammunition.
539-40. See alsoArmy Service Forces. Supply by air. See Air supply.
Somme River, 183,415, 479,488 Supply-by-air demands (SAD’s),574
Sommesous, 495,552,566, 567 Supply flow, 103-04, 166, 270, 306, 308, 430. See also
SOS. See Services of Supply, ETOUSA; Services of Cargo; Shipping.
Supply, USA. Supply plan, 306- 12
Southampton, 91, 144, 146, 281, 353. 359, 360,363, Supply shortage, 239-40, 258-60, 367-68
37 1,400,423,448 Supply Specialists School, 81, 336
Southeastern Command (Br.), 20 Supreme Allied Commander, 183, 184, 193-95. See
Southern Base Section. See Base Sections,Southern. also Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D.
Southern Base Section districts Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
XVI, 359,360 (SHAEF), 200-201, 203,209,219,233,262,264-
XVII, 359,360 65, 269, 300, 327, 365,413n,438,449-50, 467,
XVIII, 348. 349,350, 359-61, 365,370 470,471,481,484-85
XIX, 345, 346, 347, 349, 350, 351,359-61, 365, 370 on advance to Germany, 487-88
XXIX, 350 on air supply, 572,574-75, 577-81
Southern Command (Br.), 64,66, 69-70, 74, 106, 108, on ammunition shortage at Brest, 533-35
122-23,345 directive, 9 February 1944,206-07, 209-10
Southwick House, Portsmouth, 470 establishment of command lines, 203-05, 215-16,
Soxo, 145 222-26, 435-36
Spaatz. Lt. Gen. Carl, 28, 31, 46, 101-02, 202, 578 G–3, 451, 452,472
Special Army Observer. See Chaney, Maj. Gen. G–4, 327, 451, 452, 453, 471, 472, 487, 555-56
James E. origins of, 195
Special Observer Group (SPOBS), 14-21, 26-27, 29, Swansea, 146,365
30, 32, 46, 49-50, 76 SWORDHILT, 188n, 468. See alsoBrest.
Special Observer Section. See Air Section, SPOBS.
SPOBS. See Special Observer Group. Tables of Basic Allowances, 260
SPOBS, Air Section. See Air Section, SPOBS. Tables of Equipment, 260
SPOBS, Technical Committee, 50. See also Air Sec- Talley, Col. Benjamin B., 335,413n
tion, SPOBS. Tank Destroyer Group, 6th, 361
Stalin, Marshal Joseph V., 88n Tanks, German. See German Panthers; German
Standing operating procedures (SOP’s).See ETOUSA, Tigers.
Standing Operating Procedures. Tanks, U.S.
Stanley Tobacco Warehouse, Liverpool, 154. See also inferiority to German tanks, 523-25
Depots. Liverpool. losses, 522-23
Stanmore, 572 Tare Green, 387,388,399,401
Stark, Admiral Harold R., 14 Task Forces
Stars andStripes, The, 50, 366, 571 B, 298,363,365,372,383-84
 614 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

Task Forces—Continued Transportation—Continued

Center, 89-90, 97, 103 Red Ball Express (motor transport on the Conti-
MULBERRY (Naval Task Force 127.1), 278, 281, nent); Red Ball Express (shipping service); Ship-
402,413 ping; Railways; Roads.
O (OMAHA), 298,352, 359, 363,365, 370-71, 372, Transportation Corps, 91, 141, 145, 146, 149,257-58,
375, 383 260, 284, 286, 287, 288, 290,293-94, 311,314-
U (UTAH),298, 359, 363, 365,370-71, 372-73, 375, 18, 319,321, 364, 366, 498, 544,553-59, 563-64,
384 566,568
Western Naval, 89-90, 97, 103, 185, 372,413 Transportation Service, 44. See also Transportation
Taunton, 346 Corps.
Taute River, 427, 428, 429 Trévières, 313, 390, 431
Taw estuary, 341 Tribehou, 429
Taylor, Col. Victor V., 78 TRIDENT Conference, 120-23, 130, 132, 136-38, 177,
Tehran Conference, 195 231,240
Tennant, Rear Adm. William, 278 Troop accommodations in United Kingdom, 23-26,
“Tentative Manual for Landing Operations,” US. 60-61, 65, 242-44. See also Construction; Nissen
Marine Corps, 328 huts; Tented accommodations.
Tented accommodations, 243, 246-47, 247n. See also Troop basis, 116, 133, 134, 262,299-300, 319,456,
Troop accommodations. 557
Texas, 545 air force, 124-25
Thames River, 280 balance between combat and service, 299-301,
Thatcham. See Depots, Thatcham. 452-53
Thiele, Brig. Gen. Claude N., 35, 78, 81 BOLERO,55-59, 66, 104, 106
Third Army (TUSA), 188, 224, 238, 290, 301, 303, ETOUSA, 123, 456-57, 457n
436, 475-80, 483, 487, 488, 515, 543, 546-47, ETOUSA, first phase, 1 May 1944, 128-29, 136,
550, 552, 552n, 558, 564, 567,579, 582. See also 139,231, 236
Patton, Lt. Gen. George S. ETOUSA, second phase, 1 February 1945,128-29
activated, 203 ground force, 124, 125-26
ammunition supply, 528-31, 542 for North Africa, 90-91
Class II and IV supply, 519-21, 523 for Northern Ireland, 24
POL supply, 489-90, 504-08, 513-14, 515,558, SOS, 110, 118, 123-28, 131-32
575-76 for United Kingdom, 107, 109, 119-20
ration supply, 517-18 War Department, 1942, 111, 127
supply situation, 491-92, 495, 499 Troop build-up, 115, 120-32, 233, 241, 297-303, 306,
transportation, 542, 570 308, 310-11, 404, 420-22, 422n, 449-57
Thompson, Col. Paul W., 340-41, 384 Troop Carrier Command, IX, 573, 581
Thrasher, Brig. Gen. Charles O., 9, 35, 78,80, 84, Troop flow
111, 169 to Continent, 303, 423-24, 430,449-50, 454-55,
TIGER,345, 351-52, 354, 359, 361, 365, 372 457,467
Tiger. See German Tigers. to United Kingdom, 104, 120, 122, 134, 135, 139,
TOMBOLA, 323, 444 166,231-34
Ton, long, 135n Troop labor, 243,250, 253
Ton, measurement, 135n Troop lift
Ton, ship, 135n to Continent, 301
TONNAGE, 350 from Middle East-Indian Ocean program, 58
TORCH,89-99, 109, 110, 111-13, 114, 117, 120, 139, shortage of, 57-58
140, 158, 159-61, 169, 175, 176, 191-92, 256, Troop movements, 88, 129-30, 132, 137, 139,234,
319, 331, 341,367,369. See also North African 423-24, 450
Theater of Operations. Troop replacement. See Replacements.
Torquay, 351 Troyes, 488
Toul, 552 Trucks. See Motor transport; Red Ball Express (motor
Toulon, 480 transport on the Continent); Transportation.
Tours, 189,2 2 3 n 324 Truscott, Col. Lucian K., Jr., 340
Traffic Control Points, 564 T U P (twin unit pack), 66n, 156
Traffic Regulating Group, 6811th, 552n Turn-round, 423, 425
Train ferry, 545 Turn-Round Control (TURCO), 364
Training and Security Division, SOS, 164 Twelfth Air Force, See Air Force units.
Transportation, 231, 234-39, 314-18, 365-66, 432-33, Twining, Maj. Gen. Nathan F., 202
450, 510, 513, 544-83. See also Motor transport; Type loading, 236-37. See also Prestowage.
INDEX 615

UGLYsystem, 140-46 Verneuil, 560

Ulster, 20, 22 Versailles, 499, 567
Uncle Red, 387, 399,401, 402 Vierville-sur-Mer, 185, 379, 390,434
Unit of fire, 306-07, 306-07n Villedieu, 494, 495
United Nations, 88, I 15 Vire, 469, 475-76, 494, 495, 510, 511, 547,565
United States Army Air Forces in the United King- Vire River, 376, 377,429
dom (USAAFUK), 192, 193, 202, 203. See also Visiting Forces Act (Br.), 50
Air Force, U.S.
United States Army Forces in the British Isles Walker, Col.John S., 529
(USAFBI), 21-39, 46-50, 55,56,61-62 War Department, 144,286,456
United States Army Northern Ireland Force on BOLERO build-up, 104, 114
(USANIF), 23, 25-26, 84. See also Corps, V. on BOLERO-ROUNDUP, 107
United States Chiefs of Staff. SeeJoint Chiefs of Staff. directive, 8 June 1942, 40
United States Embassy in London, 16, 76 control over shipment of supplies, 92-93
United States Military Mission to Great Britain, 16, G–1,463
21,46 on PROCO, 260-61
United States neutrality, 14, 20, 21 relations with ETOUSA, 110-11, 126-27
United States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF), 202, reorganization, 37,47
203, 224, 263, 437, 579. See alsoAir Force, U.S. on replacements, 305-06
USAAFUK. See United States Army Air Forces in the “Tentative Movement Schedule,” 58
United Kingdom. troop basis, 117, 124-29, 304
USAFBI. See United States Army Forces in the British on troop flow, 449
Isles. on UGLYsystem, 141
USANIF. See United States Army Northern Ireland War Department General Staff, 127, 133
Force. War Department Operations Division. See Operations
USSTAF. See United States Strategic Air Forces. Division, War Department.
UTAHBeach, 290, 292, 302, 312, 348-50, 351-52, War Department SOS. See Services of Supply, USA.
389-90, 431, 432, 434, 500, 536, 573 War Office (Br.), 62, 73, 74, 76, 81-83, 91, 98, 106,
airborne troops, 386 110, 122, 144, 242,277, 278, 363,579
brigades, 343, 399-400, 410-11 War Plans Division, G H Q 20
D Day, 374-76, 384-89 War Shipping Administration, 135, 137, 144, 281,
development of, 397-401 364
dumps, 473 Warren, Col. Ross B., 560
as first continental line of communications, 282-83 Warton, 30-31
GOOSEBERRY, 277-78 Wasp, 18
harbor, 402 Waterproofing, 367,368-69
location of, 188 Watford, 84
NOIC (Naval Officer in Command), 400-401, 407 Weather. See also Storm, 19-22June 1944.
physical characteristics, 384-86 D Day, 374-75
ponton causeways, 278 effect on Cross-channel movement, 270-71
ship-to-shore operations, 400 Weaver, Brig. Gen. William G., 98n, 162, 164, 169,
storm, 19-22 June 1944,406- 15 170
supply clearance, 398 Weight of individual equipment, 380-81, 380-81n
tonnage capacity 389-90, 397-98, 401,407,411- “Wems,” 248
13,415-16, 464,465 Wernher, Brigadier Sir Harold, 278
Western Base Section. See Base Sections, Western.
Valognes, 313, 435, 436 Western Command (Br.), 339
Vannes, 324 Weyand, Col. Alexander M., 78
Varreville, 185 Weymouth, 348, 360,372
Vaughan, Brig. Gen. Harry B., 9-10, 169, 207, 210, WHALE, 275-76, 278,280,406,415
211, 435 Wharton, Brig. Gen. James E., 10, 387, 388
Vehicle Whipple, Col. William, 453, 483
assembly, 156-58, 313 White, Brigadier Bruce G., 286
discharge, 404,419-20 White, Maj. Gen. Miller G., 463
lift, 452 “Willow Run,” 227-30
maintenance, 443 Wilson, Maj. Gen. Arthur R., 10
waterproofing, 367,368-70 Wilson, Brig. Gen. Robert W., 10
Venning, Lt. Gen. Sir Walter, 62 Wilton, 84
Verdun, 479,485,488,552 Wood, Maj. Gen. Leonard, 33
616 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE ARMIES

Woolacombe, 341,342 Wylie, Brig. Gen. Robert H., 95

Wootten, Maj. Gen. Richard M., 62-66, 70, 105-06, Wyman, Col. Theodore, Jr., 347, 359
241. See also Deputy Quartermaster General
(Br.). XYZ operation, 571
World War I experience relative to ETOUSA and Yank, 366,571
SOS, 223,223n
“World Wide System” (Br.), 391 Zone of interior, 92-94, 139, 171
Wycombe Abbey, 30 Zoning system in United Kingdom, 144-45