Globalization and its Political Consequences:

The Effects on Party Politics in the West

Helen V. Milner, Princeton University∗

Current Draft: September 20, 2018

Abstract

Globalization has grown much since 1980s. What political trends have been associated with
this growth? This paper examines two aspects of the political consequences of globalization.
Economic globalization, according to some economic theories, has adverse consequences for la-
bor, especially less skilled labor, in the rich democracies. If these voters are the median, then
we might expect parties to respond to this by turning against globalization and the openness to
flows of goods, services, people and capital that it brings. Have parties turned against economic
openness? And have parties, especially extreme right-wing ones, that oppose openness advanced
in terms of their electoral strength as a result? Furthermore, have these pressures from global-
ization been mitigated by social welfare policies, as earlier research claimed? First, updating and
extending the research of Burgoon (2009), I ask whether political parties in the advanced indus-
trial countries have adopted more anti-internationalist platforms as globalization has advanced.
Second, I examine whether parties have been affected deferentially by globalization; in particular,
have extreme, right-wing populist parties gained vote share as globalization has proceeded, while
mainstream left ones have lost. The evidence suggests that globalization, especially trade, is
associated with a political turn to anti-internationalism and to extremist parties.

Word Count: 13647 words (Excluding Abstract, Appendix, and References)

∗
Prepared for the annual APSA conference, August 2018 Boston MA. Thanks to Dominic De Sapio, Sayumi
Miyano, and Bryan Schonfeld for their excellent research assistance. Many thanks to Noam Gidron, Nita Rudra,
Bryan Schonfeld, for their helpful comments on various versions. Comments from the conference on “Globalization,
Polarization and the Eroding Foundations of International Order” at Stanford University in June 2017, from the
colloquium at the Institut des Sciences Politiques in Paris in October 2017, and from the Nuffield College Comparative
Politics seminar in Oxford in February 2018 have been very helpful.
1 Introduction
Globalization has grown much since 1980s. What trends in politics have been associated with this
growth? This paper examines two aspects of the political consequences of globalization, involving
the party systems in established democracies. Over the years concerns about the compatibility of
democracy and capitalism have continuously been raised. But with a global capitalist market now in
place these concerns have been magnified. In a globalized world will democracies be able to respond
to their publics so that their citizens remain supportive of democracy itself? Or, will globalization
affect publics and party systems in such ways that majorities of the public and their political parties
turn against not just incumbent governments and globalization but against democratic governance
itself?
Economic globalization, according to some economic theories, is likely to have adverse conse-
quences for labor, especially less skilled labor, in the rich democracies. If these voters are the
median, then we might expect political parties to respond to this by turning against globalization
and the openness to flows of goods, services, people and capital that it brings. Have parties turned
against economic openness? And have parties that oppose openness advanced in terms of their elec-
toral strength as a result? Earlier research showed that certain conditions could mitigate the effects
of globalization. This research looked at the role of left parties and labor organizations and the size
of the welfare state. Strong left parties and labor organization as well as a large welfare state were
shown to dampen political reactions against globalization (Garrett 1995, 1998, Garrett and Mitchell
2001).1 Do these factors still exert such influences?
I examine two issues here. First, updating and extending the research of Burgoon (2009), I ask
whether political parties in the advanced industrial countries have adopted more anti-internationalist
and more nationalist and populist platforms as globalization has advanced. He showed that global-
ization as associated with more anti-internationalism but that social welfare spending could mitigate
this tendency.
Second, I ask whether certain types of parties, especially extremist ones, have gained vote share
as globalization has proceeded. I also examine whether centrist left parties, whose base of support
is the industrial working class, have lost vote share as globalization has advanced. Globalization
could have direct or indirect effects on politics. I explore both here, focusing on how it may operate
indirectly through deindustrialization. First, I show that deindustrialization is directly driven in part
1
In Milner (2018), I explore Garrett’s claims about left-labor strength and the welfare state with a very open
economy.

1
by globalization. Then I try to unpack the direct and indirect relationship between globalization
and party vote shares using mediation analysis. In future work I hope to look directly at voters’
preferences and see if rising globalization is associated with changes in their views.
The evidence here is cross-national. Recent research by economists and increasingly by political
scientists has become more micro in orientation. In part this is because of a frustration with poor
cross-national data and in part with concerns over causal inference in large-N cross-national studies.
These are both valid points. Given the highly regional implications of globalization, aggregate cross-
national studies may be very imprecise. But they still do present a picture of the broad correlations
and trends common to many countries. And replicating important prior research seems worthwhile
in order to understand how these broad patterns may have changed over time.
The evidence here suggests that globalization is having direct effects on party platforms and that
social welfare may not mitigate these effects as much any more. Trade and FDI are both generating
pressure for parties to adopt more anti-globalization platforms. And the extent of social welfare
spending in a country is not mitigating this much any more. Second, globalization is indirectly
exerting an impact on party vote shares. It is increasing support for extreme right-wing populist
ones and decreasing support for center left ones. This indirect effect is coming through its impact on
deindustrialization, which has affected all the major established democracies lately. Globalization
in these ways seems to be having a major impact on politics within developed democracies and to
be generating a reaction against itself.
The causal pathway(s) by which globalization may work to affect politics need greater attention.
I hope to investigate more in future work whether these effects come through globalization via rising
inequality (see Bourguignon 2015), through the effect of globalization on reduced job opportunities
and stagnant wages, through international financial liberalization and integration that facilitated
crises, or through globalization’s acceleration of technological change. Initial analyses here, however,
suggest that deindustrialization, or the relative decline of jobs in manufacturing, seems to be strongly
associated with rising extreme right-wing party votes. In future iterations I hope to examine these
other forces in greater depth, especially to see if they are related to globalization as deindustrialization
appears to be.

2 Main Questions and Theory

Since the 1970s, globalization — the cross-border movements of capital, goods, and people — has
expanded significantly. There have been immense welfare gains from this growth, especially from

2
trade, in both the developing and developed world. These gains have not been evenly distributed,
either within or across countries. Some economic theories — the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, in
particular — predict adverse distributional consequences for labor, especially less skilled labor, in
rich democracies.2 As Gordon (2017, p. 633) points out, “Globalization is working as in the classic
economic theory of factor price equalization, raising wages in developing countries and slowing their
growth in the advanced nations.” If these voters are the median in these countries, do political
parties respond by turning against globalization and openness to cross-national flows of goods,
services, people, and capital? If the means for compensating them no longer work, then do these
voters turn against openness and to populism?3
The questions addressed here are four. One, does globalization lead parties to adopt more anti-
internationalist and populist positions? Two, does globalization lead directly to more votes for
extremist parties, especially on the right? Three, does globalization indirectly affect politics through
other means? While there are many potential such mediators, here I focus on deindustrialization.
Four, can the traditional mechanisms posited in the literature, such as the social welfare state and
welfare spending, still compensate for the effects of globalization and moderate pressures for populism
and anti-internationalism?
This strand of research goes back to Polanyi (1957). He argued in The Great Transformation
that the growth of the capitalist market, including its opening to the global economy (especially the
Gold Standard) had led to the decline of democracy, rise of fascism, and war in the inter-war period.
He claimed that if the market was not regulated and embedded within society, it would disrupt
people’s lives so much they would turn against democracy and fall prey to extremism. Recently,
Rodrik in The Globalization Paradox has argued that democracy, national sovereignty, and extensive
globalization are not compatible; he stresses that preserving national diversity and democracy may
make sacrificing globalization an appealing alternative. After World War II, Ruggie (1982) noted
that the industrial countries adopted an “Embedded Liberalism” approach, combining the welfare
2
Evidence for this effect is widespread: stagnant wages for lower skilled workers for many years, rising inequality
within OECD countries, declining labor vs capital share of national income. For example, Baccaro and Pontusson
(2016, p. 184) note that “the extent to which the wage share [in national income] has declined since 1980 varies across
countries, but the broad OECD-wide pattern is quite striking. The shift in income from labor to capital in the past
thirty years would appear to be at least as pervasive and dramatic as the OECD-wide increase of household income
inequality since 1990.”
3
Globalization seems to be making global markets more synchronized and more correlated with one another.
“‘Business cycles across different markets are more correlated than they have ever been,’ said Mr. Saroliya,
of Oxford Economics. ‘It’s the global supply chain.”’ as quoted in Goodman, Peter S. 2018. “The Era of
Easy Money Is Ending, and the World Is Bracing for Shocks” New York Times 6 February. Available from
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/06/business/stocks-bonds-markets-central-banks.html. Globalization may
also be making politics among the advanced industrial countries more correlated with each other. Populism may spread
more easily in such a globalized world.

3
state with gradual economic opening and deregulation. The welfare state was seen as necessary
to compensate citizens for losses from globalization. Empirical research also confirmed that larger
state intervention in the economy tended to go hand-in-hand with economic openness. More open
countries were found to have larger government sectors (Cameron 1978, Katzenstein 1985, Rodrik
1998). But as globalization accelerated in the 1990s, scholars debated whether the welfare state
could grow and even continue in a very globalized world. Two prominent scholars argued that it
could but for different reasons (Garrett 1995, 1998, Garrett and Mitchell 2001). In a series of papers
and books, Garrett argued that strong left party government combined with strong labor unions
and labor organization would enable countries to avoid the pressures of globalization and maintain
large welfare states. Burgoon (2001, 2009) in a series of articles saw the welfare state as acting as a
brake on extremism in party politics under conditions of globalization. Garrett’s view is in line with
Polanyi’s original argument that strong labor organization and social democratic parties would be
the only way to preserve democracy in a global capitalist economy.4
Since the 1990s, scholars of party politics mainly in Europe have noted the rise of extremist
parties and especially of populist ones (see Betz 1994, Kitschelt 1996, Kriesi 2010, Mayer 2013,
Mudde 2007).5 Inglehart and Norris (2016) note that populist parties have entered into government
coalitions in 11 Western democracies recently, have grown their average vote share in national and
European elections from 5% to 13%, and have seen their average seat share rise from 4% to 13%.
There is, however, much debate over what is causing the rise of the far right parties and populism.
But first though, we should define populism, which also remains a bit vague and contested. Mudde
(2007) says that a main defining characteristic of populism is nativism, which combines nationalism
and xenophobia. But populism also adds authoritarianism, combined with a strong sense of “the
people” against the elite. “Nativism feeds upon the feeling of endangered or threatened ethnic
or national identity, linked most likely to the process of European integration, mass immigration,
and the mechanism of multiculturalism” (Mudde 2007, p. 297). Much of this, he maintains, is
driven by discontent and resentment linked to modernization and globalization. Müller (2016) in his
book on populism stresses that populism contains anti-elite, anti-pluralist, anti-openness, and anti-
liberal sentiments that elevate “the people” who are seen as one unified national community against
the distrusted, cosmopolitan elites. He emphasizes more the anti-elite and anti-democratic side of
4
Note that those voting for the radical right in France are from the less skilled workforce who face import competition
and technological change most strongly. As Mayer (2013, p. 171) points out: “Marine Le Pen attracts even more
working class voters than her father: the first hit by the economic post 2008 crisis, the most exposed to unemployment
and precariousness, and the most discontented with Sarkozy’s policies. They gave her a record score of 33 percent.
But she has not as yet managed to extend her influence to middle and upper class voters.”
5
See the review by Golder (2016).

4
populism, while Mudde (2007) focuses much on the nationalist, anti-internationalist component;
however, both seem to agree on many elements of the populist character.
Two interesting strands of the research on party politics in Western Europe note the connection
between changes in party systems and globalization. Kriesi et al. (2006) and Kriesi (2010, 2014)
in various papers argues that populism arises in part from a new cleavage. As Kriesi et al. (2006,
p. 922) write, “the processes of increasing economic (sectoral and international) competition, of
increasing cultural competition (which is, among other things, linked to massive immigration of
ethnic groups who are rather distinct from the European populations) and of increasing political
competition (between nation-states and supra-or international political actors) create new groups of
‘winners’ and ‘losers’.” Globalization has created a new cleavage in European politics; globalization’s
winners and losers now define that cleavage.6 Kriesi et al. (2006, p. 922) further note the different
preferences of the two groups: “losers of the globalization process to seek to protect themselves
through protectionist measures and through an emphasis on the maintenance of national boundaries
and independence. Winners, by contrast, who benefit from the increased competition, support the
opening up of the national boundaries and the process of international integration. We shall refer
to the antagonism between winners and losers of globalization as a conflict between integration and
demarcation.” He claims that parties have begun competing to capture these voters and aligning
across this new cleavage.7 Indeed, the changes in European party systems over the past few decades
are attributed largely to this new cleavage around globalization.8 Moreover, he views these losers as
potentially very powerful politically; they do not have exit options and thus must stay and fight.9
He views the economic and cultural cleavage that comes with it as inseparable. The main
cultural elements of the losers are defense of the nation and nationalism, defense of traditional values,
opposition to the EU and other international organizations, and deep opposition to immigration.
6
“. . . new right-populist parties which, for more than 20 years now have spearheaded the nationalist reaction to eco-
nomic (neoliberal reform of the economy including delocalisation, liberalisation of financial markets, and privatisation),
cultural (immigration), and political (European integration, internationalisation of politics) processes of denationali-
sation do not simply articulate a populist challenge to the mainstream parties which habitually govern. Instead, they
articulate a new structural conflict that opposes globalisation ‘losers’ to globalisation ‘winners’.” Kriesi (2014, p. 369)
7
Kriesi (2014, p. 369) “a new structural conflict that opposes globalisation ‘losers’ to globalisation ‘winners’. In
several countries, the success of these new populist challengers has given rise to the transformation of established
parties which start to compete for the mobilisation of the demands of the ‘losers’. Some of these new challengers or
transformed established parties have taken up government responsibilities.”
8
Kriesi et al. (2006, p. 929) “those parties that most successfully appeal to the interests and fears of the ‘losers’ of
globalization to be the driving force of the current transformation of the Western European party systems. In most
countries, it is these parties of the populist right (Decker 2004) who have been able to “formulate a highly attractive
ideological package for the ‘losers’ of economic transformations and cultural diversity.”
9
Kriesi et al. (2006, p. 929) “Moreover, the mobilization of the ‘losers’ is particularly consequential because, in
contrast to the ‘winners’, the ‘losers’ typically do not have individual exit options at their disposal. To improve their
situation, they depend on collective mobilization.”

5
Thus the losers become ripe for the populist movement, some on the right and some on the left.10 The
winners from globalization will gravitate toward and be attracted by mainstream centrist parties.11
He (2006, p. 950), however, claims that the cultural dimension is becoming increasingly important:
“as the positions of parties usually vary as strongly with respect to the cultural issues as with respect
to the economic ones. Both dimensions are polarizing. Furthermore, the cultural dimension has
been gaining in importance as it has become the primary basis on which new parties or transformed
established parties seek to mobilize their electorate.”
In another branch of the literature, scholars have argued that transnationalism has brought huge
changes to the party systems. Hooghe and Marks (2018) describe a new transnational cleavage.
They document the “emergence of a transnational cleavage, which has as its core a political reaction
against European integration and immigration. The perforation of national states by immigration,
integration and trade may signify a critical juncture in the political development of Europe no less
decisive for parties and party systems than the previous junctures that Lipset and Rokkan (1967)
detect in their classic article. For challenging parties on the radical right these issues relate to the
defense of national community against transnational shocks. The European Union (EU) is itself such
a shock, because it introduces rule by those who are regarded as foreigners, diminishes the authority
exercised by national states over their own populations, produces economic insecurity among those
who lack mobile assets, and facilitates immigration.” Europeanization and the wider globalization
of which it is a part thus seem to generate the forces that engender a populist backlash.
What is the causal story linking globalization to populism or the extreme right? Some scholars
(see Mayer et al. 2015) suggest that globalization leads to a dual labor market: one consisting of
insiders and outsiders. Insiders have long-term contracts and secure well-paying jobs; they support
for status quo. Outsiders, who are unemployed or in temporary work, form of the basis of this
populist reaction; they express their fear and anger through support for extreme right parties, whose
rhetoric about immigrants is very powerful for them. But for this factor to operate as a cause
globalization has to be related to dualization of the labor market. And outsiders have to have
preferences that the extreme right also promotes. Why aren’t outsiders drawn to the (extreme) left,
10
Kriesi (2014, p. 369-70) notes that the left and right populists want different things however. “I expect the populist
right to mobilise in defence of the national identity, the national political community, and of the nation-state, while I
expect the lefts populist mobilisations to take the form of the defence of the national welfare state (e.g. mobilisation
against Europe in the name of the national social welfare state model) as well as in defence of the economic privileges
of domestic sectors of the economy and of domestic production sites.”
11
Kriesi et al. (2006, p. 926) “in Western Europe, (a) mainstream parties will generally tend to formulate a winners
programme (i.e., a programme in favour of further economic and cultural integration), but that (b) mainstream parties
on the left will attempt to combine the economic integration with the preservation of the social protection by the
welfare state, while mainstream parties on the right will tend to reduce the role of the state in every respect.”

6
as they seem to have been in the past?
Cultural arguments for the rise of populism exist as well, but these also seem to be related to
globalization. Bornschier (2010, p. 3) articulates the position that rise of populism and the rad-
ical right are due to a new cultural cleavage: “As a consequence, a new cultural conflict gained
center stage in Western European party systems in the 1990s. One side holds universalistic concep-
tions of community and advocates individual autonomy; the other emphasizes the right to preserve
traditional communities in which common moral understandings have developed and are seen as
threatened by multicultural society’. He continues claiming that “[a] central argument developed in
this book is that the rise of the populist right is a consequence of the growing salience of the new
cultural dimension of conflict at the expense of the economic state-market cleavage.”
Bornschier (2010, p. 5) “the populist right rides the tide of a broader societal movement that
represents a counter-offensive to the universalistic values advocated by the New Social Movements
that came up in the 1960s. A new cultural line of conflict has thereby taken shape across Europe
that puts libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values in opposition”. The
main elements of this cultural program for the radical right are three, according to Bornschier (2010,
p. 17-18): “The discourse of right-wing populist parties now centers on three convictions. The
parties claim, first, that traditional norms based on common understanding stand over abstract
universalistic principles. Second, they claim that multicultural society destroys the ‘organically
grown’ national community and thus dilutes those traditional norms. And third, they insist on
the primacy of politics, in that majority decisions taken within a political community stand above
universalistic normative principles and decisions taken by supranational political authorities such as
the European Union (EU). . . the populist right’s traditionalist-communitarian discourse represents
a polar normative ideal to the libertarian-universalistic conviction of the New Left.” Note however
that the last two ideas are directly related to the economic cleavage identified by Kriesi (2010) as
deriving from globalization. Multiculturalism and supranationalism are fostered by globalization.
Inglehart and Norris (2016) try to separate out the two sets of causes, and they argue for the
primacy of the cultural. They delineate an economic inequality and insecurity motivation and
a cultural backlash one. While admitting that these two may be linked, they argue for a new
political cleavage pitting those with populist values against cosmopolitan liberal ones. They claim
that this cultural cleavage now dominates the former left-right one based on socio-economic issues.
Moreover, they (2016, p. 4) show that economic insecurity does not have a consistent relationship
with populist support but that certain cultural values do: “populist support was strengthened by

7
anti-immigrant attitudes, mistrust of global and national governance, support for authoritarian
values, and left-right ideological self-placement.” They (2016, p. 4-5) conclude by noting that
“cultural values, combined with several social and demographic factors, provide the most consistent
and parsimonious explanation for voting support for populist parties; their contemporary popularity
in Europe is largely due to ideological appeals to traditional values which are concentrated among
the older generation, men, the religious, ethnic majorities, and less educated sectors of society.”
But Kriesi (2010) argues that it is virtually impossible to separate cultural from economic ar-
guments. As Kriesi (2010, p. 680) notes, “not only that conflicts between winners and losers of
denationalization are increasing, but also that, as we have argued, they are mainly fought out in
cultural terms.” For instance, in France, the best predictor in 2012 [for votes for the National Front]
was having negative feelings about the EU. 12 Again the reasons seem to combine inseparably eco-
nomic and cultural factors: ”In the present context of global crisis, Europe is seen as the open door
on a threatening outside world, as the main factor of economic, political and cultural insecurity.
Protection is at the heart of the 2012 Le Pen votes as confirmed by other studies based on quali-
tative data (Mergier and Fourquet (2011, p. 77-85) as cited in Mayer (2013, p. 168)). For many
scholars including Kriesi et al. (2006, p. 928), the economic and cultural elements of the globalization
cleavage are tightly interlinked:

The populist right’s opposition to the opening up of the borders is first of all an opposition
to the social and cultural forms of competition and the threat they pose to national
identity. The main characteristics of the populist right are its xenophobia or even racism,
expressed in a fervent opposition to the presence of immigrants in Western Europe, and
its populist appeal to the widespread resentment against the mainstream parties and the
dominant political elites.

Gidron and Hall (2017a,b) also argue that the combination of economic change in part wrought
by globalization and changes in society have generated growing support for populism. They combine
in a sophisticated and interesting way cultural and economic factors to explain populism. In their
BJS article they show that the social status of white, working class men- defined by their levels of
education, income, and occupation- has declined for various reasons in the past twenty years and that
this group is the most supportive of populism in the West. The question is why now and why right-
12
“But the strongest predictor [for votes for the National Front in France] is the negative feeling about the EU:
declaring one would be greatly relieved if the EU were to be abandoned doubles the probability of voting for her
(Table 2). The 2012 presidential election confirms previous findings about votes for the far right in Western Europe
concerning the two main dimensions of the left right cleavage. What matters is not so much the position of voters on
the classical economically liberal/interventionist economic axis, as their position on a libertarian/authoritarian cultural
axis, and their degree of openness or closure to ‘others’ Bornschier (2010), Mudde (2007), Tiberj (2008), van der Waal,
Achterberg and Houtman (2007) ” (Mayer 2013, p. 168).

8
wing populism; declines in social status of groups occur all the time, but populism does not rise all
the time. They show that recent economic changes have been an important cause of this declining
status, thus triggering the rise in support among ”losers” from globalization. Further, they note
that one effect of this change in social status is increase alienation and foster social disintegration,
as these workers are forced out of the market or into low-pay, low-status jobs. As they (2017a, p. 2)
point out, “the basis on which populist parties rally electoral support, while multi-faceted, is often
deeply emotional, playing on feelings of anger, resentment or nostalgia that reflect alienation from
conventional politics. In many cases, populist parties mobilize people who would otherwise not vote
on the basis of appeals that are anathema to mainstream political elites.”
Economists have recently begun to research the topic of the political consequences of global-
ization. They have generally found strong effects of trade, especially imports from less developing
countries mainly China, on voters in different countries. The losses from trade can carry significant
adjustment costs in terms of job displacement and reduced earnings for individuals (Acemoglu et al.
2016, Autor et al. 2016, Autor, Dorn and Hanson 2013, Dauth, Findeisen and Suedekum 2014),
as well as health problems for exposed workers (Colantone, Rosario and Ogliari 2017, Hummels,
Munch and Xiang 2016, Lang, McManus and Schaur 2016, Pierce and Schott 2016). Rodrik (2010
location 1096) points out that the amount of redistribution from trade is usually many times larger
than the actual gains from trade; moreover, ”the gains from removing restrictions on trade run into
diminishing returns as trade becomes freer and freer, with the consequence that the distributional
effects begin to loom larger and larger.” These costs and the rising uncertainty and shocks associated
with globalization may create strong demands for assistance from the state; as others have shown,
they may increase demands for redistribution and compensation for the exposed individuals (Cusack,
Iversen and Rehm 2006, Margalit 2013, Rehm 2009, Walter 2010). When these demands are not
met or not met in a desirable way, then voters may become attracted to more extreme groups and
their programs.
Autor (Autor et al. 2016, Autor, Dorn and Hanson 2013) in a series of papers shows that districts
in the US most affected by surges in imports from China tended to remove moderate members of
congress and vote in more extreme ones, especially on the right. Colantone and Stanig (2018b) show
that increased trade especially Chinese imports leads voters to shift to the right, to increase support
for nationalist and extreme right parties in 15 west European countries from 1988-2007. Colantone
and Stanig (2018a) show that support for the “Leave” option in the UK was stronger in areas hit
hardest by trade. Dippel, Gold and Heblich (2016) demonstrate that German voters responded

9
similarly to increases in trade and especially imports from China and Eastern Europe; those in areas
most exposed to this trade tended to increase their support for extreme right parties the most.
These papers use micro-level data matching geographic data on imports to political constituencies
and then using public opinion or voting data. They are better able to pinpoint the causal nature of
the link between trade and political action, but they do not identify the causal mechanism as well.
One puzzle is why working class voters choose right-wing parties instead of their more “natural”
attachments to the left (Evans 2000). Colantone and Stanig (2018b, p. 4) claim that it is because
of the extreme right wing’s program of protectionism; “economic nationalism is a viable — albeit
inefficient — policy bundle that substitutes protectionism for the main components of ‘embedded
liberalism’: trade liberalization, redistribution, and compensation of social groups and geographic
regions negatively affected by global trade.” But the right in the advanced industrial countries has
tended to favor free trade more than the left (Milner and Judkins 2004); and it is not clear that
the extreme right now is most supportive of protectionism. For a long time, scholars assumed that
voters faced by the vicissitudes of openness to the global economy would demand compensation for
their losses in exchange for such openness, the so called “embedded liberalism” bargain (Ruggie
1982). Compensation via redistribution was the program of the left and seemed to attract working
class voters and damp preferences for extremism (see Burgoon 2009, Garrett 1998). Some scholars
now question whether such compensation is still appealing and effective. Gidron and Hall (2017b)
maintain that people whose social status has fallen and who feel left behind by globalization because
they are its unacknowledged “losers” prefer recognition over redistribution. “Our analysis suggests
that ‘compensation’ is not what these people are looking for. Voters for right populist parties are
not especially strong supporters of redistribution. What distinguishes them from other voters is a
feeling that they have not been treated with respect a sense that they are not fully valued members
of society. They care as much, or even more, about recognition as about redistribution” (Gidron and
Hall 2017b, p. 26). The questions now are whether compensation at a level necessary to support the
losers from globalization is possible, and whether it still appeals to voters.
What is the alternative to embedded liberalism? Is the only option left is an economic nationalism
program with protectionism? This closure would involve not just trade but also migration and
possibly capital flows. The economic nationalist bargain could offer this broad protectionism as a
way to “compensate” workers threatened by globalization. At the same time, if it is no longer needed
to mitigate globalization shocks or no longer believed to be effective, the welfare state could be cut
back, or even dismantled, which would reduce the government’s need for tax revenues. The promise

10
of lower taxes then could be combined with protectionism to appeal to other constituencies. The
whole platform could be motivated by an ideological appeal to nationalism and national nostalgia
for “making the country great again.” Is this the alternative being offered increasingly by extremist
parties, especially those on the right?

3 Globalization’s Growth
To provide a preliminary examination of globalization’s growth, I look at various measures of glob-
alization in a sample of 23 advanced OECD countries between 1970 and 2016.13 Globalization is a
multidimensional concept referring to the cross-border movements of capital, goods, and people. One
comprehensive measure aggregating these components is the KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher
2006). In this index, economic globalization refers to the creation of a single, unified world market
in which all national economies are tightly integrated. It is measured as actual flows of international
trade and investment minus restrictions like tariffs and capital controls. Social globalization captures
the flows and exchanges of people, information, and culture across borders. Finally, political glob-
alization refers to the number of embassies in a country and participation in international treaties
and organizations.
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of globalization and its subcomponents across 23 advanced economies.14
It reveals a substantial rise in the liberalization of trade and investment as well as greater social
and political integration since the 1970s. The mean value is 75 for the 23 advanced economies from
1970 to 2015 with Japan being the most “closed” in 1970 (KOF index = 49) and Belgium the most
integrated in 2014 (91). These advanced economies saw the fastest growth of globalization in the
1990s when the mean value rose approximately 10 points between 1990 and 2001. There is a tight
relationship between growth in economic and social globalization until 2000 when social globaliza-
tion begins to flatten out and economic globalization decreases. Political globalization has a large
increase starting in 1990 but also begins to flatten at the turn of the twenty-first century.
13
The 23 OECD countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great
Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
14
As for the developing countries, they began liberalizing later and were much more closed in the 1970s and 1980s
than the rich ones. But “about 1990, developing nations in regions around the world started to lower their tariffs. This
was not a triumph of the GATT or WTO, nor was it fundamentally related to the rash of regional agreements signed
among developing nations. The change was driven by conscious decisions by the nations themselves; quite simply, they
decided that high tariffs were hindering their development.” (Baldwin 2016, p. 101)

11
 KOF Globalization Index, 1970-2015
23 OECD members

90 80
KOF Index
70

Financial Crisis
60

End of Cold War

50

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Overall Globalization Index Economic Globalization

Political Globalization Social Globalization
Source: Dreher, 2006; Gygli, et al. 2018

Figure 1: KOF Globalization Index, 1970-2015. Mean values for the KOF Globalization Index and its
three subcomponents for 23 OECD countries.

What countries in this group experienced faster or greater levels of globalization? Despite the
overall rise in globalization, the advanced economies have not liberalized uniformly. The Netherlands
(89), Belgium (89), Ireland (86),and Luxembourg (85.5) were the most integrated in the global
political economy in 2015, with higher than average scores for economic globalization. At the lower
end, Japan has increased its involvement in international organizations and treaties (59 in 1970 to
91.5 in 2015) but its economic (64) and social (76) integration have remained limited.
To further investigate these differences, I look at some individual measures of economic and social
globalization from 1960 to 2016: trade flows, FDI net inflows and outflows, the share of the migrant
population, and international migration inflows. Trade flows are the share of exports and imports
in real GDP at current PPP and drawn from the World Bank (2018). Figure 2 depicts a secular
rise in trade openness from an average of 51 percent in 1960 to 98 in 2016. This masks considerable
variation between countries. Total trade as a percentage of GDP is small in large countries such as
the United States (about 9% in 1962) and grew 17 percentage points by 2016. By contrast, trade in
small countries such as Luxembourg and Belgium represents a disproportionate share of GDP (e.g.,
410% in Luxembourg in 2015).

12
 To capture movements of capital across borders, I investigate FDI net inflows and outflows from
the World Bank (2018) starting in 1970. Overall, FDI inflows compose a much smaller share of
GDP with a mean of 3.2%, but they are much more volatile than trade. For example, Luxembourg
has both the minimum and maximum values of FDI inflows ranging from -58% of GDP in 2007 to
252% in 2012. In addition to attracting large amounts of foreign investment, these countries are
considerable exporters of capital. FDI outflows track closely with inflows, surging just before the
2008 great recession.
I measure social integration by looking at both the stock and flows of international migrants.
First, I use the number of migrants as a share of total population from the World Bank (2018). On
average, migrants consisted of 9.5% the population across the 23 countries, with countries such as
Japan and Finland on the low end with a foreign population of less than one percent in the 1960s and
1970s. By contrast, Luxembourg’s foreign population peaks at 43.8% of its total population in 2015.
From the OECD’s International Migration Database, I look at inflows of international migrants,
which are based on population registers or residence permit data from 1984.15 The sample mean is
187,278 and a median of 80,400. Germany reported the largest influx of immigrants with over two
million people in 2015.
15
Estimates are only available for the U.S. and Canada prior to 1984.

13
 Economic & Social Globalization, 1960-2016
23 OECD members

100

300
Migrant Inflows (thousands)
80 End of Cold War

250
% GDP/Population
60

200
40

Financial Crisis

150
20

100
0

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Trade FDI Inflows

FDI Outflows Migrant Stocks
Migrant Inflows (thousands)
Source: WDI, 2018; UNCTAD, 2018; OECD/UN 2018.

Figure 2: Economic and Social Globalization Measures. Overall trade flows as share of GDP, FDI net
inflows and outflows as share of GDP, migrant population as total population share, and foreign population
inflows in the thousands for 23 OECD countries.

Figure 2 depicts differences in these trends, showing that trade flows and FDI inflows take off
in the 1990s. However, after the 1999 dot-com crisis and 2008 great recession, both trade flows and
FDI inflows drop considerably. Due to the large variance and skew in these measures, I log transform
the flow measures to smooth the overall distribution in the regression analysis. For FDI flows, which
take both negative and positive values, I take the symmetric log to preserve the sign and add a small
constant to the absolute value before logging its value.
What have been the economic and political effects of globalization? Economic theory provides an
initial expectation about the economic effects of globalization. Stolper-Samuelson and Heckscher-
Ohlin theories spell out the distributional effects of trade. Overall, under many conditions trade
benefits the entire national as a whole but it hurts certain groups. Low-skilled individuals, who
remain the majority even in these countries, are the ones who are most likely to see negative effects,
as their jobs migrate to developing countries with cheaper labor and their replacement wages fall.
Both increases in imports, mainly manufactured products, and offshoring by multinational firms
have contributed to the exit of firms in lower skilled industries and the loss of jobs and decline in
wages for workers in these areas. Economists have focused on the large surge in Chinese imports

14
(mostly manufactured goods) into developed countries to estimate the effects of trade on exposed
regions of a developed country. The loss of jobs, closing of factories, and decline in wages for low
skill workers that they document is notable. However, as others have noted, all working people may
feel more insecurity as trade and capital mobility create a global market with greater wage elasticity.
As Rodrik (1998) and Scheve and Slaughter (2004) show, employment and wages may become more
volatile as globalization rises, fueling general insecurity.
In addition to effects on wages and jobs, trade and globalization more generally may induce
faster technological change. Recent research suggests that such change is skill-biased and probably
exacerbates the distributional effects of trade in developed countries. Economists have pointed out
that skill-biased technological change can explain much of the reduced demand for lower skilled
labor in developed countries and the wage stagnation they have experienced in the past twenty years
(Autor, Levy and Murnane 2003, Berman, Bound and Machin 1998).
While many economists accept skill-biased technological change as an explanation for wage stag-
nation and rising inequality in the developed world, the debate has centered on the role of trade,
foreign investment- especially offshoring and outsourcing- and immigration on the speed of techno-
logical change. Wood (1998) was an early proponent of the claim that globalization was the prime
factor in this process. More recent empirical evidence suggests that trade can explain up to 20-25% of
the recent decline in US manufacturing jobs.16 The remaining 75-80% is explained by other factors,
such as technological change.17 But globalization may indirectly stimulate technological change,
and it may also reinforce the effects of such change. Just like technological change, trade increases
the relative demand for high-skilled workers, as well as the nominal wages of high-skilled workers
relative to low-skilled workers in developed countries (Acemoglu 2003). However, trade increases the
purchasing power of poor, low-skilled workers by enabling them to purchase a more affordable and
wider variety of imported products therefore increasing their wages in real terms. But this benefit is
often less apparent to voters than is their wage or job availability. Immigration has also been noted
as a force for wage stagnation in the developed world. Low skill immigrants can increase the supply
of low skill workers and thus reduce their wages and job opportunities, as Goldin and Katz (2008)
16
”Our calculations suggest that, on average, only about one-tenth of the overall increase in inequality between
the 1980s and the 2000s can be attributed to the decline in the share of manufacturing jobs.” https://voxeu.org/
article/declining-share-manufacturing-jobs.
17
“An estimate that seems to capture the middle ground attributes 15 to 33 percent of the widening US wage gaps
to the rise in import competition from developing countries. Note that this is a share of wage inequality only, not total
income inequality, and only for the period up to the early 1990s. Within these limits, it leaves 67 to 85 percent of
the explanation for other forces, like political shocks, labor force growth, the financial boom, and education slowdown.
The share awaiting other explanations would be even greater for the total income inequality” (Lindert and Williamson
2016, p. 237).

15
point out.
Many scholars have attributed the rise in inequality to the process of globalization. Among the
OECD countries, income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient has widened from 0.37 in
1980 to 0.47 in 2011, and the income share of the top 10% increased from 28.8% to 35.3% during
this same period (Alvaredo et al., 2015; OECD, 2015).18 Bourguignon (2015, p. 117) says “within
nations globalization has often directly or indirectly contributed to a rise in inequality. Directly,
because it has lowered the relative compensation for unskilled labor in developed countries which
face direct competition from the cheap labor costs of emerging economies, and also because it has
increased the profits and remuneration of capital and highly skilled labor across the world.” It is
also seen as having increased technological change especially its rapidity and increasing the premium
paid to skilled labor as well as financial capital.19 As Bourguignon (2015, p. 115) points out, “First
of all, we should emphasize the major role played by globalization. It is the background for almost
all that has happened. It has changed the international climate for all national economies and
has profoundly modified their structures. By intensifying competition, it has accelerated the pace
of technological innovation and its consequences. It has induced financial liberalization in a large
number of countries and reinforced the mobility of capital.20 Although they are not presented as
such here, the general deregulatory movement and the weakening of the progressiveness of taxation
may themselves be an indirect consequence of globalization.” Growing inequality may reflect the
effects of globalization but there is much debate over whether and how much it does.21
18
Alvaredo, F., Atkinson, A.B., Piketty, T., Saez, E., Zucman, G., 2015. The World Wealth and Income Database
(WID), http://www.wid.world
19
The implications of technological change in the advanced industrial countries are as “An earlier literature on
skill-biased technological change associated these developments to the significant increase in wage inequality between
those with university degrees and those with a high school degree or less (Katz and Murphy, 1992). More recently,
technological change is argued to promote a significant decrease in the share of routine occupations that occupy the
middle of the educational and wage distributions. Information technology, therefore, does not lead to linear upskilling
of work, but rather to a process of polarization (Autor et al. 2016, Spitz-Oener 2006)” , according to Thewissen and
Rueda (2017, p. 2).
20
Globalization has induced more capital mobility and perhaps more inequality via tax competition. “There has
been a remarkable reduction in corporate taxes around the world since the early 1980s. The average for the member
countries of the OECD countries, excluding the United States, has fallen from around 50 percent in 1981 to 30 percent
in 2009. In the United States , the statutory tax on capital has come down from 50 percent to 39 percent over the same
period (Location 3108). . . A study on OECD tax policies finds that when other countries reduce their average statutory
corporate tax rate by 1 percentage point the home country follows by reducing its tax rate by 0.7 percentage points
(Location 3160). . . There are thousands of bilateral investment treaties ( BITs ) and hundreds of bilateral or regional
trade agreements ( RTAs ) currently in force. Governments use them to promote trade and investment links in ways
that go beyond what the WTO and other multilateral arrangements permit. A key objective is to provide a higher
level of security to foreign investors by undertaking stronger external commitments.” Rodrik Globalization Paradox
2010. US corporate tax rates were further reduced in 2018, now around 21%. The OECD average has now declined
to about 24%. In 1987 the simple OECD average was around 45%. https://taxfoundation.org/oecd-corporate-
income-tax-rates-1981-2013/
21
Gordon (2017, p. 606) in assessing why inequality has risen points out that the very top income earners have gained
for various reasons and the bottom income earners have lost out due to other reasons: “The rapid pace of advance in

16
 It is also important to note that globalization has changed over time in the past 30 years. As
Baldwin (2016, p. 86) has argued in his book, The Great Convergence, since 1990 globalization has
changed course.22 The unbundling of production and the creation of global value chains dramatically
changed the world economy. With the ICT revolution, ideas and technological knowledge became
much easier to transfer and hence this led to the joining of Northern knowledge with Southern low
cost labor to produce ever more competitive goods and services. This “unbundling — sometimes
called the global value chain revolution” — redrew the international boundaries of knowledge. The
contours of industrial competitiveness are now increasingly defined by the outlines of international
production networks rather than the boundaries of nations” (Baldwin 2016, p. 6). In this new
environment, it is not clear who wins and loses from globalization. 23 As Baldwin (2016, p. 147)
tells us, “when sources of comparative advantage cross international borders, it is not sure that
all nations win. . . . If the firms from a nation, say Austria, transfer technology abroad in a way
that increases the international competition facing Austrian exports, then the Austrians working in
Austria may well lose.” The story of globalization before 2000 was that high-skill workers in rich
nations won, while low-skill workers in rich nations lost, and vice versa for the developing world.
Now it is less sectors or skill groups that win or lose but more individual based. As Baldwin (2016, p.
167-169) says, “One implication is that it is less useful to classify the winners and losers according to
the sector in which they work or the skill group to which they belong. By fragmenting the production
processes, the New Globalization shifted competition from a sector-by-sector type of competition to
a stage-by-stage type of competition. . . globalization could help a particular type of worker in one
sector if the offshoring boosted the competitiveness of the stage in which the worker found herself.
But the same type of worker with the same skill set in the same company could be hurt if she
happened to be working in a stage that was offshored.” This also means that unions which are
organized along sector or skill levels are no longer very useful.
incomes at the top, particularly within the top 1 percent, can be explained by a set of factors that have boosted top
incomes, including the economics of superstars, changing incentives for executive compensation, and capital gains on
real estate and the stock market. Income stagnation for the bottom 90 percent of the distribution has a different set of
causes, including the effect of automation in destroying middle-income jobs, an erosion of the strength of labor unions,
the decline in the purchasing power of the minimum wage, the effect of imports in the shrinkage of the manufacturing
sector, and the role of both high-skilled and low-skilled immigration.”)
22
“The New Globalization has turned this situation on its head. The North — the group of countries called ‘in-
dustrialized nations’ twenty years ago — has seen a rapid fall in the number of jobs and value added shares in the
manufacturing sector. At the same time, manufacturing output has soared in six developing nations — called the
Industrializing Six (I6) — namely, China, Korea, India, Indonesia, Thailand, and Poland.”
23
“In the decades straddling the year 2000, almost a fifth of the worlds manufacturing shifted from the G7 to the I6.
This rapid industrialization triggered historically unprecedented income growth. Since almost half of humanity lives in
the I6 nations, their growth takeoffs sparked a commodity super-cycle that “lifted the boats” of commodity-exporting
nations around the world.” (Baldwin 2016, p. 136)

17
 Hence Baldwin (2016, p. 175) points out that in this unbundling process, “In both sunrise and
sunset sectors, some production stages moved, others did not. As a consequence, the winners and
losers from globalization are much harder to predict. As this recombination is happening inside the
contours of global value chains, national boundaries are no longer the only relevant frontiers when
thinking about international competition. Nations that try to compete on the basis of purely national
competencies find it increasingly difficult to compete with those who are mixing and matching
national competencies. . . globalization’s impact on national economies is less predictable and more
individual. The fact that it is driven by information and communication technology means the
impact is also more sudden and less controllable.” All of which means that there is more uncertainty
and insecurity at individual level. And this deep sense of insecurity may have political effects.

4 The Backlash Against Globalization

I focus on globalization and its backlash in terms of party platforms and especially those on foreign
policy. What does the domestic reaction to globalization mean for party politics and for the politics of
foreign policy? Is globalization leading parties to change their programs and become more nationalist,
more anti-internationalist, more autarchic and generally more populist?
The exact causal pathway that would induce this kind of change in party platforms is much
harder to pin down. Evidence exists that bad economic circumstances for individuals in developed
democracies do lead to more support for extreme parties on the right or left (Gomez, Morales and
Ramiro 2016, Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers 2002, Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017, Rydgren 2013,
Werts, Scheepers and Lubbers 2013). Right-extremism is associated more with nativism and anti-
immigration, while left-extremism is more about anti-capitalism, redistribution, and inequality. As
bad times spread, this suggests support for the extremes may grow. But what is it exactly that mo-
tivates extremist support in terms of an individual’s economic situation? Is it actual unemployment
or feared, low and falling real wages, inequality, rising prices and inflation? Any or all of these may
generate dissatisfaction with mainstream parties, and globalization as noted above may be linked
to most of them. In anticipation of loss of support then, more mainstream parties may adopt more
extreme positions. All parties may shift their platforms as economic circumstances change. And
finally if globalization affects or is believed to affect an individual’s economic situation negatively,
individuals and parties may blame it and turn against it as well.
A first step to examine this claim is to follow Burgoon (2009). He looks at political party mani-
festos in the rich, advanced industrial countries over time and how they have approached certain pol-

18
icy issues. He identifies two measures that focus much on foreign policy issues but also include some
domestic ones: net autarky and net nationalist autarky.24 These measures examine party po-
sitions on trade protectionism, internationalism, nationalism, multiculturalism, traditionalism, and
democracy. Rejection of engagement in the international system, of international institutions for
cooperation and of globalization itself are key foreign policy elements of a populist backlash.
First, Net autarky is composed of (1) Protectionism, support for and opposition to trade pro-
tectionism (per406 and per407, respectively, in the CMP codes); (2) Internationalism, support for
and opposition to international institutions (per107 and per109, respectively); and (3) European
Union, support for and opposition to authority of the EU as opposed to national sovereignty (per108
and per110, respectively). This measure captures how much a party in a given election prioritizes
statements that advocate autarky: that is, support for protectionism, opposition to international
institutions and to the EU. Positive values represent net support for autarky, and negative values
represent net opposition to autarky.
The other measure, net nationalist autarky, is a composite of issues that gauge not only
support for anti-internationalism, but also for political nationalism, traditionalism, xenophobia, and
anti-democratic sentiment. This variable supplements a party’s support for autarky as defined above
with the following elements: (1) multiculturalism, support for and opposition to multiculturalism
and ethnic-linguistic-religious cultural diversity in the country (per607 and per608, respectively);
(2) National way of life, support for and criticism of patriotism, nationalism and laws to protect
established ideas (per601 and per602, respectively); (3) Traditional morality, support for and op-
position to traditional values and censorship or other laws to protect established national religion
and values (per603 and per604, respectively); (4) Constitutionalism, support for and criticism of
accepting constitutional constraints and ‘constitutional way of doing things’ (per203 and per204, re-
spectively); and (5) Democracy and freedom/human rights, support for principles and legal specifics
of minority protection and democratic procedure and of individual and political freedoms (per201
and per202, respectively). This measure captures how much a party puts emphasis on traditional
morality, multiculturalism, nationalist patriotism, and democracy and human rights. These mea-
sures provide a broad assessment of backlash as it combines the many different elements of a populist
reaction.
In addition to these two measures, I use a third measure, which Burgoon (2012) uses as well.
Looking at data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (2017), I ask whether parties in the rich
24
In later work Burgoon (2012) calls net autarky now anti-globalization.

19
democracies have turned against engagement with the international economy. Has Anti-Internationalism,
net opposition to international institutions, risen or fallen? Specifically, this measure captures opposi-
tion to minus support for international institutions (per107 and per109, respectively). This includes
references to foreign assistance, global governance, international courts, global plans of resources, and
international organizations. Negative references toward international cooperation include favorable
mentions of national sovereignty, isolation, or unilateralism as opposed to internationalism.

Evolution of Backlash, 1960-2015

23 OECD Countries in the Comparative Manifesto Project
-2
Net Scores (4-yr avg)
-4

End of Cold War

-8 -6

Financial Crisis
-10

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Net Autarky Nationalist Autarky

Anti-Internationalism
Source: Burgoon, 2009; Lehmann et al, 2016.

Figure 3: Evolution of Backlash in 23 OECD Countries Four-year mean values of net autarky, nation-
alist autarky, and anti-internationalism across all parties in 23 advanced economies. Positive values represent
net support for each measure with +100 as the theoretical maximum, and negative values represent net
opposition for each measure with -100 as the theoretical minimum.

Figure 3 depicts yearly averages for net autarky, nationalist autarky, and anti-internationalism for
the 23 OECD countries in Burgoon’s dataset from 1960-2015. On average, support for net autarky
and anti-internationalism actually decline during the 1970s and 1980s but then rise beginning in 1991,
reaching their highest levels lately. This is the inverse of globalization trends in these countries.25
These two measures have mean values of -2.88 and -2.16, respectively, indicating that that the
average party manifesto is not autarkic or anti-internationalist. Consistent with Burgoon’s findings
25
An alternative explanation could be a lag in responses to globalization. That is, the KOF index flattens during
1985-1990, and rises again from 1990s up to 2005. Capital flows in OECD countries are modest until the late 1990s
and soar upward from then.

20
(p. 153), the standard deviations for both scores are quite high: 5.02 for net autarky and 3.3 for anti-
internationalism, which are both higher than the mean. This implies that there is a large amount of
dispersion among the countries. Net national autarky rises throughout the 1990s and flattens out in
the early 2000s and then drops a bit after 2009, which closely tracks globalization measures. That
being said, the standard deviation is also quite high (11.05 with a mean of -7.17).
The question here is whether evidence supports the idea from Polanyi (1957) that globalization
may cause a backlash among the public if its effects are left unregulated. This backlash may take the
form of populist politics rising among parties — especially ones on the extremes. And secondarily
I ask whether social welfare policies that try to mitigate the dislocations of globalization can help
sustain liberal-democratic politics in a globalized world; that is, whether “embedded liberalism” is
still useful.
Following Burgoon, I use social transfers as a percentage of GDP from the Comparative Political
Dataset (Armingeon et al. 2018) and OECD historical statistics. This measure encompasses of broad
range of transfers including unemployment, social security, health and other grants. Averaging across
our 23 countries, there is some growth in spending from about 8 percent in 1960 to 13 percent in 1980,
but spending flattens out to reach only 14 percent in 2016. As Burgoon (2009, p. 158) finds, this
measure of welfare spending is “imperfect” as it is too broad to capture the overall generosity of labor
market policies or targeted spending on unemployment. However, it provides the best coverage with
annual data available for most countries from 1960 to 2016.26 I also looked at alternative measures
such as unemployment generosity and replacement rates from Comparative Welfare Entitlements
dataset (Scruggs, Jahn and Kuitto 2017) as well as labor market expenditure data from the OECD,
but coverage is much more limited and as Burgoon (2009, p. 158) notes there is little variation
overtime.
With an extended timeframe from 1960-2016, I estimate Burgoon’s models with similar eco-
nomic and political controls. Deindustrialization measures the percentage of workers not in industry
(Armingeon et al. 2018) and captures the movement of manufacturing jobs to lower-wage polities.
This job dislocation can help fuel anti-internationalist sentiment. Seats in parliament in the last
election drawn from the Comparative Manifesto Dataset (Volkens et al. 2017) proxies the potential
influence of the party in actual economic policymaking. Following Burgoon, I also look at GDP per
capita (World Bank 2018) —- logged to smooth the distribution —- to investigate whether wealth
can mitigate the backlash against globalization. Unemployment may lead to frustration among dis-
26
Greece, Portugal, and Spain have coverage starting in the 1970s.

21
placed workers and increase blame toward international factors such as outsourcing, immigration,
or lower-wage imports. I use the standardized rate of unemployment from Armingeon et al. (2018)
to control for the size of unemployment in the country. Old Age refers to the dependency ratio
of people older than 65 to the working-age population as reported by World Bank (2018) and can
affect both the demand for social welfare expenditure and types of jobs available. Indicators for each
political party family is also included to ensure that any backlash against globalization is not driven
exclusively by one group.

Table 1: Net Autarky (Social Security Generosity), 1960-2016

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Trade FDI-In FDI-Out FDI-Total MigStock MigFlow
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Globalization(t-1) 1.602* 0.916* 0.787** 0.679* 0.160 0.307
(0.919) (0.548) (0.398) (0.376) (0.124) (0.677)
Social Welfare (t-1) 0.261 -0.108* -0.096 -0.111* 0.036 -0.096
(0.247) (0.061) (0.061) (0.065) (0.068) (0.536)
Globalization X Welfare -0.063 -0.053 -0.062** -0.043 -0.005 -0.004
(0.057) (0.040) (0.032) (0.030) (0.007) (0.049)
Deindustrialization(t-1) 0.031 0.049 0.047 0.064* 0.006 0.050
(0.025) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.029) (0.047)
Autarky(t-1) 0.448*** 0.452*** 0.411*** 0.446*** 0.448*** 0.444***
(0.046) (0.047) (0.050) (0.047) (0.047) (0.057)
Seats(t-1) -2.249*** -2.420*** -2.614*** -2.503*** -2.300*** -2.708**
(0.744) (0.783) (0.818) (0.814) (0.756) (1.104)
Log(GDP pc)(t-1) -0.593*** -0.977*** -0.752*** -0.892*** -0.569** -0.151
(0.199) (0.227) (0.232) (0.243) (0.249) (0.373)
Unemployment(t-1) -0.060 0.011 -0.012 -0.005 -0.054 0.087
(0.042) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.041) (0.066)
Old Age(t-1) 0.064** 0.119*** 0.107*** 0.099*** 0.075** 0.068
(0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035) (0.030) (0.056)
Left Party -0.872** -0.918** -1.032** -0.904** -0.842** -1.220**
(0.356) (0.408) (0.412) (0.421) (0.353) (0.501)
Christian Democratic Party -1.565*** -1.683*** -1.830*** -1.677*** -1.511*** -1.757***
(0.436) (0.494) (0.483) (0.502) (0.435) (0.575)
Right Party -1.212*** -1.260*** -1.286*** -1.232*** -1.156*** -1.192**
(0.358) (0.414) (0.413) (0.420) (0.357) (0.506)
Nationalist Party 1.242 1.821** 1.913** 1.842** 1.300 3.398***
(0.922) (0.915) (0.930) (0.921) (0.935) (1.068)
N 1853 1483 1545 1443 1843 1033
R2 0.35 0.40 0.36 0.40 0.35 0.40
Estimates are based on OLS with country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by political party.
∗
p < .1; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗∗∗ p < .01.

I use a linear regression model with country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered

22
by political party, as used by Burgoon (2009). The panel is unbalanced with party-country-year
observations that correspond to the election year in the country. All of the globalization, economic,
and seats in parliament are lagged one year, because we expect that the effects of globalization (if
any) will not contemporaneously appear in party manifestos. Following Burgoon, each globalization
variable is estimated separately given the difference in data availability.
In table 1, I report the results from a model predicting the extent of net autarky in party programs
where each column looks at a different globalization variable. (Labels for each globalization variable
used are at the top of each column.) So column 1 is looking at the effect of the log of trade dependence,
for example. Table 1 uses very similar models to Burgoon 2009 but updated to 2016, and it shows
that trade and FDI (both inflows and outflows) generate increasing support for autarky in party
platforms. There is no evidence here that social welfare spending acts to offset this either directly or
when interacted with globalization. These results look at globalization lagged one year, but lagging
back to two, three, four or even five years shows similar results. Notably migration either in stock
or flow measures does not have an impact. This finding suggests that globalization in the form of
trade and FDI does indeed work its way into the party system and exacerbate anti-globalization
sentiment.
In table 2, using updated data for Burgoon’s models, the results for the broadest measure, net
nationalist autarky, are presented and are mainly null. Neither globalization nor welfare spending has
an impact on this comprehensive measure of populist sentiment. This outcome might be expected
since nationalist autarky is a composite measure of many issues, including domestic ones, and is far
broader than autarky or internationalism.
In Table 3, using the dependent variable which captures only the internationalist element of for-
eign policy, the results show again a strong impact of globalization on anti-internationalist sentiment
in party platforms. Trade and FDI (columns 1-3) but not immigration increase a party’s platforms’
references to anti-internationalism. Here, however, social welfare spending seems to have a counter-
acting impact. In interaction with globalization, it tends to reduce pressure for anti-internationalism.
Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the marginal effects of globalization measures–for trade, FDI inflows, and
then FDI outflows- on anti-internationalism as social welfare spending rises. In all cases, the im-
pact of globalization changes from positive to negative as such spending increases, thus lowering
anti-internationalist platforms. Lower levels of social welfare spending mean that globalization will
lead to greater anti-internationalism in party platforms. But compared to Burgoon’s original time
frame ending in 2003, it seems as if the effect of social welfare spending has declined over time. The

23
 Table 2: Nationalist Autarky (Social Security Generosity), 1960-2016

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Trade FDI-In FDI-Out FDI-Total MigStock MigFlow
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Globalization(t-1) 0.057 0.347 0.749 0.651 0.051 1.842
(1.563) (1.007) (0.675) (0.682) (0.213) (1.668)
Social Welfare (t-1) 0.117 -0.021 0.040 0.010 0.099 0.755
(0.470) (0.100) (0.097) (0.108) (0.113) (1.265)
Globalization X Welfare -0.010 0.035 -0.036 -0.007 -0.003 -0.063
(0.113) (0.082) (0.063) (0.063) (0.013) (0.115)
Deindustrialization(t-1) 0.061 0.117* 0.125** 0.139** 0.054 0.124*
(0.049) (0.066) (0.061) (0.065) (0.055) (0.073)
Nationalist Autarky(t-1) 0.506*** 0.523*** 0.503*** 0.523*** 0.505*** 0.535***
(0.038) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.038) (0.043)
Seats(t-1) 0.815 0.736 0.521 0.630 0.702 1.380
(1.253) (1.299) (1.338) (1.332) (1.268) (1.433)
Log(GDP pc)(t-1) -0.077 -1.019** -0.601 -0.892* -0.069 -1.241*
(0.313) (0.451) (0.461) (0.489) (0.390) (0.692)
Unemployment(t-1) 0.004 0.016 0.013 -0.004 0.009 0.087
(0.094) (0.102) (0.100) (0.101) (0.094) (0.123)
Old Age(t-1) 0.031 0.039 0.002 -0.014 0.028 -0.033
(0.057) (0.062) (0.063) (0.064) (0.059) (0.088)
Left Party -2.420*** -2.655*** -2.771*** -2.666*** -2.411*** -3.762***
(0.678) (0.768) (0.746) (0.784) (0.675) (0.760)
Christian Democratic Party 0.643 0.694 0.648 0.748 0.710 -0.128
(1.058) (1.218) (1.141) (1.244) (1.068) (1.042)
Right Party -1.677** -1.519* -1.591** -1.509* -1.615** -2.051**
(0.714) (0.828) (0.794) (0.839) (0.718) (0.835)
Nationalist Party 8.026*** 8.814*** 9.032*** 8.764*** 8.072*** 10.316***
(2.490) (2.278) (2.324) (2.280) (2.533) (2.090)
N 1853 1483 1545 1443 1843 1033
R2 0.47 0.53 0.51 0.53 0.47 0.59
Estimates are based on OLS with country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by political party.
∗
p < .1; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗∗∗ p < .01.

24
 Table 3: Anti-Internationalism (Social Security Generosity), 1960-2016

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Trade FDI-In FDI-Out FDI-Total MigStock MigFlow
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Globalization(t-1) 2.520*** 0.658** 0.508** 0.335 0.073 -0.181
(0.885) (0.314) (0.242) (0.207) (0.088) (0.455)
Social Welfare (t-1) 0.660*** -0.032 -0.022 -0.036 0.057 -0.105
(0.231) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.055) (0.343)
Globalization X Welfare -0.149*** -0.042* -0.041** -0.024 -0.003 0.005
(0.053) (0.024) (0.019) (0.017) (0.005) (0.031)
Deindustrialization(t-1) 0.038** 0.060*** 0.057** 0.075*** 0.032 0.057**
(0.017) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.020) (0.027)
Anti-Internationalism(t-1) 0.355*** 0.334*** 0.275*** 0.329*** 0.364*** 0.326***
(0.065) (0.028) (0.051) (0.029) (0.066) (0.038)
Seats(t-1) -0.620 -0.921** -0.863* -0.883** -0.732* -0.733
(0.435) (0.417) (0.441) (0.428) (0.439) (0.498)
Log(GDP pc)(t-1) -0.583*** -0.812*** -0.806*** -0.818*** -0.498** -0.437
(0.189) (0.188) (0.198) (0.205) (0.213) (0.278)
Unemployment(t-1) -0.012 0.020 0.008 0.008 -0.016 0.054
(0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.041)
Old Age(t-1) 0.009 0.063** 0.072** 0.061** 0.034 0.100*
(0.023) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.023) (0.053)
Left Party -0.752*** -0.807*** -0.995*** -0.797*** -0.744*** -1.115***
(0.265) (0.203) (0.286) (0.210) (0.264) (0.245)
Christian Democratic Party -0.948*** -1.064*** -1.226*** -1.073*** -0.913*** -1.319***
(0.347) (0.314) (0.381) (0.320) (0.346) (0.374)
Right Party -0.430* -0.396* -0.493* -0.359 -0.393 -0.378
(0.251) (0.227) (0.278) (0.231) (0.247) (0.277)
Nationalist Party -0.018 0.286 0.255 0.302 -0.033 0.824**
(0.458) (0.343) (0.373) (0.345) (0.461) (0.342)
N 1853 1483 1545 1443 1843 1033
R2 0.32 0.38 0.32 0.38 0.32 0.36
Estimates are based on OLS with country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by political party.
∗
p < .1; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗∗∗ p < .01.

25
 Marginal Effect of Trade Flows on Anti-Internationalism
23 OECD Countries
1960-2003 1960-2016
5

5
Marginal effect of Trade Flows

Marginal effect of Trade Flows

0

0
-5

-5
0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30
Social Security Transfers (% GDP) Social Security Transfers (% GDP)

Figure 4: Marginal effect of trade and social welfare spending on anti-internationalism

interaction is less influential (i.e., the line is flatter) in all three tables for the different globalization
variables.
As for the other variables in the models, there is less consistency. The party families do seem
to matter. Left parties show up as less likely to have programs that support autarky, nationalist
autarky, and anti-internationalism. Christian Democratic ones are also usually unlikely to support
such programs. Deindustrialization only shows up in leading to more anti-internationalism. Other
economic variables are more inconsistent.

26
 Marginal Effect of FDI Inflows on Anti-Internationalism
23 OECD Countries

4 1960-2003 1960-2016

4
Marginal effect of FDI In-Flows

Marginal effect of FDI In-Flows

2

2
0

0
-2

-2
-4

-4
0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30
Social Security Transfers (% GDP) Social Security Transfers (% GDP)

Figure 5: Marginal effect of FDI inflows on anti-internationalism

Marginal Effect of FDI Outflows on Anti-Internationalism

23 OECD Countries
1960-2003 1960-2016
4

4
Marginal effect of FDI Out-Flows

Marginal effect of FDI Out-Flows

2

2
0

0
-2

-2
-4

-4

0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30
Social Security Transfers (% GDP) Social Security Transfers (% GDP)

Figure 6: Marginal effect of FDI outflows on anti-internationalism

27
5 Globalization and Deindustrialization

Employment by Sector, 1960-2016

23 OECD Countries
80
% of Civilian Labor Force
60

End of Cold War Financial Crisis

20 40
0

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Industry Services
Agriculture
Source: CPDS, 2018; WDI, 2018

Figure 7: Employment by Sector, 1960-2016

Does globalization have a direct impact on politics? Trade, FDI, and migration have many effects
on the economy. Economists have noted that globalization should affect lower skilled, lower wage
workers in industries that compete with imports from developing countries. Labor-intensive indus-
tries in the West have been hit by imports from the developing world and the number of workers
and their wages have fallen in these industries in the North. This trade has supposedly led to dein-
dustrialization, that is, the decline of manufacturing as a percentage of the labor force. Here I focus
on first showing that deindustrialization is a consequence of globalization and then below I examine
its consequences for politics.
Figure 7 shows the path of deindustrialization in the 23 advanced industrial countries studied
here. Beginning in the 1960s these countries began to lose manufacturing employment. The value
added by manufacturing has not declined as much in these countries; they are producing as much
but with much less labor and thus greater productivity (van Neuss 2018).
Among economists, a debate has raged over whether internal or external forces were more im-

28
portant for explaining deindustrialization.27 While some claimed it was largely internal forces (e.g.,
Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin 1986, Clark 1957), a large number have pointed the finger at different
elements of the global economy.28 Many scholars have cited trade, and especially trade with the de-
veloping world as the key to the decline of manufacturing (Alderson 1999, Kollmeyer 2009, Lawrence
1983, 1987, Lawrence et al. 1993, Rowthorn and Ramaswamy 1997, 1999, Sachs et al. 1994, Wood
1994, 1995). In addition, studies have shown that FDI outflows contribute to deindustrialization
(Kang and Lee 2011).
Using updated data, I examine the role of external factors and internal ones in deindustrialization
in the advanced industrial economies since the 1960s. The aim is to show that globalization is an
important predictor of this process. The models here focus on the change in industrial employment,
not value-added.
I define deindustrialization as 100 minus the percentage of labor employed in industry. Using data
from the Comparative Political Dataset, I calculate the ratio of the number of workers in industry
over the total civilian labor force. To assess the extent that international factors affect the rate of
deindustrialization, I look at a series of measures of globalization: trade, FDI, and migration. First,
I use the same variable for trade as the percentage of GDP variable from the prior analysis on party
manifestos. In prior work on the causes of deindustrialization, scholars have also disaggregated trade
into two components: net exports and imports from non-OECD countries. The net exports variable
is calculated as exports as a percentage of GDP minus imports as a percentage of GDP. Imports
from non-OECD countries are calculated using data from the World Trade Flows (WTF) bilateral
dataset (Feenstra et al. 2005) from 1984. Imports from all countries outside the 23 OECD countries
were summed and divided by the country’s GDP. To examine the hypothesis if FDI outflows present
a “hollowing-out effect on industrial labor (Kang and Lee 2011), I divide net FDI outflows from the
World Bank’s Development Indicators by the country’s total population to calculate FDI Outflows
per capita. Migrant inflows are measured using the OECD’s International Migration Dataset. All
of these globalization measures are logged to smooth the overall distribution and lagged one year.
Finally, to examine the influence of internal factors, I look at GDP per capita and the unemploy-
27
Deindustrialization is seen as a major problem for two reasons mainly: its consequences for individual employment
and well-being of laid-off manufacturing workers as well as the prospects for continued long-term productivity growth.
For workers, manufacturing offers relatively high wages to workers with lower or middle level of education and skills.
In terms of growth, industrial sectors have long been among those with the highest growth rates of productivity.
Deindustrialization thus is viewed as a threat both to current standards of living for workers and to future income
levels.
28
Three internal factors are usually noted: changes in demand for the manufacturing industries owing to an increase
in the national income; a faster rate of productivity increase in the manufacturing sector vis-a-vis services; and a faster
decrease in the prices of manufacturing goods relative to services.

29
ment rate. GDP per capita captures what economists have been termed “positive deindustrializa-
tion,” or in which higher productivity growth in manufacturing and changes in consumption patterns
cause movement from employment in manufacturing to services. Economists have termed this type
of globalization “positive” as the service sector was able to quickly absorb jobs from manufacturing. I
use data from the World Bank and log the variable to smooth the distribution. In the regression esti-
mates below, I also use the squared-term, because previous work found that “relative manufacturing
employment rises across modest levels of per capita income but then falls once a country becomes
more affluent (Kollmeyer 2009, p. 1653).” The unemployment rate is drawn from the Comparative
Political Dataset and captures “negative deindustrialization” where lost manufacturing jobs cannot
be absorbed by the service sector (van Neuss 2018, p. 57).
My empirical model is based on a country-year dataset covering all 23 OECD countries from
1960-2016.29 In table 4, I report OLS estimates with country-level fixed effects and robust standard
errors clustered by country. If external factors matter, we expect that coefficients on trade, FDI
outflows per capita, and migration inflows to have a positive effect on deindustrialization. If internal
factors matter, we expect that the square of GDP per capita and unemployment to have positive
effects and GDP per capita to have negative one.
Table 4 shows that trade and the internal factors but not FDI nor migration lead to increases in
deindustrialization. Trade is highly correlated with deindustrialization even if the substantive effects
are fairly small. As expected, GDPpc and squared GDPpc account for the effect of shifting demand
for industrial products, where higher levels of GDP per capita should in the beginning lead to larger
shares of industrial employment in the economy (which is accounted for with the variable GDPpc),
but in later stages of development rising GDP per capita is expected to have the opposite effect
on industrial employment (accounted for with squared GDPpc). Unemployment is also positively
related to deindustrialization but it is hard to see this as causal. But even after accounting for these
internal causes, trade still shows up as a potential cause.
I also investigate trade with the developing world specifically in table 5 beginning in 1984 when
data is available. Consistent with our expectations, such imports are positively correlated with
deindustrialization. Much as economic models of trade like Stolper-Samuelson would predict, import
competition from the labor abundant countries in the developing world will place industries, jobs, and
wages at risk for these industries in the North. Surprisingly, neither net exports nor FDI outflows
are significant. Indeed, migration may actually allow rich countries to avoid deindustrialization
29
Coverage for FDI Outflows begins in 1970 and Migration inflows in 1985

30
 Table 4: Deindustrialization, 23 Countries , 1960-2016

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Log(Trade)(t-1) 5.331*** 5.830*** 4.794***
(0.711) (0.814) (0.844)
Log(FDI Outflows pc)(t-1) -0.031 -0.033 -0.029
(0.024) (0.026) (0.021)
Log(Mig Inflows) (t-1) 0.224 -0.110
(0.221) (0.214)
Log(GDP pc)(t-1) -180.693*** -52.767*** -71.025** -61.811*** 41.088
(8.070) (16.196) (30.513) (14.992) (32.186)
Log(GDP pc)-squared(t-1) 9.293*** 3.393*** 4.391*** 3.676*** -1.093
(0.391) (0.772) (1.410) (0.711) (1.488)
Unemployment(t-1) 0.726*** 0.681*** 0.743*** 0.628*** 0.627***
(0.042) (0.037) (0.041) (0.039) (0.041)
Constant 917.065*** 247.751*** 325.225** 287.960*** -261.006
(41.799) (84.859) (163.679) (78.829) (172.562)
N 1177 921 643 921 624
R2 0.86 0.87 0.84 0.88 0.87
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. OLS models with country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country

as the negative sign on migration suggests by importing low wage labor. Trade is then the only
globalization measure that is consistently significant.

31
 Table 5: Deindustrialization (t-1) 23 Countries , 1984-2016

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Log(Non-OECD Imports)(t-1) 2.555*** 2.169*** 2.415***
(0.296) (0.248) (0.289)
Log(Net Exports)(t-1) 0.084 0.132 0.085
(0.109) (0.112) (0.118)
Log(FDI Outflows pc)(t-1) -0.031 0.004 -0.010
(0.024) (0.021) (0.023)
Log(Mig Inflows) (t-1) 0.224 -0.647**
(0.221) (0.298)
Log(GDP pc)(t-1) -99.067*** -52.767*** -71.025** -69.485*** -17.847
(25.537) (16.196) (30.513) (24.428) (28.064)
Log(GDP pc)-squared(t-1) 5.146*** 3.393*** 4.391*** 3.780*** 1.432
(1.223) (0.772) (1.410) (1.167) (1.315)
Unemployment(t-1) 0.599*** 0.681*** 0.743*** 0.573*** 0.565***
(0.044) (0.037) (0.041) (0.045) (0.049)
Constant 537.281*** 247.751*** 325.225** 378.024*** 101.302
(133.332) (84.859) (163.679) (127.872) (148.260)
N 436 921 643 429 401
R2 0.89 0.87 0.84 0.90 0.90
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. OLS models with country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country

In this section, I investigated whether globalization might be related to deindustrialization, which

is a key trend that has affected all 23 countries studied here. The data imply that besides internal
factors trade has had a sizable and significant effect on deindustrialization since the 1960s in the West.
Other studies have shown that such industrial contraction has large political effects (e.g., Iversen and
Cusack 2000). In the next section I explore whether globalization via deindustrialization is affecting
the electoral popularity of parties. Is globalization directly or indirectly contributing to the growing
support for right-wing populism?

6 Populist Parties in OECD Elections

This part of this paper looks at what is happening to support for political parties in the 23 rich
advanced industrial countries used in this study. I examine two issues here. One are extreme
right populist parties gaining support with globalization? And two are centrist parties, especially
mainstream left ones, declining in the wake of globalization? These two trends appear to be related.
As centrist parties cooperate more, voters have see them as being identical and as representing their
own elite interests, not those of ordinary people. As noted by German political analysts:

In the 2017 election in Germany that set off coalition negotiations, the Christian Democrats
and the Social Democrats suffered their worst losses ever in the postwar era, losing more

32
 than 100 seats in the Bundestag, the German federal legislature. . . This has been the
story across Europe, as establishment parties plummet in popularity. “Most analysts
attributed the German mainstream parties losses to voters anger at the years of grand-
coalition government, which many said had rendered the parties distant and indistin-
guishable. . . Agreements between the center-left and center-right have long been seen as
a fundamental building block of European stability. But now, as such agreements fal-
ter, the popularity of mainstream parties is falling fast, with the center-lefts support
collapsing particularly quickly.30

Turning to the question of whether populist party vote share has risen as globalization increases,
I merge elections data from ParlGov (Doring and Manow 2016) with classifications of far right and
mainstream left parties. To classify parties as extreme right, I relied on seminal accounts of extreme
far right and populism by Golder (2003), Mudde (2007), van Kessel (2015). I augmented these lists
with more recent classifications of populist parties by Algan et al. (2017), Funke, Schularick and
Trebesch (2016), Marks et al. (2017), Rooduijn and Burgoon (2017), Rovny (2013). In total, there
were 126 parties in 15 European countries that were considered “far right” by at least one article.
Many of these parties are quite small and failed to generate considerable support in any election.
Out of the 126 parties, only 65 met ParlGov’s threshold of gaining more than one percent of the
vote share in an election. The final list of parties is provided in appendix table 4. I adopted a
similar method to classify mainstream left and right parties by relying on standard definitions in the
literature (see appendix tables 5 and 6).31
30
Taub, Amanda. 2018.“How Germanys New Coalition Explains Europes Uncertain Future,” New York Times.
February 11. Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/11/world/europe/europe-politics-far-right.
html
31
Specifically, Wagner and Meyer (2017), van Hauwaert and Kessel (2017), Rovny (2013), and Pontusson and Rueda
(2010)

33
 Far Right and Mainstream Parties Vote Share, 1985-2016
22 OECD Countries

40
Vote Share (4-yr avg)
20 30

End of Cold War Financial Crisis

10 0

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Far Right Mainstream Left

Mainstream Right
Source: ParlGov, 2018. See appendix for party classifications.

Figure 8: Far Right and Mainstream Left and Right Vote Share, 1985-2016.

Figure 8 depicts aggregate vote shares of extreme right-wing parties, mainstream right, and
mainstream left parties from 1985-2016, averaged across the 15 European countries with at least one
far right party and 22 OECD countries for mainstream left and right parties, excluding the United
States. I take the four-year average of each country’s vote share totals to smooth over non-election
years. Consistent with our expectations, far right parties experienced a sharp increase in support as
globalization surged in the 1990s, more than doubling their average from approximately 5 percent
in 1985-1989. By contrast, support for mainstream left parties has declined considerably after the
Cold War and the again following the 2008 financial crisis. Support for the mainstream right parties
has declined but less so.
Are similar forces increasing support for right populist parties and decreasing confidence in
establishment ones? The existing research has produced inconsistent findings with some authors
arguing that there is “comprehensive evidence of [a] link between globalization and the electoral
success of nationalist, isolationist, and radical-right parties” (Colantone and Stanig 2018b, p 2.)
whereas others claim any link between globalization and populism “lacks empirical support at both
the aggregate and individual level” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2018, p. 8). One difficulty in analyzing
how globalization affects electoral outcomes is that the effects of trade, investment, and migration

34
flows may be indirect and affect vote choice through mediating variables such as deindustrialization.
As shown in the previous section, globalization is strongly associated with a decrease in the share of
industrial employment.
I investigate the determinants of vote share in all elections for the national legislature since 1985
using election data from ParlGov (Doring and Manow 2016). I leverage the same globalization
variables used in the prior sections, including trade flows as percentage of GDP (World Bank 2018),
FDI net inflows and outflows as a percent of GDP (World Bank 2018), and migrant stock and flows
from the (World Bank 2018) and OECD, respectively. These measures are logged and lagged one year
so that a party’s electoral performance is associated with economic flows in the previous year. I also
include a battery of controls, which might influence the outcome, such as the growth rate of GDP
per capita, the post-fiscal income inequality Gini (after transfers and taxes), deindustrialization,
social security transfers, and the effective number of parties from the Comparative Political Dataset
(Armingeon et al. 2018).
Is there evidence of movement in electoral support for populist parties in Europe related to the
growth of globalization? I expect that globalization might increase vote shares for such parties, and
this might especially be the case as globalization works through deindustrialization to affect workers’
employment and wages. I attempt to capture these inter-related effects through a series of structural
equation models. Structural equation models allows us to combine and elucidate the influence of
globalization on deindustrialization and its direct, indirect, and total effects on electoral outcomes.
The total effect of trade, FDI, and migration on the far right vote share is defined as the effect of
globalization mediated through deindustrialization (i.e., the indirect effect), and a direct effect that
consists of other factors outside of deindustrialization. In other words, the direct effect captures the
effect of globalization on voting behavior if the level of deindustrialization experiences no change.
Table 6 reports the estimates from structural equation models of deindustralization and the de-
terminants of electoral support for populist right-wing parties. All specifications are estimated using
robust standard errors clustered by country and include country level fixed effects. The unit of
observation is country-election year. In the top half of table 6, I report the direct effects of deindus-
trialization and globalization on far right party vote share. Overall, there is a strong relationship
between deindustrialization and extreme right-wing vote shares. More deindustrialization leads to
more support for such parties. The globalization measures generally do not have a large direct ef-
fect on such support. But as the mediation models show, they have significant and sizable effects
on deindustrialization and through it on populist vote shares. Deindustrialization is an important

35
mediator of the relationship between globalization and populism. Interestingly, migration flows and
stocks have significant direct effects on populist vote shares; more migrants lead to greater support
for them. In addition, it is notable that social welfare spending levels have no significant relationship
to populist party support. In sum, as table 7 shows, globalization in the form of trade and FDI have
significant indirect effects on populist vote shares, while FDI inflows and outflows and migration
have direct effects as well.
In table 8, I estimate the same series of structural equation models for mainstream left party vote
shares. In these models deindustrialization has a negative and often significant effect on support for
the left. I expect this negative relationship because industrial workers have been a main part of the
coalition supporting the left; as their manufacturing jobs disappear, they become prime candidates
for supporting populist parties. Migration also has direct negative effects on support for the left.
Once again FDI appears to have an indirect effect through deindustrialization on left party support.
It increase deindustrialization which in turn decreases left party voting. In table 9, the direct and
indirect effects of the globalization variables are shown. Trade, FDI and migration all have significant
negative effects in total on left party vote shares. They are contributing to the decline in left, often
Social Democratic party, votes, that was shown in table 8. Finally, the data show no effect for social
welfare spending in influencing left party vote shares.
In the appendix tables 7 and 8, I present analysis of mainstream right vote shares. Deindustri-
alization seems to have no effect on them and globalization has neither direct nor indirect effects.
The impact of deindustrialization is thus mainly on the left, which makes sense given who left voters
were. Left parties tended to be supported by the industrial working class, which is the group most
affected by trade and FDI. It should be expected then that left, Social Democratic parties face the
greatest threat from globalization and deindustrialization.
This analysis shows strong evidence that globalization is affecting votes shares of political parties
in the advanced industrial countries, and it is affecting them differentially. Globalization is directly
and indirectly increasing support for right-wing populist parties and decreasing it for left parties. Its
indirect effect is mainly operating through the erosion of manufacturing jobs in these countries. The
loss of jobs in this sector and the inability to find jobs of similar pay often leads to dissatisfaction with
the status quo and more openness to populist appeals. Globalization may also have indirect effects
on technological change and adoption of labor-saving innovations, which again may drive support
for populism as workers lose jobs. This path is one that I plan to examine in future research. But
here it is evident that globalization is having an impact on eroding support for the mainstream left

36
 Table 6: Mediation Models - Far Right Vote Share (t-1) (1985-2016)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Direct Effects
Deindustriaization(t-1) 0.767*** 0.760*** 0.748*** 0.786*** 0.075 0.462**
(0.165) (0.215) (0.215) (0.210) (0.189) (0.192)
Log(Trade)(t-1) -1.235
(5.997)
Log(FDI Inflows)(t-1) 0.955
(0.637)
Log(FDI Outflows)(t-1) 0.528
(0.427)
Log(FDI Total)(t-1) 0.597
(0.365)
Migrant Stk(t-1) 1.609***
(0.461)
Log(Mig Inflows)(t-1) 2.835*
(1.646)
Social Welfare (t-1) -0.200 -0.070 -0.116 -0.078 -0.109 -0.500
(0.436) (0.368) (0.404) (0.396) (0.428) (0.459)
GDP per capita Growth (t-1) -0.342 -0.494** -0.463** -0.502** -0.391** -0.312
(0.238) (0.199) (0.199) (0.200) (0.186) (0.252)
Unemployment (t-1) -0.191 -0.237 -0.210 -0.250 -0.079 -0.013
(0.254) (0.258) (0.247) (0.249) (0.275) (0.329)
Eff. No. Parties 2.051* 1.702* 1.798* 1.670 1.890** 2.079**
(1.064) (1.031) (0.979) (1.017) (0.825) (0.922)
Gini (t-1) -0.467 -0.325 -0.406 -0.285 -0.504* -0.523
(0.393) (0.340) (0.343) (0.342) (0.287) (0.440)
Constant -52.590** -61.903*** -56.931*** -62.526*** -17.867 -55.666***
(21.616) (16.800) (17.605) (16.621) (15.362) (17.572)
Global → Deindus.
Log(Trade)(t-1) 2.987**
(1.295)
Log(FDI Inflows)(t-1) 1.677***
(0.446)
Log(FDI Outflows)(t-1) 1.371**
(0.619)
Log(FDI Total)(t-1) 1.376***
(0.529)
Migrant Stk(t-1) 0.317***
(0.055)
Log(Mig Inflows)(t-1) -0.292
(0.627)
GDP pc Growth (t-1) -0.470*** -0.471*** -0.486*** -0.498*** -0.360*** -0.413***
(0.087) (0.088) (0.113) (0.104) (0.116) (0.126)
Constant 62.613*** 73.415*** 73.554*** 73.065*** 71.539*** 78.563***
(5.753) (1.038) (1.170) (1.289) (1.062) (6.913)

37
 Table 7: Far Right Vote Share (Indirect and Total Effects) (t-1) (1985-2016)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Trade FDI-In FDI-Out FDI-Total MigStock MigFlow
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Indirect Effect 2.291** 1.275** 1.027* 1.081** 0.024 -0.135
(1.1459) (0.494) (0.5823) (0.5165) (0.0589) (0.2701)
Total Effect 1.056 2.229*** 1.555** 1.678*** 1.633*** 2.700*
(5.9693) (0.7806) (0.652) (0.5984) (0.4243) (1.597)
N 139 131 135 130 137 120
Estimates are based on generalized structural equation models with country fixed effects and
robust standard errors clustered by country. ∗ p < .1; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗∗∗ p < .01.

and enhancing it for right-wing populists.

38
 Table 8: Mediation Models - Mainstream Left Parties Vote Share (t-1) (1985-2016)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Direct Effects
Deindustrialization(t-1) -0.187 -0.406** -0.382** -0.392** -0.118 -0.195
(0.220) (0.179) (0.174) (0.176) (0.184) (0.183)
Log(Trade)(t-1) -6.938
(4.419)
Log(FDI Inflows)(t-1) 0.036
(0.475)
Log(FDI Outflows)(t-1) -0.306
(0.422)
Log(FDI Total)(t-1) -0.171
(0.352)
Migrant Stk(t-1) -0.618**
(0.242)
Log(Mig Inflows)(t-1) -1.614***
(0.563)
Social Welfare (t-1) 0.284 0.275 0.228 0.246 0.240 0.526**
(0.179) (0.218) (0.221) (0.218) (0.195) (0.235)
GDP pc Growth (t-1) 0.278** 0.228* 0.246** 0.239** 0.237** 0.275
(0.119) (0.118) (0.119) (0.119) (0.101) (0.188)
Unemployment (t-1) -0.631 -0.582 -0.581 -0.583 -0.653* -0.403
(0.393) (0.398) (0.379) (0.391) (0.388) (0.328)
Eff. No. Parties -3.751*** -3.722*** -3.737*** -3.722*** -3.653*** -3.735***
(0.872) (0.941) (0.899) (0.933) (0.837) (0.834)
Gini (t-1) 0.127 0.002 -0.006 -0.003 0.000 0.095
(0.377) (0.356) (0.348) (0.359) (0.361) (0.366)
Constant 89.581*** 84.612*** 83.655*** 84.207*** 77.306*** 81.433***
(9.823) (12.331) (11.183) (12.111) (8.588) (10.450)
Global → Deindus.
Log(Trade)(t-1) 2.987**
(1.295)
Log(FDI Inflows)(t-1) 1.677***
(0.446)
Log(FDI Outflows)(t-1) 1.371**
(0.619)
Log(FDI Total)(t-1) 1.376***
(0.529)
Migrant Stk(t-1) 0.317***
(0.055)
Log(Mig Inflows)(t-1) -0.292
(0.627)
GDP pc Growth (t-1) -0.470*** -0.471*** -0.486*** -0.498*** -0.360*** -0.413***
(0.087) (0.088) (0.113) (0.104) (0.116) (0.126)
Constant 62.613*** 73.415*** 73.554*** 73.065*** 71.539*** 78.563***
(5.753) (1.038) (1.170) (1.289) (1.062) (6.913)

39
 Table 9: Mainstream Left Parties Vote Share (Indirect and Total Effects) (1985-2016)

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Trade FDI-In FDI-Out FDI-Total MigStock MigFlow
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Indirect Effect -0.559 -0.681** -0.524 -0.539* -0.037 0.057
(0.7128) (0.3334) (0.3362) (0.3116) (0.0606) (0.1315)
Total Effect -7.497* -0.646 -0.830* -0.711 -0.656*** -1.557**
(3.9453) (0.5221) (0.4354) (0.4017) (0.2101) (0.625)
N 199 191 194 189 197 174
Estimates are based on generalized structural equation models with country fixed effects and
robust standard errors clustered by country. ∗ p < .1; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗∗∗ p < .01.

7 Conclusion
This investigation of the political effects of globalization in the rich democracies of the OECD since
the 1960s suggests an important relationship between globalization and populism. First, a direct
relationship appears to exist between globalization and changes in party platforms. More trade and
FDI are associated with a turn to anti-internationalism and anti-globalization, but less so for broader
populist sentiments. Social welfare spending also seems less and less able to mitigate this relationship.
Second, globalization is indirectly affecting party vote shares. A big factor in shifting votes from
left parties and toward extreme right-wing populist ones is deindustrialization. But globalization is
connected to deindustrialization and when it is mediated by that force globalization then leads to
declining support for the left and rising support for right-wing populist parties. Globalization thus
seems to be generating a political backlash against itself and mainstream democratic politics.
Because it is the largest part of the economy engaged in globalization, international trade seems
to generate the most amount of backlash against globalization. Foreign capital flows-both inflows
and outflows- have an effect in generating anti-internationalism and populism in party programs, but
their effects seem less strong than those from trade. While talked about most these days, immigration
has little direct association with pressure for autarchy and anti-internationalism in party programs.
But it could well be that the pressure from immigration is too recent to track here; recent political
problems in Germany over migrants suggest more political effects now. Migration, however, is having
direct effects on increasing vote shares for populist parties and decreasing them for left-wing parties.
The research here is cross-national, aggregating the specific and often regional impacts of global-
ization into a national measure. Studies, however, suggest that much of the action is at the regional
or local level and thus I expect that more fine-grained data would expose an even stronger rela-
tionship. As Pavcnik (2017, p. 4) notes because workers are not very mobile, “Effects of trade on

40
earnings are geographically concentrated and unequal within a country, depending on the region’s
exposure to import and export shocks. . . Trade’s adverse effects appear to be highly geographically
concentrated and long-lasting in developing and developed countries alike.” This aggregation may
obfuscate the impact of globalization.
Furthermore, many of the traditional policy instruments and political institutions that seemed
to have contained globalization pressures on the public no longer seem to work. As Pontusson and
Weisstanner (2018, p. 32) point out, despite many differences across these countries they have all
experienced the same broad economic trends, suggesting that their differences are not that important:
“we show that relative poverty as well as overall inequality, measured before taxes and transfers,
jumped in virtually all OECD countries in the early 1990s, held steady or even declined from 1994
to 2007, and then increased again in the wake of the Great Recession.” In Milner (2018) I show that
left-labor power does not seem to mediate the decline in social welfare spending due to globalization
any longer. In this paper it seems as if social welfare spending is not mitigating the impact of
globalization on party platforms either. Finally, globalization may be undermining left parties and
their main source of political support.
I have also begun to explore the relationship between globalization and technological change.
Globalization may not have direct relationship with political outcomes. It may operate through
other factors: such as technological change, inequality, or the demise of the welfare state. Driven by
trade and technological change, deindustrialization has been noted as a force for change in politics
(Iversen and Cusack 2000). Here I show that globalization works through deindustrialization to foster
support for right-wing populist parties. In other research Milner (2018), I look at the adoption of
technologies more specifically and the introduction of robots as well.32
What is to be done? Should we end globalization and retreat into protectionism and isolation?
Would this help politics and democracy? There’s evidence that trade and FDI promote growth and
innovation, so ending both of them would probably make countries overall worse off (e.g., Dollar and
Kraay 2004, Frankel and Romer 1999, Grossman and Helpman 1991). The better path would be to
maintain openness but somehow help the losers from it. This idea is an old one and the welfare state
in part was developed to help with this. But these older policies may not work any more to reduce
the pressures associated with globalization and rapid economic change. It may be that unions have
32
Gordon (2017, p. 443) in his recent book on technological change notes that the US and other countries have not
experienced a huge surge in technological innovation affecting society lately. He claims the earlier period from 1870
to 1940 was much more revolutionary in terms of technological change and economic growth. His argument and data
suggest that technological change is not the cause of recent sweeping economic changes-like inequality or the decline
of unions- that might bring about political change, like the rise in populism.

41
been so weakened they can no longer function to contain globalization pressures.33 Left parties also
are under attack and caught in a bind where policies to help labor in the longer run have short-run
costs that make them unappealing. The welfare state itself may no longer be able to compensate the
public for the vicissitudes of global capitalism, as open capital markets make it harder and harder
for governments to collect the necessary taxes to pay for the benefits.
Rising inequality, financial crises and deflationary pressures, deindustrialization and competition
from the developing countries, and rapid technological change may be undoing the compromise of
embedded liberalism that sustained globalization previously. Into this breach are coming radical left-
and right-wing parties who promise protection; they articulate a populist program that offers workers
protection from the vicissitudes of contemporary global capitalism. Such programs may provide help
in the short run but they tend to have long run costs that make them unsustainable (Dornbusch and
Edwards 1991, Sachs 1989). Unfortunately, playing on the dissatisfaction with economic conditions,
populist leaders often combine them with strongly nationalist and anti-democratic practices, as
evidenced in countries like Hungary and Poland recently. Populist, anti-democratic politics is what
Polanyi anticipated would arise when individuals are left to face the market without political or
social help. The question is what can be done to stop this trend.

33
Baccaro and Pontusson (2016, p. 196) note how trade may undermine unions and labor organization. A large
driver of economic growth in the OECD countries has been exports. But they point out that such export-driven growth
tends to increase inequality since low skill workers do not benefit (as much) from it as high skill ones do. Moreover,
they claim that high skill workers benefit from it the most when they are not constrained by unions or centralized
labor bargaining. Hence these workers become less and less interested in unions and labor organization.

42
References
Acemoglu, Daron. 2003. “Patterns of Skill Premia.” Review of Economic Studies 70:199–230.

Acemoglu, Daron, David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon H. Hanson and Brendan Price. 2016. “Import
Competition and the Great US Employment Sag of the 2000s.” Journal of Labor Economics
34(S1):S141–S198.

Alderson, Arthur S. 1999. “Explaining Deindustrialization: Globalization, Failure, or Success?”

American Sociological Review 64(5):701.

Algan, Yann, Sergei Guriev, Elias Papaioannou and Evgenia Passari. 2017. “The European Trust
Crisis and the Rise of Populism.” Working Paper.

Armingeon, Klaus, Virginia Wenger, Fiona Wiedemeier, Christian Isler, Laura Knpfel, David Weis-
stanner and Sarah Engler. 2018. Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2016. Bern: Institute of
Political Science, University of Berne.

Autor, David, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson and Kaveh Majlesi. 2016. “Importing Political Polar-
ization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure.” NBER Working Paper.

Autor, David H, David Dorn and Gordon H Hanson. 2013. “The China Syndrome: Local La-
bor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States.” American Economic Review
103(6):2121–2168.

Autor, David H., Frank Levy and Richard J. Murnane. 2003. “The Skill Content of Recent Technolog-
ical Change: An Empirical Exploration.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(4):1279–1333.

Baccaro, Lucio and Jonas Pontusson. 2016. “Rethinking Comparative Political Economy.” Politics
& Society 44(2):175–207.

Baldwin, Richard E. 2016. The great convergence: information technology and the new globalization.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Berman, Eli, John Bound and Stephen Machin. 1998. “Implications of Skill-Biased Technological
Change: International Evidence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 113(4):1245–1279.

Betz, Hans-Georg. 1994. Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. New York: St. Martin’s
Press.

Bornschier, Simon. 2010. Cleavage politics and the populist right : the new cultural conflict in
Western Europe. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Bourguignon, Francois. 2015. The Globalization of Inequality. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press.

Burgoon, Brian. 2001. “Globalization and Welfare Compensation: Disentangling the Ties that
Bind.” International Organization 55(3):509–551.

Burgoon, Brian. 2009. “Globalization and Backlash: Polayni’s Revenge?” Review of International
Political Economy 16(2):145–177.

Burgoon, Brian. 2012. “Inequality and anti-globalization backlash by political parties.” European
Union Politics 14(3):408–435.

43
Cameron, David R. 1978. “The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis.”
American Political Science Review 72(04):1243–1261.

Chenery, Hollis, Sherman Robinson and Moshe Syrquin. 1986. Industrialization and Growth - A
Comparative Study. New York: Oxford University Press.

Clark, Colin. 1957. The Conditions of Economic Progress. London (UK): Macmillan.

Colantone, Italo, Crinò Rosario and Laura Ogliari. 2017. “Globalization and Mental Distress.”
Working Paper.

Colantone, Italo and Piero Stanig. 2018a. “Global Competition and Brexit.” American Political
Science Review pp. 1–18.

Colantone, Italo and Piero Stanig. 2018b. “The Trade Origins of Economic Nationalism: Import
Competition and Voting Behavior in Western Europe.” American Journal of Political Science
pp. 1–27.

Cusack, Thomas, Torben Iversen and Philipp Rehm. 2006. “Risks at Work: The Demand and Supply
Sides of Government Redistribution.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22(3):365–389.

Dauth, Wolfgang, Sebastian Findeisen and Jens Suedekum. 2014. “The Rise of the East and the
Far East: German Labor Markets and Trade Integration.” Journal of the European Economic
Association 12(6):1643–1675.

Decker, Frank. 2004. Der neue Rechtspopulismus. Berlin: Springer.

Dippel, Christian, Robert Gold and Stephan Heblich. 2016. “Globalization and Its (Dis-)Content:
Trade Shocks and Voting Behavior.” California Center for Population Research Working Paper
Series.

Dollar, David and Aart Kraay. 2004. “Trade, Growth, and Poverty.” The Economic Journal
114(493):F22–F49.

Doring, Holger and Philip Manow. 2016. “Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): In-
formation on parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies.”. Available from https:
//www.parlgov.org.

Dornbusch, Rudiger and Sebastian Edwards. 1991. The Macroeconomics of Populism. In The Macroe-
conomics of Populism in Latin America, ed. Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press chapter 1, pp. 7–13.

Dreher, Axel. 2006. “Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a new Index of Globaliza-
tion.” Applied Economics 38(10):1091–1110.

Evans, Geoffrey. 2000. “The Continued Significance of Class Voting.” Annual Review of Political
Science 3(1):401–417.

Feenstra, Robert, Robert Lipsey, Haiyan Deng, Alyson Ma and Hengyong Mo. 2005. “World Trade
Flows: 1962-2000.” NBER Working Paper Series.

Frankel, Jeffrey A and David Romer. 1999. “Does Trade Cause Growth?” The American Economic
Review 89(3):379–399.

44
Funke, Manuel, Moritz Schularick and Christoph Trebesch. 2016. “Going to extremes: Politics after
financial crises, 18702014.” European Economic Review 88:227–260.

Garrett, Geoffrey. 1995. “Capital Mobility, Trade, and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy.”
International Organization 49(4):657–687.

Garrett, Geoffrey. 1998. “Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?”
International Organization 52(4):787–824.

Garrett, Geoffrey and Deborah Mitchell. 2001. “Globalization, government spending and taxation
in the OECD.” European Journal of Political Research 39(2):145–177.

Gidron, Noam and Peter A Hall. 2017a. “Populism as a Problem of Social Integration.” Paper
prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
San Francisco, September 1, 2017.

Gidron, Noam and Peter A. Hall. 2017b. “The politics of social status: economic and cultural roots
of the populist right.” The British Journal of Sociology 68(S):S57–S84.

Golder, Matt. 2003. “Electoral Institutions, Unemployment and Extreme Right Parties: A Correc-
tion.” British Journal of Political Science 33(03):525–534.

Golder, Matt. 2016. “Far Right Parties in Europe.” Annual Review of Political Science 19(1):477–
497.

Goldin, Claudia Dale. and Lawrence F. Katz. 2008. The race between education and technology.
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Gomez, Raul, Laura Morales and Luis Ramiro. 2016. “Varieties of Radicalism: Examining the Diver-
sity of Radical Left Parties and Voters in Western Europe.” West European Politics 39(2):351–379.

Gordon, Robert J. 2017. The rise and fall of American growth: The US standard of living since the
civil war. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman. 1991. “Trade, knowledge spillovers, and growth.” Eu-
ropean Economic Review 35(2-3):517–526.

Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. 2018. “Cleavage theory meets Europe’s crises: Lipset, Rokkan,
and the transnational cleavage.” Journal of European Public Policy 25(1):109–135.

Hummels, David, Jakob Munch and Chong Xiang. 2016. “No Pain, No Gain: The Effects of Exports
on Sickness, Injury, and Effort.” Working Paper.

Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris. 2016. “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic
Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash.” Harvard Kennedy School Working Paper.

Iversen, Torben and Thomas R. Cusack. 2000. “The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: Deindus-
trialization or Globalization?” World Politics 52(03):313–349.

Kang, Sung Jin and Hongshik Lee. 2011. “Foreign Direct Investment and De-industrialisation.” The
World Economy 34(2):313–329.

Katzenstein, Peter J. 1985. Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.

45
Kitschelt, Herbert. 1996. The radical right in Western Europe: a comparative analysis. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan.

Kollmeyer, Christopher. 2009. “Explaining Deindustrialization: How Affluence, Productivity

Growth, and Globalization Diminish Manufacturing Employment.” American Journal of Soci-
ology 114(6):1644–1674.

Kriesi, Hanspeter. 2010. “Restructuration of Partisan Politics and the Emergence of a New Cleavage
Based on Values.” West European Politics 33(3):673–685.

Kriesi, Hanspeter. 2014. “The Populist Challenge.” West European Politics 37(2):361–378.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier and Timotheos
Frey. 2006. “Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European
countries compared.” European Journal of Political Research 45(6):921–956.

Lang, Matthew, T. Clay McManus and Georg Schaur. 2016. “The Effects of Import Competition
on Health in the Local Economy.” SSRN Working Paper.

Lawrence, Robert Z. 1983. “Is Trade Deindustrializing America? A Medium-Term Perspective.”

Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1:129–171.

Lawrence, Robert Z. 1987. Trade Performance as a Constraint on European Growth. In Barriers to

European Growth: A Transatlantic View. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Lawrence, Robert Z., Matthew J. Slaughter, Robert E. Hall, Steven J. Davis and Robert H. Topel.
1993. “International Trade and American Wages in the 1980s: Giant Sucking Sound or Small
Hiccup?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics (2):161.

Lindert, Peter H. and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 2016. Unequal gains : American Growth and Inequality
Since 1700. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan. 1967. Party systems and voter alignments: cross-national
perspectives. In International yearbook of political behavior research, ed. Seymour M. Lipset and
Stein Rokkan. Number 7 New York: Free Press pp. xvi, 554 p.

Lubbers, Marcel, Mérove Gijsberts and Peer Scheepers. 2002. “Extreme right-wing voting in Western
Europe.” European Journal of Political Research 41(3):345–378.

Margalit, Yotam. 2013. “Explaining Social Policy Preferences: Evidence from the Great Recession.”
American Political Science Review 107(01):80–103.

Marks, Gary, David Attewall, Jan Rovny and Liesbet Hooghe. 2017. “Dealignment Meets Cleavage
Theory.” Working Paper.

Mayer, Nonna. 2013. “From Jean-Marie to Marine Le Pen: Electoral Change on the Far Right.”
Parliamentary Affairs 66(1):160–178.

Mayer, Nonna, Allison Rovny, Jan Rovny and Nicolas Sauger. 2015. “Outsiderness, Social Class,
and Votes in the 2014 European Elections.” Revue européenne des sciences sociales 1(53).

Mergier, A. and J. Fourquet. 2011. Le point de rupture. Enquête sur les ressorts du FN en milieux
populaires. Paris (France): Fondation Jean Jaurès.

46
Milner, Helen V. 2018. “Globalization and its Political Consequences: the Rise of Populism in the
West?” Working Paper.

Milner, Helen V and Benjamin Judkins. 2004. “Partisanship, Trade Policy and Globalization: Is
there a Left-Right Party Divide on Trade Policy?” International Studies Quarterly 48(1):95–119.

Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. New York: Cambridge University
Press.

Mudde, Cas and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2018. “Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective:
Reflections on the Contemporary and Future Research Agenda.” Comparative Political Studies
pp. 1–27.

Müller, Jan-Werner. 2016. What Is Populism? Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Pavcnik, Nina. 2017. “The Impact of Trade on Inequality in Developing Countries.” NBER Working
Paper Series, no. 23878.

Pierce, Justin and Peter Schott. 2016. “Trade Liberalization and Mortality: Evidence from U.S.
Counties.” NBER Working Paper Series, no. 22849.

Polanyi, Karl. 1957. The great transformation: the political and social origins of our time. Boston:
Beacon Press.

Pontusson, Jonas and David Rueda. 2010. “The Politics of Inequality: Voter Mobilization and Left
Parties in Advanced Industrial States.” Comparative Political Studies 43(6):675–705.

Pontusson, Jonas and David Weisstanner. 2018. “Macroeconomic conditions, inequality shocks and
the politics of redistribution, 1990–2013.” Journal of European Public Policy 25(1):31–58.

Rehm, Philipp. 2009. “Risks and Redistribution.” Comparative Political Studies 42(7):855–881.

Rodrik, Dani. 1998. “Why do More Open Economies have Bigger Governments?” Journal of Political
Economy 106(5):997–1032.

Rooduijn, Matthijs and Brian Burgoon. 2017. “The Paradox of Well-being: Do Unfavorable Socioe-
conomic and Sociocultural Contexts Deepen or Dampen Radical Left and Right Voting Among
the Less Well-Off?” Comparative Political Studies pp. 1–34.

Rovny, Jan. 2013. “Where do radical right parties stand? Position blurring in multidimensional
competition.” European Political Science Review 5(01):1–26.

Rowthorn, Robert and Ramana Ramaswamy. 1997. Deindustrialization: Causes and Implications.
In Staff Studies for the World Economic Outlook. Washington, D.C.: IMF chapter 4, pp. 61–93.

Rowthorn, Robert and Ramana Ramaswamy. 1999. “Growth, Trade, and Deindustrialization.” IMF
Staff Papers 46(1):18–41.

Ruggie, John Gerard. 1982. “International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism
in the postwar economic order.” International Organization 36(02):379–415.

Rydgren, Jens. 2013. Introduction: Class Politics and the Radical Right. In Class Politics and the
Radical Right, ed. Jens Rydgren. New York: Routledge pp. 1–10.

47
Sachs, Jeffrey. 1989. “Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America.” NBER Working Paper
Series.

Sachs, Jeffrey D., Howard J. Shatz, Alan Deardorff and Robert E. Hall. 1994. “Trade and Jobs in
U.S. Manufacturing.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1):1.

Scheve, Kenneth F and Matthew J Slaughter. 2004. “Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of
Production.” American Journal of Political Science 48(4):662–674.

Scruggs, Lyle, Detlef Jahn and Kati Kuitto. 2017. Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset 2.
Version 2017-09. University of Connecticut & University of Greifswald.

Spitz-Oener, Alexandra. 2006. “Technical Change, Job Tasks, and Rising Educational Demands:
Looking Outside the Wage Structure.” Journal of labor economics 24(2):235–270.

Thewissen, Stefan and David Rueda. 2017. “Automation and the Welfare State: Technolog-
ical Change as a Determinant of Redistribution Preferences.” Comparative Political Studies .
FirstView.

Tiberj, Vincet. 2008. La crispation hexagonale. Paris: Plon.

van der Waal, Jeroen, Peter Achterberg and Dick Houtman. 2007. “Class Is Not DeadIt Has Been
Buried Alive: Class Voting and Cultural Voting in Postwar Western Societies (19561990).” Politics
& Society 35(3):403–426.

van Hauwaert, Steven M. and Stijn Van Kessel. 2017. “Beyond protest and discontent: A cross-
national analysis of the effect of populist attitudes and issue positions on populist party support.”
European Journal of Political Research . FirstView.

van Kessel, Stijn. 2015. Populist Parties in Europe: Agents of Discontent? New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.

van Neuss, Leif. 2018. “Globalization and deindustrialization in advanced countries.” Structural
Change and Economic Dynamics 45:49–63.

Volkens, Andrea, Pola Lehmann, Theres Matthieß, Nicolas Merz, Sven Regel and Bernhard Weßels.
2017. “The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version
2017a.” Available from https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/.

Wagner, Markus and Thomas M Meyer. 2017. “The Radical Right as Niche Parties? The Ideological
Landscape of Party Systems in Western Europe, 1980–2014.” Political Studies 65(1 suppl):84–107.

Walter, Stefanie. 2010. “Globalization and the Welfare State: Testing the Microfoundations of the
Compensation Hypothesis.” International Studies Quarterly 54(2):403–426.

Werts, Han, Peer Scheepers and Marcel Lubbers. 2013. “Euro-scepticism and radical right-wing vot-
ing in Europe, 20022008: Social cleavages, socio-political attitudes and contextual characteristics
determining voting for the radical right.” European Union Politics 14(2):183–205.

Wood, Adrian. 1994. North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality: Changing Fortunes in a
Skill-Driven World. Oxford (UK) ; New York: Clarendon Press.

Wood, Adrian. 1995. “How Trade Hurt Unskilled Workers.” Journal of Economic Perspectives
9(3):57–80.

48
Wood, Adrian. 1998. “Globalisation and the Rise in Labour Market Inequalities.” The Economic
Journal 108(450):1463–1482.

World Bank. 2018. “World Bank Development Indicators.” Available from http://databank.
worldbank.org/.

49
 APPENDIX

Table 1: Net Autarky (Social Security Generosity), 1960-2003

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Trade FDI-In FDI-Out FDI-Total MigStock MigFlow
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Globalization(t-1) 2.052** 2.416** 1.508 1.720** 0.077 -0.832
(1.021) (1.012) (0.936) (0.841) (0.152) (0.890)
Social Welfare (t-1) 0.394 -0.003 0.008 0.015 0.024 -1.298*
(0.291) (0.081) (0.088) (0.097) (0.074) (0.769)
Globalization X Welfare -0.082 -0.172** -0.135** -0.127** 0.003 0.112
(0.065) (0.076) (0.066) (0.062) (0.006) (0.073)
Deindustrialization(t-1) 0.018 0.052 0.045 0.062 -0.027 0.049
(0.029) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.040) (0.072)
Autarky(t-1) 0.404*** 0.390*** 0.337*** 0.380*** 0.405*** 0.360***
(0.054) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.054) (0.071)
Seats(t-1) -2.701*** -3.202*** -3.513*** -3.436*** -2.746*** -3.949***
(0.731) (0.693) (0.755) (0.737) (0.747) (0.915)
Log(GDP pc)(t-1) -0.832*** -1.599*** -1.108*** -1.451*** -0.705** -1.041*
(0.294) (0.337) (0.358) (0.374) (0.333) (0.547)
Unemployment(t-1) -0.049 0.061 -0.004 0.034 -0.023 0.191**
(0.059) (0.068) (0.064) (0.066) (0.059) (0.079)
Old Age(t-1) 0.094 0.196*** 0.152** 0.169** 0.120* 0.076
(0.064) (0.075) (0.075) (0.081) (0.067) (0.141)
Left Party -0.637* -0.591 -0.740* -0.550 -0.614* -0.984*
(0.340) (0.397) (0.404) (0.417) (0.341) (0.511)
Christian Democratic Party -1.366*** -1.381*** -1.613*** -1.376*** -1.311*** -1.350**
(0.409) (0.467) (0.463) (0.483) (0.410) (0.575)
Right Party -1.160*** -1.225*** -1.256*** -1.184*** -1.104*** -1.181**
(0.349) (0.414) (0.413) (0.425) (0.353) (0.539)
Nationalist Party 0.473 1.351 1.396 1.392 0.525 2.853***
(1.057) (0.956) (0.998) (0.970) (1.071) (1.072)
N 1429 1059 1121 1019 1419 621
R2 0.34 0.40 0.34 0.39 0.33 0.37
Estimates are based on OLS with country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by political party.
∗
p < .1; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗∗∗ p < .01.

1
 Table 2: Nationalist Autarky (Social Security Generosity), 1960-2003

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Trade FDI-In FDI-Out FDI-Total MigStock MigFlow
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Globalization(t-1) 0.486 3.763 1.584 2.468 0.154 0.007
(1.926) (2.369) (1.866) (1.792) (0.280) (2.629)
Social Welfare (t-1) 0.015 0.171 0.144 0.190 0.079 -1.377
(0.568) (0.147) (0.152) (0.185) (0.121) (2.116)
Globalization X Welfare 0.026 -0.234 -0.143 -0.165 0.008 0.131
(0.136) (0.173) (0.134) (0.132) (0.012) (0.196)
Deindustrialization(t-1) 0.083 0.214*** 0.218*** 0.222*** -0.000 0.211*
(0.059) (0.082) (0.077) (0.083) (0.072) (0.111)
Nationalist Autarky(t-1) 0.480*** 0.496*** 0.475*** 0.498*** 0.477*** 0.526***
(0.044) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.044) (0.052)
Seats(t-1) 0.421 0.216 -0.182 -0.033 0.347 0.506
(1.430) (1.496) (1.561) (1.557) (1.459) (1.926)
Log(GDP pc)(t-1) -0.314 -1.677** -0.899 -1.330* -0.378 -1.909*
(0.441) (0.658) (0.657) (0.702) (0.504) (1.002)
Unemployment(t-1) -0.010 0.048 -0.006 0.017 0.043 0.386**
(0.117) (0.134) (0.120) (0.128) (0.115) (0.171)
Old Age(t-1) 0.049 0.110 0.071 0.050 0.085 -0.083
(0.103) (0.129) (0.124) (0.129) (0.110) (0.231)
Left Party -1.869*** -1.934** -2.174*** -1.907** -1.848*** -3.563***
(0.680) (0.815) (0.763) (0.831) (0.682) (0.766)
Christian Democratic Party 1.918 2.565* 2.223* 2.696* 2.031* 1.580
(1.177) (1.439) (1.298) (1.468) (1.199) (1.175)
Right Party -1.624** -1.449 -1.570* -1.404 -1.569** -2.440***
(0.714) (0.885) (0.823) (0.895) (0.722) (0.886)
Nationalist Party 7.738** 9.059*** 9.175*** 9.067*** 7.878** 11.716***
(3.063) (2.902) (2.954) (2.899) (3.132) (2.962)
N 1429 1059 1121 1019 1419 621
R2 0.44 0.51 0.48 0.51 0.44 0.60
Estimates are based on OLS with country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by political party.
∗
p < .1; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗∗∗ p < .01.

2
 Table 3: Anti-Internationalism (Social Security Generosity), 1960-2003

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Trade FDI-In FDI-Out FDI-Total MigStock MigFlow
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Globalization(t-1) 2.359*** 1.205* 1.402** 0.996** -0.018 -0.982
(0.837) (0.629) (0.542) (0.486) (0.091) (0.804)
Social Welfare (t-1) 0.768*** -0.007 0.040 0.039 0.020 -0.595
(0.247) (0.064) (0.061) (0.071) (0.056) (0.586)
Globalization X Welfare -0.177*** -0.112** -0.132*** -0.099*** 0.001 0.055
(0.056) (0.047) (0.039) (0.037) (0.004) (0.056)
Deindustrialization(t-1) -0.014 -0.008 -0.011 0.012 -0.023 0.022
(0.021) (0.021) (0.030) (0.021) (0.034) (0.037)
Anti-Internationalism(t-1) 0.357*** 0.338*** 0.248*** 0.321*** 0.363*** 0.327***
(0.077) (0.038) (0.063) (0.040) (0.078) (0.048)
Seats(t-1) -0.630 -1.031** -1.027* -1.062* -0.713 -0.811
(0.522) (0.521) (0.556) (0.547) (0.532) (0.629)
GDP Gwth(t-1) 0.030 0.007 -0.006 0.016 0.028 0.022
(0.044) (0.040) (0.057) (0.043) (0.045) (0.079)
Unemployment(t-1) 0.023 0.070* 0.045 0.051 0.017 0.124**
(0.038) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.055)
Old Age(t-1) -0.099** -0.013 -0.021 -0.013 -0.040 0.173*
(0.042) (0.045) (0.039) (0.048) (0.037) (0.102)
Left Party -0.658** -0.721*** -0.966*** -0.720*** -0.663** -1.191***
(0.314) (0.244) (0.355) (0.259) (0.317) (0.337)
Christian Democratic Party -0.863** -0.928*** -1.165*** -0.966*** -0.838** -1.299***
(0.381) (0.326) (0.432) (0.337) (0.384) (0.422)
Right Party -0.426 -0.446* -0.584* -0.405 -0.403 -0.436
(0.301) (0.262) (0.342) (0.273) (0.302) (0.373)
Nationalist Party -0.230 0.157 0.115 0.178 -0.254 0.471
(0.620) (0.424) (0.481) (0.438) (0.617) (0.484)
N 1385 1050 1112 1010 1366 621
R2 0.33 0.40 0.33 0.40 0.33 0.39
Estimates are based on OLS with country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by political party.
∗
p < .1; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗∗∗ p < .01.

3
 Table 4: Far Right Parties

Country Party Abb. Party Name

Austria FPO Freedom Party of Austria
Austria TS Team Stronach for Austria
Austria BZO Alliance for the Future of Austria
Belgium VU People’s Union [Flemish Concentration]
Belgium PP People’s Party
Belgium FN National Front
Belgium LDLDD List Dedecker / Libertarian, Direct, Democratic
Belgium VB Flemish Block
Denmark DF Danish Peoples Party
Denmark FrP Progress Party
Finland SP P Finnish Party / True Finns
Finland IK Isnmaallinen Kansanliike
France FN National Front
France MPF Movement for France
France PRG Radical Party of the Left
France MNR National Republican Movement
Germany AfD Alternative for Germany
Germany WAV Economic Reconstruction League
Germany NPD National Democratic Party
Germany Rep The Republicans
Germany DP German Party
Germany DVU German People’s Union
Greece POLAN Political Spring
Greece LSCA Peoples Association / Golden Dawn
Greece EDE National Democratic Union
Greece EPEN National Political Union
Greece EP National Alignment
Greece ANEL Independent Greeks
Continued on next page

4
 Table 4 – continued from previous page
Country Party Abb. Party Name
Greece LAOS Popular Orthodox Rally
Italy LL Lombard League
Italy LV Venetian League
Italy AN National Alliance
Italy LN North League
Italy MSFT Fiamma Tricolore
Italy FdICN Brothers of Italy – National Centre-right
Italy MSI Italian Social Movement / Italian Social Movement-National Right
Italy MS Five Star Movement
Italy ASM Social Alternative Mussolini
Luxembourg ARADR Action Committee Pensions / Alternative Democratic Reform Party
Luxembourg NB National Movement
Netherlands CD Centre Democrats
Netherlands CP Centre Party
Netherlands PVV Party for Freedom
Netherlands SP Socialist Party
Netherlands LN Livable Netherlands
Netherlands LPF Fortuyn List
Norway FrP Progress Party [Anders Langes Party]
Portugal PDC Christian Democratic Party
Portugal CDSPP Democratic and Social Center – People’s Party
Portugal FSP People’s Socialist Front
Sweden NyD New Democracy
Sweden SD Sweden Democrats
Switzerland SVPUDC Swiss People’s Party
Switzerland MCG Geneva Citizens’ Movement
Switzerland APFS Automobile Party / Freedom Party of Switzerland
Switzerland NASD National Action against Foreign Domination Swiss Democrats
Switzerland LdTI Ticino League
Continued on next page

5
 Table 4 – continued from previous page
Country Party Abb. Party Name
Switzerland RB Swiss Republican Movement
United Kingdom NF National Front
United Kingdom DUP Democratic Unionist Party
United Kingdom ED English Democrats
United Kingdom UKIP United Kingdom Independence Party
United Kingdom BNP British National Party

6
 Table 5: Mainstream Left Parties

Country Party Abb. Party Name

Australia ALP Australian Labor Party
Austria SP Social Democratic Party of Austria
Belgium PS Socialist Party [Francophone]
Belgium SPASpirit Socialist Party Different / Social Liberal Party / Spirit
Belgium SP Flemish Socialist Party
Canada LP Liberal Party
Denmark SD Socialdemokraterne
Finland SDP Social Democratic Party of Finland
France PS Socialist Party
Germany SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany
Greece PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement
Ireland LAB Labour Party
Italy DS Democrats of the Left
Italy PD Democratic Party
Italy PCI/PDS Italian Communist Party
Italy Ulivo Ulivo
Japan JSP Japan Socialist Party / Social Democratic Party
Japan DSP Democratic Socialist Party
Luxembourg LSAP Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ Party
Netherlands PvdA Labour
New Zealand LP Labour Party
Norway AP Norwegian Labour Party
Portugal PS Socialist Party
Spain PSOE Spanish Socialist Workers Party
Sweden SAP Social Democrats
Switzerland SP Social Democratic Party of Switzerland
United Kingdom Lab Labour Party

7
 Table 6: Mainstream Right Parties

Country Party Abb. Party Name

Australia LPA Liberal Party of Australia
Austria VP Austrian People’s Party
Belgium CD&V Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams
Belgium CDH Humanist Democratic Centre
Belgium PVVOVLD Party of Liberty and Progress /Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats
Belgium PRL Liberal Reformist Party
Belgium MR / VLD Reformist Movement
Canada CPC Conservative Party of Canada
Canada PCP Progressive Conservatve Party of Canada
Denmark V Liberal Party
Denmark KF Conservative People’s Party
Finland KESK Agrarian Union / Centre Party
Finland KOK National Coalition Party
France RPR Rally for the Republic
France UMP Union for a Popular Movement
France UDF Union for French Democracy
France NC New Centre
Germany CDU Christian Democratic Union
Germany CSU Christian Social Union
Germany FDP Freie Demokratische Partei
Greece ND New Democracy
Ireland FF Fianna Fail The Republican Party
Ireland FG Fine Gael (Familiy of the Irish)
Italy FI Go Italy
Italy PdL The People of Freedom
Italy DC/FI Christian Democrats
Japan LDP Liberal Democratic Party
Luxembourg PCS/CSV Christian Social People’s Party
Luxembourg DP Democratic Party
Netherlands CDA Christian Democratic Appeal
Netherlands VVD People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy
New Zealand NP National Party
Norway KrF Christian Democratic Party
Norway H Conservative Party
Portugal PPDPSD Popular Democratic Party / Social Democratic Party
Spain PP People’s Alliance-Party / People’s Party
Sweden M Right Party / Moderate Party
Sweden BC Farmers’ League / Centre Party
Switzerland CVP/PDC Catholic Conservative / Christian Democratic Peoples Party
Switzerland FDP The Liberals
United Kingdom CON Conservatives

8
 Table 7: Mediation Models - Mainstream Right Parties Vote Share (t-1) (1985-2016)

Trade FDI-In FDI-Out FDI-Total MigStock MigFlow

b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Direct Effects
Deindustrialization(t-1) -0.241 -0.203 -0.277 -0.220 -0.206 -0.404
(0.335) (0.362) (0.365) (0.364) (0.479) (0.319)
Log(Trade)(t-1) -0.626
(5.397)
Log(FDI Inflows)(t-1) -0.535
(0.526)
Log(FDI Outflows)(t-1) -0.192
(0.432)
Log(FDI Total)(t-1) -0.260
(0.338)
Migrant Stk(t-1) -0.080
(0.531)
Log(Mig Inflows)(t-1) 1.512
(1.352)
Social Welfare (t-1) -0.394 -0.430 -0.439 -0.413 -0.383 -0.448
(0.313) (0.308) (0.317) (0.312) (0.308) (0.363)
GDP(t-1) 0.054 0.060 0.075 0.053 0.048 0.007
(0.170) (0.160) (0.179) (0.167) (0.168) (0.166)
Unemployment (t-1) -0.072 -0.132 -0.060 -0.124 -0.082 0.024
(0.172) (0.161) (0.176) (0.164) (0.203) (0.286)
Eff. No. Parties -2.978** -2.962* -2.873* -2.975* -2.958** -2.407*
(1.483) (1.559) (1.499) (1.563) (1.501) (1.373)
Gini (t-1) -0.070 0.045 -0.129 0.038 -0.062 -0.347
(0.724) (0.667) (0.662) (0.664) (0.662) (0.706)
Constant 67.868*** 60.338*** 69.941*** 61.532*** 63.625*** 65.088***
(16.674) (12.984) (14.898) (13.169) (18.032) (17.571)
Global → Deindust.
Log(Trade)(t-1) 3.772***
(1.100)
Log(FDI Inflows)(t-1) 1.709***
(0.609)
Log(FDI Outflows)(t-1) 0.876
(0.689)
Log(FDI Total)(t-1) 0.816
(0.616)
Migrant Stk(t-1) 0.322***
(0.055)
Log(Mig Inflows)(t-1) -0.540
(0.686)
GDP(t-1) -0.355** -0.351** -0.338* -0.331* -0.229 -0.325
(0.161) (0.163) (0.202) (0.196) (0.189) (0.245)
Constant 59.052*** 73.097*** 73.906*** 73.707*** 71.332*** 81.029***
(4.922) (1.262) (1.290) (1.465) (1.195) (7.543)

9
Table 8: Mainstream Right Parties Vote Share (Indirect & Total Effects) (t-1) (1985-2016)

Trade FDI-In FDI-Out FDI-Total MigStock MigFlow

b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Indirect Effect -0.909 -0.347 -0.243 -0.180 -0.066 0.218
(1.3279) (.6416) (.3883) (.3372) (.1544) (.3088)
Total Effect -1.535 -0.882 -0.435 -0.440 -0.146 1.730
(5.481) (.9785) (.6273) (.5693) (.4472) (1.2762)
N 199 191 194 189 197 174

10