Chemical Warfare Service Chemicals in Combat

Foreword
This is the third and final volume of the Chemical Warfare Service
subseries of The Technical Services in the series UNITED STATES
ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Concluding the chemical warfare story
that was begun in Organizing for War and was continued in From
Laboratory to Field, Chemicals in Combat records in meaningful de-
tail the ultimate and most rigorous test of all things military: perform-
ance in battle.
Entry of the United States into World War II found the nation's
Armed Forces, like those of its principal allies and enemies, mindful
of the possibility of gas warfare. The gas attacks of World War I
did not recur, but the Chemical Warfare Service was in the position of
being ready for a type of war that did not happen. Thus the CWS, the
only technical service having combat troops armed with weapons it
had specifically provided for itself, was forced to show its flexibility.
The Service sought to fulfill its supporting role with smoke, flame, and
incendiaries; with 4.2-inch mortars and flame throwers; and, having no
gas to contend with, its decontamination companies provided front-line
troops with the means for simple physical cleanliness. Chemicals in
Combat recounts the administrative, logistical, and tactical problems
arising from the Service's dual responsibility, and highlights the flexi-
bility and ingenuity demanded of chemical troops in World War II.
These are, of course, qualities that military men have and will always
find essential.
Washington, D.C. HAL C. PATTISON

15 March 1965 Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History
The Authors
Dr. Brooks E. Kleber received a Ph.B. degree from Dickinson College
and M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in history from the University of Penn-
sylvania. From 1950 to 1963 he served as historian with the U.S. Army
Chemical Corps Historical Office. In January 1963 Dr. Kleber was
appointed Chief Historian, United States Continental Army Command.
Dr. Dale Birdsell holds an A.B. degree from Reed College, an M.A.
from Brown University, and a Ph.D. from the University of Pennsyl-
vania. He served as historian with the U.S. Army Chemical Corps
Historical Office from 1952 to 1963 and is now Chief, Historical
Division, U.S. Army Munitions Command.
Preface
Chemicals in Combat is the last of three volumes concerned with the
activities of the Chemical Warfare Service in World War II. It is de-
voted to the overseas story—administration, logistics, and combat. In
World War II the CWS faced a unique situation, in that it found itself
in the unenviable position of preparing for an unconventional kind of
warfare that never came to pass. Yet, even as it served as insurance in
the event of the introduction of gas by the enemy (United States policy
permitted the use of gas only in retaliation), it also had to be useful in a
gasless war.
The CWS was useful in World War II. Its contributions included the
missions of smoke, flame, and incendiary weapons, which, less heralded
at first, eventually eclipsed the gas mission. How the CWS carried out
these various missions in the theaters of operation is the main theme of
this volume.
"Chemical Warfare" is a term meant to include the employment of
artificial smoke, flame, and incendiary munitions as well as gas offensive
and defensive munitions. While the practice at the time of this writing
is to refer to the "employment of chemical weapons" rather than to
"chemical warfare," the latter term is appropriate to a World War II
setting, and the term "chemicals" retains its inclusive World War II
meaning.
In planning a volume devoted to the overseas activities of the CWS,
the authors found the logic of either of two alternative organizational
methods was appealing: (1) trace each CWS activity, such as prepared-
ness, administration, and logistics, and each of the combat functions,
from war area to war area in a unified account by subject; or (2) treat
all CWS activities for each overseas area in a unified account under an
area heading. The first alternative tended to obscure the administrative
and logistic individuality of the CWS overseas branches. It also tended
to minimize the impact of area physical characteristics, of area organi-
zational policy, and of area tactics. Even two theaters so intimately con-
nected and in many ways so parallel as the European and North African
were decidedly different entities from the CWS point of view. The
theater chief chemical officers operated from different echelons of com-
mand, and these individuals did not hold the same conception of
operating control. The possibility of gas warfare was great in Europe
but usually remote in North Africa. The CWS supply system was
highly centralized in Europe; it was in part decentralized in the Medi-
terranean area. But neither did the second alternative solve all the
problems. The development of mortar and smoke tactics and tech-
niques in the Mediterranean area was much more closely related to the
employment of those tactics and techniques in the European theater
situation than it was to the evolution of the Mediterranean theater
supply systems. Further, in the Pacific the development of flame
weapons and tactics would not observe area boundaries, and Pacific
incendiary bomb experience was only a grand enlargement of European
experience.
The authors fully realize that the war was carried on in more than
the four major areas usually considered herein. They have no desire to
detract from the considerable contributions of the CWS branches in the
other major areas and in those outposts which could not be designated
major. But the authors believe that most CWS problems can be illus-
trated from activities in the European and North African/Mediterran-
ean theaters and the Southwest and Central Pacific Areas with some
reference to the South Pacific Area. The China, Burma-India, North
Pacific, and Middle East areas are thus excluded.
The CWS in the United States is treated in two complementary
volumes which have preceded the publication of Chemicals in Combat.
The first of these, Organizing for War, traces matters of organization,
administration, and training from World War I CWS origins through
the end of World War II. The second, From Laboratory to Field, deals
with CWS research, development, and supply.
The present volume was begun by and under the direction of the
late Dr. Paul W. Pritchard, then Chief, U.S. Army Chemical Corps
Historical Office. While Dr. Pritchard's work appears only in portions
of the chapters on smoke, the authors greatly benefited from his guid-
ance and advice and from his unflagging interest in overseas military
operations. He was one of those historians who could become personally
involved in and enthusiastic about his subject without impairment of
objectivity. Dr. Pritchard's successor, Dr. Leo P. Brophy, continued to
provide valuable guidance and advice. Dr. Brooks E. Kleber wrote
Chapters VIII through XVII. Dr. Dale Birdsell wrote Chapters II
through VI. These authors collaborated on Chapters I and XVIII.
Mr. Sherman L. Davis wrote Chapter VII. Dr. Kleber co-ordinated
the work on the volume.
The authors are greatly indebted to Dr. Stetson Conn, Chief His-
torian, and to Dr. John Miller, jr., Deputy Chief Historian, Office,
Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, for guidance and
suggestions. Many members and former members of the staff of the
U.S. Army Chemical Corps Historical Office also contributed knowl-
edge, preliminary research, or early drafts of portions of this volume.
Individuals who were especially helpful and their areas of interest are:
Mr. H. Gilman Wing, flame throwers and administration; Lt. Col.
Leonard J. McKinney, flame throwers; Dr. Ben R. Baldwin, mortars
and readiness; Dr. Alfred J. Bingham, mortars, readiness, administra-
tion; and Mr. Innis Brown, chemical troop units. The following U.S.
Army Chemical Corps Historical Office enlisted research assistants were
especially helpful: Thomas J. Morgan, Nelson Ledsky, Richard Breault,
William Piez, Harvey Fergusson, John J. Keeley, Victor H. Walton,
and Arthur Macqueen. Mrs. Alice E. Moss supervised the preparation
of the manuscript, did yeoman service in checking source locations, and
diligently performed preliminary editorial tasks. Mrs. Doris M. Jacob-
son displayed extraordinary skill in preparing the final typescripts.
Research for this volume was greatly facilitated by personnel of the
World War II Records Division, National Archives, especially Mrs.
Lois Aldridge, Mrs. Hazel Ward, and Mrs. Caroline Moore. Mr.
Howard Bauté, Mrs. Mary K. Stuart, and Mrs. M. Virginia Nester of
the Federal Records Center in Alexandria were most helpful in locating
CWS records, and personnel of the Federal Records Center, Kansas
City, the Archives Division, The Air University, and the Marine Corps
Archives provided many collections of overseas records. Mr. Israel Wice
and Miss Hannah Zeidlik of the Office, Chief of Military History,
steered the authors to many records sources they might otherwise have
overlooked. Miss Ethel M. Owens, Office of the Chief Chemical Officer,
provided valuable information on the careers of CWS officers.
The veterans of the Chemical Warfare Service have been remarkably
frank in supplying materials which do not appear in the official rec-
ords, and many have given unstintingly of their time. The authors are
grateful to all these officers whose interviews or comments have been
cited as well as to others who provided more general background in-
formation. They are especially grateful to Maj. Gen. Alden H. Waitt,
Brig. Gen. Hugh W. Rowan, and Col. Maurice H. Barker, all of whom
followed the project throughout the entire span and contributed much
to the authors' understanding of the World War II experience of the
CWS. The following officers were always ready with good counsel:
Cols. William A. Copthorne, Alexander Batlin, Frank M. Arthur, and
Nelson McKaig, Jr., Lt. Col. Levin B. Cottingham, Maj. Gen. William
N. Porter, Cols. Siegfried P. Coblentz, James H. Batte, and Robert W.
Breaks, Brig. Gen. Charles S. Shadle, Cols. Alfred J. P. Wilson, Alex-
ander Leggin, John C. MacArthur, Thomas H. Magness, Jr., Claude J.
Merrill, Carl V. Burke, Irving R. Mollen, John C. Morgan, Harold
Riegelman, and Patrick F. Powers.
Thanks are also due to several other members of the Office of the
Chief of Military History: Mr. David Jaffé, editor, Mrs. Marion P.
Grimes, assistant editor; Miss Ruth A. Phillips, who selected the
photographs; and Mr. Elliot Dunay, who prepared the maps.
For errors in the facts presented and in the conclusions drawn, the
authors assume sole responsibility.
Washington, D.C. BROOKS E. KLEBER

15 March 1965 DALE BIRDSELL
Contents
Chapter Page
I. ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE . . . . . 3
World War I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The CWS Between the Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
II. THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER . . . . . . . . . 36
Planning and Organization: 1940-43 . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Planning and Organization: 1944-45 . . . . . . . . . . . 61Summary
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
III. CWS ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN . 86
Chemical Supply—The Beachhead Phase . . . . . . . . . . 94
Chemical Supply—Theater Organization Phase . . . . . . . . 99
Theater Chemical Supply Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
IV. THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

Evolving the Theater CWS Supply System . . . . . . . . . 136
Air Chemical Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Ground Chemical Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
On the Continent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
V. CWS ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
The CWS in the West and Southwest Pacific, 1941-42 . . . . 187
The Principal Mission—1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
CWS, Southwest Pacific Area, 1944-45 . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Organizing the CWS, Hawaiian Department . . . . . . . . 219
The Offensive Period in the Central Pacific . . . . . . . . . 225
VI. THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

Foundation of Chemical Supply in Australia . . . . . . . . . 236
The Tyranny of Climate and Distance . . . . . . . . . . . 246
Chemical Warfare Tactical Supply, Southwest Pacific Area ... 254
The Theater Supply System, Central Pacific . . . . . . . . . 266
Chemical Warfare Tactical Supply, Central Pacific . . . . . . 270
VII. CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS . . . . . . . . . . 277

The Chemical Laboratory Company . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
xiii
ChapterPage
The Chemical Maintenance Company . . . . . . . . . . . 288
The Chemical Depot Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
The Chemical Decontamination Company . . . . . . . . . . 300
The Chemical Processing Company . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
The Chemical Service Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
Chemical Air Service Companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
VIII. LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE MTO . . . . . . . 321

Background of Large Area Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
Initial Operations: The Northwest African Ports . . . . . . . 326
Perfecting the Technique: The Italian Ports . . . . . . . . . 329
The Changing Mission: Smoke in Amphibious and Beachhead
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 4
Smoke in Normal Forward Area Operations . . . . . . . . . 345
IX. LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO . . . . . . . . 354

The Invasion of Normandy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
The Generators, Units, and Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
The Use of Smoke at River Crossings . . . . . . . . . . . . 361Summary
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
X. LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE PACIFIC . . . . . . 394

Early Attempts To Introduce Area Screening in SWPA . . . . 394
A Question of Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
Renewed Interest in Smoke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
The Navy's Use of Smoke ................ 404Screens for Airborne Operations
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411
XI. THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO . . . . . . . . . . . 418

The Authorization of the High Explosive Mission . . . . . . . 419
Activation of Chemical Mortar Units . . . . . . . . . . . 421
Sicily . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
The Salerno Landings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432
From the Volturno to the Winter Line . . . . . . . . . . . 435
The Gustav Line . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 442
The Anzio Beachhead . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 445
Cassino . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 448
The Drive on Rome . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 450
The Invasion of Southern France . . .. . . . . . . . . . 453
The Fighting Ends in Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455
XII. THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE ETO . . . . . . . . . . 459

Preparations for OVERLORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461
The Normandy Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462
xiv
Chapter Page
Operational Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468
The Drive Toward Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471
Mortar Parts and Their Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . 477
The German Winter Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480
Mortar Shell Malfunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482
The Final Drive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484
XIII. THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC . . . . . . . . 492
South Pacific Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 492
Southwest Pacific Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 497
Central Pacific Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 516
Amphibious Employment of the 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar ... 520
XIV. THE FLAME THROWER IN THE PACIFIC:
GUADALCANAL TO THE MARSHALL ISLANDS ... 534
The Portable Flame Thrower in the South Pacific . . . . . . . 536
The Southwest Pacific: The first Years . . . . . . . . . . . 543
Introduction of the Portable flame Thrower in the Central
Pacific Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5 3
XV. THE FLAME THROWER IN THE PACIFIC:
MARIANAS TO OKINAWA . . . . . . . . . . . . . 558
The Need for a Mechanized flame Thrower . . . . . . . . . 558
The Marianas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 559
Peleliu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564
T h e Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 568
I w o Jima . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 578
Okinawa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584
Preparations for the Invasion of Japan . . . . . . . . . . . 589
XVI. THE FLAME THROWER IN THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY 592
The Portable flame Thrower in the MTO . . . . . . . . . . 592
The Portable flame Thrower in the ETO . . . . . . . . . . 596
The Mechanized flame Thrower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 604
XVII. FIRE FROM THE AIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 614
The Incendiary Bomb: The Strategic Weapon . . . . . . . . 614
The fire Bomb: The Tactical Weapon . . . . . . . . . . . 630
XVIII. CWS OVERSEAS—AN EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . 636
Administration and Manpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 637
Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 640
T h e Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 644
Readiness for Gas Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 648
Why Gas Was Not Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 652
Charts
Page
1. Organization of Chemical Warfare Service, American Expeditionary Forces,
13 July 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2. Suggested Organization of Offices of Chemical Officers, Theater of
Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3. Planned Distribution of Staff and Service Agencies, Chemical Warfare
Service, Theater of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4. Organization of Chemical Warfare Service Section, Headquarters, European
Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, January 1944 . . . . . . . . . 63
5. Actual Distribution of Service Agencies and Combat Units, Chemical
Warfare Service, European Theater of Operations, 1944-1945 ... 66
6. Organization of Chemical Warfare Section, Allied Force Headquarters, and
Headquarters, North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army,
November 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
7. Organization of Chemical Section, Headquarters, United States Army
Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area, 1 June 1944 . . . . . . 209C
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 659

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 664
CODE NAMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 669
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 675
Maps
No.
1. Theaters of Operations, 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1. Theaters of Operations, 1943 . . . . . . . . . .31 of Operations, 1943
2. Pacific Ocean Areas, 1 August 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
3. Smoke at Naples, December 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330
4. Smoke at Anzio, 18 March 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338
5. Smoke Along the Garigliano, April 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
6. Smoke Generator Operations, 10-15 September 1944 . . . . . . . . . 364
7. Nadzab Smoke Curtains, 5 September 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
Illustrations
Maj. Gen. William N. Porter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
General Porter and Top-Ranking Officers in London, 1943 . . . . . . . . . 49
Col. Maurice E. Barker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
xvi
Page
Col. Charles S. Shadle and Staff in Algiers, 1943 . . . . . . . . . .
. . . 120
Decontamination Unit Functioning as a Shower . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Chemical Warfare Depot, Loton Deer Park, England . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Conferring Somewhere in England Before D-day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
"I see Comp'ny E got th' new style gas masks, Joe" . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
Annex Building, Chemical Warfare School, Brisbane . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Col. Harold Riegelman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 7
Col. Carl L. Marriott Examining Japanese Gas Mask . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Col. William A. Copthorne and Brig. Gen. Alden H. Waitt . . . . . . . . . 216
Chemical Warfare Officers at Oro Bay, 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Col. George F. Unmacht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Repairing Gas Masks for Civilian Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
Capua Arsenal, as the Germans Left It . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
Plant of 105th Chemical Processing Company, Brisbane . . . . . . . . . . 306
Testing Flame Thrower Fuels, New Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
A Chemical Service Company Laboratory, New Guinea . . . . . . . . . . 312
Loading Liquid Smoke Into an M10 Smoke Tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318
Smoke Screen Shields Unloading Operations, Salerno . . . . . . . . . . . 333
"My God! There we wuz an' here they wuz" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
Effect of Smoke Curtain, Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
Carrying Smoke Pots Into Position, Rapido River . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
Smoke Screen Conceals Movements Along Highway . . . . . . . . . . . 352
M 2 Smoke Generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 8
Smoke Screen Begins To Form on the Moselle River . . . . . . . . . . . . 365
Smoke Generator in a Dukw, Milne Bay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396
Smoke Shields a Paratroop Drop, New Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415
4.2-Inch Mortar Crew, Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 3
Pulling a 4.2-Inch Mortar Cart Over Rugged Terrain . . . . . . . . . . . 427
Smoke Screen, OMAHA Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463
Chemical Mortars, UTAH Beach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 464
Preparing a 4.2-Inch Mortar Shell for Firing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480
Roer River Bridge Behind a Smoke Screen ................ 488Artificial Haze on Rhine River
Artificial Haze on Rhine River. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490
4.2-Inch Chemical Mortars on LST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 522
Marines Using CWS Flame Thrower, Tarawa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 554
Flame Thrower on an Amphibious Tractor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 565
Neutralizing a Cave, Iwo Jima . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 580
Flame-Throwing Tank, Okinawa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8 5
Men Training With Flame Thrower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600
British Crocodile With Fuel Trailer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 607
Loading Magnesium Bombs Into a B-24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 623
Tokyo, After Incendiary Bombing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 9
Attaching Fire Bomb Tank to a P-47 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 631
All illustrations are from the files of the Department of Defense except for the car-
toons by Bill Mauldin on page 176 and page 341 and the photograph supplied by Col.
Thomas H. Magness, Jr., on page 607.
xvii
THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE:
CHEMICALS IN COMBAT
CHAPTER I
Origins of the Chemical

Warfare Service
The great paradox of America's wartime gas experience is that in
World War I, when the nation was unprepared for it, gas was used, and
in World War II, when the nation was prepared, gas was not used. The
gas warfare experience of World War I is important not only as the
sole example of large-scale use of toxic chemicals in battle, but also
because this experience in large measure dictated the chemical mission,
organization, weapons, tactics, and techniques with which the belliger-
ents entered World War II. The Allies and the Central Powers used no
fewer than twenty-eight gases and sixteen mixtures of gases during
World War I. Although the United States retained or developed nearly
a dozen gases, only four, mustard, phosgene, lewisite, and Chloraceto-
phenone, in order of importance, were considered as basic at the
beginning of World War II. The first two were accorded this priority
as the result of actual World War I combat experience; lewisite
owed its prominence to its likeness to mustard, while Chloracetophenone
was similar to, although less expensive and less corrosive than, the
World War I tear gases.1 The ground weapons available for gas at the
beginning of World War II had for the most part likewise been devel-
oped and battle-tested in World War I. These included artillery with
toxic shell, the Livens projector, chemical cylinders, and toxic candles.
The Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) in the United States had modi-
1
(1) Brig. Gen. Amos A. Fries and Maj. Clarence J. West, Chemical Warfare (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1921), pp. 24-27. (2) WD TM 3-215, 1 Oct 40. (3) Leo P. Brophy, Wyndham D. Miles, and
Rexmond C. Cochrane, The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field, UNITED STATES
ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959), pp. 49-74.
4 THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE
fied the 4-inch Stokes mortar into the longer range, more accurate
4.2-inch chemical mortar, again on the basis of World War I experi-
ence.2 The aerial chemical bomb was a development of the period be-
tween the wars, but even this new weapon did not significantly alter
gas warfare tactics. The concept of the massive gas attack adopted by
most of the major World War I combatants dominated tactical doc-
trine in the period following the war. Retained too was the practice of
using mustard in defensive operations. In offensive chemical operations
nonpersistent agents were to be used in terrain over which friendly
troops would advance, whereas the persistent mustard would be placed
on areas to be neutralized and bypassed.3 In general, the troops who
successfully stood up in the face of such gas attacks were those who had
training and gas mask discipline.
Two comments about the American use of gas in World War I are
in order. First, troops in the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF)
used a disproportionately large amount of Allied materiel. In time, the
United States did send bulk toxics to Europe where they were poured
into British and French shells. And although four million American-
made masks were eventually shipped to Europe, soldiers of the AEF
initially used almost a million British and French masks. The second
point concerns the place of gas warfare in the thinking of American
battle leaders. These officers had to be won over to the usefulness of gas
warfare and this task was not always easy. Brig. Gen. Amos A. Fries tells
of the case of the operations officer of an American corps demanding
written assurance that gas used in support of an attack in the Argonne
would not cause a single friendly casualty. Fries also brings out another
point, supported by contemporary documents, which involves the re-
luctance of American commanders to use gas because of the possibility
of retaliatory fire. They held this attitude despite the fact that the
Germans had made good use of the chemical weapon regardless of
enemy reaction.4
2
(1) Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field, pp. 123-38. (2) The gas cylinder and
the Livens projector were dropped early in World War II because the range of both and the accuracy of
the Livens projector suited them only to trench warfare conditions.
3
(1) Maj. Gen. C. H. Foulkes, "Gas!" The Story of the Special Brigade (Edinburgh and London: W.
Blackwood & Sons, 1934) (hereafter cited as Foulkes, Gas!) p. 267. (2) Brig. Gen. Alden H. Waitt,
Gas Warfare (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942), pp. 137-54.
4
Amos A. Fries, MS, History of Chemical Warfare in France, 1919, pp. 52-53.
ORIGINS OF THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE 5
World War 1
The First Gas Attack
Late in the afternoon of 22 April 1915 three flares glowed from a
German balloon hoisted in the salient near Ypres, Belgium. At this
signal plumes of greenish-gray smoke began to pour from the earth in
front of the German trenches. The plumes suffused into a yellowish
cloud rolling downwind toward the Allied trenches at the juncture of
the French and British lines. The first notable gas attack in military
history was in progress, The chlorine gas cloud enveloped a French
colonial regiment. Some soldiers emerged from the cloud blinded,
choking, and coughing, but other soldiers, incapacitated, dying, or
dead from the effects of the gas were left in the trenches. German gas
breached the Allied lines for four miles, and German soldiers captured
fifty French guns.5
The French did not announce their casualties from this first attack,
but the Germans estimated them at 15,000, including 5,000 deaths in
the attack of 22 April and in that of 24 April in the same sector.6
Although the German estimate may have been high, the casualties were
nonetheless extensive. These losses, along with the shock and panic re-
sulting from the surprise introduction of a new weapon, could have
been a serious blow to the Allies had the Germans followed up their
initial success. They failed to advance more than a few hundred yards,
however, and before they could gain ground significantly, the Allies
had plugged the hole in their line.7 The failure of the Germans to exploit
their initial success and Allied lack of preparation for the introduction
of gas can best be understood in the light of the strategic concepts and
views of the military art held by the belligerents before World War I.
5
(1) Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 18-19. (2) Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 10-13 (eyewitness ac-
counts cited). (3) Victor Lefebure, The Riddle of the Rhine (New York: The Chemical Foundation,
1923), pp. 31-32 (statement of Sir John .French, British Commander-in-chief in the field, cited). (4)
Waitt, Gas Warfare, pp. 16-19. (5) Capt. Basil H. Liddell Hart, The Real War, 1914-1918 (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1931), pp. 130, 175-81. (6) Rudolph Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg (3d
ed., Berlin: Mittler, 1937), I, 16-17. All references to this work are to the third edition unless otherwise
noted.
6
(1) Foulkes in Gas!, page 306, cites these figures, which appear in Hanslian et al., Der Chemische
Krieg (2d ed., 1927), page 12, but believes they are exaggerated. In the 24 April attack 122 soldiers of
the Canadian forces holding a section of the British line were hospitalized and eleven died. (2) Waitt,
Gas Warfare, page 18, indicates 5,000 casualties. (3) A French authority, Henri le Wita, Autour de
la Guerre Chimique (Paris: Tallandier, 1928) page 34, accepts the German estimate without question.
7
Liddell Hart, The Real War, p. 176.
Background of Gas Warfare

While the nineteenth century industrial and technological revolu-
tions produced a new arsenal of weapons that radically altered the
character of warfare, the new technology produced no toxic war gases.
Such were envisaged, however, and several suggestions for the use of
toxic chemicals in war had been made.8 The prospect of the union of
the science of chemistry with the art of war was sufficiently real by the
end of the nineteenth century to cause the nations deliberating at The
Hague during the International Peace Conference to attempt to ban
the use of "projectiles, the sole object of which is the diffusion of
asphyxiating or deleterious gases." 9
The attempted ban did not run counter to any area of military opin-
ion. Military leaders, theorists, and innovators were engrossed, and in
the early years of the twentieth century became even more engrossed,
in the concepts of mass armies, grand strategic offensives, and the
undreamed-of firepower of modern weapons.10 The nations of Europe
entered World War I dominated by the grand strategic conception of
mass offensive through which one set of belligerents or the other would
claim victory—probably in as short a time as six weeks.11 No nation
envisioned the need for large-scale industrial preparation; the initial
stockpile of weapons and ammunition would serve for the brief dura-
tion of the war.12 Since gas was expected only to hamper the progress
of assaulting forces in mass offensive, each nation reviewed its potential
for producing toxics in but cursory fashion.
Only Germany, with the world's largest and most varied chemical
industry, appeared to have the potential for war gas production.
Germany set Professor Fritz Haber, director of Berlin's Kaiser Wilhelm
Institute, and a small group of chemists to work on war gases in Haber's
own institute in the first month of the war.13 At first there must have
2
See Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field, pp. 1-2.
9
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, Pamphlet 8, The Hague
Declaration (IV, 2) of 1899 Concerning Asphyxiating Gases (Washington: The Endowment, 1915).
10
For pre-World War I military theory, see (1) Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World (Durham,
N.C.: Duke University Press, 1959}, pp. 143-212; (2) Lynn Montross, War Through The Ages
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), pp. 590-698.
11
Ropp, War in the Modern World, pp. 177-217.
12
Liddell Hart, The Real War, pp. 44-45, 127-29.
13
(1) Lefebure, Riddle of the Rhine, p. 35. (2) Foulkes, Gas!, p. 25. (3) Hanslian et al., Der
Chemische Krieg, pages 9-10, denies that the Germans were working on war gases prior to October 1914
and he cites Professor Haber to refute Lefebure. It is noteworthy that the quotation from Haber is given
in the second edition, pages 6 — 7n., as: "Wahrend der ersten drei Monate des Krieges hat in Deutschland
seemed little likelihood that any product of Haber's laboratory would be

used. The German strategy of mass offensive was overwhelmingly suc-
cessful until the Allies decisively halted the German advance in the
famed September 1914 battle of the Marne.14 In October and Novem-
ber 1914 the first battle of Ypres taught the Germans that they could
not resume their offensive in the west, at least for the time being. The
Germans reacted promptly by digging in. Deadlock, static trench
warfare, soon characterized the Western Front while the Germans pre-
pared to press the offensive on the Eastern Front and to undertake
large-scale, long-term economic and industrial war mobilization within
the homeland. In these preparations Germany began to look for "keys
to the deadlock."15 War gas could be such a key.
A Period of Improvisation
German forces experimented with an eye and nose irritant powder
on the Western Front in October but it was so ineffective that little or
no notice was taken of it. Gas was then used on the Eastern Front,
possibly as early as December 1914, but certainly in January and
February 1915.16 British and French disregarded other more definite
warnings of the impending German employment of gas. In March
1915 a German officer captured in a raid told a British noncommis-
sioned officer that gas cylinders were in place, ready to use, on the
Western Front. On 30 March the French 10th Army bulletin con-
tained a prisoner of war report that indicated where gas cylinders were
emplaced, how they were to be used, and what protection German
troops had against gas. The 10th Army information was confirmed by
another war prisoner on 15 April and again confirmed shortly there-
niemand an Gas gedacht. Wir Lasen in der "Pall Mall Gazette" von 17 September 1914 zum erstenmal
von Gasvorbereitungen des Feindes. Erst drei Monate nach Beginn des Kreiges begannen wir mit
Gasarbeiten." In the third edition, page 10n., the quotation is given: "We had actually first to read in
the French, Italian and English Press—as for instance in the Tall Mall Gazette' of Sept. 17, 1914—of
the terribly [sic] things that were in preparation for us before we began to make similar preparations in
view of the commencement of the war of position." Foulkes, in Gas!, page 24, points out that the tall
Mall Gazette reference was not to gas but to a new French explosive, "Turpinite."
14
Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg, I, 15.
15
(1) Ropp, War in the Modern World, pp. 222-25. (2) Liddell Hart, The Real War, pp. 67-70,
80-102, 115-16, 127-35. The phrase quoted above is Liddell Hart's.
16
(1) Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 30, 31. (2) Hanslian, Der Chemische Krieg, I, 12, 15. Foulkes, page 30,
cites a report that gas was used on the eastern front in December 1914 but indicates that the first con-
firmed attack was in January 1915. Hanslian, volume I, page 15, indicates that a tear gas was employed
on the Eastern Front in January 1915.
after by a captured German document and a Belgian General Staff

report on German offensive and defensive measures. The Belgians fur-
ther advised their allies that the Germans were manufacturing gas
respirators in Ghent. Again, British and Canadian air and ground troops
actually saw and even counted gas cylinders and shell. And, perhaps
as a final indication of intent, the Germans were accusing the Allies of
employing gas.17
All warnings went unheeded. The German gas attack on 22 April
took the Allied forces by complete surprise, and, what is more astonish-
ing, its success was a surprise to the Germans. The German high com-
mand initially had looked upon the scheme with tolerant acquiescence,
not bothering to provide the reserves to exploit a possible break-
through.18 Consequently, instead of achieving a major victory, the
Germans had to settle for merely straightening their line. But major
victory or no, after Ypres toxic chemical warfare clearly became a
force to reckon with.19 The French, the British, and the Germans all
began to concentrate on the offensive and defensive aspects of gas
warfare.
Within a few days after the Ypres attack, on the appeal of Lord
Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, British women had equipped
the entire British Expeditionary Forces with gauze pads which could be
used as a crude mask to protect against toxics.20 The French provided
similar pads, and, like both the British and Germans, furnished chemi-
cals to wet the pads in order to increase their filtering potential.21 The
development of an offensive capability in gas warfare naturally took
longer. The British designated elements of the War Office to initiate
17
(1) Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 28-35. (2) Hanslian repeats charges that the French were using gas, but
he doubts the authenticity of reports detailing the lethality of so-called Turpinite. The French had
used a riot control agent (tear gas) in grenades, but it had not been effective. It is unlikely that the
French would have used lethal gas offensively without being prepared defensively, and there is no indica-
tion that the French took any protective measures until after the Ypres attacks. Der Chemische Krieg,
I, 11—15, and 2d ed., pp. 7-10.
18
One German authority states that German commanders lacked faith in the weapon and only allowed
the attack as an experiment. (Ulrich Mueller-Kiel, Die Chemische Waffe Im WeltKrieg Und—Jetzt
(Berlin: Verlag Chemie, 1932; unpublished U.S. Army translation, 1932), p. 17) Maj. Gen. William N.
Porter, USA (Ret.), World War II Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service, speculated that German
commanders and staff officers who were nearly all professional soldiers disapproved of a weapon developed
and managed by reserve officers and civilians. Professor Haber personally supervised the Ypres attack.
Interv, Hist Off with Gen Porter, 24 Aug 61.
19
Liddell Hart, The Real War. pp. 129-30.
20
Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 36-37.
21
(1) Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 195-96. (2) Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg,
pp. 190-93.
and supervise work on both protection and weapons and organized a

chemical laboratory in France. Sir John French, commander-in-chief
in the field, made Lt. Col. Charles H. Foulkes (later promoted to
brigadier) his adviser on gas and gave him the responsibility for gas
offensive operations in the field.22
The availability of weapons dictated the tactics of gas warfare. The
Germans used chlorine cylinders because chlorine was readily available
and because the cylinders provided the best method of placing large
quantities of an agent on a nearby enemy. Toxic fillings in artillery
shells were not immediately effective because of problems of containing
a liquid, corrosive toxic under pressure and because use of liquid fillings
required ballistic re-engineering. Moreover, an artillery shell contained
a relatively small amount of agent. Most of the early German and
British attacks thus took the form of the chlorine cloud of Ypres.23
The first British cloud attack took place at Loos, Belgium, on 25 and
27 September 1915 and involved 6,400 chlorine cylinders on a twenty-
five mile front.24 Since it was impossible to cover so large a front with
the available cylinders, an innovation was introduced—more than
12,000 newly developed smoke candles were deployed to supplement
and simulate the gas cloud and to conceal troops moving forward.
While natural smoke had been used for battlefield concealment for
centuries, this was probably the first use of artificial smoke on a battle-
field of a modern war. The tactical employment of artificial smoke
gave the new chemical warfare and gas services another mission.25
The use of cylinders to disperse gas had inherent disadvantages. These
munitions were difficult to transport, hard to emplace, and quick to
expend their filling—they took three to five minutes to empty. More-
over, the success of a cylinder attack depended on the wind direction.
The fact that the prevailing winds in France were westerlies might cast
22
Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 16-17, 36-41.
23
(1) Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 36-48. (2) Wyndham Miles, "Fritz Haber, Father of Chemical Warfare,"
Armed Forces Chemical Journal, XIV (January-February, 1960), 28-30.
24
British tactical organization provided a section headed by an officer to handle the cylinders for 250
yards of trench. Ten sections made a company, four of which were authorized by the time of this first
attack. Foulkes, Gas!, p. 57.
25
(1) Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 54—66. (2) Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg (second edition pages
322-24) credits the first use of smoke to the Germans, but he names neither date nor place, and he indi-
cates that British smoke apparatus were being delivered to the front as early as July 1915. In his third
edition, volume I, pages 619-20, Hanslian credits the English claim, citing Foulkes.
some doubt on the wisdom of the Germans in introducing the cylinder

method of gas warfare.26
In December 1915, again near Ypres, the Germans introduced a new
war gas, phosgene, a highly toxic commercial gas used in the dye indus-
try. As a matter of fact, the Germans, British, and French had dis-
covered the military effectiveness of phosgene almost simultaneously
during the summer of 1915, but the Germans used it first because they
were in a much better position to produce it in large quantities.27 While
Germany was first to use gas in cloud attacks, the French retaliated with
phosgene-filled artillery shells in February 1916. The first employment
of a nonexplosive artillery shell for gas represented a decided tech-
nological breakthrough. The use of explosive shell had resulted in too
great a dispersion of gas, but a shell with only enough explosive to
rupture the container allowed the toxic contents to form a small cloud
at the point of impact. A tremendous bombardment was required to
create a large cloud, and the French possessed the means for firing such a
bombardment in their astonishingly effective 75-mm. gun. French
artillery fire, both the phosgene-filled shells and later Vincennite, a
hydrocyanic gas mixture, was significantly more effective than German
artillery gas fire at the time. A measure of this greater effectiveness was
the statement of a German commander: "In order to reply to the
dangerous gas shells of the French I have only shells which are filled
with 'eau de Cologne'."28
Allied intelligence had predicted the German introduction of phos-
gene, and the British developed the small box respirator to cope with
this new agent. Air was taken into this mask through a canister filled
with charcoal and soda lime. The wearer inhaled and exhaled through a
rubber tube held in the mouth. The tube was connected to the canister
for fresh air and to a "flutter valve" for exhalation. Nose clips were an
integral part of the rubberized fabric facepiece as were eye lenses. The
mask was uncomfortable and become more so with long wearing, and
the heat of the face on the lenses caused condensation which greatly
26
(1) Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 43-44, 48, 64-65, 86-88, 122-26, 176-78, 182-83, 186, 206-09. (2) Fries
and West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 390-91.
27
28
Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg, I, 20—23. The quotation, page 21, is from General von Deim-
ling: "Zur Beantwortung den gefarhlichen Gasgeschosse der Franzosen habe ich legidlich Granaten, die
mit 'Eau de Cologne' gefullt sind."
interfered with vision.29 The British mask was the best protection avail-
able despite its defects. It had replaced gas helmets—porous fabric
hoods impregnated with chemicals to filter gases—which were much
less effective. The French M2 mask which was standard until nearly
the end of the war was a modification of the gas hood wherein a face-
piece was attached to the head with straps.30
Full-Scale Gas Warfare

The British gas offensive at Loos, the German introduction of phos-
gene, and the French employment of phosgene-filled artillery shell
ended the first phase of gas warfare in World War I. The British at Loos
successfully challenged German domination of gas warfare and the
French improved upon the German introduction of phosgene. The
era of emergency improvisations of weapons and protective equipment
and of dependence upon the only readily available commercial toxic,
chlorine, was over. The chlorine cloud attack had been effective when
used with surprise against unprotected troops, but protection against
chlorine had not been difficult to provide and surprise could not be
counted upon since an enemy could be on guard when wind conditions
favored an attack. The remainder of the war was to be characterized
by a fairly equal race between Germans and Allies to discover and em-
ploy new methods of protection, new gases, and new methods of con-
ducting attacks. Gas warfare became a series of technical and scientific
battles, with sometimes one set of belligerents ahead and sometimes the
other. Gas warfare, along with the tank and military aircraft, became
part of the World War I revolution in the art of war.
In 1916 the British introduced a new means of projecting gas, the
4-inch Stokes mortar, developed from the 3-inch version of this
weapon, which had been the standard mortar in the British Army. Be-
cause of their inability to manufacture gas shells, the British first used
the mortar to fire improvised smokes and incendiaries. The Stokes gas
shell, or bomb, as the British called it, contained six pounds of agent as
compared to three pounds for the British 4.5 -inch heavy howitzer shell.
29
(1) Ibid., pp. 198-200, 214-18. (2) A number of interviews with World War I veterans confirm
the discomfort and poor vision experienced by wearers of the British mask. Interv files in CMLHO.
30
(1) Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg, volume I, pages 195-207, maintains that the German
leather mask, with a filtering canister attached directly to the facepiece, was the best mask of World War
I, but Foulkes, in Gas!, page 119, challenges that claim. (2) Foulkes, Gas!, pages 53, 182, 306, com-
ments on the gas helmets. (3) Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, pages 201-02, described the French
M2 mask.
Its 1,000-yard range was adequate for situations in which opposing

trenches were not far apart, and its accuracy, while not pinpoint, was
good. Crews were capable, under combat conditions, of firing fifteen
rounds per minute, a rate of fire more rapid than that of the howitzer.31
Still, the Stokes mortar had its limitations.
The British and French had adopted a tactic of gas warfare depen-
dent on overwhelming the enemy with vast quantities of toxics.32 The
massive cylinder attacks of the British and the artillery barrages of the
French met this requirement. The Stokes mortar also could have met
such requirements for targets less than 1,000 yards distant, but the
number of mortars, shells, and crews necessary was beyond the ca-
pacity of the Allies at this time. The need was for a simple inexpensive
projector with a longer range and a larger capacity shell. Such a pro-
jector was invented almost by accident.
Capt. William H. Livens, commander of the British Special Brigade
flame projector company, sought to extend both the range over which
incendiary materials could be dispersed and the quantities of materials
which could be employed. He found that a large steel drum buried in
the ground almost up to the open end made a makeshift mortar from
which could be fired a smaller drum filled with oil and cotton waste. He
used black powder as a propellant and guncotton to ignite the oil. The
improvised weapon was capricious and dangerous to its crew, but it was
effective. What was more pleasing to the British was that it turned out
to be equally effective for the projection of toxics. Livens, accordingly,
set about making a more reliable version, one which used a boxed pro-
pellant charge detonated electrically and which fired a cylindrical bomb
equipped with a light bursting charge. This Livens projector could
shoot a thin-cased bomb nearly 8 inches in diameter and 20 inches long
and filled with 30 pounds of toxic for a distance of nearly a mile. Range
could be varied by increasing or decreasing the propellant charges; di-
rection was determined by careful placement at the time the weapon
was buried. The weapon was not accurate but it did not have to be:
31
(1) Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 182-83. (2) Freis and West, Chemical Warfare, p. 20.
32
(1) Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 197-98. It is evident throughout Foulkes' work that the massive attack tactic
was adopted early (see Chapter VIII) and was increasingly dominant as the war progressed (see especially
Chapter XVI). (2) Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg, I, 23—27. The implication in Hanslian's work
is that the Allied tactical concept placed more emphasis on massive gas attack than did the Germans, at
least until the use of projectors became common, but it is difficult to see any great difference between the
tactical concepts of the Allies and those of the Germans.
the simultaneous firing of a 25-projector battery, each projector firing

a 61-pound drum, was ideal for a large area gas barrage.
Emplacing the Livens projector entailed a good deal of work. A
trench had to be dug for each battery, the weapons emplaced, and then
the trenches filled. Once this task was done the projectors could not be
re-aimed. Even considering the amount of work involved, emplacement
of the Livens projectors had certain advantages over the emplacement
of cylinders. While the Livens projectors could usually be dug in some
distance behind the front lines in daylight, cylinder emplacements were
usually made at night because there was no practical means of denying
enemy observation of the forward trenches. Although enemy observa-
tion was denied by nighttime emplacement of cylinders, the sound of
digging in positions close to the front provided noisy clues as to the
imminence of a gas attack.
An advantage of the Livens projector, as well as of any means of
projecting gas, was that the warning period was reduced to the few
seconds between the time the projectiles struck and the gas clouds
formed. By way of contrast, the cylinder-bred clouds which billowed
across no-man's-land gave much greater forewarning, although this
might not prove an unqualified disadvantage to the attacker because
the more widespread the alarm the more the enemy might be hampered
by protective devices. Use of cylinders continued but the projector
proved to be a formidable weapon and became a major means of launch-
ing gas attacks.
The first combat use of the Livens projector took place on 4 April
1917, the beginning of the battle of Arras. Three thousand projectors
fired nearly 50 tons of phosgene on 31 targets. At the same time 48
Stokes mortars alternately fired phosgene and a new gas, Chloropicrin.
Chloropicrin, which was also used by the French and the Germans,
is a lethal gas and a strong lachrymator, but because of its lightness
and instability it was first used primarily as a means for penetrating
the German protective mask. The battle of Arras also saw the first
employment of a substantial amount of British toxic artillery shell.33
The Arras experience evidently convinced the Germans of the useful-
ness of the projector for it prompted them to rush into production
their own version of the weapon which was to be first used on the
Italian front during the following October.34
33
Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 165—72, 191-92, 202—03, 206-09, 211-13.
34
Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg, I, 24—25, 164—71, 177—82.
But the immediate German counter to this successful Allied use of

gas was the introduction of two new agents, diphenylchloroarsine35
and dichloroethyl sulfide. The latter, better known as mustard,36 is a
liquid in its natural state, not a gas, although it readily vaporizes.
It is a vesicant, that is, it inflames and burns those parts of the body
with which it comes in contact. This characteristic means that a
mask alone is insufficient protection against the agent. Mustard, per-
sistent in its staying power, clings to clothing and equipment, covers
vegetation, lies in pools in low places.37 The agent is thus particularly
effective in defensive situations or in keeping areas clear of the enemy.
Such a saturation as required for interdiction demanded heavy bom-
bardment—the Germans used more than a million shells containing
about 2,500 tons of gas in the ten days following the introduction of
mustard.38
The implication of Germany's use of mustard was not lost on the
Allies. The American expert, General Fries, termed its introduction
"probably the greatest single development of gas warfare." 39 Brigadier
Foulkes declared that with it the enemy had achieved "undoubted
success in the gas war." 40 While most mustard victims were incapaci-
tated, not killed, the casualty rate was high and most of these victims
had to be evacuated for treatment. Evacuation of so many soldiers
greatly weakened the Allied line. The Allies immediately wanted to
retaliate in kind, but it was more than a year before the gas could be
manufactured in sufficient quantity. Mustard had been known before
35
Diphenylchloroarsine was not a gas but a solid, dispersed from artillery shells in a particulate cloud.
The Germans first used it in Flanders in July 1917. Because contemporary masks could filter most
vapors but not solid particles, this agent was often used with lethal phosgene in order to "break" the
masks.
36
To the French this agent was known as yperite, after the place of its introduction. The Germans
called it Lost, combining the first two letters of the names of the two chemists who devised its manu-
facturing process. It was also known as Gelb Kreuz and yellow cross after the marking on German
munitions in which it was contained.
37
(1) Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg, I, 26-29; 2d ed, pp. 18-20, 48-55, 56-58. Hanslian
indicates (second edition, page 52) that mustard is effective from twenty-four hours in hot dry
weather to one month or more in cold weather in a location protected from wind. In enclosed areas
such as dugouts and cellars, it is effective for a year or more. (2) Mustard, after heavily soaking into
porous concrete protected from weathering, has been known to cause burns after more than twenty
years. (3) Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 150—51, 168-76.
38
Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg, I, 28-29.
39
Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, p. 150.
40
Foulkes, Gas!, p. 323.
the German attack, but the Allies had not adopted it because its manu-
facture presented so many difficulties.41
Gas warfare required not only agents and weapons but also military
organizations to handle the myriad technical and tactical problems of
its employment. The appointment of Colonel Foulkes as gas adviser for
the British Expeditionary Forces and as responsible officer for offensive
gas operations, mentioned earlier, initiated attempts to set up an ef-
ficient organization in the British Army. Foulkes' organization, desig-
nated the Special Brigade early in 1916, grew from four to twenty-one
companies. Sixteen of the companies were organized in four battalions,
each battalion having four companies assigned to handle gas cloud
attacks; four special companies fired the 4-inch Stokes mortar; and a
separate company operated flame projectors.42
The employment of flame projectors as tactical weapons was a
concept that appealed to the Western Front belligerents, perhaps not
as a key to the deadlock but as a nonetheless valuable device. The Ger-
mans had first used a portable apparatus for projecting flaming oil in
June 1915. The French soon developed a similar apparatus, and shortly
thereafter Germans, French, and British each developed small portable,
as well as large, semifixed, projectors. The value of flame at the time
was principally psychological—the fiery spurt of burning oil, the roar
of the flame, and billowing clouds of black smoke had a terrifying effect
on troops in the trenches. But the portable equipment was cumber-
some, resupply was difficult, the field of fire was small, and the range
rarely exceeded 30 yards. Furthermore, the operator of the portable
apparatus was easily distinguished and highly vulnerable to small arms
fire. The various semifixed projectors soon developed, with a range of
from 40 to 50 yards and a protected position for the operator in a
trench, were a little better, but the field of fire was still small and the
equipment difficult to install, maintain, and resupply. The flame pro-
jector, with all its faults, became a responsibility of the chemical war-
fare services.43
With the addition of the flame mission, the British chemical warfare
elements had their full quota of missions for World War I—gas, smoke,
and incendiary. The British still had no central organization to handle
41
(1) Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 263-66, 323-26. (2) Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg, I, 29-30.
(3) Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 151-52. (4) Liddell Hart, The Real War. p. 340.
42
43
(1) Foulkes, Gas!, pp. 49-50, 111-12, 162-65. (2) Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 347-52.
chemical warfare research and development, training, supply, and field

employment and remained without one until mid-1916, when they
formed a new combined organization of offensive and defensive chemi-
cal elements in the field and appointed a director of gas services, Brig.
Gen. Henry Thuillier. Although this reorganization made little signifi-
cant change in the status of Foulkes's Special Brigade, it did create a
co-ordinated chemical arm in the field.44 The French, meanwhile, had
established a centralized organization, the Service Chimique de Guerre,
in September 1915. But the French industrial potential was insufficient
to provide the logistic capability for any significant gas warfare offen-
sive until 1916 and the introduction of toxic artillery shells.45
The Gas Service, AEF
The discussion of Allied chemical organizations, particularly that
of the British, is of special interest from the American point of view
since the overseas chemical warfare contingent of the United States
patterned its organization after the British who trained the contingent.
Maj. Gen. John J. Pershing and the advance elements of the AEF
landed in France in June 1917. The United States was unprepared for
waging chemical warfare even though it had been waged in Europe for
over two years. Research on toxics had begun in the United States only
a few months earlier. The nation had no gas weapons, no toxics, no
military gas organization, and no protective supplies. It did have some
information on gas warfare gathered by War Department observers
with the Allies, notably by Dr. George A. Hulett of Princeton Univer-
sity. Although the War Department had not viewed gas warfare
seriously, Pershing's staff saw an immediate need for action, even
before the first mustard attack, and appointed a board to make recom-
mendations concerning gas warfare.46
The AEF board, which met on 18 June 1917, recommended assigning
an officer to "create and handle" an AEF gas organization and provid-
ing him with assistants, funds, and authority.47 A week later Head-
44
Foulkes, Gas!, p. 97.
45
(1) Lefebure, Riddle of the Rhine, pp. 91-110. (2) Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg, I,
20-21.
46
Leo P. Brophy and George J. B. Fisher, The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War,
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959), pp. 1-5.
47
Memo, Lt Col John McA. Palmer, Chief Opns Sec Hq AEF, for CofS AEF, 30 Jul 17, sub: Gas
and Flame Serv, Offensive and Defensive. A copy of this memo appears as General History, Appendix
2, in History of Chemical Warfare Service, American Expeditionary Forces (unpublished official history).
quarters, AEF, asked the War Department for such an officer and
soon thereafter temporarily assigned gas offensive responsibilities to the
AEF chief engineer and gas defensive responsibilities to the AEF chief
surgeon. Despite advice from the War Department in July that gas
responsibilities in the United States were apportioned among the Ord-
nance and Medical Departments and the Corps of Engineers, Lt. Col.
John McA. Palmer and Lt. Col. James R. Church of the AEF staff, in
consultation with Dr. Hulett and Capt. Walter M. Boothby, advanced
a strong case for the organization of gas services in the United States
and France. Church declared that the gas service in the United States
should be subordinate to that in France in matters of policy and equip-
ment. Both officers emphasized the necessity of immediate action,
especially for protection. The commander of the 1st Division, com-
prising the first Army troops in France, had called for gas masks—his
organization had none at all.48 The timing of the comments by Church
and Palmer suggests that the recent employment of mustard could have
fostered their sense of urgency.
By the middle of August 1917 the AEF had received from the United
States 20,000 gas masks and the news that a gas and flame regiment
had been authorized. No other supplies, officers, or advice were received.
About the same time Lt. Col. Amos A. Fries, Corps of Engineers, ar-
rived in France and was about to be named director of roads when his
orders were changed to make him engineer in charge of gas as well as
Chief of the Gas Service, AEF. Headquarters, AEF, dispatched a cable
to the War Department indicating that, since no further delay was
possible, the appointment had been made. The AEF staff requested that
Fries be designated to command the authorized gas and flame regiment.49
Colonel Fries took up his new duties on 22 August 1917 and left
Paris on the same day to make his own appraisal of the British gas
service in the field and to determine American requirements for gas
organization, protection, and weapons. He learned from the British
that the American masks recently received had failed to afford adequate
protection in British tests, and on 23 August 1917 he accordingly
recommended the adoption of the British small box respirator as the
standard American mask. American troops were also to carry the
48
(1) Ibid. (2) AEF GO 8, 5 Jul 17- (3) Maj James R. Church, MC, "A Suggested Organization
of the Gas Service of the American Army," 26 Jul 17, apps. 3 and 5 of General History, in History
of CWS AEF.
49
(1) Memo, H. Taylor, Hq AEF, for CofS AEF, 17 Aug 17, sub: Gas and Flame Service, app. 8,
General History, History of CWS AEF. (2) Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 72-75.
French M2 mask for emergency use in event the British mask was lost
or became no longer wearable.50
Fries returned to Paris on 28 August and completed the draft or-
ganization for the AEF gas service. He also drafted the order formally
establishing the AEF Gas Service.51 The AEF order, issued on 3
September 1917, charged the Chief of the Gas Service "with the organi-
zation of personnel, the supply of material, and the conduct of the
entire Gas Service both Offensive and Defensive, including instruc-
tion." 52 At the same time Fries became colonel and titular commander
of the 30th Engineers, Gas and Flame, later the 1st Gas Regiment, then
being organized in the United States under the actual command of
Maj. Earle J. Atkinson.53 Fries's initial problems were many: he needed
officers and men; he needed supplies; he needed to train American
troops; and, in order to help discharge the offensive portion of his mis-
sion, he needed to persuade American commanders that gas was a useful
offensive weapon.
In meeting all these needs except that for officers and men he had to
rely on Allied, especially British, help and experience. His own service
he organized into an Offensive Branch and a Defensive Branch. Colonel
Church became chief of the Defensive Branch, and Fries himself as-
sumed the duties of the Offensive Branch. These branches were in-
tended to operate in the field through gas officers assigned to army,
corps, divisions, and regiments, as in the British organizational pattern.
Both branches were to join in the operation of gas schools, the first
two of which Fries and Boothby opened in the Army school at Langres
on 10 October 1917 and within the I Corps Center of Instruction at
Gondrecourt on 15 October 1917. The Offensive Branch was to direct
the operations of gas and flame troops according to the British brigade
pattern. There were then no troops to direct. The first companies of
the 30th Engineers did not arrive in France until February 1918, and
it was not until the summer of 1918 that officers began arriving in
sufficient numbers to staff the gas service.54
50
Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 75-77.
51
Ibid., p. 76.
52
AEF GO 31, 3 Sep 17.
53
(1) Interv, Hist Off with Maj Gen Amos A. Fries, USA (Ret.), 4 Aug 55. (2) Historical Division,
Department of the Army, UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD WAR: 1917-1919, vol. 15, Reports
of Commander-in-chief, A. E. F. Staff Sections and Services (Washington, 1948), p. 291 (hereafter
cited as Reports of Commander-in-chief, A. E. F., Staff Sections and Services).
54
(1) General History, History of CWS AEF, pp. 6-12 and apps. 12-15, 18. (2) Fries and West,
Chemical Warfare, pp. 78-79, 93-95.
As indicated above, supply, both offensive and defensive, came mainly

from the British and French. At first, Fries attempted to handle supply
personally through liaison offices established in London and Paris and
through the supply services of the AEF. Maj. Robert W. Crawford, as
Chief of Gas Service supply, soon relieved Fries of supply operating
functions. Crawford found that the Gas Service was automatically
assigned lowest priority by the established supply services who had their
own problems. He accordingly secured direct purchase authority for
the Gas Service and arranged for the Gas Service to handle its own
supply system all the way from requisition or purchase to actual supply
to troops in the field.55
Fries felt that his most difficult problems were to persuade American
commanders to employ gas and to educate troops to take adequate pro-
tection against gas. It was necessary for Gas Service officers to "go out
and sell gas to the Army." 56 A service which intended to sell its method
of warfare, train the Army in the field, operate its own supply system,
conduct offensive operations with its own troops, and advise on the
conduct of both offensive and defensive operations by other combat
troops clearly required more than a handful of officers and a more
comprehensive organization than the one originally envisioned.
The Gas Service was enlarged to meet the demands of its many re-
sponsibilities whenever men and equipment became available. For ex-
ample, a completely staffed and equipped laboratory arrived in France
early in 1918 and an officers' training camp was organized in France
later in the year.57 The provision of a laboratory had been one of the
projects of the Office of Gas Service since the time of its organization
in the United States in October 1917.58 The increasing demands on the
service resulted in the reorganization of Fries's immediate office in
March 1918 to combine offense and defense into a Military Division
and to establish a Technical and a Production and Supply Division.
In May the Military Division was again separated into Offense and
Defense Divisions. Finally, in June, the Gas Service in the United
States was converted into the Chemical Warfare Service, National
Army. The Gas Service, AEF, became the CWS AEF, officially the
55
(1) General History, History of CWS AEF, pp. 12-14. (2) Fries and West, Chemical Warfare,
pp. 76-79.
56
57
(1) General History, History of CWS AEF, pp. 18-19. (2) Fries and West, Chemical Warfare,
p. 88.
58
Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, pp. 9-13.
CHART 1—ORGANIZATION, CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE, AMERICAN
EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, 13 JULY 1918
Staff and Technical Channel
NOTE: Chief, Chemical Warfare Service, a member of the staff of the Commander in Chief, reported to the Commanding General, SOS, in marten of
procurement, supply, transportation, and construction. GHQ AEF GO 31, 16 Feb 18.
Source: Adapted from: Plate VII, General History, History, CWS, AEF.
Overseas Division, CWS, and Fries, now chief of CWS AEF, was pro-
moted to brigadier general.59 The final CWS AEF organization which
was prepared at that time included six divisions, and the duties of these
divisions are evidence of the scope of gas warfare activities in the final
year of the war. (Chart 1)
The Offense and Defense Divisions within the Office of the Chief,
CWS AEF, exercised staff supervision over tactical gas warfare activi-
ties,, evaluated combat experience, planned the employment of gas and
flame units, and suggested changes in gas warfare tactics and techniques
for all combat elements through army, corps, and division gas officers.
These "military" divisions co-operated with the Technical Division
in supervising the AEF Gas School and the army and corps gas schools.
The Defense Division was also charged with the issue of defensive
equipment and therefore supervised the CWS Services of Supply (SOS)
troops immediately involved in combat supply support and training.60
The Technical Division, in addition to controlling the AEF Gas School,
directly operated chemical and medical laboratories and a gas research
experimental station. The Office of the Medical Director, with divi-
sional status, translated Technical Division findings into procedures for
the care of gas casualties and co-operated with the Medical Corps in the
development of treatment equipment and the application of care pro-
cedures. The Intelligence Division collected chemical warfare intelli-
gence material for the use of the operating divisions and served as a
clearinghouse for all CWS reports and requests for information. While
the "military" divisions and the other divisions supporting them were
mainly oriented toward combat operations, the remaining division,
Production and Supply, was the element charged with those functions
most clearly associated with the basic, logistics-oriented SOS mission.
The organizational relationship of the CWS AEF to the SOS therefore
largely depended upon the functions of the Production and Supply
Division. Branches of this division computed chemical materiel require-
ments, procured munitions and equipment, supervised manufacturing
plants in England and France, directed field salvage of chemical ma-
terials, and controlled four CWS SOS depots, chemical sections in six
59
(1) General History, History of CWS AEF, pp. 25, 29-32. (2) WD GO 62, 28 Jun 18.
60
General Pershing, in February 1918, had organized the Services of Supply under Maj. Gen. James
G. Harbord, formerly his chief of staff, as a major AEF command charged with co-ordinating all the
supply services and all AEF supply functions.
ports of debarkation, and chemical sections of several field army

depots.61
Fries's own office, after the establishment of the SOS command, was
located in SOS headquarters at Tours, but Fries continued to report
to General Pershing's General Headquarters (GHQ), AEF. Most CWS
administrative matters, except those directly relating to SOS, were
handled through GHQ with the assistance of a CWS representative
stationed at that headquarters. Fries handled detailed administrative
work, including the assignment of CWS officers throughout the AEF,
through his own administrative staff which included an adjutant, a
personnel officer, and representatives in the AEF Liaison Service in
London and Paris. Fries, by the time of the armistice, immediately
supervised more than 150 officers. More than half of these officers were
assigned to CWS staff and liaison duties while the remainder carried on
laboratory and training work. Approximately another 30 officers di-
rectly supervised CWS SOS field operations. While Fries deferred to
field commanders in their supervision of tactical chemical operations,
he could exert considerable pressure on tactical planning officers be-
cause of his direct control of 168 field army, corps, and division gas
officers. These gas officers reported to and advised their organization
commanders according to the accepted staff pattern. The Chief, CWS
AEF, was empowered to and did require detailed reports of offensive
and defensive chemical operations. His "military" divisions presented
their summaries and analyses of these reports in a weekly bulletin to
organization gas officers. The bulletins contained criticisms of past
chemical operations and suggestions for improvement. Gas officers on
regimental and battalion staffs, as well as noncommissioned officers, were
not members of the CWS; they were chosen by unit commanders from
the unit complement. Yet, Fries could exercise some measure of control
over these officers inasmuch as AEF orders specified that they be trained
at CWS schools and that they be given gas warfare work as their prin-
cipal duty.62
Another change which took place with the formation of the Chemi-
cal Warfare Service in the National Army was the redesignation of the
61
General History, History of CWS AEF, pp. 29-33, 38-41, 53-58.
62
(1) General History, History of CWS AEF, pp. 24-25, 55-56. (2) AEF GO 79, 17 May 18,
and GO 107, 2 Jul 18. Apps. 47 and 48 to General History of CWS AEF. (3) Commissioned
Pers of the CWS AEF, November 11, 1918, in History of CWS AEF. (4) Comments on draft of this
volume, Brig Gen Hugh W. Rowan, USA (Ret.), 16 Dec 60.
30th Engineers, Gas and Flame, as the 1st Gas Regiment, CWS. This
organization had been gradually growing as the war progressed, and by
the time of the armistice it comprised 4 battalions with a total of 6
American companies and 4 attached British companies. Three platoons
of each company fired projectors, and the fourth fired Stokes mortars.
The authorized goal of one gas regiment for each field army was not
achieved by the time the war ended.63
The extent of Fries's control over CWS activities in World War I is
important since some CWS officers subsequently viewed Fries's au-
thority as setting a precedent for the authority of principal CWS offi-
cers in World War II. The nature of Fries's position is also important
because it was one of the factors in determining general and special
staff relationships and duties. The U.S. Army had not employed the
general and special staff concepts in war before World War I. AEF
experience played a part in molding these concepts as they emerged in
the period between the wars. General Pershing kept a tight rein on all
elements of the AEF organization, and he apparently expected all his
staff officers, including his Chief, CWS, to act as extensions of his own
person throughout his organization.64 Thus, Fries dealt with gas war-
fare matters while cloaked with his commander's rank and authority.
The extent of his control is illustrated by the fact that Fries on one
occasion relieved a division chemical officer.65 Fries clearly believed in
the necessity for maintaining a field chemical warfare organization
broad enough to link research in chemical weapons and protection by
"the closest possible ties to the firing line." He felt that he had estab-
lished a strong, well co-ordinated service in the AEF which encom-
passed research, development, manufacturing and supply, tactical em-
ployment of chemicals, and employment of chemical weapons by
chemical troops in the field. "The success of the CWS in the field and at
home," he wrote, "was due to this complete organization." 66
The organizational maturity achieved in the AEF quite early in the
war unhappily was not paralleled within the military structure in the
63
(1) James T. Addison, The Story of the first Gas Regiment (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1919),
pp. 256-58. (2) Three regiments and a total of fifty-four companies had been authorized in September
1918, but most of these had not been activated. Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, p. 94.
64
Maj. Gen. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., National Security and the General Staff (Washington: Infantry
Journal Press, 1946), pp. 245-300.
65
(1) Interv, Hist Off with Rowan, 26 Sep 58. General Rowan was an assistant division gas officer
and later division gas officer under Fries. (2) Interv, Hist Off with Maj Gen Alden H. Waitt, USA
(Ret.), 13 May 61.
66
United States. Unprepared for gas warfare when the United States
entered the war in April 1917, the War Department divided responsi-
bility for this new form of warfare among five different agencies, one
of which was a civilian bureau.67
It is not strange that the people responsible for the battlefield em-
ployment of chemical warfare were stanch and vocal pleaders for a
more rational chemical organization in the War Department. Fries's
dealings with the Hydra-headed, un-co-ordinated chemical warfare
complex in Washington led to repeated requests for organizational
improvements which would ease his labors. In making these requests,
Fries had the full support of General Pershing.
As indicated earlier, the War Department set up a co-ordinating
agency known as the Office of Gas Service in October 1917. This clear-
inghouse for chemical matters consisted of a director and representa-
tives from the Ordnance and Medical Departments and from the
Chemical Service Section of the National Army—a section established
at the same time as the Gas Service with a principal mission of providing
the AEF with a chemical laboratory. In February 1918 the Chemical
Warfare Service and the Gas Division were joined in a move that failed
to provide the administrative centralization and the prestige that could
only come from the formation of an independent gas corps. This final
step was taken on 28 June 1918 with the creation of the Chemical
Warfare Service, National Army, with Maj. Gen. William L. Sibert as
director.
The CWS Between the Wars
Defining the Role and Responsibilities

When General Fries returned from France after World War I he
applied all of his considerable vigor to the establishment of the Chemical
Warfare Service as a permanent part of the Regular Army. In July
1919 Congress had given the CWS a year's reprieve, and, in 1920, after
debate in which the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, the Chief
of Staff, General Peyton C. March, and General Pershing registered
67
The organizations and their responsibilities were: (1) Bureau of Mines: research on chemical agents;
(2) Medical Department: the provision of defensive equipment; (3) Ordnance Department: manufac-
ture and filling of gas shells; (4) Corps of Engineers: the formation and training of gas and flame
units; and (5) Signal Corps: the provision of gas alarms. The organizational difficulties are fully
discussed in the first chapter of Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War.
dissent, the Congress of the United States amended the National De-
fense Act of 1916 so as to make the CWS a permanent part of the
Military Establishment. The new service received the functions of de-
velopment, procurement, and supply of all toxic, smoke, incendiary,
and gas defensive materials, the training of the Army in chemical war-
fare, and the "organization, equipment, training and operation of
special gas troops." 68
The dissent of people as influential as Baker, Pershing, and March
should have augured ill for the newly formed Chemical Warfare Serv-
ice. The fact is that the period of the 1920's and 1930's was a difficult
one for the Army establishment in general and the Chemical Warfare
Service in particular. Reasons for this are not hard to find. This period
between the world wars was one of disillusionment, disarmament, and
depression. A nation, indeed a world, appalled by the costs of the re-
cent conflict, looked for ways to prevent such a holocaust from re-
curring. The Washington conference of 1921 tried to limit the types
of armament civilized nations might use in warfare, and four years
later the Geneva conference on the regulation of arms traffic looked
toward the same end. Both conferences drew up conventions outlaw-
ing gas warfare. The Washington treaty failed by one to achieve the
required unanimous agreement of the five participating powers.69 The
Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925 did receive the support of over forty
nations and thus became the most influential statement regarding gas
warfare in the body of international law. The United States and Japan
were the two major powers that did not ratify this protocol.
Nonetheless, the War Department General Staff took a defensive
position toward gas warfare throughout most of this period—defensive
both in the attitude with which it approached the subject and in the
type of warfare upon which it concentrated. In 1922 it suspended
work on toxic agents and restricted other CWS efforts to defensive
measures. Although this restrained approach was frequently reaffirmed
in the 1920's and 1930's, modifications in the War Department prohibi-
tion of research on toxic gases allowed some work in this field—one
had to know the offensive potential of an agent in order to defend
against it.
68
(1) Public Law 242, 66th Congress, sec. 122. Reproduced in WD Bulletin 25, 9 June 1920, the
source of the above quotation. (2) See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, pp. 11—17.
69
The dissenter was France, which objected to the antisubmarine provision in the convention, not
to the one against gas.
In addition to these handicaps, the new service faced another rather

unpleasant situation. It would seem that the large majority of the
people who had faith in gas as a viable system, capable of contributing
to success in battle, was centered in the Chemical Warfare Service.
There was little support for it within the combat arms. AEF com-
manders did not properly utilize chemical warfare in World War I, and
it is quite probable they later looked upon it with skepticism. Many
felt it would be an encumbrance added to the battlefield, not merely
in the increased logistical support it would entail but in the burdens it
would place on the infantryman and in the difficulties of decontamina-
tion it would involve. If it were successfully used by both combatants
it would be something akin to two fighters, each with one arm tied
behind his back. And why fight under such handicaps?
The Chemical Warfare Service set about accomplishing its rather re-
stricted mission with meager resources of men and money. These
restrictions lasted throughout the depression, but by 1939 the war in
Europe and subsequent reaction in the United States brought about
a definite change. The annual Congressional appropriation for the
CWS from 1927 to 1935 came to about one and a quarter million dol-
lars. In 1939 it was almost 3 million dollars, in 1941 it was 60 million,
and in 1942 it was over a billion. Manpower was a similar story. In
1933 the CWS had an actual strength of 77 officers and 413 enlisted
men; in 1940 the numbers were 93 and 1,035; in 1941, 833 and 5,059;
and the peak in 1943, 8,103 and 61,688. Civilian employees ranged
from
The742 in 1931
uneasy to a peak
situation of 29,000
in Europe 1943.70modify the restrictions
alsoinhelped
imposed upon the CWS. Two years before the outbreak of war the
service began work on a mustard gas shell filling plant at Edgewood
Arsenal, Md.
In the process of CWS expansion gray areas of mission responsibility
were clearly defined, much of this work done under the direction of Maj.
Gen. William N. Porter who became Chief, Chemical Warfare Service,
in May 1941. This effort to define responsibilities resulted in expanded
duties for the CWS, for example, development of a high explosive shell
for the 4.2-inch mortar and the acquisition of complete responsibility
for the incendiary bomb program. In 1941 the War Department gave
the CWS the mission of biological warfare research.
70
For complete statistics, see Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, pp. 25-27.
GENERAL PORTER
Many of the 93 Regular Army officers in the CWS in 1940 had served
under and been tutored by Maj. Gen. Amos A. Fries. Many of them
believed as strongly as he did in the military efficacy of gas, and they
looked upon themselves as custodians of one of the most awesome weap-
ons to come out of World War I. They considered the CWS unique
among the services because it had a legal operational function such as
only the combat arms had. True, the Corps of Engineers and the Signal
Corps had combat roles, but neither had its own weapons which its
own troops would employ in combat. There were also dissenters in
the ranks of the CWS who felt that Porter and some of their fellow
officers overemphasized the uniqueness of the CWS and the extent
of its probable contribution to the next war. In countering these dis-
senters, and they were probably in the minority, the advocates of gas
warfare could point out that gas appeared to be the ideal weapon for
aerial bombardment. General Porter, as chemical instructor at the

Army Air Corps Tactical School 1933-37, had in co-operation with Air
Corps tacticians successfully evolved a tactical system for aerial bom-
bardment which was well received by many Air Corps officers.71 Some
CWS officers felt that a prediction made in 1920 was about to come
true: "gas and military aeronautics will play the principal parts in the
next war, which will be literally finished in the chemical laboratory." 72
While military aviation became important soon after the 1939 out-
break of World War II in Europe, gas warfare, to the surprise of many
observers, was not initiated. Great Britain, on 3 September 1939, the
day of her declaration of war, sought assurances from the belligerents
that they would observe the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use
of gases and bacteriological methods of warfare. Germany, Italy, Bul-
garia, Rumania, Finland, and Japan replied that the protocol would be
observed.73 Gas was therefore not used, and Japan, in accordance with
her assurance to Great Britain that the Geneva Protocol would be ob-
served, did not use gas in the Pearl Harbor attack which brought the
United States into the war. Six months later, on 5 June 1942, the
President of the United States threatened the initiation of gas warfare,
but only in retaliation against Japan in the event that that nation used
gas upon China.74 Since the President's statement was accepted as
national policy, it began to appear that gas warfare might not be em-
ployed unless Germany or Japan initiated it. The possibility of enemy
initiation demanded that the United States take protective measures
and that it prepare for offensive retaliation, but the preparedness
mandate lacked force and precision.75 While these events determining
the role of chemical warfare in international policy were taking place,
the War Department was shaping the role the services were to play in
possible future overseas operations. War Department planners built
their concepts of mobilization organization around a combined field
and theater of operations headquarters designated, as the AEF head-
quarters had been, General Headquarters. Under the GHQ plan, when
71
(1) Porter Interv, 24 Aug 61. (2) Waitt Interv, 13 May 61. Waitt was Porter's successor as
instructor at the Air Corps Tactical School. (3) Interv, Hist Off with Col John C. MacArthur, USA
(Ret.), 19 Sep 61. (4) Interv, Hist Off with Col Augustin M. Prentiss, Jr., USAF (Ret.), 25 Oct 61.
72
Edward S. Farrow, Gas Warfare (New York: Dutton, 1920), p. vii.
73
Dale Birdsell, The Department of State and the Gas Warfare Question (unpublished Monograph
in CMLHO), p. 1.
74
For additional information on the President's statement, see Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for
War, pp. 63-64.
75
CHART 2—SUGGESTED ORGANIZATION OF OFFICES OF CHEMICAL OFFICERS
THEATER OF OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF CHEMICAL OFFICER, THEATER OF OPERATIONS
war came the Chief of Staff or the ranking War Department officer
designated by the President was to assume command of GHQ, assemble
and train troops, and move them into a theater of operations for com-
bat. The GHQ commander would then convert his headquarters into
a theater headquarters, or he would designate a theater commander
who would organize a theater headquarters. Representatives of the War
Department administrative and supply services were to form a special
staff for the GHQ and theater commander, and the senior representative
of each service was to be the theater chief of his service.76
The War Department-approved CWS field operations manual pro-
vided that the theater chief chemical officer, "a general officer of the
Chemical Warfare Service," would organize and administer his own
service and would exercise "technical control" over CWS activities
through subordinate service and combat chemical officers. (Chart 2)
So far these provisions recapitulated World War I experience, but there-
after the emphasis changed to stress the role of the theater chief chemical
officer as a representative of the War Department Chief, CWS. The
manual indicated that the CWS organization in the United States would
plan theater materiel requirements, set initial stockages and issues, deter-
mine the extent of theater materiel procurement, prescribe the move-
ment, supply, and training of officers and troops, specify utilization of
civilian labor, approve interservice agreements, and fund theater finan-
cial transactions.77 The GHQ CWS was to be much more closely tied to
the War Department CWS than the CWS AEF had been. This closer tie
was a direct outgrowth of Fries's idea of a broad-scope, co-ordinated
service which he had helped make possible by having a clause inserted
in the National Defense Act of 1920 assigning the responsibility for the
supervision and operation of chemical troops to the Chief, CWS.78
The Administrative System

When the United States entered World War II, the prewar plans
had to be adapted to a multitheater war and previously unexpected
demands for a strongly centralized Army command in Washington.
(Map 1) The GHQ concept was abandoned and a "Washington Com-
76
(1) Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, UNITED STATES
ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1950), pp. 2, 295-96. (2) WD FM 100-10, 9 Dec 40.
77
WD FM 3-15, 17 Feb 41.
78
Porter Interv, 24 Aug 61.
mand Post" was created within the General Staff, and through this post
General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, exercised command of the
worldwide activities of the Army. At the same time, in March 1942,
the President and General Marshall delegated the zone of interior (ZI)
operating functions of the War Department to three major commands,
one each for ground, air, and service.79 Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell,
the service commander, brought the reluctant technical services, in-
cluding the CWS, under the jurisdiction of his Services of Supply
(SOS), later Army Service Forces (ASF). Somervell interposed his
headquarters organization between the CWS and other operating ele-
ments. Thus, while chemical sections were created in the ground and
air forces commands, the formal route of communication for the Chief,
CWS, was through Somervell's organization. The question almost im-
mediately arose of forming theater organizations.80
There was little chance, in view of the subordination of the services
to ASF and considering the command and staff doctrines which had
reached formal statement in the period between the wars, that the
Chief, CWS, would have any control within overseas organizations.81
But there were still those Fries-trained officers who were unaware of or
prepared to disavow the extent of ASF control. These officers also be-
lieved that should command and staff doctrines be so interpreted as to
subordinate the CWS in overseas organizations, those overseas organiza-
tions would be forced to accommodate themselves to the unique char-
acter of the CWS by delegating extraordinary controls and channels
to their service.82 These officers felt that, as an absolute minimum, the
Chemical Warfare Service would control gas warfare planning and
chemical supply at all echelons from development in the United States
to expenditure on the overseas firing line. The new War Department
reorganization and the new doctrines were to lead to the establishment
of procedures that were not in accord with CWS convictions.
79
Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, UNITED STATES ARMY IN
WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951), chs. VI, VII.
80
John D. Millett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service forces, UNITED STATES ARMY
IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954), chs. II and XII.
81
82
Waitt Interv, 13 May 61. General Waitt, postwar Chief, U.S. Army Chemical Corps, successor
to the CWS, counts himself among the Fries-trained officers who strongly believed in the necessity for
a unitary CWS organization.
The Logistics System

The global logistics system of the United States was oriented to an
"impetus from the rear" pattern.83 Global warfare and the role of the
United States as the principal arsenal of the United Nations made it
impractical from a War Department point of view for the World War
II logistic impetus to come from the theater commander as it had often
come from the theater commander in World War I. Accordingly, the
Chief of Staff, or, more specifically, his right arm, Operations Division
(OPD), War Department General Staff (WDGS), was the principal
logistics authority, the allocator of resources, of the World War II
Army. OPD served as the Army logistics policy arbiter whose duties
included approving requirements, priorities, and plans, acting as inter-
mediary between the theaters and the forces in the United States, and
setting up the formulas and objectives of logistics operations. The
Services of Supply supervised all phases of the logistics operations in the
United States and served as the principal troubleshooter on theater
logistics problems. OPD and other WDGS elements often referred such
problems to ASF. The continental technical services, each in its own
field, were responsible for the basic computation of requirements and
for the provision of materiel. In the Chemical Warfare Service,
troubleshooting, both formal and informal, on overseas problems was
the province of Brig. Gen. Alden H. Waitt, Assistant Chief, CWS, for
Field Operations.84
The operational focus of overseas supply was the port of embarkation.
Each major port was responsible for a theater or theaters of operations,
processing theater requisitions, or its automatic supply, requesting ma-
teriel from the technical services, and actually shipping approved al-
lowances. The responsibilities of the continental technical services
ended at the port; the port of embarkation was in charge until cargo
cleared the harbor. Technically, the theater became accountable for
shipments at sea, but the physical responsibilities of the theater organi-
83
The following comments on the nature of the logistics system and theory of supply are derived
from: (1) Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-45,
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955), chs. IX, XIII; (2) Cline,
Washington Command Post, chs. I, VII, XIV; (3) Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, 30
November 1945, compiled under the direction of Cresswell G. Blakeney, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4,
ch. II.
84
(1) For discussion of requirements computation, see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory
to Field, ch. XII. (2) For organization and functions of the Office of the Assistant Chief, CWS, for
Operations, see Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. V.
zation began at the port of debarkation.85 The War Department gov-

erned supply activities of the ports of embarkation and, theoretically
at least, those of the theaters of operations through a War Department
provision which specified procedures for computing requirements, re-
quisitioning, and effecting supply.86 The War Department system thus
ordained clearly precluded any unitary control by any technical serv-
ice, but even had the system permitted such control, the CWS would
have been poorly prepared to take advantage of the opportunity.
CWS resources available at the outbreak of war for the evolving
global logistics system were slim indeed. Actual CWS supplies in po-
tential overseas bases in the month of Pearl Harbor included 12 major
items for gas warfare protection and decontamination and 5 major
offensive munitions. In all, the overseas departments stocked 28 items
from an active supply list of 34 in limited normal maintenance stocks
or war reserves. The most important single item of antigas protective
equipment, the service gas mask, in late 1941 was stocked overseas in
quantities totaling 281,207.87 For offensive use in the event of necessity,
the CWS and the Ordnance Department in 1941 in the overseas de-
partments stored 242 tons of bulk persistent gases, 259 tons of non-
persistent gases, a small quantity of toxic-filled artillery shell, and a
small quantity of toxic-filled 4.2-inch chemical mortar shell. Even
in an emergency, combat delivery of toxics on the enemy would have
been only by air or artillery. The CWS lacked standard weapons to
project toxics except for the 4.2-inch chemical mortar which was
stocked in sufficient quantity to equip a battalion in Hawaii, a platoon
in Panama, and a company in the United States.88 Consequently, de-
spite phenomenally accelerated CWS materiel production in the United
States, the first large-scale wartime CWS logistics experience overseas,
85
For a discussion of CWS continental distribution, see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory
to Field, ch. XVI.
86
WD Memo W-700-8-42, 10 Oct 42, sub: Sup of Overseas Depts, Theatres, and Separate Bases.
87
Stockages in the United States were likewise extremely limited. For example, the total mask
stockage, including that in the continental United States, in late 1941, was 2,855,500, an amount
almost a million less than the war-end stockage of the lightweight service mask in the European
Theater of Operations alone.
88
(1) Weekly Rpt for CofS, CWS Munitions on Hand as of 12 Dec 41, dated 20 Dec 41. CWS
319.1/2249. (2) CWS Materiel Status Rpt for Overseas Theaters, Mar 45, cited in Ben Baldwin,
Alfred J. Bingham, and Paul W. Pritchard, Readiness for Gas Warfare in Theaters of Operations,
CMLHO draft MS. (3) Memo, Lt Col Charles C. Herrick, WPD, to Chief Opns Gp WPD, 10 Feb 42,
sub: Use of Toxic Gases. WPD 165-23, in OPD 165-10 through 165-24.
in North Africa, involved at the outset no offensive materials and only

one new piece of equipment, the mechanical smoke generator.
The administrative arrangements of the CWS and the War Depart-
ment were to be tested earlier than the logistic procedures. Before
United States entry into World War II, the CWS had staff officers and
units in the Philippine and Hawaiian Departments, and a CWS officer
was on duty as assistant military attache in London. These overseas
CWS elements played a role in the military events following the Pearl
Harbor attack, and a CWS section was established in Australia when
the first American troops reached that continent. But the first War
Department effort to establish a theater 89 headquarters in its own image
took place in England. This theater, which was to become the Euro-
pean Theater of Operations (ETO), represented the largest overseas
undertaking of the Army in terms of men and materials during World
War II. In the European theater, perhaps more extensively than in
other theaters, those CWS officers who believed in a unique and unitary
service first tried and then modified their administrative concepts.
89
The term theater is used in this volume to indicate any overseas area of operations of the United
States Army. It is also used to mean the principal United States headquarters in the area under con-
sideration.
CHAPTER II
The CWS in the European Theater

Planning and Organization: 1940-43
Erecting the Framework for an Overseas Command

CWS officers in the United States followed the initiation of World
War II in Europe with keen interest as a chance to test predictions that
gas would become a major weapon of the war. There was no indication
that gas was used in Hitler's attack on Poland, but the British Govern-
ment had begun issuing gas masks to military and civilians alike even
before the declaration of war. Lt. Col. Charles E. Loucks, CWS, in
June 1940 arrived in France to fill the position of assistant military at-
tache in the American Embassy and to serve as CWS observer. With
the fall of France shortly thereafter, Loucks was transferred to England
in the same capacity. The most interesting development early in the
European war from the CWS point of view was the German incendiary
bombing of England. Loucks reported extensively on bomb types and
effects of bombing.1
Loucks did not become a member of the American Special Observer
Group (SPOBS), which was organized in England prior to the United
States entry into the war, but in February 1942 his successor as military
attache, Col. Carl L. Marriott, was also designated Chemical Officer,
United States Army Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI), the first
official American command in Europe, in fact a redesignation of
SPOBS.2 Marriott thus assumed the duties of reporting, still principally
1
CMLHO Biographical Sketches: Maj Gen Charles E. Loucks.
2
( 1 ) CMLHO Biographical Sketches: Col Carl L. Marriott. (2) [Henry G. Elliott] MS, The
Predecessor Commands, SPOBS and USAFBI, pt. I of The Administrative and Logistical History of the
PTO, Hist Div USFET, 1946, p. 239, OCMH.
THE CWS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER 37
reporting on incendiary bombings, and he began to oversee the chemical

warfare protection and training of American troops. Lt. Col. Lewis
F. Acker established a chemical section in the headquarters of U.S.
Army V Corps, the first U.S. ground forces organization to arrive in
the British Isles.3
On 2 May 1942 Colonel Marriott was forced by ill health to return
to the United States, and Col. Charles S. Shadle assumed the dual role.
By the time of Shadle's appointment, the duties of Chemical Officer,
USAFBI, were demanding full time: there was not only the necessity
of seeing to the equipment and training of increasing numbers of
American troops but also the requirement for participating in and
initiating administrative, supply, and operational planning for what
was clearly to become a major overseas command. At that time, a little
more than a month before the President's first pronouncement on gas
warfare, neither national nor international policy on gas warfare was
clear. CWS officers always assumed, in absence of definite information
to the contrary, that their first duty was to make as many defensive and
offensive gas warfare preparations as possible. In June Col. J. Enrique
Zanetti, CWS incendiary expert and World War I liaison officer on
Fries's staff, arrived to relieve Shadle of the attache position.4 Also in
June Col. Crawford M. Kellogg, six officers, and nine enlisted men of
the Chemical Section, Eighth Air Force, arrived in England. The Eighth
Air Force Chemical Section had been activated along with the Eighth
Air Force headquarters at Boiling Field in April.5
While the chemical sections in the British Isles were organizing and
embarking on their planning and supply duties, other organizational
developments were taking place in the United States. The President and
his military advisers in consultation with the British had decided to
establish a theater of operations headquarters in England. A manual
describing theater headquarters organization existed, but the manual
had been written before the War Department reorganization into
three commands with the attendant revision of organizational policy.
Furthermore, United Nations strategists had not yet decided upon
launching a ground offensive, so that the first mission of the American
3
Interv, Hist Off with Col Lewis F. Acker, USAR (Ret.), 9 Jun 61.
4
(1) CMLHO Biographical Sketches: Brig Gen Charles S. Shadle. (2) MS, CWS History, Hq SOS
ETO (hereafter cited as CWS SOS History), n.d. (3) Waitt Interv, 13 May 61.
5
History of the Cml Sec Eighth AF VIII AFSC for the Period 21 Apr 42 to 31 Dec 42 (hereafter
cited as History, Cml Sec Eighth AF). CWS 314.7 Eighth AF.
theater headquarters would be co-operation with the British and super-

vision of a materiel build-up in anticipation of a combined assault upon
the European continent at some future date. The second mission
would be the support of Eighth Air Force operations and the support
of ground and service troop training and equipment. Emphasis upon
logistics organization was clearly indicated. The War Department
tricommand organization was not prescribed for a theater in the regu-
lations which antedated this organization, but neither was it proscribed.
General Marshall set about organizing a tripartite theater command,
and, since the air element in the form of Eighth Air Force already
existed and the ground element would not be important for the time
being, he concentrated on that service element. Generals Marshall and
Somervell picked Maj. Gen. John C. H. Lee to be the European theater
SOS commander. They oversaw the organization of Lee's headquarters
in the United States, and they instructed Lee on Marshall's desires con-
cerning theater organization.6
Marshall's, Somervell's, and Lee's organization and organizational
concepts proved important to the CWS. The manual provided that a
theater chief chemical officer would restrict himself and his immediate
staff to the formulation of broad policy. He would operate his service
through technical control of subordinates. Subordinates for combat
matters, as in the CWS AEF, were to be army, corps, and division
chemical officers. Subordinates for service and supply matters were
to be on the staffs of the communications zone, regulating station, and
advance, intermediate, and base section commanders.7 (Chart 3) With
such decentralization of operations, the immediate office of the theater
chief chemical officer was to have only one operating division for re-
search, development, and intelligence and a small staff. General Fries,
working under a highly centralized policy, had needed a large staff and
six operating divisions. The problem in the case of the European theater
organization was that neither the World War I type of organization
nor the manual organization seemed to apply.
General Somervell's ASF instructed the chiefs of the services in the
United States to provide top-quality officers to join Lee's staff before it
6
Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume 1, UNITED STATES ARMY IN
WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1 9 5 3 ) , pp. 31-38.
7
(1) WD FM 3-15, 17 Feb 41. (2) WD FM 100-10, 9 Dec 40. (3) WD FM 3-5, 20 Jul 42.
Previously published in draft, 1 June 1942, and in an unnumbered WD series as Chemical Warfare
Service Field Manual, Volume I, Tactics and Technique, 1 August 1938.
CHART 3—PLANNED DISTRIBUTION OF STAFF AND SERVICE AGENCIES, CHEMICAL
WARFARE SERVICE, THEATER OF OPERATIONS
Source: Adopted From: FM 3-15, 17 Feb 41 and C2, 6 May 43.

left to go overseas. General Porter, under the assumption that he was

appointing a theater chief chemical officer, chose Col. Edward Mont-
gomery, one of the four Regular Army colonels in the appropriate age
group within the CWS, to head the group. Montgomery's deputy, Col.
Lowell A. Elliott, and three of his division chiefs, Cols. Hugh W.
Rowan, John C. MacArthur, and Edwin C. Maling, were top-ranking
Regular Army lieutenant colonels then recently promoted to tem-
porary colonel. These officers, several junior officers, and a number of
enlisted men joined Lee's headquarters at Indiantown Gap Military
Reservation to await transportation to England.8
General Lee and a small advance echelon of his headquarters arrived
in London on 24 May 1942 and immediately set to work activating the
SOS USAFBI. Lee just as immediately ran into a storm. The USAFBI
staff was adamantly opposed to Lee's planned subordination of the
theater service chiefs to the SOS commander since that subordination
implied exactly what the War Department intended—SOS control of
theater service and supply policy. After much discussion and reviewing
of directives, the first of many compromises on theater organization
was reached in June closely following the redesignation of USAFBI as
the European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA).
In this compromise the chemical warfare and ten other theater special
staff sections were given over to the control of Lee's SOS while re-
taining their titles as theater special staff sections. Colonel Mont-
gomery, who arrived in June, was designated chief chemical warfare
officer and a member of the theater special staff. The SOS headquarters
and the offices of the theater service chiefs were moved from London
ninety miles to Cheltenham. The theater headquarters, now com-
manded by Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, remained in London.
Shadle was named CWS representative at Headquarters, ETOUSA,
and given two officer assistants. Shadle's position, reminiscent of the
position of CWS AEF representative at GHQ, was established in ac-
cordance with the basic theater organizational directive which pro-
vided for a service representative when the theater chief of service was
not located at theater headquarters.9
Still, from the CWS point of view, the situation was not a happy one.
If Montgomery was to be represented in, rather than resident in, theater
8
(1) Porter Interv, 24 Aug 61. (2) CWS SOS History.
9
(1) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 37-39. (2) CWS SOS History.
headquarters, the CWS preparedness and advisory mission could only

be properly performed if he had a large, strong operational staff such as
Fries had had at Tours. The prospects of getting such a staff at Chelten-
ham were dim since Cheltenham was intended to be a service and supply
headquarters only. Montgomery consequently spent much of his time
in the London echelon of SOS while Elliott proceeded to Cheltenham in
the dual role of deputy and temporary chief of the Supply Division. In
Cheltenham, Capt. Warren S. LeRoy, Acting Chief, Storage and Issue
Section, Supply Division, at once resumed work on storage and issue
procedures for chemical supplies which he and the OCCWS (Office of
the Chief, Chemical Warfare Service) staff had begun in the United
States. Maj. Maurice H. Wright activated the Procurement Section,
Supply Division, while Maj. John J. Hayes set up a Requirements Divi-
sion. Rowan and MacArthur reported to Cheltenham early in July.
Rowan set up the Technical Division while MacArthur established the
Operations and Training Division, but for several weeks both officers
were confined to planning and background work since their activities
were inappropriate to the work of the Cheltenham command and since
they had no assistants and very little equipment.10
By the end of July Montgomery was able to bring about some im-
provement in the maladjusted organizational distribution. He secured
the transfer of Rowan's Technical Division and Wright's Procurement
Section to the London echelon of SOS. The Technical Division was
charged with liaison concerning all technical matters both with the
British and with headquarters other than the SOS, and Wright was
given the additional duty of liaison with the British on lend-lease mat-
ters. In both cases, location in Cheltenham would have greatly com-
plicated communications and the discharge of normal functions.11
Rowan set up his London office at the end of the first week in August
with two officer assistants. Wright was allotted one assistant. Approxi-
mately two weeks later Shadle was designated Chief Chemical Officer,
Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), a position at least in theory
superior to that of theater chemical officer. AFHQ, a combined su-
preme headquarters, was preparing for the North African invasion.
10
(1) CWS SOS History. (2) Personal Ltr, Col Rowan to Col William C. Kabrich, Chief, Tech
Serv OCCWS, 8 Sep 42. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, ETO. Unless otherwise noted, all personal letters
relating to the European theater cited hereafter are from this file (see Bibliographical Note). (3)
Comments on draft of this volume, Col Lowell A. Elliott, USA (Ret.), 16 Jan 61.
11
Personal Ltr cited in n. 10 ( 2 ) , above.
MacArthur moved in as his replacement and took over supervision

of the chemical warfare exercises for which planning, in co-ordination
with British chemical warfare authorities, was virtually complete.
Since MacArthur was Montgomery's planning officer and his training
policy chief, MacArthur's move to London completed the physical
transfer of all chemical warfare policy, technical, advisory, and liaison
functions to theater headquarters while organizationally all but Mac-
Arthur remained in the SOS.12
Also in August 1942 the operating elements of the CWS began to
sort themselves out. Col. Leonard M. Johnson arrived in Cheltenham to
become Chief, Supply Division. Although few CWS supplies were
arriving in England, the Supply Division was already working on stor-
age and distribution measures. At about the same time, Colonel Maling,
his four officers and five enlisted men, began the establishment of the
CWS training operations within the newly authorized American School
Center at Shrivenham. The CWS had hoped and planned to establish its
own school but had been obliged to participate in the centralization of
theater training activities. Centralization did offer advantages of better
facilities and equipment and better handling of admissions than a single
service could manage.13 Kellogg, meanwhile, had distributed his ten
Eighth Air Force chemical officers among three chemical sections—
one, to control supply and training branches in the Eighth Air Force
headquarters, another, to direct supply operations in the VIII Air
Force Service Command (AFSC), and a third, to supervise ground
service and training in the VIII Bomber Command. While these sec-
tions were in the process of organization, Kellogg and his staff worked
on a revision of the war gas supply plan which had been formulated by
his section in the United States. Since, even in this early period, both
the War Department and the forces in the theater had accepted the
policy that any gas warfare retaliatory or offensive effort would be
the operating responsibility of the air forces, the Eighth Air Force toxic
supply plan was crucial to the gas warfare potential of the CWS
ETO.14 It then appeared that the CWS ETO pattern was set, and the
pattern followed neither the World War I precedent nor the prescrip-
tions of regulations. Whether the CWS ETO could accomplish its
12
CWS SOS History.
13
Ibid.
14
History, Cml Sec Eighth AF.
mission through the use of this pattern remained to be seen. The first
test soon came when England became a base for the North African
invasion (TORCH operation) for which the European theater provided
logistical support. Largely as a result of providing officers and men for
TORCH, CWS ETO experienced sweeping staff changes.
Colonel Montgomery was recalled to the United States for special
duty in September 1942. Elliott was appointed to establish a chemical
section for the forming Twelfth Air Force headquarters, destined for
North Africa, and Maling was attached to the AFHQ planning staff
in a nonchemical capacity. One lieutenant colonel, six majors, and
three captains from the London and Cheltenham CWS elements soon
joined the North African forces. Kellogg was the senior CWS officer
remaining with European theater forces, but Rowan, senior CWS officer
in the SOS, succeeded Montgomery in acting capacity.15 Elliott's duties
as deputy were divided between Johnson in Cheltenham and Mac-
Arthur in London. Maling's post at Shrivenham went to a succession of
junior officers.16
By mid-September TORCH was not only creating a constant drain
on manpower, but it was also demanding materiel, support for opera-
tional planning, and readiness inspection. At the same time, the base
sections, local supply and service organizations, were organizing in the
United Kingdom, and supply and service installations were being acti-
vated as rapidly as possible. Furthermore, although the materiel and
troop build-up in England had been brought virtually to a standstill
in deference to the North African venture, operational and informa-
tional demands in the theater were growing apace. Theater officers re-
garded the strategic hiatus with respect to ETOUSA as only temporary,
and they continued to believe that the prime task in the United King-
dom was to prepare for eventual assault on the Continent. To meet an
important CWS need for intelligence information, the CWS arranged
for Colonel Zanetti, assistant military attache, to become in effect chief
of an intelligence division. Capt. Philip R. Tarr and two other officers
were transferred from Cheltenham to London on 19 September 1942
to assist Zanetti. One of Maling's successors at the American School
15
While the manual provided that the senior CWS officer in the theater would be chief of service
(see above, p. 30) and while Montgomery's seniority had been a factor in his appointment, the seniority
principle did not consistently apply during World War II. Still, Kellogg could probably have secured
the appointment had he desired it. Waitt Interv, 13 May 61.
16
CWS SOS History.
Center and a Supply Division section chief moved out to establish

chemical sections in two newly activated base sections. Maj. Frederick
E. Powell, another section chief, and seven company-grade officers
went from Supply Division to establish chemical sections in general
depots and chemical branch depots. Since three other Supply Division
section chiefs had gone to the TORCH forces, newly arrived lieutenants
filled most supply division staff positions.17
First Reorganization
On 9 November 1942 the War Department notified the theater
headquarters that Colonel Montgomery, who had been appointed
chemical officer in the War Department Air Forces Headquarters,
would not be returning to the European theater. The theater com-
mander appointed Colonel Rowan chief chemical warfare officer and
assigned him to theater headquarters in London. Thus, Rowan officially
became resident at theater headquarters and the position of CWS repre-
sentative was automatically abolished. Rowan appointed MacArthur
his deputy and executive officer.18 While General Porter had not had
a hand in Rowan's appointment, he was well satisfied with it.19 Rowan's
qualifications were good. At 48, he was a year younger than the average
age of the ETO technical services chiefs. He held the same permanent
rank, lieutenant colonel, as all but one of his peers. At the time of his
appointment he held the same temporary rank as three of the service
chiefs—the four others having attained general officer rank. Like most
other senior CWS officers, Rowan had World War I experience, as as-
sistant gas officer and gas officer of the division in which General Lee
had been chief of staff. He was a chemist, a graduate of Yale Univer-
sity, the Chemical Warfare School, and the Army Industrial College.
Early in his Army career, Rowan had been marked as an expert on in-
dustrial mobilization in the chemical field, and he had served several
tours, including one in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, in
positions relating to that specialty. He had also had assignments in
war planning, in chemical technical work, and in troop training, and
17
(1) Ibid. (2) History, Sup Div CWS Hq SOS ETOUSA (hereafter cited as History, Sup Div,
42-43). ETO Admin 545A Cml Warfare.
18
CWS SOS History.
19
he had served a 4-year tour as assistant military attache in Berlin at the

20
beginning of the Nazi period.
A week after Rowan's appointment ETOUSA clarified and regu-
larized the status of the theater CWS. ETOUSA assigned specific
duties and functions to the CWS office at Cheltenham under the con-
trol of SOS. These included supervision of all CWS supply activities
across the board from requirements, purchasing, and manufacture
through storage and issue and maintenance and repair to transportation
and shipping as well as supervision of CW training for SOS troops, and
CWS administration within SOS.21 The specification of duties at
Cheltenham and the additional provision that he could transfer per-
sonnel needed in his theater headquarters office to provide planning,
policy, training, technical, and intelligence services from Cheltenham
or the London SOS offices, left Rowan free to organize his office as the
situated dictated. On 18 November he submitted his proposals to G-3,
ETOUSA, and on 23 November published the approved pattern in
Office of the Chief Chemical Warfare Officer, ETOUSA, Office Order
No. 1. MacArthur officially resumed the post of Chief, Operations and
Training Division, which in fact he had never left, in addition to his
duties as executive officer and deputy. Lt. Col. Walter M. Scott's po-
sition as Chief, Technical Division, was affirmed, and he was given
supervision of a liaison officer who had been stationed at the British
chemical warfare experimental center at Porton. Rowan named Maj.
Roy LeCraw to head a new Administrative Division. Captain Tarr,1
officer, and 2 civilian clerks were to form an Intelligence Section, pri-
marily an office of record since Colonel Zanetti continued to handle
intelligence, within the Administrative Division. The total complement
of Rowan's theater headquarters office, besides himself, was 12 officers,
5 enlisted men, and 5 civilians.22
The November 1942 reorganization of the CWS ETOUSA produced
an organization similar to the one suggested in the manual for the
office of a theater chemical officer. The situation of the CWS and the
theater itself was not a "book" situation. The theater was active
logistically but its strategic destination was more in doubt than it had
20
(1) CMLHO Biographical Sketches: Brig Gen Hugh W. Rowan. (2) Ruppenthal, Logistical
Support, I, 1-10.
21
ETOUSA GO 59, 16 Nov 42.
22
(1) OCCWO ETO Off Order 1, 23 Nov 42. ETO Admin 544 Cml Warfare. (2) CWS SOS
History.
been before the North African invasion. The lines of the theater
commands were not clear and no chief of service could be positive
about the precise character and scope of his service's mission. In
Rowan's case, one element of his office, his Supply Division, was located
ninety miles away from him under the jurisdiction of a command
which might be considered an SOS field organization. A "book"
solution to these problems of communications, relationships, and super-
vision within the CWS ETO would have been to designate the Supply
Division as a communications zone chemical section, but when the
SOS command at Cheltenham decided upon this action it served only
to further confuse the issue of mission and supervision. Neither
Rowan's London office nor the Cheltenham branch was prepared to
operate as a separate entity under the prevailing theater pattern.
On 18 October 1942 when Supply Division absorbed Requirements
Division, Colonel Johnson supervised eleven CWS officers and twenty-
two enlisted men in Cheltenham. He also supervised the procurement
and reverse lend-lease activities of Major Wright and his assistant in
London. Support of the North African operation and activation of
a logistics system in the United Kingdom kept this staff fully
occupied.23 After the reorganization of Rowan's London office and
just before Johnson's transfer to the North African forces, the
Cheltenham SOS headquarters designated Johnson as Montgomery's
successor as Chief Chemical Warfare Officer, SOS, and renamed the
CWS Supply Division as the SOS Chemical Warfare Section.24 Johnson
took the position that the SOS order was meaningless. Rowan was
clearly Montgomery's successor, and he considered himself as Rowan's
assistant. He furthermore lacked the staff and the authority in the
field to establish a communications zone (SOS) chemical section.
While his office had the operating functions of determining materiel
requirements, preparing requisitions on the United States, and directing
distribution of chemical supplies within the theater, its functions were
more nearly those of a supply policy division in the office of a theater
chief chemical officer than they were the functions of a theater supply
and distribution command chemical section. Also, if Johnson had
attempted to establish a communications zone chemical section, he
would have deprived Rowan of the direct control of chemical supply
23
History, Sup Div, 42-43.
24
SOS ETO GO 80, 10 Dec 42.
25
since Rowan had no supply policy element in his London office.
The only outcome of the SOS order was the establishment of the
largely inactive Cheltenham element of the CWS Operations and
Training Division as the Training Branch, Supply Division. A lieu-
tenant was assigned to head the Training Branch and he was allotted
one part-time adviser and one part-time assistant. The branch was
assigned the function of supervising chemical training within SOS
ETOUSA.26
Major LeRoy, who succeeded to the position of SOS chemical war-
fare officer when Johnson was designated Chemical Officer, Mediter-
ranean Base Section, North African Theater of Operations (NATO),
in December, made no change in policy. Indeed, LeRoy experienced
enough difficulty in staffing Supply Division without trying to extend
the scope of his activities. He was the only field-grade CWS officer
left in Cheltenham, and he had no captains on his immediate staff of
fourteen officers. His executive officer, Lt. Arthur T. Hingle, also
served as Chief, Statistical Section. Lt. Ingalls S. Bradley headed both
the Operations and Service Sections while another lieutenant was
Chief, Processing Section, and assistant in the Service Section. LeRoy
did not staff prescribed subsections for salvage, maintenance, impreg-
nating, and filling plants in order to concentrate manpower in the
27
requirements, control, transportation, and issue areas. Such concen-
tration of effort was demanded in order to meet the needs of the North
African forces, but late in 1942 and early in 1943 when chemical
supply requirements for North Africa were increasingly met by direct
shipment from the United States, the need for concentration in the
same areas did not lessen because now the task of top priority was
preparing the European theater for gas warfare. The first question
raised in connection with theater gas warfare preparedness was that
of the requirement for chemical offensive and defensive materials and
service troops. Once requirements had been estimated, it was necessary
to plan storage and distribution within the theater.
25
Interv, Hist Off with Col Leonard M. Johnson, USA (Ret.), 18 Aug 59.
26
History of the Tng Div CWS Hq SOS ETOUSA, 27 Jul 42-31 Dec 43 (hereafter cited as History,
Tng Div SOS). ETO Admin 545A Cml Warfare.
27
(1) History, Sup Div, 42-43. (2) CWS SOS ETO Memo 19, 20 Dec 42, sub: Assignment of
Pers. SOSCW 200.3 (19 Sep 42)SD, in ETO Admin 545A Cml Warfare.
Gas Warfare Planning

Rowan's staff had completed most of the basic work on a compre-
hensive gas warfare plan for the European theater before the War
28
Department letter requiring such a plan was received. Kellogg and
his staff had prepared air force supply and storage estimates for the
offensive portion of the plan. Late in 1942 LeRoy took a draft of the
ETO plan to Washington where he discussed it in detail with General
Porter's staff and exchanged information on theater and stateside
preparations. Later OCCWS referred the draft plan to the chemical
liaison officer on the OPD staff.29 But since the ETO plan was predi-
cated on the vast expansion of the theater for a continental invasion,
as yet uncertain, it could only be brought to an indefinite conclusion.
Policy and strategy were in the making. The Allied leaders decided
at the January Casablanca Conference to revive the build-up in the
United Kingdom and took a number of actions during 1943 to flesh
out that decision.30 In November 1942 the Combined Chiefs of Staff
had briefly turned their attention to gas warfare and now an Allied
as well as a United States policy was emerging. This policy required:
(1) a co-operative American and British effort aimed at arranging
the defensive preparedness of all United Nations troops; and (2) the
accumulation of sufficient toxic munitions to make immediate retalia-
tion possible should the enemy initiate gas warfare anywhere in the
31
world.
The Second Reorganization
In connection with the determination of Allied policy on chemical

warfare and in order to evaluate the status of chemical warfare pre-
paredness among American troops, General Porter and Brig. Gen.
Charles E. Loucks of his staff journeyed to England in March of 1943,
and from there went on to North Africa. Loucks, writing his own
28
Ltr, TAG to CG ETOUSA et al., 19 Dec 42, sub: Theater Plans for Cml Warfare. AG 381
(12-18-42) OB-S-E-M.
29
Draft Plan, Hq ETO, Jan 43, sub: Theater Plans for Cml Warfare (noted: "by hand from
Major LeRoy"), with cover Memo, CCWS to Maj F. G. Schmitt, WDGS, 5 May 43, sub: Tentative
ETO Plan. CWS SPCVO 381, ETO.
30
Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, ch. HI.
31
See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. IV.
GENERAL PORTER AND TOP-RANKING CHEMICAL OFFICERS IN LONDON, 1943.

(Left to right) General Porter, General Loucks, Colonel Kellogg, Colonel
Rowan, Colonel MacArthur, and Colonel Zanetti.
and Porter's impressions, advised OCCWS on several European theater

problems and developments. The two officers found that the ETO had
enough supplies for the force then in the theater, but they considered
some of the items from the United States poor in quality.32 The theater
organization situation, they believed, was unsatisfactory. It appeared
to them that "the Commanding General, Army Service Forces in
Great Britain [sic] is entirely independent of the Commanding Gen-
eral, European Theater of Operations. The latter is dependent on the
33
former for the supply but does not function as his superior."
Officially, the theater commander, now Lt. Gen. Frank M. Andrews,
certainly functioned as General Lee's superior, but Loucks's words were
probably intended to describe the de facto rather than the de jure
32
Ibid., pp. 100-101.
33
Ltr, Gen Loucks to All Concerned [OCCWS], 23 Apr 43, sub: Inspection of Cml Warfare Ac-
tivities in Great Britain. CWS SPCWS 319.1 (Cml Warfare Activities in Great Britain).
situation with respect to the CWS. The import of these remarks was
that Rowan, despite his official status as theater chief chemical warfare
officer, could in fact work only through Lee under whose jurisdiction
his office fell. Consequently, he had no direct channel of communica-
tion and authority through which he might, in the words of the manual,
34
exercise "general technical supervision over his service as a whole."
Such supervision was vital. Although the European theater was active
at the time only in the air war, the greatest threat of gas warfare
initiation was posed by the known German industrial chemical poten-
tial. The heavy concentration of American and British strength in
the United Kingdom and the proposed build-up of men and materials
there presented to the Germans excellent targets for vesicant gases.
Germany was unlikely to launch a gas attack on the United Kingdom
since she had not done so in the great blitz bombings of 1940-41 and
since she would fear retaliation. But no chances should be taken, from
the CWS point of view, by failing to build up a retaliatory potential.
Developing such a potential, laying the defensive and offensive plans,
and co-ordinating CWS operations in the theater demanded that
Rowan have some direct channel through which to operate.
Porter's solution for the organizational impasse was to suggest that
"the officer occupying the position of chemical officer for the theater
commander" take the initiative in securing the co-operation and co-
ordination of all the principal chemical officers in the theater. In other
words, he proposed using the informal channels of personal and tech-
nical correspondence and communication among officers of the same
service, known as technical channels, in place of formal command
channels. Porter further suggested that he would personally elicit such
co-operation. It is interesting to note that Loucks did not refer to
the theater chief chemical warfare officer nor to the chief of service.
In a listing of personnel, he cited Rowan as "Chemical Officer, Army
Service Forces" and "for the present . . . also the staff chemical officer
35
for the European Theater of Operations."
Clearly, while Porter and Loucks accepted Rowan as theater chief
chemical officer, they were not prepared to acknowledge that there
was a theater chief of the CWS. Rowan was, as he had been from the
previous November, Chief Chemical Warfare Officer, ETOUSA. In
34
FM 100-10, 9 Dec 40.
35
Ltr, Loucks to [OCCWS], 23 Apr 43.
the same month of Porter's visit, the theater commander ordered SOS
headquarters back from Cheltenham. He relocated the service chiefs
in SOS.36 The fiction of a separate chemical section in Cheltenham
was thereby dropped, and Rowan officially became Chemical Officer,
SOS ETOUSA. Neither of these positions fitted the manual definition
of the chief of service nor did they compare to the positions which
Fries had held. Rowan, accepting Porter's advice, decided to make
his position as theater chief chemical officer equivalent to that of chief
salesman for such services and supplies as the CWS could contribute
to the war effort in the theater. He found it necessary to employ his
own prestige and ability to persuade commanders that it was in their
best interest to be prepared against gas warfare, and to use smoke,
flame, and chemical mortars. Porter was right in his observation that
Rowan did not have the usual channels of a theater staff officer;
Rowan could seldom speak with the authority of the theater com-
37
mander as Fries had done. Indeed, he could sometimes not speak with
the authority of his other and more immediate commander, General
Lee. Lee, for example did not authorize his chiefs of service to operate
within his field commands, the base sections, chiefly because base
section commanders complained that the service chiefs interfered in
38
their command procedures. The service chiefs did most of their
volume business, supply, through the base sections and were therefore
required to control a part of the operation. Rowan solved this problem
by using technical channels to base section chemical officers and by
frequently meeting with these officers to resolve CWS difficulties.39
The looseness of control within the theater organization and within
the SOS which created so many problems for the technical services
and particularly for the CWS was by no means peculiar to the Euro-
pean theater. Under the principle of "unity of command" General
Marshall advocated placing theater and supreme commanders in a
position of controlling all forces in their area. Probably as an extension
of this principle he gave the theater and supreme commanders broad
36
Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 160-63.
37
Rowan Interv, 28 Sep 58.
38
39
Ltr, Col Ferris U. Foster, USAR, to Hist Off, 13 Oct 59. Colonel Foster was Chemical Officer,
Southern Base Section, in the United Kingdom.
40
discretionary powers. Perhaps as an extension of the delegation con-
cept or perhaps as simply a reaffirmation of the normal staff and com-
mand doctrine propounded in the period between the wars, theater
and subordinate commanders tended to de-emphasize the operating
and co-ordinating functions that members of their special staffs could
perform for their own services. Dual exercise of staff and command
functions, as permitted by regulations,41 became virtually unknown,
at least in the CWS. As logical and necessary as was the emphasis on
command authority and control, it did not make any easier the opera-
tion and control of a service which fitted neither into staff nor com-
mand lines. Fries had found it necessary to be a salesman in 1918, but,
since he controlled CWS staff officers down to the division level, he
had a better means than Rowan, two decades later, of conducting his
42
sales campaign. Rowan perforce substituted liaison between his
office and the chemical and command elements of the various theater
commands for control of his chemical subordinates as a means of
selling chemical warfare munitions and services.43
Rowan's problems were many in molding his staff to constant liaison
with the British, with the ground and air forces, and with the zone
of interior. In addition he possessed SOS supply and liaison duties which
would normally have devolved upon a communications zone chemical
officer. He still lacked officers in sufficient numbers and with sufficient
rank to handle all liaison and operating duties.
The April Reorganization

When General Porter left the theater, Rowan asked him to carry
back to Washington a list of proposals for less hurried consideration.
40
(1) Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
(Washington, 1954), pp. 41-42. (2) Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for
Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953).
pp. 123-24, 196-97, 262-63. (3) Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-
1944, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959), pp. 102-05. (4) Cline,
Operations Division, pp. 21-22, 161-62, 184, 293-94.
41
WD FM 101-5, 19 Aug 40.
42
See above, ch. I.
43
Some CWS officers objected to the point of view that declared "selling" necessary and objected
to the use of the term selling. These officers believed that the relationship of each CWS special staff
officer to his commander was the only important relationship so far as the CWS was concerned. It was
the duty of each special staff officer to suggest the employment of CWS munitions and units to
his commander when appropriate. No control within the CWS was required, from their point of
view, as long as technical information could be disseminated through technical channels. (Col Mac-
Arthur, Comments on draft of this volume, 10 Apr 61.)
These proposals related to Rowan's desire to increase the strength and

prestige of his immediate office in order better to perform both liaison
and operating functions. Foremost on this list was a request for the
return of Colonel Johnson from the North African theater or the
dispatch of a well-qualified lieutenant colonel to head his Supply
Division. Rowan also asked for four or five majors, high-ranking
captains, or low-ranking lieutenant colonels with staff experience and
training. He further asked that Col. James H. Defandorf and an
officer assistant, who had recently been assigned to his office to work
on medical liaison and the new, and then secret, work on defense
against biological warfare, not be charged against his allotment since
their work was on a special project basis and since he desperately needed
the spaces.44 The request for Johnson or a substitute was not intended
to disparage Major LeRoy whom Rowan later called "my very best
supply officer," but it was intended to point up the fact that LeRoy
was still the only field-grade supply officer available and that the
45
important supply operation needed more rank and prestige. The
request for majors, captains, or lieutenant colonels was necessary be-
cause the CWS needed field-grade officers for staff positions, but the
space allotment was such that Rowan could not risk taking a full
colonel or a lieutenant colonel about to be promoted.46
Porter's reply to Rowan's requests demonstrates that Rowan did not
yet realize how weak the ties between the theater CWS and its parent
service had become with the growing strength of ASF, OPD, and the
theater organizations. Porter pointed out that the matter of Johnson's
transfer from the North African to the European theater was out of
his hands: it could only be handled officially by intertheater request.
Porter could and did attempt to smooth this process by asking a
chemical officer in North Africa to intercede in favor of the transfer,
but nothing came of this attempt. On the matter of Colonel Defan-
dorf's status and on that of securing additional staff officers for Rowan,
Porter's hands were equally tied since the status of officers within the
theater as well as requests for additional personnel were considered to
be within the province of the theater commander. Porter agreed to
evaluate qualifications of officers to be sent upon receipt of the official
44
Memo [Rowan for Porter], n.d., sub: Things for General Porter's Attention Upon His Return
to the U.S. CWS 314.7 Personal Ltr Files.
45
Personal Ltr, Rowan to Gen Waitt, ACCWS for Field Opns, 22 Jul 43.
46
Personal Ltr, Rowan to Gen Porter, CCWS, 22 Jul 43.
request, but even in this there was a strictly limiting factor—officers

with staff experience were hard to find in 1943.47 It began to appear
that the solutions for staffing and prestige problems must be found in
the European theater.
In April 1943 Rowan reorganized his own office to reflect the
expanding responsibilities of the CWS ETO and for better liaison. He
took the Intelligence Section from the Administration Division and
made it a division with Maj. Philip R. Tarr, recently promoted, as
chief. The creation of a new division was no duplication of Colonel
Zanetti's efforts. Zanetti specialized in strategic intelligence and in-
telligence liaison with the British and with the continental United
States while Tarr assumed the growing burden of chemical tactical
intelligence, which also involved liaison with the British but at a
different level. The Intelligence Division continued to process attache
48
reports for Colonel Zanetti. Lt. Col. Maurice H. Wright, also recently
promoted, headed a new Supply Liaison Division whose chief function
was to effect co-ordination between London, where broad supply policy
was determined in the Operations and Training Division, and Chelten-
ham, where direction of all requirements and supply operations
remained. Wright's procurement and reciprocal-aid duties were dele-
gated to an assistant with the title of branch chief. The Administration
Division, now headed by Lt. Col. Chester O. Blackburn, included three
office service branches and one branch to handle personnel for the
CWS as a whole. The Technical Division, with its important liaison
functions, was assigned more higher ranking officers than the other
divisions: Colonel Scott remained as chief; Colonel Defandorf headed
the Special Projects Branch; Lt. Col. Melville F. Perkins handled liaison
with Porton, the British chemical research establishment, and the CWS
Laboratory, for which a chemical laboratory company had not yet
been received; Lt. Col. Thomas H. Magness, Jr., was in charge of
Offensive Munitions Branch while a captain headed the Defensive
Munitions Branch. In Operations and Training Branch, Colonel
MacArthur had a Training Branch headed by a lieutenant colonel,
who was also his executive officer, an Equipment Branch, and a Plans
49
Branch.
47
Personal Ltr, Porter to Rowan, 3 Jun 43.
48
(1) History, CWS SOS. (2) Ltr, Col J. Enrique Zanetti, CmlC, USAR (Ret.), to Hist Off,
26 Jun 60.
49
(1) OCCWO ETO Off Order 5, 22 Apr 43. (2) OCCWO ETO Off Order 7, 12 May 43.
Both in ETO Admin 544 Cml Warfare.
LeRoy, now a lieutenant colonel, had 20 officers in his Supply

Division, but he still lacked field-grade assistants. His Executive
Officer and Chief, Statistical (requirements and control) Branch, and
his Operations Branch chief had been promoted to captain along with
the Transportation and Issue Section chief. The Processing (formerly
Impregnating) and Training Branches were still one-man branches
while the Service Branch had a chief and an assistant. One-man
branches were common in the London office where five branches were
wholly unstaffed. The London office was assigned 22 officers, three of
whom were on duty with the Administrative Branch of the Adminis-
tration Division at Cheltenham. In all, Rowan had 41 officers, 28
50
enlisted men, and 16 civilians. While 14 officers had been added since
the previous fall and while section prestige had increased, mostly
through promotions, both members and prestige were still low in rela-
tion to the tremendous expansion in theater activities contemplated
in the year before the D-day target, which was established in May.
Rowan had a personal prestige problem in that the other technical
service chiefs had all been advanced to general officer grade.
The First Gas Warfare Plan

An example of the contemplated expansion of theater activities was
the issuance, also in April 1943, of the first theater gas warfare plan.
Enough strategic information had become available by that time to
complete the draft plan of the previous December. The final plan,
personally signed by General Andrews, called for an eight months'
supply of aircraft gas munitions and a four months' supply of ground
gas munitions. The theater requested, in the event of gas warfare, at
least 2 chemical combat battalions per corps, 40 air chemical service
and supply units, 30 ground chemical service and supply units plus
5 smoke generator companies for ground service, and 23 SOS service
and supply units plus 5 smoke generator companies for the communi-
cations zone. It also requested 3 base section staffs totaling 9 officers
and 30 enlisted men, 75 officers and 150 enlisted men for depot admin-
istration, and an SOS headquarters staff of 93 officers and 339 enlisted
men. Pointed out in the plan was the fact that the theater was then
50
OCCWO ETO Off Order 5, 22 Apr 43. ETO Admin 544 Cml Warfare.
capable only of passive defense and individual protection against gas

51
warfare.
The theater and air forces chemical sections modified the plan's
supply and troop build-up schedule to make it accord with the current
theater build-up level and the nongas warfare situation. They then
submitted requisitions against the modified schedule, but while cargo
flow began to increase, needed supplies, especially toxic munitions,
were not forthcoming. A month after the submission of the theater
plan, Maj. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, Commanding General, Eighth Air Force,
52
forwarded a strong plea for an interim toxic munitions supply plan.
By the end of July, General Eaker's plan had been approved for muni-
tions shipment. But long before the approval was received—in fact,
before the original Eighth Air Force interim plan had been dis-
patched—Rowan had become concerned about War Department slow-
ness in handling theater requests and particularly about the burden
placed upon the theater by the necessity of planning and replanning.
Rowan expounded the theater point of view to General Waitt, Assist-
ant Chief, CWS, for Field Operations, early in May 1943. He con-
sidered it to be the function of the War Department "to assist overseas
Commands, and not to attempt to sit in judgment upon their actions
and requisitions." He further indicated that he believed the policy
of requiring theater commanders to disclose detailed plans of con-
templated operations in justification for requisitions of an unusual
53
nature to be an unsound one. Waitt replied that he, personally,
agreed completely, and he gave assurance that his own office would
not attempt to "sit in judgment on theater requests or actions." He
asked only that the theater keep his office well enough informed so
that the War Department CWS might "go to bat for you." He
pointed out that the War Department higher echelons had to know
enough about plans of contemplated operations to act intelligently
on requests.54
The higher echelons which Waitt defended were not always as
reasonable as he was in considering theater requests. Porter, Waitt,
51
Ltr, CG ETO to TAG, 17 Apr 43, sub: Gas Warfare Plans, ETO. ETO AG 381; also in OPD
385 CWP.
52
(1) Ltr, CG Eighth AF to CG ETO, 20 May 43, sub: Eighth AF Preparedness for Offensive Cml
Warfare, with 1st Ind, CG ETO to TAG, 9 Jun 43. Eighth AF 353, ETO AG 381 x 475.9 MDGS.
(2) 2d Ind, TAG to CG ETO, 30 Jul 43. AG 381 (20 May 43) OB-S-E.
53
Personal Ltr, Rowan to Waitt, 5 May 43. CWS ETO CWO-400/32-Sec.
54
Personal Ltr, Waitt to Rowan, 21 Jun 43. CWS SPCVO 016 APO 887.
and Rowan were satisfied that the CWS in the United States was
doing everything in its power to assist the theater CWS in meeting its
55
obligations as to organization, planning, and supply. Waitt placed
the blame for delays and for modification of theater plans on ASF.56
While approximately ten weeks was not an extraordinary amount of
time for War Department action on the Eighth Air Force request, this
request was only one of a stream of Eighth Air Force schedules and
plans which had followed from the original plan made in April 1942
when Kellogg's section was still in the United States. In many other
cases, such as the projects for continental operations begun in mid-
1943, the processing delays seemed longer than final results warranted.
The theater CWS found itself in a frustrating position: the theater
staff was to plan in detail within the framework of the basic plans laid
down in Washington because the War Department would not invade
the theater prerogative by doing detailed planning; but the War
Department apparently felt no compunctions about redoing the
theater's detailed planning. A like difficulty existed in organization.
The prewar theory of theater organization, under which the theater
commander channeled authority through his technical services chiefs
as well as his tactical commanders, had been discarded in the ETO
under War Department pressure so that the planned channels of au-
thority no longer remained, yet the War Department did not consider
the provision of a new authority channel as being within its province.
The June Organization Plan

In June the ETO SOS chief of administration asked Rowan to
submit his plans for handling the theater build-up load. Rowan's plan
reflected his desire to meet both problems. If he could have direct
control of the theater CWS organization, he wanted enough officers
of sufficient rank to control it by persuasion. If he must do the plan-
ning which, according to the manual, should have been done in the
United States, and if he must perform the operation normally the
responsibility of the communications zone, he wanted the staff to
handle planning and operating functions. Rowan replied by submitting
a comprehensive organizational and functional justification for a staff
of 100 officers.
55
(1) Porter Interv, 24 Aug 61. (2) Waitt Interv, 13 May 61. (3) Rowan Interv, 28 Sep 58.
(1) Waitt Interv, 13 May 61. (2.) Waitt Comments on draft of this volume, 5 Jan 61.
56
He asked for a deputy and two assistant chiefs but suggested that
the position of deputy and one of the assistant chief positions could
be held by one officer. While MacArthur had in fact been deputy
since August of 1942, he had in title been Executive Officer and Chief,
Operations and Training Division. Rowan proposed that he should
officially be deputy and assistant chief for plans and training. As
mentioned above, Rowan had become "outside man" for his organiza-
tion, so that he needed a deputy who could function in his absence.
He also needed an additional executive officer who would be "inside
man" and function in his or his deputy's stead when both were absent.
The second assistant chief was to be the operating supervisor of supply
and service functions. Since half of Rowan's staff was to be occupied
with these functions and since this portion of the staff was located at
Cheltenham, he felt that the position warranted the assignment of a
general officer. Considering the growth of the technical services within
the theater and considering that the CWS ETO was destined to become
fourth ranking among the seven technical services in the operation of
general storage space and second ranking in the operation of ammuni-
tion storage and shop space, and further considering that the Chelten-
ham echelon was charged with the chemical warfare training of about
375,000 SOS troops, the establishment of an assistant chief position in
57
the general-officer grade was not unreasonable.
Since Rowan planned for his deputy to hold the position of assistant
chief for plans and training, there seems to have been little reason for
establishment of the second position of assistant chief except the
psychological factor of acknowledging the unique position of the
CWS chief as tactical adviser in chemical warfare to the theater
commander and to all theater forces. A subsidiary reason for estab-
lishing the second position could have been to parallel the OCCWS
organization which had recently been revised to provide assistant chiefs
58
for materiel and for field operations. In effect, the two assistant
chiefs in the ETO would perform comparable functions to the two
in OCCWS. Only one officer, a lieutenant colonel, to act in an
executive capacity, was to be assigned directly to the assistant chief
for plans and training.59
(1) Study, Rowan [to Chief, Admin SOS], Functions and Duties of the OCCWO, 13 and 17 Jun
57
43. ETO Admin 545A Cml Warfare. (2) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, p. 128.
58
59
Functions and Duties of the OCCWO.
Six of the nine divisions proposed were to be organized on the pattern

already established in the Technical Division—colonels and lieutenant
colonels would primarily perform liaison and inspection functions
outside the Office of the Chief Chemical Warfare Officer. These
divisions were: Technical; Plans and Training; Intelligence; Medical
Liaison; Supply Liaison and CWS Representative to AC of S, G-5,
ETOUSA; and SOS Training (at Cheltenham). The liaison divi-
sions were to contain branches or sections staffed by lower ranking
officers and enlisted men to perform planning, supervisory, and report-
ing duties. Colonel Wright had already been appointed CWS repre-
sentative to ACofS, G-5, ETOUSA, in addition to his duties as Chief,
Supply Liaison Division. His duty as representative consisted of liaison
with the Allied forces planning command (Chief of Staff to the Su-
preme Allied Commander [Designate] COSSAC). The SOS CWS
Training Division, to be headed by a major, was to operate under the
60
assistant chief for supply. The SOS CWS Training Division was not
to duplicate the training policy role of the training element in London,
but was to provide staff supervision for chemical training within SOS.
Rowan meant for two of the remaining three divisions to handle
internal administrative functions, but both of these divisions, Admin-
istration in London and Supply Administration in Cheltenham, were
also to have advisory roles with respect to the assignment of CWS
personnel in the theater and in SOS, respectively. Rowan and LeRoy
redesigned Supply Division to re-emphasize the position that this
division had always held as an independent CWS supply and service
agency which LeRoy operated, on a small scale, under Somervell's and
Lee's principle of centralized control and decentralized operation.
Supply liaison at levels co-ordinate with and above SOS was to remain
in Wright's hands in both of his capacities. Liaison at SOS level was
to be accomplished by the division itself. To supplement the division
liaison at subordinate levels, Rowan and LeRoy wished to create an
Inspection Branch headed by a lieutenant colonel who would be a
troubleshooter for field problems and carry on technical inspection
of field installations. The pattern of liaison, and indeed the organiza-
tional plan of the whole division, demonstrated how free a hand the
CWS had in determining its own supply concepts and procedures.
The division was to have, and in most cases already had, branches or
60
Ibid. (2) OCCWO ETO Off Order 8, 20 May 43. ETO Admin 544 Cml Warfare.
sections to determine requirements, to control materiel, to ordain

storage, issue, and transportation procedures, and to regulate mainte-
nance and services such as processing.61 In sharp contrast to the prac-
tice in the Pacific areas, policy could originate within the division or
with the chief chemical warfare officer; higher level direction was
minimal.
As far as his own office was concerned, Rowan had already imple-
mented a part of the organization of the June plan, since that plan
did not differ greatly in pattern from the reorganization of April.
Some features of the new plan, such as the official designation of
Colonel MacArthur as deputy and the appointment of an executive
officer, were implemented piecemeal. The post of assistant chief chemi-
cal warfare officer for supply was established, but Rowan could find no
one to fill it. Several colonels arrived in the theater during 1943, but
they were either already assigned to the staffs of field organizations or
were needed in the rapidly proliferating field headquarters. Rowan
was forced to use captains, majors, and some lieutenant colonels in
positions he had intended to fill with lieutenant colonels and colonels.
For liaison and inspection he sometimes sought the assistance of field
chemical officers. He was still short of manpower. At the end of 1943
his officer allotment totaled forty-six. In Cheltenham he lost Colonel
LeRoy who was returned to the United States under a policy of rotating
officers with field experience. Major Powell, who had filled assignments
both in Cheltenham and in the SOS depot system, became LeRoy's
replacement.62
The importance of the June plan does not lie in its implementation,
although it was implemented at about half strength and became the
basic pattern for the remainder of the war. Its importance lies in the
fact that its concept and scope demonstrate the changed character
of the overseas CWS in World War II. It represents the anomaly of
World War II: the technician and the specialist were taking a back
seat in the war which was being touted as the technicians' and specialists'
war. The technician, the specialist, and the logistician, had achieved
positions of great importance in the warfare of World War I. In the
period between the wars most CWS technicians, specialists, and logis-
61
Functions and Duties of the OCCWO.
62
(1) History, Sup Div, 42-43. (2) Ltrs, Rowan to Porter and Waitt, 22 Jul 43. (3) Ltr,
Waitt (in ETO) to Col Herrold E. Brooks, Chief, Pers Div OCCWS, 13 Sep 43. CWS 314.7 Pers
Files, ETO. (4) Ltr, Col Ernest Greene, USAR, to Hist Off, 22 Jan 60.
ticians had been led to believe that they would work with bureaulike
unity. Strategy, plans, materiel, and personnel would emanate from
OCCWS to be translated into the theater commander's policy by the
theater chief chemical officer who would supervise execution at sub-
ordinate levels. More than a year's experience in the theater proved
that the interposition of theater headquarters, OPD, and ASF between
the theater CWS and OCCWS prevented OCCWS from accomplishing
its planned direction. Theater emphasis on the discretion of the in-
dividual commander, plus the organizational setup, in effect demoted
the special staff officer to the role of supply administrator whose control
even in the supply field depended on his ability to institute and main-
tain decentralizing procedures. In the supply role Rowan and his staff
fared very well despite the failure to acquire the personnel specified in
the June plan. In the liaison role the failure to acquire the staff and
rank indicated in the June plan threw the entire burden on Rowan
and a few members of his staff. The Technical Division very success-
fully maintained liaison with the British in the research and develop-
ment areas.63 CWS officials also found the British very helpful in
arranging reverse lend-lease for service and supply, areas in which
Rowan and many members of his staff performed liaison.64 In matters
of policy, liaison with the British was excellent since Rowan was
Porter's representative to the British policy group, the Inter-Service
Chemical Warfare Committee.65 It was in liaison with the American
ground forces that difficulties arose. So small a staff with such varied
duties could not maintain a regular ground forces liaison program. The
partial solution for this problem was to emerge later during operations
on the Continent.
Planning and Organization: 1944-45

By the end of 1943 the build-up in the ETO had reached a furious
pace. All the CWS ETO supply installations and sections in the United
Kingdom were firmly established and supplies, even the long-awaited
toxic munitions, were coming in. In the SOS the base sections, the
ports of debarkation, and selected general depots had working-strength
chemical sections, and scarce chemical service units or detachments
63
Interv, Hist Off with Col Thomas H. Magness, Jr., 5 May 59.
64
Ltr, Gen Rowan to Hist Off, 8 Jul 60.
65
were attached where necessary for operation. Arriving ground force

organizations usually brought their own chemical sections.
Staff and Organization Changes

Many staff changes were made—some the result of organization and
unit activations and some arising from a desire to have officers with
theater experience in the United States. As noted above, Colonel
LeRoy had for the latter reason returned to the United States in the
fall of 1943. Colonel Kellogg had returned to the United States in
July 1943 and his position as Chemical Officer, Eighth Air Force, had
been assumed by Col. Harold J. Baum who subsequently became Chemi-
cal Officer, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USSTAF) ,66
One lieutenant colonel from Rowan's London staff also returned to the
United States, while Colonel Blackburn left the Administration Divi-
sion to become Chemical Officer, Ground Forces Replacement Com-
mand, in the theater.67 Three field-grade officers arrived from the
United States for duty in the London office.68
With the organization of several ground commands late in 1943,
the build-up reached the point where defensive gas warfare planning
for specific forces had to be undertaken with a probable cross-Channel
mission in mind. The requirements portion of such specific planning
depended upon the ground forces elements themselves, but Rowan's
staff would be called on to co-ordinate planning and, more importantly,
to translate plans and estimates into actual supply. The fact that
supply lead time was running at about 180 days impressed Rowan's
staff with the necessity of anticipating the requirements of ground
forces planners as far ahead as possible. Just before leaving for an
extensive briefing and conference tour in the United States late in
December 1943, Rowan designated a transitional Planning Group
within the Operations and Training Division to work under the direct
supervision of the deputy chief chemical warfare officer, Colonel
MacArthur. This group was, in addition to its planning duties, to
absorb the functions of the Supply Liaison Division.69 A few days
later, MacArthur, acting chief chemical warfare officer, brought about
66
67
Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Chester O. Blackburn, CmlC, USAR (Ret.), 21 Sep 59.
68
Interv, Hist Off with Col Alexander Leggin, USAR, 13 Oct 61. Leggin served as Rowan's
executive officer during this period.
69
OCCWO ETO Off Order 21, 28 Dec 43. ETO Admin 744 Cml Warfare.
CHART 4—ORGANIZATION OF CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE SECTION, HEADQUARTERS. EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
U.S. ARMY, JANUARY 1944
Source: Adapted from: Ruppenthal, I, 198-201; CWS SOS ETOUSA, Office Orders No. 23, 4 Jan 44, No. 25, 25 Jan 44. ETO Adm 544.
a realignment of the theater office. (Chart 4) The Planning Group

became the Planning Division under Lt. Col. Albert C. Bilicke, with
Maj. Arthur T. Hingle, who was moved up from Cheltenham, and
another field-grade officer as his principal assistants. This division was
given the task of determining broad troop and supply requirements for
future operations. The parent Operations and Training Division had
like responsibilities for current operations as well as for training super-
70
vision.
The other divisions remained as indicated in the modified plan of
June 1943, but a sign of the times was the appointment of Maj.
Alexander Leggin, Executive Officer, OCCWO, ETO, to the added
role of liaison officer to First United States Army Group (FUSAG).
Leggin's verbal instructions were to initiate the formation of a chemical
section and to start chemical planning for FUSAG, then organizing
in the United Kingdom as the principal American ground forces head-
quarters.71 Also, Maj. William Foley came from the American School
Center to Cheltenham to head an SOS Training and Equipment Section,
an upgrading of the Training Branch, Supply Division.72 By the end
of January it had become apparent that the Operations and Training
Division could not handle all the detailed transactions concerning
troops. A new Personnel Division was therefore established, and to it
were assigned the personnel records functions of Administration
73
Division.
The Personnel Division had a number of individual changes to
record. Col. Marshall Stubbs in January had moved from Ninth Air
Force to establish the chemical section for and become the deputy
assistant chief of staff, G-4, of Advance Section, Communications
Zone (ADSEC), the mobile base section scheduled to operate directly
behind the combat forces. ADSEC, as an important distribution
agency and link between combat and SOS forces, was of considerable
interest to the CWS ETO. The ability to discover ground forces
chemical supply requirements and to meet them could well depend
on the successful operation of the ADSEC Chemical Section. Maj.
Ingalls S. Bradley of Supply Division soon joined Stubbs as his
70
OCCWO ETO Off Order 23, 4 Jan 44. ETO Admin 544 Cml Warfare.
71
(1) OCCWO ETO Off Order 22, 4 Jan 44. ETO Admin 544 Cml Warfare. (1) Leggin
Interv, 13 Oct 61.
72
OCCWO ETO Off Order 23, 4 Jan 44. ETO Admin 544 Cml Warfare.
73
OCCWO ETO Off Orders 25 and 26, 25 Jan 44. ETO Admin 544 Cml Warfare.
74
assistant. Leggin left his executive officer post in February formally
75
to activate the FUSAG Chemical Section. In March, after Rowan's
return from the United States, MacArthur became FUSAG chemical
officer with Leggin serving as his deputy. Col. Alfred C. Day, a
Reserve officer and veteran of World War I's 1st Gas Regiment, who
had been on temporary duty as chemical officer of the assault and
amphibious training center in England, became Rowan's deputy.76
Col. Roy C. Charron, another Reserve officer with World War I
experience, arrived from the United States to assume, after briefly
filling the long-vacant position of assistant chief at Cheltenham, the
post of Chemical Officer, Forward Echelon, Communications Zone
(FECOMZ). The Forward Echelon was essentially a planning head-
quarters, a smaller version of SOS itself, which was to plan for and
provide logistical support to the combat forces on the Continent from
D-day plus 41 to D plus 90 when the main headquarters of SOS,
renamed Communications Zone (COMZ), was expected to be in
operation on the Continent.77 The CWS SOS-COMZ complement was
filled in May by the arrival of Col. Hubert B. Bramlet, a Regular Army
officer who had been commissioned in the CWS during World War I,
to fill the position of assistant chief at Cheltenham.78 (Chart 5)
The change in staff assignments and the addition of the ADSEC
and FECOMZ Chemical Sections enabled the CWS ETO to operate
more effectively within the theater. Officers entirely familiar with the
theater CWS system, such as MacArthur, were now in key positions
while the new chemical sections were created in new organizations
designed within the theater to serve theater purposes. These organiza-
tions therefore had channels of communication, authority, and opera-
tions specially suited to theater needs. Thus FECOMZ was a planning
headquarters with "built-in" liaison to the parent SOS.79 ADSEC was
74
Biographical Sketch, CMLHO: Maj Gen Marshall Stubbs. Thirty-seven years old at the time
of his appointment, Stubbs was a Regular Army officer and a Military Academy graduate. Of the
prominent chemical officers in the European theater, he was the first who was too young to have had
World War I experience. (2) Opns History of ADSEC COMZ ETOUSA, Oct 43-10 Jul 45 (here-
after cited as History, ADSEC).
75
OCCWO ETO Off Order 28, 16 Feb 44. ETO Admin 544 Cml Warfare.
76
OCCWO ETO Off Order 33, 23 Mar 44. ETO Admin 544 Cml Warfare.
77
(1) History, FECOMZ ETOUSA, From Inception to Termination (9 Feb to 7 Aug 44) (here-
after cited as History, FECOMZ). ETO Admin 136. (2) Personal Ltrs, Col Charron to Waitt, 2 Feb,
19 Mar 44. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, ETO, Feb 44-Dec 44.
78
OCCWO ETO Off Order 42, 30 May 44. ETO Admin 544 Cml Warfare.
79
History, FECOMZ.
CHART 5—ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF SERVICE AGENCIES AND COMBAT UNITS
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE, EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, 1944-1945
a. Position abolished, October 1944.

b.January 1944 reorganization. Allied Expeditionary Air Forces abolished 15 Oct 44.
c.Firstand Ninth Armies attached to the Northern Group lor periods in 1944-1945. Fifteenth Army added to 12th Army Croup in 1945. Chemical Officer, 12th Army Group, conducted
liaison with chemical officer (British), 21 Army Group
d. As of December 1944.
e.Theater and Communications Zone (then Services of Supply) Headquarters combined, January 1944.
f.Base Air Depot Area supported Eighth and Ninth Air Force Service Commands in some functional areas.
g.Fifteenth Air Force under USSTAF operational control. Under administrative control Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.
Source: Pogue, Supreme Command, pp. 159, 562, 379, 458, 455, Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol. I, p. 199, Craven and Cate, Europe—TORCH to POINTBLANK, pp. 745,
753, 839, Craven and Cole, Europe—ARGUMENT to V-E Day, pp. 111, 398, 576
a planning headquarters with "built-in" liaison to First Army (FUSA)

and Third Army (TUSA), whose basic logistics planning it was
handling and extending, as well as to SOS-COMZ, of which it was
80
an organizational subordinate echelon. The ground forces-CWS
ties were therefore good.
First Army, whose chemical section was headed by Col. Joseph D.
Coughlan, was to direct all American operations on the Continent
in the beachhead period. FUSAG co-ordinated all ground planning,
and a successor army group headquarters, as yet unannounced, was
to take over control of First Army and Third Army when the "secret"
Third became operational. Third Army chemical officer was Col.
81
Edward C. Wallington.
Air Forces liaison was more tenuous. Air Forces officers, probably
as part of their bidding for a status independent of the Army, took
the position that the theater and SOS headquarters had a ground forces
jurisdiction only, even in logistics matters. Since Rowan and his
staff were firmly identified with theater and SOS headquarters, they
were doubly handicapped in approaching the Air Forces. The CWS
situation in the Air Forces became worse when USSTAF combined
its Ordnance and Chemical Sections under the ordnance officer, but
Colonel Baum in USSTAF, Col. Joseph Triner, chemical officer in the
Ninth Air Force, and Maj. Leonard C. Miller of Allied Expeditionary
Air Forces (AEAF) managed to keep Rowan informed of their more
important plans through their personal channels to the chief chemical
warfare officer and his assistants.82 After January 1944 the planning
channel for the Air Forces was through the Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), rather than through theater
headquarters. In January theater and SOS headquarters were combined
with the staff serving in a dual capacity. While General Lee became
deputy theater commander, the staff carefully defined their theater
functions which they performed in General Eisenhower's name and
their SOS functions which they carried out in General Lee's. Despite
the careful definition, the activation of other operational and planning
commands restricted the combined headquarters to administrative and
80
History, ADSEC.
81
Biographical Sketches, CMLHO. Coughlan and Wallington were senior Regular Army CWS
officers. Both were graduates of the U.S. Military Academy, Class of 1915.
82
(1) Interv, Hist Off with Col Leonard C. Miller, 2 Feb 60. (2) Rowan Interv, 26 Sep 58. (3)
Rowan Comments 16 Dec 60.
supply matters and ultimately resulted in the predominance of logistic

function.83
In March Col. Adrian St. John arrived in the theater and be-
came the chemical representative on the SHAEF staff. Although
Colonel Wright, as liaison officer to COSSAC, the SHAEF predecessor,
had been on Rowan's staff, Colonel St. John did not report to Rowan.
The air forces chemical officers co-ordinated their gas warfare planning
with St. John. Organizational confusion resulted.84 Even General
Porter believed that Rowan was no longer the principal chemical officer
in the theater. He was under the impression that St. John, who was at
the time senior to Rowan, had been appointed "Chief Chemical Officer,
SHAEF," and he asked Brig. Gen. Augustin M. Prentiss, who was on
an observer mission to the theater, to indicate proper communications
channels.85 Prentiss replied that the confusion in the United States
was understandable since many individuals in the theater were also
confused, but he affirmed Rowan's position as theater chief of service,
and St. John's as chemical adviser to G-3, SHAEF, and indicated that
86
communications should be channeled through Rowan. Rowan's
status became more clearly defined upon his advancement to brigadier
general on 25 May 1944.
During the three months of his European duty before the continental
invasion, St. John assumed some of the gas warfare readiness planning
responsibilities as appropriate to his assignment to the highest planning
headquarters. He approved and staffed air forces operational readiness
plans which included stocking toxics available for immediate retaliatory
missions at operational airfields. He also secured the issuance of a
SHAEF directive which required all commanders to make both offen-
sive and defensive plans. Again, Porter was apparently under the im-
pression that this directive had greater significance than it actually
did.87 The SHAEF directive was in fact only a slightly stronger
restatement of a number of theater directives which had preceded it,
83
84
SHAEF had special staff divisions in only three technical services areas, Signal, Engineer, and
Medical. These were all combined staff branches whose roles outside their own headquarters were like
those of inspectors general; they did not perform the functions of theater sections or services (Pogue,
Supreme Command, pages 91-93). St. John was not in a special staff position. He was originally as-
signed as chemical adviser to G-4, SHAEF, and was shortly thereafter transferred to G-3 with the same
title since little of his work had to do with logistics. (Personal Ltr, St. John to Porter, 28 Mar 44).
85
Personal Ltr, Porter to Prentiss, 22 Mar 44.
86
Personal Ltr, Prentiss to Porter, 14 Apr 44.
87
Ltr, Porter to Prentiss, 22 Mar 44.
and the real key to readiness lay in the supply planning which was
being handled by Rowan's office, the air forces chemical sections, and
the chemical sections in FECOMZ, ADSEC, FUSAG, FUSA, and
TUSA.
The liaison method of planning and the organizational confusion
in the theater made chemical planning difficult at times and occasionally
resulted in personal differences which normally occur in any organiza-
tion, but both Rowan and St. John could informally handle problems
as they arose. One problem was that Coughlan was reluctant to submit
to direction and co-ordination by the FUSAG Chemical Section or by
Rowan's staff. St. John managed to bring this matter to the attention
of the FUSAG commander and planning co-ordination thereupon
became effective. On the whole, both planning and actual preparations
in the field proceeded apace.88
When Porter indicated to Prentiss that, according to the reports,
unspecified, which he had received, something was amiss in ETO
chemical activities Prentiss replied that he could find nothing wrong.
Plans were complete, the staff was competent, the supply situation,
at least for immediate needs, was good, and the chemical officers
89
seemed to enjoy the confidence of higher authority. In fact, Rowan
felt that he had done precisely as Porter had recommended—he had
"sold" his services to the theater forces.
General Porter got the same impression that Prentiss did when he
arrived in the European theater shortly before the cross-Channel attack.
He inspected gas warfare readiness in both ground and service com-
mands. He found no reluctance to acknowledge Rowan as the theater
chief chemical officer and he found theater forces well prepared, from
90
a CWS point of view, for the operation they were about to undertake.
On the Continent
American commanders and staff officers knew that the assault on
the Normandy beaches provided the enemy with an ideal opportunity
to inaugurate gas warfare. General Omar N. Bradley, then First Army
commander and principal United States ground commander for the
assault, later wrote that "even a light sprinkling of persistent gas on
88
(1) Leggin Interv, 13 Oct 61. (2) MacArthur Interv, 19 Sep 61. (3) Interv, Hist Off with
Col Maurice H. Wright, USAR (Ret.), 10 Jul 61.
89
Prentiss to Porter, 14 Apr 44.
90
Omaha Beach could have cost us our footing there."91 American

intelligence experts believed that the German forces had the logistic
capability to launch a gas attack although it was a comfort to know
that their lack of aerial superiority made it unlikely that such an
attack could be launched by aircraft. All assault forces wore antigas
protective clothing and carried gas masks and other protective
articles. While the adequacy of such protection was assured against
known gases in a situation in which warning could be given, the danger
of a high casualty rate was great in the event of surprise attack or the
introduction of an unknown gas. Further, the adequacy of the warning,
service, and retaliatory offensive systems could only be estimated.
First Army requested 3 chemical mortar battalions for retaliation
and 4 chemical service companies to meet possible gas warfare. The
3 battalions, 1 chemical depot company, 1 chemical maintenance com-
pany, 1 smoke generator battalion headquarters and 4 companies, and
1 small detachment from a chemical laboratory company were assigned
or attached to FUSA and scheduled for the assault echelons. The
laboratory detachment and 3 chemical decontamination companies
assigned to engineer special brigades joined the earliest assault waves
with the mission of determining if gas was being used. These units
were to identify the gas and take immediate protective measures.92
The first chemical staff sections ashore in Normandy were those in
the headquarters of the engineer special brigades, the V and VII Corps,
and the 1st, 29th, 4th, and 30th Divisions. Three officers of FUSA
Chemical Section landed on 9 June, three days after D-day. They
found the chemical supply situation adequate and the 30th Chemical
Decontamination Company ready to provide artificial smoke protec-
tion if needed. The fear of enemy gas attack was still lively as demon-
strated by several "gas scares," reports that the enemy had employed
93
war gases. All such reports proved false.
Since First Army was responsible for all logistics arrangements on
the Continent in the early period, the first job was to establish dumps,
especially dumps at which the chemical mortar battalions could draw
ammunition. The initial supply of several chemical items, including
91
General Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1951),
p. 279.
92
(1) FUSA Rpt of Opns, 20 Oct 43-1 Aug 44, an. 17, Cml Warfare Sec. (2) Ian F. Fraser,
Clifford L. Jones, and Hugh Williamson, Opn Rpt NEPTUNE, 30 Sep 44, pp. 38-39, 126. In CMLHO.
93
FUSA Rpt of Opns, 20 Oct 43-1 Aug 44, an. 17.
ammunition, was being expended faster than anticipated. The FUSA

Chemical Section and the assigned chemical service units handled these
problems. Officers of the ADSEC Chemical Section, who had arrived
a day after Coughlan and his assistants, assisted the FUSA section in
these tasks.94
The ADSEC Chemical Section gradually assumed direction of the
distribution functions in the areas nearest the beaches. The FUSA
Chemical Section retained its direct interest in all chemical supply
95
since FUSA did not relinquish supply control to ADSEC. During
July the FECOMZ, TUSA, and nth Army Group Chemical Sections
were established on the Continent as the headquarters of which they
were part became established. FECOMZ never assumed operating re-
sponsibility and the members of its chemical section, like those of Third
Army and 12th Army Group, acted as observers and reporters on the
combat, supply, and service situations until early August when the
main COMZ (formerly SOS) headquarters began to arrive and
absorb FECOMZ. Members of the chemical section then assumed
their planned operating roles. Third Army and 12th Army Group
became operational on 1 August 1944 and MacArthur's chemical sec-
tion became the senior chemical policy organization on the Continent
96
pending the arrival of the remainder of Rowan's office.
Rowan, Day, and St. John visited on the Continent during the
beachhead and breakout period (June-August 1944), as did General
Porter.97 They found little evidence of any enemy intention to initiate
gas warfare, but, as insurance the CWS sections and units ashore were
striving to increase and improve the level of gas warfare protection
by collecting and refurbishing discarded gas masks, by distributing
decontaminating equipment and supplies, and by setting up antigas
clothing processing plants. The chemical mortar battalions were fully
occupied and highly prized in their nongas warfare role, an intended
one, of firing high explosive and smoke missions in direct combat
support of the infantry. Artificial smoke, other than that produced
94
Informal Comments of CWS Officer [Maj Hingle to Col Charron, CmlO FECOMZ], 20 Jun 44.
CWS 314.7 Pers Files, ETO.
95
(1) FUSA Rpt of Opns, 20 Oct 43—1 Aug 44, an. 17. (2) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I,
433-36.
96
(1) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 436-37. (2) MacArthur Interv, 19 Sep 61. (3) TUSA
AAR, 1 Aug 44-9 May 45, vol. II, CWS Sec. (4) 12th Army Group Rpt of Opns, vol. XI, Cml War-
fare Sec, pp. 104-33.
97
OCCWO COMZ ETO, Daily Journal, Jul and Aug 44. ETO Admin 467.
by white phosphorus shell, had not been used in expected quantities,

and expensive fog oil, the smoke agent used in mechanical smoke
generators, was being used to oil emergency aircraft landing strips.
The smoke generator units were used as service units. The chemical
supply situation was satisfactory at the moment, but Rowan and
St. John predicted growing supply problems as the mortar battalions
became more extensively used and the distribution area for smoke,
flame, and gas warfare supplies became larger. From Rowan's point
of view the most immediate problem was the supply and allotment
of CWS officers and enlisted men, particularly those for the chemical
98
mortar battalions.
While Rowan had organized a Personnel Division and expanded it
into a Personnel and Troops Division, he did not control the assign-
ment of CWS-trained men. All assignments in the European theater
were made under the supervision of the ETO SOS assistant chief of
staff, G—1, by the theater adjutant general or a command adjutant
general or by the Ground Forces Reinforcement System. The assigning
agency commonly considered all CWS officers and men as service troops
and indiscriminately assigned individuals to any CWS vacancy. While
such indiscriminate assignment produced some problems in service
units, such as the assignment of decontamination specialists to mainte-
nance units, the real difficulty arose in connection with CWS combat
assignment. Mortar battalion commanders found they were receiving
service specialists or clerks while CWS-trained combat soldiers were
assigned to service units. Chemical mortar battalion commanders con-
sequently requested infantry- or artillery-trained men in preference
to those trained by the CWS. It was easier to retrain men who could
be counted upon to have received basic combat training than it was
to retrain CWS men who had no combat training at all."
Rowan immediately began to tackle this problem both from the
field end and from the theater staff end until he persuaded the theater
adjutant general to consult the CWS in the allotment of both men
and units. While it was still necessary to work through the theater
98
(1) St. John to Porter, Rpt for CCWS, 28 Jun 44. CWS 314.7 Pers Ltr Files, ETO. (2) Personal
Ltr, Rowan to Waitt, 2 Sep 44, inclosing Memo, Rowan, no addressee, 26 Aug 44, sub: Notes on Trip
to Far Shore. (3) MacArthur Interv, 19 Sep 61. (4) Leggin Interv, 13 Oct 61. (5) Wright
Interv, 12 Jul 61.
99
(1) History of Pers and Troops Div OCCWO COMZ ETO, D Day to V-E Day (hereafter cited
as History, Pers and Troops Div). ETO Admin 545A. (2) Rowan Interv, 28 Sep 58. (3) Waitt
Comments, 5 Jan 61.
system, and while the preference of individual commanders could still

outweigh OCCWO planning, this concession gave Rowan a much
larger hand in the solution. Rowan and his subordinates were there-
after able to correct many inequities in chemical assignments.100
On moving to the Continent in September, Rowan began consoli-
dating his offices. FECOMZ, its operational period having been cur-
tailed on the one end by the extension of First Army's control and on
the other by the early arrival on the Continent of the main echelon,
was absorbed into the COMZ headquarters. Little change was made
in the theater chemical section organization when the section was
established in Paris. The Supply Division carried on its day and night
job much as it had in Cheltenham. The Technical Division remained
in the United Kingdom with a liaison section in Paris. Colonel Bramlet
remained in England to become Chemical Officer, United Kingdom
Base Section, which was in fact a rear echelon of COMZ. The one
significant change was the recombination, just after the arrival in
Paris, of the Planning and the Operations and Training Divisions into
a Planning and Training Division. Since there were no gas warfare
operations, the concept of an Operations and Training Division as a
successor to General Fries' "military" offensive and defensive divisions
faded completely, and toward the end of the war the division devoted
itself to demobilization and redeployment planning.101 Since Colonel
St. John had also primarily been employed in planning, his position
was abolished in the fall of 1944. He, too, turned to demobilization
work, mostly outside the CWS sphere.102
Rowan gave much of his personal attention to the problems of
operating in a nongas warfare situation. The chemical mortar bat-
talions were in considerable demand for close infantry support from
the time of their debut on the Continent, but since their extensive
use in a nonchemical role had not been envisioned before the war,
there was no well-established body of doctrine relating to their employ-
ment. In the resultant controversy over infantry or artillery fire
100
(1) History, Pers and Troops Div. (2) Personal Ltr, Rowan to Waitt, 1 Sep 44. (3) Personal
Ltr, St. John to Waitt, 1 Sep 44.
101
(1) CWS History, 1 Jan 44 to "D Day." (2) History of the Administrative Div OCCWO,
D Day to V-E Day, Hq COMZ ETOUSA. Both in ETO Admin 545A. (3) History of Sup Div
OCCWO Hq ETOUSA, D Day to V-E Day (hereafter cited as History, Sup Div, II.) ETO Admin
544. (4) History of CWS Plans and Tng Div in the ETO, 6 Jun 44 to 9 May 45. (5) History of
the Tech Div CWS Hq ETOUSA, 6 Jun 44-9 May 45. Both in ETO Admin 545B.
102
Personal Ltr, St. John to Col Elliott, DCCWS, 22 Nov 44.
direction, Rowan aligned himself firmly with the proponents of

infantry control.103 Lacking the means to establish doctrine as a repre-
sentative of the theater commander, Rowan chose to visit combat
commanders to persuade them to use attached chemical mortar bat-
talion elements under infantry control. Though he was sometimes
frustrated in this attempt, Rowan usually found personal persuasion
effective.104
The theater chief chemical officer also used personal persuasion in
an attempt to secure the proper employment of smoke generator units.
Since many commanders were unaware of the new techniques in use
of smoke which had been developed in the Mediterranean theater,
they were unprepared and unwilling to initiate the employment of
smoke. As a result, many smoke generator troops made their way
across France engaged in such miscellaneous activities as service and
transportation troops. General Rowan tried to persuade field com-
manders to maintain the integrity of these units, to keep up their
equipment and to employ them on their primary mission wherever
possible. Smoke came into great demand for concealment in Germany
when the river-crossing operations began. At that time many smoke
units were recalled to their primary mission, but re-equipping and re-
training was no easy task. Some units and their equipment had been
so dispersed that they were never called back to their primary mission.105
Rowan's activities on the Continent, such as those in connection
with the mortar battalions and the smoke generator units, raise the
question of the proper role, in the absence of gas warfare, of the
Chemical Warfare Service and of the various staff chemical officers.
Neither Porter nor Rowan felt that the absence of gas warfare signifi-
cantly altered the basic mission of the CWS or of CWS staff officers.
Both believed that Fries's concept of a service in which "research was
linked with the closest possible ties to the firing line" still applied.106
Although toxics had not been used and although the likelihood of
their use became more remote with each succeeding month of the war,
there was always the possibility that the Germans might use gas to cap
the offensive which had created the "bulge" in the Ardennes, or to
prevent the crossing of the Rhine, or in last-ditch defense of the
103
See below, ch. XII.
104
Rowan Interv, 28 Sep 58. (2) Rowan Comments, 16 Dec 60.
105
(1) Rowan Interv, 28 Sep 58. (2) Rowan Comments, 16 Dec 60.
106
homeland.107 These possibilities were sufficiently real so that European

theater forces had to be at least prepared to wage gas warfare. Pre-
paredness meant that gas masks and protective clothing must be
available for all troops in potential danger zones, that decontamination
equipment and supplies must be available, that gas alarms and detection
devices must be in the hands of line units or ready for issue and that
gas defensive training for all troops must not be neglected. Further-
more, preparedness meant that chemical intelligence information must
be gathered and interpreted, that chemical advisers and service and
combat troops must be ready to begin offensive or defensive operations
or both with very short notice. And there was yet another threat—the
threat of biological warfare. The gas warfare defensive system would
serve for defense against biological warfare, but CWS officers had to
be acquainted with the latest developments so that should such warfare
be initiated, they could recognize it, furnish needed advice, and take
proper defensive measures. Retaliation in this field was out of the
108
question since the CWS had no biological munitions. Preparedness
was no small task. But preparedness was only the first of the CWS
tasks. There were also the tasks connected with the nongas warfare
operations of the chemical mortar battalions, with the supply and field
employment of artificial smoke, and with the supply and training for
incendiary and flame weapons employment.
Rowan had to reconsider, once the pattern of operations on the
Continent was apparent, how to accomplish the CWS tasks. Since his
own office operated a CWS supply system, he only had to see that his
Supply Division was operating and secure the co-operation of the base
sections in distribution and of the combat elements in stating require-
ments. The contacts with the base sections were maintained, as in
England, through the base section chemical officers who kept in in-
formal touch with his office.109 The base section chemical officers also
107
(1) Rowan Interv, 28 Sep 58. (2) Porter Interv, 24 Aug 61. (3) Waitt Interv, 13 May 61.
(4) Interv, Hist Off with Col Kenneth A. Cunin, 5 Dec 45.
108
See Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field, pp. 101-22.
109
Information on the base sections is drawn from: (1) Wright Interv, 16 Jul 61 (Colonel Wright
was Chemical Officer, Loire Base Section); (2) Intervs, Hist Off with Col Christian O. Christensen,
USAR (Ret.), 13, 23 Oct 61 (Colonel Christensen was Chemical Officer, Oise Base Section); (3) Ltr,
Col Greene to Hist Off, 22 Jan 60 (Colonel Greene was Chemical Officer, Brittany Base Section and
Seine Base Section); (4) Ltr, Col Hubert B. Bramlet, USA (Ret.), to Hist Off, 6 Oct 59 (Colonel
Bramlet was Chemical Officer, United Kingdom Base Section); (5) Ltr, Col Ferris U. Foster, AUS
(Ret.), to Hist Off, 13 Oct 59 (Colonel Foster was Chemical Officer, Southern Base Section in England
and subsequently assigned to United Kingdom Base Section).
maintained informal liaison with each other and with combat organiza-
tion chemical officers. Base section chemical officers operated under
their own command, but most of them asserted some independence in
chemical supply matters. They were usually able to arrange transpor-
tation as they saw fit, and they supervised the activities of chemical
service units in their areas. Problems were handled directly with
Rowan's office—usually by telephone.
The supply and service aspects of preparedness thus taken care of,
Rowan could devote most of his time to his duties as "roving ambassa-
dor." He or Day frequently talked to MacArthur and his successor,
Col. Patrick F. Powers, or their deputy, Leggin, in the 12th Army
Group Chemical Section.110 These officers regularly, both officially
and informally, saw and corresponded with the chemical officers of
First, Third, and Ninth Armies, and they occasionally heard from
Col. Benjamin F. Mattingly, chemical adviser to G-3, 6th Army
Group, and from the chemical officer of Seventh Army. The 12th
Army Group Chemical Section also maintained liaison with the British
21 Army Group Chemical Section as long as General Sir Bernard L.
Montgomery, 21 Army Group commander, was also Allied land com-
mander. In September 1944, 12th Army Group was transferred to the
direct control of SHAEF, and the chemical officers continued, as they
had throughout the planning and early continental period, to corre-
spond with St. John.111 Preparedness occupied much of the time of
the 12th Army Group Chemical Section. MacArthur's first problem
on arriving on the Continent was to determine what might be done
to relieve the combat troops of the need to carry the gas mask.
Soldiers individually discarded burdensome masks whenever they felt
that there was no further danger of gas or whenever they had what
they regarded as a more important item to carry. Even when retained
masks suffered abuse because carriers were used as catch-alls. Instruc-
tion and training were useless in persuading soldiers to care for their
masks. MacArthur met with members of the army group staff on this
problem, and General Bradley himself suggested at the conference
that division commanders be given the option of withdrawing masks
110
Information on the 12th Army Group Chemical Section is from: (1) MacArthur Interv, 19 Sep
61; (2) Leggin Intervs, 13 Oct 61, 22 Nov 45; (3) Interv, Hist Off with Col Powers, USA (Ret.), 24
Sep 59; (4) 12th Army Group, Rpt of Opns, vol. XI, Cml Warfare Sec.
111
MacArthur (comments on draft of this volume) minimizes St. John's role since it was only that
of an adviser with SHAEF headquarters.
from individuals if transport could be found which would carry the

masks with advancing troop units, making them readily available for
reissue. Since no combat element either below or above division had
an organizational baggage train, the only feasible solution from the
army group point of view was to suggest that divisions allot the neces-
sary space for masks in their division trains and this soon became
SHAEF approved policy.
The 12th Army Group Chemical Section was to perform its more
routine duties through an organization which consisted of four
branches: Administrative, Supply and Logistics, Operations, and Tech-
nical and Intelligence. Five officers and 7 enlisted men were allotted
to the organization, and on 13 October 1944 this allotment was reduced
to 3 officers and 3 enlisted men. The duties of stating requirements for
supplies and dividing scarce supplies, such as chemical mortar ammuni-
tion, among the three armies proved to be time consuming. Formu-
lating chemical annexes for army group tactical plans was also time
consuming. Liaison, inspection, and intelligence duties and the constant
and thorny problems posed by the necessity of advising on the allot-
ment of chemical mortar units took the remaining time. Powers
greatly regretted that no time remained to co-ordinate the direct gas
warfare training being carried on by division chemical officers. He
was not satisfied with the state of gas warfare preparedness although
he felt that Rowan and his staff were doing an excellent job, considering
the personal effort required for communication among the various
elements in the theater. Powers managed to reverse the earlier policy
and secure the reissue of the gas mask to individual soldiers. He felt
that even a gas scare would have caused panic at the time of the Battle
112
of the Bulge when troops had no individual protection. He was
never able to achieve the movement of more than a token stock of
toxic ground ammunition to the Continent, and no aerial toxic muni-
tions were ever moved from England. On the point of the adequacy
of aerial retaliation, Powers disagreed with both Porter and Waitt. He
shared the view of the Chief and Assistant Chief of the CWS that
strategic aerial retaliation in kind against the initiation of gas warfare
was possible, but he maintained that essential tactical retaliation, which
would have taken a ground effort, had been overlooked. Because
ground retaliatory preparation was only token, Powers, like many of
112
For discussion of supply problems caused by this decision, see below, Chapter IV.
his colleagues, believed the Allied forces fortunate in that the Germans
never took advantage of their opportunities to initiate gas warfare.
Lt. Col. Kenneth A. Cunin, who succeeded Coughlan as First Army
chemical officer on 24 July 1944, also believed the American forces
inadequately prepared for gas warfare because of the shortage of
113
ground toxic ammunition. Cunin considered the protective supply
adequate, but his section agreed with nth Army Group policy in
reissuing individual protection at the time of the December threat.
The First Army Chemical Section could do little to improve the pre-
paredness situation from the standpoint of toxic supply or gas warfare
training. Although the section allotment was 6 officers and 16 enlisted
men, 3 officers and 13 enlisted men more than the 12th Army Group
Chemical Section, First Army chemical officers found themselves fully
occupied with the problems of the mortar battalions and those of
114
nongas chemical supply and gas warfare intelligence.
Colonel Wallington, Chemical Officer, Third U.S. Army, through-
out the European campaigns, was less concerned about gas warfare
preparedness than Powers and Cunin. He believed in preparedness, but
he considered the gas warfare retaliatory potential in the European
theater adequate in view of the absence of gas warfare. In Wallington's
opinion the theater command and combat commanders in Europe
justifiably took the risk of being less than fully prepared for gas
warfare. He believed the risk was justifiable because there were so
many other pressing demands on commanders' resources, because
United States national policy forbade the initiation of gas warfare,
and because intelligence was expected to provide warning if a policy
115
change was required.
While Wallington believed that the state of gas warfare training
among U.S. forces in Europe was such that the initiation of gas
warfare would have resulted in panic, he conceived his job as being
primarily that of supporting nongas warfare activities of the corps and
divisions under Third Army. At the same time, he gave all the support
he could to protective preparedness and intelligence activities.116 This
conception of duties meant that the TUSA Chemical Section, like the
113
Cunin Interv, 5 Dec 45. Cunin was succeeded as First Army chemical officer by Col. Frederick
W. Gerhard in April 1945.
114
FUSA Rpt of Opns, 1 Aug 44-22 Feb 45, vol. 4, an. 13, Cml Warfare Sec Rpt, pp. 253-67.
115
116
Interv, Hist Off with Brig Gen Edward C. Wallington, USA (Ret.), 1 Dec 59.
Ibid.
FUSA Chemical Section, devoted maximum attention to supply and

to the needs of the chemical mortar battalions. It also meant the pro-
vision of supply support and tactical advice for the smoke generator
units which were heavily employed by TUSA, especially in its river
crossings. As a result of experience in these tasks, the TUSA Chemical
Section found that the one chemical depot company attached could
not handle all supply requirements. It recommended that two such
companies be assigned, and more important still, that CWS should
have far more transportation for the depot company, the smoke gen-
erator, and the mortar units. The CWS could not operate its own
supply system, which it did with very little help from other supply
services, and at the same time shift men and equipment in a fast-
moving war without greatly increased transportation. The chemical
section suggested addition of a truck company to the Army for CWS
use.117
To accomplish the intelligence mission, which Wallington deemed
so important since warning of necessary policy change was to come
from intelligence information, two technical intelligence teams were
attached to Third Army. Several of these CWS technical intelligence
teams were organized and trained by the CWS in the United States
and several more were organized and trained by Rowan's office. These
teams were attached to Army chemical sections. They reported to
the section to which they were attached and to Colonel Tarr's Intelli-
gence Division in Rowan's office and to the CWS in the United States.118
The work of all such teams is revealed in an account of the activities
of CWS Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Team (EEIST) Num-
ber One, under Capt. James F. Munn.119
EEIST Number One, consisting of Captain Munn and three enlisted
men (a driver, a photographer, and an interpreter) was organized and
trained in the United States and shipped to Europe in time to arrive
in France on 18 July 1944. It was first attached to FUSA and was
later under orders of the nth Army Group Chemical Section until
attached to the TUSA Chemical Section in September. During the
campaign across France, the team investigated several French labora-
tories and chemical factories used by the Germans, and analyzed, photo-
117
TUSA AAR, 1 Aug 44-9 May 45, vol. II, CWS Sec.
118
CWS COMZ ETO History of Intell Div, From D Day Through V-E Day. ETO Admin 545B.
119
The following account is derived from: (1) Rcds of CWS EEIST No. 1, Apr 44—Aug 45, CWS
314.7 EEIST No. 1; (2) Information furnished by Lt Col James F. Munn, USAR (Ret.).
graphed, and inventoried laboratory, manufacturing, and protective

equipment. Although several rumors of German toxic stores were
reported, the team found no German toxics and no equipment for
manufacturing them.120 Interviews with Frenchmen who had been
pressed into German employment revealed only that the Germans were
interested in and had continued French toxic and munitions develop-
ment. As the campaign moved into Germany, the team was called
upon for numerous similar analyses and descriptions, and it became
increasingly involved in the interrogation of prisoners of war who
might have chemical information. Such interrogations were carried
on in co-operation with Army prisoner of war and intelligence
authorities. This team and others operating on the battlefront gradu-
ally accumulated a fairly good store of information concerning German
individual and collective protection, doctrine, and instructions for
civilians as well as military forces. The teams also collected adequate,
although not abundant, information on German weapons and agents
and chemical investigative processes. On 20 April 1945 the Chemical
Officer, Seventh Army, informed EEIST Number One that the forward
elements of the 14th Armored Division had discovered a German war
gas factory in Velden, Germany. The XV Corps Chemical Section
moved in to investigate.121 A few days later, on 24 April 1945, XII
Corps discovered a German toxic depot, whereupon the team set out,
in co-operation with Colonel Wallington and Col. Ragnar E. Johnson,
XII Corps chemical officer, to investigate and inventory this depot.
The chemical analysis of captured munitions was beyond the capacity
of this small team, but they were able to sort out munitions which
could be sent to Rowan's Intelligence and Technical Divisions for
further analysis. The findings of EEIST Number One proved beyond
a doubt that the Germans were well and elaborately prepared for gas
warfare and that they possessed toxic munitions unknown to the
Allied forces.
The Ninth Army Chemical Section under Col. Harold Walmsley
and the Seventh Army Chemical Section under Lt. Col. Bruce T.
Humphreville operated in much the same way as the First and Third
Army Chemical Sections. Again the principal interest was in nongas
warfare and defensive gas warfare supply. The Ninth Army Chemical
120
A small store of French toxics was found. Ltr, Chief EEIST No. 1 to CmlO TUSA, 3 Oct 44,
sub: Ammunition Dump at Fameck, France. CWS-EEIST-ETO-R13 in CWS 314.7 CWS EEIST.
121
Journal Memo, CmlO Seventh Army, 20 Apr 45. CWS 314-7 EEIST.
Section additionally performed extensive liaison functions since that

122
Army was for a time attached to the British 21 Army Group.
Rowan was satisfied that chemical matters were well handled at the
army group and army level. His greatest concern was that corps and
123
division do their job well. This job was a demanding one. The
division chemical officer was actually in charge of field training and
intelligence. He was adviser to his commander on gas warfare pre-
paredness and on the employment of mortar battalions and was also
adviser to his commander and to engineer and infantry teams on the
employment of the flame thrower. His section either actually handled
or kept close track of the handling of chemical supply and it was
called upon to mix flame thrower fuel and fill flame throwers whenever
they were used. The ability of the division chemical officer to handle
this job depended upon his own energy and inventiveness since he was
handling weapons and materials not familiar to most line soldiers and
since his job concerned gas warfare preparedness, which was not popu-
lar with many commanders and most troops. His ability to do his job
also depended upon the encouragement and support he got from the
division commander and his staff and from higher echelon chemical
officers. It was the duty of the corps chemical officer to oversee all
these activities for the several division chemical officers under his corps
except that he had no specific duties in supply. Since the corps head-
122
(1) Ninth U.S. Army G-4 Per Rpts, 3-16 Sep 44; AAR's 1-31 Oct 44, Dec 44-Jun 45. Files
L196-Envelope 10 Cml Sec and L216-Envelope 1; (2) Seventh U.S. Army CWS Staff Sec Rpts,
1 Jan-31 Oct 44, and Dec 44. File L-1139 7th Army Staff Sec "43."
123
The following account of the corps and division chemical officer's activities is derived from: (1)
Rowan Interv, 28 Sep 58; (2) Rowan Comments, 16 Dec 60; (3) Col Ragnar E. Johnson, CWS,
Study, Functions and Orgn, Cml Warfare-Liaison Sec Hq XII Corps, n.d.; (4) Interv, Hist Off with
Col William C. Hammond, 26 Nov 56 (Colonel Hammond was Chemical Officer, VI Corps); (5) Ltr,
Col John B. Cobb, USAR (Ret.), to Hist Off, 17 May 60 (Colonel Cobb was Chemical Officer, 35th
Infantry Division and XIX Corps); (6) Interv, Hist Off with Col Edward J. Barta, USAR (Ret.), 23
Sep 59 (Colonel Barta was Chemical Officer, XVIII Corps); (7) Cunin Interv, 5 Dec 45 (Colonel
Cunin was Chemical Officer, 1st Inf Div, before becoming Chemical Officer, FUSA); (8) Interv Hist
Off with Lt Col Levin B. Cottingham, 9 Oct 45 (Colonel Cottingham was Chemical Officer, 5th
Infantry Division); (9) Intervs, Hist Off with Col William Foley, 16 Oct 46, 19 Dec 57 (Colonel
Foley was Chemical Officer, 1st Infantry Division, succeeding Colonel Cunin); (10) Intervs, Hist Off
with Col John L. Miles, 12 Apr 56, 9 Mar 61 (Colonel Miles was Chemical Officer, 26th Infantry
Division); (11) Interv, Hist Off with Col Russell W. Dodds and Lt Col Samuel J. Boyles, 8 May 56
(Colonel Dodds was Chemical Officer, 65th Infantry Division, and Colonel Boyles was Chemical Officer,
91st Infantry Division); (12) Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Thomas B. Crawford, USAR, 18 Apr 56
(Colonel Crawford was Chemical Officer, 80th Infantry Division); (13) Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col
Herbert B. Livesey, Jr., USAR (Ret.), 8 Jun 56 (Colonel Livesey was Chemical Officer, 106th Infantry
Division); (14) Interv, Hist Off with Col Alfred G. Karger, USAR, Jun 56 (Colonel Karger was
Chemical Officer, 8th Infantry Division); (15) Daily Log, Cml Warfare Sec, 29th Inf Div, 6 Jun
44-30 Dec 44.
quarters was primarily a tactical element, the corps chemical officer

naturally centered his attention on tactical employment of chemical
weapons and equipment.
Rowan was of course concerned about the energy and resourcefulness
of division and corps chemical officers since he, like Fries, believed that
CWS services should be sold to combat commanders, but even after
his arrangement on manpower with the ETO adjutant general, he
could seldom control the assignment of division chemical officers since
most such officers arrived with their divisions from the United States.
Even in the few instances when replacements were made in the theater,
the nearest ranking CWS officer was usually chosen by the organization
commander without reference to theater manpower channels. Rowan
was most anxious that the organization give the chemical officer a
chance to do his job. Many commanders felt that in the absence of gas
warfare, the corps or division chemical officer had nothing to do and
was therefore available for any assignment in which there might be a
vacancy. Rowan and the organization chemical officers expected that
organization chemical officers would receive the normal quota of
additional assignments to military courts, investigating and inspection
teams, and the like, but Rowan urged all chemical officers to resist
assignments to nonchemical duties which would occupy most or part
of their time. Whenever Rowan had an opportunity in his tours he
asked corps and division commanders or their chiefs of staff to permit
chemical officers to devote most of their time to what were, in his
opinion, the crucial duties of chemical training and intelligence. He
also felt that chemical officers should be active in the staff supervision
and tactical control of chemical mortar and smoke units which oper-
ated under the organization commander. Despite Rowan's pleas, most
chemical officers received additional assignments which consumed most
of their time. The usual assignment was the operation of the organiza-
tion liaison section which handled liaison with other organizations and
higher echelons, received and briefed visitors, and maintained a tactical
and/or intelligence information center. One energetic chemical officer
so assigned maintains that he spent precisely one and a half hours
exclusively on chemical work while his division was in combat, but
he believes he was a better division chemical officer because of his
additional assignments.
Those organization chemical officers not assigned the liaison task
had many other regular or part-time assignments such as reconnais-

sance for the division commander, acting as headquarters commandant,
and even serving as divisional mess officer. Many organization chemical
officers disagreed with Rowan and welcomed these nonchemical assign-
ments since they were usually with the forward or command echelon
of the division where the chemical officer could not expect to be in
a nongas warfare situation, and since the work usually kept them in
better touch with the tactical situation than most staff officers. As one
chemical officer phrased it, the CWS officer was an orphan, away from
any CWS command echelon—he increased his own prestige and that
of his service if he could make himself useful in a combat organization.
Frequently his ability to sell CWS services varied in direct proportion
to his usefulness in a nonchemical capacity. Lt. Col. William Foley,
Chemical Officer, 1st Infantry Division, was assigned as assistant to
the division assistant chief of staff, G-3. He felt that this assignment
to the operations and plans element was ideal since in the event of gas
warfare he would have been acquainted with the tactical situation and
able to render his advice as a member of the staff section charged with
applying the tactical plan. Most organization chemical officers with
other assignments, like Foley, believed that they were not neglecting
their chemical job. The assistant division chemical officer, a captain,
and some or all of the four enlisted men in the section could handle
supply and administrative functions from the division rear echelon.
The assistant chemical officer could and usually did refer really knotty
problems involving liaison with higher echelons or special requests for
authority or supplies to the organization chemical officer in forward
echelon.
Many assistant division chemical officers and their enlisted assistants
became proficient at handling chemical training, to which the whole
124
section had usually devoted most of its efforts in the United States.
Because of severe manpower restrictions on the CWS, every combat
organization, just as in World War I, usually maintained unit gas
officers (UGO's) in all elements at regiment and battalion levels.
Unlike the World War I precedent, these officers were usually given
this duty as an additional assignment, and they did not report to the
organization chemical officer except for training. The division chemical
officer was also responsible for training unit gas noncommissioned offi-
124
See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, pp. 382-93.
cers (UGNCO's) for every company-sized unit. This, too, was an

additional duty and UGNCO's usually reported for this duty to UGO's.
Most chemical officers attempted to keep the roster of UGO's and
UGNCO's current by offering courses and demonstrations, even con-
ducting them in forward areas, whenever commanders and operations
officers would allot the time. The more ambitious chemical officers
also trained decontamination squads from combat units, gave flame
thrower training, and demonstrated the use of incendiary and smoke
grenades. Corps and army chemical officers frequently co-operated,
or at least provided moral support when the physical assistance they
could give was limited.
Division and corps chemical officers, like their seniors in army and
army group, emphasized intelligence activities. Protecting captured
munitions from souvenir hunters was one of the problems in this
field as was securing transportation to take samples back for analysis.
Corps chemical officers usually called upon the army chemical officer
for EEIST assistance in such cases.
A few corps and division chemical officers found it possible to par-
ticipate actively in tactical plans and preparations, especially for
smoke operation.
Nearly every activity of the division and corps chemical officers
presented problems. They were perpetually short of transportation
and of service personnel. Supply of wanted items, such as incendiary
or smoke grenades and mortar ammunition, was often short and com-
munication to the rear to remedy these shortages was difficult. But
despite these drawbacks, most corps and division chemical officers felt
that they accomplished their mission and that their organizations were
reasonably well prepared for gas warfare and had made effective nongas
warfare use of mortars and smoke. The few who had biological warfare
defensive training also felt that they were ready to cope with this kind
of warfare should it come. Very few organization chemical officers
seriously considered offensive gas warfare since, aside from the mortar
battalions, they had no contact with any of the units scheduled to
wage it and did not handle offensive supplies.
Summary
There is no simple way of measuring the work of the CWS in the
theaters of operations. There is no accounting comparable to that of
tactical objectives taken, bridges built, and miles of communication

wire laid. The 2,097 CWS officers and 26,909 CWS enlisted men in
the European theater in March and April of 1945 were there, first, to
provide the insurance that the American forces could continue to fight
125
and retaliate in kind if the enemy initiated gas warfare. Second,
these "chemicals" as some denominated themselves, were there to
provide CWS gas protective services, fire CWS nongas weapons, pro-
vide supply of CWS items, and support the combat forces in any way
which they or the theater commanders could devise. There was no
question in Porter's, or Waitt's, or Rowan's mind that they provided
gas warfare insurance and that they performed extraordinarily well
126
at their nongas warfare tasks.
Theater commanders, with a few exceptions, willingly supported
the preparedness effort since they valued the insurance. They increas-
ingly welcomed the CWS nongas warfare activities as the war pro-
gressed. They had no heavy mortar other than the chemical mortar,
which proved tremendously effective, and they had no means for
sustained provision of artificial smoke other than the smoke generator
units and CWS-furnished smoke pots and ammunition.
There were many problems in accomplishing the CWS tasks ranging
from lack of staff and service manpower to a general lack of under-
standing of what the CWS might do in a nongas warfare situation.
As in the Fries and Porter ideal, the ties between research and the
battle lines, although tenuous, did exist, and Porter's conception of
the CWS as a unique service, which participated and aided in almost
every phase of military activity, was most nearly realized in the
European theater. Rowan came closer than any other theater chief
chemical officer to Porter's goal of operating a unified service although
the unity in many cases completely depended on the personal obligation
which most chemical officers felt toward their service and its senior
representatives in the theater.
125
Strength figures compiled from STM-30, Strength of the Army, prepared by The Adjutant
General's Machine Records Branch monthly. The 31 March 1945 figure of 26,909 enlisted men is the
peak CWS strength for the European theater as is the 30 April 1945 strength of 2,097 officers. (Brophy
and Fisher, Organizing for War, app. B.)
126
(1) Porter Interv, 24 Aug 61. (2) Waitt Interv, 13 May 61. (3) Rowan Interv, 28 Sep 58.
CHAPTER III
CWS Administration and Supply:

Mediterranean
The Chemical Warfare Service, like the rest of the Army, matricu-
lated in the logistics school of the North African campaigns. The
Army had directly participated in the global supply effort for eight
months before the planning for North Africa got under way, but
this was the first Army participation in an Allied logistics operation
of great magnitude. Supply of any considerable force at any time
during the war was far from a simple matter, but probably no other
logistics operation of the war was surrounded by so many complicating
circumstances as this initial venture. Planning got under way late.
Allied forces strategy for a landing originally projected for October
1942 and finally for November did not assume a clear pattern until
5 September 1942. The Allied commander-designate, General Eisen-
hower, set up his planning headquarters, AFHQ, in England, though
the source of the bulk of materials was the United States, and a major
combat force under Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., was to sail directly
from the United States for the assault. The Navy had determined
that an acute shortage of cargo ships, the grave threat of submarine
warfare, and the shortage of escorts made small, fast-moving, infrequent
convoys a necessity; thus, the quantities of materials and the numbers
of men to be shipped were severely limited and the intervals between
deliveries were lengthened. Few troops had received enough training
to be considered ready for operations, and elsewhere in the Army,
as in the CWS, few production lines were furnishing equipment,
especially new equipment, in desired amounts. Furthermore, the
administrative mechanisms were not yet working properly. Jurisdic-
ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY: MEDITERRANEAN 87
tional boundaries between the Army Service Forces and the two other
major War Department commands, Army Ground Forces and Army
Air Forces, had not been clearly delineated. Strategic or tactical alter-
ations time and again upset logistical plans. Details of port operation
and organization still had to be fixed, and co-ordination among the
ports, the technical services, and the Services of Supply headquarters
was to be developed through the North African experience. General
Eisenhower later wrote that the operation was ". . . in conflict with
all operational and logistical methods laid down in textbooks. . . ."1
General Eisenhower called in Colonel Shadle one day in the middle
of August 1942 and told him that he was appointed Chemical Warfare
Officer, AFHQ.2 This appointment to a supreme allied headquarters
placed Shadle in a position that no CWS officer had ever been in
before; the headquarters of Marshall Ferdinand Foch, the only perti-
nent World War I example, had no special staff. General Eisenhower
created AFHQ from a number of military concepts both current and
new to comply with his basic directive. AFHQ was, first, an instrument
for co-ordinating Allied strategic plans and operations and a combined
command for ground, sea, and air forces. It was next a theater head-
quarters or at least it was designed to contain the nucleus of a theater
headquarters in that it had a full general and special staff oriented to
the direction of American Army activities in a theater of operations.
It was, third, a tactical and operational headquarters approximating
that of a field army with initial supervision of three corps. It was,
fourth and least, the parent organization for a communications zone
headquarters whose operating elements, the base section headquarters,
were being formed as adjuncts of the corps headquarters.3
Shadle and an officer assistant immediately set about making general
chemical plans for the scheduled invasion, known as Operation TORCH.
On 15 September 1942, Shadle's section was officially organized as the
Chemical Warfare Section, AFHQ. Lt. Col. Ian A. Marriott, British
Army, was appointed deputy and one of the two American officers
assigned became executive officer. One British major, three American
enlisted men, and two British enlisted men completed the staff. While
1
(1) George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, UNITED STATES
ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1957), ch. II. (2) Leighton and Coakley, ch. XVI. The
quotation from General Eisenhower is cited on page 455. (3) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 87-90.
2
Interv, Hist Off with Gen Shadle, 16 May 61.
3
History of AFHQ, pt. I, Aug-Dec 42, pp. 1-26. (2) Pogue, Supreme Command, pp. 56-58. (3)
Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 32-59.
the section was intended to serve both AFHQ and the planned Amer-
ican theater Headquarters, North African Theater of Operations,
United States Army (NATOUSA), the manpower allotment, as
authorized by the AFHQ chief of staff, was sufficient only to form
two divisions, one Administration, the other Technical and Intelligence.
Despite the lack of a supply or logistics division, the AFHQ Chemical
Section, in its NATOUSA role, was assigned staff responsibility for
chemical materiel through the entire overseas span from requirements
to salvage.4
Since at this time national policy and the toxic supply capability of
the Army forbade the employment, even in retaliation, of war gases,
Shadle and his staff made no gas warfare offensive plan.5 They were
also unable to make any nongas warfare offensive plans involving the
use of chemical mortar units or the new portable flame throwers as
neither units nor weapons were yet ready. Brig. Gen. Lyman L.
Lemnitzer, AFHQ assistant chief of staff, G-3, suggested to Shadle that
artificial smoke protection would be valuable in view of German air
superiority over the Mediterranean and North Africa. Shadle accord-
ingly requested smoke pots both from the United States and from the
British and drew up tactical smoke plans. The CWS in the United
States could furnish only the prewar training allowance of one pot
per twenty soldiers, a ratio which Shadle viewed as entirely inadequate.
A part of the smoke deficit was made up by the supply of British pots
and another part by the inclusion of some new mechanical smoke
generators and a. smoke generator unit in the forces to arrive from
the United States. Still, Shadle considered preparedness for smoke
operations to be below the desirable standard.6
In the absence of gas warfare supplies, and with inadequate nongas
warfare supply, the principal responsibility of the AFHQ and
NATOUSA Chemical Sections was to provide for gas warfare pro-
tection, and the prime corollary task was the computation of protec-
tive materiel and service requirements for all forces expected to be
in North Africa. Time was too short and the AFHQ staff section too
small to accomplish this prime task without aid. Consequently, all
4
(1) History of AFHQ, pt. I, pp. 35-37, 59-61. (2) Personal Ltr, Shadle, Chief Cml Sec AFHQ, to
Porter, CCWS, 11 Feb 43. CWS 201—Shadle, Charles S. (O) in CWS 314.7 Pers Files, NATO,
Feb 43-Feb 44.
5
For national policy and toxic supply potential in 1942, see Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War,
Chapters III and IV, and above, Chapter I.
6
Shadle Interv, 16 May 61.
the existing and forming chemical sections in the European theater,

the Office of the Chief, CWS, in the United States, and the Chemical
Section of General Patton's newly organized Western Task Force
(WTF) headquarters in the United States pitched into the job, not
only of estimating requirements, but also of actually supplying staff
sections, materials, and troops. The OCCWS participated in these
activities through liaison provided by ASF and OPD with the overseas
staffs and with the WTF headquarters which was at first divided
between Washington's Munitions Building and Indiantown Gap Mili-
tary Reservation and was later consolidated at Fort George G. Meade,
Md.7 All echelons began planning before the character of the TORCH
operation had definitely been determined.
In the United Kingdom, Maj. Gen. Mark W. Clark's II Corps Head-
quarters, in which Col. Walter P. Burn was chemical officer, assumed
most of the planning burden for what was to become Center Task
Force (CTF), an American force scheduled to make an assault on and
in the vicinity of Oran, Algeria. The Office of the Chief Chemical
Warfare Officer, European theater, transferred one officer and four
enlisted men into II Corps headquarters in September 1942. During
September, October, and November, the remainder of the planning
period, a number of CWS ETO officers and men were transferred into
or detailed for service with the forming Mediterranean Base Section
(MBS) and Twelfth Air Force headquarters in which supply matters
were being co-ordinated with II Corps.8 Maj. Herbert F. Croen, Jr.,
scheduled to be acting chief of the MBS Chemical Section, remained
for some time with the CWS ETO to assist in the task of apportioning
available chemical resources in England for TORCH. Although SOS
ETO had been advised that all TORCH troops arriving from the United
States to assemble in the United Kingdom would be fully equipped,
the CWS ETO discovered that units and organizations inspected on
7
(1) Memos, ACofS G-2 WDGS for CG's AGF, AAF, SOS, and A Task Force, 11, 20 Aug 42, sub:
Security Control, A Special Opn. (2) Memo, Col Norman E. Fiske, WD Security Officer for All WD
Security Officers, 18 Aug 42, sub: Rules Governing Security in the War Dept for A Special Opn.
(3) Ltr, TAG to ACofS Opns SOS et al., 26 Aug 42, sub: Security Control, A Special Opn. SPX
312.11 (8-25-42) MS-SPEX-M All in CWS 314.7, A Special Opn, TORCH.
8
(1) History of CWS Per Activities, in History, Sup Div CWS ETO (ca. Jan 1944). ETO Admin
545A. (2) Narrative History of Mediterranean Base Section, NATOUSA-MTOUSA, Sep 42 to May 44
(hereafter cited as History of MBS), no paging. OCMH. (3) Ltr, Maling, CmlO XII AFSC, to
Porter, CCWS, 3 Apr 43, sub: Orgnl History of Cml Warfare Sec, Twelfth AF. CWS 314.7
Twelfth AF.
disembarkation reported critical shortages of chemical equipment,

9
especially protective equipment.
The European theater BOLERO build-up was brought to a sudden
halt.10 The CWS ETO diverted chemical equipment and supplies from
BOLERO reserves and from ordinary issues to fill shortages for TORCH
organizations and units. These organizations and units made requisition
directly upon the CWS ETO for chemical supply, and the CWS in
turn extracted requisitions to depots. Shortage of time, shortage of
materials, and the fact that establishment of the depots had just begun
did not permit the operation of the normal supply pattern under which
a designated depot would receive requisitions from and make issues to
all units in its geographical area. Since the impromptu supply arrange-
ments were unlikely to cover all cases of critical shortage, the CWS
ETO also undertook a program of inspecting the chemical readiness
of units about to be shipped to North Africa in order to remedy needs
which had been overlooked.11
In the United States, OCCWS and the Chemical Section, WTF,
computed requirements and determined shortages, as did the CWS ETO,
by checking tables of basic allowances (TBA's) and tables of organiza-
tion and equipment (TOE's) against unit and organization requisitions
and against inventories of materials in the hands of troops. While the
supply of troops scheduled for the assault was being completed,
OCCWS and the various chemical sections of organizations scheduled
for TORCH also computed the reserves necessary to maintain supply
when forces were operating in the combat zone. The level of supply
reserves in terms of days of supply was set by agreement among War
Department agencies, AFHQ, and ETO headquarters, and OCCWS
arrived at estimated expenditure rates in order to translate day of
12
supply into actual quantities of materials. Since no conclusive ex-
penditure data were available, these estimates were at best educated
guesses, but problems arising from lack of experience did not become
apparent in the planning and early operational period. The CWS was
able to supply gas warfare protective items, which made up the largest
9
Interv, Hist Off with Col Herbert F. Croen, Jr., USAR, 21 Sep 59.
10
BOLERO was the code name for the build-up of supplies in the British Isles for a projected Allied
attack on continental Europe. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, pp. 87-99.
11
History of CWS Sup System, CWS ETO (27 Jul 42-1 Jan 44) (hereafter cited as History, Sup
System). ETO Admin 545A Cml Warfare.
12
A "day of supply" was the amount of any item, group of items, or entire category of supply
calculated to support a given number of men (force or theater strength) in one day's operation.
portion of the requirements list,

in sufficient quantities to meet
13
demands. Problems arose in pro-
viding commanders' special re-
quirements, in providing service
troops, and in limiting both
troops and supplies to available
shipping space.
In connection with com-
manders' special requirements,
Col. Maurice E. Barker, WTF
chemical officer, declared that
General Patton would have "in-
cluded a regiment of wizards" if
such an inclusion would have
given promise of help on the far
14
shore. Regiments of wizards COLONEL BARKER
were in short supply, but each
service conducted a search for any special equipment or special allow-
ances of ordinary supplies which might be valuable in the operation.
One OCCWS contribution was the recently developed mechanical
smoke generator which was not available in time for shipment to
15
the forces assembling in England but was included in WTF. WTF
also requested and received special allowances of incendiary hand
grenades so that six grenades could be placed in every vehicle of
the force and be used for destroying the vehicle in event of cap-
16
ture. Army Service Forces made a special allotment of chemical
land mines for Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon's Subtask Force BLACK-
13
(1) Requisitions and statements of shortages checked by OCCWS appear in CWS 320.2 files.
(2) Memo, Brig Gen LeRoy Lutes, ACofS Opns SOS, for Chief of Sup Servs; Dir of Distr Div SOS;
and Dir of Mil Pers Div SOS, 14 Sep 42, sub: Distr of Equip. SPOPP 475 in file CWS 314.7
A Special Opn, TORCH. (3) Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Lyman C. Duncan, 3 Jun 55. (Colonel
Duncan was a member and chief of the OCCWS requirements staff during most of the war period.)
(4) Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 65-67. (5) Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Matthew A. Capone,
USAR, 24 Apr 58. (Colonel Capone worked at requirements computation in CWS ETO in the
fall of 1942.)
14
Personal Ltr, Col Maurice E. Barker, USA (Ret.), to Hist Off, 12 Jul 49.
15
(1) For development of the mechanical smoke generator, see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From
Laboratory to field, Chapter IX. (2) For smoke generator operations in North Africa, see below,
Chapter VIII.
16
(1) Ltr, AG Task Force A [WTF] to ACofS OPD WDGS, 10 Oct 42, sub: Request for Grenades,
Incendiary, M14. (2) DF, ACofS OPD to CG SOS, 11 Oct 42, sub: Request for Grenades, Incendiary,
M14. OPD 400 TF (10-10-42). Both in Class V Sup File, Theaters Br Plans Div SOS.
STONE, an element of WTF, and in answer to Shadle's request, ordered

16,000 smoke pots and 11,300 incendiary grenades shipped to England
17
for early delivery to CTF. While the number of smoke pots was inade-
quate from Shadle's point of view, the shipment at least denoted the
firm intention of providing smoke cover for the debarkation ports.
This port concealment operation was one the CWS had not previously
attempted.
Port defenses required the provision of chemical troops not only
for smoke generator operation and for manning pot lines but also for
supply, service, and maintenance of smoke units and their equipment.
Very early in North African planning, before the operation had even
acquired a code name, and before even chemical officers realized how
large the smoke mission might be, the OCCWS decided that no
chemical troops would be required in the initial phase of the operation
and recommended that two chemical composite companies and three
decontamination companies be landed only after beachheads were
firmly established. The OCCWS also suggested that four impregnating
companies should be considered as later additions to the force then
contemplated while requirements for depot units and smoke generator
units should be determined by the field commander on the basis of the
tactical and logistical situation.18
These OCCWS troop recommendations and suggestions established
the minimum chemical service requirement according to doctrine then
current, and reflected the idea that gas warfare protection would be
needed until forces started moving inland. Even this minimum service
could not be provided until long after the beachheads were established.
Lack of shipping space and lack of troops who could complete training
and be prepared for overseas shipment in a short time caused a drastic
alteration of plans. Commanders of the troops mounting in England,
assuming that reserve stocks of chemical supplies would not arrive in
the combat zone before service troops could be made available to
handle them, and agreeing with the view that gas warfare would not
start early, accepted a schedule under which chemical service troops
were not provided in the initial phases of the operation. The possibility
17
(1) Memo, CG SOS for CCWS, 23 Oct 42, sub: Mines, Land, for Mvmt 9999-Q-CWS-V. SPDDO
476 Mines. (2) Memo, CG SOS for Dir Distr Div SOS and CofT, 3 Oct 42. SPOPP. (3) Memo,
CG SOS for CCWS, 2 Nov 42, sub: Ammunition for 9999-R.. SPDDO 471.6 Grenades. All in Class
V Sup File, Theaters Br Plans Div SOS.
18
Ltr, Chief Field Serv OCCWS to Lt Col George H. Decker, Opns Div SOS, 28 Jul 42, sub: Cml
Troops for BOLERO. CWS 320.2/314 (7-28-42). CWS 314.7, A Special Opn, TORCH.
of enemy initiation of gas warfare before arrival of chemical service

troops was accepted as a calculated risk. Even had commanders re-
quested such troops, few were available; the 6th Chemical Depot
Company was the only chemical service unit available in England. The
planners scheduled this company to arrive in the CTF area about one
month after the initial landings. CTF planners also requested that a
smoke generator company be scheduled to arrive as soon as possible
from the United States. General Patton and his chief of staff, Col.
Hobart R. Gay, wanted both service and smoke generator troops in
the initial phase. WTF plans provided, because of superior resources
in the United States and because General Patton deemed it a logistic
necessity, for building up both reserve and operating stockages, in-
cluding chemical, to a 90-day level as soon as troops and supplies could
be landed. Colonel Barker decided to take along in the earliest echelon
one platoon of a decontamination company, since such a unit could
provide decontamination services in event of gas warfare, could initially
handle chemical supply, and could use its decontaminating equipment
to clean and disinfect buildings to be occupied by WTF headquarters
and troops. He also obtained a smoke generator company to embark
on the initial resupply convoy in order that smoke cover might be
provided in port areas as soon as supplies began to be landed in quantity.
Colonel Barker devised a plan under which the smoke generator com-
pany could provide convoy smoke cover using deck-mounted gen-
19
erators from its own organizational equipment.
Planning completed, or at least terminated, the assault and assault
support convoys, late in October and early in November, sailed from
Hampton Roads, Va., and England's Mersey ports. The first convoy
from England entered the Strait of Gibraltar on 5 November 1942.
19
(1) For data on units, see Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, Appendix F. Units involved
were the 6th Chemical Depot Company and the 69th Chemical Smoke Generator Company for CTF,
and one platoon of the 21st Chemical Decontamination Company and the 78th Chemical Smoke
Generator Company for WTF. No chemical units were originally scheduled for Eastern Task Force,
a predominantly British force scheduled to land near Algiers. (2) Memo, ACofS OPD for CG SOS,
6 Oct 42, sub: Preparation of the 78th Cml Co, Smoke Generator, for Overseas Mvmt. OPD 370.5/CT
(10-6-42). (3) Memo, ACofS OPD for CG SOS, 6 Oct 42, sub: Assignment of the 69th Cml Smoke
Generator Co. OPD 320.2 (10-6-42). (4) Memo, with Incl, ACofS G-3 Hq II Corps CTF for CG
II Corps, 9 Oct 42, sub: Over-all Troop Rqmts, (5) Ltr, CG Task Force A to ACofS OPD, 7 Oct 41,
sub: Request for Cml Co, Smoke Generator. (6) DF, ACofS OPD to CG SOS, 11 Oct 42, sub:
Request for Cml Smoke Generator. OPD 320.2 TF (10-7-42). Last three in 7B Troop Unit File,
Theaters Br Plans Div SOS. (7) Personal Ltr, Barker to Hist Off, 12 Jul 49. (8) Ltr, Burn, CmlO
Hq II Corps CTF, to CCWS, 5 Dec 42, sub: CWS Opn in the Field. MTO CWS 370, Employment,
Opn and Mvmt of Troops. (9) Barker, Comments on draft of this volume, Feb 61.
The WTF convoy moved into assault position off the Moroccan coast
a day later. On 8 November the three task forces struck and war in
the Atlantic area began for the United States ground forces.20 The
token chemical sections and units still at sea on the support convoys
probably had but little comprehension of the magnitude of the logistics
operation in which they were about to participate.
Chemical Supply—The Beachhead Phase
Chemical supply experience in the North African and Mediterranean
Theaters of Operations passed through several phases, each illustrative
of a development in both the theater supply system and the chemical
supply system. The terms theater supply system and chemical supply
system are employed advisedly, because the theater system and each
technical service system tended to develop independently although
both were dependent to a considerable degree upon the War Depart-
ment system. But that War Department system was only eight months
old at the time of the landings in North Africa, and, as it was never
able completely to overcome the traditional autonomy of the technical
services in the United States, so was it even less able to exert its influence
on the theater technical services through the intermediary of the
theater organization.
The theaters themselves had developed no consistent policy of supply
organization. It was, for example, more than two years after the
initial landings before the North African theater corrected a "serious
flaw in the structure of organization," the assignment of base sections
to NATOUSA rather than SOS NATOUSA headquarters.21 War
Department and theater attempts at supply system evaluation and
co-ordination were consequently sporadic. With an almost overwhelm-
ing amount of logistical work to be done in an unfamiliar and difficult
set of circumstances and in the apparent absence of specific and con-
sistent guidance from the major commands, each supply officer in the
theater, whether of high or low echelon, pitched in to do the job as
he saw it, creating his own policy in the process. Such ad hoc procedures
inevitably resulted in the establishment of several systems, and, as the
Mediterranean theater assistant chief of staff, G-4, later pointed out
20
Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 84-96. The third force was Eastern Task Force, a British con-
trolled element.
21
Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, p. 30.
with some asperity, each theater chief of technical service developed his
own supply system.22
The period of the landings and the two months thereafter represent
the initial phase in the establishment of the theater CWS supply system.
During this phase the confusion and frustration of the lower echelon
chemical supply officers led to measures for co-ordination at theater
technical service level.
Western Task Force
Maj. Bruce T. Humphreville, Colonel Barker's assistant, who had
won a coin toss with his chief for the honor, and four of the chemical
section's enlisted men went in with the first wave of the WTF landing
at Fedala and in the process lost all their personal equipment except
the clothing they were wearing and their weapons. Colonel Barker,
Capt. James J. Heffner, and the remainder of the WTF CWS contin-
gent arrived in the D+5 (11-13 November 1942) support convoy
outside the wreckage-strewn harbor of Casablanca, French Morocco,
but the lack of facilities ashore kept them from landing. A few hours
before debarkation at Casablanca on 19 November 1942, Colonel
Barker informed the men of the decontamination platoon through
their commanding officer, 1st Lt. Robert D. Myers, that they were to
operate the task force chemical depot while the 78th Chemical Smoke
Generator Company, which was to arrive with the D+20 convoy,
worked with the Navy and the antiaircraft regiment on port air
defense. Depot operation proved to be more of a job than the sixty
days of chemical supply carried on the D+5 convoy and the thirty
days from the assault convoy would seem to indicate. The principal
difficulty was the lack of operating equipment and vehicles. The first
platoon unit equipment was never unloaded from the transport, at
least not at Casablanca, since the support convoy turned back after
discharging only half its load. Unit transportation was scheduled to
arrive on a later convoy. Most of the equipment and transportation
of the task force chemical section had been lost when three transport
ships were torpedoed and burned off the Moroccan port of Fedala.
Chemical supplies were widely scattered throughout the Casablanca-
Fedala area, even as far away as Safi (120 miles from Casablanca),
22
Ibid., p. 76.
in an all-services, all-classes 23 jumble which became only the more

confused with each incoming shipload.24
Barker and Humphreville had fortunately been furnished money
belts well stuffed with worn French francs, mostly in large notes. They
bought a Ford truck and a Renault sedan, rented a tile factory for a
depot, and hired some local labor. In Barker's opinion the money was
the most valuable commodity they took ashore. The first platoon
moved into a part of the tile factory, borrowed some quartermaster
trucks, and proceeded to collect, transport, sort, stack, and inventory
chemical supplies, most of which were located by a bicycle-mounted
squad that regularly patrolled the docks. Barker's own WTF Chemical
Section, except for two men, worked with them. The bulk of the
supply, Class II protective items, was stored in the factory warehouses.
Class V items, mostly incendiary and smoke grenades and fog oil, were
stored in an open courtyard adjacent to the factory. On 21 December
Colonel Barker reported the local supply position stabilized with about
3,000 tons of all supplies in storage. The chemical supply plan was
entirely of chemical section creation. WTF headquarters, while it had
not interposed objections, had offered no help and no direction to the
chemical procedures. Each of the other technical services represented
had likewise set up its own procedures and was operating according
to its own policy.25
Center Task Force
Chemical officers with CTF—Colonel Burn, task force (II Corps)
chemical officer, Major Croen, acting chemical officer of Mediterranean
Base Section, and Colonel Elliott, chemical officer of Twelfth Air Force
and XII Air Force Service Command—landed near Oran from the
assault and assault support convoys (11-21 November 1942) to find
23
Classes refers to classes of supply, designated as follows: Class I, food; Class II, unit and organiza-
tion allowances of clothing, weapons, vehicles, and tools; Class III, fuels and lubricants; Class IV, unit
and organization special equipment not subject to prescribed allowances but allotted according to opera-
tional needs; Class V, ammunition, pyrotechnics, mines, and chemical warfare agents.
24
(1) Personal Ltr, Barker, CmlO WTF, to Porter, 20 Nov 42, no sub. CWS SPCW 314.1/188 in
file CWS 314.7 Barker Corresp, NATO, 1942-43. (2) 21st Cml Decontamination Co History, Sep 42
to Sep 44. (3) Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 1940-45, pp. 449-51. (4) Ltr, Barker to
Hist Off, 11 Aug 59.
25
(1) 21st Cml Decontamination Co History, Sep 42 to Sep 44. (2) Personal Ltr, Barker to
Porter, 21 Dec 42. CWS SPCW 319.1/188 in file CWS 314.7, Barker Corresp, NATO. (3) Barker
to Hist Off, 11 Aug 59.
26
a supply situation as bad as the one first experienced at Casablanca.
Although the lack of service units and materials had enabled the plan-
ners to schedule only twenty-seven tons of Classes II and IV and only
nineteen tons of ammunition for these convoys, the landing organiza-
tions had strewn poorly marked supplies of all shapes and sizes through-
out the beachhead area. The chemical officers found that to distinguish
between maintenance supplies and the 60-day reserve, which organiza-
tions and units were scheduled to retain as their property, was virtually
impossible. Even when the organization property was identified, the
combat commanders understandably asked to be relieved of the burden
27
of caring for it.
Colonel Burn, his 3 officers and 7 men, established a chemical depot
in a slaughterhouse on the outskirts of Oran, Algeria, in which they
handled more than 70 tons of Classes II and IV in less than a month
with the help of local labor and a detail of engineer troops. Burn
vigorously stated his need for chemical service troops and suggested
that service troops be assigned to the leading elements of any future
operation.28 Croen and his section, which eventually numbered 8
officers and 17 men, established themselves in Oran where Mediter-
ranean Base Section became operative under the supervision of II Corps
on 11 November 1942, the day on which the first echelon landed. The
MBS Chemical Section concentrated on setting up chemical storage
and supply operations. The base section group took over the slaughter-
house depot and began gathering such chemical supplies as Burn and
his men had been unable to locate or unable to move. Knowing that
British smoke pots were subject to spontaneous combustion when wet,
Croen made an extra effort to collect them with the idea of establishing
several small ammunition dumps at some distance from the city. The
sites had been prepared and most of the pots collected in the slaughter-
house courtyard awaiting the availability of transportation, when one
of the pots ignited. The courtyard, which had been the only storage
point, became an inferno minutes after the first pot flared. Most of
the other supplies were saved, and the slaughterhouse was sufficiently
isolated so that no other damage was done, but the new AFHQ head-
26
Colonel Maling, who was at the time assigned to staff duty with the advance echelon of AFHQ,
reached the landing area from a ship which was torpedoed and sunk just offshore.
27
(1) Burn Ltr, 5 Dec 42. (2) Capone Interv, 24 Apr 58. (Major Capone was a member of the
Twelfth Air Force Chemical Section.) (3) History of MBS. (4) Maling Ltr, 3 Apr 43.
28
Burn Ltr, 5 Dec 42.
quarters in Algiers had to await resupply before effective smoke con-

cealment could be provided. The lesson of this unfortunate accident
was that specialist service troops and transportation are needed early
in any operation. After the arrival of the 6th Chemical Depot Com-
pany with the base section third echelon on 6 December to take over
the job of establishing chemical depots and depot sections, the service
problem was considerably eased.29
Since there was no transportation available, members of Elliott's
section hiked several miles to their designated area near La Sénia,
Algeria, on the day of their landing. They bivouacked in a sea of mud
and returned the next day to the port area to begin collecting supplies.
Whenever any form of transportation could be begged or borrowed
or whenever space could be obtained on any truck going in the right
direction, they shipped supplies to La Sénia. Since they had no ma-
terials-handling equipment, no shelter and no depot setup, the only
virtue in sending the material to La Sénia was that it could be sorted,
identified, and piled in some sort of order. They hired local workers
whenever possible, sometimes paying them from personal funds or by
bartering personal possessions. Arrangements had been made in plan-
ning for the Twelfth Air Force to draw chemical supply from II Corps
stocks while that organization controlled supply and subsequently from
the base section. II Corps was unable to meet the air force's demands,
and when the responsibility passed to the base section, that headquarters
was forced to restrict the air force share to 25 percent of available
supplies. MBS early became the focal point of supply for the Tunisia
Campaign, and, in view of the fact that its original maintenance level
was half that of WTF, a quota issue policy was the only answer to an
increasingly perilous stock situation. Air force's chemical officers
approved the quota imposition because they understood that their
requisitions would otherwise have exhausted base section supplies.
Under these conditions, the Chemical Section, XII AFSC, was six
30
months in building up to a 30-day balanced supply.
Shadle, his 2 British colleagues, 1 other American officer, and 2
American enlisted men arrived in the theater in early December. As
29
(1) History of MBS. The base section became independent of II Corps on 6 December. (2)
Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pp. 20-22. (3) 6th Chemical Depot Co History (12
Jul 42 to 8 Aug 43), 1944. (4) Croen Interv, 21 Sep 59.
30
(1) Capone Interv, 24 Apr 58. (2) Maling to Porter, 3 Apr 43. (3) Elliott Comments
16 Jan 61.
Shadle indicated to the Chief, CWS, 2 officers could not thoroughly

perform the multifarious duties demanded of the American
(NATOUSA) complement of the Allied Force Headquarters, but
they devoted as much time as possible to "one of the biggest jobs"
they had, the supply of troops. Shadle examined operations in MBS
and noted that, despite great obstacles, Croen was doing "a 'bang-up*
job." Then, accompanied by Elliott, he visited WTF, which had not
yet received the designated base section complement from the United
States, and discussed chemical matters with Barker. Shadle found the
whole theater force prepared to provide individual protection against
gas warfare, and he found the CWS capable of meeting its supply
responsibilities of the moment, but offensive preparedness was only
in the early planning stage while almost the entire theater chemical
31
supply organization and process remained to be developed.
Chemical Supply—Theater Organization Phase

Colonel Shadle's first task in the second phase of North African
logistics development, after the task force service groups were absorbed
in and supplanted by Atlantic Base Section (WTF) and Mediterranean
Base Section (CTF) under AFHQ on 30 December 1942, was to decide
upon an issue policy and to make corresponding storage and handling
arrangements.32 In theory, the base section chemical sections would
simply have ordered their depots to fill table of equipment or table of
allowance shortages for any organization or unit according to unit or
organization requisition, but continental theory failed to cover the
rough facts of life on the far shore. Many tables of allowances and
tables of organization and equipment were incomplete, and the chem-
ical sections were unacquainted with many others which had recently
been revised or introduced. Even had information concerning new
tables been provided in the theater, it would have been of no help. The
North African logistics arrangements had been made with the old
tables in mind and implemented with materiel available; therefore,
chemical section depots lacked the quantity and variety of equipment
demanded. Furthermore, many units arrived without basic equipment
or with unusual demands for equipment to suit special operational
31
(1) Personal Ltr, Shadle, Chief Cml Sec AFHQ, to Porter, CCWS, 11 Feb 43. CWS 201—Shadle,
Charles S. (O) in file CWS 314.7 Pers Files, NATO, Feb-Dec 43. (2) Barker to Porter, 21 Dec 42.
32
Base sections were organized by AFHQ General Orders, 38, 30 December 1942, cited in History
of AFHQ, Part II, Section 1, pages 169-75.
needs. Shortages developed, but the chemical supply officers' immediate

concern was the determination of the extent of these shortages and the
forecasting of future demands on the issue system. Colonel Shadle;
Col. Siegfried P. Coblentz, Chemical Officer, Atlantic Base Section,
who had arrived with part of his section in Casablanca on Christmas
Eve, 1942; Colonel Johnson, who arrived in February 1943 to become
Chemical Officer, MBS; and Colonel Barker, who became Chemical
Officer, Fifth United States Army, when it was activated at Oujda,
Morocco, on 5 January 1943—all found that the principal obstacle to
the determination of an issue policy was lack of information on current
and forecast demand and on supply allowances.33
As an interim measure pending the establishment of an issue policy,
Shadle adopted a compilation of chemical logistics data prepared by
Colonel Barker on the basis of his experience.34 This compilation was
intended to serve as a guide in estimating issue, storage, and handling
requirements, but the chemical officers were aware of the fact that
it was far from definitive. They exhorted their colleagues in the
United States to supply them with such information as the number
of troops scheduled for the theater, the current descriptions of items
and packaging in shipments, and the new development of material and
techniques. Barker particularly requested a compact compilation of
logistics data for field use which would be so handy and so valuable
that it could compete for space in personal baggage with such essential
items as candy bars and toilet paper. General Waitt, Assistant Chief,
CWS, for Field Operations, promised that a pocket-size supply and
issue catalog would be forthcoming, but no War Department approval
for such a publication was ever secured.35
OCCWS found it difficult to provide information to the theater
chemical officers. Both Porter and Waitt tried to include all informa-
tion possible in personal letters. The personal letter method was un-
33
(1) Shadle to Porter, 11 Feb 43. (2) Personal Ltr, Coblentz, CmlO ABS, to Waitt, Chief Opns
Div OCCWS, 25 Feb 43. CWS SPVCO (4-3-43) in file CWS 314.7 Pers Files, NATO, Feb-Dec 43.
(3) Ltr, Johnson, CmlO MBS, to CCWS, 12 Apr 43, sub: Résumé of CWS Problems. CWS 314.7
Corresp, NATO, Apr-Jun 43. (4) Ltr, Barker, CmlO Fifth Army, to CCWS, attn: Waitt, 9 Jan 43,
no sub. CWS 314.7 Barker Corresp, NATO, 1942-43.
34
(1) Coblentz to Waitt, 25 Feb 43. (2) Hq Fifth Army Cml Warfare Memo 1, 4 Feb 43, sub:
Data on Cml Warfare Sups [Col Barker's logistics data compilation]. CWS MTO 050 Logistical Data.
35
(1) Ltr, Waitt, Chief Opns Div OCCWS to CmlO Fifth Army, 5 Mar 43, sub: Development of
CWS Items. CWS SPCVO (3-5-43) in file CWS 314.7 Barker Corresp, NATO, 1942-43. (2) Ltr.
Waitt, ACCWS Fld Opns, to CCmlO [sic] MBS, thru CCmlO AFHQ, 30 Jun 43, sub: Résumé of CWS
Problems. CWS SPCVO (30 Jun 43) in file CWS 314.7 Corresp, NATO, Apr-Jun 43.
orthodox, but it was effective for some kinds of information particu-

larly since the small number of regular CWS officers were so well
acquainted with one another that there was little chance that personal
letters would be misunderstood. When Porter and Loucks came to
North Africa in April 1943 after their sojourn in the European theater,
Porter appraised the information problem as being the most serious
matter facing the chemical officers overseas. He accordingly directed
the establishment of a liaison officer position for each theater in his
own office.36 These liaison officers were assembled in a theaters division
operating under Waitt. Waitt inaugurated a special series of "Theater
of Operations Letters" in May to let all principal overseas chemical
officers know what was going on in the United States and in other
theaters. Waitt almost immediately ran into a stumbling block. ASF
wished to clear all information sent to the theaters and even wanted
to control the content of technical channels communications. The
CWS and the other technical services were forbidden to reproduce or
even make extracts from official publications. Waitt deemed it neces-
sary to continue technical channels communications which, as he later
expressed it, "short-circuited ASF." 37 The use of theater of operations
letters continued, but they were carefully oriented to technical, mostly
research and development and intelligence, matters. Waitt's listing
of official publications must have been frustrating to North African
chemical officers since assembling a set of such publications was not
possible at the time.38 Indeed, Waitt and his liaison officers in the
United States were frustrated at being unable to furnish all the in-
formation required in any form the chemical officers overseas might
want it. Waitt felt that most of the information desired was eventually
39
supplied, even if by means almost clandestine. But the problem of the
moment early in 1943 was information on which to base an issue policy
and that need was not met at the time. During the second phase of
NATOUSA CWS development, for approximately the first six months
of 1943, each of the base section chemical officers decided what allow-
36
Ltr, Loucks to All Concerned [OCCWS], 23 Apr 43. CWS SPCWS 319.1 (CW Activities in
Great Britain).
37
Ltr, Waitt to Hist Off, 14 Sep 59.
38
(1) Barker to Porter, 9 Jan 43. (2) Johnson to Porter, 12 Apr 43. (3) Croen Interv, 21 Sep 59.
39
(1) Waitt Comments, 5 Jan 61. (2) Waitt Interv, 13 May 61.
ances of materiel to make as each instance of demand on the chemical

supply system arose.40
Theater Chemical Section Organization
The fact that base section chemical officers had to make their own
interim policy decisions demonstrates that Shadle had a communica-
tions problem of his own. During the first two months ashore, no com-
munications system was operating well enough across the 1,500-mile
range of the North African campaign to permit a comprehensive
assessment of the situation. Personal visits provided the only feasible
solution to this problem. Shadle visited the field elements, as he had
done soon after arriving in North Africa, whenever he could, and
field officers, in turn, visited him and each other. As a means of control
these visits were too infrequent and too brief to be effective, but they
at least kept chemical officers informed on the activities of their col-
leagues. In February 1943 the War Department drew new boundaries
and created the North African Theater of Operations. While Ameri-
cans in AFHQ had long assumed that this theater was to be activated,
there was officially no theater organization in North Africa. The
theater organization in charge was the ETO in recognition of General
Eisenhower's dual role as AFHQ and European theater commander.
Upon the official creation of a new theater, Eisenhower designated the
American element of AFHQ as the NATOUSA headquarters without
physically separating the Allied and American elements. Shadle then
added to his own office two American-staffed divisions, one for opera-
41
tions and training, the other for supply and requirements.
Neither of these new divisions had any operating function compar-
able to that of Supply Division in the European theater. Again, dis-
tance prevented direct control. Barker was handling training in the
Fifth Army headquarters, and supply operations were still handled by
the base section and combat organization chemical officers. A supply
co-ordinating and operating agency was in the process of activation.
The Services of Supply, NATOUSA, had been organized, and Maj.
Arthur C. Rogers, assisted by one enlisted man, opened the chemical
section on 25 February 1943.42 Col. Lewis F. Acker served as Chemical
40
(1) Col Siegfried P. Coblentz, USAR (Ret.), Comments on draft of this volume, 9 Jan 61. (2)
Croen Interv, 21 Sep 59.
41
History of AFHQ, pt. II, sec. 4, pp. 510-11.
42
History, COMZ NATOUSA-MTOUSA, Nov 42-44, pt. I.
Officer, SOS NATOUSA, during the month of March, but he could

accomplish little beyond arranging section organization since supply
supervision channels were not yet in operation. In any case, early SOS
lines of authority were not clear, manpower was not allotted in suffi-
cient numbers for the task at hand, and existing regulations failed to
cover the functions or the procedures of the organization. During
April, with a section enlarged to three officers and twelve enlisted
men, Maj. Alfred J. P. Wilson, acting chemical officer, began to
assume the responsibilities of requirements computation and super-
vision of supply status reporting. Shadle pointed out to Wilson and
to Col. Alfred L. Rockwood, who became SOS NATOUSA chemical
officer in May, that chemical supply policy was the province of the
theater chief of service. Shadle exercised his policy control through
his Supply and Requirements Division which was assigned the addi-
tional duty of compiling and reporting statistical data on supply levels
and on handling of chemical warfare supplies in the theater. In prac-
tice, the function of Shadle's office became more one of review than
of control since nearly every operational act involved policy decisions,
and the SOS headquarters at Oran was too far removed from AFHQ
and NATOUSA organizations in Algiers to permit concomitant
43
review. The control-review situation was, however, not the only
complication. The base sections continued to report to NATOUSA
rather than to SOS, and base section chemical officers sometimes looked
to Shadle's office for co-ordination of activities. Further, as in the
European theater, many chemical problems continued to be handled
through informal, personal contact outside the established channels
of authority. Maj. Gen. Thomas B. Larkin, SOS NATOUSA com-
mander, once asked Shadle to handle a chemical staffing problem in
SOS. When Shadle pointed out that the SOS, a separate command,
was outside his area, Larkin disagreed and reasserted that Shadle as
theater chief chemical officer should deal with the matter.44 Shadle
did provide a solution to this problem and in so doing set his own
precedent for an authority crossing a command line. Subsequently,
43
(1) History of COMZ NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pt. IV, Introduction, and History of Cml Warfare
Sec SOS NATOUSA. (2) History of AFHQ, pt. II, sec. 4, pp. 510-13. (3) Personal Ltr, Shadle
to Waitt, 26 May 43. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, NATO, Feb 43-Feb 44. (4) Interv, Hist Off with Col
Alfred J. P. Wilson, USAR,16 Oct 58.
44
Shadle Interv,16 May61.
Shadle, or members of his immediate staff, did informally handle a

number of other problems outside the theater headquarters.
While problems of control did arise and while the CWS of AFHQ
and NATOUSA was tending to be a separate service as in the European
theater, Shadle did not view his control problem as being as serious as
Rowan's. Shadle was in a better prestige position than Rowan since
his position on the AFHQ and NATOUSA staffs was not complicated
by an SOS jurisdiction over the technical services. Also, while Rowan
from the end of 1942 to the end of 1943 was left largely without the
support of ranking, experienced chemical officers, Shadle had experi-
enced, aggressive, ranking chemical officers in almost every field
position.45 He could count on the field officers to perform their own
liaison with field elements and to direct field CWS activities. Shadle
did have a matter of some personal embarrassment in this connection—
both Rockwood and Barker were his seniors in rank and the seniority
rule for appointment to top positions had been almost inflexible in the
Army prior to World War II. Shadle did not view seniority as being
of great importance in his own case; only on one occasion did a senior
officer point out his junior status.46 On the whole, the autonomy of
the field chemical sections and the rank represented there worked in
the favor of the NATOUSA CWS and its chief.
Shadle concentrated on the staff relationships within his own head-
quarters and he consulted with or worked with the AFHQ and
NATOUSA assistant chiefs of staff whenever chemical warfare matters
were under consideration. He informed Waitt that his advice was
sought and accepted by these officers.47 This is not to say that there
were no stresses and strains in CWS administration in North Africa.
At the time of the organization of NATOUSA, Shadle praised the
work of his American and British subordinates, but privately com-
plained to Porter that Rowan and Montgomery had prevented his
acquisition of more experienced officers. How the European theater
officers could have blocked him he did not make clear since his own
headquarters allotment prevented an increase in his immediate staff and
45
Rowan highly valued the Reserve and AUS officers serving on his staff and in the field in the
European theater. Both he and General Porter indicate that the contribution of such officers to the
success of CWS operations in Europe can hardly be overstated, but the fact remained that prior to the
cross-Channel attack Rowan suffered from a lack of sufficient rank and experience among ETO CWS
officers, (1) Rowan Comments, 16 Dec 60. (2) Porter Interv, 24 Aug61.
46
(1) Personal Ltr, Shadle to Waitt, 26 May 43. (2) Shadle Interv, 16 May61.
47
(1) Shadle to Waitt, 26 May 43. (2) Shadle Interv,16 May61.
since most of the senior ETO CWS officers had moved into North
48
African field commands. By the time of Porter's and Louck's visit
to North Africa in April, the CWS NATOUSA had apparently ad-
justed to the staffing situation since the visiting officers did not mention
it in their letters reporting North African troubles. The pressing
problem at the moment was that the chemical supply situation as a
whole in North Africa had deteriorated to a "dangerously low
49
position."
Chemical Supply Situation: Spring 1943

The serious threat to the North African theater's chemical warfare
potential in April was the result of failure to obtain sufficient material
from the zone of interior to raise the theater stock level and to balance
it. As in the case of issue, the acquisition and balancing of theater
stocks was, in theory, a simple matter. Theater levels were determined
by the War Department on the advice of the theater commander. The
ports of embarkation then automatically furnished food, fuel, and
spare parts according to theater strength and number of vehicles in use.
The theater requisitioned shipments in supply Classes II and IV to
bring stocks up to desired levels. Ammunition was to be furnished
according to War Department allotment.50 But again, as task force
experience demonstrated, theory rode high in the clouds while fact
plodded the Tunisian sands. In the first place, the War Department
instructions were issued at the time that planning for the North
African operation was at its peak; even if the official publication was
immediately and widely circulated, it is doubtful that supply officers
would have had the time to give it much consideration. In the second
place, the War Department for some time in effect suspended its own
procedures, supplying Class II and IV supplies automatically rather
than on requisitions based on actual consumption rates in the theater.
The New York Port of Embarkation (NYPE) could not adjust
quantities or kinds of supply until there was a considerable easing
of the problems of shipping space and supply documentation.51 The
48
Shadle to Porter, 11 Feb 43.
Rpt, Cml Warfare Statistical Summary, Text Summary (hereafter cited as Statistical Summary),
49
30 Apr 43. MTO CWS 400.19 Statistical Summary.

50
WD Memo 700-8-42, 10 Oct 42.
51
(1) Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics, 1940-1943, p. 321 and ch. XVI. (2) Logistical
History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pp. 51-54.
theater staff found over-all supply documentation virtually impossible:

there was no common reporting form, and, if there had been, the
situation was too fluid and communication too poor for assembling
data, particularly from the combat units.
The base section chemical officers assumed the burden of evaluating
chemical supply status on the receiving end because no one else pos-
sessed as much chemical information. They then submitted requisitions
for shortages to the United States (NYPE), but some of these were
edited or rejected by the port of embarkation because of noncompliance
with the WD overseas supply procedures memorandum. Even in cases
when the material was shipped, the port required a 90-day processing
and shipping period. The base section chemical officers pleaded with
the OCCWS to expedite supply, particularly items such as FS smoke,
colored smoke, white phosphorus and thermite grenades, stocks of
which were entirely depleted. General Waitt replied that he was
unable to influence the requisitioning and shipping situation which
52
was entirely governed by ASF and higher headquarters.
The North African chemical officers could do little but wait and
hope that shipments would be forthcoming from the United States.
Their hopes were met, quantitatively at least, during the next month.
Shipments received during May increased stocks so that 80 percent
of major ground forces items were stocked in levels above the author-
ized forty-five days. The air force's chemical supply position also
improved although not as much as the ground force supply. The
Chemical Section, Eastern Base Section, established by Capt. Carl E.
Grant in February, was authorized to allot 50 percent of its stocks to
the XII Air Force Service Command. Balancing stocks among the
base sections continued to be a problem until at least the fall of 1943,
since congested ports and inadequate railroad facilities rendered inter-
depot transfers extremely difficult.53
Qualitatively, the supply picture was not so bright. Most of the
items reported stocked at or exceeding authorized levels were protective
items. The level of individual gas protection had been high and had
52
(1) Personal Ltr, Barker to Porter, 21 Feb 43. CWS 412.3 APO 464 (Sabotage Device) in CWS
314.7 Barker Corresp NATO, 1942-43. (2) Personal Ltr, Coblentz to Waitt, 3 Mar 43. CWS 314.7
Pers Files, NATO, Feb-Oct 43. (3) Personal Ltr, Coblentz to Waitt, 22 Apr 43. ABSCW in same
file. (4) Personal Ltr, Waitt to Coblentz, 3 Apr 43. CWS SPCVO (4-3-43) in CWS 314.7 Pers
Files, NATO, Feb-Oct 43. (5) Waitt to CmlO MBS, 30 Jun 43. (6) Johnson to Porter, 12 Apr 43.
53
(1) Statistical Summary, 30 Apr, 31 May 43. (2) Maling Ltr, 3 Apr 43. (3) Logistical History
of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, p. 23.
remained so although the quantity of individual protective items in

the resupply system was low in April. The collective protection
potential,54 on the other hand, was lower than that for individual pro-
tection: the SOS Chemical Section reported shortages of the common
decontaminating agent, bleach (chloride of lime), of the power-driven
decontaminating apparatus, and of the collective protector.55 These
shortages of protective supplies were important given the assumption
that gas warfare could be initiated at any time, but the supply of gas
warfare items to be used offensively should gas warfare retaliation be
necessary was even more important. Supply of the nongas warfare
chemical munitions such as incendiary bombs and high explosive mortar
shell was highly important also.
At the end of May, Shadle expressed his satisfaction with the chemical
offensive potential and ammunition status in the North African theater.
His view seems to have been overly optimistic since smoke pots, tear
gas, and HC smoke grenades were the only ammunition items available
in sufficient supply. All the chemical supply officers reported urgent
requests for unavailable white phosphorus grenades. The Twelfth Air
Force reported limited quantities of ANM50A1 4-pound incendiary
bombs, a few M52 500-pound incendiary bomb clusters, and a con-
siderable number of M54 100-pound incendiary bomb clusters. There
was no other chemical ammunition in the theater although the New
York port had promised that 120 days' supply of high explosive and
smoke shell was en route for the three chemical mortar battalions which
had recently arrived in the theater. Aside from a small amount of
artillery shell stored by Ordnance, no toxics were available in the
theater and none was scheduled to arrive until the fall of 1943. The
March theater plan for gas warfare, the first such plan, was based on
meeting possible enemy gas attack with this plainly inadequate supply
of artillery shell. The new War Department policy for retaliation in
event of enemy initiation of gas warfare called for the use of aerial
munitions as the principal gas weapons. Shadle's satisfaction with the
toxic supply status can be explained by the fact that he did not con-
54
Collective protection is that provided to units or groups of men. For example, units and organiza-
tions were provided with area and equipment decontaminating agents and the means to apply them
should vesicant gases be used. The collective protector, a machine for filtering and circulating air,
was to be provided for command posts and other crucial command and service installations which could
not readily be moved in the event of gas attack. Brophy, Miles and Cochrane, From Laboratory to
field, ch. IV.
55
(1) Statistical Summary, 30 Apr, 31 May 43. (2) Shadle to Waitt, 26 May 43.
sider the lack of aerial munitions to be a critical problem. He believed

that the Axis Powers were in no position to initiate gas warfare in
North Africa, a correct estimate, as it happens, for subsequent investi-
gation proved that there were no German toxic munitions in North
Africa. Still, in terms of War Department policy and authorized
theater levels, the North African theater was critically short of offen-
sive chemical munitions.58
Field conditions produced a further complication in the supply
problem which was not unanticipated among chemical officers but
which was not provided for by the War Department. Troops in the
field are ingenious at adapting supplies to their own purposes. While
the use of the gas mask carrier as a carry-all was frowned upon because
it meant loss of the mask, chemical officers overlooked or unofficially
encouraged secondary use of other gas warfare supplies in a nongas
warfare situation. An acetate eyeshield had been developed by the
British to provide readily available individual protection against liquid
vesicant droplets in the absence of the gas mask. The United States
forces in North Africa had been supplied with these eyeshields before
the War Department declared them obsolete. North African troops
used eyeshields in lieu of sunglasses and as protection against swirling
dust and sand. Constant demand nearly exhausted the supply and,
since there was no resupply channel for obsolete items, created a prob-
lem for which chemical officers saw only one solution. The War
Department had to be convinced that gas warfare items such as the
eyeshield could be used in a nongas warfare situation so that a resupply
channel such as existed for other items could be provided. Antigas
shoe impregnite could be used as "canned heat," as could the chemical
fire starter, and, when applied to tents, shoe impregnite proved an
excellent waterproofing substance and served as a base for sand camou-
flage. Antigas covers could also be used as a waterproof covering for
shelter tents, and antigas curtains, when obtainable, served as ground
sheets, tarpaulins, and foxhole covers. The decontaminating appa-
56
(1) Statistical Summary, 30 Apr, 31 May 43. (2) Shadle Ltr, 26 May 43. (3) Maling Ltr, 3 Apr
43. (4) Col Gerhard to CCWS, 13 May 43, Notes on Visit by Col Frederick W. Gerhard, CWS, to
Theaters of Operations in England and Northern Africa. CWS 314.7 Observer Rpts. (5) Memo,
Actg ACofS OPD WDGS for CG ASF, 11 Aug 43, sub: Implementation of Theater Plans for Gas
Warfare NATO. OPD 385 CWP (11 Aug 43). (6) Ltr, CinC AFHQ to TAG, 19 Mar 43, sub:
Cml Warfare Plan for NATO. AFHQ AG 322.095/378 CWS-M in file OPD 385 CWS sec. 11B.
ratuses could be used for insecticide spraying, carrying water, fighting

fires, and giving showers. CWS nongas warfare supply turned out to
be a considerably more active business than had been intended, par-
ticularly since CWS officers could not allow the secondary uses of
chemical items to lower the gas protective potential.57
As the second phase of the chemical supply operation in the North
African theater drew to a close in June, the weapons and ammunition
status took a turn for the worse. Supplies earmarked for the Sicilian
operation were withdrawn without the prospect of immediate replace-
ment. The process of chemical supply planning for the assault on
Sicily had begun in March when Major Humphreville, newly desig-
nated Chemical Officer, Seventh Army, sent the supply unit of his
section to Oran to plan with the Chemical Section, SOS NATOUSA.58
Since logistic data were not available, the Chemical Section, MBS,
supplied estimated data which the SOS and Seventh Army sections
used to compute requirements. The SOS Chemical Section submitted
requisitions to the zone of interior for assault materiel requirements
and for maintenance stocks which were to be built up to a 30-day
level as soon as depot operations in Sicily were practicable. The SOS
section computed requirements on a regular table of allowance and
maintenance factor basis, relying on estimates in cases when informa-
tion was lacking.59 This system presented no problems in Class II
supply except for spare parts for which maintenance factors were
unavailable. Any determination of spare parts usage rate was purely
guesswork, and, even had estimates been accurate, spare parts stocks
both in the theater and the ZI were wholly inadequate to meet the
demand. The SOS supply officers found that the great drain on
theater reserves came in the Class IV and special equipment categories.
Major Humphreville requested special allotments of grenades and flame
throwers and, in view of the constant need for smoke concealment in
57
(1) Statistical Summary, 30 Apr, 31 May 43. (2) Barker Comments, Feb61. (3) Coblentz
Comments, 9 Jan61. (4) For more information on eyeshields, see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From
Laboratory to Field, Chapter IV.
58
Seventh Army was not officially activated until 10 July 1943. The predecessor headquarters was
I Armored Corps.
59
A maintenance factor was the estimated resupply quantity per month, stated as a percentage of the
total theater stock, or of any item, necessary to maintain stock level, both in depots and in the hands
of troops, while losses because of wearing out, capture, abandonment, pilferage, and the like were
occurring. This designation was, in November 1943, changed to "replacement factor" to avoid
confusion between repair and resupply. WD Cir 297, 13 Nov 43.
the North African ports, 100,000 smoke pots for emergency use in the
Sicilian ports.60
Major Wilson, then acting chief of the SOS Chemical Section, pro-
tested this smoke pot allotment to the SOS commander, General Larkin,
for two reasons: (1) regardless of requirements, a lack of shipping
dictated a space allotment plan for Sicilian cargo, and most of the
CWS space would be filled with smoke pots; (2) filling the Seventh
Army demand for smoke pots would exhaust theater stocks and would
require special shipments from the United States. General Larkin
agreed to revise the Seventh Army requisition to a smaller amount,
but General Patton, now Seventh Army commander designate, ap-
pealed directly to General Eisenhower. Reasoning from the point of
view which thereafter governed supply policy for both the North
African and European theaters—that the combat commander should
have anything he wanted—General Eisenhower insisted on the supply
of the original smoke pot requisition.61
In this particular instance Major Wilson was probably right. But,
in retrospect, this incident and the supply operations which it represents
assume more significance than the immediate problems imply, for this
operation marks the bifurcation of the chemical supply system. Hence-
forth, one element of the chemical supply system was oriented, despite
doctrine to the contrary, to an impetus from the front.62 This element
of the system was primarily devoted to meeting the demands and
special requirements of the combat forces, especially for new equip-
ment, such as the lightweight mechanical smoke generator, or equip-
ment used in new missions, such as the 4.2-inch chemical mortar.63
60
(1) Maj Humphreville, CmlO Seventh Army [to CG Seventh Army] (copy to CCWS), 15 Sep 43,
Rpt of Cml Warfare Opns, Sicilian Campaign, reproduced as sec. H, pt. II, of Rpt of Opn of the U.S.
Seventh Army in the Sicilian Campaign, 10 Jul—17 Aug 43, Sep 43. (2) History of Cml Warfare Sec
SOS NATOUSA, in History of COMZ NATOUSA-MTOUSA. (3) Wilson Interv, 16 Oct 58. (4)
IOM, A.L.R. [Col Alfred L Rockwood, CmlO SOS NATOUSA] to CofS [SOS NATOUSA], 20 Jul 43,
no sub. CWS MTO 400.19 Statistical Summary, (5) MBS reported no spare parts, except for a wholly
inadequate supply of some mortar parts, on hand as of 28 June 1943. CWS MBS [to Cml Sec SOS
NATOUSA], Stock Status and Materiel Issue Rpt, 28 Jun 43. CWS MTO 142.1 Inventory (Corresp).
61
(1) Wilson Interv,16 Oct 58. (2) Memo for Red, Rpt of Material on Hand in Depots and ASP's
in Sicily as of 20 Aug 43, dated 29 Aug 43, Cml Sec AFHQ and NATOUSA. In CWS MTO 142.1
Inventory (Corresp). (3) Min of Staff Conf, Hq SOS NATOUSA, 4 May 43. CWS MTO 337 Confs.
62
Colonel Coblentz maintains (Comments, 9 January 1961) that the impetus from the front orienta-
tion started earlier when base section chemical officers began deciding their own issue policy.
For use of new equipment and smoke technique development, see below, Chapter VIII, and for
63
mortar operations, see Chapter XI.

Impetus from the front meant that line organizations determined their
own requirements for materials, determined how those materials should
be used, and what the procedures of the supply system which provided
them should be. It must be noted that under the impetus from the
rear theory the line organizations had also always determined their own
requirements, but the point of difference is that they selected their
requirements from a list provided by and with procedures ordained
by supply organizations, whereas under impetus from the front they
drew up their own lists and established their own procedures. The
other element, which retained the impetus from the rear orientation,
was concentrated on the development of gas warfare offensive and
defensive potential. Although the two elements of the chemical supply
system overlapped and although they were both handled by the whole
CWS organization in the theater, base and field chemical sections
became increasingly concerned with the immediate nongas warfare
support of combat forces and their routine preparedness for gas war-
fare defense. The impetus from the front pattern imposed great
strains on the supply system. War Department long-range supply
planning and even the planning of the SOS in the theater was fre-
quently scrapped or greatly amended when combat forces demanded
a 6-month supply of an item for a 30-day operation or when a standard
item of supply was rejected. This pattern also called for many
improvisations. Many front-line organization chemical officers gave
reality and immediacy to Fries's concept of the closest possible con-
nection between research and the fighting line by carrying on a certain
amount of research and even manufacture in the combat zone.
Initially, the CWS in the theater used the same supply channels and
procedures for both elements of the system, but as the Joint and
Combined Chiefs of Staff and their subsidiary committees assumed
64
more direct control of gas warfare policy, the impetus of supply
for the preparedness mission moved even farther to the rear than
formerly.
Chemical Supply and Administration—Development

of the Theater Chemical System
The accommodation of the existing system of impetus from the
rear to the new demands of the unofficial system of impetus from the
64
front characterized the third phase of chemical supply in North Africa.

This phase in the theater CWS supply and administrative system, in
contrast to the second phase, was marked by the availability of an
increasing amount of supply information to chemical supply officers.
This development had its inception in the establishment, mentioned
above, of a statistical reporting function in Shadle's office. It gathered
momentum from the activities of each supply officer in the field and
from the operation of the SOS Chemical Section and from the improved
communications throughout the theater. In April, for example, Major
Wilson invited the chemical supply officers to a conference in which
they arrived at a common understanding of procedures and where they
received the latest information available to SOS NATOUSA.65 At the
end of May the theater "went on" the materiel status report, which
was a War Department prescribed report prepared in the ports of
embarkation to show the zone of interior, in-transit, and theater status
of certain controlled and critical items. Since only about one-quarter
of the 200 stock chemical items in North Africa was included, the
immediate impact on theater chemical supply was not great, but the
materiel status report and its supporting perpetual inventory in the
ports of embarkation required more exact reporting of theater on-hand
and expenditure data—data which became part of a more extensive
accounting and reporting system.66
The base sections had begun to report stock status to the theater
and SOS chemical sections in April under the increased reporting
requirement. However, their reports were little more comprehensive
than the earlier informal reports until June, when comprehensive
reports from ABS and MBS and a partial report from Eastern Base
Section permitted the theater and SOS chemical sections to compile
the first full-scale stock status report. Even then, quantity in the
hands of troops was known for only one item, the eyeshield, which
had been reported 500,000 short. The theater chemical section assumed
65
Min of Sup Officers Mtg, Hq SOS NATOUSA, 24 Apr 43. CWS SOS NATOUSA 337/4 in CWS
MTO 337 Confs.
66
(1)Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pp. 59-60. (2) History of COMZ NATOUSA,
pt. I. (3) Rqmts and Stock Contl Div ASF, Rpt, Survey of the Opn of the Materiel Status Rpt, Aug
44. Files of Rqmts and Stock Contl Div ASF.
that supply of all other items in the hands of troops equaled authoriza-
tion since no other complaints had been received.67
The SOS Chemical Section requested, in July, that the Commanding
General, NATOUSA, require troop units and organizations to submit
full reports of chemical materials in their hands.68 These reports began
to arrive in August, and the chemical supply officers thereafter calcu-
lated the status of theater supply much more realistically. The
improvement in calculating supply status again raised the question of
the adequacy of requirements and logistical data computations. While
the CWS supply catalogs, which contained detailed information on
requirements, allowances, spare parts, and item nomenclature, were
not available until January 1944, chemical supply officers assembled
such data from other sources in 1943.69
The Army Service Forces manual, Logistical Planning and Reference
Data, arrived in the theater in May 1943. Although the ASF manual
primarily dealt with transportation of supplies, it did present some
helpful examples of requirements computations.70 Such information
as the ASF manual provided was useful, both in the headquarters and
to the supply officers in the field, but it met only part of the need.
To satisfy the whole need, Colonel Coblentz, Chemical Officer, ABS,
made his own compilation of logistical data.71 In July he obtained
OCCWS Circular No. 1, issued on 20 June 1943 as a predecessor to
CWS supply catalogs. Although the OCCWS circular contained the
latest War Department information, Colonel Coblentz' experience in
the theater led him to reproduce a table of maintenance factors pre-
pared by the CWS ETO. The European theater was not engaged in
67
(1) Ltr Rpt, AG EBS to CG SOS NATOUSA, 3 Jul 43, sub: Stock Status and Material Issue Rpt.
EBS CWS 400.11 in CWS MTO 142.1 Inventory, Base Sec, vol. I. (2) AG ABS to CG SOS NATOUSA,
4 Jul 43, Stock Status and Material Issue Rpt. ABS AG 319.1 in CWS MTO 142.1 Inventory, Base Sec,
vol. I. (3) CWS MBS [to CG SOS NATOUSA], Stock Status and Material Issue Rpt as of 28 Jun 43,
2400 H [29 Jun 43]. CWS MTO 142.1 Inventory (Corresp). (4) [Chief Cml Sec AFHQ and
NATOUSA to CG NYPE thru CG NATOUSA], ca. 15 Jul 43, Rpt, Theater Status, Chemical Warfare,
Selected Class II Items—30 Jun 1943, and Chemical Warfare, Selected Class V Items—In Depots 30 Jun
1943. CWS MTO 050 Logistical Data.
68
Ltr, AG SOS NATOUSA to CG NATOUSA, 10 Jul 43, sub: Inventory of Cml Warfare Materiel
in Hands of Troops. SOS AG 142.1 in CWS MTO 142.1 Inventory (Corresp).
69
1st Ind, Lt Col Lloyd E. Fellenz, ExO CW Sec Hqs NATOUSA, to CmlO Seventh Army, 15 Jan
44, on Ltr, CmlO Seventh Army to CmlO NATOUSA, 8 Jan 44, sub: Request for Logistical Data.
Seventh Army 400-CW in CWS MTO 050 Logistical Data.
70
Unnumbered manual, Hqs SOS, Feb 43, Logistical Planning and Reference Data. Stamped "May
1943" in Cml Sec AFHQ and NATOUSA. CWS MTO 050 Logistical Data.
71
Memo, Off of CmlO ABS, no addressee, 4 Jul 43, sub: Logistical Data—CWS Supplies. CWS MTO
300.6 Memo Book 1.
ground combat, but, from the point of view of the chemical supply
officer, the data compiled by the CWS ETO was the best and most
realistic then available. Accordingly, the NATO Chemical Section
relayed through the OCCWS a request for a complete set of the CWS
logistical tables prepared by CWS ETO. In August CWS ETO for-
warded to NATO a complete set of its tables plus a description of the
computing processes and a listing of pertinent authorities. But, shortly
after this material was received the situation in NATO changed. A 26
October note on the ETO letter of transmittal indicated that Colonel
Shadle consigned the ETO material to the dead file "as ETOUSA logis-
tics [are] not necessarily applicable here." 72
It seems probable that Colonel Shadle meant that the ETO data had
been useful only until the North African theater had revised and
adapted the information to its own use. Theater officers quickly learned
a lesson which the War Department seemed to have great difficulty in
understanding—that the procedures of one theater were not necessarily
applicable to the conditions of another. The theater and SOS chemical
sections, having learned this lesson, were consequently in the process of
adapting and revising all logistical data to fit the experience of the
Tunisian, Sicilian, and early Italian campaigns. Many theater supply
officers continued to believe that the War Department supply authori-
ties were unresponsive to their needs, but their logistics analyses led
them to request adjustments in the War Department governing
directives. For example, the theater CWS suggested, as early as July,
a revision in some War Department maintenance factors. As such
suggestions demonstrated, chemical supply officers were becoming more
sophisticated in the handling of their system, and, as a consequence,
the system was becoming more standardized internally; yet, at the
same time, it was becoming more individual since its logistical data,
the basis for its operation, was compiled and controlled within the
73
system.
By the end of August, Colonel Coblentz, then chemical officer desig-
72
(1) Ltr with Incls, Col LeRoy, Chief Sup Div CWS ETOUSA, to CmlO NATOUSA, 14 Aug 43,
sub: Transmittal of Logistic Tables. CWS ETO SOS CW 050/77 (10 Aug 43)SD in CWS MTO 050
Logistical Data. (2) For more information on the CWS ETO system, see below, Chapter IV.
73
(1) Wilson Interv, 16 Oct 58. (2) Statistical Summary, 31 Jul 43. (3) Ltr, Harold L. Field
to Hist Off, 1 Feb 59. Mr. Field, as lieutenant and captain, was a supply officer in the Chemical Sec-
tion, SOS NATOUSA. (4) Lt Col Joseph F. Padlon and Maj Howard P. McCormick, War Plans Br
OACCWS Field Opns, to CCWS, Rpt on Visit to NATOUSA (hereafter cited as Padlon-McCormick
Rpt), 24 Feb 44. CWS 314.7 Observer Rpts.
nate of Peninsular Base Section, which was organizing within Atlantic

Base Section for supply operation in Italy, had assembled enough
information to compile a detailed set of chemical supply instructions
covering definitions, organization methods, reporting forms, distribu-
tion, and storage operating data.74 This compilation is evidence of a
significant improvement in procedures, and it is noteworthy that these
procedures and the reports which controlled them were largely of
theater CWS origin.
At the same time individual performance was improving as the
chemical supply officers gained confidence in themselves and their
system. Colonel Shadle had advised General Porter in May that
". . . everything pertaining to supply knowledge is deficient. Our
officers are simply not trained in supply work and staff procedure."
Major Wilson agreed.75 But in November Colonel Shadle wrote to
General Porter, "All of the officers over here . . . are doing a splendid
job." 76 The change had been wrought by extensive on-the-job supply
training afforded by actual supply experience and by such compilations,
both official and unofficial, as Colonel Coblentz had prepared. As
Colonel Shadle also declared, ". . . we now know what we are talking
about and what is needed. . . ." 77 In other words, the field elements
of the chemical supply system, with the exception of that portion
applying to the Army Air Forces, were well established during the fall
of 1943. In October Colonel Maling's Twelfth Air Force Chemical
Section still lacked a basis for requirements computation both for
incendiary bombs and toxics. Such information by War Department
decision could emanate only from Army Air Forces headquarters in
Washington.78
At the same time that the supply level was improving during 1943,
the supply handling situation was also improving. The SOS Chemical
Section increased its operating responsibilities with the addition of
such duties as those assigned in June of editing, consolidating, and
74
CWS Sup Cir Ltr No. 1, 1 Sep 43. CWS MTO 300.6 Memo Book I. This copy, apparently a
draft, is headed, "Chemical Section, Base Headquarters." There is no signature and no indication that
the draft was submitted for staff comment or that the circular was ever issued, either by Peninsular
Base Section or by Headquarters, NATOUSA.
75
(1) Personal Ltr, Shadle to Porter, 4 May 43. CWS 320.2/20 in file CWS 314.7 Pers Files, NATO,
Feb-Dec 43. (2) Wilson Interv, 16 Oct 58.
76
Personal Ltr, Shadle to Porter, 23 Nov 43. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, NATO, Feb-Dec 43.
77
Personal Ltr, Shadle to Waitt, 2 Dec 43. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, NATO, Feb-Dec 43.
78
(1) Padlon-McCormick Rpt, 24 Feb 44. (2) Notes on visit to North African theater made by Brig
Gen Alden H. Waitt and Lt Col Jacob K. Javits, OCCWS, 17-26 Oct 43. CWS 314.7 Observer Rpts.
forwarding to the zone of interior base section chemical requisitions.

Rockwood's section increased to seven officers, a warrant officer, and
thirteen enlisted men and women organized into Administration,
Supply, Control, and Technical Divisions.79 These divisions supervised
base section requisitioning, inventorying, and reporting activities on
what SOS termed "a sort of individual project" basis. The lines of
supervision were by no means direct or consistent since SOS still did
not have command control of base sections.80
The base section chemical officers and those in the air forces con-
tinued to develop their own systems of operation. Each chemical
officer received a different type of assistance from his own command
organization. In Coblentz' opinion, base section headquarters' attempts
to help created "nothing more than a bottleneck," because the base
section staff knew no more than the chemical officers about supply
procedures, and because the staff officers lacked such chemical informa-
tion as the chemical officers compiled for themselves or got from their
colleagues in the United States and in the theater.81 The base sections
did designate storage locations and did provide some co-ordination
among the services. Chemical sections improved storage and handling
82
at these locations with the help of a number of service units. By the
end of February 1943, the Twelfth Air Force had received its comple-
83
ment of four chemical air service companies.
CWS Staff and Functions, AFHQ and NATOUSA

During 1943 Shadle's office acquired several new functions, in addi-
tion to those authorized when the AFHQ Chemical Section was first
established. (Chart 6) An analysis of actual performance of these
functions demonstrates what role the CWS NATO had come to play.84
79
History of Cml Warfare Sec SOS NATOUSA, in pt. IV, History of COMZ NATOUSA-MTOUSA.
80
Ibid.
81
(1) Coblentz to Waitt, 25 Feb 43. (2) Croen Interv, 21 Sep 59. (3) Capone Interv, 24 Apr 58.
82
In addition to the early units mentioned above, the nth Chemical Maintenance Company arrived in
January 1943; the 63d Chemical Depot Company and the 12th Chemical Maintenance Company in
March; the 41st Chemical Laboratory Company, the 92d Chemical Composite Company, the remainder
of the 21st Chemical Decontamination Company, and the 52d and 53d Chemical Processing Companies
in May; and the 24th and 25th Chemical Decontamination Companies in June 1943. See Brophy and
Fisher, Organizing for War, app. H, and see below, ch. VII.
83
The 751st and 758th Chemical Depot Companies, Aviation, arrived in December 1942; the 753d
Chemical Depot Company, Aviation, and the 875th Chemical Company, Air Operations, reached the
theater in February 1943.
84
Functions are stated in History of AFHQ, Part I, pages 59, 60, Part II, Section 4, page 511. This
analysis, unless otherwise noted, is derived from a survey of the collected files of CWS MTO.
CHART 6—ORGANIZATION OF CHEMICAL WARFARE SECTION, ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, AND HEADQUARTERS,
NORTH AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, U.S. ARMY, NOVEMBER 1943
Source: Adapted from: History of AFHQ, pt. Il, pp. 203, 223-24, 241, 512, History of COMZ, NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pts. Ill and IV.
The principal function was to advise the commander in chief (AFHQ

and theater commander) and his staff on chemical matters. This was a
standard special staff function which involved, for the CWS, gas
warfare planning and any other matters which might require theater
supervision. In the absence of gas warfare, performance under this
function became a routine matter of concurring or advising on theater
personnel, operation, and supply.
Another function was to plan the use and allotment of chemical
troop units, and in 1943 the scope of this planning was extended to
the procurement and supervision of all CWS personnel in the theater.
Performance under these functions was advisory since Shadle had no
command responsibilities. The advisory capacity was severely limited
by theater quotas on both personnel and units, and by the requests of
individual field commanders for personnel and units—requests which
usually overrode staff advice. Shadle's Chemical Section managed to
get enough service units even when training in the United States could
not keep pace with worldwide demand. Combat units were eventually
obtained on about the same basis on which they were furnished other
theaters, three battalions per authorized army during peak combat
activity.85 With respect to officers, Shadle experienced difficulties similar
to Rowan's—the theater received a number of CWS casual officers
who frequently were badly handled by the replacement system. It was
practically impossible to find vacancies for all arriving officers, and it
was absolutely impossible to determine their qualifications so as to
channel officers to duties for which they were fitted.86
The principal mission of the theater CWS in the event of gas warfare
was to supervise "chemical operations, gas-proofing, decontaminations,
and filling of chemical munitions in the Theater," 87 as well as chemical
training. This mission resulted in the establishment of review activities
rather than of supervisory controls since, in a nongas warfare situation
and under the organization of the theater, actual supervision devolved
upon the base section and field army chemical officers and their sub-
ordinates. The theater chemical section usually learned of chemical
operations after their accomplishment. Shadle did use field reports of
experience to supplement War Department directives with theater
85
Sec Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, app. H-1.
86
(1) Interv, Hist Off with Wilson,16 Oct 58. (2) Waitt Comments, 5 Jan61. Waitt's comment
on the replacement system is "scandalous."
87
History of AFHQ, pt. 1, p. 60.
directives on operation, and he did make his office serve as a clearing-

house for operational information, but these activities were too remote
to be classed as supervision. In unusual cases either the theater or the
SOS Chemical Section followed up on compliance with directives or
solutions to problems, but the staff was not large enough to make this
an invariable practice.88 Functions added in the operational sphere
during 1943 were planning and advising on the smoke protection of
port areas and distributing technical information on area smoke screens.
While the theater chemical section became more directly involved in
the direction and appraisal of smoke operations, these functions, too,
were usually performed by working with field chemical officers who
had prime supervisory responsibilities.
Two functions, intelligence and co-operation with the theater sur-
geon, were primarily liaison and reporting functions. Intelligence was
initially handled by the British complement of the AFHQ Chemical
Section, and the British continued to play a large part in this activity
after it became a joint enterprise. One officer, Lt. Col. Henry I.
Stubblefield, was added to the section for medical liaison and to plan
protection against the possibility of biological warfare.
Three of the remaining original functions covered the supervision
of supply from requirements to distribution. Since the theater section
was not staffed to handle supply supervision, since the theater chemical
section had no opportunity to inaugurate a basic supply plan like that
used in the ETO, and since theater organization in effect decentralized
supply operations to such a degree that field chemical officers in fact
instituted their own supply plans, the 1943 assignment of functions
provided that the theater chemical section should "merely" procure
"logistical and statistical data on chemical warfare supplies in the
theater." 89 Shadle spent most of his own time dealing with supply
matters. He was proud of his accomplishments, and he was commended
by British as well as American authorities for performance in this
area.90 From Shadle's own point of view, he and his AFHQ section
performed exactly those functions which should have been theirs in
the light of tradition and of theater conditions. He saw no need, as
chief chemical officers in other theaters did, for enlarging his planning
88
Interv, Hist Off with Julius F. Klaswick, 6 Mar 59. (Mr. Klaswick, as lieutenant and captain,
served with the SOS and theater chemical sections.)
89
History of AFHQ, pt. II, sec. 4, p. 511.
90
Ltr, Shadle to Hist Off, 18 Aug 59.
120
THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE
COLONEL SHADLE AND STAFF IN ALGIERS, FALL OF 1943
responsibilities, or for attempting to influence combat operations, or

for striving to exercise control of the theater CWS through technical
channels. He felt that he appropriately operated most of the time
through command channels. He later pointed out that his position
as a staff officer in a supreme headquarters, AFHQ, made it possible
for him to operate differently from Rowan, who did not occupy such
a position.91
By the end of 1943, Shadle's AFHQ section was authorized 5
American officers, 3 more than authorized at the time of the invasion,
and 3 British officers, one more than in the previous year. Enlisted
strength had grown from 2 to 4 Americans, but the number of British
soldiers had remained at 2.92 Lt. Col. Lloyd E. Fellenz, a Regular Army
officer and a smoke expert, had arrived to become executive officer.93
Lt. Col. Ian A. Marriott had returned to London to be replaced by
Lt. Col. G. des C. Chamier as British deputy.
91
Shadle Interv, 16 May61.
92
History of AFHQ, pt. II, sec. 4, p. 513.
93
Shadle to Porter, 4 May 43.
Theater and CWS Reorganizations

When, early in 1944, General Eisenhower left the North African
theater to take command in Europe, the character of the North African
organization was changed slightly to accommodate to a British supreme
commander and to new responsibilities. The theater at last corrected
what from a staff point of view had been a serious error in the original
organization.94 The Communications Zone, which had been inseparable
from the theater organization except in the person of its commander,
Maj. Gen. Everett S. Hughes, also deputy theater commander, was
combined with the theater SOS, and the new command was given
those theater functions which pertained to the COMZ. At the same
time, the remaining American responsibilities were restricted to ad-
ministration—all control of combat operations passing to AFHQ or
the combat organizations. The result was essentially the creation of
95
a tricommand organization like that of the War Department.
Shadle's office maintained its staff and its AFHQ-theater position,
but the functions of control of COMZ personnel and units, COMZ
training and gas warfare defense, and all allocation and issue of supply
passed to the SOS Chemical Section. Colonel Maling moved from
Twelfth Air Force to assume Rockwood's position as chief of this
section which was augmented by the addition of one colonel, three
majors, and a captain.96
The COMZ Chemical Section then assumed control of the "impetus
from the rear" supply system and took over some of the administrative
functions which had been the province of AFHQ, and of NATOUSA,
then renamed Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTOUSA).
Shadle, who became a brigadier general on the same day that Rowan
received his promotion, maintained his section as a clearinghouse for
chemical information and did a considerable amount of troubleshooting
in the field of both CWS supply systems. But the work of the theater
headquarters chemical section was declining while that in the European
97
theater section was as great or greater than it had been. One reason
for this was the growing emphasis in MTOUSA on combat organiza-
tion and function rather than theater organization. Another reason
94
Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, p. 30.
95
96
(1) History,
(1) Ibid. (2)CmlHistory of Sec
Warfare AFHQ, pt. III, sec. I. (2) History of AFHQ, pt. III, sec. 4, pp. 979-80.
SOS NATOUSA.
97
Interv, Hist Off with Col Johnson, 18 Aug 59. (Johnson at the time was Shadle's American
deputy.)
was Shadle's view of his own function. Since he emphasized the staff
role and since, ideally, staff work declines when administrative systems
are functioning smoothly, it was appropriate that the work of his own
section would decline. The administrative systems were, for the most
part functioning smoothly by the middle of 1944, or, at least, the
problems which had beset the systems had become less important.
If gas warfare had ever been a threat in the Mediterranean area, it
would have been at the time of the assault landings. Shadle had been
proved right in his estimate that there was little threat in the North
African landings. In the Sicilian landings small stores of enemy toxics
were found, but their placement and manner of storage indicated
that there was no intention of using them.98 For the landings on the
Italian mainland, Allied intelligence officers feared that toxics would
be employed by the enemy, and as a result retaliatory stocks were
brought in too soon. A tragic gassing of Allied forces in the harbor of
Bari, Italy, occurred when enemy action breached a ship carrying
Allied gas." No clear signs of German intent were found when troops
broke through into the Italian mainland. The prolonged struggle along
the Rapido and the Winter Line would have given the Germans an
excellent tactical opportunity to use gas, but again no evidence turned
up that they had considered the employment of toxics.100 The principal
CWS mission, preparedness for gas warfare, therefore lost weight in
the Mediterranean theater, and the part of the COMZ Chemical
Section mission which related to gas warfare supply became of little
importance. The whole of the COMZ organization declined in im-
portance late in 1944, possibly because the impetus from the front
system had its own de facto communications zone. In the opinion of
the chemical officer, Peninsular Base Section—which supported Fifth
101
Army—was a communications zone itself. His opinion was con-
firmed by an organizational change in November 1944 under which
COMZ was discontinued and its functions delegated to Peninsular Base
Section.102
98
Hammond Interv, 26 Nov 56.
99
(1) Shadle Comments on draft of this volume, 24 Jan61. (2) Interv, Hist Off with Col Francis
Browne, USAFR (Ret.), 23 Oct61. (3) Capone Interv, 24 Apr 58.
100
Porter Interv, 24 Aug61.
101
Memo, Coblentz to Rowan [ca. 1946], sub: Comments on Theater CWS Orgn. CWS 314.7.
102
Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, pp. 37-38.
Still another reason for the decline of the theater headquarters CWS
sections was that the intelligence activity, largely managed by the
British, had never assumed much importance in the American group.
Furthermore, since facilities were lacking for a technical activity and
since liaison with the British on technical matters was carried on by
the European theater CWS, there was no need for a large technical
organization in NATOUSA-MTOUSA. The theater chemical lab-
oratory company did not experience, as did chemical laboratory com-
panies in most other theaters, frequent calls for development work.
A recurrent theme of the CWS effort in the Mediterranean area
was that the service's most important experience here was supply
experience. The CWS MTO supply system entered its fourth phase
in the winter of 1943-44. During this phase, which eventually included
most of the period prior to victory in Europe, the bifurcation of the
supply system was most marked. Ground chemical supply officers
brought nearly all of their attention to bear on item troubleshooting
which had been a part, but only a subsidiary part, of their concern
since the initial landings. As they became more and more concerned
with the immediate needs of the combat forces it became more appar-
ent that to wait for instructions and supplies to filter down through
the complicated system from the zone of interior was not always
possible. The local arrangement, the informal agreement, and the
field expedient became the order of the day. The officers in the field
evolved new techniques and used supplies and equipment where and
when they were needed, regardless of the original intention or function.
Whenever it was possible they manufactured supplies or adapted
equipment to their immediate needs. They tended to suspect the
motives of every rear area organization, even that of their own theater.
One base section chemical officer bitterly remarked, perhaps with some
exaggeration, that it was easier to manufacture spare parts than it was
to "argue SOS [NATOUSA] out of them." 103
The basic problem was that the War Department's impetus from
the rear supply system was not sufficiently responsive to the immediate
needs generated by changing conditions in the field. Yet even the
suggestion that an impetus from the front policy was being employed
103
Memo, Lt Col Henry C. Hall for Col Rockwood [CmlO SOS NATOUSA], 21 Mar 44, no sub.
CWS MTO 333 Inspections and Investigations.
was enough to call forth official investigators.104 Despite this official

disapproval, CWS and other ground supply officers in MTO accom-
plished their supply tasks.
For example, Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark's Fifth Army set up its own
system. Ammunition supply points (ASP's) were set up close to the
front for each corps plus one ASP for troops not attached to corps.
Each supply point contained a chemical, an ordnance, and an engineer
section manned by service troops of the appropriate branch but com-
manded by the Ordnance Department representative. Combat troops
drew what they needed from the ASP after certifying that the amount
drawn plus that on hand would not exceed the basic authorized load
for their organization. Supply points for other classes of supply were
so located that each combat organization could form one convoy to
bring up all its supplies. Late every afternoon, Colonel Barker's
assistants visited each supply point and reported back to him an
estimate of stock status. Barker consulted operational plans furnished
him by the Army staff and calculated necessary levels in each ASP.
He then telephoned Coblentz in base section headquarters at Naples
to tell him what supplies were needed at what points and depots.
CWS officers and men waiting in trucks loaded with supplies, which
usually had been sorted, cleaned, reboxed, and marked in the base
section depots, received Coblentz' instructions and departed to re-
plenish all Army ASP's and depots before daylight. As the Army
moved forward, the base section took over and expanded forward area
depots established by Fifth Army so that there would be no change
in the distance through which immediate supply action need take
place.105
Coblentz and his section, plagued by continual shortages of man-
power and equipment, by what he considered to be a lack of under-
standing of combat needs on the part of all echelons to the rear, and
by the continual necessity of refurbishing or even making wanted items,
found themselves hard put to keep up with Fifth Army needs.106
104
IOM, ACofS G-4 MTO to CofS MTO, 13 Dec 44, sub: Rpts of Inspection Made by War Dept
Inspectors. CWS MTO 333 Inspection and Investigations.
105
(1) Barker to Hist Off, 11 Aug 59. (2) Ltr, Coblentz to Hist Off, 17 Aug 59.
106
Coblentz to Hist Off, 17 Aug 59.
Theater Chemical Supply Problems

The first of the troubleshooting problems the CWS dealt with in
the Mediterranean area was that of item overages and shortages. The
second was the fact that the condition of some material on reaching
the theater was such that extensive repair, renovation, or adaptation
was required—this was the maintenance problem. There were many
other troubleshooting problems, but, examples of the overages and
shortages and of maintenance problems not only demonstrate solutions
but also show how the practice of impetus from the front operated.
Overages and Shortages
The problem of item overages and shortages resulted from several
causes. Overages were brought about by oversupply from the United
States or by failure to deplete stocks as anticipated. Shortages were
caused by breakdown of faulty or damaged materials, by failure to
unload ships because of lack of facilities, by failure to estimate needs,
or by enemy destruction of ships or depots. One major cause of over-
ages was automatic supply. The New York Port of Embarkation con-
tinued automatic supply or materiel status report supply, which was
virtually automatic, on many items. Consequently, by the end of
July 1943, the stocks of three items, noncorrosive decontaminating
agent, protective ointment, and shoe impregnite ranged from 125
percent to 143 percent of authorization. Before the end of the year
the overages on some of these items reached nearly 200 percent of
authorization. Although the SOS Chemical Section cabled the port
of embarkation canceling requisitions and requesting discontinuance
of automatic supply on the grounds that the storage and transportation
expenditures exceeded the value of stocks, stock continued to accumu-
late. In desperation, theater chemical officers appealed to General
Somervell during one of his trips to the theater, but it was 1944 before
shipments began to decline. The first three items remained in excess
stockage until disposal procedures were instituted late in 1944. Shadle,
claiming that the Arabs sometimes pilfered shoe impregnite for use
as a butter substitute, suggested that one solution for the problem of
excesses was to encourage this practice.107
107
(1) Statistical Summary, 31 Jul 43, 31 Aug 43, 30 Sep 43, 25 Oct 43, 31 Oct 43, 25 Nov 43,
30 Nov 43, 25 Dec 43, 31 Jan 44. (2) Wilson Interv,16 Oct 58. (3) Ltr, Shadle to Hist Off, 18
Aug 59. (4) "Sup Status of CWS Protective Materiel in MTO," table compiled from theater matériel
status reports, reproduced in Baldwin, Bingham, and Pritchard, Readiness for Gas Warfare in Theaters
of Operations, app. B.
Other overages in the stocks of canisters for collective protectors,

diaphragm gas masks, and dust respirators resulted from changes in
the basis of issue. In the absence of gas warfare, replacement stocks
of collective protector canisters were not sent forward, and, since
there was no expenditure, excess stocks accumulated in depots. The
diaphragm gas mask, equipped for voice transmission, proved to be
cumbersome and not much more efficient for voice transmission than
the service mask with M8 outlet valve. The basis of issue was therefore
eventually changed from 30 percent of issue requirements for gas
masks of all kinds to issue to artillery and Signal Corps units only.
But meanwhile shipments of diaphragm masks continued to arrive at
the rate set by estimate, resulting in excess stocks. Although the troop
demand for dust respirators in North Africa was heavy, individuals
in the field found that they were principally used by drivers of vehicles
and that other soldiers were so weighted down with equipment that
the respirator could not conveniently be carried. Respirators were
therefore issued in substantially reduced numbers on a per-vehicle
rather than per-person basis. The new issue policy led to overages in
depots. Excess stocks of the diaphragm mask were returned to the
United States after issue of the new lightweight service mask, which
began late in 1943, was complete. Excess stocks of the collective pro-
tector canister and dust respirator were held in the theater until late
in the war since it was considered possible that the theater commander
might again have to change the basis of issue if events took a different
108
turn.
While theater chemical supply officers found the problems presented
by overages annoying, as the overages tended to create inefficiency in
the supply system, the problem of shortages threatened, on several
occasions, to destroy part of the CWS effectiveness in the theater. The
first serious shortages after the stabilization of the supply system were
holdovers from the prestabilization period. The CWS in the United
States was unable to initiate production of the M15 white phosphorus
grenades until July 1943 and was unable to supply the theaters during
that year.109 The M8 HC smoke grenade was substituted in the North
108
(1) Statistical summary cited in n. 107 (1) above. (2) Sup Status of CWS Protective Materiel
in MTO cited in n. 107 ( 4 ) , above.
109
(1) CWS Consolidated Rpt of Procurement, 1 Jan 40-31 Aug 45. (2) 2d Ind, ACCWS Field
Opns to CCmlO NATOUSA, 15 Dec 43, on basic Ltr, CmlO Seventh Army to CCWS, thru CCmlO
AFHQ and NATOUSA, 24 Sep 43, sub: Cml Warfare Opns Sicilian Campaign. CWS SPCVO 319.1.
African theater, but Seventh Army chemical officers reported that

the M8 grenade was not effective in the Sicily Campaign because it
produced an insufficient volume of smoke and because it lacked the
antipersonnel effect of the white phosphorus grenade. The M8 grenade
was nevertheless again substituted for the white phosphorus grenade
early in the Italian campaign as there was still no theater stock of the
M15. The theater CWS acquired some white phosphorus grenades in
the fall of 1943, and a sufficient stock was built up by December 1943.
Although a total of 269,639 white phosphorus grenades was used in
combat in the theater by the end of the war, this munition would
probably have been more extensively employed had combat soldiers
become acquainted with it during the initial campaigns.110
Another, and even more critical item was the 4.2-inch chemical
mortar, with spare parts and ammunition. After twenty days of
fighting in Sicily, where the chemical mortar battalions saw their first
extensive action and where they proved themselves invaluable and
practically indispensable in a close support role, the theater had only
one complete mortar and about a dozen barrels and base plates in depot
111
stock. Since the mortar was already being used considerably more
than had been intended, barrels wore out rapidly—so rapidly in fact
that a dozen replacement barrels did not begin to satisfy the demand.
The really critical need, however, was not for the barrel, nor even for
the base plate, which broke at the excessive ranges demanded of the
weapon, but for elevating screws and recoil springs, which were not
even listed among spare parts available. In August CWS supply officers
listed no mortars or mortar parts whatever. In September they received
stocks although still insufficient to meet demands; and the SOS Chem-
ical Section noted that Shadle had requested 120 days' reserve of mor-
tars, comparable to the reserve for ammunition rather than that for
other Class II weapons. The need for parts was so great that mortars
112
received in working condition were broken down for this purpose.
In October the North African CWS again had no mortars. In
110
(1) Statistical Summary as cited in n. 107 (1), above. (2) Ammunition Sup Rpt, 31 Oct 43,
31 Dec 43, 31 Jul 45. This report was a feeder report prepared in OCCWS for the ASF monthly
progress report. Ltr, CG ASF to CofOrd and CCWS, 3 Nov 43, sub: Instructions for Preparation of
Ammunition Supply of MPR. ASF SPX 319.1 (30 Oct 43) OB-P-SPDDL-MB-A. (3) Rpt of Cml
Warfare Opns Sicilian Campaign. (4) Padlon-McCormick Rpt, 24 Feb. 44.
111
Statistical Summary, 31 Jul 43.
112
(1) Statistical Summary, 31 Aug 43, 30 Sep 43. (2) Padlon-McCormick Rpt, 24 Feb 44. (3)
Wilson Interv,16 Oct 58.
November the War Department increased the maintenance factor

from 7 percent to 12½ percent, but experience in Italy outmoded
113
the new factor before it was received. By the end of 1943 General
Porter had personally intervened to secure air shipment of 12 mortars
and a few critical mortar parts to the theater. In all, late in 1943 and
early in 1944, 172 mortars were scheduled to arrive by air or by
convoy to relieve the situation in which depot stocks were nil and there
was an actual shortage of 16 mortars in the operating battalions. Also
in November 1943, the first serious theaterwide shortage of 4.2-inch
mortar ammunition was reported. Despite the mortar shipments and
the 40,000 rounds of HE mortar shell en route to the theater, supply
114
proved to be insufficient.
In February 1944 Rockwood diagnosed the difficulty as a lack of
systematization in mortar supply and repair and the failure of the
CWS in the United States to observe existing directives with respect
to spare parts and replacement.115 His analysis undoubtedly covered at
least part of the problem, but the CWS in the zone of interior could
not supply the parts it did not have. The CWS inaugurated its first
comprehensive procurement plan for spare parts in 1944, and it was
not until late 1944 and early 1945 that the products of this plan
became available in quantity through an integrated spare parts opera-
116
tion. The CWS also made herculean efforts to supply ammunition,
and, while theater problems of maintenance and distribution, as will
be indicated below, and occasional lags in delivery to the theater caused
critical local situations and ammunition rationing, the over-all supply
117
met the demand in 1944 and 1945. Rationing of ammunition also
became necessary at Anzio in January of 1944 because of the large
113
Coblentz Comments, 9 Jan61.
114
(1) Statistical Summary, 31 Oct 43, 25 Nov 43, 25 Dec 43. (2) Ammunition Sup Rpt, 31 Dec
43. (3) Wilson Interv,16 Oct 58. (4) Msg, CM-IN-14914, CG NATOUSA to WD, 24 Nov 43.
(5) Ltr, CCWS to CCmlO AFHQ and NATOUSA, 11 Dec 43. (6) ASF, Cml Warfare Serv Monthly
Maint Factors, 4 Nov 43; ASF, Cml Warfare Monthly Replacement Factors, 13 Jan 44. CWS MTO
400.6 Replacement and Maint Factors. (7) Ltr, CG SOS NATOUSA to CG NATOUSA, 3 Feb 44,
sub: Replacement of 4.2-inch Cml Mortar Parts. SOS NATOUSA 472.4 in CWS MTO 400.6
Replacement Factors.
115
Col Rockwood, CmlO SOS NATOUSA to CG NATOUSA (attn: CmlO), 1 Feb 44, sub: Sup
Procedure of 4.2-inch Cml Mortar. SOS CWS 319.1/48 in CWS MTO 400 Supply of Base Secs,
Units, etc.
116
For discussion of the spare parts situation in the zone of interior, see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane,
From Laboratory to field, Chapter XIII.
117
(1) Ammunition Sup Rpt, Monthly, 1944-45. (2) IOM, Col Walter A. Guild, CCmlO
NATOUSA for ACofS G-4 MTOUSA, 29 Oct 45, sub: CWS Sup Methods. CWS MTO 400 Supplies,
Servs and Equip.
number of ammunition dumps destroyed by enemy action. Fifth Army

chemical officers improvised ammunition protection by bulldozing
118
earth over stacked ammunition boxes. The parts situation on the
other hand became so critical that Barker, acting in the spirit of
General Clark's instruction to give the combat commanders what
they wanted even if it was necessary to manufacture the material,
in December 1943 joined the Fifth Army ordnance officer in re-
establishing operations at the Italian Capua arsenal.
At Capua a composite Fifth Army chemical group and nearly 1,000
Italian workmen under the direction of 1st Lt. Anthony Notorangelo
cast and machined mortar and smoke generator parts. The "Capua"
mortar slide, cast from Italian navy bronze taken from the Naples
harbor, was considered superior to the stateside product, as was the
"Capua" integrally cast barrel cap and firing pin. For some time in
1944 more than half of the mortar and smoke generator maintenance
supplies used were made in Italy at Capua and in chemical service unit
shops at Florence and Leghorn. After Fifth Army moved on, Penin-
sular Base Section assumed the job of operating the CWS half of
119
Capua arsenal with Lieutenant Notorangelo remaining in charge.
In August of 1944, the Army Service Forces promised an adequate
stock of spare parts within the next six months.120 Also in August the
theater formulated, and in September put into practice, an individual
CWS NATOUSA spare parts policy, concentrating supply and control
of spare parts in Peninsular and Delta Base Sections.121 But, as the
investigations of a CWS spare parts team from December 1944 to
February 1945 demonstrated, the Mediterranean theater CWS never
122
reached the goal of adequate parts stockage.
Despite these handicaps, the chemical mortar battalions in the North
African-Mediterranean theater reported only one instance when mortar
fire was actually curtailed because of the shortage of weapons, parts,
or ammunition.123 That there was only one such instance, in this case
118
Barker Comments, 15 Dec 60.
119
(1) Col. Maurice E. Barker, USA (Ret.) "War Is Not All Fighting," Armed Forces Chemical
Journal, VII (October, 1953),16-19, 27. (2) Barker to Hist Off, 11 Aug 59. (3) Coblentz to Hist
Off, 17 Aug 59.
120
Ltr, Actg Dir Plans and Opns ASF to CG SOS NATOUSA, 25 Aug 44, sub: Theaters Plans for
Cml Warfare. ASF SPOPP 381 in file CWS MTO 381 Theater Plans for CW.
121
SOS NATOUSA, Cir 109, 26 Sep 44.
122
OCCWS, Final Rpt, CWS Spare Parts Team in MTO and ETO, 19 Jun 45. (2) See below, Chapter
IV. (3) Statistical Summary, 30 Jun, 31 Aug 44.
123
History of 3d Cml Mortar Bn, Nov 43, Journal of Co D, 29-30 Nov 43.
an ammunition shortage, is a testimonial to the ingenuity and energy

of theater chemical officers who manufactured parts, as at Capua, and
arranged for welding teams to repair broken weapons right in the
124
front-line mortar positions. Thus the most serious supply threat to
CWS operations in the theater was met.
There were shortages besides those of weapons and ammunition, but
none so critical. An example of such shortages was the power-driven
decontaminating apparatus, which was diverted from its gas warfare
125
role to water carrying, fire fighting, and providing showers. It was
this type of apparatus that was used to provide all the water for the
city of Naples during the first ten days after Allied forces took the
city because the Germans had cut off the water supply and the Army
engineers were unable to re-establish service immediately. The high-
pressure pump on the apparatus was also used to open sewage drains
which had dried up and become clogged because of the lack of water.
The apparatus, using a chloride of lime mixture spray, was also used
to disinfect and delouse buildings subsequently used as hospitals and
126
barracks.
The Twelfth Air Force considered the provision of showers for
combat pilots returning from missions essential to morale and efficiency,
but only in rare cases was it able to acquire engineer or quartermaster
shower facilities. Consequently, the power-driven decontaminating
apparatus became the most jealously guarded item of chemical equip-
ment allotted to the air force. Stocks of the truck-mounted M3A1
apparatus were low when supply status was first reported in May 1943,
and by the end of July the air forces were forty short. Accounting
for these had been transferred to the materiel status report, indicating
that supply was automatic. Despite automatic supply, the total theater
stockage in November was only about 80 percent of authorization and
demand had increased so much in the Twelfth Air Force that the
AFSC chemical officer maintained a waiting list for issues. At one
time the Commanding General, XII AFSC, personally assumed re-
sponsibility for distribution within his command. The AFSC chemical
124
Wilson Interv, 16 Oct 58.
125
(1) Postscript on Ltr, Barker to Porter, 27 Feb 43. CWS 314.7 Barker Corresp, NATO, 1942-43.
(2) Barker, "War Is Not All Fighting," Armed Forces Chemical Journal, VII (October, 1953), 16-19, 27.
126
Coblentz Comments, 9 Jan61.
DECONTAMINATION UNIT FUNCTIONING AS A SHOWER

officer secured copies of ship manifests from SOS and base section
chemical officers so that he could have someone on hand to claim the
air force allotment as soon as the ship carrying the cargo docked.
Since the apparatus was also one of the items which presented almost
insuperable maintenance problems, supply was frequently complicated
by a large number of apparatus deadlined for repairs. In the month
before V-E Day the theater at last reached its quota of apparatus.127
Maintenance Problems
Chemical maintenance officers, like many others, got their first real
experience and learned their first logistics lessons in the Mediterranean
area. For one thing, the Mediterranean campaigns were among the
earliest of World War II, and in many instances the latest refinements
in equipment and materiel did not arrive there until after the peak
of combat activity. Then, too, adverse conditions, such as the damp
climate and rough terrain in Italy, made faults and defects far more
serious than they would have been elsewhere. Maintenance problems
127
(1) Statistical Summary, 31 May, 31 Jul 43, 25 Nov 43. (2) Sup Status of CWS Protective
Materiel in MTO. (3) Capone Interv, 24 Apr 58.
had their greatest impact in the forward areas where weapons, equip-
ment, and ammunition saw the heaviest use and where, by the time
they reached these positions, they had been heavily exposed to weather
and rough handling. Again chemical officers were forced to reorient
their thinking—repair, renovation, and rebuilding of materiel and
equipment had to take place wherever feasible and wherever needed
rather than, as planned, in some rear area shop. Again, improvisation
was the order of the day.
Theater chemical officers found maintenance and repair of the
power-driven decontaminating apparatus only one of their extremely
difficult maintenance problems. In the case of the apparatus the prime
difficulty was caused by the fact that four different manufacturers
produced the equipment, essentially a truck-mounted orchard
sprayer.128 Each manufacturer produced an item according to his own
specifications with the result that four stocks of spare parts had to
be maintained and that operating instructions varied according to the
product used. This situation was further complicated by the fact that
another apparatus mounted on skids rather than on a truck was also
supplied to the theater. The skid-mounted apparatus early proved
unsatisfactory because shortage of trucks made it immobile and mo-
bility was of great importance either for primary or secondary missions.
Depending on the local situation, maintenance and repair of the appa-
ratus was performed by using units or by chemical and ordnance
maintenance companies. Although the spare parts problem was largely
solved by the end of 1944, theater distribution of parts remained
difficult. The SOS (COMZ) Chemical Section sometimes found itself
in the peculiar situation of dealing with an overage of spare parts,
especially small items such as nuts and bolts, interchangeable among
apparatus, while field units failed in attempts to acquire an adequate
129
supply of the more critical parts which were not interchangeable.
128
For an account of development and procurement, see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Labora-
tory to Field, ch. XIV.
129
(1) Capone Interv, 24 Apr 58. (2) Padlon-McCormick Rpt, 24 Feb 44. (3) Brig Gen William
C. Kabrich, Chief Tech Div OCCWS, and Maj Francis B. Stewart [to CCWS], n.d., Rpt of Inspection
Trip to NATO, 22 Feb-3 Apr 44. CWS 314.7 Observer Rpts. (4) Ltr, AG Delta Base Sec to CG
COMZ MTOUSA, 19 Nov 44, sub: Study To Determine Necessary Replacement of CWS Major Items
of Equip. DBS AG 400.61 (DBSCW) in CWS MTO 400.6 Reclamations and Replacements. (5)
Ltr, AG MBS to CG MTOUSA, 19 Nov 44, sub: Study To Determine Necessary Replacement of CWS
Major Items of Equipment. MBS AG 47 (BMCML) in same file as ( 4 ) , above. (6) Ltr, Shadle,
CCmlO MTO, to CCWS, 22 Dec 44, sub: Rpt of Study To Determine Necessary Replacement of
CWS Major Items of Equip. CWS MTO 400.6 CWS. (7) Klaswick Interv, 6 Mar 59.
While the problem of maintaining the decontaminating apparatus

was tied in with the problem of shortages, maintenance of 4.2-inch
mortar shell and its propellant charges—in many ways the most critical
theater maintenance problem—was complicated by problems of ammu-
nition shortages, provision of service troops, packing and packaging,
and poor condition of supplies and equipment. Experience in the
maintenance of mortar shell is illustrative of similar experience with
M1 and M4 smoke pots, grenades, bombs and clusters, and gas masks.
From the outset of the Sicily Campaign, the Seventh Army Chemical
Section discovered chemical mortar shells in need of reconditioning.
The shells were corroded as a result of becoming wet while poorly
packaged. The nth Chemical Maintenance Company, which was
attached to Seventh Army for the campaign, was assigned the respon-
sibility of renovating and repacking shells in addition to its supply
and mortar repair duties.130 In the campaign on the Italian mainland
the situation was worse. Shell cartridges and fuzes proved to be
defective, shells needed cleaning, and, as Barker reported, "the powder
131
came in wet and got wetter." Barker set up a drying operation for
propellant charges at the army supply point, and Coblentz started
another at the base section. Both used blowers from collective pro-
tectors to force air through a heater fabricated from a 55-gallon drum.
The charges were hung on wooden rods in a box through which the
hot air passed. After the charges were thoroughly dry, the maintenance
crews replaced them in their original "ice cream" cartons and then
packed the cartons in German shell containers which were sealed to
be opened only at the mortar position. German containers were so
prized that Fifth Army Chemical Section made it a regular practice
to scavenge the battlefield for these items on the heels of the retreating
enemy.132 The drying operation was carried on at Naples in a series of
caves which the Germans had used for ammunition storage. A serious
fire, later attributed to an unknown store of German ammunition,
broke out in the caves and the fire and the explosions which followed
destroyed so many rounds of mortar shell, so many smoke pots, incen-
diary grenades, gas masks, and other chemical supplies that Fifth Army
was short until resupply could be effected. Coblentz resumed propel-
130
Humphreville, Rpt of Cml Warfare Opns, Sicilian Campaign.
131
Personal Ltr, Barker to Shadle, 20 Dec 43. CWS 314.7 Pers files, NATO.
132
(1) Ibid. (2) Barker to Hist Off, 11 Aug 59.
lant drying operations on the new supply with an improved steam coil
dryer.133
The number of bad fuzes which caused premature shell explosions
plagued both CWS and Ordnance throughout the war. During the
winter of 1943-44, Barker was forced to set up a line near San Pietro,
Italy, to disassemble all chemical mortar shell fuzes and check and
clean the components. Coblentz later established a similar line at
Naples.134
Meanwhile, the OCCWS made strenuous efforts to improve the
ammunition and the packing and packaging.135 A new cartridge was
provided. On 1 August 1943 ASF adopted a new method of packing
in which two unassembled rounds coated with cosmoline or a corrosion
preventative and with noses covered by vinylite sacks were packed in
136
a stained wooden box. Propellant charges and cartridges were packed
in sealed waterproof tin cans. A final packing method was developed
for all shipments after 1 February 1944 whereby the assembled round
was sealed in a laminated fiber cylinder before being packed in the
box.137 These packing methods lessened theater problems with respect
to newly received shell except when shipping damage resulted in leak-
ing containers or when shell was reclaimed or repacked in the theater.138
The 76 officers and 575 enlisted men of the CWS in North Africa
by the end of December 1942 knew their mission—to prepare for the
eventuality of gas warfare, to provide artificial smoke concealment, and
to support combat troops with chemical weapons and equipment—but
few of these men could have had much conception of what the mission
139
involved or how they were to accomplish it. They had no toxics and
no means to use them. The mechanical smoke generator was a new
133
(1) Barker Comments, 15 Dec 60. (2) Coblentz Comments, 9 Jan61.
134
Barker Comments, 15 Dec 60.
135
For general packaging improvement, see Brophy, -Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field,
ch. XVI.
136
Fifth Army Peninsular Base Section earlier sprayed white pine ammunition boxes with a tar mixture
so that they could more readily be camouflaged in forward positions (Coblentz Comments, 9 Jan61).
137
(1) Personal Ltr, Porter to Shadle, 5 Feb 44. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, NATO. (2) IOM, Col
B. L. Neis, Chief Conservation Br ASF, for Dir of Materiel ASF, 9 Feb 44, sub: Extracts from History
of 2d Cml Bn in Sicilian and Part of Italian Campaigns, 1 May to 9 Sep 43, Commenting Upon Pack-
aging 4.2-inch Cml Mortar Ammunition. ASF SPUPC 4051, in files Off Dir of Materiel ASF.
138
Such difficulties are illustrated in Proceedings, Board of Investigation, Lt Col Lawrence M. Hoover,
President, Hq Fwd Echelon PBS, 2 Oct 44. CWS MTO Folder 100 Accidental Explosion of 4.2-inch
HE Shell in MTO.
139
For strength figures, see Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, app. A.
item unfamiliar to most men of the CWS. The 4.2-inch chemical

mortar had not yet been officially recognized as a weapon which could
fire high explosives, and, in any case, there were neither mortar units
nor mortars in North Africa at the time. Some of the officers who
had come from England and a few from the United States were ac-
quainted with incendiary bombs, but not even all of these few had
seen such bombs or knew of the existence of the portable flame thrower.
Organizationally, the man who was soon to be theater chief chemical
officer then occupied a supreme headquarters position, as AFHQ chem-
ical officer, which was unlike any position ever held by or planned for
any chemical officer. No field army chemical section had been organ-
ized overseas since World War I. Supply procedures, still in the process
of formulation late in 1942, were known but vaguely if at all.
In this situation it is not strange that not only did an autonomous
CWS develop in the Mediterranean area but also that each element
of it developed its own independence. Such independence was en-
couraged by Shadle who believed in the importance of his staff
function and preferred to give strong field elements their head. The
organizational situation was, in turn, excellent seed ground for the
development of two chemical supply systems, one oriented toward
impetus from the front and the other toward impetus from the rear.
In the final analysis, the CWS in the North African-Mediterranean
theater accomplished its tasks and that accomplishment was largely
the product of great independence of spirit and a great willingness of
chemical officers and men at all levels to improvise and innovate—to
adapt the procedures and the equipment and the organization as each
new situation demanded.
CHAPTER IV
Theater Supply: Europe

Evolving the Theater CWS Supply System
European Theater—The Strategic and Logistical Pattern
The theater environment in which the Chemical Warfare Service,
European Theater of Operations, performed its supply tasks was
unusual in that the theater, after remaining uninvolved in ground
combat for nearly a year, directed the largest combat effort of the war.
While the Army Air Forces was on the offensive in several overseas
areas and the Navy was strategically and tactically involved in the
Pacific early in the war, the ETO ground forces in 1944 were still
striving to build up launching places for assaults. In the Pacific the
ground assaults began in August of 1942 and continued in November
in North Africa. At the end of June 1943 General MacArthur
launched his broad-scale offensive in the Southwest Pacific, and by
early winter the ground forces were fighting in the middle Pacific atolls.
The European theater, activated in June 1942, had theoretically been
responsible for early operations in North Africa, but the whole theater
organization had been primarily devoted, from the U.S. Army point
of view, to the conversion of the British Isles into a vast supply base
for the greatest ground offensive of the war. Two years, lacking a
few days, elapsed between activation of the theater and the initiation
of that offensive. During those two years the theater, and the Chemical
Warfare Service within the theater, built up the most comprehensive
overseas supply operation of the war. Under such circumstances it
would seem axiomatic that theater control of the technical services
would be more encompassing than in any other theater. The fact of
the matter is that the CWS ETO was the most independent of all
overseas CWS organizations. The CWS ETO developed a supply
THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE 137
system unlike any other in the European theater and unlike that of
any other CWS organization in any theater, although some supply
problems and their solutions were markedly similar to those of the
CWS MTO.
The CWS ETO was the largest overseas organization of the service.
The extent of CWS activity is shown by the fact that, at peak
strength, the number of CWS officers and men in the theater was
1
nearly twice as great as in any other theater or overseas area. The
service supplied every individual in this, the theater with the greatest
total strength, with complete gas warfare protection. And, although
chemical mortars were in action almost a year longer in the North
African-Mediterranean theater, the sixteen mortar battalions in the
ETO expended nearly twice as much ammunition as did those in the
Mediterranean.2 CWS ETO officers forecast the demands of this supply
job in terms of procedures which must be developed almost immediately
after establishment of a theater headquarters.
Supply Role of the Chief, CWS ETO

Soon after the activation of the theater and its special staff agencies,
Captain LeRoy, acting chief of the Storage and Issue Section of the
Supply Division, Office of the Chief, CWS ETO, laid the groundwork
for the CWS ETO supply system. Introducing the medium which
remained throughout the war as the principal means of disseminating
supply instructions, CWS ETO supply circular letters, LeRoy, by
authority of Colonel Montgomery, then Chief, CWS ETO, briefed
chemical supply officers on their duties and responsibilities and on the
theater chemical supply procedures. This initial supply circular letter
indicated that the Chief, CWS ETO, would: (1) exercise technical
control over CWS depots and chemical sections of general depots;
(2) set chemical stock levels for the theater; (3) allocate credits to
3
major theater commands; (4) distribute stocks arriving from the
1
For a comparison of CWS theater strengths, see Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, Appendix A.
2
(1) Ammunition Sup Rpt, 31 Jul 45. This was a feeder report prepared in OCCWS for the ASF
monthly progress report. (2) Ltr, CG ASF to CofOrd and CCWS, 3 Nov 43, sub: Instructions for
Preparation of Ammunition Sup of MPR. ASF SPX 319.1 (30 Oct 43) OB-P-SPDDL-MB-A.
3
"A credit consists of a notification to a Headquarters that specific items are available in definite
quantities in a specified depot subject to requisition [draft] by the Headquarters for whom the credit is
established. Materials which have been credited to a Headquarters may be withdrawn at the discretion
of the using Headquarters without reference to Tables of Basic Allowances or Tables of Allowances."
In CWS ETO Sup Circ Ltr 1, 30 Jul 42. CWS ETO 300.4/1 (26-7-42)SD. In ETO Admin 545A.
ports of debarkation among the depots; (5) order interdepot transfers;

(6) determine stock reporting and recording procedures; (7) receive
requests for supplies and services required for depot operations when
not available locally; and (8) provide policy for and control over
chemical service operations. The depot commanders or chemical supply
officers were charged with operating the depots, supervising service
operations, securing transportation not otherwise provided, and re-
porting to the Chief, CWS ETO.4
The chemical supply officers of the chemical supply sections which
had been established on 11 July 1942 in general depots at Ashchurch
and Bristol in Gloucestershire, at Thatcham in Berkshire, and at
Taunton in Somersetshire, and the commanding officers of chemical
depots which had been activated on 15 July at Savernake Forest in
Wiltshire and at Marston Magna in Somersetshire received these in-
structions, but lacked the means to comply. It was late in August
before the 6th Chemical Depot Company and the 51st Chemical Im-
pregnating Company, the only chemical service units in the theater,
5
could provide sufficient men to carry out the operating instructions.
Supply Status, July-December 1942

There was in any case not a large quantity of supply with which
to operate. By the end of July, the total accumulation of all supplies
in the theater amounted to only 181,979 long tons, and, judging from
the CWS portion of total supply arriving in the theater during the
first year, CWS stockages could hardly have exceeded 2,000 tons.6
The 10 August 1942 ETO materiel status report indicates the CWS
had received a smaller proportion—69 percent—of its authorized
supplies than any other service in the theater. Detailed listings in the
same report reveal that fewer than half the number of service gas
7
masks authorized was available.
By the end of September, the CWS ETO reported the supply pros-
pects as encouraging, but the actual status of stocks had not improved.
The average number of days of combat maintenance of all items was
4
(1) History, Sup Div, 42-43. (2) CWS ETO Sup Circ Ltr 1, 30 Jul 42. CWS ETO 300.4/1
(26-7-42)SD. (3) History, Sup System.
5
(1) History of CWS Depot Installation in the ETO, CWS ETO (May 42-Dec 43). ETO Admin
545A. (2) History, 6th Cml Depot. (3) History of the 51st Cml Processing Co.
6
(1) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 103. (2) Transportation Service ETO, Rpt, U.S. Army
Cargo Arrivals—UK: Percentage Composition by Serv, 10 Jan 44. ETO Admin 424.
7
Msg, 8724, CG SOS ETO (G-4) to AGWAR, 10 Aug 42. ETO Admin 311A.
24, but in view of the imbalance of stocks, ranging from 873 days
for the gas alarm to zero days for vesicant detector crayon, the
average was not significant. The significant fact was that even based
on a troop strength of 217,123 then reported in the United Kingdom,
there was a serious shortage of both individual and collective protection
items, such as the gas mask and the portable decontaminating appa-
ratus. This strength was slightly more than half the strength, 427,000,
for which ETO planners set requirements in the same month. The
real CWS supply level was estimated at 12 days for Class II (general
supplies issued against established allowances) items and practically
nil for all other classes. This real level was not more than one-sixth
of the lowest authorized theater supply level computed on the 427,000
strength figure for 60 days of supply. The figure for the number of
days of supply fluctuated from 60 to 90 days in the several versions of
8
the theater plan formulated in the fall of 1942. The quantity of supply
immediately available was critically low. Yet, the ETO was then
primarily a planning theater, and CWS ETO officers took the long-
range view that the immediate problem of supply shortages was im-
portant only insofar as the shortages reflected the need for planning
to meet the ultimate goal—supplying the theater at full strength.
Major Hayes, Chief, Requirements Division, CWS ETO, stated in
the October supply report to the War Department that the immediate
supply shortage resulted from the necessity for filling initial shortages
for all units and organizations in and arriving in the United Kingdom.
Filling initial shortages depleted stocks much more rapidly than re-
placing normal consumption, and Major Hayes was anxious to know
if plans should provide for the greater issue rate. If so, he pointed out,
the CWS ETO planners would have to know the approximate extent
of shortages among arriving troops. The CWS ETO was in a poor
position to forecast issue requirements even if only normal replacement
supply would be required. Planners did not know the theater priority
for supply, nor did they know how much shipping tonnage would be
allocated to CWS supply and how much of that allocation might be
lost because of extensive enemy submarine warfare. Further, they
had not been informed whether CWS ETO requisitions would be hon-
ored in the United States, and they had received no information on
8
(1) Actg CCWS Hq SOS ETOUSA to ACofS G-4 WDGS, thru channels, Initial G-4 Per Rpt,
From Arrival in Theater to 30 Sep 42, 2400 Hours, 1 Oct 42 (hereafter cited as G-4 Rept, 1 Oct 42).
CWS 319.1/3040 1942. (2) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 103-05.
the War Department ammunition supply policy. Apparently the

failure to provide information extended even to their own theater
headquarters. At the end of September, the CWS ETO was still plan-
ning on a 180-day level of supply for Class II instead of on the 90- to
60-day level mentioned above.9 Hayes urged the War Department to
provide requirements information at once since, despite the lack of
supplies, supply officers were convinced that the BOLERO and ROUNDUP
build-ups would result in the theater having to handle vast quantities
of materials within a few months.10
The CWS Credit System
Anticipating a greatly increased workload, CWS supply officers bent
their efforts to turning out a comprehensive supply plan. The com-
pleted plan made the Chief, CWS ETO, as stated above, directly
responsible for stating requirements and preparing theater requisitions
on the United States and for supervising the receipt and storage of
goods. In handling the third element of the supply system, distribu-
tion, LeRoy realized that the small number of men and the lack of
available facilities meant that distribution would have to be decentral-
ized for efficient operation. He accordingly based the distribution
system on the allocation of supply credits. The allocation of supply
credits to using units and organizations was an established War De-
partment procedure which the CWS in the United States had incor-
porated into its supply manual.11 Credit allocations were made spo-
radically throughout the Army's distribution system and in many
cases, as in corps area distribution in the United States, these allocations
were used early in the war to establish quota distributions for short
12
supply items of lesser importance than controlled items.
The CWS ETO anticipated a credit-employment trend in the
United States by using the credit system to govern the issue of con-
9
G-4 Rpt, 1 Oct 42.
10
ROUNDUP was an Allied plan for a cross-Channel attack in 1943. BOLERO was a more encompassing
plan for building up Allied strength in the British Isles for continental invasion and follow-through.
The two plans were complementary until TORCH (the North African plan) outmoded ROUNDUP.
BOLERO continued, through many modifications, as the build-up plan. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support,
I, ch. II.
11
(1) FM 100-10, 9 Dec 40. Revised 15 Nov 43. (2) FM 3-15, CWS, 17 Feb 41.
12
Controlled items were scarce and important items whose issue was controlled by the War Depart-
ment (OPD and/or ASF) on a priority or urgency basis. Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and
Strategy, 1940-43, p. 304.
trolled as well as less important items when, as early as 31 July 1942,

they made all Class II noncontrolled items and the majority of Class II
controlled items subject to credit allocations. Theater requirements
for Class IV (special supplies outside regular allowances) items were
not firm enough to warrant credit allocations, but procedures were
adopted to place ammunition (Class V) on credit in accordance with
authorized training allowances whenever a sufficient supply became
available.13 Total stocks of air chemical Class V were credited to the
Eighth Air Force from the inception of the system.14 The CWS ETO
thus inaugurated the only comprehensive credit distribution system
to be used in the theater.
Although administrative arrangements for the CWS ETO issue
system were complete by the end of July 1942, operating difficulties
prevented more than token allotment of credits during the remainder
of the year. The first of these difficulties arose because there was too
small a staff at all levels of theater organization to manage the system.
The great advantage in the credit issue system was that only one action,
the allocation of credits, had to be performed at theater or SOS head-
quarters level; the responsibility for requesting allocations and for
receiving issues from depots lay with major commands subordinate
to the theater commander. Issuing allocations to minor commands
would have involved theater headquarters in so much detail that the
purpose of decentralizing supply operations would have been defeated.
Throughout 1942, there were insufficient numbers of chemical supply
management officers at the subordinate major command levels to
handle the workload for their commands. The planned use of the new
base section organizations for area distribution of chemical supplies to
SOS units was likewise thwarted by the lack of chemical manpower.15
The expected major ground forces command comparable to Army
Ground Forces in the United States was never organized in the theater,
and no acceptable alternative co-ordinating command was available
until the activation of an army group headquarters late in 1943.
Although the Eighth Air Force became operational in August 1942
and although a bulk Class V credit was issued, the air force head-
13
(1) Ibid., pp. 303-04. (2) History, Sup System. (3) CWS ETO Sup Circ Ltr 4, 31 Jul 42.
CWS ETO 400-35 (28-7-42)SD. (4) G-4 Rpt, 1 Oct 42.
14
For more information on air chemical ammunition, see below, pp. 149-63.
The Eastern, Western, Southern, and Northern Ireland Base Sections were organized by SOS ETO
15
on 20 July 1942, but only with skeleton staffing. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 84-85.
quarters, which served as the theater air command, was not well enough
organized for the next several months to handle the issue accounting
problems which would result from crediting other supplies.16
The burden placed on the supply system by the requirements for
TORCH and the virtual suspension of the BOLERO build-up resulted
in a diversion of the supply effort from the long-range goal. Shipments
earmarked for TORCH began to replace BOLERO shipments in August.
In the ensuing three months almost the entire theater supply effort
was directed toward equipping units alerted for the TORCH operation
and, for two months thereafter, to setting up maintenance shipments
for North Africa. The seriousness of the supply situation was greatly
aggravated. The CWS ETO participated in the TORCH effort by
assuming the burden of detailed supply operations which included
receiving unit requisitions from alerted units, extracting requisition
items to the depots where stock was known to exist, and conducting
unit "show down" inspections to determine if requisitions had been
placed for basic equipment and if supplies had been received. To speed
up and to simplify the actual details of requesting and handling
materials, Captain LeRoy's section devised a multicarbon single control
form which could be used as a requisition, tally sheet, packing slip,
bill of lading, and notice of receipt. A Control Division, SOS, officer
visiting in the ETO saw the CWS forms in Supply Division, CWS ETO,
and took a number of them to Washington with him. About six
months later ASF published a "War Department Shipping Document"
which was similar to the CWS ETO form.17
Some conception of the magnitude of the TORCH supply tasks can
be derived from the fact that 10,020 U.S. troops sailed as part of
Eastern Task Force and 70,800 as part of Center Task Force in convoys
originating in the United Kingdom. Many of these troops had to be
equipped in part and almost all had to be inspected in the United
Kingdom. Also, the War Department directed the European theater
to set up twenty-two maintenance shipments of CWS supplies totaling
3,133 deadweight tons to be sent in twelve North African resupply
16
(1) History, Sup System. (2) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, 1, 84-85, 202-03. (3) Wesley F.
Craven and James L. Cate, eds., "The Army Air Forces in World War II," vol. II, Europe: TORCH to
POINTBLANK, August 1942 to December 1943 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp.
210-11, 216. (4) History, Cml Sec Eighth AF.
17
(1) History, Sup System. (2) Interv, Hist Off with Col LeRoy, 17 Apr 52. (3) WD SM 38-401,
Jul 43.
convoys between November 1942 and February 1943.18 Despite the

amount of this work, or perhaps because of it, the headquarters supply
officers were unaware of the inroads TORCH was making into BOLERO.
The CWS ETO supply policy consequently remained unchanged and,
indeed, supply officers found it possible to issue twenty credits for
19
local supply during the second half of calendar year 1942.
Logistical Data
While theater stocks were virtually exhausted when the ETO was
finally relieved of responsibility for North Africa in February 1943,
it was probably fortunate that there had been no change in CWS ETO
supply policy. The Allied leaders agreed at the Casablanca Conference
in January 1943 to reinstate BOLERO and, at the TRIDENT Conference in
Washington in May, they set targets for an approximately 1.5-million
troop strength to be ready for a cross-Channel operation about 1 May
1944. The CWS system, which had been predicated on such a build-up,
was therefore ready to go into more extensive operation when, about
the middle of 1943, BOLERO moved from crawl to sprint. But, in the
meantime, from November 1942 to May 1943, the theater staff, in-
cluding the CWS, had not been idle. The theater and SOS general
staffs drew up detailed plans of troop requirements to be used when
the order to proceed with the build-up was received, and they decided
how to allot forces for the air and supply effort and the eventual ground
effort. The G-4, SOS, compiled basic logistical planning factors, such
as required storage space per 1,000 men per 30 days' maintenance and
tonnage per day required to support given strengths. Colonel LeRoy,
now chief of the Supply Division, CWS ETO, realized that these
computations prepared at higher echelons would have little meaning
for the CWS as long as they lacked basic logistical data for CWS
items.20 The information which Hayes had urgently requested from
the United States in October had not yet been received since it was not
18
(1) History, Sup System. (2) History of CWS ETO Statistical Summaries. ETO Admin 545A.
(3) Leighton
Africa, and Coakley,
(3) Rowan Global
Comments, 16 Logistics
Dec 60. and Strategy, 1940—43, p. 437. (4) Howe, Northwest
19
(1) History, Sup System. (2) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 87-113.
20
LeRoy was acting chief of the Storage and Issue Section, Supply Division, from 27 July to 19
September 1942 and executive officer from that time until 5 December; he was acting chief of the Supply
Division from December 1942 to 17 February 1943, then on temporary duty in the United States until
4 April 1943 when, now a lieutenant colonel, he returned to the theater as chief of the Supply Division;
on 26 October 1943 he was reassigned and sent to the United States.
then available in the United States. Preparations for the TORCH opera-
tion had made CWS ETO planners understand how essential such
logistical data were for adequate supply planning. LeRoy accordingly
embarked on an extensive project for the assembly of CWS logistical
21
data.
The job done by Colonel LeRoy and the members of the Supply
Division on CWS logistical data was monumental. The work was
begun in December 1942, and distribution of the initial portions took
place in February and March 1943. In June 1943 the CWS ETO sent
out a complete set of compiled tables for the guidance of all supply
officers and of chemical officers at all echelons of command. The
compilation was divided into four sections. The first section provided
basic data, a list of all items for which the CWS had procurement,
storage, and issue responsibilities together with correct nomenclatures,
types of packaging, unit and package weights and cubages, storage and
shipping factors, and a list of all British and American cargo vehicles
and railway cars which showed weight and load limit and cargo meas-
urement for each type. The second section set forth the basis for
computing requirements, giving consolidated chemical supply listings
from tables of basic allowances, tables of allowances, tables of organiza-
tion and equipment, and lists of chemical expendable supplies. This
section also listed the basis for issue of ammunition and gave established
units of fire, days of supply, and replacement factors on specific items.
In the third section the logistic requirements of each type of organiza-
tion in the Army were analyzed in terms of initial issue of chemical
materiel, and the weight and cubage of each item authorized were
given together with total weights and cubages converted into total
tonnage and shipping space needed. Such special logistic problems as
the supply of impregnating materials and the proper calculation of
payloads per aircraft for chemical or incendiary aerial bombardment
were set forth in detail in the fourth section. The compilation closed
with a detailed account of the use of these data in planning operations.
This invaluable compilation was amended many times as required by
changes in equipment and organization, and an extensive revision was
issued, section by section, in 1944. It was the foundation of all CWS
21
(1) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 113-23. (2) History of CWS Logistics in the ETO (here-
after cited as History, Logistics). (3) For logistical data problems in North Africa, see above,
Chapter III.
ETO logistical planning throughout the war, even after the issuance
of the CWS supply catalogs which covered some of the same area.22
The CWS ETO logistical data compilation served, on the one hand,
as the basis for computing total theater chemical materiel requirements
according to present or expected strengths, and on the other hand, as
a source of shipment, storage, and distribution information, including
a rapid means of calculating credit allocations once the materiel arrived
in the theater. In March 1943 the decentralization of the supply dis-
tribution process was encouraged by extending the credit allocation
plan to cover all classes of supply.23 While the basic credit system
procedures were thus set, the CWS ETO was well aware of the fact
that the system would be workable only when field elements were
prepared for storage, issue, and accounting.
Storage and Issue

Storage and issue was one of the original CWS ETO problems.
Supply authorities, as mentioned above, had a difficult time staffing the
depots and depot sections. This problem was somewhat alleviated, at
least in the management sphere, when supply officers arrived in Sep-
tember 1942 to replace the troop officers who had been managing the
depots and depot sections. This benefit was almost immediately can-
celed out, however, by the transfer of some of these officers and most
of the enlisted men to the North African forces then being assembled.
The 6th Chemical Depot Company, the only such unit in the theater,
also embarked for North Africa. The 51st Chemical Impregnating
Company became the sole theater chemical service unit. The staff
reduction was so drastic that the chemical section of the general depot
at Taunton was left with one officer and no enlisted men, and the
chemical section of the general depot at Thatcham with two officers
and no enlisted men. The chemical section of the Ashchurch general
depot had one officer and eleven enlisted men while the chemical section
22
(1) History, Logistics. (2) Sup Div CWS SOS ETO, Cml Warfare Logistics, various portions
dated from 1 Feb 43 to Jun 43. ETO Admin 545A. (3) Sup Div OCCWO Hq SOS ETO and Hq
COMZ ETO, CWS Logistics, various portions dated from. 15 Jan 44 to 10 Aug 44. ETO Admin 544.
(4) Sup Circ Ltr 31, CWS SOS ETO, 18 Mar 43, sub: Computation of Rqmts. SOSCW 471.6/11
(15 Mar 43)SD. ETO Admin 545A. (5) ASF Cml Warfare Sup Catalog, prepared by Field Rqmts
Div OCCWS, 1 Apr 44. (This catalog is an assembly of various catalogs and lists on which publica-
tion began 23 September 1943.)
23
Sup Circ Ltr 31, CWS SOS ETO, 18 Mar 43.
146THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE
in the Bristol general depot had two officers and six enlisted men.24 The
heavy demands of the TORCH preparations could not have been met
but for the help of British pioneer troops and civilians. The British
could not provide manpower on a permanent basis since their own
manpower shortages were severe and since they operated on a strict
priority system. The labor problem was further complicated by a lack
of facilities. Storage buildings provided were not well lighted, floors
were rough and uneven, and in one of the designated locations the
maximum safe floor load was so low as to preclude efficient storage
operation. In another depot the chemical section was assigned space
on the fifth floor of a building with only one small elevator. Only
one depot possessed car-level loading platforms, and the lack of
mechanized equipment and even roller conveyors meant that all
lifting, loading, sorting, and stacking had to be performed manually.
This bad situation was made worse by a lack of adequate communica-
tions between the SOS headquarters, the ports, and the depots and,
until January 1943, the absence of maintenance facilities. The one
chemical maintenance company in the theater was being used in depot
operation, and the second company did not arrive until November
1943.25
The CWS ETO storage manpower situation reached a low in
December of 1942. From the supply handling point of view it was
fortunate that theater stocks were virtually exhausted and that few
shipments were arriving. The 7th Chemical Depot Company arrived
in the theater in December and by early January had been parceled
out into detachments to operate the two chemical depots and four
chemical sections of general depots which had been established six
months earlier, and one general depot chemical section which had
been established at Sudbury Egginton, Derby, Staffordshire, in De-
cember. At the time these detachments were sent out, a new chemical
depot, soon to be converted into a chemical section of an ordnance
depot, was activated at Cinderford, Gloucestershire. Another general
24
History of CWS Installations in the ETO, CWS ETO, Jul 42-Dec 44 (hereafter cited as History,
Depot Installations). ETO Admin 545A.
25
(1) History, Depot Installations. (2) Personal Ltr, Rowan to Waitt, 5 May 43. CWO-400/32
Sec in CWS 314.7 Pers Files, ETO, Oct 42-Jan 44. (3) G-4 Rpt, 1 Oct 42. (4) For maintenance
companies in the theater, see Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, Appendix H-9. As indicated in
Appendix H-7, one chemical maintenance company (aviation) arrived in the theater in August 1943.
depot chemical section was activated at Moneymore, Northern Ireland,

26
before the end of January.
While the Allied leaders had agreed in January to renew the BOLERO
build-up, tonnage arrivals remained light for the first three months of
1943, the March incoming CWS shipments amounting to only 25 long
tons. The April figure suddenly shot up to 826 long tons of CWS
supplies, and, after the official rescheduling of BOLERO targets in May,
the June figure reached 4,004 long tons.27 Such a cargo inflow was
certainly more than one depot company could handle, particularly
since work had been increased by the establishment of another chemical
depot in Sudbury, Suffolk, on 1 June 1943. On 1 July 1943, the
handling situation was relieved by the arrival of the 60th Chemical
Depot Company. The two companies were then able to operate with
a maximum of five detachments each. Incoming tonnage rates soared,
plummeting occasionally, but reaching more than 9,000 tons in
September, more than 12,000 in December, and a peak of 34,604 tons
in June 1944. The handling situation would have grown rapidly
worse again but for the arrival of new units and a comprehensive
depot installation plan which had been laid down in May 1943.28
The unit complement for the build-up period in the British Isles
was rounded out during the last six months of 1943. One chemical
depot company (aviation) arrived in July and two in August. The
65th Chemical Depot Company disembarked in England about 6
October, and the 761st Chemical Depot Company (Aviation) followed
a few days later. Three chemical depot companies, the 9th, the 61st,
and the 64th, completed the list in November. Meanwhile, the SOS
depot plan brought about the establishment of chemical sections in
general depots at Barry, Glamorganshire, in July, and at Hilsea, Hamp-
shire, at Westbury, Wiltshire, and at Histon, Cambridgeshire, in No-
vember. Chemical ammunition depots were activated at Shepton
Mallet, Somersetshire, and at Loton Deer Park, Alderbury, Shropshire,
in November. From December 1943 until after the invasion of the
Continent six months later, the CWS ETO, in 9 of the theater's 18
general depots and in 6 of its 54 branch and ammunition depots,
managed more than 700,000 square feet of closed storage space, more
26
History, Depot Installations.
27
Summary of Army Cargo Arrivals by Port Area and Serv, Statistical Summary prepared by Program
Div SOS ETO, n.d. ETO Admin 416.
28
(1) Ibid. (2) History, Depot Installations.
CHEMICAL WARFARE DEPOT, LOTON DEER PARK, ENGLAND
than one million square feet of open storage space, more than 50,000
square feet of shop space, and space for 68,400 long tons of ammu-
29
nition. The CWS ETO stood fourth, approximately equal with the
Engineers, among the technical services in operation of both closed
and open space. The only service other than Ordnance and Engineers
operating shop space and the only service other, than Ordnance oper-
29
(1) History, Depot Installations. Exact totals of storage space given are as follows:
(2) ICAF SR 46-8, Rpt of Committee on Production, Jan-Jun 1946 course, sub: Transportation,
Storage, Packaging, cites report (of travel) of Col. A. B. Drake to the United Kingdom, 1943, which
gives the following total figures for the CWS ETO:
(3) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 158.

ating ammunition storage space, the CWS ETO was a poor second in
30
these two categories.
Air Chemical Supply

After eighteen months of operations in the theater, the CWS ETO
was at last in a position to handle supply adequately. Admirable pro-
cedures had been established; facilities and installations were satisfac-
tory if not ideal; and sufficient manpower was available to implement
the procedures and to staff the installations. Problems for the remaining
six months of the build-up period, as well as for the major part of the
subsequent operational period on the Continent, centered about the
provision of specific items of supply and the operation of specific
supply plans. The CWS ETO was not without experience in these
problem areas. While most of the activities of the theater had been
directed toward build-up, the CWS ETO had received its logistics
baptism of fire in the preparations for the North African campaigns,
and the steadily increasing combat activities of the Army Air Forces
kept the theater in operational status throughout the build-up period.
The CWS ETO was heavily involved in the Army Air Forces efforts
for two reasons: (1) the CWS provided the incendiary and fire bombs
which became major weapons for both bomber and fighter elements
of the air arm; and (2) the greater part of the gas warfare retaliatory
effort was to be concentrated in the air forces should the enemy initiate
gas warfare.31
Founding the Air Chemical Supply System, ETO
CWS computations of air chemical munitions requirements for the
European theater were begun in the United States before the activation
of the theater organization. Colonel Kellogg initiated the requirements
work immediately upon his assignment as Eighth Air Force chemical
30
The Drake report, cited above, lists:
For description of incendiary and fire bombs, see below, Chapter XVII.
31
officer and the organization of his chemical section in April 1942.

Colonel Kellogg's section, proceeding on inadequate data as to aircraft
strength and capacity, submitted its requirements estimate for the
second half of 1942 on16 May, a few days before the Eighth Air
Force headquarters moved to an overseas staging area. On reaching
England in June, Colonel Kellogg realized that the probable inaccuracy
of the May submission was not significant since there was little hope
32
of acquiring any substantial stockage of munitions during 1942.
He at once inaugurated a threefold program in the supply field. His
objectives were: first, to secure materiel, such as gas defensive equip-
ment, aerial incendiaries, toxics, and smoke munitions, from the
United States, or, as an interim measure, from the British; second,
to acquire or construct storage space for toxics and incendiaries; and
third, to provide a firm basis for supply planning and requirements
33
computations. While the air forces in the theater, like the Army
Air Forces headquarters in the United States, were tending to become
independent in matters of supply, the whole CWS organization in the
theater was vitally involved in all the elements of the Eighth Air Force
program because the theater CWS was charged with co-ordination
of all theater chemical warfare policy, including liaison with the
British. Also, the SOS section of the CWS ETO was already providing
storage for air chemical supplies and had begun, as noted above, to
work on air chemical logistical data.
The accomplishment of all phases of the Eighth Air Force chemical
supply program was fraught with difficulties. The only incendiary
bombs in production in the United States in this early period were
the small 4-pound magnesium and steel case bombs. Most of the
magnesium bombs were going to the British under lend-lease, and all
production was slowed by the scarcity of magnesium. The steel case
bomb was not an effective incendiary for use on many targets, and it
was consequently rarely issued to the theaters of operations. The
32
(1) History, Cml Sec Eighth AF.. (2) History, Hq Eighth AF, vol. II, pt. 2, 17 Aug 42 to 1
May 43. Eighth AF 520.01-36, 17 Aug 42-1 May 43. (3) For CWS organization in the ETO Army
Air Forces, see above, Chapter II.
33
(1) History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. (2) Capt John F. Crowther, Cml Sec Eighth AF, to Col
Kellogg, CmlO Eighth AF, Staff Study, Study of Tactical Rqmts for New Types of Cml Bombs,
27 Jul 42. Eighth AF 471.6 in app. C, History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. (3) Memo, CmlO Eighth AF for
ACofS G-3 Eighth AF, 11 Aug 42, sub: Summary of Requests for Cml Warfare Servs Munitions.
App. C, History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. (4) Memo, CmlO Eighth AF for CofS, ACsofS G-3, G-4
Eighth AF, 28 Jul 42, sub: Conf With Principal RAF Officers of 42 Group, Reading, England.
Eighth AF 519.225, 4 Jul 42-May 45.
M47 100-pound bomb with an incendiary filling was satisfactory, but

it was late in 1942 before a successful filling could be produced in
34
quantity. Quantity production of toxics was just beginning, and
not even token shipments to the European theater were authorized
until January 1943.35 Defensive equipment and service supplies were
no more available to the air forces than they were to the ground and
service forces, and all stockages in and destined for the European
theater were subject to the demands of the North African campaigns.
Existing demands on the British supply system had reached monumental
proportions, but the British were in a position to be of some assistance
to the chemical preparedness of the United States forces.
Air Toxic Supply

The United Kingdom had the capacity to produce toxics, but pro-
duction had almost come to a standstill for lack of containers in which
to store the finished product. The small British supply of corrosion-
resistant steel, the ideal container material, was diverted to other high-
priority purposes. While the chances of obtaining such steel were
slightly better in the United States, rigorous shipping priorities forbade
the shipment of empty containers.36 As to munitions for the delivery
of toxics on the enemy, the United States had the M47 100-pound
bomb which was considered to be satisfactory and which was available
in limited quantities. The British had a 65-pound and a 30-pound
bomb, but the Eighth Air Force was skeptical about their usefulness;
furthermore, the bombs did not lend themselves to economical opera-
tional loading in American aircraft. Neither the United States nor
Great Britain had a bomb cluster for toxics, but the British 250-pound
bomb was considered acceptable pending the availability of larger
bombs or clusters of smaller bombs. The British 500-pound bomb for
filling with nonpersistent agents was considered so highly effective that
air chemical officers requested a comparable American munition. Smoke
tanks adaptable to aerial vesicant spray missions were the American
500-pound, available in small quantities but virtually obsolete because
of the scarcity of aircraft on which it could be carried, the American
34
See Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to field, chs. VIII and XV.
35
Personal Ltr, Waitt to Kellogg, 11 Jan 43.
36
(1) Waitt to Kellogg, 11 Jan 43. (2) Rpt of Visit of Col W. Hepburn Chamberlain and Capt
John L. Armitage to ETO, 18 Mar 44 (hereafter cited as Chamberlain-Armitage Rpt). CWS 314.7
Observer Rpts.
2,000 pound, which was not expected to be available in quantity for

some time, and the British 400-pound Flying Cow, a bomb which
sprayed smoke or toxics when released from an airplane. The British
were able to manufacture the Flying Cow for the American Air
Forces, and it was consequently scheduled to be the mainstay of the
potential for spraying toxics from aircraft until a better munition
37
should become available.
In addition to supplying the Flying Cow and a small reserve of toxics,
the British agreed to provide their 30-pound bomb with an incendiary
fill, their 250-pound bomb with an oil incendiary fill, and about 6,500
of the 500-pound phosgene-filled bombs. Also, since the Eighth Air
Force was occupying air stations established by the Royal Air Force
(RAF), Colonel Montgomery was able to get the RAF to leave their
protective equipment and decontaminating facilities intact when va-
cating the stations. The British further agreed to manufacture some
protective, warning, and detection supplies for the United States
Army forces, including the air forces.38
While the total quantity of British chemical warfare materials
furnished the United States Forces was small, and while only token
deliveries were made in 1942, awareness of British capability and
British reserves was nearly the only reassuring gleam in the dark
chemical supply picture from July 1942 to July 1943. The entire
gas warfare retaliatory potential depended on British resources for
most of that period. CWS ETO officers measured the British contribu-
tion as much or more in terms of their willingness to co-operate and
their readiness to provide technical and operating experience data as
39
they did in their provision of supplies under reverse lend-lease.
Through the provision of such technical advice as well as actual labor
and materials, the British helped to solve the dilemma with respect to
toxic storage. Late in 1941 and early in 1942, the British experimented
with the storage of toxics in concrete tanks only to reject that method
in the spring of 1942 because the toxics seeped through the concrete.
37
(1) Crowther Staff Study, 27 Jul 42. (2) Memo, CmlO Eighth AF for ACofS 6-3 Eighth AF,
11Aug 42, sub: Summary of Requests for Cml Warfare Servs Munitions. (3) Memo, CmlO Eighth
AF for CmlO's Eighth AF, 11 Dec 42, sub: Cml Warfare Munitions on Order for 1943. In app. C,
38
(1) Memo for File, CmlO Eighth AF, 24 Jun 42, sub: Conf, 22 Jun 42. (2) Ltr, Chief Sup
Div CWS ETO to General Purchasing Agent SOS ETO, 2 Sep 43, sub: Rpt of Material Procured by
U.S. Forces in the U.K. SOSCW 400.12/121-Sec (2 Sep 43)SD. (3) History, Cml Sec Eighth AF.
39
(1) Rowan Interv, 26 Sep 58. (2) Magness Interv, 5 May 59.
Almost immediately after the rejection, however, scientists of the

Imperial Chemical Industries working for the Ministry of Supply and
the Ministry of Aircraft Production hit upon a simple method of lead-
lining the concrete tanks to provide a seepage-proof seal. The British
quickly constructed a number of lead-lined tanks at three installations
to store some of their own reserves, and they offered to build similar
facilities for the U.S. Eighth Air Force. Working with the RAF, the
Ministry of Supply, and the Imperial Chemical Industries under reverse
lend-lease authorizations, Kellogg and Lt. Col. Albert H. Hooker,
Chemical Officer, VIII Air Force Service Command, selected sites for
advance chemical parks at Barnham, Suffolk, and at Melchbourne Park,
near Kettering, Northamptonshire, and the Imperial Chemical Indus-
tries agreed to construct three 500-ton tanks at each location. Hard-
standings and Romney huts were also built at each site for the storage
of 4,000 tons of chemical ammunition and 6,000 tons of incendiaries.
The VIII AFSC later installed American toxic and incendiary filling
apparatus at both locations. The tanks at the Barnham site were com-
pleted and filled by the end of 1943 and, while the Melchbourne Park
facility was not completed until the spring of 1944, 1,215 tons of toxics
40
were in storage there in December 1943.
Although the construction of the advance chemical parks repre-
sented a major achievement, Army Air Forces chemical officers never
assumed, even at the outset, that these parks would solve the problems
of storage space for air chemical supplies. For example, against the
air park capacity of 3,000 tons of bulk toxics and 8,000 tons of chem-
ical ammunition, the initial estimate of requirements for bulk persistent
toxics alone was 34,000 tons.41 Furthermore, the air chemical officers
were concerned not only with storage of reserve and normal station
issue supplies but also with the daily munitions requirements of aerial
operations. Combat operations requirements, principally of incendiary
40
(1) History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. (2) Ltr [CG USSTAF] to CG AAF (Attn: Air CmlO)
[1 Aug 44], sub: Status of Cml Cos, Air Opns and Cml Depot Cos, Aviation Assigned to Orgns of
USSTAF in Europe. Eighth AF 225 Cmls. (3) Memo, CmlO Eighth AF for CofS, ACsofS G-3 and
G-4 Eighth AF, 28 Jul 42, sub: Conf With Principal RAF Officers of 42 Group, Reading, England.
(4) History of VIII AFSC (Eighth Strategic Air Depot Area), vol. I, Narrative. Eighth AF 528.01,
17 Feb 42-1 Mar 44. (5) Memo, no signature for Col Kellogg et al., 3 Nov 42, sub: Notes on a
Mtg to Discuss FFD, 1 and 2 held at Special Products Dept on 30th Oct 1942. Eighth AF 226.9(8)
Cml Warfare Confs. (6) Memo for File, CmlO Eighth AF, 11 Mar 43, sub: Conf on Advanced
Cml Parks. Eighth AF 400.24 in Eighth AF 226.9(8) Cml Warfare Confs.
Memo, CmlO Eighth AF for CmlO's Eighth AF, 11 Dec 42, sub: Cml Warfare Munitions on
41
Order for 1943.

bombs, had to be immediately available at each operational base from

August 1942, when the Eighth Air Force initiated its famous raids on
the Continent, until the end of the war in Europe. In the first month,
42
6.1 tons of incendiary bombs were expended. Despite the fact that
Ordnance was officially charged with storage of toxic munitions and
usually with the storage of incendiaries, air chemical officers found it
almost as difficult, for the whole of the combat period, to find and
maintain adequate storage space as it was to obtain munitions.
As supplies began rolling in, in the second half of 1943, air force
storage facilities were soon filled. For example, while 18,875 mustard-
filled loo-pound bombs were brought into SOS depots and 12,000 into
air force depots between April and July 1943, 205,485 toxic-filled M47
bombs were in theater storage by the end of December.43 Despite the
fact that all ammunition storage was an Ordnance function, SOS CWS
and even RAF chemical ammunition depots initially assumed most of
the load of air force chemical storage. Eventually so much of the air
force storage backlog was in SOS depots that the chemical section of
the ordnance ammunition depot at Cinderford became in fact, if not
in name, a Ninth Air Force depot operated by air chemical service
units.44 The largest SOS CWS ammunition storage facility, that at
Loton Deer Park, was designed primarily for incendiary storage, sec-
ondarily for toxic storage, mostly of air force munitions, and only
45
incidentally for the storage of ground forces ammunition.
A comparison of ground and air forces toxic stockages in the theater
is illuminating, both because it indicates the scope of the storage prob-
lems and because it states retaliatory capability in terms of munitions
available. The level of ground forces toxic artillery ammunition, all
of which was stored by Ordnance, increased only slightly from De-
cember 1943, at approximately 301,000 rounds, until March 1945
42
(1) History of the Cml Warfare Sec 1st Bombardment Div, Aug 42-Feb 44. Eighth AF 525.
(2) Statistical Summary of Eighth AF Opns, European Theater, 17 Aug 42-8 May 45. Eighth AF
520.308A, Archives of AF Hist Off Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
43
(1) Baldwin, Bingham, and Pritchard, Readiness for Gas Warfare in Theaters of Operations, app. B.
(2) Draft, History of Eighth AF—History of Special Staff Sec, May to Dec 43. Eighth AF 520.01-
48. (3) History, VIII AFSC (Eighth Strategic Air Depot Area), vol. I, pt. I, Narrative.
44
(1) IOM, Col Hooker, CmlO VIII AFSC, for Col Stuart, Plans Sec, 3 Feb 43, sub: Supplies for
Advanced Air Depots. (2) Ltr, Chief Admin IX AFSC to CG ASC USSTAF, 17 Mar 44, sub: Use of
Savernake Forest as an Advanced Cml Warfare Class V Depot for Ninth AF Stations. (3) IOM, Col
Baum, CmlO USSTAF, for Dir of Pers, Dir of Sups, Dir of Admin Serv USSTAF, 21 Aug 44, sub:
Transfer of Cml Depot Cos (Colored). All in Eighth AF 519.225-4 Jul 42-May 45.
45
History of CWS Storage Depot C-900 at Loton Deer Park, Alderbury, Shropshire. ETO Admin
545A.
when the number of rounds stored nearly doubled. The February 1945
stockage of 308,352 rounds contained approximately 895.45 long tons
of toxic filling while the March stockage of 568,225 rounds contained
about 1,500 long tons. Nearly a million rounds in storage at the end
of the war in Europe contained only about 650 long tons more filling
than the March stockage because the type of shell acquired after
March included a small payload. The stock of 4.2-inch chemical
mortar toxic shell, also stored by Ordnance but of more direct concern
to the CWS, was built up from approximately 26,000 rounds in
December 1943 to more than 60,000 rounds in March 1944 and then,
suddenly, to 137,732 rounds in February 1945. This peak stock, less
than half of the 345,000-round peak authorization level, contained
approximately 375 tons of toxics. Bulk persistent toxics which, except
for the amount stored in the air chemical park tanks, were stored in
ton containers and 55-gallon drums, rose from about 6,600 to 8,200
long tons from December 1943 to April 1945. In April 1945 aerial
munitions stocks amounted to 306,963 100-pound bombs, 13,081 500-
pound bombs, and 35,898 1,000-pound bombs with a total of approxi-
mately 16,785 long tons of toxic filling.46
The problem of toxic storage in England was finding, improving,
and managing storage space. The difficulties encountered in other
theaters, such as corroding and leaking munitions, were not experienced
to any significant extent. General Waitt and chemical officers in the
theater examined toxic munitions stocks in the theater at the end of
the war in Europe. They found a small number of M47 bombs, about
one percent, that were leaking persistent gas. A small percentage of
the remainder were seriously corroded, and a large percentage slightly
corroded. The leaking and seriously corroded bombs were destroyed
while the rest were cleaned and painted and prepared for shipment out
of the theater. A few of the 55-gallon drums were leaking and others
needed cleaning and painting. The cleaning and painting process had
been continuous during storage in the theater. No serious defects were
found in other toxic munitions.47
Despite the problem of finding space for the storage of aerial toxic
munitions, the level of supply mentioned above was by no means over-
46
Baldwin, Bingham, and Pritchard, Readiness for Gas Warfare in Theaters of Opns, app. B.
47
(1) Ltr, Maj J. T. Herndon, Tech Div CWS ETO to Gen Waitt, 4 Jun 45, sub: Shipment of U.K.
Base Stored CWS Toxic Munitions to the Pacific Theater. CWS ETO CWOTD 471/8 in CWS 314.7
Observer Rpts. (2) Chamberlain-Armitage Rpt.
generous. Though ground toxic munitions were available, they were

considered only supplementary to the basic retaliation potential. The
CWS ETO based its gas warfare retaliatory potential on the bomb
stockage plus a large portion of the bulk gas intended to fill aerial
munitions, and chemical planners reckoned this aerial supply as capable
of supporting only 14 operational days of retaliatory gas warfare.48
Had the Germans resorted to gas warfare, the possible 2- or even 4-
week duration of the initial operation would have been a short time in
which to move additional supplies from the United States. Indeed, in
May 1944 air planners estimated that 45 days would be required to
move a stock of the principal toxic weapon, persistent-gas-filled M47
bombs, into the theater. At that time, less than a month before D-day,
the theater command considered the threat of German initiation of
gas warfare serious enough to order combat-ready toxic bomb loadings
sent to operating air stations so that a retaliatory strike could be
launched in a maximum of 24 hours.49 When the continental invasion
produced no indications of the initiation of gas warfare, no new prep-
arations for retaliation were made in the fall of 1944. On two subse-
quent occasions, in December 1944 and near the end of the war,
theater planners feared that Germany might turn to gas warfare as a
last-ditch defense of the homeland although Rowan believed there
was little danger. Aside from the increase in toxic munitions stocks
in the early months of 1945, no further aerial bombardment retaliatory
preparations were made in response to the last-ditch threat.50
Incendiary Bombs
The CWS ETO was unable for most of 1942 to supply incendiary
bombs.51 The British 30- and 250-pound incendiaries were therefore
48
(1) Interv, Hist Off with Col Baum, formerly CmlO USSTAF, 5 Dec 45. (2) Estimates of aerial
gas warfare capabilities varied. Chemical Section, 12th Army Group, believed the theater air forces
capable of supporting 21 operational days. Leggin Interv, 22 Nov 45.
49
(1) Memo for Red, Baum, 18 May 44, sub: Notes on the State of Preparedness of USAAF in the
U.K. for Retaliatory and Sustained Effort in the Event Gas Warfare Is Initiated by the Enemy. Eighth
AF 519-253, 1944. (2) Baum Interv, 5 Dec 45. (3) Miller Interv, 2 Feb 60. Air Chief Marshal Sir
Trafford Leigh-Mallory, AEAF commander, was designated Air Commander-in-chief for the initial
phase of the continental operation. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., "The Army Air
Forces in World War II," vol. III, Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1951), pp. 80-82.
50
Notes by Col M. T. Hankins on Conf of CmlO's at Dillingen, Germany, 29 Apr 45. CWS 314.7
Observer Rpts.
51
For a discussion of European theater development and employment of incendiary bombs see below,
Chapter XVII.
adopted for American use, but the British were little more prepared
than the Americans to provide supply in the quantities soon demanded.
Kellogg obtained 10,000 American thin cased, 100-pound (M47)
bomb bodies late in 1942 and had them filled with an incendiary mix-
ture by air chemical service units in England. Just about the time this
field improvisation was completed, a substantial supply of American
100-pound clusters of 4-pound magnesium bombs began to arrive.
Just as the incendiary supply situation was beginning to look good,
air chemical officers discovered that the 100-pound clusters were
defective. They were forced to withdraw the clusters from issue.52
Beginning with successful incendiary raids on German industrial
targets in occupied France during the summer of 1943, incendiary
bomb expenditures, especially of the M47 bomb, then available from
the United States, reached large proportions in the fall of 1943 and
by December accounted for 40 percent of the total American bomb
load.53 The Chemical Section, VIII AFSC, took extraordinary meas-
ures to meet operational demands. They routed incendiary shipments
from the United States directly from the port of debarkation to the
operational air stations. Short supply M126 fuzes for the M47 were
airlifted from the United States. Still there were shortages and some
of the tonnage expended included the alternative British oil-perspex-
filled 250-pound bomb. At the end of December 1943, M47 stocks
were double the tonnage expended in that month, and 1,424 tons of the
new 500-pound aimable cluster, M17, had been received. Nearly
16,000 of the 100-pound clusters of 4-pound bombs, now capable of
modification by a special fuze to permit cluster opening at an altitude
safe to carrying aircraft, were on hand. Seven other clusters of small
bombs and the British 250-pound bomb were also stocked in small
quantities, in one case as low as six tons. By January 1944 the M17
cluster, which contained no 4-pound magnesium bombs, had reached
VIII Bomber Command stations, and within a week, on 11 January
1944, three groups of the 1st Bombardment Division dropped M17's
on Wilhelmshaven. Although bombardiers had to learn its aiming
52
(1) History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. (2) History, Cml Warfare Sec 1st Bombardment Div. (3)
Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col John A. Martin, formerly OpnsO Cml Sec Eighth AF, 28 Aug 51.
53
Statistical Summary of Eighth AF Opns, European Theater.
characteristics, the new cluster proved to be an accurate weapon of

54
great power.
The long awaited M76 500-pound bomb filled with incendiary gel
arrived in the theater early in 1944, but operational results of this
weapon, dubbed the Block Burner, were disappointing. While the
M76 was used with moderate success against Berlin on 6 March 1944,
subsequent operations proved that target opportunities for so large a
bomb, which contained a low percentage of incendiary fuel with
respect to total weight, were few in number. By September the Eighth
Air Force had no plans for use of this munition, and a large portion of
the stock was turned over to the Ninth Air Force whose tactical targets
55
were more suitable.
The 1944 and 1945 expenditures of incendiary bombs were spotty—
the highest month of Eighth Air Force expenditure was October 1944
at 11,337.1 tons while the next month was the lowest at 566.4 tons.
The monthly average expenditure for 1944 was nearly 5,200 tons and
for 1945 nearly 6,400 tons, approximately one-seventh the monthly
average of all Eighth Air Force bombs on target. The M17 cluster
comprised about 70 percent of the expenditure, and most of the re-
mainder was the M47. Although on one occasion air chemical officers
had to request that M17 shipments be rushed, supply was normally
excellent. The curtailed usage of M76 and M47 bombs resulted in
stockages beyond the authorized theater 75-day level, and supply
officers recommended, in the fall of 1944, that further shipments from
the United States be halted. They did not propose that the theater
overage be returned since variation in operations or types of targets
56
available might again have meant a large demand.
54
(1) History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. (2) Cml Sec VIII AFSC, Rpt, Incendiaries, Eighth AF, 1943,
Jun-Dec, prepared by Statistical Contl Eighth AF, 7 Jan 44. Eighth AF 519.225-1. (3) Hist, Cml
Warfare Sec 1st Bombardment Div.
55
(1) History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. (2) CG USSTAF to CG AAF, Rpt, Monthly Ammunition
Rpt, 6.Oct 44. Eighth AF 519.225-1. (3) Ltr, CG USSTAF to CG AAF [5 Aug 44], sub: Level of
Sup of Incendiary Bombs. Eighth AF 519.225-1.
56
(1) Ltr, CG Base Air Depot Area ASC USSTAF to CG ASC USSTAF, 16 Sep 44, sub: Level of
Sup of Incendiary Bombs. (2) IOM, Baum, CmlO USSTAF, for Dir of Sup, Dir of Opns, OrdO,
and AG USSTAF, 4 Sep 44, sub: Rqmts for M76 500-lb. Incendiary Bombs. (3) Msg, Doolittle
[CG Eighth AF] to AWW, 3 Sep 44. (4) IOM, Baum for Dir of Sup USSTAF, 3 Oct 44. (5) Ltr,
CmlO USSTAF to Chief, Sup Div CWS COMZ ETO, 14 Oct 44, sub: USSTAF Incendiary Bomb
Rqmts. (6) Msg, CG USSTAF to CG Eighth AF [20 Jun 44]. (7) IOM, Baum for Dir of Sup
and AG USSTAF, 1 Nov 44, sub: Shipments of M17 Incendiary Bomb Clusters. (8) Msg, MF-O3482,
CG USSTAF to CG Eighth AF [30 Dec 44]. (9) IOM, Lt Col Clarance H. Breedlove, Asst OrdO
and CmlO, Eighth AF for Opn/Research Sec, 5 Jan 45, sub: MF-03482. Eighth AF 471.18. (10)
Msg, D-65036, CG Eighth AF to CG USSTAF, 8 Jan 45. All in Eighth AF 519.225-1. (11) Sta-
tistical Summary of Eighth AF Opns European Theater.
Fire Bombs
During the second half of 1944 the most pressing air chemical supply
problem concerned the provision of another field expedient, the fire
bomb. This bomb was a field improvised incendiary bomb fabricated
from expendable, auxiliary, aircraft gasoline tanks. Air service units
filled the tank with a mixture of gasoline and a thickener (usually
napalm) and wired on an incendiary grenade or part of a magnesium
bomb as an igniter. The fire bomb was an excellent tactical weapon
to use against supply dumps, troop concentrations, convoys, and
vehicles. Air chemical officers in the United Kingdom anticipated
post-D-day use of fire bombs by the VIII and IX Fighter Commands.
The Air Service Command, USSTAF, accordingly increased amounts
and priorities on their orders for thickeners and other fire bomb com-
ponents from the United States. By June of 1944 it was apparent that
shipments would not be received in time to meet the demand, and air
chemical officers conducted a theaterwide survey of thickener supply.
57
They concluded that interim needs could be met, but with difficulty.
Intensive fire bomb missions were inaugurated in July, and supplies
proved adequate, particularly since the Ninth Air Force was using
the M76 500-pound bomb on the same kind of mission.58 At the same
time, USSTAF requested that SOS transfer 50,000 gallons of the
ground forces flame thrower fuel, which was not being used in antici-
pated quantities, to the air forces.
By the first week in August, SOS had delivered 20,000 gallons of
fuel to the air forces and had agreed to lend enough packaged dry
napalm from SOS depots for mixing the remaining 30,000 gallons.
Air Service Command delivered the entire loan of napalm to the
Ninth Air Force and directed the Commanding General, Base Air
Depot Area, to complete arrangements, already informally approved,
to have the British mix some or most of this fuel. The IX Air Force
57
(1) IOM, Baum for Dir of Sup, Dir of Opns, and AG USSTAF, 17 Jun 44, sub: Thickened Fuel
for Use in Jettisonable Gasoline Tanks. (2) Ltr, CG USSTAF to CG's Eighth and Ninth AF's and
ASC, n.d., sub: Nomenclature and Rcds for the Blaze Bomb. Both in Eighth AF 519.225-1.
58
Ltr, CmlO USSTAF to Air CmlO AAF WD, 5 Aug 44, sub: Eighth and Ninth AF's Expenditure
of Incendiaries, Jul 44. Eighth AF 5 19.225-1.
Service Command was to mix, using a borrowed Canadian mixing

apparatus, any fuel that the British could not handle.59
Despite the SOS loan and the successful completion of arrangements
for British mixing, the anticipated shortage became critical. USSTAF,
during August 1944, reminded SOS that the 59 tons of napalm sched-
uled to arrive from the United States must be available by 25 August
and that 64 additional tons already on order must be received by 16
September. Two more pleas for expedited delivery were sent before
the first shipment arrived in two parts late in August and about the
middle of September.60
About 70 percent of the first two shipments—the second had arrived
early in October—was dispatched directly to a plant of the National
Oil Refining Company, subsidiary of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company,
in Swansea, Wales, which had been ready for processing since 21
August. The rest of those shipments were sent for field mixing by
the air force service commands. The British plant mixed more than
375,000 gallons of fuel before the end of October and contracted to
continue this job. In addition, a factory in the north of England con-
tracted to supplement the American supply by providing 185,500
gallons of perspex mix fuel from September through November.61 The
fuel supply in the mixing process plus the assured prospect of continu-
ing deliveries from the United States should have removed the fire
bomb supply problem from the critical list by the end of September,
but plans were knocked awry during the month by startling statements
of new requirements and by a distribution problem.
Eighth Air Force in September 1944 decided to drop fire bombs from
heavy bombers on targets so well fortified as to have withstood high
explosive bombardment. The air force initially requested 600,000
gallons of mixed fuel and in November increased that request to
1,000,000 gallons to be expended at the rate of 130,000 gallons per
month. As an alternative to the availability of mixed fuel, the air force
(1) Ltr, CG USSTAF to CG ETOUSA (Attn: CCWO), 21 Jul 44, sub: Flame Thrower Thick-
59
ened Fuel, with 1st Ind, CG ETOUSA to CG USSTAF, 3 Aug 44, and 2d Ind, CG USSTAF to CG
BADA ASC, n.d. (2) Msg, Brig Gen Hugh J. Knerr [CG ASC] to CG BADA ASC, 7 Aug 44, no
sub. Both in Eighth AF 519.225-1.
60
(1) IOM, Baum for AG USSTAF, 16 Aug 44, no sub. (2) Msg, CG ASC USSTAF to CG
ETOUSA, 26 Aug 44, no sub. (3) Ltr, CG ASC USSTAF to CG ETOUSA, 28 Aug 44, sub: Rqmts
of Napalm and M15 Grenades for Blaze Bomb Fuel. All in Eighth AF 519.225-1.
61
(1) Ltr, CG BADA ASC to CG ASC USSTAF, 19 Aug 44, sub: Thickened Incendiary Fuel.
(2) Personal Ltr, Baum to Brig Gen Edward Montgomery, Air CmlO AAF WD, 16 Oct 44. Both in
Eighth AF 519.225.
requested 75 tons of dry napalm and a sufficient number of mixing units

to handle it. USSTAF chemical officers reshuffled their planned distri-
bution schedule and notified Eighth Air Force in tones of justifiable
pique that, while its original request was out of the question, 60,000
gallons could be furnished at the end of September, an additional 30,000
gallons during October, and that attempts would be made to meet
the 130,000-gallon requirement in November and December. At this
point the air chemical officer in War Department Headquarters, Army
Air Forces, cabled to ask if his headquarters could be of assistance in
improving the fire bomb supply situation. USSTAF answered that
the greatest possible assistance would be in insuring the delivery of
100 tons of dry napalm per month by setting up fast ship and air
transportation in addition to that already allotted to USSTAF. This
plea was renewed after Eighth Air Force increased its requests.
Meanwhile, air chemical officers even canvassed the Twelfth Air Force
in the Mediterranean area in the hope of securing thickener, but the
Twelfth Air Force was itself then attempting to borrow thickened
fuels from the Ninth. In December 1944 and in 1945 the problem
was solved by the arrival of a sufficient supply of thickeners from the
United States. About the same time, American mixing and transfer
kits became available in quantity. AAF enlarged the table of equip-
ment for chemical air operations companies to provide eight of these
mixing and transfer kits for each unit, and USSTAF secured special
kit allowances for the Eighth Air Force. Thus, field units could mix
enough fuel to greatly augment the British capacity.62
The use of mixing and transfer units also helped to solve the dis-
tribution problem arising from the supply of fire bomb fuel. The
nature of this problem was that the Ninth Air Force was already
operating from the Continent by the time mixed fuels began to come
off the processing lines in the United Kingdom, sometime in September.
62
(1) Msg MF-00742, Lt Gen Carl Spaatz to CG Eighth AF, 21 Sep 44, no sub. (2) IOM, Baum
for Dir of Opns USSTAF, 30 Sep 44, Sup of Thickened Fuel for Eighth Air Force. (3) IOM, Baum
for Dir of Sup and Dir of Opns USSTAF, 2 Oct 44, sub: Cable From Gen Henry H. Arnold re Fire
Bombs. (4) IOM, Baum for Dir of Sup and AG ASC USSTAF, 4 Oct 44, no sub. (5) Msg MF-
01268, Spaatz for CG Eighth AF, 11 Oct 44, no sub, with 1st Ind, CG Eighth AF to CG USSTAF,
n.d., and 2d Ind, CG USSTAF to CG Eighth AF, n.d. (6) IOM, Baum for Dir of Sup, Dir of Opns,
and AG USSTAF, 13 Oct 44, no sub. (7) Baum to Montgomery, 16 Oct 44. (8) IOM, Baum for
Dir of Opns, Dir of Sup, and AG USSTAF, 1 Nov 44, sub: Supply of Napalm for Fire Bomb Fuel.
(9) IOM, Baum for Dir of Sup and AG ASC USSTAF, 4 Nov 44, sub: Eighth Air Force Fire Bomb
Fuel Rqmts. (10) IOM, Baum for AG USSTAF, 10 Nov 44, sub: Mixing and Transfer Units.
(11) Msg, Spaatz to CG Ninth AF, 19 Nov 44, no sub. All in Eighth AF 519.225.
Routing these fuels, packed for the most part in still scarce 55-gallon
drums, through normal supply channels resulted in insupportable
delays. The USSTAF Chemical Section accordingly arranged with
COMZ ETO to transfer fuel distribution from the normal channels
to Army Air Forces priority supply channels from the beachheads and
ports forward. The change in channels resulted in special and rapid
handling of fuel. Colonel Baum stationed "expediters," chemical offi-
cers or air chemical units, at crucial points along the supply line to
see that the fuel kept moving. The mixing and transfer kits also per-
mitted the air chemical units attached directly to the operation groups
to fill fire bombs on the spot, thus eliminating drum shortage complaints
and relieving the overtaxed distribution system.63
By the beginning of 1945 air chemical supply was proceeding

smoothly, and more than a month before the end of the war in Europe
air chemical officers turned their attention to the disposition of sup-
plies on hand. For the air forces as for all forces in the theater, D-day
had been a momentous event, and the character of air forces operations
had changed substantially because of the nature of D-day preparations
and post-D-day requirements, but D-day was not a turning point in
air chemical supply as it was in ground chemical supply. The turning
points in air chemical supply were two: the first at the beginning of
1944 when the minimum required supply for toxic retaliation was at
last reached and when incendiary supply was at last equal to operational
demands, and the second at the beginning of 1945 when the avail-
ability of fire bomb material could be counted on to meet operational
demands. Despite this difference in culmination of air and ground
efforts, the problems of air and ground chemical supply were essentially
alike. The foremost question was always how to compute requirements
for toxics, a weapon which might not be used, or for incendiaries and
fire bombs, weapons which had not previously been used. But the
question which required greater expenditure of energy and ingenuity
was how to meet the requirements once computed or presented by
operational usage. The air chemical supply system answered both of
these questions but neither answer was quick and easy. To consider
ground chemical supply it is therefore necessary to return to the end
63
(1) Baum to Montgomery, 16 Oct 44. (2) Mgs, Gen Spaatz to Maj Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg
[CG Ninth AF], cited in IOM, Baum for Dir of Sup, Dir of Opns, and AG USSTAF, 5 Oct 44, no
sub. Both in Eighth AF 519.215.
of 1943 when ground preparations for the scheduled spring continental

operation became the dominating theater activity.
Ground Chemical Supply

The CWS ETO and all its sister services in the theater had been
involved in preparations for D-day ever since the establishment of the
theater headquarters in June 1942, for a build-up supporting the
cross-Channel operation was the aim of the BOLERO plan under which
they functioned. But, until the end of 1943, the problems of the
build-up and of supply shortages were so grave as to obscure the main
objective. In the fall of 1943 chemical supply was arriving in a suffi-
cient quantity, as noted above, to make the assault on the Continent
seem more feasible. Furthermore, in November and December 1943
the Allied Staffs were beginning to consider the precise nature and
scope of OVERLORD, the forthcoming operation.64 The basic ques-
tion facing the ground planners was tactical: how can a Normandy
beachhead large enough to serve as a point of departure for continental
operations be secured? This basic question quickly resolved itself into
two logistical questions: (1) how many men could the Allied forces
get across the Channel and on the beachhead; (2) how much build-up
of materiel would be required to support them?
Plans and Planning Agencies
The answer to the basic tactical question from the American point
of view was to mount an overwhelmingly superior force, which would
mean using all the men in every combat-ready unit which could be
assembled in the United Kingdom and which could be provided with
transport to the Continent. The technical services in turn would have
to accumulate sufficient materiel to support such a force. The CWS
ETO portion of the materiel project involved three basic categories
of supply: (1) individual and collective gas warfare protective and
decontaminating items for the entire force; (2) weapons and ammu-
nition for chemical mortar units plus flame and smoke weapons and
equipment for all combat forces; (3) and special operational require-
ments such as smoke protection for the beachhead. The first job was
64
to secure statements of chemical requirements in each category from

each of the responsible planning headquarters.
Activation of the planning headquarters had begun late in 1943.
First United States Army was to be responsible for all supply opera-
tions until two weeks after D-day. Advance Section, Communications
Zone, a mobile base section headquarters, was to take over for the
next twenty-seven days. Forward Echelon, Communications Zone,
was to assume control of supply operations in the remaining forty-nine
days of the first three months on the far shore. It was assumed that
Communications Zone, the redesignated SOS ETO, would be in oper-
ation on the Continent at the end of the third month. Major Hingle
moved over from Supply Division, CWS ETO, in January to establish
a supply division in the FECOMZ Chemical Section. Chemical sections
of all these closely co-ordinated agencies immediately set to work on
their requirements planning. Since initial issue of all regular supplies
had already been made or materials credited to all units and organiza-
tions in or arriving in the United Kingdom, the requirements plans
were for cross-Channel resupply.65
On 15 April FUSA began submitting requisitions for the materials
in its chemical supply plan which had been the last of the major plans
to be formulated.66 CWS Supply Division issued 375 shipping orders
releasing 8,364 ship tons of Classes II and IV supplies and 12,072 ship
tons of Class V supplies for movement over the beaches in the first 2-
week phase. Three weeks later Third United States Army, the organi-
zation to which ADSEC was scheduled to render most of its support,
submitted requisitions for chemical resupply in the ADSEC control
phase. Materials requisitioned totaled 4,026 ship tons of Classes II
and IV and 7,815 tons of ammunition. The CWS ETO discovered some
shortages in filling these requisitions, but none were serious, and
acceptable substitute items were available. FECOMZ phase requisitions
required 400 shipping orders for 9,053 ship tons of protective items,
weapons, and equipment, and 9,084 ship tons of ammunition. Again,
some substitutions which FECOMZ considered satisfactory were
made.67
65
(1) History, Sup Div, II. (2) Hq 12th Army Group Final AAR, 31 Jul 45. (3) History,
ADSEC. (4) History, FECOMZ. (5) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 219-26.
66
Personal Ltr, Prentiss to Porter, CCWS, 12 Apr 44. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, ETO.
67
History, Sup Div, II.
While normal resupply was being set up, theater headquarters, an-
ticipating unpredictable and unusual demands once the operation
started, set up two procedures for rapid filling of spot needs. The
"Red Ball Express" 68 provided for a daily coaster service shipment
of 100 long tons of urgently needed general cargo unobtainable from
normal resupply. "Red Ball Express" shipments were to be called
for and allocated by the senior commander ashore. The CWS ETO
was called upon to provide a total of 90 ship tons during the 3-month
operation of this measure. The "Green Light Supply" plan was
evolved just a few days before D-day to meet extraordinary ammuni-
tion requirements, unavailable from normal resupply, at an estimated
rate of 600 long tons per day in the critical period from D plus 14 to
D plus 41. CWS shipped 400 ship tons of ammunition through "Green
Light."69 Chemical resupply was thus expeditiously handled with
minimum difficulty from the wholesale issue point of view, but the
acquisition of some of the items and of services which went into the
CWS resupply effort and the initial issue effort had not been easy.
Protective and Decontaminating Equipment

Since the service gas mask had been proved too bulky and too heavy
during the North African campaigns, chemical officers in the ETO
hoped that the CWS in the United States would be able to provide a
promised lighter weight mask before their own campaigns began.
Late in 1943 the new lightweight mask began to arrive and the CWS
ETO embarked on the not inconsiderable task of exchanging the old
masks in the hands of each individual in the theater for the new. Unit
and organization and depot mask reserves were also exchanged.
Chemical officers and gas officers at all echelons then examined the fit
and adjustment of every mask in the possession of every individual
and conducted gas chamber and wearing exercises and tests, even in
the Supreme Headquarters. The tests and exercises sometimes turned
up masks that did not fit and could not be adjusted to fit. Fortunately,
the number of nonadjustable masks, a defect which OCCWS blamed
on the molds used by one manufacturer in early production, was not
great. These masks were called in and facepieces from the old masks
were assembled to render them serviceable. Issue of the new masks
68
Not to be confused with the later and better-known motor transport operation of the same name.
69
was completed in March 1944, and chemical maintenance companies

examined, cleaned, and repaired salvageable old masks turned in to
provide a secondary reserve and to build up an inventory of repair
parts. Not long after the invasion, Colonel St. John, chemical adviser
to G-3, SHAEF, wrote, "There are sufficient gas masks in the UK to
70
cover the faces of all Europe and Asia."
The gas mask was the most important of the protective items, but,
since chemical officers assumed that vesicant gases would be employed
in far greater quantities than nonpersistent gases, protective clothing
was also very important. Storage and issue of protective clothing was
a responsibility of the Quartermaster Corps, but the CWS was charged
with impregnating permeable clothing with gas-resistant chemicals.
The CWS provided chemical processing companies to perform this
service in the theaters. As noted above, the 51st Chemical Processing
Company was one of the first two chemical service units in the
European theater. Late in 1942 this company began to set up a large
capacity impregnating facility, in fact a modified commercial dry-
cleaning plant, in the factory of the Blythe Colour Works at Cresswell,
Staffordshire. This "zone of the interior impregnating plant," which
crated weighed nearly 215 long tons and occupied more than 43,000
cubic feet, was intended to be the first of nearly a dozen such plants
to be erected in the United Kingdom; but, when it was discovered
that sites were unavailable and that requirements for water, waste
disposal facilities, and power were more than the overburdened British
economy could bear, the CWS ETO requested that the schedule be
changed to provide the smaller "theater of operations" plant.71
By the end of 1943, ten more chemical processing companies had
arrived in the United Kingdom, had been equipped with two theater
of operations impregnating plants each, and had been installed, usually
within or adjacent to quartermaster clothing depots. A number of
70
(1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, TAG to CG's AGF, AAF, ASF, POE's et al., 28 Oct 43, sub: Instr on
Issuing New Type Gas Masks. AG 470.72 (26 Oct 43) OB-S-E-SPMOT-M, in Rqmts and Stock
Contl Div, ASF 470.72 Gas Masks. (3) Ltr, CCWO ETO to CmlO USSTAF, 22 Aug, sub: Special
Fitting of Gas Masks. CWO 470.72/499 in Eighth AF 225.5 Protective Equip. (4) 8th Ind (Basic
Ltr not available), CmlO USSTAF to Air CmlO AAF WD, 1 Sep 44, no sub. AAF 470.72 (25 Apr
44) in Eighth AF 225.5 Protective Equip. (5) Personal Ltr, Porter to Prentiss, 22 Mar 44. CWS
314.7 Pers Files, ETO. (6) Rpt for CCWS, St. John, 28 Jun 1944. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, ETO.
(7) Personal Ltr, Porter to St. John, 2 Aug 44. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, ETO. (General Porter
pointed out that ETO mask stockage was 2,246,000, with 213,000 in the hands of troops. This quan-
tity, even considering the 719,000 old-style masks still in reserve, was not a significant overage.)
71
History, Impregnation in ETO, 1 Jul 42-1 Jan 44, CWS ETO. ETO Admin 545A.
the plants utilized the new water emulsion impregnating process. The
Quartermaster Corps had been able to obtain impregnated clothing
from the United States to satisfy most of the theater's planned needs,
so that there was little initial impregnating work to do. By agreement
between the theater quartermaster and the CWS, all but one of the
processing companies were given laundry work. Most of the companies
"kept a hand in" by doing reimpregnation on clothing which had
been turned in and by doing initial impregnation of Navy uniforms.
In January 1944 the theater commander assigned to the CWS ETO
the responsibility of inspecting clothing in storage to determine how
impregnation was holding up. Rowan delegated the inspection func-
tion to teams picked from the processing companies. The inspection
operation further improved the technical proficiency of the companies
72
and also served to identify lots of clothing needing reimpregnation.
The theater quartermaster called in and reissued protective clothing
for every individual in the theater at the same time that the distribution
of the lightweight mask was in progress. The European theater was
authorized an initial issue of double layer protection, that is, antigas
impregnated underwear and socks, hood, combat uniform, gloves, and
leggings, for every individual. In April 1944 the War Department
authorized in addition to this initial issue a theater reserve (in the
absence of gas warfare) of double layer protection for 35 percent of
the theater force and one and one half layer, that is, antigas socks,
drawers, and outer uniform plus hood, gloves, and leggings, for the
73
remainder of the theater force. Thus, every soldier in the theater
had available two complete sets of protective clothing except that 65
percent of the force would lack a second protective undershirt. The
invasion plan called for every soldier to wear protective outer garments
for the landing, to carry the gas mask, and to carry two cellophane
protective covers, four eyeshields, one tube of eye ointment, one can
of shoe impregnite, and one package of protective ointment. Most
soldiers were also equipped with sleeve detectors (a brassard of gas
detector paper) which the CWS had procured from the British.74
While most items of chemical protective, gas warning, and decon-
taminating equipment existed in ample supply by January 1944,
72
73
Ltr, TAG to CinC SWPA et al, 24 Apr 44, sub: Cml Warfare Protective Clothing Accessories and
Equip. AG 420 23 May 4 2 ( 2 ) sec. 2.
74
there were several shortages. One acute shortage was for gas alarms,
and the CWS ETO through reverse lend-lease procured the British
trench rattle as a substitute. Another more acute shortage was for the
power-driven decontaminating apparatus. As in North Africa and
Italy, the decontaminating apparatus was cherished by the Army Air
Forces in the United Kingdom for its secondary uses, such as giving
showers, hauling water, serving as fire-fighting equipment, and washing
aircraft. The Army Air Forces found the skid-mounted M4 power-
driven apparatus completely unsatisfactory for their needs, and the
ground and service forces took an equally dim view of this immobile
equipment. Consequently, the CWS ETO set its maintenance com-
panies to work truck-mounting the M4 apparatus. The job was com-
pleted in the spring of 1944, and, while the M4 apparatus failed to
meet Air Forces requirements even when mounted, the ground forces
and service forces were willing to accept it. As of June 1944 the au-
thorized theater level for the M3 and M4 apparatus was 1,336 while
the supply was 1,298. In the absence of gas warfare, this shortage
was not a serious matter, but it did present chemical officers with the
problem of giving air forces and ground forces elements reasons for
not supplying them with all the apparatus they wanted for secondary
uses.75
Weapons, Ammunition, and Smoke Equipment
The availability of and requirement for chemical mortar battalions
remained in doubt during the entire preparation period, and conse-
quently no firm basis existed on which to compute weapons and am-
munition requirements. Weapons supply and ammunition supply,
in Colonel St. John's opinion, were adequate, and he believed that the
only serious preinvasion chemical shortage was in repair parts for the
mortar. ETO chemical officers, aware of the spare parts problems in
the Mediterranean area, attempted to improve their own situation by
requesting supply from the United States. The CWS at home had
not yet remedied the repair parts situation. The task was doubly
difficult because ASF was attempting to standardize all repair parts
requirements computations, and, owing to the uncertain weapons
75
(1) Ibid, (2) History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. (3) Msg D-1441, Maj Gen Ira C. Eaker [CG
Eighth AF] to Arnold [CG AAF], 30 Jun 43. Eighth AF 519-253 1944. (4) Baldwin, Bingham,
and Pritchard, Readiness for Gas Warfare in Theaters of Opns, app. B.
requirement situation and the lack of expenditure experience in the

ETO, CWS could furnish ASF with recommendations based only on
roughly estimated data. But even had requirements recommendations
been firm, it is doubtful that the supply system could have operated
rapidly enough to furnish the ETO with stocks in the few months
before the cross-Channel attack. Experience was to prove the limited
76
supply of repair parts grossly inadequate.
Other weapons and ammunition furnished by the CWS ETO to the
combat forces included the flame thrower, smoke pots, and smoke
grenades. The CWS ETO had acquired a sufficient supply of the
portable flame throwers, and chemical units had mixed a substantial
quantity of thickened fuel. No American tank-mounted flame thrower
was available, but fuel had been mixed for use in British models on
loan in limited numbers to the United States forces. Soon after the
invasion, St. John reported critical shortages of both portable and
mechanized flame throwers and of fuels as well as of mortars and
mortar parts, but subsequent experience did not warrant the critical
designation since flame throwers were not popular in Europe.77
Not enough smoke pots or grenades were available to meet antici-
pated requirements. British No. 24 smoke generators, similar to the
American smoke pots, were procured as substitutes, and the British
No. 79 grenade was procured as a substitute for the American M8
smoke grenade. The American mechanical smoke generator should
also be included in this category although it was not technically classed
as a weapon. The bulky semimobile M1 generator was available in
sufficient quantity, but a supply of the newly produced, highly mobile
M2 was considered essential for combat operations. The CWS in the
United States sent new generators, some by airlift, just in time to be
used in the invasion. Generator fuel was provided by the British.78
Special Requirements
ETO chemical officers, anticipating the need for concealing mount-
ing areas in England and assault beaches in France, had long expected
that the need for smoke materials would far exceed the normal demands
76
(1)History, Sup Div, II. (2) Personal Ltr, St. John to Waitt, 17 May 44. CWS 314.7 Pers
Files, ETO. (3) Rowan Interv, 26 Sep 58.
77
(1) For additional information on flame thrower experience in Europe, see below, Chapter XVI.
(2) History, Sup Div, II. (3) St. John to Porter, 28 Jun 44.
78
CONFERRING SOMEWHERE IN ENGLAND JUST BEFORE D-DAY. (Left to right)

Colonel Cunin, General Porter, Lt. Col. Thomas H. James, and Colonel St. John.
of combat operations. They also anticipated a number of special de-

mands for other CWS materials for use on the Continent. The fact
that the Germans were to lose their air superiority by the time of the
invasion, negating the need for smoke during the mounting and assault
phases, could not have been counted on or, indeed, foreseen by these
planners.
To take care of such special demands, the War Department set up
a project system known as PROCO (projects for continental opera-
tion) soon after the 1943 reinstatement of BOLERO. PROCO was to
be set up by the technical services in the theater. Each technical service
was to state specific requirements for each project together with
shipping weights and cubages and an extensive justification for the
use of materials beyond regular authorizations. The justifications were
to be reviewed by higher authority in the theater and by ASF and OPD
in the United States. CWS ETO PROCO 1 requested 1,164,508 M1
smoke pots and 20,000 M4 smoke pots. The first project was submitted
on 20 July 1943, and on that and the following day nine other projects
for decontaminating, impregnating, and gasproofing materials and
supply handling and maintenance equipment were dispatched.79
The first ten CWS projects initially called for 179,283 long tons,
or 590,059 ship tons, of materiel, delivery for which was to be phased
over a period of nearly a year. In view of the fact that this gross ship
tonnage was more than ten times the CWS cubage eventually shipped
to the Continent in the first ninety days, it is apparent that PROCO
was no insignificant matter in the eyes of ETO chemical supply officers;
indeed, PROCO must have been manna to the CWS officers who
believed ETO supply inadequate for chemical warfare. PROCO as
interpreted in the theater presented the first and last opportunity for
the CWS in any theater of operations to prepare for gas, smoke, and
flame warfare on a scale considered by many chemical officers as wise.
CWS ETO in September 1941 accordingly submitted three more
projects, one for flame thrower accessories and two for smoke materials,
before any word had been received from the War Department on the
fate of the first ten. On 22 October 1943 ASF directed shipment of
those items which CWS ETO had scheduled for early theater delivery
in projects one through ten, and theater officers assumed that the
whole schedule would be followed. But, before this first shipment
could be made theater hopes were shattered. On 3 November 1943
ASF withdrew all projects for review by the United States Chemical
Warfare Committee (USCWC).80
ASF restored CWS PROCO after review by the USCWC and after
much correspondence with the theater and the intercession of General
Waitt, Assistant Chief Chemical Officer for Field Operations, but they
restored only 40 percent of the original quantities. Project 12 for
79
(1) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 260-61. (2) Ltrs, CCWO ETO to TAG through CG SOS
ETO, 20 Jul 43, sub: Proj 1, SOSCW 470.72/134-C1-Sec (20 Jul 43)SD; 21 Jul 43, sub: CWS Proj
2, SOSCW 470.72/311-Sec (21 Jul 43)SD; 21 Jul 43, sub: CWS Proj 3, same file; 20 Jul 43, sub:
CWS Proj 4, SOSCW 470.72/309-Sec (20 Jul 43)SD; 20 Jul 43, sub: CWS Proj 5, SOSCW 470.72/
310-Sec (20 Jul 43)SD; 20 Jul 43, sub: CWS Proj 6, SOSCW 470.72/134-C1-Sec (20 Jul 43)SD;
21 Jul 43, sub: CWS Proj 7, SOSCW 470.72/311 Sec (21 Jul 43)SD; 21 Jul 43, sub: CWS Project 8,
same file; 20 Jul 43, sub: CWS Proj 9, same file; 20 Jul 43, sub: CWS Proj 10, SOSCW 470.72/134-
Ci-Sec (20 Jul 43) SD. All in Planning Div ASF Proj for Continental Opn PROCO.
80
(1) Ltrs, CCWO ETO to TAG through CG SOS ETO, 22 Sep 43, sub: CWS Project 11; CWS
Project 12; CWS Project 13. All SOSCW 381-Pro Sec (22 Sep 43) SD in Planning Div ASF, Proj for
Continental Opn PROCO. (2) Memo, Col Carter B. Magruder, Chief Planning Div ASF, for Deputy
Dir for Plans and Opns ASF, 28 Apr 44, sub: History of Opnl Projects for ETO. ASF SPOPP 400
(ETO) in Off of CG ASF 400.
smoke grenades was disapproved on the theory that increases in normal

allowances would take care of the requirement. Projects 11 and 13
were approved after a 60-percent slash. ASF again directed shipment
of the materials specified in these modified projects and six additional
projects in February, March, and April of 1944. The CWS ETO had
submitted Project 14 for smoke (WP) bombs in November 1943,
and Project 16 for smoke grenades, Project 18 for gas mask parts, and
Project 19 for flame thrower parts and accessories in February 1944.
In March it submitted Project 23 for flame throwers and Project 20
for flame thrower pressure cylinders. ASF disapproved Project 17 for
grenades and smoke pots to be used by the air forces, indicating that
regular theater stocks would cover the requirement. It disapproved
Project 15 for equipment to convert decontamination companies to
smoke generator companies, and Project 22 for a combat reserve of
smoke generators, on the ground that these materials also could be
provided from theater stocks. Project 21 seems to have vanished from
81
the record. The significant feature of the 1944 projects as opposed
to the 1943 projects was that the 1944 projects were so limited in scope
as to seem almost niggardly. Gone were the implications of vast and
all-out preparations for gas, smoke, and flame warfare.
While the curtailed PROCO shipments did help out in the opera-
tional period, PROCO did not live up to theater expectations. The
CWS ETO undoubtedly expected too much, and it is apparent in
retrospect that theater chemical officers got along despite shortages.
Materials which CWS ETO requested under the original PROCO
would certainly have added to the theater gas warfare defensive po-
tential since they would have provided for more collective protection
and more decontamination. ETO combat forces would probably not
have used smoke and flame in any greater quantities had more materials
been available. That ASF after postwar analysis found it had guessed
right with respect to requirements does not alter the fact that ASF
81
(1) Magruder for Dep Dir for Plans and Opns ASF, 28 Apr 44. (2) Ltrs, CCWO ETO to
TAG through CG SOS ETO, 27 Nov 43, sub: CWS Proj 14, SOSCW 381-Pro Sec (27 Nov 43)SD;
15Jan 44, sub: CWS Proj 15, SOSCW 381-Pro Sec (15 Jan 44)SD; 11 Feb 44, sub: CWS Proj 18,
SOSCW 381-Pro Sec (11 Feb 44)SD; 12 Feb 44, sub: CWS Proj 19, SOSCW 381-Pro Sec (12 Feb
44)SD; 3 Apr 44, sub: CWS Proj 20, SOSCW 381-Pro Sec (3 Apr 44)SD; 17 Mar 44, sub: CWS
Proj 22, SOSCW 381-Pro Sec (17 Mar 44)SD; 31 Mar 44, sub: CWS Project 23, SOSCW 381-Pro Sec
(31 Mar 44) SD. (3) Msg WL-470, Lee (CG SOS ETO) for War, 21 Jan 44 (Project 16). (4)
Msg W-11067, Lee for War, 12 Feb 44 (Project 17).
handling of PROCO violated the principle of theater requirements

determination.
PROCO's importance from a chemical point of view is that the
history of the system demonstrated the lack of understanding and lack
of adequate communication between the theater and War Department
headquarters, and perhaps even between ASF and its technical services
at home. Maj. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, Director for Planning and Opera-
tions, ASF, complained in May 1944 that theater officers had misunder-
stood and misapplied the concept of PROCO. He charged that the
82
theater had failed to plan adequately in advance. General Lutes
undoubtedly had grounds for complaint as far as theater strategic and
tactical decisions were concerned, but the CWS ETO could hardly
have begun requirements planning any earlier since CWS officers did
begin planning in the month of theater activation, and CWS ETO
could hardly have had less help in such planning from ASF. Specifically
with respect to PROCO, the War Department allowed the theater to
labor under a misapprehension of the PROCO concept from June
until November 1943, and apparently the War Department concept
was not understood by the CWS ETO until the reinstatement of the
revised projects in February 1944. Almost a year elapsed between the
system authorization and General Lutes' statement of his complaints.
It is not strange, therefore, that at the time of the Normandy assault
the CWS ETO was a vigorously individualistic organization many of
whose officers and enlisted men felt that they must meet their own
needs without much help from the official logistics organization. The
experience of these officers and enlisted men on the Continent was to
confirm this belief.
On the Continent
The Landings
The 1st Platoon, 30th Chemical Decontamination Company, under
the command of 1st Lt. Bernard Miller, landed on OMAHA Beach at
H plus sixteen minutes. The platoon fought its way ashore with the
first wave, providing grenade smoke screens to conceal infantry land-
ings. Lieutenant Miller and six enlisted men were wounded or missing
82
Memo, Lutes for ACofS OPD, 25 May 44, sub: Opnl Projects for ETO. Plng Div ASF 400
History of Projects. (Also cited in Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 260).
in action. Sgt. John J. Cunningham assumed command of the platoon,

which then pushed on, probing for land mines, giving aid to the
wounded, fighting as infantrymen, and providing what smoke con-
cealment it could. At 1300 the 3d Platoon under 1st Lt. James W.
Cassidy joined the 1st Platoon, and together they salvaged and put
into working order a few of the M2 smoke generators which had been
sunk on an incoming Dukw. On D plus one Capt. Milton M. Moore,
company commander, arrived with the remainder of the company,
and the entire unit launched more extensively into its special mission
activity, gas reconnaissance. First Army, then commanding all
American forces on the Continent, made few calls on the company's
secondary mission, provision of smoke concealment, but the company
got smoke pots ashore and set up smoke lines in the vicinity of Colle-
ville sur Mer. By the time a company overstrength had been landed,
14 June, the 30th Chemical Decontamination Company was in the
supply and service business, setting up and working in supply dumps,
furnishing showers, settling road dust, and fighting fires with power-
driven decontaminating apparatus.83
The id Platoon, 33d Chemical Decontamination Company, went
ashore on UTAH Beach at approximately H plus 3 (0930). Since
resistance at first was light on UTAH, the 2d Platoon at once established
the first CWS beach dump of the invasion. By D plus 2 detachments
of the company which had landed with elements of the 53 1st Engineer
Shore Regiment were ordered to assemble under the command of Lt.
Carroll W. Wright. The assembled 33d Company expanded the
original CWS dump into a CWS maintenance and supply dump which
the unit operated until D plus 21. It handled about 5,000 tons of
CWS Class II and IV supplies during this period. Like their colleagues
on OMAHA Beach, the men of the 33d also performed gas reconnais-
sance, provided showers, and fought fires.84
Headquarters Detachment, 60th Chemical Depot Company, Capt.
George W. Brown, commanding, debarked on OMAHA on D plus 4
(10 June) and on the following day set up operations of a FUSA CWS
dump at Mosles. The advance party of another detachment joined the
33d Company on UTAH on the next day. The whole company was
83
History, 30th Cml Decontamination Co.
84
(1)
History, 33d Cml Decontamination Co. (2) Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack,
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951), pp. 302-05.
at work operating FUSA dumps by 28 June.85 Meanwhile, Major

Hingle, FECOMZ chemical supply chief, arrived on D plus 13 (19
June) in ADSEC headquarters, which had become operational three
days earlier, to begin preparations for the FECOMZ assumption of
supply control. He found Colonel Stubbs's ADSEC Chemical Section,
staffed by Major Bradley and six other officers, without enlisted men
or the scheduled stock control team. Since the invasion had not been
going as rapidly as planned, FUSA had not transferred supply control
to ADSEC, and the ADSEC staff members on the Continent were
assisting FUSA while preparing for their own operational role. Hingle
also visited Colonel Coughlan, Chemical Officer, FUSA, and learned
from his assistant for supply, Capt. J. R. Yankhauer, that chemical
supply, unlike that of other services, had run into no very serious
problems. The expenditure of chemical mortar shell was running
greater than had been expected, and a greater proportion than
expected, about 35 percent, was white phosphorus shell. Both combat
and service troops made extensive use of dust respirators and eyeshields
against dust, and Captain Yankhauer called upon the CWS in the
United Kingdom for increased resupply of these items. He also re-
quested that the quota be cut on smoke materials which were piling
up.86
Hingle decided that principal CWS supply efforts on the Continent
in the immediate future would need to be directed toward storage,
maintenance, salvage, and service. While chemical supplies were
arriving in good shape, except for a few inevitable instances of exces-
sively rough handling, he did not believe that all stocks would stand
up well under the expected ninety days' open storage. Some chemical
weapons and equipment, such as the chemical mortar and the power-
driven decontaminating apparatus, were being employed at or beyond
rated capacity. Flame throwers and gas masks were discarded by
advancing troops. A number of men had their masks hit because the
mask bulge in silhouette offered a sniper target. Some troops had
ceased to wear gas protective clothing, and, while salvage was a quarter-
master problem, the CWS was likely to be called upon for laundering
garments as well as for reimpregnation. All these factors meant ex-
tensive repair and materials rehabilitation work, particularly since the
85
History, 60th Cml Depot Co.
86
Informal Comments of CWSO [Hingle to Charron, CmlO FECOMZ], 20 Jun 44. CWS 314.7
Pers files, ETO.
"I see Comp'ny E got th' new style gas masks, Joe."
demand for mortars was increasing and that for flame throwers was
87
expected to increase. FUSA also insisted that the gas warfare protec-
tion level be maintained. While several gas warfare scares had all
proved false, the Germans still might initiate gas warfare. Capt.
John J. O'Brien, Acting Chemical Officer, 29th Infantry Division,
who had been captured and had escaped, reported that the Germans
would use any weapons in their possession, including gas, to stop the
Allied advance. Since Allied progress at the time was halting and
uncertain, enemy initiation of gas warfare would have been catastro-
phic. Hingle, accordingly, in order to accelerate rehabilitation of
protective equipment which ADSEC was gathering up, asked FUSA
to lend its chemical maintenance company to ADSEC, and accom-
panied Major Bradley in a search for shop space. He recommended to
his chief, Colonel Charron, that chemical supply and service officers
and men be sent to the Continent as soon as possible and that service
troop build-up plans be closely followed up.88
Establishing the CWS Supply Base

Since FECOMZ never assumed control of supply operations on the
Continent,89 Colonel Charron, in his FECOMZ capacity, did not
have the opportunity to put Major Hingle's recommendations into
effect, but FECOMZ officers did assist ADSEC in its efforts and later
opened the COMZ headquarters CWS section on the Continent.
ADSEC gradually assumed responsibility for various supply installa-
tions after FUSA, while still retaining supply control, on 20 June
designated an ADSEC area of operations. ADSEC retained the three
FUSA supply dumps. The dump at Mosles it converted into a Class
II and IV depot while the the dump at Longueville behind OMAHA
became a Class V depot and that at Audouville-la-Hubert behind
UTAH became an all-classes depot. Audouville materials were soon
transferred to a permanent installation at Montebourg, and both
Audouville and Longueville were closed out by COMZ in October.
The American lodgment on the Continent failed to grow as planned,
but manpower increased almost on schedule, as Hingle had hoped, and
tonnages, despite port and beachhead discharge difficulties, accumu-
87
The flame thrower demand did not materalize, but the CWS could not afford to be unprepared in
event demand should arise.
88
[Hingle to Charron], 20 Jun, 21 Jun, 22 Jun 44. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, ETO.
89
Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 436.
lated at a rate in excess of the June-August needs. The ADSEC Chem-

ical Section accordingly established an all-classes depot at Cherbourg,
a II and IV depot at Villedieu, a II and IV depot and an ammunition
depot at Le Mans, and at Rennes an all-classes depot, which COMZ
split into a II and IV and an ammunition depot. The 65th and 7th
Chemical Depot Companies and the 66th and 9th Chemical Base
Depot Companies operated these installations while the 711th Chemical
Maintenance Company set up a shop at Valognes, the site of the first
90
continental COMZ headquarters.
On D plus 20 St. John analyzed the chemical supply situation on
the Continent. He noted critical shortages of mortars and mortar parts
and expressed the belief that flame thrower supply would not meet
demand. On the other hand, he took the view that some protection
and decontamination materials were excess to all future needs while
smoke materials, for which he expected demand to increase, were
91
adequate for the time being. In reply to these observations, General
Porter indicated that while the theater had reached or slightly exceeded
supply authorizations in all categories mentioned except mortar spare
parts, he could not concede that any of these excesses were significant.
Porter believed that the parts need could be met by supplying an over-
age of complete mortars. The CWS had no outstanding unfilled orders
from the theater, and General Porter was powerless to increase any
allotment without a specific theater request approved through War
Department channels.92 As in the case of NATO-MTO CWS supply,
here was the rub. A supply crisis was coming in the ETO which would
affect the CWS, although not as extensively as the other services, but
the individuals most concerned could do little to forestall its arrival.
Although the theater had top supply priority over all other theaters
and although the theater commander was firmly committed to the
policy of giving combat commanders everything they desired, the
exigencies of transportation and War Department-controlled supply
authorization procedures tended to block timely measures for pre-
venting a crisis. Just how much of the ensuing supply crisis might be
attributable to physical limitations in obtaining and moving supplies
and how much to the complications of supply management in the
90
(1) Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 434-44. (2) History, FECOMZ. (3) History, ADSEC.
(4) History, Sup Div, II.
91
St. John to Porter, 28 Jun 44.
92
Porter to St. John, 2 Aug 44.
theater and in the United States is, from the CWS point of view,
impossible to say.
The Supply Crisis

General Rowan, on D plus 44, pointed out even more vigorously than
Colonel St. John the critical nature of mortar parts and ammunition
supply. He suggested to General Waitt that the CWS plan to double
its production quotas for those items. The last CWS ETO ammunition
requisition, he wrote, had been cut in half, presumably by NYPE, and
he had been unable to determine on what basis the cut was made.93
The CWS in the United States could not raise its production quotas
until theater recommendations for increases in War Department
allowances had been approved. Three weeks later Rowan paid a
flying visit to his new office, which Charron had established in the
Valognes COMZ headquarters. Rowan joined St. John for a tour of
mortar units, field headquarters, and forward areas. He found the
CWS supply situation still satisfactory on the whole, but he noted
not only that the shortage of mortars, mortar parts, and ammunition
was critical but also that some of the mortar battalion equipment
94
needed replacement.
As the combat forces broke out of the beachhead in July 1944 and
headed toward Germany, all chemical sections in the combat organiza-
95
tion became increasingly involved in supply. The chemical sections
in the base sections became active, as ADSEC had already been, in
the support of combat organizations. The 12th Army Group Chemical
Section allotted supplies to the armies and kept Rowan's office and
sometimes the base section chemical officers informed as to long-range
requirements and immediate needs.96 The 12th Army Group Chemical
Section considered protective supply adequate throughout the Euro-
pean campaigns except for a brief period late in 1944 when "cold set"
destroyed the usefulness of the synthetic rubber facepiece of the light-
97
weight mask. The First and Third Army chemical officers likewise
93
Personal Ltr, Rowan to Waitt, 20 Jul 44. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, ETO.
94
Memo, Rowan, no addressee, sub: Notes on Trip to Far Shore, 26 Aug 44, in Ltr, Rowan to
Waitt, 2 Sep 44. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, ETO.
95
See above, ch. II.
96
(1) MacArthur Interv, 19 Sep 61. (2) Leggin Intervs, 13 Oct 61, 22 Nov 45. (3) Powers
Interv, 24 Sep 59.
97
12th Army Group, Rpt of Opns, vol. XI, Cml Warfare Sec.
considered protection adequate except in isolated circumstances.98

Dissent on the adequacy of protection came from base section chemical
officers who felt that, in the early period on the Continent, the CWS
distribution plan looked better on paper than it did in practice. The
problem was that since supplies were so scattered about in dumps and
since so much equipment, especially masks, had been abandoned by
troops moving forward, it would have been a tremendous and perhaps
impossible task to assemble, rehabilitate, and reissue protective equip-
ment in event of need." Fortunately, no large-scale call for protective
equipment was made until the following December by which time
chemical service units had collected and refurbished protective equip-
ment. Also, by December the distribution system was working well
with the aid of a considerable amount of troubleshooting from most
chemical officers in both COMZ and combat organizations.100
The CWS supply problems began to multiply with the September
1944 supply crisis. Most of these problems arose not because of the
malfunctioning of the distribution system but because of a general
shortage of supplies, equipment, and transportation. The CWS problem
was increased by the flaws in certain chemical items, notably chemical
mortar shell, spare parts, and protective materials.
Chemical Mortar Shell
The armies were moving rapidly forward in September when Rowan
and the United Kingdom section of his office moved into the new
COMZ headquarters in Paris. Supply of fast-moving items was by
then on a hand-to-mouth basis. General Rowan personally visited the
ports to expedite the distribution of chemical mortar shell which was
finally arriving from the United States. Shortage of docking facilities
frequently made it difficult to unload ships. But, when he could get
shells ashore, he got the theater chief of ordnance to allot railway
ammunition cars for his use and he had these cars included in priority
supply trains. Usually no more than one day's reserve of shell was
101
available in forward areas.
In November two barrel bursts of high explosive shell in chemical
98
(1) Cunin Interv, 5 Dec 47. (2) Wallington Interv, 1 Dec 59.
99
(1) Wright Interv, 16 Jul 61. (2) Christensen Intervs, 13, 23 Oct 61.
100
(1) Christensen Intervs, 13, 23 Oct 61.
101
102
mortars led to the assumption that some shell was defective. This
assumption complicated the supply situation since no one knew how
much of the available stocks was serviceable. But in the same month,
when a shell shortage in southern France imperiled operations supplied
by Southern Line of Communications (SOLOC), the CWS ETO
released 50,000 shells to SOLOC in return for a December shipment
scheduled for that area.103 Chemical mortar units in northern France
had enough shells at the time to continue operations although rationing
was frequently necessary. But rationing had been necessary from time
to time since early in the Normandy campaign, and, while mortar men
could have used more shell, the 20 rounds per weapon per day usually
allotted against the official 25 to 30 rounds per day of supply was
enough to keep them going. In December, 12th Army Group Chemical
Section, the agency charged with shell allocation, requested 40 rounds
104
per weapon per day for the next six months. Using the 40-round
base for all the 10 battalions then in the theater and assuming 36 oper-
ational mortars per battalion as allotted under the tables of organization
and equipment then going into effect, the 12th Army Group recom-
mendation would have meant immediate supply of almost 15,000
shells per day. Computed on the basis of 15 battalions in the line in
1945 nearly 22,000 rounds per day would have been required.105 The
12th Army Group ammunition supply goal was never reached.
In January 1945, barrel and muzzle bursts reached epidemic pro-
portions. During theater and OCCWS investigations of the problem,
CWS ETO impounded lot after lot of shell until nearly the whole
theater supply was impounded. Allotment per weapon sometimes fell
from twenty to ten rounds per day. When spring weather came, faulty
shell ceased to be a problem. Shell supply improved, but supply never
106
equaled demand during the period of combat.
102
Personal Ltr, Powers, CmlO 12th Army Group, to Porter, 21 Nov 44. CWS 314.7 Pers Files,
ETO.
103
History, Sup Div, IL
104
Leggin Interv, 22 Nov 45.
105
See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, Appendix H-1, for information on battalions in the
theater. Sixteen battalions had entered action by V-E Day, but the sixteenth saw only a few days of
combat.
106
(1) Rowan Interv, 26 Sep 58. (2) Leggin Interv, 22 Nov 45. (3) For more details on the
faulty shell problem, see below, Chapter XII.
Spare Parts
The parts situation also failed to improve during continental opera-
tions. According to Rowan the "lack of spare parts was the outstand-
ing failure of the American Army supply system, and the CWS was
just as bad as the rest of the technical services." 107 In early October,
CWS ETO found it necessary to embargo all CWS spare parts issues
except "Red Ball Express" shipments which were directed to chemical
maintenance companies operating with the armies. Issue for levels of
maintenance less than major overhaul was banned. Some items in need
of repair, such as masks, dust respirators, and hand decontaminating
apparatus, were exchanged for serviceable items in lieu of repair.108
Chemical maintenance companies repaired chemical mortars, flame
throwers, and power-driven decontaminating apparatus on a "parts
available" basis and exchange items were supplied, with the specific
approval of the Supply Division, CWS ETO, when parts were not
available but alternative end items were. The maintenance companies
also fabricated parts whenever possible and some parts which would
normally have been considered beyond repair were rebuilt. Late in
1944 orders were given to French firms for the manufacture of parts
for mortars, smoke generators, then being heavily employed to produce
tactical smoke concealment, and flame throwers. In January 1945, the
CWS ETO engaged firms in Belgium and Luxembourg to manufacture
mortar base plates, reinforcing plates, shock absorber slides, cup forks,
tube caps, and base caps. As in the case of manufacture in Italy,
many chemical officers preferred the parts manufactured in Europe
to those shipped from the United States. In Europe greater skill and
better equipment were available for small parts manufacture than in
the war-burdened United States industry.109
The CWS spare parts team which surveyed the theater situation in
1945 found parts supply still inadequate, and General Waitt confirmed
110
this finding in his visit to the theater at the end of the war.
107
Rowan Comments, 16 Dec 60.
108
The mask parts situation was one of the few not critical. The principal problem here was the great
volume of maintenance work caused by abuse of the mask. Rowan Comments, 16 Dec 60.
109
(1) History, Sup Div, II. (2) Histories, 211th (71th), 12th, 13th, and 14th Cml Maintenance
Cos. (3) Magness Interv, 5 May 59. (4) Rowan Comments, 16 Dec 60.
110
(1) OCCWS, Final Rpt, CWS Spare Parts Team in MTO and ETO, Dec 44-Feb 45, prepared by
OCCWS, 19 Jun 45. (2) IOM, Lt Col J. C. Morgan, Chief War Planning Br OCCWS, for Chief War
Plans and Theaters Div OCCWS, 13 Apr 45, sub: Topics for Discussion in ETO and MTO. CWS
314.7 Observer Rpts.
Protective Material
Although FUSA and FUSAG insisted on having each individual
maintain his gas mask during the beachhead period, the breakthrough
and rapid advance after the end of July brought a change in attitude.
Many commanders and some chemical officers assumed there would be
no further risk of gas warfare. Indeed, SHAEF itself seemed to
assume that the risk of gas warfare was past and St. John, whose
position in SHAEF was abolished in the fall, did not express disagree-
111
ment. MacArthur and other members of the FUSAG/12th Army
Group staff were concerned lest mistreatment and abandonment of
the mask by individual soldiers drastically reduce the gas warfare
defensive preparedness on the Continent. They consequently decided
to act upon General Bradley's suggestion that masks be withdrawn
from individual soldiers on the organization commander's option. One
of St. John's final acts in his SHAEF position was to make the army
group decision SHAEF policy.
Rowan conceded, in September, that reduction in the theater pro-
tective clothing level was not inconsistent with the calculated risk
policy. He further advised reducing the protective clothing reserve to
two-layer protection for 50 percent rather than 100 percent of theater
strength as he had earlier recommended.112 Commanders in most cases
authorized the withdrawal of protective clothing and masks from indi-
viduals. The masks were theoretically available in unit supply trains.
A number of chemical officers felt that calling masks back to regimental
and even divisional trains was a hazardous policy, particularly since
it was reasonable to expect the likelihood of gas warfare to increase
as the German homeland was approached. In October when he suc-
ceeded MacArthur, who had been requested for a position in the
United States, Colonel Powers strongly expressed his disapproval of
the mask policy.113
Powers paid a call on the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower,
a prewar fellow staff officer. He expressed his misgivings concerning
protective policy to General Eisenhower and General Bradley, who
happened to be visiting the supreme commander. General Eisenhower
111
Personal Ltrs, St. John to Waitt, 1 Sep 44; to Col Lowell A. Elliott, Deputy CCWS, 23 Oct 44;
to Elliott, 8 Nov 44.
112
Personal Ltrs, Rowan to Waitt, 17 Sep 44. (2) See above, p. 167. The actual reserve au-
thorization at the time of the Normandy operation had been 35 percent double-layer protection.
113
Powers Interv, 24 Sep 59.
indicated that he thought German initiation of gas warfare most

unlikely, but he displayed some interest in the defensive situation.114
Although not immediately successful in his campaign to increase the
availability of individual protection, Colonel Powers found he had
strong support among the Army chemical officers. He recommended
to the Chief of Staff, 12th Army Group, that the theater be requested
to reverse the policy decision so that each individual soldier could again
carry a mask.115
The 12th Army Group did request a change which was approved
by SHAEF in December. Shortly thereafter the German counterattack
in the Ardennes threatened the American advance and many com-
manders were given added incentive to insure individual gas protection
since it appeared conceivable that the German forces might try to
consolidate their initial success in the Battle of the Bulge by using gas.
The reissue of masks caused a flurry throughout the CWS supply
system. Some organizations could find no trace of their masks. Others
discovered that many masks had become unserviceable because of fre-
quent moves and poor storage conditions. One corps chemical officer
finally managed to scrape up enough transportation to send several
truckloads of masks forward, only to hear that both trucks and masks
were destroyed or captured in the German advance. Spot issues to
replace such losses caused temporary shortages, but fortunately the
reserve was large enough so that demands could be met and reserves
restocked from the United States on an emergency basis.116 St. John's
assertion that there were enough masks in the theater to cover all the
faces of Europe and Asia proved to be even more overdrawn than he
had intended.117 Some of Powers' colleagues were critical of his action,
contending that his lack of experience in the theater made him over-
zealous. The possibility exists, however, that the reissue of masks, which
could hardly have been unknown to German intelligence, deterred the
Germans from exploiting what would have been an excellent oppor-
118
tunity to turn the Bulge into a World War II Ypres.
The maintenance load imposed by mask rehabilitation, particularly
in view of occasional parts shortages, was very heavy. When "cold set"
14
115
Ibid.
Personal Ltrs, Powers to Elliott, 7 Nov 44, and to Porter, 21 Nov 44.
116
(1) Rowan Interv, 26 Sep 58. (2) Powers Interv, 24 Sep 59. (3) Barta Interv, 23 Sep 59.
117
See above, p. 166.
118
Leggin Interv, 13 Oct 61.
(cold weather hardening) was discovered in reclaimed and synthetic

rubber mask facepieces during the winter, the CWS ETO mainte-
nance burden became greater than the maintenance units could
handle.119 Since the facepieces hardened by "cold set" could not be
properly fitted, CWS ETO contracted with eight French firms for
the exchange of 400,000 faulty facepieces for the natural rubber face-
piece from the old-style mask. At the same time another French firm
initiated remanufacture of old-style gas mask carriers into 133,000
lightweight mask carriers.120 After considerable effort, the CWS ETO
successfully met the challenge of bringing protective supply up to a
highly effective level for the remainder of the war.
The CWS ETO Supply System—Final Form
Considering the many unexpected problems it ran into, the CWS
ETO supply system changed amazingly little during the period of
continental operation. The credit system continued to operate effec-
tively although during the fall supply crisis it became necessary to
delegate credit allocation for ammunition and certain critical supplies
to 12th Army Group. Supply Division, CWS ETO, headed during
the entire period on the Continent by Col. Frederick E. Powell, con-
tinued to allocate credits for normal Class II and IV supply. The
supply pattern brought materials into CWS branch depots from the
ports and beaches.121 CWS ETO established forty such depots under
COMZ control in the advance across France and Germany. Supply
Division or 12th Army Group allocated materials in depots to using
organizations on credits or assigned them to reserve stocks. Credit
allocation notices were forwarded to ADSEC or to Continental Ad-
vance Section (CONAD), to the regulating stations which distributed
materials to combat echelons, to the depot commanders, and to the
credited organizations. The using combat organizations in northern
France and northern Germany then called forward from the depots
through the regulating stations and ADSEC, or in southern France
and Germany, through CONAD, such materials from their credited
119
(1) For a discussion of "cold set," see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to field,
pp 323-24. (2) Leggin telephoned the development authorities in the United States when "cold set" was
discovered to ask advice. The only recommendation offered was that the CWS ETO provide warm stor-
age for masks! (Leggin Interv, 13 Oct 61.)
120
121
No general depots were established on the Continent.
stocks as they desired. The using organization, the regulating stations,

and the advance section could always easily calculate the quantities of
any item to be transported and the quantities remaining to the credit
of any organization in the depots.122
122
CWS Administration: Pacific
The CWS in the West and Southwest Pacific, 1941-42
Defending the Philippines

After the Japanese attacked Clark Field on 8 December 1941 and
brought World War II to the Philippines, Col. Stuart A. Hamilton,
Chemical Officer, Philippine Department, the 14 officers, 275 enlisted
men, and 12 Philippine Scouts assigned to the CWS in the Philippines
immediately stepped up efforts to prepare for gas warfare.1 Intensive
preparations for gas warfare in the department had begun the preceding
spring with the dedication of a new impregnating plant in the Manila
port area for the production of gas resistant clothing. By the day of
the attack the department's defense preparations were in many respects
satisfactory, but chemical officers were disturbed that training rather
than service masks had been the authorized issue to individual soldiers
and that the protective clothing supply was completely inadequate
even with the new plant in operation.
Both the U.S. forces and the enemy greatly feared that the other's
next move would be a gas attack. On 8 December the Japanese assault
commanders on Formosa issued masks to their troops.2 In Manila,
requests for masks poured in to the departmental chemical office. On
10 December General MacArthur's Headquarters, United States Army
1
This section is based on: (1) Log Book and Journal—CWS, Hq Philippine Dept USAFFE and
USFIP, 8 Dec 41-17 Apr 42. (Mailed to CCWS in one of the last mails leaving the Philippine Islands
before the surrender.) CWS 319.1/2275. (2) Hamilton to CCWS, 6 Apr 1946, Rpt, Personal Ex-
periences During World War II. (3) Hamilton to CG USFIP (Gen Jonathan M. Wainwright), 22
Nov 46, Rpt Activities, CWS, Philippine Islands, World War IL (4) Louis Morton, The Tall of the
Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1953). (5) Lt Col
Charles A. Morgan, Jr., Comments on draft of this volume, 16 Jan 61.
2
Morton, Fall of the Philippines, p. 80.
Forces, Far East (USAFFE), ordered training masks exchanged for

service masks. On the same day the CWS began issuing service masks
to Philippine Army units. Some training and service masks were later
provided for civilian employees of the Army. Chemical troops under
1st Lt. Charles A. Morgan, Jr., operated the new impregnating plant
on a 24-hour basis until 23 December, when the power plant was
bombed. The clothing was to provide individual protection against
expected gas attacks and to equip unit gas warfare decontamination
details. About a week later Colonel Hamilton supervised the destruc-
tion of the plant, along with supplies and records, to prevent capture.
After the loss of the plant, the CWS contingent on Bataan continued
clothing impregnation by hand in order to finish equipping the de-
contamination squads. A day after the plant was destroyed Hamilton
moved his office into an improvised chemical laboratory in the Malinta
Tunnel, Fort Mills, Corregidor. The CWS hastily completed part of
a large gasproofing project so that the ventilating blowers could be
used to make the Malinta Tunnel usable for a hospital, offices, and
quarters.
The few CWS officers and men not continuously used as infantry
labored mightily to adapt existing materials to emergency needs.
Hamilton's men improvised field plants to produce liquid bleach
(chloride of lime) for sanitation purposes both on Bataan and Cor-
regidor. These plants used lime and liquid chlorine originally intended
for decontamination of vesicant gases. Bleach was also used as an
insecticide by the hospitals, around latrines, and on the battlefields.
The field plant on Corregidor continued to operate even after the
Japanese occupation. The CWS laboratory assayed and packaged an-
other vesicant decontaminant, high-test hypochlorite, for water puri-
fication. The Philippine Chemical Depot staff, operating on Bataan,
prepared tiki-tiki extract from rice bran for the prevention and
treatment of beriberi and polyneuritis, but an effort to develop a
substitute for quinine sulphate was only partially successful. The
CWS also converted FS smoke fillings from Livens projectors and
4.2-inch chemical mortar shells into sulphuric acid to keep in operation
the storage batteries in electric generator units, radio sets, and vehicles.
After an enemy bomb destroyed the first field acid plant and killed
four of its five operators, another plant was set up where production
continued until the week of the Corregidor surrender. To aid the
ADMINISTRATION: PACIFIC 189
fighting units, Lt. Frank L. Schaf, Jr., CWS, assisted by a U.S. Navy
detachment, improvised a flame thrower from two 3-gallon decon-
taminating apparatus. The chemical depot group also contributed to
the fighting units thousands of Molotov cocktails hastily improvised
from beer bottles and other scrap materials.
When not busy with emergency improvisations, the CWS laboratory
analyzed and described captured Japanese materials, such as gas masks
and canisters, explosive charges, and flame throwers, brought in by
men of the Philippine Chemical Depot. These analyses and descriptions
were radioed to OCCWS, and samples of captured equipment were
shipped to the United States. When surrender seemed inevitable, the
CWS destroyed all remaining chemical materials. Colonel Hamilton
and his surviving men were taken prisoner after the surrender of
Corregidor on 6 May 1942 and remained in Japanese prison camps
for the rest of the war.
Establishment in Australia
On 7 December 1941 the 3d Chemical Field Laboratory Company
was aboard a Pacific convoy carrying units and individual officers and
men destined to augment the American forces in the Philippines. On
12 December Brig. Gen. Julian F. Barnes, the senior officer aboard,
organized the Army forces in the convoy into Task Force, South
Pacific, and appointed a general and special staff. The War Depart-
ment next day ordered General Barnes's convoy and task force to
proceed to Australia where Barnes would assume command of United
States troops. The convoy docked at Brisbane on 22 December, and
General Barnes spent the following month straightening out the con-
fused command situation, organizing the United States Army Forces
in Australia (USAFIA) at Melbourne, and making desperate and
unsuccessful attempts to send troops, aircraft, and supplies to the
Philippines. On 28 January 1942 Capt. John C. Morgan, an officer
of the 3d Chemical Field Laboratory Company, set about establishing
a chemical section in USAFIA. Col. William A. Copthorne arrived
on 2 February with a number of experienced officers and enlisted men.
Known as the Remember Pearl Harbor Group, these men were being
rushed to the Pacific to serve wherever senior command and staff
officers and specialists were needed. Copthorne became chemical officer
and was assigned to the USAFIA chief of staff's special mission for
3
co-ordinating relief shipments to Corregidor.
The CWS, U. S. Army Forces in Australia

Colonel Copthorne and Maj. John C. Morgan, now assigned as
Copthorne's executive officer, tackled the job of setting up a CWS
for USAFIA. First, they had to set up and staff the territorial organi-
zation in Australia and allocate personnel and units among other
organizations, both those already in the area and those being activated.
Then there was the task of providing chemical supplies for American
forces. The third undertaking was the establishment of CWS planning
and training functions. And the fourth act was to expand and super-
vise CWS technical and technical intelligence functions established by
the laboratory company.
Six numerically designated base sections with headquarters at Dar-
win, Townsville, Brisbane, Melbourne, Adelaide, and Perth were set
up on 3 March 1942. The seventh base section was established at
Sydney in the following month. Sixteen CWS officers arrived in April,
and Copthorne managed to assign one or two officers and one or two
enlisted men to the chemical section of each base section, after a brief
period of training and orientation in his own office. Chemical officers,
like other base section special staff officers, were directly responsible
to their chief of service in matters of plans, policies, and supply, but
they served the additional function of advisers to base section com-
manders under whose administrative control they worked. Since the
original intention of the Australian establishment was to support
Lt. Gen. George H. Brett's Far East Air Force, Copthorne and Morgan,
who held a second position as chemical officer in the Air Section,
USAFIA, also sought to provide chemical manpower and service for
4
the air forces. His ability to accomplish such work was severely
3
(1) MS, Mil History of USASOS in the Southwest Pacific, vol. I (hereafter cited as History,
USASOS). OCMH. (2) Elizabeth Bingham and Richard Leighton, MS, Development of the U.S.
Supply Base in Australia, pp. 1-10. OCMH. (3) Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col John C. Morgan,
1 Oct 45. (4) Col William A. Copthorne, USA (Ret.), Comments on draft of this volume, 13 Jan 61.
(5) Col John C. Morgan, USAR (Ret.), Comments on draft of this volume, 9 Feb 61.
4
The United States establishment in Australia had been set up to provide air and logistical support for
the Philippines and for the forces operating in the Netherlands East Indies. After Japanese seizure of
the Netherlands East Indies and after it proved to be impossible to support the Philippines, Fast East Air
Force was inactivated and the conception of the American command in Australia as predominantly an
air command was abandoned. The air command, subsequently designated Fifth Air Force, became an
important element of the Allied land, naval, and air forces. History, USASOS, vol. I.
limited by lack of officers and men and by a lack of information as

to air forces chemical organization and duties. The information finally
arrived from OCCWS in July, and two months later the theater
acquired enough personnel to activate four chemical air operations
companies, using detachments and a platoon of the 3d Chemical
Service Company (Aviation), already in the theater, as nuclei.5
Organizing the Chemical Section, U.S. Army Services of Supply
In March 1942 Allied leaders designated the Pacific as one of the
three main theaters for prosecuting the war against the Axis. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff in turn subdivided the Pacific into areas: the
Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) from Australia to the Philippines,
and the Pacific Ocean Areas (POA) to the east of the Philippines,
the Netherlands East Indies, and Australia. (Map 2) POA was again
subdivided into North Pacific Area, Central Pacific Area (CENPAC)
(including the Hawaiian, Gilbert, Marshall, Mariana, Bonin, and
Ryukyu Islands), and South Pacific Area (SOPAC) (including New
Zealand and New Caledonia). POA came under the command of Ad-
miral Chester W. Nimitz who designated a deputy to head the South
Pacific Area. In April MacArthur, now in Australia, organized GHQ,
SWPA, an Allied and supreme command over all air, land, and sea
forces in the area.6 The Southwest Pacific Area was not technically a
theater but GHQ, SWPA in mission and responsibility was an Allied
headquarters as well as the senior American strategic and tactical
headquarters in the area. After the creation of GHQ, USAFIA became
7
a supply and service headquarters, redesignated United States Army
Services of Supply (USASOS) in July. Copthorne retained his posi-
tion in USAFIA and its successor. Although he was regarded as chief
chemical officer for the U.S. forces, he had no direct role in GHQ.
By 1 July Copthorne and Morgan had their section in operation. The
5
(1) History, USASOS. (2) Interv, Hist Off with Col Burton D. Willis and Col Robert N. Gay,
12 Jun 50. Colonel Willis' first assignments were chemical officer of the base sections at Brisbane and
later at Townsville. (3) Personal Ltr, Copthorne, CCmlO USAFIA, to Brig Gen Alexander Wilson,
Chief Field Serv OCCWS, 13 Jul 42. CWS 319.1 1942. (4) Personal Ltr, Copthorne to Porter, 17
Aug 42. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, SWPA. (All personal letters hereafter cited, unless otherwise noted,
are from this file.)
6
Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-42, pp. 164-73.
7
The term theater will hereafter be used to indicate each of the Pacific areas and the senior U.S.
Army headquarters therein. The North Pacific and the South Pacific Areas will not be considered here
since the major features of the Chemical Warfare Service experience are apparent in the SWPA and
POA accounts.
MAP 2
technical function, involving liaison with Australian chemical warfare

authorities, and the supervision of the chemical laboratory, recently
redesignated the 42d Chemical Laboratory Company, Copthorne exer-
cised through his technical and intelligence officer, Maj. Walter W. F.
Enz. Capt. Arthur H. Williams, Jr., handled fiscal and administrative
matters, including supply, and was purchasing and contracting officer
for the CWS. Capt. Carl V. Burke was operations and training officer.
One other officer and three enlisted men completed the section.8
8
(1) History, USASOS. (2) History, Cml Sec Hq USASOS, SWPA Orgn Files, AFWESPAC,
Folder USASOS History of Cml Warfare School, APO 923, Jul 42-May 44. (3) Ltr, Copthorne to
Hist Off, 16 Feb 51. (4)Copthorne Comments, 13 Jan 61. (5) Morgan Comments, 9 Feb 61.
Copthorne was the only CWS Regular Army officer in SWPA, not
only at the time of organization but also for another year. A Military
Academy graduate, he was 52 years of age at the time and had seen
service in World War I but not overseas. He had a variety of chemical
experience, including a tour as Philippine Department chemical
officer, a tour as a corps area chemical officer in the United States, and
had most recently been an instructor at the Army's Command and
9
General Staff School.
Supply was a very difficult matter to handle. Since there had been
no preplanning for a theater headquarters based in Australia, all sup-
plies obtained in the early period were destined for arriving organiza-
tions. There was no theater reserve. American forces supplies and
services of all kinds were obtained from the Australians when possible
through a necessarily complicated series of procedures which prevented
a fatal drain on the Australian economy and which precluded compe-
tition among American and Allied forces for available goods and
services. Captain Williams had little to work with; Copthorne wrote
to OCCWS that he could determine neither theater strength nor the
availability of supplies in the hands of troops.10
The Theater CWS School

The training job was more readily, although not easily, handled.
Copthorne urged all base section chemical officers to give the troops
as much chemical training as possible. Many of them were too short-
handed to accomplish much training outside their immediate head-
quarters, but Maj. Burton D. Willis, Chemical Officer, Base Section 3
in Brisbane, had a larger staff, and he could call upon the 42nd Chemical
Laboratory Company (formerly the 3d Chemical Field Laboratory).
He gave several courses in chemical warfare defense, using a classroom
in the University of Queensland. Although base section training was
on a part-time basis, such training was a good foundation on which
to build, and Copthorne dispatched Captain Burke to open a theater
school. On 12 July 1942 Burke reported to the Brisbane base section
headquarters to establish a chemical warfare school for all American
forces. Since no authority existed for such an establishment, Burke
9
CMLHO Biographical Sketches. Copthorne was also Acting Adjutant General, USAFIA, from
March to May 1942.
10
Copthorne to Wilson, 13 Jul 42.
officially assumed the operation of the base section school while in

fact preparing for the establishment of a SWPA CWS school. The
first class with thirty-three unit gas officer students was in session
before the school was approved in August, and the third class, also
of unit gas officers, was ready to graduate before September, when the
school officially became a theater activity as part of the Chemical
Warfare Service Training Center.11
Burke started his school in a converted private residence with one
officer and two enlisted assistants. He called on Willis, soon promoted
to lieutenant colonel, on officers of the laboratory company, the 62d
Chemical Depot Company, and on the 10th Chemical Maintenance
Company to assist him with instruction. In the following year, with
a peak staff of five officers, the CW school conducted thirty courses,
including those for unit gas officers, unit gas noncommissioned officers,
and special, technical, decontaminating, and demonstration courses for
other soldiers. These courses, usually of two weeks' duration, graduated
nearly 1,000 students.12 But even this accomplishment was not equal
to the task at hand of training and retraining SWPA forces in defense
against gas warfare. Even before the school started, Copthorne drew
upon his meager supply of officers, again supplementing them with
details from the chemical service units, to establish four mobile training
teams for the purpose of instructing widely dispersed units in chemical
warfare defense. In driving home instruction these training teams
demonstrated chemical warfare defensive and decontaminating equip-
ment and tested procedures in which live toxic agents were used. The
demonstrations and tests were usually given at company level for
selected officers and NCO's. Length of instruction varied from a few
hours to two days, according to the company's needs and schedules.13
The training teams, like the school, were attached to the Chemical
Warfare Service Training Center, which was supported by the base
section headquarters at Brisbane. The training center, in addition to
administering the school and the teams, also arranged or conducted
special co-operative instruction and demonstrations which called for
11
(1) Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Carl V. Burke, 28 Jan 46. (2) Summary of Past History of
the Cml Warfare School, APO 923 (hereafter cited as History, Cml Warfare School). Orgn Files,
AFWESPAC, Folder USASOS History of Cml Warfare School, APO 923. (3) Willis-Gay Interv, 12
Jun 50.
12
History, Cml Warfare School.
13
(1) History, Cml Sec USASOS. (2) Burke Interv, 28 Jan 46. (3) Copthorne Comments, 13
Jan 61.
ANNEX BUILDING, CHEMICAL WARFARE SCHOOL, BRISBANE, AUSTRALIA
more equipment or a greater instruction load than the school or the

teams could handle individually. Standard U.S. training aids and
equipment were not available. Major Enz acquired a small laboratory
at the University of Melbourne and manufactured gas identification
sets using commercial materials and toxics furnished by the Australian
and American Armies. Instructors or chemical service units fabricated
other equipment and aids. The school got very little instruction and
no materials from the United States, but it did benefit by an exchange
of information with the Australian Antigas School near Toowoomba.14
The newly established training facilities were used by the 32d and
41st Infantry Divisions, first American tactical ground forces organi-
zations in the theater. The 41st Division had reached Australia on
7 April 1942, and the 32d Division on 14 May 1942. Both organizations
14
Burke Interv, 28 Jan 46.
included chemical sections, the 41st section headed by Maj. Frank M.

Arthur, and the 32d section by Capt. Edward H. Sandell. Both of
these officers established division chemical warfare schools.15
When General MacArthur converted USAFIA into USASOS on
20 July 1942, general and special staffs retained their responsibilities
virtually unchanged. Such reorganization as was accomplished was
apparently intended to bring USASOS into line with a War Depart-
ment directive for theater communications zone organization.16
Copthorne felt that there should be a chemical officer in General Mac-
Arthur's GHQ, but, he also felt that for the time being his location
in USASOS permitted him close supervision of the matters in which
17
the CWS had the greatest immediate concern. A position in GHQ
would presumably have been an Allied staff position similar to the one
which Shadle had just taken over in AFHQ. Since there was no World
War I precedent and since Shadle's was the only such CWS appoint-
ment in World War II, a like appointment in GHQ would have been
unusual.
CWS Functions
CWS functions of immediate concern were those of personnel,
supply, and training, as they had been earlier; but now Copthorne also
had reason to become deeply interested in the technical preparations
for gas warfare. As theater chemical officers the world over were then
discovering or were about to discover, he had found that they had
"almost an independent Chemical Warfare Service out here." 18 The
manifestation of this independence in SWPA was not, as in other
theaters, in the realm of supply, but rather in the provision of technical
chemical information to all forces in the theater and in the exchange
of information with the Allies. As far as supply was concerned, the
time lag between the United States and the theater was so great that
the individual service could as yet do little to influence shipments.
Distribution within the theater was tightly controlled by USASOS
since critically short transportation had to be centrally controlled. In
technical matters, however, Copthorne had charge of the only full-
fledged laboratory in the theater, and he strongly believed that it was
15
16
Ibid.
History, USASOS, pp. 27-29.
17
Personal Ltr, Copthorne to Porter, 17 Aug 42.
18
Ibid.
to the advantage of the service for

this laboratory to handle any tech-
nical problem referred to it. Since
the Japanese had reportedly em-
ployed gas in China, since they
were apparently logistically cap-
able of mounting a gas attack, and
since it would be to their advan-
tage to initiate such an attack be-
fore the American defenses were
organized, Copthorne also believed
that the Japanese might initiate
gas warfare at any time. This pos-
sibility, he felt, called for active
intelligence work and extensive
technical investigation of the COLONEL RIEGELMAN
characteristics of available muni-
tions in the theater's tropical environment. He also saw the need for
improvising new munitions and techniques to be used before supplies
and information became available from the United States.19
In order to meet the technical portion of his functions, Copthorne
had set up a Technical Advisory Board to maintain scientific liaison
with the British, the Australians, and within the U.S. forces, and to
advise the laboratories. Also, several of Copthorne's subordinates had
begun munitions testing. Two of them, Capt. Richard H. Cone and
Lt. James W. Parker were killed in an air accident while carrying out
experiments to determine whether incendiary bombs could be im-
provised from training bombs, using gasoline thickened with crude
rubber as a filling.20
In September 1942 the chemical section went along with USASOS
headquarters to Sydney, but the change in location made little change
in the section's operation. In the following month the chemical section
began circulating a mimeographed Chemical Warfare information
bulletin designed to apprise officers in the field of technical and intelli-
gence developments.21 Also, during this period Headquarters, I Corps,
under the command of Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, arrived in
19
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
History, Cml Sec USASOS.
Australia to become the senior tactical American ground command.

The I Corps chemical officer was Col. Harold Riegelman, a distinguished
New York attorney who had served in World War I as a gas officer
and had since been prominent in Reserve activities. In the words of
his commander, he was "a loyal efficient staff officer with an analytical
22
brain who pursued his work with diligence." Riegelman's section
23
included an officer assistant, a warrant officer, and six enlisted men.
On arrival in Australia, Colonel Riegelman at once began to lay plans
with Major Arthur of the 41st Division, and to await an opportunity
to confer with Captain Sandell of the 32d Division.
CWS Baptism—The Papua Campaign

This opportunity never arose. Two regiments of the 32d Division
had been ordered forward to New Guinea in September, and on 18
October Sandell, T/Sgt. John K. King, and Sgt. Raymond F. Dasman,
as the advance detail of the chemical section, reported to their com-
manding general at Port Moresby on the southern tip of New Guinea.24
Sandell's was among the first chemical sections to participate in combat
in World War II after the fall of the Philippines. The duties performed
by the 32d Division Chemical Section, while they might not be cate-
gorized as either administrative or staff work, which were theoretically
the section's main responsibilities, demonstrate the ingenuity with
which chemical sections in many combat elements in all parts of the
25
world approached and defined their tasks.
Sandell and his sergeants spent a few days in the Port Moresby area
locating the chemical equipment which the regiments had discarded
on landing. Most of the equipment was in a deplorable state, having
been scattered in odd piles about Port Moresby and exposed to the
elements. The gas masks, approximately 5,000, had been collected and
put under cover. USASOS had established a forward base at Port
Moresby, but the base chemical officer, inexperienced and recuperating
from malaria, had been unable to locate either the labor or the materials
22
Gen Robert L. Eichelberger, USA (Ret.), "A Prefatory Note," in Harold Riegelman, Caves of Biak
(New York: Dial, 1955).
23
Riegelman, Caves of Biak., pp. 3-4.
24
For a complete account of the Papua Campaign, see Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua, UNITED
STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1957).
25
The following account of the initial activities of the 32d Division Chemical Section is based on:
Acting Div CmlO to CG 32d Inf Div, 18 Feb 43, sub: Rpt on the Activities of the 32d Inf Div Cml
Sec During the Papuan Campaign.
to build storage places and to collect and store other equipment.

Nearly all troops in the area had been fighting to repel the Japanese
invasion until a short time before Sandell's arrival.
Sandell managed to get a 10-man detail from the 107th Quarter-
master Battalion, then assigned to the Port Moresby base, and with
this help he and his men gathered, inspected, and stored any materiel
that gave promise of serviceability. Sandell and his men were also given
the mission of searching the jungle to discover if any native garden
or jungle foods could be found to supplement the ration. From 8 to 21
November Sandell attended the New Guinea Force school on jungle
tactics as a student and presented briefings on chemical warfare as an
instructor.
On 27 November Sandell was ordered forward to the Buna-Gona
area, where an assault had been launched ten days earlier, to see if
chemical smoke or incendiary supplies would be useful in pushing the
attack. The assault was going badly because locating the enemy in
his cleverly camouflaged positions was difficult and driving him from
well-fortified bunkers with the weapons available was almost impos-
sible. To get a line on enemy fortifications and master the assault
26
problem, Sandell led a patrol to a point south of the Buna Mission.
He returned to Port Moresby, joined forces with Sergeants King and
Dasman, and together they collected HC smoke pots, Australian rifle
smoke grenades, thermite aerial bombs, blasting powder, gelignite,
safety fuzes, detonators, and friction tape. Back in the fighting zone
on 4 December, they set to work improvising hand grenades from the
rifle smoke grenades. They had some difficulty persuading infantrymen
to use them until an infantry captain demonstrated that it was safe
to pass through the smoke released by two grenades thrown directly
in front of an active bunker. The grenades were then much in demand.
On 7 December 1942 men of the 114th Engineer Combat Battalion
brought forward the first two portable flame throwers to arrive in the
combat area. Despite King's one attempt to put the flame throwers
in operating condition, they failed to fire properly. Flame throwers
were not again used in the Papua Campaign.27 After receiving chemical
and ordnance supplies on 11 December, King and Dasman refined their
modified smoke grenade. Persisting in spite of a number of false starts,
they also produced a dependable Molotov cocktail and developed a
26
For this patrol action Captain Sandell was awarded a Silver Star.
27
See below, Chapter XIV, for full account of this failure.
hand-thrown concussion torpedo capable of killing all the occupants

of a large bunker. After combat testing the improvised weapon, the
127th Infantry requested all the torpedoes the CWS sergeants could
manufacture.
Captain Sandell was killed in action on 26 December 1942, and
Dasman became a victim of malaria. King carried on at the front
until the division was relieved late in January 1943.28 The initiative
and resourcefulness of Sandell and his men fitted in well with the con-
cept of the CWS developed by Fries and Porter.
The Principal Mission—1943

Preparedness for Chemical Warfare
In February 1943 Riegelman visited New Guinea to assess the combat
situation. He felt that Sandell and his men had done a fine job under
extremely difficult circumstances, but he was disturbed by the lack of
chemical weapons and the evidences of the poor use of smoke in the
whole campaign. Like Copthorne, he was firmly convinced that the
chemical officers should learn what effect gas would have in the tropics,
and he agreed with Copthorne that the best place to find out was on
the spot. While he believed defensive training was better than it had
been in World War I, he was still concerned about the adequacy of
both training and equipment since he believed the Japanese to be
capable of using gas, and feared that even if they did not, some of the
jungle odors might cause gas scares, which like an actual attack would
result in panic if more specific training was not given. Riegelman
reported his observations to his superiors and set to work in corps head-
quarters to provide remedies to the problems he foresaw.29
Copthorne likewise continued to be much concerned with the tactical
problems of preparedness, but he believed that his position in USASOS
prevented him from acting adequately in the tactical and planning
field. In February 1943 he and his section moved up to the newly
reconstituted U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, a headquarters some-
what comparable to the army theater headquarters in Europe and
North Africa. He took with him to Brisbane Lt. Col. John C. Morgan,
28
King was later commissioned and served in the Sixth Army Chemical Section.
29
(1) Riegelman, Caves of Biak, pp. 26-30. (2) Personal Ltrs, Riegelman to Waitt, 26 Jan 43, and
Riegelman to Porter, 26 Feb 43. CWS 314.7 Pers Ltrs of Colonel Riegelman.
recently promoted, Major Enz, and three other officer assistants. Lt.
Col. John C. Morcock, Jr., became Chemical Officer, USASOS, serving
with Captain Williams and two other officer assistants.
Copthorne still felt that he should be in GHQ where the chief
engineer and chief signal officer resided but recognized that although
the new USAFFE was a headquarters without tactical functions, it at
least promised to offer a better place for gas warfare preparedness
planning than USASOS.30 USAFFE headquarters did not offer chan-
nels for formal co-ordination of the preparedness effort with Australian
chemical warfare authorities. Although informal relationships with
the Australians were good, Copthorne strongly felt that there should
be a formal relationship, particularly since the Australians found it
possible to communicate through their technical channels with the
chemical warfare establishment in England, and thereby with the
CWS and with the U.S. Chemical Warfare Committee in the United
States. Copthorne himself had found neither a command nor a tech-
nical channel which permitted easy communication with the technical
and planning authorities in the United States.31 The Australians had
established a Chemical Warfare Service early in 1942 which like the
British counterpart was a joint effort of their army, navy, and air
force. Lt. Col. F. S. Gorrill of the British establishment was on duty
in Australia, and in 1943 he undertook an investigation of gas warfare
32
in the tropics.
Staffing Problems
The move to higher headquarters and the completion of the first
33
theater gas warfare plan in March again brought to the fore the
problem, which had been troublesome from the beginning, of providing
a chemical staff. Copthorne had still received no allotment of officers
in which each officer was earmarked for the kind of job he was intended
to fill. The only officers with appropriate rank, military education,
and experience to fill the top positions were Col. Carl L. Marriott who
arrived in April as Chemical Officer, Sixth Army, and Colonel Riegel-
30
(1) History, Cml Sec USASOS. (2) Ltr, Copthorne to Hist Off, 22 May 51.
31
Interv, Hist Off with Copthorne, 26 Apr 61.
32
D. P. Mellor, "Australia in the War of 1939-45," The Role of Science and Industry (Canberra:
Australian War Memorial, 1958) pp. 372-76.
33
Ltr, CinC GHQ SWPA to TAG, 7 Apr 43, sub: Theater Plans for Cml Warfare. GHQ AG 381
(12-8-42)C.
man. Both men already had important posts and were unavailable to
the theater organization. By the end of July 1943, no requisition for
CWS personnel channeled through the USAFFE G-1 had yet been
filled. Copthorne took the view that most of the young Reserve officers
assisting him were doing excellent, and in some cases, outstanding work,
but in implementing and revising the theater gas warfare plan and
the training responsibilities which were growing daily, he had no one
with sufficient rank and experience to handle the operations (planning)
tasks. Furthermore, a large part of offensive gas warfare planning had
to originate with the air forces where preparation for the retaliatory
effort would be concentrated. Neither in USASOS nor in USAFFE
did Copthorne have any power to control the Fifth Air Force, which
reported to GHQ through Allied Air Forces. His relationship with
Maj. Walter C. Weber, Fifth Air Force Air Staff chemical officer, was
so cordial that he could practically consider him as an assistant, but
Weber, then the only field-grade chemical officer in the Fifth Air
Force, had his hands too full with supply and service functions to
34
give any deep consideration to long-range planning.
In the face of such problems, Copthorne increased his strength as
best he could. It had been demonstrated by the time of the move to
USAFFE that the existing organization for securing chemical technical
intelligence through unit gas officers and NCO's was ineffective. Cop-
thorne accordingly assigned Maj. John A. Riddick, who had been Enz's
assistant, to head a new Intelligence Section in his office. He charged
Riddick with securing six junior officers and twelve NCO's to organize
and train six technical intelligence teams. Riddick found the officers
and men and brought them into the USAFFE Chemical Section for
training. At the same time the headquarters rule that all captured
equipment must be channeled to the Australians was relaxed. The
teams soon went out on attachment to combat units. Riddick compiled
their findings, together with laboratory analyses and descriptions of
captured enemy equipment, and forwarded the resulting report to
chemical officers and unit gas officers as well as to the headquarters of
other theaters and areas in contact with the Japanese.35
At the same time the CWS SWPA began to rotate chemical officers
among assignments so that as many officers as possible could have field
34
Personal Ltrs, Copthorne to Waitt, 14 Jul 43; Copthorne to Porter, 27, 28 Jul 43.
35
(1) Copthorne Comments, 13 Jan61. (2) Morgan, Comments, 9 Feb61.
and staff experience. Lt. Col.

Robert W. Smith became Mor-
cock's executive, and Maj. Irving
R. Mollen came from Base Section
3 to be his supply officer. The
Melbourne base section chemical
officer came in to be supply officer
in the USAFFE section for a few
months and then returned to Mel-
bourne. Another field officer was
assigned to a brief tour as opera-
tions and training officer in the
Chemical Section, USAFFE, be-
fore becoming commandant of
the school. Maj. Carl V. Burke
replaced Colonel Morgan as exec-
COLONEL MARRIOTT examining
utive officer in the USAFFE sec- Japanese gas mask.
tion after Morgan became CWS
Liaison Officer with the Australian Army, a position established in
place of formal co-ordination. Colonel Willis moved from Brisbane
to Townsville since Townsville was the base most actively in support
of forward operations. He then served a short tour in the Advance
Section, USASOS, in New Guinea, and returned to Townsville.
Morcock moved out to become chemical officer of the Advance Section
and Colonel Smith took his place in USASOS.36
Co-ordinating the Theater CWS

Copthorne felt the CWS in the United States should provide gas
warfare technical and preparedness doctrine for the tropics, or else
that it should assist him and his colleagues in the Pacific areas in formu-
lating such doctrine, but he was not satisfied that his appeals for help
had received sufficient attention in the United States.37 He found
communication with the Central Pacific Area chemical staff too diffi-
cult in 1943 to offer adequate opportunity for co-ordinated study of
chemical problems, but his colleagues in the South Pacific were closer
36
(1) Information Bull, CWS Hqs USAFFE Nos. 8-16, 10 May-10 Sep 43. (2) Morgan Interv,
10 Oct 45. (3) Burke Interv, 28 Jan 46.
37
Copthorne Interv, 26 Apr 61.
and had more experience with tropical warfare so there the oppor-
tunities for exchange of information seemed better. The Chemical
Section, U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area (USAFISPA),
had been organized by Col. Leonard J. Greeley in August 1942. In
November 1942 Greeley was designated Deputy Chief of Staff,
USAFISPA, and Lt. Col. Joel L. Burkitt became chemical officer.
While the USAFISPA Chemical Section had been hampered by short-
age of manpower, lack of chemical materials, and the perpetual Pacific
problems of difficulties in communication and transportation, its staff,
as Copthorne knew, had kept in close touch with the combat organi-
zation chemical officers.38
Copthorne decided that he might be able to accomplish gas warfare
doctrinal formulation by "committee." He accordingly invited
Greeley and Burkitt along with the principal chemical officers in
SWPA to a conference at the SWPA CWS school from 1-3 July 1943.
Col. Robert N. Gay, Chemical Officer, XIV Corps, then in SOPAC,
joined Greeley and Burkitt. From SWPA came Marriott, Riegelman,
Lt. Col. Lyle A. Clough, Chemical Officer, 32d Division, Lt. Col.
James O. Andes, who was soon to replace Clough, and Major Arthur,
along with principal members of the USAFFE and USASOS staffs.
The conference first "defined" the tropics in terms of the effect of pre-
vailing meteorological conditions and terrain on gas warfare. Next
the conferees observed demonstrations of incendiary, flame, and smoke
weapons and munitions. They then spent a day on tactical gas warfare
requirements and a half a day on tactics of smoke employment. The
meeting concluded with a half-day session on ammunition supply
requirements. The principal value of the conference appears to have
been that the chemical officers were able to agree on what they did
and did not know. What they did know or were able to conclude
concerning the performance of available munitions in the tropics was
stated as area tactical doctrine for the employment of chemical agents
and weapons. A list of items related to munitions performance char-
acteristics about which they were in doubt was drawn up for investi-
gation in the theater or referral to OCCWS.39
As Riegelman expressed his views on the conference, "Everybody
38
(1) CMLHO Biographical Sketches. (2) 1st Ind, CG USAFISPA to TAG, 1 Apr 43, on Ltr,
TAG to CG USAFISPA, 19 Dec 42, sub: Theater Plans for Cml Warfare. AG 381 (12-8-42) OB-S-
E-M. (3) Interv, Hist Off with Col Nelson McKaig, USA (Ret.), 27 Apr61.
39
Rpt of Conf of Cml Warfare Officers, 1, 2, 3 Jul 43, Cml Sec USAFFE, n.d.
profited enormously. Everybody contributed values from his own

experience."40 But in retrospect, the conference was more significant
than its immediate value in providing a forum for the exchange of
experience and as a means of formulating temporary doctrine would
indicate. Its significance lay in the fact that it presented practically
the only means of integrating the CWS in SWPA. It accomplished
for Copthorne a measure of the co-ordination of effort which Rowan
achieved in the ETO through supply control and continuous personal
liaison. It was less successful as a means of control than Rowan's
because a conference is a transitory affair, and in the SWPA the means
of sustaining its co-ordinating benefits were few. The organization
of the SWPA forces, the tremendous physical distances over which
the forces in the theater had to move troops and materiel, and the
continuing difficulty of communication within the theater and with
the United States all militated against maintaining a continuously co-
ordinated effort. Copthorne could only hope to provide a link between
research and the firing line by enlarging and continuously revitalizing
his two greatest sources of strength, control of technical intelligence
and authority to advise on, and sometimes even to make, CWS per-
sonnel assignments. He also still sought to build up the function of
formulating supply policy and the capability of planning within his
own staff.
A temporary hitch in the operation of Copthorne's plans came in
September 1943 when he and the other service chiefs were transferred
back to USASOS. Except for about two weeks' confusion attendant
upon the move, the transfer had little impact on Copthorne's functions
because the promise of improved prestige and capability and of better
lines of communication in USAFFE had not been fulfilled. An officer
remained in the G-4 office in USAFFE as CWS representative. The
reorganized USASOS office included Enz, Burke, and Riddick in their
respective technical, training, and intelligence positions. Smith became
supply officer and Mollen remained as his assistant. A lieutenant colonel
recently arrived from the United States became operations and training
officer. Two other officers and two warrant officers completed the
section. Intelligence trainees were transferred to the 42d Laboratory
for further training.41
40
Personal Ltr, Riegelman to Waitt, 9 Jul 43.
41
Info Bull, CWS USASOS, No. 18, 25 Oct 43.
Preparedness—The Theater CWS Situation at the End of 1943

After the period of adjustment, prospects for the chemical section
became brighter. Lt. Col. John P. Youngman, a supply officer with
considerable background and experience whom Copthorne had long
wanted in the theater, arrived from the United States to take over
the supply position. Colonel Smith became Copthorne's deputy. Maj.
Jack F. Lane, a young officer with a training background, arrived to
take a training center assignment. Lt. Col. Augustin M. Prentiss, Jr.,
a vigorous, young (28 years old) Military Academy graduate with in-
fantry, CWS, and air experience, also arrived from the United States
to become Chemical Officer, Fifth Air Force. Major Weber became
Chemical Officer, V Air Force Service Command, thus giving Prentiss
an opportunity to devote his time to planning and policy.42
Lt. Col. Donald G. Grothaus and Maj. Richard T. Brady of the
Field Operations staff, OCCWS, agreed with Copthorne's estimate of
his problems and accomplishments during their visit to the theater
late in 1943 and early in 1944. Grothaus agreed with Copthorne that
the Pacific was the most likely area for the initiation of gas warfare,
and he pointed out, as Copthorne had, that the CWS deficiency of
knowledge as to the employment of gas in the tropics was a serious
drawback in planning and could well be a vital defect should actual
43
gas operations commence. He also noted that Prentiss was hampered
in planning for gas warfare retaliation by a lack of information on
the effectiveness of toxic munitions in a tropical environment.
Grothaus praised Copthorne's policy of setting the service units,
such as the chemical laboratory, to work on any technical problem
within their range of competence whether the solution would have
chemical significance or not. He believed that these services performed
for a number of theater elements had added significantly to the respect
for and acceptance of the CWS in the theater. Other factors increasing
respect resulted from four successful Fifth Air Force smoke operations
42
(1) Info Bull, CWS USASOS, No. 19, 25 Nov 43. (2) Personal Ltr, Copthorne to Porter, 24
Nov 43.
43
The following remarks on Grothaus' and Brady's estimate of the situation are drawn from: Grothaus
and Brady, OCCWS to CCWS through ACCWS Field Opns, 29 Mar 44, Rpt on Visit to SWPA, SOPAC,
and CENPAC (hereafter cited as Grothaus-Brady Rpt). CWS 314.7 Observer Rpts. While Grothaus
and Brady worked part of the time as a team, Brady was charged only with the investigation of technical
intelligence and wrote only that portion of the report.
in New Guinea,44 and from excellent liaison with the Australian forces.
One CWS officer, Capt. Howard E. Skipper, had been sent to work
in the Australian Chemical Warfare experimental station, and Grothaus
believed that the CWS should provide more help, both in manpower
and materials, to further the Australian experiments on gas in the
tropics. Another source of increased respect was the record of the
4.2-inch chemical mortar battalion in the South Pacific Area. In the
United States this mortar battalion had been assigned to SWPA, but
since the SWPA chemical staff was not informed that the unit was
authorized to fire high-explosive shells nor that such shells were
available, the battalion had been given so low a movement priority as
a gas warfare unit that it was diverted to SOPAC.45 Reports filtering
into SWPA on the effectiveness of the chemical mortar using high-
explosive shells made several ground commanders eager to obtain bat-
talions for their own employment. On the debit side, Grothaus, again
as Copthorne had, deplored the poor condition of CWS materiel
arriving in the theater and indicated that OCCWS action to improve
the situation was imperative. Also, despite some recent improvements
in the manpower situation, SWPA still had a greater shortage of
experienced officers than any other major theater. While strict theater
personnel ceilings prevented large additions to the theater CWS com-
plement, Grothaus was of the opinion that in future shipments
OCCWS could do much to make up in quality what was lacking
in quantity.
Major Brady, whose specific mission was to investigate intelligence,
was so impressed with Major Riddick's accomplishments that he for-
warded to OCCWS Riddick's schedule for training technical intelli-
gence teams. Brady recommended that these teams be trained in the
United States. He visited some of the teams which had begun to
operate in forward areas with command sanction early in November
46
and approved their activities. The intelligence teams were a valuable
aid to the CWS SWPA for the remainder of the war. Copthorne later
44
(1) Prentiss personally supervised these four operations and flew in the lead plane on the first one.
Prentiss Interv, 25 Oct 61. (2) For details on one of these operations at Lae, see below, Chapter X.
45
Copthorne Comments, 13 Jan61.
46
Personal Ltr, Riddick to Morgan, 14 Nov 43, inclosing: (1) Ltr, AG USAFFE to CG USASOS,
9 Nov 43, sub: Responsibility for Technical Intelligence, FEGC 323.361; (2) Memo for Red, Riddick,
12 Nov 43, sub: Conf with Col E. R. Thorpe, ACofS G-2 USAFFE.
commented that the organization for intelligence was so effective that

it should stand as an example for all similar theater activities.47
CWS, Southwest Pacific Area, 1944-45

The year 1944 was somewhat paradoxical for the Office of the Chief
Chemical Officer, USASOS. On the one hand, the supply situation
was good; the condition of equipment had improved; planning capa-
bilities improved throughout the year; training was progressing
smoothly; technical intelligence was working well; and technical in-
vestigations continued to produce worthwhile information. On the
other hand, until late in the year, the advance of forces toward the
Philippines put increasingly greater distances between Copthorne's
immediate staff and the CWS in the field, thereby making communica-
tion increasingly more difficult. Even the advanced echelons of
USASOS communicated more readily with the combat forces than
with their own main echelon. Thus, while the USASOS Chemical
Section was successfully accomplishing its aims and missions, the chief
chemical officer, because of the organization of the theater and its
physical setup, had a less important role in the operation of the theater
CWS as a whole. (Chart 7)
A Solution for Technical Planning Problems
Copthorne made a trip to Washington in the spring of 1944 for
consultations in OCCWS, where he gave special attention to his man-
power and planning problems. Lt. Col. William A. Johnson, an officer
whom Copthorne had several times requested, arrived in the theater
during Copthorne's absence to take over the operations and training
functions. In June the theater gas warfare plan was revised, and the
revision indicated a considerable improvement in the theater situation
both with respect to supply and plans. Technical and munitions per-
formance information was still deficient, but a team of two officers
sent out to SWPA by OCCWS had made a preliminary survey of
requirements for information on gas warfare in the tropics just before
Copthorne's departure, and OCCWS was soon to set up a project for
48
assessment of gas in tropical situations in the western hemisphere.
47
Copthorne to Hist Off, 22 May 51.
48
(1) Info Bulls, CWS USASOS, Nos. 24 and 25, 25 Apr and 25 May 44. (2) History of the Cml
Sec USASOS, Mar 44-Jul 45. USASOS Mil History Rpts.
CHART 7—ORGANIZATION OF CHEMICAL SECTION, HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY SERVICES OF SUPPLY
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, 1 JUNE 1944
Source: Adapted from: SWPA Personnel and Administration, CWS 314.7; Organizational Man-
ual, U.S, Army Services of Supply, SWPA, revised 1 Jun 44, ASF 200, Cannon, Leyte: Return
to the Philippines, p. 25.
By the end of 1944 the SWPA gas warfare planning enterprise at

last reached the echelon where it had been in theory but not in fact
for three years.49 Copthorne personally went on temporary duty with
G-3, GHQ, to make another revision of the gas warfare plan. This
superior headquarters could co-ordinate the activities of the ground,
naval, air, and service commands affecting plans for gas warfare. The
remaining technical problems were also approaching solution. In
November 1944 the theater and the Allies concurred in a proposal
forwarded to the theater by General Waitt for the establishment of a
Far Eastern Technical Unit (FETU) to investigate the performance
of toxics and toxic munitions in the theater. Enz had originally sug-
gested such an establishment to OCCWS. FETU, under the command
of Lt. Col. John D. Reagh, completed its tests and analyses during
1945 and in the process furnished needed planning data to the theater.
The unit employed officers and civilian scientists from the United States
and drew upon the theater CWS for assistance, service, and supply.50
Theater Training—Final Phase

The Chemical Warfare Service training center continued to be a
SWPA focus for chemical training during 1944 although corps and
division courses had become common in the latter half of 1943. Early
in 1944 the distance of most combat units from Australia made it
impractical to send large groups back to Brisbane. A new Chemical
Warfare Service training center was therefore established at Oro Bay
in New Guinea. At first the school remained at Brisbane, but gave
some assistance in conducting courses at Oro Bay. About the middle
of 1944, a little less than two years after its establishment at Brisbane,
the school moved to Oro Bay where it remained until early in 1945.
The Chemical Warfare Service Training Center and the school were
subsequently re-established in the Manila area, but the war ended
51
before the school was in full operation.
In the Oro Bay location, the training center and school came under
the jurisdiction of the Chemical Officer, Intermediate Section, USA-
SOS. Intermediate Section (later New Guinea Base Section) was a
forward area service and supply command with jurisdiction over all
49
SWPA gas warfare plans from the first officially emanated from GHQ.
50
(1) History, Cml Sec USASOS, 44-45. (2) FETU's Rpts and Corresp. CWS 314.7 FETU.
51
(1) History, Cml Sec USASOS, 44-45. (2) Burke Interv, 28 Jan 46.
but the most forward bases. Copthorne had secured the transfer of
Colonel Gay from SOPAC to SWPA in December 1943 to be Chemical
Officer, Intermediate Section. In January 1944 Colonel Gay became
chemical officer of an advanced headquarters of USASOS and Burke,
recently promoted to lieutenant colonel, became Intermediate Section
chemical officer. In this position, Burke was in charge of direct support
to the combat forces as supplied by the New Guinea bases. This was
a difficult position since the occupant in effect served two masters.
General instructions and command came from USASOS, but decisions
on allocation of resources and requests for supply, services, and training
52
came primarily from Sixth Army.
The CWS in the Combat Forces, 1944-45

The SWPA combat forces had from the beginning enjoyed a greater
degree of independence than most similar forces elsewhere in the world
because the nature of the area, as noted earlier, made closely co-ordi-
nated operation extremely difficult. The independence, at least with
respect to chemical matters, increased throughout 1944. Sixth Army
was the principal U.S. Army ground combat organization in the
theater in 1944, although Eighth Army was to be organized late in
1944 and to become operational in 1945.53 Colonel Marriott presided
over the Sixth Army chemical establishment. Maj. Leonard L. Mc-
Kinney was assistant, deputy, and frequently operations officer, for
54
Colonel Marriott. The Sixth Army Chemical Section included a
supply officer with one or sometimes two assistants, and usually an
operations officer. Colonel Marriott was invalided home in mid-1944
55
and was replaced by Col. John R. Burns.
The Sixth Army Chemical Section had a major hand in determining
tactical policy, and it not only allocated incoming resources among
the supporting bases, but also allocated resources among subordinate
combat organizations. The allocation duties meant distributing to
Sixth Army organizations such combat units as the chemical mortar
52
(1) Ltr, CmlO Intermediate Sec USASOS to CmlO's Bases A, B, D, E, F, 1 Apr 44, sub: Ltr of
Instr. ISCW 300 in Unit Files, 93d Cml Composite Co. (2) Burke Interv, 28 Jan 46. (3) Willis-Gay
Interv, 12 Jun 50.
53
See Robert Ross Smith, The Approach to the Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD
WAR II (Washington, 1953), pp. 278, 450n.
54
(1) Col Harold Riegelman, MS, Admin of CW Functions in Theaters of Opns—SWPA. (2)
CMLHO Biographical Sketches.
55
CMLHO Biographical Sketches.
battalions, which belatedly became available to the theater with the

activation of one battalion and the arrival of another in mid-1944,
and of such service units as were available. But service units were not
readily available. When, late in 1943, Marriott asked Copthorne how
he might obtain one of Copthorne's service units, Copthorne wrote,
"you might just as well have nonchalantly asked me how you could
56
get my right arm or even my bed at Lennon's." Copthorne was
understandably reluctant to give up any service unit since USASOS
units were already thinly spread in detachments in an attempt to meet
supply and service requirements. But even had he been willing and
able to release a unit, the organizational cleavage between service and
combat forces was so deep that USASOS did not feel that it was
responsible for supplying units to the combat forces. It was USASOS
policy to retain its badly needed units.57 Eventually, USASOS policy
was changed to permit the release of one unit in January.58 Sixth Army
parceled out this unit, and later others, in detachments to divisions to
service flame throwers, recondition shell, and handle supply. These
detachments were subsequently converted into cellular units, that is,
units composed of smaller self-supporting elements, to perform the
same functions.
Colonel Burns and Col. Ralph C. Benner, Chemical Officer, Eighth
Army, continued to work on the problems of chemical tactical policy
and of allocation of men, units, and materials for the remainder of the
war in the Pacific. They had the job of receiving and evaluating plans
and requirements which originated in echelons subordinate to the army
headquarters. They, in turn, translated these plans and requirements
into the concepts of the whole organization, co-ordinated them through
staff in their own headquarters, and dispatched them through command
channels to GHQ. Using both technical and command channels, the
Army chemical officers received reports of chemical activities and
problems and maintained continuous inspections to insure the greatest
possible effectiveness at field levels.59
Below army level, 1944 and 1945 saw the culmination of a great
change which had taken place since the tragic and heroic improvisa-
56
Personal Ltr, Copthorne to Marriott, 19 Nov 43. Sixth Army Cml Sec Memos. (Lennon's was
the best hotel in Brisbane and a highly prized officer's billet.)
57
Ibid.
58
History, Cml Sec USASOS, 44-45.
59
(1) Riegelman, Admin of Cml Warfare Functions in Theaters of Operations—SWPA. (2) Interv,
Hist Off with Lt Col Leonard L. McKinney, 12 Jan 46.
tions of the 32d Division Chemical Section in the Papua Campaign.

USASOS and Sixth Army managed during 1943 and early in 1944 to
obtain a sufficient supply of essentials such as smoke pots, hand gre-
nades, 4.2-inch chemical mortar shells, and individual protective equip-
ment. Colonel Riegelman in I Corps and his subordinates in the
divisions plunged into training and tactical work, and by the time
of the Hollandia operation early in 1944, they had defensive training
60
of the individual soldier well in hand. I Corps had also officially
adopted a policy of using smoke shell to provide a target area marking
system. Riegelman secured approval for the concept of attaching a
mortar company to each assaulting division under the operational
control of the division chemical officer. The misuse of smoke conceal-
ment which Riegelman had found in his first tour in New Guinea had
been corrected by troop training and by orienting commanders.61
Flame thrower techniques had also been perfected, and the weapon
itself had been improved through the extraordinary efforts of both
USASOS and field chemical officers and men. The weapon still had its
faults and maintenance and repair problems were to plague SWPA
forces for the duration of the war. With respect to tactical employ-
ment of the flame thrower, Sixth Army declared that the weapon
logically belonged with the infantry rather than with the engineers,
who had brought it into the Pacific. Both Sixth Army and I Corps
developed an infantry team for the tactical employment of the flame
thrower, and Sixth Army officially set up a team training program
which was materially aided by a roving demonstration team organized
62
by Colonel Gay in the USASOS advanced echelon.
Other corps chemical officers, Col. Francis H. Phipps, X Corps, Lt.
Col. John L. Bartlett, XI Corps, and Lt. Col. Richard R. Danek, XIV
Corps,63 like Riegelman who was replaced by Col. Frank M. Arthur
in 1945, for the most part performed tactical and training functions.
They concerned themselves with supply only with respect to critical
60
For information on the campaigns in this period, see Smith, The Approach to the Philippines.
61
(1) Riegelman, Caves of Biak, pp. 64-65, 70-74, 87-96. (2) Interv, Hist Off with Col Harold
Riegelman, USAR (Ret.), 10 Oct 56.
62
(1) Riegelman, Admin of Cml Warfare Functions in Theaters of Opns—SWPA, (2) Willis-Gay
Interv, 12 Jun 50. (3) Burke Interv. 28 Jan 46.
63
XIV Corps transferred from SOPAC to SWPA. Col. Hugh M. Milton II, corps chemical officer in
SOPAC, became corps ACofS, G-4, and subsequently corps chief of staff. Col R. N. Gay, XIV Corps
chemical officer, was succeeded by Lt. Col. William H. Shimonek who returned to the United States in
1944 and who was replaced by Danek.
items, such as the gas mask and 4.2-inch mortar shell, or in emergency
situations. Depending on the training and talents of each officer, corps
chemical officers also performed a variety of staff and operating tasks
not directly related to chemical warfare or completely unrelated,
depending upon their capabilities. Riegelman, who had been an
infantry officer as well as a gas officer in World War I, did a study
on the reduction of Japanese cave defenses on the island of Biak, an
operation which had combined infantry and chemical techniques.64
65
Division chemical officers had their hands full. As their top priority
function, they were directly responsible for gas warfare training of
every man in the division. They accomplished what training they
could through their own sections and also made use of traveling train-
ing teams. By these means and by sending quotas (ideally, one officer
per company and one noncommissioned officer per platoon) of unit
gas officers and gas noncommissioned officers to theater and other
schools, they could train UGO's and UGNCO's and in turn help them
establish unit schools and training periods. The training activity was
a constant one since malaria, battle casualties, and ordinary shifts in
personnel frequently necessitated the establishment of an entire new
roster of UGO's and UGNCO's who would likewise be required to
give instruction down to the last private in the last squad. Corps
chemical officers and command inspectors checked on divisional chem-
ical training periodically.
The division chemical officer's duty of next priority was supply.
He cleared requirements statements for gas masks and other protective
supplies, smoke pots, grenades, mortar shell, and various items of chem-
ical equipment with the division G-4, and, if necessary, with the
Ordnance and Quartermaster officers. When supplies were received
64
(1) Riegelman, Admin of Cml Warfare Functions in Theaters of Opns—SWPA. (2) Riegelman,
Caves of Biak, pp. 140-55. (3) USAFFE Board, n.d., Rpt 126 (Japanese Cave Defenses).
65
This account of the duties of the division chemical officer is based on: (1) Riegelman, Admin of
Cml Warfare Functions in Theaters of Opns—SWPA; (2) Memo, Arthur for Hist Off, 21 Nov 45,
sub: Review of Col Riegelman's Paper, Admin of Cml Warfare Functions in Theaters of Opns—SWPA
(Colonel Arthur was Chemical Officer, 41st Infantry Division and I Corps); (3) Memo, Lt Col
Maurice A. Peerenboom for Hist Off, n.d. (Colonel Peerenboom served as Chemical Officer, 32d Infantry
Division in 1943); (4) Personal Ltr, Maj David D. Hulsey to Waitt, 3 Jun 45, in CWS 314.7 Pers Ltr
File (Misc) WESPAC, AFPAC, SPBC (Maj Hulsey was Chemical Officer, 6th Infantry Division);
(5) Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col James P. Sutton, 18 Dec 45 (Colonel Sutton was assistant chemical
officer and assistant to the Chief of Staff, I Corps, and subsequently the 32d Division chemical officer);
(6) Memo, Capt John M. McDonald, OpnsO, for Col Burns, CmlO Sixth Army [1 May 45], in
Sixth Army 333 Inspections; (7) Riegelman, Caves of Biak, passim; (8) Riegelman Interv, 10
Oct 56.
or in transit, the chemical schedule in loading, storage, issue, and service

plans had to be cleared again with general and special staff officers, and
the actual operation of supply followed down to the regimental and
special staff levels. Division chemical officers in the Pacific found that
co-operative plans, sometimes employed in other theaters, for combin-
ing chemical issue and service operations with those of ordnance or
engineer sections seldom worked since these services normally used
their own resources to the limit. Since, in such combined arrangements,
the chemical sections relied heavily on the facilities and services which
Ordnance and Engineers provided in the Pacific, the division chemical
officer acquired the additional duty of securing and supervising his
own service detachments which occasionally worked as far forward
as regimental supply to issue chemical materials, service flame throwers,
and handle mortar shell. The assistant division chemical officer often
devoted full time to supply and service which included field improvisa-
tion or adaptation of materiel.
Planning, staff, and advisory functions also occupied the chemical
officer—at least part of the time. Some of this work was chemical;
some was not. The division chemical officer might find himself assigned
to liaison, reconnaissance, or observer duties, or he might move out of
the staff field into the supervision of combat loading or beach discharge
of cargo. Lt. Col. Nelson McKaig, 25th Division chemical officer, an
agricultural chemist in civilian life, inspected and supervised divisional
food preparation and spent a considerable period setting up a divisional
rest camp on Luzon. There were always the additional details that
every staff member drew, such as sitting on courts-martial, assisting
in command inspections, acting as fire hazards inspector, savings bond
officer, and the like. There was an initial impression that the chemical
officer had little to do in the absence of gas warfare, so that the division
chemical officers may have been assigned a proportionately larger
number of staff, command, and operating details than their colleagues.
Some division chemical officers, like their colleagues in Europe, wel-
comed such details because of the opportunity, lacking in the course
of ordinary chemical activities, to keep in touch with members of the
staff and subordinate units. Some believed, as did Colonel Copthorne,
that any service rendered by the CWS increased the prestige and ac-
ceptability of the service.
A Second Theater CWS

Conference
To return to the theater level,
the respect for the service was in-
creasing, and after the middle of
1944, Copthorne again laid plans
for co-ordinating the chemical
warfare effort for the Pacific
through the best means available
to him—a service conference such
as the one which had been so suc-
cessful in 1943. The second the-
ater CWS conference, held from
10-13 October at Oro Bay under
the official direction of Maj. Gen.
COLONEL COPTHORNE (LEFT) WITH J. L. Frink, Commanding General,
GENERAL WAITT at Colonel Cop- USASOS, was considerably more
thorne's Oro Bay quarters in October
1944. extensive in scope than the pre-
vious conference, but the theme
was still the tactical employment of chemical warfare, including aerial
and land smokes and incendiaries, the chemical mortar, and the flame
thrower.66
General Waitt and Lt. Col. Jacob K. Javits attended as representa-
tives of OCCWS. Col. George F. Unmacht, Chief Chemical Officer,
U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, and Colonel Greeley repre-
sented POA, while Colonel Kellogg and others represented the China-
Burma-India theater. The Australian Army, the American corps,
divisions, and chemical mortar battalions also sent chemical officer
delegates as did USAFFE and USASOS. The Navy sent some of its
officers having chemical duties. Colonel Prentiss, now Chemical Officer,
Far East Air Forces (a headquarters supervising the Fifth and Thir-
teenth Air Forces) attended with other representatives of the air
forces. Also present were Dr. W. A. Noyes and several other civilian
scientists of the National Defense Research Committee.
The conference made a series of recommendations that were con-
siderably more authoritative than those of the earlier conference. The
66
This paragraph and the following account are based on: Rpt, CWS Conf, USASOS SWPA. CWS
314.7.
CHEMICAL WARFARE OFFICERS DURING THE ORO BAY CONFERENCE, OCTOBER 1944
conferees sought a simple table of toxic ammunition requirements

based on operational trials under tropical conditions. This, as already
indicated, they were soon to get.67 They asked for new aerial toxic
munitions, impregnated clothing with increased durability, new gas
grenades, and tactical training material reflecting the behavior of
chemical agents in the tropics. Other requests were for more man-
power for mortar battalions, improved mortars, more spare parts,
more and improved field equipment and munitions. But the signifi-
cance of this conference, as of the previous one, was not so much in
what was recommended and requested as it was in the indication of
joint effort and the revelation of considerable technical knowledge,
much of which had been accumulated through considerable effort and
three years of theater experience. General Waitt was particularly
impressed by the fact that the conference permitted an exchange of
views and experiences among chemical officers of all the Pacific areas,
and he noted that the presence of individuals from the United States
tended to lessen the view held by some theater officers that they had
68
been neglected by OCCWS.
The Office of the Chief Chemical Officer—Final Phase
In September 1944 Colonel Copthorne and a part of his section
moved to Hollandia and in October the remainder of the section
followed from Australia. This office in Hollandia served as the base
for setting up the Philippine operation. Copthorne visited Leyte during
the campaign in December, and early in February moved his office to
that island. These moves placed the USASOS Chemical Section nearer
the nerve center of the theater and considerably eased communication
with the forward elements. But even better things were to come. At
the end of March the office of the chief chemical officer moved with
the advanced echelon of USASOS to Luzon. Here command, service,
and supply activities were being centered, and, while the chief chemical
officer still had no official control or function outside of USASOS, his
technical ties and his supervision of theater gas warfare planning at
last gave him a very effective tool for controlling the theater CWS.69
67
See above, pp. 208-10.
68
Waitt, 25 Nov 44, Preliminary Rpt on Situation in POA and SWPA Based on Visit to SWPA and
POA, 24 Sep-21 Nov 44.
69
History, Cml Sec USASOS, 44-45.
General MacArthur was named, after the return to the Philippines,

to command the U.S. Army Forces, Pacific (AFPAC), with jurisdic-
tion over all Pacific theaters. In July 1945 Copthorne achieved what
since April 1942 he had considered to be his rightful place—he was
named Chief Chemical Officer, AFPAC. He finally had technical
control of the CWS not only in the service command but also in the
air forces and the ground forces.70 Of the theater chemical officers
in World War II only General Shadle as Chief Chemical Officer, AFHQ,
enjoyed a comparable official position.
The war in the Pacific ended in September. Most of the officers who
had served Copthorne during the long period of the war had already
returned to the United States, but he remained as Chief Chemical
Officer, AFPAC, until October 1945 when he was succeeded in turn
by Col. Sterling E. Whitesides, Jr., and by General Loucks, both of
whom served brief tours. Brig. Gen. Egbert F. Bullene served from
July 1945 to March 1946 as Chemical Officer, Army Forces, Western
Pacific—the administrative, supply, and service command which was
organized to succeed USASOS in supporting the invasion of Japan but
which was diverted instead to closing out the activities of SWPA or
rebuilding them to suit occupation needs. Until his departure Cop-
thorne worked, in a new context, on the same kind of problems which
had occupied his attention since February 1942; he requested and
assigned personnel, made plans, traced supplies, sought information,
established intelligence procedures, and tried to put the CWS com-
ponent of the occupation forces on a firm technical footing.71
Organizing the Chemical Warfare Service, Hawaiian Department

The Emergency
Lt. Col. George F. Unmacht, Chemical Officer, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, was having breakfast on the morning of 7 December 1941 when
70
(1) GHQ AFPAC GO 73, 26 Jul 45. (2) GHQ AFPAC Staff Memo 15, 14 Jul 45. (3) Ltr,
CCmlO AFPAC to CmlO's, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Armies, FEAF, AFWESPAC, 2 Aug 45, sub:
Corresp with the CCWS. AFPAC CW 312.3 in CWS 314.7 Misc Files, WESPAC, AFPAC, SPBC.
71
(1) Personal Ltrs, Waitt to Copthorne, 4, 17, 29 Aug, 25 Sep, 4, 5 Oct 45. (2) Personal Ltrs,
Copthorne to Waitt, 17, 19, 29 Aug 45. (3) Ltr, CCWS to CCmlO AFPAC, 23 Aug 45, sub:
Request for Publications. (4) Ltr, CCmlO AFPAC to CCWS, 12 Aug 45, sub: Japanese Sniff Set.
AFPAC CW 386.3. (5) Ltr, CCWS to CCmlO AFPAC, 25 Sep 45, sub: Post-Hostilities Cml Warfare
Mission. (6) Ltr, CCmlO AFPAC to CCWS, 31 Oct 45, sub: Misc Info. AFPAC CW 350 (31 Oct
4 5 ) . ( 3 ) . ( 4 ) , ( 5 ) , and (6) in CWS 314.7 Misc Files WESPAC, AFPAC, SPBC.
he saw Japanese planes dropping bombs.72 Within half an hour,

Unmacht reported to the department headquarters from his office at
Fort Shafter and directed Maj. James M. McMillin, Commanding
Officer, Hawaiian Chemical Warfare Depot, Schofield Barracks, to
begin issuing service gas masks to departmental troops then equipped
with training masks. Lt. James E. Reilly and the men of the 5th
Chemical Service Company (Aviation) on duty at Hickam Field also
saw the attack and sprang into action. They shot down one of the
73
attacking planes.
Hawaiian Department authorities at the time feared that other air
attacks would be made and that these attacks would include the use of
gas. Unmacht's first responsibility, therefore, was to prepare against
aerial gas attack. Leaving M/Sgt. Ralph I. Libby in charge of the
Fort Shafter office, Unmacht reported to the departmental advance
command post at Aliamanu crater. By noon he had telephoned all
CWS staff officers and units on Oahu and had made sure that all were
preparing for gas attack. The CWS officer ranking next to Unmacht,
Lt. Col. Maurice E. Jennings, Chemical Officer, Hawaiian Air Force,
also reported to the advance command post, with an enlisted assistant.
Lieutenant Reilly and Lt. Melvin F. Fincke remained at Hickam Field
while Lt. Willard H. Blohm took up duty at Wheeler Field. The CWS
officers with the air force had the assistance of the chemical aviation
company. Major McMillin and 1st Lt. William J. Tanner continued
to operate the depot at Schofield Barracks where Capt. Howard S.
Leach, Commanding Officer, Company A, 1st Separate Chemical Bat-
talion, was, in addition to his other duties, post chemical officer. The
men of Company A, whose second in command was 1st Lt. Rubert D.
Chapman, were assigned to guard the depot, haul munitions, and fur-
nish details for the post.
Maj. John H. Becque, Chemical Officer, 25th Infantry Division,
was on duty at the Aliamanu crater post with the division staff.
Unmacht secured the appointment of 1st Lt. Woodson C. Tucker as
Acting Chemical Officer, 24th Infantry Division, which lacked a
72
Unless otherwise noted, this and the following sections are based on History of the Chemical Warfare
Service in the Middle Pacific, a 5-volume collection of journals, historical reports, and documents com-
piled and edited under the direction of Capt. Jerome K. Holmes, Chief, Intelligence and Technical Di-
vision, Chemical Office, Headquarters U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific, 1946, OCMH.
73
Chronological history of the chemical office, Hawaiian Department to Middle Pacific, History of
Cml Sec, USAFMIDPAC, vol. I, sec. IL Lieutenant Reilly was awarded the Legion of Merit for his
performance on 7 December 1941.
chemical section, on the afternoon of 7 December. Unmacht was him-

self joined that afternoon by 1st Sgt. Roland P. Fournier and one
other enlisted man. These 11 officers and approximately 375 enlisted
men made up the CWS, Hawaiian Department, until 11 December
when 2 Reserve officers reported for duty.
During those first few days the CWS established several supply
points in addition to the depot and, with the help of a Civilian Con-
servation Corps company, completed the issue of service masks.
McMillin also put into operation a reconditioned impregnating plant,
a chloride of lime production plant, and a toxic land mine and shell-
filling plant, all of which had been refurbished in the month before
the attack.74 One Reserve officer at once began converting a plant of
the Pacific Guano and Fertilizer Company, of which he had been an
employee, to the production of bleach.
Civil Defense
Since the CWS had the only available supply of sirens and horns,
intended to be used as gas alarms, these were distributed as warnings
for air attack pending the acquisition of an air alert system from con-
tinental United States. The CWS reconditioned training masks turned
in by troops and reissued them to the home guard, civil defense officials,
police, firemen, public utilities employees, and other civilians in key
positions. At the cabled request of the Hawaiian Department, the
Chief CWS gathered 478,000 new and used training masks in the
United States and shipped them to Hawaii. When these masks began
to arrive early in 1942, Unmacht's men set civilian crews to work
reconditioning the masks and modifying them with sponge rubber
padding to fit oriental faces and the faces of children. Civilian masks
were issued through first aid stations.
Unmacht and nearly all of his officers, including several newcomers
in the theater, together with 2d Lt. Edouard R. L. Doty, who gave up
the post of territorial civil defense director to be commissioned, became
involved in extensive civil defense training. Unmacht, promoted to
colonel on 12 December 1941 and made territorial Co-ordinator for
gas defense in January, gave almost 300 public talks and radio broad-
casts. A total of 68,000 civilians attended schools for specialized
chemical warfare defense. After the middle of 1942 civil defense ac-
74
Personal Ltr, Unmacht to Porter, 10 Nov 41. CWS 210.3/234.
tivities began to decrease, but civil defense training continued until

75
mid-1943.
Organization—Departmental Chemical Office

Meanwhile, in February 1942, Unmacht reorganized his immediate
office, which in December had consisted only of Libby's Administrative
Section, to include an Administrative Section under a civilian employee,
Miss M. Allegra Clifton, a Training and Civil Defense liaison Section
under Lieutenant Doty and a Supply Section under Lieutenant Libby,
recently commissioned. In July a further reorganization introduced
an executive officer, Capt. James H. Batte, changed Doty's section to
Plans and Training, and put 2d Lt. Roland P. Fournier, who had been
commissioned with 2d Lt. Ralph I. Libby, in charge of supply. This
reorganization in part reflected the addition of responsibilities and
individuals to handle them, but it also helped prepare for the strategic
and organizational decisions then being made in the Pacific theater.
The Hawaiian Department organization, after the organization of the
Pacific areas, continued to be the senior Army command for the Central
Pacific Area. There was at the time no chemical representative on
Admiral Nimitz' joint and Allied POA staff nor on his Pacific fleet
staff. The supreme command and the fleet command were based in
the Hawaiian Islands.
Early Training
The July 1942 organization remained in effect during the second
half of 1942. In this period emphasis shifted from immediate defensive
preparations to preparation for combat in the Central Pacific Area.
The area mission up to that time had been indirect support of operations
in SOPAC and SWPA, and Hawaii had operated as a staging point
for units bound south of the equator. This responsibility had entailed
checking supply and training and providing either or both when
required for troops outward bound. After the middle of 1942 it
became increasingly evident that Hawaii would serve as a base for
mounting forces for combat in the Central Pacific under CENPAC
or POA command. The CWS, Hawaiian Department, stepped up
troop training as its immediate share in the expected CENPAC re-
75
Unmacht, Summary of Activities of CWS in POA, 19 Feb 45. CWS 314.7.
COLONEL UNMACHT WATCHING TRAINEES WASH GAS FROM CLOTHING,
Hawaii.
sponsibilities. Unmacht did not establish a theater school as Copthorne

had done in SWPA, but he inaugurated a series of gas officer and gas
NCO courses for various elements of the department and for combat
organizations. While the first informal instruction had been given
to a group of air wardens only a few days after the attack on Pearl
Harbor, the first course, for 278 UGO's and UGNCO's, was given
17-18 August 1942 in the Fort Shafter gymnasium. Two more ad-
vanced courses were given in September and October, and training for
the year was brought to a rousing finish during three days in December
when the departmental CWS staged a chemical warfare maneuver with
1,295 participants.
Position of the Theater Chemical Officer

At the end of 1942 the Hawaiian Department reorganized from
an advance and rear echelon structure in which both echelons were
responsible for all functions under the direction of the rear echelon, to
a more conventional combat forces, service forces, and air forces pat-
tern and added an echelon for military government since the territory
was still under military control. Unmacht remained the department
chemical officer with responsibilities in all four fields. His position was
unique among chief chemical officers overseas in that he was both
staff officer and commander of the chemical warfare troops not assigned
76
to other organizations.
In actually commanding troops, Unmacht came closer to the manual
definition of a chief of service than any other chief chemical officer.
But this was not the only way in which Unmacht's position differed
from the positions of the other chief chemical officers. The Hawaiian
Department and its successor commands, U.S. Army Forces, Central
Pacific Area (USAFICPA), U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas
(USAFPOA), and U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific (USAFMID-
PAC), were in fact theater headquarters of the kind envisioned in
the War Department organization manuals, and in these headquarters,
unlike those in Europe, North Africa, and the Southwest Pacific, a
commander, who did not double also as a supreme commander, was
resident.77 Unmacht therefore had more opportunity to present his
76
Hawaiian Dept GO 110, 29 Jul 43.
77
The Central Pacific Army headquarters was not technically a theater headquarters since no over-all
Pacific theater command was organized and since the Central Pacific Army headquarters was supervised
by POA, a superior headquarters with a larger jurisdiction.
proposals directly to his commander, Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, until

May 1943 and Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., thereafter, than
did chief chemical officers in other theaters and areas. As Unmacht
himself phrased the relationship, "We receive a lot of encouragement
78
and impetus from topside." With the theater naval command,
which stood in a position roughly comparable to supreme headquarters
in other theaters, Unmacht had a good relationship although the Navy
took little interest in chemical warfare until combat experience proved
the value of the chemical mortar and flame throwers. Navy and Marine
Corps officers assigned to chemical duties were usually junior, but
commanders frequently consulted Unmacht on chemical supply and
training. A reciprocal agreement was worked out whereby the CWS
would use the Navy impregnation plant at Pearl Harbor in return for
impregnating Navy uniforms. When in the summer of 1944 Navy
interest in chemical warfare quickened, Admiral Nimitz, in his capacity
as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, appointed a chemical officer to
his own staff—Capt. Tom B. Hill, USN, who worked in close co-
79
operation with Unmacht.
The Offensive Period in the Central Pacific

Organization of the Theater Chemical Office, 1943-45
On the eve of combat operations in the Central Pacific, Unmacht
twice reorganized his office to reflect the increase in activities relating
to combat planning and training. In January 1943 Captain Doty,
recently promoted, became executive officer and chief of a new Intelli-
gence Division. Reilly, now a captain, became chief of Plans and
Training Division and was assigned an officer assistant. Except for
redesignation as divisions, administration and supply remained un-
changed from the 1942 organization. At the end of June 1943, with
an increased workload and greater availability of officers, Unmacht
again reorganized his office on a pattern very similar to that prescribed
in prewar planning for a theater chemical office. Doty, now a major,
became operations and executive officer. Intelligence Division was
given the added duty of supervising technical functions. Unmacht
78
Personal Ltr, Unmacht to Waitt, 29 Oct 42. CWS 314.7 Pers Files, MIDPAC.
79
Waitt and Javits to CCWS, 15 Dec 44, Rpt of Trip to POA and SWPA. CWS 314.7 Observer
Rpts.
CHART 8—ORGANIZATION OF CHEMICAL OFFICE, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS, 1 APRIL 1945
Source: History, CWS USAFMIDPAC, AnnexesIaand IIIa.

had detailed a few men with technical experience to set up a small

laboratory with locally obtained equipment and supplies. At the end
of 1943 a laboratory company arrived to assume technical duties.
The Plans and Training Division was enlarged and redesignated Oper-
ations and Training Division.
The June 1943 reorganization established the form from which the
theater chemical section varied but slightly until 1945. At that time
an organization consisting of five policy and supervisory divisions and
one administration division was approved. (Chart 8) Lt. Col. Edouard
R. L. Doty, again promoted, remained as executive officer with duties as
assistant chemical officer, supervisor of the theater chemical plan, and
liaison officer to field chemical sections and the Navy. Operational plan-
ning, base development, personnel and unit assignments, and redevelop-
ment planning were assigned to the Operations Division. Capt. Jerome
K. Holmes, in civilian life a chemist, headed the Intelligence and Tech-
nical Division which supervised intelligence and laboratory operations
and which prepared or supervised the preparation of all technical and
intelligence reports. Maj. R. Beverly Caldwell headed the Special
Projects Division which was charged with training, inspections, super-
vision of, and planning for, defense against biological warfare, and
technical developments outside the usual laboratory sphere. The Toxic
Gas Warfare Division was assigned supervision of gas warfare doctrine
development, surveillance of toxic munitions, and liaison with the air
forces, which in this theater, as in the rest of the world, had become
virtually independent of the local Army command.
Colonel Unmacht delegated operating supply functions and detailed
supply planning to the Chemical Office, Central Pacific Base Command,
which had been organized under Maj. Roland P. Fournier on 1 July
1944. In his own office, Unmacht retained the Supply and Logistics
Division. To this division the CWS chief assigned policy functions
relating to operational projects and forecasts for requirements and
transportation and analysis functions relating to supply reporting.
Gas Warfare Preparedness

The Chemical Section, Hawaiian Department, like the chemical
sections all over the world, had a paramount interest in gas warfare
preparedness. Although Unmacht had devoted most of his attention
after the Pearl Harbor attack to immediate individual and collective
protection, he also surveyed the department's ability to retaliate in the

case of gas warfare. There were some toxics in the area, but the means
of retaliation, like the possibility of being able to reach any enemy
force, were indeed slim in 1942. Even had they been ample, however,
the nearest target was so far away as to make the immediate possibility
of retaliation a remote one. Unmacht set about improving the supply
status and at the same time inaugurated both offensive and defensive
training. He also arranged to check on both methods of training.
In June and July 1942 the War Department ordered chemical offen-
sive training in the theaters, and the CWS in the Central Pacific com-
plied by providing training for CWS units and chemical sections.80
In August the department CWS initiated a schedule for spot-check
inspections of Army units in the Central Pacific to determine their
readiness for gas warfare. Of the 522 units inspected by the end of
October, 12 percent proved to be thoroughly prepared, 69 percent
satisfactorily prepared, and 19 percent partially prepared or without
any preparation. Renewed training, especially of UGO's and
UGNCO's, and new issues of supplies soon enabled all units to come
up to acceptable standards of preparedness. While these preparedness
measures were being accomplished, the War Department in December
1942 called for the submission of a gas warfare plan.81
The first Hawaiian Department gas warfare plan, which was co-
ordinated with the local Navy and Marine Corps commands, was
dispatched to the War Department on 8 February 1943. The plan
simply indicated that in the event of gas warfare maximum use of
available weapons and equipment would be made, and no request for
special supplies was included. The heart of the plan consisted of a
detailed plea for the immediate provision of chemical units and man-
power, including a chemical weapons regiment, air and ground service
troops, and chemical staff personnel.82 The War Department at first
indicated that no troops were available but in July requested restudy
83
and resubmission of the troop request. Unmacht replied by reviewing
the problems of preparedness. In his opinion these were: (1) lack of
80
Ltr, Unmacht to CG Hawaiian Dept, 7 Jan 43, sub: Theater Plans for Cml Warfare. CWS 314-7
Central Pacific Theater.
81
Ibid.
82
Ltr, CG Hawaiian Dept to TAG, 8 Feb 43, sub: Theater Plans for Cml Warfare. Hawaiian Dept
AG 381.
83
Ltr, Unmacht to CG Hawaiian Dept, 17 Aug 43, sub: Theater Plans for Cml Warfare. CWS 314.7
Central Pacific Theater.
suitable aircraft and trained airmen for toxic spray missions; (2) lack
of chemical troops for ground retaliation and for providing artificial
smoke protection; (3) inadequate decontamination troops and lack
of centralized control over decontamination squads in the Seventh
Air Force; and (4) insufficient manpower for service operations.
Unmacht asked first priority for service units and a smoke generator
battalion since such troops were urgently needed. He assigned a lower
priority to, but still cited an urgent need for, nine CWS staff officers
in addition to the fifteen authorized, and a chemical mortar battalion.84
During the period from the August 1943 reappraisal until November
of 1944, most of the service, smoke, and mortar units that the Central
Pacific CWS required in the absence of gas warfare were received from
the continental United States or were acquired when the South Pacific
85
Area organization was consolidated with the Central Pacific. Also
during that period Unmacht was delegated the responsibility for co-
ordinating and consolidating all gas warfare plans for Army (including
Army Air Forces), Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard elements in the
Pacific Ocean Areas. Since the POA administrative organization had
long permitted Unmacht to work with all of these elements, he and
his staff were well acquainted with the needs and capabilities of each.
The consolidated gas warfare plan, formulated in June and July, was
consequently extensive and specific, even including an annex listing
and describing selected aerial objectives for possible retaliatory gas
attacks on the enemy. The first concern now was not service units or
weapons since the POA was well equipped or had the promise of being
well equipped early in 1945, but, rather, the strategic plan.86 Also of
concern was the supply of toxics which, considering the scope of the
plan, still existed only in token quantities.
The strategic planning question was to be answered through the
co-ordination of the Pacific area plans by the United States Chemical
Warfare Committee. In General Porter's opinion the CWS would
have been ready for gas warfare in the Pacific had it broken out in
87
1944 or 1945 No new duties were indicated for the CWS POA by
the strategic plans. Unmacht continued his emphasis on gas warfare
84
85
Ibid.
Memo, Unmacht for Waitt, 4 Nov 44. CWS 3 14.7 Central Pacific Theater.
86
Ltr, Unmacht to CCWS, 8 Jul 44, sub: Theater Plans for Cml Warfare. USAFCPA CWS 381 in
CWS 314.7 Central Pacific Theater.
87
(1) Porter Interv, 24 Aug61. (2) See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. IV.
and nongas warfare chemical training, on technical intelligence, and

on the special projects assigned to his service.
Training in the Offensive Period

Divisional duties in the 1945 organization reflected the activities of
the CWS in the Central Pacific in the period 1943-45. The tempo of
training, as noted above, increased greatly during these years. During
1943, the CWS presented chemical warfare courses including four for
various Marine Corps elements, two for Navy commands, and eight
for Army combat organization UGO's and UGNCO's. Another chem-
ical field maneuver with 1,376 participants was held 28-31 July.
According to the G-3 report, this maneuver included:
. .. use of smoke, use and types of smoke-producing equipment, use
of chemical land mines and minefields including students' laying of
minefields, firing of chemical munitions from all types of weapons,
decontamination methods and problems, use of protective clothing
and equipment, demonstration of field hospital methods of handling
gas casualties by Medical Corps personnel, tactical use of flame throwers,
incendiaries, filling of airplane spray tanks, and spray attack on
88
column [of students on a] road.
The same report indicated that participants were favorably impressed
by the maneuver.
In September 1943, two months before the first Central Pacific
forces assault on Makin Atoll, the CWS presented the first course of
instruction in the operation of the portable flame thrower. Many
similar courses followed since in the Central Pacific as in the South
and Southwest Pacific, the flame thrower became a valued infantry
weapon and a particular favorite of the Marine Corps. From January
to May 1944, Unmacht's immediate staff prepared a total of thirty-two
courses, including, for the first time in February 1944, a course on the
vehicle-mounted flame thrower developed and manufactured by the
CWS, Navy, and Marines in Hawaii.
In July 1944, after giving courses or demonstrations for nearly
37,000 students, Unmacht's office turned over the operating training
responsibility to the Chemical Officer, Central Pacific Base Command.
Between 1 July 1944 and 31 August 1945 the CPBC office conducted
88
Memo, Capt G. L. Quigley, CAC, for Col Keliher, OACofS G-3, Hawaiian Dept, 4 Aug 43, sub:
Rpt on Dept Cml Field Exercise. Reproduced as an. I-c, History of Cml Sec USAFMIDPAC.
gas courses, lectures, and demonstrations for 38,933 students. In view

of the fact that all of this instruction was given at the highest area
Army (and sometimes Navy) level and that the usual organization
and unit schools continued to be conducted, the training record of
the CWS in the Central Pacific was a particularly outstanding one.
The CENPAC CWS took full advantage of the fact that the Hawaiian
Islands were used as a staging area through which many units and
combat organizations were being rotated and given advanced training.
Lt. Col. James E. Reilly, Unmacht's training officer for most of the
active period, received the Legion of Merit for his accomplishments.
Chemical Warfare Intelligence

The intelligence activities of the Central Pacific chemical office
actually began in January 1943 when Maj. Nelson McKaig, formerly
a member of Unmacht's staff and then Chemical Officer, 25th Infantry
Division, sent in from the South Pacific a Japanese gas mask. The
staff of the improvised laboratory immediately set to work analyzing
the mask. In February McKaig sent a shipment of Japanese chemical
warfare materials. Since chemical intelligence combat teams did not
begin to function in SWPA until the following November, Central
Pacific laboratory analyses of such materials were among the earliest
although the 42d Chemical Laboratory Company in SWPA had ob-
89
tained some items. Thereafter, a fairly regular flow of captured
chemical items came to the theater CWS, mostly through intelligence
channels. Lt. Robert E. Wingard, the first Intelligence Division chief
who was able to devote most of his attention to the task, set up the
chemical office as a clearinghouse for intelligence information. He both
received information from and transmitted it to the theater intelligence
authorities, OCCWS, the laboratory, and field chemical officers. In
November 1943, Unmacht also assigned Wingard to the supervision
of the CWS portion of an Army-Navy project for the study of micro-
meteorological conditions in advanced Pacific bases. The data thus
collected became a part of theater gas warfare planning, and the study
was continued for the duration of the war. The Intelligence Division
trained CWS field officers to collect meteorological data, and CWS
elements of island garrison forces contributed to this collection.
89
(1) See above, pp. 197, 202. (2) For an account of laboratory work, see below, Chapter VII.
Holmes succeeded Wingard in July 1944. Holmes concentrated on

widening the field of intelligence liaison and on building up an extensive
file of intelligence information not only of theater origin but also of
that originating in other theaters or from allied sources. The Intelli-
gence Division also compiled catalogs of enemy materiel for ready
field reference. The section staff interviewed CWS officers returning
from combat in order to find out and publish lessons learned. Holmes
combed the entire catalog compilation for the most significant gas
warfare data which he included in an annex to the theater gas warfare
plan.
Special Projects and Technical Activities

The CWS in the Central Pacific devoted a major part of its attention
during World War II to special projects and technical developments.
The first special project, as recounted above, was the equipping and
training of civilians in gas defense. In connection with this first project,
CWS officers, Medical Corps officers, and civil defense officials devel-
oped, tested, and supervised the manufacture of gas protective hoods
for small children. The hoods were made more attractive for children
by the addition of "bunny" ears. Officials also supplied the "bunny"
hood to patients in the leper colony on Molokai Island.
As the combat period approached, Colonel Unmacht and his staff
turned their attention from numerous projects in gas warfare defense
and decontamination to the nontoxic chemical weapons and munitions.
Their work on the flame thrower tank, and later on stabilized flame
thrower fuels, was the outstanding overseas development work of the
90
worldwide CWS. Unmacht was a strong proponent of the use of
the 4.2-inch chemical mortar with high-explosive shell, and the devel-
opment, testing, and combat supply of a landing craft mortar mount-
ing for Pacific amphibious operations represented one of his achieve-
ments in the field of combat support. The mortar gun boat
development was also a noteworthy example of Army-Navy
co-operation.
As did the chief chemical officers in the European and North African
theaters, Unmacht treated defense against biological warfare (BW)
on a special project basis. During the period 1941-44, he co-operated
with the theater surgeon, Brig. Gen. Edgar King, as well as other
90
See Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field, ch. VII.
HONOLULU HIGH SCHOOL BOYS REPAIRING GAS MASKS FOR CIVILIAN USE
service chiefs in inspecting water, ice, and food supplies. CWS units
participated in insect and rodent control. These measures were ex-
tended to the forward bases through garrison force medical officers.
In August 1944, Unmacht was designated to succeed the surgeon as
theater bacteriological warfare officer in keeping with the assignment
of that function to the CWS on a global basis. Major Caldwell, as
Unmacht's representative, then arranged a co-operative plan with the
surgeon under which the CWS accepted the primary responsibility for
BW intelligence, the physical protection and training of troops, and
strategic and tactical BW defense planning. The Medical Department
reassumed the primary responsibility for inspection of food and water,
the biological protection of troops, epidemiological control, and the
care and treatment of casualties. Caldwell, subsequently promoted to
lieutenant colonel, and Maj. John O. Clements of CPBC performed
the CWS tasks and worked with the medical officers in the performance
of their duties. A War Department observer reported in April 1945
that the theater was "quite BW conscious," and he found that intelli-
gence information and defensive plans met the required standard.91
Colonel Unmacht was an unusually dynamic officer who was not

afraid to use his energy in any way he felt might contribute to the war
effort. Few other chemical officers would have believed possible the
overseas development, much less the assembly, of a main armament
flame thrower tank. Unmacht not only believed it possible—he got the
job done. His willingness to undertake large responsibilities in no small
measure contributed to the success of the CWS in the Central Pacific
and to the esteem in which the service was held. The Central Pacific
situation also contributed because the commander, not being also a
supreme commander as in other theaters, had the time to give support
to his services. The Central Pacific Army commander did not command
combat operations, but his support as senior Army commander in the
theater for most of the war made easier the operation of the CWS.92
The CWS also enjoyed an excellent relationship with the POA and
Navy commands in the area because it was able to provide services
and weapons support when the Navy and the Marine Corps wanted
them. The Central Pacific Area and the military facilities in the area
offered a unique opportunity for accomplishment. The CWS admin-
istration in the theater was almost ideally suited to these circumstances.
The environment and the area command situation in SWPA, by
contrast, were not amenable to the CWS. The chemical officers in
SWPA strove mightily and ingeniously to provide chemical weapons
and equipment and to insure preparedness. Their contributions were
significant, especially in connection with portable flame throwers and
mortars, but distances and difficulties of communication hampered
them. Even more hampering was the disadvantageous position of the
highest CWS echelon in the SWPA service and supply organization.
While Copthorne maintained that the CWS SWPA was well regarded
in the theater throughout the war, the CWS until late in the war faced
the obstacles in performing its gas warfare preparedness duties of work-
ing through two superior echelons. Gas warfare preparedness in the
United States, in North Africa, and in Europe, was a joint and Allied
91
Rpt, Lt Col W. S. Moore to CMIS, Apr 45, as cited in History, Cml Sec USAFMIDPAC.
92
The commander of the Tenth Army, which formed in Hawaii for the Ryukyu Campaign, was sen-
ior to General Richardson, Central Pacific commander.
concern, but in SWPA there was no joint or Allied agency through

which Copthorne could work formally.
Copthorne and his subordinates evolved some excellent, indirect
methods, such as the conferences and the intelligence and training
teams, for presenting the contributions of the CWS. Through the use
of these methods, Copthorne accomplished co-ordination of his service.
Unmacht accomplished a similar co-ordination through his relation-
ships with his superior commands. Rowan achieved his co-ordination
through a combination of personal diplomacy and supply control.
Shadle in the MTO did not see the necessity for a close control of his
service. He accordingly emphasized a lesser co-ordination than the
other chief chemical officers through staff work in his own headquarters
and supply troubleshooting on problems which strong field chemical
sections could not handle.
CHAPTER VI
Theater Supply: Pacific

Foundation of Chemical Supply in Australia
Forming a Theater Stock
Chemical warfare supplies available to the United States Army
Forces in Australia in December 1941 consisted of 14,000 empty 100-
pound bomb casings, a small amount of protective equipment in the
hands of troops, and the maintenance allowances brought in by the
3d Chemical Laboratory Company. This company was equipped with
the training gas mask, a light, snout-type mask with canister directly
attached to the facepiece,1 some 1½-quart decontaminating apparatus,
and a little antigas protective ointment. The unit possessed no non-
corrosive decontaminating agent for use in the apparatus, no bleach
(chloride of lime) for area decontamination, and no antigas shoe
impregnite. Units and individuals subsequently arriving in Australia
did have personal protective items and decontaminating materials.
2
Units also arrived with small maintenance stocks.
USAFIA chemical officers collected the maintenance stocks from
incoming organizations and units and these constituted the first theater
chemical warfare supply. Even Task Force 6814, soon to be the
Americal Division, added to this stock when it stopped over in Mel-
bourne on the way to New Caledonia.3 The 32d and 41st Infantry
Divisions, on arriving in Australia in the spring of 1942, also con-
tributed. The chemical stockpile further increased as the War Depart-
1
For description of the various CWS gas masks, see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to
Field, Chapter XIV.
2
Morgan Interv, 1 Oct 47.
3
Task force 6814 and the Americal Division are identified in John Miller, jr., Guadalcanal: The
First Offensive, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1949), p. 215.
THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC 237
ment diverted to Australia supplies which could not be landed in the

Philippines and as theater chemical supply officers bought what they
could in the local market. The USAFIA CWS carefully hoarded all
equipment for the use of forces which at any moment might move
out to fight the enemy. Issues were kept to a minimum in the rear
areas, and some issues of Australian gas masks were made. By 30 June
4
1942 the CWS inventory stood at 2,098 short tons.
War Department Policy for the Southwest Pacific Area

The CWS in SWPA was not yet aware, at the end of June, of the
War Department supply policy; they had heard nothing at all from the
United States in the first four months after the establishment of the
USAFIA and were to have no word from the Office of the Chief,
5
Chemical Warfare Service, until July. The basic War Department
plan was dated 22 January 1942, and the specific plan for the forces
in Australia was dated 2 February 1942. The specific War Department
plan called for 90 days' supply of all classes other than ammunition,
computed on the standard tables of basic allowances (TBA); 90 days'
supply of ground ammunition, computed on the basis of a special
ammunition day of supply for weapons in the theater; and five months'
supply of aerial bombs, ammunition, and pyrotechnics, computed ac-
cording to a special allowance per aircraft in Australia and the Nether-
lands East Indies. The Adjutant General instructed the technical
services in the United States to compute allowances and set up ship-
ments to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation, which was charged
with shipment to the theater. The chiefs of the technical services
were also charged with allotting funds to the theater for the operation
of their services in the theater and for the local procurement of
6
matériel.
OCCWS immediately began to set up shipments against the War
Department plan in accordance with strength figures furnished. It
4
(1) Interv, Hist Off with Maj Arthur H. Williams, Jr., 23 Jan 46. (2) Office of the Chief of
Engineers, GHQ, AFPAC, Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, vol. VII, Engineer Supply (Washington,
1949), Table 5, p. 58.
5
(1) Morgan Interv, 1 Oct 45. (2) Personal Ltr, Copthorne, CCmlO USAFIA, to Wilson, Chief
Field Serv OCCWS, 13 Jul 42. CWS 319.1 1942.
6
(1) Ltr, TAG to CG USAFIA, Chiefs Supply Arms and Servs, et al., 22 Jan 42, sub: Sup of Over-
seas" Depts, Theaters, and Separate Bases. AG 400 (1-17-42)MSC-D-M. (Later to be revised as WD
Memo W-700-8-42, 10 Oct 42. See above, ch. III). (2) Ltr, AG to CG USAFIA, Chiefs Sup Arms
and Servs, 2 Feb 42, sub: Sup of U.S. Army Forces in the Australian Area. AG 400 (1-31-42 )MSC-
D-M.
calculated requirements for toxics according to the allowances for

ammunition and aerial bombs. Only mustard gas was available for
immediate supply. CWS supply authorities questioned the shipment
of mustard gas without the specific authority which had always been
necessary for toxic shipments. They also questioned the quantity to be
shipped because they lacked aircraft strength figures on which aerial
toxic requirements computations were based. General Brett, USAFIA
commander, who was probably unaware of these questions within the
War Department, nevertheless answered them by cabling a request for
1,000 tons of mustard. The Chief of Staff queried General MacArthur
as to his desires and, receiving a confirmation of Brett's request, in
April directed the shipment. The Services of Supply reduced the
quantity to 870 tons because of shipping space shortage. OCCWS
7
effected shipment on 15 April 1942.
At the time the mustard was being shipped, the theater forces were
compiling a materiel status report which reached the United States at
the end of May. According to OCCWS figures, most items were in
excess of allowances and only one item, the chemical land mine, was
in short supply. OCCWS attributed excesses to the shipments diverted
from the Philippines and to cabled special requirements, such as the
one for mustard and another for incendiary bombs which the Com-
8
manding General, Army Air Forces, had ordered shipped. In fact,
OCCWS apologies for excesses were misleading. Theater chemical offi-
cers still considered the supply short because, although they had no
exact knowledge of strength in the theater or supplies in the hands of
troops, they rightly anticipated a considerable build-up in theater
9
strength. Later War Department plans for other theaters provided
for substantial build-up on the basis of anticipated strength far in
excess of current strength, but not until the end of the war in Europe
was in sight did a build-up concept apply to the Pacific. To illustrate,
OCCWS computed the July 1942 report of chemical materials in
Australia according to the theater strength and estimated that the
7
(1) Ltr, Chief Field Serv OCCWS to TAG, 15 Feb 42, sub: Shipment of Mustard Gas to Australia.
CWS 320.2/45-79. (2) Memo, ACofS OPD for TAG, 28 Mar 42, sub: Mustard Gas in Australia.
OPD 475.92 sec. 1. (3) Memo, Actg Chief Distr Br SOS for CCWS, 19 Apr 42, Shipment of Mustard
Gas to Australia. ASF SP 400(4-19-42). (4) Msg, CCWS to CG USAFIA, 15 Apr 42. CM-OUT
1296, also in CWS 320.2/54-79.
8
Memo, ACCWS for CG SOS, A t t n : Chief Distr Br, 14 Jun 42, sub: Status of Materiel in Australia.
CWS 320.2/75 (6-14-42).
9
(1) Ltr, Copthorne to Wilson, 13 Jul 42. (2) Williams Interv, 23 Jan 46.
chemical stock had reached 98 percent of the authorized level. There

were, at that time, 95,021 service gas masks for the United States
forces in Australia, and this quantity was estimated to be 9,000 more
than the allowance. Yet, also in July 1942, the Army Service Forces
asked the chiefs of the technical services if they were prepared to
10
support 1,000,000 men in the Pacific. On the assumption that at
least half of this strength would be assigned to SWPA, this would mean
approximately one mask for every five men as opposed to the European
theater planning ratio of one mask in stock for each individual who
would already have an initial issue mask.11 Even though masks and
shipping space were not available at the time, some method of supply
planning that would have anticipated SWPA needs in advance of an
increase in strength would have caused less confusion.
Theater Retaliatory Preparedness for Gas Warfare

There was little that Colonel Copthorne, Chief Chemical Officer,
USAFIA, and in July USASOS, could do to order enough supplies to
meet an increase in SWPA strength except to ask that supplies be sent
in quantities greater than the SWPA allowance. Under War Depart-
ment supply procedures he could make requests to exceed allowances
only by explaining at length that unusual circumstances would result
in the use of extra supplies or that service operations would require
supplies not listed in the War Department plan for SWPA. The sup-
plies which prepared SWPA for retaliation in case gas warfare should
start were mostly obtained, like the first shipment of mustard gas, by
such requests to exceed the allowances. The CWS SWPA needed toxic-
filling plants, which were not on the allowance list, to handle this
first shipment. Copthorne accordingly cabled an order for plants.
The plants arrived in Australia in July but drawings and assembly
instructions, which were not available in Australia, did not accompany
them. The mustard shipment reached Australia in August. In order
to store the gas in newly established toxic gas yards at Darra, Queens-
land, and Geelong, Victoria, CWS officers assembled the filling plants
10
(1) Monthly Matériel Status Rpt 403, USAFIA, as of 15 Jul 42, ACofS G-4 WDGS to CCWS,
20 Aug 42. CWS 320.5/54-79. (2) Memo, ACofS Opns SOS for Chiefs of Engrs, CWS, et al, 24
Jul 42, sub: Storage Facilities for Pacific Opns. AFS SPOPN 486.1; also in CWS 320.2/23-26.
11
The European ratio was determined by comparing 1943 mask authorization (Baldwin, Bingham, and
Pritchard, Readiness for Gas Warfare in the Theaters of Operations) with theater projected strength
(Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, I, 128-29).
by guesswork. The 14,000 100-pound bomb casings were available

for filling only because USAFIA had been unable to ship them to
their original destination, the Philippines. While most of the mustard
was used in filling these bombs, some of it was set aside for filling toxic
land mines which had been procured in Australia. Mio aircraft spray
tanks, which came from War Department allowance to SWPA, arrived
without accessories and mounting instructions. The War Department
12
also shipped some toxic-filled artillery shell from allowances.
In March of 1943, when the first gas warfare plan was produced,
toxics had been further dispersed to six toxic storage yards. One, near
Charters Towers, Queensland, contained 115 tons of bulk agents, 5,900
filled 100-pound bombs, about 1,000 empty spray tanks, and 600
empty bombs. Another, at Kangaroo, north of Townsville, contained
5,500 mustard-filled 100-pound bombs and more than 20,000 artillery
shells. The enlarged Darra yard held nearly 435 tons of bulk agents,
nearly 90,000 artillery rounds, a small supply of toxic smoke candles,
and empty bombs, spray tanks, and land mines. A new Columboola
yard 200 miles west of Brisbane held 11,000 mustard-filled loo-pound
bombs, and a new yard at Kingswood near Sydney stored only artillery
shell (approximately 53,000 rounds). The original yard at Geelong
stored 400 tons of bulk mustard and 3,160 toxic smoke candles. The
CWS SWPA estimated that in the event of gas warfare the stock at
Charters Towers would be sufficient for an immediate retaliatory strike.
Then, within seven hours, spray tanks could be filled and delivered for
a 16-plane spray mission. The spray mission could thereafter be sus-
tained from other stocks for 63 plane missions. More missions could
be flown only if some spray tanks were returned after the flights and
this was not expected because spray tanks were normally jettisoned.
The artillery shell could not be used prior to movement to forward
areas, and no time estimate was given for that movement, presumably
because the time could not be calculated in the face of uncertainty as
to the available forms of transport. There was at the time no assurance
that forward artillery would be on hand to fire the shell since only one
American artillery piece had gone forward for the recently ended
13
Papua Campaign.
12
(1) Ltr, Copthorne to Wilson, 13 Jul 42. (2) Morgan Interv, 1 Oct 45. (3) Williams Interv,
23 Jan 46.
CinC GHQ SWPA to TAG, 7 Apr 43, Rpt, Theater Plans for Cml Warfare (hereafter cited as
13
Theater Plans, Mar 4 3 ) . GHQ AG 381 (12-8-42)C.

Theater Defense Preparedness for Gas Warfare

On the defensive side, as noted above, every individual in the theater
was allotted a gas mask, and there was a small reserve, adequate on the
TBA basis, of service masks.14 In the opinion of the chemical officers,
one undoubtedly shared by the troops, the 5-pound service mask was
of very limited utility in the tropics. It could not be worn for any
length of time in a hot climate with even an acceptable degree of dis-
comfort, and it was too heavy and bulky to be carried by troops, who
could function efficiently only under a minimum burden. The SWPA
Chemical Section accordingly requisitioned 228,000 training masks or
lightweight substitutes for the equipment of, at least, all assault eche-
lons, and the 2,000 training masks in the theater were earmarked for
this purpose.15 OCCWS shipped 139,000 training masks which repre-
sented the available supply since training masks were also in demand
elsewhere. The masks arrived, as requested, waterproofed; that is,
both ends of the canister were sealed. The difficulty with the water-
proofing job done in the United States was that the seals were paper
and had to be torn off to put the mask in ready condition. The seals
could not be restored by the individual user of the mask even if the
materials had been provided. SWPA chemical officers thereupon set
out to design restorable seals. Capt. Stephen Penler, commander of the
412th (later 62d) Chemical Depot Company, suggested a "milk bottle
16
cap" for the valve (outer) end of the canister. A Sydney paper man-
ufacturer succeeded, after several attempts, in producing the bottle
cap seal. These seals were packed in small cans and the can inserted
into a pocket sewn into the mask carrier. The open (mask end) of the
canister was sealed with a rubber plug, and Capt. John Senter designed
a quick acting clamp for securing the canister to the facepiece. Both
plug and clamp were also locally procured. The 10th Chemical Main-
tenance Company set up a production line and performed the not
17
inconsiderable task of modifying masks and carriers. More than a
year later the CWS in the United States provided a reusable rubber
cap which could be attached to the valve end of the canister.
14
Theater Plans, Mar 43.
15
Ibid.
16
Captain Penler was killed in an air accident in December 1942.
17
(1) Ltr, Copthorne to Hist Off, 16 Feb 51. (2) Lt Col Irving R. Mollen, Chemical Warfare
Sup—SWPA, World War II, 16 May 52. MS in CMLHO. This article also appeared in Armed forces
Chemical Journal, vol. XI, No. 2 (March-April, 1957), pp. 34-36, and No. 3 (May-June,1957),pp.
31-33.
Furnishing protective clothing was an even greater problem than

supplying the mask. In SWPA, as elsewhere in the world, protective
clothing storage and issue was a quartermaster responsibility, but im-
pregnating the clothing with antigas chemicals was a CWS responsi-
18
bility. Also in SWPA, as elsewhere, the CWS and the Quartermaster
Corps worked in close co-operation. The first supply of protective
clothing came from the United States in July 1942. Because fighting
would be in the tropics, it was unfortunate that much of the clothing,
including underwear, was woolen. Just as the supply arrived instruc-
tions were received that all garments must be modified by the insertion
of gussets and double flies to afford increased protection at trousers
and shirt openings.19 Quartermaster employees made the gussets and
flies and inserted them; the CWS rented a dry-cleaning establishment
in Melbourne for the dual purpose of impregnating the gussets and
flies and of testing an improvised impregnating process. Copthorne
secured the formula for the American impregnite from the Australians
who got it from the chemical warfare experimental station in England.
The direct channels of communication with the United States had
again failed.20
The experience in the rented dry-cleaning plant proved the impro-
vised impregnating process acceptable. The CWS acquired two Eng-
lish-made Maja trichlorethylene dry-cleaning plants and three com-
mercial laundry dryers, and by the middle of October had this
equipment in operation in a factory in Sydney. There the CWS im-
21
pregnated such clothing as the quartermaster had in stock.
Copthorne, writing to Brig. Gen. Alexander Wilson in OCCWS,
questioned the sense of providing prescribed double-layer (long under-
wear, outer garments, gloves, sox, leggings, and hood) protection in a
22
climate where that much clothing could certainly not be worn.
Wilson replied that the War Department was working on worldwide
protective policy and that, for the time being, the SWPA CWS could
18
See Alvin P. Stauffer, The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan, UNITED
STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1956), pp. 202-03.
19
Ltr, TAG to CINC SWPA et al, 14 Jul 42, sub: Cml Warfare Protective Clothing. AG 420
(5 Jul 42) MS-SPOPS-M.
20
(1) Ltr, Copthorne to Hist Off, 16 Feb 51. (2) Personal Ltr, Copthorne to Porter, 14 Oct 42.
21
Ltr, Copthorne to Porter, 14 Aug 42.
22
A survey made in 1943 disclosed that 38 percent of rear area troops in New Guinea wore no under-
wear whereas the figure for combat area troops who dispensed with these items was 100 percent.
Grothaus and Brady to CCWS, 29 Mar 44, Rpt on Visit to Southwest, South and Central Pacific Areas.
CWS 314.7 Observer Rpts.)
only furnish the prescribed level under the assumption that the area
commander would weigh the risk of gas warfare against the efficiency
of the soldier and instruct subordinate commanders as to his policy on
wearing protective clothing. The question of policy was never settled
to theater satisfaction. The March 1943 SWPA gas warfare plans
provided only that outer garments and leggings would be stocked in
forward areas while underwear was held in rear reserve.23 The world-
wide policy adopted over a year later, in April 1944, provided that
only 15 percent of SWPA soldiers would have double-layer protection
24
available. Other forward area combat and service troops, or 35 per-
cent of the area command, were given one and a half layer (outer gar-
ments, gloves, leggings, and hood, plus cotton drawers) protection, and
the rear area troops, estimated at 50 percent of the command, were
not provided with any protective clothing.25 Copthorne believed that
mid-thigh length knit cotton shorts would afford nearly as good pro-
tection as the cotton drawers and would be bearable in the tropics.26
The 1944 plan permitted the use of knit shorts, when available, for
one and a half layer protection.
Other items of protection against gas warfare were the decontami-
nants and the equipment to disperse them. The decontaminants in-
cluded personal protective ointment, noncorrosive decontaminant for
vehicles and equipment, and bleach, the area decontaminant. Since
the M1 protective ointment was in short supply and regarded by
SWPA officers as of doubtful effectiveness, the CWS SWPA improvised
an individual protective kit consisting of swabs, kerosene (a solvent for
vesicant gases), an alkaline soft soap produced locally, and a half
27
measure of M1 ointment. General Porter advised Copthorne that the
M1 ointment had been reappraised and redesignated M4 and that new
techniques for its use had been evolved. OCCWS at the time considered
the M4 ointment effective without a solvent or soap to accompany it.28
The solvent and soap in the SWPA kit served as a substitute for oint-
ment until a sufficient quantity of M4 ointment was received late in
23
Theater Plans, Mar 43.
24
Ltr, TAG to CINC SWPA et al., 24 Apr 44, sub: Cml Warfare Protective Clothing Accessories and
Equip. AG 420 (28 Mar 44) OB-S-SPOPP-M.
25
26
Ltr, CCmlO USASOS to CCWS, 29 Jan 43, sub: Use of Jockey Midway Shorts. CWS USASOS
422.
27
Copthorne to Porter, 14 Oct 42.
28
Pers Ltr, Porter to Copthorne, 12 Nov 42.
1942. The War Department at the same time sent enough noncorrosive
decontaminating agent and its disperser, the 1½-quart apparatus.
Bleach supplies were growing, but the theater was still short of full
allowance. Chemical officers believed that bleach would deteriorate in
the tropics. Although the first tests proved that American bleach was
standing up well, SWPA officers found after a few months that both
the bleach and its containers deteriorated. To fill shortages, the CWS
bought bleach from the Australians. The supply men discovered a
double benefit in this procurement. Not only was the bleach more
readily obtained, but also it was more stable in the tropics and the
containers could better withstand the inevitable rough handling. The
supply was unfortunately limited by the small production of chlorine
in Australia. As for the dispersing equipment—the 3-gallon hand
decontaminating apparatus and the 400-gallon power-driven apparatus
—the hand apparatus was available in considerable quantity, more than
a thousand in excess of allowance in February 1943, and the stock of
powered apparatus, 115 in February, was sufficient for critical needs
even though 18 short of allowance. It is very doubtful that much area
decontamination would have been possible in the jungle in any case.
Gas detection devices and gas alarms were not available although the
29
latter could be improvised.
The one protective item of which there was a definite overage was
the gasproof curtain. The curtain was designed for World War I trench
warfare and was still issued on a World War I basis of two curtains
for 20 men. The SWPA CWS asked the San Francisco port to stop
shipping curtains and suggested to area forces that those on hand
might be used for foxhole covers in event of vesicant gas attack, since
the individual protective cover was not yet available to serve that
purpose. OCCWS soon changed the basis of issue to two per 200 men
and designated the curtains for use at command posts, communications
30
centers, and medical installations.
29
(1) Copthorne to Wilson, 13 Jul 42. (2) Copthorne to Porter, 14 Oct 42. (3) Mollen,
Cml Warfare Sup—SWPA, World War II. (4) Monthly Materiel Status Rpt 403, USAFIA, as of15
Jul 42. (5) Theater Plans, Mar 43. (6) Baldwin, Bingham, and Pritchard, Readiness for Gas Warfare
in Theaters of Opns, app. B.
30
(1) Copthorne to Porter, 14 Oct 42. (2) Porter to Copthorne, 12 Nov 42.
Theater Chemical Supply Status—End of the Preparatory Phase

In sum, the CWS SWPA had by the end of 1942 reached the status
of gas warfare supply, both offensive and defensive, reflected in the
area gas warfare plans reported to the War Department on March 1943.
That is, except for gas detection, SWPA could defend against any gas
warfare emergency involving troops likely to be in direct contact with
the enemy. Offensively, the air forces could make an immediate re-
taliatory strike and although they could sustain retaliation for only a
brief period, this might have been sufficient considering the distances
which isolated individual enemy forces in the theater. The big problem
was service in the event of gas warfare. The only available facility
for clothing impregnation was the improvised Sydney plant. The CWS
estimated that in the event of gas warfare, it would need several chem-
ical impregnating companies, three additional air service units, and
one chemical composite company per forward area division. The
ability of services other than the CWS to handle gas warfare was also
dependent upon increasing service capability. For example, Australian
hospitals would have to bear the load of gas casualty treatment because
the American hospitals did not then have enough manpower and
facilities. Forward area medical service would have been sadly deficient
for the same reasons although the chief chemical officer and the SWPA
surgeon had co-operated in improvising a field gas treatment kit which
would have afforded assistance to medical officers in the field.31
While the SWPA supply of most gas warfare items could be con-
sidered adequate, the supply of nongas warfare chemical items was
clearly inadequate. There were few hand grenades and little smoke
equipment. In fact, smoke munitions were so scarce that Colonel
Copthorne ordered the improvisation and testing of a smoke apparatus
using FS mixture procured in Australia. There were some flame
throwers of the kind that had proved unemployable in the Papua
Campaign, but there were no mortars and only 1,000 rounds of mortar
shell. The general chemical inventory, which from July to December
1942 had grown from 2,098 short tons to 5,093 short tons, was there-
fore mostly gas warfare items. The greatest gain, from 299 to 1,641
tons, had been in Class V, ammunition, the class into which the toxics
31
(1) Ltr, CCmlO USASOS to CWS, 26 Jan 43, sub: Directions for Use of Cml Warfare Sups.
CWS USASOS 461 APO 501 (Directions). (2) Williams Interv, 23 Jan 46. (3) Theater Plans,
Mar 43.
fell. During the last six months of 1942, the CWS had received 4,983
short tons of materiel. The bulk of this total, 4,645 short tons, came
from imports, mostly from the United States, but 139 tons, the greater
portion of which was laboratory equipment and production supplies,
had come from distress cargoes (cargoes landed in Australia because
they could not reach destinations in the combat zone), and 199 tons
came from local procurement. Although the latter figure was small,
its size is not the measure of its importance since most of the items so
32
procured were critical.
The Tyranny of Climate and Distance

Establishment of a New Guinea base in August 1942 and the events
of the Papua Campaign brought sharply into focus the problems dealing
with the condition of both gas warfare and nongas warfare chemical
materiel. SWPA chemical officers had been aware from the first that
much of the equipment received was rushed production not of the
highest quality, but conditions of storage and issue in New Guinea
demonstrated that every weakness in design, manufacture, inspection,
packaging, and shipment was magnified many times when items were
subjected to the extremes of heat, humidity, and rough handling un-
avoidable in the tropics and semitropics. Sometimes these problems
could be resolved or reduced to manageable proportions in SWPA;
sometimes they could be met by improvements in the United States;
sometimes area forces simply had to adjust to living with the problems.
Often a combination of these solutions applied, as in the case of the
flame throwers, for example.
Bleach
The deterioration of bleach, mentioned above, was another problem
which called forth a joint effort but which was never solved with com-
plete satisfaction. SWPA received and stored bleach in light-gauge,
painted and unpainted steel drums of 70-, 100-, 140-, and 300-pound
capacity. Handling the larger drums was a problem, but it became
apparent, late in 1942, that the handling difficulty was insignificant
compared to the problem arising from corrosion of the containers and
32
(1) Morgan Interv, 1 Oct 45. (2) Copthorne to Porter, 14 Oct 42. (3) Office of the Chief of
Engineers, GHQ, AFPAC, Engineer Supply, pp. 57-58, Tables 4 and 5.
deterioration of the bleach. Copthorne in December 1942 ordered a

survey of bleach in semitropical and tropical storage to determine how-
great the loss might be. Base section chemical officers found that all
the 100-pound nonpainted drums surveyed had corroded and that the
bleach had deteriorated below the standard acceptable for decontami-
nation. Corrosion of larger unpainted drums, for some unexplained
reason, was negligible while 77.2 percent of 100-pound drums painted
brown had corroded. Orange-painted drums in both 70- and 100-
pound sizes had stood up well. In all, the CWS turned over 25 tons
of deteriorated bleach to the engineers for water purification use. A
few weeks later the New Guinea base reported corroding drums and
deteriorating bleach. Copthorne could only advise that, since there was
probably no solution other than the impractical one of lacquering the
drums inside and out, deteriorated bleach should be turned over to
other services and replacement requisitioned. A part of the replace-
ment could come from Australian sources, but the bulk would have
33
to come from the United States.
OCCWS was at work on the problem when Copthorne informed it
of his experience. The War Department CWS finally succeeded in
obtaining a more stable bleach and in improving the container,34 but
the tropical climate continued to take its toll in every storage place
from Australia to the Philippines. Fortunately, the deteriorated bleach
was still adequate for the hygienic uses to which the Quartermaster
Corps and the Corps of Engineers could put it. Because of this second-
ary use, the demands on critically short transportation were no greater
than they would have been had each service obtained its own supply.
The CWS SWPA was forced to adjust to the demands of continuous
35
survey of stocks and handling transfers.
Noncorrosive Decontaminating Agent

Another decontaminant problem concerned the noncorrosive decon-
taminating agent (DANC). The agent was a mixture of solvent,
acetylene tetrachloride, and a dry chemical known as RH 195. The
33
(1) Ltr, CCmlO USASOS to CCWS, 10 Dec 42, sub: Corrosion of Chloride of Lime Containers
(CWS USASOS 470.6), and 1st Ind, CCWS to CCmlO USASOS, 24 Feb 43. CWS SPCVO 470.6
(12-10-42). (2) Ltr, CWO Serv Comd APO 502 to CCmlO USASOS, 14 Jan 43, no sub, and 1st
Ind, CCmlO USASOS to CWO Serv Comd APO 502, 2 Feb 43.
34
Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, from Laboratory to Field, ch XVI.
35
Mollen, Cml Warfare Sup—SWPA, World War IL
two components were shipped and stored unmixed in a 2-compartment

6-gallon drum with the RH 195 packed in the compartment above
the acetylene tetrachloride. The dry chemical apparently corroded the
seal between the two compartments allowing the contents to mix; the
resulting mixure had a life of about three months. Drums dented in
shipment almost inevitably corroded because the lacquer on interior
surfaces scaled off around the dent. After the first discovery of this
packaging deficiency in October 1942, base section chemical depot
troops opened dented drums and transferred serviceable RH 195 to
bottles. If the chemical had combined with the solvent, the mixture
was stored for its serviceable life, and when manpower and equipment
were available the solvent was reclaimed at the end of that life. The
area CWS obtained a crimping machine to reseal drums containing new
and reclaimed solvent. The War Department CWS strengthened the
RH 195 compartment, made it of a metal more receptive to preserva-
tive lacquer, provided a corrosion-proof plastic gasket between com-
partments, and, eventually, designed a new dual container. But still
the CWS in the Pacific had trouble—the old container continued to
come through the supply system. One base section received 14,000
old containers in the four months ending in September 1943. The
noncorrosive decontaminating agent problem was one that the CWS
36
SWPA learned to live with.
The one and a half quart decontaminating apparatus for dispersing
the noncorrosive decontaminant and the 3-gallon apparatus were poorly
crated. The crate consisted of a wooden frame with a cardboard liner;
both cardboard and wood frequently failed with almost disastrous
37
results when the crates were used as a base in warehouse stocks.
Another minor but annoying packaging defect was in the pack for
shoe impregnite. The War Department CWS shipped the preparation
in small cans packed in cardboard boxes. The boxes were too heavy
for one man to handle, and the cardboard simply disintegrated after
brief exposure to the weather. The CWS solved this problem by
switching to small wooden boxes.38
36
(1) Ltr, CCmlO USASOS to CCWS, 16 Nov 42, sub: Deterioration of RH 195 Containers.
CWS USASOS GSCW 400.2. (2) Ltr, CCWS to CCmlO USASOS, 18 Dec 42, sub: Deterioration of
RH 195 Containers. CWS SPCVO 470.6 (12-18-42). (3) Ltr, CCmlO USASOS to CCWS, 29 Sep
43, sub: Defective DANC Containers (CWS USASOS GSCW), with 1st Ind, ACCWS Field Opns to
CCmlO USASOS, 25 Oct 43. CWS SPCVO 457 APO 501 (29 Sep 4 3 ) . (4) Grothaus-Brady Rpt.
37
Grothaus-Brady Rpt.
38
Morgan Interv, 1 Oct 45.
The Gas Mask.

A considerably more serious problem arose from the effect of the
jungle climate on gas masks and carriers. Fungi attacked the glass
lens of the Australian gas masks which American troops were using.
Molds and mildew covered and rotted gas mask carriers and the harness
of the mask itself. Rust and corrosion ate away canisters, buckles, and
rivets. In the 41st Infantry Division the chemical officer, Colonel
Arthur, prescribed a daily brushing of the carrier, but this only retarded
the growth of mold and mildew. Furthermore, brushing was possible
only for masks kept by individuals, who usually had them only for
short periods. Assault troops carried masks in landing and dropped
them as soon as the risk of initiation of gas warfare was determined to
be slight. These masks were uncared for until chemical officers could
assemble details or obtain service troops to collect, inspect, and store
them. In early operations losses were large, as much as 45 percent in
one assault, and the number of recovered masks rendered unserviceable
was also large. Better recovery techniques, especially those evolved
when service detachments landed with assault troops, reduced losses
to 5 percent and greatly increased the number of serviceable masks
39
recovered.
OCCWS believed that the SWPA mask problems might be solved
by the introduction of the lightweight service mask in 1943. The
lightweight mask and its carrier were more rugged than the training
mask then in use in SWPA, and the carrier was water resistant and
therefore was more resistant to mold and mildew. Also, the CWS
provided an adhesive tape waterproofing for the canister. Colonel
Arthur set up a wearing test of the mask in the 41st Division. The
facepiece was plainly superior to that of the training mask, but the
canister rusted as badly, and the adhesive tape waterproofing tended
to remove the paint, thus accelerating rusting. With waterproofing
clamp in place the rubber hose from canister to facepiece softened and
distorted in twelve days, and the adhesive tape waterproofing proved
of doubtful value under tropical conditions. Also, the carrier, although
apparently more resistant to deterioration, proved somewhat bulky to
39
(1) Ltr, CmlO 41st Inf Div to CmlO USAFFE, 7 Jun 43, sub: Mold on Gas Mask Carriers.
Sixth Army 475—Weapons for Jungle Warfare. (2) Mollen, Cml Warfare Sup—SWPA, World War
II. (3) Ltr, CO 42d Cml Lab Co SWPA to Chief Tech Div OCCWS, 1 Sep 43, sub: Transmittal of
Mold Cultures.
wear and, as in Normandy, offered a target for sharpshooters. Arthur

recommended that the SWPA-devised training mask and waterproofing
be retained but that the lightweight facepiece be substituted for the
training facepiece. The War Department approved Arthur's suggested
modification of the training mask, and supplies were furnished to make
theater modifications. The CWS tried again with an assault mask with
cheek-mounted canister, but no significant number of these masks
became available in the theater before the end of the war. In sum,
this was again a problem that the SWPA CWS tried to overcome
with various expedients but without a real solution, for it was unable
to find a means of preventing mold, mildew, and corrosion.40
Protective Clothing
As noted above, storage and issue of antigas protective clothing was
a quartermaster responsibility, but the CWS was vitally involved in
providing impregnation services and in prescribing the use and care of
protective clothing. The SWPA chief quartermaster issued instruc-
tions, in the name of the Commanding General, USASOS, on protective
clothing in December 1942, in January 1943, and in March 1943. The
last of these instructions repeated the then current War Department
policy of providing as yet undesignated "double layer" protection
based on the cotton herringbone twill "fatigue" uniform as "minimum"
and with an additional impregnated woolen or cotton khaki uniform
41
as "complete" protection.
Patently, complete protection was beyond the SWPA capacity, and
the instructions provided that only one set of outer garments plus
accessories per individual should be issued or should be held in forward
depots for issue to combat troops. Forward depots were also authorized
to hold normal replacement quantities to be called forward when
needed by operational organizations. The instructions also prescribed
storage and maintenance procedures including provision for CWS
42
inspection of clothing in storage.
40
(1) Ltr, CmlO 41st Inf Div to CmlO I Corps, 16 Jun 43, sub: Rpt on Field Test of M4-10-6
Gas Mask (41st Div 470.6), with 2d Ind, forwarded by Ltr, CCmlO USAFFE to CCWS, 9 Jul 43,
sub: Lightweight Service Masks. USAFFE FECW 470.72. (2) Ltr, CCmlO USASOS to CG Sixth
Army, 22 Oct 43, sub: Wearing Tests on New Type Masks. Sixth Army AG 470.72—Protective
Apparatus.
41
Ltr, AG USASOS to CG's Sixth Army et al, 26 Mar 43, sub: Cml Warfare Protective Clothing.
USASOS GSQMS 421 in Sixth Army 422.3 Protective Clothing.
42
Ibid.
USASOS elaborated the storage, requisition, and issue procedures

for protective clothing in May 1943. At the end of the month, the
commanding officer of the subbase at Oro Bay, which had officially
opened late in April, informed the Commanding General, 41st Infantry
Division, that 70 percent of the base protective clothing stock, most
43
of which was held for the division, was unserviceable. The unserv-
iceable clothing had rotted or the fabric had lost its tensile strength.
Much of the unserviceable clothing was that dyed jungle green on
which chemical service units in Australia had expended so much effort.
Since CWS officers had made the serviceability tests, the CWS SWPA
was aware of the problem. In a little more than a week after the first
notification, Copthorne asked Sixth Army to determine the extent of
damage. Sixth Army replied that almost all clothing in loose storage
or in the hands of individuals had deteriorated. Clothing received from
the United States and stored in its original waterproof bales and pack-
ages off the ground and under cover had not deteriorated. Similarly,
those sets of clothing in the hands of individual soldiers which had been
stored, as prescribed, in the bottoms of barracks bags hung so that air
would circulate under the bag had not deteriorated. Since all troops
did not have the opportunity to hang barracks bags in positions where
air would circulate, Sixth Army ordered protective clothing withdrawn
from individuals for storage in unit supply, but storage conditions in
unit supply were far from ideal. The best that unit storage could
accomplish was slightly to prolong garment life and, perhaps more
importantly, to make garments available for regular serviceability
inspection.44
CWS officers soon learned that the effective life of protective clothing
was likely to be six months and that the best which could be expected
was a year.45 Colonel Smith, then chief of the USASOS Chemical
Section and later Copthorne's deputy, undertook the direct supervision
of protective clothing distribution plans and liaison with quartermaster
43
Ltr, CO Advance Subbase B to CG 41st Div, 30 May 43, sub: Impregnated Clothing. USAFFE
Advance Subbase B 422 in Sixth Army 422.3 Protective Clothing.
44
(1) Ltr, CCmlO USAFFE to CG Sixth Army, 9 Jun 43, sub: Impregnated Clothing. USAFFE
FECW 420, cited in Ltr, CG Sixth Army to CG USAFFE, 29 Jun 43, sub: Impregnated Clothing.
Sixth Army AG 420W in Sixth Army 422.3 Protective Clothing. (2) Ltr, CmlO 41st Div to CG 41st
Div, 22 Jun 43, sub: Inspection of Impregnated Clothing. 41st Inf Div 470.6 in Sixth Army 422.3
Protective Clothing. (3) Memo, CmlO Sixth Army CO Hq Co Sixth Army, 23 Jun 43, no sub. In
Sixth Army 422.3 Protective Clothing.
45
Also see Stauffer, Operations in the War Against Japan, p. 202.
on the subject. In the circumstance, Smith had no choice but to

provide protective clothing for forward area troops and to plan re-
placing it every six months. Replacement was provided either from
the United States or from stocks impregnated in SWPA. In order to
carry on impregnation in the area, processing units were required. The
105th Chemical Processing Company arrived in SWPA in June 1943
just as the extent of the clothing problem was becoming known. Since
the unit did not receive its own plants for another six months, it
worked at processing in the improvised theater plant to rebuild the
theater reserve. Copthorne and Smith sought to move the 105th and
the eighteen companies received in 1944 into forward areas so that
impregnating facilities, both for building up clothing reserves and for
reimpregnation in the event of gas warfare, could be close to the
organizations with the greatest need, but obtaining USAFFE or GHQ
authority and transportation for these forward moves was extremely
difficult.46
The SWPA protective clothing reserve problem diminished during
late 1944 and early 1945 as stocks were continuously reconstituted by
shipments from the United States. Anticipated reserve demands were
also reduced by the War Department directive of April 1944 which
assigned protective clothing only to 50 percent of the area force.
Clothing still deteriorated although better packaging and the use of
the M2 water emulsion impregnating process somewhat lengthened
the serviceability period. The CWS still sought to move processing
units forward as reimpregnation insurance against a gas warfare emer-
gency, and the units, even in forward areas, were diverted to secondary
47
missions which would permit readiness to operate in such emergency.
In the last year of the war, most of the area protective clothing re-
serve was stored in the Hollandia, New Guinea, base while organizational
allowances were carried in unit supply when commanders would permit,
or in forward bases when they would not. The forward bases also
stored organizational maintenance stocks. As the fighting progressed
farther and farther from Hollandia transportation for resupply became
more difficult to obtain, and, in event of gas warfare, the transportation
situation might have been desperate. Chemical officers were confident,
however, that had gas warfare been initiated there would have been
sufficient air transportation available in the interim before the process-
46
Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Irving R. Mollen, 28 Apr 53.
47
Ibid.
ing companies could move forward and commence operation. Certainly

SWPA was adequately supplied with processing units. Because of the
SWPA storage problems and the estimated threat of gas warfare in
forward areas, SWPA had more units than any other theater.48
Defective Equipment and Spare Parts
Some SWPA chemical supply problems were common to all theaters.
For example, the power-driven decontaminating apparatus was widely
used for water carrying and giving showers, but the parts supply, as
elsewhere, was critical. No spare parts of any description arrived in
the theater before Colonel Morgan returned to the United States after
the middle of 1943. Even when parts did begin to arrive, there were
few for the large apparatus. Some vehicles were cannibalized to keep
others in operation, but even this expedient failed because many parts
were not interchangeable among the four different makes of apparatus
and because the same type of parts wore out on all apparatus. CWS
officers arranged with their Ordnance colleagues, late in the war, to
replace worn-out decontamination motors with jeep motors, and this
local adaptation permitted some apparatus to be returned to service.49
Other munitions also failed because of faulty manufacturing, faulty
inspection, or poor packaging in the United States. Examples are the
early shipments of the M33 smoke tank, which air chemical units
rebuilt, and of M14 and M8 chemical hand grenades of which such a
large percentage malfunctioned that Colonel Grothaus, the OCCWS
observer, recommended the destruction of entire lots.50 Another major
problem which was at least aggravated by SWPA storage conditions
was that concerning the 100-pound toxic bomb.
Toxic Munitions
As noted above, bombs were early stored in three toxic gas yards
in Australia. Leakers were soon discovered among the thin-cased
bombs, and sizable detachments from two service units were required
to segregate the leakers, decontaminate the storage areas, and vent and
paint nonleaking bombs. After a time it became evident that the
48
(1) Mollen Interv, 28 Apr 53. (2) For information on processing company assignments, see
Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, app. H-11.
49
(1) Morgan Interv, 1 Oct 45. (2) Grothaus-Brady Rpt. (3) Mollen, Cml Warfare Sup—
SWPA, World War II.
50
Grothaus-Brady Rpt.
mustard filling of some bombs was itself deteriorating. Copthorne

asked for replacement by distilled mustard, which was not so much
subject to deterioration, but OCCWS replied that the production au-
thorities in the United States could not afford the time and effort to
distill mustard when the undistilled product proved satisfactory else-
where. Concentrated SWPA CWS effort kept most of the bombs in
serviceable condition. Copthorne was anxious, as the war progressed,
to move the bombs closer to the scene of fighting. Finally, in 1944,
transportation was secured to establish a considerable stock in New
Guinea. When Copthorne's own section moved to Leyte, he again
attempted to move the bombs forward, but transportation could not
be obtained. Toward the end of hostilities, after a toxic gas yard had
been established in the Philippines, another effort was made to move
the stock forward, but a detailed inspection revealed that few bombs
were then serviceable, and the Chemical Section, Western Pacific, ar-
ranged for the disposal of bombs remaining in Australia and New
Guinea.51
The deterioration of stocks did not mean that SWPA was without
supplies for gas warfare retaliation. General MacArthur requested that
stockage be maintained on the west coast pending the availability of
shipping. Shipping would have been allotted at once in case of emer-
gency. Also, bombs and other toxic munitions declared unserviceable
were replaced so that minimum area reserves were maintained until
near the end of the war. The area reserves, equal to four or five days'
retaliation, were in any case inadequate since the plans made late in
52
the war were based on the west coast stock.
Chemical Warfare Tactical Supply, Southwest Pacific Area

Tactical Supply Policy
Just as many problems in chemical supply in SWPA arose from the
difficulties imposed by climate, terrain, and distances, so was the
51
(1) Morgan Interv, 1 Oct 45. (2) Grothaus-Brady Rpt. (3) Personal Ltr, Waitt to Copthorne,
13 Jan 45. (4) Ltr, CCmlO AFWESPAC to CWS, 2 Sep 45, sub: Destruction of M47A2 H-Filled
Bombs, with 4th Ind. AFWESPAC CSCW 470.6 (2 Sep 45) in CWS 314.7 Misc files, WESPAC,
AFPAC, SPBC. (5) Baldwin, Bingham, and Pritchard, Readiness for Gas Warfare in Theaters of
Opns, pp. 474-75. (6) Mollen, History of Cml Warfare Sup—SWPA, World War II.
52
(1) Ltr, CINC GHQ SWPA to TAG, 19 Dec 43, sub: Revised Theater Plans for Gas Warfare.
GHQ AG 381 (19 Dec 43) APO 500 in OPD 385 CWP sec. II-B. (2) Baldwin, Bingham, and
Pritchard, Readiness for Gas Warfare in Theaters of Opns, pp. 457-75. (3) Mollen, History of Cml
Warfare Sup—SWPA, World War II.
organization for supply dictated by these conditions. Other factors,

such as War Department priority, perpetual shortage of manpower,
and the nature of the SWPA organization also played a part. In theory
SWPA supply operated just as it did in other theaters. SWPA was first
concerned with insuring TBA and tables of organization and equip-
ment allowances for all its organizations and units. It was secondly
interested in establishing regular maintenance quotas, usually 30 days'
supply, which moved forward with combat units, or were held in rear
area depots or unit supply for rear area units. A third task was estab-
lishing theater reserves set at 60, 90, 150, or 180 days' supply by the
War Department (OPD), as calculated against the War Department
approved troop basis. All this was the normal business of supply which
was handled and computed in just about the same way by SWPA
personnel, by the office of the chief of the War Department technical
service, and by the responsible port of embarkation.
In the CWS SWPA, as mentioned above, once the initial problems
of determining area strength and authorizations and initial supply
status of units and organizations had been solved, "normal" supply
became a matter of forwarding requisitions for shortages in initial
equipment, maintenance, and area reserves. The complication here
became one of knowing what to ask for since poor communication
frequently left SWPA chemical officers in the dark as to what was
available, or what changes had been made in equipment and allowances,
or what new items had been added to the system. Part of this burden
was removed by the port of embarkation which automatically filled
shortages disclosed by the theater's materiel status reports, but this
and other automatic supply created problems in unwanted equipment
such as gasproof curtains, and 20,000 horse gas masks in a virtually
horseless area.53 Materiel status report supply also frequently arrived
in the theater so many months after the report went forward that the
54
conditions cited and basis for stockage no longer existed. But these
"normal" supply problems existed in every theater and were only
more difficult in degree in SWPA because of serious shortages and
failures of communications. Much more difficult were the special
requisitions problems.
Again in the special requisitions area, the theaters operated on the
same basis. All theater chemical officers submitted special requisitions
53
Grothaus-Brady Rpt.
54
Ibid.
to build up gas warfare preparedness, and in all theaters special requi-

sitions or special projects originating with combat organizations were
the very basis of tactical supply. In the North African-Mediterranean
theater special requisitions sometimes brought wanted tactical require-
ments, but when special requisitions failed, organization chemical offi-
cers like Colonel Barker, with the help of service chemical officers like
Colonel Coblentz, improvised their own requirements and handled
them through their own channels. In the European theater special
requisitions seldom brought the items the theater wanted from the
United States, but General Rowan and his staff controlled chemical
supply through an individual system that had matured for two years
before it was put to the test of combat. Rowan and his staff could call
upon the comparatively abundant resources of the European build-up
and of the British allies. The chemical special operational projects in
Europe were evolved in close co-ordination between combat and service
elements, and the bulk of supply came from theater stocks managed
in the theater by the service elements. For example, base section chem-
ical officers could come in for weekly conferences with their theater
chief, and, on the Continent, service elements, such as Colonel Stubbs's
ADSEC Chemical Section, were in daily contact with the combat
organizations. Transportation and communication in Europe were
overburdened, but the distances were shorter and the road and other
facilities vastly superior to those of the Pacific. The differences in
degree in SWPA were so great as to be almost differences in kind.
When Sixth Army became the major SWPA American ground ele-
ment, on a level co-ordinate with USASOS, in February 1943, it
assumed responsibility for tactical supply. Colonel C. L. Marriott,
Sixth Army chemical officer, arrived in Australia with the second
echelon of the army in April but remained only a short time before
moving forward to Milne Bay with ALAMO Force, a task force
created in June 1943 from Sixth Army troops, and in fact a forward
echelon of the army. Marriott's office was thus separated by 1,200
air miles from Copthorne's. Marriott's assistant, Major McKinney,
remained in the Sixth Army headquarters. The only expeditious means
of communication was by radio, but with such heavy demands on the
radio net, normal communication was by letter or informal memo.55
55
(1) Mary H. Williams, Chronology 1941-1941, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
(Washington, 1960), pp. 93, 114. (2) General Walter Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon
(Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1 9 5 3 ) , pp. 6—10, and app. 1.
Responsibility for CWS operational supply projects rested with Mar-

riott. Since he had very little assistance and since, after the move to
ALAMO Force at Milne Bay, even his own section was divided, most of
the supply policy load fell directly upon his own shoulders. But even this
was not difficulty enough in the difficult Pacific area. He lacked the
logistic information and means of transportation, and his ability to
improvise locally was practically nil, since there was no available civilian
source of transportation and no substitute line of communication to
Allied forces such as many field chemical officers had. New Guinea
had no motor roads, no industry, and only a little unskilled manpower.
Air transportation carried very high priority and water transportation
was at a premium. Until 15 November 1943, he could deal with the
Chemical Officer, Advance Section, USASOS, at Port Moresby. From
15 November until 31 March 1944 he dealt with chemical officers of
Advance Section at Lae and Intermediate Section at Port Moresby.
But miles of water or air lay between the USASOS sections and his
office in ALAMO Force headquarters, which was at Milne Bay until
October, at Goodenough Island until December, and near Finschhafen
56
until May 1944.
Requirements and Transportation

Marriott spent much of his time in 1943 simply in determining how
SWPA interpreted chemical supply, what channels existed, how much
subordinate elements wanted, and where to store the immediate supply
demands of organizations. In June 1943 USASOS provided that requi-
sitions for TBA equipment should be submitted to base section chemical
officers who could fill them without further reference. Requisitions
for supplies in excess of TBA had to be approved by Marriott and for-
warded to USASOS. The availability of non-TBA items in USASOS
depended upon the ability of the USASOS Chemical Section supply
officers to predict unusual issues and to persuade the United States
authorities to ship them. Transportation could be obtained either by
theater allotment of space, which was controlled in GHQ, or by San
Francisco Port of Embarkation allotment. USASOS sometimes issued
credits for controlled (non-TBA or scarce) items to Sixth Army for
Marriott's suballotment, but each issue against credit had to be approved
56
(1) Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon, pp. 12-15. (2) Mollen, History of Cml Warfare
Sup—SWPA, World War II.
by USASOS through the issuing base.57 Unusual issues of TBA, such

as for the 1st Marine Division which arrived from South Pacific area
fighting minus much of its equipment, were approved through
USAFFE, Sixth Army's administrative (not operational) command
58
channel, to USASOS.
Sixth Army forwarded operational projects to GHQ SWPA and
in the course of preparing such a project in June, Marriott, bypassing
technical channels, pointed out to the supreme command that confusion
59
existed as to the meaning of the term CWS supplies. He indicated
that the prohibition against the use of toxics led some staff officers to
believe that smoke and incendiary shells and grenades, chemical ammu-
nition then issued by Ordnance, were also prohibited. The belief also
existed that protective equipment and chemical ammunition were
restricted to a 30 days' supply, and problems arose because some pro-
tective equipment (such as protective clothing and covers) were issued
by Quartermaster on a 90 days' supply basis while other equipment
(gas mask, protective ointment, and shoe impregnite) were issued by
CWS, apparently on a 30 days' basis. USAFFE, where Copthorne's
office was then located, replied without reference to GHQ that the
Ordnance-issued items were to be used since they were not toxics.
The theater administrative headquarters also indicated that tactical
planning should encompass TBA plus 30 days' maintenance and 30
days' reserve for Classes II and IV. For ammunition supply USAFFE
prescribed basic units of fire for initial issue and provided that mainte-
60
nance and reserves be calculated in days of supply. Reserves were
parceled out among intermediate bases by the combat organizations.
The headquarters regretted confusion resulting from the issue of pro-
tective equipment by two services and indicated that action had been
initiated to make all protective equipment the responsibility of one
61
service.
With the possible exception of information on specific day of
57
Ltr, CmlO USASOS to Base Sec and Subbase CmlO's, 6 Jun 43, sub: Requisition Channels for CWS
Sups. USASOS GSCW 400.312 in Sixth Army 400 Sups (General).
58
Ltr, CG Sixth Army to CG USASOS through CG USAFFE, 18 Jun 43, sub: Cml Warfare Equip
for 1st Marine Div (Sixth Army AG 400W), with 1st Ind, CG USAFFE to CG USASOS, 27 Jun 43
(USAFFE FECW 470.6), and 2d Ind CG USASOS through CG USAFFE to CG Sixth Army, n.d.
(USASOS GSCW 457/29). All in Sixth Army 400 Sups (General).
59
Ltr, CG Sixth Army to CG SWPA through CG USAFFE.
60
For definitions of days of supply, units of fire, and classes of supply, see above, Chapter III.
61
1st Ind, CG USAFFE to CG Sixth Army, 27 Jun 43, on basic Ltr above. USAFFE FECW 475 in
Sixth Army 400 Sups (General).
supply and unit of fire allowances, Marriott certainly learned nothing

he did not already know. His letter was undoubtedly prompted by a
desire to "get something on paper" which would establish an operational
planning base and at the same time set headquarters thinking about the
assignment of responsibilities. The responsibility for protective items,
despite the USAFFE assurance, remained divided between CWS and
Quartermaster, but the SWPA responsibility for storage and issue of
chemical grenades was transferred from Ordnance to CWS in Sep-
tember. Chemical and incendiary bombs remained an Ordnance re-
sponsibility, but the CWS was newly charged with inspection and
servicing of the munitions.62 If Marriott had indeed sought a transfer
of responsibility for all chemical items to CWS supply authority, he
learned, as the following events demonstrated, to regret it, because he
found that the CWS had acquired so much responsibility as to make
handling the forward supply job a huge burden.
Supply Procedures and Their Application

Just two days before the transfer of responsibility from Ordnance
to CWS, ALAMO Force prescribed supply procedures for combat troops.
Each special staff section was assigned to prepare requirements and to
oversee and record distribution of the items in its province. The
USASOS requisition procedure was followed in that units would
requisition directly on base commanders while approval channels were
63
through the army staff section. Marriott was launched into a hectic
period of dealing with loading and unloading, storage, maintenance,
and combat replacement of the small quantities of the comparatively
few chemical items which were so easily misplaced, misappropriated,
and misspent among the vast quantities of material moving over the
vast distances of the Pacific.
Probably as much at Marriott's behest as for his own use, Copthorne
attempted, also in September 1943, to obtain the latest logistics tables,
TBA's, and TOE's from the CCWS.64 This information was not imme-
62
Ltr, CG USAFFE to CG's Sixth Army, Fifth Air Force, and USASOS, 8 Sep 43, sub: Allocation of
Ordnance and Cml Warfare Functions (USAFFE ECW 321.011), with 1st Ind, CG Sixth Army to
Distr, 22 Sep 43 (Sixth Army AG 322-W), in Sixth Army 400 Sups (General).
63
CG ALAMO Force to Distr, 6 Sep 43, sub: SOP for the Sup and Resup of Outlying Forces. Sixth
Army 400.311—Req-Proc and Sup.
64
Ltr, CCmlO USAFFE to CCWS, 25 Sep 43, sub: Logistic Planning Tables, CWS. USAFFE FECW
400.301.
diately forthcoming, but McKinney did get USAFFE unit of fire data
which he sent to Marriott and subordinate chemical officers on 4 Oc-
tober, and Marriott promptly issued an ALAMO Force version.65 But
he still lacked information on grenades. A month later he wrote to
McKinney that it was embarrassing not to know the particulars on
these items for which he was responsible. Declaring that someone must
66
have the information, he briefly ordered, "Shell out."
Preparations for the forthcoming Arawe-Cape Gloucester-Saidor
offensive were more important than obtaining a set of logistical data.
Organizations were about to move out from Australia. McKinney, at
a conference in Copthorne's office (Copthorne had now returned from
USAFFE to USASOS) apparently charged that not enough was being
done for the combat forces. He particularly urged that division chem-
ical officers be given advance information on their supply status.67
Copthorne's men, who were older hands at fighting the battle of Pacific
transportation, must have appeared un-co-operative since there was
little they could do that had not already been done. USASOS ele-
ments had only limited ability to provide transportation and no official
power to assess tactical supply preparations. Movement and allotment
priorities must come from Sixth Army, and, since supply was strictly
interpreted as a command function in SWPA, only Sixth Army could
furnish supply status data to combat organizations. Furthermore,
USASOS chemical officers never knew when materiel would move. It
was their legitimate practice to ship maintenance with outgoing units
so that it might be withdrawn to stock forward bases. There it would
be available to supply the same units or others in critical need. The
point was that conditions of movement and storage in SWPA were so
poor that the area command could not afford to permit combat organi-
zations to attempt to carry along all their supplies into an assault.
The only result would be wastage, and wastage as high as 90 percent
of protective items had already been experienced in assaults.68
Sixth Army was not long in seeing the point. On 12 October 1943,
Marriott notified the Chemical Officer, Advanced Echelon, USASOS,
65
(1) Ltr, ACmlO Sixth Army to CmlO ALAMO Force et at., 4 Oct 43, sub: Cml Warfare Unit of
Fire Table. Sixth Army 400.314 Estimated Rqmts. (2) Memo, CmlO ALAMO Force, 13 Oct 43, sub:
Approved Unit of Fire Table for Cml Warfare Ammunition. OCmlO Sixth Army—Memos from
Forward Echelon.
66
Memo, Marriott for McKinney, 14 Nov 43. Sixth Army AG 300.6 Misc Memos.
67
Memo, McKinney for Marriott, 3 Oct 43. Sixth Army AG 300.6 Misc Memos.
68
(1) Mollen, Cml Warfare Sup—SWPA, World War II. (2) Grothaus-Brady Rpt.
of his intended distribution of Sixth Army ammunition supplies among

the New Guinea subbases, and he indicated the initial issues that would
be required from each base.69 McKinney's principal task then became
getting the transportation that USASOS could not get. Base section
chemical officers had become adept at locating and using any nook or
cranny not spoken for in any kind of shipping headed for New Guinea,
but supply of the scope required by Sixth Army called for more space
than they could find. McKinney appealed to the Regulating Officer,
GHQ, who was in charge of all SWPA transportation allottments, and
also appealed to Sixth Army general staff members to assist in obtaining
70
priorities for chemical items.
Procedures Questioned
Marriott was naturally concerned about having McKinney do a trans-
portation job which he felt should be done automatically in connection
with operational planning. He further objected to being separated
from his own section by 1,200 miles and to doing business with the
USASOS main echelon from the same distance. Copthorne made a
tour of New Guinea bases at this time and talked these points over
with Marriott. Copthorne agreed that Marriott should deal with the
chemical element of Intermediate Section at once and with that of
Advanced Section as soon as that section was set up to handle his
requests. Copthorne emphasized, both while in New Guinea and in a
letter upon his return, that under the circumstances planning must
come from Marriott and that only Marriott was in a position to clear
information to the combat elements on the one hand and to the
USASOS base elements on the other. He forcefully pointed out that
the base elements could be prepared to meet demands upon them only
if they knew the complete supply plan—how much material had been
issued, how much was to be issued and maintained, and who was au-
thorized to receive supplies. During his trip Copthorne discovered
that one base chemical officer had reissued ammunition TBA to a
division since he did not know that the division had already received it.
Another division refused to relinquish an overage of flame thrower fuel
69
Ltr, CmlO ALAMO Force to CmlO Adv Echelon USASOS, 12 Oct 43, sub: Stockage of CWS Class
V Items. Sixth Army 475 Weapons for Jungle Warfare.
70
(1) Mollen, Cml Warfare Sup—SWPA, World War II. (2) Memo, Cml Sec for ACofS G-4
through ACofS G-3 Sixth Army, 12 Nov 43, no sub. Sixth Army 400 Sups (General). (3) Memo,
McKinney for Marriott, 14 Nov 43. Sixth Army AG 300.6 Misc Memos.
because it feared future unavailability. At least part of this fear was

justified, but if every organization was not supplied on the same basis,
the supply system would soon fail. Copthorne had neither the authority
nor the channels to correct these situations. Marriott chided Copthorne
for ordering base chemical officers to suspend issue in some cases, but
Copthorne could do no less in trying to prevent misapportionment of
resources.71
Except for the instances of maladjustment in issue and lack of
knowledge by the base chemical officers of specific resupply require-
ments for ammunition, the base supply status met minimum require-
ments (30 days' for Sixth Army's 180,000 strength) at the time of
Copthorne's visit. The only items deficient were the 1½ -quart decon-
taminating apparatus (19.9 days) and the M15 white phosphorus gre-
nade, of which there were none.72 The WP grenade deficiency was
not a local failure; there were no stocks in any theater. When WP
grenades did become available SWPA got them first, and a supply of
73
these was in the forward bases by 15 December. The Oro Bay base
was below 30 days' Class II supply in October and just above 30 days
in November, but, presumably at Marriott's direction, the Port
Moresby base compensated with 67 days in October and 76 days in
November.74 The only supply complaint noted in the period was one
from the 24th Infantry Division pointing out a shortage of SWPA-
modified training masks, but again this was not a local failure. The
10th Chemical Maintenance Company was awaiting the arrival of new
canisters from the United States in order to begin waterproofing.75
During the combat operations a shortage of hydrogen cylinders for
flame throwers developed, but this too was a problem which was not
solved locally for some time since there was no regular channel of
76
supply for commercial gases.
71
(1) Memo, Marriott for McKinney, 27 Oct 43, no sub. CCmlO Sixth Army Memos from For-
ward Echelon. (2) Memo, Marriott for McKinney, 1 Nov 43, no sub. (3) Personal Ltr, Copthorne
to Marriott, 13 Nov 43. (4) Memo, Marriott for McKinney, 21 Nov 43, no sub. All in Sixth Army
AG 300.6 Misc Memos.
72
Memo, CmlO Intermediate Sec USASOS, for G-4 Intermediate Sec, 24 Nov 43. USASOS Inter-
mediate Sec 400.314 in Sixth Army 400.314 Estimated Rqmts.
73
Memo, ACmlO Intermediate Sec USASOS for G-4 Intermediate Sec USASOS, 17 Dec 43, no sub.
Intermediate Sec 400.314 in Sixth Army 400.314 Estimated Rqmts.
74
Ibid.
75
Ltr, CmlO Sixth Army to CmlO 24th Div, 23 Nov 43, sub: Training Masks, Waterproofed for
24th Infantry Div. Sixth Army Cml Warfare 470.72 in Sixth Army 470.72, Gas Masks No. 4.
76
Memo, ACmlO Intermediate Sec USASOS for G-4 Intermediate Sec USASOS, 17 Dec 43, no sub.
Intermediate Sec 400.314 in Sixth Army 400.314 Estimated Rqmts.
Tactical Procedures Set

By the end of the first week in December there was little more that
Marriott and McKinney could do. Fighting in the Pacific was savage
and intense but usually brief, so that once forces were committed in a
campaign there was practically no hope of getting even resupply from
distant bases or from the United States unless it was already on the way.
Sixth Army Chemical Section planning turned to supplying training
munitions for the next break in combat, and support of the combat
forces consisted of juggling supplies at the forward bases to permit
maximum availability.77
Marriott took the occasion to write to chemical officers at subordinate
echelons asking that statements of requirements for future operations
come early and in full detail. The only way to avoid the last-minute
hustle which had just been experienced was to plan far enough ahead
so that CWS claims on shipping and storage could be entered months
in advance. Marriott realized that the supply element of Copthorne's
office should not be placed in the position of having to outguess the
combat elements in order to place requisitions on the United States
78
in time to receive any material.
As new campaigns began in early 1944, it became obvious that it
was no longer possible to start from scratch. In order to keep supplies
moving, the Sixth Army Chemical Section had to know what had been
expended and what was on hand. Marriott and McKinney experienced
considerable difficulty in obtaining expenditure and status reports from
task forces in widely scattered locations. This failure was particularly
frustrating since, at the expense of much effort, they had secured
service detachments or at least junior officers to accompany those task
forces without chemical sections. The primary duty of these detach-
ments was flame thrower service, but the officers were also charged
77
(1) Memo, Cml Sec ALAMO Force for CmlO Advance Base A, 7 Dec 43, no sub. Sixth Army
300.6 Memos (ALAMO Supply Point No. 1). (2) Ltr, CmlO ALAMO Force to CmlO Advance Base B,
1 Dec 43, sub: Routing of Requisitions. Sixth Army 400.311 Requisitions. (3) Ltr, CmlO ALAMO
Force to CWSO BACKHANDER Task Force, 2 Dec 43, sub: Routing of Requisitions. Sixth Army
400.311 Requisitions. (4) Memo, Marriott for Riegelman, CmlO I Corps, 13 Dec 43, no sub. Sixth
Army AG 300.6 Memos—I Corps. (5) Ltr, CCmlO USASOS to CmlO ADSOS, 30 Dec 43, sub: Ship-
ment of Sups by ALAMO Force. Sixth Army AG 300.6 Memos—ADSOS.
78
(1) Memo, Marriott for Lt Col K. W. Haas, CmlO 1st Cavalry Div, 30 Nov 43. (2) Memo,
Marriott for Riegelman, 30 Nov 43. Both in Sixth Army AG 300.6 Memos.
with handling supply. It was finally necessary to secure a command

letter to get some of the reports.79
By the end of February 1944 Marriott was thoroughly disgusted
with the detailed supply operation which had been the lot of the Sixth
Army Chemical Section. He wrote to Copthorne that he had come to
the conclusion that "we were sweeping water up hill." 80 Considering
the small quantity of chemical supply, he believed that Ordnance would
feel no additional strain on handling chemical ammunition, and he
felt that Ordnance would not need a separate system as did the CWS.
He wanted more time to devote to tactical policy and gas warfare
protection and he felt he could get the time only by disposing of a
81
part of his supply burden.
There was some justice in Marriott's comments. The quantity of
chemical supply was very small, but perhaps precisely for that reason,
chemical materials tended to be lost when handled by another service.
But Marriott was not to be relieved of his supply burden; if anything,
it increased. USASOS did offer some help. The Distribution Division,
USASOS, had been created in January specifically to handle Sixth
Army's most vexing problems—transportation and distribution policy.
The veteran CWS supply manager, Maj. Arthur H. Williams, Jr.,
moved into the position of Chemical Officer, Distribution Division.
The Distribution Division operated as a field element of USASOS and
it moved forward ahead of the main echelons.82 The USASOS com-
mander, Maj. Gen. John L. Frink, also redefined the duties of USASOS
Advance and Intermediate Sections. Effective 1 March 1944, Advance
Section became a transportation and handling agency and Intermediate
Section took over the command of all forward bases and the supervision
83
of supply policy. Since the Distribution Division soon moved into
Intermediate Section, the Sixth Army Chemical Section at last had
79
(1) Ltr, ACmlO ALAMO Force to CmlO US Forces APO 321, 21 Jan 44, sub: CWS Resup
MICHAELMAS. Sixth Army 471.6 Grenades. (2) Memo, McKinney for CmlO ALAMO Base 2, 21 Jan
44, no sub. Sixth Army 400 Sup. (3) Ltr, ACmlO ALAMO Force to CCmlO USASOS, 25 Jan 44,
sub: Ammunition Status Rpts. Sixth Army 471 Ammunition. (4) Memo, Col Marriott for Col R. N.
Gay, CmlO ADSOS, 31 Jan 44, sub: CWS Units. Sixth Army AG 300.6 Memos, (5) Ltr, CG
ALAMO Force to CG Dir Task Force, 2 Feb 44, sub: Cml Ammunition Rpts. Sixth AG 471W in Sixth
Army 470.71 Ammunition.
80
Personal Ltr, Marriott to Copthorne, 26 Feb 44. Sixth Army 472.4—4.2 inch Cml Mortar.
81
Ibid.
82
History of Distr Div USASOS. OCMH MS.
83
Ltr, CG USASOS to CG's ADSOS and Intermediate Sec, 25 Feb 44, sub: Functions and Responsi-
bilities of ADSOS and Intermediate Sec. Sixth Army 323.31 Development of Bases.
USASOS officers with considerable resources close at hand. Still, the

Sixth Army Chemical Section devoted much of its time to supply and
service.
Marriott issued a new unit of fire table on 1 March because he was
still responsible for tactical requirements and planning.84 Also, now
that some support problems were handled by USASOS, the forward
area problems increased. The inexperienced, young junior officers with
the task forces lacked the knowledge to handle supply, and Marriott's
office was frequently called upon to give detailed instructions at the
regimental combat team level. In many cases Marriott sent out the
officers of his own section to inspect or to clear up a field supply
problem.85
The introduction of chemical mortar battalions to the Pacific and
the increased use of the flame thrower also added to supply duties.
Every task force chemical section whether of divisional size or smaller
was now more than ever engaged in combat loading and unloading, in
collecting supplies on beachheads, and in furnishing support, such as
flame thrower fuel mixing, in forward areas. These elements all re-
ported expenditures and special requirements and problems. In each
case the Sixth Army Chemical Section had a function of planning,
reviewing, or directing operations.86
By the middle of 1944 replacement factors had been increased, supply
was more plentiful, and items received were in better shape. The first
block-loaded ships were then being prepared in San Francisco, and the
Sixth Army Chemical Section took advantage of this means to resupply
ammunition. Block-loaded ships were those vessels with loads specially
designed to support a task force with a balanced variety of supplies.
The materiel was loaded so that discharge could be effected easily and
expeditiously, and loads were so marked that accounting and reporting
problems were greatly reduced. Each block-loaded ship came into a
USASOS base and waited there to be called forward for the support
84
Ltr, CG Sixth Army to Distr, 1 Mar 44, sub: Unit of Fire Table for Cml Warfare Ammunition.
Sixth Army AG 471 W.
85
(1) Memo, SupO Sixth Army Cml Sec for CmlO ALAMO Force, 24 Mar 44, no sub. (2) Memo,
CmlO ALAMO Sup Point No. 1 for CmlO ALAMO Force. (3) Memo, Marriott for Riegelman, 11 Apr
44. (4) Memo, CmlO ALAMO Sup Point No. 1 for CmlO ALAMO Force, 3 May 44. All in Sixth
Army AG 300.6 Memos. (5) Ltr, CmlO ALAMO Force to CO Det 93d Cml Composite Co, 8 Mar 44,
sub: Maintenance Factors. Sixth Army 470.72 Protective Equip.
86
(1) CmlO 41st Inf Div, n.d., Rpt, Cml Phase and Sec Hist Red of HORLICKS [Biak] Opn.
Sixth Army 350.05 Biak.
of an appropriate task force. The block-loaded procedure facilitated

87
supply on Leyte.
Colonel Marriott was invalided home in July 1944, so that he did
not see the effect of the block-loaded ships upon his supply operation.
By the time of his departure the pattern of supply was well set, and
although there were problems, such as the inability of USASOS to
move bases forward fast enough when combat reached the southern
Philippines and a critical supply shortage late in 1944, there was no
essential change in the chemical tactical supply operation until the end
88
of the war.
Chemical officers in the Southwest Pacific faced the most difficult

supply task experienced by the CWS during World War II. The hard-
ships faced by chemical officers in other theaters—lack of supply infor-
mation, immensely complicated requirements, requisitioning, and re-
view systems, shortage of critical items, and the early poor condition
of equipment—were all compounded by distance, tropical conditions,
and lack of channels and facilities in SWPA. As a result SWPA chem-
ical officers developed a series of expedients which were at times unusual
and often ingenious. By employing these expedients they did build up
area reserves and they did provide the combat forces with both materiel
and service. It does seem possible in retrospect that their task, which
was never an easy one because of the unpredictable and almost over-
whelming difficulties of tropical warfare, might have been somewhat
more simply and more expeditiously handled had logistical planning
received more emphasis both in the theater and in the War Department.
The Theater Supply System, Central Pacific

Supply in the Emergency Period
The CWS Hawaiian Department in December 1941 stocked more
chemical items than any other overseas element of the Army.89 Major
87
(1) Memo, Cml Sec Sixth Army for Mollen, 30 Jun 44, no sub. In Sixth Army 400 Supplies.
(2) Mollen, Cml Warfare Sup—SWPA, World War II.
88
(1) Mollen, Cml Warfare Sup—SWPA, World War II. (1) Ltr, CmlO Base K to Distr, 4 Dec
44, sub: Critical Items CWS Class II and IV. Base K KCWS 400.301 in Sixth Army 401.1 Critical
Items. (3) Ltr, CmlO Base K to CmlO Subbase K and Cml SupO Base K, 5 Dec 44, sub: Issue of Cml
Warfare Equip and Sups. Sixth Army 400 Supplies.
89
Unless otherwise noted, this and the following sections are based on the History of the CWS in the
Middle Pacific.
McMillin, Chemical Officer, Hawaiian Chemical Depot, was prepared

to issue 60,000 service gas masks when, less than an hour after the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor began, Colonel Unmacht, department
chemical officer, ordered distribution. The departmental CWS also
stocked about 90 tons of bleach, no tons of chemicals for impregnating
permeable protective clothing, and nearly 25,000 gallons of noncorro-
sive decontaminating agent. Several thousand hand decontaminating
apparatus and a completely inadequate supply of personal protective
ointment completed the defensive stock.90
The CWS stored some ammunition, smoke agents, and toxic agents,
about eleven tons of FS smoke, 3,000 HC smoke pots, and nearly 500
tons of bulk toxics almost evenly divided between persistent and non-
persistent gases. The departmental ordnance officers stored some toxic
and smoke-filled ammunition. The departmental CWS carefully
hoarded 32 4.2-inch chemical mortars, aware that the whole Army
91
hadSince
onlyUnmacht's
44. first responsibility was to insure gas warfare pro-
tection and a defensive potential for troops, as noted above, he at

once directed that impregnating and bleach production operations start,
and he also set out to procure cans to be filled as chemical land mines.
On 10 December 1941 he cabled the Chief, CWS, for funds to procure
materials and to operate and to convert plants. The theater CWS
assumed that the War Department would immediately ship TBA
equipment for the known troop strength in the Hawaiian Department,
but in case such material should not be en route, Unmacht on 17 De-
cember cabled for 60,000 suits of protective clothing, 25 tons of im-
pregnite, nearly 200,000 tubes each of shoe impregnite and protective
ointment, and training masks, dust respirators, gasproof curtains, and
chemical mortar shell. The request was amended on the following day
to include more mortar shell, bleach, children's masks, and respirators
for babies.
By the end of December most of the protective equipment on hand,
including all but about 5,000 service masks and 5,000 training masks,
had been issued to troops, and issues to civilians began. The War
Department emergency shipments including training masks for civil-
ians began to arrive in January. Within ten days 15,673 masks had been
90
Weekly Rpt for the CofS, CWS Munitions on Hand as of 12 Dec 41, OC CWS, dated 20 Dec 41.
CWS 319.1/2249.
91
Ibid.
issued to civilians, and by 1 March 1942 393,680 of the eventual

425,699 had been distributed. Local workers added nearly 38,000
"bunny" hoods, substitutes for nonavailable children's masks, to the
total.
Chemical Supply Reserve

The first department report on supply status to the War Depart-
ment G-4 in October 1942 revealed no serious supply problem except
the lack of service personnel. The depot was severely handicapped in
the operation of 3 subdepots on Oahu, 3 in outlying islands, and 5
production plants. In Unmacht's opinion the one chemical depot com-
pany activated in the theater in March and the one decontamination
company which arrived in June were already overburdened. Theater
stock was not up to the prescribed 75-day reserve level, but the San
Francisco port was keeping the theater informed on the progress of
requisitioned shipments, and automatic supply on less important items
was steadily building toward the stockage goal. There is little sense of
urgency in the report, probably because the department was enjoying
a lull between the emergency period and the combat period.
The March 1943 report does reflect a sense of urgency. Requisition-
ing responsibility had been transferred from the depot to the depart-
mental chemical office because supply planning for CENPAC combat
forces was now in prospect. The failure to maintain authorized stock
levels had become serious because large-scale issues of TBA equipment
contemplated would deplete area reserves. The departmental CWS
had run into the problem of requisitions edited in the United States,
a problem which plagued all theater chemical officers. The port had
supplied in the requested quantity only two items of a 19-item requisi-
tion placed in November 1942; fourteen items were disapproved with-
out statement of cause. Even more serious in the view of departmental
chemical officers was the fact that training ammunition supplies were
running out in a period of intensive training.
The CWS in Hawaii could report no improvement in June, but in
September 1943 the theater reported that relief had been received.
The War Department authorized for the Central Pacific Area a 60-day
operating level in addition to the 75-day reserve level, and the port
authorized an additional "pipeline" factor. The "pipeline" factor al-
lowed the Hawaiian Department to requisition additional supplies to
maintain levels during order and shipping time. TBA issues for combat
forces, of which the first was then mounting, could then be handled
without difficulty.
On 1 July 1944 the Chemical Office, Central Pacific Base Command
(CPBC), assumed the logistics functions except for broad policy and
long-range planning which remained the province of Unmacht's chem-
ical office. This transfer placed stock level and TBA issue problems in
CPBC hands. It also gave the Chemical Office, CPBC, supervision of
the combat supply and resupply system which had been inaugurated
for the earliest theater operation against the enemy in the Gilbert
Islands in November 1943.
Toxic Supply
Another reserve problem was that of toxic supply. As the first gas
warfare plan indicated, the 500 tons of toxic on hand at the time of
the Pearl Harbor attack would have been sufficient, taking into account
the retaliation then possible. As strength grew and weapons and air-
craft became available, the CWS in CENPAC realized that 500 tons
represented hardly a token amount for retaliation even under the
assumption that retaliation would take place on one of the small
Pacific islands. The CWS consequently persuaded Army and Army
Air Forces commands to requisition toxics. Some were received and
stored by Ordnance with CWS maintaining the responsibility for in-
specting munitions in storage. Between July and November of 1944
the peak stock of 498.5 short tons of bulk lewisite was on hand as well
as the peak stockage of 1,126.5 tons of toxics that went into bombs.
Other peak stockages for bulk mustard, artillery shell, and chemical
mortar shell were attained in the first half of 1945.
CWS officers judged the 100-pound mustard-filled bomb as the
most important munition for retaliation. The peak stock on this item,
attained in July 1944, was 1 5,244 bombs with 541.2 tons of toxic filling.
This supply was token only. If, for example, this entire supply had
been used on Iwo Jima, which had an area of seven and one-half square
miles, it would only have contaminated a little more than half, or four
and one-half square miles.92 Considering the vapor effect of mustard
and the fact that the entire island would not have been regarded as a
target, the stock would have been sufficient for one contamination. In
92
These computations were made using the standard World War II manuals.
the opinion of most chemical officers one contamination would have

been enough to end all enemy resistance on the island. The question
of resupply for other objectives would then arise. According to
Generals Porter and Waitt an actual initiation of gas warfare would
have given the CWS sufficient priorities to effect resupply, by air if
necessary, from the west coast.93
From the point of view of supply on hand the CWS in CENPAC
was only prepared to make an initial gas warfare strike. But, since
CENPAC had better lines of communication to the United States than
most overseas areas, gas warfare could have been sustained.
Chemical Warfare Tactical Supply, Central Pacific

Tactical Supply Policy
The essence of the combat supply and resupply lay in the nature of
Central Pacific combat. The Joint Chiefs of Staff scheduled area forces
to take a number of small and fiercely defended islands and atolls lying
across the expanse of the Pacific. Early supply base development in
most of these objectives was out of the question—they were too small
and too far away from main bases, or even if they were large enough
for base development the distance between them was so great that it
was impossible to establish a string of forward bases in the SWPA
pattern. Each ground and sea combat operation had to be complete
in itself. The assigned combat force took the objective as rapidly as
possible and withdrew leaving a small or, in the case of Marshalls and
Marianas, a large garrison to clean up and prepare the objective for
such use as could be made of it. Any resupply was destined for the
garrison only. These island garrisons sometimes built large bases but
they usually served the air forces rather than ground combat forces.
The U.S. Army Forces in the Central Pacific formed seven provisional
garrison battalions before a single objective was taken. Each supply
plan was made on the assumption, which proved correct, that the
ordinary requisition or allotment procedures used in other theaters
would not work. All supply for the combat forces must be at sea
before the forces arrived at their objective, and garrison force supply
had to be in the area as soon as garrison forces could receive it. In this
93
(1) Porter Interv, 24 Aug 61. (2) Waitt Interv, 13 May 61.
circumstance, supply could hardly be a function of the combat com-

mand. Logistic plans for each operation were a joint product of
combat, garrison force, and theater planners. Tight logistical control
was essential. Consequently, supply plans were originated by the
combat staffs working with the technical service staffs. These pre-
liminary plans were approved and co-ordinated at general staff echelons
and forwarded to the Commander in Chief, POA, for the strategic,
tactical, and logistical last word. The tight control came from the
management of transportation by the Commander in Chief, POA.
Every inch of transport space had to be allocated by strict priorities
since shipping was short, since all essentials had to be carried, and since
an amphibious force operating at such distances from a base had to be
of an easily manageable size.
The First Test—The Gilberts Operation

In the Gilberts operation assaulting troops carried full initial allow-
ances plus 30 days' essential maintenance and five units of fire computed
according to War Department replacement factors.94 An additional
30 days' maintenance accompanied garrison force troops. Then addi-
tional shipments were set up to give the garrison forces a 30-day oper-
ating level and a 60-day reserve by D-day plus 60 days. The CWS
computations were involved because each of these levels had to be
computed on the basis of troop strength expected to be at the objective
when supplies arrived. Since strength would decline rapidly with the
withdrawal of combat forces once the objective was taken, a descending
schedule of strength was drawn up.
All CWS supplies for the Gilberts operation were loaded in Hawaii.
Shipments totaled 93 measurement tons (40 cubic feet per ton), most
of it for the Marine Corps assault forces. There were no serious CWS
supply problems, but there were a number of lessons for the future.
Assaulting forces wanted more flame throwers and more smoke in
forthcoming operations although the CWS made a special allowance
of smoke pots for the Gilberts.
Assault troops on the Gilberts used the power driven and 3-gallon
decontaminating apparatus to spray sodium arsenite on the dead since
it was impossible to provide mortuary services in the assault. The
94
For an account of the Gilberts operation, see: Philip A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love, Seizure of the
Gilberts and Marshalls, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1 9 5 5 ) .
chemical aided in control of disease-bearing insects and the arresting

of nauseous odors.95 An extra allowance of the apparatus was indicated.
The Gilberts operation also pointed up some handling problems.
Combat troops found flame thrower fuel mixing and repair difficult,
partly because 55-gallon drums of fuel were too heavy to handle, and
partly because repair parts could not be adequately distributed and
used during tactical operations. The Navy and the marines requested
the installation of racks on landing craft so that smoke pots could be
carried in a ready position for immediate firing. The Army's 27th
Division chemical officers indicated that chemical supplies were in-
sufficiently waterproofed.
Supply System Refinement

The USAFICPA CWS took these problems from the Gilberts into
account in planning the Marshall Islands invasion for January, Feb-
ruary, and March of 1944. Flame fuel was provided in 5-gallon cans.
Waterproofing was improved and allowances for smoke and flame
munitions and for the decontaminating apparatus were raised. Even
the basic supply system underwent refinement. USAFICPA set up
block loads to be shipped directly from the United States to the
Marshalls. The CWS shared in the theater system revision by com-
puting a block-load on the basis of 20 days' supply for 1,000 men.
Since War Department factors were usually stated on a 30-day basis
and were often not computed in a per-man requirement, CWS
USAFICPA was forced to convert War Department figures into per-
man-per-day requirements according to theater experience in order
to determine the more convenient 20-day block. Chemical officers
worked up shipment blocks which would provide 90 days' supply for
the garrison forces on D-day plus 90 days in the Marshalls.
In the actual Marshalls operation, the tactical commander held
resupply offshore until he could determine that it could be landed
without clogging the beaches. The only CWS supply problem arising
in the Marshalls was that so many portable flame throwers were pro-
vided that not all could be used. The allowance per division for subse-
quent operations was cut from 192 to 141 weapons. The physical con-
dition and handling of supplies otherwise met demands, demonstrating
that the CWS had learned to operate its share of the theater supply
95
Stauffer, Operations in the War Against Japan, pp. 252-55.
system. For example, the CWS supplied only end-item replacements

to the combat echelons since it was apparent that spare parts could
not be handled and used until the garrison forces were set up. Water-
proofed packaging and palletized loads assembled by the Hawaiian
Chemical Depot and the combat troops themselves before the operation
proved to answer other equipment and handling needs. Although space
could not be provided for chemical service troops to handle supply, the
sanitation problem was so great that the excess decontaminating appa-
ratus were provided and manned by troops of the 29th Chemical
Decontamination Company under the supervision of a medical officer.
The theater and CWS supply system was substantially complete at
the end of the Marshalls operation. In subsequent operations, the only
major refinement was a differentiation between assault and garrison
resupply. The practice previous to the Marianas operation in June was
to provide resupply on a per-man basis without regard to whether the
men supplied were in combat or garrison echelons. POA experience
made it clear, however, that combat troops would not be in any area
long enough to need resupply on some items, such as gas mask repair
kits and gasproof curtains, even in the event of gas warfare. The
garrison forces who collected and reconditioned equipment would be
in greater need of reconditioning supplies and base development sup-
plies. The CWS USAFICPA accordingly determined assault and gar-
rison resupply blocks on the basis of probable need and scheduled
shipment of these blocks so that assault forces would handle only
essential resupply.
The Final Test—Okinawa
The great test of the Central Pacific supply system came with
invasion of Okinawa in April 1945. Tenth Army was organized in
Hawaii in preparation for the Ryukyus Campaign of which the Oki-
nawa invasion was a part, and the Tenth Army Chemical Section, then
under Col. Thomas A. Doxey and later under Col. John H. Harper,
set to work with the theater (now U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean
Areas—USAFPOA) and CPBC Chemical Sections. CWS supply
troubles both in providing basic equipment and in resupply were in-
tensified because units and organizations scheduled for the operation
were mounting in places varying from the west coast of the United
States to the recently captured Palaus and some were still committed
in other operations. The CWS planners prepared supply plans which

could be rapidly adjusted to new situations. They provided this flexi-
bility by planning for "type" units and organizations rather than
for specific named units and organizations, according to earlier
practice. The theater command arranged that requisitions for "type"
unit supplies could be placed on the San Francisco port. The port then
forwarded supplies to holding and reconsignment points to await
theater designation of receiving organizations. The theater further
directed the assemblage of an emergency reserve stock in the Marianas
to be used in event the "type" supplies fell short of filling basic require-
ments for the designated specific unit. The CWS logisticians, on the
basis of their own experience, estimated shortages for organizations
which were known but which could not be consulted because they
were still committed to combat. The logisticians computed resupply
blocks according to the theater system as usual.
The chemical service manpower requirement was greater than the
theater had ever experienced. There were not enough service units
available in the theater, and repeated pleas to the United States resulted
in the scheduling of two chemical service units on redeployment from
the European theater and one unit from the United States. But these
units could not arrive before the operation was well under way, so
Unmacht activated two service companies and a provisional chemical
detachment in Hawaii. He also secured the assignment of a quarter-
master service company to chemical work pending the arrival of other
96
units in the target area.
Assault on Okinawa's Hagushi beaches began on Easter Sunday
morning, 1 April 1945. Contrary to expectations, no significant re-
sistance was encountered, and a much larger area was taken than had
been originally planned in the first three days. As far as the CWS was
concerned, the easy advance immediately posed the problem of collect-
ing chemical equipment dropped on the beachhead by incoming troops.
Initially, division personnel established beach dumps. On L-day plus
three, XXIV Corps took over the operation of the dumps, and the
4342d Quartermaster Service Company which had been assigned to
the CWS arrived with the 1st Provisional POA Chemical Detachment
(later the 411th). Elements of the service company and the detach-
96
(1) Cml unit files, 147th and 148th Cml General Serv Cos and 231st Cml Depot Co. (2) Ltr,
CG Tenth Army to CG Island Comd, 20 Jan 45, sub: Plan for CWS Sup. Tenth Army AG 475 Cml.
ment were attached to division chemical sections to assist in dump

operation. On 10 April 1945 Island Command, the garrison force for
Okinawa, whose chemical officer was Lt. Col. Emory A. Lewis, took
over the supervision of the dumps and service personnel.97 Island Com-
mand Chemical Section and its service units had the mission of receiv-
ing, storing, and issuing CWS materiel to service echelons and to Tenth
Army ASP's and dumps.
The most serious problem of the CWS which developed during the
Okinawa operation was the shortage of 4.2-inch mortar ammunition.
The 4.2-inch chemical mortar was increasingly acknowledged by com-
manders and troops alike as a valuable weapon. Because of extensive
use, especially in such operations as the Battle of the Bulge,' 4.2 ammuni-
tion was in short supply in the zone of interior and in all theaters of
operations when the Okinawa operation was being formulated. The
USAFPOA CWS had planned on having ammunition resupply for
Okinawa arrive in the block-loaded ships from the west coast, but
because of the shortage, ammunition had to be collected in the Hawaiian
Islands and the Marianas and then forwarded to Okinawa. In all, ap-
proximately 50,000 rounds of heavy M4 shell were forwarded and
another 20,000 rounds of M3 shell were acquired from the Navy at
the target. The M4 shell weighed 3 5 pounds as opposed to 2 5 pounds
for the M3 HE and WP shell. The heavier shell decreased mortar range
by 1,000 yards and caused greater strain and wear upon the guns.
Breakdowns occurred and a greater replacement of parts than had
been anticipated was required. It was a case, however, of using the
M4 shell or having none. Fortunately, the end-item and spare parts
replacement allowances were sufficient to cover necessary repairs, but
98
this was not the end of the shell problem.
The mortar units in combat soon discovered that fuzes had corroded
in many of the shells, causing premature bursts. Tenth Army called
for replacement fuzes. The USAFPOA responded to eleven emergency
requests by air, shipping 46,502 pounds of fuzes from the United States
and from Hawaii.
97
(1) Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens, Okinawa: The Last
Battle, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1948), pp. 68-76. (2) Action
Rpt, XXIV Corps, Ryukyus Campaign, 1 Apr 45, dated 30 Jun 45, Incl to Barker to CCWS, 28 Sep 45,
Rpt, Visit to Okinawa, Ryukyu Islands. CWS 314.7 Observer Rpts.
98
1st Lt John A. Landt, CO B 88th Cml Mortar Bn to CG 1st Marine Div, Opnl Rpt of Action
With the 1st Marine Div on Okinawa, 30 June 45.
Neither ammunition nor fuze problems could be attributed to the

USAFPOA chemical supply system, for shells and fuzes were not avail-
able in the United States according to plan. It is possible that the
requirements stated for ammunition resupply were low, but since there
was a shell shortage this point could not be proved. On the whole, the
system worked well for the Okinawa operation.
The administration of all CWS activities in the Central Pacific

proved to be more effectively and economically handled than in other
theaters because circumstances in the area permitted greater centraliza-
tion of procedures and more command support of the CWS. The
CWS supply system in the area also reflected this administrative effi-
ciency. In supply the CWS did not have the independence in the
Central Pacific that it had in other theaters—the service had to work
through the well-oiled Army-Navy machine. But under Central
Pacific conditions this lack of independence was not a significant
drawback, for it brought the benefits of working as a part of, rather
than in spite of, the theater organization. Independence in other
theaters, on the other hand, brought the frustrating problems of trying
to operate a very small supply service in a company of giants. In final
analysis the CWS supply job was accomplished both through the
independent CWS supply systems evolved in other theaters and through
the centralized system of the Central Pacific and neither type of
system proved to be perfect. But the Central Pacific system which
provided logistical control from the top, although it was less responsive
to the desires of field commanders, offered the CWS the best and most
consistent employment of theater resources and talents.
CHAPTER VII
Chemical Warfare Service Units

The Chemical Warfare Service provided service units for all theaters
of operations during World War II. In so doing, it had in mind pri-
marily its responsibility for providing the United States Armed Forces
with the capability of defending themselves against gas attack and
retaliating effectively in kind. The task of maintaining readiness for
gas warfare in the field embraced a number of contributory missions.
Chemical warfare materiel, whether defensive, like gas masks and pro-
tective clothing, or offensive, like toxic agents and the munitions to
deliver them, had to be provided through depots and dumps; this
required units trained to handle, repair, and issue such items. Teams
trained and equipped for the systematic decontamination of service
area installations after gas attack were essential in a gas warfare
situation. Defensive measures also included the availability of freshly
processed permeable protective clothing for troops called on to execute
missions in a contaminated area; hence the need for processing teams
and equipment to insure an adequate supply of impregnated uniforms.
Gas warfare intelligence was dependent on the presence in theaters of
technicians and laboratories capable of determining the nature of gas
attacks and assessing the significance of captured materiel. Finally,
the prosecution of a gas offensive demanded close maintenance and
supply support for the combat elements responsible, whether they were
mortar battalions or Air Forces bombers.
The needs of gas warfare readiness, therefore, set the pattern for
prewar CWS planning for service units. The prescribed standard for
a wartime situation, in which the existence or at least the imminence
of gas warfare was taken for granted, called for the assignment of a
chemical depot company, decontamination company, laboratory com-
pany, impregnating company (as the processing company was then
called), and maintenance company to each field army, with additional
base depot chemical facilities under the control of the army communi-
cations zone.1 By the time the United States entered the war, the
CWS had come, perforce, to adjust its standards to meet the needs of
gas warfare preparedness in situations which, for the time being, at
least, did not include gas. The normal basis of assigning maintenance
companies remained the field army, but the other units were hence-
forth to be assigned to theaters of operation, either for retention under
direct theater control or for further assignment to agencies within the
theater. CWS air service units were provided for assignment to theater
air forces. In addition to these specialized companies, the CWS began
at the outset of the war to provide composite companies capable of
undertaking all of these service missions for field armies through a
system of specialized teams of platoon size or less.
Somewhat more than a year after Pearl Harbor, with large-scale land
action against the enemy taking place as yet only in the Southwest
Pacific and North Africa, a CWS report showed a total of 19 service
units of all types sent to all overseas destinations, including some in
the Western Hemisphere. Of these 19, the Southwest Pacific had
received a composite company, 2 decontamination companies, a lab-
oratory, a maintenance, and a depot company. A depot company, a
maintenance company, and a decontamination platoon had gone to
North Africa. Only 2 processing companies had left the zone of
interior; both were in the United Kingdom.2 By the middle of 1944,
with major Allied offensive campaigns in process all over the world,
the current troop basis included an authorization for 128 CWS ground
service units, about 2 5 more than the total number included in theater
CWS plans, so far as these had been formulated. There were 102
service units actually in the theaters as of 31 July 1944, compared with
the 101 deemed necessary by the Chief, CWS, for a nongas situation.
A total of 64 additional CWS units were on duty overseas with the
Army Air Forces. In general, the supply of CWS service units was
adequate for "insurance" purposes, considering the fact that gas had
not been used by the enemy and that there was no particular indication
of a sudden change in that situation. Had there been a sudden shift to
gas warfare conditions, service unit requirements would have been
seriously above existing theater capabilities in some instances, most
1
FM 3-15, Sup and Field Serv, 17 Feb 41.
2
USCWC, Rpt on Gas Warfare Preparedness, U.S. Army, 2 Feb 43.
CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS 279
notably in the need for processing companies. The European and

Mediterranean theaters alone would have required a total of two dozen
additional processing companies to meet an all-out resort to gas warfare
by Germany.3
But with gas warfare no more than a grim possibility, it was not
surprising that theaters were willing to spread their chemical service
units somewhat thin. It was inevitable, also, that those service missions
which were not directly dependent on the presence or threat of gas
should come to the fore. Two of these, both unanticipated in prewar
planning, came to be of particular importance: the provision of close
maintenance and supply support for 4.2-inch mortars firing HE and
the storing, mixing, filling, and loading of airborne incendiary muni-
tions. The hard-won acceptance of the flame thrower as an effective
weapon in the Pacific theaters brought with it the need for flame
thrower maintenance and fuel supply. The demonstrated value of
CWS screening smokes led to the requirement for stockage of smoke
mixtures and maintenance of smoke generators. The immediate rele-
vance of all these services to the needs of combat gave them prominence,
but the basic gas warfare readiness mission was not forgotten. Depot
companies continued to see to it that a gas mask in good working
order was available for every soldier, processing companies maintained
theater reserve stocks of impregnated clothing, and laboratory com-
panies worked steadily at the tasks of evaluating enemy chemical war-
fare materiel and providing technical surveillance for American stocks.
As one of the consequences of serving as insurance against the out-
break of gas warfare CWS service units acquired an assortment of
responsibilities of immediate urgency, but often unrelated to their basic
missions. The decontamination companies, which never functioned as
such overseas, were particularly prone to this sort of development.
Their equipment, which lent itself to the carrying and dispensing of
water, became the basis for their utilization as shower units, among
other things. Similarly, the impregnating plants of the processing
companies bore enough of a functional relationship to laundry ma-
chinery to enable companies to supplement quartermaster laundry
service when their own processing mission was in abeyance. Sometimes
it was CWS training rather than organic equipment that seemed to
point the way to new missions for service units. More than one chemical
3
USCWC, Rpt of Readiness for Cml Warfare as of 1 Jul 44.
service company found itself, after a brief training period, operating

smoke lines, and in two cases CWS service troops joined mortar units.
Laboratory companies turned to developing or testing field expedients
ranging from camouflage dye to flame thrower tanks and found time
to perform an impressive variety of miscellaneous technical chores for
other services.
The development of new missions, even more than the ordinary
exigencies of active theaters, frequently demanded a high degree of
flexibility in CWS service units. More often than not, flexibility in
response was obtained at the expense of the proper organization of the
unit and consequently with a good deal of difficulty. For the most part,
each type of company was set up to operate as a unit under the control
of the company commander. Each subordinate element was organized,
manned, and equipped for a specific range of specialized tasks con-
tributory to the main task. Ad hoc rearrangement of manpower and
equipment to meet new demands resulted in administrative problems
which often interfered with the unit's effectiveness. The requirement
for flexibility was met to some degree by the formation of the compos-
ite companies, with their cellular structure designed to permit each
cell to operate independently of the others. The experience of the
Pacific theaters was to lead to greater reliance on these all-purpose
organizations and to demands for still more flexibility of structure and
employment. In this respect this experience pointed the way toward
postwar doctrine.
The Chemical Laboratory Company

Seven Chemical Warfare Service laboratory companies saw service
overseas between 1941 and 1945. The essential mission of the laboratory
company in the field was to analyze and evaluate enemy chemical
materiel and to maintain technical surveillance over CWS supplies.
These functions made it a major source of technical intelligence, both
as to enemy capabilities for chemical warfare and the storage life of
CWS ammunition and protective items. At first conceived of as a more
or less mobile entity capable of following an army in the field, it was
in practice treated as a semifixed installation of a theater communica-
tions zone, a status better suited to its more than ten tons of laboratory
equipment.
However bulky its equipment, a laboratory company was not a

large unit. Its prescribed strength at the time the United States entered
World War II was only 86—14 officers and 72 enlisted men—and the
tendency of subsequent years was toward a still more restricted per-
sonnel roster. Indeed, the first laboratory company to go overseas,
en route at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, was authorized no
more than 78 officers and men in its movement orders.4 By the end
of 1943, in accordance with a TOE of the preceding July, laboratory
companies were reorganized to consist of 8 officers and 51 enlisted men.
The enlisted strength was set at 50 the following year.5 The original
laboratory company was organized rather loosely into headquarters,
chemical, and physical sections, the headquarters organization includ-
ing, in addition to the major commanding, an officer in charge of
chemical intelligence. The 1943 reorganization, while cutting the
strength of the company, doubled the number of its subdivisions.
There were, henceforth, in addition to the headquarters unit, sections
designated organic, analytical, chemical engineering, toxicology, and
intelligence. This setup was designed for a more effective division of
labor in handling the work facing a company in the field.
Once established and operating, usually in or near a major urban
center, the chemical laboratory company acted as a research center
and technical clearinghouse for the entire theater. In performance of
its principal mission, it examined captured enemy chemical munitions
and protective items, studied the behavior of American chemical
materiel under theater conditions, surveyed items in storage for possible
deterioration, collected chemical intelligence from captured enemy
personnel and documents, and made regular reports of its various find-
ings and activities to OCCWS. It was from the reports of the 45th
Chemical Laboratory Company in the spring of 1945 that the Chemical
Warfare Service first learned of the existence and structure of the
new German nerve gases, the so-called G agents. When not engaged
in its principal chemical mission, the laboratory served the theater as
a general-purpose research establishment, carrying out whatever proj-
ects its equipment and technical personnel were capable of handling.
4
History of the 42d Cml Lab Co.
5
TOE 3-97, 6 Jul 43 and 3 Jun 44.
These tasks ranged from tests of Army Air Forces engine coolants to
6
manufacture of a camouflage skin dye for jungle troops.
The oldest of the laboratory companies was typical in its overseas
experience. The 41st Chemical Laboratory had begun its existence as
the 1st Chemical Company (Laboratory) in 1940 in the days before
the laboratories were assigned the forties for numerical designation.
From its ranks while in training at Edgewood Arsenal had come cadres
for the second and third laboratories to be activated. In the spring
of 1943 the company took ship for North Africa, arriving at Mers el
Kébir near Oran early in May, as the Tunisia Campaign was approach-
ing its end. Assigned at first to Fifth Army, the company spent several
months at Marina, Algeria, just over the border from Fifth Army's
Moroccan headquarters, working under the supervision of the Fifth's
Chemical Officer, Colonel Barker. When Fifth Army embarked for
Italy in September 1943, the 41st was retained in Africa at the disposal
of theater headquarters in Algiers. After several weeks in a staging
area near Oran, under assignment to Mediterranean Base Section, the
company moved to more permanent quarters at Sidi Ferruch, near
Algiers, and took up its role as a theater laboratory assigned to AFHQ.
It remained there until after the fall of Rome.7
The principal business of the 41st in North Africa turned out to
be surveillance of CWS materiel held in storage. When stored items
developed unexpected reactions to aging in depots the laboratory was
called upon for an explanation. An instance of this occurred in the
spring of 1944 when the chemical officer of Seventh Army asked for
an investigation of certain phosgene detector tubes, which had turned
black. The 41st determined that the tubes, taken from the detector
kit, M9, contained a highly unstable indicator chemical which had
decomposed, and recommended replacement with tubes of a newer
type.8 For the most part, though, surveillance consisted of sending
inspection teams to the depots. A typical team might consist of an
officer and two enlisted men.9 A surveillance program drawn up by
the 41st in the spring of 1944 and scheduled for accomplishment before
6
(1) Ltr, ACCWS Field Opns to Theater CmlO's, 10 Jun 44, sub: Rpts of Lab Units. (2) 42d
Cml Lab Co, 29 Oct 43, Rpt, Problems Submitted to the 42d Cml Lab Co. Both in CWS 314.7 Unit
Files.
7
History of the 4151 Cml Lab Co.
8
Tech Rpt 30, 4151 Cml Lab Co, 8 Jun 44 .
9
Memo, CmlO Fifth Army for CmlO AFHQ, 14 Jun 43, no sub. CWS MTOUSA 400.112 Analyses,
Tests, Trials, Equivalents, Experiments.
the end of the year included thirty-four item examinations, ranging

from bulk mustard to antidim sticks (for preventing mist on gas mask
10
eyepieces).
In July 1944 a few weeks after the fall of Rome, the 41st moved
from its Algerian home to new quarters in the Italian capital. There
it shared with a British Expeditionary Forces outfit, the South African
23d Antigas Laboratory, the facilities of the Italian Military Chemical
Institute. The surveillance responsibilities continued, including now
a program for the test firing of mustard-filled mortar shells, instituted
for the purpose of checking the ballistic properties of chemical ammu-
nition kept in storage over long periods.11 Intelligence reports increased
as more chemical equipment from enemy depots in Italy fell into
American hands. Captured items included not only German materiel
but also defensive chemical warfare items from countries occupied or
controlled by the Germans. The 41st had the opportunity of studying
and reporting on individual gas mask canisters, decontamination kits,
and the like from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugo-
slavia in addition to German and Italian materiel. Nevertheless, as
might have been expected in a less extensive theater, the intelligence
functions of the 41st did not match in magnitude those of some of
the laboratory companies in western Europe and the Pacific.12
In contrast to the comparatively routine transfer overseas of the
41st Laboratory, the process of getting the 3d Chemical Field Lab-
oratory Company (later redesignated the 42d Chemical Laboratory
Company) to a theater of operations was far from typical. The com-
pany came into being at Edgewood, Md., on 15 May 1941 with a
complement of Reserve officers and a cadre drawn largely from the
1st Laboratory. After filling out its ranks with newly inducted selec-
tees, the unit spent the summer and early fall in basic and specialized
training. Rather suddenly, at the end of October 1941, it was ordered
to the west coast to prepare for shipment overseas. On 21 November,
the company embarked and sailed westward, the first CWS unit of
the war to be dispatched overseas. The destination was given simply
as PLUM, but it was not reached on schedule. PLUM was the Philippines,
10
Ltr, CO 41st Cml Lab Co to CCmlO NATOUSA, 24 May 44, sub: Surveillance Program for U.S.
Cml Warfare Materiel. CWS MTOUSA 400.112 Analyses, Tests, Trials, Equivalents, Experiments.
11
Interv, Hist Off with Maj James B. Goodson, CO 41st Cml Lab Co, 14 Aug 59.
12
CWS Technical Notes for Laboratories (a series of monthly compilations of major laboratory field
reports and other items of interest, published monthly from July 1944 until the end of the war by
CWS Technical Command).
and the troops were still at sea when the Japanese turned the Philip-
pines into a theater of war. The convoy received orders diverting it
to Australia and, as indicated above, docked at Brisbane on 22
December. The company was not to reach the Philippines for three
and a half years.
In Brisbane the company settled down to work as a unit of Base
Section 3, U.S. Army Forces in Australia. By the end of February
the laboratory equipment had been set up in permanent quarters and
organized technical work was under way. At first a substantial number
of laboratory personnel were detailed for general duty with base section
headquarters, but these demands slackened after the first few months
and by midyear the company was able to pursue its mission at approxi-
mately full strength. It had become in the interim the 42d Chemical
Laboratory Company by redesignation effective April 12, 1942, and
had moved to new quarters in buildings formerly occupied by a
Brisbane hospital.13
According to one of its commanding officers, the 42d possessed
neither a clearly defined mission nor an effective training for field
operations when it arrived in Australia.14 This did not prevent the
company from serving as an all-purpose technical unit from the very
outset. Before it had finished unpacking its equipment, it had received
and responded to Air Corps queries on oxygen and rust inhibiters,
Australian Army problems with Kieselguhr water filters, and base
section demands for an ant exterminator. Not long thereafter it was
at work on practical studies of petroleum bomb fillings. In September
1942, the 42d took on a major assignment for the Quartermaster
Corps—turning 100,000 pounds of fatigue uniforms into jungle green
camouflage suits. A formula and procedure for dyeing the uniforms
were developed in the course of a day by a 5 -man team, and the dyeing
itself was carried out under the supervision of company personnel.
By midsummer the 42d, in addition to its routine analytical work,
was engaged in several CWS research problems of a more generalized
nature, including studies of nitrogen mustard, low temperature studies
of mustard for high altitude spraying, and tests of the action of mustard
and impregnite on fabric. Colonel Copthorne, chief chemical officer
of USASOS, regarded this type of work as a necessary supplement to
13
14
Interv, Hist Off with Maj Hugh W. Hillis, CO 42d Cml Lab Co (1942-44), 25 Sep 45.
the technical information he was receiving from the United States, so

much so that he recommended to General Porter that field laboratory
companies be declared branches of the Technical Division of Edgewood
Arsenal. This attempt to formalize a research and development mission
for the laboratory companies was met with a prompt and firm reminder
that the mission of field laboratories was properly confined to testing
friendly and captured chemical warfare equipment and identifying
enemy toxic agents, should any be used. While this reminder may
have served to set the record straight, it had little direct application
to the multitude of miscellaneous technical problems which the 42d
by now regarded as its responsibilities. In a subsequent letter General
Porter admitted as much; pure research aside, he said, the work of the
42d could not be precisely circumscribed so as to deprive SWPA of
the services it was performing.15
Fortified with official approval, the 42d Chemical Laboratory Com-
pany increasingly continued to handle the theater's laboratory needs.
A report prepared in October 1943, summarizing the problems outside
the normal mission area which the 42d had undertaken since its arrival,
listed over fifty tasks performed for the other technical services and
the Air Corps. Some of these were of considerable magnitude. A skin
dye for camouflage purposes was developed to meet a Quartermaster
Corps requirement, and enough of it was manufactured to fill 150,000
2-ounce bottles. For Ordnance a considerable amount of analysis of
defective items was done: propellant cartridges, mortar charges, and
AN-M103 bomb fuzes. In addition, captured enemy explosives were
analyzed, both for Ordnance and for the Navy. Counter Intelligence
Corps received help from the laboratory in checking on several instances
of suspected sabotage. Industrial analyses of many types were made—
steels for the Air Corps, sand for the Engineers, soldering flux for
Ordnance, soaps for Quartermaster. Even the Chemical Warfare
Service benefited from the 42d's nonmission labors, if the manufacture
of some 3,500 detonation tubes of assorted toxic agents for troop
training be so considered.16
The miscellaneous field work of the 42d, varied as it was, did not
15
(1) Ltr, CCmlO Hq USASOS SWPA to CCWS, no sub, 17 Aug 42. (2) Ltr, CCWS to CCmlO
Hq USASOS SWPA, no sub, 17 Sep 42. (3) Ltr, CCmlO HQ USASOS SWPA to CCWS, no sub,
24 Nov 42. (4) Ltr, CCWS to CCmlO Hq USASOS SWPA, no sub, 14 Jan 43. All in CWS 314.7
Pers Files.
16
52d Cml Lab Co, 29 Oct 43, Rpt, Problems Submitted to the 42d Cml Lab Co. CWS 314.7 Unit
Files.
prevent the company from carrying out the primary responsibilities

of its mission. Its regular technical intelligence reports on captured
Japanese chemical equipment began to appear as soon as its laboratory
was set up, and continued thereafter, to the number of nearly fifty,
during the two and a half years that elapsed before it prepared to leave
Australia. Surveillance of theater stocks of CWS equipment was a
continuing responsibility.17
Toward the end of September 1944 the 42d was instructed to prepare
itself and its equipment for transfer forward. Much of the regular
laboratory work was accordingly discontinued, and the company spent
the following months largely on garrison duty while waiting for move-
ment orders. For a time it conducted advanced chemistry courses for
its own personnel. Finally, in June 1945, with the reconquest of the
Philippines nearly complete, the 42d embarked for Luzon. It arrived
in Manila on 21 June. By the time the laboratory was set up once
again, the war had come to an end.18
Just as the experience of the 42d demonstrated a tendency for the
work of the laboratory in an isolated theater to broaden, the 43d Chem-
ical Laboratory, in a somewhat comparable situation, exemplified to
a striking degree the ability of such a unit to extend its usefulness.
In this case the functions of the unit were construed by the theater,
at least in practice, to include a measure of research and development.
Despite the official CWS policy which regarded development as the
prerogative of the Technical Division at Edgewood, the 43d, in the
course of its work on "field expedients," tended to make itself a
development unit in the field.
The 43d Chemical Laboratory Company, activated at Edgewood
Arsenal on 26 August 1942,19 was ordered to Hawaii in December of
1943. Upon its arrival it was assigned to theater headquarters (Central
Pacific Area) and stationed at Schofield Barracks, where the theater
chemical officer, Colonel Unmacht, had laboratory facilities (manned
by 8th Chemical Depot Company personnel) already in operation.
The 43d took over the existing laboratory functions, added its own
equipment, and set to work.20 The immediate tasks were predominantly
within the intelligence portion of the mission—the study and descrip-
17
18
Ibid.
19
Hq CWS Edgewood Arsenal GO 17, 26 Aug 42.
20
History of Cml Sec AFMIDPAC, I, an. I-b, 8-11.
tion of captured Japanese chemical equipment. Nearly one hundred

technical reports on captured materiel were to be made by the 43d in
the succeeding twenty months. Surveillance of theater chemical stocks
led the company into a detailed study of deterioration in impregnated
clothing. But before long larger problems began to absorb its attention.
At the time the 43d arrived in the Pacific theater, Army, Navy,
and Marine Corps personnel were becoming increasingly anxious to
acquire armored vehicles equipped with flame throwers for use against
Japanese island emplacements. Rather than wait for Edgewood Arsenal,
entangled in conflicting priorities and requirements, to provide the
weapons, the theater went ahead on its own.21 The work was in its
early stages when the 43d appeared on the scene. In February 1944,
after tests of the Anglo-Canadian Ronson flame thrower mounted on
a Bren gun carrier had proved inconclusive, the project was placed in
the hands of Colonel Unmacht, who assigned it to the 43d. A task
force from the company succeeded in redesigning the Ronson to make
it a practical main armament weapon for the M3 tank. Mounted in a
shroud simulating a howitzer, the Ronson flame thrower turned the
quondam M3 into the Satan. By mid-May 1944, the task force had
supervised the completion, test firing, and combat readying of twenty-
four Satans for use by the marines in the Marianas.22
From flame throwers the 43d moved on to an extensive consideration
of flame thrower fuels. The development of thickened fuel—gasoline
thickened to jelly by the addition of certain aluminum soaps—had
proved to be essential to the effectiveness of flame throwers in the field.
Napalm had been adopted as a standard thickener during the war, but
in practice it appeared that field-thickened fuels tended to vary in
characteristics and performance. Flame thrower fuels mixed in Hawaii
and sent to the front lines, for example, were sometimes found to have
had their viscosity more or less reduced by absorbed water, and any sub-
stantial change in viscosity involved an unacceptable lack of certainty
of flame thrower range and performance. Assigned this problem, the
43d determined that drying gasoline before mixing, and adding finely
divided activated silica gel to the mix, would produce a fuel stabilized
enough to be packaged, stored, and shipped successfully. This work,
accompanied by a series of papers on the theory and manufacture of
stabilized fuel, was completed in the summer of 1945, whereupon the
21
See Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field, ch. VII. See also, below, ch. XIV.
22
History of Cml Sec AFMIDPAC, II, an. II-c, 2-6.
company proceeded to supervise the building of an activating plant

at the chemical warfare depot and the mixing of 150,000 gallons of
fuel, using silica gel salvaged from packaged motors, in which it had
23
been enclosed as a desiccant.
The research and development activity which these accomplishments
characterized went beyond the specific mission of the laboratory, but
was typical of the manner in which Colonel Unmacht as head of the
theater CWS encouraged independent action to meet theater needs.
It played a major role in winning for the 43d a Meritorious Service
Unit Award at the conclusion of hostilities.24
The Chemical Maintenance Company
Twenty maintenance companies were supplied to the ground forces

overseas by the CWS before the end of the war. Though designed to
serve field armies, they could also be, and frequently were, assigned
to the Communications Zone. Their mission was third and fourth
echelon maintenance of all CWS equipment and materiel, which could
and did include everything from salvaging discarded gas masks to
manufacturing parts for the 4.2-inch mortar. While maintenance
companies were intended to function as salvage and repair centers near
CWS Class II and IV depots, in practice some maintenance units as-
signed to field armies found it necessary to send their men forward
beyond the army service area for close support of the front, in order
to keep mortars and smoke generators in combat condition.
T/O 3-47, 1 April 1942, set the authorized strength of a maintenance
company at 4 officers and 119 enlisted men, organized into a head-
quarters outfit, a 3-unit repair platoon, and a salvage platoon. The
repair platoon was supposed to include all of the company's skilled
mechanics not assigned directly to headquarters, leaving the salvage
platoon to operate principally with laborers. A revised organization
table published in November 1944 showed a maintenance company
pared down to 93 officers and men. The two platoons were redesignated
gas mask repair and equipment repair, respectively, and nearly all the
enlisted personnel authorized were classified according to specific skills.
23
(1) Ibid., pp. 35-37. (2) 43d Cml Lab Co Tech Rpts 81, 10 Jul 45, and 90, 22 Aug 45. CWS
314.7, Unit Files.
24
Ltr, CO 14th Cml Sv Bn to CG CPBC, 22 Aug 45, sub: Recommendation for the Meritorious
Service Unit Award. CWS 314.7 Unit Files.
25
The platoons were organized into functional sections. Nevertheless,
experience in the field throughout the war showed that under the
pressure of combat requirements the work of maintenance companies
often left prescribed organizational patterns behind.
One of the more noteworthy service records of the war was that
of the 12th Chemical Maintenance Company, which acquired eight
battle credits in the course of assignments ranging from Tunisia
through Sicily and Italy to central Europe. Activated 1 May 1942 at
Fort Custer, Mich., the 12th went overseas in March 1943, landing
at Casablanca on the 18th. It was assigned to Atlantic Base Section
and its first job was running CWS supply dumps. In the last month
of the Tunisia Campaign it operated in conjunction with advanced
supply depots at Bone and Ouled Rahmoun in eastern Algeria and at
Tabarka in Tunisia. It began to undertake more orthodox mainte-
nance work—salvage and repair—in the days after the Tunisia Cam-
paign ended.26
An advance detachment of the 12th, assigned to 3d Division, landed
in Sicily on 10 July 1943 at the outset of the invasion, in order to get
a CWS supply dump functioning as soon as possible near the combat
area. The rest of the company was in Sicily by the middle of July.
During the month or so of fighting that followed before Sicily was
won, the company provided the first example of close maintenance
support of combat units by the CWS. The 12th's maintenance and
repair officer, Lieutenant Notorangelo, took a 10-man detachment
into the combat zone near Sant'Agata in the second week of August
to carry out on-the-spot maintenance for the 4.2-inch mortars of the
2d Chemical Battalion. The battalion was supporting the infantry
advance along the north coast of Sicily on the left wing of Seventh
Army. The maintenance detachment later proceeded south to Ran-
dazzo, on the right wing, to perform the same service for the 3d
Chemical Battalion, after getting needed parts from a rear depot. At
the same time, Lieutenant Notorangelo utilized this experience to
provide the Chemical Officer, Seventh Army, with the first detailed
27
figures available on attrition rates of mortar parts in combat.
After a period of salvage and repair work in Palermo, marked by a
concerted effort to get the required number of serviceable gas masks
25
TOE 3-47, 22 Nov 44.
26
Hist of the 12th Cml Maint Co.
27
Draft Ltr, CO 12th Cml Maint Co to CG NATOUSA, 17 Nov 43, sub: Recommendation for
Award. CWS 314.7 Unit Files.
ready for the coming campaign, the 12th followed the Allied forces
into Italy early in November 1943. Setting up shop at the Fontanello
Caves near Naples, the company reverted to its role of depot operator,
storing incoming CWS supplies for Peninsular Base Section. It found
time to re-establish its gas mask repair line, though, with the aid of
some Italian civilian labor. In December the 12th responded to an
emergency report from Fifth Army that mortar propellant charges
were too damp to give accurate ranging. Discontinuing its gas mask
line, the company set to work improvising a powder ring dryer and a
shell reconditioning line and repacking the propellant rings in water-
proofed cases. Two weeks after the operation began an explosion and
fire wrecked the shops, though fortunately there were no major casual-
ties. The 12th put its equipment together again at another depot near
Casandrino, devised a more reliable powder ring dryer, and had its
lines operating again within a week.28
Meanwhile, a mortar repair detachment had settled at Capua to
service the mortar battalions attached to Fifth Army. In April 1944,
the remainder of the company also moved to Capua. There they found
the weapons repair section, commanded by Lieutenant Notorangelo,
established at the erstwhile Royal Italian Arsenal, which the retreating
Germans had wrecked before moving out. The section had joined other
Fifth Army service troops in getting the installation in working order
by salvaging usable machinery and acquiring additional equipment,
Italian, American, or German, wherever possible. In effect, the 12th
now had an arsenal of its own. It was fortunate that this was so, for
the demands for smoke generator and mortar spare parts rose sharply
under the pressure of the bitter Italian campaign of 1943—44. When
the depots could not supply enough parts, the 12th's Capua arsenal
manufactured them. The Weapons Repair Section, making full use
of the skills of a large working force of Italian civilian machinists,
inaugurated this new mission with the fabrication of mortar cup forks.
A number of other items were soon added to the list as the rugged
terrain, long usage, and high ranges took their toll of the overworked
4.2-inch mortars. Shock absorber slides proved especially vulnerable.
To keep the mortars in working condition, the 12th cast and machined
new slides of bronze—after liberating the bronze from Italian naval
28
(1) History of the 12th Cml Maint Co. (2) 12th Cml Maint Co, Activities During the Italian
Campaign, 1943-44. CWS 314.7 Unit Files.
CAPUA ARSENAL, AS THE GERMANS LEFT IT. Within thirty days it was producing
mortar parts for the Fifth Army.
vessels in Naples harbor—which subsequently proved to be more dur-

able than the brass slides they replaced. Tube caps and steel recoil
springs were also prominent in the mortar parts output of the Capua
arsenal. For the mechanical smoke generators and the power-driven
decontaminating apparatus the weapons repairmen fabricated sprocket
gears of several types, along with nuts, couplings, and the like.
The usual repair functions of a maintenance company were carried
on side by side with the manufacture of spare parts. The Capua arsenal,
as reconstructed by the 12th, contained a cradle rack for repairing
400-gallon tanks from power-driven decontaminating apparatus, a
welding shop, a repair shop for vehicular components and chemical
handling trucks, and sections for work on Esso and Besler mechanical
smoke generators. The 12th's gas mask repair sections occupied a
shop of its own, with two production lines for the disassembly, repair,
and reassembly of damaged or salvaged masks. A group of Italian
soldiers assisted in the operation of this facility, which turned out

over 150,000 reconditioned masks in less than five months.
In September 1944, the 12th was assigned to Seventh Army, then
engaged in pushing up the Rhone Valley from the coast of southern
France to join the armies in the European Theater of Operations. By the
end of the month, the company was in Dijon, serving as a unit of
Continental Advance Section. A weapons repair group, designated as
Detachment A, moved on to Épinal to resume close support of the
mortar battalions. More work was done to improve the Capua shock
absorber slide, including the addition of small amounts of phosphoric
tin to the original bronze alloy. Mortar cup forks continued to be
made. Portable flame throwers were reconditioned. By December the
rest of the company reached Épinal, whereupon a reorganized and
somewhat smaller Detachment A moved out to the front. It took up
quarters near the command post of the 99th Chemical Mortar Battalion,
then supporting Third Division on the Colmar front. Here, within
range of German artillery, the detachment kept the battalion's mortars
in operating condition. The detachment remained with the battalion
throughout the winter, and in March 1945, moving forward across
the Saar with the front, became the first portion of the 12th to enter
Germany. Before the end of the month it was across the Rhine. By
the time the Germans surrendered, it had accompanied combat troops
deep into southern Bavaria.29
A second close support group, Detachment B, left the main body
of the 12th in mid-March to join the 87th Chemical Mortar Battalion
in Germany. The 87th had begun to take part in the advance across
the Rhineland, and the detachment had to carry out its mission between
rapid movements forward. Once across the Rhine, and before moving
ahead to the 96th Chemical Mortar Battalion, Detachment B performed
a final individual maintenance mission for the 87th on the eve of the
battalion's transfer to First Army. Together with the other forward
elements of Seventh Army it had penetrated Austria before hostilities
ended.30
Chemical maintenance companies were not as extensively utilized
in the Pacific war as they were in Europe. Only two maintenance com-
panies got west of Hawaii, and one of these, the 10th, ended the war
29
Hist of 12th Cml Maint Co.
30
Ibid.
as a CWS general service company, a type of all-purpose support

organization much favored in the Southwest Pacific Area. Before its
conversion, however, the company had made important contributions
in its original role. The 10th Chemical Maintenance Company, acti-
vated 1 July 1940 at Edgewood Arsenal, was sent overseas three months
after Pearl Harbor as part of the forces assigned to rebuild Allied power
in the Southwest Pacific. It reached Australia early in April 1942, and
like the 42d Chemical Laboratory Company joined Base Section 3 in
Brisbane.
As an early arrival in the theater, one of the 10th's original tasks
was to assist the 62d Chemical Depot Company in the operation of
CWS depots in Australia. It was not long before special maintenance
problems resulting from waging war in a tropical environment began
to dominate the scene. A major example was the discouraging failure
in combat of the M1A1 portable flame thrower in the course of the
Papua Campaign. The 10th spent the greater part of 1943 putting
the discredited weapon through an extensive series of tests, in the
course of which all flame throwers in the SWPA were thoroughly over-
hauled.31 It became clear that tropical heat and humidity were the
flame thrower's chief enemies. Pinhole corrosion of the nitrogen, hydro-
gen, and fuel cylinders, occurring in 75 percent of the weapons ex-
amined, led to leakage, low pressure, and consequent failure in the
field. Corrosion resulting from moisture attacked other components
as well, and batteries deteriorated readily when exposed to jungle
32
climate.
The 10th set to work to clear up as many of these defects as possible.
There was no quick solution for the problem of pinholes in the cylin-
ders. All that could be done was to repair those cylinders which were
not excessively corroded and replace the rest, insofar as supplies per-
mitted. In order to make it possible for troops to spot flame throwers
with defective cylinders before attempting to use them in combat,
pressure gages and adapters to fit all types of commercial pressure
31
(1) Ltr, CmlO USASOS SWPA to CmlO's Base Secs 2, 3, 4, and 7 and CO 10th Cml Maint Co,
16 May 43, sub: Flame Throwers. Sixth Army Rcds, 470.71 Flame Thrower. (2) Ltr, CG USASOS
SWPA to CO 10th Cml Maint Co, 6 Feb 44, sub: Commendation. History of the 10th Cml Maint Co.
32
(1) Ltr, CCmlO USAFFE to CmlO USASOS SWPA, 12 Apr 43, sub: Auxiliary Equip for Flame
Throwers. FECW 470.71/6 in CWS SPCVO 470.71 APO 501. (2) 3d Ind, CO 10th Cml Maint Co
to CCmlO USASOS SWPA, 29 Dec 43. Sixth Army Rcds, 470.71 Flame Thrower.
cylinders were added to the flame thrower service kits.33 The problems
resulting from wet electrical systems were met by waterproofing the
weapon effectively enough to enable it to stand total immersion and
still retain its usefulness. The company's own tests of the results of
its waterproofing project included the firing during rainfall of random
samples of waterproofed weapons after keeping them under water for
about seventeen hours. It was able to report by October of 1943 that,
given adequate pressure in the cylinders, the flame throwers which it
had waterproofed and checked would function as intended regardless
of moisture.34
While the work on flame throwers was of major importance, it was
far from constituting the only large-scale project of the 10th in Aus-
tralia. Reconditioning of depot stocks was a continuing task. Providing
waterproof seals for gas mask canisters kept the company busy on
more than one occasion. Some 180,000 canisters of one type were
waterproofed in late 1943 and early 1944; the company historian per-
tnitted himself the remark that the job had become somewhat monot-
onous after the first hundred thousand. By April 1944, however, the
10th found itself somewhat short of CWS assignments and tending
more and more toward ordinary garrison details as the focus of war
moved northward toward the Philippines. At last the company itself
moved northward, to New Guinea, in August 1944, and shortly there-
after was reorganized. Pressure toward the streamlining of rear area
service units in the theater had been reflected in proposals to replace
the CWS depot, maintenance, and decontamination units with general
service companies capable of meeting all of these requirements as they
arose. Though the European theater commanders had been unimpressed
with the idea, it seemed sufficiently attractive in the special circum-
stances of the Southwest Pacific to cause it to be adopted in the case
of a few selected units, as soon as an appropriate table of organization
was published. This event occurred in the summer of 1944, and the
10th, just arrived in New Guinea and past the critical period in its
33
Ltr, CCmlO USAFFE to CmlO USASOS SWPA, 10 Jun 43, sub: Flame Thrower Testing Equip.
Sixth Army Cml Sec Rcds, 470.71 Flame Thrower.
34
(1) 10th Cml Maint Co, Instrs for Changing the Battery in the Flame Thrower and Rewater-
proofing, 28 May 43. Sixth Army Rcds, 470.71 Flame Thrower. (2) Rpt, CO 10th Cml Maint Co
to CCmlO USASOS SWPA, 25 Oct 43, sub: Rpt of Serviceability of Flame Thrower, Portable, M1A1,
Waterproofed. CWS 314.7 Unit Files. (3) Ltr, Maj John J. Shaffer, USAR, to Hist Off, 19 Sep 56.
Major Shaffer, then a captain, commanded the 10th Chemical Maintenance Company for the greater
part of its service in Australia.
maintenance mission, was one of the units to experience the change.

As of 1 November 1944 it was reorganized as the 10th Chemical War-
fare General Service Company. The remainder of its war service,
including an additional eight months in New Guinea and the last month
35
of the war in Luzon, was spent under that name.
The Chemical Depot Company

Chemical depot companies played a key role in the movement of
CWS materiel in the overseas theaters. The basic mission of these
units, some twenty of which saw overseas service, was to act as CWS
supply centers, either for field armies or for communications zone
commands. This included receiving, storing, and issuing chemical sup-
plies, certain salvage operations, and operating filling lines for certain
chemical munitions. A depot company was a good-sized outfit, with
a total strength of almost 200 men. When in the field, it was not
unusual for a company to resolve itself into a group of detachments
handling a series of assignments simultaneously. A company assigned
to a theater headquarters, on the other hand, was also capable of serving
many needs, ranging from technical training to theater supply.
As organized under TOE 3-67, 28 May 1942, the 184 officers and
men of a depot company constituted a small headquarters unit, an
administration platoon controlling three record, storage, and mainte-
nance sections, and three service platoons for guard and labor functions.
This plan was substantially altered by the next edition of the TOE,
6 October 1943, which shifted administrative functions to an enlarged
headquarters unit, turned the former administrative platoon into a
52-man maintenance organization, and assigned all remaining storage,
surveillance, and handling responsibilities to the service platoons, now
reduced to two. By the end of the following year emphasis was being
placed on the supply and munitions filling missions, with a consequent
conversion to a uniform 3-platoon organization totaling 155 officers
and men.36 Operating under a headquarters unit charged with basic
administration, the three service platoons, each divided into ammuni-
tion, toxic gas, and general supply sections, were nonetheless capable
35
(1) History of the 10th Cml Maint Co. (1) Draft Memo, CCWS to CofS, attn: ACofS G-3,
7 Jan 44, sub: Proposed Cml Warfare General Serv Co. CWS 314.7 Unit Files. (3) TOE 3-1378;
Cml Warfare General Serv Co, 9 Aug 44.
36
(1) FM 3-65, Cml Depot Co, 1 Dec 44. (2) TOE 3-67, 6 Jan 45.
of acting independently if the need arose, providing the company com-

mander with three ready-made units for detached service.
The 8th Chemical Depot Company had a notable record as one such
theater supply agency. It was activated at Fort Shafter in March of
1942 for the specific purpose of operating the supply functions of the
Hawaiian Chemical Warfare Depot for the department chemical officer.
These were of considerable magnitude. Under Colonel Unmacht's vig-
orous leadership, the depot had already completed the substantial task
of obtaining and distributing enough service gas masks to provide
adequate protection to troops in the event of a new Pearl Harbor in
37
chemical warfare. By the time the 8th was activated the depot was
in full swing as the only central distribution agency in the department
for CWS supplies. It maintained subdepots for local troops on the
islands of Hawaii, Kauai, and Maui. In addition to discharging its
supply mission, the depot served as a third and fourth echelon mainte-
nance center, a function performed in 1944-45 by the 10th Chemical
Maintenance Company.38
Along with its other responsibilities, the 8th found itself on activation
with an impregnating plant already in full operation. Colonel Un-
macht had had an experimental impregnating plant—one shipped to
Hawaii at some earlier date—put in operating condition shortly before
Pearl Harbor. One of his first acts after the attack was to order the
plant into active operation, in order to provide protective clothing
for the troops then in Hawaii. The plant, designated No. 5, was
manned by men of Company A, 1st Separate Chemical Battalion, the
only force then available for the purpose. When Colonel Unmacht
got his depot company activated, it was given the additional duty of
running No. 5 until an impregnating company should arrive. As
Plant No. 5 demonstrated a high degree of mechanical unreliability,
the depot company was generally engaged in emergency repairs. For a
time it took over and operated two small Navy impregnating plants
at Pearl Harbor. By January 1943 a new plant, No. 8, had been
shipped to the Islands, and a new building had been constructed to
house it. The new facilities tended to ease the task of the depot com-
pany somewhat, but not until January 1944 was the 8th finally able
to turn this unscheduled responsibility over to a newly arrived unit,
37
See above, pp. 220, 267.
38
History of Cml Sec AFMIDPAC, II, an. I-d, 2-23.
the 1 10th Chemical Processing Company, and concentrate on its supply

39
mission.
As a supply unit, the 8th was responsible for seeing to it that all
troops sent forward from Hawaii were properly equipped with CWS
materiel. It kept subdepots and forward areas supplied. The unit some-
times found it necessary to handle bulk toxics in operations involving
transfer from damaged containers, or from ton containers to drums.
In the course of these handling operations, three enlisted men of the
8th designed and built a handling cart for more expeditiously moving
150-pound cylinders.40
The 8th assisted the 43d Laboratory Company in manufacturing
the first batches of the stabilized flame thrower fuel (napalm plus
activated silica gel) developed by the latter unit in 1945. In the
summer of that year the Hawaiian Chemical Warfare Depot built its
own unit for the activation of the silica gel. The 8th had this unit
operating at a rate of one ton per day during the last weeks of the war.
Between May and August of 1945 the depot manufactured a total of
41
226,343 gallons of fuel.
Of great importance to the theater CWS was the 8th's secondary
mission of training cadres for new units. Among these were supply
detachments activated to help shoulder the burden of CWS depot
management in Hawaii and general service companies destined for
combat support in the Western Pacific. In the last year of the war
the 8th trained and supplied to other units enough officers and enlisted
men to have doubled its own authorized strength.
In contrast to the role of the 8th as a theater headquarters supply
element was that of the 6th Chemical Depot Company, a unit which
operated many installations without ever permanently establishing itself
at any of them. It was a depot company on the move, following
American combat forces from England to Germany by way of North
Africa, Italy, and France.
The 6th was activated at Fort Sam Houston on 25 March 1942.
After a brief training period, the company embarked for an overseas
assignment on the 1st of July and arrived in Scotland on the 12th.
Within a few days the company, the first of its kind to reach the
European theater, was in quarters at two points in southwestern Eng-
39
Ibid., V, an. II-k, 1-6.
40
Ibid., V, an. III-a, 50-51.
41
Ibid., pp. 104, 107.
land, under assignment to the newly created Southern Base Section of

the theater Services of Supply. It set to work almost at once, sending
out detachments to establish chemical sections at general depots for
handling Class II and IV CWS supplies, as well as for constructing two
depots for chemical munitions. This procedure of operating several
installations at once through self-sufficient detachments was to be a
consistent pattern in the operation of the 6th throughout its service
42
overseas.
The 6th was the CWS unit depot assigned to II Corps in the fall of
1942 for operations in North Africa. It arrived in Oran from England
early in December 1942, and immediately took over a depot previously
established by corps headquarters. As the North African campaign
developed, the 6th began setting up new installations, after the manner
of its English experience. The Oran depot, for Class II and IV sup-
plies, remained company headquarters for the time being, while de-
tachments set up and operated depots eastward along the North African
seaboard as far as the Tunisian border, turning them over in due
course to relieving units. The company used anything available for
storage—garages, factories, sheds—and resorted to open storage when
necessary. For chemical munitions, however, open storage was the
rule, rather than the exception.43
The 6th remained in North Africa during the month-long Sicilian
campaign, but was reassigned to Fifth Army immediately afterwards
in anticipation of the invasion of Italy. Nine of the company's enlisted
men, temporarily attached to the 531st Engineer Shore Regiment,
went ashore at Salerno on D-day, 9 September 1943, with the assault
troops. Operating in two groups, they took charge of identifying,
storing, and issuing CWS materiel brought over the beaches on the
first three days of the invasion. By the 8th of October the 6th was in
Naples.
The 6th spent almost a year in Italy, in the course of which it was
at one time or another responsible for over thirty supply points. It had
general responsibility for all chemical depot needs of Fifth Army.
Company headquarters, originally in the Naples area, was shifted
northward repeatedly, reaching Piombino in northern Tuscany by
midsummer of 1944. In the interval the company supplied two de-
42
(1) History of the 6th Cml Depot Co. (2) Ltr, Maj Levin W. Lane to CmlC Hist Off, 28 Mar
50. Major Lane was commanding officer of the 6th, 1943-45.
43
History of the 6th Cml Depot Co.
tachments for service with the Anzio-Nettuno assault force. The first
of these landed at Nettuno on D-day, 22 January 1944, the second
joined it on 23 January. During the months of bitter fighting that
followed, the beachhead detachment of the 6th, augmented from time
to time, handled 12,000 tons of CWS munitions. In the same period,
Headquarters Detachment was enlarging the scope of its usual duties
by manufacturing some 10,000 Molotov cocktails out of napalm and
44
glass bottles.
In July 1944, the 6th was assigned to Seventh Army, in order to
participate for a third time in an invasion—in this case the assault on
the Mediterranean coast of France. Three detachments, attached re-
spectively to the 3rd, 36th, and 45th Divisions, VI Corps, landed with
the initial assault forces on 15 August and carried out the unusual
mission of organizing chemical supply on the beaches. Company head-
quarters followed two weeks later and moved northward almost at
once to Grenoble, where it set up a depot for Class II and IV CWS
supplies before moving forward again. Meanwhile a detachment had
gotten a base depot at Marseille under way for Continental Base
Command, the supply and service agency of the invasion period. Other
detachments handled CWS supply at successive ammunition supply
points as Seventh Army advanced toward Alsace.45
The 6th remained with Seventh Army through the winter of 1944-
45 (during which the partial withdrawal of American forces in Alsace
to meet the threat of the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes
temporarily forced the 6th, like some other forward units, to move
its headquarters back), and advanced with it into Germany in the
spring. In the meantime, it found time to organize and conduct a
training program to convert a French smoke generator company to a
chemical depot unit. 46 The end of the war found the company oper-
ating several depots in the Seventh Army area of the southern Rhine-
land. Immediately after the end of hostilities, the 6th set up Rheinau
CWS Depot before preparing to go home.47
41
(1) Ibid. (2) Lane Ltr, 28 Mar 50.
45
History of 6th Cml Depot Co.
46
Ltr, CO 6th Cml Depot Co to CG Seventh Army (Through CmlO Seventh Army), 9 Nov 44,
sub: Rpt on Cml Warfare Depot School . . . CWS 3 14.7 Unit Files.
47
Hist of the 6th Cml Depot Co.
The Chemical Decontamination Company

The chemical decontamination company was a specialized organiza-
tion designed to counter the threat of crippling gas attacks on rear
area service facilities. While the services of a company were expected
to be available to combat troops under gas attack if the situation per-
mitted, the primary mission was confined to installations in the service
area, on the assumption that combat units should have the capability
to meet a tactical gas situation with their own resources. Deconamina-
tion companies were not assigned by any precise formula (the recom-
mended ratio was one company per 100,000 strength) and were in-
tended, while maintaining a headquarters in a service area, to send out
detachments to either service or combat zones at their own discretion.
As organized under TOE 3-217 (1 April 1942), a company included
4 officers and 200 enlisted men, functioning as three 60-man platoons
of three sections apiece, plus company headquarters. The table was
changed on 12 October 1943 to provide for four 33-man platoons,
reducing the total company strength to 170, and making the 10-man
section the smallest operating unit, instead of having a further sub-
division into squads, as formerly provided. The basic function of the
section was to operate a 400-gallon power-driven decontaminating
apparatus, a truck-mounted sprayer designed to heat and distribute a
slurry of bleaching powder and water.
The abstention of the belligerents from gas warfare left the decon-
tamination companies without a primary mission to perform. In
consequence, while keeping themselves in readiness for possible future
gas emergencies, the companies sent overseas found themselves assigned
to a variety of tasks. Theater and army chemical officers welcomed
their presence when CWS-trained units were needed for munitions
handling, smoke screening, or depot labor. Other elements of the
armed forces discovered that the power-driven decontaminating appa-
ratus had more than one use; thereafter, decontamination units were
sometimes engaged in giving showers, handling water, and wetting
down dusty roads. Occasionally, decontamination companies were
pressed into service totally unrelated to their training or equipment.
One such unit eventually became part of a G-2 task force in ETO.
The 21st Chemical Decontamination Company was one of the most
active of those whose overseas service lay principally in the CWS
mission area. The 21st, activated at Camp Bowie, Tex., in March 1942,
began its overseas experience when its 1st Platoon, detached for the
purpose, joined Western Task Force in Casablanca on 18 November
of the same year, ten days after the first assault forces had landed
in North Africa. The task force chemical officer, Colonel Barker, used
the platoon to set up his CWS depot. The platoon had had no specific
training for this mission, but with the administrative aid of a detail
from the task force chemical section it set up a depot nonetheless. By
January 1943 it was able to find the additional time to assist in the
program of CW schooling begun by Colonel Barker.48
In May 1943 the rest of the 21st reached Casablanca. By that time
the company's 1st Platoon had gone forward to Algeria, and the com-
pany itself followed within a month. The company and platoon alike
were destined for the Sicily Campaign and accordingly were earmarked
for assignment to Seventh Army.49 They arrived in Sicily during July,
the 1st Platoon going direct to Palermo (which had been occupied on
the 22d), the remainder of the company landing on the south shore.
By August the company had been reunited at Palermo, but only to
split up into detachments stationed along the Sicilian north coast where
they handled CWS supplies. Together with elements of the 63d Chem-
ical Depot Company and the nth Chemical Maintenance Company,
the several platoons of the 21st implemented the CWS supply plan by
setting up and operating a series of ammunition supply points extending
50
as far east as Campofelice, some thirty miles beyond Palermo. The
21st also supervised the operation of the CWS Class II depot in Palermo
until relieved by the 63d Depot Company in October.
The 21st remained in Sicily for about ten months after the conclu-
sion of the Sicily Campaign, under assignment to Island Base Section.
During the period it was kept busy on various CWS tasks under the
supervision of the IBS chemical officer, including such work as gas
mask reconditioning and the maintenance of a smoke line as part of
51
the defense plan for Palermo harbor. By June of 1944 CWS stocks
in Sicily had been closed out, and the 21st went to Italy to prepare for
reassignment to Seventh Army and the campaign in southern France.
The role of the 21st in the Seventh Army's campaign from the
beaches of the Riviera to the heart of Germany was to be that of a
48
Hist of the 21st Decontamination Co. Seventh Army 322.
49
Seventh Army Rpt of Opns in Sicilian Campaign, an. H.
50
Ibid.
51
History of IBS.
smoke unit. There was time for only a brief training period before the
company joined the assault forces. In the initial assault, a platoon of
the 21st accompanied each of the three assault divisions, company
headquarters and the remaining platoon being held in reserve.52 The
mission in this instance was to provide smoke cover for supply dumps
on and near the beaches, as needed. On D-day, August 15, groups of
men from the 21st went ashore with the first assault wave carrying
(or towing) smoke pots with them. Smoke lines were set up several
hundred yards inland as soon as possible. Two weeks later the 21st
was moved, in two installments, to Marseille to provide smoke cover
for the port. For its work on the beaches, the company received a
53
commendation.
As the campaign advanced northward toward Alsace and Germany,
the 21st continued to function as a smoke generator outfit. Equipped
with smoke pots and M2 mechanical smoke generators, it provided
detachments for smoke coverage throughout the autumn of 1944 for
the Army supply routes. Toward the close of the winter campaign in
Alsace, the company once again found itself in a battle zone when it
provided screening for the troops, American and French, of the XXI
54
Corps front during the final cleaning up of the Colmar Pocket.
Though the 21st had become accustomed to its smoke mission by
the spring of 1945, it had reverted to its original role by the end of
the war. As American troops drove across Germany in April and May
of 1945, they seized intact a number of chemical warfare depots. The
task of safeguarding and managing these important and potentially
hazardous acquisitions was an appropriate one for a decontamination
company. Accordingly, a detachment of the 21st took over initial gas
security and munition inventory responsibility at the Wildflecken site
in April. By the time the war ended, the company was in charge of
gas security for the principal German chemical depot at St. Georgen,
deep in Bavaria.55
The overseas experience of the 31st Chemical Decontamination
Company was in decided contrast to that of the 21st. Both gained
52
Seventh CWS Staff Sec Rpt, T Jan-13 Oct 44.
53
GO 64, Hq Seventh Army, 24 Feb 45.
54
CO 21st Cml Decontamination Co to CmlO Seventh Army, 25 Feb 45, Rpts, (1) Opns with XXI
Corps and 75th Infantry Div, (2) Opns with the 3d Inf Div. CWS 314.7 Unit Files.
55
(1) Memo, CmlO Seventh Army to CO 21st Cml Decontamination Co, 20 Apr 45, no sub. (2)
Memo, Div CmlO 42d Inf Div to CmlO Seventh Army, 14 May 45, sub: Opn of 21st Cml Co (Decon-
tamination). Both in CWS 314.7 Unit Files.
honors for front-line combat. But while the 21st served in direct
support of CWS missions as supply and smoke troops when not ful-
filling their original purpose, the secondary missions ultimately acquired
by the 31st turned out to be somewhat farther afield.
The 31st was activated at Camp Bowie, Tex., in July 1942. After
a training period which included some instruction in amphibious oper-
ations, it embarked for Great Britain, arriving early in January 1944.
Its assignment was to First Army's 6th Engineer Special Brigade, a
collection of units destined for the assault wave of the Normandy
invasion. With them it underwent further training in invasion tactics
throughout most of the two months immediately preceding the start
of the campaign.
Shortly after noon on D-day a 25-man detachment from the 31st
landed in Normandy with the 149th Engineer Combat Battalion and
joined the battle which had been in progress on OMAHA Beach since
dawn, its primary mission being reconnaissance against the possible
gassing of the landing site by the Germans. By the time the remainder
of the company landed on the following day, seven of the detachment's
personnel, including its commander, 1st Lt. Stanley Boggs, had been
wounded. When the absence of gas warfare had been confirmed, the
company joined other service troops in policing the beach and unloading
ammunition. It was able to move to a bivouac area on 12 June (D plus
6), by which time it was busy with a variety of emergency tasks—
assembling supply dumps, guarding prisoners, and finding new uses
for its big power-driven decontaminating tanks. It employed them to
56
wet down dust, to haul water, to fight fires, and to provide showers.
In the last week of July the battle moved out of Normandy, and by
mid-August the Germans were rapidly retreating across France. As
the German policy of abstention from gas warfare continued to be
confirmed by events, the necessity for the retention of decontamination
units by the engineer special brigades declined. On August 20th, the
31st was reassigned, this time to an unexpected destination. It was
detailed to Headquarters, Special Troops, 12th Army Group, to serve
as headquarters troops for a special intelligence force being organized
by the 12th Army Group G-2. This so-called T-Force was designed
to operate as a front-line agency directly behind the advancing combat
troops, where they were to seize enemy documents and round up agents
56
History of the 31st Cml Decontamination Co.
and collaborators before they escaped.57 The 3 1st turned in all its CWS
unit equipment, including its decontamination tanks, drew in exchange
an additional supply of cargo trucks and jeeps, and departed, for prac-
tical purposes no longer a CWS unit, for the first T-Force objective—
Paris. On August 23, it reached the front line at Rambouillet. The
objective was entered on August 25th, in the vanguard of the Allied
troops. The 3 1st, one of the first American service units in the liberated
capital, had T-Force headquarters set up in the Petit Palais before mid-
night of that day. That action marked the beginning of more than
eight months of constant movement. T-Force headquarters left Paris
for the east on 7 September. Between that date and the German
surrender the following May, the 31st occupied fourteen successive
stations in France, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Germany. It had all
the usual headquarters administrative duties to keep it occupied—
operating messes, providing mail and payroll services, supplying the
force with clerks, maintaining a motor pool, and assuring internal
security.
The 31st continued in its new role until T-Force ceased to function
on 6 May 1945, the day before the instrument of surrender was signed
at Reims. The company was en route for Wiesbaden at the time. On
its arrival it joined 12th Army Group's Special Troops and performed
such missions as operating trucks and guarding prisoners of war for
three weeks until it was returned to the United States for redeployment
to the Pacific. It was training for that purpose when the war ended.58
The Chemical Processing Company

The chemical processing company was a basic element in defense
against gas warfare. Its primary mission was to keep available to
theater chemical officers a supply of permeable protective clothing
adequately and recently impregnated with chlorinating compounds so
as to protect the wearer from the effects of vesicant vapor or droplets.
Companies were designed for assignment to theaters for location in the
communications zone, generally near a chemical depot.
A company consisted of a total of 146 men, organized on a 2-platoon
basis. Each platoon was the organizational equivalent of a processing
plant and contained three functional sections for continuous 3-shift
57
12th Army Group Rpt of Opns, IV, 3-6.
58
Hist of the 31st Cml Decontamination Co.
operation. Accordingly, the company possessed two impregnating

plants (either the M1 type employing acetylene tetrachloride as a sol-
59
vent or the M1 water suspension type). The impregnating plants
were semifixed industrial installations of impressive size, not unlike
commercial laundries. An M1 plant, for example, included two 400-
gallon solution tanks, a predryer, two final dryers, and an impregnator,
recognizably related to laundry-type drying and washing machines
respectively, solvent recovery apparatus, a steam generator unit, com-
plete with boiler and oil burner, an electric generator unit, a fuel tank,
a water pump, and such auxiliary items as work tables, tool kits, and
spare parts—the total equipment load approximating fifty tons. It
could be installed only in a building with a floor heavy enough to
support it and large enough to provide adequate work space. In
practice, this meant a building with the equivalent of a 4-inch rein-
forced concrete floor and about 3,600 square feet of floor space.
Installation required the skills and labor needed to handle heavy
machinery, four or five separate piping systems, and electrical wiring.60
The equipment and techniques involved in the impregnation of clothing
were enough like those of quartermaster laundries to provide the proc-
essing companies with ready-made secondary missions—laundering,
dry-cleaning, waterproofing, dyeing, and comparable service functions
—which were to keep many companies profitably occupied during
periods when their primary mission was not in requisition. But less
obvious duties were not wanting. Like other service troops, processing
companies were drawn upon for whatever labors were required at the
time. Depot assignments were not uncommon. Two units, the 113th
and the 120th Chemical Processing Companies, had nearly all their
men detailed for a time to the 87th and 8 1st Chemical Mortar Battalions
respectively to provide additional support for the mortar teams. They
served with the battalions throughout the Normandy and Northern
France Campaigns. Another, the 109th, did construction work with
the engineers. But a due regard for the possible outbreak of gas
warfare and the corresponding requirement in every theater for reserve
supplies of impregnated clothing kept processing companies occupied
with their primary mission fairly often.
The experience of the 105th Chemical Processing Company may be
cited to demonstrate the work of a typical unit. The 105th was ac-
59
TOE 3-77, 1 Mar 44.
60
TM 3-270, Clothing Impregnating Plant M1 (Theater of Opns), 4 Feb 44.
PLANT OF 105TH CHEMICAL PROCESSING COMPANY, BRISBANE, AUSTRALIA
tivated in August 1942 at Edgewood Arsenal and trained there and at

Camp Sibert. In mid-May 1943, the company embarked from New
York for Brisbane, Australia, via the Panama Canal. It arrived a
month later, marched out to Camp Doomben, and went to work for
the chemical warfare depot and 61base section headquarters pending
arrival of its impregnation plants.
Personnel of .the 105th got their first taste of processing in the field
when the bulk of the company's first platoon went to Sydney to help
the theater provide a reserve of some 70,000 protective uniforms for
its troops. The 62d Chemical Depot Company was in charge of the
effort, which consisted of getting a nonoperating improvised impreg-
nating plant in working condition. The detachment spent a week on
the task before the setup, manufactured from standard laundry equip-
ment, was ready for its first load. Thenceforth, the unit kept the
plant running at full prescribed rates, some 8,000 pounds of clothing
per 24-hour run. It remained on the job until mid-February 1944,
61
History of the 105th Cml Processing Co.
when, with
62 the mission virtually complete, it rejoined the rest of the
company.
The rest of the 105th had been kept busy, meanwhile, on details for
the theater chemical officer. One detachment, for example, went to
Columboola, two hundred miles west of Brisbane, to provide storage
and perform surveillance for 29,000 mustard-filled bombs, a task in-
volving a good deal of decontamination work when leakers were found.
The company's first organic impregnating plant, an M1, arrived in
January 1944, and the men went to work to provide a building for it
at the CWS center near Brisbane. Before the end of March, after
essential piping was finally acquired, the plant was ready for operation,
and the 105th proceeded with its primary mission.
Not long thereafter the 1st Platoon was again detached, this time
for duty at Base A, Milne Bay, New Guinea. At this more forward
base it set up an impregnating plant to help protect the combat forces
clearing the way to the Philippines against possible gas attack. The 2d
Platoon continued operating the company's M1 plant in Brisbane, for
the most part on a 24-hour basis. Its output of protective clothing
continued until the beginning of October 1944, when it was ordered
to cease operations and prepare for movement. For the next few
months, while awaiting movement orders, the 105th kept itself busy
with miscellaneous jobs for the 62d Chemical Service Company and
the local Ordnance service center. At Milne Bay, meanwhile, the com-
pany's 1st Detachment, now well behind the new front in Leyte, had
been diverted to laundry and dry-cleaning operations, together with
63
depot work.
In mid-June 1945, the 105th finally received its long delayed orders
and moved forward to Luzon. At the same time the 1st Detachment
left Milne Bay and rejoined the company at the CWS training center
near Manila. The training center needed them, but not for processing;
it was in the midst of a hurried construction program to house a CWS
school and garrison. The 105th, well accustomed to construction jobs,
pitched in and was hard at work building facilities when hostilities
ended.
Another processing company in the Southwest Pacific Area, the
103d, though its overseas experience was much like that of the 105th,
62
(1) Ibid. (2) History of Cml Sec Hq USASOS SWPA. Orgn Files, AFWESPAC, Folder
USASOS History of Cml Warfare School, APO 923, Jul 42-May 44.
63
History of 105th Cml Processing Co.
found itself for a time with a new mission. The 103d, which had also
been activated at Edgewood in August 1942, was sent to Hollandia,
New Guinea, in July 1944. There, at a base captured from the
Japanese only three months before, it was to be comparatively close
to combat organizations.
An immediate need of the combat troops was protection against
mite-born scrub typhus. The answer appeared to be impregnation of
uniforms with an insecticide. Accordingly, the 103d, once it had its
two impregnating plants set up, was put to work mite-proofing all
available uniforms with dimethyl phthalate. Not until this task was
complete, in mid-October, did the company turn to its normal process-
ing missions. But by that time theater requirements for protective
clothing were taking second place to more routine needs. The base
quartermaster required assistance in meeting his laundering mission,
so that the 103d began devoting the bulk of its time to laundry. By
December 1944, the company's plants were working full time as laun-
dries for base units and hospitals. These duties, continued for the next
six months at rates in excess of 150,000 pounds of laundry per month,
earned the 103d a Meritorious Service Unit Plaque before it went to
Luzon for miscellaneous service assignments just before the Japanese
surrender.64
The Chemical Service Company
For the greater part of the war the type of unit ultimately designated
as a chemical service company was known as a chemical composite
65
company. The purpose of the composite company was to provide
field organizations of divisional size with a CWS service organization
capable of simultaneously operating supply points, doing third and
fourth echelon maintenance, running a field laboratory and a field
impregnating program, and providing at least a nucleus of trained
men for decontamination. Furthermore, the composite company was
expected to be able to put its entire manpower of over 200 into any
one of these tasks should the situation require. The goal was flexibility:
a versatile unit, not too tightly organized, which could meet CWS
service needs for smaller combat forces or isolated fronts. The war in
the Pacific was emphatically of such a nature, and it was in the Pacific
that most composite companies saw service.
64
History of the 103d Cml Processing Co.
Composite companies were redesignated service companies in March 1945.
65
The first organizational scheme for composite companies provided

for specialized sections of considerable bulk, averaging almost forty
men apiece, fairly closely tied in to company headquarters, and pre-
66
sumably meant to remain intact during operations. Within a short
time reports from the Southwest Pacific declared that more flexibility
was needed and that in actual practice existing units were usually split
up into smaller groups. Such detachments usually suffered from the
lack of an appropriate administrative organization and organic equip-
ment. The problem was that the concept of cellular structure had
been modified by too great a dependence on the administrative and
internal support capabilities of the unit as a whole. The cells were
not self-sufficient, and clearly they needed to be. In July 1943 a
new organization plan was devised, making more explicit use of the
principle of cellular structure—that is, of flexible organization based
on small specialized teams capable of extended independent operations
—than had previously been the case. The new pattern, applicable alike
for separate platoons, companies, or battalions, was promulgated by
TOE 3-500, 19 July 1943, and provided a choice of several types of
such teams, varying in size from one to sixty-six men, for the CWS
functions of maintenance, depot operations, decontamination, proc-
essing, and laboratory work. The War Department also authorized
teams which could operate as headquarters for units composed of
operational teams and support teams to operate messes and to provide
automotive maintenance. Separate equipment allowances were listed
for each type of team. This arrangement was intended to make possible
the formation of composite units of a size directly related to the type
of mission required and the size of the force to be supported. A
further refinement of cellular organization was made when the TOE
was reissued in December 1944 in order to provide still greater flexi-
bility, principally in the area of administrative and maintenance
teams.67
Hence, the service units that the CWS placed overseas, for the most
part in the Pacific, were far from uniform in size, makeup, or func-
tions. In some cases, rather than maintain company organizations for
scattered service detachments, companies were inactivated and their
66
TOE 3-277, Cml Composite Co, 1 Apr 42.
67
(1) Ltrs, CCmlO USASOS to CCWS, 27 Jan 43 and 6 Mar 43, sub: Cml Composite Cos. CWS
320.2 CWS Units. (2) TOE 3-500, Cml Warfare Serv Orgns, 19 Jul 43, 15 Dec 44.
93D CHEMICAL COMPOSITE COMPANY TESTING FLAME THROWER FUELS,

Milne Bay, New Guinea.
elements reconstituted as separate service platoons, as TOE 3-500 had

68
provided for. Sixth Army, in the course of its campaign on Luzon in
1945, attached chemical service platoons to its divisions; the missions
of such a divisional platoon included reconditioning 4.2-inch mortar
ammunition (the checking and cleaning of shells being of particular
importance in the corrosive environment of the tropics), service and
maintenance of portable flame throwers (together with training their
operators), manning a smoke pot line, repairing gas masks, preparing
napalm, performing second and third echelon maintenance of mortars,
providing chemical warfare intelligence, and using the power-driven
decontaminating apparatus as a water carrier and portable shower.
Such an attached platoon was regarded by Sixth Army as an essential
69
part of the combat division.
68
The 94th Chemical Composite Company, for example, assigned to SWPA in the fall of 1943, oper-
ated as four separate units from January 1944 onward and was at length disbanded in November 1944
to form the 272d, 273d, 274th, and 275th Composite Platoons.
69
Ltr, CG Sixth Army to CG USAFFE, 26 Dec 44, sub: Shortage of Cml Serv Troops. Sixth Army
322 CWS Orgns.
One of the few exceptions to the rule that CWS composite companies
went to the Pacific was the 92d Chemical Composite Company.
Activated at the end of 1942 at Camp Sibert, the 92d was organized
on the basis of TOE 3-277 when it went overseas the following spring.
It was destined for the North African theater. Its debarkation point,
reached on 10 May 1943, was Casablanca, but it soon moved forward
to Mateur in newly won Tunisia. There its depot section took over
the CWS section of General Depot 6, Eastern Base Section, and its
impregnation section set up an open storage depot. The laboratory
section assembled its equipment in a garage and went to work on
captured chemical materiel. The maintenance section set up a repair
shop and began work on gas masks, flame throwers, and decontami-
nators, both portable and power driven. During the summer the units
followed EBS headquarters from Mateur to Bizerte but otherwise they
maintained their activities through 1943 uninterrupted, save for an
occasional air raid. The company formed a principal CWS rear
echelon support for both the Sicilian and the Italian invasions.
In February 1944 the 92d was reorganized under the new TOE
3-500, utilizing an organizational scheme under which the laboratory
section was discontinued entirely, leaving the company with a repair
team, a maintenance and salvage section, a decontamination team, and
70
three supply (depot) teams, as well as a headquarters and mess. The
following month, despite the new organization, a detachment amount-
ing to about half of one of the supply teams (and taking about half
of the team's equipment) left for depot duties with Northern Base
Section in Corsica, not to rejoin the company until January 1945.
Another depot team, together with the decontamination team, was
sent, as Detachment A, to Island Base Section in Palermo. The bulk
of the company spent a few weeks closing out its depot and mainte-
nance installations before being itself transferred in May to Mediter-
ranean Base Section at Oran.71
The 92d's mission at Oran was primarily the creation of a consoli-
dated CWS depot near MBS headquarters. Four outlying depots were
closed out and their stocks moved to the new central installation, a
former engineer storage center with ample facilities. It took more
than a month to get the 4,000 tons of CWS materiel crated, consoli-
70
Ltr, AGO to CG NATO, 17 Feb 44, sub: Reorgn of 92d Cml Composite Co. AG 322 (14 Feb 44)
OB-I-SPMOU-M.
71
History, 92d Cml Composite Co.
A CHEMICAL SERVICE COMPANY LABORATORY, NEW GUINEA
dated, stored, and properly maintained. When the job was complete
and the depot, plus an attached CWS maintenance shop, was in good
running order, the 92d turned the facilities over to another unit and
prepared to leave for its next assignment, Peninsular Base Section in
Italy.72
In Italy the 92d served again primarily as a depot unit. Upon its
arrival in mid-August 1944, it was sent to the CWS depot near
Bagnoli; Detachment A had already arrived from Sicily to take over
the depot at Santa Maria and move its stocks to Bagnoli for consolida-
tion. The maintenance mission was resumed in September, when a
detachment went north to set up and run a CWS maintenance shop
at PBS Forward Echelon, Leghorn. This left the rest of the company
with the Bagnoli depot as its sole responsibility, except for the gas
mask repair section, which operated in conjunction with the storage
facility. The decontamination team had become, in effect, another
depot team. Depot administration, however, came to include training
72
Ibid.
as well. An Italian service battalion was stationed at the depot under

control of the 92d for training in depot operation, as well as for the
sake of the additional labor supply. Depot work included both Class II
and IV storage at the main installations and open storage of Class V
materiel at a site near Naples. The provision of trained security details
for shipment and storage of toxic munitions gave men of the decon-
tamination team recurring practice in their primary mission. A less
common opportunity for the use of their skills came in spring, when
the team decontaminated the area used by the 41st Chemical Laboratory
73
Company for testing mustard-filled mortar shells.
The 92d remained on the job as a depot-maintenance outfit at Bagnoli
and Leghorn for the remainder of the war. The cessation of hostilities
in Europe did not reduce the company's workload for some time. The
Leghorn detachment, much depleted by personnel transfers, acquired
control of a German prisoner of war battalion to help it rehabilitate,
box, and ship materiel to the Far East, a task accomplished ahead of
schedule. The Bagnoli portion of the company celebrated the end of
the war by disposing of its supply of toxics through the winter of
1945-46, sinking the materiel in deep water off the island of Ischia.
It was not until the spring of 1946 that the 92d, by then possessed of
a Meritorious Service Unit Plaque, was ready for inactivation.
More typical of the experience of composite companies was the
overseas record of the 240th. Activated in August 1943, at Camp
Sibert, the 240th Chemical Composite Company was reorganized under
TOE 3-500 the following February. Under this setup, the company
had a total of no less than twenty-two cellular teams, including at
least one for each of the following CWS service missions: maintenance,
supply, decontamination, and processing. The last of these was repre-
sented by only a single unit, and the laboratory function was omitted
altogether, leaving the company organized primarily for depot and
maintenance work, with decontamination capabilities when needed.
The 240th, after reorganization, had a total strength of just over 200
men. Toward the end of May 1944, it embarked from Portland, Ore.,
for the Southwest Pacific Area, and arrived in Finschhafen, New
Guinea, a month later for assignment to Sixth Army.
On arrival, the 240th went into bivouac at Cape Cretin and began
functioning for the time being as a depot unit, helping out with the
78
Ibid.
operation of the CWS depot at Finschhafen's Base F. Meanwhile, the

Chemical Officer, Sixth Army, decided that the 240th, like other com-
posite companies so assigned, could be best utilized as four separate
service units, of a size and composition suitable to the support of a
reinforced division. Accordingly, in mid-August, the company became
the parent of Units 1 through 4. Unit 1 was weighted toward the
maintenance and depot functions, as was Unit 4, though the latter also
had impregnation specialists. Unit 2 was largely drawn from the
impregnation team, with smaller numbers representing the other
service missions. Unit 3 was almost entirely a maintenance outfit,
except for one small depot team. Company headquarters personnel
were divided between units 1,2, and 4.74 All four units were destined
to participate as divisional support elements in amphibious assaults.
Unit 1, suitably enough, was the first to be committed. Toward the
end of August it was earmarked for the mid-September invasion of
Morotai, midway between New Guinea and the Philippines. Its mission
was to set up CWS supply dumps on the beaches to collect, store, and
salvage CWS materiel and to provide second and third echelon main-
tenance for chemical equipment.70 The Morotai task force, named
TRADEWIND, assembled for staging at Maffin Bay in Wakde-Sarmi
sector of northwestern New Guinea before the end of August. On 11
September the unit's depot team, including five maintenance men
attached to infantry regiments to support flame thrower operations,
embarked with the assault forces and landed with them on Morotai
on the morning of 15 September. There was little organized Japanese
resistance on the island as the combat troops moved rapidly forward
and the service units, after some initial trouble with the approaches
76
to the beaches, began organizing support areas. The depot team of
Unit 1 of the 240th, working like the rest of the task force under
sporadic enemy air attack, brought up ammunition to a CWS mortar
platoon, set up its bivouac area, and arranged for its dump to be sit-
uated near the ordnance supply site. It was busy for the next few days
locating and storing materiel, principally signal and incendiary
grenades.77
74
History of the 240th Cml Composite Co.
75
An. 5, Admin Order i, Hq TRADEWIND Task Force, 23 Aug 44, cited in History of the 240th Cml
Composite Co.
76
See Smith, Approach to the Philippines, pp. 480-93.
77
History of the 240th Cml Composite Co.
The remainder of Unit 1 joined the depot team on Morotai on 11

October, by which time the operation had been declared over and the
work of building an air base was well under way. The unit continued
operation of the CWS dump, put up warehouses with space for main-
tenance operations, and did a brisk business in picking up and recon-
ditioning gas masks. The unit remained in place on Morotai, attached to
the 31st Division, until the last week in January 1945, when it joined
the 33d Division and embarked for Luzon.78
Unit 2's first mission was not long behind that of Unit 1. This unit
left New Guinea for Los Negros in the Admiralties at the beginning
of October 1944, to join the 1st Cavalry Division as part of Sixth
Army's invasion force for the reconquest of the Philippines. It
promptly reembarked to join the Leyte invasion convoy. A-day for
Leyte was 20 October, and that morning the 1st Cavalry Division
landed as the northernmost element of the assault, securing White
Beach just south of Tacloban, the island's capital. Unit 2 reached
Leyte and landed at White Beach on A plus 2, 22 October, by which
time the division was driving the enemy out of the Tacloban area.
The unit's first task was getting 4.2-inch mortar ammunition to the
85th Chemical Mortar Battalion, in the course of which operation it
ran a beach ammunition dump. By mid-November it was in Tacloban,
setting up a divisional CWS depot. The operation of this supply point
constituted Unit 2's mission for the remainder of the Leyte Campaign.
At the end of January 1945 the unit was attached to XI Corps, which
joined Sixth Army's Luzon Campaign by landing near San Narciso
on 29 January to cut off Bataan. Unit 2 landed with the corps and
set up a corps chemical warfare depot.
Unit 3, after being first assigned to and then withdrawn from the
Morotai invasion force, remained at the Maffin Bay staging area for
the time being, providing depot support and flame thrower maintenance
for the 123d Regimental Combat Team, then engaged in local opera-
tions against the Japanese. In mid-November the unit went to
Sansapor, at the northwest tip of New Guinea, to join the 6th Division,
part of the force being staged for the invasion of Luzon. It spent the
next weeks loading mortar shells and other CWS supplies on ships;
inspecting, reconditioning, and test firing flame throwers; and training.
The task force of which it was a part embarked on 30 December 1944-
78
Ibid.
On the morning of 9 January 1945 the combat troops landed on the

shores of Lingayen Gulf, north of Manila, 6th Division holding the
center of the beachhead. There was no immediate enemy opposition.
The men of Unit 3 began reaching the beaches some three hours after
the first assault and immediately set to work organizing a CWS beach
dump. A consolidated chemical dump for the 6th Division's beach-
head was in operation by the next morning, supporting the division's
4.2-inch mortar companies. Five days later a detachment set up an
advance depot fifteen miles inland, and the task of moving mortar
shells, grenades, and flame thrower fuel off the beaches was begun.
A second inland depot was set up the following week, replacing the
first. Regular forward movements of supply points followed at inter-
vals of a few days. The unit's repairmen were kept busy maintaining
the division's flame throwers. Supply and maintenance operations in
close support of 6th Division continued without a break until the
division was relieved on 30 April after three and a half months in
79
action.
Unit 4 remained at Cape Cretin, New Guinea, until mid-November
1944. At that time, having been attached to the 40th Division, it
proceeded to the division's stage area at Cape Gloucester, New
Britain. The 40th, like the 6th, was scheduled to participate in the
Luzon landings, and Unit 4, like Unit 3, spent the last weeks of
November 1944 checking and loading mortar ammunition. The unit
also placed 15-man teams on detached duty with each of two mortar
companies attached to the division. The 40th Division landed on the
southwestern flank of Sixth Army's assault on the shore of Lingayen
Gulf on the morning of 9 January. Two hours after the first assault
wave hit the beach, personnel of Unit 4 began arriving ashore. The
unit soon had a depot for Class II and Class IV CWS supplies in the
town of Lingayen and an ammunition dump operating in conjunction
with the divisional ordnance supply point. Both depot and ammunition
dump were moved forward after two weeks, by which time the detach-
ments had rejoined the main group, bringing Unit 4 up to its full
strength. It continued in support of the 40th Division throughout
80
February 1945.
By that time the 240th Chemical Composite Company had long
ceased to be a unit in any operational sense. Its four segments were
79
History of the 237th Cml Serv Platoon.
80
History of the 238th Cml Serv Platoon.
all on Luzon, but each was in support of a different outfit. Sixth Army
had already come to the conclusion that it required nothing of compos-
ite companies save the provision of platoon-size detachments for close
divisional support. Under the circumstances there was little reason to
retain company organization, especially in view of the fact that the
basic TOE 3-500 could apply as well to an independent platoon as to
a company. As had already happened in other cases, the decision was
made to disband the 240th as a company and activate its units as
separate composite platoons. Accordingly, as of 12 February 1945 the
240th Chemical Composite Company ceased to exist. In its place there
appeared, organized under the current TOE 3—500 (15 December
1944), the 240th Chemical Service Platoon, formerly Unit 1, and the
236th, 237th, and 238th Chemical Service Platoons, the erstwhile
Units 2, 3, and 4, respectively. From then on the four platoons were
for all practical purposes divisional chemical warfare elements and
served through the remainder of the Philippines campaign in that
81
capacity.
Chemical Air Service Companies
As in other respects, so in the field of chemical service operations the
Army Air Forces functioned as a separate entity. The Air Forces had
major CWS functions, as a potential principal user of toxic agents in
the event of gas warfare, as a participant in smoke missions, and as the
utilizer of the new CWS strategic weapon, the incendiary bomb. To
assist in the execution of these chemical missions, the CWS organized
and sent into the field several types of service units especially designed
for Air Forces needs. Included among those seeing overseas service were
chemical depot companies, chemical maintenance companies (both
types bearing the additional designation "Aviation"), and the many
chemical companies designated simply "Air Operations," one hundred
of which were activated between 1942 and 1945. Half of these saw
service in overseas theaters. Four of the fourteen maintenance com-
panies, aviation, and all of the twenty depot companies, aviation, also
went overseas.
The air depot companies, like their ground counterparts, had as their
principal mission the storage, surveillance, and preparation for issue
81
The 236th (formerly Unit 2) was attached to the 38th Division, an element of XI Corps, on 23
March 45.
LOADING LIQUID SMOKE INTO AN M10 SMOKE TANK FOR AIRCRAFT, New
Guinea.
of CWS materiel, in this case primarily bulk toxics, smoke mixtures,

and incendiaries. Normal assignment was on the basis of one per AAF
general depot when, as was usually the case, the depot in consideration
was intended for storage and issue of chemical supply in appreciable
quantities. A typical air depot company, the 754th, assigned to the
VIII Air Force Service Command in England, had four sections: ad-
82
ministrative, chemical, incendiary, and security maintenance. The
last three of these were respectively in charge of storage, surveillance,
and filling of chemicals and chemical ammunition, storage and sur-
veillance of incendiaries, and repair, maintenance, defense, and security
details for the depot. The proper execution of these tasks called for a
good deal of technical proficiency, especially in the handling and sur-
veillance of toxics. Another air depot company in that command, the
82
T/O 3-418, 28 Feb 42.
763d, found that a depot company might be responsible not only for
filling mustard bombs but for making up such items as M4/Ai incen-
83
diary bombs as well, using bomb casings, gasoline, and thickener.
Chemical companies, air operations, in their organization and mission
presented certain parallels to the composite companies of the ground
forces. Like the latter, they were meant for close support of combat
units and were organized on a cellular basis, with platoons (four to
the company) capable of performing like missions on a self-sustaining
basis when attached separately to units of appropriate size. The major
missions of air operations companies were to maintain CWS ammuni-
tion storage dumps, to prepare and arm chemical munitions for combat
use and (in practice) to load such munitions on the using aircraft. The
recommended normal basis of assignment was one air operations com-
pany per group or one platoon per squadron. A platoon consisted of
a headquarters team and four identical operations teams, which were
essentially toxic-filling outfits. In addition to its headquarters and
its four platoons, the air operations company included a distributing
point section to operate its dump; this group included at least two
men trained in decontamination techniques and equipped with a
power-driven decontaminating apparatus.84 The processes involved in
handling, arming, and loading CWS bombs, bomb clusters, and spray
tanks required a good deal of technical training and special equipment.85
Air operations companies were not infrequently faced with unan-
ticipated tasks. For example, companies in the SWPA used a newly
developed spray tank (the E2B25, produced by the Far East Air
Force Service Command) not only for smoke operations but for the
spraying of DDT over areas rendered hazardous by the presence of
insect-borne malaria or typhus.86
In the last months of the Pacific war aerial incendiaries played an
increasingly important role in both the strategical and tactical spheres.
The assault on Iwo Jima, for example, was preceded by a 10-week
bombardment by planes based in the Marianas; incendiary bomb
clusters formed a significant part of their load. Air operations com-
83
Conf Rpt, The Opn, Duties, and Function of a Cml Depot Co, Avn, 22-23 Feb 43- Eighth AF
520.805-Nov 43.
84
TOE 3-457, 29 Sep 44. An earlier version, 1 July 1942, differed in providing for platoons with
two large operations teams apiece.
85
Capt Louis E. Schueler, 876th Cml Co AO, The Cml Co, Air Opns. Eighth AF 520.805-Nov 43.
86
Col Augustin M. Prentiss, Jr., Cml Warfare History of Fifth Air Force-Far East Air Forces.
CWS 314.7 Fifth AF.
panics supporting the bomber formations increased the supply of

incendiaries by improvising fire bombs from 55-gallon drums filled
with napalm and armed with an M15 WP grenade and an all-ways
fuze. The fuzing of this unfamiliar weapon was the source of so much
concern to the air crews that at first they insisted that CWS personnel
accompany the flights to keep an eye on the incendiaries. The air
operations companies always loaded incendiaries into planes and, when
necessary, were called upon to modify bomb bays to accommodate
87
particular types of incendiary bomb clusters. In the early months of
1945 incendiary raids on a vast scale carried the war direct to the
industrial centers of Japan. In their support of these crippling blows,
the air operations companies contributed significantly to the final
victory.
87
Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Alfred J. Green, USAR, 15 Sep 59.
CHAPTER VIII
Large Area Smoke Screens in the

MTO
It was the fate of the Chemical Warfare Service to enter World
War II with rather ill-defined responsibilities, a circumstance accented
by the absence of its most clearly defined mission—gas warfare. As a
consequence, responsibilities were delineated and missions took shape
as the necessity for meeting new conditions actually arose in the theaters
of operations. A case in point was large area screening. The tremendous
development in air power between the world wars produced a situation
which made the concealment of ground targets a prime necessity.
Clues pointing to this development were apparent in the 1930's but
for various reasons little had been done to prepare for large area
screening. The first adequate American smoke generator did not
appear until 1942. Once the generators were in the theaters, a chain
of circumstances created smoke missions which were unknown even
in the tentative doctrine of the prewar period.
Background of Large Area Screening

Experiment and Trial
Although the employment of small quantities of smoke in combat
was an ancient military technique, its use to conceal extended areas
was a twentieth century innovation. The term large area screen is
quite imprecise. The size of a large area screen depends upon the
nature and size of the target to be obscured. The screen had to be
large enough to baffle enemy bombardiers; if it were too small it would
merely pinpoint vital areas. The technical aspects of large-scale smoke
screening had been a CWS concern from the time that service received
the smoke mission in 1920. The most immediate interest was in the
development of agents and munitions to support tactical operations.
Because initial CWS experiments in area screening along the Panama
Canal were unsuccessful, the search for agents and means of dissemi-
nating area screens continued sporadically until 1936 when the War
Department decided that with the means available large area screening
was not practicable.1
The high importance placed on hemisphere defense by the RAINBOW
2
plans of 1939 revived War Department interest in providing passive
defense for the vulnerable areas of the Panama Canal. On 1 July 1940
the War Department directed Maj. Gen. Walter C. Baker, Chief,
Chemical Warfare Service, to submit an estimate of the costs of devel-
opment, installation, and maintenance of smoke screening apparatus
required for concealing the three locks. By the end of the month the
War Department sent this estimate to the commanding general, Panama
Canal Department, for comments. The Air Corps commander in the
Canal Zone favored the project in principle but had some reservations.
The commanding general of the Panama antiaircraft defenses opposed
any extensive use of smoke which might nullify the effectiveness of
antiaircraft fire. The department chemical officer advised his com-
mander that in view of the lack of information about the effectiveness
of large area screens it would be unwise to plan a costly screening
installation for the three locks. The matter was held in abeyance.3
Nevertheless, two points had emerged from the Panama studies. First,
technical means for generating artificial clouds were inadequate.
Second, there was serious opposition by commanders to the employ-
ment of smoke during air raids. Until a better means of smoke produc-
tion was devised, a mutually satisfactory decision about smoke employ-
ment was impossible.
At that time, the war in Europe provided actual combat tests of the
use of smoke. Before mid-1940 British interest in large area screening
had been rather theoretical—an interesting proposition but hardly
practicable.4 When the German invasion of the Low Countries and
1
(1) Phosphorus, Chlorosulfonic acid, and hexachlorethane (HC) had been the agents tested. (2)
For a review of large area smoke tests at Panama from 1921 to 1939, see OCCWS Tech Study 23, Use
of Smoke to Screen Panama Canal Locks, 18 Jul 40 (rewritten 9 Jul 4 1 ) . (3) Special Folder on
Smoke Screen Experiments in Panama [1921-31], CWS Ret 470.6/2491.
2
Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-42, pp. 7-8.
3
(1) Ltr, CmlO Panama Canal Dept to CCWS, 1 Oct 40, sub: Use of Smoke to Screen Panama
Canal Locks. (2) Memo, CmlO PCD for ExecO OCCWS, 8 Oct 40, no sub. Both in CWS Ret
470.6/57-231.
4
(1) Statement, Dir of Weapons and Vehicles (Br) for Asst Chief Imperial General Staff, ca. 1 May
43. CWS 314.7 Smoke Opns. (2) The various smoke devices developed by the British are discussed
in TDMR 396, Jun 42. Tech Lib ACmlC, Md.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE MTO 323
France in the spring of 1940 provided the Luftwaffe with airfields

within easy reach of the United Kingdom, the British gave serious
attention to the possibility of using smoke to conceal vital installations.
At first, the British Ministry of Home Security, responsible for screen-
ing vulnerable targets, provided oil-burning orchard smudge pots for
targets in Birmingham and Coventry. It waived smoke abatement
orders so as to increase the industrial haze, no longer the public nuisance
it had been in time of peace. The Admiralty Fuel Experimental Station
at Haslar, England, later developed the first large-capacity oil-burner
generator, cumbersome and inefficient but the best smoke producer
available at the time.
The typical British large area smoke installation in 1941 consisted of
several thousand stationary smudge-type oil pots and a few Hasler
generators which gave body to the screen from upwind positions.
Although requirements for oil, all of which had to be imported, and
manpower were heavy, area screening proved well worthwhile. In
addition to military advantage, smoke became an important factor in
maintaining the morale of factory workers, especially in munitions
plants. Employees sometimes demanded smoke, despite its incon-
5
venience, as the price of continuing to work at night.
Beginnings of Large Area Screening in the United States

The gradual transition of area screening from theory to practice was
observed with interest in the United States. The Chemical Warfare
Service carefully surveyed the development of European equipment
and screening techniques and, with the Army Air Corps and other
Army elements, investigated the problems which would accompany
the development of large area screening.
In mid-1940 the only smoke-producing munitions available to the
U.S. Army were smoke shells, pots, grenades, and airplane smoke tanks.
These munitions were satisfactory for establishing transitory curtains
and could be used to a limited extent for blanketing enemy positions,
but they were unsuitable for maintaining smoke screens over wide areas
of friendly terrain because of the limited amount of smoke they pro-
duced and because artillery and mortar shells could not be impacted
5
(1) Thomas K. Sherwood, NDRC, Div B, Rpt 197 (OSRD 4 3 5 ) , Rpt on Screening Smokes, CWS-
17, 3 Mar 42, passim. Tech Lib ACmlC, Md. (2) British Historical Monograph, Special Weapons
and Types of Warfare, Part II A, gives a complete picture of the development of smoke missions and
munitions in Great Britain.
near friendly troops. Moreover, smoke from the HC-filled pots was
harassing at best and in concentrated amounts could be quite toxic.
Following the British lead, the CWS adapted the commercial smudge
pot which was standardized as the M1 stationary oil generator. CWS
scientists and later those of the National Defense Research Committee
(NDRC) became interested in more efficient smoke production tech-
niques. In 1942 there appeared an entirely new type of smoke gen-
erator, one which emitted a "smoke" composed of small particles of
oil created when a superheated oil-vapor mixture condensed upon
ejection into the air. Production began on this generator in September
1942, and it was standardized as the M1 mechanical smoke generator
(often called the Esso, after the company which produced it) in the
following December.6
In December 1941 the Chemical Warfare Board undertook a study
of large area smoke concealment with particular application to Edge-
wood Arsenal. Within a few days after the Pearl Harbor attack
General Porter instructed the board to expand its objectives to include
the general principles and techniques of screening, a project which was
given highest priority.7 The investigations of the Chemical Warfare
Board soon had proceeded far enough to establish several tentative
principles of rear area screening. Observation from the air revealed
that smoke at night changed the appearance of both natural and arti-
ficial terrain features. Smoke was of less value during daylight and
might even accentuate vital targets. Blackouts would still have to be
maintained at night because bright lights were visible through the
smoke; in other words, rear area screening was supplementary to the
blackout, not a substitute for it. And, finally, screening, while appre-
ciably reducing visibility, would not eliminate observation from the
air.8
After the completion of the Edgewood tests, the CWS felt better
prepared to provide technical supervision of smoke installations in the
zone of interior, which the Operations Division, War Department
General Staff, was finding difficult to establish because of shortages of
6
(1) See Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field, for a detailed account of research
and development activities and technical details of these generators. (2) James P. Baxter 3d, Scientists
Against Time (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1947), pp. 282-89. (3) Barker Ltr, 13 Dec 58.
7
Ltr, Chief Field Serv OCCWS to President Cml Warfare Bd, through CG Edgewood Arsenal, 19
Dec 41, sub: Study of Large Area Smoke Screen Technique. CWS 470.6/1554 CWB Proj 251.
8
Ltr, President Cml Warfare Bd to Chief Phila Ord Dist, 2 Jan 42, sub: Smoke as Protective Con-
cealment. CWS 470.6/1554 CWB Proj 251. Further tests early in 1942 substantiated these findings.
men and materiel. The commanding generals of the several defense

commands forwarded screening requests, arranged in order of impor-
tance, to the War Department, which compiled all requests, giving
each a priority rating. The CWS aided OPD in this task by performing
9
feasibility surveys for each proposed installation.
Meanwhile, the CWS recommended the activation of thirty-four
chemical smoke generator companies. On 8 April the first three units
(the 75th, 76th, and 77th Companies) were formed and, before their
training was completed, received the mission of concealing aircraft
plants in California. By the end of May the War Department had
authorized the activation of 11 companies to be stationed as follows:
6 with the Western Defense Command; 3 in Panama; one at the
Sault Ste. Marie Locks; and one, an experimental unit, at Edgewood
Arsenal.10 By 20 July a total of 14 companies had been activated, 9
located on the west coast of the United States.
Each of these early smoke units, organized under a table of organiza-
tion calling for 4 officers and 196 enlisted men and 3,600 M1 stationary
smoke generators (the smudge pot type)11 was capable of blanketing
an area of about four square miles. Generators were employed in two
or more concentric smoke lines which completely surrounded the vital
area, allowing for wind from any direction. By the proper placement
of additional generators and by use of an electrical ignition system, a
substantial amount of smoke could be formed in about ten minutes.
When the United States entered the war the long-standing Panama
Canal screening project was immediately revived. At the time, the
smoke pot was the only screening munition available and it required
too many men to make a Panama smoke installation feasible.12 The sta-
tionary generator proved more satisfactory, and, as a consequence, Lt.
Gen. Frank M. Andrews, Caribbean Defense Command, recommended
that plans for screening in the Department be implemented as soon as
possible.13 By 1 January 1943 two smoke generator companies had
9
Memo, Maj D. R. King, OCCWS, for Col James W. Rice, Cml Warfare Bd, 5 May 42, sub: WD
Policy With Reference to Rear Area Smoke Screens. CWS 470.6/1554 CWB Proj 251.
10
Ltr, TAG to CCWS, 25 May 41, sub: Request for Authority for Activation of Cml Smoke Gen-
erator Cos, and 1st Ind. CWS Ret 320.2/207.
11
T/O 3-267, 1 Apr 42.
12
Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Harold Walmsley, 23 Feb 48.
13
Ltr, CG AGF to CG SOS, 19 Jun 42, sub: Stationary Smoke Generators for Large Area Screen, and
2d Ind, CCWS to CG SOS. CWS Ret 470.6/2711-2754. An electrical ignition system further re-
duced the necessary manpower.
arrived in Panama equipped with the M1 mechanical generator. Used

in conjunction with the stationary generator, this new equipment
greatly eased the situation on the smoke lines.
In July 1942, with a practical means of screening assured, General
Porter made several recommendations on plans for rear area screening
which were approved by the General Staff. The War Department
ordered that additional smoke generator companies be activated to
bring the total to 42. These new units were to train at the CWS
Replacement Training Center at Camp Sibert, where large area screen-
ing exercises could be freely conducted.14 By August 1942 troop basis
planning provided for the employment of 12 companies in theaters of
operations, 3 in Panama, and 14 by the defense commands in the zone
of interior. Activation of chemical smoke generator companies con-
tinued at the rate of about 3 a month until February 1943, when a
total of 40 had been organized.
Defensive screening operations during 1942 consisted of the estab-
lishment of zone of interior smoke installations and the development
of screening readiness in Panama. Operations at the Sault Ste. Marie
15
locks and at Camp Edwards, Mass., were primarily for experimental
purposes, both tactical and technical. The requirement for smoke
installations in the Western Defense Command began to decline after
the defeat of the Japanese fleet in the Battle of Midway in June 1942
and ended with the increase in American air power during the early
months of 1943. Smoke was never made in anger in the United States.
But the anxious period after 7 December 1941 provided the impetus
for rapid progress in the development of materiel and the organization
of units. This was a necessary prelude to overseas screening operations.
Initial Operations: The Northwest African Ports

Early on the morning of 8 November 1942 British and American
forces attacked Northwest Africa. The assault operations consisted
of three distinct parts. The Western Task Force, entirely American
and combat loaded in the United States, struck the coast of French
Morocco in the vicinity of Casablanca. The Center and Eastern Task
14
(1) Memo, CCWS for ACofS OPD WDGS, 20 Jul 42, sub: 1942 Over-all Plan for Rear Area
Smoke Screen Protection. (2) 1st Ind, ACofS for Opns SOS to CCWS, 11 Aug 42. Both in CWS Ret
320.2/207.
15
Originally the purpose of smoke operations at Sault Ste. Marie was protection, not testing. Memo,
Capt Howard P. McCormick, CWS, for Gen Wilson, 3 1 Mar 42.
Forces, mounted in Great Britain, had as their respective targets the

Mediterranean ports of Oran and Algiers.16 The initial French resist-
ance soon ceased, and the British-American forces turned east toward
Tunisia.
By then the United States Army had attained a capability in large
area screening which a year earlier would have seemed impossible. A
new generator, the M1, had been devised, units were being activated
to operate it, and the doctrine for its employment—the concealment
of vital rear area installations—had become an accepted feature in the
defense against air attack. The Northwest African campaign was to
provide the crucial test of combat for this generator, these units, and
this mission.
Although the Luftwaffe failed to react to the landings in Northwest
Africa, enemy planes in the succeeding months raided Algiers and other
ports to the east in an effort to disrupt Allied supply lines. Both the
United States and Great Britain supplied troops and munitions for the
large area screening mission. Shortly before, the British No. 24 smoke
pot had been dubbed "the savior of Malta" for its part in shielding the
17
island's harbor from concentrated enemy air attacks. The Americans
provided the M1 smoke pot and the M1 mechanical smoke generator,
smaller and more efficient and maneuverable than the large British
Haslar.18 These two generators, the primary equipment of the units
performing the smoke mission, were to form the nucleus of the smoke
installations at the Northwest African ports.
Because smoke was not required, no American smoke units partici-
pated in the initial landings, a fortunate circumstance in view of the
limited number of available units. Elements of the 78th Smoke Gen-
erator Company did arrive at Casablanca on 13 November, five days
after the shooting began.19 The company set up a smoke installation
on 23 November which served principally for demonstration purposes.20
16
Howe, Northwest Africa, provides the complete story of the Northwest African campaign.
17
London Mil Attaché Rpt 56781, 12 May 43, sub: Area Smoke Screening, app. B.
18
The M1 mechanical generator weighed 3,000 pounds empty and 5,400 pounds when filled, that is,
complete with fog oil, fuel oil, and water. Troops could operate in its smoke with no adverse effects.
The M1 smoke pot contained 10 pounds of HC smoke mixture and burned from 5 to 10 minutes. An
improved model, the M1A1, appeared in 1944. The longer burning M5 pot was developed later in the
war.
19
78th Cml Smoke Generator Co History, 1942, p. 1. This detachment of the 78th embarked in six
different vessels and had smoke generators ready for emergency use.
20
Ltr, CO 78th Smoke Generator Co to CmlO Western Task Force, 30 Nov 42, sub: Report of Test
Run. . .. CWS 314.7.
The first smoke company to see action in Northwest Africa was the
69th Smoke Generator Company. It landed at Oran on 25 December,
and on the following day it relieved a detachment of engineer troops
which, using British No. 24 smoke pots, had maintained a smoke line
in the harbor since 9 November.21 By February 1943 both the 78th
and the 69th Companies were at Algiers where they successfully
operated their M1 mechanical generators in conjunction with a British
22
company equipped with Haslars.
All told, ten major North African ports had the benefit of smoke
installations manned by troops from the United States, Great Britain,
and France.23 These operations were not simultaneous but represented
a steady movement eastward as the Allied troops, in conjunction with
those under Generals Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander and Montgomery,
converged on the Axis concentrations in Tunisia. Bizerte, although
captured just before complete victory in Northwest Africa, served as
one of the chief marshaling ports for the invasion of Sicily and later
Italy, thus becoming one of the Mediterranean's most heavily screened
ports. A British smoke unit was waiting on the outskirts of Bizerte
on 7 May as the II U.S. Corps was capturing the city, and within
twelve hours the port was screened. By the end of June all four of the
American smoke generator companies in the theater were providing
the smoke defenses for Bizerte. In addition to the 69th and 78th these
were the 168th and 172d, just arrived from the United States and still
24
without generators.
Smoke installations usually consisted of two rings, the size of-which
depended upon the area to be screened. An inner ring of smoke pots
provided for the quick concealment of vital targets while an outer
ring of mechanical generators built the main element of the smoke
blanket. Pots were also used to fill in gaps in a blanket caused by
shifting winds or by other unforeseen conditions. Smoke was made
at night only; during the day fighter aircraft provided protection for
the dock areas of the harbors.
21
69th Cml Smoke Generator Co History, Jun 42-Apr 44, p. 2.
22
CWS TofO Ltr No. 1 2 , 3 1 Mar 44, Incl. 4.
23
A detailed account of the screening operations in Northwest Africa as well as of those in Italy,
described later in this chapter, can be found in Paul W. Pritchard, CmlC Hist Study No. 1, Smoke Gen-
erator Opns in the Mediterranean and European Theaters of Opn, 1949, pp. 36-83.
24
Also arriving in June were the 24th and 2 5 t h Chemical Decontamination Companies, in the theater
as insurance against the introduction of gas by the enemy but well trained in the smoke mission.
Early on the morning of 6 July 1943, with Bizerte's port, channel,

outer harbor, and bay crowded with ships for the impending invasion
of Sicily, the Luftwaffe attacked with a force of more than sixty
aircraft. The smoke units had nine minutes warning. At 0409 the
German bombers began their run on the smoke-obscured targets.
Despite intense antiaircraft fire the enemy kept up an almost uninter-
rupted attack for thirty-six minutes. At 0445 the bombers withdrew,
and the order to "cease smoke" came shortly after. During the
65-minute smoking period the units expended 4,135 gallons of fog
oil and 535 British smoke pots. Although the enemy bombed several
dumps and inflicted about a score of casualties outside the screen, no
bombs fell within the vital area. The ships and docks were untouched
and the channel remained open.25
In August two of the four American smoke units were alerted for
the Sicilian operation. In September the remaining American com-
panies sailed for Italy, and British troops manned the Bizerte screen
until their relief by French units in January 1944.
By concealing the harbors and port facilities from Algiers to Sfax
from enemy air bombardment, American and British smoke companies
played a limited yet important part in the Northwest African cam-
paign. The extent of the smoke operations depended upon the clearness
of the night, the military traffic at a port facility, and the degree of
enemy air activity. The Luftwaffe succeeded in sinking a few ships
in these harbors and caused some damage to port installations, but its
28
attacks on the ports in Northwest Africa were largely without effect.
This first combat experience entirely justified the hopes of the
designers of the mechanical generator. It produced substantial clouds
of persistent white "smoke" with comparative speed. Although the
weight of the generator required vehicular transportation and its fuel
requirements were substantial, these were but modest logistical con-
siderations compared with the results obtained.
Perfecting the Technique: The Italian Ports

The port of Naples was the initial Allied objective after Anglo-
American forces had secured a foothold in southern Italy. The logistical
25
(1) 69th Cml Smoke Generator Co History, Jun 42-Apr 44. (2) 78th Cml Smoke Generator Co
History, 1943.
26
Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, 30 Nov 45, pp. 106-07.
MAP 3
considerations that demanded taking the port city naturally required

the uninterrupted flow of supplies into its spacious harbor. The smoke
installation that aided in this task was the most comprehensive of its
kind in the war. And it had the benefit of the experience gained in
screening the ports of Northwest Africa.
The vital shipping area at Naples included the port and harbor of
the city itself, the port area at suburban Bagnoli, and the fine harbor
at Pozzuoli in the Bay of Baiae. (Map 3) The smoke installation
began operations in October 1943, reached a climax late in the year,
and tapered off by the following summer as Allied successes farther
to the north helped reduce the possibility of heavy enemy air attacks.
At its height the smoke lines were manned by the 163d, 164th, 168th,
172d, and 179th Smoke Generator Companies, the 24th Decontamina-
tion Company, and the British 807th (SM) Company—in all, about
1,000 officers and enlisted men.
At first, no common headquarters existed to direct the activities of
these units, a fact which soon led to the establishment of a provisional
smoke generator battalion headquarters.27 Although an improvement,
this "provisional" headquarters was not the answer. The lack of status
and the inadequate capability of this provisional unit, led by the senior
smoke generator company commander, finally impelled the theater
in March 1944 to request the assignment of a headquarters and head-
quarters detachment, chemical smoke generator battalion. This unit
was urgently needed, the theater said, to provide centralized control
over the several smoke companies in such matters as technical operations
and administrative and logistical support. As a result, Headquarters
and Headquarters Detachment, 22d Chemical Smoke Generator Bat-
28
talion, was activated on 5 May 1944.
The smoke installation in the Naples complex included three sectors,
each with inner and outer rings. The inner ring at Naples proper
consisted of 370 British smoke pot positions and 14 Besler gen-
erators, a Navy generator, small, efficient, and much like the Army's
M2 which would appear later. The outer ring, about six miles long,
included 86 mechanical generators. The Bagnoli sector had 100 smoke
pot and 3 8 mechanical generator positions, the Pozzouli, 48 mechanical
generators. The smoke from these installations blended into one massive
screen extending at times for a distance of twenty miles. As in the
case of the North African ports, smoke was used during the night and
during the periods of twilight. The prevalent winds at these times
were offshore, an ideal condition for the land-based generators, although
ten craft loaded with floating M4 smoke pots were ready to cover any
gaps caused by occasional breezes from the sea. Air turbulence from
two nearby land masses created constant difficulty in the development
of an adequate screen. One of these was the volcano Vesuvius whose
mass and glow, according to captured German pilots, provided the
27
Technical and administrative problems of the American companies initially were handled by
Colonel Barker, Fifth Army chemical officer, and later by Colonel Coblentz of the Peninsular Base
Section.
28
(1) CM-IN 13125, 18 Mar 44. (2) Ltr, TAG to CG NATO, 30 Mar 44, sub: Constitution and
Activation of Hq and Hq Detachment, 22d Cml Smoke Generator Bn. AG 322 (28 Mar 44) OB-L-
SPMOU-M. (3) GO 80, Peninsular Base Sec, 4 May 44.
additional disservice of furnishing guides to attacking enemy bombers.29

Smoke orders came from the British 45th AA Brigade charged with
the port defense.30
Enemy air raids were frequent and heavy at Naples, but its defenses
—fighters, flak, and smoke—combined to blunt the effectiveness of
the attacks. On the night of 26 November, for example, the screen
confused and delayed the enemy flare laying aircraft to such an extent
that the bomber formation released its load without benefit of flares.
As a result, none of the bombs did damage, most of them falling into
31
the bay.
Although there was a letup in the number of air raids on Naples
during the last half of March and April 1944, the tempo increased in
May with the Allied drive on Rome, and the port was screened fourteen
times. During one of the spring raids about 113 merchant ships and
60 naval craft were shielded by smoke in the ports and anchorages at
Naples, all of which escaped damage.32 According to the AFHQ
intelligence bulletins this was not exceptional; the screening activities
at Naples were generally effective.33
As the Germans fell back before the Allied offensive their air attacks
against Naples practically ceased. The smoke installation was gradually
reduced to a single ring of pots around the harbor, manned by Italian
personnel. Some of the American smoke units began to prepare for
operation against southern France; others moved north to new ports,
now that Naples was no longer able to supply efficiently the troops
above Rome. During the advance northward the Fifth Army captured
Civitavecchia, Piombino, and Leghorn, ports which upon repair were
pressed into service to relieve the supply situation. Civitavecchia
required but a small screen and that for a short time. The 179th Smoke
Generator Company saw brief service there before moving to Piombino,
where in June it joined with the 172d Company in manning the smoke
installation.34
29
Colonel Barker toyed with the idea of concealing Vesuvius with 4.2-inch mortar shell, a plan soon
discarded as impracticable.
30
Fifth Army Cml Sec Daily Jnl, 18 Dec 43.
31
CWS TofO Ltr No. 12, 31 Mar 44, p. 48.
32
AFHQ, History of AA and Tactical Smoke Screening in North Africa and Italian Theaters Between
1 Jan and 31 Dec 44, pp. 7-8.
33
An evaluation based upon about fifty AA intelligence bulletins issued between October 1943 and
May 1944 by the 12th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.
34
AFHQ, History of AA and Tactical Smoke Screening in North Africa and Italian Theaters Between
1 Jan and 31 Dec 44, p. 8.
SMOKE SCREEN SHIELDS UNLOADING OPERATIONS DURING AIR RAID ALERT,

Salerno.
Activity at both of these ports subsided when the facilities at

Leghorn, captured on 19 July, were repaired and gradually put into
operation. Within a week the 179th Smoke Generator Company, to
be joined shortly by three British companies, erected a screen at
Leghorn. Initially, Leghorn represented a unique example of rear area
screening in that it remained for some time within range of enemy
artillery on the north bank of the Arno River. On 28 July the 172d
Company moved up from Piombino and deployed in a 7-mile arc at
a distance approximately five miles north and northeast of the city.
35
The haze from the generators, just as in the Anzio operation, denied
to the enemy observation of port and road traffic. The company main-
tained the line, sometimes despite the objections of the Royal Navy
in the port, for thirty-eight days, by which time the enemy had with-
35
See below, pp. 336-40.
drawn from his Arno River positions. The smoke installation at the
port itself was continued until April 1945.36
Leghorn marked the end of American participation in port screening
in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Rear area missions grad-
ually petered out with the diminished effectiveness of the Luftwaffe.
The 172d and 179th Smoke Generator Companies, by now the only
U.S. smoke units in Italy, turned to a type of employment that had
evolved earlier in the theater—the use of smoke in forward areas. But
before the development of that mission smoke units had been used in
assault landings.
The Changing Mission: Smoke in Amphibious and

Beachhead Operations
Salerno
The fighting in Italy proper saw an immediate extension of what
had been the normal mission of smoke units. Thus far, in doctrine and
experience, large area screens had concealed rear area installations
exclusively. At Salerno smoke troops landed on D-day in support of
37
the combat elements.
The Fifth Army landings in the Gulf of Salerno, just around the
Sorrento Peninsula from Naples, represented the first foothold of
American troops on the mainland of Europe. Two corps participated
in the attack—the British 10 on the left and the U.S. VI on the right.
The 36th Infantry Division, forming the assault element of the
American corps, drew as its objective the beaches near the town of
Paestum.38
Each of the assault battalions, storming ashore early on 9 September
1943, carried about 200 M4 smoke pots.39 Dropped in the water by
36
(1) Ltr, CO 172d Cml Smoke Generator Co to CG Adv Hq Allied Armies in Italy, 13 Sep 44,
sub: Report on Smoke Haze North of Leghorn. (2) Fifth Army Cml Sec Daily Jnl 28 Jul 44. (3)
AFHQ, History of AA and Tactical Smoke Screening in North African and Italian Theaters Between
1 Jan and 31 Dec 44, pp. 8-9, 11-12.
The Salerno action is based on: (1) Fifth Army Cml Sec Daily Jnl, 9, 10, 25 Sep 43, CMLHO;
37
(2) Memo, Barker for CMLHO, 4 Feb 47, sub: Answers to Questions; (3) Lt Harrie A. James,
USNR, Observations During Opn AVALANCHE, Center Task Force Southern Task Force, 24 Oct 43,
CWS 314.7 Smoke Opns.
Details of this operation may be found in Martin Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, a volume in
38
preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR IL

39
The M4 floating smoke pot (and improved models M4A1 and M4A2) consisted of a 5-gallon pail
containing twenty-six pounds of HC. This amount filled but one-third of the container, thus creating
the necessary buoyancy.
infantrymen, the floating munitions helped conceal succeeding landing

craft; placed on the beaches they screened exposed flanks. Navy per-
sonnel also employed smoke. Some support craft dropped pots; others
were equipped with the Navy Besler smoke generator. This artificial
smoke, combined with the morning mist and the haze of battle, created
limited visibility. As a consequence, the enemy, with limited observa-
tion, resorted to a curtain of unobserved fire placed just off the beaches.
This was in decided contrast to the initial situation wherein individual
landing craft were reported to have been sniped at by enemy 8-inch
guns.40
One CWS unit landed on D plus 2 as part of the beach force of VI
Corps. The 24th Decontamination Company, under the direction of
the naval task force, used M1 and M4 smoke pots to screen the
beaches and anchorages. Later, the Navy gave the unit eight Besler
generators, a number gradually increased to thirty-six. Standard prac-
tice during the first week, when the issue was often in doubt, was to
create smoke during the hours of evening and morning twilight and
during moonlight, favorite times for German bombers to attack.
During air raid alerts the smoke of the 24th Company usually was
abetted by generators on naval craft. So effective was the smoke screen
that beach and harbor were often concealed within three minutes of
the alert. During the nights smoke came to assume the primary position
among antiaircraft defenses.
Average daily expenditures during the first week on the Salerno
beaches were 250 M1 and 100 M4 smoke pots and 5,000 gallons of fog
oil. One of the principal difficulties encountered was the burning glow
of the smoke pots which often served as aiming points for enemy
41
bombers.
Despite this handicap the smoke mission received new respect in the
strongly contested battle for the Salerno beachhead. Troops and land-
ing craft welcomed anything that would make them less vulnerable,
and the pots and generators manned by infantrymen, sailors, and CWS
40
(1) James, Observations During Operation AVALANCHE. (2) Professor Morison does not mention
smoke in his account of the battle although he includes a photograph (opposite page 282) of a PT
(patrol boat, motor torpedo boat) boat laying smoke. (Samuel Eliot Morison, "History of United
States Naval Operations in World War II," vol. IX, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio, January 1943-June 1944
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1954).
41
This objection was voiced by several Navy observers as cited in CWS Theater of Operations Letter
No. 15, 21 June 1944, pages 26-27.
troops provided effective concealment from enemy fire.42 It was the

opinion of naval officers with the shore control party at Salerno that
the smoke screen saved many lives and landing craft.43
Anzio
The bold end run of Fifth Army's VI Corps at Anzio has provoked
much debate among postwar strategists, both armchair and professional.
At the time, its planners felt that this maneuver would be the best way
to break the stalemate encountered in front of the formidable German
defenses which formed the Gustav Line. Unfortunately, Operation
SHINGLE fell far short of expectations. The enemy responded quickly
to the "abscess" in its flank and contained the beachhead in beleagured
impotency from its establishment on 22 January 1944 until the Allied
breakout in the following May.44
As at Salerno, provision was made for a large area screen for the
Anzio beachhead. Again as at Salerno, the 24th Decontamination
Company was assigned this mission. The company, equipped with M1
and M4 pots and with eight Navy Besler generators, landed on D-day.
On its first night ashore the unit smoked the beaches and anchorage,
and within two days it had set up a smoke line almost two miles long.
As the beachhead forces were augmented, other smoke troops, including
a British unit and the U.S. 179th Smoke Generator Company, moved
to Anzio to increase the size of the screen.45
Initially, smoke at Anzio was intended to be part of the antiaircraft
screen. Experience had shown that a favorite enemy tactic was low
level bomber attacks at dawn and at dusk. Consequently, it soon
became standard practice to screen the port each day during the
periods of dawn and dusk. The smoke troops also operated during red
alerts at night, for smoke again proved to be the best antiaircraft
defense during the hours of darkness. Throughout the first three weeks
the Luftwaffe made at least one raid each night. Flares dropped by
42
(1) AGF Board Rpt, pt. V, NATO, 10 Nov 43, cited in CWS TofO Ltr No. 9, 31 Dec 43, p. 10.
(2) CWS TofO Ltr No. 12, 31 Mar 44, p. 32.
43
James, Observations During Opn AVALANCHE.
44
Nevertheless, the Anzio landing had a concrete effect on the over-all German war strategy, for the
enemy interpreted it as the first of a series of peripheral attacks aimed at dispersing German reserve
forces in Europe. The enemy also reacted with special vigor in order to gain the prestige of destroying
an Allied beachhead. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 232-33, 234.
45
(1) Fifth Army History of Activities, 22 Jan 43. (2) AFHQ, History of AA and Tactical
Smoke Screening in North African and Italian Theaters Between 1 Jan and 31 Dec 44, p. 11.
lead planes seemed to be extinguished as they dropped into the screen.

During daylight raids antiaircraft artillery and fighter planes consti-
46
tuted the sole defense.
The decrease in the number of enemy air raids after mid-February,
caused by effective antiaircraft defenses, brought little relief to the
port and beachhead at Anzio, for the reduction of air attacks was
accompanied by an increase in long-range artillery fire. Along the
periphery of the beachhead and in the bordering mountains were
innumerable enemy observation posts. Farm houses suspected of har-
boring German observers were demolished with 8-inch howitzers, and
towers and nearby ridges were blanketed by chemical mortar and
artillery smoke shell. But the mountains in the background continued
to afford the enemy unrestricted view of beach installations and ships
in the harbor. Although the entire Allied beachhead lay within range
of enemy guns, the air defense, artillery, and naval commanders at
first objected to smoking the beach and harbor during daytime because
of possible interference with observation for friendly gunfire and with
the unloading of the ships in the anchorage. This valid complaint was
something to be reckoned with. Yet the losses incurred from enemy
bombers and artillery were also worth taking into account. From 22
January through 10 February, for example, a daily average of almost
twenty-eight tons of Allied ammunition was blown up by these means.47
To resolve this problem chemical officers, with the approval of Maj.
Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., the corps commander, came up with a
new technique for the mechanical smoke generator—the production
of a light haze in the area between the harbor and the front lines, thin
enough to permit normal operations within it, thick enough to prevent
German observation from the encircling hills.48
To apply this technique the 179th Smoke Generator Company on
18 March moved from the harbor area toward the forward positions.
The smoke line, now forming a 15-mile arc around the port, included
nineteen generator positions on land and two generators mounted on
Navy patrol craft in the harbor. (Map 4) The latter prevented enemy
observation from the flanks of the concave contour of the coast line.
46
Col Walter A. Guild, "That Damned Smoke Again," vol. LIV, No. 10, Infantry Journal (October,
1944) pp. 25-28. (Colonel Guild served as VI Corps chemical officer during the Anzio operation.)
47
Anzio Beachhead, AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION SERIES (Washington, 1947), p. no.
48
(1) Ltr, CmlO AFHQ to OCCWS, 11 Mar 44, sub: Smoke at Anzio Bridgehead. (2) Guild,
"That Damned Smoke Again," Infantry Journal (October, 1944).
MAP 4
After a period of trial, error, and compromise the smoke line was
established just beyond the antiaircraft positions of the port and just
short of the field artillery observation posts. The line was divided into
four sections with generators spaced at 1,000-yard intervals. Smoke
positions were connected by telephones, and each section had radio
communication with the command post. The amount of smoke needed
was determined by an observation tower in Nettuno, abetted at times
by liaison planes borrowed from the artillery. Each hour an Air Forces
meteorology section provided weather data. Operations began one-half

hour before dawn and ended one-half hour after sunset.49
The result was a light haze which, regardless of wind direction,
denied observation to the enemy without restricting movement within
the beachhead. Under concealment of this haze trucks were driven
off LST's (landing ships, tank) onto the beach, unloaded, and returned
to the ships unmolested. This was a particularly important operation
as the Allied troops at Anzio received an average of 3,500 tons of
50
supplies a day for the 6 months after the January landings.
Radio interception disclosed that German artillery was on the alert
during daylight hours to take advantage of sudden wind changes which
afforded brief views through the screen. Objections to the daylight
screen which commanders had raised during the planning stage dis-
appeared after the smoke operation began. Allied artillery units even
requested and obtained additional daylight screening to hide the flash
of guns, thus inaugurating a new mission for smoke generators.51
Another unusual mission of the 1799th was in the interest of health.
Generators, run at a reduced temperature for fifteen minutes during
the morning and evening, spread a thin film of oil over the area. This
oil film settled on the water and killed the larvae of the malarial mos-
52
quito, long a menace in the area.
Soldiers going ashore at Anzio sometimes did not realize that smoke
was being used. Lt. Raymond C. Stillger, who landed with the 34th
Infantry Division three days after the daylight screening began, thought
that the haze was a result of either a natural morning mist or smoke
and dust from the battlefield. He noted that the mountain ranges were
not visible from the harbor and that the artillery fire which dropped
offshore was ineffective. When his unit moved forward, Stillger saw
that the haze rarely drifted to within a mile of his position, usually
remaining well to the rear. This was good; the infantry did not want
the smoke to its front lest the Germans counterattack under cover of
the screen. During the two months which Stillger spent in the line, it
49
(1) Guild, "That Damned Smoke Again," Infantry Journal (October, 1944). (2) 179th Smoke
Generator Co, Opnl Memo No. 1, 1 Aug 44, sub: Method and Lessons Learned on the Anzio Beachhead.
(3) Interv, Hist Off with Capt Morris W. Lofton, 13 Mar 46. (Captain Lofton, the author of the
operational memo, served as operations officer of the 179th at Anzio.)
50
Logistical History of NATOUSA-MTOUSA, 30 Nov 45, p. 106. Beach gradients at Anzio per-
mitted this ship-to-shore unloading.
51
Ltr, CmlO Fifth Army to CCWS, 14 Apr 44, sub: Status of Cml Units in the Fifth Army.
52
Opnl Memo No. 1, 179th Smoke Generator Co.
was necessary to request a reduction of smoke in his sector on only

two occasions. At the rear it was a different story. After fighting in
the mountains of southern Italy, the average infantryman felt un-
covered on the Anzio plain and welcomed the concealment of smoke
53
haze.
While the large area screen at Anzio was not as decisive as some com-
mentators would have one believe—"It [the mechanical smoke gen-
erator] probably saved the Anzio beachhead. . . ."—54 its value was
nonetheless considerable. General Truscott commented on the effec-
tiveness of the smoke, which was used extensively "to limit German
observation and reduce the effectiveness of their artillery fires."55
German sources after the war testified to the effectiveness of the "well
prepared and conducted" screening operations at Anzio which ob-
56
structed observation and interfered with defensive and direct fire.
Perhaps the situation was best summed up in the observations of Bill
Mauldin's incomparable Willie and Joe.
The Invasion of Southern France

With the successful completion of the Sicilian operation in the sum-
mer of 1943 the Seventh U.S. Army became nonoperational, its head-
quarters reduced to caretaker status.57 Then in January 1944 Allied
Force Headquarters directed it to form a planning group for an oper-
ation against southern France to be mounted sometime in the following
May. After considerable debate at the highest echelons DRAGOON
(it was first called ANVIL) was given a definite time, place, and
implementing force. These were 15 August 1944, a series of beaches
east of Toulon, and Seventh Army's VI Corps.58 The corps got three
experienced infantry divisions for the operation, the 3d, 45th, and 36th.
Because of the mountains bordering the narrow beaches of the as-
sault areas, the enemy could have excellent observation of the landing
53
Interv, Hist Off with Capt Raymond C. Stillger, 29 Nov 50.
54
Baxter, Scientists Against Time, p. 287.
55
Lt. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., Command Missions: A Personal Story (New York: E. P. Dutton,
1954). P. 457.
56
Herman Ochsner (formerly a major general in the German Army), CmlC Hist Study No. 2,
History of German Cml Warfare in World War II, pt. I, The Military Aspect, p. 30.
57
For a complete account of the invasion of southern France, see Robert Ross Smith, The Riviera to
the Rhine, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
58
Report of Operations—The Seventh United States Army in France and Germany, 1944—1943 (here-
after cited as Seventh Army Opns in ETO) (Heidelberg, Germany: Heidelberg Gutenberg Printing Co.,
May 1946), I, chs. I-V, 1-115.
force. Cognizant of the terrain and with the experience of Salerno and
Anzio behind it, the Navy was eager to screen the assault force and
anchorage from artillery fire and bomber aircraft. Its smoke plan,
drawn up to provide concealment for beach and bay, was quite com-
plete. Each Navy and merchant vessel had several means of producing
smoke—with smoke pots, liquid smoke, and fog oil for the Besler
generators furnished by Seventh Army's Chemical Section.59 CWS
troops attached to the assault divisions were prepared to land at H-
hour, screen the flanks of the several beachheads, and be ready to
conceal the assault boats in case of offshore winds. Once the landings
were secure these CWS parties, under control of the engineer shore
groups, would be ready to shield supply dumps and anchorage from
60
air attack.
The smoke troops again were to come from a chemical decontamina-
tion company, this time the 21st. On 25 March 1944 the unit's 2d
Platoon moved from Palermo to a beach near Oran, where it was at-
tached to the 40th Engineer Combat Regiment to prepare for the
invasion. Practice in assault landings and in the erection of beachhead
smoke lines constituted the bulk of this unit's training. In turn, the
Engineers gained the experience of working in a haze limiting visibility
to fifty yards. By June the platoon rejoined the 21st in Italy where it
passed on its recently acquired amphibious experience to its three
61
sister platoons.
During the last weeks of July and the first week of August the three
divisions which were to make the assault and their supporting troops
underwent brief but effective practice for the appointed task.62 The
culminating point was a full dress exercise in which the conditions
expected on the beaches of southern France were realistically duplicated.
Live ammunition, beach obstacles, and smoke screens helped to achieve
63
authenticity.
59
Seventh Army Cml Sec, Hist Rpt, 1 Jan 44 to 31 Oct 44. A unique employment of the liquid
smoke saw LCM's (landing craft, mechanized) equipped with a contraption which forced the FS smoke
through an ejection pipe where it was dispersed in a cloud by the blast of an airplane propeller.
60
(1) Ibid. (2) Cml Annex to Field Order, 40th Engineer Combat Regt, 23 Jul 44 (included as
an. 4 to the Seventh Army report.)
61
Seventh Army Cml Sec Hist Rpt, 1 Jan—31 Oct 44, an. 199, in R. G. 207.3.
62
Assignment of the platoons of the 21st Chemical Decontamination Company was as follows: the
1st Platoon to the 36th Engineer Shore Group, 3d Division; the 2d to the 40th Engineer Shore Group,
45th Division; and the 3d to the 540th Engineer Shore Group, 36th Division. The 4th Platoon was
held in corps reserve. (1) Ibid. (2) Seventh Army Opns in ETO, III, 909-10.
63
Seventh Army Opns in ETO, I, 71-89.
The 1st Platoon, 21st Decontamination Company, received an extra

amount of training because the 3d Division had detailed plans for the
use of ground smoke during the initial phases. The additional work
for the platoon, and for a detail of two officers and thirty enlisted men
from the 3d Chemical Mortar Battalion which augmented the division's
smoke troops, was aimed at producing physical hardness, self-reliance,
and proficiency in tactics of the infantryman.
The 3d Division's target area was the St. Tropez Peninsula. Eleva-
tions here reached 1,000 to 1,500 feet, providing the defenders with
excellent observation of the sea, the beaches, and the narrow strip of
wooded dunes. The 3d Division's assault areas on the peninsula, desig-
nated Red Beach and Yellow Beach, were both flanked by capes, a
situation which enhanced the possibilities of German observation and
provided the motive for the flanking screens of the attacking force.
But if the terrain was unpropitious, its defense was another matter.
Intelligence sources indicated that the enemy would not defend the
area too strongly because of commitments in northwest France. More-
over, the rather skimpy fixed defenses of the area were manned by non-
German and limited service troops.64
Preceded by heavy naval and air bombardment the VI Corps landed
on 15 August against light resistance. During the actual assault the
Navy used smoke only in the 3d Division sector. Here smoke pots and
generators in landing craft screened the flanks of the boat lanes and
concealed incoming craft from enemy fire. Each of the four smoke
details, two per beach, was to land at H-hour in an LCT. Training
trials had demonstrated that under favorable conditions the detach-
ments with their allotments of 1,200 M1 smoke pots could unload in
about five minutes. It was hoped that the final stage of the trip to
the beach would take place in specially buoyed medium tanks which
were on the LCT's. If this were not possible the pots were to be
floated ashore in rubber boats, or, in an extreme case, the packing boxes
64
The account of smoke operations in the 3d Division sector is based on: (1) Ltr, CmlO 3d Div to
CmlO Seventh Army, 20 Sep 44, sub: Ground Use of Smoke Pots, M1A1, During Opn DRAGOON; (2)
Ltr, ACmlO 3d Div to CmlO 3d Div, 18 Sep 44, sub: Use of Smoke on Red Beach for the DRAGOON
Opn; (3) Ltr, Platoon Leader, 2d Platoon, 21st Cml Decontamination Co to CO 21st Cml Decon-
tamination Co, 16 Sep 44, sub: Platoon Opn; (4) Ltr, Platoon Leader, 1st Platoon, 21st Cml Decon-
tamination Co to CO 21st Cml Decontamination Co, 16 Sep 44, sub: Opns of 1st Platoon, 21st Cml
Decontamination Co, 15-30 Aug 44; (5) 3d Cml Mortar Bn, Histories, Italy, 1—14 Aug 44, and
Campaign of Southern France, 15-31 Aug 44.
with the pots enclosed could be tied in tandem and towed ashore by
hand.
The smoke detail on the left flank of Red Beach was led by Lt.
Frank J. Thomas, commanding the 1st Platoon, 21st Company.
According to plan, four amphibious tanks carried the men across the
beach to the railroad about 150 yards beyond. Fanning out to four
positions at loo-yard intervals, the detail began operations within ten
minutes of landing. The smoke line was gradually pushed inland to
a road 250 yards from the beach. Until this time the smoke troops
had not received enemy fire, but now mortar and small arms fire caused
one casualty. No casualties were suffered in the heavily mined
woods through which the smoke troops passed to reach the road.
The detachment from the 1st Platoon, which landed on the right
flank of Red Beach, was led by Capt. Sam Kesner, assistant chemical
officer of the 3d Division. For some reason the landing craft dropped
its amphibious tanks some 1,000 yards from shore. Consequently,
Kesner's party, which remained in the LCT, had to unload its pots
the hard way. Some were thrown into two 6-man rubber boats and
towed to the beach. The rest of the smoke munitions were tossed over-
board and floated ashore in their crates, an expedient made necessary
by the pressure of enemy small arms fire. The situation was made more
difficult because the LCT had landed 400 yards to the right of its
assigned area in order to avoid mines. The smoke plan called for four
positions on the beach, a number soon increased to twelve because of
the adverse winds. The smoke detail soon pushed inland about100
yards, suffering four casualties in the early hours.
The two smoke details in 3d Division's Yellow Beach came from the
3d Chemical Mortar Battalion. Each of the one officer-fifteen enlisted
men details landed at H-hour, meeting conditions not unlike those
found on Red Beach. Because of the offshore mines, the LCT carrying
the right flank party beached south of the assigned area. The group
worked northward into position using smoke grenades for concealment
from small arms fire. Opposition was heavier near the center of the
beach but the smoke screen helped to eliminate observation, with the
result that enemy fire became erratic, ceasing about H plus 30 minutes.
The total length of the two screens on Yellow Beach was 2,000 yards.
Although the smoke mission for DRAGOON was extremely well
planned and executed there was still room for improvement. Captain
Kesner felt that the eggs should not have been placed in so few baskets—
that a larger number of craft should have carried the members of the
smoke details during the assault. In this way the sinking of any LCT
would not have been an irreparable disaster. Maj. Albert L. Safine,
Chemical Officer, 3d Division, suggested that in landings where enemy
opposition would be substantial (resistance at DRAGOON was weak)
the smoke detail should land at H plus 30 and that the equipment
include amphibious mounted generators.
Smoke in Normal Forward Area Operations

In the struggle for Italy it seemed that the dice were always loaded
in favor of the defense. As a rule the German defenders controlled
the high ground which typified the Italian terrain and thereby kept
the Allies under excellent observation. Such a situation called for a
considerable amount of smoke.
There were several methods for laying smoke under such circum-
stances. The firing of artillery smoke shells upon enemy observation
points was an old technique, abetted by the introduction of the efficient
4.2-inch mortar. The trouble in Italy was the abundance of observa-
tion points, making the blanketing of all of them impracticable.
Another method of preventing enemy observation was the somewhat
difficult job of placing a curtain of smoke between the opposing forces.
More feasible was the covering of friendly positions and movements
by smoke, a technique obviously requiring emplaced rather than pro-
jected smoke. Smoke pots were immediately available for this type
of mission, although the harassing, if not toxic, nature of the HC
filling hardly commended them for extensive or extended use. More
often a combination of pots and shells was used. To illustrate, early
on the morning of 13 October 1943, as VI Corps' 3d and 34th Divisions
attacked across the swift moving Volturno River, the 2d and 84th
Chemical Mortar Battalions routinely fired smoke shells on enemy
observation towers in the distant hills. More unusual was the detail
from the 84th Battalion which manned smoke pots for the conceal-
ment of bridging sites and exposed approaches. The mission was not
uniformly successful. On the evening of 13 October, for example,
smoke pots set off to conceal bridge building activities drew enemy
artillery fire to the area, a circumstance which made construction im-
possible. Even though smoke in some cases, particularly in inadequate
amounts, could thus be a mixed blessing, Company D, 84th Chemical

Mortar Battalion, kept alerted a 100-man detail equipped with 1,000
smoke pots to cover bridge sites.65
Another example of a screen formed by pots and shells occurred in
mid-January 1944. II Corps captured the high ground east of the
Rapido River and began to move up troops and supplies in preparation
for an assault crossing. Because the main supply route, Highway No. 6,
passed through relatively level terrain, it was exposed for a considerable
distance to observed artillery fire from enemy positions on the moun-
tain heights beyond the Rapido.66 On 18 January troops from the
headquarters of the 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion, under the super-
vision of Colonel Burn, II Corps chemical officer, screened a section of
the highway with M1 smoke pots. At noon this force was supplemented
by three smoke pot stations manned by troops from one of the firing
companies of the battalion. During that day more than 1,000 enemy
shells fell into the screened area with practically no damage and little
interruption of traffic. Although the smoke interfered with the ob-
servation of American artillery, the corps commander considered the
screen essential, and an entire company of the 3d Battalion went for-
67
ward with 185 tons of smoke pots.
These two examples demonstrated the need that existed for conceal-
ment in the forward areas in Italy and the immediate steps taken to
adapt the smoke pot to the large area mission. These initial attempts,
while generally successful, called attention to the possibilities of the
use of the mechanical generator in similar situations—possibilities which
were soon to be realized.
Smoke on the Garigliano
On 9 March the 88th Infantry Division relieved a British unit on
Fifth Army's extreme left. The sector included the area southeast of
the town of Minturno where Highway No. 7 crossed the Garigliano
not far from where the river emptied into the Tyrrhenian Sea. About
65
(1) From the Volturno to the Winter Line, AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION SERIES (Wash-
ington, 1944), P. 48. (2) Co D 84th Cml Mortar Bn, Field Jnl, 10-17 Oct 43. (3) Memo, Barker
for Hist Off, 4 Feb 47. (4) Interv, Hist Off with Capt Ernest H. Davis, former CO Co C 84th Cml
Mortar Bn, 27 Jun 45.
66
See Fifth Army at the Winter Line, AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION SERIES (Washington,
1945), illustration, p. 66.
67
(1) 2d Cml Bn S-3, Jnl, Jan 44. (2) CWS TofO Ltr No. 11, 9 Mar 44, p. 15. (3) Fifth Army
Cml Sec Daily Jnl, 19 Jan 44. (4) Co C 2d Cml Bn Jnl, 19 Jan 44.
EFFECT OF SMOKE CURTAIN, ITALY. Bridge site before screening (above). Same
bridge after screening, with background obliterated (below).
CARRYING SMOKE POTS INTO POSITION IN THE RAPIDO RIVER AREA
five miles up the coast stood Mount Scouri which, with the hill masses
above Minturno, provided the Germans with excellent observation of
the road network in the valley. Particularly vulnerable was Highway
7 along which passed all troops and supplies for the II Corps front.
The British had used smoke pots around the river's main bridge, a prac-
tice continued by American troops. On 28 March the 172d Smoke
Generator Company, recently freed from duty at Naples, undertook
68
the large area smoke mission in this area. The new smoke installation
also centered on the bridge. (Map 5) This vital point was encircled
by a ring of 10 smoke pot positions having a 200-yard radius. The
nucleus of the screen was a circle of mechanical generators 600 yards
from the bridge. Just offshore, generators in small craft lent substance
68
The account of the Garigliano screen is based on: (1) Fifth Army Cml Sec Rpt, n.d. (ca. April
44), sub: Defensive Smoke in Current Fifth Army Opns; (2) Col. Maurice E. Barker, "Smoke for
River Crossings," Infantry Journal, LVIII, No. 1 (January, 1946), 37-41; (3) Interv, Hist Off with
Maj Richard C. Burn, formerly CO 172d Smoke Generator Co, 30 Jan 47.
MAP 5
to the left flank of the screen, an expedient made necessary by the

prevailing onshore winds.
In an effort to nullify the effectiveness of enemy artillery each gen-
erator had three prepared positions. Under cover of darkness the crews
moved their generators from position to position always eschewing
regularity and pattern in a generally successful attempt at hiding exact
locations. The area between the river and the enemy lines was dotted
with other pot and generator positions picked primarily to deny ob-
servation between the bridge and Minturno. The most advanced of
these were within 500 yards of the enemy and about 200 yards beyond
friendly infantry strongholds. Lesser installations concealed other
bridges over the Garigliano and road junctions and portions of the high-
way farther to the rear. From his post at Minturno a smoke control
officer supervised the installation, regulating the emission of smoke so
that a uniform haze was maintained during all daylight hours as well
as during moonlight nights and nocturnal air raids.
In this its first forward area mission the 172d Company quite nat-
urally met with problems not found in rear area screening. For one
thing, the unit worked in two shifts because of the necessity of a
constant daytime screen as well as the possibility of operations at night.
(Installations at the rear, it will be remembered, did not include smoke
among their daytime antiaircraft defenses.) The problem of security
was greater because of the danger of enemy patrols. Communications
maintenance increased appreciably and the need for continuous fog oil
resupply in an area both difficult and dangerous to reach involved
problems unknown at the port screen at Naples.
Large Area Screening in Northern Italy
Stymied by swift German reaction to Operation SHINGLE (Anzio)
on one hand, and by the strong Gustav Line on the other, the Fifth
Army did not capture Rome until early June 1944. Later that summer,
the much debated invasion of southern France became a reality and
drew off in the process a large part of Fifth Army strength, in fact,
the entire VI Corps. Six of the nine CWS companies capable of
smoke operations were included in the departing force; remaining
were the 172d and 179th Smoke Generator Companies and the 24th
Chemical Decontamination Company, the latter experienced in smoke
operations but soon diverted to chemical depot operations. As a result,
the means to pursue a successful forward area smoke mission were
seriously impaired, especially when the recently won ports of Civita-
vecchia, Piombino, and Leghorn were requiring what were to be the
last vestiges of port screening in the Italian campaign. By September
the 172d and 179th were released from the Leghorn operation and
placed in support of II and IV Corps, respectively, attachments which
were to last until the end of the war.
That same month saw the beginning of a concerted effort by the
15th Army Group to penetrate the Gothic Line to which the Axis
had withdrawn after the fall of Rome. The natural strength of this
position, which crossed Italy between Florence and Bologna, combined
with the weakened state of the Allied forces, resulted, after an initial
Fifth Army penetration, in eventual stalemate.
During the first month of the offensive the 172d Company concealed
bridge sites on the Sieve and Santerno Rivers. In each case, accurate
69
German artillery fire became ineffective once smoke was employed.
The divisions in the II Corps sector at first made spectacular gains,
reaching a point on Highway No. 65 above Livergnano within twelve
Miles of Bologna. Here the advance stopped, and there was to be
little change in the front line until the following April. On the left
shoulder of this penetration, strong German resistance denied Fifth
Army Mount Adone and the hill mass at Monterumici, with the result-
ant variation on a Familiar theme—from these vantage points the en-
emy retained direct observation of Highway No. 65, the main supply
70
route for the section.
In partial answer to this threat on the supply route, the 172d Smoke
Generator Company maintained a smoke line from 16 October 1944
until 14 April 1945. For 181 days, except when the weather made
screening unnecessary or when II Corps for one reason or another
needed perfect visibility in the area, the smoke haze concealed friendly
movements along a 2-Mile stretch of the highway. Periods of bright
moonlight sometimes forced the 172d to operate on a 24-hour basis.
Although the enemy was only about two Miles away vehicles drove
along the road without difficulty. The smoke was also of value to
patrols and other troops moving across exposed areas. By reducing
the danger and dread of observed fire the operation on Highway No.
65—the longest continuous forward area smoke screen in World War
II—was both a material and psychological aid.
The 172d, with some outside help, performed another important
Mission while at Livergnano. From 25 January to 27 March 1945 a
detachment from the company screened the road network in the
Sillaro Valley which supplied both the U.S. II Corps and British
Eighth Army sectors. The most vital part of this network was the
69
See photographs on page 347, above.
70
This section on operations in northern Italy is based on: (1) 172d and 179th Smoke Generator Co
Journals; (2) Fifth Army Cml Sec Jnl, 25 Feb-3 Mar 45; (3) Lt. Col. Houston Joyner, CWS, "They
Couldn't See Down Into the Valley," Armed Forces Chemical Journal, III, No. 2 (October, 1948).
SMOKE SCREEN CONCEALS MOVEMENTS ALONG HIGHWAY
crossroads at San Clemente, the site of a smoke pot screen manned

first by the 88th Division and then by British troops, since the capture
of the town in October. The undesirable characteristics of the HC
pots led to a successful January trial of a smoke installation featuring
the recently developed M1 mechanical generator. Captured enemy
patrols admitted the effectiveness of this installation which concealed
vehicular traffic, troop concentrations, supply dumps, and artillery
positions of American and British forces.
On the IV Corps front the 179th Company supported operations
ranging from the Ligurian coast to the Serchio Valley and Highway
No. 64. Because of the distance between these Missions—in the IV
Corps sector Highway 64 was over forty Miles from the sea—the unit's
two platoons operated separately. The 1st Platoon, between Highway
No. 1 and the sea, screened the coastal plain north of Viareggio.
Detachments from the platoon were split off to fulfill other Missions:
screens for bridge sites and tank attacks and hazes for daylight patrols.
On 5 November, the 2d Platoon began a 102-day haze to cover an

exposed stretch of Highway 64, as well as several supply installations,
in the right sector of IV Corps. Just as in the case of Highway 65
south of Bologna, before the haze daytime traffic on the road always
drew fire. Afterward, the amount of enemy fire noticeably decreased,
bridges were built and strengthened without interruption, and traffic
passed with little interference.
As World War II began, the large area screen was designed to

conceal rear area installations. American and British smoke units and
equipment in North Africa successfully demonstrated the validity of
this Mission and the adequacy of the smoke munitions. Once the scene
of fighting shifted to the mainland of Italy doctrine for large area
screens saw a drastic expansion. True, the old Mission remained—as
witness the smoke installation at the Naples complex, the largest of its
kind of the war. But added to this was the use of smoke in assault
landings and during the more conventional type of front-line oper-
ations. The evolution of the front-line Mission was dependent upon
several factors. First was the peculiar nature of the terrain in Italy,
where circumstances and geography conspired to have the Allied forces
continually advance under the superior observation of the enemy and
against his deadly fire. The second factor was the Limitations of con-
ventional front-line smoke munitions—artillery and mortar shells and
the smoke pots. And last, the gradual diminution of the power of the
Luftwaffe and the consequent lessening of the need for port screening
released smoke units, never in abundance in Italy, for the fulfillment
of the new Mission.
Forward area screening encountered the stiff and legitimate objec-
tions of such diverse sources as the field artillery and the supporting
naval units. The problem, of course, was observation. Smoke did
contend with these effective and established elements, and CWS officers
took great care to see that the nature of these smoke screens was com-
plementing, not competing.
CHAPTER IX
Large Area Smoke Screens

in the ETO
The Invasion of Normandy
Almost from the very beginning of their labors Allied planners for
the cross-Channel attack contemplated the use of smoke for the beaches
in France and the ports that were to be developed there. In 1942 the
combined British-American planning organization included an anti-
aircraft committee which, in turn, had a smoke subcommittee. The
logistical computations for the British Haslar generator, the best model
then available to the Allies, indicated such large requirements for oil
as seriously to limit extensive use of the technique of large area screen-
ing. Fortunately, at this time the National Defense Research Com-
Mittee brought out the M1 mechanical generator, news of which sent
a Mission hurrying from England to the United States. Colonel Mont-
gomery, the American representative, reported that the new generator
was five times as efficient as any existing smoke device. Substitution of
the M1 for the Haslar enabled smoke planners to draw up oil require-
1
ments which were far more reasonable.
The development of the new generator prompted attempts by CWS
staff officers in England to get a smoke generator company for the
theater. War Department inquiries about the requirements for such
units got little response from the Eighth Air Force, which came to
the conclusion that the advantages of airdrome concealment were
equaled or outweighed by the interference of smoke with operations.
But SOS authorities in the theater showed interest in smoke as a means
of concealing supply installations and later included the ports in
1
(1) Interv, Hist Off with Col MacArthur, 23 Nov 45. MacArthur participated in the smoke
planning for the invasion, later becoming Chemical Officer, 12th Army Group. (2) Col Montgomery
to CG ETO, 14 Oct 42, Rpt of American Representatives, British-American Large Area Smoke Mission
to the U.S. CWS Ret 470.7-2815.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO 355
Great Britain through which flowed the build-up of troops and supplies
from the United States. Diminishing German air raids reduced theater
interest in this type of activity, although during Mid-1943 planners
envisioned the use of some twenty or twenty-four smoke companies
2
to conceal continental ports once the invasion was under way.
With the return of General Eisenhower to London from the Medi-
terranean area in January 1944, planning for the cross-Channel attack
began to take final shape. The troop basis for U.S. smoke generator
troops now totaled twelve companies, organized into three battalions.
Although these were originally listed as SOS units with a primary
Mission of rear area screening, Colonel MacArthur, CWS representa-
tive in the planning group, insisted that one smoke battalion be ear-
marked for tactical employment with the combat forces.3 And it was
to be in this role, rather than through their part in the concealment
of rear areas, that smoke units were to make their most effective
contribution.
Brigadier G. H. Pennycock, director of chemical warfare for the
British 21 Army Group, co-ordinated Allied smoke screening plans for
the initial phase of the invasion. Colonel Coughlan, FUSA chemical
officer, was in turn responsible for the operational plans for American
forces. One problem which had been troubling First Army, the diffi-
culty of landing the heavy M1 generators on the Normandy beaches,
was eliminated almost on the eve of the assault with the arrival of the
M1 generator which had a dry weight of only 172 pounds. Smoke
troops received the first M2 on 13 May, 7 more on 24 May, 50 on the
28th, and 27 between that date and 3 June.4
Final plans for the use of large area smoke screens during the cross-
Channel attack provided for smoke over the ports of England from
which the invasion would be mounted and smoke over OMAHA and
UTAH beaches in Normandy. In both cases the screens would be used
as a means of concealing activity from German aircraft. The companies
of the 24th and 25th Smoke Generator Battalions received the English
port assignment; the 23d Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. William
M. Fiske and including the 79th, 80th, 84th, and 161st Smoke Gen-
erator Companies, was earmarked for duty at OMAHA Beach, but not
2
Pritchard, Smoke Generator Opns in MTO and ETO, pp. 85-87. This monograph contains a
detailed account of smoke planning and operations in the European theater.
3
MacArthur Interv, 23 Nov 45.
4
23d Cml Smoke Generator Bn Unit Diary, 18 Apr-3 Jun 43.
for the first three days of the operation. Chemical decontamination

troops, scheduled to go ashore with the initial landings, were at first
to use smoke pots and M2 generators to provide any necessary smoke.
The 23d Battalion, with two companies on land and two on offshore
trawlers, would assume responsibility for the antiaircraft smoke at
OMAHA Beach on D plus 3.5
Once these general plans for smoke operations were completed, the
units which were to take part could begin realistic training for their
projected tasks. The 30th, 31st, and 33d Decontamination Companies
received such training and were attached to engineer special brigades
for the operation. The 79th and 80th Smoke Generator Companies,
designated as the sea group of the 23d Battalion, had to become accus-
tomed to working and living on trawlers. Their offshore employment
also presented communications problems which had to be worked out
by the battalion. In order to insure the necessary timing and co-ordi-
nation the 23d was attached to the 49th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade
which had control of smoke although subject to the approval of the
naval command and the veto of the tactical air command.
The two smoke generator battalions assigned to the English ports
naturally began operations before the actual day of the invasion. The
25th, comprising the 85th, 86th, 165th, and 171st Smoke Generator
Companies, furnished smoke in the Weymouth-Portland area. During
the last part of May the Luftwaffe attacked the area three different
times inflicting damage only during raids when the battalion was not
ordered to make smoke. The 24th Battalion (81st, 82d, 87th, and
167th Smoke Generator Companies), part of which saw action in the
vicinity of Brixham, made smoke on fewer occasions than did the
6
25th.
The 33d Chemical Decontamination Company landed on UTAH
Beach on D-day with the multiple Mission of decontamination recon-
naissance, smoke, and CWS supply.7 Although by that afternoon the
unit was prepared to provide smoke on call from VII Corps, the
German Air Force failed to appear in strength and the need for smoke
never materialized. As a consequence, the 33d's main Mission became
that of supply; the CWS dump maintained by the unit handled over
5
Final area smoke plans for the invation appear on FUSA Rpt of Opns, 20 Oct 43-1 Aug 44, an. 17,
Cml Warfare Sec.
6
Pritchard, Smoke Generator Opns in MTO and ETO, pp. 93-94.
7
For details of the invasion, see Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack.
5,000 tons of CWS Class II and IV supplies during the first three weeks
8
on the beachhead.
Both the 30th and 31st Decontamination Companies saw action on
OMAHA Beach. The former's 1st Platoon landed at H plus 16 Minutes
in the Midst of the most rugged fighting of the invasion with the
Missions of decontamination, smoke, and supply. At first, the platoon
fought along side the infantry using small arms and grenades and later,
when the beachhead was secured, it aided in evacuating wounded and
in clearing Mine fields. During the afternoon the portable generators
that had been lost in the surf at the time of the landings were retrieved
and put into operating condition. As at UTAH, there were no calls
for smoke. The 1st Platoon suffered 25 percent casualties on D-day
and was cited for outstanding performance of duty.9 At 1300 the
3d Platoon landed on OMAHA to be joined by the remainder of the
30th Company on D plus 1. A 25-man detachment of the 31st
Decontamination Company came ashore at H plus 7 hours on 6 June
and was reunited with the rest of the company on the next day. In
activities which followed the pattern set by the other decontamination
companies, the men of the 31st performed a series of secondary duties
in the absence of gas warfare and the need for smoke.10
According to plan, the companies of the 23d Smoke Generator Bat-
talion were to have assumed the smoke Mission at OMAHA on D plus 3.
The land contingent of the battalion, the 84th and 161st Companies,
arrived off the beach on the afternoon of D plus 2 and came ashore
that evening. Both companies experienced a great deal of difficulty.
Men and equipment became separated; some roads indicated on the
map were nonexistent and others were heavily Mined or subject to
enemy fire. Fortunately, few German planes appeared over the area
and smoke was not required.11
The 79th and 80th Smoke Generator Companies, with their men and
M1 smoke generators aboard thirty of His Majesty's trawlers, on 9
June arrived off OMAHA Beach, where they served as the offshore
element of the 23d Battalion smoke installation. But they received no
requests for smoke. The great storm of 18-21 June wrecked some of
8
(1) 33d Cml Decontamination Co Hist Resume. CMLHO. (2) Pritchard, Smoke Generator
Opns in MTO and ETO, p. 94.
9
(1) WD GO 21, 30 Mar 45. (2) The 1st Platoon also received the French Croix de Guerre with
Silver-Gilt Star. DA GO 24, 10 Dec 47.
10
31st Cml Decontamination Co, Hist Resume.
11
23d Cml Smoke Generator Bn Unit Diary, June 44.
M2 SMOKE GENERATOR
the trawlers and others returned to England for repair and refueling,
never to return to OMAHA. Some offshore smoke troops did provide
screens at Port en Bessin where both British and Americans were bring-
ing ashore fuel oil and lubricants. Here, in co-ordination with the
British, the smoke trawlers stood ready to provide screens at twilight
and during nocturnal red alerts as long as this important facility seemed
12
threatened.
During the critical period while the Allies were fighting to secure a
firm foothold in Normandy, the landing beaches were virtually free
from bombing from the air, and the need for beachhead and port
screening did not materialize. Equipped with M1 generators, the com-
panies of one smoke battalion did take positions around Cherbourg and
remained on the alert until Mid-August, although the need for smoke
never arose. Under circumstances such as these, smoke units received
12
(1) 23d Cml Smoke Generator Bn Unit Diary, Jun-Jul 44. (2) 79th and 80th Smoke Generator
Cos Unit Diaries, Jun 44.
unrelated secondary Missions, mostly involving trucking duties. Con-

sequently, when an opportune time did arise for using smoke in close
support of tactical operations the companies were busy performing
other tasks.
The Generators, Units, and Missions
The most influential factor in the development of the Mission of
forward area screening in the European theater was the appearance of
the M1 mechanical smoke generator. This compact, efficient generator
enabled chemical troops to establish effective smoke installations in those
areas of the battlefield subject to enemy small arms fire. For example,
the M1 could be emplaced on the near bank in an assault river crossing
and ferried to the far side as soon as that area was cleared of enemy
opposition. The M1 mechanical generator, as already mentioned,
weighed only 171 pounds as compared to the ton and a half figure of
the M1. Employing the same principle as its predecessor, the M1 drew
its fog oil from an external source, usually a 55-gallon drum, and was
capable of producing smoke one Minute after it started operation,
whereas it took the M1 five Minutes. The new model consumed about
fifty gallons of fog oil in an hour compared to twice that amount for
13
its predecessor.
A total of five smoke generator battalions saw action in the European
Theater of Operations. The need for some organization for the admin-istration
evident in Italy in connection with the complex Naples installation

with its several smoke companies. Consequently, three battalion head-
quarters and headquarters detachments, the 23d, 14th, and 15th, were
organized just before the cross-Channel attack. Later the 22d Smoke
Generator Battalion entered the theater as a supporting unit of Seventh
Army, and the 27th Battalion, activated in the zone of interior in July
1944, was placed in support of Ninth Army.
The basic smoke unit was the smoke generator company, 15 of which
saw action in the European theater. A smoke company consisted of a
company headquarters, headquarters platoon, and operations platoon.
The operations platoon comprised 4 sections, each section having 6
squads. A company equipped with M2's had a total of 50 generators,
13
For more on the development and characteristics of the several CWS mechanical smoke generators,
see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field.
2 per operations squad and 2 with company headquarters. Personnel

14
of this smoke company numbered 4 officers and 131 enlisted men.
The same company with the identical number of troops would have
been equipped with only 24 M1 generators, or one per operations squad.
The mission which smoke units had originally considered their most
important, the concealment of ports, never materialized in the Euro-
pean Theater of Operations. Experience at the time of the cross-
Channel attack indicated that the Luftwaffe was not strong enough
to jeopardize these basic supply installations, and this situation did not
change throughout the rest of the war. Seventh Army did maintain
a rather extensive smoke installation at Marseille during the period
September to November 1944, but at no time did the Luftwaffe seri-
ously threaten the port.15
The large area screening mission in the European theater did not
undergo the slow transition from rear to forward areas that had
marked the fighting in North Africa and Italy. The absence of any
great threat by the enemy air force and the development of a mobile
generator meant almost from the first that the smoke companies in the
ETO would play their most significant role in the forward areas,
that is, if they were to play a smoke role at all. Initially, when the
German air threat failed to materialize, the smoke units found them-
selves assigned to a series of secondary missions— transportation, guard,
and security details. Early in the fall of 1944 only four of the twelve
companies assigned to the theater were available for forward area
smoke operations.16 While at times the assignment of smoke companies
to other missions was understandable in the absence of tactical situations
which called for concealment, in other cases the transfer was not
justified. The First Army, for example, could often have used smoke
units in forward operations but refused to do so until the time of the
Rhine crossings.
But gradually smoke companies began fulfilling forward area mis-
sions as the situation warranted. These could be of several kinds.
Screens were used to conceal main supply routes. Seventh Army em-
ployed smoke units in this manner as much as any other army in the
14
TOE 3-267, 4 May 44.
15
(1) See Pritchard, Smoke Generator Opns in MTO and ETO, pp. 215-19. (2) Two U.S. smoke
companies operated with the British at Antwerp for more than two months and smoked the Scheldt
River and the approaches to the city.
16
Ltr, CCmlO ETO COMZ to CCWS, 20 Sep 44, sub: Tactical Use of Smoke Generator Cos. CWS
314.7.
theater, perhaps because of its previous experience in Italy. Com-

manders occasionally used smoke haze to cover the advance or with-
drawal of troops or to cover a unit attacking a fortified position.17
But there can be no doubt whatever that mechanical smoke generators
played their most important role in the theater by concealing American
troops as they crossed many of the rivers which had temporarily
blocked the way to eventual victory. The first such operation took
place early in September at the Moselle River.
The Use of Smoke at River Crossings

General Patton's Third U.S. Army became operational on 1 August
1944 and shortly thereafter began its rapid advance across France. By
the end of August its forward units, outrunning their supplies of oil
and gasoline, ground to a halt east of the Meuse. When the advance
resumed early in September, Third Army faced an enemy with a
second wind and rather good defensive positions behind the Moselle
River.
As long as the Third Army had been rolling forward it doubtless
had been more concerned with fuel oil than fog oil. Its rapid advance
of August left little room for the tactics of concealment, smoke or
otherwise. Consequently, those smoke troops which had been assigned
to Third Army had left their generators and turned to transportation
duties on the supply line, whose tail extended clear back to the Nor-
mandy beaches.
On 6 September Patton's XX Corps renewed the advance with the
7th Armored Division in the van, its mission the seizure of crossing
sites over the Moselle. The 5th Infantry Division, following hard on
the heels of the 7th, prepared to force a crossing if the armored attack
failed. On 7 September the corps commander, Maj. Gen. Walton
Walker, ordered the 5th Division to pass through the 7th Armored
and establish a bridgehead on the east bank of the Moselle at Dornot,
six miles southeast of the fortress city of Metz. This initial attack
across the Moselle proved abortive and two days later, 10 September,
the 5th Division abandoned the precarious bridgehead. On the same
17
For details of these operations, see Pritchard, Smoke Generator Opns in MTO and ETO.
day the 10th Infantry, 5th Division, crossed the Moselle at Arnaville,
three miles south of the site of the unsuccessful crossing.18
The Arnaville Crossing

The 84th Smoke Generator Company was hastily recalled from its
transportation duties to support the Arnaville crossing. The excellence
of German artillery and observation was such as to recommend the
possibilities of smoke as a means of concealing the exposed crossing site.
At this time the possibilities of the M1 generator were not widely
known in Third Army; in fact large area smoke screens in tactical
situations had evolved rather recently. This screen at the Arnaville
assault and bridging sites was thus to provide new experiences for the
various people involved—the infantry, the engineers, and the men of
19
the smoke company.
At the site of the crossing in the narrow valley of the Moselle, a
railroad, a canal, and the river roughly parallel each other in a 500-yard
belt. A small stream, the Rupt de Mad, flows through the Arnaville
gap, passes under the railroad and canal, and empties into the river.
East of the river lay a strip of open land beyond which rose the hills
which were occupied by the enemy. North-south roads on each side
of the river mark the division between river flats and the beginning
of the hills. On clear days the Germans had observation of the Arna-
ville area from 5 or 6 miles down (north) the river and from 3 or 4
miles up the valley.
18
Two other volumes in the series U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II provide additional material on
this battle and on the campaign of which it was a part. Hugh M. Cole's excellent The Lorraine Cam-
paign (Washington, 1959) deals with Third Army Operations in Lorraine during the period September-
December 1944. In the volume Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt, by Charles B. Mac-
Donald and Sidney T. Mathews (Washington, 1 9 5 2 ) , MacDonald gives a detailed and graphic account
of the Arnaville crossings. Both can be profitable to a reader desiring further information on operations
of Third Army in the Lorraine Campaign. For additional details on the use of smoke at Arnaville, see
again Pritchard, Smoke Generator Operations in the MTO and ETO, pages 107-25, a work on which this
present account relied heavily.
19
Chief sources for this account are: (1) CO 84th Cml Smoke Generator Co, Opn Rpt, Vicinity
Arnaville, France, 17 Sep 44; (2) CO 84th Cml Smoke Generator Co, Final Opns Rpt, Arnaville,
France, 10-21 Sep 44; (3) Lt Col Levin B. Cottingham, Employ of a Smoke Generator Co in an
Assault Crossing of the Moselle River, n.d. (ca. 21 Sep 44); (4) 12th Army Group Immediate Rpt
No. 68, I, Use of Smoke in Crossing of the Moselle River, 28 Sep 44; (5) Intervs, Cottingham (for-
merly CmlO 5th Inf Div), 1 Oct 45, 9 Oct 45, 19 Mar 46, 25 Sep 46; (6) Rpt of Lt Col William H.
Greene (formerly CmlO XX Corps) on the smoking operations at Arnaville, France, 10 Sep 44, dated
11Nov 47, all in CMLHO; (7) TUSA AAR, I, 68-81; (8) 5th Inf Div G-3 AAR, Sep 44,
Orgn Files, ETO; (9) 5th Division Historical Section, The Fifth Division in the ETO (Atlanta: Albert
Love Enterprises, 1945).
Early on 9 September Col. Robert P. Bell, commanding the 10th

Infantry, and a party went forward to examine the crossing site.
Despite the presence of enemy mines they were able to select suitable
approaches and found two footbridges over the canal. They also deter-
mined that the river banks were suitable for the launching of assault
boats and the erection of adequate bridges once the area was secured.
In quest of surprise, the artillery plan stipulated that there would
be no preparatory fire preceding the crossing. But smoke from the
generators of the 84th Company was expected to conceal the crossing
sites as dawn broke on the 10th. Lt. Col. Levin B. Cottingham, chemical
officer of the 5th Division, arranged for a meteorological study of the
area as an aid to the smoke operations. He scanned the daily weather
reports of the Air Forces and the local weather supplements of the
division artillery. Arnaville residents verified that the prevailing winds
were westerly and of low velocity. After a reconnaissance Cottingham
and the commander of the 84th Smoke Generator Company decided
on a line of generators behind Hill 303, some 2,300 yards west of the
crossing site. (Map 6). They expected that the prevailing winds
would carry the smoke from these positions over the crossing sites
and over the flat areas on the far side of the river. Concealed from
enemy air and ground operations, engineers could erect and maintain
the necessary bridges in support of the operation. Generators were not
placed at the crossing site at first because of the unlikelihood of wind
change and because of the 84th's lack of experience under fire. Hill
303 protected the generators from direct enemy artillery and small
arms fire, an important consideration for smoke troops who, far from
battle hardened, had been driving trucks across a quiet countryside
only a few days before. One smoke observation post was established
at the OP of the 10th Infantry's Cannon Company on the crest of
Hill 331, south of Arnaville. Another was located on Hill 303. Cot-
tingham, the smoke control officer at the crossing site, used radio to
keep in touch with the observation posts. The 1103d Engineer Combat
Group, commanded by Lt. Col. George E. Walker, charged with the
bridge building operation, had tactical control of the screen.
Fog oil for the M2 generators was available at the Third Army depot
at Troyes, 180 miles to the rear. Because the organic transportation of
a smoke company was inadequate to cope with such lengthy supply
lines, the division quartermaster lent the trucks for fetching the fog
MAP 6
oil to a company supply area four miles to the rear of the forward
dump behind Hill 303. Company vehicles hauled the oil drums the
rest of the way. In addition to generator smoke, the 84th had a supply
of M1 and M4 smoke pots to be used for patching gaps in generator
smoke and for supplemental screening.
The 84th moved into its positions during the night of 9-10 Sep-
tember and was ready to produce smoke at dawn. Initially the company
set up only twelve generators at Position 1, a number which could be
increased or decreased as the situation demanded since the full comple-
ment of fifty generators was available.
At 0115 on 10 September troops of the 1st Battalion, 10th Infantry,
began loading into the boats on the near bank of the Moselle. They
SMOKE SCREEN BEGINS To FORM ON THE MOSELLE RIVER
encountered scattered small arms fire immediately and machine gun

and mortar fire as they advanced over the flat open terrain across the
river, but the first German artillery fire did not fall until daybreak.
By this time the 2d Battalion had also begun its crossing, assisted by
the smoke of the M2 generators which opened up at 0600. Under this
concealment the 2d Battalion completed its crossing, the wounded
were evacuated from the far shore, and supplies and ammunition were
sent across to the embattled troops. By 0800, after close fighting and
heavy casualties, the two battalions had taken two hills. Suddenly at
1000 the wind shifted, causing the screen to dissipate. Enemy artillery
concentrated on the crossing site, now laid bare.
Within an hour Colonel Cottingham and Lt. Frank W. Young, of
the 84th Company, moved four generators down to the side of an
abandoned railroad embankment (Position 2 on the map). Smoke
pots helped conceal the generators as they began to build up a screen,
and by 1200 the crossing site was again covered by smoke. Shortly
before noon Brig. Gen. Alan D. Warnock, assistant division com-
mander, and Cottingham looked for the commanding officer of the
84th Smoke Generator Company to tell him to keep the generators
running continuously, 1st Lt. George R. Lamb, the company executive
officer, was across the river reconnoitering for new emplacements, and
Lieutenant Young continued to direct operations along the near bank.
The company commander could not be found. At this point, Col.
William H. Greene, XX Corps chemical officer, present to inspect the
screening operation, joined Cottingham in a search for company per-
sonnel. There were many barrels for fog oil at the dump west of
Arnaville, but no sign of smoke generator troops. The two CWS
officers eventually located a group under control of the 1st sergeant
who, not without difficulty, organized details to move generators and
fog oil to the crossing site. Without preparation for this type of oper-
ation and without company leadership, a number of the smoke troops
had to be urged to take up positions down by the river bank. Upon
making his appearance in the late afternoon, the company commander
was relieved and replaced by Lieutenant Lamb.
The number of generator positions was soon increased in order that
an effective screen might be maintained, regardless of the direction of
the wind. Position 3 paralleled a short stretch of the Arnaville-Noveant
road and was later augmented by a jeep-mounted generator which pa-
trolled the road on the lookout for any gaps in the screen. That night
eight generator crews crossed the Moselle with their equipment, dug
in their generators, and were ready to start operations at Position 4
at dawn of 11 September. The new smoke plan also included emergency
Positions 5 and 6, located south of Arnaville, but these were never
needed in the operation.20
At daybreak on 11 September the 84th began smoking operations
at Position 3 on the far bank of the river. For several hours activity
at the bridgehead was essentially unmolested; enemy shelling had prac-
tically ceased. The engineers had hauled several pieces of heavy equip-
ment to the near bank and were about to begin bridge construction.
Around 0900 an unidentified engineer, doubtlessly influenced by the
absence of opposition and the interference of smoke with bridging
20
It was also during the night of 10-11 September that the smoke company tested the feasibility of a
screen against artillery observation and air bombardment on moonlight nights, although the bridgehead
was neither bombed or strafed during any night of the operation.
activities, ordered the smoke generators to shut down.21 As soon as

the screen dissipated, hell broke loose on the bridge site. German artil-
lery made direct hits on two pieces of heavy engineer equipment and
killed or wounded several engineers. Cottingham ordered the screen
re-established at once, and the engineers shifted their efforts 300 yards
downstream inasmuch as the enemy had pinpointed the original bridge
site. To avoid any future interference with smoking activity, the
division commander assumed control at the bridge site, to be exercised
by his chemical officer.
The engineers rated the value of smoke at Arnaville less highly than
did the participating chemical officers. After the war, Colonel Walker
expressed the view that enemy fire on the crossing site was limited
more by a shortage of ammunition than by American smoke.22 Un-
doubtedly the enemy did suffer from a limited supply of ammunition
and could not make lavish use of shells for missions of harassment and
interdiction. But his interest in lucrative targets of opportunity, as
evidenced by this experience on 10 and 11 September, was enough to
convince the 5th Division that a smoke screen should be maintained.
A 15-hour screen on 12 September was featured by the use of a jeep-
mounted generator on the valley road east of the river. About noon
engineers completed a treadway bridge at the north site but had to
withdraw temporarily because of heavy shelling. The screen continued
on 13 September although from time to time enemy fire made the
location almost untenable. That day German guns inflicted four casu-
alties and destroyed two generators of the 84th Company and two of
its trucks.
Again on the 14th enemy fire forced the engineers to evacuate the
bridge site from time to time. Fluctuating winds frequently exposed
generator emplacements to direct enemy observation, and the crews
hurriedly moved their generators after such an exposure. Smoke pots
hid upwind generators, filled gaps in the line, and maintained the screen
while crews replaced or repaired generators. Enemy fire killed one
man of the smoke company and wounded another. Late on the 14th,
engineers completed the bridge at the south site making possible one-
21
(1) Colonel Walker of the 1103d Engineer Combat Group was not the officer who gave the order.
Three Battles, p. 74n. (2) Some engineer accounts place the time of heavy shelling several hours
earlier, but MacDonald in his Arnaville account, after a careful study of the after action reports, agrees
that 0900, the time set by Cottingham, must have been the approximate hour. Ibid., p. 74.
22
MacDonald in Three Battles, page 67, cites this opinion by Colonel Walker.
way traffic across the Moselle. That day there was some decrease in
enemy fire. On the 15th the 5th Division captured the dominating
hill in the area, and German artillery fire further diminished with the
advance of the infantry and armor. Thus the bridgehead was secured
at a cost of 725 casualties in the 10th Infantry, 13 killed and 100
wounded in the 1103d Engineer Combat Group, and 2 killed and 7
wounded in the 84th Smoke Generator Company.
Securing the bridgehead did not eliminate the need for smoke, for
the Arnaville bridges, which became integral parts of the main supply
route for succeeding operations of XX Corps, remained under German
observation from Fort Driant and neighboring points in the vicinity
of Metz. The 161st Smoke Generator Company, under the command
of Capt. Charles D. Underwood, relieved the 84th on 21 September
and maintained a screen at Arnaville until the 25th, when XX Corps
decided that smoke was no longer necessary. Enemy artillery promptly
destroyed the treadway bridge and damaged the ponton structure,
stopping all traffic. In response to an engineer request for the resump-
tion of the screen a section of the 84th returned on the 29th and
established "a very comforting smoke screen." 23 Enemy guns at Fort
Driant, with much of the Moselle Valley in range, continued to fire
indiscriminately but failed to damage seriously the heavy ponton
bridge.24
The Lessons Learned at Arnaville

The operation at Arnaville demonstrated for the first time in the
European theater that smoke generators could give effective support
to an opposed river crossing. The experience also served notice that
certain improvements were desirable.
Even before the operation began it was evident that a smoke company
had enough organic vehicles for transporting fog oil and supplies from
company dumps to forward positions, but too few 2½-ton trucks
to haul oil from the army supply point. The 5th Division solved the
problem of fetching oil from the army supply by augmenting the five
company trucks with additional vehicles. This matter of limited or-
ganic transportation and its effect on resupply remained a constant
23
Col. William C. Hall, CE, "Harassing Fire," The Field Artillery Journal, vol. 35, No. 2 (February,
1940. PP. 68-69.
24
TUSA AAR, vol. II, pt. III, p.
problem for smoke generator companies in the fighting in France and

Germany.25 The Arnaville experience also pointed out that definite
plans had to be made to get generators and fog oil across the river at
an early hour. This meant making an initial assignment of boats and
rafts to the smoke company for that specific purpose, an assignment
which quite possibly would have been made if a section of the 84th
Chemical Smoke Generator Company had been a component part of
the river crossing assault team.
The operation focused attention on the need for definite control of
area screening. Tactical control of the screen by the engineer unit
responsible for the bridge appeared logical at first. But the action of
the engineers in shutting down the screen in the course of the operation
caused all elements to suffer and demonstrated that in certain tactical
situations it was highly desirable to clear smoke interference complaints
through division headquarters where a decision could best be made.
In fact, in subsequent river crossing operations the 5th Division kept
control of the screen in the hands of the commanding general until
his rear boundary had advanced beyond the bridge. If screening was
still necessary, as it was at Arnaville, control reverted to the corps
engineer unit charged with maintaining the bridge.
One of the most important lessons learned at the Moselle was the
fallacy of depending upon prevailing winds and the necessity of plan-
ning for winds from any quarter. On 10 September the prevailing
wind remained constant for the first four hours and then turned
variable and remained so for several days. Five valleys converged near
the vital point, and at times the smoke from generators only several
hundred yards apart drifted in opposite directions. Matters were made
worse by difficulties in the observation and adjustment of the Arnaville
screen. Colonel Cottingham decided to experiment with aerial obser-
vation because the hills which rose beyond the far bank were too
insecurely held for the establishment of observation posts. Beginning
on 14 September he made at least three flights daily: one at 0800,
another at 1300 when convection currents began raising havoc with
the screen, and the last at 1700 when the air temperature began
dropping. Aerial observation revealed defects which could not be
noticed from the ground, enabling the observer to anticipate the
25
(1) Pritchard, Smoke Generator Opns in MTO and ETO, p. 119; (2) USFET Study 69, Smoke
Generator Opns and Orgns, pp. 10-11.
effects of wind change. He could note smoke drift from fires in

villages and streamers from artillery smoke shell and thus direct gen-
erator shifts before the development of any serious gaps. Usually such
a trip in a liaison plane, borrowed from the artillery, took about fifteen
minutes, but on one trip conditions were so miserable that the necessary
adjustments required almost two hours.
Maintenance proved a problem despite the fact that a continuous
screen required only a few generators operating simultaneously and
that the average generator hours of operation in a day was only forty-
four. Experience indicated that extra generators, strategically placed,
obviated the need of shifting others when variations and veerings ap-
peared in the wind or when a generator failed to operate. And as a
rule three generators a day were replaced because of mechanical failures,
burned-out coils for the most part. Consequently, before the end of
the operation all forty-eight generators had to be employed. In
subsequent operations, assignment to the division of mechanics from
a chemical maintenance company brought about improvement in
maintenance.
The experience at Arnaville indicated the need for additional smoke
generator operators. One man per generator sufficed for rear area
screening but the conditions encountered in the front lines made two
operators mandatory. The additional man enabled proper reliefs and
insured that someone was available for relaying messages to the next
position along the smoke line. In case of a casualty, one operator could
administer first aid and keep the generator operating. And two men
at a position were better for morale.
Troops coming directly from the communications zone into a sector
under enemy artillery and small arms fire had to make a rapid mental
and emotional adjustment. A few men cracked under the strain, but
the majority held up well. Nonetheless, this initial experience demon-
strated that a smoke company should have combat training and a
period of indoctrination before commitment to an assault crossing
operation.26
The 84th Chemical Smoke Generator Company began its Arnaville
operations under the additional handicap of inefficient direction before
its attachment to the 5th Division. Both personal and organizational
26
The 90th Division chemical officer reached the same conclusion about another smoke generator unit.
See Ltr, CmlO 90th Div to CCmlO ETO, 20 Jan 45, sub: Opns of Smoke Generator Company in
Support of River Crossing. CWS 3 14.7.
equipment were below standard, with a number of men lacking articles

of clothing, rifle belts, helmets, and canteens. Some trailers had been
left at the last bivouac before reaching the division. Training in the
important areas of communications and map reading was below
standard. All these factors, combined with the examples of poor lead-
ership on the part of the company commander once the 84th was
committed to action, contributed to make more difficult the company's
introduction to combat. A few shifts in leadership and the example
set by officers and men who did respond to demands of the situation
helped mold the unit into an efficient team. That the performance of
the 84th improved is indicated by the fact that General Walker
awarded Bronze Star medals to an officer and four enlisted men and
by the statement of the 5th Division Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3,
after the operation, that "a Smoke Generator Company must be in-
cluded in making a river crossing.27
The Third Army Crossing of the Saar River

After the successful campaign against Metz, which fell in late
November 1944, XX Corps was ready to begin its advance into Ger-
many.28 By 1 December the corps had reached the west bank of the
Saar River and was preparing to establish bridgeheads on the east bank,
in the face of the West Wall defenses of the enemy. Before reaching
the West Wall, one of the most strongly fortified areas in Europe,
Third Army would have to cross the open river flats, a tactical situation
which could well call for a considerable use of smoke.29
The XX Corps plan for the Saar operation called for assault cross-
ings in the Dillingen-Saarlautern sector by the 90th and 95th Divisions
while the 10th Armored Division feinted a crossing near Hilbringen.
The 161st Smoke Generator Company, attached to the 10th Armored
Division, was ordered to screen the vicinity of the partially destroyed
Merzig bridge, which, for all the enemy could know, might already
30
have been repaired for a crossing operation. Beginning on 4 December
the 84th Smoke Generator Company screened both flanks of the 95th
27
5th Inf Div G-3 AAR, Sep 44. Orgn Files, ETO.
28
The Metz campaign involved assault crossings of the Moselle, Seille, and Nied Rivers, all of which
were effectively supported by the 84th and 161st Smoke Generator Companies. For a discussion of the
use of smoke in these operations, see Pritchard, Smoke Generator Opns in the MTO and ETO.
29
Elements of XII Corps crossed the Saar on the right of XX Corps.
30
(1) TUSA AAR, II, pt. II, 9. (2) 10th Armored Div CWS Sec AAR, 1-31 Dec 44.
Division as it crossed the river in the vicinity of Saarlautern. The

division also called for generator smoke on the captured bridge at
Saarlautern and over the construction activities at Lisdorf.31
The most extended screening missions of the Saar crossing were
those in the Dillingen-Pachten area, several miles north of Saarlautern,
in support of the 90th Division. These operations involved the 84th
and 161st Smoke Generator Companies, and elements of the 81st
Chemical Mortar Battalion. The infantry began crossing before dawn
on 6 December, and smoke operations began at daybreak. Entrenched
behind the West Wall on the far side of the Saar River, the Germans
could observe all feasible crossing sites and the road nets leading to
them. Artillery and mortar fire hit throughout the river area during
the whole period of the operation, and in the early phase enemy small
arms fire covered the crossing sites. The smoke troops at the ferry
32
site were still within range of small arms fire as late as 10 December.
So heavy was hostile fire that for the sixteen days of the assault, engi-
neers of the 90th Division were unable to erect a vehicular bridge and
operated ferry traffic only with great difficulty. The variable winds
which prevailed for the first six days tore gaps in the screen, so that
mortar and artillery smoke shells had to be used as supplements.33
On 19 December the 90th Division began to withdraw from the
east bank as part of Third Army regroupment to oppose the German
breakthrough in the Ardennes. This maneuver involved the movement
of nine battalions of infantry and more than 100 vehicles through a
restricted crossing site which was still within range of enemy artillery
and which was serviced by only a single ferry, one foot-bridge, and a
few assault boats. The 84th and 161st Smoke Generator Companies
screened the withdrawal successfully and were among the last troops to
return to the near bank.
Screens for the crossing and withdrawal at the Saar resulted in
expenditures of 151,000 gallons of fog oil and 8,500 HC smoke pots.
The smoke line near Dillingen had extended for more than 2,000 yards
31
(1) 84th Cml Smoke Generator Co, Summary of Smoke Opns in the ETO, 12 May 45. (2) For
an account of the spectacular capture of this bridge by the 1st Battalion, 379th Infantry, see Cole, The
Lorraine Campaign, pages 517-19.
32
During these operations seven enlisted men of the 161st and one officer and three men of the 84th
received a total of two Silver Star and nine Bronze Star medals for valor under fire.
33
(1) 90th Inf Div, Rpt of Opns, Dec 44, pp. 7-26. Orgn Files, ETO. This report furnishes a
detailed account of the difficulties of screening and bridging the Saar River at Dillingen during both the
assault and the withdrawal phases. (2) Ltr, Div CmlO 90th Inf Div to CCmlO ETO, 20 Jan 45. (3)
81st Cml Mortar Bn AAR, Dec 44.
and covered troops and vehicles moving up to, as well as across, the
Saar River and had effectively concealed traffic along roads to Saar-
lautern and other points. Enemy sources reported that U.S. "artificial
fog" along the Saar interfered with German observation and diminished
34
the effectiveness of his artillery fire.
Smoke Operations at the Roer

As early as December 1944 Ninth Army was aware of the desirability
of smoke support for its contemplated Roer River crossing, and it
was at this time that it had secured the services of the 74th and 83d
Smoke Generator Companies.35 These units, commanded respectively
by Capt. George B. Warren, Jr. ,and Capt. Augustus H. Shaw, Jr.,
were attached to XIII and XIX Corps. Both companies underwent
training for front-line operations since preparations in the zone of
interior had been directed toward the rear area mission. The German
counteroffensive in the Ardennes delayed the scheduled Roer crossing.
During this interval Ninth Army held smoke demonstrations in the
rear area of the 29th Division to acquaint infantry and engineer com-
manders with the capabilities and limitations of the mechanical
generator.36
With the defeat of the Germans in the Ardennes, the Allies again
focused their attention on the Rhine. But the immediate objective
was to cross the Roer, and Ninth Army, flanked on the right by the
First Army, was to launch an assault crossing of that river and advance
northeast to join forces with the First Canadian Army, which was to
drive southward along the Rhine and clear its west bank. The Ninth
Army sector was a broad, flat region cut by the Roer and other streams
which flow generally in a northward direction. Entrenched on the far
bank the enemy had excellent observation of the western approaches
to the river. He also was able to flood the Ninth Army sector by the
controlled release of water from the dams up the valley. As a conse-
quence, the 10 February target date for the crossing was postponed
until 23 February when Ninth Army assaulted on a 2-corps front—the
34
Interv, Hist Div ETOUSA with Maj Gen Kurt von Muehlen (former commander of Kampfgruppe
Muehlen), Apr 46. MS # A-972 in OCMH.
35
These were the first smoke units assigned to the Ninth Army which became operational on5
September 1944.
36
(1) 83d Cml Smoke Generator Co Opns Rpt, 19-30 Dec 44. (2) 29th Div AAR, Dec 44.
XIII on the left near Linnich and the XIX on the right in the vicinity
of Jülich.
The 74th Smoke Generator Company supported the crossing of the
84th Division in the XIII Corps sector. On the night of 22-23 Feb-
ruary the 74th used smoke pots from 2000 to 0315 while engineer and
infantry troops concentrated on the near bank; the assault began at
the latter hour under concealment of smoke which drifted toward
the far side. At first, the smoke company used only pots for fear that
the noise and placement of the mechanical generators would disclose
the position and intention of the infantry, separated from the enemy
only by the Roer River. But after the crossing the 74th used both
mechanical generators and pots in smoking the bridge sites. Each day
it stood by prepared to smoke on call. Each night from 1700 to 0700
hours it screened several bridges in the vicinity of Linnich from enemy
aircraft. The 74th continued these missions until 3 March, first in
support of the 102d Division and then while attached to the 19th
Antiaircraft Artillery Group. The screening at Linnich was generally
successful despite understandable complaints about the irritating effect
of HC smoke and some interference with traffic and friendly artillery
observation. The smoke materially aided bridging operations and, ac-
cording to infantrymen of the 1st Battalion, 333d Infantry, effectively
concealed the flash from their 60-mm. mortars.37
While the Linnich assault was in progress, XIX Corps crossed the Roer
upstream on a 2-division front, the 29th Division on the left at Jülich
and the 30th Division on the right in the Pier-Schophoven area. Corps
assigned the 83d Smoke Generator Company (less one section) to the
29th Division which in turn attached it to the 121st Engineer Combat
Battalion. The smoke plan for the operation stipulated that Company
A, 92d Chemical Mortar Battalion, use white phosphorus shells to
supplement the generator smoke in the event of unfavorable winds.
Screening began at 0350, twenty minutes after the initial assault, along
a 2-mile smoke line opposite Jülich. Under cover of this smoke engi-
neers worked with little hindrance by the enemy. A request by the divi-
sion engineer that smoke be continued after daybreak to keep observed
enemy fire away from the bridge sites was overruled by corps because
37
(1) 74th Cml Smoke Generator Co Rpt of Smoke Generator Opns (5 Feb-3 Mar 4 5 ) , 9 Mar 45.
(2) Ltr, CO 27th Smoke Generator Bn to CmlO Ninth Army, 25 Feb 45, sub: Smoke Opns of the 74th
Smoke Generator Co. (3) 84th Inf Div AAR, Feb 45, pp. 13-25. Orgn Files, ETO.
of interference with the observation of corps artillery.38 Shortly after

the screen lifted hostile artillery fire destroyed one of the bridges under
construction. It was the opinion of the division engineer that smoke
might well have saved the bridge, and the XIX Corps staff was con-
vinced that better smoke co-ordination was needed in future
39
operations.
Several miles upstream the 30th Division planned to cross the Roer
River in the vicinity of Schophoven and Pier and drive north to the
Cologne-Jülich highway along which the enemy might launch a coun-
terattack against the Jülich bridgehead of the 29th Division. It ex-
pected that the crossing would be difficult because of the swollen
channels, the many pools of water from the recent floods, the spongy
soil, and the lack of cover. In fact, during November Ninth Army
had considered a crossing in that vicinity impracticable.40
The infantry began the crossing by boat at 0330 23 February after
a 45-minute artillery preparation reported to have been one of the
heaviest concentrations of fire experienced in the European theater.41
Along the 8,000-yard division front 246 artillery pieces, 35 mortars of
the 92d Chemical Mortar Battalion, and 36 guns of the 823d Tank
Destroyer Battalion participated in the preparation. The initial assault
force encountered only light opposition. The 119th Infantry crossed
at the north site, opposite Schophoven, while one battalion of the
120th Infantry crossed to the south, opposite Pier. A mile of low,
boggy ground and water separated the two sites.
The smoke plan called for screens over both these sites, as well as
over the area between them, during the twelve daylight hours of 23
February. If conditions should prevent the effective screening of both
bridge sites, the northern bridge was to have priority. The division
commander maintained control of the use of smoke, while the division
chemical officer supervised its operation. The critical observation posts
of the enemy were in the towns on the far bank and along the low
ridge of hills to the northeast. At first, only one section (twelve gen-
38
(1) Ltr, Col John B. Cobb to Hist Off, 18 Jan 50. (2) Ltr, Col Charles H. Gerhardt to Hist
Off, 9 Feb 51. Gerhardt, as a major general in command of the 29th Division during this operation,
wanted the screen continued during daylight hours but was overruled by corps.
39
(1) Cobb Ltr, 18 Jan 50. (2) Ltr, CmlO 29th Div to CmlO XIX Corps, 7 Mar 45, sub: Smoke
Generator Opn in Roer River Crossing. CMLHO. (3) 83d Cml Smoke Generator Co, Notes on Roer
River Screening, Koslar, Germany, 23 Feb 45, n.d.
40
Robert L. Hewitt, Work Horse of the Western Front: The Story of the 30th Infantry Division
(Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), pp. 212-13.
41
Ibid., pp. 215-16.
erators and crews) of the 83d Smoke Generator Company was avail-
able, supplemented by a detachment of seventeen infantrymen, several
mechanics from the 57th Chemical Maintenance Company, and two
men from the division chemical section. For several nights preceding
the jump-off, smoke troops went forward and dug foxholes, established
supply dumps, and prepared generator emplacements.42
The smoke troops moved into position at 0245 on 23 February. The
din of the heavy artillery preparation drowned the noise of movement
and darkness hid the exact location of the bridging area. Smoking
began at 0630. The generators provided good concealment at the
northern site but unexpected winds at the south site tore gaps in the
screen. The smoke line was extended to the southeast. In mid-morning
engineers ceased construction on the south bridge because of accurate
artillery fire, which was probably adjusted when gaps appeared in the
screen. After one battalion crossed on boats and Alligators, the 120th
Infantry transferred its effort to the northern site where the 119th,
under effective smoke concealment, was crossing without much
difficulty.
Smoke concealed the northern crossing throughout the day. While
engineers worked on a treadway bridge, infantrymen crossed a foot
bridge and overran enemy positions on the east bank of the river.
Maj. Gen. Leland S. Hobbs, commanding the 30th Division, ordered
the screen continued during the coming night and the next day. The
request for the night screen was prompted by the Luftwaffe which had
been rather active during the previous two nights and which was using
a number of jet-propelled planes. Another section of the smoke com-
pany came from the 29th Division at Jülich to help maintain the screen.
During the night of 23—24 February the 30th Division extended the
bridgehead to the northeast, capturing the towns of Hambach and
Niederzier and eliminating enemy observation of bridge sites from the
east. The northern bridge was opened to passage of armor at midnight.
By dawn the wind was from the north and smoke troops established
pot positions on the far bank along the western edge of the
Krauthausen-Selgersdorf road. Troops and armor advancing over this
route were exposed to observed fire from the woods beyond Hambach,
so the smoke line was moved eastward across the road, 100 yards into the
42
CmlO 30th Div Rpt on Roer River Smoke Screen, Schophoven, Germany, 23-24 Feb 45, n.d. This
report covers in detail the planning and operational phases of screening for the 30th Division at the
Roer crossing, and is the chief source for the discussion of that crossing.
fields. For the same reason, other smoke positions were established
north of the Selgersdorf-Daubenrath road. Chemical troops captured
four prisoners while setting up these final positions in an area infested
with enemy mines.
Division headquarters ordered smoke over both the northern and the
southern bridges for the night of 24-25 February. But the supply of
smoke pots was exhausted by about 1530 hours and the M2 generators
were in need of repair after a long period of continuous operation.
Moreover, the crews were fatigued from thirty-three hours of con-
tinuous duty. Consequently, the decision to use smoke that night was
canceled. By morning the 30th Division had driven the enemy beyond
range of observation, and smoke was no longer necessary.
Large area screening activities along the Roer contributed to the
success of 30th Division operations in several ways. Smoke over the
northern area enabled the engineers to start construction of a vehicular
bridge five hours earlier than had been anticipated. The enemy never
had an opportunity to deliver observed fire, a circumstance that enabled
the 295th Engineer Combat Battalion to maintain uninterrupted bridg-
ing operations. In fact, there was not a single engineer casualty from
enemy fire at the northern bridge. As a result of this building feat, the
first armor moved across the Roer River at H plus 21, fifteen hours
ahead of schedule.43 Another benefit of the screen was the concealment
of infantry and armor units moving up to, across, and beyond the
river, particularly those units in the vicinity of Selgersdorf. In two
instances the infantry called for extension of the smoke coverage near
the front line. Captured prisoners stated that, while they believed the
Roer offensive was imminent, the darkness at the time of the initial
attack and the subsequent screening confused the Germans as to the
exact location of the American effort. The plan for the Roer crossing
had called for only twelve hours of smoke, but during operations
screening continued without cessation for thirty-three hours. This
extension was indicative of the effectiveness of the screen and the value
which General Hobbs placed upon smoke.44
First Army crossed the Roer on the right of Ninth Army. The VII
Corps, on the left, crossed near Düren and advanced northeastward
43
Combat Observer XIX Corps to CG ETOUSA, 28 Feb 45, Observers Rpt No. 155 (Roer River
Crossing).
44
(1) CmlO 30th Div Rpt on Roer River Smoke Screen, Schophoven, Germany, 23-24 Feb 45, n.d.
(2) Hewitt, Work Horse of the Western Front, p. 221.
to protect the right flank of Ninth Army. The 104th and 8th Divisions
spearheaded the corps attack. The other two corps of First Army, the
III in the center and the V on the right, initially remained on the
defensive but were prepared to advance on or after D plus 2.45
Forward area screening developed slowly in the First Army. There
was none during 1944, with the exception of an August operation at
Mayenne, France, which shielded a bridge against enemy air bombard-
ment. But the smoke tests that Col. Kenneth A. Cunin, army chemical
officer, ran at Liege in late 1944 impressed at least one high ranking
commander, Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, commanding VII Corps.
Collins and his engineer officer, Col. Mason Young, both saw great
possibilities in using the mechanical smoke generator in assault river
crossings and the general attempted to get some to support his corps'
assault of the Roer. Circumstances prevented the use of smoke gen-
erators in the Roer crossing. Col. Jack A. Barnes, VII Corps chemical
officer, had too little time to collect the equipment or to assemble
suitable trained troops. In fact, the only trained smoke units were the
79th and 80th Smoke Generator Companies and these, the First Army
commander decided, could not be released from the secondary duties
to which they had been assigned. Any screening operation would
therefore have to depend upon the smoke pot and the white phosphorus
shells of the chemical mortar. The plan for using smoke in the sector
of the 104th Division was abandoned when its artillery commander
46
objected to possible interference with observation.
The 8th Division planned to cross south of Düren with the 28th
Infantry on the right at Lendersdorf and the 13th Infantry on the left.
After the crossing, the 28th Infantry was to protect the corps right
flank until III Corps entered the fight. The 13th Infantry did not
plan to employ smoke at the crossing, but the 28th Infantry made
provisions for using HC pots to conceal the initial assault and the
subsequent bridge construction. S/Sgt. Robert J. Cesari of the 80th
Smoke Generator Company gave training in smoke tactics to the
infantrymen of the reserve battalion who were to man the pots. On
the eve of the attack Capt. Kirk J. Ruger, commanding the 80th, was
attached to the division as smoke observer and adviser. He was espe-
cially concerned with screens planned for the two bridges which were
45
FUSA Rpt of Opns, 1 Aug 44-22. Feb 45, p. 160.
46
Interv, Hist Off with Barnes, 27 Jun 50. Barnes believed that division objection to smoke would
have been overruled had mechanical generators been available.
to be built by the 294th Engineer Combat Battalion in the vicinity

47
of Lendersdorf.
The 28th Infantry jumped off near Lendersdorf early on 23 Feb-
ruary. The smoke from HC pots, the haze from shell fire, and the
morning mist concealed the crossing site until shortly after 1000.
During this phase the two bridge sites (Nos. 9 and 10) received sporadic
and unobserved small arms and mortar fire. But at 1000 the west wind
ceased, the screen lifted, and accurate enemy artillery fire began to
come in on bridge site 10. Captain Ruger's suggestion to have Company
D, 87th Chemical Mortar Battalion, fire WP shells against enemy
positions on the right flank across the river was ruled out for fear that
friendly troops might be in the impact area. In the absence of wind
the use of smoke pots would have been ineffective.
There was also trouble at the bridge site No. 9, visited by Ruger in
midafternoon. Engineers had suspended all activity on this treadway
bridge because of the direct fire from an enemy self-propelled gun
on the opposite bank, accompanied by small arms fire. The division's
assistant commander, Brig. Gen. Charles D. W. Canham, insisted that
the bridge be started promptly, regardless of cost, and asked Ruger
to recommend the use of smoke so as to conceal renewed attempts at
construction. A light northwesterly wind had set in by this time and
Ruger suggested a smoke installation through Lendersdorf augmented
by floating pots which, because of the curve in the stream, would
establish a semicircular smoke line around the crossing site. But in
the meantime enemy fire had increased so much that all work was
postponed at this site and concentrated on bridge No. 10. Company
D, 87th Chemical Mortar Battalion, was then ordered to establish a
smoke screen on the far bank where the Roer River intersected the
III-VII Corps boundary. Sergeant Cesari had already set up a smoke
line around bridge No. 10 and his smoke detail of ten men from the
28th Infantry had placed the pots. The heavy fire, however, had
scattered the detail and Cesari had to light the pots himself. The
smoke drew additional fire, but the engineers were able to resume work
on the footbridge. Chemical troops maintained HC and WP screens
47
(1) 2d Ind, CmlO First Army to CmlO 12th Army Group, 5 Apr 45, on Ltr, CO 80th Smoke
Generator Co to CO 23d Smoke Generator Bn, 28 Feb 45, sub: Rpt on Smoke Opns 23d, 24th, 25th
Feb, Roer River Assault and Crossing. CWS Unit Files, 23d SG Bn. CMLHO, (2) 23d Cml Smoke
Generator Bn Unit Diary, 18-24 Feb 45. (3) 294th Engr Combat Bn AAR, 1-28 Feb. 45. Orgn
Files, ETO.
from 1630 until darkness. That night the Luftwaffe bombed and
strafed the bridge site while enemy artillery continued to fire into the
48
area. Next morning the commanding officer, 28th Infantry, on the
advice of Captain Ruger, ordered Company D, 87th Chemical Mortar
Battalion, to continue the screen on the high ground to the southeast.
German artillery fire on the bridge sites lessened but did not cease.
Obviously the enemy knew the location of the engineers. Later in the
day jet fighters strafed the bridge sites, by now without smoke prob-
ably because the pot supply was exhausted. That night enemy planes
dropped flares and continued to bomb and strafe the area, damaging
the bridge at site No. 9 and some engineer equipment. The air effort
which continued until noon of the 25th had as many as twenty planes
over the area at one time.49
Smoke was not effectively used to support the Roer crossing of the
28th Infantry. VII Corps correctly estimated during the planning
stage that the enemy could seriously oppose any crossing in the 28th
Infantry sector for at least three days. The two bridge sites remained
within mortar range of an enemy-held area on the right flank which
was not engaged by American forces until 26 February, or three
days after the 28th Infantry attack. Projected smoke could have been
employed here profitably, as Captain Ruger suggested, if suitable co-
ordination had existed. Under the prevailing northwest wind mechan-
ical generators could have concealed the bridges effectively without
seriously interfering with infantry or artillery operations. For the
most part, the smoke would have drifted into enemy-held territory
opposite III Corps. The area to be covered was too large to be effec-
tively hidden by smoke pots. The 4.2-inch chemical mortars placed
smoke on observation points to the southeast, but only after the enemy
had ranged in on the bridges. And none of these screens could conceal
the bridge sites from an attack. German artillery fire and bombing
delayed the construction of the two bridges, so that they were not
finished until more than forty-eight hours after the fighting began, and
50
then at a cost of 23 wounded engineers. Smoke, if properly employed,
undoubtedly would have reduced enemy observation and probably
48
Interv, 2d Info and Hist Serv, First Army, with Ruger and Cesari, 1 Mar 45.
49
(1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, CO 80th Cml Smoke Generator Co to CO 23d Cml Smoke Generator Bn,
28 Feb 45, sub: Rpt on Smoke Opns, 23d, 24th, 25th Feb 45, Roer River Assault and Crossing.
50
Part of the delay was due to the rapid current and high water. At other crossings of VII Corps,
however, bridges were completed much sooner. Just a few miles down the Roer the 30th Division
(Ninth Army) completed a vehicular bridge in twenty-one hours under the cover of smoke.
would have lessened the time required for construction and the number
51
of engineer casualties suffered in the process.
The Use of Smoke at the Rhine River Crossings

When the Allies terminated the Rhineland Campaign on 21 March
1945 they found themselves, with one exception, poised along the west
bank of the Rhine, ready for the final assault. The exception was the
Remagen bridgehead in the First U.S. Army sector, where a combina-
tion of fortuitous circumstances and aggressive action by the leaders
and men of Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division, secured on
7 March the only Rhine River bridge taken intact by the Allies. During
the fourth week in March the Ninth, Third, and Seventh U.S. Armies
successfully assaulted the Rhine. In each case, units of the four armies
used smoke generator companies to conceal either their actual assault
crossing or the crossing sites during the period of build-up.
The unexpected capture of the Ludendorf railroad bridge on 7
March and the rapid expansion of the bridgehead radically changed
the First Army plans for the Rhine crossings. Under the new plan
VII Corps would expand the Remagen bridgehead northward to the
Sieg River. As army forces cleared the far bank of the Rhine, its
engineers, under the concealment of smoke, would build bridges first
at Rolandseck, then Konigswinter, then Bonn. Because of success at
Remagen, conventional assault crossings in the VII Corps sector were
unnecessary. Bridge sites might be subject to artillery and mortar
fire but not to any serious amount of small arms fire.52
The day after the capture of the Ludendorf bridge the engineers at
the bridge site requested a smoke generator unit. When First Army
replied that none was immediately available the engineers at Remagen
had to depend upon whatever pots they could hurriedly gather. Finally,
on 10 March, First Army relieved its smoke units from other duties
and gave them five days to be ready for screening missions, whereupon
the 79th and 80th Smoke Generator Companies retrieved their smoke
51
(1) Interv, Hist Off with Maj Martin F. Massoglia, formerly ExecO 238th Engr Bn, 1 Dec 49.
(2) History of VII Corps During Opns in Belgium and Germany, 1-28 Feb 45. Orgn Files, ETO.
(3) 294th Engr Combat Bn AAR 1-28 Feb 45. Orgn Files, ETO. (4) Ltr, CO 80th Cml Smoke
Generator Co to CO 23d Cml Smoke Generator Bn, 28 Feb 45, sub: Rpt on Smoke Opns, 23d, 24th,
25th Feb 45, Roer River Assault and Crossing.
52
(1) 3d Ind, Deputy CCmlO ETO, 26 Apr 45 on Ltr, CmlO VII Corps to CmlO FUSA 7 Apr 45,
sub: VII Corps Smoke Opns for Bridging the Rhine River. CMLHO. (2) History of VII Corps,
1-31 Mar 45. Orgn Files, ETO.
equipment from its six months' storage. On 15 March the two units
received march orders and, early next morning, the 79th departed for
Remagen and the 80th Company headed for VII Corps in the vicinity
53
of Rolandseck.
During the early phase of the Remagen operation the Germans held
the high ground on the east bank with observation over the bridges
and the approaches thereto. Artillery fire continually impeded, and
at times halted, the movement of First Army troops through the area.54
To provide for the increased traffic, III Corps engineers built two
bridges which the enemy attempted to destroy by artillery and mortar
fire, by bombing, and even by demolitions. Mechanical smoke gen-
erators would have expedited the erection of the bridges, according
to an engineer officer, but by 16 March, when the 79th Smoke Gen-
erator Company (Capt. Morris W. Kane) arrived, the urgent need
for smoke had ended.55
The first VII Corps units passed through the Remagen bridgehead
on 15 March and within two days they had cleared the area opposite
Rolandseck. Engineers started bridging the Rhine at Rolandseck on
the night of 16-17 March and at dawn the 80th Smoke Generator
Company began concealing the bridge site. The next afternoon most
of the company departed for another bridge site at Konigswinter
although several squads remained at Rolandseck until 23 March.
Meanwhile, the 79th Company had moved from Remagen to Konigs-
winter and set up generators on the east bank of the Rhine. Smoke
operations at this site, featured by the use of boat-mounted generators,
also ended on 23 March.56
An extensive First Army screening operation took place along the
Rhine at the southern outskirts of Bonn. Under technical control of
the 23d Smoke Generator Battalion, smoke was started at 0501, 21
March, and continued without interruption for sixty-one hours. After
53
(1) Armor School Research and Evaluation Div, Study: The Remagen Bridgehead, 7-17 Mar 47.
CmlC School. (2) 23d Cml Smoke Generator Bn Unit Diary, 11-24 Mar 45. (3) Ltr, Cunin to
Hist Off, 1 Feb 50.
54
Capt. John F. Hyde, CMP, "Armored Bridgehead Operation," Armored Cavalry Journal, LVIII,
No. 4 (July-August 1949), 37-38.
55
(1) Massoglia Interv, 2 Dec 49. (2) 23d Cml Smoke Generator Bn Unit Diary, 10-24 Mar 45.
56
(1) Ltr, CmlO VII Corps to CmlO FUSA, 7 Apr 45, sub: VII Corps Smoke Opn for Bridging the
Rhine River. (2) 79th Cml Smoke Generator Co S-3 Rpt 51, Mehlem, Germany, 18-24 Mar 45, dated
25 Mar 45. (3) 80th Cml Smoke Generator Co S-3 Rpt 30, Bonn, Germany, 18-24 Mar 45, dated
25 Mar 45.
23 March the smoke troops remained alerted for five days, ready to
operate against bombers, but the threat never was to materialize.
By 21 March the Third Army had reduced the Saar-Palatinate tri-
angle, except for the mopping-up phase, and three of its corps had
reached the Rhine. General Patton insisted that the enemy be given
no chance to recover from the defeat in the Palatinate. Third Army
planned to secure crossings over the Rhine River promptly and then
advance to the northeast. The VIII Corps, on the left, would attack
between Koblenz and Bingen and XII Corps was to cross the Rhine
between Bingen and Worms. XX Corps, on the right flank, would
continue mopping-up activities and then cross through the bridge-
head of either VIII or XII Corps.57
The XII Corps attached the 84th and 161st Smoke Generator Com-
panies to the 5th and 90th Divisions, respectively, for the assault
crossings. The 162d Smoke Generator Company was to support the
87th and 89th Divisions of VIII Corps operating north of Bingen. The
81st Company was trucking for XX Corps but would be available for
smoke operations on short notice. With four smoke generator units on
hand, the Third Army could not only use smoke at the crossings but
could also lay deceptive screens. There was some thought of placing
a large dummy screen at Mainz because the enemy apparently believed
58
that an initial crossing attempt would be made at that point.
Previous Third Army smoke generator operations had emphasized
concealment from artillery observation, as enemy aircraft had been
relatively inactive. During February, for example, only thirty-two
enemy planes were reported over the entire Third Army zone, and
59
of these only two made attacks, both of them strafing. But as the
Army approached the Rhine, enemy air activity increased. On 20
March large numbers of German aircraft, including the new jet-
propelled Me262, attempted to bomb bridges and strafe troops. On
that date the Luftwaffe made a total of 314 sorties in the XII Corps
zone alone.60 This increased enemy air activity, even though temporary,
was a distinct threat to the Rhine bridging operations and suggested
that the crossing sites be screened against air as well as against artillery
observation.
57
TUSA AAR, I, 311-12.
58
George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co, 1947), p. 266.
59
TUSA AAR, I, 279.
60
Ibid., I, 310.
The 5th Division made the first crossing of the Rhine for the Third
Army on the night of 22-23 March in the Oppenheim-Nierstein area.
Two regiments had already crossed when, at dawn, the 84th Smoke
Generator Company provided smoke from both sides of the river.
Each day thereafter the 84th established a heavy screen at dawn and
dusk, the periods when the engineer bridges were most vulnerable from
the air. During the night the 84th maintained a haze which could
be readily thickened in case of attack. In daylight, fighter planes and
AA guns fought off enemy aircraft. A number of the generator posi-
tions along the near bank were atop a hill and the smoke, although
blanketing the bridges from the air, was not dense enough on the
ground to hinder traffic.61 Additional generators were mounted on
Dukws, but were not needed.
The importance of screening the Oppenheim-Nierstein area can be
judged by the traffic which crossed the Rhine at that point. Five divi-
sions, with supplies and supporting troops, passed over its three bridges
between 23 and 27 March. And between 24 and 31 March, 60,000
vehicles crossed in support of the XII Corps assault. The smoke screen
which initially concealed this area was approximately two and a half
miles long and three-quarters of a mile wide. None of the bridges
sustained damage during the area's four major air attacks.62
For several days after the crossing at Oppenheim-Nierstein the in-
creased activity of enemy aircraft necessitated the continuance of
smoke generator operations. On 24 March, 138 enemy planes attacked
bridges, installations, and troop concentrations in the XII Corps sector.
During the next day the sorties increased to 231. Heavy enemy aircraft
losses and the overrunning of many fighter fields by the Third Army's
advance soon reduced the threat posed by the Luftwaffe, and on 26
March only three German planes appeared over the XII Corps.63 As a
matter of precaution, smoke generator operations continued at Oppen-
heim-Nierstein until 31 March.
While the 5th Division was crossing at Oppenheim, the 90th Division
was cleaning up Mainz and threatening to cross the Rhine either there
or to the north. In support of this feint the 161st Smoke Generator
61
84th Cml Smoke Generator Co, Summary of Smoke Opns in the ETO, 12 May 45.
62
Brig Gen P. H. Timothy, The Rhine Crossing—Twelfth Army Group Engineer Operations (Here-
after cited as The Rhine Crossing), (Ft Belvoir, Va., Jul 46), p. 38.
63
TUSA AAR, I, 315-17. Another factor in the sudden reduction of Luftwaffe activity may have
been the shifting of enemy planes to the crossing sites of other Allied armies.
Company, on 23 March, made smoke at several points between Bingen

and Mainz. On the same day the 90th Division swung south, crossed
the Rhine at Nierstein, and assumed control of the southern portion of
the 5th Division bridgehead, an action which obviated the need for
smoking the Rhine between Mainz and Bingen. Two days later a de-
tachment of the 161st moved into Nierstein and extended the smoke
line which the 84th Smoke Generator Company had already established
there.64 By 26 March all major units of XII Corps were well beyond
the Rhine and were attacking points along the Main River in the
vicinity of Frankfurt. The 161st Smoke Generator Company then
moved forward and screened the bridges.
The divisions of VIII Corps crossed the Rhine between Bingen and
Koblenz. The precise sites were Rhens and Boppard in the 87th
Division sector, and Oberwesel, St. Goar, and Wellmich in the sector
of the 89th Division. The 162d Smoke Generator Company divided
its generators and crews between the two divisions. The smoke plan
at Boppard called for screens for the assault crossing of the 345th
Infantry and for the ponton bridge building activities of the 1102d
Engineer Combat Group. The 162d made the first smoke at Boppard
on 25 March from 0620 to 0635, just before the 345th Infantry attack.
The generators smoked again at 0650 and remained in operation until
late that night. With a favorable wind, the cloud traveled across the
river and filled the valley. That night the wind shifted from south-
southeast to northeast and the 162d, in order to conceal the bridge oper-
ations, moved its generators across the river. The smoke crews con-
tinued the screen throughout the next day, 26 March, under a steady
rain of enemy artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire. The operation
65
ended 26 March.
Meanwhile, on the night of 24 March one section of the 162d set
up a smoke screen in support of a deceptive move made by the 353d
Infantry, 89th Division. The ruse was successful in that the enemy
directed a large amount of artillery and small arms fire into the
screened, but unoccupied area. The actual assault came early on 26
March; smoke operations ceased after half an hour because of inter-
64
TUSA AAR, I, 314-22; II, pt. 11, 15.
65
(1) 162d Cml Smoke Generator Co, Final Opn Rpt, Boppard, 24-27 March 45. (2) Smoke was
not employed in the crossing of the 347th Infantry, 87th Division, at Rhens.
ference with forward observation. The crews of the 162d remained

in position, until 28 March, in case the enemy shelled the bridge site.66
The 162d Smoke Generator Company also provided smoke for the
assault of the 354th Infantry, 89th Division, opposite Wellmich, on
the morning of 26 March from 0600 to 0630. Enemy artillery and
small arms fire at the time of the successful crossing was heavy but
unobserved.67 At the same time, the company set up five generator
positions near Oberwesel for the crossing of the 355th Infantry, 89th
Division, and smoked from 0550 to 1700 hours, 26 March, while two
battalions crossed the river. The screen not only covered the crossing
site but also denied observation to enemy forces located at Kaub, up-
stream on the far side of the Rhine.68 The Luftwaffe was not as active
against VIII Corps bridge sites as it was against those of XII Corps
although artillery and small arms fire were heavier. But despite heavy
initial resistance the 85th and 89th Divisions advanced rapidly to the
east, and by 28 March the Rhine mission of 162d Smoke Generator
Company was over.
The 81st Smoke Generator Company supported XX Corps, which
did not enter the picture until 27 March, when the 80th Division
attacked across the Rhine and Main just southeast of Mainz and cleared
the area around Kastel and at the junction of the two rivers. As soon
as the infantry cleared the far bank, the smoke company screened the
bridging operations, with half of the unit on either side of the river.
Under smoke, the Third Army engineers built a 1,896-foot steel tread-
way bridge, probably the longest floating tactical bridge of the war.69
70
The 81st continued to operate at Mainz until the evening of 1 April.
Early in March 1945 the 3d and 45th Divisions of Seventh Army
began preparations for the Rhine crossings. These divisions and various
supporting organizations converged on Lunéville, France, to make use
of the several lakes in the area for specialized training. Among the
units supporting the 3d Division was the 540th Engineer Combat
66
162d Cml Smoke Generator Co Final Opn Rpt, St. Goar, 25-28 Mar 45. CMLHO. Col. James V.
Montgomery, VIII Corps chemical officer, was killed during this operation.
67
162d Cml Smoke Generator Co, Final Opn Rpt, Wellmich [Germany], 25-26 Mar 45. CMLHO.
There were no bridging activities at Wellmich.
68
(1) 162d Cml Smoke Generator Co, Final Opn Rpt, Oberwesel [Germany], 25-27 Mar 45.
CMLHO. There were no bridging operations at Oberwesel. (2) Timothy, The Rhine Crossing, p. 42.
69
Timothy, The Rhine Crossing, p. 40.
70
TUSA AAR, I, 3 2 2 ; II, pt. 11, 15.
Group with the 69th Smoke Generator Company attached. Supporting

troops of the 45th Division included the 40th Engineer Combat Group
and the 78th Smoke Generator Company. These attachments were to
carry through the entire period of the Rhine crossings so that trained
and co-ordinated teams would be ready to support the assault.71
Divisions of XV Corps led the Seventh Army assault across the
Rhine. The initial crossings were to be made between Gernsheim and
Ludwigshaven by the 45th Division on the left and the 3d Division
on the right, the first crossing north, the second south of the city of
Worms.72 All five companies of the 22d Smoke Generator Battalion
received screening assignments for the assault crossing, the first time
all had been committed to the same forward area operation. Battalion
headquarters was relieved from all other duties on the eve of the
crossing and placed under direct control of the Seventh Army chemical
officer. Previously, the battalion commander had occasionally partici-
pated in the Rhine crossing preparations, but generally his headquarters
had performed other duties. As it turned out, the most important
battalion function at the Rhine was logistical, the co-ordination of the
supply of fog oil to the various smoke companies.73
Early on 26 March, for a brief period just before as well as during
the assault crossings, the 163d and 168th Smoke Generator Com-
panies drew German attention from the actual sites by maintaining
feint screens in the sectors of the 71st and 36th Divisions. Meanwhile,
the 45th and 3d Divisions crossed the river in the Worms areas on
2-regiment fronts. Enemy opposition to the 45th Division petered out
quickly and no smoke was needed although the 78th was in position.
This was not the case with the 3d Division in its Ludwigshaven-Worms
sector. Here initial resistance to the early morning attack was weak,
but by 0400, an hour and a half after the assault began, hostile artillery
pinned down all troops in the area, and engineer operations at the
upstream crossing site stopped. One engineer company suffered fifty-
four casualties. Although German artillery fire hit three smoke com-
pany vehicles, the unit lost no men to enemy action. The intense
71
(1) The same two smoke generator companies had attended an engineer school at La Valbonne,
near Lyon, during the previous October, with the mission of screening engineer river operations. (2)
69th Cml Smoke Generator Co, History (May-Dec 44). (3) 78th Cml Smoke Generator Co, History,
1 Oct-3 1 Oct 44, 12 Nov 44. 80th in Orgn Files, ETO. (4) Seventh Army Cml Sec History,
1 Jan-31 Oct 44.
72
Seventh Army Opns in ETO, III, 741-45.
73
Seventh Army Cml Sec History, Mar 45.
artillery fire did prevent a platoon trying to take over smoke pots
in assault boats from reaching the west bank. Fortunately, the
southwest winds eliminated the need for pots across the river. At 0700
the 1st Platoon, from positions in the near bank generated a fog oil
screen between the enemy on Friesenheimer Island and the crossing
site, a maneuver which effectively blocked German observation of
troop and boat movement. At 1030 the 1st Platoon with six generators
crossed the river in Dukws only to be pinned down for several hours
by enemy fire with four generators still on the craft. The two that
were gotten off maintained a haze between Sandhoffen and the crossing
site which "greatly reduced the accuracy of enemy fire on the engineer
operations.74
The two assault battalions in the 30th Infantry sector completed
their crossings by 0305, and the 2d Platoon, 69th Smoke Generator
Company, set up a smoke pot line on the far bank two and a half
hours later. Just before daylight smoke began to pour from the pots
across the river and from mechanical generators on the near shore.
The variant winds caused smoke to be needed on all sides. The smoke
haze denied observation to German troops on an island in the river
which held out until several hours after daylight. Because the infantry-
men took over the storm boats which had been allotted to the smoke
troops, their own being destroyed by enemy artillery, the supply of
smoke pots and the crossing of the generators were both delayed. By
0930 the smoke troops had four generators in operation across the river
and half an hour later a wind shift to the southwest minimized the
problem of smoke supply to the far bank.75
During the day the commanding general, 3d Division, ordered that
smoke be made over both sites on a 24-hour basis. After 27 March the
Luftwaffe, not hostile artillery, became the greater threat. The 2d
Platoon, 69th Smoke Generator Company, continued to smoke the
ponton and treadway bridges, which the engineers built near Worms,
until 31 March. The 1st Platoon concealed the heavy ferry site with
smoke until 30 March then moved to Ludwigshaven and screened the
74
(1) 2832d Engr Combat Bn Opns Rpt, Mar 45. Orgn Files, ETO. (2) 69th Smoke Generator
Co Opns Rpt No. 3, 5-31 Mar 45. Except for the omission of meteorological information and data on
expenditures, this is a model report. It outlines the general situation, the special training, the special
organization of the company for the operation, the preliminary moves, the operations of both platoons,
and includes a discussion, an evaluation, and overlays of the smoke lines.
75
(1) 69th Smoke Generator Co Opns Rpt No. 3, 5-31 Mar 45. (2) 2833d Engr Combat Bn
Journal, Mar 45. Orgn Files, ETO.
bridge which connected that city with Mannheim. The 78th Smoke
Generator Company moved to Mannheim on 1 April and set up a
smoke line around the bridge which was erected over the Neckar
River, but smoke was not needed. CWS troops maintained both in-
76
stallations until 5 April.
On the eve of the Rhine crossing the Ninth U.S. Army was still
with the British 21 Army Group, an attachment which had taken
place at the time of the German counteroffensive. On its left was the
British Second Army with a boundary near Wesel; on its right, just
upstream from Dusseldorf, was the First U.S. Army, holding the left
sector of General Bradley's 12th Army Group. Ninth Army designated
its XVI Corps to make an assault crossing in the sector between Orsoy
and Buderich. Initially, XIII and XIX Corps were to hold the west
bank of the Rhine opposite the Ruhr, later to follow through the
XVI Corps bridgehead. Chemical units available to XVI Corps for
screening operations included the 27th Smoke Generator Battalion and
the 74th and 83d Smoke Generator Companies. The 89th and 93d
Chemical Mortar Battalions also were to contribute to the smoke
mission.
Ninth Army screening operations along the Rhine River were di-
vided into two phases, those before the crossing and those in connec-
tion with the assault. The purpose of smoke in the first phase was
to conceal movement on the west bank and confuse the enemy as to
Army intentions and crossing preparations. For eight days before
the assault, smoke intermittently covered sixty-eight miles of the
front north of Dusseldorf held jointly by British and American troops.
The plan provided for "smoking" days and "nonsmoking" days, ac-
cording to a schedule which was co-ordinated with air reconnaissance
activities. In the Ninth Army sector the 74th and 83d Smoke Gen-
erator Companies and provisional personnel performed these prelimi-
nary missions with smoke pots, the mechanical generators being con-
served for the main crossing effort. Enemy reaction to the employment
of smoke during the first phase was varied. Prisoners stated that at
first the Germans expected the assault after each smoke operation,
but after continued feints they became confused as to Allied intentions.
In some localities the Germans were extremely sensitive to smoke and
76
(1) Ibid. (2) 69th Smoke Generator Co History, Mar 45. (3) XV Corps, AAR, Mar 45, pp.
7 1 f f . Orgn Files, ETO. (4) Memo, CO 22d Smoke Generator Bn to CmlO Seventh Army, 29 Mar 45.
Orgn Files, ETO. (5) Cml Sec Seventh Army History, Mar 45.
replied promptly with inconsequential fire. A German radio broadcast

boasted that an American attempt to cross the Rhine under smoke had
been repulsed. On the whole, however, the enemy showed little
reaction. A more important result of the smoke was expediting Allied
troop and supply movements, particularly in the British and Canadian
sectors where many dumps were located in exposed areas.77
The XVI Corps plans for the Rhine operation called for a 2-
division crossing in the vicinity of Wallach, Mehrum, and Milchplatz.
Naval craft were available for the initial assault and the engineers were
ready to bridge the Rhine, a task which they anticipated would be no
more difficult than that of bridging the Roer River under flooded
conditions. After the crossing, the Ninth Army was to drive eastward,
contain the enemy in the Ruhr pocket to the south, and maintain
contact with the British Second Army on the left.
Smoke plans for the crossings provided for concealing the bridge
sites for forty-eight continuous hours, if necessary. Under no cir-
cumstances was smoke to interfere with the airdrop of the First
Allied Airborne Army at Wesel, scheduled to begin at 1000 hours on
the first day. Maj. Robert H. Kennedy, commanding the 27th Smoke
Generator Battalion, supervised the activities of the two smoke gen-
erator companies and operated the corps smoke control center. The
artillery agreed to furnish liaison planes for observation of the screen.
With the additional assistance from the artillery meteorological sections,
the smoke control center would be advised of screening conditions any-
where in the army area at any particular moment. Any complaints
about the interference of smoke with operations were to be referred
to the smoke control center, with the matter reconciled by the G-3.
Elements of the 89th Chemical Mortar Battalion would screen the
right flank of the corps sector, opposite Orsoy, along the Rhein-Herne
78
Canal. The 83d Smoke Generator Company and two sections of the
77
This account is based upon: (1) Lt Col W. R. Sawyer, GSO 1 Rpt on Smoke Screens Carried
Out by First Canadian Army (R) (printed in the field by 1 Canadian Mobile Printing Sec RCASC,
15 Jul 4 5 ) , pp. 33-34; (2) 21 Army Group, Cml Warfare Liaison Ltrs, No. 8, 25 Mar 45, No. 9,
24 Jul 45, CmlC School 4 6 1 / 2 5 1 4 ; (3) Interv, Hist Off with Col Harold Walmsley (formerly
CmlO Ninth Army) and Capt Joel B. Marangella (formerly IntellO Cml Sec Ninth Army), 14 Feb 47;
(4) Ltr, CO 74th Cml Smoke Generator Co to CG Ninth Army, 13 Mar 45, sub: Rpt of Smoke Opns;
(5) Ltr, CG 84th Div to CG XIII Corps, 7 Apr 45, sub: Smoke Opns; (6) Ltr, ACmlO 102d Div to
CmlO XIII Corps, 7 Apr 45, sub: AAR on Smoke Used on Rhine River, all in CMLHO; (7) Hewitt,
Work Horse of the Western front, pp. 234-38.
78
(1) Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Andrew M. Bishop, Lt Col Joseph C. Prentice, Capt Clyde H.
Westbrook, Capt Ralph R. Wance, and Mr Charles E. Miller, 1 Mar 50. (2) For more information on
chemical mortar smoke operations, see below, Ch. XII.
74th would conceal the crossing sites of the 30th Division near Wallach
and Mehrum, while the other two sections of the 74th Smoke Generator
Company were to smoke at Milchplatz for the 79th Division crossing.
Generator positions, as far as practicable, were to take advantage of
the protection afforded by the dike on the west bank. Where necessary,
the smoke troops were to use pots over the low land between the dike
and the river. The first smoke was to appear at dawn on 24 March.79
The Ninth Army assault crossing of the Rhine River began on the
night of 23-24 March. After heavy preparatory fire the initial waves
of the 30th and 79th Divisions jumped off at 0200 and 0300 hours,
respectively. Resistance was not serious and by daybreak thirteen bat-
talions of infantry had crossed and secured four bridgeheads, several
thousand yards deep. Within twenty-four hours the front lines had
80
advanced approximately six miles beyond the Rhine.
At dawn, smoke from the generators along the dike line concealed
the ferrying operations of the assault boats from enemy ground and
air observation. Fear that the haze might drift over the Wesel airdrop
area and impede paratroop operation proved groundless. In midmorn-
ing the wind shifted from west to east, through south, and the smoke
troops moved pots and generators across the river and screened from
the far bank. Smoke continued on the first day until after dark. On
25 and 26 March smoke covered the bridges in the 3Oth Division sector
during the daylight hours. But at Milchplatz, in the sector of the 79th
Division, the generators remained idle until enemy guns had ranged in
on the bridge site.81 From 27 to 31 March the smoke troops operated
only during the periods from 0500 to 0800 and from 1700 to 2000
hours, when the bridges were most vulnerable to air attack. Enemy
aircraft strafed the generator lines during the nights of 24, 25, and 26
March, and artillery fire lasted through 24 and 25 March, but the
smoke troops suffered only two casualties. The only damage to smoke
equipment occurred during the movement of Alligators and tank
destroyers during the hours of darkness of the initial assault. Smoke
82
was not required after 31 March.
79
(1) Ltr, CmlO XVI Corps to CmlO Ninth Army, 1 Apr 45, sub: Smoke Opns—FLASHPOINT.
Reproduced in Pritchard, Smoke Generator Opns in MTO and ETO, pp. 313-15- (2) Walmsley-
Marangella Interv, 14 Feb 47.
80
(1) Hewitt, Work Horse of the Western Front, pp. 238-42. (2) 30th Inf Div G-3 After Battle
Report, Mar 45, pp. 4-5. Orgn Files, ETO.
81
Interv, Hist Off with Capt Warren (formerly CO, 74th Smoke Generator Co), 27 Jun 50.
82
Ltr, CmlO XVI Corps to CmlO Ninth Army, 1 Apr 45, sub: Smoke Opns—FLASHPOINT.
Planned as a 48-hour operation, smoke actually was used at the

Rhine crossings for a period of eight days. During the first two days of
the crossing the frequent shifts of wind direction made screening
difficult, especially at Milchplatz, although the concealment of crossing
activities was generally effective.83
Summary
The outstanding mission of the chemical smoke generator company
for all armies in the European theater was the concealment of bridge
and river crossing sites. Next in importance was the screening of
main supply routes. Only as the Allies approached the Rhine did the
Luftwaffe become a threat to operations. There were no calls for
smoke to hide the flash of friendly artillery, as had been the case in
Italy. Occasionally, an area screen concealed a flank of an armored
or infantry advance or withdrawal.
Smoke generator companies generally operated as a unit, under the
control of either the division or of the engineer unit charged with the
bridging activities. When the need for area screening was anticipated,
the division commander secured one or more smoke units from either
corps or Army. Only in rare instances was the smoke generator kept
available at regimental level, or lower, to be used as an instrument of
opportunity.
European experience in large area screening revealed several prin-
ciples which govern successful smoke operations. First, adequate time
should be allowed during the planning of any operation to insure thor-
ough reconnaissance and supply. Second, the control of a screen should
be in the hands of the commander of the highest echelon concerned.
Smoke can be a two-edged sword, simultaneously harmful and bene-
ficial. A high level arbiter is necessary to balance its benefits against
its disadvantages and come up with a decision most likely to insure
ultimate success. Third, a smoke plan should provide for a smoke
installation which completely surrounds the vital area, a factor which
requires the planned transfer of men and equipment to the far bank
83
(1) Hewitt, Work Horse of the Western front, pp. 238-42. (2) 30th Inf Div G-3 After Battle
Report, Mar 45, pp. 13. (3) Lt. Col. John C. Dalrymple, "Engineer Combat Group in the Rhine River
Crossing," Military Review, XXVIII (August 1949), 5. (4) Ltr, CO 57th Cml Maintenance Co to
CmlO Ninth Army, 29 Mar 45, sub: Maintenance of M2 Smoke Generators During Opns (Rhine
River). CWS 314.7 Unit Files, 57th Cml Maint Co.
during the initial plan of a river crossing operation. And, finally,

screening operations should begin before the enemy observes activity
in the vital area and should cover considerably more territory than that
area.
American armies gradually applied these principles to their European
smoke operations. At first, the divisions of Seventh Army were more
adept in the technique because of their experience in Italy. But before
long the Third Army units resorted to corps area screens even more
often than those of Seventh Army. Of the four armies in the European
theater only the First failed to employ area screening when the occasion
seemed to demand it, due in large part to a policy which kept smoke
units at other tasks from which they could not be quickly relieved.
On the whole, American forces in Europe learned the technique and
principles of forward area screening rather quickly, especially con-
sidering the late development of the M1 generator which enhanced the
possibilities of such employment.
CHAPTER X
Large Area Smoke Screens

in the Pacific
Large area smoke operations in the Pacific contrasted sharply with
those in Italy, France, and Germany. By concealing rear area installa-
tions and forward area operations, CWS smoke generators in Europe
had performed a vital service. The few smoke units in the Pacific, on
the other hand, were inactivated while still in the training stage. The
role of smoke in the Pacific was restricted mainly by geography and
by the decision which gave the war against Germany priority over
the Japanese conflict. Geography was an especially limiting factor.
It dictated that a good deal of the fighting in the Pacific would be
done by the naval arm. The most effective use of smoke in the Pacific
was in the form of anchorage screens maintained by the Navy to
conceal the vulnerable vessels involved in the numerous island hopping
campaigns so typical of the war against Japan.
Early Attempts To Introduce Area Screening in SWPA

In the early phases of the war in the Southwest Pacific Area com-
manders who considered area screening as a means of concealing air-
fields from enemy air attack ran up against several serious problems.1
These included not only a lack of a suitable means for static screening
and a shortage of smoke materials but also a scarcity in shipping,
both within the immediate area and from the United States to SWPA.
If smoke was to be used the means and material would have to be
devised locally.
When an industrial survey disclosed that large quantities of the FS
smoke material could be produced in Australia, Colonel Copthorne,
Chief Chemical Officer, USASOS SWPA, assigned the 42d Chemical
1
Ltr, CCmlO USASOS to CCWS, 16 Nov 42, sub: Tech and Intell Work. AGO CWS Ret 319.1/
3006. This letter reviews the background of the early requests for screening.
LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE PACIFIC 395
Laboratory, then in Brisbane, the mission of developing both a large

and a small smoke generator which could employ this chemical smoke.
Tests in the summer of 1942 revealed deficiencies in the large model
which was dropped entirely later in the year after word came that the
newly developed mechanical smoke generator would soon be made
available to the theater. The 42d Laboratory Company went on to
develop a small smoke generator which was to see limited use in the
theater.
In January 1943 the Commanding General, USASOS SWPA, ap-
proved a project for concealing an advanced base or port with smoke
and requisitioned two smoke generator companies from the United
States to carry out the project. The harbor at Port Moresby, New
Guinea, was chosen as the site for the first smoke installation, although
military authorities realized that another port might be more critical
by the time the smoke units arrived. After an on-the-spot survey of
Port Moresby, Colonel Copthorne recommended that some generators
be mounted on barges or power boats to insure adequate smoke
2
coverage.
In May 1943 the theater asked the Chief, CWS, to comment on its
tentative plans for a smoke installation at Milne Bay, which, as had
been foreseen, was now a more exposed harbor than Port Moresby.
These plans, which included the employment of generators both on
land and on water to conceal shipping activity in the harbor, suffered
from a lack of power boats on which to mount the generators which
were to be waterborne. The theater requested the War Department
to send several craft suitable for this purpose along with the two smoke
companies requisitioned earlier in the year.3
In July SWPA pressed the War Department for the immediate ship-
ment of the two smoke companies and speculated on the reduced re-
quirement for smoke pots if three smoke generator battalions were
assigned.4 People in the Southwest Pacific Area were also concerned
with the possibility that the two companies, which by September had
not yet arrived, would be equipped with the 3,000-pound M1 generator,
instead of the new lightweight M2.5 Meanwhile, in response to the
2
Ltr, CCmlO USASOS to CCWS,30 Jan 43, sub: Rear Area Smoke Screens. CWS 314.7.
3
Ltr, CCmlO USAFFE to CCWS, 21 Jul 43, sub: Smoke Generator Cos. AGO CWS Ret 320.2-
USAF in the Far East.
4
(1) CM-IN 257, Brisbane to WAR, 1 Jul 43. (2) CM-IN 7666, Brisbane to WAR, II Jul 43.
5
CM-IN 1601, Brisbane to WAR, 3 Sep 43.
SMOKE GENERATOR IN A DUKW ON MILNE BAY
theater's interest in large area screening, General Porter in August

1943, sent Maj. Roy E. Halverson, a trained smoke officer, to the
Southwest Pacific Area.6 Major Halverson made surveys at Milne Bay,
Oro Bay, and Goodenough Island, concluding that the establishment
of smoke installations at any of these locations would be a difficult
proposition. He confirmed Colonel Copthorne's view that the lack
of road nets at advanced ports would entail heavy dependence upon
water transportation. Not only were appropriate craft in short supply
but the M1 smoke generator was rather bulky for this type of employ-
ment. In fact, the successful screening of port facilities in the South-
west Pacific seemed to require an amphibious smoke unit, a type that
7
so far had not been foreseen by planners in Washington.
By mid-1943 the Japanese were raiding Goodenough Island regularly
and Milne Bay, New Guinea, occasionally. The theater proceeded with
its plans to station the two smoke generator units temporarily at
Milne Bay where they could be adapted to island employment and
6
CWS USAFFE, Info Bull, No. 15, 24 Aug 43.
(1) Interv, Hist Off with Morgan, former theater CWS liaison officer with the Australian Army,
7
30 Jan 46. (2) Interv, Burke, former CmlO Base A, Milne Bay, New Guinea, 30 Jan 46.
8
trained for more difficult operations at a more advanced port. But
the 70th and 17Oth Smoke Generator Companies landed at Sydney,
instead of Milne Bay. Shortage of shipping and the higher priority
of other units precluded the immediate transshipment of these units to
Milne Bay, and the two companies remained in Australia for almost
two full months after their arrival in October 1943. As a result, smoke
company training at Milne Bay did not begin until January 1944 and
then only under the greatest difficulties. The base commander could
not permit a considerable amount of smoke over the area because his
installation was operating under pressure, day and night. Of even
greater importance was the lack of craft on which to mount the smoke
generators. Boats could be borrowed for short periods, but none could
be assigned to the smoke troops. General Porter, Chief, CWS, arranged
to ship four J boats which, shortly after arrival, were severely damaged
by a storm.
By April 1944 it was evident that smoke training operations would
have to be shifted to a less active port. Chosen was Base E at Lae, on
the northeastern coast of New Guinea, where ships anchored while
9
awaiting a call to a more exposed port and, consequently, where
practice screens would not interfere with normal port operations.
Another advantage was the short distance to the air base at Nadzab, up
the Markham River from Lae. The air base was an ideal place to test
screening of air installations and a source of aircraft from which to
observe the practice screens. The companies moved to their new loca-
tion in mid-July and immediately experienced greater success with their
training program. The road net facilitated land training, and boats
were available for working out problems in the bay. In mid-August
Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 26th Smoke Generator
Battalion, under the command of Maj. Allen H. Williams, arrived
from the United States and took charge of the two smoke companies.10
A Question of mission
In June 1944 the commanding general, USASOS, recommended to
General MacArthur the employment of smoke generator units during
the early stages of an amphibious operation for screening supply dumps
8
9
Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Joseph S. Terrell, Jan 46.
10
(1) Ibid, (2) Burke Interv, 30 Jan 46.
11
as well as for concealing ships engaged in unloading. He proposed that
the 70th and 170th Smoke Generator Companies be equipped with
suitable craft and trained to use the new lightweight M1 generators,
then en route to the theater. General MacArthur agreed that the
smoke troops could be profitably employed in future operations and
suggested the transfer of the two companies to the Sixth Army for
amphibious training under an engineer special brigade.12
Col. Carl L. Marriott, Sixth Army chemical officer, opposed this
suggestion, indicating that the USASOS recommendation was merely
an admission that it had been unable to interest the14th Antiaircraft
Command in the value of the smoke units. Reasons given by Colonel
Marriott for this lack of interest included inappropriate equipment,
the fact that the Esso generators were too unwieldy, and the reputation
of the two smoke companies at Milne Bay for "smashing up" their
equipment.13 CWS officers at Milne Bay refuted this last argument,
attributing damaged equipment to the work of the elements, not to
14
careless maintenance. In arguing against the assignment of the two
smoke companies to Sixth Army, Marriott also brought up the matter
of control. In an assault landing these units initially would be con-
trolled by the naval task force commander. On the other hand,
smoke operations to conceal ships just off the beaches would have to
be co-ordinated by a second agency, the one charged with the control
of antiaircraft artillery and fighter aircraft. Marriott recommended
that USAFFE should clarify the question of control and assign the
smoke units to the 14th Antiaircraft Command, a troop unit not
15
under Sixth Army.
Early in September 1944, and before any decision was reached on
the control of the smoke units, a group of Sixth Army officers wit-
nessed a smoke demonstration at Lae which featured the recently
arrived M1 mechanical generator, smaller and more economical and
efficient than its predecessor. Without exception, the officers were
most enthusiastic about the capabilities of the new mechanical gen-
11
Ltr, CG USASOS to CG USAFFE, 4 Jun 44, sub: Assignment of Craft to Provisional Smoke Gen-
erator Bn. Sixth Army, 470.71-SG.
12
1st Ind, CG USAFFE to CG Sixth Army, II Jul 44.
13
Memo, CmlO Sixth Army for G-3 Sixth Army, 16 Jul 44. Sixth Army 470.71-SG.
14
Ltr, Lt Col Joseph S. Terrell to Hist Off, 19 May 1950.
15
Memo, CmlO Sixth Army for G-3 Sixth Army, 16 Jul 44. Sixth Army 470.71-SG.
erator and requested that every effort be made to obtain smoke com-
16
panies for Sixth Army to be used on beachheads and airstrips.
It seems that the final decision regarding the assignment of the CWS
smoke companies pleased no one. The two companies were not assigned
to the Sixth Army, nor to an antiaircraft artillery command, as recom-
mended by Colonel Marriott. In October the commander of the USA
Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area, unaccountably ordered
that the 70th and 170th Chemical Smoke Generator Companies be
inactivated and that the personnel so released be used to activate two
quartermaster truck companies.17 This decision marked the end of
efforts to prepare the two units for combat and prompted Navy officers
to question the wisdom of eliminating the smoke units in face of the
18
increasing need for smoke in beach operations.
The officers and men of the headquarters of the recently arrived
smoke generator battalion received assignments with the chemical
warfare school at Oro Bay. There they taught and prepared studies
for the employment of smoke in future operations. The new light-
weight M2 generators, which arrived in the theater in August, were
turned over to the Navy along with the supply of fog oil and most
19
of the floating smoke pots.
Renewed Interest in Smoke

The smoke companies had hardly been inactivated before ground
commanders in the area began inquiring about their availability. The
XI Corps, for example, became interested in smoke after learning of
20
the successful employment of the mechanical generator at Anzio.
Chemical officers at the CWS conference at Oro Bay wanted to know
how long it would take to train combat troops in the use of the light-
weight M1 generator for forward area operations. At this time, Oc-
tober 1944, about 100 of these generators were in or en route to the
21
theater. A month later Lt. Col. David D. Hulsey, Chemical Officer,
16
Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Allen H. Williams, formerly CO 26th Smoke Generator Bn, 5 Jun 50.
17
(1) Ltr, Secy War to CINCSWPA, 16 Oct 44, sub: Disbandment, Constitution and Activation of
Certain Units. AG 322 (12 Oct 44). (2) CM-IN 12423 (13 Nov 44) CG USAFFE, 12 Nov 44.
18
Williams Interv, 5 Jun 50.
19
20
Ltr, CmlO XI Corps to CmlO Sixth Army, 22 Aug 44, sub: Smoke Generators, and 1st Ind
thereto, CG Sixth Army to CG XI Corps, 30 Aug 44. ORB Sixth Army 470.71-SG.
21
CCmlO USASOS, Rpt of CWS Conf, 10-13 Oct 44, p. 30.
6th Infantry Division, asked Col. Harold Riegelman, Chemical Officer,

I Corps, whether any smoke troops were available to screen river cross-
ings. The answer was: in the absence of smoke units ground troops
would continue to rely on mortar smoke shell and smoke pots for that
type or mission.22
Meanwhile, various units of the Sixth Army resorted to limited area
screening with whatever smoke weapons or equipment was available.
The 2d Engineer Special Brigade used the small FS generator developed
by the 42d Chemical Laboratory Company to conceal LCM's unloading
at Colasion Point from rifle and machine gun fire.23 But the M1 and
M4 smoke pots proved to be the mainstays for area screening. Smoke
from these munitions successfully concealed the Tacloban airstrip on
Leyte from Japanese bombers during the full moon period of November
I944-24 In the Zamboanga operation in western Mindanao Colonel
Arthur, chemical officer of the 41st Infantry Division, organized a
smoke pot line along one side of an airstrip then under construction
after Japanese artillery had damaged heavy engineer equipment.25
During the Luzon Campaign, the Sixth Army used smoke pots far
more extensively than previously to conceal road and bridge con-
struction from enemy observers.26 The increased use of smoke in the
Sixth Army resulted from the stepped-up activity of the Japanese
air force; the shift to larger land masses for maneuvering, along with
a decrease in the amount of jungle fighting; the availability of smoke
weapons and munitions; recent emphasis by commanders and chemical
officers on the importance of smoke in combat; and the fact that the
use of smoke had proved beneficial in saving lives and equipment.
Another possible mission for large area screening, the concealment
of airfields, was beginning to take shape in the Pacific Ocean Areas.
22
Ltr, CmlO I Corps to CmlO 6th Inf Div, 8 Dec 44. In Riegelman's private files.
23
(1) Memo, Actg CmlO for ACofS Sixth Army, 23 Nov 44. Sixth Army 470.6-Smoke. (2)
In the Biak operation, I Corps had used this same item for harassing effect; when the generators were
placed in the windward openings of caves, the smoke not only drove out the Japanese but disclosed
other entrances to the cave. CG I Corps, History of Biak Opn 15—27 Jun 44, G-3 Rpt, an. 2, Cml,
p. 47. AGO HRS 201-11.4 (15459). General Krueger cites the testimony of Japanese generals
after the Philippines campaign attesting to the usefulness of smoke and white phosphorus in driving
Japanese soldiers out of their caves. From Down Under to Nippon, p. 327.
24
Comdr Amphib Group 8 Seventh Fleet Action Rpt, Leyte Opn, pt. V (D), Special Comments,
Smoke.
25
Interv, Hist Off with Col Frank M. Arthur, former chemical officer of the 41st Division and I
Corps, 1 Jul 46.
26
Sixth U.S. Army, Rpt of the Luzon Campaign, 9 Jan 45-30 Jun 45, III, Rpts of the General
and Special Staff Secs, Rpt of the Cml Warfare Officer, 90.
In the summer of 1944 United States forces captured Guam, Tinian,

and Saipan in the Marianas group and immediately began constructing
airfields from which to stage bombing attacks against Japan. These
bases became operational in the fall and early winter of 1944, and
B-29's of the XXI Bomber Command began their assault on the Japan-
27
ese homeland. In turn, these airfields in the Marianas were subjected
to enemy air raids, infrequent and largely ineffective, but nonetheless
"an expensive nuisance, which, if unchecked, could have become more
costly." 28
Even as the Advanced Echelon, XXI Bomber Command, was staging
at Hickam Field, Oahu, its chemical officer, Maj. John Barrows sug-
gested the use of smoke generators to conceal the B-29's when they
reached the Marianas. The Commander in Chief, POA, turned down
this request on the ground that the available shipping space was needed
for more vital supplies.29 General Waitt, Assistant Chief CWS for
Field Operations, brought the subject up again during his November
1944 visit to Saipan. Noting the vulnerability of the B-29's to Japanese
attack—several of the planes had already been destroyed by enemy air
action—Waitt insisted that the use of smoke could conceal the expen-
sive aircraft without interfering with the antiaircraft screen. Later
on in Hawaii, he urged Admiral Nimitz and General Richardson to
adopt this plan.30 Despite the merits of the case, and the fact that
eleven B-29's had been destroyed and forty-three others damaged, the
plan for screening the Marianas airfields against enemy attack never got
off the ground. The interests of the strong antiaircraft artillery de-
fenses were considered paramount.31 In any event, enemy air attacks
ceased early in 1945 when Iwo Jima with its air bases fell to U.S.
Marine forces, thus eliminating the trouble at its source.
The question of employing smoke troops at airfields arose again in
27
The XXI Bomber Command was an element of the Twentieth Air Force, which, under Joint Chiefs
of Staff control, had as its mission the strategic bombing of Japan. For the complete picture of these
operations, see Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., THE ARMY FORCES IN WORLD
WAR II, vol. V, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945 (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1953).
28
Craven and Cate, eds., Matterhorn to Nagasaki, p. 582.
29
Interv, Hist Off with Grothaus, former CmlO, Seventh Air Force, 27 Apr 50.
30
Rpt on Trip of Waitt and Javits to POA and SWPA, 24 Sep-21 Nov 44, dated 15 Dec 44. CWS
314.7 Observer Rpts.
31
(1) CM-IN 930, CG AAFPOA to WD, 1 Dec 44. (2) Grothaus Interv, 27 Apr 50. Colonel
Grothaus felt that the shortage of available shipping remained a factor in the decision not to employ
smoke.
connection with Operation ICEBERG, the campaign against the Ryukyus

chain. Because of the proximity of the islands to the Japanese home-
land, American planners correctly anticipated that their assault would
provoke a great amount of enemy air action. The Navy made excellent
use of smoke at Hagushi Beach, Okinawa, during the earlier phases of
the operation, but withdrew its smoke personnel in the postamphibious
phase when Lt. Gen. Simon B. Buckner, commanding Tenth Army,
assumed leadership ashore of the land forces of the operation. Orig-
inally, the Army planned to use smoke generators to conceal airfields
and beaches during Phases II and III of ICEBERG, during the occupation
of Ie Shima and the establishment of control over northern Okinawa,
and during the seizure of additional islands in the Nansei Shoto. The
28th Smoke Generator Battalion, comprised of the 67th, 68th, and
71st Smoke Generator Companies, received the Okinawa assignment.
Unfortunately, the 71st Smoke Generator Company was not available
in time for operations on Ie Shima. Although the Headquarters and
Headquarters Detachment, 28th Chemical Smoke Generator Battalion,
and elements of the 67th and 68th Smoke Generator Companies arrived
at Okinawa on 12 June, Phase III of the operation was canceled. The
remainder of the two companies arrived on Okinawa early in July,
but Japanese air activity had diminished considerably, and the need
32
for smoke no longer existed.
Although the planning for the invasion of Kyushu, the southern-
most island of the homeland of the enemy, had not been completed
when Japan surrendered, it appeared certain that smoke generator
troops would have seen extensive use had the invasion been mounted.
Colonel Copthorne, now Chemical Officer, Army Forces, Pacific, ar-
ranged with representatives of the operations officer of his headquarters
and with the commander of Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, for the
use of five chemical smoke generator companies during the early stages
of OLYMPIC, as the operation was dubbed. Earmarked for the eastern
shore of Kyushu were the three companies of the 28th Smoke Gen-
erator Battalion. The two quartermaster truck companies which had
formerly been the 70th and 170th Smoke Generator Companies were
to be reconverted to smoke units and earmarked for operations on the
western shore of Kyushu. During the initial stage of the operation
32
(1) Unit records in CmlC Hist Off. (2) Interv, Hist Off with Maj Lucius F. Lincoln, formerly
ExecO 28th Smoke Generator Bn, 12 May 50. (3) CG Tenth Army Action Rpt, Ryukyus, 26 Mar-
30 Jun 45, vol I, ch. 11, sec. XIII, par 1a(2).
and under control of the Navy, the companies were to screen ship
concentrations, harbors, and beaches. Once the invasion forces had
successfully landed, smoke troops would revert to Army control. How
these units were to be assigned in support of tactical operations on
Kyushu was still a matter of conjecture when the war came to an end.
Upon orders of AFPAC, Eighth Army prepared a study on the use
of smoke troops in land operations on the island. It recommended in
July 1945 that twelve M2 mechanical generators be issued to the
chemical service platoon assigned to each combat division and that
two smoke generator battalions, each with four companies, be rede-
ployed from Europe and assigned, one each, to the two invading
33
armies.
Colonel Copthorne approved the idea of giving mechanical smoke
generators to chemical service platoons, calling attention to the growing
tendency of combat troops to demand larger and larger smoke screens
and arguing that the use of fog oil by the service platoon would reduce
the tonnage of mortar and artillery smoke ammunition. The chemical
officer of Sixth Army, Colonel Burns, opposed the plan. He felt that
the chemical service platoons had neither the men nor the transporta-
tion for the conduct of screening operations. Moreover, he considered
impractical any attempt to substitute a fog oil screen for a projected
smoke screen because they served "different tactical purposes."34
There could be no doubt that chemical service platoons in the combat
area were fully occupied in the supply and maintenance of chemical
supplies and were already short of transportation facilities. But Burns's
statement concerning tactical screening ran counter to the experience
of U.S. forces in Europe who frequently used fog oil to save mortar and
artillery ammunition. V-J Day found still unanswered this question
of how the combat divisions in the Pacific could best be supported by
smoke generator personnel.
33
(1) Interv, Hist Off with Williams, 5 Jun 50. Colonel Williams of the AFPAC Chemical Section
had a part in this smoke planning. (2) Lt Col William R. Maull to CCWS, 28 Sep 45, Rpt of Official
Travel, pp. 35-36. CMLHO. Colonel Maull stated that AFPAC was to activate only one additional
smoke company.
34
Ltr, CCmlO AFPAC to CmlO Sixth Army, 4 Aug 45, sub: Smoke Generators as Additional
Equip for Cml Serv Platoons, and 1st Ind CmlO Sixth Army to CCmlO AFPAC, 11 Aug 45. Sixth
Army 400.34—Equipment—Special T/E & T/BA.
The Navy's Use of Smoke

Naval operations in Pacific waters, particularly in the last two years
of the war, were accompanied by an extensive use of smoke. Although
the Navy had its own arsenal of smoke munitions, including HC pots
and the Besler mechanical generator, its use of CWS equipment was
not uncommon. CWS personnel also contributed to the fulfillment
of the Navy's smoke mission.
The question of concealing Pearl Harbor with smoke was one of
long standing, and the Army, before World War II, had discouraged
at least one Navy suggestion for screening that most important in-
35
stallation. It was natural that the matter would assume a much
greater significance after 7 December 1941. Although early in 1942
a special smoke board set up by Admiral Nimitz recommended against
screening the Pearl Harbor area, the M1 mechanical smoke generator
was scarcely off the assembly line before the Navy obtained fifteen of
the items for use in the Hawaiian Islands.36 Knowing little or nothing
about the generators, Navy officials at Pearl Harbor requested Colonel
Unmacht to service and demonstrate the machines. By March 1943 he
had gotten possession of all fifteen generators, trained men from the
91st Chemical Mortar Company in their operation, started a program
for training Navy personnel, and had demonstrated the generators
37
along the Honolulu waterfront and at Pearl Harbor.
The Navy's interest in area screening prompted General Richardson,
commanding the Hawaiian Department, to take a renewed interest in
smoke equipment. Earlier, he had attempted unsuccessfully to secure
fifty generators without taking any smoke troops. The Chief, Chemical
Warfare Service, had strongly opposed this suggestion, arguing that
the efficient operation of the generators required trained men available
38
on a 24-hour basis. Richardson was still unwilling to substitute smoke
generator troops for others on his troop basis for Hawaii. Again the
War Department replied that the Hawaiian Department could not
have the equipment without the troops, although as a compromise it
was willing to send a cadre of smoke specialists, provided that General
35
Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 470-71.
36
Ltr, Waitt to Unmacht, 18 Nov 42. CWS 314.7 Personal Ltr file, AFMIDPAC.
37
Ltrs, Unmacht to Waitt, 11 Dec 42, 3 Mar, 5 Mar 43.
38
Ltr, Waitt to Unmacht, CmlO Hawaiian Dept, 18 Nov 42.
Richardson activate a smoke unit within the theater.39 During the

negotiations, Colonel Unmacht argued that the need for smoke was
far greater in Hawaii than along the west coast of the United States,
where smoke units were then stationed. He believed that the situation
justified 500 smoke troops despite the presence at Honolulu and Pearl
Harbor of 10,000 men assigned to fighter, antiaircraft, and barrage
balloon units. Unmacht's arguments that smoke troops, man for man,
contributed more to antiaircraft defense than those of any other service
were not persuasive enough to cause the Hawaiian Department to
substitute smoke troops for other types.40
The Navy made one more attempt to secure a smoke installation for
Pearl Harbor, suggesting that its facilities be screened with existing
equipment—15 mechanical generators and 1,100 obsolete stationary
generators. General Richardson referred the proposal to Colonel Un-
macht who pointed out that, in comparison with mechanical gen-
erators, the stationary models consumed too much oil and required
too many men to operate. Besides, he argued, there was not enough
equipment on hand to screen Pearl Harbor effectively. Unmacht used
this opportunity to try again to convince the Hawaiian Department
41
to ask for smoke generator companies. The diminishing need for
smoke at the islands served to nullify this last attempt to get a full-
scale smoke installation at Pearl Harbor.
After mid-1943 smoke screening activities in the Pacific Ocean
Areas were confined to the combat zones. The first of the island cam-
paigns in the Central Pacific Area was the V Amphibious Corps' as-
sault on the Gilberts. Plans for Tarawa, the objective of the2d
Marine Division, called for curtains of smoke laid by carrier planes,
as well as the use of Army M1 and M4 smoke pots loaded on landing
craft, to conceal mine sweeper activity and the assault waves of
marines as they rendezvoused for the final run. The actual operation
saw limited use of smoke. The aircraft screens were deemed unneces-
sary, although the pots on the landing craft did obscure the assault
craft from enemy observation. Smoke activity during the difficult
days after the assault proved to be of more importance. Six landing
craft, stationed at various positions to the windward, used smoke pots
39
Ltr, CG Hawaiian to CG ASF WD, 23 Apr 43, sub: Smoke Generator Equip and 1st Ind,
Secy War to CG Hawaiian Dept. AG 400 (4-23-43) OB-S-E.
40
Ltr, Unmacht to Waitt, 30 Mar 43. CMLHO.
41
Ltr, Unmacht to Waitt, 13 Jul 43. CMLHO.
to shield ships anchored in the lagoon during enemy night air attacks,
42
at times aided by LST's equipped with smoke pots.
Area screening of anchorages became accepted procedure for oper-
ations in the Marshall Islands, the next step up the island ladder. The
Navy rehearsed the planned smoke procedures during January 1944
and put them into practice during the invasions of Kwajalein, Roi-
Namur, and Eniwetok. In brief, small craft burned M1 and M4 HC
pots, furnished by the CWS depot in Hawaii, while the cargo and per-
sonnel ships employed the Navy's Besler mechanical smoke generators
for the first time. The glare from the pots and their fire hazard em-
phasized the need for a small lightweight generator which could be
mounted on small craft for this type of operation.43
The Marianas campaign in the summer of 1944 saw further Navy
successes with anchorage screening. Between 15 June (D-day) and
7 July, the Saipan anchorage had a total of 19 hours of smoke entailing
57,000 gallons of fog oil and 11,400 smoke pots. The commander of
the Joint Expeditionary Force called it "the greatest factor in the
extremely effective defense of the transport area against air attack.
During the repeated attacks 100 bombs were dropped in the vicinity
of the transport area, but were obviously dropped blindly. . . .44
The Navy set up a most complete smoke installation at Guam.
Emplaced mechanical generators lined the landlocked harbor while
small craft with mounted generators patrolled the entrance. Resembling
those established during 1943-44 at Bizerte, Naples, and Anzio in the
Mediterranean theater, this was one of the few smoke installations in
the Pacific which depended upon land-based mechanical generators
as the primary means of screening. Ironically, enemy air forces never
45
tested the smoke defenses.
42
(1) Comdr TF 53, app. 3 to an. A to CTF 53 OPORD A 104-43 (revised). CMLHO. (2)
Comdr, Transport Div 4 Tarawa, in Extracts from Naval Rpts on Use of Smoke by the Navy in
Amphib Opns to Date, Jan 44. Sixth Army 470.6—Smoke. (3) Rpt of Tarawa Opn (AGO 370.2
(31 Dec 4 3 ) ) , cited in CWS TofO Ltr 11, 9 Mar 44, p. 12. (4) Crowl and Love, Seizure of the
Gilberts and Marshalls, p. 129. (5) Capt. James R. Stockman, USMC, The Battle for Tarawa
(Washington, 1947), p. 13.
43
(1) Extracts from Naval Rpts on Use of Smoke by the Navy in Amphib Opns to Date Marshall
Islands Opn. Sixth Army 470.6—Smoke. (2) Ltr, CmlO Sixth Army to Div CG's, 24 Jun 44,
sub: Marshall Islands Campaign. Sixth Army 3 14.7—Rpts, Hist.
44
CWS TofO Ltr 22, 28 February 1945, pages 23-24, cites comments made by the Commander of
the Joint Expeditionary Force in Report of Amphibious Operations for the Capture of the Marianas
Islands, 25 August 1944.
45
(1) Lt. Comdr. V. C. Alexander, USNR, "Area Smoke Screen in Harbor Defense," Naval Harbor
Defense (OPNAV 30-3-A), No. 3, May 1945, pp. 11-15. (2) Interv, Hist Off OCCmlO with
Comdr Alexander, member of the Amphib Smoke Committee, 25 Sep 45. CMLHO.
On 20 October 1944 Sixth Army launched its operations against the

Philippine Islands with the assault on Leyte. The Japanese response
was immediate, including the commitment of a substantial part of
Japan's air reserves.46 During the first stage of the operation U.S.
carrier-based planes twice laid screens over the invasion beaches of
X and XXIV Corps. Floating smoke pots enabled two beached LST's
to resume unloading after an interruption caused by enemy mortar fire.
For the first four days the Japanese concentrated their air activity
during the hours of daylight. Antiaircraft defenses during this period
consisted for the most part of U.S. carrier-based fighters which pre-
vented any serious damage to the ships or the targets onshore. This
procedure restricted smoke to the twilight periods and night alerts.
In the next four days, when enemy planes averaged 175 sorties, the
Navy used smoke extensively during day as well as twilight and night
attacks. After 27 October the smoke again was restricted to twi-
light, moonlight, and nocturnal alerts. This return to former tactics,
which were continued in operations at Lingayen Gulf and Okinawa,
came about for several reasons: the ineffectiveness of the daytime
screens except under ideal low-speed wind conditions, the fear that the
smoke generators would not hold up under extended use, a shortage
of fog oil, the establishment of an airstrip at nearby Tacloban, and the
fact that daytime smoke precluded observation by the antiaircraft
batteries at the same time that it allowed enemy aircraft glimpses of
47
the masts of the assembled ships.
Antiaircraft defenses at Leyte Gulf were largely successful. Few, if
any, ships received hits while hidden by smoke although several de-
stroyers outside the screen suffered damage. This accomplishment was
the greater because Leyte marked the first appearance in force of the
Japanese kamikaze planes. By preventing Japanese pilots from sighting
individual targets, smoke did much to reduce the effectiveness of these
suicide missions. After the operation the commander of Southern
Attack Force commented that "area smoke, properly employed, is
46
CG Sixth Army, Rpt of the Leyte Opn, 20 Oct-25 Dec 44, pp. 40-41. CMLHO.
47
(1) Ltr, Comdr TF 79 to Comdr Seventh Fleet, sub: Seizure of Leyte—Rpt of Participation of
TF 79. Bur Yards & Docks File No. FFI-D-NB ( 5 0 3 ) . (2) Comdr Amphib Group 6, Pacific Fleet,
TF 79.2, Rpt of Leyte Opn, 4 Nov 44. CMLHO. (3) Comdr Amphib Group 8, Seventh Fleet
Action Rpt—Leyte Opn—Rpt On, pt. V, Special Comments (d) Smoke (extract undated). Both
in CMLHO.
invaluable for protecting a transport area from enemy air attack at

night or at twilight." 48
The landings at Lingayen Gulf in Luzon saw some use of smoke pots
to conceal the beaches from direct observation by enemy artillery
until American counterbattery fire could silence the opposition.49
Once the beachhead was secured the Navy regularly screened the
anchorage at dawn and dusk for a daily total of about two hours.
The Leyte experience led to improvements in the screens at Lingayen
Gulf. Smoke boats arranged in lines at distances of 500, 1,000, and
2,000 yards windward from the ships resulted in a more uniform
screen than had been the case at Leyte. Ships under smoke at Lingayen
suffered no damage from the dawn and dusk air raids, despite the fre-
quent 15- to 20-knot sea breeze. Denied observation of the anchorage,
the Japanese planes made several hits on destroyers and escorts patrol-
ling outside the concealed area. The supply situation at Lingayen Gulf
was much better than that at Leyte which had seen the near depletion
of fog oil and smoke pots.50
The naval commander at Lingayen Gulf strongly recommended
that LCVP (landing craft, vehicle and personnel) smoke boats should
be fitted with the CWS lightweight smoke generator as soon as possible.
The smoke cloud produced by this mechanical generator not only was
more persistent, but it was without the toxicity of HC smoke. Fre-
quently, both at Leyte and at Lingayen, men aboard ships became ill
when ventilating systems drew in the HC-laden air. And there was
always the storage problem and fire hazard presented by smoke pots.51
In preparing for the campaigns of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the Navy
in the Pacific received technical assistance from members of the
Amphibious Smoke Committee. Capt. N. F. Chamberlain, CWS, and
three naval officers of the committee reported to the Commander,
Amphibious Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet, on 5 November 1944 for
48
(1) Comdr Southern Attack Force (TF 79), Rpt of Philippine Opn: Tactical Use of Smoke 13
Nov 44. Bur Yards & Docks, FFI-D-NB (503) (AL). (2) CmlO X Corps, Hist Data, Leyte-
Samar Campaign, app. G, n.d. Sixth Army 319.1—Leyte Opn.
49
Ltr, CmlO 43d Inf Div to CmlO I Corps, 23 Jan 45, sub: Misc Summary Rpt, 23 Jan 45.
Sixth Army 319.1—Weekly Activity Rpts, Divs.
50
(1) Rpt, Comdr TF 79, Lingayen Gulf Opn, n.d., sub: Tactical Use of Smoke. Bur Yards & Docks
FFI-D-NB (503) (AL-1), and in ORB Sixth Army 370.2-Luzon Opns Rpts. (2) Ltr, Copthorne
to Hist Off, 23 May 50. Naval officers remarked to Colonel Copthorne that smoke operations at
Lingayen Gulf showed a great improvement in technique.
51
(1) Ibid, (2) Capt Walter Karig, Battle Report: Victory in the Pacific (New York: Rinehart
& Co., 1949), pp. 30-31.
temporary duty as smoke specialists. In Hawaii they lectured on the

experimental work done at the Amphibious Training Base, Fort Pierce,
52
Fla., trained air and naval crews and infantry troops in the employ-
ment of smoke munitions and equipment, prepared training directives,
and assisted in writing smoke plans for scheduled operations. The
committee appeared in Hawaii at a rather opportune moment, for
interest in smoke screening had reached a high point with the news
of how kamikaze pilots had been baffled at Leyte.53
On 22 December 1944 the committee, before many high-ranking
combat commanders in the POA, including ten admirals and a number
of Marine and Army generals, successfully staged in Hawaii a large-
scale demonstration on the use of smoke in landings. Vice Adm.
Richmond K. Turner, Commander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet,
was among those impressed by the capabilities of smoke. As a result of
the demonstration members of the smoke committee were requested
to participate in subsequent landing operations as smoke advisers.54
At Iwo Jima the Navy used a limited quantity of smoke during the
initial assault, including screens laid by carrier-based planes as the
first wave approached the beach.55 Later, screens concealed ships in
the anchorage from kamikaze planes during sixteen different night
raids. No vessel under the screen suffered damage, although five enemy
56
bombs straddled the USS Auburn. Beach and shore party personnel
had been specially trained for the employment of portable smoke gen-
erators on the island, but none actually made the landing.57 The
satisfactory performance of waterborne generators negated the need
for landing the palletized generators, an operation which would have
been imperiled by the heavy sea and currents.
The most extensive and prolonged area screening operation in the
Pacific took place at Okinawa. Anticipating that the Japanese air
forces would desperately oppose any landing so close to the homeland,
framers of the task force smoke plan specifically provided for night
coverage of the anchorage and further directed the commanders of
52
The naval doctrine on use of smoke in amphibious operations was published in Commander in
Chief, U.S. Fleet, Smoke Screens for Amphibious Operations, 8 Nov 44.
53
Memo, Chamberlain for CO Research and Development Center Amphib Tng Comd U.S. Atlantic
Fleet, 22 Jun 45, sub: Summary of Activities of the Amphib Comd in Forward Areas. CMLHO.
54
(1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, CmlO POA to ACCWS for Field Opns, 23 Dec 44. CWS 314.7 Personal
Ltr file, AFMIDPAC.
55
Karig, Battle Report: Victory in the Pacific, p. 303.
56
Comdr Amphib Group 2, Iwo Jima, Action Rpt, pt. VIII, Smoke. CMLHO.
57
Ibid.,pt. X, Force Beachmaster's Rpt, sec. B ( K ) , Smoke Generators.
attack forces and groups to draw up detailed plans for other uses of
smoke. The latter provision resulted in limited use of smoke in con-
nection with underwater demolition team activities, landing feints,
the assault on Ie Shima, and mine-sweeping activities. But the anchor-
age screens were another matter. Okinawa saw the kamikaze campaign
reach a crescendo,58 and in an effort to minimize the terrible destruc-
tion caused by these riders of the "heavenly wind" the Navy expended
more fog oil and smoke pots at the Hagushi Beach anchorage than in
59
any other single operation of World War II.
In addition to the customary means of smoking from small craft
and ships the Navy on L-day plus 1 took ashore forty-five mechanical
generators and divided them between the north and south sectors of
Hagushi Beach. Next day these generators went into operation. The
southern line, commanded by Captain Chamberlain of the Amphibious
Smoke Committee, had twenty-five emplacements; the northern line
had about fifteen. Limited training of the generator operators did
not prevent the shore contingent from maintaining an adequate screen
60
over the anchorage.
A word about the operation of the screen. The senior officer present
afloat ordered smoke when unidentified planes, as shown by the radar
screen, seemed likely to attack. All ships under the screen withheld
antiaircraft fire, because smoke was an ample safeguard against the
few planes which penetrated the outside fighter defense and because
61
AA fire might disclose the location of the ships. During the night of
L-day (1 April) smoke covered the anchorage for a total of 6 hours
and 32 minutes. Smoke concealed the anchorage and beaches during
40 of the 46 nights between L-day and 16 May, with the average screen
lasting slightly more than 2 hours. From 17 May until 21 June, the
day the island was secured, the Navy resorted to smoke practically
58
For details on the kamikaze attacks, see: (1) Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle, pp.
97-101; (2) Maj Charles S. Nichols, Jr., and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific
(Washington, 1 9 5 5 ) , pp. 82-86.
(1) Comdr (Adm Turner) Amphib Forces Pacific Fleet, Action Rpt, Okinawa Gunto, pt. V,
59
Special Rpts; sec. C, Naval Ordnance and Gunnery; IV—Protective Smoke Cover (1 Apr-16 May 45).
CMLHO. (2) Memo, Chamberlain for CO Research and Development Center Amphib Tng Comd,
U.S. Atlantic Fleet, 22 Jun 45, sub: Summary of Activities of the Amphib Comd in Forward Areas.
60
(1) Beachmaster Hagushi Beaches to Comdr Amphib Group 12, Rpt, Smoke Generator Opn,
Hagushi Beaches, Okinawa. (2) Comdr (Turner) Amphib Forces Pacific Fleet, Action Rpt, Okinawa
Gunto, pt. V, Special Rpts; sec. C, Naval Ordnance and Gunnery; IV—Protective Smoke Cover (1 Apr-
16 May 45).
61
Ltr, Maj N. F. Chamberlain, CmlC Res, to Hist Off, 1 May 50.
every night for an average of one hour and 27 minutes, although one
night of unusual Japanese air activity resulted in an 8-hour screen.
Estimated expenditures of smoke materials for the Okinawa operation
were 2,475,000 gallons of fog oil, 35,000 land smoke pots, and 47,500
floating smoke pots, or floats as they were known to the Navy.62
Comments on smoke operations at Okinawa were of special impor-
tance because of their influence on planning for the invasion of Japan.
Captain Chamberlain reported that the initial skepticism among ship
captains as to the value of smoke over the anchorage quickly changed
"to an almost frantic clamor for smoke cover when it was found that
only those ships outside the smoke screen were being hit by suicide
planes." 63
Admiral Turner made a number of recommendations for future
smoke operations, which, for the most part, concerned logistics. Again,
planning for the Okinawa operation had not provided adequate quan-
tities of fog oil and pots, either in the forward area or in reserve.
Consequently, supplies were almost exhausted several times during an
operation. He advocated equipping all merchant ships with fog oil
generators and expanding the maintenance facilities for smoke equip-
ment. Both measures would further increase the requirements for fog
oil to 8,000 barrels (approximately 400,000 gallons), an amount he
considered a minimum for planning an operation the size of the one
at Okinawa. This weekly replenishment figure was double that re-
quested (although not always supplied) for Okinawa. Turner also
emphasized that smoke personnel should be recognized as specialists and
urged that CWS smoke generators units be provided for onshore
assistance.64 It seems that if the Pacific war had continued, smoke
would have played an important role on sea as well as on land.
Screens for Airborne Operations

Airborne operations in the Pacific differed considerably from those
in the war against Germany. The difference was largely a matter of
62
(1) Comdr (Turner) Amphib Forces Pacific Fleet, Action Rpt, Okinawa Gunto, pt. V Special
Rpts; sec. C, Naval Ordnance and Gunnery: IV—Protective Smoke Cover (1 Apr-16 May 4 5 ) . (2)
Comdr V Amphib Force, CTF 51, Rpt of Capture of Okinawa Gunto, Phases I and II (17 May-21 Jun
45).
63
Memo, Capt Chamberlain for CO Research and Development Center Amphib Tng Comd U.S.
Atlantic Fleet, 22 Jun 45, sub: Summary of Activities of the Amphib Comd in Forward Areas.
64
Comdr (Turner) Amphib Forces Pacific Fleet, Action Rpt, Okinawa Gunto, pt. V, special Rpts;
sec. C, Naval Ordnance and Gunnery; IV—Protective Smoke Cover (1 Apr—16 May 4 5 ) .
size; the geography of the Pacific area, as noted earlier, dictated that
most ground operations there would be on a smaller scale than those
on the land mass of Europe. The forces in the Pacific received more
modest allotments of men and matériel than did those in Europe.
Perhaps the very small size of the Pacific airborne operations made
them more suitable for support by air-land smoke screens. In any
event, in contrast with experience in Europe, half of the six airborne
operations in the war against Japan had the benefit of smoke.65
The first of the air-screened paratroop landings, indeed the first
airborne operation in the Pacific, took place in eastern New Guinea
at the airstrip near Nadzab, a village some twenty-five miles up the
66
Markham River from the coastal town of Lae. The landing at the
Nadzab strip, an overgrown facility about a half a mile north of the
river, took place on the morning of 5 September 1943, the day after
an Australian-American amphibious task force went ashore near Lae.
The successful completion of these missions would lead to control of
New Guinea's Huon Peninsula and increased control of the straits
between New Guinea and New Britain. More immediately, the seizure
of Nadzab would prevent Japanese reinforcement from the Wewak
area and would enable C-47's to fly in the Australian 7th Division for
a move down the Markham River to Lae.67
The 503d Parachute Infantry regiment made the jump at Nadzab.
Little enemy opposition was expected, but because the Japanese did
have troops in the vicinity of Lae and at the Heath Plantation, between
Lae and the immediate objective, there was some chance of encounter-
ing one of the daily patrols which scouted the Nadzab area. To take
care of any such possibility the airdrop was preceded by B—25's which
worked over the area with .50-caliber machine guns and parachute
fragmentation bombs. Seven A—20's followed armed with smoke tanks
to screen each of the three drop zones from possible enemy observation.
(Map 7) Eighty-one C-47's fell in behind the smoke-laying A—20's.
The troops began jumping at 1020 and within five minutes the entire
65
For a detailed account of the use of smoke in Pacific airdrops, see John Christianson, "The Use
of Smoke with Parachute Operations," Military Affairs, XXV, No. 3 (Fall, 1961) 47-56.
66
For a full treatment of this operation and the general strategic picture of operations in eastern
New Guinea, see John Miller jr., CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul, UNITED STATES ARMY
IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959), pp. 189-221. See also, Wesley Frank Craven and James
Lea Cate, eds., "The Army Air Forces in World War II," vol. IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950), pp. 180-86.
67
Miler,CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul, pp. 189, 194.
MAP7
force was on the ground. No Japanese were encountered; casualties

were minor.68 No doubt the distinct success of the landings was the
result of the total lack of opposition at Nadzab.
The smoke phase of the operation, while generally successful, re-
vealed the expected inadequacies in procedure which accompany any
such pioneering effort. Each of the seven A-20's carried four M10
smoke tanks, a versatile munition which served also as a spray tank
for toxic agents. Slung under the wings of aircraft, the M10 tank
68
(1) Ibid., p. 208. (2) General George C. Kenney in General Kenney Reports, A Personal History
of the Pacific War (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943), page 233, states there were ninety-six
C-47's in the Nadzab operation.
had a capacity of thirty gallons and when filled with the smoke agent
69
FS weighed a total of almost 550 pounds.
On the morning of the Nadzab operation weather conditions were
almost ideal for putting down a curtain of smoke. The wind was
blowing from northwest to southeast at an estimated five miles an hour.
Although the sky was clear there was a high overcast. The 80° tem-
perature was accompanied by a humidity of 85 percent, a favorable
condition for a good curtain, dependent as FS is on the moisture in
70
the atmosphere.
In 2 groups of 2 and one of 3, the A-20 attack aircraft laid the
screens over Nadzab at an altitude of 250 feet and a speed of 225 miles
an hour. Each of the tanks was filled with 19 gallons of the agent,
or a total for the 28 tanks of approximately 532 gallons. In each
formation the pilot of the lead plane discharged 2 tanks, counted 4
seconds, and discharged the remaining 2. Staggered slightly to the rear,
the other A-20 went through the same procedure, allowing for a
slight overlap to insure the continuity of the screen. The smoke settled
quickly to the ground and then rose to an average height of 400 feet
along each of the three 4,500-foot screens. Each screen lasted about
2 minutes, the length of time prescribed in the operational plan. Still
effective after 5 minutes, the smoke rose, bunched, and dispersed after
10 more minutes had passed.
How effective would these smoke curtains have been if the para-
troopers had landed in the face of enemy opposition? Maj. Tristram J.
Cummins, Jr., Chemical Officer, Fifth Air Force, felt that two of the
screens were too close to the wooded areas to have screened the observa-
tion of Japanese had they been located in the outer fringes of the woods.
If the screen had been placed 2,000 feet from the woods, the troopers
could have landed and organized with a potential enemy still cloaked
by the drifting smoke. The operation also disclosed shortcomings in
filling equipment and difficulty with the attachment of tanks to the
aircraft.
It seems that little use was made of the lessons learned at Nadzab
in the application of air smoke to the next Pacific airborne operation—
69
FS, a solution of sulphur trioxide in chlorosulfonic acid, was a standard smoke agent. When
atomized it reacted with water vapor present in the air to form a dense cloud of droplets of sulphuric
acid.
70
Cml Warfare Opns Rpt 1, CmlO Fifth AF, 14 Sep 43. Sixth Army 470.6 Smoke. The remainder
of the Nadzab account is based upon this report.
SMOKE SHIELDS A PARATROOP DROP, NEW GUINEA
the jump at Kamiri airdrome on the island of Noemfoor. Capture of

the island, which lay just off the coast of northwestern New Guinea,
would neutralize the Japanese on nearby Biak and provide airstrips for
the Allied advance on the Vogelkop Peninsula. Again, the jump was
made by paratroopers of the 503d Parachute Infantry regiment; their
3 July 1944 airborne attack followed by one day the amphibious
landing of the 158th Regimental Combat Team (RCT).71 Because
of the success of the assault landing, the troopers of the 503d landed
without encountering enemy opposition. Two smoke missions preceded
the airdrop. B-25's used M47A2 white phosphorus bombs to blanket
nearby Kornasoren airdrome and its antiaircraft batteries. Then three
A-20 attack bombers, each with two M10 smoke tanks, moved in the
van of the C-47's with their cargo of paratroopers.
71
Smith, in Approach to the Philippines, pages 397-424, presents a detailed description of the Noem-
foor operation.
The weather, similar to that at Nadzab but with a bit more humidity,
favored the use of smoke. But the six smoke tanks on the three attack
bombers, not enough to lay a screen for the required two and a half
miles, produced a patchy, hole-filled curtain over the airdrome. Conse-
quently, the troopers jumped into a undeveloped screen and were still
jumping as the smoke began to dissipate and as a southeasterly wind
blew it directly over the drop zone, creating hazard and confusion.
The hard surface of the airstrip, the debris with which it was cluttered,
and the low altitude from which the jump was made combined to
produce casualties totaling 10 percent, an abnormally high rate. Next
day another battalion jumped onto the same airstrip, this time without
a smoke screen. Casualties were 8 percent, high enough for the task
force commander to call off a scheduled third jump.72
By way of explanation for the rather shoddy smoke operation, the
Fifth Air Force chemical officer cited insufficient notice of the im-
pending mission and the lack of opportunity for the wing chemical
officer to participate in the operation's logistical planning. Whatever
the fault, the fact remained that not only was smoke for the mission
inadequate but no planes were in reserve to patch up the screen once
it got spotty.73
The last use of smoke in Pacific airborne operations took place on
23 June 1945 over the Camalaniugan airstrip in northern Luzon. The
airdrop, carried out by a reinforced battalion of the 511th Parachute
Infantry, coincided with a drive down the Cagayan River valley by
Sixth Army's 37th Division and the occupation of the coastal town of
Aparri by a Ranger task force. Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, Army com-
mander, expected that this combination of actions would pinch out
the remaining Japanese forces in northern Luzon.74
Smoke was needed to conceal the troopers from the observation of
Japanese forces suspected to be in positions in the wooded hills four
miles to the southeast of the airstrip. Three B—25's, each equipped with
a single tank, laid down an intervening screen. The E1 tank, developed
in the Southwest Pacific by the V Air Force Service Command,
72
Smith, Approach to the Philippines, pp. 413-16.
73
(1) Cml Warfare Opns Rpt 5, CmlO Fifth AF, n.d., no sub. (2) See also unsigned report, Use
of Smoke at Noemfoor Island. Both in CWS 314.7 Air Smoke.
74
Robert Ross Smith, in Triumph in the Philippines, finds fault with General Krueger's conclusion,
pointing out that most of the contemporary intelligence sources, which proved to be right, indicated
that the Japanese forces were not retreating down the valley but into the mountains both east and
west of the valley.
carried 167 gallons of liquid FS smoke and featured a discharge valve

75
which could be opened and closed during the course of a mission. This
was in decided contrast with the M10 smoke tank, used at Nadzab and
Noemfoor, which expended smoke all at one time.
The weather over northern Luzon was ideal for the smoke mission.
The three B-25's took off from an airfield to the south and arrived
over the target at 0855. A pair of planes made the initial run, one a
scant 10 feet above the grassy surface, the other, 25 feet. They flew
parallel to one another, 30 yards apart and one echeloned 100 feet to
the rear, at speeds between 230 and 240 miles an hour. After an interval
of several minutes the third plane reinforced the screen by laying
smoke between the existing streamers at an altitude of 50 feet.
Within a matter of minutes the original planes made a return run,
this time at altitudes of 75 and no feet. The third B-25 completed
the mission by making its second pass at 120 feet. The net result was
a dense screen which was effective for over an hour. The first wave
of C-47's dropped its paratroopers a little after 0900, and within half
an hour the second and third waves landed. The operation was featured
by seven gliders which brought in artillery and heavy equipment.
Jump casualties came to 7 percent of the participating force. There
was no enemy opposition.76
All of the air screening operations in the Pacific were carried out
unhampered by enemy opposition, certainly a factor which contributed
to their over-all success. But this much can be garnered from the
Pacific experience: given proper planning, an adequate amount of
smoke correctly placed, and good weather conditions, smoke delivered
by air could add great insurance to the success of any airborne
operation.
75
Ltr, ACCmlO for Field Opns to CmlO FEAF, 29 Jan 45, sub: Airplane Spray Tank E-1 for
B-25 Aircraft. CWS 314.7 Air Smoke.
76
(1) Rpt, CmlO 309th Bomb Wing to CmlO Fifth AF, 26 Jun 45, sub: Cml Warfare Tactical
Opns Rpt. CWS 314.7 Air Smoke. (2) Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 29-30.
CHAPTER XI
The 4.2-Inch Mortar in the MTO

On 10 July 1943 American, British, and Canadian forces landed on
the southern and eastern coasts of Sicily, and in the ensuing 38-day
campaign the 4.2-inch chemical mortar met its first test in combat.
This CWS weapon, still untried in battle nineteen months after the
entry of the United States into the war, by 1945 was to become an
important part of the Army's arsenal.
The 4.2-inch chemical mortar was a multiple-purpose weapon em-
ployed in close support of ground troops. Its versatility was indicated
by its ability to fire toxic agents, smoke, and high explosives. In
original tactical concept it was a basic ground weapon for offensive
gas warfare. No other weapon approached the gas-delivering capacity
of the 4.2-inch mortar; eight of them could fire over a ton of toxic
1
agent in a span of two minutes. The smoke mission was also a part
of the original tactical concept of mortar employment and was one
of the reasons for its success in World War IL But the real key to the
popularity of the weapon was its ability to fire high explosive shell, a
johnny-come-lately as far as chemical mortar missions were concerned.
The 4.2-inch mortar was the culmination of attempts to improve the
4-inch British Stokes Brandt (SB) mortar. With American-made SB
mortars and with shell and propellants purchased from the British after
World War I, the CWS sought to obtain increased range, accuracy,
and mobility.2 By 1924, experiments under the direction of Capt.
Lewis M. McBride (later colonel) produced the rifled 4.2-inch chemical
mortar with a range of over 2,000 yards, and by the end of World War
II this distance had been doubled.3
The Chemical Warfare Service saw the 4.2-inch mortar as a weapon
which possessed mobility and flexibility, which could go in and out of
1
Memo, CCWS for AcofS G-3, 13 Apr 36.
2
Chemical Mortars, 4-inch and 4.2-inch, in Summary of Activities of the Mechanical Division, Edge-
wood Arsenal, 1920-1928 (hereafter cited as EATR 189) Proj E8a 29 May 35, p. 63.
3
(1) EATR 189, p. 62. (2) For a full description of the research and development of the 4.2-inch
mortar, see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field.
THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO 419
action quickly, and which was capable of delivering mass fire in an

unusually short time. Compilation of firing data was simple, and the
communications system was efficient and rapid. Its high angle enabled
it to reach targets in defiladed positions, inaccessible to most types of
artillery. The short minimum range of the mortar and its mobility
enabled it to give support to infantry units. The low silhouette of
4
this easily concealed weapon offered a difficult target to the enemy.
Despite the potentialities of the 4.2-inch mortar the War Depart-
ment showed little interest in the weapon and in 1935 suspended its
manufacture. For about a year preceding September 1941 the 81-mm.
mortar and not the 4.2-inch was the authorized weapon for the chem-
ical battalions. These developments were typical and help reveal the
over-all status of the CWS during the 1930's. Later, during the war,
a theater chemical officer was to maintain: "It can be readily under-
stood that our service cannot be too greatly criticized, for at no time
during the days of peace were we permitted to try out our equipment
during field maneuvers, etc., which would have given us a great amount
of experience," 5 an opinion concurred in by General Porter, Chief of
the CWS.
The Authorization of the High Explosive Mission
If the high explosive mission had not been authorized, activity of

chemical mortar units in a nongas war probably would have been con-
6
fined to screening operations. While the CWS saw the chief function
of the mortar as firing gas shells, it did not overlook the possibility of
using the weapon to fire high explosives. As early as 1934 these shells
were fired in experiments.7 After the outbreak of World War II the
infantry's need for a good medium-range close support weapon became
evident, and General Porter and his staff took vigorous steps to get the
HE shell standardized and to make the firing of such a shell a major
mission of the chemical mortar battalions.
4
Memo, ExecO OCCWS for CCWS, 17 Dec 34. CmlC Bd.
5
(1) Ltr, CCmlO AFHQ to Chief Opns Div CWS, 26 May 43. (2) Ltr, CCWS to CCmlO
NATOUSA, 4 Jun 43. Both in CWS 314.7 Personal Ltr files, NATOUSA.
6
For an expanded account of the matter of authorization of the HE mission and the early activa-
tion of mortar units, see (1) Opnl History of Cml Bns and the 4.2-Inch Mortar in World War II, pt.
I, To the End of the Sicilian Campaign (Aug 4 3 ) ; (2) Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, pp.
302-04.
7
Memo, Lt Col Rollo C. Ditto ExecO OCCWS for CCWS, 17 Dec 34, in Mortars (4.2-Inch), De-
velopment of Mechanized Transportation. CRDL Tech Library, Edgewood Arsenal.
The determination, mentioned above, to convert the chemical weap-

ons units to the 81-mm. mortar naturally interrupted negotiations
regarding the HE 4.2 mortar shell. A personal conference between
General Porter and General Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, resolved
the issue in favor of the 4.2-inch mortar, a decision followed by steps
8
to equip the mortar battalions with the approved weapon. Later came
the authorization to produce a high explosive filling for the 4.2-inch
mortar shell.9
This was only half the battle. There remained the double problem
of securing War Department approval for the necessary doctrinal
change and convincing the ground commanders that mortar battalions
were worthy inclusions on troop lists that already must have looked
pathetically thin. The doctrinal matter involved the revision of
FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations. Actually, the manual
change would merely reflect the tacit approval of the War Department
of the new mission for the 4.2-inch mortar. The CWS presented its
case at a February 1943 conference with representatives of the Army
Ground Forces and the Services of Supply. The latter agreed with
the CWS point of view but the Army Ground Forces demurred,
advocating a Field Artillery Board test of the mortar. If it passed,
the weapon should be given to the Field Artillery to be employed only
in those theaters which were without 105-mm. howitzers, just about
eliminating any effective employment of the mortar.10
The Training Division, Services of Supply, in a strong statement of
nonconcurrence, called attention to the substantial increase in fire-
power which would be enjoyed by a division supported by 4.2-inch
mortars. For example, the mortar could place almost four and a half
times as much high explosive on a target in a given period of time as
could the 105-mm. howitzer, albeit at shorter ranges. The mortar
weighed 305 pounds, the howitzer over 2 tons. And mortar units were
extremely economical in demands upon manpower. To support its
case by actual combat experience, SOS cited the excellent war record
11
of the British chemical mortar with its high explosive mission.
8
Memo, Chief Field Serv OCCWS for CmlO GHQ, 19 Jan 42. Cited in CWS, Monograph, Opnl
Hist of Cml Bns and the 4.2-inch Mortar in WW II, pt. I, p. 19.
9
(1) CWTC Item 515, 26 Apr 42. (2) Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, p. 45.
10
(1) Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Graydon C. Essman, 30 Oct 44. (2) Memo, Dir of Tng SOS
for CofS SOS, 27 Feb 43. (3) Memo, CG AGF for CofS, 13 Feb 43. All in CMLHO.
11
(1) Memo, CofS SOS for CofS, 27 Feb 43. CMLHO. (2) The 12,000-yard range of the
105-mm. howitzer was three times that of the 4.2-inch mortar.
Opposition to the CWS SOS point of view gradually waned, and on

19 March 1943 the War Department authorized the use of HE by
the 4.2-inch mortar and directed that necessary amendments be made
in the tactical doctrine.12
There remained the difficulty of selling the mortar battalion to the
field commanders. To them the idea of firing high explosives from the
chemical mortar was untried and unproven. An accompanying diffi-
culty was the fact that the 4.2-inch mortar was a chemical weapon.
The general impression of most ground force officers was that the
functions of CWS were confined to "gas and gas masks and . . .
smelly clothing." 13 These officers were surprised and dubious about
including in the troop basis chemical units which would fire WP and
HE in close support of the infantry.
Obviously, CWS officers had a job on their hands, particularly those
staff officers assigned to commands just entering combat. In North
Africa Colonel Barker, chemical officer of the Western Task Force,
was effective in convincing ground commanders of the worth of the
4.2-inch mortar. Barker pressed for chemical mortar units for support
of the North African operations, calling attention to the tactical
demands for such a weapon. "This country (and north) is mostly
open except for farmhouses and country villas which are in fact rather
strong little forts. Trenches within these rock walls give lots of pro-
tection to the inhabitants thereof and [machine guns] in such places
14
command a lot of ground." Barker was not to get his mortar units
in time for North African operations, but as Fifth Army chemical
officer he got four chemical mortar battalions with which to begin the
Italian campaign, fought in terrain even better suited for use of the
4.2-inch weapon.
Activation of Chemical Mortar Units
In mid-1941 there was only a handful of mortar units, consisting

of regiments, separate battalions, and companies. The 1st and 2d
Chemical Regiments had only one active company between them; the
two separate battalions, also the 1st and 2d, each had an active company.
Completing the roster were two separate chemical companies, one of
12
Memo for Red, 18 Mar 43, by Essman, on Memo, CofS SOS for CofS. CMLHO.
13
Ltr, CmlO Atlantic Base Sec NATO to Chief Opns Div, 25 Feb 43.
14
Ltr, CmlO Fifth Army to CCWS, 9 Jan 43. CWS 314.7 Personal Ltr files, Barker, 1942-43.
which was to be lost on Bataan and the other to be inactivated shortly

after the United States entered the war.15 This unimpressive list, with
its regiments, battalions, and companies, indicated some indecision
about the size of the basic type of weapons unit. Indeed, the brigade
also had its supporters. By 1941 it had been pretty well decided that
the basic unit of the mortar organization would be the battalion, com-
posed of organic companies. The exception was the several separate
mortar companies which saw action in the Pacific fighting.
As of January 1942 there were two chemical mortar battalions, the
16
2d and 3d, on active duty. Four more, the 81st, 82d, 83d, and 84th
17
were activated by mid-year. During the ten-month interval from
June 1942 until May 1943 the number of mortar battalions remained
at six.
Meanwhile, the series of plans prepared in the United Kingdom for
the cross-Channel attack included the possibility of chemical weapon
support.18 The 1942 plan, for example, which called for a force of a
million men included a recommendation for twenty mortar battalions.19
While there was far less than this number available, the lack of reality
between plans for the use of mortar battalions and the number of
units on hand was tempered by several factors. At that time the
mission of these units was restricted to gas and smoke, and thus far
it was a gasless war. Moreover, ground force commanders, operating
within the limits of the troop basis, were reluctant to give up units
of known potential for a type untested in combat.
By March 1943 the persistent work done by the Chemical Warfare
Service in selling its battalions was beginning to prove embarrassing
because by this time theater requests for weapons battalions exceeded
the 6 on hand. The CWS pointed out that, unless other activations
15
See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, app. H.
16
Chemical mortar battalion was the designation prescribed by the last of several wartime tables of
organization. Earlier names included separate chemical battalions, chemical battalions (separate),
and chemical battalions (motorized). For the sake of simplicity, the designation chemical mortar bat-
talion will be used throughout the text.
17
(1) Ltr, TAG to CG Third Army and CG SOS, 25 Mar 42. (2) 1st Ind, Asst AG to CCWS,
7 Apr 42. (3) Ltr, Asst AG Third Army to Chief CWS, 11 Apr 42. (4) 83d Cml Bn GO 1, 10
Jun 42. (5) The War Department General Staff based future activations on a schedule which called
for a total of 6 battalions by the end of 1942, 12 more in 1943, and another 12 in 1944. Except
for 1943, when only five battalions were activated, this schedule was met. Memo, Troops Div OCCWS
for Chief Field Serv, 28 Mar 42.
18
Memo, McCormick for Chief Troops Div, 2 Apr 42.
19
Memo, Chief Planning Br Opns Div SOS for Supply Arms and Services, 7 May 1942.
4.2-INCH CHEMICAL MORTAR CREW IN ACTION during the Italian campaign.
were authorized before the existing units were shipped, there would
be no battalions in the United States, trained or in training, and no
sources of cadres for units activated later. As all of the 6 existing
battalions were committed for the months of March and May 1943,
the CWS urgently recommended that 19 additional battalions be acti-
vated by the end of 1943, 6 of them at once to replace a like number
being sent overseas.20 Soon after the final decision to commit four
battalions for operations in Sicily, the War Department authorized the
activation of four additional battalions—the 86th, 87th, and 88th in
May and the 85th in June.21
20
Ltr, Actg CCWS to OPD WDGS, 11 Mar 43.
21
(1) Memo, Chief Field Rqmts Br OCCWS for Chief Sup Br, 16 Apr 43. (2) TAG Ltr, 4 May
43. AG 320.2 (5-1-43). (3) CWS Units Activated, 1 Oct 44. CMLHO.
Sicily
Preparation for Combat
The mortar battalions selected for participation in HUSKY, the
22
invasion of Sicily, were the 2d, 3d, 83d, and 84th. The latter three
sailed almost immediately, arriving in North Africa early in May.
These battalions finished their training in the theater although about
half of the available time was spent in acquiring their full complement
of organizational equipment and in staging. At this time the 3d, 83d,
and 84th Battalions were placed in support of the 3d, 1st, and 9th
Infantry Divisions, respectively.23
Unfortunately, the pressure of preinvasion activities and the late
date of attachments left little time for the kind of training most
urgently needed by the mortar battalions—combined exercises with the
infantry units to which they were attached. Most mortar units also
lacked amphibious training. Of the early arriving battalions, only two
companies of the 3d, commanded by Lt. Col. Edgar D. Stark, had
received this specialized training before leaving the United States, and
that was limited to a few weeks at the Amphibious Training Center,
24
Camp Carrabelle, Fla., later known as Camp Gordon Johnston. The
three battalions received "only sketchy preparation for the problem
of amphibious maneuvers" at the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center
after they arrived in North Africa.25
The fourth mortar unit earmarked for Sicily fared better in its
preparations. While undergoing training at Fort Bragg, N. C., the
2d Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Robert W. Breaks, had been
able to arrange locally for joint training with infantry units also located
at Fort Bragg. The 2d Battalion was attached to the 45th Infantry
Division in February 1943 during final training preparations for over-
seas movement, preparations which included work in mountain and
amphibious operations. This experience constituted what until then
22
Unless otherwise noted, the section on Sicily is based upon the combat reports of the participating
battalions: (1) Journal of 2d Cml Bn (Motorized) in World War II, to 10 Aug 1943; (2) History
of 3d Cml Bn in Campaign of Sicily, 10 Jul 43-30 Aug 43; 83d Cml Bn, Battle Rpt, The Battle
for Sicily, 5 Nov 1943. See also: (4) Lt Col Albert N. Garland and Howard McGaw Smyth, Sicily
and the Surrender of Italy, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1965).
23
Rpt of Seventh Army in Sicily.
24
(1) Rpt of Seventh Army in Sicily, p. H-1. (2) Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col Robert W.
Breaks and Col Fellenz, 23 Oct 44. (3) Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. XIII.
25
Rpt of Seventh Army in Sicily, p. H-1.
were probably the only cases of joint 4.2-inch mortar-infantry train-

ing in the United States. The 45th and its supporting units sailed for
North Africa combat-loaded, arriving near Oran just twelve days
before embarkation for Sicily. During this brief stay the 2d Battalion
completed a 15-day training program in less than half the allotted
time.26
CWS officers in North Africa exerted every effort to acquaint in-
fantry commanders with the chemical mission, including the 4.2-inch
mortar and its proper employment. Even before the arrival of the
chemical battalions they conducted demonstrations with 4.2-inch
mortar WP shells, colored grenades, and flame throwers. With the
arrival of the first three battalions CWS officers were able to hold
mortar demonstrations for the chief of staff of Seventh Army and other
27
high ranking officers.
Despite the limited time to prepare for the invasion the participating
infantry divisions gave some thought and effort to use of mortar units
during the assault phase. Three platoons of the 3d Battalion mounted
mortars on landing craft and actually accompanied the assault waves
of three of the four landing teams of the 3d Infantry Division. Com-
plete surprise in that sector eliminated any need for the 4.2-inch
mortars.28 Plans to use 2d Battalions mortars in the assault phase were
canceled because of the limited number of landing craft. No thought
was given to the amphibious employment of the 83d Battalion because
29
of that unit's lack of specialized training. The 84th Battalion was
not committed to the fighting in Sicily, but was kept in reserve.
The experience in Sicily prompted some of the participating CWS
officers to predict the unlikelihood of mortar employment in subsequent
landing operations.30 The Fifth Army chemical officer felt that "when
one is making a landing at a distance from his base, shipping space is
so precious that I doubt if it will ever be possible to mount the 4.2-inch
26
(1) Journal of 2d Cml Bn. (2) Col. Breaks Comments on draft of this volume, 3 Feb 61,
declared that senior commanders such as Maj. Gen. Omar Bradley and Maj. Gen. Troy Middleton
gained an early appreciation of the 4.2-inch mortar from observing these exercises.
27
(1) CWS TofO Ltr No. 5, 3 Sep 43 and Incl, 1, p. 2. (2) Rpt of Seventh Army in Sicily,
p. A-4.
28
History of 3d Cml Bn in Campaign of Sicily, 10 Jul 43-30 Aug 43. (2) CWS TofO Ltr No. 6,
8 Oct 43, p. 14.
29
(1) Breaks-Fellenz Interv. (2) CWS TofO Ltr No. 6, 8 Oct 43, p. 14.
30
(1) Ltr, CO 83d Cml Bn to ACCWS for Field Opns, 12 Sep 43. CWS 314.7 Personal Ltr files,
NATOUSA. (2) Breaks-Fellenz Interv.
on landing craft," a correct prediction for the war against Germany,

if not for the operations in the Pacific theaters.
Upon entry in combat each of the mortar battalions was composed
of 1,010 men: 36 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 973 enlisted men, 32
distributed among a headquarters, a headquarters company, a medical
detachment, and four weapons companies. Each company had 2
platoons, each platoon 2 sections, and each section 3 squads. On the
basis of one mortar per squad, the battalion complement of mortars
was 48. Transportation of the battalion consisted of 88 2½-ton trucks
and 36 vehicles of varying smaller sizes. Chemical mortar carts were
present in case of rough terrain. Side arms for the battalion included
33
820 .45-caliber automatics.
The Initial Test of Battle
H-hour for HUSKY was 0230, 10 July 1943. With one exception
the mortar units landed in their assigned sectors without incident. The
exception was the 83d Battalion, commanded by Colonel Cunin, three
companies of which supported a Ranger task force which was attached
to the 1st Infantry Division and which had as its objective the coastal
town of Gela, with its complex of strong defenses.34 The three mortar
companies encountered false beaches in front of the true landing area.
Although the assault craft carrying Company A managed to push
across the sandbar and reach its proper objective, the vessels carrying
the other two companies extricated themselves only with difficulty.
During the first days of the battle chemical mortars fired against
every type of target that presented itself. Some of the hardest fighting
took place at Gela where a series of enemy tank thrusts threatened
Ranger units, and, surprisingly enough, where 4.2-inch mortar fire
was used with a great deal of success against armor. On D-day mortar
fire from Company C, 83d Battalion, helped throw back a tank-
infantry attack, and later a group of Italian light tanks broke into
town only to be repulsed by antitank guns, bazookas, and pole charges.
31
Ltr, CmlO Fifth Army to ACCWS for Fld Opns, 26 Sep 43.
32
T/O 3-25, Cml Motorized Bn (Separate), I Apr 42.
33
The 2d Battalion substituted .30 carbines for the .45's in order to have a better local defense capabil-
ity. Breaks Comments, 3 Feb 61.
34
(1) 83d Cml Bn, Battle Rpt, The Battle for Sicily, 5 Nov 43, pp. 2-5. (2) Maj. William S.
Hutchinson, Jr., "Use of the 4.2-Inch Mortar in the Invasion of Sicily," Chemical Warfare Bulletin,
vol. 29, No. 8 (December, 1943-January, 1944).
PULLING A 4.2-INCH MORTAR CART OVER RUGGED TERRAIN
In this skirmish the bazooka team of Company A disabled one tank

35
which was immediately blown up by a Ranger with a pole charge.
Next day chemical mortars, firing without aiming stakes or prepared
emplacements, were not quite accurate enough to destroy any of a
group of nine tanks but were threatening enough to force the tanks
to withdraw to positions where they were dispatched by friendly
36
artillery and naval gunfire.
Actually, the chemical mortars had the necessary accuracy to engage
targets as small as a tracked vehicle. Just before dawn on one of the
early days of the Sicily campaign, a temporarily disabled German tank
began harassing an infantry position with automatic fire as the crew
made repairs. Asked for help by the infantry, a 2d Chemical Battalion
company commander called for one sensing round and then for a volley
of eight. The tank was silenced. Daylight examination of the tank
found all mortar rounds within an area fifteen yards in diameter, with
35
Hutchinson, "Use of the 4.2-Inch Mortar in the Invasion of Sicily," Chemical Warfare Bulletin,
vol. 29, No. 8 (December, 1945-January, 1944).
36
(1) Ibid. (2) 83d Cml Bn, Battle for Sicily, 5 Nov 43.
37
one of them down the open turret of the vehicle. Once the beach-
heads were consolidated, chemical mortars fired preparations preceding
infantry attacks, interdicted enemy lines of communications, and fired
on machine guns, mortars, ammunition dumps, and barracks.38
One of the most significant chemical mortar smoke missions in
Sicily was a series of screens fired for the 3d Infantry Division during
the period 6-8 August. The Germans held a strong ridge line east of
the Furiano River, which flows northward to the sea. The 7th Infantry
received the mission of seizing the heights dominated by Hill 715.
The 2d Mortar Battalion supported the attack with smoke and high
explosives; Companies A and D fired HE concentrations and Company
39
B carried out the smoke mission. From 0530 to approximately 0900
on 6 August B Company maintained a 3,500-yard screen to conceal
the advancing infantry. Firing from positions west of the river the
mortarmen gradually increased the range of the smoke curtain from
1,000 to 3,200 yards to keep pace with the progress of the attacking
troops. The smoke mission terminated upon orders of the commander
of the assault infantry battalion. At about 1000, as the mortars were
firing on call, enemy artillery began pounding the American positions.
Enemy shells hit 4 of the 6 mortar positions (knocking over 3 weapons,
but damaging only 1), 2 platoon-size ammunition dumps, and gen-
erally raised havoc with the wire communications of the battalion.
That afternoon D Company fired a smoke mission which helped 2
infantry battalions under heavy counterattacks to withdraw to the
west side of the river.
Early next morning the infantry tried again, and one B Company
platoon concealed the advance to the attack position with a 1,000-yard
screen. The mortars maintained this screen for almost fourteen hours
40
despite difficulties caused by shifting winds. Once the screen was
established it was kept up by two WP rounds a minute, although for
a short period around noon weather conditions made it necessary to
raise this number to five. The mortar crews lifted the screen several
37
Journal of of Cml Bn, 14 Jul 43. (2) Lt Col Robert C. Breaks, "My Men Had Guts," Chemi-
cal Warfare Bulletin, vol. 30, No. 1 (February-March, 1944), (3) The journals of the three batta-
lions contain frequent references of the direct or indirect destruction of tanks by 4.2-inch mortar fire.
38
Ltr, ACmlO 45th Div to CmlO 45th Div, 31 Jul 43.
39
Because of its proficiency in dispatching enemy troops the 4.2-inch mortar in Sicily acquired
the nickname Goon Gun. As a tribute to the part these mortars played in this operation, Hill 715
became known as Goon Gun Hill, at least in CWS circles. The infantry called it Million Dollar Hill
because of the large number of rounds fired on it. The artillery also participated in the smoke mission.
40
Rpt of Seventh Army in Sicily, p. B-18.
times during the day to permit friendly dive bomber attacks on the
enemy positions. On the third day the infantry succeeded in taking
the heights east of the Furiano, again with the help of chemical mortar
41
smoke and high explosives.
Of the three mortar units committed to HUSKY the 2d Chemical
Battalion saw the most action. In fact, it was said to have been the
only combat unit on the island that saw no relief during the entire
operation.42 After reaching Palermo the 3d Battalion was transferred
to II Corps, an attachment which terminated its combat activities for
the campaign. Thereafter the battalion performed a number of rear
area duties, principally those dealing with transportation. It also
guarded prisoners of war and ammunition dumps, collected ammuni-
tion, and generally participated in assignments which failed to utilize
its capabilities as a mortar unit.43 On the other hand, the limited ac-
tivity of the 83d Battalion, attached to both the 2d Armored and
82d Airborne Divisions after the initial stages of the campaign, resulted
primarily from a lack of suitable targets.44
Despite early difficulties faced by the chemical mortar battalions in
their first combat action, they made a creditable record during the
Sicily Campaign. The absence of established doctrine and, with the
exception of the 2d Battalion, the lack of joint infantry-mortar train-
ing, resulted not only in some misuse of the battalions but in the failure
to use them "where they could have been employed to exceptional
45
advantage."
Nevertheless, reaction of ground commanders who had been sup-
ported by the chemical mortars was generally favorable, and most of
them advocated chemical mortar support for all divisions committed
46
to action. Among their comments were "the equivalent of real ar-
tillery," which the chemical mortar was not, and "the most effective
47
single weapon used in support of infantry," a statement to which
it had fair claim.
41
Breaks, "My Men Had Guts," Chemical Warfare Bulletin, vol. 30, No. 1 (February-March, 1944).
42
(1) Ibid. (2) Upon its relief from attachment to the 45th Division, the 2d Battalion was attached
to the 3d Division.
43
(1) History of 3d Cml Bn in Sicily. (2) Rpt of Seventh Army in Sicily, pp. H-1—3.
44
Rpt of Seventh Army in Sicily, pp. H-1—3.
45
CmlO Seventh Army, Rpt of Cml Warfare Opns—Sicilian Campaign, 24 Sep 43.
46
Ltr, CO 83d Cml Bn to ACCWS for Field Opns, 12 Sep 43.
47
Extracts from Training Notes from the Sicilian Campaign, in Ltr, CCmlO NATOUSA to ACCWS
for Field Opns, 6 Nov 43. CWS 314.7 Personal Ltr files, NATOUSA.
The Problem of Transportation

General Shadle, Chief Chemical Officer, NATOUSA, put his finger
on one of the main shortcomings revealed by this first test of combat
when he said there was nothing seriously wrong with the 4.2-inch
mortar or the chemical battalion except transportation.48 The prin-
cipal means of motor transport in the mortar battalion was the 2½-ton
truck, often too big and too conspicuous to operate adequately in
positions as near the front as the 4.2-inch mortars were emplaced.
The ¼-ton truck and trailer seemed more appropriate, and at times
infantry commanders gave up some of their own jeeps in order to
insure chemical mortar support.49 Because man-handling the mortar
carts was an arduous task, crews sometimes attached them to jeeps, an
unsatisfactory practice because of damage to the wheels and handles
of the smaller vehicle. Once an infantry battalion commander directed
his reserve riflemen to help mortar crews struggling with their carts,
an unorthodox move which illustrated as well as anything how highly
50
infantrymen esteemed the mortar. Often mortar crews comman-
deered mules in order to keep up with the infantry advance. These
animals not only made up for inadequate basic transportation but
reached places inaccessible to vehicles,51 a fact that led General Patton
to opine at the end of the campaign that the pack animal still had a
52
role in modern warfare.
The mortar battalion tables of organization and equipment pub-
lished shortly after the Sicilian campaign provided for % -ton trucks
and trailers as the basic means of transportation. But because of delays
in acquiring the new vehicles and because of the type of terrain and
fighting encountered in Italy, this change did not prove to be the
expected panacea.
Efforts To Increase the Range

The other serious difficulty encountered in the first combat employ-
ment of the mortar was that of its range. The introduction of the
48
Ltr, CCmlO NATOUSA to ACCWS for Field Opns, 26 Aug 43. CWS 314.7 Personal Ltr files,
NATOUSA.
49
Journal of 2d Cml Bn.
50
Breaks, "My Men Had Guts," Chemical Warfare Bulletin, vol. 30, No. 1 (February-March, 1944).
51
Journal of 2d Cml Bn.
52
Notes on the Sicilian Campaign.
M5A1 propellant in January 1943 increased the range of the mortar

from 2,400 to 3,200 yards.53 The M6 propellant, standardized in
March 1943, raised the maximum range to 4,500 yards although the
item was not in production in time for use in Sicily. Meanwhile, in
July 1943 OCCWS froze the range of the 4.2-inch mortar at 3,200
yards, despite repeated requests from North Africa for increased range.
Washington headquarters answered: "It has been decided, for prac-
tical purposes, and in view of manufacturing and materiel difficulties,
the chemical mortar is to be considered as having a maximum range
of 3,200 yards. ... It is considered that this is a satisfactory range,
and any additional work done is to be confined to further perfecting
the performance of this weapon within this range." 54
At the end of hostilities in Sicily a conference of Seventh Army
55
CWS officers agreed that a range of 4,500 was required, an opinion
which was reflected in the other important reports of the Sicilian
56
campaign. These recommendations, combined with an urgent request
from theater headquarters for a chemical mortar range of at least
4,500 yards, led the OCCWS to reverse its decision.57 Shortages of
certain ingredients for the M6 propellant added to the delay involved
in getting the Army Ground Forces blessing for the increased range,
so that supplies of the M6 propellant did not reach the theater until
the end of the year.
Among the lesser problems arising in Sicily were certain shortcomings
of the M2 mortar sight. This piece of equipment was unsatisfactory
for night employment because it lacked a means of illumination. More-
over, it could not be employed from deeply defiladed positions. In these
positions sighting stakes had to be placed to the rear of the mortar
position rather than to the front, because of the small traverse (200
mils) of the M2 sight. This limited traverse also caused excessive
re-emplacements. Captured Italian 81-mm. mortar sights with 360°
traverse proved much superior to the American model.58
53
CWS TofO Ltr No. 1,3 Mar 43.
54
CWS TofO Ltr No. 3, 23 Jun 43.
55
Conf of Cml Warfare Officers of Seventh Army. CMLHO.
56
(1) Rpt of Cml Warfare Opns, Sicilian Campaign, 24 Sep 43. (2) Notes on the Sicilian Cam-
paign.
57
(1) CM-IN 18330, 24 Aug 43. (2) CM-OUT 11648, 28 Aug 43. (3) IOM, ACCWS to
ACCWS Field Opns, 26 Aug 43.
58
(1) Ltr, CO 83d Cml Bn to ACCWS Field Opns, 12 Sep 43. (2) Conf of Cml Warfare Officers
of Seventh Army. (3) Memo, ACmlO Seventh Army for CmlO Seventh Army, 23 Aug 43.
CMLHO.
There was little difficulty with mortar maintenance during the oper-
ation as the equipment was new and not seriously overtaxed. Ammuni-
tion was in good supply in Sicily although inadequate waterproofing
initially resulted in numerous corroded fuzes.59 And transportation
difficulties resulted in low ammunition reserves at forward positions,
even though the over-all supply of mortar shell in Sicily was ample.60
The Salerno Landings

The 2d, 83d, and 84th Chemical Mortar Battalions took part in the
fighting at Salerno, the first of a series of punishing campaigns fought
in the rugged terrain of Italy.61 Companies C and D of the 83d sup-
ported American Rangers and British Commandos of the 10 British
Corps, Fifth Army's left unit during its assault at Salerno. Originally,
the 84th Chemical Battalion was to have supported the 36th Division,
the assault force of the VI U.S. Corps on the army's right. These
plans went awry. According to the battalion commander, Lt. Col.
Harrison Markham, Seventh Army orders releasing the 84th to VI
Corps were lost, and by the time the confusion cleared no shipping
space was available with the 36th Division. Three companies of the
battalion did find room with corps reserves and eventually fired for
the 45th Division, which also had the support of the 2d Chemical
62
Battalion.
Although the enemy reacted vigorously to the Salerno landings, so
that a period of sanguinary fighting resulted in which the fate of the
beachhead was sometimes uncertain, the attack began auspiciously.
Company A, 2d Chemical Battalion, landed at 0300, 10 September,
(D plus 1) with the 179th Infantry, 45th Division.63 Next day violent
enemy counterattacks pushed the American force back from its ad-
vanced position, and in the course of the withdrawal Company A's
1st Platoon lost eleven men. Company B, in support of elements of
59
(1) Rpt of Seventh Army in Sicily, p. H-1. (2) CM-IN 4819, 8 Jun 43.
60
See Journal of 2d Cml Bn, pp. 28, 33, 40, 52.
61
For general accounts of the fighting in Italy, see (1) Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, and Ernest
F. Fisher, Cassino to the Alps, volumes in preparation for the series U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR
II; (2) see also, Garland and Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy.
62
(1) Interv, Hist Off with Markham, 16 Jan 45. (2) Opnl History of Cml Bns and the 4.2-
Inch Mortar in World War II, pt. II, The Italian Campaign, p. 53. This is a detailed study of chemical
mortar operations in Italy.
63
Unless otherwise noted, the 2d Chemical Battalion S-3 Journal serves as the basis for the account
of that unit's operations in Italy.
another regiment of the 45th Division near the town of Persano, also
ran into trouble. Suddenly faced with direct enemy fire, the mortarmen
had no alternative but to pull back. In the confusion that followed
some of the mortars were left behind, to be recovered, fortunately, at
a later time. Company C supported the 157th Infantry, 45th Division;
for some unaccountable reason Company D remained in reserve during
64
the entire Salerno operation.
The first troops of the 84th Battalion came ashore near Paestum on
D-day, but congestion in shipping space forced them to land without
equipment. It was not until 12 September that these companies received
their full complement of men and mortars.65 By this time the situation
of the Fifth Army was serious. The German attack which had turned
the right flank of the 45th Division also cut off elements of the 36th
Division north of the Calore River.66 Orders received by a company
commander of the 2d Mortar Battalion indicated the grave plight of
the American forces. If the enemy should come too close for effective
mortar fire, the mortar troops were directed to stand fast and defend
67
their positions with rifle fire and, if necessary, bayonets.
Virtually every available American element was thrown into the
line on 14 September when the enemy renewed his heavy infantry and
tank attack. One of the companies of the 2d Chemical Battalion fired
1,152 rounds during the day. Over 500 of these were white phos-
phorus used to set fire to the dry brush, making those areas untenable
to the enemy. Early that afternoon the company helped repulse an
enemy tank attack in an action which saw the mortar forward observer
direct artillery fire as well as that of his own weapons. The stalwart
defense on 14 September blunted the German counterattack and se-
cured the beachhead.
Meanwhile, companies of the 83d Battalion supported the American
68
Rangers and British Commandos in action in the 10 Corps sector.
On Sicily this mortar unit had earned the sobriquet Artillery of the
Rangers. This expression was equally apt for the unit's service with
the Commandos, who also operated without organic heavy weapons.
64
(1) Co A 2d Cml Bn, Rcd of Events. (2) 2d Cml Bn Casualty Rpt, 11 Sep 43. (3) Fifth Army
Cml Warfare Sec Journal, 26 Sep 43. (4) Ltr, Fifth Army CmlO to CCWS, 25 Sep 43.
65
Unless otherwise noted, the operations of the 84th are based on the battalion field journal.
66
VI Corps Opns Rpt, Sep 43.
67
Co C 2d Cml Bn Unit Journal.
68
Unless otherwise noted, the 83d Battalion Operations Report is the basis for account of unit op-
erations in Italy.
The Commandos and Company D landed at Vietri sul Mari at 0400,

9 September, with the task of blocking the northern approaches to
Salerno. In addition to performing missions of harassment and inter-
diction, the 4.2-inch mortars fired on troops, tanks, and emplacements.
An impressive action took place on 18 September when D Company
fired a preparatory barrage of 1,194 rounds on two strongly defended
hills north of Salerno. The hard fighting in the Vietri area continued
69
for about ten days until the Germans began their withdrawal.
At this juncture, the Commandos, having suffered casualties of
almost 75 percent, were pulled from the line. Company D stayed on,
reinforcing Company C, which had landed at Mairoi on D-day in
support of the three battalions of American Rangers. This small, elite
force of 1,500 advanced inland and seized Chiunzi Pass and Mt. St.
Angelo, which commanded the German supply route south of Naples.
Charged with holding the entire peninsula the Ranger force held out
for three weeks against attacks in which the enemy sometimes had
a numerical superiority of eight to one. As a consequence, the Rangers
were so thinly spread that mortar units not only performed their own
mission as artillery of the Rangers but also held front-line positions
as regular infantry. Sometimes mortar crews were stripped down to
one or two men and the rest sent to repel counterattacks or on patrol.
These crews engaged enemy 88-mm. guns and 240-mm. howitzers
at distances 2,000 yards or more beyond the authorized range of their
mortars. Companies C and D of the 83d fired over 14,000 rounds in
the first two weeks of the campaign, a total, according to Colonel
Barker, which equaled that of all the other mortar units.70 One result
of this heavy firing at excessive ranges was the rapid breakdown of the
weapons. In spite of the combined efforts of both CWS and ordnance
maintenance units, at the end of the first three weeks in Italy there
were only three mortars in action in one company and six in the other.71
Naples fell to the British 10 Corps on 1 October and the first phase
of the Italian fighting was over. The important role of 4.2-inch mor-
tars in the over-all success is indicated by Col. William Darby of the
Rangers who reported that his forces were able to hold Chiunzi Pass
"largely due to the chemical mortar battalion attached to the unit." 72
69
Interv, Hist Off with Lt Col William S. Hutchinson, Jr., 26 Jan 45.
70
Ltr, CmlO Fifth Army to CCWS, 25 Sep 43.
71
(1) Ibid. (2) Hutchinson Interv, 26 Jan 45.
72
Notes on Interv with Darby, 18 May 44. AG-OB-S, Log 2704.
From the Volturno to the Winter Line

Crossing the Volturno
By 6 October the Fifth Army had advanced to a line running gen-
erally along the south banks of the Volturno and Calore Rivers inland
to the town of Benevento. The British 10 Corps held the western part
of this front, the U.S. VI Corps the eastern sector. These units crossed
the Volturno on the night of 12-13 October. The 84th Chemical Mor-
tar Battalion (less Company A) supported the 3d Division and Com-
pany A, 2d Battalion, supported the 34th Division.
Of these mortar units, the 84th Battalion probably received the most
calls for support. Company D fired both screening and high explosive
missions for a regimental crossing and later screened bridge-building
activity of the engineers. During the daylight hours of 13 October
Company B used 2,805 rounds of white phosphorus to conceal the
corps left flank from enemy observation from the heights above the
town of Triflisco. The mortarmen carried out this mission by firing
the WP directly on these heights using the maximum authorized range
of the 4.2-inch mortar—3,200 yards. At first, Company B employed
one platoon of four mortars for the screening operation but the re-
quired rapid rate of fire made barrels so hot that propellants ignited
before the rounds reached the firing pin. The commitment of another
73
platoon reduced the rate of fire and eliminated the trouble. In addi-
tion to these normal mortar missions, the 84th Battalion furnished a
detail of 3 officers and 100 men which expended 400 M1 smoke pots
to conceal bridging sites and their exposed approaches.74
Fifth Army carried the assault of the Volturno with swiftness and
skill, and for a brief time thereafter chemical mortar activity was
characterized by relatively light firing. It was during this period that
problems arose which were to confront mortar units throughout most
of the Italian campaign. One of these involved communications.
Mortar battalions used a tremendous amount of wire to maintain
contact among units, the radio playing a secondary role because of
the excessive amount of dead space typical in mountainous terrain and
because of the danger that its use would reveal exact positions to the
enemy. Mortarmen usually laid two lines of wire from the company
73
(1) Fifth Army Chemical Warfare Sec Journal, 16 Oct 43. (2) Markham Interv, 16 Jan 45.
74
For an account of the use of smoke pots by mortar units, see above, Chapter VIII.
command post to the platoon firing positions and at least two lines (by
different routes) from each gun position to the observation post. In
heavy fighting enemy fire frequently shot up the wire—the communi-
cation lines of one mortar platoon were interrupted six times during
a single day in the Mount Acero region, permitting it to fire only two
75
missions with a total expenditure of eighteen rounds. The wire-
cutting capabilities of friendly vehicles, particularly those with tracks,
also proved discouraging to good communications. In fast-moving
situations there was no alternative to the radio. The SCR-284, used
principally between battalion and company command posts, proved
reasonably satisfactory but poor performances by SCR's 193 and 194
brought a great many complaints.76
It was also at this time that the need for animal transport began to
increase. Poor roads characterized the rocky, mountainous terrain in
which the fighting took place, forcing the 84th to use oxen to haul
its mortars over the steep slopes near Venafro. Mules were the usual
beasts of burden. Upon crossing the Volturno, the 84th Battalion,
failing to get these animals from the 3d Division to which it was at-
tached, captured its own mules and successfully improvised pack saddles.
Because the U.S. Army mule pack was too large and heavy for the local
77
animals, the Italian model became the pack usually employed.
Early Fighting in the Winter Line

After being driven from positions north of the Volturno the enemy
fell back to his Winter Line which extended along the Garigliano River
and thence into the mountainous region from Mignano to Venafro and
on toward Isernia. This series of defensive positions was designed to
hold Fifth Army's advance and allow the Germans to fortify further
the more formidable Gustav Line. Allied forces reached the Winter
Line during the first week of November, but the rather rapid advance
ground to a halt in front of stiffened resistance and in face of the
78
increased difficulties caused by winter weather.
The initial attack on the Winter Line saw all four chemical mortar
battalions committed to action. The 3d Battalion, which had remained
75
Co C 2d Cml Bn Unit Diary, 15 Oct 43.
76
(1) History of 3d Cml Bn, Jan 44, pp. 10-11. (2) ASF Bd Rpt, NATO, No. 71, 6 Nov 43, Rpt of
45th Inf Div. (3) Breaks-Fellenz Interv, 23 Oct 44. (4) Markham Interv, 16 Jan 45.
77
(1) Markham Interv, 16 Jan 45. (2) AGF Bd Rpt, NATO, No. A-112, 23 Dec 43.
78
Fifth Army History, II, 47.
behind in Sicily, joined the Fifth Army on 30 October. Company A

of the 84th and Companies A and B of the 83d rejoined their parent
units for the first time on Italian soil.79 Until then the operations of
the Fifth Army had not been marked by extended static situations,
and the chemical mortar units were of only limited value in rapidly
moving situations. Strong enemy defenses and the approach of winter
promised a different sort of campaign, one which would make good
use of the capabilities of the 4.2-inch mortar.
The key position in the American sector opposite the Winter Line
was a gap in the mountains at Mignano through which ran Highway 6.
This presented an avenue to the Liri Valley, called the Gateway to
Rome, and the ultimate objective of the operations. To the left of the
Mignano gap loomed Mount Camino and to the right, Mount Sam-
mucro. In between were several lesser land masses which effectively
served as "stoppers" for the break in the east-west mountain chain.80
The VI Corps had reached the Winter Line in early November and
had bloodied its nose in its attempt to break through. In the various
engagements in the Mount Difensa-Mount Sammucro-Mount Santa
Croce area the 2d and 83d Chemical Mortar Battalions saw action
in support of the 3d Division and Ranger and parachute troops. The
mortars fired preparatory barrages, sometimes followed by screens for
the advancing infantry. On 12 November one platoon of Company
C, 2d Battalion, in conjunction with the artillery and in support of
a 3d Division attack on Mount Difensa, laid down a preliminary bar-
rage on a point just beyond the summit, an area which could not have
been reached by the artillery. During the last three minutes of the
barrage, the platoon fired forty-nine rounds of WP to conceal the
infantry assault. Twenty-four rounds of white phosphorus screened
the American withdrawal when the attack failed.81
On 13 November a German counterattack against the 4th Ranger
foothold on Mount Sammucro initially rolled back that unit's right
and left flank. Some of the shells of the protective concentrations of
Company B, 83d Battalion, fell within 100 yards of friendly positions.
The company fired 3,605 rounds of HE and 163 WP so rapidly that
one of the mortar firing pins became fused. In the course of this
fighting German artillery scored two direct hits on Company B ammu-
79
Fifth Army Cml Warfare Sec Journal, 1, 9, 22, 30 Oct 43.
80
Fifth Army at the Winter Line, p. 8.
81
Co C 2d Cml Bn Unit Diary.
nition dumps, destroying 1,000 rounds of ammunition.82 The Rangers

thwarted the attack, and artillery, mortar, and small arms fire pre-
vented the enemy from reorganizing for another assault.83
In mid-November Fifth Army paused to regroup. II Corps moved
to the middle of the line, and VI Corps shifted to the right. For
two weeks, while army planned for a continuation of the assault
on the Winter Line, its troops remained on the defensive. The missions
of the 4.2-inch mortars—the prevention of enemy observation and
disruption of his troop concentrations and counterattacks—reflected
this lull in operations. It was during this period that water-damaged
propellants became a serious problem. In the 84th Battalion 80 percent
of these items were found to have moisture enough to cause shorts or
"poop outs." An investigation of this condition by the chemical
officer of the Fifth Army led to the manufacture and operation of a
dryer for propellants by the 12th Chemical Maintenance Company
84
at Capua.
Fifth Army plans for overcoming the Winter Line defenses consisted
of three phases: an attack on Mount Camino on the left of the Mignano
gap; an attack on Mount Sammucro on the right of the gap; and,
finally, the drive into the Liri Valley. The first phase, appropriately
called Operation RAINCOAT, combined assaults by the British 10 and
the American II Corps on Mount Camino and its neighboring peaks,
Mounts Difensa and Maggiore. Company A of the 83d Battalion and
85
Company B of the 2d supported the 1st Special Service Force and
the 142d Infantry, 36th Division, in this operation. The second phase,
the attack on the Mount Sammucro complex, began on 8 December.
During this difficult fighting Company B, 83d Chemical Battalion,
supported the 3d Ranger Battalion in an attack against Hill 950, a
lesser land mass adjacent to the main objective. Although at first suc-
cessful, the Rangers were finally swept off the hill by a violent enemy
counterattack. Company B mortarmen placed heavy concentrations
on the hill in rebuttal, attracting intense enemy artillery and mortar
fire in the process. This concentration killed two men, wounded ten,
hit the company ammunition dump, and temporarily put one platoon
82
83d Cml Bn Casualty Rpt, 14 Nov 43.
83
Co B 83d Cml Bn Action Rpt, 23 Nov 43.
84
(1) Fifth Army Cml Warfare Sec Journal, 10 Dec 43. (2) See above, Chapter VII, for more
on the Capua facility.
85
Composed of Canadians and Americans, this regiment-sized unit was a specially trained task force
and not, as the name implies, a service force in the normal sense.
out of action. Next morning the Rangers again took Hill 950, abetted
by heavy artillery and 4.2-inch mortar preparations, but their losses
were so heavy that they were replaced by the 504th Parachute Infantry
regiment. The 4.2-inch mortar company remained in position and
supported the new unit until 23 December, by which time Mount
Sammucro was in American hands.
Problems and Improvisations

On 15 December the 3 6th Division attacked the remaining enemy-
held heights of Mount Sammucro and the stronghold of San Pietro,
a town located off the southwest slope of the mountain. The four
companies of the 2d Battalion ran into trouble in supporting this
attack with smoke and high explosives. Tanks broke the communication
wire of two companies, and spongy soil caused the mortars of another
to bounce so badly that they had to be re-emplaced every five or six
rounds. Mortar breakage was a serious problem; when Company A
completed its mission on 16 December only three mortars remained
in action, and the elevating screw of each of these was locked.86 Much
of the breakage resulted from frequent use of mortars against German
heavy mortars and Nebelwerfers, whose ranges exceeded that of the
American weapon. Firing at excessive range caused failure of many
parts of the mortar—elevating and traversing screws bent, the brass
barrel housings split, locking forks bent, base plates broke, and recoil
springs lost their resilience.87 The new M6 propellant, promised during
the Sicily Campaign, and a strengthened base plate combined to increase
the maximum authorized range of the 4.2-inch mortar from 3,200 to
4,400 yards. The battalions in Italy began receiving the new propel-
lants in December 1943, and their successful tests prompted the Fifth
Army chemical officer to request that all future shipments of propel-
88
lants be of this type.
A feature of the fight for San Pietro was the introduction of a self-
propelled 4.2-inch mortar, designed to provide the infantry with a
means of more mobile support and armored units with a weapon with
a high angle of fire. Developed by Colonel Barker and the 3 6th Divi-
sion ordnance officer, at the instigation of the latter's commander,
86
(1) Co C 2d Cml Bn Unit History, 15 Dec 43. (2) Co A 2d Cml Bn Rcd of Events.
87
Ltr, CmlO Fifth Army to CCWS, 24 Nov 43. CMLHO.
88
(1) 3d Cml Bn Journal, 5 Dec 43. (2) Fifth Army Cml Warfare Sec Journal, 5 Dec 43, 21
Jan 44. (3) Ltr, CmlO Fifth Army to CCWS, 22 Jan 44. (4) CM-IN 20511, 31 Jan 44.
this roving gun was simply a 4.2-inch mortar mounted on an M7

half-track. Upon first lumbering into position at San Pietro, its noise
brought down a heavy enemy artillery concentration. Moving to a
defiladed position the self-propelled mortar fired with good results
fifty rounds of WP at a range of 3,000 yards.
The weapon and chassis came through this initial test with moderate
success. The mortar mount suffered some damage and the blast effect
against the sides of the vehicle proved exceedingly uncomfortable to
the gun crew. But it appears that little subsequent use was made of
the self-propelled mortar. Its size and silhouette precluded emplace-
ment where close support weapons were needed. And any weapon
which attracted too much enemy fire was not popular with the in-
89
fantry.
While II Corps was overcoming the stubborn German defenses
around Mignano, VI Corps, occupying the right flank of Fifth Army,
found the going equally rough in the mountains to the north. Heaviest
fighting in the 45th Division sector took place near the village of
Lagone. In an engagement on 15 December a forward observer for
Company B, 84th Battalion, attached to the 180th Infantry, sighted
the enemy forming for a counterattack in the sector of the adjacent
regiment. The 209 rounds of high explosive and 454 rounds of white
phosphorus shell dumped upon this formation aided in throwing back
the enemy assault. One prisoner disclosed that the attack was going
well until the German troops suddenly encountered intense mortar
fire which killed the prisoner's officer and a number of his fellow sol-
diers. "We wanted to surrender . . .," the German continued, and the
"mortar fire scattered our troops all over the hill and gave us a chance
90
to get away and give ourselves up."
Mount Pantano was the scene of the heaviest action in the sector of
the other VI Corps division, the 34th. Fighting seesawed among the
four knobs of the mountaintop for days, supported on the American
side by the effective fire of a company and a half of the 3d Chemical
Battalion. During a 2-day period at the end of November the mortar
crews used so much ammunition, over 1,500 rounds, that fire was
temporarily suspended. This was one of the few cases of such curtail-
91
ment in the Italian campaign.
89
Fifth Army Cml Warfare Sec Journal, 5, 7, 8, 11, 16 Dec 43.
90
84th Cml Bn Field Journal, 15 Dec 43.
91
(1) History of 3d Cml Bn, Nov 43. (2) Co D 3d Cml Bn Journal 29, 30 Nov 43.
Action With the French Expeditionary Corps

The capture of the heights of Mount Sammucro, to the northwest,
and of Mount Lungo, to the southeast, made San Pietro untenable for
the Germans. The 36th Division occupied the destroyed and deserted
village on 17 December. There remained the third phase of the Fifth
Army attack on the Winter Line, a II Corps drive to the Rapido, ac-
companied by a similar move through the mountains to the river by the
French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) on the north. The fighting here
provided a unique attachment for the 3d Chemical Mortar Battalion.
The FEC, composed of a Moroccan and an Algerian division, replaced
the VI U.S. Corps early in January 1944 when the corps withdrew from
the right sector of Fifth Army to prepare for the impending Anzio
operation. The 3d Chemical Mortar Battalion joined the FEC in an
attachment which, with brief exceptions, lasted until June 1944.
Preparatory to this attachment Fifth Army screened the four mortar
battalions in Italy for French-speaking personnel, assigning those who
qualified to the 3d Battalion. The mortar unit carried out its assign-
ment well, being only mildly affected by the difficulties of adjusting
to the operational procedures of the French.92 Its troubles came from
another quarter.
On 12 January the French Expeditionary Corps began a 3-day attack
which successfully carried it through the northeastern vestiges of the
Winter Line. Initially, Company B supported a regiment of the 2d
Moroccan Division. During the course of the morning's firing a shell
exploded in a mortar barrel, killing one of the crew and wounding three
others. As it turned out, this was but a prelude for worse things to
come. The command post of Company C, 3d Battalion, was located in
the town of Cerasuolo, a focal point for action in that particular
sector. Colonel Stark, the battalion commander, was at this command
post to insure the necessary close mortar support and to co-ordinate the
fire of Companies C and D. At 1430 12 January Colonel Stark held an
impromptu conference, attended by two company commanders, two
acting company commanders, and a company executive officer. Eight-
een minutes after these officers assembled enemy aircraft bombed the
town. The command post sustained at least one direct hit. All the
attending officers and seven enlisted men died instantly. Despite the
virtual elimination of the command element of the battalion, prompt
93
3d Cml Bn Journal, Dec 43, Jun 44.
reorganization permitted the unit to continue its mission, in fact, Com-

pany C fired 157 rounds within two hours of the bombardment. The
next day, however, the battalion reverted to Army control and went to
a rest area near Naples.93
The Gustav Line

While defending the Winter Line the enemy had been working
furiously on his positions behind the Rapido and Garigliano Rivers.
Known as the Gustav Line, these defenses extended from Mount Mar-
rone on the northeast, through the mountains to Belvedere Hill, and
south to Cassino. The line then followed the Rapido and Garigliano
Rivers across the Liri Valley and continued along a formidable moun-
tain barrier curving back to its terminus, Mount Scouri, on the Tyr-
rhenian Sea. The mountains on both ends of the Gustav Line, tremen-
dous obstacles in themselves, were supplemented by well-emplaced
weapons and mine fields. The center of the line, although lacking
natural impediments, was a skilfully organized defense of mine fields
and wire, pillboxes, and automatic weapon emplacements, all of which
were covered by enemy artillery farther up the valley. The Fifth Army
History succinctly summarizes the strength of the position: "The area
of the Gustav Line had long provided the Italian General Staff with
ideal terrain for field exercises. In these problems forces representing
the enemy had never been able to penetrate the defense. The Italians
considered the area as an impregnable obstacle to any army attempting
to capture Rome from the south. The Germans were determined to
prove the validity of that assumption." 94
On 15 January the enemy line before II Corps extended from Bel-
vedere Hill along the right bank of the Rapido and Garigliano Rivers
to the junction of the Liri and the Garigliano. Highway 6, the road to
Rome, passed through the level terrain in the center of the corps sector,
exposed as far back as Mount Lungo to observed artillery fire from
enemy positions on the mountain heights in back of Cassino.95 The 2d
Chemical Battalion used smoke pots to conceal this vulnerable area
93
3d Cml Bn Opns Rpt, Jan 44.
94
Fifth Army History, VI, 7-8.
95
See Fifth Army at the Winter Line, illustration on p. 66.
during the build-up for the II Corps attack across the Rapido, the
initial American thrust against the Gustav Line.96
The Fifth Army plan for its drive on Rome consisted of two parts:
a 3-corps attack against the Gustav Line followed a few days later
by an amphibious maneuver south of Rome and in back of the Gustav
Line defenses—the SHINGLE operation at Anzio. Army planners hoped
that the pressure on the main German position, combined with the
threat to his rear, would force the enemy into a general withdrawal.
The assault on the Gustav Line began on 17 January when the British
10Corps attacked across the Rapido. Successful on the left and in the
center, the British forces were unable to win their objective on the right.
So it was that when II Corps attacked three days later, it did so with an
exposed left flank. South of Cassino the Rapido is a narrow, swift-
moving stream varying in depth from nine to twelve feet. Sant'Angelo,
the objective of the 3 6th Division, the assault force of II Corps, stands
on a 40-foot bluff above the west bank of the river. The 141st Infantry,
supported by Company A of the 2d Chemical Battalion, was ordered to
cross the Rapido north of the town and then attack south and west.
Companies B and C of the mortar battalion fired for the 143d In-
fantry which was to cross the river south of the town and then, after
reaching initial objectives, assist the 141st in the seizure of Sant'Angelo.
Company D, assigned to a regiment of the 34th Division, was located
in a position from which it could support the 141st Infantry.
The night of 20 January was one of pandemonium. Attacking at
2000 without surprise through mine fields and the fire of artillery,
mortars and automatic weapons, both regiments encountered terrific
resistance. All four mortar companies fired barrages just before or im-
mediately after the time of attack. One half hour before the assault,
Company A used 400 rounds of white phosphorus to lay down a smoke
screen which, in the total absence of wind, rose to a height of 150 feet.
Between 2030 and 2100 Company C placed 119 rounds of WP on
enemy positions. Next day Company A laid down smoke screens for
the men of the 141st who had been stranded on the far bank of the
Rapido while Company C fired 204 rounds of WP to cover the with-
drawal of elements of the 143d Infantry which had been given up for
96
For an account of these screening activities by the 2d Battalion, see above, Chapter VIII.
lost on the previous night. That afternoon, on the resumption of the

97
attack, further 4.2-inch mortar fire supported the infantry units.
One of Company C's forward observers participated in this action
as a member of the command post party of the 1st Battalion, 143d
Infantry. Meeting with heavy German rocket and automatic weapons
fire on the near side of the river, the battalion commander ordered a
barrage of 4.2-inch white phosphorus. At midnight the small party
crossed the Rapido. The battalion commander was wounded, and the
lieutenant who took charge ordered the men to dig in for the night.
At dawn he went in search of the missing infantry Companies A and B
and upon his return announced that they were the only ones re-
maining. With the radio out, the small group made its way back across
the Rapido under cover of fog. It was a thorough defeat; the regi-
mental commander reported that the combat efficiency of his unit was
destroyed.98
The situation was just as bad with the 141st Infantry. Mortar Com-
pany A fired smoke missions on 21 and 22 January to screen two in-
fantry battalions on the far side of the river. Next day the company
expended 441 rounds of WP on a screen to cover the withdrawal of
some forty men of the 141st Infantry. The abortive attack had been
costly.99
Unfortunately, the smoke screen mission fired for the men stranded
on the far bank of the Rapido seriously interfered with the observation
of the corps artillery. With communications out and with infantry
100
positions unknown, effective artillery support was impossible. There
were also misunderstandings regarding the use of smoke. In a 23
January conference between the 36th Division chemical officer and
Capt. James O. Quimby, Jr., commanding Company A, 2d Chemical
Battalion, the former commented on the density of enemy smoke at
the site of the bridgehead. Quimby had to explain that this was his
101
smoke, not German, a fact unknown to division as well as corps.
A 24 January mission of Company C demonstrated that some com-
manders receiving support continued to be unfamiliar with the cap-
97
(1) 2d Cml Bn Journal, 15-20 Jan 44. (2) Co C 2d Cml Bn Unit Diary, 20-21 Jan 44. (3)
Co A 2d Cml Bn Unit Diary, 21 Jan 44.
98
(1) Co C 2d Cml Mortar Bn Unit Diary, 21 Jan 44. (2) 143d Inf Opns Rpt, Jan 44.
99
(1) Co A 2d Cml Bn Rcd of Events, 22 Jan 44. (2) 141st Inf Opns Rpt, Jan 44.
100
Fifth Army History, IV, 47.
101
Statement, Maj James O. Quimby, Jr., to CMLHO, 17 May 50.
abilities of the chemical mortar. The infantry battalion commander,

for example, called for smoke to screen a patrol which was about to
feel out enemy defenses and search for American wounded. Several
times during the course of this mission he called for target changes
requiring gun re-emplacements and once he wanted it without cessation
of fire. The commander also requested an increase in the rate of fire
at a time when mortarmen were already firing twenty-one rounds per
mortar per minute. When the smoke ascended directly into the air,
he called upon the mortar commander to rectify the situation. In the
words of the custodian of the company diary: "We are still wondering
if he wanted us to come down and blow on it."102 Reactions to this
impromptu mission were mixed. The captain with the infantry patrol,
which brought back two wounded American soldiers, praised Company
C for the effective screen. On the other hand, II Corps immediately
informed the mortar company that no more smoke was to be fired
103
without its approval.
The Anzio Beachhead

Fifth Army launched the second phase of its winter offensive on
22 January on the beaches near Anzio and Nettuno, seaside resort
towns located barely thirty air miles south of Rome. The objective of
VI Corps was to cut the historic roadway known as the Appian Way
and Highway 7, as well as other German supply routes. With these sev-
ered, the enemy in the Gustav Line would be left to choose between ex-
termination and withdrawal. Two mortar battalions saw action at An-
zio, the 83d, initially in support of Colonel Darby's Ranger forces, and
the 84th, which landed late on D-day with the 3d Infantry Division.
The 83d had undergone a month of training in preparation for the
assault. Companies A and B, loaded in Dukws, went in with the second
wave but received no calls for fire until H plus 6 because of the achieve-
ment of complete surprise. An enemy 88-mm. gun which had been
shelling the beach supplied the mortars with their first target. In firing
on this gun at a range of 2,000 yards and forcing it to withdraw,
Company B provided an excellent example of its usefulness at times
when the artillery had not yet come into position.104 That the mortars
102
Co C id Cml Bn Unit Diary, 24 Jan 44.
103
Ibid.
104
(1) 83d Cml Bn Opns Rpt, Jan 44. (2) Hutchinson Interv, 26 Jan 45.
did not need specific targets to be effective was well illustrated at

Anzio by the tactics of the Ranger commander. Colonel Darby, who
had received mortar support both on Sicily and at Salerno, met the
first elements of the 83d Battalion with orders to set up weapons and
start firing in the general direction of the Germans. His logic was:
"I want the bastards to know I have something heavy, so they will start
digging in. That will give me a chance to maneuver." 105
On the morning of D plus 1 Company B moved into position 2,000
yards north of Anzio to support the advance of the Rangers, while
in the afternoon Company A advanced to a position 10,000 yards north
of the town on the east side of the Anzio-Rome highway. From 24 to
28 January these companies fired on wooded areas and troop concentra-
tions, on roads and rail junctions, and on houses and haystacks in sup-
port of Ranger attacks on Carocetta and Aprillo. Bedevilled by ex-
cessive mortar breakage from emplacements in the spongy ground, Lt.
Col. William S. Hutchinson, Jr., commanding the 83d, ruefully con-
cluded that the 4.2-inch mortar was far better suited to mountain
fighting than for operations "in the mucky, ill-drained soil of the
Anzio beachhead." 106
Although it landed on D-day, the 84th Chemical Battalion did not
undertake its first missions until three days later, 25 January, when
Company A, with its mortars emplaced on an abandoned railway bed,
fired 100 rounds against houses, haystacks, roads, and ditches, all places
that were suspected of concealing Germans. Two days later the same
unit expended 750 rounds of ammunition, hindered all the while by
107
excessive mortar breakage.
Meanwhile, on 26 January Companies C and D met with tragedy.
While en route from Naples to the beachhead the LST carrying these
units struck a mine and caught fire. The explosion of mortar ammuni-
tion magnified the danger. Many of the survivors who escaped this
small hell were picked up by an LCI (landing craft, infantry) which in
turn hit a mine and went down with all on board. The two companies
lost a total of 293 officers and enlisted men; the survivors were taken
to a rest camp near Naples.108 Augmented, reorganized, and retrained,
105
Cml Warfare School Tng Memo No. 6, 31 Oct 44.
106
83d Cml Bn Opns Rpt, Jan 44.
107
84th Cml Bn Field Journal, 25, 27 Jan 44.
108
83d Cml Bn Unit Journal, 31 Jan 44.
these units were to see some combat action with the 88th Division near
Minturno before joining the parent battalion at Anzio in mid-April.
One of the objectives of the 30 January drive by VI Corps toward
the Alban Hills was cutting Highway 7 at the point where it passes
through Cisterna. The 1st and 3d Ranger Battalions set off toward the
town at 0100, an hour before the main effort, which would be made by
the 4th Ranger Battalion and elements of the 3d Infantry Division.
Companies A and B, 83d Chemical Battalion, were in support of the
Ranger battalions. Creeping along a ditch which led to Cisterna, the
Rangers reached the outskirts of town by dawn. There they fell into
an enemy ambush. The units making the main effort failed to advance
sufficiently to be of any aid to the embattled Ranger forces. Company
B placed mortar fire on the encircling Germans in a vain attempt to
cover a withdrawal. Only six Rangers made it back.109
Not only did the VI Corps attack fail but it was soon clear that a
German counterattack was imminent. From 1 February until the
eventual breakout in May, the corps mission was essentially defensive.
Both mortar battalions were called upon for heavy fire against enemy
attacks and were subjected to frequent enemy artillery and mortar
shelling and air bombardment. Because of excellent German observa-
tion of the beachhead and all routes leading to Allied positions, there
was a great demand for smoke screens laid by mortars, pots, and gen-
erators.110
During the period of containment at Anzio it was usual for three
mortar companies to stay in the line, while one remained in reserve
near battalion headquarters. Unlike the situation near Venafro and
San Pietro on the southern front, rear areas at Anzio were well within
the range of enemy artillery. Reports were that some men preferred
their emplacements to the battalion areas on the beaches. Nevertheless,
rotation did give the men a change of scene and diet and also allowed
commanders to inspect equipment and to supervise the integration of
replacements.
From the time of the landing until 20 May the 84th Battalion fired
50,166 rounds (8,019 WP) of ammunition; the 83d from February
109
(1) Company A supported the 4th Ranger Battalion on 30 January in its attempt to relieve
its sister units at Cisterna. (2) Rounds Away!—The Story of the 83d Cml Bn, pp 8-9. CWS 314.7
Unit Files. (3) Hutchinson Interv, 26 Jan 45. (4) CmlO Fifth Army Rpt of Cml Warfare Activi-
ties, 8 Jan-21 Jan 44.
110
See above, Chapter VIII, for smoke generator operations at Anzio.
until 20 May expended 14,326 rounds (4,716 WP). Casualties for the
two battalions in the Anzio beachhead were 30 dead and 87 wounded.111
Cassino
With the failure of the 3 6th Division attack across the Rapido, Gen-
eral Clark directed II Corps to shift to the north, with the town of
Cassino, Monte Cassino, and the eventual drive into the Liri Valley as its
objectives. By 1 February the 34th Division, which was to serve as the
main striking force, had established a bridgehead across the Rapido near
the town of Cairo, about two miles north of Cassino.
The town of Cassino lies on Highway 6 at the foot of the main moun-
tain barriers to the Allied advance through the Liri Valley. Rising
behind Cassino is Castle Hill, an elevation of some 633 feet. Over-
shadowing both is Monte Cassino upon which stands the historic mon-
astery. Together they offered the enemy excellent observation of the
movements of the Allied army in its attempt to break into the Liri
Valley. A few miles north of Cassino were the towns of Cairo and
Villa, the latter being the site of a group of Italian barracks which at
different times in the tug of war which followed were to shelter both
German and American forces. Four miles northeast of Monte Cassino
massive Mount Cairo towers 5,500 feet above sea level. This small area
to the north and west of Cassino was to be the scene of some of the
bitterest battles fought during the Italian campaign, for it was here that
the German forces battled to protect Monte Cassino and the entrance
112
to the Liri Valley.
Commanded now by Maj. James R. Chapman, the 2d Chemical
Battalion supported the 34th Division in the February attacks against
the Cassino defenses. On 1 February Company D fired ninety-seven
rounds of WP before a successful infantry assault on the barracks area
at Villa. But next day the lack of communications and the absence of
adequate observation precluded mortar support for men of the 135th
Infantry as they worked their way southward along a ridge line. This
situation repeated itself during the period 4—6 February in the bitter
engagement on the headland and plateau north of the abbey. In three
days of costly fighting the infantry won Hill 593 (Abaneta Farm)
111
(1) 84th Cml Bn Opns Rpt, Jan-May 44. (2) 83d Cml Bn Opns Rpt, Feb-May 44.
112
Fred Majdalany, The Battle of Cassino (Boston: Houghton Miffiin Co., 1957), gives a graphic
account of this action.
which dominates the approaches to the abbey but the fluid, even con-
fused, situation dictated that there could be little or no mortar support.
In further attacks toward the abbey on 8 February Companies B and D
did fire 840 rounds in casualty and screening missions. On the same
day Company A used limited amounts of WP to screen the advance of
supporting tanks, a mission abruptly halted when the smoke spread over
113
infantry positions on the flats near the river. On 11 February, in rain,
sleet, and snow, the troops of II Corps made another effort to take
Monte Cassino. Companies B, C, and D, hampered by the weather
and disrupted communications, supported individual regiments of the
34th and 36th Divisions. Fighting in the craggy terrain before the
abbey was at such close quarters that Company C received no calls from
the regiment it supported. The other two mortar companies fired
less than 100 rounds each.114
Mid-February saw British, New Zealand, and Indian troops com-
mitted to the fighting around Monte Cassino. Allied bombers struck
the famous abbey on 15 February in an operation conspicious for its
lack of positive results. In fact, Allied troops moved back from the
hard-won Hill 593 just before the bombardment, and it was the Ger-
man forces that reoccupied the position when the air strike was over.
It took three days for British and Gurkha troops to retake the hill, dur-
ing which time the British requested and received support from Com-
pany C, 2d Chemical Battalion. The mortar unit delivered a 20-minute
barrage of 246 rounds against a row of trees near the abbey among
which the enemy had emplaced a number of machine guns. After
completion of this mission the commanding officer of the 141st In-
fantry, to which the mortar company was attached, telephoned his con-
gratulations and those of the British to the mortarmen of Company C.
This gesture, as well as expression of thanks upon the relief of Company
C on 27 February, was particularly gratifying for the mortarmen
since this same infantry officer had previously announced, when a
short mortar round fell within fifty yards of his command post, that
he would never again request a mission from a chemical mortar unit.115
During the last days in February all of the weapons companies of
113
(1) 2d Cml Bn Opns Rpts, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 Feb 44. (2) 135th Inf Opns Rpt, 2 Feb 44. (3) 2d
Cml Bn S-3 Journal, 8 Feb 44. (4) Co A 2d Cml Bn Rcd of Events, 8 Feb 44. (5) 133d Inf Opns
Rpt, Feb 44.
114
(1) Co C 2d Cml Bn Unit Diary, 10 Feb 44. (2) 2d Cml Bn Opns Rpt, 11 Feb 44.
115
(1) Co C 2d Cml Bn Unit Diary, 14, 18, 20 Feb 44. (2) Co C 2d Cml Bn Rcd of Events,
17, 18, 27 Feb 44.
the 2d Chemical Battalion reverted to the control of the parent unit.

One hundred and seventy consecutive days in the line had been cul-
minated by the difficult fighting at Cassino, the roughest time ex-
perienced by the battalion to date. The Germans were not the only
enemy; the terrain, the weather, the lack of shelter, and the limited
116
supply of suitable clothing combined to make life miserable.
Small satisfaction was gained at Cassino from the over-all contribu-
tion of the mortars. There were times when disrupted communications
and the fluid nature of the fighting meant that the chemical companies
could offer only limited support.
The Drive on Rome

During March and April 1944 the Allied forces in Italy paused,
trained, refitted, and regrouped in preparation for another assault
against the Gustav Line defenses. A greatly contracted Fifth Army
held a narrow sector from the Tyrrhenian coast to the Liri River;
II Corps, composed of the recently arrived 85th and 88th Divisions,
was on the left and the French Expeditionary Corps was on the right.
The sector of the British Eighth Army now extended from the Liri
River to the Adriatic, including the strong German defenses which
centered at Monte Cassino.
The 2d and 3d Chemical Battalions maintained their attachments to
the II Corps and the FEC. After leaving the lines at Cassino in late
February, the 2d Battalion passed into II Corps reserve for a period of
rest, training, and repair and replacement of equipment. On 13 March
Company D joined the 88th Division in its quiet zone near Minturno
for a 2-week attachment that served to familiarize the new unit with
the 4.2-inch mortar and its capabilities. During April the entire bat-
talion, again in corps reserve, underwent a vigorous training program.
Elements of the 3d Battalion participated in smoking operations on
the upper Garigliano in the FEC sector. Abetted by a detail from the
172d Smoke Generator Company, successive companies of the mortar
battalion maintained an extensive smoke installation in the vicinity of
the Tiger Bridge across the Garigliano.117
On the eve of Fifth Army's 11 May attack on the Gustav Line 3d
Battalion communication equipment was augmented by the issue of
116
History of Second Mortar Battallion (Salzburg, Austria, n.d.) p. 24. CMLHO.
117
3d Cml Bn Opns Rpts, 30 Apr 1-13 May 44.
sixteen SCR-300's. The successful use of this radio prompted the bat-
talion commander to regard it as the only set which might tend to
reduce the telephone to the rank of a secondary means of communica-
tion in battle. The exchange just before the attack of 10 2½-ton
trucks for 32 jeeps and 48 ¼-ton trailers increased the mobility of the
mortar battalion and its ability to get ammunition forward.
The 3d Battalion fired 7,000 rounds of ammunition in twelve hours
of preparatory fire. Each of the four companies supported a French
division, three of them by direct attachment to the infantry and the
fourth through the control of division artillery. The latter company
did the least firing, primarily because of delays encountered in securing
firing data, a circumstance which prompted the battalion commander
to recommend strongly that this company also be placed under infantry
control.118 The enemy lines broke by the middle of the second day, and
mortar support decreased. By 27 May the pursuit became so rapid that
the battalion was placed in corps reserve and remained there until
relieved from attachment to the FEC on 11 June.
The 2d Chemical Battalion went into action on the Minturno front
on II May in support of II Corps' 85th and 88th Divisions. After
expending more than 10,000 rounds in a 7-hour preparation, the bat-
talion fired missions for the two divisions as the situation required.119
For example, the initial objective of the 339th Infantry, 85th Division,
was San Martino Hill which had an importance all out of proportion
to its modest height of 200 feet because it dominated an important
enemy supply route. Within a 15-minute period late on II May the
battalion fired 1,267 rounds against this objective.120 The fight for San
Martino Hill lasted several days. On 13 May all four mortar companies
fired high-explosive and smoke missions in support of the attacking
infantry. The hill fell next day, and II Corps placed the 2d Battalion
in support of the 88th Division attacking Santa Maria Infante. In this
engagement the mortars made good use of smoke to blind enemy obser-
vation from nearby Pulcherini. In fact, WP made up about one-third
of the 13,575 rounds fired by the battalion between 11 and 14 May.
Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, the German commander in
Italy, commented on the effectiveness of these American screens. Be-
118
Hist of 3d Cml Bn, May 44.
119
Col. Maurice E. Barker, "Mortars Are the Man-Killers," Chemical Warfare Bulletin, vol. 30, No.
4 (August, September, October, 1944).
120
2d Cml Bn Opns Rpt, May 44.
cause of the extensive use of smoke along the Garigliano, he wrote, Ger-
man artillery had to fire on American river crossings "without the
121
least observation."
The May experiences of Company A may be taken as typical of
those of the entire 2d Chemical Battalion once Allied forces breached
the Gustav Line defenses. On the 14th the company moved forward
by jeep with a regiment of the 88th Division, firing 191 rounds of white
phosphorus in midafternoon. Two days later the company used a
pack mule train to move overland with the infantry; even then it took
overnight marches to keep up with the assault battalions. During the
period 21-22 May Company A fired 165 rounds against enemy troops.
There were more marches, more difficult terrain to traverse, more
changes in position and attachment. All in all, events and units moved
so swiftly that there could be little employment of the 4.2-inch
mortars.122
Fifth Army co-ordinated the VI Corps breakout of the beachhead
at Anzio with the southern front's attack on the Gustav Line. Com-
panies A and B, 83d Chemical Battalion, supported the 1st Armored
Division and Companies C and D, the 45th Infantry Division. All
four companies fired mass concentrations in support of the initial at-
tack, those with the 45th Division aiding greatly in the successful
resistance to two German counterattacks. Once the breakthrough was
achieved the mortar units supporting the armored division found they
could keep pace only by frequent displacements. Consequently, corps
placed these companies in support of the 36th Division, which had
moved to Anzio by sea, for the drive that broke the German line at
123
Velletri, twenty miles southeast of Rome.
Meanwhile, the 84th Chemical Battalion on 23 May expended 3,081
rounds in support of 3d Division. After the initial breakthrough the
84th Battalion, as had the 83d, found it impossible to keep up with the
infantry. The battalion commander blamed this on the large and un-
wieldly 2½-ton trucks and the scarcity of jeeps and trailers. Com-
munications also broke down during the swift movement, for there
was no time to lay wire and the SCR-284 proved unreliable. But
121
Quoted in Fifth Army History, V, 204.
122
Co A 2d Cml Bn Rcd of Events, May 44.
123
(1) The Story of the 83d Cml Bn, pp. 10-11. (2) Lt. Col. William S. Hutchinson, "The For-
gotten Front," vol. 31, No. 1 Chemical Warfare Bulletin (January, February, 1945). (3) Hutchin-
son Interv,26 Jan 45.
these complications mattered little; the rapid retreat of the enemy

meant that the mortars found little use. As the 83d Chemical Battalion
commander summarized it: "The pursuit was so fast-moving and re-
sistance so weak that the use of the 4.2-inch mortars was unwar-
ranted." 124
Both mortar battalions participated briefly in the pursuit beyond
Rome before reverting to army control on 10 June. The 2d and 3d
Battalions returned to army control a day later. After about a month's
rest three of the battalions, the 2d, 3d, and 83d, went with VI Corps
from the Fifth Army to the Seventh Army and began training for the
125
invasion of southern France.
The Invasion of Southern France

The three chemical mortar battalions which participated in the as-
sault on the beaches of southern France were veteran units which
had taken part in one or more amphibious landings in Sicily and
126
Italy. Consequently, preparations for DRAGOON for the most part
consisted of perfecting teamwork with the infantry. The exceptions
were Company A, 2d Chemical Battalion, and Company D, 83d Bat-
talion, which were part of an airborne task force created especially
for the operation. Activated in July, this force included American
127
and British parachute and glider units. The mortar companies re-
ceived their assignment to the airborne task force on II July and
moved to training sites at airfields in the vicinity of Rome. Here
they trained in glider operations and prepared loading lists for per-
128
sonnel, equipment, and vehicles.
Late on the afternoon of D-day, 15 August, the two airborne mortar
companies landed in the vicinity of Leluc, France, with the glider units
of the provisional airborne task force. None of the gliders was lost
through enemy air or antiaircraft action but many were wrecked by
the sawed-off utility poles—Goering asparagus—with which the Ger-
mans studded some of the most likely landing sites. One glider hit
124
(1) 84th Cml Bn Opns Rpt, May 44. (2) 83d Cml Bn Opns Rpt, Jun 44.
125
(1) Hist of 3d Cml Bn, Jul 44, incl 5. (2) Markham Interv, 16 Jan 45.
126
For a detailed description of the invasion of southern France, see Smith, Riviera to the Rhine.
127
Rpt of Opns, Seventh U.S. Army in France and Germany (hereafter cited as Rpt of Opns, Sev-
enth Army), I, 110-11. Other supporting units were antitank, engineer, signal, and medical com-
panies.
128
CWS TofO Ltr No. 23, 3 Apr 45. This document includes the loading lists and tables of indi-
vidual equipment.
with such impact that the jeep load in its nose catapulted through the
front end of the aircraft, seriously injuring the three men sitting in the
vehicle.
Elements of Company A, landing between 1845 and 1900, had as-
sembled at their predesignated area by 2130 and were prepared to fire
on the town of Le Muy. Next morning the company fired 200 rounds
of HE on the town and 48 rounds of WP on its southern exits. Le Muy
fell by midafternoon. Later that day the airborne troops made contact
with reconnaissance elements of the 45th Division. After this junction
the mortar companies remained attached to the task force as it pushed
to the French-Italian border, being relieved from this attachment on
129
17 September at Nice, France.
The gliders of Company D, 83d Chemical Battalion, were released
over the drop zone near Le Muy at seven minutes after seven on the
morning of D-day. Fourteen mortarmen received light injuries during
the landings. The company did not fire on that first day but expended
650 rounds in support of the 517ht Infantry on 16 August. The mortar
unit remained in support of this unit until the end of the month doing
relatively little firing in the drive to the Italian border.130
A mortar company accustomed to normal attachments encountered
problems in adapting itself to glider operations. Techniques of loading
and securing equipment had to be formulated and mastered. Men and
equipment had to be distributed in such a way as to allocate weight
equally among the several gliders. Moreover, it was necessary to al-
locate the material so that the loss of one glider would not destroy all
the equipment of the same type. The exigencies of glider operations
caused a number of changes in the normal organization and equipment
of a mortar company based mostly on the fact that a company, landing
by gliders, often had to operate as an independent unit until such time
as contact could be made with other elements. Because of this fact
medical aidmen joined each mortar platoon and automatic weapons
were added to provide means for independent defense. In the table of
equipment for an airborne mortar company drawn up after DRAGOON
by Capt. Raymond J. Lakey of the 83d Battalion, the responsibility
for unit security accounted for all additions to the complement of
weapons. Captain Lakey recommended that 4 light machine guns, 8
129
(1) Rpt of Opns, Seventh Army, I, 110-14. (2) CWS TofO Ltr No. 23, 3 Apr 45. (3) Co A
2d Cml Bn Rcd of Events.
130
83d Bn Rpt of Action, Aug 44.
BAR's, 16 tommy guns, and 18 .45-caliber pistols be added to the

arsenal of an airborne company. And whereas the table of equipment
of a motorized company called for 5 bazookas, 7 should be carried by
131
a glider-borne company.
Since the assault operation against the beaches of southern France
met only light opposition, the mortar battalions found they had rela-
tively few missions to fire as they accompanied their divisions to the
132
west and north. Because fire was not needed in such a rapid advance,
some of the units were given jobs involving supply. A company of
the 83d Battalion established and operated a railhead to St. Maximin in
order to ease the serious logistical problems of the 45th Division. And
at one time companies of the 2d Battalion hauled supplies for the 36th
Division.133 For the 3d Battalion August was a period of long, fast
movements with little fighting. The low rate of ammunition expendi-
ture mitigated the shell supply problem which otherwise would have
been acute since army supply dumps were frequently 100 miles to the
rear.134
These mortar battalions continued to support the troops of the
Seventh Army as they fought to the north and northeast—the Vosges,
Belfort, Bitche, Colmar were familiar names to the mortarmen. Some
mortar units fired for divisions of the 1st French Army which, with the
U.S. Seventh, made up Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Dever's 6th Army Group.
Offensive action came to a temporary halt in mid-December 1944 when
the Germans launched their Ardennes counteroffensive.135
The Fighting Ends in Italy

The departure of the 2d, 3d, and 83d Chemical Mortar Battalion for
southern France left only the 84th in support of the divisions of Fifth
Army from July until the end of October 1944. This unit found
itself scattered along the entire army front.136 In an effort to make up
for this lost support the theater in June 1944 converted two antiaircraft
131
Capt Raymond J. Lakey, Rpt on 4.2-Inch Mortar Airborne Company, pt. II, 15 Oct 44. CmlC
School Lib.
132
For an account of mortar battalion participation in the D-day screening, see above, Chapter VIII.
133
(1) Rounds Away: Two Years of Combat with Eighty-Third Chemical Mortar Battalion (Inns-
bruck, 1945), pp. 41-42. (2) History of Second Chemical Mortar Battalion, pp. 33-34.
134
3d Cml Bn Rpt of Opns, Aug 44.
135
See below, Chapter XII, for details on the German counteroffensive.
136
Ltr, CCmlO NATOUSA to CCWS,26 Oct 44. CWS 314.7 Personal Ltr files, NATOUSA.
artillery automatic weapons units to the 99th and 100th Chemical Mor-
tar Battalions. After completing a period of intensive training under
the direction of Colonel Hutchinson, a former commander of the 83rd,
the 99th, commanded by Lt. Col. Gordon A. Dixon, left for France
and the 100th, commanded by Lt. Col. Russell E. McMurray, joined
Fifth Army in Italy.137
July had seen the 84th reorganize under the long ignored tables of
organization and equipment of September 1943, a move which reduced
the number of officers and enlisted men of a mortar battalion from
1,010 to 622. The new tables also cut the number of 2½-ton trucks
and increased the number of ¼-ton trucks (jeeps) assigned to a bat-
talion. The long delay between the publication of the tables and actual
reorganization was the result of several factors. For one thing, mortar
battalions in Italy had scant time away from the front line to put the
required changes into effect. Moreover, for a long while there were
not enough jeeps to make the substitution in vehicles. Finally, mortar
commanders feared that because of the cut in personnel their units
would138find it impossible to operate efficiently if reorganization took
place.
While the Italian campaign was in progress the War Department
drew up still another TOE based upon 139the recommendations received
from battle-experienced CWS officers. The salient feature of this
revision was the elimination of one weapons company, a move which
placed the battalion on the triangular basis characteristic of the in-
fantry division.140 The new organization became effective in Septem-
ber 1944, and two months141
later the 84th and 100th Battalions re-
organized accordingly.
After his rapid retreat above Rome, the enemy defended positions
north of the Arno River, called the Gothic Line, which were not
137
(1) Ibid. (2) 100th Cml Bn Opns Rpts, Jul-Nov 44.
138
(1) Hist of 3d Cml Bn, Jun 44, p. 44. (2) Markham Interv,16 Jan 45. (3) See Opnl History
of Cml Bns and the 4.2-inch Mortar in World War II, pt. II, The Italian Campaign, pp. 101-19. (4)
The fighting in Italy had altered mortar commanders' views as to the desirability of the ¼-ton truck.
Too much had been expected of these vehicles. The 2½-ton trucks were still needed to haul ammuni-
tion from army supply points to the mortar battalion dumps and on to company dumps. Earlier
thoughts on transportation had been conditioned by the experience of the fast-moving Sicilian cam-
paign; operations in Italy, characterized by slow movements and static situations, brought about the
change. Opnl History of Cml Bns and the 4.2-inch Mortar in World War II, p. II, Italian Campaign,
p. 106.
139
Ltr, ACCWS for Field Opns to CCmlO NATOUSA, 12 Feb 44.
140
Other features of this TOE are discussed in Chapter XII, below.
141
CWS TofO Ltr No. 21, 31 Jan 45, p. 35.
breached by Allied forces until late September 1944. During that

month the 84th Battalion expended about 6,500 rounds of ammuni-
tion, over half of which was white phosphorus. New infantry divisions,
unfamiliar with the mortars and particularly their high-explosive mis-
sion, seemed to make more frequent calls for smoke. Each of the four
companies of the 84th supported a different division of II Corps, which
was fighting its way northward through the mountains. Despite trans-
portation difficulties, the 84th gave heavy support during October,
firing some 16,000 rounds (5,000 HE), mainly against enemy counter-
attacks and emplacements and also as a screen for American positions
and supply routes.142 On 31 October the 84th Chemical Battalion
passed into Fifth Army reserve to be replaced by the 1 0 0 t h Battalion,
companies of which supported, at one time or another, each of the
infantry divisions of II Corps.143
In January 1945 Fifth Army received reports of the hardships en-
countered in other theaters and in the United States with the fuzes for
the M3 4.2-inch mortar ammunition which, unfortunately, made up
the bulk of 4.2-inch ammunition in the theater. Nonetheless, during
February the 84th and 100ht Battalions used over 11,000 rounds of the
suspected ammunition without particular difficulty. On 9 March a
shell burst three feet from the barrel of one mortar, killing one man
and wounding four others. Thereafter, mortar crews used lanyards
to fire suspected ammunition, a precaution which at first reduced the
efficiency of mortar crews.144
From the conclusion of the Gothic Line fighting in the fall of 1944
until the spring of 1945 Fifth Army troops remained in relatively the
same positions. April saw an army offensive which cracked German
defenses in a matter of a week. The 84th and 1 0 0 t h Battalions sup-
ported the IV and II Corps, respectively, in this operation until the
infantry advance was too swift for effective support. It was at this
time that 4.2-inch mortar operations in the Mediterranean theater
145
came to an end.
142
84th Cml Bn Opns Rpts, Sep, Oct 44.
143
1 0 0 t h Cml Bn Opns (for Nov 44), 5 Dec 44.
144
(1) 84th Cml Mortar Bn Opns Rpt, Feb, Mar 45. (2) 100th Cml Mortar Bn Opns Rpts, Feb
45. (3) 84th Cml Mortar Bn Field Journal, 9 Mar 45. (4) Fifth Army Cml Sec, Cml Warfare
Activities, 11-17 Mar 45.
145
(1) 84th Cml Mortar Bn Opns Rpt, Apr 45. (2) 1 0 0 t h Cml Mortar Bn Opns Rpt, Apr 45.
Fighting in Italy was as bitter and the enemy defenses as stubborn as

any experienced by American forces in World War II. The moun-
tainous Italian terrain, with its abundance of defiladed positions in-
accessible to artillery fire, placed a heavy demand on high trajectory
weapons, particularly the 4.2-inch mortar. In addition, 4.2-inch
mortar units were indispensable to Ranger and Commando units which
lacked organic heavy weapons. Most infantry commanders were at
first unaware of the potential of the 4.2-inch mortar, but once they
had seen the weapon in action they were usually anxious for mortar
support. In Italy the chemical mortar truly came of age.
CHAPTER XII
The Chemical Mortar in the ETO

Getting chemical mortar battalions for the European Theater of
Operations, U.S. Army, proved to be a complicated and difficult prob-
lem. Colonel Rowan, chief chemical officer in the theater, had recom-
mended a total of 24 battalions for the theater troop list, a figure based
upon the formula of 2 battalions per corps (18) and 2 additional bat-
talions per army (6). His commander approved this recommendation,
including the figure in the over-all troop list, which was forwarded to
Washington early in 1943.1
The War Department took no action on the troop basis recom-
mended by the theater commander. In November 1943 it sent an
officer to England to inform the theater commander on War Depart-
ment troop basis policy—the establishment of an over-all theater
personnel ceiling within which the theater commander could set up
his own troop basis. The officer produced a list of those units which
were immediately available, those which were in training, and those
which were scheduled for activation. He stated that the theater com-
mander could take his pick, staying, of course, within his over-all
ceiling. Because the list admittedly had no relation to the one sub-
mitted by the ETO, a situation which negated a large amount of de-
tailed theater planning, the War Department agreed to activate and
train units not on the list, with the understanding that this would take
additional time. Unfortunately, there were only seven chemical mortar
battalions on the list.
Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, commander of the U.S. army group in
the theater, received the job of determining the final troop list. Rowan
pointed out to General Bradley that the seven chemical mortar
battalions bore no logical numerical relation to the number of armies
and corps on the list, that they could not be distributed equitably,
1
(1) Ltr, ACCWS for Field Opns to CCmlO ETOUSA, 16 Nov 43. (2) Ltr, Rowan to Hist
Off, 3 Dec 51. CWS 314.7.
and that they were far too few to achieve their full potential. Rowan
then asked Bradley for the twenty-four mortar battalions of the origi-
nal troop list. Bradley replied that he would like to have more mortar
units but, because the troop ceiling had just about been reached, adding
them would mean giving up other units that were equally valuable.
This he was reluctant to do.
At the time of these negotiations the only mortar battalion located
in the European theater was the 8 1st. Attempts to secure one of the four
combat-experienced units from the North Africa Theater of Opera-
tions were turned down as "impossible and impracticable"; the mortar
battalions in Italy already were overworked. Colonel Shadle, chief
chemical officer of that theater, stated that the battalions were so
highly regarded that "the sticking of my fingers into this question
2
would be practically the same as putting them in a 'bandsaw'."
A change in the table of organization for the mortar battalion
promised an unexpected source of men. Under the existing table the
authorized strength was 1,010; a revised table of September 1943 re-
duced this number to 622.3 Colonel Rowan was informed that the
battalions in the United States were organized under the older table.
Taking into consideration the battalions then existing and those which
could be formed from the men excess by reorganization under the
new table, Colonel Rowan came up with a total of eleven potentially
available battalions. If General Bradley asked for but one battalion in
addition to the War Department troop list, there would be enough to
equal just half of the original request, or one per corps and army. Gen-
eral Bradley acceded, requesting twelve mortar battalions for the
theater troop list.
Although it began auspiciously, the plan for capitalizing on battalion
reorganization as a source for new units soon turned sour. The theater
received permission in December to activate a mortar battalion in Eng-
land manned in large part by the men freed in the reorganization of the
81st Battalion.4 But Rowan learned to his dismay that the battalions
in the United States earmarked for his theater had already been re-
organized under the new table of organization, thus cutting off an
important supply of personnel.
With only two battalions in England as late as February 1944 the
2
Ltr, CCmlO NATO to ACCWS for Field Opns, 2 Dec 43.
3
See above, ch. XL
4
(1) CM-IN 7606, 12 Dec 43. (2) CM-OUT 7110 16 Dec 43.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE ETO 461
shortage of such units became critical. Although the troop basis for
the ETO now included 12 battalions> only 7 were listed as available in
1944. What was worse, only 4 of these would be in the theater in time
for the Normandy landings—the 81st, the 92d, activated in England,
and the 86th and 87th, both of which arrived in April.5
Preparations for OVERLORD

Of these four battalions the 92d was least prepared for combat op-
erations in France. The other three units concentrated on amphibious
training in the winter and spring of 1944, having undergone basic and
unit training in the United States. The 92d, activated in England in
6
February 1944, had to start from scratch.
From the beginning the training activities of the battalion were
hampered by the type of men it received. Of the first 373 assigned
to the unit, 308 were of average intelligence or less. Fifty-six had
AWOL records, 22 had been court-martialed for other offenses, and
12 had had VD. About 15 of the group were suffering from some
disability or were on limited service; 13 others went immediately to
the hospital. Throughout its period of activation the 92d usually re-
ceived those men declared surplus by other units.7
The battalion devoted the last two weeks of February to making its
camp at least partially fit for human habitation. The first part of
March saw the enlisted men screened for a selection of potential NCO
material and subjected to a review of all basic subjects. Small arms
instruction, mortar drill, and the training of 162 drivers followed.
By the end of March companies had been organized, squads knew
something about their mortars, and the battalion was able to pack
and move with some degree of order. Training intensified in April,
with special emphasis on field work and marksmanship. Morale
reached its lowest point at this time; few realized that the rigorous
conditioning was necessary for their own survival. Work on mortar
ranges began on 10 April and continued into May. The month of
5
(1) Memo, MacArthur, CmlO FUSAG, for Brig Gen James E. Wharton, ACofS G-1 FUSAG,25
Mar 44. (2) CM-OUT 1365 3 Feb 44.
6
The only other mortar battalions activated overseas were the 99th and 1 0 0 t h , converted from
antiaircraft artillery units in Italy, and the 98th converted from a tank destroyer battalion on New
Guinea.
7
Unless otherwise noted, the unit material in this chapter has been taken from the histories, journals,
and after action reports of the several mortar battalions.
May also saw the battalion undergo a two-and-a-half-week period of

intensive training while attached to a field artillery group. There was
no time for amphibious training before the invasion, and as a conse-
quence the 92d did not participate in the initial landings. Nor did
the 86th Battalion receive assault training in time for D-day activity.
The 81st Battalion was the chemical unit most adequately prepared
for the D-day operation. It had trained at the amphibious center at
Camp Gordon Johnston, Fla., before leaving the United States. From
December 1943 until the following April it participated in intensive
exercises at the Assault Training Center in Devonshire and in other
maneuvers along the western and southern coasts of England. The
87th Battalion was also well prepared for the invasion; thoroughly
trained in the United States, it took part in two amphibious exercises
in England that spring. The latter training had indicated that the
increased problems in communications and supply in amphibious oper-
ations made greater demands on unit personnel. (Battalion commanders
already were finding that the reduced complement of men in the
new TOE was inadequate to keep forty-eight mortars in action even
in normal operations.) Consequently, each of the two mortar bat-
talions earmarked for the invasion was temporarily fattened by 125-
man detachments from two chemical processing companies.
The Normandy Campaign

The 81st and 87th Chemical Mortar Battalions landed in Normandy
early on D-day in support of the V and VII Corps, respectively, on
OMAHA and UTAH Beaches. Companies A and C of the 81st were
attached to battalions of the 16th Infantry, 1st Division, and Com-
panies B and D landed with battalions of the 116th Infantry, 29th
Division. As it approached the shore, the landing craft carrying the
forward battalion group received heavy shelling which killed a sergeant
and seriously wounded the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Thomas H.
James. Without benefit of engine or rudder the craft drifted aimlessly
until currents providentially beached it at a protected spot along the
shore.
Company A, landing at H plus 50, lost some of its equipment in the
heavy seas. Even worse, Capt. Thomas P. Moundres, its commander,
was mortally wounded before reaching the beach. The senior lieutenant
assumed command and succeeded in getting the platoons into firing
SMOKE SCREEN DURING THE OMAHA BEACH LANDINGS
positions. First day missions included a smoke screen for advancing

infantry and the destruction of an enemy machine gun. Company C
did not land until midafternoon because the infantrymen in preceding
waves were pinned down on the edge of the beach. The unit finally
got ashore at 1500 and made its way to positions about 200 yards
inland. It received no requests for supporting fire.
The four LCVP's carrying Company B were unable to find a route
through the heavy obstacles in their assigned sector, and two of these
vessels were disabled by artillery fire as they headed toward another
landing area. Despite a heavy sea and enemy opposition, all troops and
equipment aboard the stricken craft were transferred to an empty
LCT. Company D landed between H plus 50 and H plus 60, but its
commander, Capt. Philip J. Gaffney, was killed when his landing craft
struck a mine. Before finding an outlet off the dangerous strip of beach
the unit changed its position three times and fired one mission. Night
found the mortars dug in at St. Laurent-sur-Mer. Thus, on 6 June
CHEMICAL MORTARS AT UTAH BEACH
1944 3 officers of the 81st were killed and 2 others, including the
battalion commander, were seriously wounded. One company lost its
total complement of transportation while each of the other three com-
panies lost two vehicles.
Trouble developed on D plus 1 as enemy snipers allowed leading
infantry elements to pass through, firing on units which followed.
To meet this threat the battalion formed details to wipe out the sniper
nests. The mortarmen learned another trick of combat during these
early days in Normandy. The enemy, having retreated from the area
in which American mortars were to be set up, had marked on its firing
charts all logical positions for these weapons. The men of the 81st
soon found it was best to avoid reverse slopes and similar accepted
mortar sites in favor of unconventional open terrain.
The 87th Chemical Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. James H.
Batte, was attached to VII Corps in the D-day assault of UTAH Beach.
Three of the firing companies supported the three battalions of the
8th Infantry, 4th Division, and the fourth company supported a

battalion of the 22d Infantry of the same division. Forward observers
of the mortar companies landed with the initial waves of infantry,
and the units themselves came in at H plus 50. Shortly after landing,
the battalion fired 140 rounds and then followed the infantry in moving
off the beach. For almost six hours the 4.2-inch mortars were the only
ground weapons capable of delivering heavy fire support.8 Targets
during the first twenty-four hours of action were enemy machine gun
emplacements, concrete emplacements, and pillboxes.
Quinville Ridge, some ten miles northwest of UTAH Beach and a
D-day objective for VII Corps, was not taken until 14 June. The
companies of the 87th Battalion supported the 4th Division in the
fight for this objective, expending 16,870 rounds and suffering 36
casualties in the process. The mortar units continued in support of
the 4th Division as it drove north to Cherbourg. On 23 June Company
C fired a spectacular rolling barrage in support of a battalion attack
which prompted Brig. Gen. Theodore Roosevelt to telephone his con-
9
gratulations back to the mortar positions.
The attack on Cherbourg included several other noteworthy 4.2-inch
mortar missions. On 23 June Company A blended its fire so that white
phosphorus showered German troops just routed from their positions
by high explosives. That evening twenty men from Company D fought
as infantry troops while the rest of the unit delivered heavy fire against
an enemy counterattack. On 24 June the mortars of Company B
successfully dueled with German artillery, assumed to be 88-mm.
guns, which had been shelling an American regimental command post.
On the same day, Company C aided in repelling a vigorous enemy
counterattack by getting off 300 rounds before the division artillery
could come into action. Expressing his view that the two mortar
companies with his division had materially aided the success of the
advance, Col. Kramer Thomas, chief of staff of the 79th Division,
emphasized an inherent characteristic of the mortars—that of quick
response to a given mission. On several occasions, he stated, the chemical
mortars, because of the rapidity with which they went into action and
the availability of ammunition at gun positions, were the only artillery-
type support available.10
8
87th Cml Bn Journal, 6 Jun 44.
9
87th Cml Bn Opns Rpt, 6-15 Jul 44.
10
87th Cml Bn Journal, From D Day to D plus 20.
After the fall of the port of Cherbourg half of the battalion sup-
ported the 9th Division during the several days required to mop up
the Cap de la Hague. By 1 July, when this operation ended, the 87th
Battalion had been in continuous combat for twenty-five days. Nine-
teen man had been killed and 75 had been wounded; battalion ammuni-
tion expenditures totaled 19,129 rounds of HE and 11,899 rounds of
white phosphorus.
The nature of the fighting in Normandy was determined by the
predominant feature of the Norman terrain, the hedgerow. As de-
scribed by Colonel MacArthur, Chemical Officer, 12th Army Group:
"The country is gently rolling grazing land, consisting of rectangular
grass fields generally about 100 yards deep in the direction of our
advance and 150 to 200 yards wide." The colonel stated that these
hedgerows were actually earth walls about four feet high surmounted
with bushes and dotted with small trees. They were natural obstacles
which could be put to excellent use in warfare, and the enemy fully
exploited their defensive possibilities. Machine gun emplacements were
located at the corners of hedgerows, and their lengths bristled with
machine pistols, rifles, and antitank weapons. Mines with trip wires
sometimes supplemented the already imposing defenses. Naturally, an
advance over this ground was as slow as it was dangerous; units meas-
ured their progress by hedgerows, not miles. This was a form of
position warfare with bocage replacing the traditional role of trenches.11
The terrain was particularly dangerous for mortar forward ob-
servers, a fact emphasized by the following notation from the journal
of the 87th Battalion for 13 July 1944: "Scarcely a day passes that
some one, if not all the forward observer party, are either wounded
or killed. Yet, all officers of this battalion operate as forward observers
and there are always volunteers among the men."
The 86th Battalion arrived in Normandy on 29 June. Attached to
First Army, the companies of this unit initially supported elements of
the 90th Infantry and 82d Airborne Divisions. Company B was an
exception. The ship which was taking this unit across the Channel
sank after either striking a mine or being struck by a torpedo. One
man was listed as missing and26 were injured; most of the equipment
was lost. Refitted in England, the unit rejoined the 86th on 18 July.
11
Memo, MacArthur for ACofS G-3 Hq 12th Army Group, 28 Jul 44, p. 2. CWS 314.7 Unit Files.
CMLHO.
Although created for combat support, chemical mortar battalions

found themselves at times in something other than a supporting role.
The experience of Company A of the 86th on the night of 6-7 July
is a case in point. One of its platoons was firing for a battalion of the
359th Infantry; another was in the immediate vicinity. Wire con-
nected the mortar company with the infantry battalion. The mortar
company liaison officer at the forward infantry observation post re-
ported that the situation there was uncertain and appeared to be
getting out of control. An urgent mission, requested by an adjacent
battalion, prompted the mortar company commander to withdraw
his security element and send it for more ammunition. Although three
infantry companies were thought to be in front of the mortars, enemy
machine gun fire suddenly pierced the air above the mortar crews.
The mortar company commander called the infantry battalion but
could get no definite word about the situation. The infantry battalion
agreed that a mortar barrage would probably help, and the two platoons
fired at a range of 700 yards. When the machine gun fire crept closer,
the commander again tried to contact the infantry command post.
Finding it had moved, he ordered one of his platoons to withdraw, a
maneuver accomplished with difficulty because of the heat of the
barrels and the firm emplacement of the base plates. Soon the mortar
positions were swept by enemy machine gun fire and the other platoon
received the march order. As the company withdrew, 5 men fell into
enemy hands, escaping when the Germans were driven off by the com-
pany's sole remaining .50-caliber machine gun. The next morning all
equipment was recovered with the exception of one destroyed jeep.12
Although not involved in D-day operations, the 92d Chemical Bat-
talion soon participated in the Normandy fighting. Attached to XIX
Corps and supporting the 30th Division, the unit first saw action in
the opening days of July along the Vire River. On 8 July the 92d
supported the 29th Division which was spearheading the XIX Corps
drive on the centers of German resistance around St. Lo. This and one
other attack proved unsuccessful; fourteen days and two attachments
later the battalion was poised for the breakthrough operation.
COBRA, the offensive to break out of Normandy, began on 25 July.
The VII Corps, with three divisions abreast, led the attack. Companies
A and B, 92d Battalion, were firing preparatory missions in support
12
86th Cml Bn AAR, 1 Jul-31 Jul 44, pp. 5-6.
of units of the 30th Division when Allied heavy bombers droned in

to soften German resistance. To the dismay of the American troops,
about 3 5 of the planes dropped their bomb loads within friendly lines.13
Nearly 200 bombs fell in the 92d Battalion area alone. Lt. Gen. Lesley
J. McNair, Army Ground Forces commander, was instantly killed
while observing the action from a point just in front of Company A.
Battalion losses were 5 dead and 23 wounded. Company A lost 9 mor-
tars, half of its ammunition, and all of its vehicles. Company B fared
better, managing to salvage 8 of its 12 mortars. On the following day
Company C relieved Company A and the latter unit drew back to
reorganize; three days later Company A, in turn, relieved Company B.
By 3 August all units returned to the battalion area for rest and
refitting.
Operational Problems
Despite the complaints heard throughout the Normandy Campaign
about the lack of trained mortar battalion replacements, there was no
over-all shortage of CWS officers in the European theater. Colonel
St. John, Chemical Adviser, G-3, SHAEF, reported in June 1944 that
so many CWS officers were in the theater that they were "sitting in
each other's laps and standing on each other's feet." 14
The root of the trouble was the existence of two distinct types of
CWS officers, technical and combat, whose roles were usually not inter-
changeable. Misassignment not only resulted in a waste of talent but
usually in a substandard performance. An officer whose training and
background fitted him for a chemical laboratory assignment probably
made a poor mortar platoon leader. Because these facts were under-
stood neither by the Ground Forces Replacement Command in England,
nor by the personnel officers of the higher commands, it was not
unusual for trained mortar officers to find themselves in depots or in
branch immaterial positions, while the mortar battalions had to settle
for unqualified replacements.15
This situation was verified by the commander of one of the mortar
units which saw action in Normandy. Colonel Batte reported that
during the course of one week in the latter part of June he received
13
Craven and Cate, eds., Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, pp. 231-34.
14
Rpt, St. John for CCWS, 28 Jun 44.
15
(1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, Rowan to Waitt, 24 Feb 45, no sub. CWS 314.7 Personal Ltr files, ETO.
(3) Rowan Interv,26 Sep 58.
two CWS officers and one infantry officer as battalion replacements.

Batte stated: "The two CWS officers admitted they had never so much
as touched a mortar in their entire army experience; before entering
OCS they were in the Medical Corps. The greater part of their service
in CWS after finishing OCS had been in pools and at the Military
Police Training Center, Ft. Custer, Mich." 16 The accuracy of these
comments made by graduates of the CWS officer candidate school
might be open to question, since the OCS curriculum included fifty
hours of 4.2-inch mortar training.17 But whatever the explanation,
these men were not psychologically prepared to enter combat.18
They probably lacked technical proficiency, as well, for the Chemical
Warfare School came to consider fifty hours as an inadequate period
of mortar training, and in the summer of 1943 inaugurated a Battalion
Officers Course, with the specific purpose of producing qualified mortar
battalion officers. Because the battalions in combat were not receiving
these officers as replacements, Colonel Batte had been requesting and
usually getting infantrymen.19 Similar problems were encountered
with enlisted men. Lt. Col. William B. Hamilton, commanding the
86th Battalion, stated that the replacements received by his unit were
not trained CWS mortarmen but were "basics from the infantry or
most any other branch." 20
Efforts were made to overcome the lack of suitable mortar battalion
replacements. General Rowan established a Chemical Training Bat-
talion in England which began operations in August 1944. Until its
termination in October 1944 this unit, which doubled as a replacement
organization, trained 125 officers and 700 enlisted men for assignment
with mortar battalions. This fine record was in part vitiated by two
factors: the heavy demands permitted only a fraction of these troops
to receive all of the prescribed three weeks of training, and despite
16
Memo, Batte to Porter, 26 Jun 44. CWS 314.7 Personal Ltr files, ETO.
17
See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, ch. XV.
18
Colonel Batte had some first lieutenants who actually broke down and cried at the prospect of being
sent into battle. Ltr, Batte to CMLHO, 28 Jul 60.
19
Memo, Rowan, no addressee, 26 Aug 44, sub: Notes on Trip to Far Shore, in Ltr, Rowan to
Waitt, 2 Sep 44.
20
Ltr, CO 86th Cml Bn to CCWS, 18 Jul 44, sub: Employ of Cml Combat Bn.
all precautions these men continued to become lost in the Ground

Forces Replacement Command.21
The personnel situation remained critical throughout the winter of
1944-45. December found the mortar battalions in the 12th Army
Group understrength by twenty-five officers and the theater replace-
ment center seemingly devoid of qualified chemical mortar officers.22
The 92d Battalion, earlier unaffected by replacement problems, now
reported that "trained officer and enlisted replacements have been un-
available and consequently a continuous training program has been
23
found necessary."
An urgent message from the theater to the War Department in
February 1945 called attention to the need for chemical mortar
officers. Within the theater further steps were taken to rectify the
replacement situation. All CWS officers assigned outside the service
had been located and a number of them were now serving in their
proper capacities. Also, the willingness of the Ground Forces Replace-
ment Command to work with the informal advice of General Rowan's
office lessened greatly the chance of misassignment of officers.24
A personnel problem of a different sort had existed even before the
battalions entered combat. The revised table of organization of Sep-
tember 1943, it will be recalled, reduced the battalion strength from
1,010 to 622. Battalion commanders were of the opinion that this
number was below that required to man, supply, and provide com-
munications for the forty-eight mortars within the unit. Although
there was disagreement as to the composition of an appropriate table
of organization, all of the commanders considered the 6-man squad
too small to keep a mortar in action. A popular remedy was to with-
draw several mortars and reinforce the remaining squads with the
men thus freed. Lt. Col. Ronald LeV. Martin took more drastic
measures with the 92d Battalion. He received permission to eliminate
one of the four companies of his unit, thus anticipating the revised
21
(1) Ltr, Maj Otis P. Gray to CCmlO ETOUSA, 15 Jan 45, sub: Rpt on Cml Training Bn, Incl
to History of Plans and Tng Div Cml Sec ETOUSA, 6 Jun 44-9 May 45. Admin File 545B, Hq
ETO, WW II Div NA. (2) Memo, St. John for Comdt Cml Warfare School, 21 Sep 44. (3) Ltr,
Rowan to Waitt, 22 Dec 44, no sub. CWS 314.7 Personal Ltr files, ETOUSA.
22
Ltr, CmlO 12th Army Group to CCWS, 11 Dec 44, no sub.
23
92d Cml Bn AAR, Dec 44.
24
(1) CM-IN 22090, 22 Feb 45. (2) Ltr, Rowan to Waitt, 24 Feb 45, no sub. CWS 314.7
Personal Ltr files, ETO.
table of organization which was to become effective in the fall of

1944.25
Another difficulty which emerged in Normandy involved the tactical
employment of chemical mortar units, or more precisely, the matter
of mortar battalion control. The resulting controversy provoked two
schools of thought, one holding that mortar units should be directly
responsible to the infantry which they supported, the other maintaining
that they should operate under artillery control. Influential in this
dispute was the background and training of the participants. The
commander of the 92d, for example, had been a field artillery officer
until transferring to the CWS; moreover, the last training phase of
his unit had been supervised by the artillery officer of the corps to
which the battalion was attached. It was not strange that this battalion
commander became a leading exponent of the artillery control school.
One of the main benefits of the artillery control system was the
efficiency with which the battalion could operate as a unit. In defensive
situations mortar fire could be readily massed, and the unit's fire could
be effectively integrated with that of the artillery. In the European
theater, however, the limited number of mortar battalions generally
precluded the maintenance of battalion integrity.26
Most of those concerned, CWS and otherwise, favored the close
infantry support method. This fact was confirmed in a CWS theater
of operations letter which stated that although applicable artillery
techniques and practices should be used, the normal role of the chem-
ical battalion "should be considered as part of the Infantry team…
furnishing close support with a heavy and powerful mortar." 27
The Drive Toward Germany

The Fall of Aachen
After the breakout at Avranches, the Allied advance to the east
sharply accelerated. The tactical value of the 4.2-inch mortar usually
decreased in fast-moving situations, and such was the case during most
25
(1) Brig. Gen. Hugh W. Rowan, "Mortars in Normandy," Chemical Warfare Bulletin (January-
February, 1945). (2) 92d Bn History.
26
(1) Rowan, "Mortars in Normandy," Chemical Warfare Bulletin (January-February, 1945). (2)
Memo, CCmlO 12th Army Group for G-3 12th Army Group, 28 Jul 44. CWS 314.7 (3) Rowan
Interv, 26 Sep 58.
27
(1) CWS TofO Ltr No. 18, 14 Sep 44, p. 3. (2) This view was substantiated by a postwar
study in chemical mortar battalions by the General Board, U.S. Forces European Theater.
of the campaign in northern France. Although there were periods of

intense action, most of the mortar battalions enjoyed a breathing spell.
Some battalions temporarily acted as trucking units to help ease logis-
tical problems which accompany any army in rapid movement. Time
was available for rest, rehabilitation, and training, as well as for the
opportunity to enjoy the enthusiastic reception of the liberated French
people. It was a well-deserved respite coming between two taxing
campaigns.
The American forces first came into contact with the Siegfried Line
in September 1944. At that time there were still only four chemical
battalions assigned to the 12th Army Group, an insignificant number
for such a formidable force. And the stiffening enemy bore little re-
semblance to the German troops who had recently fled across northern
France. First Army, lacking the logistical support it had recently en-
joyed, began a series of limited probes against the German defenses.
The objective of one of these attacks was Aachen.
The 92d and 87th Chemical Mortar Battalions supported First Army
in this difficult operation which took the form of a double envelopment.
The 92d Battalion fired for the 30th Division in the XIX Corps drive
to the north, and the 87th supported elements of VII Corps in the
southern sector.
The attack on Aachen, set for September, was delayed by the wet,
miserable weather until early October. During the ensuing lull the
92d improved its gun positions, perfected plans for prearranged mis-
sions, and fired a number of probing missions. Finally, on 2 October,
the 30th Division attacked the Siegfried Line in the direction of
Ubach, Germany. In preparation for the assault the 92d Battalion
placed a destructive barrage upon wire barriers of concertinas and
double aprons which lay in the route of advance of two infantry regi-
ments. Over 1,200 high-explosive shells fell in these two areas whose
combined size measured 1,700 by 300 yards, cutting broad swaths
through the obstacles. The mortars then kept a rolling barrage 150
yards ahead of the advancing troops. Subsequent missions included
those of interdiction, harassment, general support, and smoke screens
on the flanks to hamper enemy observation. Targets of opportunity
were numerous. One forward observer used mortar fire to chase a
German weapons platoon into a pillbox and then adjusted 8-inch
artillery fire to bring about the destruction of the concrete fortification.
The battalion expended 25,000 rounds of ammunition and suffered

30 casualties in the Aachen operation, which ended with the fall of
28
the city on 23 October.
The 87th Battalion supported the 1st and 9th Divisions in the lower
jaw of the pincers attack against Aachen. Frequent re-emplacements
of the mortars resulted because of the soft, wet ground, a condition
which also contributed to the heavy breakage of parts. Missions of
interdiction were frequent; tanks, personnel, machine guns, and mor-
tars were targets of opportunity for the 4.2-inch weapons. White
phosphorus effectively screened observation from the formidable enemy
positions which protected Aachen. Later, mortar fire was placed upon
the enemy's vigorous counterattacks as he attempted to fight out of
the beleaguered city. Against one counterattack on 16 October Com-
pany B disabled 2 tanks, knocked out 1 self-propelled gun, and killed
between 70 and 80 of the enemy. The captain of the infantry company
thus aided declared that the mortar support prevented the enemy from
overrunning his unit. Against another counterattack the chemical
mortars fired white phosphorus shells behind the supporting enemy
tanks, silhouetting them for the benefit of American tank destroyers.
One German tank was knocked out, two others were damaged, and
the rest withdrew. Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, commanding the
1st Division, praised the chemical mortars for the part they played in
stopping these counterattacks.29
The 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion at Metz
While assigned to the First Army, the 81st Battalion crossed north-
eastern France into Belgium and Luxembourg, and in September got
its first taste of fighting among the fortifications of the Siegfried Line.
Here it learned that while the prepared concrete and steel positions were
impervious to mortar shell, smoke did prove effective in preventing
30
observation from these strongpoints.
28
(1) 92d Cml Mortar Bn, History, 1944. (2) History of 30th Inf Div Arty, 1-31 Oct 44. (3)
Col. Ronald L. Martin, "92d Chemical Mortar Battalion History," Armed Forces Chemical Journal
(October, 1951).
29
87th Cml Bn Rcd of Events, pp. 87, 91.
30
(1) The Eighty-First Chemical Mortar Battalion (booklet, 1945), pp. 44-51. (2) 12th Army
Group, Battle Experiences No. 88, 9 Nov 44. White phosphorus shell, apart from its utility as a
screening agent, sometimes had a psychological effect when used against enemy fortifications. The
crew of at least one enemy pillbox, for example, surrendered when one of its members, seeing the WP
smoke, called out, "Gas!"
In mid-September the battalion was reassigned to the Third Army,

also recently halted by logistical difficulties. Lt. Gen. George S. Patton
ordered a series of limited operations which would place his forces in
a more favorable position once the drive to the Rhine was resumed.
Attached to XX Corps, the 81st Battalion was in the vicinity of Metz,
preparing to support the 5th and 90th Divisions in attacks against
Fort Driant and Maizieres-les-Metz, an industrial town located north
31
of the city.
The first attempt against Fort Driant was made on 27 September by
the 2d Battalion, 11th Infantry, 5th Division. This hurriedly planned
attack proved abortive, primarily because the strength of the objective
was not fully appreciated. Located on the dominant height in the area
south of Metz, Fort Driant was one of the most important elements
of the fortifications which encircled the city. It consisted of four
casemates and a central fort whose concrete walls were 7 feet thick
and whose various components were connected by a labyrinth of un-
derground tunnels. Wire obstacles and a dry moat, 60 feet wide and 30
feet deep, surrounded the over-all complex.
The infantry battalion attacked the fort under a pall of smoke which
Company D, 81st Battalion, placed on the installation and on the
observation posts behind it. By late afternoon the futility of the attack
was fully revealed, and the infantry troops were ordered to withdraw.
Plans were immediately made by the division commander for a more
systematic attack on the fortification.
Company D was to remain in support of the 11th Infantry, but its
attachment was changed from the regiment itself to the supporting
19th Field Artillery Battalion. From positions two miles north of the
town of Onville, the mortars began to register on targets in the Fort
Driant area in preparation for the coming attack. Occasionally, other
missions were fired. Targets of opportunity included mortar and
machine gun positions and harassing rounds were placed on the road
network. In turn, the mortar positions were subjected to sporadic
but effective enemy artillery fire.
On the evening of 2 October Capt. Arthur R. Marshall, the company
commander, attended several conferences with artillery officers to
settle certain details of the attack. Late that night two 2½-ton trucks
31
Cole, Lorraine Campaign, pp. 257-75. This volume contains an excellent description of the Fort
Driant action.
brought an extra 866 rounds of white phosphorus to a forward position

where they were met by jeeps and trailers from the company. A
platoon from Company C was attached to Company D for the oper-
ation.
A great deal more planning went into the 3 October attack on Fort
Driant, again made by the 2d Battalion, 11th Regiment, than was
given to the one a week earlier. Tankdozers were called on to fill in
portions of the encircling moat, and "snakes"—long pipes filled with
explosives—were brought forward to be used against the wire obstacles
in front of the fort. Again, fighter bombers attacked the fort and
corps and division artillery battered its concrete defenses. More mortar
smoke was used than in the earlier attack.
H-hour for the second Fort Driant attack was 1100. Company D
and its attached platoon immediately began the smoke screen in order
to prevent enemy observation of the assault. An irregular 15-mile-an-
hour wind made this an extremely difficult mission. At times four
distinct screens had to be maintained in order to achieve the proper
placement of smoke. Company D continued the screen for five and
one half hours, expending 1,600 rounds of white phosphorus ammuni-
tion. Despite these well-laid plans the infantry had but limited success.
One company did reach positions within the fort, but the enemy
reacted strongly, making reinforcement impossible. Again on11
October Company D's mortars maintained a 7-hour, 1,400-yard smoke
screen, this time with 1,975 rounds of white phosphorus. Elements of
the 11th Infantry fought on and around Fort Driant until the night
of 12-13 October, when a decision was reached to withdraw. No other
large screens were required in the ensuing days although target of
opportunity and harassment missions were frequent.
The high-explosive shell fired by the mortar company proved just
as ineffective against the fortifications around Metz as it had against
Siegfried Line installation at Aachen. This result was not surprising;
500 and 1,000-pound aerial bombs also bounced harmlessly off the
32
concrete and steel of the fortifications.
One of the handicaps under which the 81st Battalion operated in
front of Fort Driant was the high incidence of mortar breakage. Not
only did the weaker parts of the mortar (the recoil slides and elevating
screws) give way, but the sturdier components (the base plates and the
32
81st Bn, Metz Campaign, 18 Sep-21 Nov 44.
standards) as well. During the afternoon of 5 October, for example,

the breakage became so severe that only one mortar per platoon was
available for firing. On that day 10 base plates, 6 standards, 1 barrel,
1elevating screw, and 1 collar were damaged. Blame for this equip-
ment failure was attributed to the extreme range at which missions
were fired and to the mixed rock and shale in which the base plates
were emplaced, resulting in uneven pressures and a consequent shearing
effect. 33
Meanwhile, Company A of the 81st Battalion supported the 35th
Infantry, 90th Division, in an attack on Maizieres-les-Metz. The mor-
tars laid smoke to screen friendly attacks and to cloud enemy observa-
tion while mine fields were being removed. Other missions included
those of interdiction and targets of opportunity.
The operation against the town proceeded slowly. At one point the
infantry was content to use the situation as a realistic training ground,
each day setting up platoon and squad attack problems against a house
or two.34 Company A accomplished an extraordinary mission during
the house-to-house fighting. When an infantry battalion was held
up by a single enemy machine gun, the battalion commander, located
in a cellar across the street from the enemy position, called for 4.2-inch
mortar fire. Company A adjusted a single mortar on the machine gun;
its fourth or fifth round landed directly on the sill of the second story
window from which the enemy weapon was firing.35
Maizieres-les-Metz fell on 30 October, and the all-out drive on the
city of Metz began early in November. As at Aachen, the attack took
the form of a double envelopment, each arm of which was supported
by companies of the 81st Battalion. In this operation Company C
found itself attached to Team Cherry of the 1 0 t h Armored Division,
a most unusual arrangement. During the initial stages of the attach-
ment mine fields and roadblocks kept the advance at a relatively slow
pace, and the mortar company was able to assume its normal role.
But as the pace quickened, the problems of the supporting unit in-
creased. In order to insure constant support, the two mortar platoons
leapfrogged forward, one of them ready to fire while the other advanced
to the next appropriate position. A liaison officer stayed with the team
commander to insure prompt response to any calls for fire. This leap-
33
(1) Co A 81st Bn War Diary, 1-7 Oct 44.(2) 81st Bn, Hist Rpt, 24-30 Sep 44.
34
Cole, Lorraine Campaign, p. 278.
35
Memo for Rcd, Maj James H. Watts, 5 Mar 52.
frogging technique was abandoned when Team Cherry split in two,

and a platoon joined each of the new elements.
This employment of a mortar unit in support of an armored team
was not altogether satisfactory. The battalion commander, Lt. Col.
Jack W. Lipphardt, questioned the practice, calling attention to the
difficulties of replacing mortar parts and of resupplying ammunition
in fast-moving situations and to the relative vulnerability of mortar
equipment.36 As the battalion operations officer, who accompanied
Company C during this attachment, put it: "The mortar is a close
support weapon for the doughboy and is of much more value to the
37
infantry regiment than to a combat command."
In support of the entire Metz operation the 81st Chemical Battalion
fired 51,118 rounds of ammunition. During part of the time a shortage
of artillery shell enhanced the role of the 4.2-inch mortar.38
Mortar Parts and Their Maintenance

Maintenance of the 4.2-inch mortar, which became such a grave
problem during the autumn fighting along the Siegfried Line, had
bothered battalion commanders since the Normandy landing. In the
early days of fighting in France the chemical mortar assumed an im-
portant role as a primary means of heavy weapon support. Missions
were fired from undesirable positions at ranges far in excess of the
4,500 yards for which the mortar was designed, a circumstance which
contributed in a large way to mortar part breakage.
The 87th Chemical Battalion, during its first twenty days in Nor-
mandy, for example, expended 114 complete sets of springs and bent
100 elevating screws beyond repair.39 The failure of the springs was
not entirely the result of equipment fatigue and firing at excessive
ranges. According to Colonel Batte the difficulties experienced with
the mortar springs were "due to faulty and inferior material and
workmanship." New springs were known to stay contracted an inch
or so under normal length after only five or six rounds had been fired.
This weakness compounded the over-all vulnerability of the mortar,
36
81stBn, Hist Rpt, 5-11 Nov 44.
37
Co C 81st Cml B, Metz Campaign, 18 Sep-21 Nov 44.
38
(1) The Eighty-First Chemical Mortar Battalion, p. 60. (2) 81st Bn Hist Rpt,5 -11Nov 44.
39
Ltr, Batte to CG First Army, 25 Jun 44, sub: Replacement of Parts for 4.2-inch Mortar. CWS
314.7 Personal Ltr files, ETO.
for other parts—shock absorber slides, elevating screws, and even

standards—suffered when springs functioned improperly.40 The situa-
tion was greatly alleviated when the CWS devised new and stronger
rectangular springs.41
Mortar breakage was not confined to Normandy but continued
through the campaigns of northern France and the Rhineland. A
number of circumstances accounted for such breakage. For one thing,
in the fast-moving fighting across northern France, which was more
in the nature of pursuit than combat, mortars were almost always
called on to perform at excessive ranges.42 Another factor was the
emplacement of weapons in soft ground, a situation which plagued
the 86th Battalion, in September and October. In some cases, the
mortar crews of the 86th, after firing only two or three rounds, had
to dig through the mud to the base plate and haul it out with a jeep.43
A similar problem was the presence of hard shale rock in the soft clay
which provided uneven support for the base plate and produced a
shearing effect. The 81st Battalion particularly experienced this diffi-
culty. But as the damage was much less frequent with the new mortar
than with the old, part of the weapon mortality must have resulted
44
from equipment fatigue.
As mortar parts continued to break, battalion commanders began
to criticize the design and construction of the weapon, claiming that
it should be able to withstand the rigors of combat without an extraor-
45
dinary amount of repairs and replacement. They were especially
critical of the construction of the base plate. The standard base plate
weighed 150 pounds, a heavy item when carried by hand. In the
European theater where hand-carry was at a minimum (the weapons
and ammunition were usually conveyed by jeep trailer) it would have
been practicable to have a heavier base plate if the additional weight
would have added to its strength.
Upon the recommendation of Colonel Batte of the 87th Battalion
steps were taken to devise such a base plate. One model, constructed
40
(1) Ibid. (2) Rowan Interv,26 Sep 58.
41
(1) Ltr, Waitt to CCWS ETOUSA, 14 Aug 44. (2) Memo, Col Harry A. Kuhn for CG ASF,
7 Aug 44, sub: G-4 Per Report ETO, Quarter Ending 30 Jun 44. CWS 319.1. (3) 81st Cml Bn
AAR, 4 Nov 44 (for Oct 44), p. 4.
42
81st Cml Bn Hist Rpt, 30 Jul-5 Aug, 13-19 Aug, 10-16 Sep 44.
43
86th Cml Bn Hist, 11 Oct 44.
44
81st Cml Bn Hist Rpt, 1-7 Oct 44.
45
(1) Ltr, CCmlO ETO to CCWS, 21 Feb 45, sub: Bn Comdrs' Comments on the Cml Mortar Bn
and Its Equip. (2) 92d Cml Bn AAR, Dec 44, Battle Lessons and Conclusions.
in a Belgian steel mill, weighed 275 pounds and was 7 inches longer
and broader than the standard item. Several were issued to mortar
units of the First Army, where the reaction among the crews was
favorable. The use of this base plate resulted in fewer re-emplacements,
in better accuracy, and in less damage to other parts of the mortar.
Modifications were also made in the tie rod. Instead of welding this
part to the standard, it was secured by a loop, nut, and belt arrange-
46
ment which, by allowing greater flexibility, resulted in less breakage.
Manufacture of the base plate in Europe resulted from a search for
improvement, but other parts were produced there for the specific
purpose of relieving shortages.47 Among these items were cup forks,
elevating and traversing screws, connector rods, standards, base and
tube caps, shock absorber and traversing slides, and spring guides.
Unfortunately, no manufacturers could be found for the most critical
mortar part, the spring.48 The Seventh Army also made spare parts
for CWS equipment, preventing at one time, at least, a crisis in the
resupply of certain items. This work took place at Épinal at an army
maintenance installation which used the students and facilities of a
former vocational school.49
The shortage of mortar spare parts harassed battalion commanders
from the early days of the Normandy fighting and remained unsolved
throughout most of the European operations. The solution of this
problem was a primary mission of a CWS spare parts team which
visited the Continent during the winter of 1944-45. In its final report
the Spare Parts Team praised the work done by the chemical mainte-
nance companies on the component parts of the mortar. With in-
genuity and versatility these companies improvised, cannibalized, and
even manufactured sufficient spare parts to permit the continued
46
(1) Ltr, CmlO First Army to CCWS, 11 May 45. (2) Ltr, CmlO First Army to CCmlO
ETOUSA, 1 May 45, sub: Shipment of Strengthened ADSEC COMZ 4.2" Cml Mortar Baseplates to
Edgewood Arsenal for Test. (3) Memo, Batte for Hist Off, 4 Apr 52.
47
(1) Memo, Capt Robert O. Myers for CmlO Seventh Army, 17 Jan 45. (2) Ltr, Lt Col Ingalls
S. Bradley, Deputy CWO ADSEC COMZ to CCWO ETOUSA, 9 Jan 45, sub: Procurement of Spare
Parts for 4.2-inch Cml Mortar. (3) One of the plants at which mortars were produced was located
about twenty-five miles north of Namur, Belgium. Full advantage was taken of local skilled labor
and the mass production facilities of the plant. Ltr, CO 11th Cml Maint Co to CmlO Seventh Army,
16 Feb 45.
48
(1) OCCWS, Final Rpt, Spare Parts Team in MTO and ETO, pp 108-09. CMLHO. (a)
Ltr, Bradley to CCWS ETOUSA, 9 Jan 45, sub: Procurement of Spare Parts for 4.2-inch Cml Mor-
tars. (3) Rowan, panel comments.
49
Seventh Army Cml Sec Hist Rpt, 1-31 Dec 44.
operation of the mortar battal-

50
ions. Despite occasional criticism
about the distance between the
mortar battalions and the main-
tenance companies,51 effective liai-
son was generally maintained be-
tween these units. Seventh Army
insured prompt maintenance by
the unprecedented device of at-
taching 17-man detachments of
the chemical maintenance com-
panies directly to the mortar bat-
talions under army control. The
rest of these companies were re-
sponsible for the maintenance of
other chemical equipment, as well
as of mortar carts and ammuni- PREPARING A 4.2-lNCH MORTAR
tion, and for fourth and fifth SHELL FOR FIRING, Ardennes counter-
echelon maintenance on the mor- offensive.
tars themselves.52
The German Winter Offensive
Progress of the Allied armies, slow and costly during the fall of 1944,
came to a complete halt on 16 December as the Germans launched
their surprise winter offensive through the Ardennes. In one of the
many readjustments hurriedly made to meet the threat of the Bulge,
the 3d Chemical Battalion was shifted from the 6th to the 12th Army
53
Group. There it fought with Third Army's III Corps to relieve the
50
(1) OCCWS, Final Rpt, CWS Spare Parts Team in the MTO and ETO, p. 11. (2) The 11th
Chemical Maintenance Company (Seventh Army) developed and manufactured a pneumatic shock
absorber which aided in the reduction of breakage of mortar parts. Hist Rpt, Cml Sec Seventh Army,
1-30 Dec 44.
5l
In November, Lt. Col. Ronald LeV. Martin of the 92d Battalion requested that the maintenance
company be moved farther forward as it took a day to take damaged parts to the rear for repair. The
colonel also considered excessive the length of time taken to make the repairs. Ninth Army Cml Sec,
p. 1, Notes on Visit, 28 Nov 44, by Lt Joel B. Marangella and Capt Cooney.
52
Ltr, Maj J. J. Heffner, Office of CmlO Seventh Army, to CO 11th Cml Maint Co and CO 12th
Maint Co, 22 Dec 44, sub: Responsibilities of Seventh Army CWS Maintenance Cos. App. A, Hist
Rpt Cml Sec Hqs Seventh Army, 1 Dec-31 Dec 44).
53
The 2d, 3d, and 83d Chemical Mortar Battalions participated in the Seventh Army invasion of
southern France and eventually were assigned to the 6th Army Group. The 99th Battalion, activated
in Italy, joined the 6th Army Group in December 1944.
encircled forces at Bastogne. Mortar companies initially were attached

to 2 infantry divisions, an armored division, and a cavalry squadron.
During December units of the battalion operated under 2 armies, 2
corps, 6 infantry divisions, and a cavalry group. They expended
17,499 rounds of ammunition and, surprisingly enough, suffered no
casualties.54
Farther to the north the 86th Chemical Battalion supported V Corps
in the First Army sector. There it was touch and go. The enemy had
broken through a neighboring unit and had then cut into the V Corps
sector. German paratroopers landed in the corps rear area intent on
the disruption of communications and the seizure of installations.
86th Battalion headquarters organized eight patrols to comb the area
for these enemy troops. The patrols found no paratroopers, but they
did come across a house with a cache of enemy equipment and weapons.
The rear area of Company D was overrun during the confusion of
the breakthrough, and 14 of its men were listed as missing in action.
Company C of the 86th lay in the direct path of the German drive.
Never had the unit experienced such a critical situation; never had its
efficiency, morale, discipline, and resourcefulness been so tested. Units
which had protected the mortar company suddenly turned to it for
protection. Mortar fire halted enemy advances and covered friendly
movements; mortarmen maintained communications for and with
isolated and threatened units and stayed at their guns while these units
withdrew to safety. One mission fired on 19 December enabled a hard-
pressed infantry company to withdraw safely from a position that had
become untenable. The mortarmen placed smoke and high-explosive
shell in a narrow gap which separated the infantry unit from the enemy
and continued to fire while all other units passed to the rear. Then
they, themselves, withdrew. At times during this period division artil-
lery, armor, and infantry withdrew under Company C's protective
fire—fire which "was largely responsible for holding up the enemy
advance and almost solely responsible for the safe manner in which
these withdrawals, were effected.55
During the first week of the Ardennes offensive the 86th Battalion
expended 7,380 rounds of ammunition. However, the service given
by the battalion could not be measured in rounds. Its value during
54
(1) Hist, Hqs 3d Cml Bn, 25 Dec 44, p. 20. (2) 3d Cml Bn Rpt of Opns, 1-31 Dec 44, p. 2.
Both in 3d Cml Bn History, Dec 44.
55
86th Cml Bn Hist, 17-23 Dec 44, p. 4.
those trying days can be appreciated only with the knowledge that the
4.2-inch mortar was an important source of artillery-type fire—fire
which enabled the infantry in its sector to gain some order out of the
chaos caused by the German attack.
During December the mortar battalions began to reorganize under
new tables of organization and equipment. Dated 29 September, the
revised TOE triangularized the battalion by eliminating Company D.
This change had long been advocated by CWS officers, although there
had been a recent move to retain the fourth company as a replacement
56
and training unit. The designation of the three companies was
changed from "weapons" to "mortar." Each had 3 platoons of 4 mor-
tars, or a total of 36 for a battalion; the previous organization provided
for 4 companies, each with 2 platoons of 6 mortars, or a total of 48.
Battalion commanders had long complained of insufficient men; now,
despite the reduction in the number of weapons, battalion strength rose
from 622 to 672. What formerly had been the headquarters detach-
ment with 63 men was changed to a headquarters company with 155.
The inclusion of nine 1½-ton trucks in the new TOE provided a
slight increase in the amount of organic transportation.
All of the chemical mortar battalions (they previously had been
designated "chemical battalions, motorized") did not convert to the
new organization immediately but did so throughout the winter of
1944-45 and the following spring, as they enjoyed an infrequent relief
from front-line activity. The 2d and 92d, for example, converted in
December, the 91st in January, and the 87th in May.
Mortar Shell Malfunctions
The period of the Ardennes counteroffensive saw the start of a series

of mortar shell malfunctions which were to plague the battalions for
most of the winter of 1944-45. These malfunctions were of two types:
barrel bursts, in which the round prematurely exploded within the
barrel; and muzzle bursts, in which the round exploded after leaving
the barrel but still within the vicinity of the mortar emplacement.
In December 1944 ETOUSA impounded several lots of chemical
mortar ammunition suspected of containing faulty shells. Periodically
thereafter, as muzzle and barrel bursts occurred, other ammunition
56
(1) CM-OUT 19799, 28 Mar 44. (2) CM-OUT 8007, 19 Mar 44. (3) 12th Army Group
Immediate Rpt 39, Batte Interv. (4) St. John, Chemical Opns in France.
was withdrawn from supply channels. By the middle of January 1945

a combined list of restricted ammunition included 90 percent of the
available supply. Sometimes the pressure of the tactical situation forced
the release of suspected ammunition. In these cases the mortar crews
took particular precautions to minimize danger; some chemical mortar
battalions fired their weapons with the use of lanyards and others built
sandbag emplacements along side of the mortars.57
A conference of mortar battalion commanders of both the 12th
and 6th Army Groups was held in January in the office of General
Rowan, with defective 4.2-inch mortar shell as one of the main topics
of discussion. Consensus was that most of the blame for malfunctions
was attributable to the mortar fuze. One solution initiated by Seventh
Army was the substitution of an artillery fuze for the suspected CWS
item. Test firing of shells with this alteration proved successful, and
30,000 of these fuzes were obtained for the conversion of an equal
number of impounded mortar shells. A difference in threads made the
substitution of fuzes no easy job. One big advantage resulted from the
new combination; the artillery fuze included a delayed action setting
(not found in the CWS M3) which had long been sought by chemical
units for use against buildings, pillboxes, and other structures.58
Mortar shell misfires reached a peak in January 1945. In one 10-day
period two mortar battalions attached to First Army experienced a
total of five barrel or muzzle bursts resulting in serious injury to four
men. These accidents happened despite careful checking and the
observance of precautionary measures. One serious result of these
malfunctions was that mortar crews were beginning to show fear of
their weapon.59
Concern for this serious situation in the theater naturally extended
to the Office of the Chief, CWS, in Washington. The few zone of
interior malfunctions had been thoroughly investigated and were
found to have been caused in practically every case by a faulty fuze.
The increase of misfires overseas prompted General Porter in January
1945 to send to Europe an investigating mission headed by General
Bullene. A definite correlation between extreme cold weather and
57
(1) Seventh Army Cml Sec Hist Rpt, 1-31 Jan 44, 25 Feb 45, p. 4. (2) OCCWS Rpt of Mal-
function of the 4.2" Cml Mortar Ammunition, Their Cause, Effect and Measures Taken to Correct
Deficiencies (hereafter cited as Rpt of Malfunctions), 12 Aug 46, VIII, 75.
58
Seventh Army Cml Sec Hist Rpt, 1-31 Jan 45; 1-28 Feb 45.
59
Rpt on Malfunctions, VIII, 55.
malfunctions, particularly barrel bursts, had been established by tests

in the zone of interior. The experience in Europe substantiated these
findings, as there were no more barrel bursts after 29 January when
the cold spell ended. The Bullene mission attributed the muzzle bursts,
which were not related to the temperature, to a series of weaknesses
and defects in the mortar fuze. Corrective measures were recommended
in all cases, some of which had been anticipated by the zone of interior
investigations.
Actually, the over-all malfunction record of 4.2-inch mortar ammu-
nition during World War II was not bad. Of the approximately four
million rounds expended both in training and in combat a total of
63 exploded prematurely, causing the death of 38 and the injury of
127 American soldiers. This averaged 1.58 premature rounds in every
60
100,000 fired.
The Final Drive
By the end of January 1945 the Allies had regained the ground lost
during the enemy's Ardennes offensive. In February the 12th Army
Group prepared for attack along the Roer and Sauer Rivers, an attack
whose impetus would carry to the Rhine. This latter obstacle, the
last great defensive barrier for the enemy, was surmounted in March.
After that, victory was but a matter of time.
Much of the fighting of February and March involved river cross-
ings. The Roer, the Erft, the Sauer, the Moselle, the Rhine—these
were the larger rivers which blocked the American forces in their
drive to the east. The chemical mortar battalions, by both smoke and
high explosive missions, provided valuable support in this series of
important operations.
One of the most spectacular smoke operations in Europe involving
chemical mortar battalions was staged in the Third Army sector during
the XII Corps attack across the Sauer and Our Rivers. This attack,
which began on 7 February 1945, was supported by the 91st Chemical
60
Rpt of Malfunctions, Abstract, pp. I-II. (2) See Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, from Labora-
tory to Field, Chapter XV, for more on mortar shell malfunction.
Mortar Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Roy W. Muth.61 Companies

B and C fired for regiments of the 5th Division; Company D supported
the 417th Infantry, 76th Division, attached to the 5th Division for
the operation; and the two platoons of Company A supported, respec-
tively, the 905th and 314th Field Artillery Battalions of the 80th
Division.
These mortar units moved to positions to the west and south of the
Our-Sauer Rivers line several days before the attack was to begin.62
This movement in itself was difficult. The roads, heavy with traffic in
support of the impending attack, were subject to enemy fire from the
heights east of the rivers. The positions of Company D were in the
town of Echternach on the south bank of the Sauer, an area which
had not been occupied in strength by American forces because the
commanding ground just across the river was studded with pillboxes
of the Siegfried Line. This fact was driven home when the mortar
officers who. reconnoitered Echternach quickly attracted enemy ma-
chine gun fire. The company moved into the town, two vehicles at a
time, under the cover of darkness and with chains and reflectors re-
moved from the jeeps and trucks.
Company B, in support of the 1 0 t h Infantry, had less trouble getting
to its attack position despite the traffic-clogged roads leading to the
river. Four hours after receiving march orders on the morning of
5 February, the platoons of the unit traveled ten miles and set up
their mortars in the town of Berdorf. Company C supported the
11th Infantry also from positions near Berdorf. Anticipating heavy
enemy artillery opposition, the unit placed its switchboard and fire
direction centers near the mortars to reduce the expected difficulty in
keeping wire communications intact.
The XII Corps met strong resistance along the Our and the Sauer.
The Germans, ensconced in the strong defenses on the heights on the
east, dominated the valley. The swift-moving rivers were additional
61
The 91st Battalion was committed to action in December 1944, a month which saw the beginning
of a steady influx of new mortar battalions. By the end of the war the 12th Army Group had a
total of twelve, the number previously decided upon for the European theater. In addition to those
units already mentioned in the text, the following chemical mortar battalions saw action with the
12th Army Group: the 89th, commanded by Lt. Col. Donald E. Yanka; the 90th, Lt. Col. Edgar V. H.
Bell; the 93d, Lt. Col. Jacquard Rothschild; the 94th, Lt. Col Benjamin D. Williams, Jr.; the 95th,
Lt. Col. Earl L. Shepherd; the 96th, Lt. Col. Farleigh E. Smith; and the 97th, Lt. Col. Edwin S. S.
Hays, Jr. The 6th Army Group had four battalions.
62
The Our River branched off from the Sauer River about ten miles or so below the town of
Echternach, making the two, in effect, a continuous waterway.
obstacles. Given the excellent German observation and the relative

impregnability of his positions, it is understandable that smoke missions
assumed a great importance in the XII Corps operation.
All four of the companies fired screening missions for the American
attack. The 1 0 t h Infantry found the going exceedingly rough. On
the second day of the attack Company B maintained two major
screens to obscure enemy observation, one parallel to the front and
one perpendicular to it. In addition, one of the platoons successfully
blanketed an enemy observation post and placed fire on several troop
concentrations. In all, 2,357 rounds of WP were fired that day. Oper-
ations were impeded by abnormal wind conditions which caused the
smoke to rise vertically, a phenomenon called "pillaring." On the fol-
lowing day the company expended 2,232 rounds of white phosphorus
on a 9-hour smoke screen. At one point the screen was lifted and the
effectiveness of smoke was dramatically demonstrated as enemy artillery
and machine guns opened fire on American troops. The screen was
resumed at once, and the enemy activity abruptly ceased. During the
two days action just described the 1st Platoon alone expended 3,287
rounds of white phosphorus, or roughly 4½ tons.
One platoon of the smoke generator company attached to corps
supported the Echternach crossing. After a short period of operation
the smoke troops claimed that twelve generators were out of order
and their unit commander sent the equipment back to a maintenance
company for repair. There the generators were examined by Colonel
Cottingham who found all but one to be in perfect operating condition.
And the exception was in need of very minor adjustment. Apparently,
the lack of training, discipline, and leadership prompted the smoke
troops to take this action in an effort to be relieved from front-line
duty. At Bollendorf, to the west, smoke generator troops effectively
established a curtain between the crossing site and the high ground to
the northwest from which the Germans had excellent observation.63
Among the problems confronting the 91st Battalion during the
Sauer-Our operation was the dirty ammunition with which the bat-
talion was supplied. During the two days of intense firing reported
above, all available officers and men, from cook to company commander,
63
(1) Pritchard, Smoke Generator Opns in MTO and ETO, p. 140. (2) According to Colonel
Cottingham, XII Corps, after Echternach, requested Third Army to see to it that the smoke company
not be attached to it in future operations until the company had proper training and leadership. Cot-
tingham Interv, 17 Dec 56.
were compelled to assist in cleaning the rounds and preparing them for
firing. Communication was likewise a problem. The wire and radio
communication of a platoon of A Company, for example, was also
used by two engineer units and the medical detachment and heavy
mortar platoon of an infantry battalion. Even the matter of feeding
the men proved difficult. The road leading into Echternach was a
gantlet that had to be run daily by the mess personnel of Company D.
Pfc. Richard Stubblefield had two jeep tires shot out from under him
by shell fragments during one such mission, but continued to take
hot food to the men.
As evidence of the severity of fighting against the obstacles of the
Sauer and Our Rivers and the Siegfried Line, the companies of the 91st
fired for five days from their initial positions. During this period units
of the battalion completed twenty-four smoke missions ranging in
duration from thirty minutes to nine hours and requiring almost
10,000 rounds of shell.
In another February operation the 87th Battalion supported VII
Corps in the First Army attack across the Roer River in the vicinity
of Düren. Early in the month the battalion's four mortar companies,
two attached to the 8th Division and two to the 1O4th, moved into firing
positions on the west side of the river. Here they waited for two weeks.
The Germans, before relinquishing control of the area, destroyed the
sluice valves of the Roer River dams. The raging waters of the river
rose five feet, forcing postponement of the attack until 23 February.
The period of waiting was not idly spent by the mortar companies.
Some fired on targets of opportunity and others interdicted road junc-
tions. Company D, during the last days before the attack, set up feint
smoke screens in the hope that the enemy would be less apprehensive
when screens appeared for the actual crossing. On the night before
the attack the company blanketed the eastern bank of the Roer to
cover four patrols sent out to clear mines from the far side of the river.
Smoke was necessary because of the bright moonlight.
Supporting fire for the First Army attack began early on the
morning of 23 February. After the assault began the mortar companies
laid smoke screens to cover the infantry in its drive across the river.
One company fired four smoke screens which progressively covered
an attacking battalion, enabling it to cross the river and an expanse
of flat terrain with negligible casualties. Again moonlight made this
ROER RIVER BRIDGE BEHIND A SMOKE SCREEN
concealment necessary. Company C for over fifteen hours maintained

a continuous 1,500-yard screen which blocked enemy observation from
the high ground near Düren and allowed ferrying and bridge con-
struction operations to continue without the hazard of observed artil-
lery fire. On this first day alone the 87th Mortar Battalion fired over
4,000 rounds of ammunition.
The VII Corps, spearheading the First Army's advance to the Rhine,
eliminated all enemy resistance in its zone on the west side of the river
by 9 March. On the following day the 87th Battalion received word
that it was to be sent from the First to the Seventh Army, which on
15 March was to initiate a drive through the imporant Saar-Palatinate
triangle.64 This operation was to involve the penetration of the Sieg-
64
The 87th Battalion made this move as a unit, the first time it had assembled or moved as a batta-
lion entity since it had left England. The 162-vehicle convoy covered the 317 miles and was in
position with mortars ready to fire in 33 hours. Only 3 vehicles failed to complete the move because
of mechanical failures, (1) 87th Cml Bn Rcd of Events, 13-14 Mar 45. (2) Ltr, Batte to Hist Off,
25 Jul 60.
fried Line and the drive to and the ultimate crossing of the Rhine.
Twice before the 87th had supported divisions which penetrated the
Siegfried Line—near Aachen in September 1944 and near Malmédy
in February 1945. And, as before, the battalion supported a vanguard
corps, this time the XV. By 23 March divisions of the corps had pene-
trated the Siegfried Line and were ready for the Rhine crossing. All
four companies of the 87th Battalion were in support of the3d
Division which was to cross in the vicinity of Worms. Intense artillery
and mortar preparations preceded the assault across the 1,000-foot-wide
river.
Companies A and B consolidated their fire in support of the 7th
Infantry. Between 0200 and 0315 on26 March they fired twenty-three
concentrations entailing 1,200 rounds of ammunition. Thereafter
various targets of opportunity—machine guns, self-propelled guns,
mortars—were hit by the 4.2-inch mortars. At dawn the combined
companies laid two 10-hour screens (600 and 2,200 yards) which
concealed bridge-building operations from direct enemy observation.
Companies A and B expended 3,615 rounds of WP and 462 rounds of
65
HE during the first day of the attack. The effectiveness of the fire
was made a matter of record by the operations officer of the 3d Division.
The Ninth Army, north of First Army and still under control of
21 Army Group, crossed the Rhine in an area just north of the Ruhr
Valley. The army attack was concentrated on the XVI Corps front,
with another corps poised to exploit initial successes, and a third lending
support by fire and demonstration. In keeping with the decision
temporarily to bypass the great Ruhr industrial area, XVI Corps
attacked with an exposed right flank. To prevent enemy observation
from the many potential observation posts in the Ruhr Valley, Ninth
Army called for a 2-mile smoke screen along its exposed right flank.
The XVI Corps attacked with two divisions abreast, the 30th on the
left and the 79th on the right. The 89th Chemical Mortar Battalion,
Colonel Yanka commanding, supported the 79th Division.66 Colonel
Yanka initially divided his battalion into two parts, one for each of
the attacking regiments of the 79th. Company A, with the 3d Platoon
of Company B attached, supported the 313th Infantry on the division's
right; Company C, augmented by the other two platoons of Company
65
Company C was not called upon for fire on26 March and Company D expended only 457 rounds.
Both units crossed the river on the first day.
66
The 92d Battalion was attached to the 30th Division.
ARTIFICIAL HAZE OBSCURES VEHICLES CROSSING THE RHINE
B, fired for the 315th Infantry on the left. These inflated companies
reported to their respective regiments on 12 March. As this mortar
battalion was without experience in river crossings, forward observer
teams, two of which were to cross with the assault elements, joined the
infantry for specialized training.
The 79th Division began to cross the Rhine in the Milchplatz-Orsoy
area at 0300 on 24 March. Companies A and C of the 89th Chemical
Mortar Battalion joined artillery units in pre-H-hour preparations and
then, for seventy-five minutes after the attack began, fired prearranged
concentrations. Upon completion of the preparatory fire the platoons
of B Company reverted to company control. At 0600 Company A,
firing from Orsoy, began its 3,500-yard screen along the division's
right flank. Each mortar fired a volley of fifteen rounds to establish
the screen and then fired a round every fifteen seconds to maintain it.
This rate was found to be excessive and was reduced to an average of
one shell per mortar per minute. At times the screen thinned, and
additional rounds were fired. The screen was maintained until dark.
One mortar was reserved for any targets of opportunity reported by

the forward observers. Late in the day Company C crossed the river
as did the first platoon of Company B, now in support of the 314th
Infantry. Company A remained in position.67
Several problems arose during the first day. The soil gave way under
rapid fire, causing frequent re-emplacement of base plates. The heavy
rate of fire also caused considerable damage to mortar parts. Over-
heated barrels caused premature ignitions; in one instance a barrel
became so hot that it bent. Shock absorber mechanisms broke down,
base cap pins sheared, and locking forks broke or bent. On the other
hand, tie rods and standards held up well.
On the morning of D plus 1 (25 March) heavy enemy fire from
the right hastened the resumption of the flanking smoke screen. During
that day the length of the screen was reduced by 700 yards because
of the high rate of attrition of mortar parts. The next afternoon Capt.
Clyde H. Westbrook, commander of Company A, reconnoitered the
east bank of the Rhine for new mortar positions. That night the
company crossed the river on Alligators and floating bridge sections
and continued the smoke screen at dawn the next day. On 27 March
the tactical situation was such that the use of smoke on the right flank
was no longer required.68
With the Rhine behind them the Allies pushed deeper into German
territory, and although there was some bitter resistance left in the
enemy, it was to be only sporadic. Chemical mortar battalions accom-
panied the armies in their advance but much of the time, as in northern
France, the rapid movement eliminated the need for their employment.
And so, as the European war came to an end, some of these battalions
were already serving in nonoperational and occupational capacities.
This was as it should have been; they had done their measure of fighting
and had acquitted themselves well.
67
Part of the 74th Smoke Generator Company supported the 315th Infantry at Milchplatz. There
were no generators at Orsoy until26 March. See above, Chapter IX, for details of smoke generator
activities during the Rhine crossing.
68
(1) Notes of Conf Held at Hist Off, 1 March 50, sub: 89th Cml Bn and the Rhine Crossing, (1)
89th Cml Mortar Bn History, 24 Mar 45.
CHAPTERXIII
The Chemical Mortar in the Pacific

The employment of chemical mortar units in the Pacific differed
considerably from that in the Mediterranean and European theaters.
With the halt of the general Japanese advance at Guadalcanal, Allied
forces faced the prospect of subjugating or bypassing the many island
groups that lay between them and Japan. Because some of the islands
were not very large certain of the campaigns were to be fought by
small task forces, with a single mortar platoon attached to a regimental
combat team. The islands also dictated that there would be a great
many amphibious operations in which the 4.2-inch mortar, mounted
on landing craft, was gradually to assume an important role. In many
cases the advancing Allies were confronted by thick jungle growth
which hindered the use of artillery and enhanced the value of the
more mobile 4.2-inch mortar. This terrain, consisting of dense vege-
tation broken only by an occasional path, created problems of observa-
tion and transportation even for chemical mortar units. The climate
of the Pacific added to the difficulties of mortar operations; the heavy
rain, intense heat, and high humidity of the tropics made it difficult
to insure effective employment of the mortar and proper maintenance
of the weapon and its ammunition.
South Pacific Area

The initial combat employment of chemical mortar units in the
war against Japan took place in September 1943 during the fight for
New Georgia in the South Pacific Area.1 It must be re-emphasized
that the CWS did not receive authorization for the high explosive
mission for 4.2-inch mortars until 19 March 1943, nearly seven months
1
The South Pacific Area lay south of the Equator, east of longitude 159° east, and west of longitude
110° west. It was a vast expanse and included more than one million square miles of ocean and
thousands of islands, among them New Zealand, New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, and the Santa
Cruz, Fiji, Samoan, Tongan, Cook, and Society Island.
THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE PACIFIC 493
after U.S. forces first landed on Guadalcanal. For the Allies the
Guadalcanal operation was the beginning of the road back. More
immediately it had the mission of blunting the Japanese advance and
2
protecting the vital lifeline between Australia and the United States.
With Guadalcanal secured, American forces looked northwest up the
Solomon Island chain that led to New Britain and the important
Japanese base at Rabaul. The Russell Islands fell first; then came the
New Georgia campaign with its focal point at Munda, the site of an
enemy airfield. The attack on the island of New Georgia began on
2 July 1943.
The 82nd Mortar Battalion was the first and only battalion in the
South Pacific Area. Under command of Lt. Col. William H. Shimonek,
the unit arrived at New Caledonia on 19 July 1943, too late to see
action in the Munda operation. After a few weeks of training on
Guadalcanal, elements of the 82d Battalion entered the mopping-up
operation on Arundel and Kolombangara Islands in the New Georgia
group. Assigned to XIV Corps and attached to the 43d Infantry Divi-
sion, a platoon of B Company landed on what was to be known as
Mortar Island in the Stima Lagoon area. This platoon fired its first
combat rounds on the morning of 10 September when, under control
of the division artillery, it delivered harassing and interdictory fire
against the enemy, some of it on enemy barges operating between Ko-
lombangara and Sagekarasa Islands.3
Meanwhile, in close support of the 27th Infantry, 25th Division,
another platoon of the mortar battalion, moved up to Bamboe Penin-
sula on Arundel Island. The men used jeeps, hand carry, and a variety
of boats to negotiate the difficult terrain. Once in position the mortars
fired at enemy barges and troops. Despite the extreme range mortar
fire destroyed three barges, causing the loss of enemy troops and sup-
plies. From 25 September to 4 October the mortars placed cross-
channel fire on the airfield on Kolombangara Island and on enemy ship-
ping in the narrow waters between the islands.
These initial mortar operations were accompanied by certain prob-
lems, notably those involving transportation and supply. Major Mc-
2
For details on the Guadalcanal operation, see Miller, Guadalcanal: The first Offensive.
3
Unless otherwise noted, material for this section was based on the after action reports and unit files
of the 82d Chemical Mortar Battalion and supported units. The latter include XIV Corps, 43d, 37th
and 25th Divisions, 182d and 24th RCT's, and 135th Field Artillery Battalion. These records may be
found in the Sixth Army Rcds, CMLHO. Military Intelligence Division, War Department, World
War II, A Chronology, and CWS Theater of Operations Letters, 7, 10, 18, 19, have also been used.
Kaig, chemical officer of the 25th Division, improvised methods to

provide the transportation and manpower necessary to resupply mortar
units. Shipped from Guadalcanal to New Georgia by LST and from
New Georgia to the northern end of Arundel Island by LCT (landing
craft, tank), the ammunition was then transferred by LCM's to a
battalion dump at the west end of Sagekarasa Island. From there
engineer ponton boats took the ammunition across a lagoon to the mor-
4
tar platoon's unloading points at the other end of the island.
Although infantry commanders were unfamiliar with the capabili-
ties and limitations of the mortar, most troops recognized the satis-
factory performance of both the mortar crews and the weapon. And it
was the opinion of a prisoner of war that the Japanese feared mortar
barrages more than those of the artillery. One criticism by supported
units was the great number of tree bursts which occurred in the heavy
jungle canopy and which resulted from a lack of a delayed action fuze.5
The 82d Battalion next saw action on Bougainville, the largest of the
Solomon group. Operations on this island began on the first day of
November 1943 when the 3d Marine Division spearheaded the assault
landings of the I Marine Amphibious Corps, with the 37th Infantry
Division landing a week later. The XIV Army Corps, composed of
the 37th and Americal Divisions, took over from the marines on 15
December. The corps commander, Maj. Gen. Oscar W. Griswold, in-
dicated his desire to employ chemical mortar units in place of corps
artillery in situations where the use of the latter was impracticable.
During and after the all-out enemy counterattacks on the American
perimeter around Empress Augusta Bay in March 1944, infantry divi-
sions attached mortar platoons to regiments or battalions. Control of
the weapon varied. In the Americal Division mortar units operated
directly under the supported infantry organizations, while in the 37th
Division the mortarmen received firing instructions through the fire
direction center of the artillery battalion to which they were attached.
Both methods were satisfactory, but direct contact with the supported
infantry seemed preferable since it allowed greater responsiveness dur-
ing changing situations and provided closer liaison with responsible
4
Ltr, Col McKaig to Hist Off, 27 Dec 50.
(1)
5
Ltr, Dir Intell ASF to Distr, 21 Jan 44, sub: Opns Against Treasury Island and Munda.
CWS 319.1-Treasury Island. (2) Ltr, CO Co B 82d Cml Bn to CCWS, 2 Oct 43. (3) 43d Inf Div
Rpt of Opns During Arundel Campaign (29 Aug-23 Sep 43).
commanders.6 Heavy barrage missions were normally co-ordinated

with corps and division artillery.
The jungle foliage on Bougainville was so thick that forward ob-
servers, compelled to employ sound-sensing methods of observation,
were often located only 30 yards from the enemy and directed fire to
within 20 yards of their own observation post and of the front lines.
During the height of one enemy attack, the mortars placed smoke
shell directly in front of enemy forward elements while troops of the
182d Infantry, only 30 yards away, withdrew without casualties. This
was one of the few uses of WP on Bougainville, since the smoke further
reduced the jungle's limited visibility.
Infantry commanders soon recognized that the mortars could en-
gage, with a weight of shell comparable to that of 105-mm. artillery,
many targets which could not be reached by the 105's and 155's. To
insure adequate fire coverage of the entire 13-mile perimeter, thirty
mortar positions were established which were linked together by more
than 150 miles of communications wire. The necessity for this unusual
number of gun positions was well demonstrated during one 4-day
period in March by simultaneous requests from the 129th, 145th, and
182d Infantry for supporting fire from the platoons of Company A.
Daily battalion expenditure of mortar shell on Bougainville during
March was extremely heavy; during the last three weeks of the month
Company A alone expended 20,250 rounds in defense of a hill held by
elements of the Americal Division. In an 11 March mission Companies
A and D massed fire with 75-mm. and 105-mm. howitzers and with
60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars in a preparation which helped repel an
enemy attack. Twelve days later Companies C and D joined with seven
artillery battalions and two cannon companies in the heaviest general
supporting fire laid down in the South Pacific fighting.
Field artillery officers were impressed by the amount of effective
fire produced by a chemical mortar company as compared to that of
an artillery unit. Maj. John D. Tolman, who commanded the 82d
Chemical Mortar Battalion from 26 April until the close of the Luzon
Campaign, disclosed that infantry commanders felt they could not
"properly accomplish [their] mission [without] 4.2-inch mortar sup-
6
XIV Corps, Extracts, Rpt on Lessons Learned in Bougainville Opn (hereafter cited as XIV Corps,
Extracts, Rpt on Bougainville), p. 3. CMLHO.
port." 7 The 37th Division considered the 4.2-inch mortar "a powerful
and devastating supplement to the division's artillery and mortar
fires," and commanders of the Americal Division, while recommending
reduction of the minimum range to increase the weapon's flexibility,
commented on the effectiveness of the chemical mortar in perimeter
8
defense and for fire on reverse slopes. Captured Japanese documents
revealed the enemy's fear of the weapon; enemy artillery was instructed
9
to concentrate on American mortars.
Infantry and chemical battalion commanders on Bougainville in-
dicated that they were unfamiliar with each other's organization,
tactics, and procedures and recognized the need for joint unit training.
This reciprocal unfamiliarity continued to be a problem whenever a
mortar unit was committed for its first engagement or a division had
a chemical mortar unit attached to it for the first time.10
Beginning at Bougainville securing mortar crews against enemy in-
filtrations became a serious problem, particularly during night mis-
sions. Because of the absence of infantry perimeter guards and the
frequency of enemy infiltrations, the battalion provided for day and
night shifts both at the gun positions and at forward observation posts.
Single and double apron fences surrounded emplacements. Automatic
rifles and grenades were the chief means of repulsing Japanese attempts
to overrun mortar positions.
The relatively static nature of the battle for the perimeter around
Empress Augusta Bay eased the problem of maintenance. On the coral
rock soil of Arundel, Company B had broken five base plates, bent five
or six tie rods, and cracked several barrel cups and base plate spades.
On Bougainville, despite the heavy and continuous fire, the softer
ground and the fact that time was available to construct adequate em-
placements resulted in a minimum of damage to mortar parts. The tor-
rential rains, high humidity, and intense heat of South Pacific islands
created serious problems both in the maintenance of mortar shell and its
7
(1) Ltr, CO 82d Cml Mortar Bn to ACCWS for Field Opns, 22 Apr 44, p. 4. (2) CWS TofO
Ltr No. 19, 24 Oct 44, p. 38.
8
(1) Ltr, CG 37th Div to CO 82d Cml Mortar Bn, 20 Apr 44, sub: Commendation, (1) XIV
Corps, Extracts, Rpt on Bougainville, pp. 2, 9,
9
(1) Ltr, CO 82d Cml Mortar Bn to ACCWS for Field Opns, 22 Apr 44 (2) TofO Ltr No. 15,
21 Jun 44, pp. 3-4.
10
(1) 37th Div AAR Bougainville, 8 Nov 43-30 Apr 44, p. 59. (2) Lt. Col. Orbie Bostick (for-
merly CmlO SOPAC), "Twenty-one Months in the South Pacific," Chemical Warfare Bulletin, vol.
29, No. 8 (December, 1943—January, 1944).
components. During the heaviest downpours, firing ceased because

excessive water in the barrel resulted in "poop-outs." The extreme heat
melted the filling of white phosphorus shells, creating a lateral void
for those rounds stored in a horizontal position. These rounds tumbled
badly when fired. A lack of adequate waterproofing combined with
dampness caused the malfunction of cartridges and propellants and
corrosion of fuzes while shells were in storage. In an attempt to mini-
mize these difficulties on Bougainville mortarmen placed their am-
munition dump, featured by sheltered racks and a double-decked roof,
as far inland as possible. Even then ammunition had to be checked and
rechecked, particularly the fuzes. Although heat, rain, and dampness
continued to be a problem throughout operations in the South and
Southwest Pacific, the situation improved in late 1944 with the intro-
duction of metallic containers for propellants and cartridges.
At least one difficulty with mortar shells was not brought on by the
weather. This was the occasional absence of the steel balls which pre-
vented the premature arming of the fuze. Despite close inspection
of mortar ammunition short rounds and premature bursts resulted in
11
several casualties to both mortarmen and infantry.
Southwest Pacific Area

New Guinea
Early in 1943 the Chemical Warfare Service,12 the War Department,
and Southwest Pacific Area headquarters considered the possibility of
shipping chemical mortar units to the Southwest Pacific.13 The area's
demand for these units grew more insistent after a weapons demonstra-
tion held in October 1943. At the demonstration General Krueger,
Commanding General, Sixth Army, told Maj. Gen. William H. Gill,
Commanding General, 32d Infantry Division, that the 4.2-inch chemi-
cal mortar was the weapon needed to clean the enemy out of tenaciously
11
(1) Ltr, CG USAFISPA to CCWS, 10 Apr 44, sub: Faulty 4.2 Cml Mortar Shell Fuzes. CWS
314.7 Unit Files. CMLHO. (2) Rad CM-OUT 24933, 19 Apr 44. (3) Rad CM-IN 14685,
20 Apr 44. (4) The 82d remained on Bougainville until December 1944, when it sailed for Luzon.
82d Cml Mort Bn, Hist Data Cards.
12
References used for this section, unless otherwise noted, include: (1) Unit Rcds, 98th Cml Mortar
Bn (CMLHO); (2) Sixth Army AAR's (Sixth Army Rcds, ORB, CMLHO).
(1) Ltr, CmlO USASOS to ExecO OCCWS, 18 Jan 43. (2) Personal Ltr, CmlO I Corps to
13
ACCWS for Field Opns,26 Jan 43. (3) Ltr, ACCWS for Field Opns to Chief OPD WDGS, 11 Mar
43, no sub. All three in CMLHO.
held positions.14 Several other high-ranking commanders who had

participated in the Buna campaign in Papua, where mortar battalions
had not been available, echoed this opinion. They suggested that a
chemical mortar battalion be made a part of army troops for attach-
15
ment to corps and divisions.
In April 1944 General MacArthur launched a new offensive along the
northern coast of New Guinea in a series of operations which, in col-
laboration with Admiral Nimitz' drive through the Central Pacific,
would place American forces in a position to retake the Philippine Is-
lands. On 22 April MacArthur's initial objectives, Hollandia and
Aitape, were attacked by I Corps operating as RECKLESS Task Force.16
The elements of RECKLESS Task Force had chemical mortar support
for the Hollandia operation, but this support came from a rather odd
source. Because of a shortage of mortar units in the zone of interior the
War Department in February 1944 authorized the SWPA to convert
a tank destroyer battalion to a chemical mortar battalion at the earliest
practicable date. Almost immediately the theater reorganized the 641st
Tank Destroyer Battalion which, after a brief period of training, par-
ticipated in the Hollandia operation, under command of Lt. Col.
Alexander Batlin. But redesignation waited until June 1944, producing
the anomalous situation of a so-called tank destroyer unit firing 4.2-
inch chemical mortars.17
The mortars played an extremely minor role at Hollandia, the entire
four companies firing less than 350 rounds during about one week in
the line. At the request of a regimental commander one company
dragged a single mortar and 120 shells on carts for twelve miles along
a narrow, muddy mountain trail, across a 2,000-foot ridge, through
swamps, and over three rivers—only to arrive too late to support the
fight for Hollandia Airdome. It was fortunate that expenditures were
low because ammunition was limited. On the night of 23 April enemy
planes bombed the beachhead dumps at Humboldt Bay destroying 6,550
14
Memo, ACmlO Sixth Army for CmlO ALAMO Force, 8 Oct 43. 300.6—Misc Memos and Ltrs,
Sixth Army Rcds.
15
Excerpt from AGF Bd Rpt on SWPA, No. 31, 25 Feb 44. CMLHO.
16
For details of the strategic decisions and tactical aspects of these operations along New Guinea's
northern coast, see Smith, Approach to the Philippines.
17
(1) Rad, CM-IN 8408, 12 Feb 44. (2) Ltr, AG to CINCSWPA, 25 Feb 44, sub: Reorgn and
Redesignation of 64151 Tank Destroyer Bn. (3) CM-IN O238Z, Jul 44.
rounds of 4.2-inch mortar shell, or about 78 percent of the available

18
supply.
Subsequent New Guinea operations utilized but one mortar com-
pany at a time. Company B of the 98th, commanded by 1st Lt. Vernon
E. Woebbeking and attached to the 191st Field Artillery Group, suc-
cessively supported the 163d, 158th, and 20th Infantry Regiments dur-
ing the Wakde Islands-Maifin Bay fighting which took place in May
1944. During the assault phase of this operation, the LCM's carrying
the 4.2-inch shell grounded over fifty yards from the beach and the
mortar crews had to carry their cargo through chest-deep water.19
During the cross-channel firing on the Wakde group the chemical
mortars massed fires with the 81-mm. mortars and with the artillery
from the mainland. When attached to artillery units the mortar pla-
toons were divided into 2-gun sections with weapons placed approxi-
mately 1,000 yards apart. Chèmical officers and Sixth Army head-
quarters vigorously criticized this practice because it prevented the units
from massing their fires and giving close support to the infantry. They
insisted that platoons be employed as units under direct infantry
20
control. Later, mortar units were assigned to the infantry and re-
mained so attached for the rest of the operation.
In June 1944 HURRICANE Task Force, principally composed of two
of the three regiments of the 41st Division, assaulted the island of Biak,
located west of Wakde off New Guinea's northern coast.21 The Allied
forces wanted the island, as they had Wakde, as a site for airfields for
bombing operations against the enemy. Company D, 98th Battalion,
commanded by Capt. Jalmar Gertulla, supported the attacking forces
with missions for perimeter defense, beachhead extension, and harass-
ment. On one occasion the 2d Platoon covered the withdrawal by
water of a tank-led infantry battalion and then, after destroying their
mortars and ammunition, withdrew itself. Early in June observers of
the mortar platoon directed fire from landing craft on cave mouths
18
(1) AGF Bd Rpt on SWPA, No. 74, 9 Jun 44, Employ of 4.2" Cml Mortars. (2) Cml Sec 41st
Div, n.d., Hist Rpt, LETTERPRESS Opn (22 Apr-5 May 44). AGRO-H (7945) 341-11.7. (3)
Smith, Approach to the Philippines, p. 66. (4) Lt. Col. John E. Clarke, "The Longest 12 Miles on
Earth," Chemical Warfare Bulletin, vol. 31, No. 1 (January-February, 1945), pp. 47-49.
19
Personal Ltr, CmlO TORNADO TF to CmlO Sixth Army, 22 May 44. 300.6—Memos to and from
APO 565 Unit 1, Sixth Army Rcds.
20
Ltr, Cml Warfare Intell Team 4 to CmlO USASOS, 24 Jun 44, sub: Rpt on Use of Cml Warfare
Weapons and Munitions.
21
See Riegelman, Caves of Biak, for a personal account of the Biak operation. During World War
II Colonel Riegleman served as I Corps chemical officer.
invisible to both air and ground observers. Unfortunately, when the

1st Platoon fired 180 rounds of high explosive at cave mouths for an
antitank company on 7 June, 10 out of 12 rounds with T-89 delay
fuzes were duds, while other rounds with point-detonating fuzes ex-
ploded as tree bursts above the caves.
What might be considered classic examples of combined all-mortar
preparations took place on 16 and 27 June. Chemical mortar barrages
preceded advances of the 186th Infantry near the village of Mokmer
on Biak; this fire was then lifted and was followed sucessively by the
81-mm. and the 60-mm. mortars. On both dates, the infantry ad-
vanced against minor resistance to objectives which, before these prep-
arations, had been vigorously defended.22
With the Wakde experience in mind the 20th Infantry inquired
whether a chemical mortar company could be assigned to the 6th
Infantry Division. After Biak, supported battalions in the 162d and
186th Infantry Regiments stated that because of its greater range and
blast effect on area targets, the 4.2-inch mortar filled the gap between
the 81-mm. mortar and artillery. Because of the higher angle of fire,
the infantry preferred the 4.2-inch mortar to 75-mm. and 105-mm.
howitzers for firing on sharply defiladed and densely wooded terrain.
In open terrain the mortar was equal in effectiveness, if not range, to
the 105-mm. howitzer. On the other hand, two battalion commanders
considered the 4.2-inch mortar less accurate than the 81-mm. weapon
and complained of the slow displacement of the former over rough
terrain during a fast-moving advance.23
The 98th Battalion encountered some of the same tribulations on
New Guinea that had marked the fighting in the South Pacific Area.
These included the unfamiliarity of infantry commanders with the
capabilities and limitations of the weapon, the inadequate training of
mortar personnel in infantry tactics and procedures, the excessive
length of time firing personnel remained in the line without relief, and
the deleterious effects of dampness on mortar shell components and their
containers. The disadvantages of attaching mortar units to artillery
22
Ltr, CmlO U.S. Forces to CmlO ALAMO Force, 19 Jul 44, sub: Preliminary Tech Rpt 5, p. 6.
350.05-Biak, Sixth Army Rcds, ORB.
23
(1) Ltr, CmlO TORNADO TF to CmlO Sixth Army, 22 Jun 44. 472.4—4.2" Cml Mortar, Sixth
Army Rcds, ORB. (2) Ltr, CmlO 41st Inf Div to CmlO ALAMO Force, 27 Jul 44, sub: Preliminary
Tech Rpt 16, pp. 1-2. 350.05—Biak, Sixth Army Rcds, ORB.
organizations, realized in the South Pacific, were emphasized in the

24
Southwest Pacific.
Beginning with the fighting on New Guinea, one of the most per-
sistent of the bottlenecks facing mortar units was the lack of adequate
motor transportation. Several times the units were unable to keep up
with supported infantry in fast-moving actions. At Hollandia and on
Wakde ship-to-shore movement suffered seriously from a shortage of
amphibious vehicles. In the former operation, one company failed to
land in time to carry out its mission in support of an infantry regiment.
The value of adequate motorized equipment from ship to shore and
from the shore inland was again illustrated on Biak where assignment
to the company of 4 Dukws and 3 additional 2½ -ton 6x6 trucks
insured prompt and speedy landing of men, weapons, and shell;
facilitated leapfrogging of platoons during movement of the company
along beach areas; and resulted in satisfactory ammunition resupply.
Colonel Arthur, Chemical Officer, 41st Division, as well as the G-3
of I Corps, felt that mortar units should be committed with complete
organic transportation and urged that the companies be provided
with either 2 LVT's (landing vehicles, tracked) or 4 Dukws for am-
phibious movement.25
Leyte
In September 1944, with the northwest coast of New Guinea in the
hands of General MacArthur and with the Marianas Islands secured
by Admiral Nimitz, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, deciding to skip three
planned intermediate objectives, set their sights directly on the island of
Leyte in the Philippines.26 In a move that speeded up the Pacific time
24
(1) Cml Sec 41st Div, n.d., Hist Rpt, LETTERPRESS Opn (22 Apr-5 May 44), p. 10. (2) CmlO
41st Inf Div, n.d., Hist Rcd, Cml Sec 41st Inf Div, p. 4. CMLHO. (3) An. 2 to G-3 I Corps,
History of Biak Opn, 15-27 Jun 44, n.d., p. 40. (4) Ltrs, CmlO PERSECUTION TF to CmlO Sixth
Army, 27 Apr, 22 May 44. 300.6—Memos to and from APO 565 Unit I, Sixth Army Rcds, ORB.
(5) CM-IN 14904. 17 Aug 44.
25
(1) An. 2 to G-3 I Corps, History of Biak Opn, 15-27 Jun 44, p. 40. (2) Ltr, CmlO 41st
Inf Div to CmlO ALAMO Force, 12 May 44, sub: Cml Phase of LETTERPRESS Opn. (3) Sixth Army
Cml Warfare Activities During the Biak Opn, pp. 6-7. 350.05, Sixth Army Rcds, ORB.
26
Unless otherwise noted, references for the Leyte operation include:(1) Unit Histories, Rpts, and
Rcds of 85th and 88th Cml Mortar Bns, in Sixth Army Rcds; (2) Sixth Army, Rpt of Leyte Opn,
30 Nov 45, and Rpt of G-4 and Cml Sec of same headquarters; (3) CmlO X Corps, Rpt of Leyte
Campaign, 3 Jan 45, in Sixth Army Rcds; (4) Ltr, CG 24th Div to CG X Corps, 18 Dec 44, sub:
Rpt, Chemical Warfare Activities Leyte Opn, CMLHO; (5) 19th Inf Hist Rcd, Leyte Campaign,
8 Sep-22 Nov 44.
table by exactly two months, they directed MacArthur and Nimitz to

assault Leyte on 20 October.27
At the time of the Leyte invasion Sixth Army included X Corps and
XXIV Corps. The latter had been at Pearl Harbor preparing for the
assault on the island of Yap when the change of plans eliminated that
particular operation. Thereupon Admiral Nimitz turned over the
XXIV Corps to General MacArthur. Major elements of XXIV Corps
were the 77th and 96th Divisions, having among their supporting units
the 88th Chemical Mortar Battalion (less companies C and D), and
the 7th Division, supported by the 91st Chemical Company. The
latter, one of two separate mortar companies to see action in World War
28
II, had been stationed for some years at Schofield Barracks on Hawaii.
Chemical mortar units already with Sixth Army were the 98th and
the 85th Battalions. The former, having participated in the Wakde
and Biak fighting, had entered a period of rest and rehabilitation. The
85th Chemical Mortar Battalion, a recent arrival from the United
States, supported X Corps in the Leyte operation, specifically the 1st
Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions.
Commanded by Lt. Col. Kenneth K. MacDonald, the 85th Bat-
talion landed on the beaches of Leyte with the early waves of the 20
October assault. The battalion was divided into two groups, corres-
ponding with its attachments—the headquarters detachment and Com-
panies A and B with the 1st Cavalry and Companies C and D with the
24th Division. Company C ran into immediate difficulty. Coming in
with the fourth wave the two landing craft carrying the 3d Platoon re-
ceived direct hits from enemy fire. One man was killed and 10 others
were wounded. But in general, enemy resistance was light, and this
circumstance, combined with a lack of transportation, limited initial
activity for the companies of the 85th Battalion. Companies C and D
had landed without organic vehicles and were to operate under that
handicap for the entire campaign.
During the second and third weeks of November, Company C sup-
ported the 21st Infantry, 24th Division, in the extremely bitter fighting
for Breakneck Ridge, southwest of the town of Pinamopoan located
on the northern coast of Leyte. The Japanese defended this position
27
See M. Hamlin Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN
WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954), for the strategy behind this decision and for an account of
the actual operation.
28
See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, app. H.
with a tenacity that gave the hill formation its nickname. For a time
the rugged terrain limited artillery support, a situation which enhanced
the value of the CWS weapon. The mortar platoons fired nearly 2,800
rounds of ammunition during the period 7-15 November, including
missions against troop concentrations, entrenchments, pillboxes, mor-
tars, machine guns, and light artillery.
On 14 November the 32d Division relieved the 24th Division and,
as so often was the case, Company C of the 85th Battalion remained
in the line in support of a new infantry regiment, this time the 128th.
Within four days an incident occurred which marred good relations
between the supporting and supported units. On the morning of 18
November the mortars of Company C, along with other supporting
weapons, fired about 375 rounds against an enemy strongpoint. De-
spite the testimony of the mortar forward observer, the division chemi-
cal officer, and the regimental commander himself, Company C was
charged with a short round burst that killed one infantryman of the
128th and wounded seven others. The X Corps commander, Maj. Gen.
Franklin C. Sibert, ordered the relief of the mortar company, an action
which took place six days later with the arrival of Company B. Un-
fortunately, this incident destroyed the confidence of the infantry in
the chemical mortar; for quite a while thereafter the division employed
29
the 4.2-inch mortar only for road interdiction.
Company B, 88th Chemical Mortar Battalion, commanded by Capt.
Henry A. Kitselman, came ashore with elements of 96th Division
(XXIV Corps) over the beaches near Dulag.30 During the first two
weeks of combat the platoons of the company operated separately in
support of infantry battalions in attacks in the vicinity of the landing
beaches, against enemy positions on Labiranan Head, Labir, and Catmon
Hill, and inland near the villages of Tabontabon and Dagami. Initially,
the swamp and poor transportation prevented the mortars from getting
inland and thereafter transportation proved to be a major problem.
During this period, which coincided with the rainy season, the vehicles
of the mortar company became mired, while advancing infantrymen
29
(1) It was a matter of small irony that General Sibert was the son of the first Chief, Chemical
Warfare Service, Maj. Gen. William L. Sibert. (2) Ltr, CG 32d Div to CG X Corps, 19 Dec 44,
sub: Rpt of Cml Warfare Activities in the Leyte Opn. Sixth Army Rcds, 319.1 Leyte Opn Rpts.
(3) Lt John K. King, Rpt of Inspection of Forward Position during A+27 - A+31, Nov 1944.
Sixth Army Rcds, 333 Inspection Rpts.
30
The troops of XXIV Corps also had the support of eight mortar boats.
were calling for fire now beyond mortar range. The mortars did com-
plete some missions. On 22 October one of the mortar platoons re-
pulsed an attack of a Japanese patrol killing 52 of the enemy and itself
suffering 2 killed and 6 wounded. Later, on 27 and 28 October, the
mortars silenced enemy 75-mm. mortars in defilade on Catmon Hill,
burned four sniper-infested pillboxes, and screened the withdrawal of
an infantry company pinned down on Catmon Hill.
From 5 to 20 November Company B, firing as a unit, supported the
382d Infantry and then, until 28 November, the 381st, which was
slowly advancing through the swamps, rice paddies, and hilly terrain
west of Dagami. Mortarmen, with the aid of Filipinos, carried their
weapons and ammunition by hand, or placed them on the backs of
plodding Carabao. The intense rain continued to hamper all ground
operations. It caused base plates to sink into the soft mud and resulted
in mortar breakage and the consequent suspension of firing.
Company A, 88th Chemical Mortar Battalion, landed with the 77th
Division early in December 1944 and remained with that unit for two
months. The 91st Chemical Mortar Company supported the 7th Divi-
sion throughout the Leyte Campaign. Although placed under control
of division artillery, each of its three platoons supported one of the
three regiments of the division. During this 41-day commitment, two
platoons used artillery forward observers and one used its own. In the
drive on Ormoc the division artillery assumed control of the mortar
company. Although no missions took place under this arrangement the
platoon fired for registration every evening. In mid-December two of
the platoons reverted to regimental attachment, a step which in the
opinion of the company commander, Capt. Eugene F. Them, resulted
in a far better utilization of the unit.31
The performance of the 4.2-inch mortars on Leyte was not an un-
qualified success. Infantrymen frequently complained that the mortar
units could not keep pace with them in rapid advances over rough ter-
rain, a situation resulting as much from the rainy season in which the
operation took place as from the lack of complete organic transporta-
tion among the mortar units. This lack stemmed directly from the in-
fantry's unfamiliarity with the needs of mortar units—only one of
the six divisions which saw action had had previous chemical mortar
support. As a result, most of them failed to allot sufficient shipping
31
Ltr, CO 91st Cml Co (Motorized) to CmlO XXIV Corps, 14 Dec 44, sub: Rpt of Mortar Co
Activities. Sixth Army Rcds, 319.1 Leyte Opn Rpts.
space for the mortar units and most organic vehicles were not taken
32
aboard. Only when the supported divisions and regiments assigned
additional transportation to the mortar companies did the latter re-
33
cover their mobility. At the conclusion of the Leyte operation chemi-
cal officers not only recommended the use of Dukws for mortar units in
assault landings, but also the employment of tracked vehicles in swampy
34
terrain.
Luzon
Turning his attention from Leyte, where he left the newly activated
Eighth Army, to Luzon, General MacArthur directed General Krueger
to seize a beachhead on Lingayen Gulf, drive southward and free
Manila, and, eventually, liberate the entire island.35 The decision to
take Luzon had come only after prolonged debate at the highest level of
strategic planning. S-day for the operation was 9 January 1945.36
Sixth Army operations on Luzon had the support of three mortar
battalions.37 The 98th Chemical Mortar Battalion supported I Corps
on the left of Sixth Army's beachhead and the 82d fired for the divi-
sions of XIV Corps on the right. The 85th Battalion was released from
the Eighth Army later in January and attached to XIV Corps. These
three mortar battalions provided continuous close support throughout
the fighting on Luzon. As on Leyte, the corps normally reattached
mortar companies to divisions which, in turn, assigned platoons to
assault regiments.
Initially, XIV Corps faced but token resistance as it headed down
the central plain of Luzon toward Manila. Enemy opposition increased
in the last week of January, particularly in the Zambales Mountains on
32
(1) Ltr, CG Sixth Army to Distr, 25 Nov 44, sub: Rpt on Mistakes Made and Lessons Learned in
K-2 Opns, pp. 20-21. 314.7 Hist Rpts, Sixth Army Rcds, ORB. (2) Ltr, ACmlO Sixth Army
to CmlO I Corps, 29 Oct 44. 300.6 Memos, I Corps, Sixth Army Rcds, ORB.
33
(1) Ltr, CG Sixth Army to Distr, 25 Nov 44, sub: Rpt on Mistakes Made and Lessons Learned in
K-2 Opns, pp. 20-21. (2) Co A 88th Cml Mortar Bn Journal, Leyte.
34
Ltr, CmlO POA to CCWS, 4 Apr 45, sub: Observer Rpt of Action of Co B 88th Cml Mortar
Bn on Leyte. CMLHO.
35
Sources for this section include: Unit Histories and Rpts of 82d, 85th, 88th, and 98th Cml
Mortar Bns, in Sixth Army Rcds ORB and CMLHO; XIV Corps M-7 and M-1 Opns, Luzon; Rpts of
25th, 32d, 33d, 37th, and 43d Divs, of 5th, 7th, and of 8th Cav Regts, and 20th and 63d Inf Regts.
36
For details on the strategy behind the Luzon decision as well as for a comprehensive account of
the entire campaign, see Robert Ross Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, UNITED STATES ARMY IN
WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1963).
37
As in the case of Leyte the assault troops of I and XIV Corps were accompanied by 4.2-inch
mortar boats.
the right flank of the corps. After a week marked by effective mortar
fire against personnel, weapons, tanks, and supply dumps, three com-
panies of the 82d turned southward to join in the struggle for Manila.
The fourth, Company B, remained behind in the hills west of Fort
Stotsenburg, successively supporting elements of the 40th, 43d, and
38th Divisions from 28 January to 18 March. Mortar operations in
support of a 40th Division attack on Snake Hill North were featured
by some unusual action on the part of forward observers. On 7 Feb-
ruary, after enemy fire wounded a platoon forward observer, Cpl. Ed-
ward A. Yehle of the mortar observation party successfully directed
chemical mortar and artillery fire against enemy opposition in front of
a battalion of the 160th Infantry. Next morning another mortarman,
Pvt. Herbert H. League, took charge in a similar situation, simul-
taneously directing 4.2-inch mortar, 81-mm. mortar, and artillery fire
in action which resulted in the destruction of at least one enemy ma-
chine gun and which served as a screen for the evacuation of friendly
casualties. Later, League directed similar fire which proved instru-
mental in the death of 40 Japanese and in repulsing an enemy attack.
Meanwhile, the main body of the 82d supported the 37th Division as
XIV Corps pushed down Route 5 toward Manila. The approach to the
city was uneventual in comparison to the resistance encountered once
the American forces entered Manila. Fire missions for the mortars
picked up immediately. The weapon screened regimental crossings
of the Pasig River, which bisects the city, and fired support, incendiary,
and neutralization missions, mostly in conjunction with infantry mor-
tars and the artillery. After witnessing the chemical mortars in action
before the High Commissioner's residence, the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-3, 37th Division, declared that "direct support infantry weapons,
particularly 4.2-inch mortars, falling close to our own lines, were found
to neutralize the enemy where penetration took place."
The 85th Battalion was triangularized just prior to landing near San
Fabian in the Lingayen Gulf on 28 January with the 1st Cavalry Divi-
38
sion. By early February, its mortars were in Manila supporting
cavalrymen from emplacements on city pavements, vacant lots, lawns,
golf courses, even tennis courts. From 22 to 25 February elements of
Company B fought as infantry in defense of a regimental perimeter
within the city.
38
As in the fighting in Europe, the mortar battalions in the Pacific reorganized under the new
tables of organization whenever it became convenient.
Certain supported commanders, particularly in the 7th Cavalry

Regiment, refused to use chemical mortars for close support missions,
claiming that the old M2 sight was inaccurate.39 But it was with this
sight that elements of the 85th massed fire, along with 81-mm. mortars,
in the final assault on the Agriculture Building and brought fire to
within 200 feet of the mortar observation post. After the cavalry took
its objective, a regimental operations officer called the chemical mortar
fire "the most accurate fire support we've ever had." Battalion casual-
ties, the highest for a 30-day period of any chemical mortar battalion
on Luzon, totaled 7 men killed and 13 wounded.
During the last part of February and before resistance had ended in
Manila, XIV Corps gave the 1st Cavalry Division (less one brigade)
and the 6th Infantry Division, until recently a part of I Corps, the
mission of clearing the Manila watershed and attacking Japanese forces
in the Sierra Madre Mountains about ten miles east of the city. These
enemy troops, comprising the major enemy concentration in central
Luzon, had not taken part in the Manila fighting but had withdrawn to
the east with the approach of the American troops. Ensconced in the
so-called Shimbu Line, Japanese forces put up fanatic resistance in the
rugged and rocky foothills of the Sierra Madres.
The 82d and 85th Chemical Mortar Battalions fired in support of
these operations. Company A, 85th Battalion, saw a good deal of action
with the 7th and 8th Cavalry regiments west of Antipolo. Early in
March a squadron commander refused to have one of the mortar pla-
toons engage a target because it was within 500 yards of his troops.
Instead, he gave the mission to his 81-mm. mortars, despite the fact
that these weapons had a greater dispersion than did the 4.2's. This
show of hesitancy regarding mortar support by the 85th Battalion was
not the first to come from supported troops. A succession of battalion
commanders—there were three incumbents during the first six weeks
of 1945—provides another clue to the fact that not all was right with
the unit. As of 16 March the firing companies of the 85th reverted to
battalion control and underwent an intensive 2-week training period
under the new commander, Maj. Maurice G. Green, recently operations
officer of the 82d Chemical Mortar Battalion.
The 82d Chemical Mortar Battalion supported the Shimbu opera-
39
Memo, CmlO Sixth Army for ACofS G-3 Sixth Army, 12 Mar 45. S-3 Rpts, 85th Cml Mortar
Bn, Sixth Army Rcds, ORB.
tions from 25 February until 30 April. In mid-March the XIV Corps

relinquished control of this fighting to XI Corps, and the 82d utilized
this transfer of command to reorganize under the latest table of or-
ganization. Battalion support in the vicinity of Mount Mataba, one
of the bastions of the Shimbu Line, resulted in some of the heaviest 4.2-
inch mortar fire in the Pacific war. During the 2-week period between
23 March and 5 April the 82d fired nearly 190 missions with an ex-
penditure of over 22,000 rounds. On 6 April two platoons of Com-
pany B and one from Company C, in support of an attack by the 63d
Infantry, laid a 6,000-yard smoke screen southeast of Mount Mataba
and maintained it for eight hours. The smoke masked the advance
of the infantry from enemy observation posts on Mount Mataba and
a lesser hill which was an immediate objective of the attack. The mor-
tars maintained this screen by firing a total of 16 rounds a minute the
first hour and 10 rounds a minute thereafter. Unfortunately, a short-
age of ammunition brought a halt to the screen before the troops
reached their objective. Three hours later ammunition requested from
XI Corps four days earlier arrived at the mortar positions.40
On 21 April Company B (less the 3d Platoon), while in support of
the 145th Infantry, participated in one of the heaviest preparations fired
on Luzon. In order to cover an infantry advance on the slopes of
Mount Pacawagan, another of the keys to the Shimbu positions, the
mortar company fired 2,525 rounds of white phosphorus to set up a
7-hour screen, supplemented by two B-25 aircraft laying a 8,000-yard
FS screen. Six days later the crest of Pacawagan fell to troops of the
145th Infantry after a combined weapons preparation and with the
aid of a chemical mortar screen.
That the reputation of smoke increased on Luzon is suggested by
the following entry in a 6th Infantry Division operational report:
"The outstanding use for chemical warfare weapons in the Shimbu
Line battle was the use of screening smokes…" 41 One of the mortar
battalions called attention to the high ratio of white phosphorus used on
Luzon,42 indicative of quite a departure from previous Pacific practice.
40
(1) 2d Ind, CmlO 6th Inf Div to CmlO Sixth Army, 12 Apr 45, on Ltr, CmlO XI Corps to
CmlO 6th Div, 8 Apr 45, sub: Smoke Opn. Sixth Army Rcds, 470.6 Smoke Missions. (2) Artillery
as well as mortar units had difficulty with ammunition supply.
41
Digest of Staff Sectional Rpts, 6th Div, Luzon Campaign, 9 Jan-30 Jun 45, p. 126. Opns Rpts,
AGO 306 - 0.3 (12490).
42
82d Cml Mortar Bn Hist Rpt Luzon Opn, 9 Jan-3o Jun 45, The First 120 Days (hereafter cited
as 82d, First 120 Days Luzon), p. 6. CWPN 82 - 0.3 (24515).
Infantry commanders had long been reluctant to request WP fire.

Smoke as a means of concealment was often superfluous in the jungle
fighting during the early years of the war, and casualties were produced
by high explosives. As a consequence, white phosphorus ammunition
remained unused while stockpiles of high explosives were bled white.
Actually, white phosphorus ammunition was a versatile munition.
In addition to its ability to produce screens and inflict casualties, it
served as an incendiary agent. A fourth characteristic, really an exten-
sion of its antipersonnel capability, was the tremendous psychological
effect it had on the enemy. The main reason for its unpopularity was
that infantry commanders were unfamiliar with its many attributes,
especially the casualty and incendiary effects.43
Several factors contributed to the increased use of smoke shell on
Luzon. One of these was the limited supply of high explosive shell
which served to call attention to the white phosphorus munition. In
February 1945, for example, Col. Richard R. Danek, Chemical Officer,
XIV Corps, declared that the supply of chemical mortar ammunition
had "reached a critical stage." 44 Several months later Maj. David D.
Hulsey, 6th Division chemical officer, stated that during one period
in April chemical mortar operations in his sector were "practically nil"
because of the "unavailability of 4.2-inch mortar ammunition from
XI Corps." 45 Causes for the shortage included limited transportation
and deterioration of shell through improper storage, but, more basically,
the critical nature of the supply of 4.2-inch mortar ammunition on
Luzon resulted from the fact that half of the shells received from the
United States were on the list of ammunitions frozen by the War De-
46
partment because of the possibility of defective fuzes.
Other reasons for the increased use of WP involved matters of terrain
and education. In the Philippines, American forces for the first time
in the Pacific encountered a battle area of rather extended dimensions
and one that featured mountain and hill masses from which the enemy
had excellent observation. The Sierra Madres east of Manila and the series
43
85thCml Mortar Bn in the M-1 Opns (Luzon) Hist Rpt, 9 Jan-30 Jun 45. CWBN 85 - 0.3.
44
Memo, Danek for CofS XIV Corps, 25 Feb 45, no sub. XIV Corps File, Rpt, Cml Munitions.
45
Ltr, CmlO 6th Div to CmlO Sixth Army, 1 May, sub: Cml Warfare Weekly Opns Rtp.
319.1 Sixth Army Rcds, Weekly Activity Rpts, Divs.
46
(1) Ltr, CG 6th Div to CG Sixth Army through CG XIV Corps, 5 Mar 45, sub: Unsatisfactory
Condition of 4.2-inch Cml Mortar Ammunition, and 1st and 2d Inds thereto. XIV Corps File — Rpts,
Cml Munitions. (2) Memo, Sixth Army CmlO to Sixth Army G-4, 6 Feb 45. Sixth Army Rcds,
400.34 Equip.
of mountains confronting I Corps in its drive to the northeast were

typical of the Luzon terrain. A 6th Division report gave examples of
the use of screening smokes: " … to deny the enemy observation dur-
ing infantry attacks, to cover the construction of supply roads, and to
47
screen carrying parties and evacuation of wounded." As for the
matter of education, supported commanders, once they had seen the
results of WP as an antipersonnel and incendiary agent, were much less
loath to call for WP rounds in support of their operations.
Perhaps the best barometer of the reputation of white phosphorus was
the official HE-WP ratio for mortar ammunition which fluctuated back
and forth between 80-20 and 60-40, in favor of high explosives. In
August 1945 General MacArthur's headquarters established the ratio
at 60 HE-4O WP, based upon the experience of the major combat
commands of the theater.48
While XIV Corps landed against light resistance and faced only
token enemy forces until the Fort Stotsenburg fighting, I Corps had a
tough time almost from the start. The enemy had established strong
defenses on I Corps left flank, made more formidable by the rugged
mass of hills and mountains. The fact that the Japanese headquarters
lay to the rear of these defenses tended to make enemy resistance all
the more tenacious. The divisions of I Corps faced not one but a series
of difficult missions. Elements were to drive southeast across central
Luzon, cover the left flank of the southward advance of XIV Corps,
and advance north and northeast in the direction of the towns of
Damortis and Rosario and an important road junction just beyond.
An immediate I Corps objective was the enemy position in the
Cabaruan Hills, fifteen miles inland from the Lingayen beaches in
the sector of the 6th Division. On 22 January Company A, 98th
Chemical Mortar Battalion, operating as a unit for the first time on
Luzon, supported the 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, in what was ex-
pected to be the culminating effort against Japanese resistance in the
Cabaruan Hills.49 The mortar platoons went into positions about 200
yards from one another in defiladed terrain. Each unit maintained its
own observation post on one of the highest hills in the area. These OP's
47
Digest of Staff Sectional Rpts, 6th Div, Luzon Campaign.
48
(1) Ltr, Gen Hq USAFPAC to CG's First, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth Armies, et al, 16 Aug 45.
Sixth Army Rcds, 471 Ammunition. (2) The ETO arrived at the same percentage although no
ratio was definitely prescribed. Rowan comments, 19 Jan 61.
49
See Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, for a description of this action.
were located about 350 yards in front of the mortars and overlooked the
enemy positions 600 yards to the front. Wire connected the observa-
tion posts with the mortars, although once the platoons moved for-
ward they would have to rely exclusively upon radio communication.
At this stage in the fighting the forward observers of all three platoons
fired at targets selected by the infantry battalion commander. Am-
munition resupply was the province of the regimental supply officer
who delivered the shells directly to the platoon positions. When the
mortar units displaced forward the regimental supply trucks kept pace.
After laying down a heavy barrage on an area of ten artillery squares,
Company A placed white phosphorus on the corners of the enemy
position to mark it for aerial bombardment. After the air strike the
mortars blanketed the enemy area with WP as the rifle companies of
the 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, moved forward. Companies E and F
advanced along opposite sides of a ridge that led into the right flank
of the Japanese positions. Company G, located initially in front of
the objective, used the smoke to move through a ravine and into the
left flank of the enemy-held hill mass. The 1st and 2d Platoons of the
mortar company displaced forward in rear of the cannon company; the
3d remained ready to fire on any target of opportunity. The three
mortar forward observers as well as the mortar company commander,
Capt. G. B. Doolittle, accompanied Company G. During the advance
radios served as the only means of communication.
Company G experienced initial success in its flanking maneuver but
was suddenly hit on three sides by Japanese fire. At the same time the
enemy pinned down Companies E and F. This unexpected opposition
came from two sources, from the enemy that survived the preattack
bombardments and from those who had slipped into positions under
the very smoke that concealed the American advance.
Losing all of its officers, Company G began to scatter without regard
for dead, wounded, and equipment. Captain Doolittle of the mortar
company managed to halt the withdrawal. He contacted the infantry
battalion command post with his radio, the only means of communica-
tion left on the hill, and received orders to take charge. The support
infantry platoon maneuvered to the left of the enemy's position, reliev-
ing pressure on the front. Doolittle called for fire from his three mortar
platoons, which by this time had all withdrawn to their original firing
positions. White phosphorus mortar rounds not only blinded the
Japanese positions but set fire to brush and grass in which they had
taken cover. As enemy opposition ceased, Captain Doolittle organized
parties to evacuate the wounded and then led the force in an orderly
withdrawal back to the positions from which the attack began. Sev-
eral days later Cabaruan Hills fell to another infantry battalion.50
During the fighting with I Corps the mortars of the 98th Battalion
won a fair reputation for their ability to cope with enemy armor.
Chemical mortarmen received credit for destroying at least 25 tanks,
some of them dug in, and shared credit with the smaller mortars for
knocking out 15 or 20 more. On 31 January, for example, after with-
drawing from the edge of the town of Munoz with elements of the
20th Infantry, a mortar platoon forward observer directed fire on two
enemy tanks. A direct hit knocked out one of the vehicles and sub-
sequent mortar fire disabled a second. The mortar platoon observer
crept up to this tank, jumped upon it, and hurled a grenade inside. As
the tank burst into flames, the observer escaped unharmed. Four days
later two Japanese tanks raced along a road directly toward a chemical
mortar observation post, firing as they came. The observer directed his
mortars at the first tank, setting it afire less than fifty yards from his
position. The other tank turned and fled, only to be bracketed by mor-
tar rounds. Stalled and with broken tracks, the enemy tank was set
51
aflame by a final mortar round.
Infantry commanders expressed satisfaction with the support given
by the 98th. The 6th Division stated its preference for 4.2-inch mortar
support against emplaced tanks and field pieces. After the fall of
Lupao, a town vigorously defended by the Japanese, the commander
of the 35th Infantry declared "the battle would have lasted days longer
52
if the 4.2's had not been available."
During mid-February 1945 I Corps began what proved to be a 4-
month drive to the north to rout the enemy from the tenacious posi-
50
(1) Entry No. 1, 20th Inf Unit Journal, 21-22 Jan 45. 306 - INF(20)-0.7 (26300) 16-25
Jan 45. (2) Ltr, CO 98th Cml Mortar Bn to CmlO I Corps, 20 Mar 45, Rpt of Cml Warfare
Activities. CWBN 98-0.3 (24423). This source mistakenly dates this action as 23 January 1945
when, in fact, it took place a day earlier. (3) Battle of the Cabaruan Hills, 12-25 Jan 45. CMLHO.
(4) Lt. Col. Alexander Batlin, "98th Chemical Mortar Battalion," Armed Forces Chemical Journal,
vol. VII, No. 2 (October, 1953).
51
Another technique was the use of the fire of one mortar to drive tanks into preregistered areas,
to be neutralized or destroyed by the weapons of the whole platoon.
52
(1) Ltr, CG 6th Div to Distr, 17 Jul 45, sub: Rpt by Hq 6th Div, p. 32. (2) 98th Cml
Mortar Bn, Fifth Month Luzon.
53
tions of his mountain fastness. In this slow, gruelling campaign the
33d Division advanced toward the port of San Fernando and toward
Baguio, summer capital of the Philippines. The 32d Division crept
relentlessly along the tortuous Villa Verde Trail toward the heavily
fortified Sante Fe—Imugan area, while the 25th Division moved north
along Highway 5 from San Jose to Digdig and eventually Sante Fe.
During the second week of February the companies of the 9 8th
Battalion received assignments which were to last almost until the close
of the Luzon operation: Company A was attached to the 32d Division,
Company B to the 33d, and Company C remained with the 25th. On
21 April Company C, 85th Chemical Mortar Battalion, joined the
forces of I Corps, supporting the spectacular drive made by the 37th
Division from Sante Fe to Aparri on the northern coast of Luzon.
The 98th Battalion had to contend not only with the enemy but with
the terrain and weather. The mountainous region in which the enemy
held commanding positions, many of them prepared in advance, gave
every advantage to the defenders. These positions, often in defilade,
provided ideal targets for the accurate, high angle fire of the 4.2-inch
mortars. Forward observation by ground parties, the normal procedure,
was hazardous and difficult because of the superiority of Japanese ob-
servation posts. Sometimes the mortar platoons overcame this disad-
vantage by using artillery observers in liaison planes to conduct registra-
tion and to fire for effect.54 During March and early April the rain and
muddy ground curtailed mortar shell expenditures by bogging down
ammunition resupply and by compelling the constant re-emplacement
of the base plates which sank out of sight after one or two rounds.
Nonetheless the weapon proved effective. Company C fired 19,000
rounds (the two other companies fired about the same number) and
received credit for sealing about thirty-five caves and killing more than
250 Japanese caught in the open. The unit marked eight targets for air
strike with a precision that brought praise both from Fifth Air Force
and infantry commanders.
In fighting along the Villa Verde Trail, Company A fired several mis-
sions to repel enemy counterattacks, most of them during hours of
darkness. Mortarmen at one time manned infantry battalion defense
53
Unless otherwise noted, the account of this part of the campaign has been based upon unit records
of the 98th and 85th Chemical Mortar Battalions and on After Action Reports of the 25th, 32d,
and 33d Divisions and their components.
54
98th Cml Mortar Bn, First 120 Days on Luzon, p. 44.
positions, at the same time maintaining uninterrupted fire support

of the front-line companies. Smoke shell was used for screening and
casualty effect as well as for burning off occasional grassy slopes, capable
of concealing the enemy, which lay in the path of the advancing
infantry.
In situations like those found on Luzon, where the weapons com-
panies of the mortar battalions were placed under the operational con-
trol of the supported divisions, battalion headquarters played an
inconspicious but important role. In the case of the 98th, for example,
the headquarters and headquarters company established a permanent
camp in the town of Carmen where the unit could support its weapons
companies equally well. Here was the battalion rest area, and here
were the battalion personnel, including weapons company clerks, an
arrangement which permitted the battalion commander maximum
utilization of his administrative personnel. Headquarters controlled
the companies by radio and by liaison officers. The Signal Corps Radio
284 served as the basis for this communications network, proving
satisfactory at times at distances twice its normal range of thirty miles.55
Liaison officers made daily visits to each of the weapons companies, con-
tacting as many platoons as time and the situation allowed. During the
course of these visits the liaison officers assisted with administrative
problems, brought forward maintenance parts and certain supplies
from the battalion stock, and exchanged information about the situa-
tion as it affected operations. Battalion maintained both a motor pool
and radio maintenance facilities which repaired company equipment.
Repairs of 85th Battalion equipment involving third and fourth echelon
maintenance were turned over to ordnance maintenance organizations
because of the lack of appropriate CWS units. Ideally, a chemical serv-
ice platoon attached to division took care of the maintenance of am-
munition at division dumps.
The mortar company commander set up his command post in the
vicinity of the division command post or occasionally with the regiment
in reserve. The mortar platoons fired for the assault battalion in each
of the three regiments. Displacement forward, in ¼-ton trucks and
55
(1) 98th Cml Mortar Bn, Sixth Month Luzon. (2) Batlin, " 98th Chemical Mortar Battalion,"
Armed Forces Chemical Journal, vol. VII, No. 2 (October, 1953). (3) The 85th Battalion experienced
difficulties with SCR-284 during the hours of darkness when its effective range was reduced to six or
seven miles. 85th Cml Mortar Bn in the Luzon Campaign, The First 120 Days (hereafter cited as
85th, First 120 Days Luzon).
trailers, came upon orders of the infantry battalion commander. As

in the action described at Cabaruan Hills, the mortar platoons main-
tained communications with the supported infantry during displace-
ment by SCR-300 radios. Mortar platoons of the 98th Battalion main-
tained 35 rounds for each gun, while a 2½ -ton truck loaded with 300
rounds stood by at the company command post ready to be sent for-
ward whenever the need arose. Location of the firing positions of the
mortar platoons varied from unit to unit. In the 98th Battalion, Com-
pany A's platoons usually were established within the infantry battalion
perimeter, most likely with the support infantry company. Company
C, on the other hand, often set up its mortars within the infantry bat-
talion CP perimeter.
One of the difficulties faced by the chemical mortar units on Luzon
was an almost constant shortage of manpower. The 98th Chemical
Mortar Battalion operated for the six months of the campaign under-
strength by 5 officers and 130 enlisted men. The 82d Battalion, while
possessing a surplus of enlisted men until mid-March, was below
strength from that date until the end of the campaign. The 85th Bat-
talion experienced similar troubles.56 The lack of men was aggravated
by a most inadequate number of mortar companies for the simultaneous
support of 4 divisions in I Corps, 4 in XIV Corps, and 3 in XI Corps.
Reciprocal familiarity between chemical mortar and combat in-
fantry personnel continued to be less than perfect. It was often a two-
edged situation; infantry officers were unacquainted with 4.2-inch
mortar potentialities, and chemical personnel, from division chemical
officers to those of the mortar company, were unfamiliar with the
combat techniques of the infantry. All chance had passed of attaining
the ideal solution—joint training for chemical and infantry personnel,
or at least familiarization lectures and demonstrations, before attach-
ment in actual combat.57
56
(1) 82d, 85th, and 98th Cml Mortar Bns S-3 Rpts, passim. Sixth Army Rcds. (2) 85th,
First 120 Days Luzon, p. II. (3) 98th Cml Mortar Bn, Hist Data Cards.
57
(1) 82d, First 120 Days Luzon, pp. 13-14. (2) 85th, First 120 Days Luzon, p. 7. (3) 98th,
Fifth Month Luzon, pp. 17-19. (4) Personal Ltr, CmlO I Corps to ACCWS for Field Opns,
2 Aug 45.
Central Pacific Area

The Central Pacific Area lacked adequate mortar battalion support
throughout the entire war.58 Despite the efforts of Colonel Unmacht,
theater chemical officer, the only mortar unit available prior to May
1944 was the 91st Chemical Company (Motorized) which had been
stationed in Hawaii under various designations since 1920. This unit
was used in field tests, demonstrations, and joint training exercises, in-
cluding amphibious assaults with several infantry divisions.
The over-all shortage of chemical mortar battalions and the higher
priority of other theaters prevented shipment of these units to the Cen-
tral Pacific Area until the arrival early in May 1944 of the 88th Chemi-
cal Mortar Battalion. Four months later the theater activated the 189th
Chemical Mortar Company (Separate). The only other mortar units
in CENPAC were the 71st and 72d Chemical Mortar Battalions
which did not reach Hawaii until mid-1945, too late to see action
59
before the war ended.
The first chemical mortar action in the Central Pacific took place
during the fighting on Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands when the 91st
Company commanded by Capt. Joseph E. Atchison fired in support
of the 7th Division. During five days in early February 1944 the unit,
hampered by an ammunition shortage and severed communications
lines, expended about 500 rounds while losing 1 man killed and 14
wounded.60 The next mortar unit to see action was Company C, 88th
Chemical Mortar Battalion, which landed on Saipan in the Marianas
with the 27th Infantry Division. Company A of the 88th played a
minor role in nearby Guam. In mid-September 1944 Company D of
the same battalion fired for the 81st Infantry Division on Angaur and
Peleliu in the Palau group. Unlike Companies A and C, rushed to
the Marianas within a month after arriving in the theater, Company D
received an adequate period of orientation in Hawaii. Offsetting the
advantage of thorough and extensive training was a shortage of en-
listed men and motor transport. The virtual certainty that mortars and
58
References used in this section consist of: Unit Rcds of the 88th Cml Mortar Bn, 91st Cml
Mortar Co (Separate), AAR's of Tenth Army; 96th, 77th, and 7th Divs; 32d and 184th Inf Regts;
and the 5th Marine Regt.
59
AG Hist Data Cards, 91st and 189th Cml Mortar Cos and 88th, 71st, and 72d Cml Mortar Bns.
60
(1)Ltr, CO 91st Cml Co to CG 7th Div, 18 Feb 44. (2) MPR CWS Ammo Sup, Sec 2F,
Feb 44, p. 2a.
ammunition would often have to be man-hauled led to the decision to

divide the company into two 5-gun platoons.
Company D landed in the ninth wave on Red Beach, Angaur Island,
on 17 September and supported the 322d Infantry in the Solome Lake
and Ramanantelo Hill areas. Attached to division artillery, the platoons
fired under the direction of artillery air observers. Captured Japanese
documents referred to the 4.2-inch as "that high caliber mortar," while
supported infantry commanders reported that the weapon caused heavy
enemy casualties.
Company D's 1st Platoon moved to Peleliu on 16 October, followed
in a week by the 2d Platoon and company headquarters. Attached to
the 321st Infantry and later the 323d Infantry Regiments, Company D
fired normal night missions of harassment and defense as well as four-
teen barrages which ignited napalm from fire bombs dropped by planes
among the innumerable enemy caves and trenches.
The final campaign in the Central Pacific—operations in the Ryuk-
yus group—saw the participation of the entire 88th Battalion as well
as the 91st Company.61 In order to gain a limited fleet anchorage and
seaplane base before the invasion, the 77th Division, with Company A
attached, made an unopposed landing on Kerama Retto. The assault on
the main objective, Okinawa, took place on 1 April 1945. Companies
B and C of the 88th, attached to the 96th Division, landed about H
plus 1 in the ninth and eleventh waves, respectively, in the vicinity of
Chatan. Company B, commanded by Capt. Edward L. Lockman, Jr.,
supported the 383d Infantry moving south along the west coast to
the strong enemy defenses on Kakazu Ridge. Company C, under the
command of Capt. Rutherford H. Spessard, Jr., supported the 382d
Infantry in its advance south to Nishibaru Ridge. The 91st Company,
Captain Them commanding, went in on the eighth wave with the 7th
Division across Purple and Orange Beaches opposite Kadena Airfield and
supported the division advance to the east coast and down to the eastern
approaches of the Shuri Line. At first, chemical mortar support was not
62
available for the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions.
Chemical mortars on Okinawa, although effective, were used almost
entirely for little outside of normal missions fired according to standard
methods. The only exceptions occurred when the 91st Company fired
61
For a complete description of the campaign, see Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle.
(1) Tenth Army, Rpt of Opns in the Ryukyus Campaign, Cml Warfare, pp. II-XIII-1-2. (2)
62
7th Div, Opn Rpt, pp. 1-2. (3) 96th Div, Action Rpt, Ryukyus Campaign, sec. VII, pt. I, p. 3.
a few times under direction of a Navy liaison observer, and when Sound
Locator Teams Nos. 3 and 5 were attached to Companies C and D.
From 12 April to 8 May these teams directed some firing at point tar-
gets but the extreme ranges of these targets limited the use of the mor-
tars. During the first week, at least five Japanese night attacks, sup-
ported by tanks and artillery and directed against the 96th Division's
perimeter, were repulsed with the help of combined 4.2-inch mortar-
artillery fire. In even lighter firing in support of the 7th Division, the
mortars laid down small preparations by day and fired to repel Japanese
infiltration raids at night. From the second week in April until mid-
June, the pattern of chemical mortar support included preparations
preceding infantry advance, followed, in many cases, by screens to
cover U.S. troops engaged either in consolidating their positions or with-
drawing with their casualties under murderous Japanese artillery, mor-
tar, and machine gun fire. The 4.2-inch mortars than engaged in
counterbattery and neutralization missions during the remaining day-
light hours, followed by night harassing and interdictory fire.
On 21 April a mortarman from the 91st Chemical Mortar Company
played a prominent role in repulsing a Japanese attack on the Skyline
Ridge positions of the 7th Division. Here is a graphic account of this
action:
When, east of the road cut, a man in the stalled third platoon, Company E, was
killed, Sgt. Theodore R. MacDonnell, a 91st Chemical Mortar Company observer, was
impelled to drastic action. MacDonnell had frequently joined men on the line and
shown qualities of a determined infantryman. Now, infuriated, he gathered up a hand-
ful of grenades and ran in the face of the machine-gun fire along the slope to a point
underneath the spot where he believed the enemy gun to be located, and then started
up the 20-foot embankment. When he looked over the crest he failed to spot the gun,
but he did see three enemy soldiers and grenaded them. He made two trips to the
bottom of the embankment for fresh supplies of grenades, but it was not until his third
trip to the crest that he located the machine gun. MacDonnell then slid back to the
bottom, grabbed a BAR, and mounted the embankment with it, only to have the
weapon jam after the first shot. He skidded to the bottom, seized a carbine, and went
back up for the fifth time. On reaching the crest, he stood up and fired point-blank
into the machine-gun position, killing the gunner and two covering riflemen. MacDon-
nell then hurled the machine gun down the slope behind him. A mortar that he found
in the position was also sent crashing down the hillside. Sergeant MacDonnell was
later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his heroism on this occasion.63
Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle, p. 226.
63
In an average period of seventy days in the line, each mortar com-

pany on Okinawa fired approximately 25,000 rounds, a fourth of which
was WP shell. Even this rather limited amount of smoke shell appeared
excessive to Tenth Army field artillery officers, particularly as in their
opinion an "indiscriminate use of smoke, not only by artillery, but by
other supporting weapons, obscured both air and ground observation."
Most of the Army and Marine divisions participating in the operation
commented favorably on the performance of the chemical mortars and
their crews. Both the 96th Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Divi-
sion recommended that a chemical mortar company, and preferably a
battalion, be attached regularly to a division. The Tenth Army sug-
gested that each division receive the support of a mortar battalion and
that the battalion be employed as a unit only and not fragmented by a
series of attachments.64
Of the problems encountered by chemical mortar units on Okinawa,
shortage of ammunition was unquestionably the most serious. The 88th
Battalion took in three units of fire and the 91st Company took in five
on the basis of 100 rounds per unit of fire, at the ratio of 7O-percent
HE and 3O-percent WP. After this initial supply was consumed, a
shortage, which varied from limited to critical, prevailed for the bal-
ance of the operation. On at least four separate occasions, mortar com-
panies had to reduce expenditures or cease firing altogether for periods
of from a few days to two weeks. Rain and mud, particularly after1
May, bogged down ammunition resupply and made it difficult for the
chemical mortars, as well as other supporting weapons, to keep up with
the infantry. The over-all shortage of chemical mortar shell was partly
a result of the higher priority of the European theater. But as in the
case on Luzon, 35,000 of the 87,400 rounds of high explosive ammuni-
tion received from the zone of interior were in lots suspected of having
defective fuzes. Indeed, a muzzle burst was reported by Company B of
the 88th on 13 May, the date on which 14 men were listed as wounded
in action. The Navy transferred 27,000 rounds of HE shell not em-
64
(1) 10th Army, Rpt of Opns in the Ryukyus Campaign, ch. X, sec. 3; ch. II, sec. 6. (2) 1st
Marine Div, Special Action Rpt, Okinawa Nansei Shoto, ch. X, p. 13. (3) History of Cml Sec
AFMIDPAC and Predecessor Comds, 7 Dec 41-2 Sep 45, 4 vols., IV, an. II-i, 22, 33, 49. (4)
383d RCT S-3 Rpts, 10, 29 Apr 45.
ployed in amphibious support operations, but the use of much of this

was "restricted to military necessity." The average mortar company
expenditures of approximately 335 rounds per day was made possible
only by substitution of WP for HE shell, by the above Navy transfers,
by dispatch of 50,000 heavy-weight M4 rounds from Hawaii, and by
the replacement of all defective fuzes, shipped by high priority air ship-
ment from Hawaii and the United States.65
Amphibious Employment of the 4.2-Inch Chemical Mortar

Before the War Department authorized the high explosive mission for
the 4.2-inch mortar and before any chemical mortar units reached the
theaters of operations, the CWS was developing doctrine for the use
of the mortar in assault landings. Beginning in the summer of 1942
this doctrine was developed at the Amphibious Training Center, Camp
Edwards, Mass., and continued at Camp Carabelle, Fla. (later Camp
Gordon Johnston). Overseas, the U.S. Assault Training Center in
England advocated the use of 4.2-inch WP shell for smoke screens for
assault landings except in the case of offshore winds, when only high
explosives would be used.66 Elements of the 3d Chemical Mortar Bat-
talion sailed from North Africa for Sicily prepared to support the 3d
Division with mortars mounted on six assault craft, a measure made
67
unnecessary with the attainment of tactical surprise.
Despite these preparations in the European theater the amphibious
employment of the 4.2-inch mortar occurred only in the Pacific. Col-
onel Unmacht first suggested the technique to Navy officers in July
1943 at the Makua, Oahu, demonstrations. The Navy liked the idea
and played around with it for almost a year. The advantage of the mor-
tar boat plan was that it provided assault troops with heavy effective
fire during that period in the landings when they were most vulnerable
—the time between the lifting of the naval bombardment and the estab-
lishment of supporting weapons on shore.
65
(1) Tenth Army, Rpt of Opns in the Ryukyus Campaign, ch. II, sec. XIII, Chemical Warfare,
pp. II-XIII-4, 7. (2) Tenth Army Island Comd, Action Rpt Okinawa, 30 Jun 45, pp. 8-XII-3, 4.
(3) History CWS AFMIDPAC, II, an. I-d, 63, 69-71, 82; V, an. II i, 22. (4) Rad CM-IN535.2,
6 May 45. (5) Rad CM-IN 22045, 23 May 45.
66
(1) Ltr, Chief Field Serv CWS to CG SOS, 27 May 42, sub: Amph Use of 4.2-inch Cml Mortar.
(2) USATC ETO, Conf on Landing Assaults, 24 May-23 Jun 43, 2-c. See addresses by Maj Gen
Roberts, Brigadier Wales, and Col Rowan. (3) USATC Tng Memo AMPH-4A CWS, Jan 44.
67
History of 3d Cml Bn in Campaign of Sicily, pp. 1-2.
In a remarkable case of CWS-Navy co-operation, the kind which

typified the activities of Colonel Unmacht on Oahu, there emerged
a new type of craft, one armed with 4.2-inch chemical mortars. It
was not born without difficulty. The Navy provided three LCT's for
the project and later several LCI's. The latter, dubbed LCI (M) (the M
for mortar), were to become the standard mortar-landing craft com-
68
bination.
One of the principal mechanical difficulties in firing the 4.2-inch
mortar from the deck of a ship was the development of a suitable
mount. The Navy experimented with various devices including one
which mounted the mortar solidly in the deck of an LCT. Fourteen
rounds fired from the weapon were sufficient to shear the bolts holding
the base cap cup to the deck. The mount finally adopted consisted
of a wooden box reinforced with steel and filled with a mixture of sand
and sawdust. Upon this mixture sat a wooden subbase, the top of
which was notched to receive the spades of the base plate. These mounts
proved adequate, although excessive firing, such as at Iwo Jima, caused
them to break down.
The first attempt to get the mortar boats into action proved abortive.
Favorably impressed with these vessels during seven tests again run at
Makua in the spring of 1944, the Navy decided to use three of the 4.2-
inch-mortar-equipped LCT's in the invasion of Saipan. These plans
went awry during the assault rehearsal off Kahoolawe, one of the
Hawaiian group. Each of the three LCT's was lashed to the deck of
a landing ship tank, for the decision had been made for the smaller
vessel to make the long journey to the scene of operations in this piggy-
back fashion. During an extremely heavy sea two of the LCT's broke
their lashings and were washed overboard. The third LCT escaped this
fate only to be destroyed at Pearl Harbor when its LST suddenly ex-
ploded. Fifty-nine people lost their lives in the resulting holocaust.69
Before the end of the Marianas campaign, the Navy revived the
mortar boat project. This time the weapons were to be mounted on
landing craft, infantry (LCI), four of which were fitted out, each
70
with three 4.2-inch mortars. One weapon was mounted forward in
the center of the ship, the others were amidships, one on the port side
68
Ltr, CCmlO CENPAC to ACCWS for Field Opns, 24 Apr 44, sub: Use of 4.2 Mortars in LCT's.
69
(1) History, CWS AFMIDPAC, IV, an. II-d, 37-38. (2) Maj. Carl W. Hoffman, Saipan: The
Beginning of the End (Washington, 1950), pp. 32-33.
70
Ltr, CCmlO Central Pacific Area to ACCWS for Field Opns, 24 Jul 44.
FIRING 4.2-lNCH CHEMICAL MORTARS FROM THE DECK OF AN LST in the Pacific.
and one on the starboard. All fired forward, over the bow. Beneath
the mortar mounts the deck was reinforced with steel plating. The
two forward troop compartments served as magazines for mortar am-
munition, a normal complement being 1,200 rounds. Maj. Leland
E. Anderson of the 88th Chemical Mortar Battalion commanded the
mortarmen who had come from diverse sources: 4 officers from the
88th, 12 enlisted men from the 91st Chemical Mortar Company, and
4 officers and 88 enlisted men from the 111th Infantry Regiment.
Designated as LCI (M) Nos. 739, 740, 741, and 742, the mortar boats
were earmarked for the campaign in the Palaus. The four boat crews
prepared for the operation by test runs at the Makua site in the Ha-
waiian Islands and by participation in the invasion rehearsal at Guadal-
canal.71
71
(1) Maj Leland E. Anderson, Rpt on Mortar Activity Aboard USS LCI (M)'s 739, 740, 741, 742,
30 Jul-30 Sep 44, dated 10 Oct 44. (2) History, AFMIDPAC, CWS IV, an II-d, 39, 74-75.
Palau Islands
The first combat employment of chemical mortar boats took place
72
on 15 September 1944 in the Palau Islands. Led by Major Anderson,
mortar boats 739, 740, 741, and 742 supported the III Amphibious
Corps landings on Peleliu made by the 1st Marine Division. During
the initial run on the island LCI (M) 's, moving in at a speed of less than
three knots, fired 100 rounds of high explosive ammunition from
positions 3,000 to 1,300 yards offshore at the very slow rate of one
round per mortar every two minutes. As the mortar boats drew closer,
the range of the weapons was decreased by reducing the number of
increments.73 This method of fire was sometimes known as Plan BAKER.
Mortar fire covered the northern flank of White Beach for a depth of
200 to 300 yards, with only a few water bursts being observed. These
supporting boats lifted their fire as friendly aircraft strafed the beach
only to resume it from fixed positions 900 to 1,300 yards offshore.
The mortars then placed harassing fire upon the dense woods, areas
of defilade, and possible enemy observation posts and installations on
the hill to the northwest. Good dispersion resulted from this fire,
delivered at ranges varying between 2,100 and 2,610 yards, although
the thick foliage and defiladed areas precluded effective observation.
The employment of mortar boats from fixed offshore positions was
often designated Plan CHARLIE.
A second mission at Peleliu began about an hour after the end of
the first run and consisted of the bombardment of the same hill area
northwest of the beach area, its rocky top by now a mass of rubble.
Firing at ranges of 3,200 yards, each mortar delivered two rounds of
high explosive shell a minute from more or less stationary positions
1,800 to 2,100 yards offshore. While winds and currents at Peleliu
were not strong enough to cause excessive drift, the little movement
which did occur made precise firing difficult. Radar ranges taken by
LCI (M) 741, the flagship, as well as visual cross-bearings and fall of
shot observations, helped to fix the ship positions and to determine
ranges as the vessels drifted or maneuvered. In any event, the resulting
dispersion was not detrimental to the general mission of laying down
72
For a complete account of the use of mortar boats in this operation, see Maj. Leland E. Anderson,
Employment of LCI (M) in Peleliu and Anguar Operation, Chemical Corps School Monograph, 1949-
50 series.
73
Mortar range is determined by elevation of the barrel and by the addition of increments, small
rectangles of powder-impregnated paper, which serve as the propellant charge.
area harassing fire. Enemy mortar fire during the two runs proved
ineffective, most rounds falling short.
Firing from a moving boat had little effect upon the accuracy of
the mortar. In rough seas lateral, but not vertical, accuracy was im-
paired. And the latter was the more important factor because of the
possibility of hitting friendly troops as they advanced inland.74
Two days later, on 17 September, the same four mortar boats sup-
ported the 81st Division assault on the island of Angaur, also in the
Palaus. Instead of executing Plan BAKER immediately, as had been
done at Peleliu, all craft fired on abbreviated Plan CHARLIE—6 to 10
rounds per mortar per minute for 7 minutes from positions 2,400
yards offshore. The group of gunboats then moved toward shore at
a speed of four knots. It took 10 minutes to come within 1,000
yards of the beach, during which time each of the mortars fired at
the rapid rate of 20 rounds per minute. Excessive noise made the
commands of the fire control officer virtually inaudible while smoke
did much to hinder observation. Despite these handicaps most of
the 2,345 rounds landed in the target area and inflicted extensive
damage.
On the following day infantry troops on shore, pinned down by
rifles and machine guns, called for supporting fire. There was time
for only 2 runs, one of 6 and the other of 8 minutes, at speeds of 4
and 3 knots, respectively. The target area, located on the northwest
end of the island, varied in width from 500 to 850 yards and extended
from the shore to a depth of 900 yards. At an average firing rate of
5 rounds per mortar per minute, 830 rounds fell in the area. Mine
fields prevented the mortar boats from approaching closer than 1,500
yards from shore, but the effectiveness of the mortar barrage was
such that 3 minutes after it had been lifted the troops, previously
pinned down by enemy fire, encountered no opposition on advancing
into the heavy woods.
At the end of the Palau operation CWS officers recommended that
mortars on boats making the run toward the shore maintain a constant
elevation of 1,000 mils with traverse dependent upon the course of
the(1) craft.
74
TheyPacific
CmlO Central also Base
suggested thatUSAFICPA,
Comd to CmlO mortar 14fireJul be kept
44, Rpt within
of Tests 400
on Use of
4.2-inch Mortars in LCT's. (2) Action Rpt Comdr Amphib Group 2—Iwo Jima, pt. IV, Naval
Gunfire Support, sec. B, Comments and Recommendations on Fire Support Employ of Gunboat,
Mortar, and 5-inch Rocket LCI's. Both in CMLHO.
yards of the assault troops and that mortar ships maintain an offshore
range of between 3,200 and 2,000 yards as a precaution against enemy
fire. The latter recommendation was disregarded; subsequently, mor-
tar ships came within 500 yards of the shore. Suggestions about the
more effective installation of the mortars on the ships were either not
75
adopted or proved to be without merit.
Leyte Gulf
Two groups of mortar ships supported the landings at Leyte Gulf
on 20 October 1944. Each group was composed of four LCI(M)'s,
with two LCI (A)'s serving as ammunition ships. Maj. Richmond H.
Skinner, CWS, exercised over-all command of mortar firing personnel
of the groups. Men from the 98th Infantry Division stationed at
Hawaii manned all twenty-four mortars in the two groups and fired
in support of the 7th and 96th Divisions under XXIV Corps in the
Leyte landings made near Dulag. From the date of departure from
Manus Island on 11 October until the objective was reached, these
new mortar crews received training in firing methods and commands.
One of the groups (it was known as Group 2) executed Plan BAKER
at Orange Beach 2 as mortar boats moved in at a speed of 1½ knots,
firing from 2,200 to 400 yards offshore and expending about 480
rounds of HE in 20 minutes. A slow rate of fire of two rounds per
gun per minute was maintained while the range was gradually decreased
from 2,600 to 740 yards. Twelve hundred yards from the shore enemy
mortars or howitzers straddled the mortar boats without causing casual-
ties or damage. The weather was ideal and the sea relatively calm.
After execution of Plan BAKER these mortar boats fired from fixed
positions (Plan CHARLIE) on enemy positions in the ravines and on
reverse slopes of the Labiranan Head Ravine and Catmon Hill area,
silencing the Japanese guns which had been plaguing the troops on
the beaches. According to one Navy observer, this mission, completed
without observation from computed data and fired at distances from
1,000 to 1,900 yards offshore, proved accurate beyond expectations.
Later, Group 2 moved back to the transport area, twelve miles to the
75
(1) ExecO 88th Cml Mortar Bn, Rpt on Mortar Activity Aboard USS LCI(M) 739, 740, 741,
742, 30 Jul-30 Sep 44, dated 10 Oct 44, pp. 4-6, 15-17, 21-28. (2) Comdr Admin Comd Amphib
Forces U.S. Pac Fleet, Plans for Delivery of 4.2" Mortar Fire from LCI(M)'s Equipped With M-1
Modified Cml Mortar Mounts, 11 Jul 45, p. 1. (3) Excerpts from Opns Div, Info Bull, vol. III,
No. 7, 13 Dec 44. (4) History, CWS AFMIDPAC, IV, an II-d, 61, 78, 79.
rear, for resupply. It received no further missions that day. There-

after, until they withdrew on the morning of A plus 5, the mortar
boats of this group used smoke pots to screen the large vessels from
air raids during the hours of both morning and evening twilight.
On the morning of the attack on the Leyte beaches the other group
of mortar boats (known as Group 3) fired on targets south of Yellow
Beach as far as the mouth of the Daguitan River near the town of
Dulag. Spaced from 50 to 75 yards apart the mortar boats began firing
1,500 yards from shore and continued as they slowly moved in to a
position 400 yards from the beaches. This bombardment blanketed an
area 800 yards wide and 900 yards deep. Fifteen minutes after this
beach shelling phase, the mortars began firing on call. Within the next
five hours infantry requests for support resulted in the expenditure of
almost 4,500 rounds. The ships slowly drifted to the left directing
their fire on enemy targets on the south bank of the Daguitan River
and on the approaches of a bridge across that river, an effort which
drove enemy tanks from the road leading to the bridge.
Both mortar boat groups received written commendations from the
leaders of the flotillas which they supported, as well as from the com-
manders of Amphibious Groups 3 and 6. Admiral Forrest B. Royal,
commander of Group 6, stated: "The performance of LCI's equipped
with 4.2" Army mortars was excellent. The mortar fire was delivered
in a rapid, accurate, and effective manner." Admiral Royal compared
the effectiveness of the mortar ships and the rocket ships.76 While
praising the "highly successful accomplishments" of both weapons, he
pointed out that the rocket ships were of no further use after their
single crash concentration because they were unable to reload in time
to continue covering the assault waves. On the other hand, the mortars
77
could fire without letup.
Lingayen Gulf
For a short time after the recall of the mortar boats from the Leyte
fighting, future plans for their use were hazy because of the lack of
76
3d Ind, Adm Forrest B. Royal, USN, Comdr Group 6 Amphib Forces U.S. Pac Fleet, to CINCPAC,
21 Nov 44, to Ltr, CO USS LCI 660, 31 Oct 44, sub: USS LCI(M) 660—Action Rpt of Leyete Opn.
Cited in History, CWS AFMIDPAC, IV, an. II-d, 100.
77
(1) Comdr Amphib Group 6 and Task Unit 79.2, Rpt of Leyte Opn, 4 Nov 44, pp. 5, 7-8. (2)
Ltr, Comdr Task Unit 79.6.21 and Comdr Group 17 to COMINCH, 4 Nov 44, sub: Action Rpt.
(3) Ltr, Comdr LCI (M) Group 18 Temp and Comdr Task Unit 79.7.3 to COMINCH, 23 Oct 44,
sub: Action Rpt, Invasion of Philippines, Island of Leyte. All in CWS 314.7.
78
information regarding the Luzon operation. Both groups did proceed
to New Guinea to pick up men from the 98th Chemical Mortar Bat-
talion, a step made necessary when four landing craft, infantry, which
had served as ammunition carriers during the Leyte action, were con-
verted to mortar boats. All mortar craft participated in the mid-
December training exercise in Huon Gulf, which simulated the landings
that were to take place at Lingayen Gulf, Luzon.
As it turned out, three separate mortar boat groups supported the
Sixth Army landings on Luzon. One of these was Task Unit 79.8.1,
composed of six LCI (M)'s and commanded by Lt. Comdr. G. W.
Hannett and accompanied by Maj. Richmond Skinner. A second group
was formed from the converted ammunition carriers, with mortarmen
from the 98th Chemical Mortar Battalion. A third group of three
LCI (M)'s had its mortars manned by marines, trained by and under
the supervision of a detachment from the 98th Chemical Mortar
Battalion.79
The six mortar boats of Task Unit 79.8.1 supported the XIV Corps
landings on the beaches of Lingayen Gulf and then stood ready to
furnish fire on call of the 185th Infantry, 40th Division, in its move-
ment inland. The mortar boats were to be ready for any special mission
that might arise, as well as to smoke the transport areas during the
hours of morning and evening twilight.
The fire plans for support of the assault wave were quite elaborate,
including time, range, and rate of fire for the period beginning thirty
minutes before the assault until fifteen minutes after the troops had
landed. White phosphorus ammunition was put aboard to be used
only in case of an onshore wind. General control of the mortar ships
was in the hands of the task group and task unit commanders, but
individual vessels maintained the responsibility for engaging specific
targets. Each mortar ship carried 1,200 rounds of HE, 100 rounds
of WP, as well as an ample supply of 20-mm. ammunition. Training
of the mortar crews continued even while en route to the objective.
Navy men received instruction in the handling of the mortars in the
event that casualties would bring a need for extra hands.
S-day for Luzon, 9 January 1945, found climatic conditions favor-
78
Unless otherwise noted, this account of the Lingayen Gulf operation is based on Hist, CWS
AFMIDPAC, vol. IV, an. II-d.
79
(1) 98th, First 120 Days on Luzon, p.1(2) CO USS LCI (M) 359 to COMINCH, 15 Jan 45,
Action Rpt, Luzon Opn.
able, with a mild offshore wind and visibility ranging from fifteen to
twenty miles. The swell of the sea caused some difficulty with landing
operations but did not seriously affect the mortar missions. Shortly
after 0600 the six mortar ships broke off from the main body, maneuv-
ering in zigzag fashion through the armada of support ships to their
initial positions 2,500 yards from shore. A few minutes later, an enemy
suicide bomber swooped down in attack. The Japanese plane itself
inflicted no damage, but five men from an LCI(M) received wounds
from a 20-mm. shell fired at the enemy by another vessel in the
formation. At 0845 the six mortar ships moved into their attack
positions; fifteen minutes later they began their scheduled fire.
The LCI (M)'s moved forward, blanketing the beaches to a depth
of almost 350 yards with accurate and devastating fire. As the craft
approached the shore the number of propellant charges on the mortar
shells was progressively decreased. Precise ranges were determined by
radar on several of the LCI(M)'s and passed on to the others by
prearranged visual signals. The only return fire came from enemy
mortars whose shells fell 600 yards offshore. Upon reaching a position
400 yards from shore the mortar boats laid to, but continued their
fire on the beaches as the first wave of assault troops passed through.
It was now 0934, the time when small arms fire support on the gun-
boats and mortar ships ceased; naval gunfire had been lifted when the
first wave reached a position 800 yards from shore.
The mortar crews continued their support from this close-in position.
At one stage a radio message was misinterpreted and four LCI(M)'s
ceased fire. Thick smoke precluded visual signals and fire was not
resumed until several minutes later, when the noise and smoke had
abated. During the initial phase of the assault the mortar unit expended
3,345 rounds of high explosive ammunition. Because of an offshore
breeze, only seven rounds of WP were fired, this for ranging in at a
position 2,600 yards from shore.
According to plan, the mortar ships ceased fire at 0951 and proceeded
obliquely to the port to take up positions some 800 yards offshore
where they could fulfill the second part of their mission. Although
the mortar boats stood ready to support the 185ht Infantry shortly
after 1000 on S-day, they received no calls for fire because the infantry-
men pushing inland to the Agno River encountered no enemy oppo-
sition. The mortar group spent the night of S-day anchored just off
the mouth of the river, and next morning placed area fire on enemy
troops which, according to the shore fire control party, effectively
routed the opposition. Some of the LCI (M)'s replenished their ammu-
nition supply from an LST standing by with a reserve of 4.2-inch
shells.
From S plus 1 until S plus 8 the group of mortar ships provided
twilight smoke concealment and escort service for the Liberty and
Victory ships in the San Fabian transport area, a mission which termi-
nated operations of Task Unit 79.8.1 at Luzon. During this period
its mortars fired more than 5,000 rounds of 4.2-inch ammunition; the
20-mm. guns of the unit expended almost 7,700 rounds during anti-
aircraft operations.
The second group of mortar boats, the four converted from the
ammunition detail, supported I Corps landings east of Dagupan. As
in the case of Task Unit 79.8.1, these LCI(M)'s provided the ships
in its vicinity with the concealment of smoke during the twilight
hours so susceptible of enemy air attack. On S plus 3 the group went
out of action, its mortar crews returning to their parent unit, the
98th Chemical Mortar Battalion. As far as casualties were concerned
this small unit fared rather badly; on S plus 1 an enemy E-boat tor-
pedoed the radar equipped flagship with a loss of 2 officers and 2
80
enlisted men.
Group 78.1.8, the smallest of the three mortar boat units, also sup-
ported the I Corps landings near Dagupan. From positions within
3,000 yards of the beach, each of the group's three mortar boats fired
about 100 rounds of high explosives onto a road and railroad track
just in from the shore. Advancing to within 1,000 yards of the beach,
the mortar boats engaged unspecified targets on both the forward and
reverse slopes of the low-lying hills, then retired to await call fire from
the 98th Battalion. No enemy fire was received from the beach. On
S plus 3 this group shelled a group of the enemy and the railroad station
81
south of Damortis.
Vice Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid, in command of the Lingayen land-
ings, was especially pleased with the work of the mortar boats, reporting
80
98th,First 120 Days on Luzon, pp. 1-2, 4.
81
CO USS LCI(M) 359 to COMINCH, 15 Jan 45, Action Rpt, Luzon Opn, pp. 1-2.
that they were more effective for beach neutralization than were escort
82
carrier-based planes.
Iwo Jima
The success of the mortar ships in Pacific assault operations prompted
the Navy to increase the number of this type of vessel.83 Some were
acquired and equipped in California, others at Pearl Harbor. The men
who were to fire the mortars on these boats were exclusively Navy men,
trained in Hawaii by a cadre from the 189th Chemical Mortar Com-
pany under the direction of Lt. Col. Joseph E. Atchison. Naturally,
the Navy crews had much to learn; many had never seen the mortar
before. To some this lack of knowledge meant apprehension of the
weapon, to others it meant incorrect employment, with damage and
danger as a consequence. There were several examples of a second shell
being placed in the mortar barrel on top of a misfire and one case
where the crew attempted to jam in three rounds. The training in
Hawaii, which included two test runs off the coast of Kahoolawe, went
a long way in correcting these inadequacies.
On 22 January 1945 the fourteen mortar boats left Pearl Harbor
for Iwo Jima where they were joined by the LCI(M) 's which had seen
action at Lingayen Gulf. Four CWS officers from the 189th Chemical
Mortar Company accompanied the Pearl Harbor contingent, attached
for the operation to the mortar group—five units of six ships each.
On the morning of 19 February 1945 the 4th and 5th Marine
Divisions landed on the beaches of the island of Iwo Jima in the face
of the heaviest enemy beach resistance since Tarawa.84 The bombard-
ment of the island that preceded the attack was the heaviest of the
Pacific war, one that benefited from the experiences of the island
assaults that had taken place before. Three of the five mortar units,
Numbers 1, 2, and 5, took part in the actual assault phase.
82
(1) Cited in Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, ch. IV. (2) In his final report, General Richard-
son commented on the "devastating mortar fire" which mortar boats placed on the beaches during
initial stages of the assault. Final Rpt of CG AFMIDPAC to CofS USA, 15 Mar 46.
83
Unless otherwise noted, the account of operations at Iwo Jima is based on:(1)CWS TofO Ltr
No. 25, 30 May 45, incl 4; (2) Hist, CWS AFMIDPAC, IV, an II-d, 127, V, an III-a, 87; (3) Ltr,
Lt Louis L. Mikolajewski, 189th Cml Mortar Co to 14th Cml Warfare Composite Bn, 10 Apr 45,
Observations From Aboard LCI(L) Mortar Ships During Invasion of Iwo Jima. All in CMLHO.
84
For an excellent account of the Iwo Jima operation, see Lt. Col. Whitman S. Bartley, Iwo Jima:
Amphibious Epic (Washington, 1954).
From H-hour minus 3 5 until H-hour minus 10 the mortars on these

vessels expended 3,240 rounds to bombard specific area targets on the
slopes of Mount Suribachi, the 550-foot extinct volcano which domi-
nated the southern end of the island. These mortar groups used a
maneuver sometimes described as Plan ABLE. In this plan five LCI (M) 's
of a mortar group moved counterclockwise in an elliptical pattern
around the sixth vessel, which served as the reference point. Each ship
fired only during the period of the run when it was pointed toward
the target area. The advantage of this maneuver was the attainment
of the high degree of accuracy needed for interdictory fire, accuracy
which could not be realized from the decks of sporadically moving
ships attempting to maintain a stationary position.
At H-hour Units 2 and 5, proceeding in columns, entered the boat
lanes from the west, turned shoreward, formed a line parallel with
the sixth wave, and followed it toward the beaches. Reaching a
position 2,000 yards from shore, the mortars began firing at a rate
of 6 rounds per minute and at a constant range of 3,200 yards. Stopping
1,000 yards from the beaches the mortar ships, now 200 yards apart,
maintained fire on a line 1,800 yards inland until H plus 60, when they
joined Mortar Support Units 3 and 4 in the rear to repair the damage
sustained by the mortar mounts and await further assignment. Group
1, still employing the elliptical maneuver of Plan ABLE, resumed action
at H plus 10 with almost four hours of neutralization fire. When this
mission terminated Group 1 joined the other units in the rear, thus
marking the end of mortar boat support during the assault landings
at Iwo Jima.
After this first day the LCI(M)'s, with but few exceptions, fired
only night-time missions of harassment and interdiction.85 The small
size of Iwo Jima (its surface area is only 7½ square miles) and its
triangular shape made sea support of land operations singularly appro-
priate. Mortar Units 2 and 5 complied with requests from the forces
on land for harassing mortar fire during the first night on shore.
Stationed off the eastern and western side of that point of the island
tipped by Mount Suribachi, the two mortar units placed fire on the
area between the opposing forces to prevent large-scale counterattacks
by the enemy. These missions saw the first significant use of white
phosphorus shell; as an aid to observation during these hours of dark-
85
Ibid., p. 83n.
ness every fifth round was WP. On subsequent nights mortar units
fired similar missions using Plan ABLE and also Plan CHARLIE. Because
of heavy counterbattery fire received by the mortar groups they were
sometimes directly supported by heavier vessels. The destroyer, USS
Shannon, for example, covered Mortar Unit 2 as the LCI(M)'s de-
livered harassing fire on the night of 23 February.
Three mortar boat groups departed on 26 February, and the two
that remained reorganized into 5-boat units. Thereafter this sort of
support gradually decreased until 3 March, by which time all mortar
boats had been recalled. During these last days individual LCI(M)'s
provided direct daylight support to shore battalions designated by the
Headquarters Landing Force.
Ammunition expenditure of all mortar boats at Iwo Jima came to
about 60,000 rounds, of which 20 percent was white phosphorus. The
resupply of mortar ammunition from LST to LCI(M) in a fairly
rough sea was not always an easy matter. Occasionally the boxes of
shell dropped a substantial distance to the deck of the mortar boat,
a circumstance which spoke well for the safety feature of the mortar
shell fuze. Weapon breakage in this operation caused little alarm
although the heavy firing frequently broke down the mortar mounts,
taking the weapon out of action for the extent of the mission. Iron
straps welded along the sides of the mounts eliminated some of this
weakness. Sometimes it was necessary to place bands over the subbase
of the mortar to keep it from jumping out of the mount. From all
accounts, the mortar crews performed in an exemplary manner; Rear
Adm. Harry W. Hill of Amphibious Group 2 termed the successful
use of "mortar gunboats" in the early phases of the assault "one of
the outstanding features of the operation." 86 According to CWS
sources, the Marine Corps expressed its enthusiasm for massed fire from
mortar boats during the early days of the landings.87
Operations in the Ryukyus

CWS-trained Navy crewmen manned a total of 60 LCI(M) 's which
supported Tenth Army in the Ryukyus Campaign. Six days before
the main assault of Okinawa, two 6-boat mortar groups supported the
diversionary effort against Kerama Retto made by the 77th Infantry
86
Quoted in CWS TofO Ltr 25, p.16.
87
History, CWS AFMIDPAC, I, sec. 3, 34.
Division. On 1 April 1945 the XXIV Army Corps and the III Am-
phibious Corps successfully carried out the main landings on the
western coast of Okinawa. Prior to H-hour on that morning seven
groups of LCI(M)'s, each comprised of six boats, lined up parallel to
the beach behind the assault troops. Each LCI(M) carried 1,000
rounds of HE and 200 rounds of WP. Using Plan BAKER, the 42 boats
moved through a calm sea at about one knot, their 126 mortars
opening up at a point 1,600 yards from shore at a rate of 10 rounds
per gun per minute. Firing over the heads of advancing troops the
mortars, in less than an hour, placed about 28,000 rounds on a beach
area 1,000 feet deep and 5½ miles wide. The mortar boats themselves
received no enemy fire.
Another group of LCI(M)'s supported the 2d Marine Division's
L-day feint against the southeast coast of Okinawa. Subsequent 77th
Division landings at Ie Shima on 16 April received the support of two
groups of mortar boats, while three days later a single group fired for
the ruse landing made by the same division in southern Okinawa. From
7 May until 27 June LCI (M) 's, in support of Army and Marine troops,
shelled the city of Naha and enemy installations in the vicinity of the
capital.88
The amphibious use of the 4.2-inch mortar was one of the major
contributions of the CWS to the Pacific war. The mortar boat proved
extremely effective for close infantry support just before, during, and
immediately after amphibious landings. It was then that the assault
troops, running the gantlet of enemy fire while attempting to secure
a foothold on the beach, benefited from all the support fire that
could be provided. The effectiveness of the mortars in this support
is best reflected in the steady increase in the number of mortar boats
committed to Pacific assault operations. Only four LCI(M)'s saw
action in the Palau fighting in September 1944; seven months later a
total of sixty supported Tenth Army operations in the Ryukyus.
88
(1) Tenth Army, Action Rpt Ryukyus, 25 Mar-30 Jun 45, vol. I, pp. 11-V-5, 7-III-2,
7-III-11. (2) Combat Rpt, 1st Lt John R. Ralston, CWS, 189th Cml Mort Co, sub: Use of
LCI(M)'s During the Okinawa Campaign, quoted in History, CWS AFMIDPAC, IV, an II-d,
132-35. (3) 77th Inf Div Opns Rpt ICEBERG, Phase I, Ie Shima, 1-27 Apr 45.
CHAPTER XIV
The Flame Thrower in the Pacific:

Guadalcanal to the Marshall Islands
The U.S. Army in World War II used two types of flame throwers,
the portable, carried on the soldier's back, and the mechanized,
mounted on an armored vehicle, usually a tank. Because flame could
penetrate ports and apertures and could be made to turn corners,
these special-purpose weapons proved extremely useful in overcoming
a determined enemy in strong, stubbornly held defensive positions,
invulnerable in most cases to conventional weapons.
The prototype for the portable flame thrower was devised by German
engineers sometime between 1900 and 1910. Introduced in World
War I against the French at Malencourt, it saw some service on the
Western Front where it proved to be a startling, if unreliable, assault
weapon. The British and French developed flame throwers of their
own by 1916, but the weapon, because of its short range, vulnerability,
and lack of tactical doctrine, had limited combat success. It was never
1
used by American troops.
During the interwar period the United States devoted little attention
to flame thrower research and development. Military men considered
it the least valuable incendiary munition and regarded its World War I
performance as a total failure, a fact which led the Chief of the
Chemical Warfare Service to remark: "In the Chemical Warfare
Service it has been the habit for a long while not to mention the flame
thrower at all, unless questions were asked about it." 2
Other nations did not concur in this appraisal. The weapon reap-
peared in the Abyssinian war of 1935—36, when the Italians employed
1
Capt. Henry Sorenson, "Flame Warfare," Canadian Army Journal, vol. 2, Nos. 5 & 6 (August
and September, 1948), pp. 31-32.
2
Fries and West, Chemical Warfare, p. 401. Maj. Gen. Amos A. Fries was Chief, CWS, from
1920 to 1929.
FLAME THROWERS: GUADALCANAL TO MARSHALLS 535
the first tank-borne flame thrower. Then in 1937 the Italians demon-
strated the use of flame throwers mounted in combat cars and other
armored vehicles. The civil war in Spain produced a few German
flame tanks. By mid-1940 intelligence reports revealed that the
Germans had employed flame throwers in Poland, in their attack on
the Belgian fort of Eben Emael, and in their drive across the Low
Countries and France.3 As these reports were scattered, often undocu-
mented, and usually highly colored, doubt remained as to the extent
of Axis preparation for the employment of flame throwers. But that
such weapons might be useful could no longer be denied by American
planners.
In 1940 the United States Army took steps toward the development
of a portable flame thrower. On 12 August 1940, the Secretary of
War charged the Chief of the Chemical Warfare with the development,
manufacture, storage, and issue of the weapon, and during the next year
4
the CWS developed two experimental models. The first, the E1, was
quickly discarded; the second, the E1R1, was tested and issued to
troops. This model, with slight modifications, was standardized as the
M1 portable flame thrower in August 1941. When certain basic
deficiencies appeared in this weapon and in the M1A1, an improved
version, CWS scientists produced an entirely new flame thrower, the
M2-2. This was the group of portable flame weapons used by the
U.S. Army in World War II. They were frequently ineffective and
faulty, particularly in hands of troops ill trained in matters of opera-
tions and tactics. But with the development of a better flame thrower,
and with the gradual improvement in tactics and training, this CWS
weapon came to play an important part in coping with the unique
conditions of the war against Japan.
3
For reports of flame thrower employment from 1935 to 1940, see:(1) Sorenson, "Flame Warfare,"
Canadian Army Journal, vol. 2, Nos. 7 & 8 (October and November, 1948), pp. 18-19; (2) Dept
of National Defense, Army (Canada), Cml Warfare Intell Summary, 3 Feb 42, sec. on Germany,
pp. F1-F5; (3) British Hist Monograph, Special Weapons and Types of Warfare, pt. III, Flame
Warfare Including Incendiaries, p. 110.
(1)
4
Correspondence leading to the portable flame thrower directive is found in CWTC Item 221,
10 Sep 40. (2) For a full discussion of the development and manufacture of the various portable
flame thrower models, see Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field, pp. 139-47.
The Portable Flame Thrower in the South Pacific

Guadalcanal
The American portable flame thrower made its first successful com-
bat appearance on 15 January 1943 at Guadalcanal, five months after
United States forces began the assault of this South Pacific island.
Although the weapon was not available at first, its potentiality against
enemy bunkers encountered on the islands—defenses which defied
ordinary weapons—soon became apparent. In speaking of the fighting
on nearby Tulagi, Maj. Gen. Alexander A. Vandegrift, commanding
the 1st Marine Division, stated that flame throwers would have been
"practical and effective'* against the strong Japanese defenses.5
The fortifications encountered on Guadalcanal were typical of those
to be found in subsequent fighting in the Pacific. These well camou-
flaged defenses were made of indigenous material reinforced by what-
ever metal was available. The compartment of a bunker could be
from 4 to 5 feet high, from 6 to 30 feet long, and from 3 to 10 feet
wide. Foot-thick coconut logs served as columns and crossbeams, the
latter covered by several layers of logs and, later in the war, by
quarter-inch sheets of steel. Walls were strengthened by iron or steel
rails and sheeting, log pilings, or oil drums filled with sand. The whole
elaborate framework was covered with earth and thoroughly camou-
flaged. Fire trenches, connected by shallow crawl tunnels, usually
adjoined the bunker, and entrances were placed in the rear end in
positions capable of being covered by other bunkers. Consequently,
Japanese bunkers were mutually supporting and practically impervious
to the effects of artillery and mortar fire. And they were manned by
an enemy who refused to be driven out, but who chose instead to fight
6
until death. There was an obvious and pressing need for a weapon
which could reduce such positions instantly and effectively. The
flame thrower offered a possible solution to the problem.
Late in 1942 the Americal and the 25th Infantry Divisions and the
2d Marine Division arrived on Guadalcanal to bolster the slackened
pace of the American offensive. Each carried a limited number of
flame throwers. Beginning in December 1942 a CWS officer conducted
5
Miller, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, pp. 65n, 244, 279n.
6
(1) Ibid., pp. 243-44. (2) Milner, Victory in Papua, pp. 141-43. (3) Ltr, CmlO XIV Corps
to CmlO USAFFE, II Aug 43, no sub. Sixth Army Cml Sec Rcds, 470.71, Portable Flame Throwers.
on-the-spot training of flame thrower operators, and by mid-January

1943 the troops were ready to give the weapon its initial combat test.7
On 15 January 1943 combat engineers of the 8th Marines, 2d Marine
Division, attacked enemy defenses surrounding a beach installation.
Late in the afternoon they encountered a particularly stubborn Japan-
ese pillbox, and 2 marines equipped with a flame thrower went forward
to silence it. Covered by automatic rifles, they crawled to within
25 yards of the position and fired the flame thrower at the bunker.
All resistance ceased, and the marines found 5 dead Japanese inside.
Although 2 of the enemy had managed to get out, neither had escaped
the effects of the flame. One lay 3 feet from the escape hatch, the
other had run about 15 feet before collapsing. Encouraged by this
result, Marine combat engineers went forward and within 20 minutes
wiped out 2 more enemy strongpoints with flame throwers.8
The 25th Infantry Division used flame throwers on the same day
with far less success. Employed by units of the 35th Infantry, the
weapons failed to wipe out enemy pillboxes or to materially aid the
assault. Since casualties were high, and malfunctions frequent, the
regiment decided not to employ its flame throwers in future engage-
ments.9 Nevertheless, the weapon was used throughout the mopping-
up phase of the campaign by other units and often proved a quick and
effective means of reducing difficult enemy positions.
If at the conclusion of the Guadalcanal operation the intrinsic merit
of the flame thrower was still in doubt, this combat experience with
the weapon did provide answers to several important tactical problems.
Units discovered that the flame thrower, because of its limited range
and short duration of fire, had to be used in conjunction with other
weapons in order to be effective. A trained security detachment armed
with rifles, automatic rifles, and smoke grenades was needed to keep the
enemy under cover long enough for the flame thrower operator to
approach and flame his target. Experience also showed that the engi-
7
Lt Col Leonard L. McKinney, CmlC Hist Study 4, Portable Flame Thrower Opns in World
War II, 1949, p. 39.
8
(1) Lt. Col. Orbie Bostick, "Mercy Killers," Chemical Warfare Bulletin, vol. 30, No. 1 (February-
March, 44), 16-17. (2) Miller, Guadalcanal: The first Offensive, p. 279.
9
(1) Miller, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, p. 295. (2) Rpt, Opns of the 25th Inf Div on
Guadalcanal, 17 Dec 42-5 Feb 43, p. 81. 25th Div 325-11.5.
neers were too busy with other jobs to handle the flame thrower; that
the weapon would be better utilized in the hands of the infantry.10
To take advantage of these lessons, the division on Guadalcanal,
under the direction of the recently activated XIV Corps, set up am-
bitious training programs. On 27 March 1943 the 25th Division pub-
lished a training memorandum which withdrew the weapon from the
combat engineers and gave it to the ammunition and pioneer platoon
of the infantry battalion. The division then organized a series of one-
day flame thrower schools to train eight men from each of these
platoons to use the weapons.11 Other units, many of whose chemical
and regimental gas officers had themselves been trained by the 25th
Division Chemical Section, organized similar training programs. By
mid-1943 the general state of flame thrower readiness of Army units
on Guadalcanal was relatively good.
New Georgia
Unfortunately, the two divisions on Guadalcanal which had received
the least amount of flame thrower training were to employ the weapon
on New Georgia. As elements of the 37th and 43d Divisions attacked
the western end of the island following their 30 June 1943 landings,
they discovered an extensive series of small enemy fortifications similar
to those encountered on Guadalcanal. Thoroughly camouflaged, these
pillboxes were hard to locate, and once located, even more difficult to
neutralize. Since they were organized in depth and mutually sup-
porting, it was almost impossible to approach them from the rear.
On 26 July 1943 three such positions, barely visible in the deep jungle
foliage, blocked the advance of the 103d Infantry, 43d Division, with
deadly machine gun fire. Capt. James F. Olds, Jr., a XIV Corps CWS
staff officer, suggested to the regimental commander the possibility of
using flame throwers. The co-ordinated attack which followed began
with a 30-minute artillery preparation. As this fire lifted, 6 flame
thrower operators from Company C of the 118th Engineer Combat
Battalion, supported by infantrymen, crawled toward the bunkers.
Reaching a point twenty yards from their target, 2 operators opened
fire, crisscrossing their streams of flame to burn off the covering
10
(1) Ltr, McKaig, to Hist Off, 26 Dec 56. Colonel McKaig was 25th Division chemical officer
on Guadalcanal. (2) McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, p. 40.
11
25th Inf Div Tng Memo No. 6, 27 Mar 43. Reproduced as App. 1 in McKinney, Portable
Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 230-32.
vegetation. The enemy positions for the first time became clearly
visible and the 4 other operators discharged their flame directly on
target. Resistance ceased in a matter of seconds, and the infantry
12
resumed its advance.
News of this success reached other units and they too began to
employ their flame throwers. Two days later, Pvt. Frank Kordeleski
of the 145th Infantry, 37th Division, burned out three Japanese pill-
boxes with a single flame thrower filling. The XIV Corps chemical
officer, Col. Robert Gay, reported that during the first six weeks on
New Georgia flame throwers had been employed against enemy posi-
tions on no fewer than fifty-four occasions.13
On New Georgia, as on Guadalcanal, the flame thrower's record
was not one of uninterrupted success. Often the inherent weaknesses
of the M1's and M1A1's were a source of considerable trouble to the
troops who used them. Alike in basic design, these models had two
major components, a fuel unit and a gun unit. The fuel unit, which
was strapped to the operator's back, consisted of two storage tanks for
fuel and one for compressed nitrogen. The nitrogen propelled the
fuel from the storage tanks, through the gun unit, onto the target.
The gun unit included a fuel tube, a long bent nozzle, a trigger, and
a valve to regulate the flow of fuel. The compact electrical system
included a battery, spark plug, and a small hydrogen cylinder. When
the trigger was pressed, a stream of hydrogen was released, the spark
plug ignited the hydrogen, and the resultant flame in turn ignited the
fuel as it passed through the gun unit. The complete flame thrower
weighed thirty-two pounds empty and seventy pounds filled. Since it
held only 5 gallons of fuel, its duration of fire was a mere eight to ten
seconds. The M1 had a range of 15 to 20 yards while the M1 Al, using
14
fuel thickened with napalm, was capable of firing 40 to 50 yards.
The inefficiency of the ignition system was particularly bothersome.
Operators found it expedient to carry thermite grenades for emer-
12
(1) Opn Journal, 118th Engr Bn, 29 Jun-21 Aug 43, dated 20 Sep 43. 118th Engr Bn 20433,
343-43.3. (2) Capt. James F. Olds, Jr., "Flame Throwers Front and Center," Chemical Warfare
Bulletin vol. 30, No. 3 (June-July, 1944), pp. 5-8. (3) Miller, CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of
Rabaul, p. 148.
13
Ltr, CmlO XIV Corps to CmlO USAFFE, 11 Aug 43.
14
TM 3-375, May 1943, Portable Flame Throwers M1 and M1A1.
gency use, as these grenades when hurled forward on unignited flame

thrower fuel would cause instantaneous ignition.15
Mechanical failure was not the sole factor contributing to unsatis-
factory performance. Of even greater significance was the fact that
neither the 37th nor the 43d Infantry Division had been extensively
trained in the use of the flame thrower before it was committed on
New Georgia. The operators in the26 July attack, albeit successful,
had received but one hour of instruction and this a scant three hours
before the assault! Commanders and operators had little understanding
of the proper tactical employment of the weapon. Adequate infantry
support was not always provided; in some cases not a single rifleman
was assigned as protection. Often there was no satisfactory reconnais-
sance before the mission, and operators who had been ordered to go
forward and clean out a lone machine gun emplacement, on reaching
a firing position, found several bunkers in front of them. In such
situations a single flame thrower was useless. Many company com-
manders, ignorant of flame thrower tactics, selected untrained men
and ordered them to take a flame thrower and "burn out the Japs," a
mission which promised little chance of success. Chemical officers
reported that the casualty rate among flame thrower operators was
directly related to the inadequate infantry support and planning
16
afforded flame thrower missions.
It was apparent that further training of operators and infantry
commanders in the tactical uses and limitations of the weapon was
essential. Equally obvious was the need for co-ordinated flame thrower
17
teams composed of operators and supporting riflemen.
Bougainville
Though divisions soon began intensified flame thrower training pro-
grams designed to overcome the shortcomings revealed on Guadalcanal
and New Georgia, few such projects were totally complete by1
November 1943, the date of the Bougainville landings. But progress
15
(1) Ltr, CmlO XIV Corps to CmlO USAFFE 15 Sep 45, no sub. Sixth Army Cml Sec Rcds,
470.71 Portable Flame Throwers. (2) CmlO 25th Div to CCWS, 25 Apr 43, Rpt of Cml Warfare
Activities on Guadalcanal Island. CWS 314.7 Portable Flame Thrower File.
16
(1) Ltr, CmlO XIV Corps to CmlO USAFFE, 15 Sep 43, no sub. (2) Ltr, ACmlO XIV Corps
to Cml XIV Corps, 30 Jul 43, sub: Rpt on Use of Flame Thrower. Sixth Army Rcds, 470.71
Portable Flame Throwers.
17
CmlO 25th Div to CG 25th Div, 20 Nov 43, Rpt, Flame Thrower Opns During the New Georgia
Campaign.
had been made, and when Army and Marine units encountered formid-
able Japanese defensive installations on Bougainville improvised flame
thrower teams generally were available.
On 11 December 1943 the forward advance of the 21st Regiment,
3d Marine Division, was halted by an enemy position on Hill 1000.
One of the Marine Corps officers described the obstacle as follows:
The reverse slope position was encountered here, fox-holes at the
foot of a knoll with a ten-yard field of fire to the top of the k n o l l …
Interlocking lines of grazing automatic fire were integrated such that
approach to the knoll from any direction was cleverly and effectively
covered. Little room existed for maneuver on the ridge and due to the
height and number of trees 60 and 81 mm. mortars were relatively
ineffective. The hill mass likewise constituted a partial mask to the
18
supporting artillery.
The marines hammered at this position for seven days without
success. Finally, on 18 December 1943, Hill 1000 was hit by two
heavy air strikes. Right after this, six flame throwers, their operators
organized in teams, accompanied riflemen in a converging action on
the position. The flame throwers supported the infantry advance and
19
aided substantially in destroying enemy positions.
Less successful was the experience during November and December
of the 19th Marine Regiment, which found the weapon incapable of
neutralizing enemy strongpoints because of its short range. Never-
theless, flame terrified the enemy and on several occasions caused him
20
to flee from his defensive positions.
The 37th Infantry Division found little use for flame throwers
during its first two months on Bougainville. The division's 8-man
flame thrower squads (one per battalion ammunition and pioneer
platoon) suddenly became busy in March.21 In heavy action on Hill
700 eleven separate flame thrower attacks took place, each resulting in
18
Lt Col Frank M. Reinecke, USMC, MS, Hellsapoppin Ridge, 8-18 December 1943, The Bougainville
Campaign: A Study of Offensive Principles, 1947, p. 10. Marine Corps School, MOS LOG #208-48(c).
19
(1) Ibid., pp. 17, 19-32. (2) CO 21st Marines to CG 3d Marine Div, 31 Jan 44, Rpt of Opn on
Bougainville, in 3d Marine Div Combat Rpt, 1 Nov-28 Dec 43, dated 21 Mar 44. Marine Corps
Archives, A 5-2.
20
CO 19th Marine Regt to CG 3d Marine Div, n.d., Rpt of Opns, Nov-Dec 43. 3d Marine Div
Combat Rpt, 1 Nov-28 Dec 43, dated 21 Mar 44. Marine Corps Archives, A5-2.
21
(1) Ltr, CmlO 37th Div to CmlO XIV Corps, 11 Jan 44, sub: Informal Combat Rpt of Lessons
Learned in Combined New Georgia & Bougainville Opns. XIV Corps Rpts. (2) Maj Gen Oscar W.
Griswold, Bougainville: An Experience in Jungle Warfare, pp. 37-44.
the reduction of a pillbox. In one assault flame thrower teams reduced

22
two adjacent pillboxes, killing 20 Japanese in one and 25 in the other.
The Americal Division, also committed on Bougainville, set up an
extensive organization for flame thrower operations. Recalling the
haphazard organization on Guadalcanal, the division decided to build
within each of its regiments a provisional flame thrower platoon. Under
the supervision of the division chemical officer, Maj. Woodson C.
Tucker, the first of these units was formed and assigned to the 132d
Regiment Headquarters Company on 18 February 1944. The platoon
had a 5-man headquarters and six 4-man squads, each allotted two
flame throwers. Similar units were organized within the 182d and
164th Regiments, and all three underwent extensive training to develop
squad and platoon teamwork and to familiarize individuals with all
the weapons of the squad. Exercises stressed co-ordination of rifle
units and flame thrower teams, since tacticians had decided that should
flame thrower targets appear, squads from the platoon working in
23
conjunction with the infantry units would be detailed to attack them.
Only two of the three provisional flame thrower platoons, those of
the 132d and the 182d Regiments, saw combat action on Bougainville.
Both units took part in the bitter fighting in March 1944 on Hill260
and during April in the battle of Mavavia in the eastern part of the
island. The provisional flame thrower platoons were highly successful
in each action. In its first commitment in combat on Hill 260 the
132d Regiment's flame unit reduced eight enemy pillboxes in one
hundred seconds of actual firing. The platoon reduced two more on
11March 1944 while supporting the assault of Company B, 182d
24
Regiment, on an observation post on the same hill. From 7 to 9 April,
the provisional flame thrower platoon of the 182d Infantry regiment
supported troops of the 93d Division at Mavavia. Assigned primarily
22
XIV Corps Rpt on Lessons Learned in the Bougainville Opns, n.d., pp. 4-5. CWS 314.7
Portable Flame Thrower File.
23
(1) History, Flame Thrower Platoon of the 132d Inf Regt, Apr 44. CWS 314.7, Portable
Flame Thrower File. (2) CmlO, Americal Div to ACofS G-3 Americal Div, 7 Nov 44, Rpt, Flame
Thrower, and Incls. CWS 3 14.7 Portable Flame Thrower File.
24
History, Flame Thrower Platoon of the 132d Infantry Regiment, Apr 44. CWS 314.7 Portable
Flame Thrower File. (2) Griswold, Bougainville: An Experience in Jungle Warfare, pp. 96-114.
The Griswold account (pages 119-20) tells of another use of flame in the fierce fighting for Hill 260.
Two Navy men got 200 feet of flexible pipe, connected it to a drum of gasoline, and used oxygen
pressure to pump the liquid into Japanese pillboxes. The gasoline was ignited by white phosphorous
grenades. See also Miller, CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul, p. 372. For further attempts
at this type of improvisation, see below, pp. 567-68.
to mopping-up activities, flame thrower operators followed tanks and

fired into all pillboxes and suspicious holes. Later in April the platoon
supported its parent unit, the 182d Regiment, this time during the
fighting in the upper Laruma Valley.25
The portable flame thrower's highly impressive record on Bougain-
ville, coupled with its earlier performance on Guadalcanal and New
Georgia, clearly demonstrated the value of the weapon in jungle fight-
ing. Despite its shortcomings the flame thrower had made a fairly
auspicious beginning. Work remained to be done; as late as April 1944
the XIV Corps recognized that " …the tactical capabilities of this
weapon have not yet been fully developed." 26 In preparation for the
move to the Philippines the XIV Corps and the four Army divisions
in the South Pacific (the 25th, 37th, 43d, and Americal) intensified
their training efforts and reorganized their flame thrower teams.27
The Southwest Pacific: The First Years

While the portable flame thrower was winning a good name in
the South Pacific theater, it was getting a reputation of a wholly
different sort in the Southwest Pacific. The origins of its notoriety
go back to December 1942 and the Papua Campaign.
Papua
On 6 December Col. Clarence M. Tomlinson, commanding officer
of the 126th Infantry, 32d Division, asked the 114th Engineer Combat
Battalion for several flame throwers and operators to help overcome
enemy machine gun emplacements near the village of Buna. The
engineers, equipped with the E1R1 flame thrower, immediately set
about testing and servicing these weapons. Although the inspections
showed that several of the gas cylinders had developed leaks, some
from rust, some from defective material, the flame throwers functioned
28
reasonably well, if at a maximum range of only 20 yards. Five
25
Ltr, CO 182d Inf Regt to CmlO Americal Div, 31 Oct 44, sub: Present Status of the Flame
Thrower Platoon. CWS 314.7 Portable Flame Thrower File.
26
An. No. 3 to XIV Corps Tng Memo No. 8, 29 Apr 44, sub: Tng in the Use of Flame Throwers.
Reproduced as app. 3 in McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, p. 248.
27
(1) Ibid., pp. 251-52. (2) Incl 2 to 37th Div Tng Memo No. 7,26 Sep 44, sub: Tng in the
Use of Flame Throwers. Reproduced as app. 4 in McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp 253-57.
28
(1) Ltr, CO 114th Engr Bn to CmlO MAPLE Base (Port Moresby), 19 Dec 42, sub: Malfunc-
tioning of Flame Throwers. CWS SPECVI 470.71/92. (2) Ltr, Col Frank M. Arthur to Hist Off,
3 Mar 59.
operators with two weapons, two refill tanks, and 25 gallons of fuel,
reported to the regiment on 7 December, and the next day the regi-
mental operations officer ordered the flame throwers into action.29
The target was an enemy machine gun bunker ingeniously concealed
at the edge of a kunai grass flat. While the flame throwers were being
brought forward, M/Sgt. John K. King, of the division chemical sec-
tion, and one of the company officers, Lieutenant Davidson, performed
the necessary reconnaissance. They identified the bunker in the midst
of its natural and artificial camouflage and exposed themselves in
order to draw fire and pinpoint the location of its ports. A partially
demolished breastwork about 35 yards from the bunker furnished
cover for anyone approaching the position. It was possible to advance
a bit farther toward the bunker in comparative safety through a
shallow trench which extended 5 yards out from the breastwork. This
would give the operator an attack position only 30 yards from his
target.
After the reconnaissance Lieutenant Davidson went forward again,
this time accompanied by Cpl. Wilber G. Tirrell, the engineer flame
thrower operator. Once more he drew fire from the bunker so that
the corporal could see the exact location of the ports.
The plan of operation was practicable and uncomplicated. Corporal
Tirrell, his weapon concealed in a burlap sack, was to advance as far
as possible in the shallow trench, thirty yards from his objective. As a
diversion, three men with automatic weapons were to crawl around
on the left flank and fire at the rear of the bunker. Lieutenant David-
son, Sergeant King, and four riflemen were to take positions behind
the breastwork, ready to rush the bunker with rifle fire and grenades
in the wake of the flame thrower. Corporal Tirrell was to advance
at least five yards beyond the end of the trench before releasing the
flame and was to keep advancing until the fuel was exhausted.
Before the men took their stations, they checked the flame thrower's
ignition system. At the proper moment, the group on the left flank
began its diverting fire. The enemy did not answer. Corporal Tirrell
moved from his position at the end of the shallow trench and headed
toward the bunker. Seven yards beyond the trench he released the
initial burst of flame and immediately Lieutenant Davidson and his
29
The following account is based on: Ltr, Actg Div CmlO 32d Div to CG 32d Div, 18 Feb 43, sub:
Rpt on the Activities of the 32d Inf Div Cml Sec During the Papuan Campaign. CWS 314.7
Portable Flame Thrower File.
party rushed out from behind the breastwork, only to find themselves
in serious trouble. Instead of a powerful burst of flame, the flame
thrower emitted a feeble 10-foot squirt, and the Japanese inside the
emplacement began pouring machine gun fire into the advancing
group. One of the riflemen was hit as soon as he left the cover of the
breastwork, Lieutenant Davidson was killed, and the others withdrew.
Corporal Tirrell continued to advance, trying vainly to get his weapon
to function properly. When he was less than fifteen yards from the
bunker he was stunned by a bullet which struck the front of his helmet
and he fell to the ground out of sight. During the night he crawled
back to safety. 30 Two days later the infantry overcame the position
31
by direct assault.
The cause of the Buna fiasco was never absolutely determined, but
its effect was immediate. The infantry's confidence in the flame
thrower was shattered. In January 1943 Colonel Copthorne, Chief
Chemical Officer, USAFFE, informed General Porter that "the way
the flame throwers let the infantry down at a critical point brought
them into such ill-repute that I am afraid that they may never want to
use them again." 32 In Washington Colonel Benner, chief of the CWS
Field Requirements Branch, stated that a weapon such as the flame
thrower with its "temperamental nature has no place in modern warfare
where ruggedness and reliability are essential." 33
But if the flame thrower was too temperamental to rely on, it was
potentially too useful to abandon. Back on New Guinea, Sergeant
King made one last effort to make flame throwers serviceable. New
weapons were flown in from Port Moresby, across the mountains, but
these, too, were unfit for use. They were checked and serviced and
30
(1) Initial reports of the action listed Corporal Tirrell as having died in the encounter. He
actually "played dead" after regaining consciousness and waited until dusk before returning to his
position. He did suffer a leg wound inflicted by an enemy rifleman as he escaped, but contrary to early
reports he survived and was recommended for citation for his valiant, though unsuccessful efforts.
(2) Ltr, Actg Div CmlO 32d Div to CG 32d Div, 18 Feb 43, sub: Rpt on Activities of the 32d Inf
Div Cml Sec During the Papuan Campaign. (3) Ltr, CO 114th Engr Bn to CmlO MAPLE Base APO
929, 19 Dec 42, sub: Malfunctioning of Flame Throwers. CWS SPECVI 470.71/92. (4) The
account of the Buna flame thrower operation found in Milner, Victory in Papua, page 250, based on
the earliest reports of the action, gives an incomplete account of the casualties.
31
On 15 December 1942 a flame thrower was employed against another enemy bunker near Buna.
The result was the same as at Buna the week before: the flame thrower "fizzed out and the Japanese
shot it up." Milner, Victory in Papua, p. 253.
32
Ltr, CCmlO USAFFE to CCWS, 6 Jan 43, no sub. CWS 319.1/101.
33
Ltr, Chief Field Rqmts Br to Chief War Plans and Theater Br, 18 Jan 43, sub: Malfunctioning
of Flame Throwers. CWS SPCUR 470.71/92.
parts interchanged in an attempt to get at least one weapon that

would function properly, but all efforts were unsuccessful.34
Matters of Maintenance, Supply, and Training
During the first nine months of 1943 the 1 0 t h Chemical Maintenance
Company at Brisbane, commanded by Capt. John J. Shaffer, con-
ducted extensive flame thrower tests in order to locate the major sources
of trouble, a project which included the thorough overhaul of all flame
throwers in the Southwest Pacific Area. The unit discovered that most
malfunctions resulted from deteriorated cylinders and batteries which
had succumbed to the deleterious temperatures and humidity of the
tropics. All flame throwers shipped to the Southwest Pacific or carried
as equipment by units arriving in the area were thoroughly tested,
repaired, and waterproofed by trained technicians under the direction
of Colonel Copthorne and his staff. Though fundamental defects
remained, the work of the SWPA Chemical Section went a long way
in effectively preventing a repetition of the mishaps suffered on Buna.
Meanwhile, Sixth Army began a comprehensive analysis of the
Papua Campaign in an attempt to discover an effective means of
reducing Japanese bunkers. The experience of its subordinate units
indicated that these fortifications generally could not be destroyed by
artillery or mortar fire. Only the foot soldier armed with normal
infantry weapons could do the job. Having located a bunker, infantry-
men either had to outflank it or to launch repeated frontal assaults
until the enemy was overcome. Either tactic normally resulted in
heavy casualties.
Although the flame thrower had performed dismally at Buna, Sixth
Army had received reports of the successful use of the weapon on
35
Guadalcanal and New Georgia. On the basis of these reports it
appeared that a dependable flame thrower could be the answer to the
problem of pillbox destruction. By October 1943 the rigorous tests
conducted by the 1 0 t h Chemical Maintenance Company demonstrated
that the flame thrower could be made reliable. Sixth Army therefore
decided to include the weapon in its future combat operations and
asked that Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Far East, increase the
34
Ltr, Actg Div CmlO 32d Div to CG 32d Div, 18 Feb 43, sub: Rpt on the Activities of the 32d
Inf Div Cml Sec During the Papuan Campaign.
35
(1) Ltr, CmlO XIV Corps to CmlO USAFFE, 11 Aug 43, no sub. (2) Ltr, CmlO XIV Corps
to CmlO USAFFE, 15 Sep 43, no sub. Both in Sixth Army Cml Sec Rcds, 470.71 Flame Thrower.
allotment of flame throwers from twenty-four to sixty per infantry

division. This request was approved on 19 October 1943.36
Welcome as these decisions were to the CWS, they raised serious
problems for chemical officers in the Southwest Pacific. The first diffi-
culty was related to supply. Flame throwers, spare parts, accessory
kits, and fuel had become exceedingly scarce at the beginning of 1943.
Colonel Morcock, Chemical Officer, USASOS SWPA, had requisitioned
308 M1A1 flame throwers from the United States in March 1943,
37
and had repeated his plea two months later. In July the first shipment
of M1A1's arrived to replace obsolete E1R1 and M1 models and by
August supplies of M1A1's were sufficient to cover the authorized
allowances of Sixth Army units.38 This balance of supply and demand
was upset in October when, as just noted, General MacArthur's head-
quarters approved Sixth Army's request for the sixty flame thrower
allotment for each infantry division. Not until the beginning of 1944
did enough M1A1's again become available to meet increasing combat
and training needs. Supplies of spare parts and accessories never did
catch up with requirements and both continued in critical demand for
the duration of the war.39
Two additional factors complicated the supply picture. First, many
of the new flame throwers were unusable because of missing or defective
parts or because of improper packing or waterproofing.40 Upon arrival
from the United States, these weapons had to be turned over to
chemical units for inspection, servicing, and rewaterproofing. Second,
it was exceedingly difficult to obtain needed quantities of compressed
hydrogen and nitrogen. Because of the shipping shortage, these gases
were not sent from the United States and had to be procured at great
36
Ltr, CG Sixth Army to CG USAFFE, 4 Oct 43, sub: Portable Flame Throwers, and Inds.
Sixth Army Rcds, 470.71 Flame Thrower.
37
Ltr, CmlO USASOS SWPA to SupO Cml Br Overseas Sup Div San Francisco Port of Embarkation,
(Oakland, Calif.), 7 Jun 43, sub: Portable Flame Throwers, New M1A1, and Accessories. GSWC
470.7 in CWS SPCVO 470.71 APO 501.
38
Ltr, CG USAFFE to CG Sixth Army, 21 Aug 43, sub: Flame Throwers, Portable, M1A1, Sixth
Army Rcds, 470.71 Flame Throwers.
39
See above, ch. VI.
40
(1) Ltr, CG 41st Inf Div to CG USASOS SWPA 27 Oct 43, sub: Condition of Flame Throwers.
(2) Ltr, CmlO USASOS SWPA to CmlO's Intermediate and Adv Secs USASOS and CmlO's Bases
A, B, D, E, and F, 15 Dec 43, sub: Flame Throwers. Both in Sixth Army Rcds, 470.71 Flame Thrower.
expense and trouble either from naval or air units in the area or from
Australian firms.41
Even more serious than the problem of supply was that of training.
Since the flame thrower was a comparatively new weapon, and until
1943 one largely assigned to the engineers, few of the troops in the
Southwest Pacific had been trained to use it. With the allotment in
October 1943 of 12 flame throwers to each infantry regiment, it for
the first time became necessary to extend flame thrower training to
the infantry. The magnitude of the job can be judged by the Sixth
Army requirement that each rifle company, cavalry troop, and ammu-
nition and pioneer platoon have at least 4 trained flame thrower oper-
ators; this was to be in addition to the 4 trained men for each author-
ized flame thrower in each engineer company and battalion.42 Since
most commanders wanted to train men in excess of these minimum re-
quirements, the training burden on both the individual unit and the
CWS was exceedingly heavy.
Because the dispersal of American units throughout Australia and
New Guinea made a single flame thrower training center impracticable,
schools were established in several different locations. Flame thrower
operators for I Corps' 24th and 41st Infantry Divisions trained at a
jungle assault school near Rockhampton, Queensland.43 The 1 0 t h
Chemical Maintenance Company held classes for personnel of other
units stationed in Australia at the Chemical Warfare Training Center
at Brisbane.44 The Sixth Army Chemical Section provided several
traveling teams to teach flame thrower operation to Marine and Army
organizations in forward staging areas. These teams, made up of one
officer and two enlisted men, conducted a series of three 2-day flame
thrower schools for units in New Guinea and the Trobriand Islands.
41
(1) Ltr, 1st Lt Robert P. Rockway to Col Carl L. Marriott, 22 Oct 43, no sub. (2) Memo,
CmlO U.S. Adv Base A for CmlO ALAMO Force, 31 Oct 43, no sub. Both in Sixth Army Rcds,
470.71 Flame Thrower.
42
Sixth Army Tng Memo No. 8, 1 Oct 43, sub: Tng in the Use of Flame Throwers. Sixth Army
Cml Sec Rcds, 470.71 Flame Thrower; reprinted as app. 5 in McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns.
43
Under the leadership of its chemical officer, Colonel Riegelman, I Corps had taken an early
lead in the development of flame thrower doctrine and had been the first to issue a training publication
on the employment of the weapon in the Southwest Pacific. See: (1) Incl 1 to Ltr, CG I Corps to
CG's 24th, 41st ( 3 2 d Divs, 27 Sep 43, sub: Employ of Flame Throwers, CVS 314.7 Portable Flame
Thrower File; (2) I Corps Tng Memo No. 17, 10 Dec 43, sub: Tng in the Use of Flame Throwers,
CWS 314.7 File; also reprinted as app. 7 in McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 265-67;
(3) Riegelman, Caves of Biak, pp. 73-75.
44
(1) 1st Ind on Ltr, 29 Aug 43, CG USAFFE to CG Sixth Army, 21 Aug 43, sub: Flame Thrower,
Portable, M1A1. Sixth Army Rcds, Cml Sec Rcds, 470.71 Flame Thrower. (2) Shaffer Ltr, 19 Sep 56.
Under the leadership of 1st Lt. Robert P. Rockway, the teams had
trained 582 flame thrower operators by February 1944.45
The flame thrower schools stressed operation, maintenance, and
servicing as well as tactics. Based upon past experience, current Sixth
Army doctrine prescribed that the flame thrower be included as part
of the arms and equipment of an organized assault party rather than
be employed as an individual weapon. Sixth Army suggested that an
assault party be made up of eighteen men, armed with demolition
charges, bangalore torpedoes, rocket launchers, and signal projectors,
in addition to regular infantry weapons. These groups were to be
trained and readied in order to be immediately available when needed
in combat. Three flame thrower teams, each consisting of an operator
46
and assistant operator, were allotted to each assault party.
Improving the flame thrower and training operators to employ it
occupied most of 1943. Achievements in both fields were substantial,
but since the weapon had not yet performed satisfactorily in the
Southwest Pacific, lingering doubts remained as to the ultimate value
of such efforts. Flame thrower successes in a variety of operations in
the theater between December 1943 and July 1944 helped dispel such
doubts.
New Britain and the Admiralties

The first combat use of the flame thrower in the Southwest Pacific
after Buna occurred on 15 December 1943 at Pilelo, a tiny island off
the coast of New Britain. Troop B of the 112th Cavalry RCT had
landed and was moving inland when the leading platoon was halted
by fire from two caves. A bazooka quickly silenced one, but the other
was so protected by log pilings as to be impervious to both bazooka
and machine gun fire. The troop commander then organized an assault
party with a flame thrower as its principal weapon. While rifle and
automatic weapons fire covered the cave, the flame thrower operator
worked his way up and fired his entire charge into the entrance. The
rest of the party then rushed the position with hand grenades. When
45
(1) Ltr, CmlO Hq ALAMO Forces to ACofS G-3, Sixth Army, 9 Feb 44, sub: Trained Flame
Thrower Pers. (2) Ltr, ACmlO ALAMO Force to CmlO U.S. Forces, Unit 3, 4 Nov 43, sub: Flame
Thrower School. (3) For detailed course of instruction at these mobile flame thrower schools, see
114th Engineer Battalion Training Memorandum No. 14, Annex 1, 6 October 1943, Flame Thrower
School Schedule. All in Sixth Army Cml Sec Rcds, 353 Flame Thrower Tng.
46
Sixth Army Tng Memo No. 8, 1 Oct 43, sub: Tng in the Use of Flame Throwers.
the party reached the cave, it found 5 dead and 2 wounded Japanese,
all with their clothing ablaze.47
Marine units had less success with the flame thrower in the Cape
Gloucester section of New Britain. Misfires and mechanical malfunc-
tions were frequent. The M1A1's, despite their waterproofing, became
48
damp and undependable from the incessant rain. The dense foliage
and jungle growth on Cape Gloucester normally absorbed the first
burst of flame thrower fuel, preventing the flame from reaching its
target and further exposing an already vulnerable operator to enemy
49
fire.
Flame throwers made an equally inauspicious beginning in the Ad-
miralties campaign. The 2d Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division landed
on Manus Island on 15 March 1944 with sixteen flame throwers filled
and ready for action. Since opposition to the landing was negligible
and the first few days produced no suitable flame thrower targets,
many units discarded these weapons. But on the fourth day after the
landing, advancing troops were harassed by fire from a bunker which
had been bypassed by assault troops. It was a perfect target for flame
throwers, but none was available. They were found scattered along
the route from the beach, and hydrogen and nitrogen cylinders were
50
located near the airstrip, even farther from the front.
The brigade commander, Brig. Gen. Verne D. Mudge, corrected the
situation by ordering his chemical officer, Lt. Charles Land, to collect
all flame throwers and equipment and take personal charge of flame
thrower operations. From then on, the weapons were carried imme-
diately behind the attacking troops. Lieutenant Land accompanied
the forward elements, ready to organize and direct flame thrower
assault groups against suitable targets. Such targets did not appear until
the closing days of the Manus Island operation. It was discovered in
47
(1) Ltr, CmlO Task Force (93d Cml Composite Co) to CmlO Sixth Army, 30 Dec 43, sub:
Official Rpt on Tactical Use of Flame Thrower. Reprinted in CWS 314.7 Observers Rpts (Grothaus-
Brady Rpt), SWPA, SOPAC, CENPAC, 29 Mar 44, as an. 4, sec. 5. (2) Miller, CARTWHEEL:
The Reduction of Rabaul, p. 285.
48
(1) Lt. Col. Frank O. Hough, USMCR, and Maj. John A. Crown, USMC, The Campaign on
New Britain (Washington, 1952), p. 54. (2) 93d Cml Composite Co, 30 Dec 43, Official Rpt on
Tactical Use of Flame Thrower. CWS SPCWS 5205 8-6. 1605/44.
49
(1) Ltr, Cml Warfare SupO BACKHANDER Force to Cml Warfare IntellO USASOS SWPA, 1 Jan
44, sub: Cml Intell. CWS 314.7 Portable Flame Thrower File. (2) Memo, ACmlO ALAMO Force
for G-3, G-4, 16 Feb 44, no sub. Sixth Army Rcds, 333 Inspection Rpts.
50
Rpt, CmlO 1st Cavalry Div, 3 Jul 44, sub: Use of Flame Throwers in the Admiralty Campaign.
CWS 314.7 Portable Flame Thrower File.
mopping up the island that numerous Japanese had quietly remained

in their bunkers and allowed the leading elements of the attack to
bypass them. Flame thrower teams and demolition squads eliminated
these pockets by flaming and blasting every bunker they encountered.51
Wakde, Maffin Bay, and Biak

The flame thrower proved its effectiveness anew in May 1944 on
Wakde Island, of the Wakde group, off the New Guinea coast. There,
after two days of intense fighting, the 163d Infantry, 41st Division,
managed to clear out most of the enemy forces. The remaining Japan-
ese took refuge in a network of connecting tunnels and caves in a
coral shelf which sloped up sharply from the northeast shore line.
Company A of the 27th Engineer Combat Battalion was ordered to
clean them out. To do the job the company used dynamite, bazookas,
white phosphorus grenades, and flame throwers, but only the flame
thrower proved successful against both caves and tunnels. On at
least eight separate occasions flame thrower assaults either killed the
Japanese defenders outright or drove them from their hiding places into
the open, where they became easy targets for riflemen.52
Company B of the 27th Engineer Combat Battalion, attached to the
158th Infantry, did equally well with flame throwers in the Maffin
Bay area of the New Guinea mainland, across from Wakde Island.
On 24 May the engineers, supported by two tanks, destroyed a machine
gun emplacement, which had pinned down an infantry company for
53
over three hours. This was the first recorded instance of a co-ordi-
nated tank-flame thrower attack in the Southwest Pacific. A month
later, farther to the east at Lone Tree Hill, the pattern was repeated.
On 18 June 2d Lt. Theodore Frankel, antitank platoon leader, 1st
Infantry, 6th Division, supported by two tanks, knocked out three
51
(1) Ibid. (2) Lt. Col. Kenneth W. Haas, "The Pacific Is Another War," Chemical Warfare
Bulletin, vol. 30, No. 5 (November-December, 1944), p. 17.
52
(1) Ltr, CW Tech Intell Team 4 to Chief CmlO USASOS SWPA, 24 Jun 44, sub: Rpt on Use of
Cml Warfare Weapons and Munitions. CWS 314.7 Portable Flame Thrower File. (2) McKinney,
Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 69-70.
53
(1) Smith, Approach to the Philippines, p. 239. (2) Ltr, Cml Warfare Tech Intell Team 4 to
Chief CmlO USASOS SWPA, 24 Jun 44, sub: Rpt on Use of Cml Warfare Weapons and Munitions.
CWS 314-7 Portable Flame Thrower File. (3) Ltr, CG Sixth Army to Corps and Divs et al., 6 Sep 44,
sub: Cml Warfare Activities During Wakde-Maffin Bay Opns. CWS 314.7 Portable Flame Thrower
File.
enemy bunkers with a single flame thrower.54 Six days later Frankel
used the flame thrower in an entirely different kind of attack. The
target was an enemy 70-mm. artillery piece emplaced in a cave high
on Rocky Point. Frankel organized an assault party consisting of
an antitank grenadier, a TNT-armed demolitions man, and several
riflemen; he himself carried a flame thrower. The party crawled to
a shell hole about twenty yards in front of the cave, from which point
Frankel fired several bursts from the weapon. Next the demolition
man placed his charge, which knocked out the enemy field piece and
buried its crew under the resulting debris. In a 2-day period, Lieutenant
Frankel took part in nearly two dozen flame thrower assaults.55 But
the lieutenant's record in this regard was not unique, since engineers
of the 6th Engineer Combat Battalion and infantrymen of the 1st
and 20th Infantry regiments of the 6th Division carried out scores
of successful flame attacks in June 1944, especially in the Lone Tree
56
Hill and Rocky Point sections of the front.
While the battle for Maffin Bay was still in progress, elements of the
41st Infantry Division invaded Biak Island. This island, about 100
miles from New Guinea, was a mass of coral with a veneer of dense
jungle vegetation. It abounded with caves ranging in size from shallow
cavities just large enough to contain two or three men to networks
of caverns capable of accommodating eight or nine hundred. Japanese
ingenuity had turned this maze of natural cave and connecting tunnels
into an extensive and formidable defensive installation, relatively im-
57
pervious to the effects of air, naval, and artillery bombardment. The
flame thrower played a vital role in the destruction of these powerful
defenses. From 27 May to 19 August 1944 it was fired more often
than in any other previous campaign in the Southwest Pacific. Fifty-
nine flame throwers sprayed 236 gallons of fuel against enemy positions.
54
(1) Ltr, Task Force CmlO U.S. Forces Unit 1 to CmlO Sixth Army, 21 Jun 44, no sub. Sixth
Army Rcds, 470.7 Flame Throwers. (2) Frankel and 2d Lt James J. Harnes, 13 Jul 44, Rpt on Use
of Flame Throwers in Maffin Bay Area, Dutch New Guinea. Sixth Army Rcds, 350.05-Wakde.
55
Frankel and Harnes, Rpt on Use of Flame Throwers in Maffin Bay Area, Dutch New Guinea.
56
Ltr, CG Sixth Army to Distr,6 Sep 44, sub: Cml Warfare Activities During the Wakde Island-
Maffin Bay Opns. Sixth Army Rcds, 415.3.
57
(1) Ltr, CG Sixth Army to Distr, 3 Sept 44, sub: Cml Warfare Activities During the Biak Opn.
Sixth Army Rcds, 415.3. (2) Riegelman, Caves of Biak, pp. 145-47.
They were used to burn combustible Japanese stores and against a

58
variety of other targets.
Introduction of the Portable Flame Thrower in the

Central Pacific Area
Although it was in the South and Southwest Pacific that flame
throwers were first employed, it remained for troops in the Central
Pacific to demonstrate the full potential of the weapon. This they pro-
ceeded to do in a long series of amphibious assaults that, paralleling
MacArthur's drive in the Southwest Pacific, carried Army and Marine
units from the Gilberts and Marshalls to the very doorstep of Japan.
From the start commanders in the Central Pacific, especially Marine
leaders, showed an interest in and an enthusiasm for the flame thrower
unmatched in other theaters. Forces in the area were also blessed with
an adequate and sometimes overabundant supply of the weapon, a
relative absence of technical problems that plagued the Southwest
Pacific, and sufficient time between engagements to train operators and
assault teams. These factors helped to produce the success achieved by
the flame thrower in the Central Pacific.
During the last week in July 1943 the Hawaiian Department 59 pre-
sented a portable flame thrower demonstration, based on an analysis
of operations in the South Pacific, to approximately 1,400 Army, Navy,
and Marine officers and enlisted men. The display, demonstrating how
Japanese fortified defenses might be attacked and destroyed by assault
parties armed with the flame thrower, generated considerable interest.60
Later, when plans were being made for the invasion of the Gilbert
Islands, the Hawaiian Department chemical office prepared detailed
studies of types of Japanese defenses that might be encountered. An
examination of these studies convinced planners that the flame thrower
would be a desirable weapon in the coming operations; accordingly, the
27th Infantry Division received twenty-four and the 2d Marine Divi-
58
(1) CmlO 41st Inf Div, n.d., Rpt, Cml Phase and Sec Hist Rcd of HORLICKS Opn. CVS 314.7
Portable Flame Thrower File. (2) CmlO 41st Inf Div to CmlO ALAMO Force, 11 Aug 44, Preliminary
Tech Rpt—Rpt No. 9. Sixth Army Rcds, 350.05 Biak.
59
The Hawaiian Department soon became U.S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area, and later U.S.
Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, and U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific. Colonel Unmacht served
as chemical officer of these headquarters throughout the war.
Memo, Quigley, OACofS G-3 Hawaiian Dept, for Keliher, ACofS G-3, 4 Aug 43, sub: Rpt on
60
Dept Cml Field Exercise. History, CWS AFMIDPAC, vol. II, an. I-c.
MARINES USING CWS FLAME THROWER ON A TARAWA BEACH
61
sion sixty. Members of the engineer battalion of each division under-
went training in flame thrower operations, although even at this time
there was some feeling that it might be wiser to assign the weapons to
infantry rather than to engineer troops.
Portable throwers went into action on 20 November 1943 when the
165th RCT, 27th Division, landed on Makin Atoll and the 2d Marine
Division attacked Betio Island of the Tarawa Atoll. On the former,
enemy opposition was fortunately limited, for flame throwers, drenched
in the landings, failed to function.62 On Betio marines faced strong
Japanese positions. Here, enemy beach fortifications consisted of nu-
merous concrete, steel, and sand and coconut log pillboxes, plus a num-
ber of excellent bombproof shelters. These emplacements were con-
61
(1) History CWS AFMIDPAC, II, an. II-b, 3-5. (2) Ltr, Unmacht to Hist Off, 27 Jun 51.
CWS 314.7.
62
Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, p. 93.
nected by means of an intricate and highly developed trench and tunnel

63
system.
Flame throwers proved invaluable against these defenses. During the
first three days of fighting, the weapon burned out a score of enemy
pillboxes, and, surprisingly, permitted marines to take a number of
frightened Japanese prisoners. On 22 November a large concrete bomb-
proof shelter was assaulted by men of the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines.
The marines, using flame throwers, overran the top of the shelter but
the Japanese counterattacked within minutes. Flame throwers quickly
64
drove back the enemy and inflicted heavy casualties. As at least two
historians of the Pacific fighting have commented: "Perhaps the most
valuable weapon on Tarawa proved to be the flame thrower." 65
Although other units used these weapons with equal effectiveness,
there were, unfortunately, far too few flame throwers available. The
1st Battalion, 6th Marines, which had been assigned six flame throwers,
used two in close support of tanks and attached the remaining four to
the rifle platoon engaged in mopping-up activities. The battalion
recommended that it be allotted twelve for future engagements, a de-
sire reflected in the reports of several other units.66
As a result of the Gilbert experience, the 7th Infantry Division's
allotment of portable flame throwers for the Marshall operations was
67
increased to 192; the 4th Marine Division's to 72. The 7th Division
immediately began an intensive training program in these weapons.
A squad of combat engineers armed with flame throwers, demolitions,
wire cutters, and bangalore torpedoes was assigned to each rifle platoon.
Realistic exercises were conducted in assaulting replicas of fortifications
likely to be encountered in the Marshalls. The engineers soon learned
to move freely under friendly fire and to depend on the infantrymen's
CO 2d Marine Regt to CG 2d Marine Div, 17 Dec 43, Rpt of Opns GALVANIC. Combat Team
63
2 in 2d Marine Regt, Rpt of Opn—Tarawa, Marine Archives A8-1.

64
(1) CO 2d Bn 8th Marines 2d Marine Div to CO Combat Team 2, 13 Dec 43, Rpt of Tarawa Opns,
2d Marine Regt—Rpt of Opns Tarawa. Marine Corps Archives A8-1. (2) Stockman, Battle for
Tarawa, p. 47.
65
Crowl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, p. 163.
66
(1) CO 1st Bn 6th Marines to CO 6th Marine Regt, 3 Dec 43, Special Action Rpt, 6th Marine
Regt—Special Action Report—Tarawa. Marine Corps Archives A9-1. (2) CO 8th Marine Regt to
CG 2d Mar Div, 1 Dec 43, Special Action Report—Tarawa. Marine Archives AIO-I. (3) CO LT
3/2 3d Bn 2d Marine to CG V Amphib Corps, 20 Dec 43, Rpt of Opns GALVANIC. 2d Marine Regt—
Rpt of Opns—Tarawa. Marine Archives A8-1.
67
(1) History, CWS AFMIDPAC, II, an. I-d, 30. (2) CG 4th Marine Div to CG V Amphib Corps,
17 Mar 44, Final Rpt on FLINTLOCK Opn, incl J, p. 17, Final Rpt, Roi. Marine Corps Archives
A22-1.
ability to cover them. The latter, in turn, acquired confidence in the

engineer's competence in using flame throwers and in placing demoli-
tions rapidly and effectively.68
The 4th Marine Division, also readying itself for the Marshall Islands
campaign, placed emphasis on assault team training. Equipped with
seventy-two portable flame throwers, the division faced the almost
impossible task, suggested by higher headquarters, of training two men
per infantry platoon,69 as well as the engineer personnel who normally
operated the weapon.70 The division trained as many individuals as it
could, but put its greatest emphasis on organizing assault parties within
its combat teams. Typical of these units was the 19-man party or-
ganized by the 24th Marines. This team was led by an officer and con-
sisted of a flame thrower group including a flame thrower operator, an
assistant operator, and a fuel carrier; a 5-man demolition group; a 3-
man bazooka group; and a support group of 7 riflemen and BAR men.
Engineer troops comprised the flame thrower and bazooka groups.71
The inclusion of a fuel carrier in the assault team was an innovation.
Formerly, a flame thrower operator had to leave the forward area and
return to a servicing point to refill his weapon. This extra man in the
assault team made it possible to insure more rapid weapon refueling.
Chemical officers in the Marshalls also adopted the system of supplying
additional flame thrower fuel in 5-gallon cans, with an extra pressure
cylinder attached, instead of the normal 55-gallon drums, thus ex-
pediting the handling of fuel from transports to refilling points and
permitting the weapons to be serviced much nearer the front lines.
The actual combat employment of the flame thrower in the Marshall
Islands failed to justify fully the extensive preliminary training pro-
gram. Happily, Japanese defenses on Roi, Namur, Kwajalein, and
Eniwetok, pounded by a 3-day preinvasion bombardment, proved less
formidable and Japanese resistance less stubborn than had been antici-
pated. As a consequence, the flame thrower was not needed in the as-
sault phases of the amphibious landings, but was confined to mopping-
68
(1) Sixth Army Combat Notes No. 2 15 Aug 44, 106-11.6 (7076). (2) Rpt of the 7th Inf
Div Participation in FLINTLOCK Opn, 8 Feb 44. 7th Inf Div, 307-0.3 (1037).
69
V Amphib Corps Tng Memo No. 13-43, 21 Dec 43, Demolition and Flame Thrower Tng.
Reprinted as app. 13 in McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 284-85.
70
V Amphib Corps Tng Order No. 17-43, 21 Dec 43, Flame Throwers. Marine Corps School, Log
60-27, reprinted as app. 14 in McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 286-92.
71
CG 4th Marine Div to CG V Amphib Corps, 17 Mar 44, Final Rpt on FLINTLOCK Opn, Incl E,
Rpt of Combat Team 24. Marine Corps Archives, A22-1.
up operations and to the elimination of enemy personnel from under-

72
ground shelters and fortifications. The 4th Marine Division reported
the weapon most effective in this work when used in combination with
explosives. Flame was hurled at the embrasures and slits of the fortifica-
tion forcing the occupants to take cover. Next, pole or shaped charges
were used to breach the side of the structure, after which grenades,
73
satchel charges, or more flame was used to destroy the occupants.
Because operations in the Marshalls demonstrated that 192 flame
throwers were more than an infantry division needed or could ade-
quately handle, Army divisions slated for the Marianas campaign re-
74
ceived 141 flame throwers and Marine divisions 81. An analysis of
the Marshall campaign also indicated to Army and Marine leaders that
trained infantrymen as well as engineer troops were required to operate
the flame thrower. This conclusion, similar to that reached indepen-
dently by commanders in the South and Southwest Pacific, was based
on the realization that engineers were normally too busy with other
essential duties to devote their full attention to the flame thrower.
After the Marshall Islands operation infantrymen became the primary
users of the weapon in the Central Pacific.
72
(1) Rpt, Marshall Islands Japanese Defenses and Battle Damage, prepared by WD Mission for CG
CENPAC, 1 Mar 44. 98-USF3-0.3. (2) Maj. Leonard D. Frescoln, "Post-Mortem on the Marshalls,"
Chemical Warfare Bulletin, vol. 30, No. 2 (April-May, 1944), pp. 33-34.
73
CG 4th Mar Div to CG V Amphib Corps, 17 Mar 44, Final Rpt on FLINTLOCK Opn. Marine
Corps Archives A22-1, incl, 1, p. 17.
74
(1) History CWS AFMIDPAC, II, an. 1-D, 40. (2) CG 3d Marine Div to Comdt of the
Marine Corps, 21 Aug 44, Special Action Rpt, FORAGER Opn (Guam), an. B to D-3 Rpt, Marine
Corps Archives, A17-1.
CHAPTER XV
The Flame Thrower in the Pacific:

Marianas to Okinawa
The Need for a Mechanized Flame Thrower
The stimulus for the development of the mechanized flame thrower,
as for the portable, came from the war against Japan where the enemy's
excellent defenses and stubborn resistance called attention to the utility
of flame. Although the portable flame thrower gradually proved to be
an effective weapon against the Japanese, one of its inherent disadvant-
ages, the vulnerability of the operator, suggested the portable's installa-
tion in an armored vehicle. It is not to be inferred that CWS engineers
in the United States had been unmindful of the possibilities of a ma-
chanized flame thrower; the Chemical Warfare Technical Committee
had advocated the development of such a weapon in May 1940. But
for various reasons, work on the mechanized models in the zone of
interior proceeded slowly and fitfully throughout the entire war.1
There were several attempts in the Pacific to mount portable flame
throwers in some sort of armored vehicle, a combination made the more
appealing by the lack thus far of cannon or other antitank weapons in
the enemy bunkers. In the South Pacific Area, for example, the com-
mander of a tank battalion in New Caledonia installed a flame gun in
the pistol port of a tank, and a chemical officer on New Georgia modi-
fied the flame gun so that it could be fitted into the aperture for the
tank's bow machine gun. The 1st Marine Tank Battalion, serving in
the Southwest Pacific, mounted several portable flame throwers on its
tanks in preparation for the New Britain operation. None of these
improvisions could have been called successful. The portable flame
thrower was not constructed to withstand the vibrations and jarrings
1
For a discussion of the research and development of mechanized flame throwers, see Brophy, Miles,
Cochrane, from Laboratory to Field.
FLAME THROWERS: MARIANAS TO OKINAWA 559
of a moving tank, and its fuel capacity was much too limited.2 Word
came from Washingon pointing out the disadvantages of range and fire
hazards from such modifications and counseling patience until the ar-
3
rival of perfected mechanized flame throwers from the zone of interior.
After the bloody battle of Tarawa, which opened Allied offensive
operations in the Central Pacific Area, an even greater clamor arose
for a mechanized flame weapon. The portable flame thrower had done
its part in that battle, but new weapons and techniques were urgently
needed to help prevent the repetition of such staggering casualties. In
preparation for the Marshall Islands operation scheduled for February
1944 both the 4th Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division in-
stalled M1A1 portable flame throwers, modified by the chemical section
of the 7th Division, in light tanks and LVT's, an amphibious tractor.
Included in the 7th Division's version were special fuel containers
manufactured in Honolulu. But the attempts to waterproof the guns
on the LVT's were unsuccessful, and the electrical systems of those
flame weapons, drenched on landing, failed completely. The tank-
mounted versions, plagued with the basic weaknesses of fragility and
low fuel capacity, had but modest success.4
The poor results of flame thrower improvisation in the Pacific
theaters was no cause for criticism of the responsible chemical officers
and tank commanders; the portable flame thrower was basically un-
suited for tank adaption. If nothing else, these efforts clearly indicated
that improvisation was not the answer and underlined the real need
for a mechanized flame thrower in the Pacific fighting.
The Marianas
After the experience at Tarawa, General Richardson, Commanding
General, U.S. Army Forces in Central Pacific Area, asked the War De-
partment if mechanized flame throwers were available in the zone of
interior. Upon receiving a favorable reply, Richardson requisitioned
2
(1) CWS TofO Ltr No. 6, 8 Oct 43, p. 10. (2) Ltr, CmlO XIV Corps to CCWS,26 Aug 43,
sub: Rpt of Mounting Flame Throwers in Tanks. CWS 314.7 Mechanized Flame Throwers File.
(3) Maj John N. Rentz, Marines in the Central Solomons (Washington, 1952), p. 156. (4) Ltr,
CmlO ALAMO Force to Cml SupO APO 323, 24 Jan 44, no sub. Sixth Army Rcds, 470.71 Flame
Throwers.
3
CWS TofO Ltr No. 16, 12 Jul 44, p. 12.
4
(1) History, CWS AFMIDPAC, II, an. II-c-1, 2-3; I, sec. 3, pp. 21-22. (2) Crowl and Love,
Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, p. 233. (3) USAFICPA, Participation in the Kwajalein and
Eniwetok Opns, p. 194.
forty auxiliary bow gun flame throwers (E4—5) for use in the Marianas
5
operation. When these failed to arrive, he utilized local resources
6
to fashion substitutes. It was fortunate that this need arose in the
Central Pacific, for Hawaii had factories and machine shops and an
eager and able chemical officer—Colonel Unmacht, who approached
the problem of the mechanized flame thrower with the same efficiency
he had shown for the portable.
At this time the marines in the theater were perhaps even more
interested in flame weapons than were the Army troops. Late in Jan-
uary 1944 the V Amphibious Corps, preparing for the Marianas, ob-
tained twenty Ronson vehicular flame throwers from Canada. The
development work involved in adapting these British-designed weap-
ons for installation in M3A1 light tanks was to fall primarily upon
Colonel Unmacht, who utilized CWS, Ordnance Department, Naval,
and private facilities for this undertaking. The resulting main arma-
ment flame thrower, dubbed Satan, had a range of from 40 to 80 yards,
a fuel capacity of 170 gallons, and a duration of fire of 2 minutes,
enough, according to Unmacht, to reduce 40 or 50 pillboxes based
on 2-second bursts.7 At a demonstration held for interested officers on
15 April 1944, the marines fully recognized the potential of the mech-
anized flame thrower. The V Amphibious Corps managed to get ten
more Ronson units from Canada, and its commander, Lt. Gen. Holland
M. Smith, asked the Army authorities in Hawaii to install the Ronson
units in M3A1 light tanks in time for the Marianas operation.8 Al-
though medium tanks would have had advantages of better protection
and more space and mobility, none could be made available in time
9
to meet the required deadline. The Chemical Section, CENPAC, with
the co-operation of the 14th Naval District, the V Amphibious Corps,
and the Seabees, equipped twenty-four light tanks with the flame
5
In an auxiliary mechanized flame thrower the flame weapon supplemented the normal armament
of the vehicle; in a main armament mechanized flame thrower, as the name implies, the flame thrower
was the principal armament.
6
History, CWS AFMIDPAC, II, an. II-c-1, 70.
7
(1) History, CWS AFMIDPAC, II, an. II-c-1, ref 14, 4-12. (2) See Brophy, Miles, and Cochrane,
From Laboratory to Field, for details of the development work in Hawaii. (3) In his brief 8-page
final report to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, General Richardson paid tribute to this "resourceful
and inventive" CWS group which developed a flame-throwing tank that was of "incalculable value."
Final Rpt of CG AFMIDPAC to CofS USA, 15 Mar 46.
8
Memo, CmlO CENPAC for G-3 DCofS and CofS CENPAC, 17 Apr 44, sub: Installation of
Ronson Flame Thrower in Light Tank. History, CWS AFMIDPAC, vol. III, ref. 6.
9
43d Cml Lab Co, 16 Aug 44, Demonstration of Ronson and Navy Mark I Vehicular Mounted
Flame Thrower and Mobile Mechanical Servicing Equip. History, CWS AFMIDPAC, vol. III, ref. 14.
thrower units. As the Satans were being produced Colonel Unmacht

conducted a series of 40-hour classes on flame tank operation which
were attended by Marine Corps and Army officers and men. By mid-
May the weapons were tested, waterproofed, and loaded on ships.
The invasion of the Marianas began early on 15 June 1944 when the
V Amphibious Corps, known as the Northern Landing Force and con-
10
sisting of the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions, invaded Saipan. Each
division had 12 Satan tanks. These 12 plus 3 conventional tanks
formed a company of three platoons. Each platoon (4 Satans and1
light tank) was attached to a company of medium tanks—the organic
armored support of a marine regiment. Landing on D plus 2 (17 June)
the flame tanks saw infrequent use during their first day of battle and
then only for the purpose of mopping up. Next day the tanks took
part in front-line action and thereafter, as tankers and infantrymen
alike quickly learned flame tank techniques, the Satan proved to be an
effective weapon.
Targets were varied—pillboxes, brush, canefields, buildings, and
caves. Typical action against stiff opposition saw flame tanks neutraliz-
ing targets under cover of medium tanks. A tank commander, inter-
viewed shortly after the end of the operation, told of one such action
in which the Satan, supported by conventional tanks, came forward
to flame a well defended pillbox. As the target started burning, two
Japanese sprang out, only to be cut down by rifle fire. Resistance ceased.
An examination of the bunker revealed ten other Japanese, grotesquely
dead at their firing positions. The tank commander added that the
mechanized flame thrower proved to be the only effective weapon
against caves.11
After the fall of Saipan the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions immediately
started preparations for the invasion of Tinian which was to begin on
24 July. In this attack the M3A1 light flame tanks, loaded aboard
LCT's and LCM's, followed hard on the heels of the first assault wave.
The composition and attachment of flame tank units during the fight -
10
Admiral Turner's Joint Expeditionary Force was composed of the Northern Landing Force (V
Amphibious Corps) scheduled for Saipan and Tinian, the Southern Landing Force (III Amphibious
Corps) earmarked for Guam, and a Reserve Force, consisting of the 27th Infantry Division afloat and
the 77th Division in Hawaii.
11
(1) CmlO POA, 21 Aug 44, Rpt, Opns of Armored Flame Throwers by the 4th Marine Div on
Saipan and Tinian. History CWS AFMIDPAC, vol. IV, an. II-c-3, ref. 1. (2) Intervs of 4th
Marine Div Pers by Tenth Army officers, 4 Sep 44. History CWS MIDPAC, vol. IV, an. II-c-3,
ref s. 1 and 3.
12
ing were just as they had been on Saipan. The terrain on Tinian
proved much more favorable to tank employment, and this, combined
with the recently acquired combat experience, resulted in a profitable
use of flame vehicles. The Satans again combined with the medium
tanks against the more tenacious points of resistance. They also were
successful against caves and when used to burn vegetation concealing
enemy positions.13
The Southern Landing Force, as the III Amphibious Corps was desig-
nated for the Marianas campaign, assaulted Guam on 21 July with the
3d Marine Division, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, and the 77th
Infantry Division as its principal combat elements. The 3d Tank Bat-
talion, which landed on the first day, had among its armament six
M4A2 medium tanks equipped with E4-5 auxiliary bow gun flame
throwers. These weapons had arrived from the zone of interior for
service tests shortly before the operation began. One of the flame tanks
met the enemy at Assan Point on the second day of the battle. Sup-
ported by a conventional tank the flame vehicle approached an enemy
cave and fired half of its 25-gallon charge into the mouth. Seventeen
Japanese soldiers were incinerated. A similar attack near Chonito Cliff
resulted in 30 enemy dead. During the next five days the auxiliary
flame tanks continued to burn out resistance on Guam.14
A few logistical difficulties arose during these flame operations in
the Marianas. Planners for the invasion had estimated that the daily
expenditure of each flame tank would be one load of fuel; actually,
two loads were required. A shortage of napalm meant that most of
the flame fuel was either diesel oil mixed with Bunker C fuel obtained
from the vessels, or, at times, straight Bunker C. A postcampaign
recommendation called for adequate amounts of thickened fuel for
future operations to insure a longer, more effective range for the mech-
anized flame thrower.15
Flame tank crews, contrary to some pessimistic predictions, suffered
no casualties as a result of actual flame operations, although two men
were injured when a vehicle struck an enemy land mine. Fatigue be-
12
Maj. Carl W. Hoffman, USMC, The Seizure of Tinian (Washington, 1951), p. 53.
13
lbid., pp. 60, 96. (2) Philip A. Crowl, The Campaign in the Marianas, UNITED STATES
ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1960), p. 298.
14
Ltr, CO 3d Tank Bn to CG 3d Marine Div, 12 Nov 44, sub: Rpt and Recommendations on
Flame Thrower E4-5 in M4A2 Tanks by This Battalion in Guam Opn. CWS 314.7 Mechanized
Flame Thrower File.
15
(1) Hoffman, Seizure of Tinian, p. 131. (2) Interv, 4th Marine Div Pers, 4 Sep 44.
came a problem because of the extremely cramped positions within the

light tanks. While the marines were generally impressed by the flame
tank performance, they were critical of the range of the flame gun, the
limited visibility and light armor of the tanks, the lack of special tools
and spare parts, and the manner in which the Ronson was installed in
the tank. And experience in the Marianas substantiated the preinvasion
16
opinion that flame throwers should be mounted in medium tanks.
The successful debut of the mechanized flame thrower in the Mari-
anas campaign generally overshadowed the accomplishments of the
portable model. The truth was that the two types of flame throwers
supplemented one another; the mechanized afforded greater protection
to the operator and delivered larger amounts of flame for longer dis-
tances, while the portable, capable of quicker and more flexible employ-
ment, attacked targets inaccessible to the tank-mounted type. Port-
able flame throwers saw action on Saipan on D-day before the tanks
were landed and proved invaluable during the street fighting in the
village of Garapan. Later, these weapons helped overcome stubborn
resistance of cave defenses located in Saipan's cliff formations, defenses
which the tank-mounted flame throwers could not reach. On Guam
the portable flame throwers were committed against the cave defenses
of Chonito Cliff within an hour of the actual landings, and they re-
17
mained busy during the entire three weeks of fighting.
On at least one occasion the two types of flame thrower were em-
ployed in the same action. During the battle for Tinian, marines first
used the cannon of a medium tank to blast defended caves, then the light
flame tanks to spray the openings, and finally assault teams with demoli-
18
tions and portable flame weapons to actually reduce the positions.
Of the two Army divisions in the operation the 27th continued to
assign the weapons to the combat engineers while the 77th gave them to
16
(1) Interv, 4th Marine Div Pers, 4 Sep 44. (2) CG 4th Marine Div to Comdt Marine Corps, 18
Sep 44, Opn Rpt—Saipan, an. E, p. 11. Marine Corps Archives A14-1 (S&C 48430). (3) Hoffman,
Saipan: The Beginning of the End, p. 254.
17
(1) CO 8th Marine Regt to CG 2d Marine Div, 20 Jul 44, Special Action Rpt, FORAGER.
Marine Archives A20-1. (2) Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas, chs. V, IX. (3) Hoffman, Saipan:
The Beginning of the End, p. 196. (4) CG 3d Marine Div to Comdt Marine Corps, 21 Aug 44,
Special Action Rpt, FORAGER Opn, D-3 Rpt, Narrative of the Campaign.
18
(1) Lt Col B. A. Hockmuth, USMC, n.d., Rpt, Flame Throwers at Saipan. CWS 314.7. (2)
CG 4th Marine Div to CINCPAC and CINCPOA, 25 Sep 44, Opn Rpt—Tinian, an. C, p. 20. Marine
Archives, A14-3. (3) Hoffman, Seizure of Tinian, p. 96.
the infantry. The marines, prompted by previous experience, assigned

19
the portable flame throwers to the infantry.
Although the portable weapon stood up well under hard usage in the
Marianas, weather conditions caused innumerable problems. Many
flame throwers were deadlined through battery and spark plug failure
and because of inadequate waterproofing. The former difficulty was
greatly relieved with the introduction of the new M2-2 flame thrower
20
(flown from the zone of interior) and its improved ignition system.
There was a good supply of flame throwers present, but no provision had
been made for transporting them or the heavy service equipment needed
for their maintenance.21
Peleliu
Tarawa had called the Navy's attention to the possible use during
the initial stages of an assault landing of a mechanized flame thrower
mounted in some sort of landing craft. The National Defense Research
Committee provided a speedy solution to this problem. The organiza-
tion had recently developed the Q model flame thrower for light tanks
only to find that vehicle out of favor. It now adapted the Q flame unit
to fill the Navy's needs. Newly christened the Navy Mark I, five units
of the flame thrower reached Hawaii in April 1944. The Army in-
herited these units when Navy authorities turned down the model as
unsuitable for amphibious operations because of its excessive weight.
The 43d Chemical Laboratory also found that this flame unit, with a
fuel capacity of 200 gallons, a firing time of 74 seconds, and a maxi-
mum range of over 100 yards, was too bulky and heavy for installation
22
in tanks.
Interest in the Mark I flame thrower then arose in another quarter.
Early in June 1944 a Navy flame thrower detachment from the United
States joined the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal which was pre-
paring for the invasion of the Palau Islands. This detachment, con-
19
McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 150-54.
20
The ignition system of the M2-2 consisted of a plastic cylinder with five patches of incendiary
material. A trigger on the front handle activated a match-mixture-coated pin which ignited one of the
incendiary patches. The entire system was waterproof. The M2-2 weighed seventy pounds when filled
and had a capacity of four gallons.
21
McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 150-54.
22
(1) Memo 2, CmlO CENPAC to TankO G-3 DCofS CENPAC,6 May 44. (2) 43d Lab Co, 19
May 44, Rpt Demonstration U.S. Navy Flame Thrower Mark I. Both in History, CWS, AFMIDPAC,
vol. III, refs. 11, 13.
FLAME THROWER ON AN AMPHIBIOUS TRACTOR BLASTS CAVE on Peleliu Island.
sisting of one officer and three enlisted men and attached to the divi-
sion's amphibian tractor battalion, mounted its three Mark I flame
units on LVT (4)'s, the armored amphibian tractor. Tests soon re-
vealed that there were certain drawbacks to this combination. The
severe vibrations of the vehicle operating on land shook loose the gun-
ner's protective shield and cracked the porcelain of the spark plugs,
failures which were only partially remedied by improvisation and sub-
stitution. The naval detachment began to instruct the marines in the
operation and maintenance of the flame tractors but, unfortunately,
a shortage of napalm prevented adequate training of men and testing of
weapons. Three flame units which arrived from Hawaii shortly before
embarkation were held in reserve.23
23
(1) Rpt on Activities of the Navy Flame Thrower Detachment in the Palaus Opn, n.d. History,
CWS AFMIDPAC, IV, an. II-c-3, 6-7. (2) Maj. Frank O. Hough, USMCR, The Assault on Peleliu
(Washington, 1950), p. 32.
The island of Peleliu was the principal objective of the 1st Marine
Division attack in the Palaus. Each of the three assault regiments was to
have a flame tractor in support. Crews of these flame vehicles received
briefings on the over-all operation and detailed instructions in their
own particular mission. The flame tractor with the 1st Marine Regi-
ment would advance just behind the initial wave of landing craft.
Upon reaching the beach it was to fire on targets of opportunity, fol-
lowing the infantry as it pushed inland. Any infantry officer could
commandeer the flame tractor if an appropriate target appeared. The
flame vehicle with the 5th Regiment would land and advance with the
first wave of assault troops, and the 7th Regiment's flame support
would accompany a flanking group of landing craft.
The three flame tractors, plus two service tractors carrying an air
compressor and extra fuel, were loaded in a landing craft, tank, which
in turn made the 2,000-mile journey from Guadalcanal to Peleliu on
the deck of a landing ship, tank.
On the day of attack, 15 September 1944, the elaborate plan for
using the flame tractors completely broke down. The 1st Marine Regi-
ment was stopped by stiff resistance just beyond the beach, and its flame
tractor waited five hours for some kind of order. The flame vehicles
with the other regiments were told to stand offshore out of danger.
When the three flame tractors eventually landed they stood idle on the
beaches, a result no doubt of extreme confusion and the unfamiliarity
of the marines with the weapon. Inactivity on the second day was
caused by the fact that the air compressor had not yet landed. The
flame vehicles saw action on the third day, and from then on their com-
mitment was regular.24
The troops used the flame tractor principally to neutralize caves,
pillboxes, and dugouts and to burn the cover from the battleground.
Japanese, hidden in defiladed positions, were often caught by arching
rodlike streams of burning, thickened fuel which hit the reverse slopes.
The marines controlled this type of fire by radio from observation posts.
In the first phase of the fighting the flame tractors usually worked
ahead of the infantry, even ahead of the tanks. As the attack slackened
upon reaching the hills, the tanks and infantry provided support for
the flame weapons. The latter could have been more effective, par-
ticularly from commanding positions on hills and cliffs, but for their
24
Rpt on Activities of the Navy Flame Thrower Detachment in the Palaus Opn.
light armor plate and their lack of all around protection. After the
first few days on Peleliu the employment of the six flame tractors was
steady until about D plus 40 and then sporadic until D plus 75. The
flame weapons attacked about 100 caves and twenty-five pillboxes and
dugouts. They burned off some forty acres of cover, expending fifty
loads of fuel in the process.
The over-all usefulness of this mechanized flame thrower suffered
from the inadequacies of the tractors. Damage to the flame units them-
selves was negligible and usually repairable within several hours. But
the amphibious tractors could not withstand the rugged terrain and
were constantly out of action with engine troubles, torn tracks, and
broken final drives. The6 flame throwers were employed for 61 days
(or a total of 366 flame thrower days), and almost one-third of the
time was spent on tractor maintenance. This unfortunate situation
occurred despite the fact that the detachment had a total of 19 tractors
in which to mount the6 flame units. In addition to these frequent
breakdowns, insufficient training of the crews hampered efficient opera-
tions. Gunners sometimes were unable to estimate the range of the
target, and incomplete knowledge of the flame gun prevented the crew
from taking care of small malfunctions in the field. All in all, ex-
perience on Peleliu demonstrated that the LVT was not a suitable ve-
hicle for flame throwers; this was the conclusion of the Navy flame
thrower detachment. But despite the failure of the mount, the marines
were impressed by the Navy Mark I flame thrower. In some respects
they considered it superior to the Ronson flame gun used in the Mari-
anas, especially in length of range.25
An interesting sidelight to the Peleliu operation was the use of a
high pressure hose to carry flame to targets beyond the range of mech-
anized flame weapons. During the fighting at Umurbrogol Pocket,
engineers attached a 300-yard hose to a fuel tank and, with pressure
provided by booster pumps, operators sprayed Japanese positions with
flame much as firemen direct water on burning buildings.26 So im-
pressed was General Richardson with this weapon that he asked Colonel
Unmacht to continue the investigation of its combat potential. In
subsequent tests the chemical section attached a 400-foot length of
25
(1) Ibid. (2) Hough, Assault on Peleliu, pp. 32, 147, 148, 180-81. (3) Hoffman, Saipan:
The Beginning of the End, p. 254. (4) See also Robert Ross Smith, Approach to the Philippines,
pp.539, 545, 563, 571-72.
26
Hough, Assault on Peleliu, p. 175.
standard 1½-inch rubber fire hose to a flame thrower tank and attained
a range of 60 yards. Following a demonstration of the device in Feb-
ruary 1945 Tenth Army ordered three sets of these hoses, all of which
were to see service on Okinawa.27
The Philippines
Preparations for the Portable Flame Thrower
In May 1944 Sixth Army's commander, General Krueger, expressed
to his staff chemical officer some misgivings about the past performances
of the portable flame thrower.28 As a consequence, a study was made
under the aegis of Sixth Army's G-3 to determine what revisions
should be made in the Army's official flame thrower doctrine.29 This
study revealed several reasons why the flame thrower had been used
with less than maximum effectiveness. Commanders had incomplete
understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the weapon; as a
result, it was often committed to action without any chance of success
or, conversely, was not introduced into situations where it might have
been helpful. A corollary to this was the failure of unit commanders
to comply with Sixth Army doctrine requiring the employment of
portable flame throwers as an integral part of the assault party.30 A
commander, upon brief reconnaissance, would send forward a poorly
protected flame thrower on a mission that would have been difficult
for a much larger force. Or flame thrower operators would be ac-
companied by a security detachment which had been hastily formed for
the emergency. These improvised groups seldom jelled into the efficient
teams envisioned by the writers of Sixth Army's training memo on
flame thrower operations.
Commanders had difficulties even when they tried to adhere to the
established doctrine. During training, an assault party working as a
unit might attain a high standard of proficiency. But in the interval
27
(1) History, AFMIDPAC, II, an I-d, 66; an. II-c-1, 46-48. (1) See below, p. 587.
28
Ltr, CmlO ALAMO Forces to CmlO I Corps, 17 May 44, no sub. Cited in McKinney, Portable
Flame Thrower Opns, p. 91.
29
This doctrine was expressed in Sixth Army Training Memorandum No. 8, 1 October 1943, sub:
Training in the Use of Flame Throwers, reprinted as Appendix j in McKinney, Portable Flame
Thrower Operations, pages 258-60.
30
(1) Memo, CmlO ALAMO Force for ACofS G-3 Sixth Army, 8 Jun 44, no sub. Sixth Army
353 Cml Warfare Tng. (2) Memo, CmlO Sixth Army for ACofS G-3 Sixth Army, 21 May 44, no
sub. Cml Warfare Sixth Army 353 Flame Thrower Tng.
between the completion of training and the test of battle, the group
normally was so broken up by promotions, transfers, and casualties
that the maintenance of organizational integrity was impossible. To
complicate the situation still more, the flame thrower was officially
classified as a secondary weapon. This meant that with the close of the
training period flame throwers were returned to unit supply. There-
after, whenever an attacking force unexpectedly encountered a forti-
fied defensive installation, an assault party could not be sent forward
at once. Instead, flame thrower operators first had to go back to the
unit supply point to pick up and fill their weapons. Such delays were
31
often costly.
Chemical and other officers concerned with flame thrower operations
recognized the inadequacies of Sixth Army flame thrower doctrine,
especially as it applied to assault parties. As a remedy they suggested the
establishment of permanent units whose principal mission would be
attacks on fortifications and to whom the flame thrower would be as-
signed as a primary weapon. Specifically, some recommended the con-
version of chemical processing, 4.2-inch mortar, or antitank units into
chemical flame thrower companies or platoons attached to regimental
32
headquarters. Although flame thrower platoons of this type had al-
ready been organized with success by regiments of the Americal Divi-
sion on Bougainville, Sixth Army rejected this idea for its own units.
It issued instead, on 22 June 1944, new instructions which emphasized
33
the technical and tactical training of assault teams. Each infantry
battalion and cavalry squadron was to form and maintain on a perma-
nent basis at least one assault party, to include a leader, an assistant
leader, 4 flame thrower operators, 2 demolitions men, 2 rocket launcher
men, 2 BAR operators, and 4 riflemen. Trained to reduce fortified
enemy positions, the assault party was to be held in reserve during com-
bat until appropriate targets appeared. Company and battalion com-
manders and executive officers were expected to familiarize themselves
31
(1) Ltr, CmlO 1st Cav Div to CmlO ALAMO Force,6 Dec 43, no sub. Sixth Army, AG 300.6
Misc Memos (1st Cav). (2) Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Sixth Army, 23 Jun 44, sub: Flame Throwers.
CWS 314.7 Portable Flame Thrower File. (3) CmlO 41st Div to CmlO ALAMO Force, 30 Jun 44,
Preliminary Tech Rpt-Ltr, Rpt 2. Sixth Army 350.05 Biak.
32
(1) Ltr, CmlO I Corps to CmlO Sixth Army, 13 Jun 44, no sub. CWS 314.7 Portable Flame
Thrower File. (2) Ltr, CmlO XIV Corps to CmlO Sixth Army, 9 Jun 44, no sub. Sixth Army
Rcds, 353 Flame Thrower Tng. (3) Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Sixth Army, 23 Jun 44, sub: Flame
Throwers.
33
Sixth Army Tng Memo No. 18, 22 Jun 44, no sub. Reprinted as app. 9 in McKinney, Portable
Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 273-75.
with the capabilities, limitations, and tactical employment of these

assault parties, so that they would be committed with maximum ef-
34
fectiveness.
Having resolved the question of tactical employment, Sixth Army
turned to flame thrower servicing problems. It had always been diffi-
cult to refill fuel tanks, replace empty gas cylinders, and test and repair
flame throwers rapidly and efficiently near the front lines. But as long
as demands for the weapon were infrequent, speedy servicing had been
a minor consideration. The difficulty reached critical proportions only
on Biak, where for the first time flame throwers were in almost daily
use.
As an interim measure, Lt. Col. Frank M. Arthur, 41st Division
chemical officer, devised a plan for mounting two charging sets, each
consisting of two hydrogen and five nitrogen cylinders and a fuel mix-
ing kit, on jeeps and trailers. Teams of technicians from the 94th
Chemical Composite Company operated these sets and serviced flame
throwers down to the regimental level. Experience proved this system
inadequate, since it was at the battalion and the company level that
servicing was found to be most desirable.35
Although Sixth Army agreed that the assignment of CWS personnel
to lower combat units was the most likely solution to the servicing prob-
lem, the limited number of chemical troops prevented such dispersal.
In planning for the Leyte operation Sixth Army therefore decided that
battalion and company personnel would service the flame throwers
and perform first echelon maintenance. The task of second and third
echelon maintenance and the preparation of proper fuel mixtures was
assigned to chemical service platoons attached to corps and divisions.
This arrangement was to work even more successfully on Luzon than
it did on Leyte, primarily because of the presence on Luzon of a greater
number of chemical service platoons.36
Employment of the Portable Flame Thrower

The return to the Philippines took place on 20 October with the as-
sault on Leyte by Sixth Army's X and XXIV Corps. The portable
34
Ibid.
35
CmlO 41st Inf Div to CmlO ALAMO Force, 30 Jun 44, Preliminary Tech Rpt-Ltr, Rpt No. 2.
36
(1) Sixth U.S. Army Rpt of the Luzon Campaign, 9 Jan-3O Jun 45, III, Rpt of the Cml Warfare
Officer, 87, 91. (2) CG Sixth Army to Distr, 10 Apr 45, Rpt Cml Warfare Activities During the
Leyte Opn.
flame thrower saw action the first day and continued to play a signifi-
cant role throughout the operation. In all, 229 weapons were on hand
and, except for the 11 th Airborne, each of the divisions on Leyte used
the flame thrower in combat.37
The campaign demonstrated the validity of the new Sixth Army
policy on tactical doctrine and servicing. Flame thrower operator
casualties were light, malfunctions rare, and assault teams successful in
the large majority of their missions.38 Japanese bunker, cave, and dug-
out defenses on Leyte were elaborate and often ingenious. The success
of the flame thrower pointed up the merits of the weapon and the train-
ing and skill of the operators.
On 29 October a battalion of the 17th Infantry, 7th Division, en-
countered the strangest defensive position of the campaign. During the
fight for Dagami, Company L came upon a cemetery south of the town
which was overgrown with weeds and filled with stone crypts built
above the ground. Encountering no resistance the leading elements of
the company passed through the graveyard. The support platoon fol-
lowed. When the platoon was halfway through, a headstone tilted
back revealing four Japanese in the grave, armed with rifles and an
American BAR. The enemy troops could not be dislodged until a
flame thrower came forward and burned them out. The platoon broke
up into small details and pushed its way through the rest of the ceme-
tery, eliminating enemy fighters as they were located. Company K,
following Company L, also received fire from the stone crypts. It
became evident that the enemy had removed the bodies from their
tombs, punched holes through the stone, and had thus established a
series of small pillboxes. The company commander withdrew to a path
in the cemetery and, lining up his men shoulder to shoulder, sent them
through the cemetery behind a battery of six flame throwers. This
effective, albeit unorthodox, formation burned its way through the
macabre defenses, destroying about 30 of the enemy in the process.39
Flame thrower assaults by other units on Leyte, though less bizarre,
were no less successful. Regiments of the 96th Division, equipped with
the new M2-2 flame thrower, found it useful in burning off kunai
grass which hid Japanese emplacements. On one occasion a flame
37
CG Sixth Army to Distr, Cml Warfare Activities During the Leyte Opn.
38
Ibid.
39
(1) 1 7 t h Inf, 1 Jan 45, Rpt of KING II Opn. 7th Inf Div 307-Inf (17)-0.3 (15035). (2)
Cannon, Leyte, The Return to the Philippines, pp. 143-44.
thrower was used at close quarters to repel an enemy attack on Ameri-

40
can tanks. The division reported that Japanese troops were reluctant
to stay in positions attacked by flame throwers and that the weapon
was "a very important factor in overcoming the enemy's inherent will
to resist."41
Reports from the 1st Cavalry Division and the 32d Infantry Division
substantiated this estimate of the portable flame thrower. In mid-
December an element of the 1st Cavalry Division encountered an en-
emy emplacement on a narrow ridge in the Mount Minoro sector which
commanded the approach along the mountain trail. Repulsed in sev-
eral frontal attacks cavalrymen, supported by an assault team, circled
wide and approached the position from the rear. The flame thrower
sprayed the emplacement, and the defenders were cut down by small
arms fire as they fled from their position.42
On 15 December troops of the 126th Infantry, 32d Division, were
halted in the Ormoc corridor by strong resistance from a pillbox and
riflemen situated about twenty yards below the crest of a hill. After
one attempt to overcome these defenses had failed, the regiment formed
an assault party of fifteen riflemen, a bazooka team, and two flame
thrower operators. The party crept around the enemy and opened fire
simultaneously with grenades, bazookas, and flame throwers. One flame
thrower operator directed his fire on the pillbox, while the other sprayed
the rifle positions. The attacking riflemen found that the badly burned
and demoralized Japanese offered little resistance.43
Units on Leyte for the most part adhered closely to Sixth Army
flame thrower doctrine. Those who did not soon came to grief. Some
unit commanders, for example, continued to use but one flame thrower
in an assault party. By thus failing to allow for possible misfires or
casualties they endangered the success of their mission. Moreover, de-
spite repeated warnings, weapons were occasionally committed to action
without sufficient servicing. The 3 2d Division, which arrived on Leyte
on 14 November 1944, unloaded its flame throwers and sent them di-
rectly to the front line without a check. Misfires and malfunctions
40
382d RCT AAR, 7 Nov 44, KING II (Leyte) Opns. 296-Inf (382)-0.3 (15465).
41
96th Div AAR, n.d., KING II, Oct-Dec 44, p. 85. 396-0.3 (11816).
42
CG X Corps to CG Sixth Army, 13 Jan 45, Rpt of Cml Warfare Activities.
43
Ltr, CG 32d Div to CG Sixth Army, 27 Feb 45, sub: Cml Warfare Activities in the Leyte Opn.
319.1 Sixth Army Rcds, Leyte.
resulted. Not until the weapons were called back and properly serviced
did they function satisfactorily.44
The Leyte Campaign was followed in January 1945 by the invasion
of Luzon, the largest and most populous island in the Philippines.45 Al-
though suitable flame thrower targets did not develop during the 9
January landing at Lingayen Gulf, they began to appear a week later
in I Corps sectors north and east of the beachhead. Three units of I
Corps had particular success with the weapon. On the 26th a company
of the 158th RCT, operating in mountainous terrain, encountered a
series of long, curved, and defended tunnels which ran about thirty
feet into a slope. An assault team moved toward the entrances under
cover of smoke from white phosphorus grenades. The flame thrower
operator fired a long burst of fuel into the opening of the first tunnel
and flushed a number of burning Japanese, who were killed by small
arms fire as they fled from the entrance. The other openings were
treated in a like manner. Japanese bodies, victims of burns and suffoca-
tion, were found along the smouldering corridors in the most remote
parts of the tunnels.46
Although other units reported similar success with the portable
flame thrower, the weapon was not ideally suited for combat in many
parts of Luzon. The 43d Division, for example, reported that in the
open terrain which featured much of the island, flame thrower opera-
tors found their approach much more hazardous than in the under-
growth of the jungle. As a consequence, weapons with longer ranges
47
had to be used in the reduction of enemy fortifications.
The flame thrower proved more effective against urban targets. The
bitter battle for Manila marked the first extensive city fighting in the
Southwest Pacific, and flame throwers, although untested in this kind of
combat, saw much use in the street-to-street struggle. The weapon
proved particularly valuable in routing the enemy from the intricate
positions of the Intramuros, the old walled city of Manila.48 The port-
able flame thrower also played a part in the fighting in the Philippine
44
(1) Ibid, (2) CG X Corps to CG Sixth Army, 13 Jan 45, Rpt of Cml Warfare Activities.
45
For a general account of the Luzon campaign, see Smith, Triumph in the Philippines.
46
Cml Sec 158th RCT, Cml Intell Rpt, 28 Jan 45. Sixth Army Rcds, Luzon Intell Rpts, 350.05.
47
43d Div Hist Rpt, Luzon Campaign, 9 Jan-30 Jun 45, pp. 102-03. 43d Inf Div 343-33.4
(12281).
48
(1) AAR, Opns of the 37th Inf Div, Luzon, P.I., 1 Nov 44-30 Jun 45. 37th Inf Div 337-3
(22871). (2) AAR, XIV Corps, M-1 Opn (Luzon), pp. 130-32. XIV Corps 214-33.4 (3469).
(3) See Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, chs. XV, XI.
General Hospital, the Legislative Building, and the General Post Office
—fighting which often turned into a series of fierce room-to-room and
floor-to-floor battles. American troops blasted holes in walls with ex-
plosives and then used flame throwers against the enemy in the next
room. The 37th Division reported that it used over three hundred
fillings during the Manila operation, or an average of more than four
49
fillings for every flame weapon in the division.
The capture of Manila did not end the fighting on Luzon. There
remained the task of clearing out the more remote mountainous regions
of the island. In this type of action flame throwers were infrequently
used. Units reported that the flame thrower was too heavy, making it
difficult for one man to carry for prolonged periods, and, since few
extra men were available to haul the weapons, they often were left
behind. On several occasions I Corps resorted to Filipino carriers to
transport the weapons from the service point to the line of departure,
a distance of several thousand yards and at times over steep mountain
trails. Under such conditions flame thrower employment was limited
50
to reasonably accessible targets.
The policy of using flame thrower assault parties worked out suc-
cessfully as long as infantry casualties were low. But when casualty
rates mounted and every available man was wanted for the immediate
needs of combat, it became impossible to hold these organized teams in
permanent reserve. Commanders broke up these groups and sent their
personnel to line companies. Missions for which assault parties had been
organized fell to the rifle squad or platoon closest to the action.51
Sixth Army, disturbed by this situation and desirous of avoiding
similar difficulties in its forthcoming campaign on the Japanese main-
land, changed its training doctrine somewhat. Representing the ac-
cumulated experience of several years of combat, a new directive was
issued which differed in only one significant respect from its predeces-
sors—it rejected the concept of "organized assault parties in permanent
reserve." Instead, it stipulated that at least three squads from each rifle
49
(1) CG XIV Corps to CG Sixth Army, 1 Jul 45, Rpt, Japanese Defense of Cities as Exemplified
by the Battle of Manila, p. 21. Sixth Army G-2 files. (2) AAR, Opns of the 37th Inf Div Luzon,
P.I., 1 Nov 44-30 Jun 45.
50
I Corps, History of the Luzon Campaign, Philippine Islands, 1945, an B-1. I Corps 201-33.4
(21700).
51
(1) Hist Rpt, 38th Inf Div, Avengers of Bataan, 19 Jan-30 Jun 45, pp. 189-90. 38th Inf Div
files 338-33.4 (17806). (2) Hist Rpt, A History of the 63d Inf Opns on Luzon, P.I., 9 Jan-30 Jun
45. 306 Inf (63)-0.3 (26302).
company be trained to use special assault weapons and that four men
in each of these squads be flame thrower operators. These trained
groups were to operate as normal rifle squads until a situation arose in
which they were needed to perform their specialty.52 This change did
not alter the basic concept of using flame throwers solely as component
elements of an assault team. What was attempted was a further inte-
gration of the flexible assault team within the organizational framework
of the normal infantry unit. The war ended before this new system
could be tested in combat.
American forces began the Philippine campaign only partially
equipped with the new M2-2 flame thrower. As these weapons became
available, and as stocks of the M1A1 model were exhausted, the new
53
weapons were issued to combat troops. Supplies of the M2-2 flame
thrower never were sufficient to enable the M1A1's to be completely
withdrawn from service, but by V-J Day the newer type was in the
hands of the majority of units operating in the Philippines.
Those who were obliged to carry the M1A1 had to maintain a
vigilant servicing policy, especially during the rainy season, for despite
waterproofing the ignition system of the weapon was still unreliable.
Those equipped with the M2-2 also had problems. The pressure regu-
lator proved to be entirely unsatisfactory and before the end of the
Philippine operations had been replaced by an entirely new type.54
Flame thrower operators complained that the M2-2 could not maintain
pressure long enough, a result of inherent deficiencies in the weapon as
well as of poor maintenance procedures. Troops who filled the flame
thrower forgot that heat was generated when a cylinder was charged
and the subsequent cooling-off process could result in a drop of as much
as 200 pounds in pressure. Conversely, pressure built up in the fuel
tank when the tank was exposed to the direct rays of the sun, blowing
out the safety discs in extreme cases.55
52
Sixth Army Tng Memo No. 30,6 Aug 45, reprinted as app. 12 in McKinney, Portable Flame
Thrower Opns, pp. 281-83.
53
(1) Ltr, CG USAFFE to CG's Sixth Army, XIV Corps, and USASOS SWPA, 2 Sep 44, sub:
Portable Flame Throwers. (2) Ltr, CG USAFFE to CG's Sixth and Eighth Armies, 21 Sep 44, sub:
Flame Throwers. Both in Sixth Army 470.71, Flame Throwers.
54
Ltr, CmlO Sixth Army to CmlO I Corps et al.,6 Apr 45, sub: Regulators, Pressure Assembly
B81-1-778, Grove Type. Sixth Army Rcds, Cml Warfare 470.71.
55
Ltr, CG Eighth Army to CofS War Dept, 3 Jan 46, sub: Employ of Flame Throwers in the
Visaya Campaign, with inch. Eighth Army AG 470.71 (Far East).
The Mechanized flame Thrower

Not counting a limited use of improvised models, the first employ-
ment of the mechanized flame thrower in the Southwest Pacific took
place in the Philippines. The XXIV Corps had been slated for the
assault on Yap, in the Central Pacific Area, when the Joint Chiefs
of Staff canceled the Yap operation and ordered General MacArthur
and Admiral Nimitz to invade Leyte on 20 October 1944, two months
to the day before the planned date of the operation. The XXIV Corps,
which was now to take part in the assault on Leyte, had already em-
barked for Yap, when this change took place. A terrain study of that
island had recommended the utility of the mechanized flame thrower
particularly during the assault, and ten Ronson flame throwers, nine
on light tanks and one in an amphibious tractor, were in the convoy.56
Not only was Leyte's terrain far less suitable for tracked vehicles
than that of Yap, but the invasion of Leyte took place during the
rainy season, a circumstance which all but immobilized the mechanized
vehicles. During the landing one resisting enemy bunker was quickly
neutralized by the lone flame tractor, and during the first few days on
Leyte the light tank flame throwers burned off the foliage from a num-
ber of concealed enemy positions. But the fighting soon reached the
57
mountains, which put the tanks at further disadvantage.
The Luzon fighting saw the arrival of both auxiliary and main arma-
ment flame throwers from the zone of interior. The XIV Corps in-
cluded a tank battalion, equipped with bow gun flame throwers, that
was employed in the house-to-house fighting in Manila. In one instance
a flame tank neutralized in a few minutes a barricaded building which
had defied the infantry for two days. Twenty-five more bow gun
58
flame throwers reached the Sixth Army in mid-April.
On 3 April 1945 the first and only main armament flame throwers
from the United States to see action with Army troops overseas arrived
on Luzon. These were four NDRC Q model (E7-7) flame throwers
mounted in M5A1 light tanks and scheduled for service testing. The
flame throwers and a service truck were assigned to the 13th Armored
56
(1) History, CWS AFMIDPAC, II, an. II-c-1, 21-22. (2) Cannon, Leyte: The Return to
the Philippines, pp. 8-9.
57
Tech Intell Rpt 271, 5 Feb 45, p. 2, cited in McKinney, Mechanized Flame Thrower Opns, p. 93.
58
(1) Rpt of CmlO Sixth Army, Luzon Campaign, 9 Jan-1 Jul 45, pp. 13-15. (2) McKinney,
Portable Flame Thrower Opns, p. 24. (3) These bow gun auxiliary flame throwers were of the E4-5
series, standardized as the M3-4-3 in 1945.
59
Group. By this time the fighting on Luzon had reached its final
stages, and the combat activity at Ipo Dam, Balete Pass, Villa Verde
Trail, and Baguio took place in mountainous terrain, which made even
the maneuvering of light tanks difficult. Moreover, the enemy artillery
and mortar fire limited the activity of the thin-skinned M5A1's. In
mid-April these main armament tanks were attached to I Corps for
25th Division operations at Balete Pass. Following a demonstration
before officers of the division, the tanks, which were assigned to the
27th Regiment, saw action almost at once. The objective was an enemy
position located on the reverse slope of a ridge. One of the flame tanks
moved along the narrow ridge which provided the only avenue of ap-
proach and, when even with the target, turned down the slope and
attempted to flame the Japanese. Thwarted by the limited maximum
depression of the gun, the tankmen fired two quick bursts and with-
drew.60
Mechanized flame throwers experienced the usual difficulties of tank-
infantry communications. Close contact between the two was par-
ticularly important because of the limited visibility in the mountains
where infantrymen often had to guide the tank to its objective. A
power telephone on the rear deck of the tank was rigged to the turret,
allowing the turret operator to communicate with the infantry but
only at the cost of cutting off turret traversing power whenever he
spoke.6161
spoke.
The four main armament flame tanks advanced to the front lines
several times during the next twelve days, but remained uncommitted.
On 27 April the advance of Company K, 27th Infantry, was stalled
for more than twenty-four hours by deadly machine gun and 47-mm.
fire from enemy emplacements on the ridge's forward slope and the
valley beyond. Thick underbrush, which made friendly grenades in-
effective, covered the entire defensive position, while fire from U.S.
tanks and artillery was unable to reach the enemy's defiladed position.
In this situation the commanding officer of the flame detachment
suggested the use of his tanks. The heavy underbrush made the ap-
proach exceedingly difficult and a medium tank and then an armored
59
(1) Ltr, CmlO Hq AFMIDPAC to Chief Info Br OCCWS, 10 Aug 45. (2) Rpt of CmlO
Sixth Army, Luzon Campaign, pp. 13-14.
60
USAFFE Bd Rpt No. 296, 17 May 45, Rpt of Opns of Flame Throwers E7-7 in Light Tanks
M5A1. CWS 314.7 Mechanized Flame Thrower File.
61
(1) Ibid, (2) Rpt of First Combat Mission Fired by E7-7 Flame Gun on M5A1 Light Tank,
16 Apr 45. CWS 314.7 Mechanized Flame Thrower File.
bulldozer were pressed into service to clear a way. Two flame tanks
were at the assembly point 200 to 300 yards from the principal target—
a pillbox across a ravine at the foot of a large tree. Because of the nar-
row approach, only one flame tank could advance at a time and, as
there was no room for armored support by the medium tanks, two rifle
platoons from Company K furnished protection. An infantryman,
walking behind the tank, guided it over the crest of the ridge. When the
enemy resisted with hand grenades, the bow gunner sprayed the sus-
pected areas with machine gun fire. Approximately fifty yards from
the target the tank ran on a log twelve inches in diameter. The driver
carefully maneuvered the vehicle until it balanced just forward, thus
permitting direct aim down toward the target. The first burst of
flame flushed eight Japanese who were killed by supporting infantry-
men. Several short bursts, fired across the target, caused the entire area
to burn briskly for about five minutes. When the smoke cleared, an-
other dugout became visible and received what was left of the flame
fuel. The infantry advanced promptly, and by dusk Company K had
taken its objective of Lone Tree Ridge, 200 yards beyond. There were
53 enemy dead in the area,6 dying in the flame attack and the rest
killed by the infantry as they ran from cover. Friendly forces suffered
no casualties.62
The flame tanks had varying success in the subsequent fighting on
Luzon. Sometimes they burned out the enemy; other times they were
stymied by their vulnerability to the heavier Japanese weapons. There
were few mechanical difficulties and, in spite of heavy rains, no ignition
failures. Although infantrymen and tankers were enthusiastic about
the flame tanks' ability to rout the enemy from strong positions, these
combat tests indicated that the thinly armored light tank was not a
satisfactory mount for the flame thrower.63
Iwo Jima
The V Amphibious Corps invaded Iwo Jima in February 1945. It
was a costly campaign waged against an enemy entrenched in a super-
lative defensive system. But as one Marine Corps historian has stated:
62
(1) Ltr, CmlO 25th Inf Div to CmlO I Corps, 2 May 45, sub: Rpt on Use of Flame Thrower.
CWS 314.7 Mechanized Flame Thrower File. (2) USAFFE Bd Rpt 296, 17 May 45.
63
(1) USAFFE Bd Rpt 296, 17 May 45. (2) Ltr, CO 13th Armored Co to CG Sixth Army, 31
May 45, sub: Combat Testing of Flame Throwers E7-7 in Light Tanks. Cited in McKinney,
Mechanized Flame Thrower Opns, p. 149.
"Never before in the Pacific War had troops engaged in amphibious

assault been able to see so clearly the immediate importance of the ob-
jective." 64 The tiny island would provide an intermediate base for
fighter escorts for the bombers headed toward Japan. It would also be
a haven for crippled B-29's unable to make it to airfields in the Mari-
anas.
The preinvasion preparations of the three Marine divisions earmarked
for Iwo included work with both the portable and the mechanized
flame throwers. For the smaller weapon this preparation consisted
mostly of integrating the flame throwers with the assault teams. It was
3d Marine Division policy to have in each of its battalions an assault
platoon made up of 6 men from each rifle company and 2 men from
the battalion headquarters company. These 20 men, specially trained
in the use of flame throwers, rocket launchers, and demolitions, were
placed under the immediate control of the battalion commander. The
commander in turn could attach the whole platoon, or a part of it,
to his assault companies as the situation required.65 Other Marine divi-
sions devised similar platoons. Regiments of the 4th Marine Division
organized 39-man platoons which were attached to each battalion land-
ing team. Squads from these platoons were then assigned to companies
for specific missions.66
A plentiful supply of M2-2 portable flame throwers made possible
these elaborate preparations—the battalion had 27 weapons or 243 for
the division. A battalion usually assigned 1 flame thrower to each of its
9 rifle platoons, 9 to the battalion supply section, and the remaining 9
to the regimental service platoon. This arrangement insured the rapid
replacement of lost or damaged weapons. It also made possible a reserve
flame thrower for every one in use, a justifiable ratio because of the
weapon's vulnerability to enemy fire and the fact that it was difficult
to service.67
The 4th and 5th Marine Divisions each received four Hawaiian-
made main armament mechanized flame throwers. The development
and procurement of these flame throwers was undertaken by the
65
3d Marine Div Tng Order, No. 45-44, 16 Dec 44, Orgn for Employ of Flame Throwers, Rocket
Launchers and Demolition in the Inf Bn, reprinted as app. 16 in McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower,
pp. 304-06.
64
66
67
Bartley,
Ibid.,
CG 4than.Iwo
Marine
C and
Jima:
an.
DivAmphibious
Fto(23d
Comdt
RCT).
Marine
Epic, p.Corps,
23. 18 May 45, Opns Rpt, Iwo Jima, an. G (24th RCT).
Marine Corps Archives.
NEUTRALIZING A CAVE, Iwo JIMA
Chemical Section, Pacific Base Command, with help from the Navy,
the Marine Corps, other Army elements, and civilians. Briefly, the
flame unit, designated the POA CWS H1, consisted of a Ronson flame
thrower installed in a salvaged 75-mm. gun tube and mounted in a
medium tank. It had a maximum effective range of about 100 yards
(with thickened fuel), a capacity of nearly 300 gallons, and a firing
68
time of 150 seconds.
Meanwhile, the Japanese defenders of Iwo Jima had been busy
strengthening their defenses. Engineers well versed in fortifications
came from Japan to supervise the work. They added a series of trenches
and pillboxes to the natural caves which formed the backbone of the
island's defenses. Whenever possible these features were integrated
68
(1) History, CWS AFMIDPAC vol. III, refs. 29, 45-47, and vol. IV, ans. II-c-2 and II-c-3.
(2) Ltr Rpt, CO 3d Bn 21st Marines to CO 21st Marines 3d Marine Div, 11 Apr 45, sub: Action
Rpt. Marine Corps Archives.
into a single network permitting troops to move from one place to

another without exposure. Some of the strongpoints had multiple en-
trances and apertures which were invulnerable to artillery fire.
The Japanese did their work well. Not only did it take a month to
capture this tiny island, but during the course of the operation marines
actually saw very few of the enemy. The Japanese commander ex-
pressly forbade banzai charges and other mass heroics, ordering his
troops to stick to their positions to the last. Moreover, once a position
had been silenced, it was by no means safe to assume that it would give
no further trouble. The Japanese infiltrated at night, both above and
below ground, and re-occupied defenses which previously had been
neutralized.69
On 19 February 1945 the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions landed on
the south coast of Iwo Jima with the 3d Marine Division in reserve.
From the beginning, portable flame throwers were a big help in cleaning
out caves and pillboxes. A battalion in the 3d Division described the
usual employment of the portable weapon. Covered by rifle and BAR
fire, the flame operator moved to a firing position on the flank of a
target. He then fired across the face of the cave or embrasure, advanc-
ing quickly under his own fire until he could shoot directly into the
opening. This tactic consistently silenced the position, which was then
destroyed by demolition charges.70
At the end of the campaign some units commented on the superiority
of the M2-2 model over its M1A1 predecessor, particularly in regard
to its ignition system. The familiar cry for greater range continued to
be heard. As far as maintenance was concerned, experience varied—
one battalion reported no difficulty or malfunctions, while others
lamented the complete absence of spare parts.71
Because enemy emplacements were difficult to approach, flame
thrower operator casualties shot upward. The casualty rate on Iwo
Jima was probably higher than in any other campaign in the Pacific.
Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 159-60.

70
(1) 1st Bn 21st Marines 3d Marine Div AAR, Iwo Jima,6 Apr 45. (2) CO 9th Marines to
CG 3d Marine Div, AAR, Iwo Jima, 20 Apr 45. (3) Ltr Rpt, CG 4th Marine Div to Comdt Marine
Corps, 18 Mar 45, sub: Opns Rpt, Iwo Jima, an. F (23d RCT) and an. G (1st Bn 24th RCT). All
in 69Marine Corps
(1) "The Archives.
Jap Holes In," Intelligence Bulletin, III, No. 12 (August, 1945), 60-62. (2) McKinney,
71
Ltr Rpt, CG 4th Marine Div to Comdt Marine Corps, 18 Mar 45, sub: Opns Rpt, Iwo Jima, 19
Feb-16 Mar, an. G (24th RCT), an. H (25th RCT), apps. III, IV. Marine Corps Archives.
72
One battalion reported 92-percent losses. As a result, there was a scar-
city of competent and experienced operators, particularly as the battle
reached its final stages. By way of correction, commanders recom-
mended greater emphasis on flame thrower training and suggested that
all enlisted men be given at least a working knowledge of the weapon.73
The eight main armament flame throwers were lightly used during
the first few days of the operation, largely because of the rough terrain.
But within the week the marines became dependent upon flame tank
74
support and constantly requested its use. Typical tactics were as fol-
lows: the Marine infantrymen advanced, drawing fire from enemy
positions; armored dozers then pushed ahead and, protected by tank
and small arms fire, prepared a road to points within range of enemy
positions; flame-throwing tanks moved forward and neutralized the
enemy positions with flame and machine gun fire so that the infantry
could advance; engineers followed closely behind with demolitions
and destroyed the enemy caves and pillboxes to prevent their further
use. This was a slow and laborious process, but any attempt on the
part of the marines to continue the advance before bypassed positions
had been destroyed resulted in heavy casualties, and no real gain could
be made as long as the Japanese could fire on American troops from
the rear.75
The northern area of the island was featured by deep gullies, saw-
toothed ridges, sheer cliffs, and eroded, boulder-strewn plateaus, and
here the Japanese holed up for their last desperate stand. A liberal use
of portable and mechanized flame throwers helped to eradicate this
kind of resistance, although the formidable terrain made it hard to get
the flame tanks within effective range of enemy targets. Generally, a
tank dozer nudged out a few yards of roadway and moved aside. The
flame tanks then advanced, sometimes two or three in rapid succession,
and fired while regular tanks stood back and provided cover. This
operation was repeated so often that on some days the 5th Marine Tank
Jima,
72
74
incl D. Marine Corps Archives.
73 Armored
Co
(1)2dIbid.
BnForce
to(2)
COBd,
CO21stRpt
21stMarines,
of Conf12to
Marines on
AprMechanized
CG45,
3dAction
MarineFlame
Rpt,
Div, Iwo
Thrower,
Jima 45,
10 Apr Opn,
E 1Action
2 —3d
7 R 1Marine
,Rpt,
23 Mar
DivJima
Iwo 45.
Rpt, CWS
Iwo
Opn.
314.7 Mechanized Flame Thrower File.

75
(1) 26th RCT 5th Marine Div, AAR, Iwo Jima, an. QUEEN. (2) Bartley, Iwo Jima: Amphibious
Epic, p. 187.
Battalion used between 5,000 and 10,000 gallons of thickened gasoline

in its three or four flame tanks. The limited supply of flame tanks and
tank dozers was a big handicap. And despite the intricate procedure
outlined above the rugged terrain often defied all attempts at penetra-
76
tion.
The fixed assignment of flame tanks to tank companies proved to be
impracticable on Iwo. Placed in a battalion pool and stationed at the
refueling area, flame tanks were made available by the battalion
wherever needed. Tank companies or platoons sent requests through
battalion, the infantry companies through liaison personnel. As soon
as a flame thrower exhausted its fuel, it returned to the refill station
for a new load and possibly a new assignment. In spite of all these
measures, troop advances were frequently held up because all flame
tanks were engaged elsewhere.77
The 4th and 5th Marine Divisions emphasized the greater effective-
ness of the main armament type as opposed to the auxiliary flame
thrower, of which the 4th Division had twenty-four. These divisions
recommended more large capacity flame throwers and their incorpora-
tion as organic equipment in all tank battalions.78 Although the 3d
Marine Division entered the Iwo Jima operation without main arma-
ment flame throwers, it was later on able to borrow some from the other
divisions. In its opinion this type was better against enemy defenses
than the auxiliary bow gun flame throwers with their shorter range
and limited traverse.79
After-action reports for the Iwo Jima operation attested to the value
of the flame weapons. Of the two types, the mechanized flame thrower
seemed to have come out on top. One battalion commander called it
the "best single weapon of the operation." 80 The V Amphibious Corps
report referred to the mechanized weapon as the "only effective means"
76
5th Marne Div, Action Rpt, Iwo Jima, 19 Feb-24 Mar 45, an. LOVE. Marine Corps Archives.
77
(1) Ibid. (2) For a day-by-day log of flame thrower operations on Iwo Jima, see: (1) History,
CWS AFMIDPAC, IV, an. II-c-3, 5-32, and McKinney, Mechanized Flame Thrower Opns, app. 4,
pp. 286-300.
78
Comments, 4th Marine Div, Iwo Jima, and 5th Marine Div, Iwo Jima Opns. History CWS
AFMIDPAC, IV, an II-c-3, 27-32.
79
3d Marine Div, AAR, Iwo Jima. History, CWS AFMIDPAC, vol. IV, an. II-c-3.
80
CT-28, Action Rpt, Iwo Jima Opn, an. CHARLIE (Opn), see VIII LT-328 Action Rpt, p. 40.
of reducing many of the concrete pillboxes and blockhouses encount-

81
ered on the island.
Okinawa
Okinawa was the last battle of the war and one of the hardest. Con-
ducted by Tenth Army on the very doorstep of Japan, it was to involve
more CWS equipment than any other Pacific campaign. Each of the
four Army divisions of XXIV Corps had 141 portable flame throwers;
each of the three Marine divisions of III Amphibious Corps had 243,
the same number as had been taken to Iwo Jima. The 713th Tank
Battalion, converted to a provisional flame thrower unit for the opera-
tion, received a complement of 54 POA main armament flame
throwers.82
All seven of the divisions to see action on Okinawa were combat
tested and experienced in portable flame thrower operations. Employ-
ment of the portable weapon closely paralleled that of earlier actions.
Especially significant was the fighting in the southern portion of the
island where enemy positions most closely resembled those which had
been found on Iwo Jima.83 Despite these successes the portable flame
thrower was overshadowed on Okinawa by its mechanized counterpart.
The 713th Tank Battalion changed over to a flame battalion in Ha-
waii, and its own troops had assisted in the installation of the POA
flame throwers in the medium tanks. Tank crews test fired and ad-
justed their flame weapons, while others of the battalion received in-
struction in mixing the fuel. A tentative table of organization and
equipment was drawn up to reflect the differences inherent in a flame
tank unit.84
In general, each of the three companies of the 713th was attached
to a standard tank battalion in support of a division. In turn, flame
platoons joined tank companies, and sections joined standard platoons.
81
Hq V Amphib Corps Landing Force, Iwo Jima, General Staff Sec Rpt, app. 3, G-3 Rpt, pp.
56-57. Marine Corps Archives.
Armament, and 1st Ind, n.d. History, CWS AFMIDPAC, vol. III, ref. 51. (2) History CWS
XXIV
(1) Ltr,
82
83
Corps
CGAction
Tenth Rpt,
ArmyRyukyus,
to CG USAFPOA,
1 Apr-30 6JunOct
45, 44,
ch. sub:
7, p. Tank
88. XXIV
Bn Flame
Corps
Thrower
File 224-0.3
Primary
AFMIDPAC, vol. II, an. II-b.
(48295).
84
(1) This TOE is reproduced in History, CWS AFMIDPAC, volume III, Reference 53. (2) For a
popular account of the growing pains of the 713th and its combat experience, see Joseph Morschauser
III, "Blowtorch Battalion," Armor, LXIX, No. 2 (March-April, 1960), pages 30-33.
FLAME-THROWING TANK ATTACKS ENEMY INFANTRYMEN dug in along an old

road on Okinawa.
A tank platoon, including a section of three flame tanks, was placed

in support of an infantry battalion. Flame tank deployment differed
within these tank-infantry teams. Sometimes they operated alone with
the infantry; sometimes they formed an integral part of the tank
platoon; most frequently they waited at forward positions until called
upon for particular missions by the tank platoon. When the latter
tactic was used the flame tanks, supported by conventional tanks,
operated ahead of the infantry until an area had been cleared for the
latter's advance. The troops followed closely, protecting the tanks
and occupying the ground before the enemy could recover. This sup-
port was extended to both Army and Marine divisions.85
85
(1) 713th Tank Bn Armored Flame Thrower (Provisional) AAR Phase I-Nansei Shoto. This
70-page report is reproduced in toto in McKinney, Mechanized Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 307-77.
(2) Appleman, Burns, Gugeler, and Stevens, Okinawa, The Last Battle, p. 456.
Japanese troops defending Okinawa first faced mechanized flame

throwers on D plus 18 (19 April 1945), when thirty-one flame tanks
expended 3,500 gallons of napalm in the attack on a hill known as
Rocky Crags. Conventional tanks led the assault, with flame tanks and
infantry from the 7th Infantry Division close behind. The flame
throwers continued in support throughout the 6-day battle for the
Crags, which extended from the northwest and covered the approaches
to Hill 178 and the high ground west to Tanabaru, the division objective.
From 20 to 29 April 1945 other main armament flame throwers, in
support of various units of the 7th, 27th, and 96th Infantry Divisions,
continued to fire on rocky ridges, fortified caves, dugouts, pillboxes,
machine gun nests, and villages. When the Japanese withdrew, they did
so in many cases only because of the devastating effect of the flame.
American forces appreciated the psychological value of flame; the
commanding officer of one tank battalion reported that the infantry in
many cases preferred to advance behind a flame tank rather than behind
86
a standard one.
During May the fighting took place along the defensive position in
the high ground north of Shuri, the ancient capital of Okinawa. For
the first ten days flame tanks supported divisions in the battles for Kochi
Ridge, Flattop, Dick Hills, Hill 60, and Nan Hill. Meanwhile, other
flame tanks neutralized the network of caves on the reverse slopes of
the Maeda escarpment. Still others supported the marines in the savage
fire fight for Shuri Heights. The last ten days of May saw torrential
rains turn the ground into a quagmire of soft clay that immobilized
tanks and other vehicles, while the Japanese 32d Army executed a suc-
cessful withdrawal to the high ground on the southern tip of Okinawa.
Until the rains came, the flame tanks had used about 75,000 gallons of
flame fuel. Only 28 of the 54 original main armaments flame tanks
were still in operating condition.
The weather cleared in June and on its ninth day a battle began
in which mechanized flame throwers played a significant role. Facing
the XXIV Corps on its 6,000-yard front was a strong rocky line run-
ning from Yuza-Dake on the west to its eastern anchor, Hill 95. On
this end vertical cliffs 250 to 300 feet high rose to a plateau topped by
knobs, coral buttresses, and pinnacles. The 7th and 96th Infantry
86
McKinney, Mechanized Flame Thrower Opns, p. 115.
Divisions made little progress in their first attack against the 11,000
troops of the 32d Army which defended this line.
On 10 June naval gunfire, artillery, and tanks pounded the cliffs, but
the 7th Infantry Division advancing upon Hill 95 met accurate ma-
chine gun and sniper fire from at least 500 Japanese deployed in depth
in that section of the escarpment. Five flame tanks then maneuvered
into position and burned off the cover to the approaches to Hill 95.
Finally, two skeleton companies of infantry struggled to the top only
to be pinned down by enemy fire from farther up the ridge. The com-
manding officer and two men of Company C, 713th Tank Battalion,
scaled the ridge to within thirty yards of the enemy position, pulling
a 200-foot fire hose after them. From this point they burned out the
87
defenders who were then slain by the infantry.
The next day the attack was resumed. At one point a section of tanks
and flame tanks attacked a 500-yard frontage of the escarpment, driv-
ing the Japanese from their position and cutting them down with ma-
chine gun fire. Several days later two flame tanks came to the front
lines and an extension hose was hauled up a 50-foot high section of the
escarpment by means of a rope. The flame, hurled over the far edge,
was blown by the wind into the caves on the reverse slope. By moving
the hose from one flame tank to another the men destroyed ammuni-
tion dumps, fortified positions, and a large number of Japanese troops.
That same afternoon five flame throwers lined up at the base of the
cliff and fired on caves in its face. The infantry pushed forward slowly
and by 1600 hours Hill 95 was wholly in American hands. On the right
flank the 17th Infantry advanced with support from flame tanks to
capture the village of Azato before nightfall on 13 June 1945 and to
tie in with units of the 3 2d Infantry. Although some mopping up re-
mained to be done, the battle for Hill 9 5 was over, a typical struggle
88
on Okinawa in which flame tanks helped turn the tide of battle.
Hill 89, the last major strongpoint of southern Okinawa and head-
quarters of the Japanese 32d Army, was attacked by the 7th Division
on 20 June 1945. Here again was almost unbelievably difficult terrain
cut up by natural caves, tunnels, and crevices. For weeks the area had
87
been
Ibid.,systematically
p. 119. pounded by naval gunfire, long-range artillery,
rockets, and aerial bombing. A number of Japanese surrendered but
many others fought to the bitter end.
88
History, CWS AFMIDPAC, IV, an. II-c-3, 66-70.
Before the infantry attack the flame thrower and conventional tanks
moved out to burn off the remainder of the foliage from Hill 89 and
its approaches, which they left an ugly blackened mass of jagged coral.
On the second day the flame-throwing tanks advanced in increasing
numbers to pour thousands of gallons of burning fuel into caves and
crevices. Then the infantry, supported by flame tanks, medium tanks,
and artillery, successfully stormed the hill.
Between 22 and 24 June the infantry continued to mop up the
top of Hill 89. Flame thrower tanks, used in conjunction with loud-
speaker tanks, encouraged soldiers and civilians to surrender. As a
team, infantry and flame tanks killed over 100 Japanese and persuaded
three times as many to surrender. From the top of the cliff flame tanks
repeated the technique of firing toward the sea so that the wind could
blow the flaming napalm back into caves too high to be reached from
the beach. Concealed ammunition dumps blew up in loud explosions.
Load after load of fuel was fired into a huge cavern in which over
1,000 Japanese soldiers were thought to be hiding. Thus the remnants
of the Japanese 32d Army were destroyed, although some mopping
up remained in the rest of the island. The battle for Okinawa was
89
over.
During the Ryukyus Campaign the 713th Tank Battalion saw almost
continuous action for seventy days and officially received credit for
the death of 4,788 Japanese and the capture of 49. At the same time
the battalion lost 7 men killed and no men wounded, injured, or
missing. No one was killed inside a main armament flame tank as a
result of enemy action, although 41 tanks were knocked out during
90
the 630 flame tank sorties.
The XXIV Corps reported that the main armament flame tank was
one of the most effective weapons used on Okinawa and that the
Japanese fear of flame was greatly exploited by the flame tanks. The
7th Infantry Division spoke of the outstanding success of the flame
tanks.91 The periscope mounted flame thrower found little use in the
fighting on Okinawa as the large-capacity flame tanks were available.
89
Combat Opns Rpt, Ryukyus Campaign, 32d Inf Regt (7th Inf Div), n.d. Quoted in History,
CWS AFMIDPAC, IV, an. II-c-3, 87-91.
90
713th Tank Bn Armored Flame Thrower (Provisional) ARR Phase 1—Nansei Shoto, 30 Jun 45.
CWS 314.7 Mechanized Flame Thrower File.
91
(1) XXIV Corps AAR, Ryukyus Campaign. History CWS AFMIDPAC, IV, an. II-c-3, 101.
(2) 7th Inf Div Opns Rpt, Ryukyus Campaign. Both in History, CWS AFMIDPAC, IV, an.
II-c-3, p. 97.
Tank crews developed a fear of the periscope type after the fuel con-
tainer of one burst and ignited upon being struck by an enemy shell,
burning the tank crew to death. This type of auxiliary flame thrower,
therefore, was never fully tested in battle.92 Nor was the bow gun
type, with which the III Amphibious Corps was equipped, put to much
use, for main armament flame tanks of the 713th Tank Battalion were
93
preferred by Marine as well as Army units.
The 713th Tank Battalion suggested that, instead of having separate
armored flame thrower battalions, commanders should replace the light
tank company in each standard tank battalion with a flame thrower
tank company or else that the latter be added to each battalion. This
system, it was thought, would simplify administration and supply,
since a flame thrower tank company was normally attached to standard
tank battalions for operations. Some general mishandling of the
weapon brought forth the recommendation that infantry commanders
familiarize themselves with the use and limitations of armored flame
throwers and learn how to co-ordinate these weapons with other sup-
94
porting weapons and infantry.
The Tenth Army and the 713th Tank Battalion agreed that the
75-mm. gun should be retained in flame tanks and mounted coaxially
with the flame thrower, but that there should be no reduction in fuel
capacity and no decrease in the effectiveness of the flame gun.95
Preparations for the Invasion of Japan

During the summer of 1945 United States planners were concerned
with the problem of holding down casualties in the invasion of the
main Japanese islands. Such battles as Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa
had illustrated how costly victory in the Pacific could be. The assault
on Japan could be expected to exact a heavy toll of American lives
unless some means were found for reducing casualties. One of these
92
Ltr, CmlO Tenth Army to CmlO CPBC, 9 Jun 45, sub: Mechanized Flame Throwers. History,
CWS, AFMIDPAC, III, ref. 114, 3-4.
93
Each of the four Army tank battalions had eighteen periscope flame throwers; each Marine tank
battalion carried sixteen E4R2-5R1's. Tenth Army Action Rpt, Ryukyus,26 Mar-30 June 45, p. 4.
94
95
713thCofS
Ltr, Tank Bn Armored
Tenth Army to Flame
CG POA,Thrower (Provisional)
27 May AAR ch. IX,Changes
45, sub: Recommended in McKinney, Mechanized
in Construction of
Flame Thrower Opns, app. 6, p. 374.
POA CWS-H1 Mechanized Flame Thrower. Tenth Army 400 Cml.

was the full utilization of the main armament mechanized flame

thrower.
According to U.S. intelligence reports the terrain of the next
objective, the island of Kyushu, was well suited to the type of defense
which the Japanese had used so advantageously on Iwo Jima and Oki-
nawa—caves, crevices, fortified reverse slopes, pillboxes, and inter-
locking fields of fire from mutually supporting positions. Information
gleaned from enemy prisoners taken on Okinawa revealed that many
positions on Kyushu would be difficult or impossible to reduce with
conventional weapons. But flame throwers, particularly mechanized
flame throwers, could rout the Japanese from these otherwise impreg-
nable fortifications with a minimum of casualties. Experimental use
of extension hoses showed that positions hitherto inaccessible to armor
could now be attacked. A large number of flame tanks might burn
the Japanese from their well-prepared positions and keep the battle
from dragging on interminably.
On 1 July 1945 the Sixth Army, relieved of all combat operations
in the Philippines, received directions to prepare four corps, consisting
of twelve divisions, and two additional divisions as army troops, for
an assault on southern Kyushu on 1 November 1945.
For the Kyushu operation (OLYMPIC) over twice as many main
armament flame tanks per division were to be used as had been employed
on Okinawa. A tank battalion was to be attached to each assault
division and Sixth Army requested sufficient main armament flame
96
throwers to equip one company in each of these battalions. At this
time the Sixth Army understood that some 600 main armament flame
throwers were being manufactured in the zone of interior, but that
only 40 of these would be available in time for OLYMPIC.97 Therefore,
the plan called for the distribution of armored flame throwers in equal
lots to each tank battalion as soon as the weapons arrived in the theater.
Some 56 additional main armament flame throwers of the POA model
98
were to be obtained from Hawaii. Thus a total of 96 main armament
96
(1) Rpt of Official Travel, Maull to CCWS, 28 Sep 45, sec. III, p. 21. CWS 314.7. (2) Each
flame tank company was to have seventeen tanks.
97
(1) TWX, ASF to CG WESPAC, 10 Jul 45. (2) Ltr, CG USAFPAC to CG Tenth Army, 4 Aug
45, sub: Replacement Tank Mounted Flame Throwers for 713th Tank Bn. Hist CWS AFMIDPAC,
vol. III, an. II-c-1, ref. 143. (3) Rpt of Official Travel, Maull to CCWS, 28 Sep 45, sec. III, p. 34.
(4) The main armament model from the zone of interior was the E12-7R1.
98
CM-IN 439, CG Fleet Marine Force Pacific to CINCPOA, 3 Jan 45, and Ltr, CmlO POA to
G-3 POA, 4 Jan 45, sub: Flame Thrower Tanks for Fleet Marine Forces. Hist CWS AFMIDPAC,
vol. III, an. II-c-I, refs. 94-95.
flame throwers would be used in the initial assault. Since this number
was considered insufficient to meet the expected needs for flame, the
Sixth Army also decided to equip each medium tank platoon with two
auxiliary flame throwers of the bow gun type. The conclusion of
hostilities on 15 August 1945 negated the need for these plans.
In the trial of battle the Army and Marine Corps in the Pacific
discovered that the value of the flame thrower lay in its ability to reach
the enemy in his prepared positions, which were for the most part
impervious to conventional weapons. The excessive infantry casualties
ordinarily incurred in rooting the Japanese from their defenses were
thereby reduced. It appears certain that had the war not come to a
sudden close the mechanized flame thrower would have demonstrated
its ability to cut these losses to an even greater degree—not to mention
the casualties which would be inflicted upon the enemy.
CHAPTER XVI
The Flame Thrower in the War

Against Germany
The Portable Flame Thrower in the MTO
Although the combat engineer battalion of each U.S. division in-
vading Northwest Africa carried ashore twenty-four portable flame
throwers, American troops did not use the weapon in that campaign.
For one thing, no positive need existed for the portable flame thrower
in Northwest Africa where much of the fighting was characterized
by fast-moving tactics. As the enemy rarely made use of pillboxes or
other fixed fortifications and house-to-house combat was negligible,
the combat situations in which flame throwers were most valuable did
not arise.1
Even had conditions been favorable, it is unlikely that flame throwers
would have been effectively employed. The campaign took place at a
time when the tactical doctrine for the flame thrower was nascent and
its supply and maintenance procedures but poorly conceived. If a
situation favoring the use of the weapon had suddenly come up, the
flame thrower, usually back with the organizational equipment, would
2
not have been readily available.
The inherent technical deficiency of the portable flame thrower
itself also stood in the way of effective employment. The models taken
to Africa were the E1R1 and the M1, neither of which, it will be
recalled, was capable of firing thickened fuel. Not until the spring
and early summer of 1943 did the longer ranged M1A1 portable flame
thrower become available in the theater as a replacement for the early
models.3 And flame thrower training for the African landings, gen-
1
Ltr, CmlO WTF to CCWS, 21 Dec 42, no sub. CWS 319.1/88.
2
Ltr, CmlO WTF to CCWS, 2 Dec 42. CWS 320.2/100.
Nov 43, sub: Flame Throwers. 470.71—Apparatus for Using.

3
Informal Routing Slip, Maj Perry M. Moore, CWS ExecO NATOUSA, to Engr, G-4 AG, 14
FLAME THROWERS IN THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY 593
erally superficial, was, nonetheless, extensive enough to reveal the

deficiencies of the weapon. Although it is difficult to assess the im-
portance of any one of these conditions there can be no doubt about
4
their cumulative effect.
The napalm-firing M1A1 arrived in the theater in time for the
preparations which were being conducted for the invasion of Sicily.
Although demonstrations revealed a weapon with a range of forty or
fifty yards, some Seventh Army units remained unconvinced of any
appreciable improvement in the new model. The engineer battalions
of two divisions returned their flame throwers to the base depot before
embarking for Sicily.5
There was only one recorded use of the portable flame thrower by
American troops in Sicily. In an action reminiscent of the burning
of the Philistine grain fields by Samson, 1st Division engineers burned
a Sicilian wheat field in which enemy infantry had taken position.6
American troops in Sicily soon learned that white phosphorus and high
explosives could neutralize the fortifications encountered on the island;
7
flame throwers were not used again throughout the operations. At a
2-day critique after the fighting, division chemical officers expressed
doubts about the value of the flame thrower and recommended it be
declared an item of Class IV supply, or, in other words, be relegated
8
to the classification of a special-purpose weapon.
Flame thrower training given to Fifth Army units before the Salerno
landings consisted of demonstrations and enough technical training
to familiarize operators with the weapon. Some units did not even
consider it worthwhile to exchange the M1 flame thrower for the
newly arrived M1A1, although Salerno-bound engineer battalions did
carry their full quota of the weapon.9 The series of extremely strong
German defensive positions across the Italian peninsula aroused enough
4
McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, p. 181.
5
(1) Status of Equip Rpt, MTOUSA, 30 Jun 43. (2) McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns,
p. 182. (3) 1st Ind, 3 Dec 43, to Ltr, CmlO ETOUSA to CmlO AFHQ, 18 Nov 43, sub: Use
of Flame Throwers in Sicilian Campaign. Seventh Army Cml Sec Rcds, 470.71, No. 1, Jan-Feb 45.
(4) Status of Class H, IV, and V Supplies, MTOUSA, 31 Jul 43.
6
CmlO Seventh Army, Rpt of Cml Warfare Opns, Opn HUSKY, n.d. MTOUSA Cml Rcds, 370,
Employ, Opns, and Mvmt of Troops, 1942-44.
7
9
McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, p. 183.
8 Informal
Conf of Routing
Army,Slip, Cml and
Corps, NATOUSA to Engr
Div CmlO's and G-4,
CO's14
of Nov 43, sub:
all CWS Flame
Units Throwers.
in the MTOUSA
Seventh Army, 28, 29
Aug 43.
Cml Sec Rcds, 470.71—Apparatus for Using.

interest in the portable flame thrower to cause VI Corps in December

1943 to ask the chemical officer of the Fifth Army, for a 2-day school
to familiarize troops with the operation and tactical employment of
the weapon.10
Units engaged in the difficult fighting at Cassino and at Anzio used
the weapon with some success against fixed fortifications, particularly
when other means had failed to overcome this type of defense.11 An
experience of the 85th division in the Gustav Line helps to illustrate
this use. In May 1944 a platoon of Company G, 339th Infantry, had
been held up for two days near Tremensuoli by a series of enemy pill-
boxes which stretched across a dominant ridge two hundred yards
away. Finally, Lt. Robert T. Waugh, the platoon leader, secured a
portable flame thrower from regimental headquarters. Under the
covering fire of small arms and automatic weapons, Sgt. Fred Juliano,
an assistant squad leader, crawled with the flame thrower to within
fifteen yards of the key pillbox. Three short bursts killed all of its
defenders, and the platoon swiftly overcame the other positions with
the help of white phosphorus grenades.12
The portable flame thrower, for various reasons, saw little use in
13
Italy. To begin with, the reputation of the early models was not
such as to commend the weapon to combat commanders, and there
had been little experience of any kind in Africa and Sicily to recom-
mend its use in Italy. Moreover, there was hardly any need for the
weapon in Italy. The Italian terrain and climate contributed additional
problems for the employment of the flame throwers. The rugged
mountains encountered throughout most of Italy made it difficult, if
not impossible, to man-carry the cumbersome weapon to the front line
10
(1) Daily Journal Fifth Army Cml Sec, 21 Dec 43. (2) Other Same thrower training stemmed
from special situations. Before the invasion of southern France, for example, the 36th Division
Chemical Section trained over 200 men in portable flame thrower operations. There is no evidence
that any of these weapons were used against the enemy, who had put up but token opposition. Ltr,
Col Claude J. Merrill, formerly CmlO 36th Div, to Brig Gen James A. Norrell, Chief of Mil History,
5Jan 61.
11
A Mil Encyclopedia Based on Opns in the Italian Campaigns, 1943-45 (hereafter cited as A Mil
Encyclopedia), prepared by G-3 Sec Hq 15th Army Group, sec. 23, p. 187.
12
(1) Memo, Lt Col Houston C. Joyner, former CmlO 85th Div, for Hist Off, 2 Aug 48. (2)
Sergeant Juliano received the Distinguished Service Cross for his part in the action; Lieutenant Waugh
that day began a series of heroic exploits for which he was awarded the Medal of Honor.
13
(1) Rpt 359, AGF Bd MTOUSA, 27 Mar 45, sub: Current Questions Regarding Inf Opns.
Theater Cml Sec Files NATO-MTO, 319.1 AGF Rpts. (2) A Mil Encyclopedia, p. 529. (3)
OCCWS, Final Rpt, CWS Spare Parts Team in MTO and ETO, p. 43.
or to keep it apace of the advancing troops once it got there.14 The

cold, wet climate had almost the same deleterious effect as the heat
and moisture of the tropics; and, despite numerous reports of misfires,
no means was ever devised to waterproof the electrical ignition system
15
as had been done in the Southwest Pacific.
Probably because of the limited opportunity for employing the
flame thrower, matters of doctrine and training were somewhat neg-
lected. Although in April 1944 the Fifth Army published a training
memorandum 16 which recommended an integrated 8-man team for
the deployment of the portable flame thrower (illustrated with ex-
amples of successful use on Guadalcanal), there seemed to be as many
schemes for employing the weapon as there were divisions. A survey
conducted early in 1945 concluded that there was no theater standard
17
for organizing and equipping flame thrower teams.
Assault teams, usually armed with rifles, automatic rifles, bazookas,
and antitank grenades, saw a great deal of action against dugouts and
fortified houses. Flame throwers were seldom added to this armament
because a bazooka shell or antitank grenade fired through a window
or door usually sufficed. Pillbox-type fortifications impervious to more
conventional weapons, however, were considered appropriate targets
for flame throwers.18
Closely related to the problem of doctrine was the status of flame
thrower training. Despite several 2-day flame thrower schools spon-
sored by Fifth Army, the lack of adequately trained operators remained
a problem throughout the campaign. These shortcomings in doctrine
and training occasionally added up to situations wherein untrained
operators received poor support from improperly oriented assault teams
with the consequent failure of the mission.19
14
McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 186-87,190.
15
(1) Ibid., (2) Fifth Army Cml Sec, Hist Rpt, 1 Mar 45.
16
Fifth Army Tng Memo No. 8, 5 Apr 44, sub: Technique and Tactical Use of Flame Thrower,
reprinted as app. 18, McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 312-16.
17
Rpt 283, AGF BD MTOUSA, 31 Jan 45, sub: CWS. This report and Report 359, cited above,
included the policies for flame thrower teams promulgated by IV Corps, the 34th, 88th, and 92d
Divisions, and the 1st Armored Division. All differed.
18
A Mil Encyclopedia, p. 187.
19
Ibid., pp. 189, 529.
The Portable Flame Thrower in the ETO

Normandy
Pre-Normandy preparations included more effort directed toward
the training of flame thrower operators and the preparation of tactical
and logistical procedures for the weapon than had been attempted
before the invasion of Italy. In October 1943 Headquarters, ETOUSA,
published detailed instructions for all units under its control in the
tactical use of the portable flame thrower. This training memorandum
suggested the assignment of three men—operator, assistant operator,
and refill carrier—to each weapon and urged that twice that number
be trained. This document stressed the tactical necessity of covering
the flame thrower operator with small arms and smoke, but it did not
20
specify the exact composition of the assault party.
As the date of the invasion approached, ETOUSA increased the
tempo of its flame thrower preparations. New instructions, in the
form of another training memorandum, did little more than reiterate
21
the memo which it superseded. Of more help was the allocation of
150 portable flame throwers to each of the assault divisions of First
Army,22 a number far in excess of the 24 flame throwers which the
theater suggested for an infantry division in normal operations.23
The assignment of such a large number of flame throwers to the
assault regiments naturally increased the problem of training. In
general, the status of flame thrower training within the divisions in
England was poor. Engineer battalions had received limited doses, but
infantry division troops, even of the veteran units, were generally
unfamiliar with both the technical and tactical aspects of the weapon.
Divisions of the First U.S. Army conducted schools in an effort to
correct this deficiency. Third Army units, slated for commitment
later than those of First Army, suffered from a lack of flame throwers
19 in McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns.
in McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns.
20
21
22
23
Rcds,ETOUSA,
FUSA
(1) 470.71—Apparatus.
Ltr, Rpt
CmlO
Tng
Tng
of Opns,
SOS
Memo
Memo 20
ETO
No.
No.
Octto
10,
33,
(2)43-1
CmlO
65 Apr
The Aug
Oct
FUSAG,
44,
44,
43,sub:
theater bk.
sub:made
5VII,
Portable
Jun
Portable
p.44,190.Flame
this sub:
Flame
Flame
Thrower,
Thrower,
Throwers,
recommendation sec.after
sec. I, II,
reprinted
12th
thereprinted
Armyas app.
portableas
Groupapp.20
flame
thrower became an item of Class IV issue. WD Cir No. 204, 23 May 44. Other support bases of
issue were: airborne division, 15; armored division, 18; Ranger battalion, 6; and engineer combat
battalion, 24.
(in August 1944 Third Army's supply of the weapon was described
as "practically nil"),24 and a consequent lack of trained operators.25
These preparations went for nought; there is no record that the
flame thrower was used during the Normandy landings. Many of the
weapons were lost in the rough surf, and infantrymen perforce aban-
doned others in the struggle to get across the beaches in the face of
heavy enemy fire. The i4th Chemical Maintenance Company, which
landed in Normandy at the end of June, repaired and returned to
depot stock over 100 portable flame throwers which it had picked up
from salvage piles on the beaches. In any event, German positions
encountered on the beachheads usually were not suitable flame thrower
targets.26
As the initial weeks of the campaign wore on and units moved
inland, some flame thrower targets did appear. Cities and towns pre-
sented obstacles which occasionally called for flame thrower action,
although the 1st and 2d Infantry Divisions reported that the weapon
was not particularly useful in ordinary street fighting. The V Corps
stated that the limited range of the portable flame thrower restricted
its usefulness in fighting in the hedgerows, that ubiquitous feature of
27
the Normandy terrain.
Brittany
The flame thrower was used more in the August and September
fighting on the Brittany peninsula, particularly in and around the port
of Brest, than at any other time in France. On one occasion the 1st
Battalion, 121st Infantry, 8th Division, was held up near Brest by a
series of three concrete positions within a two-acre area. Although
artillery had failed to reduce the strongpoint, it had left many large
shell holes in the vicinity. Using the cover afforded by these craters
12th Army Group Rcds, 470.71—Apparatus.
W. H. Greene, 12 Jul 48. During World War II Colonel Greene served successively as chemical
officer of the 26th Division and the XX Corps.
26
(1) McKinney, Portable Flame Thrower Opns, pp. 195-96. (2) FUSA Rpt of Opns, 20 Oct 43-
1Aug 44, bk. VII, p. 197. (3) Informal comments of CWSO 21 Jun 44. CWS 317.4, Portable
Flame Thrower.
24
25
27
Ltr,
(1)
Observer's
McKinney,
CG 12th
RptArmy
1,
Portable
Flame
GroupFlame
Thrower
to CGThrower
COMZ
E4-5, ETOUSA,
Incl
Opns,to pp.
Ltr,
16192-93.
CmlO
Aug 44,12th
(2)
sub: Army
Interv,
Request
Group
Hist
for Flame
to
OffComdt
with
Throwers.
Col
Cml
Warfare School, 14 Nov 44, sub: Flame Thrower Rpts. This report consists of a series of replies
by First Army units to a questionnaire on flame thrower operations submitted by Colonel St. John,
Chemical Adviser, G-3, SHAEF.
two flame thrower operators, covered by the small arms fire of ten
men, were able to crawl within thirty yards of the fortifications. A
short burst of flame directed at each pillbox in turn resulted in the
hasty surrender of the occupants. The psychological effect of the
flame throwers was the determining factor in the success of the
28
operation. Not one enemy soldier had been burned.
A platoon of the 116th Infantry, 29th Division, had a similar ex-
perience in the same area. Halted by opposition from a pillbox, the
men brought up a portable flame thrower to help cope with the
situation. Although the fuel tanks were only partly filled, the operator
fired three good bursts into the doorways. The five occupants imme-
diately panicked but were prevented from coming out by the intense
heat engulfing the strongpoint. It was a full ten minutes before the
fire and heat subsided enough to allow the enemy to emerge, hands in
the air. None of them was seriously burned but their nerves were
shattered; as the bewildered men passed the flame thrower they shook
29
their heads.
The introduction of the flame thrower did not always spell success.
On 27 August 1944, the 38th Infantry, 2d Division, encountered
strong enemy positions which dominated an area near Brest. The
majority of the strongpoints consisted of heavy reinforced concrete
pillboxes, well protected, as German defensive positions usually were,
by bands of interlocking fire. The positions seemed impervious to
artillery fire. In this extremity three flame thrower teams came for-
ward, each consisting of an operator, assistant operator, and two BAR
men. The first team reached its contact point only to have the
operator killed and the fuel tanks of the weapon punctured by enemy
machine gun fire. The second team reached its firing position but had
to withdraw when it found that the weapon's hydrogen line had been
torn loose. The third team alone accomplished its mission, eliminating
30
one of the enemy positions.
Lest it be thought that these examples were typical of the fighting
in France, the 8th Division action described was one of three times the
unit used the flame thrower between6 June and 25 September 1944
Throwers.
28
29
30
CWS 314.7 Portable Flame Thrower.
Ltr, CmlO
CG 8th29th
2dDiv
DivDiv
totoCG
toCmlO
CmlO
VIIIVIII
Corps,
Ninth
Corps,
23
Army,
Sep
25 Sep
21
44, Oct
44,
sub:44,
sub:
Employ
sub:
Use AAR
of Flame
Vehicular
on Portable
Throwers
and Flame
Portable
During
Thrower.
Flame
Brest
T-17, B, Portable Flame Thrower (Tactical) 9th Army.
Campaign. T-17, B, Portable Flame Thrower (Tactical) 9th Army.

and the 2d Division employment was one of two such instances during
31
the entire Brest campaign.
The Siegfried Line
Fast-moving situations did not favor the employment of the flame
thrower, and this was the type of operations experienced by the Allied
forces once they broke out of Normandy. Matters of logistics, terrain,
and stiffening enemy resistance caused this advance to grind to a halt
in September 1944. In large part, the stiffening German resistance
resulted from the strength of the Siegfried Line, or West Wall, posi-
tions which stretched from the southeastern corner of the Netherlands
to the Swiss frontier. New techniques and special weapons had to be
employed against this maze of dragon tooth obstructions and the
intricate complex of concrete and steel and pillbox fortifications. One
of these special weapons was the portable flame thrower.
The V Corps, in anticipation of the assault on the Siegfried Line
fortifications, investigated the availability of portable flame throwers
and found that Army depots had enough to provide each division of
the corps with fifty weapons.32 In XIX Corps, the 30th Division
chemical officer secured ninety-nine M1A1 portable flame throwers
for the same purpose. He also found that the men who had been
trained as operators while the division was still in England were no
longer available. Consequently, the division's chemical section and
engineer battalion trained enough infantrymen to operate the twenty-
five flame throwers allotted to each of the regiments.33 Some divisions
conducted training in assault tactics before moving against the Siegfried
Line. This training usually included the employment of the portable
flame thrower. Third Army's XX Corps realistically used captured
Maginot Line fortifications to work out techniques for overcoming
the German defenses.34
The actual technique employed to neutralize strongpoints by means
of flame throwers varied somewhat among the divisions, but in most
cases flame thrower teams went to work after the infantry had ad-
Portable
31
32
34
33
Flame Throwers. CWS 314.7 Portable Flame Thrower.
(1)
V Ibid.30th
Greene
Corps
CmlO (2)Div,
Interv,
AAR Ltr,
1Sep CG
Dec 47.8th
44.Oct
30 DivRpt
207.03
44, Vto Corps.
CGUse
on VIII
of Corps,
Flame 23 Sep 44,onsub:
Throwers the Employ
SiegfriedofLine.
Vehicular
T-17,and
B,
Portable Flame Thrower (Tactical) 9th Army.

MEN TRAINING WITH FLAME THROWER against a captured German pillbox.
vanced to within about twenty-five yards of its objective. At this

point the flame thrower operator, accompanied by men armed with
bazookas, white phosphorus grenades, and pole charges, and supported
by small arms fire, made the final assault against the fortified position.
The flame thrower was capable of penetrating certain embrasures or
causing the enemy to close gun ports and other openings, thus allowing
the placement of explosives at the vulnerable points of the fortifica-
tions.35
The 22d Infantry, 4th Division, found an early opportunity to use
the flame thrower in operations against West Wall defenses in the
area of the Schnee Eifel, just within the German border. During the
third week in September, the regiments encountered a series of pill-
boxes at 100-yard intervals which were either unmanned or had poor
35
(1) Rpt on Breaching of the Siegfried Line, prepared by Engr Sec, XVIII Corps (Airborne), 28
Jan 45, p. 3. Documents of the Siegfried Line, ORB, First Army. (2) Rpt, Lt Thomas W. Leland,
CWS, to CmlO First Army, n.d., no sub. Misc Rpts E4-5R1 Flame Thrower, 12th Army Group.
This report served as an unofficial manual on flame thrower operations for First Army units.
fields of fire. Flame thrower operators moved to within effective range

without too much difficulty. Despite these circumstances, the division
reported only one successful flame thrower operation; other attempts
failed because of weapon malfunction.36
One regiment of the 9th Division reported that flame throwers were
of little value against the Siegfried Line positions; and the 30th Division
chemical officer stated in November 1944 that he had heard of only
one successful use of the flame thrower. The 117th Infantry, 30th
Division, reported that the portable weapons were of no value against
large bunkers, a judgment affirmed by the engineer battalion of the
9th Division. The engineers of VII Corps stated that although they
were equipped with flame throwers and pole charges, these weapons
were unnecessary once the neutralizing fire of armored vehicles was
brought upon the target. In October 1944 the 1st Division reported
that while extra pole charges and flame throwers were kept accessible
at all times, the flame thrower was too heavy for use by assault troops.37
On the other hand, there were some notable examples of the success-
ful use of portable flame throwers against Siegfried Line fortifications.
Despite the adverse comment on the weapon made by the 1st Division,
the 26th Infantry reported on 12 October that Company L had
"cleaned up" three pillboxes, after they had "worked on them with
flame throwers."38 The same regiment reported further successes with
the portable flame thrower in February 1945. On the third of the
month the regiment reported that it had "cleaned up a pillbox with
flame throwers," flushing out twenty men and three officers in the
process. During the next several days the 26th Infantry went on to
neutralize a number of additional pillboxes guarding the high ground
near Hollerath, Germany, in operations which featured the successful
use of portable flame throwers.39
36
(1) Combat Intervs, 4th Inf Div, Schnee Eifel Ridge, 14-20 Sep 44. HRS-CI 33. (2) Charles
B. MacDonald describes the Schnee Eifel engagement in The Siegfried Line Campaign, UNITED
STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1963).
37
(1) Immediate Rpt 61 (Combat Observations), 12th Army Group, 22 Sep 44. 99/120-0.4,
12th Army Group, Nov 44. (2) Ltr, S-3 2d Bn 117th Inf to ACofS G-2 30th Inf Div, 14 Oct 44,
sub: Documentation of Siegfried Line. First Army Rcds, Documents of Siefried Line. (3) Memo,
S-3 15th Engr Combat Bn for ACofS G-3 9th Inf Div, 23 Oct 44, sub: Assault Methods Employed
by Engrs on Siegfried Line. First Army Rcds, Documents of Siegfried Line. (4) Engr Sec XVIII
Corps (Airborne) Rpt on Breaching of the Siegfried Line, 28 Jan 45. (5) 1st Inf Div G-3 Rpt of
Opns, 1-31 Oct 44. 301-3 (22345) G-3 Opns Rpt, European Campaign, 1st Inf Div, Oct 44.
38
1stInf Div G-3 Rpt of Opns, 1-31 Oct 44.
39
26th Inf AAR, Feb 45. 301-Inf (26)-0.3 Opns Rpt 26th Inf Regt 1st Inf Div (European
Campaign).
In a February action in the Seventh Army sector near Bitche, Com-

pany B, 399th Infantry, l00th Division, used a flame thrower team
as the nucleus of a combination raiding-assault party. This party, led
by Lt. Harry G. Flanagan, consisted of the flame thrower operator and
assistant, two automatic rifle teams, two men armed with M15 white
phosphorus grenades, and riflemen. Its target was a German outpost
in a Maginot Line blockhouse. Although enemy sentries detected the
approach of the patrol and fired flares in an attempt to pinpoint it,
the flame thrower operator, Cpl. Boyd R. Pike, was able to crawl to a
position within fifteen yards of the open rear door of the emplacement.
From this vantage point Pike fired three bursts at the enemy position,
killing a sentry standing in the doorway. Enemy machine guns opened
up at once on the patrol. Pike attempted to fire on the source of some
of the enemy opposition, the steel turret surmounting the blockhouse,
but he ran out of fuel and withdrew. The grenadiers lobbed their white
phosphorus grenades against the blockhouse before retiring. On the
way back Pike, exhausted by the ordeal, abandoned his flame thrower.
All patrol members returned without injury, and even the flame
thrower was eventually recovered.40
Actually, the number of fortifications against which flame throwers
were used was few as compared to the total number assaulted. The
incident just cited represented the first use of a portable flame thrower
which came to the attention of the chemical officer of Seventh Army.
By way of explanation for the limited use of the weapon consider the
number of portable flame throwers carried by the units with Seventh
Army in February 1945: of the 8 U.S. infantry divisions so assigned,
2 had no flame throwers on hand whatsoever, 1 division had 4, 3
41
divisions had 6, and 2 others had totals of 12 and 34. It should be
remembered that at the beginning of operations the theater had recom-
mended a complement of 24 portable flame throwers.
Evaluation
Portable flame throwers contributed as little to the success of opera-
tions in the European theater as they had in the Mediterranean. The
weapon was infrequently used, and not always successfully. Some
40
(1) Ltr, CG 100th Div to CG Seventh Army, 14 Feb 45, sub: Use of Flame Thrower With
Raiding Party. 470.71-3 AG Rcds, Sixth Army Group. (2) Seventh Army Cml Sec, Hist Rpt,
41
Feb IOM, CmlO314-7.
45. CWS to G-4 Seventh Army, 22 Feb 45, sub: M2-2 Portable Flame Throwers.
infantry divisions never used the flame thrower; few considered it

valuable. Reasons for this situation, which was in decided contrast
to the successful role played by the portable flame thrower in the
Pacific campaigns, are not difficult to find.
Foremost was the fact that the fighting in Europe never developed
the need for the portable flame thrower, particularly when compared
with operations in the Pacific. The latter theaters saw a fanatical enemy
determined to resist to the last in defensive positions which were almost
impregnable to the normal complement of infantry weapons, even to
artillery fire and air action. Moreover, the jungle terrain in which
much of the Pacific fighting took place permitted the flame thrower
operator to advance to within effective range if he was protected by
adequate supporting weapons. The situation was different on the
European battlefields. As German defenses featured interlocking bands
of fire and long, uninterrupted fields of vision, the utilization of
weapons with limited range was difficult. The absence of concealment
along the approaches drew attention to the size of the portable flame
thrower and particularly to the unique silhouette of an operator with
his weapon strapped to his back.42 The small size of the fuel load was
another handicap, particularly when the flame thrower was used against
the Siegfried Line fortifications where the enemy might avoid the flame
43
by moving to another room of the emplacement.
The makeup of the German soldier, as contrasted with that of his
Axis ally in the Pacific, had an effect upon flame thrower operations.
The Japanese infantryman often fought until death, and flame weapons
were needed to insure that he was dead. The German soldier, on the
other hand, skilled and valorous as he was, surrendered when conditions
44
provided no alternative.
In addition to, and sometimes because of, the factors just related,
matters of training, supply, and maintenance conspired against the
successful use of the portable flame thrower. Although the assault
divisions of the First U.S. Army did receive some training in England
12-32, 34-92, 12th Army Group, Jul-Nov 44. (2) 76th Div AAR, 10 Oct 44. (3) Notes of
Flame Throwers (Portable), Incl 3 to Rpt on Tour, 26-30 Dec 44 (hereafter cited as Roos Rpt), by
2d Lt Edwin G. Roos, 31 Dec 44. (4) CmlO 30th Div, 30 Oct 44, Rpt on Use of Flame Throwers
on the Siegfried Line.
43
(1) 76th Div AAR, 10 Oct 44. (2) 12th Army Group Immediate Rpt 61 (Combat Observations),
22 Sep 44.
42
44
(1) CmlO
(1) 12th Army Group
30th Inf Div, Immediate
30 Oct 44,Rpt
Rpt 91
on (Combat Observations).
Use of Flame 99/12-0.4
Throwers on Immediate
the Siegfried Line. Rpts
(2)
Immediate Rpt 91 (Combat Observations). (3) Roos Rpt. (4) 76th Div AAR, 10 Oct 44.
before the Normandy landings, the supply of flame throwers was

critical during this period and none was available for other units, the
divisions of Third Army, for example. Even when Third Army depots
received stocks of portables in anticipation of operations against the
Siegfried Line, troops received little training in the weapon.45 As
late as October 1944 some divisions of II Corps had not been furnished
with this item, and its low status in Seventh Army units early in 1945,
as mentioned above, was not a reflection of extensive use.46 Seventh
Army also reported that use of the weapon was at times limited by the
lack of batteries and ignition assemblies; in October 1944 approximately
80 percent of its depot stock of flame throwers was deadlined because
of these shortages. In December a shipment of twenty of the M1A1
models included three with defective fuel tanks and others with de-
fective spark generator assemblies.47 The 5th Division reported the
receipt from depots of flame throwers with loose electrical connections
48
and with paint-filled discharge ports.
Commanders and troops in Europe never had the same confidence
in the portable flame thrower exhibited by their Pacific counterparts.49
Infrequent use of the weapon meant not only the neglect of doctrine
and training, but that supply and maintenance practices would not
be tested and improved. Employment of the weapon often ended
disastrously, a circumstance which only added to its shaky reputation.
In cases where it might have been effectively used it was sometimes
discarded in favor of another weapon.
The Mechanized Flame Thrower
The Requirement for an Auxiliary Model
The role played by the U.S. mechanized flame thrower in the war
against Germany was of even less consequence than was that of its
portable counterpart. American-made flame throwers were not used
at all in the Mediterranean theater. After the Sicily Campaign General
46
Ltr, CmlO III Corp to CmlO Ninth Army, 10 Oct 44, sub: Rpt of Flame Thrower Activities.
Ninth Army Cml Sec Files.
47
Seventh Army Cml Hist Rpt, 1-31 Dec 44.
48
7th Engr Combat Bn 5th Div AAR, 21 Oct 44. 305-Engr—0.3 (6618) Master, Jul-Dec 44.
49
Army,
45
(1) Corps,
OCCWS
Greene and Div 12
Final
Interv, CmlO's
Rpt, andSpare
JulCWS
48. CO'sCole,
(2) of all
Parts CWS in
Team
Lorraine units
MTGin the
Campaign, andp.Seventh
ETO, Army,
180n. pp. 28 and
43-44. (2) 29Conf
Aug of43.
(3) Cole, Lorraine Campaign, p. 180n.
Patton expressed doubt about the tactical value of a mechanized flame

thrower. A September 1944 demonstration of two models of the newly
developed auxiliary flame thrower for the medium tank elicited no
requirement for the weapon. A series of conferences on the mechanized
flame thrower led Allied Force Headquarters in December 1944 also
to report that no requirement existed for the auxiliary model. One of
the major factors in this conclusion was the fact that the Italian terrain
50
was most unfavorable for the use of tanks.
U.S. armored units used the mechanized flame thrower in France
and Germany but only in a modest degree. Because the United States
had not as yet produced a mechanized flame thrower, American plan-
ners for the Normandy invasion turned to the possibility of adapting
the British flame thrower unit, then under development, to the U.S.
medium tank. The British mounted the flame assembly in the hull of
a Churchill Mark VII tank, retaining the 75-mm. gun of the armored
vehicle. This flame weapon had a range of something around 120 yards.
Called the Crocodile, it featured an armored trailer which held 400
imperial gallons of fuel. In 1943, the Commanding General, ETOUSA,
submitted a request for 100 of the British flame throwers for installa-
tion in U.S. Sherman tanks. Development and testing of the Sherman-
Crocodile proceeded slowly, and the first production model did not
51
appear
50
51
52
McKinney,
Ltr, until
(1) History March
Mechanized
Armored of
Force
the Bd CG1944.
Flame Thrower
"Crocodile,"
to Armored Opns,
44. pp.
4 MarComd, 3ETO30-31.
Feb 44,
Rcds,
no 470.71—Flame
sub. CMLHO. Thrower, ORB. (2)
In the zone of interior the Armored Force Board had never been
enthusiastic about any flame-throwing tank that was a special-purpose
weapon, that is, if it had the flame thrower as its main armament, or
if it had a distinguishing silhouette. The British Crocodile met the
first requirement, but its fuel-carrying trailer certainly made it readily
identifiable. In any event, the board urged the Chemical Warfare
Service to concentrate its efforts on the auxiliary model, one that main-
-tained the normal armament of the vehicle, which was then under
development.52 The result was an auxiliary flame thrower which was
interchangeable with the bow machine gun of either the light or
medium tank.
On 9 March 1944 General Eisenhower requested that one of these
Colonel Magness, project officer of the Sherman-Crocodile flame thrower tank, states that the range
was between 175 and 200 yards.
new bow gun flame throwers be sent to England for testing, inquiring
at the same time when 100 more units could be made available. The
War Department replied that the ETOUSA could have the single
unit by mid-April and 200 flame throwers by I June 1944, 100 units
for medium tanks, the E4-5, and 100 designed for light tanks, the
53
E5-5. This was heartening news, especially as the requirements of
the British Army precluded the delivery of the complete order of
54
Sherman-Crocodiles until sometime in October.
The theater chemical section quickly installed the first auxiliary
unit in a medium tank and demonstrated it to interested officers from
General Eisenhower's headquarters in late June.55 In contrast to the
long-range Crocodile the auxiliary flame thrower gave a poor per-
formance. Perhaps the strongest point in favor of the American model
was its availability. First Army, planning on nine flame throwers per
medium tank battalion, asked for 200 auxiliary flame throwers and
canceled its requirement for Sherman-Crocodiles.56 Meanwhile, because
of the lack of trained personnel and its somewhat limited mobility, the
British Crocodile flame thrower had not lived up to expectations in
the first month on the Continent, and General Eisenhower soon can-
celed the American requirement for the flame tank. The fact that
E4-5's were understood to be available and that they had no identify-
ing,
53
54
56
(1) mobility-hampering
Ltr,Rads,
Memo,
CG First
CM-IN
CCmlO
Army
7411,
ETOUSA
to 9CG
Mar
ETOUSA,
44, trailer,
for and
CmlO Jul were
CM-OUT
11 FUSAG, 30 doubtless
44,6014,
sub: Mar
15
Tank
Mar
44,
Mounted
44. other
sub:(2)
Small
Flame
Memo, considerations
Flame
Throwers.
CCmlO
Throwers
ETOUSA for in
470.71—
the decision.57
On 23 August 1944 Lt. Col. G. C. White, OCCWS, conducted a
second demonstration of the E4-5 auxiliary flame thrower before high
ranking officers of the First and Third Armies. This time the latest
model with a capacity of fifty gallons was shown, and the equipment
for CmlO FUSAG, 30 Mar 44, sub: Small Flame Throwers for Installation in Tanks. USFET CWS
470.71—Apparatus for Using Smoke and Gas (1942-44).
Installation in Tanks. (2) Rad, CM-IN 7231, 9 Jun 44. (3) Magness Interv, 5 May 59.
There was no theater interest in the auxiliary unit for the light tank.
55
Flame Throwers (1944-45) Hq USFET Armored Sec.

57
(1) Ltr, CG SHAEF to British Under Secy of State (Dir Special Weapons and Vehicles), 13 Aug
44, sub: Crocodile Flame Throwers. 12th Army Group Rcds, 470.71—Apparatus. (2) Ltr, Cml
Adviser G-3 SHAEF to ACCWS for Field Opns, 22 Jul 44, no sub. ETO Personal files, Feb 44-Dec 44.
(3) Memo, Cml Adviser G-3 SHAEF for CmlO's in ETO, 16 Sep 44. CWS 314.7 Mechanized Flame
Thrower. (4) Ltr, CCmlO ETOUSA to CCWS, 28 Aug 44, sub: Flame Thrower Tank Development.
CWO 470.71/303.
BRITISH CROCODILE WITH FUEL TRAILER, firing at a target 200 yards away dur-
ing a test in England.
functioned perfectly at an effective range of fifty yards.58 The in-

creased capacity came from the addition of a 25-gallon flame fuel tank
For the history of the development of this and other mechanized flame weapons, see Brophy, Miles,
59
located over the transmission of the vehicle. The original tank of the
same size was situated on the right sponson.59 The 12th Army Group
soon established a requirement for 3 3 3 of these auxiliary flame throwers,
of which 150 were understood to be immediately available in the zone
of interior. First Army, about to assault the Siegfried Line in the
vicinity of Aachen, Germany, requested the prompt delivery of the
weapons.60 One hundred and fifty of the E4-5 flame throwers reached
the ETO in October 1944 but they were equipped with only one of
the two 25-gallon fuel tanks. This caused some concern as the 50-
58
(1) Interv, Hist Off with White. (2) Memo, CmlO 12th Army Group for ACofS G-3 12th
Army Group, 25 Aug 44, sub: Flame Thrower Demonstration. 12th Army Group Rcds, 470.71—
Apparatus. This was the E4R2-4R3-5R1 model with two 25-gallon fuel containers.
and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field.

60
(1) Ltr, AG Central Group of Armies to CG COMZ (Forward), 6 Sep 44, sub: Flame Throwers
E4-5. AGRO-H, 12th Army Group 470.71—Apparatus. (2) Ltr, Asst AG ETOUSA to CG First
Army, 22 Sep 44, sub: Tank Mounted Flame Throwers. AGRO-H, 12th Army Group 470.71—
Apparatus.
gallon fuel capacity was a popular feature of the flame throwers. The
missing transmission fuel tanks finally arrived in November.61
The Main Armament Flame Thrower
If the theater's interest in the auxiliary flame thrower could have
been called mild, its concern for the main armament version was
almost nonexistent. Army commanders indicated their reluctance to
give up standard tanks for main armament flame throwers not only
because of the reduced fire power but also because of the additional
tanks needed to protect the vulnerable special weapon. And, as Gen-
eral Rowan pointed out, matters were all the worse because tanks and
other armored vehicles remained in short supply.
It was not until January 1945 that General Bradley, 12th Army
Group commander, requested twelve main armament flame throwers
(E12-7R1) for operational testing.62 The armored forces in the 6th
Army Group declined to give up voluntarily any of the regular tanks
in order to provide for main armament flame throwers. The Army
Group Commander, General Devers, stated that any value gained in
the use of the flame thrower would be more than offset by the conse-
quent shortage of regular tanks and personnel.63
Word came in late February that ten, not twelve, of General Brad-
ley's flame throwers would be shipped to Europe on the first convoy
in May.64 They were on shipboard ready to sail when the Germans
surrendered at Reims on 7 May 1945.
Mechanized Flame Thrower Operations
The American forces did not have mechanized flame throwers when
they were first committed to action in France, nor did they have them
in any numbers for almost five months after the Normandy landings.
This initial lack of experience and training with flame-throwing tanks
probably did as much as anything to set the pattern for the insignificant
role the weapon was to have in Europe, a role in decided contrast to
61
62
63
Rcd
Ltr, CG
of 1Telephone
1stInd, 12th Army
Feb 45, Conv,
to Group
Ltr, GentoRowan
CCmlOCG ETOUSA
ETOUSA,
and Col toNorman
14Cml
Jan Adviser
45,
Gillet,
sub:G-3
5 Mechanized
Nov6th44.Army
CWS
Flame
314.7
Thrower,
Group, 3Mechanized
Jan12th
45,
Flame Thrower.
Army Group Rcds, 470-71—Apparatus.
no sub. Seventh Army Cml Sec Rcds, 470.71—Flame Thrower Fuels, Jan 43-Feb 45.
64
Rad, CG COMZ to CG 12th Army Group, 22 Feb 45, sub: Flame Throwers, Mechanized, E12-7R1.
12th Army Group Rcds, 470.71—Apparatus.
that in the British and the Canadian Armies, which used the mecha-
65
nized flame thrower successfully and on a fairly large scale.
Initially without flame tanks of their own, American forces in
France received occasional support of British Crocodile squadrons. In
September 1944 Squadron B, 141st Regiment, Royal Armoured Corps,
consisting of a headquarters troop and four flame thrower troops, each
with three Crocodile flame tanks, reported to Ninth Army's VIII
Corps. Three of these flame tanks supported elements of the 29th
Division in operations against Fort Montbarey, a key enemy stronghold
in Brest. On 14 September these flame tanks participated in the attack
on a series of pillboxes near the fort. Although two were knocked out
by mines before reaching the objective, the third flamed the pillboxes,
which capitulated with a yield of 60 prisoners. Two days later, in the
assault on Fort Montbarey itself, Crocodiles fired against the moat and
the wall until their fuel was exhausted. Even then the tanks remained
in position, their crews throwing white phosphorus hand grenades to
cover the final infantry assault. The fort capitulated that evening.
Prisoners indicated that the use of flame materially reduced the will to
resist.66
Favorably impressed by the work of the Crocodiles in the Brest
operation, the commanding general of Ninth Army, Lt. Gen. William
H. Simpson, on 31 October urged General Bradley to make one squad-
ron available to Ninth Army for the impending operations against the
Siegfried Line.67 At this time the British flame tank squadrons were
in great demand by 21 Army Group and Ninth Army received only
four Sherman-Crocodile flame throwers, with well-trained crews.
These four tanks, issued to a platoon of the 739th Tank Battalion,
Special (Mine Exploder), were the only large capacity flame throwers
used by American forces in the European Theater of Operations. In
support of the 29th Division, which had also worked with flame tanks
at Brest, the Sherman-Crocodile platoon crossed the Roer River on
24 February 1945. It then received orders to join in the assault on
the citadel at Jülich where enemy small arms fire had impeded the
66
67
(1)
Ltr, Col
For
65
aCG Claude
Ninth A.
descriptionArmy
ofBlack,
to Chief
CGand
British 12th
Armored
ArmySec
Canadian Group,
Ninth
flame 31Army,
tank Oct 44,
20 sub:
Sepsee
operations, 44,
Special
Rpt Equip
on Employ
McKinney, (Flame
of Churchill
Throwing
Mechanized Flame
Thrower Opns.
"Crocodiles" at Brest, 20 Sep 44. (2) Roos to CmlO Ninth Army, 31 Dec 44, Rcds Incl 2, Notes on
Churchill Flame Thrower Tanks (Crocodiles). Both in CWS 314.7 Mechanized Flame Thrower.
Tanks). 12th Army Group Rcds, 470.71—Apparatus.

advance for several days. In the plan of attack, the four Crocodiles
were to flame the south wall of the sixteenth century citadel from
across the moat and fire 75-mm. shells to demolish the gate. Two of
the tanks developed trouble before reaching the target, but the re-
maining two lumbered to within seventy-five yards of the citadel
and fired flame over the wall, forcing the defenders underground.
Twenty rounds from the 75's sufficed to smash the steel door and
permit the tanks to flame the opening. The last German defenders
fled just as infantrymen from the 29th Division poured over the moat
68
into the burning citadel.
The only American-made, mechanized flame thrower used by U.S.
troops in the European theater was the E4-5, later standardized as the
M3-4-3, the auxiliary model which initially had arrived without the
transmission fuel tanks. Four of these flame thrower units arrived in
the summer of 1944 and saw action with First Army in September.
In November, 12th Army Group allotted the 150 E4-5 units on hand
as follows: First Army, 75; Third Army, 30; Ninth Army, 45. Third
Army had never established a requirement for the flame-throwing
tank and held its 30 E4-5 flame throwers in an Army depot.69
As a matter of fact, comparatively little use was made of the E4-5
in France and Germany. Unfortunately, the first reported action was
a complete failure, a circumstance which may have helped discourage
wider use of the weapon. Two medium tanks with E4-5 flame throwers
reported to the 741st Tank Battalion, First Army, on 15 September
1944. At the time, both tanks were improperly equipped and one had
a defective engine. The 741st Tank Battalion repaired and equipped
the vehicles and attached them to Company C. When further trouble
developed, one of the tanks was evacuated to an ordnance repair shop.
On 18 September, the remaining E4-5 flame tank supported an infantry
attack on an enemy pillbox. Because of inadequate pressure the tank
had to get within twenty-five yards of the fortification before the
flame could reach the embrasure. This action failed to reduce the pill-
box, and the infantry did not take the position. In fact, there was
doubt
69
68
whether
(1) Rad,
Ltr, orArmy
CG Third
Adjutant 739th not
Tank theCGenemy
toBn, suffered
12th Army
Special (MineGroup, any
22
Exploder) tocasualties
Nov 44, from
sub:Ninth
CmlO E4-5 Flamethe
Army, 22 attack.
Throwers. (2)
Mar 45,
sub: Flame Throwers. ARBN-739-0.1 (7763) History, 739th Tractor Bn, 1 Mar 43—21 Nov 45.
Memo, Chief Armored Sec 12 Army Group for CWS, G-4, G-3, 12 Oct 44, sub: Flame Throwers
E4-5. 12th Army Group Rcds, 470.71—Apparatus.
The tank battalion commander was decidedly unimpressed with the

possibilities of the flame tank, although he admitted that the lack of
training experience of the crew (it had had one day of preparatory
training) might have contributed to the inefficiency of the weapon.
Another factor was the distinct, if unwarranted, reluctance of the
crews to enter combat with the flame tanks, a reluctance also attribu-
table to a lack of training and indoctrination.70
In December, Company B, 709th Tank Battalion, with Ninth Army,
attacked hasty entrenchments near the town of Vossenack, Germany.
The battalion had received and installed the two flame units just before
the action. Unfortunately, there was no time for training the bow
gunner-operators; they merely received verbal instructions on how
to operate the weapon. The enemy fortifications were in a V-shaped
position in a woods near the town. The plan of attack called for
clearing the left half of the wedge, followed by a tank and flame tank
attack on the right side. The vehicles, with infantrymen clinging to
them, approached the objective in a line. As the flame tanks came
within range of the positions they opened fire; when the flame fuel
was exhausted the infantrymen dismounted and quickly took the
positions. Though the operation was a success and the flame tanks
achieved the expected result, their performance was nonetheless some-
thing less than spectacular. The ignition system worked well, but the
range—only twenty yards—was extremely short. The officer in charge
blamed this poor performance not so much on the E4-5 as upon the
inexperience of the gunners.71
Seventh Army issued nine E4-5 flame throwers to the 14th Armored
Division but only one had been installed by January 1945. When this
flame tank and three standard tanks advanced abreast against a wooded
area north of Strasbourg, they encountered an enemy machine gun nest
holding up the infantry on the flank. The flame gunner fired his
weapon even though the German position was well out of range. The
flame traveled only halfway to the position but the defending enemy
immediately surrendered. The division promptly installed the eight
remaining flame throwers.72
70
Combat Observer with V Corps to CG 12th Army Group, 13 Oct 44, Observers Rpt 4. CWS
314.7 Mechanized Flame Thrower.
Roos to CmlO Ninth Army Rpt, Mechanized Flame Thrower Activities (E4R2-5R1). CWS
71

72
Ltr, CmlO Seventh Army to Cml Adviser G-3 6th Army Group, 1 Feb 45, sub: Use of E4-5
Flame Thrower. Seventh Army Cml Sec Rcds, 470.71—Flame Thrower, Jan 43—Feb 45.
Another example of the psychological impact of a flame attack took

place during the advance of the 743d Tank Battalion from the Roer
River to the Rhine. One tank fired several high explosive shells at a
German antitank gun, closed in, and poured flame on the position.
The defending Germans immediately fled into the shelter of a nearby
woods. Flame against troops in the open or in hasty entrenchments
usually was extremely successful.73
Despite the advantages which resulted from the employment of
flame, tank battalions and armored divisions remained unconvinced
of the merits of the flame throwing tank. As a consequence, the few
examples just cited represent a fairly substantial proportion of the
reported flame actions. First Army, realizing that the weapon was
seeing little use, acknowledged to its tank battalion commanders the
"considerable difficulties . . . encountered with ignition, fuel and first
echelon maintenance." Admitting that the shortcomings in the flame
thrower had no immediate solution, the Army left the way open for
the tank battalion commanders to store the flame throwers. The re-
sponse to this frankly worded communication was significant. Six tank
battalions requested permission to store most of their flame units; only
two desired to keep the equipment until a tactical situation afforded
the chance of a combat test.74
In summary, American forces in Europe used flame-throwing tanks

very sparingly. Flame would have been more successful had there been
adequate tactical and technical training in the proper use of mechanized
flame throwers. Within the tank battalions the constant strain of
combat, as contrasted with the intermittent battles in the Pacific,
hindered the proper installation of flame-throwing equipment. Units
often had to be committed to combat during the period of installation
and training, and therefore training in flame thrower maintenance
and tactics was often inadequate or entirely lacking. Moreover, the
continuing shortage of medium tanks made armored commanders very
reluctant to remove tanks from battle for the installation of the flame
throwers.
For these reasons, the armored forces made but sporadic gestures at
73
Ltr, CmlO Ninth Army to CmlO 12th Army Group, 30 Apr 45, sub: Mechanized Flame Thrower
Activities (E4R2-5R1). CWS 314.7 Mechanized Flame Thrower.
74
Ltr, First Army Armored Sec to CO Tank Bns, 3 Jan 45, sub: E4-5 Flame Throwers. CWS
establishing a requirement for a mechanized flame thrower, a fact

which did little to expedite the development of an acceptable flame
unit in the zone of interior. The late arrival of flame units caused little
stir among the using forces, and defects of equipment and problems
of maintenance did not help the reputation of the weapon. The end
result was understandable. Caught in a vicious circle the mechanized
flame thrower, much like the portable model, was able to contribute
but little support to American forces in Europe.
CHAPTER XVII
Fire From the Air

Aerial incendiaries probably caused as much death and destruction
as any other weapon used in World War II. Certainly they were the
most important chemical munitions employed, considering their con-
tribution in bringing the war to a successful conclusion. The record
of these munitions is all the more remarkable because most of them
were investigated, designed, and developed after the United States
had entered World War II. Aerial incendiaries, for practical purposes,
may be divided into two categories: the incendiary bomb, usually
dropped by bomber aircraft on targets far behind enemy lines, and
the fire bomb, a type which fighter-bombers used against targets at
or near the front. Of the two, the incendiary bomb was by far the
most important.1
The Incendiary Bomb: The Strategic Weapon

Pre-World War II Developments
The aerial incendiary was used for the first time in World War I.
The earliest German incendiaries, dropped on England from zeppelins
and airplanes, were shaped like buckets and consisted of a core of
thermite wrapped with tarred cotton waste and tarred rope. These
crude bombs were unsatisfactory both in incendiary action and bal-
listic quality. A torpedo-shaped bomb filled with gasoline and paraffin
replaced the bucketlike munition, and before the end of the war
German scientists had perfected the electron bomb. This 2-pound
bomb was composed of a magnesium-thermite filler in a magnesium
alloy casing. Though not used in World War I, it is nonetheless im-
1
For details of the research, development, and production of aerial incendiaries, see Brophy, Miles,
and Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field.
FIRE FROM THE AIR 615
portant as the prototype of a very effective group of World War II

incendiaries.2
Great Britain's principal incendiary bomb, the Baby Incendiary,
weighed but two-fifths of a pound. Filled with a special thermite mix-
ture these small bombs were carried in containers capable of holding
either 272 or 144 units. Great Britain used few of its Baby Incendiaries
during World War I, although these bombs were in production and
were found to be effective.
The United States developed several types of incendiary bombs
during World War I. Two bombs, the Mark II and Mark III, were
of the intensive type, that is, munitions with a high degree of pene-
trability and an intensive incendiary action. Both bombs contained
a thermite charge which ignited the main incendiary, solidified oil.
They differed mainly in size, and hence penetrability; the former
weighed approximately forty pounds and the latter about 100. The
Mark I, a scatter-type bomb, was intended for use against very in-
flammable targets. In outward appearance the Mark I resembled the
Mark II bomb, but, whereas the latter was filled with solid oil, the
Mark I contained a number of waste balls saturated with an inflam-
mable mixture. Two explosive charges ignited these pellets and cast
them for a radius of twenty feet.
The United States also developed two incendiary darts, the impetus
for which came from the success of the British with their Baby
Incendiaries. The first American dart, the Mark I, consisted of an
elongated 12-gauge shotgun shell filled with an incendiary material.
This munition, which ignited on impact, was designed for use against
grain fields and forests. The heavier Mark II dart, composed of a zinc
body, a thermite and solid oil filler, and a steel nose, possessed the pene-
trability needed in a munition to be used against buildings.
Neither the incendiary darts nor the other three American aerial
incendiaries saw use in combat. United States air units in France used
a French munition, the Chenard, reported to be the most efficient of
all Allied incendiary bombs.3
2
(1) George J. B. Fisher, Incendiary Warfare (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946), pp. 119-21. (2)
Memo, Col Zanetti for Maj Gen Claude E. Brigham, n.d., sub: Thermite Incendiary Bombs.
3
(1) Cml Warfare Monographs, Incendiaries (vol. 43), pts. I, II, June 19. CMLHO. (2) Fries and
West, Chemical Warfare, pp. 336-47. (3) "Chemical Warfare Service Materials Used by the Air
Service," Chemical Warfare, VIII, No. 1 (January 15, 1922), 3-4. (4) Aviation Material, Lecture
by Gen W. L. Sibert, General Staff College, 11 Mar 20, p. 44.
There was little interest in the United States in an incendiary bomb

program during the period between the two World Wars. This
neglect resulted largely from an overly optimistic evaluation of the
capabilities of high explosive (HE) bombs. In 1934 an Ordnance
Department study on the relative effectiveness of incendiary and demo-
lition bombs concluded that "everything that can be accomplished
by an incendiary bomb can, in most cases at least, be accomplished as
well or better by either a smoke bomb loaded with white phosphorus
(WP) or a demolition bomb loaded with a high explosive." 4
There was one authoritative voice which did call attention to the
possibilities of the incendiary bomb. Colonel Zanetti, a CWS Reserve
officer on the faculty of Columbia University, insisted several times
in the 1930's that the incendiary bomb had a great potential. Colonel
Zanetti had worked with these munitions in World War I and had
become perhaps the greatest American technical expert in the field.
In 1936, when some people were dwelling on the horrors of aerial gas
attacks in cities, he graphically pointed out that fire, not gas, was the
greatest danger:
The small size of these [incendiary] bombs may appear almost ridiculous, particularly
after considering the tons of gas that are required to produce lethal concentrations;
but here comes the essential difference between gas and incendiaries that makes fire
far more dangerous to a large city. Gas dissipates while fire propagates. Each of these5
small bombs held within itself the devastating possibilities of Mrs. O'Leary's cow.
Moreover, the Army Air Corps was becoming increasingly interested

in the potentialities of the incendiary bomb. As early as November
1934 the commandant of the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell
Field, Ala., recommended to the Chief of Air Corps a project aimed
at developing a filling for an incendiary bomb, and one month later
he sent the Chief, CWS, the military characteristics for such a munition.
By April 1936 the CWS Book of Standards showed a military require-
ment for an incendiary filling for the 25-pound chemical bomb, and
on 30 December 1936 the CWS established a project to find an incen-
4
Memo Study by Maj Hermann H. Zornig, Ord Dept, 17 Jan 34, quoted in Brief Review of Work
Done to Date on Incendiaries, by Alton L. Kibler, 10 Apr 34.
5
J. Enrique Zanetti, "The Forgotten Enemy," The Independent Journal of Columbia University, vol.
3, No. 6 (January 10, 1936).
diary bomb filling.6 Despite these preparations, the eve of the United
States' entry into World War II found it with only one standardized
incendiary bomb, the gasoline filled, 100-pound M47. This situation
existed because of the continuing belief in the superiority of high ex-
plosives over incendiaries.7
The outbreak of war in Europe called attention as never before to
the possibilities of aerial incendiaries. German planes began to shower
London with magnesium electron bombs and 110-kilo oil bombs, and
the English replied with their 4-pound magnesium munition. The
United States Army could no longer afford to neglect the development
8
and production of incendiary bombs.
In July 1941 General Porter, Chief, CWS, recalled Colonel Zanetti
to active duty and sent him to London to obtain firsthand information
on the research, development, and production of the British 4-pound
incendiary bomb. Colonel Zanetti returned with formulas for fillings,
blueprints for casings, and procedures for manufacturing, and a period
9
of extensive work on aerial incendiaries ensued. But there was still a
roadblock to be overcome. Since 1920 the responsibility for incendiary
munitions had been divided between the Ordnance Department and
the Chemical Warfare Service. The former had charge of the procure-
ment of the containers and the storage and issue of the complete in-
cendiary bomb whereas the latter developed the incendiary material
10
and filled the munition. General Porter strove to consolidate the
incendiary mission under the CWS. His last two assignments, before
he became Chief, CWS, had been with the Army Air Corps so that
he was fully aware not only of the value of aerial incendiaries but also
of the necessity for their undivided control. The argument for a unified
responsibility was especially strong in the case of the magnesium bomb
for the container and incendiary material were one and the same.11
6
CRL Corresp File, Proj A8.5-1, Incendiary, FE (formerly Incendiary Filling for Bombs and
Incendiary, Thermite Type), Nov 32-Jun 38. KCRC.
7
Rpt of Activities of the Tech Div During World War II, 1 Jan 46, p. 88.
8
Memo, Chief Plans Div Air Corps for DCofS for Air, 8 Apr 41, sub: Incendiary Aircraft Munitions.
9
Activities of Tech Div, WWII, pp. 88-90.
10
WD GO 54, 28 Aug 20.
11
Notes of Conf in Office of Maj Gen Richard C. Moore, DCofS, 15 Jul 41. TAGO G-4 File 32748.
In September 1941 the CWS received the complete responsibility for

12
the entire incendiary bomb program.
Experiences of the Eighth Air Force
Most new weapons and munitions initially experience difficulty in
gaining the confidence of the using arm, and the incendiary bomb
proved no exception. Moreover, the early bombs produced by the
CWS were far from perfect, an understandable situation when it is
realized that most of the work was done in the hurry and bustle after
the United States entered World War II. Factors favoring the muni-
tion, among which were Germany's success with and Great Britain's
respect for aerial incendiaries, did little to lessen the Air Corps' initial
apathy, particularly at operational levels.
The British realized the merits of incendiary bombs much sooner
than did the United States, for not only had they entered the war
earlier but their cities had been targets for bombing raids of the German
Luftwaffe. Almost immediately Great Britain established an opera-
tional research organization, known as RE/8 (Research and Experiment
Station, Section 8), under the Ministry of Home Security. Gathered
together there were scientists, statisticians, photo interpreters, and other
experts whose duty it was to study the effects of bombing. American
personnel, military and civilian, were soon attached to this division
whose findings were available to both British and American air com-
manders.13
RE/8 scientists soon found that, in attacks against the industrial
cities of Germany, properly employed incendiaries were more efficient
12
As a matter of fact War Department General Order No. 10, 10 September 1941, which provided
for this change neglected to transfer the procurement responsibility for "incendiary munitions which
are in general consumed in the incendiary process, and substitutes therefor" from Ordnance to the
CWS. War Department General Order No. 13, 24 November 1941, corrected this. More on the
question of responsibility for incendiaries may be found in Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War,
pp. 45-46.
13
Later, when the utility of RE/8 had been proven, operational research sections were established
within the U.S. Army Air Forces. The impetus for this action came in the summer of 1942 when the
Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that a study be made of the British experience with operational research
activities. General Arnold approved the resultant report and recommended that the commanding gen-
erals of the Army Air Forces establish operational research sections within their commands. The Eighth
Air Force set up such a section in the VIII Bomber Command in October 1942. (1) Rpt, Lt Bradley
Dewey, Jr., to Chief Tech Div CWS, 14 Sep 44. (2) Col John M. Harlan, The Opnl Research Sec
at the Eighth AF, 18 Jul 44. Both in CMLHO.
than high explosives.14 The Royal Air Force in a series of raids against
Hamburg in the summer of 1943 went a long way in establishing the
validity of this conclusion. Between 24 July and 3 August the RAF,
at times supplemented by American bombers, attacked that German
city seven times, proving beyond all doubt the destructive power of
the incendiary bomb. Almost 1½ million bombs were dropped on
Hamburg, the large majority (1 1/3 million) being 4-pound incen-
diaries.15 German officials stated that 45,000 people lost their lives,
although this number was admittedly inaccurate: "Exact figures could
16
not be obtained out of a layer of human ashes." Of the 122,000
houses standing before the raids, 35,719 were demolished and 4,660
17
were heavily damaged.
Despite the British success with incendiaries, the Eighth Air Force
remained unconvinced of their efficacy. Colonel Kellogg, the first
chemical officer of the Eighth Air Force, played an important part in
convincing his organization of the usefulness of incendiary bombs. A
group of RAF officers who had extensive and successful operational
experience with incendiaries vigorously supported his cause. These
same RAF officers sparked the organization of an informal American-
British discussion group, known as the Zoroastrian Society, which
materially aided the Eighth Air Force in defining the nature and char-
acteristics of incendiaries possessing the greatest potential. Mean-
while, both the RAF and the Eighth Air Force carried on an extensive
program of munitions trials. As a result of these trials, the U.S. 6-
pound incendiary oil bomb, the M69, was rejected and the British 30-
and 250-pound incendiaries were accepted as interim weapons pending
14
Final Rpt on Proj AN-23, Effectiveness of U.S. Incendiary and High-Explosive Bombs, Div 2,
NDRC of OSRD, 914 NDRC Rpt A-386 and OSRD Rpt 6445. Air University Lib Maxwell Air
Force Base, Ala.
15
RAF and Eighth AF Statistical Rpt, Bombs Dropped on Hamburg, 24 Jul-3 Aug 43, Incl 1 to
Ltr, Armament Officer, U.S. Strategic AF in Europe to Air CmlO AAF, 6 Aug 45, sub: Air Attacks
on the City of Hamburg. Tech Lib ACmlC, Md.
16
Rpt, Hamburg Civil Defense, p. 29, Incl 3 to Ltr cited in n. 15, above.
17
Rpt of "Fire Storm" Air Raids (Office, Chief of Fire Brigade, Hamburg), pp. 1-3, Incl. 2 to
Ltr cited in n. 15, above. (2) The most devastating raid (the night of 27-28 July) produced a fire
storm. This phenomenon is born of a great mass of fire combined with little or no surface winds.
A huge pillar of heated air and gases rises vertically over the inferno, and cold air rushes in from all
sides of the base of the pillar to replace the hot ascending blast. The velocity of these newly created
surface winds can tear the clothes from a person's back and uproot trees three feet in diameter.
Casualties are great because death comes not only from the flames, but from asphyxiation, the inhalation
of the intense heat, and carbon monoxide poisoning. Horatio Bond, "The Fire Attacks German Cities,"
pp. 84-85, and Anthony J. Mullaney, "German Fire Departments Under Air Attack," p. 100, in Fire
and the Air War (Boston: National Fire Protection Assn., 1951), edited by Horatio Bond.
the availability of more suitable American bombs and clusters. The

most desired U.S. munitions in the early period were the 100-pound
cluster of 4-pound magnesium bombs and the 100-pound M47 bomb
with an oil and crepe rubber filling. But these desires could not readily
be translated into supply since much of the process of development
18
and manufacture had yet to take place in the United States.
The first 100-pound clusters of the M50 bombs arrived in England
in 1942. This triumph of adequate supply was short-lived; chemical
officers found a great many defective M50's in these early shipments
and started a testing program to determine the bad lots. Defective
bombs were only part of the problem. The 100-pound incendiary bomb
adapter, which clustered the M50's into a convenient package, was
operationally unusable because of the danger of released adapter parts
striking other planes in the formation or even, in some cases, the tail
of the plane that carried it. This was dramatically revealed during the
Eighth Air Force's first use of incendiary bombs on 14 May 1943, when
falling cluster parts damaged other planes in the formation. Moreover,
it was impossible to obtain any degree of accuracy with bombs released
from their clusters at such high altitudes. Because of these deficiencies
Eighth Air Force suspended the use of the M50 pending receipt of aim-
19
able clusters.
Until the adequate clustering device for the M50's appeared, the
Eighth Air Force relied to a great degree on the M47. This versatile
100-pound bomb (it actually weighed only sixty-nine pounds) was the
sole American aerial incendiary available when the United States
entered World War II. In a desperate attempt to provide incendiaries,
Colonel Kellogg late in 1942 located a supply of empty M47 bomb
casings in Iceland, managed to get them shipped to the United Kingdom,
and had 10,000 filled and assembled by air chemical units. At first the
M47 contained unthickened gasoline or oil, but later a thickener was
added. The outstanding features of the munition were its aimability,
penetrability, and its sizable load (forty pounds) of incendiary ma-
terial. But the M47 also had its problems. While the munition itself was
effective, bomb bay suspension arrangements were such that one bomb
18
History, Cml Sec, Eighth AF. (2) Memo, CmlO Eighth AF for CG Eighth AF, 27 Nov 42,
sub: Use of Incendiary and HE Bombs. App. G, History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. (3) Interv, Hist Off
with Col J. A. Martin, formerly OpnsO Cml Sec Eighth AF, 28 Aug 51. (4) See above, ch. IV, for
more logistical details on incendiaries.
19
(1) History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. (2) History, Cml Warfare Sec 1st Bomb Div. (3) Martin
Interv, 28 Aug 51.
occupied a space which could carry a much heavier bomb. By July of

1943 the air chemical sections provided a field expedient to solve this
loading difficulty. They paired the bombs by the use of a cable loop-
sling. The loop-sling method permitted the suspension of forty-two
M47's in a B-17 bomb bay. This was an economical load, and the
number of bombs falling together improved the bombing pattern.
Furthermore, clustering supplies were readily obtained since the Eighth
Air Force prepared slings in the great air repair depot at Burtonwood.
Subsequently, Colonel Baum, who succeeded Colonel Kellogg as Eighth
Air Force chemical officer in 1943, modified the loop-sling into a short
cable toggling device which permitted the suspension of fifty-two
bombs in a bomb bay and in effect made an enormous cluster of M47's
which was more aimable and made a better bombing pattern.20
In the spring of 1943 Eighth Air Force headquarters requested
mixed loadings of incendiary and high explosive bombs in a single
aircraft on operational missions. The VIII Bomber Command declared
this request unfeasible because uneconomical loads would result and be-
cause of the danger of mixing the two munitions in the same aircraft.
The chemical officers agreed with the bomber command on mixed
loadings but renewed their proposals of incendiary loads in view of the
new development with respect to the M47. During the summer, Col-
onel Kellogg persuaded Col. Curtis E. LeMay to authorize M47 in-
cendiary loadings for missions against industrial targets in occupied
France. These missions conclusively demonstrated the effectiveness of
incendiary bombing in general and the M47 incendiary in particular.
Although a lack of fuzes caused the suspension of the employment of
M47's for a month during this critical period, the Eighth Air Force
was now firmly committed to the use of incendiaries, and the outstand-
ing success of the first major incendiary raid in October, against a
factory at Heddernheim, Germany, reinforced that decision. The
Eighth Air Force analysis of the Heddernheim mission indicated that
the incendiaries were far more effective, weight for weight, than high
explosives.21 For the next three months, the M47 was the favored in-
cendiary, and keeping a supply on hand became a major problem as all
20
(1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, Lt Col Robert N. Isbell, ExecO Cml Sec USSTAF, to Air CmlO AAF WD,
15 Sep 44, sub: Correction to the Rpt of the AAF Bd, Proj (M-5) 261. Eighth AF 519.225.
21
(1) Ltr, CG Eighth AF to CG VIII Bomb Comd, 10 Mar 43, sub: Use of Incendiary Bombs, and
1st Ind, CG VIII Bomb Comd to CG Eighth AF, n.d. Eighth AF 471.6 in Eighth AF 519.225-4. (2)
History, Cml Sec Eighth AF. (3) Martin Interv, 28 Aug 51.
incendiary expenditures mounted from 408.2 tons in September 1943,

to 1,292.6 tons in October, 2,382.9 tons in November, and 4,189.6 tons,
40 percent of the total bomb load, in December.22
The M17 500-pound cluster for the M50 bomb was first put into
operational use in January 1944. This aimable cluster eliminated most
of the difficulties inherent in those clusters which were quick opening
and made the M50 one of the most effective incendiary bombs of World
War II.23 An M50 (technically the AN-M50A1 and later the AN-
M50A2) was a 4-pound bomb based on the plans brought back from
England by Colonel Zanetti. Consisting of a core of thermate and a
casing of magnesium alloy, the M50 had a high degree of penetrability
and an intensive burning action. These qualities made it particularly
suitable for use against construction in Germany, 9 5 percent of which
consisted of brick and stone.24 Because of this construction, fire divi-
sions (that area which will be burned out by an unchecked fire) could
be not only buildings but their individual rooms. The M50 had to have
great penetrating power in order to pierce the heavy roofs, and the
fact that it was small meant that a bomber, in seeking out the numerous
fire divisions, could carry many more than if the bomb were larger.
In direct contrast with the M50 was America's largest incendiary
bomb, the 500-pound M76, popularly known as the Block Burner.
The M76 resulted from an Army Air Forces request for a large, highly
aimable incendiary bomb for use against industrial targets. It con-
tained incendiary gel (PT) which, upon the detonation of an explosive
charge, was scattered in large gobs over a 100-foot radius. The M76
was used against Berlin on 6 March 1944 with moderate success, enough
at least to warrant a request from the Eighth Air Force to the zone
of interior for a priority shipment of these heavy incendiaries. Sub-
sequent operations, however, proved that the efficiency of the bomb did
not warrant its employment. Because of its size, there were relatively
few targets against which it could be used. Moreover, there was a low
percentage of incendiary fuel as contrasted with the total weight of the
bomb. By September, because no future operational use of the M76
22
Statistical Summary of Eighth AF Opns, European Theater, 17 Aug 42-8 May 45.
23
Cml Warfare Sec Eighth AF, Jan 44-Jul 45.
24
(1) Memo, C. W. Tyson, 28 Nov 41, sub: Info Gained from Messrs H. F. Allen and H. Austin
on Building Construction Abroad. CRL Corres File Proj A8.6-1—Incendiaries, Solid Oil, FY 1942.
KCRC. (2) Thermate was a mixture of 80 percent thermite and 20 percent of the Ordnance De-
partment's M8 flare mixture.
LOADING 500-POUND CLUSTERS OF MAGNESIUM BOMBS INTO A B-24 of the

Eighth Air Force, somewhere in England.
was anticipated, the stations of the Eighth Air Force had returned most
25
of their M76 bombs to Air Forces depots.
All together the Eighth Air Force dropped 97,046 tons of incendiary
bombs on German targets compared with 569,751 tons of high explo-
sives and 20,352 tons of fragmentation bombs. The large majority of
the incendiaries were M50's, in M17 clusters, and M47's.26 Taken as a
reflection of the role of the incendiary bomb in the Eighth Air Force's
campaigns against Germany, this figure is little more than modest.
The RAF expended many more aerial incendiaries than did the Ameri-
can air unit. To explain this, the essential difference between the two
air forces must be borne in mind. The RAF was devoted to a policy of
night, area raids against the cities of Germany. The Eighth Air Force,
25
Cml Warfare Sec Eighth AF, Jan 44-Jul 45.
26
Statistical Summary of Eighth AF Opns, European Theater 17 Aug 42-8 May 45.
on the other hand, confident in its bomb sight and in the protection de-
rived from fighter escort and formation flying, pursued a policy of
daylight raids against specific industrial targets. Urban areas were more
susceptible to incendiary bombs than were the individual plants and
factories. And while the Eighth Air Force only gradually realized that
incendiaries had a part in industrial bombing, the RAF quickly saw
the efficacy of the incendiary against larger area urban targets. The
Eighth Air Force's use of aerial incendiaries was effective, but not
spectacular, and most of the damage to German cities resulted from
RAF operations. This relative lack of success cannot be construed as
a criticism of the American air unit, whose mission was different from
that of the RAF.
The Incendiary Bombing of Japan
The war in the Pacific was marked by the most spectacular and ef-
fective use of the aerial incendiary bomb. After March 1945, General
LeMay's all-out incendiary attacks against the vulnerable Japanese
cities brought to a culmination the recognition which the incendiary
bomb had gradually been winning throughout the war. It was air
power which played a very important part in Japan's decision to
capitulate, and it was the incendiary bomb which helped to make air
power such a decisive force.
The use of aerial incendiaries against Japan varied considerably from
that against Germany and German occupied Europe. For one thing,
air fields for the bombardment of Japanese cities were not immediately
available as in the case of the Eighth Air Force, which had English bases
well within range of German cities. It was not until the Mariana Is-
lands, located some 1,500 miles south of Tokyo, had been taken that
American bombers found themselves within bombing range of the
Japanese capital and the other important cities on the island of Honshu.
Up till that time, the targets throughout the island chains on the road
back, and even in Japanese-held China, were not particularly ap-
propriate for incendiary bombing missions.
Another great difference between the air war against Japan and
that against Germany was the extreme vulnerability of the Japanese
cities to fire. Although fire destruction could be and was wrought
on many German cities, they were less likely targets for the incendiary
bomb than those of Japan. Ninety-five percent of German construc-
tion, as noted earlier, was brick and stone, and the roofing material, a
very vital consideration in starting fires, usually consisted of tile or
slate. In contrast, 80 percent of the construction in Japan made use of
wood and paper. There was a nucleus of modern fireproof ed buildings
in the business areas of most Japanese cities, but, generally speaking,
the structures of urban areas were made of very inflammable materials.
These areas were so compact, so devoid of fire barriers, that an un-
controlled fire could spread very quickly.
The Twentieth Air Force supervised the incendiary blow against
Japan. This unusual organization was activated in Washington on 4
April 1944, with General Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General,
AAF, as its commander or "executive agent." The Joint Chiefs of Staff
were to make all major decisions about the deployment, missions, and
target objectives of the Twentieth Air Force. Its weapon was the
very long range bomber, the B-29, and its two principal subordinate
units (the actual operating units) were the XX and XXI Bomber
Commands.27
Oddly, the XX Bomber Command saw the light of day and in fact
delivered its first bombs against Japanese targets before the activation
of the Twentieth Air Force. The first major contingent of the (com-
mand left the United States on 5 January 1944 and arrived at New
Delhi, India, eight days later. Permanent bases for the XX Bomber
Command were in India and the advanced bases were located in the
vicinity of Chengtu, in western China. Plagued by logistical difficulties
and hindered by the fact that the advanced bases were within range of
only the cities of Kyushu, among the Japanese targets, the operations
of the command were not particularly effective. In fact, it was soon
realized that these missions would be little more than "shakedown"
training preparatory to the time that B-29 bases could be constructed
in the Mariana Islands.
The summer of 1944 saw the American conquest of the greater part
of the Marianas, including the islands of Saipan, Guam, and Tinian.
This meant that B-29 bases could be located within range of the im-
portant cities of Honshu. Even as the three islands were being mop-
ped up, the XXI Bomber Command began constructing airfields for its
27
Craven and Cate, eds., The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, pp. 38-39. Unless otherwise noted,
the background material concerning the Twentieth Air Force is based on this excellent volume.
five wings. The first strategic mission was flown from Saipan on
24 November 1944.
From November 1944 until the early days of the following March,
the XXI Bomber Command used conventional strategic bombing
tactics against the cities of Japan. In Europe the Eighth Air Force had
developed the concept of precision bombing and to some it seemed
to be the solution for the air war against Japan. With a large percentage
of the bomb load consisting of high explosives, planes flew high altitude
daylight missions against individual industrial targets. For example,
on 14 January 1945 B-29's dropped ninety-four tons of HE on the
Mitsubishi Aircraft Plant in Nagoya with only fair results. That this
industrial target was attacked seven more times in a period of several
months is some indication of the comparative ineffectiveness of these
raids.28 European experience was being translated to Pacific use, and
not too successfully.
Precision bombing was not the solution for Japanese targets. The
physical construction of Japan's industrial and urban areas was much
more combustible than that of Germany. Japanese cities frequently
experienced peacetime conflagrations; German cities did not. Industry
and labor in Japan were far more concentrated than in Germany.
Moreover, area incendiary attacks against Japan would give its "house-
hold" industries, upon whose products the larger plants depended, a
29
tremendous setback.
In December 1944 General Arnold's headquarters, aware of the
vulnerability to fire of Japanese cities, requested that the XXI Bomber
Command mount a full-scale incendiary attack against Nagoya. Brig.
Gen. Haywood S. Hansell, commanding general of the air unit and a
firm believer in daylight, precision bombing, protested but nevertheless
ordered incendiary missions against that city, the first being directed
against the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works. Encountering bad
weather, the force of forty-eight planes bombed the target using radar
and inflicted little damage. Early in January 1945, fifty-seven B-29's,
with an incendiary-fragmentation bomb load, struck urban Nagoya,
but smoke from the fires made observation and hence evaluation of the
results impossible. For the Japanese, probably the most unfortunate
28
Col Theodore P. Gahan, The Status of Incendiaries in the Army Air Forces Thesis prepared at
the Air Command and Staff School, Air University, Maxwell Field, Ala.), May 1947, pp. 6-7.
29
"Fire Blitz," Impact (August, 1945), p. 14.
effect of this rather mediocre mission was the development of an overly

optimistic opinion of their inefficient fire-fighting system.30
General LeMay replaced General Hansell on 20 January 1945. At
first this move brought little change in the tactics and results of the
missions of the XXI Bomber Command. Some success resulted from
the high altitude precision bombardment of particular Japanese in-
dustries, but this success fell far below the expectations almost everyone
had for the VLR bomber, the B-29. In an effort to achieve better re-
sults, General LeMay made radical changes in his bombing techniques.
First, he planned to send his planes not against individual plants and
factories, but against Japan's combustible cities, filled with home in-
dustries as well as with various military installations. Although this
plan was itself a departure from the established routine, the courage
LeMay needed in making his decision came not from changing targets
but from his faith in new methods by which the targets would be at-
tacked. The innovations in tactics all were based on the idea of drop-
ping the most damaging payload on the crowded, inflammable enemy
cities.
The planes were to attack at altitudes of from 6,000 to 7,000 feet
instead of the usual 20,000 and 30,000, a change partly prompted by the
weather encountered over the island of Honshu. At the higher altitude
strong winds buffeted the aircraft causing not only an unduly large
consumption of gasoline but inflicting punishment on men and planes
as well. Moreover, cloud formations over Honshu prevented the visual
bombardment of targets on all but a very few occasions. In another
change, the planes were to make individual runs against the target in-
stead of attacking in formation. Formation flying was the established
practice of the Eighth Air Force, and it provided an all-around defense
against attacks by enemy fighter planes. But it also involved ren-
dezvous points for the planes and hence a greater consumption of
gasoline. In still another innovation. LeMay ordered the B-29's to at-
tack under the cover of darkness, a tactic expected to achieve surprise
and take advantage of the enemy's weak defensive weapons, night
fighters and radar gun-laying devices. Finally, the aircraft were to
be stripped of all armament. The savings in weight resulting from the
absence of armament and the lesser demands for gasoline meant that a
30
Craven and Cate, eds., The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, pp. 563-65.
greater amount of payload could be carried. And this payload was to

31
consist exclusively of incendiary bombs.
The XXI Bomber Command first used these tactics on its historic mis-
sion No. 40 flown against Tokyo on the night of 9-10 March 1945.
The planes carried two types of incendiary bombs, the M47A2 and the
M69.32 The Pathfinder units, one squadron of each of the three partici-
pating wings, carried the M47's which served not only as aiming points
but which also started appliance fires—those fires large enough to be
controlled only by special fire-fighting apparatus. The M69's used by
the rest of the force started a multitude of small fires that soon joined
33
to form large ones. The M47 had been used extensively in Europe,
but the M69, because of its poor penetrating power, had proved un-
suitable for German targets. This very characteristic made it par-
ticularly appropriate for use against the flimsy construction of Japanese
buildings.
The ingenious M69, unlike most other American incendiaries, was
not based on a European prototype but was strictly an American de-
velopment. The over-all weight of this hexagonal shaped, light-cased
munition was six pounds; its incendiary filling, napalm, weighed
three pounds. The bomb, having a terminal velocity of 225 feet per
second, was stabilized in flight by cloth streamers rather than by fins.
A delay fuze, activated by the impact, ignited an ejection charge which
expelled the incendiary material through the tail of the bomb. Thus
when the bomb came to rest it functioned like a small mortar; when
flat on the floor it could eject flaming napalm as far as 100 feet until
34
it struck an object in its path.
The first B-29's left Guam at 1735 on 9 March, and by 2020 the
entire attacking force was airborne. Although the planes encountered
some bad weather on the way to Tokyo, they identified the coast initial
point and target without difficulty. The first bombs landed on Tokyo
at 0 0 1 5 on the following morning. It took but thirty minutes for the
31
(1) "The B-29ers," Impact (September-October 1945), pp. 78-79. (2) Twentieth AF, Special
Rpt on the Incendiary Attacks Against Japanese Urban Industrial Areas (hereafter cited as Twentieth
AF Special Rpt on Incendiary Attacks) n.d., pp. 5-6.
32
The M47 bombs were toggled together, six to a 500-pound bomb station by the T19 cluster
adapter, developed by the Chemical Section of the XXI Bomber Command. Twentieth AF Special
Rpt on Incendiary Attacks, p. 6.
33
(1) Twentieth AF Special Rpt on Incendiary Attacks, p. 6. (2) USSBS, Effects of Incendiary
Bomb Attacks on Japan, Apr 47, p. 117.
34
NDRC (Div 11), 3 Oct 45, Comparative Effectiveness of Small Incendiary Bombs on Industrial
Targets, pp. 9-10.
TOKYO, AFTER THE INCENDIARY BOMBING OF 9-10 MARCH, 1945
development of fires of conflagration size, and by that time the situa-

tion was so far out of hand that efforts to combat the flames were fruit-
less. The multitude of bombs (1,665 tons were dropped on Tokyo),
the combustible nature of the structures, and the high winds all con-
tributed to the creation of the inferno.
Some people were able to escape through the wide fire lanes, but
many others were encircled by the flames and died of suffocation and
burns. Those who fled to the canals faced death in the scalding water
or were crushed by the terrified mob which crowded in on top of them.
This raid alone caused the death of an estimated 83,793 people and al-
most 41,000 more received injuries. Over one million people lost their
homes.
The fire destroyed 15.8 square miles in the center of Tokyo. All
buildings in the area were entirely destroyed or seriously damaged. Al-
though some of the modern, fire-resistant structures were not totally

destroyed, the majority of even this type was left as sagging skeletons.
Glass, steel bars, and concrete melted in the intense heat; wooden
buildings went up in flames before the fire front had reached them.
Such was the havoc wrought by the first of the "blitz" raids against
the cities of Japan.
The results achieved by the XXI Bomber Command left no doubt
as to the validity of the revolutionary tactics of General LeMay. Tokyo
had been surprised by both the low altitude and the magnitude of the
attack. The command suffered but moderate losses; 14 of the 279
planes over Tokyo failed to return. These losses came not from enemy
fighter opposition, which failed to damage a single B-29, but from flak.
The combination of bombs used was excellent.
Following the Tokyo raid at about 2-day intervals, Nagoya, Osaka,
Kobe, and again Nagoya received the terrible punishment of incendiary
bombing. Throughout the rest of the Pacific war a total of sixty-nine
Japanese cities were subjected to these "blitz" attacks.35
The Fire Bomb: The Tactical Weapon

Incendiary munitions were useful in tactical air missions—those
flown in the combat zone for the purpose of influencing the local tacti-
cal situation. Enemy strongholds, motorized vehicles, troop concentra-
tions, and military stores were targets particularly vulnerable to fire.
Sometimes tactical aircraft used M47 and M50 bombs against these
targets, and occasionally they dropped an M76, but another type of
incendiary munition, the fire bomb (often called the napalm or blaze
bomb), proved most effective against tactical targets.
Employment in Europe
A fire bomb was simply a large capacity container filled in the field
with napalm gel.36 It began as a field improvisation. Fighter planes
carried jettisonable fuel tanks for long missions, and it became custom-
ary for the pilots, on the trip homeward, to drop these tanks on targets
35
(1) Twentieth AF Special Rpt on Incendiary Attacks, pp. 6-9. (2) USSBS, Effects of Incendiary
Bomb Attacks on Japan, pp. 94, 97, 102. (3) USSBS, Final Rpt Covering Air-Raid Protection and
Allied Subjects in Japan, Feb 47, p. 70 (4) "B-29ers" and "The Z-29 Payoff," Impact (September-
October, 1945), pp. 78, 79, 85.
36
Fire bombs were of a variety of sizes, depending upon the kind of containers on hand. The bombs
which saw the most use were of 165-, 75-, 100-, 108-, and 110-gallon capacity.
ATTACHING AN EMPTY 108-GALLON FIRE BOMB TANK TO THE FUSELAGE of

a P-47.
of opportunity, igniting the gasoline with tracer ammunition. It was

only a small step to provide these tanks with igniters more convenient
and reliable than tracer ammunition. The CWS devised an igniter from
an all-ways fuze and a shortened section of a 2-pound magnesium bomb
which was clamped on the side of the gasoline tank. It was soon realized
that thickened fuel would provide a more satisfactory fire than ordi-
nary gasoline, so air and chemical officers in Europe began thickening
gasoline in spare tanks with oil, or rosin oil and lime, or when they
were available, with the approved thickeners, British perspex and
American napalm. Because the thickened fuel required a better igniter,
chemical officers adapted the white phosphorus grenade for the purpose.
One of the most favorable features of the bomb was the ease with which
it could be constructed from materials which were relatively abundant,
since the spare tanks, often made of process paper, were stocked in
quantity. The ratio of filling to the over-all weight of the munition was
high. The extreme accuracy with which the fire bomb could be placed
on small targets was another major advantage, although this precision
was possible only when the bombs were released from a low altitude,
something pilots under heavy antiaircraft attack could not always do.37
An example of the effectiveness of the fire bomb against point targets
took place on 25 August 1964 when sixteen fighter planes, carrying
twenty-four 165-gallon napalm bombs and eight 500-pound HE
bombs, attacked the headquarters of Generalfeldmarschall Guenther
von Kluge, German Army Group commander, at Verzy, France.
Twenty-two of the napalm tanks made direct hits on the buildings
comprising the headquarters; eight houses were completely destroyed.38
Although men were more vulnerable than material to the fire bomb,
motorized vehicles, marshaling yards, warehouses, and other com-
bustible buildings made excellent napalm bomb targets. Fighter planes
carrying this munition flew frequent missions against the Germans
while the latter were attempting to escape encirclement at Falaise.
During this period twelve P-38 fighters, each carrying two 165-gallon
fire bombs, attacked a concentration of enemy trucks and armor, de-
stroying or damaging an estimated thirty or forty vehicles. At the
time of the Ardennes counteroffensive American planes used fire bombs
effectively against German motor transportation and armored con-
centrations in the wooded sections of the area. When fighter planes
dropped seventy-two fire bombs on the marshaling yards at St. Quentin,
39
France, 400 of the 500 railway cars in the yards were destroyed.
The munition was sometimes used in conjunction with artillery or
high explosive bombs in attacks against fortified towns or strongpoints
consisting of open emplacements and earth and log fortifications. In
one approved sequence, these positions first were subjected to artillery
fire or high explosive bombing. Then planes dropped fire bombs on
the rubble forcing the enemy into the open. Just before the infantry
assault, the artillery placed its fire on the exposed enemy troops.40 The
fire bomb, however, had little or no effect against heavy fortifications
such as the pillboxes of the Siegfried Line. And, reports to the contrary,
37
(1) Broughton Weekly News Letter No. 26A, 7 Dec 44, and No. 40A, 12 Apr 45. (2) Msg MF
01268, CG USSTAF to CG Eighth AF, 11 Oct 44. Eighth AF 519.225.1. (2) Craven and Cate, eds.,
Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK, pp. 654-55.
38
(1) Cml Warfare Munitions Used by Ninth Air Force, Incl 3, CWS TofO Ltr No. 26, 30 Jun 45.
(2) Fire Bomb Opns, Incl 5, CWS TofO Ltr No. 19, 3 Nov 44.
(1) Cml Warfare Munitions Used by Ninth Air Force, Incl 3, CWS TofC Ltr No. 26, 30 Jun 45.
39
(2) Ninth AF, Use and Effectiveness of Napalm Fire Bombs, 9 Feb 45, Incl 4, CWS TofO Ltr No. 23,
3 Apr 44. (3) Broughton Weekly News Ltr No. 26A, 7 Dec 44.
40
(1) Ninth AF, Use and Effectiveness of Napalm Fire Bombs, 9 Feb 45, Incl 4, CWS TofO Ltr
No. 23, 3 Apr 44. (2) CWS TofO Ltr No. 28, 31 Aug 45, p. 20.
the Operational Research Section of the IX Bomber Command found

that the fire bomb was not instrumental in the surrender of the fortress
of St. Malo on the French coast.41
Use in the Pacific
In the war against Japan, the fire bomb saw use from the mainland
of Asia to the many small islands of the Pacific. As in Europe, the
munition gave best results when used to produce casualties. Some
observers in the Pacific went as far as to say that matériel destruction
should be but a secondary mission for the fire bomb and then only if the
target were highly combustible. Apart from its casualty potential the
fire bomb had definite psychological effect on enemy troops; ground
commanders agreed that enemy morale suffered an obvious decrease
after a fire bomb attack. The Japanese on Tinian, after experiencing
several fire bomb attacks, broke from their positions upon the approach
of fighter planes with belly tanks and ran in a direction that was at right
angles to the flight of the planes. But whether used against troops or
other targets, fire bombs to be effective had to be dropped in adequate
numbers. Prisoners of war stated that widely dispersed fire bomb hits
42
had little or no effect on the morale of a unit.
When used against emplacements the fire bomb performed the addi-
tional service of burning off the dense foliage and camouflage which
so often surrounded Japanese positions. The Commanding General,
81stInfantry Division, stated, "Napalm bombing serves as an excellent
means of uncovering hostile strong points in jungle and cave warfare.
Unless the enemy is prepared to meet it by special provisions in his
caves, this fire will drive him into the open where he can be reached with
HE shells." 43
Used in collaboration with regular incendiary and HE bombs, the
napalm bomb burned cities and towns in Burma and China whose
wooden buildings housed supplies for Japanese operations. For example,
the Fourteenth Air Force struck Paoching with M50 and M69 in-
cendiary bombs and demolition and napalm bombs. In this particular
41
(1) Brougham Weekly News Ltr No. 26A, 7 Dec 44; No. 15, 16 Sep 44. (2) Craven and Cate
state that although the fire bomb strike at St. Malo was "spectacular, and much photographed," the
napalm "though burning out one surface shelter, produced little effect on the garrison." Craven and
Cate, eds., Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, p. 262.
42
Fire Bomb Opns, Incl 5, CWS TofO Ltr No. 19, 3 Nov 44.
Quoted in Use of Napalm (Fire) Bombs in the Palaus Opn, Incl 5, CWS TofO Ltr No. 23, 3 Apr 45.
43
case the results (the destruction of 20 percent of the city) were sub-
standard because of the mud and brick walls of the buildings and be-
cause many of the bombs fell on previously burned areas. In Burma,
fire bombs alone received credit for the evacuation of one Japanese-
held city.44
During the Luzon campaign American air units dropped on the
enemy a total of 1,054,200 gallons of napalm-thickened gasoline, of
which an estimated 989,000 gallons were effectively placed on targets.
The failures were the result of defective igniters and of faulty release
mechanisms. While on certain missions there may have been an un-
usually high percentage of duds (these, likely as not, were ignited by
strafing), in the over-all picture the fire bomb performed efficiently.45
The most effective use of the fire bomb took place during the fight
for Ipo Dam, north of the city of Manila.46 After the fall of the Philip-
pine capital the Japanese forces withdrew to this area and augmented
the natural defensive features of the terrain with a network of trenches
and fortified caves. The low supply of water in Manila made the re-
capture of the dam imperative, and fighter-bombers of the Fifth Air
Force supported troops of XI Corps as they attacked to take this im-
portant facility. During the initial stage of the operation (3-5 May
1945), 238 planes dropped demolition and fire bombs on the outlying
defenses of the dam with good results. The final all-out effort to seize
the dam took place on 17 May. On the day before, fighter planes again
struck the Ipo defenses, this time with 50,000 gallons of napalm. On
the day of the attack 240 fighter-bombers dropped 62,500 gallons of
napalm. A Fifth Air Force report described the technique:
Five enemy strong points were selected as target areas, each one consisting of about
3,000,000 square yards. Obviously, in a target of this size, the term saturation bomb-
ing is used in a tactical rather than physical sense, meaning that sufficient bomb cover-
age was provided to negate enemy opposition. To administer the blanket of fire treat-
44
(1) Incendiary and Fire Bomb Attack on Paoching, China, CWS TofO Ltr No. 26, 30 Jan 45, p. 11.
(2) CWS Munitions Used Operationally by First Tactical Air Force, CWS TofO Ltr No. 25, 30
May 45, p. 17.
45
(1) Rpt, CmlO Sixth Army, Luzon Campaign (9 Jan-1 Jul 45), pp. 15-16. (2) An. to Cml
Opns and Tech Per Rpt 8, CmlO I Corps, 21 Jun 45, sub: Rpt of Napalm Bombings. (3) An. I to
Cml Opns and Tech Per Rpt No. 7, CmlO I Corps, 13 Jun 45, sub: Rpt on Napalm Bombings. All
in CMLHO.
46
(1) Craven and Cate, eds., The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, p. 436. (2) Smith, Triumph in
the Philippines, ch. XXI.
ment, 200 to 250 5th AF fighters came in low, wave after wave, four to eight
abreast, with air and ground controllers giving target information and regulating
traffic. At first, the closely spaced fighters found that smoke from preceding waves
obscured the target. The problem was overcome by directing the bombing runs down-
wind, with each successive wave dropping its bombs on the near side of the bursts
from the wave which preceded it. The fighter bombers followed each other at 10- to
15-second intervals. A-20's then came in, showering the area with parafrags and
47
winding up with a thorough strafing.
Positions in the area which had withstood infantry attacks for almost
a week, were taken after only feeble resistance and minimum casualties.
Whether these results were entirely due to the use of napalm is not
certain. One chemical officer, for example, viewing one of the attacks
from the air, concluded that its effect was little more than harassing.
But most observers were inclined to place greater emphasis on the
effectiveness of the fire bomb, and General Krueger, Sixth Army com-
mander, went so far as to say that these attacks "made possible the early
48
capture of the vital Ipo Dam."
All together during World War II the American Army Air Force
dropped about 37,000 CWS fire bombs (14,000 tons) on German and
Japanese targets. Two-thirds of the bombs and an even higher per-
centage of the tonnage were used in the Pacific war. No matter where
the fire bombs were used reaction to their method of employment
seemed to be the same. To insure the best results they had to be dropped
in adequate numbers and from altitudes ranging from 50 to 100 feet;
the efficiency of a napalm strike was increased when co-ordinated with
HE bombs, artillery fire, or strafing; the most effective targets for
the munition were enemy strongholds and troop concentrations, ex-
49
tremely inflammable material, and motorized vehicles.
47
Quoted in "Napalm—Fire Bombs Turn Trick Against Holed-Up Nips in Luzon," Impact (August,
1945),
48
pp. 48-53.
(1) Ibid. (2) Memo, CmlO, I Corps for CofS I Corps, 18 May 45, no sub. Sixth Army File,
471.6. (3) After the war, General Yamashito, Japanese commander on Luzon, stated that napalm
had little effect against the rain-soaked terrain of the island. Quoted in Craven and Cate, eds., The
Pacific: From Matterhorn to Nagasaki, p. 443.
49
(1) CWS Munitions Used Operationally by First Tactical Air Force, CWS TofO Ltr No. 25,
30 May 45, p. 18. (2) Ninth AF, Use and Effectiveness of Napalm Fire Bomb, 3 Apr 45, Incl 4, CWS
TofO Ltr 23. (3) Broughton Weekly News Ltr No. 40A, 12 Apr 45.
CHAPTER XVIII
CWS Overseas—An Evaluation

The CWS had much to learn in World War II. The service entered
the war as the custodian of one of the most awesome weapons to come
out of World War I. Even while experiencing the diplomatic, political,
and military antipathy to gas that was manifest during the years be-
tween the wars, many CWS officers, military analysts, and strategists
(and many pacifists) believed that gas and air power would rule the
next global conflict. When war broke out in Europe gas was not used
in spite of the fact that England must have presented a tempting target.
This state of affairs affected the CWS in the United States in two ways:
the service had to adjust to the idea of preparing for a gas war which
might never be fought and for a nongas war which involved missions
hitherto either secondary or nonexistent.
The problems of a nongas war, such as was fought in World War II,
centered about use of smoke, flame, and incendiaries, natural appendages
to the mission of a technical service which dealt largely with the prod-
ucts of the science of chemistry.
The CWS did in fact prepare for both kinds of war. Its staff officers
and combat and service units performed usefully, even while fulfilling
their insurance roles. To do this, to achieve the goal of effective par-
ticipation in the war effort, involved ingenuity, resourcefulness, and
adaptability of the highest order.
Attendant upon both of these differing objectives was the matter
of meeting demands for a rapid expansion, for the activation of new
organizations and units, and for the mass production and distribution of
new weapons and materials. The CWS, like other elements of the
Armed Forces, received resources of men and money undreamed of in
the difficult years through which it had just passed. In 1940 the CWS
had an active strength of 93 officers and 1,035 enlisted men; in 1943
these figures were 8,103 and 61,688. Within the space of these three
years the civilian rolls increased twentyfold. Appropriations for 1940
were just over two million dollars; two years later they exceeded one
CWS OVERSEAS—AN EVALUATION 637
billion. This transition from famine to feast was not an easy one to
make. The development and efficient management of programs to pro-
vide for the greatly expanded mission of the CWS involved many prob-
lems, not the least of which, according to General Porter, was the
effective use of all the money allotted to the service. It was necessary
to balance funds against priority schedules and limited allocations of
men, materials, storage space, and transportation.
The CWS branches established by the Army in each of the overseas
areas of war operations also dealt with problems of priorities and al-
locations. But the CWS overseas, perhaps even more than the CWS
at home, felt the full impact of preparing for a kind of war which
was not being fought while contributing significantly to the war which
was being fought.
Administration and Manpower

Among other things the CWS in World War II had to learn about
the character, structure, and channels of overseas organizations. In
spite of between-the-wars planning and training, the CWS on the eve
of conflict was essentially as unprepared to form its overseas branches as
it was for waging gas warfare. Part of this difficulty was the lack of
manpower—there were not enough senior officers even to form the
nuclei of several theater of operations staff sections. So it was that
Colonel Copthorne went to SWPA without the support of even one
other Regular officer. Only two other Regulars supported Colonel
Unmacht in the Hawaiian Department. The European theater was de-
prived of all but three of its senior CWS officers to make their ex-
perience available for the North African forces. While nearly all of
the leading CWS officers in the United States and overseas—Porter,
Waitt, Rowan, Copthorne, and Shadle—highly praised the energy,
resourcefulness, and intelligence of Reserve and temporary officers,
most of these emergency officers, during the critical phase of the form-
ulation of overseas organizations, were inexperienced and they lacked
a knowledge of current policies and plans. It is a tribute to the Reserve
and temporary officers that they learned so quickly and performed so
well.
A part of CWS unpreparedness to establish overseas branches
stemmed from the changes imposed upon the Army by global warfare.
It became impossible to have the direct communication with the
OCCWS which many officers had expected. It became necessary to deal

with the Allies, to act within the framework of international policy.
Although acting within this framework, most overseas chemical officers,
with the notable exception of Shadle, found themselves set apart from
the Allied agencies, operating even below the joint Army-Navy-Army
Air Forces level, at the level of the Army supply services. Even in
Shadle's case, his presence in an Allied headquarters isolated him to
some extent from the field agencies and to a greater extent from the
War Department. Furthermore, there was the necessary but neverthe-
less restrictive requirement for OCCWS to deal formally with its over-
seas branches through ASF and OPD.
The lack of administrative preparedness was also due in part to the
fact that the CWS did not "fit" into the organizational patterns of
World War II. The service was in the anomalous position of being
both a supply and technical service; an organization which furnished
staff advice, conceivably even in tactical and strategic fields; a service
legally responsible for firing-line units; and a service equipped to do
research in the field. Most of the other technical services had a similar
range of responsibilities, but none was spread so thin, none had combat
units primarily equipped with their own weapons; moreover, all other
services had supply and service support as a primary mission. World
War II organizational doctrine tended to categorize activities into
those of "service" or those of "combat." The CWS overseas never
succeeded in persuading some field commanders that its activities and
units, even front-line smoke generator units, were not in the supply
and service category.
In the face of such determined categorization, most CWS overseas
branches worked outside or on the fringes of the official organization.
The CWS in each area or theater became highly individualistic. In
the European theater Rowan used his personal persuasion with com-
mand and staff elements and his close personal ties with other CWS
officers to maintain a unity of service and accomplish his mission. He
and his subordinates, insofar as they were able, operated their own ad-
ministrative system, their own intelligence activity, their own technical
and liaison organization, and their own supply service. Such indepen-
dence was possible only because the European theater and theater Com-
munications Zone headquarters permitted and even encouraged it. The
ASF inspectors did not approve of this independence, but without it the
CWS ETO could not have accomplished its missions.
The CWS administrative effort overseas most nearly like that in the
European theater was in the Central Pacific Area. There Colonel Un-
macht vigorously asserted CWS independence with the active concur-
rence and support of first the senior Army headquarters and later the
combined and joint Pacific Ocean Areas headquarters. Unmacht was
the only overseas chief chemical officer who also commanded CWS
troops other than the theater or area laboratory company. Unmacht
was also the only overseas chief chemical officer who was specifically
designated to co-ordinate and compile a joint Army, Army Air Forces,
and Navy gas warfare plan although Rowan, as Porter's representative,
and Copthorne, on temporary duty in GHQ SWPA, participated in
both combined and joint planning while Shadle, as a staff officer in a
combined headquarters, had advisory functions in the joint and com-
bined field. Unmacht and his subordinates certainly maintained a very
close connection between research and development and the firing line
even to the extent of carrying on research, development, and manu-
facture in the theater of operations.
Colonel Copthorne in SWPA likewise saw that new developments
reached combat chemical officers, but he did so in a different manner
from that of either Rowan or Unmacht. Copthorne and his CWS
colleagues had far fewer resources than did the CWS branches in Europe
or the Central Pacific; they did not have as close a relationship with
the combined and joint headquarters; and they had to contend with
the considerable problems of enormous distances and a tropical en-
vironment. Copthorne could not, therefore, unify his service and assert
its independence in the same way that Rowan and Unmacht did, but
he could co-ordinate his services by providing the mechanisms for
understanding and common effort among field and rear area chemical
officers. These mechanisms were area and even theaterwide confer-
ences, the creation of a centralized area training facility, the provision
of centralized technical intelligence activities, and a continued emphasis
on the problems of chemical warfare in the tropics. Copthorne and
the field chemical officers in SWPA operated in greater isolation from
the CWS in the United States and even from their colleagues in their
own area than did other chemical officers overseas. Their solutions
to problems, except for the determination of tropical gas warfare doc-
trine in which they co-operated with the CWS in the United States,
were ordinarily their own. Consequently, field army, corps, and divi-
sion chemical officers in SWPA acted as independently as did their
colleagues anywhere else in the world, and, with one exception, they
operated through a wider range of chemical responsibilities. This is not
to say that they did more and better work than their colleagues else-
where, but that they did have a more varied experience in the chemical
field.
The only elements having just as great a variety of chemical experi-
ence were to be found in the field armies in North Africa, Sicily, and
Italy. Since Shadle preferred to emphasize his own staff role and to give
field elements their head, Colonels Barker and Guild in Fifth Army
and Colonel Humphreville in Seventh Army found themselves, again
by their own preference, operating a CWS of their own. Barker and
Coblentz, in a unique partnership, carried on development and manu-
facture and operated their own supply system. As a result, there was
less co-ordination and unity in the CWS in the North African and
Mediterranean theater than elsewhere in the world, but again the re-
quired job was done. The much lesser threat of gas warfare in the
Mediterranean area made it particularly appropriate to accomplish
the CWS administrative task differently there.
In summary of the worldwide CWS administrative experience, it
can be said that every overseas branch of the CWS surveyed found some
means of creating a service that accorded with the concepts held by
Fries and Porter. The lot of the chemical technician in what was sup-
posed to be a technician's war was not an easy one, but the chemical
technician managed to do what he was called on to do by dint of much
improvisation and ingenuity.
Logistics
In logistics, as in administration, the CWS branches overseas dealt
with the two problems of gas warfare supply and nongas warfare sup-
ply. Also as in administration, each CWS overseas branch created its
own supply system according to geographical environment and ac-
cording to the kind of combat forces to be supported in its area. In
the European theater, where the build-up of forces and materials went
on for nearly two years before the attack, there was time to develop
for chemical supply a system of centralized CWS control over a

decentralized operation.
The sophisticated CWS ETO credit system of distribution, while
by no means original with the CWS, was admirably suited to a small
service handling only a small number of fast-moving items. Since a
combat commander using this system could ask for materials credited
to his organization when and where convenient, the system gave the
combat commander control over the forward movement of supplies.
The big stumbling block was in having supplies ready for call. The
CWS ETO distribution system, through no basic fault of the system
itself, tended to break down when supplies were unavailable or when
depots and dumps could not be organized and stocked as desired. When
strains were put on the system, General Rowan and all of his subordin-
ates, often acting informally, jumped in to make the system function
by obtaining and moving supplies. Aided by such application of energy
at all levels, the CWS ETO supply system for the most part did manage
to carry on. Supply failures or near failures arose in connection with
mortar shells, incendiary bombs, and spare parts, but in each case the
trouble was that materials were unavailable in the United States. And
in each case of failure or near failure the CWS ETO was able to make
adjustments which at least eased matters.
CWS ETO supply problems were slightly easier to handle because
that theater had the most men and facilities. Distances were shorter
and transportation, while nearly always in critical demand, was more
plentiful than elsewhere in the world. North Africa was quite an-
other story in this respect. Distances were great and existing road and
rail nets were few and poor. These natural drawbacks, the inexperience
of the Army in global supply at this early stage, and enemy submarine
and air warfare helped shape the CWS NATOUSA supply system. The
independence and isolation of CWS elements in the theater also had an
effect. Base sections and combat organization chemical officers created
their own supply system which eventually became the "impetus from
the front" system. What materials Colonels Barker and Coblentz could
not get from the theater SOS or from the United States, they manu-
factured or reclaimed. When necessary the combat organization chemi-
cal officers reinforced their requests for materials through command
channels. General Shadle meanwhile handled the "impetus from the
rear" supply system and did his part in fighting the battles of overages
and shortages. Both CWS NATOUSA-MTOUSA supply systems

worked, but only because the chemical officers made them work against
considerable odds.
CWS SWPA officers were able to make their supply system work in
the face of even greater odds. Enormous distances, chronic shortages
of transportation and communications facilities, and the almost un-
believable deterioration of materials in the tropical environment
plagued them from the time combat began. For at least the first
half of the war they could rely on the economy of neither the United
States nor Australia to furnish enough materials in usable condition.
They were hampered by low priorities and force-level allocations
which did not permit building up area reserves. Again, improvisation
and ingenuity provided the answers. Again, items were built, reclaimed,
and rebuilt through area efforts. In SWPA the area SOS and even GHQ
stepped in to provide procedures for forward organization and trans-
portation. Eventually, as more ships and more equipment became avail-
able all over the globe, the United States provided ships block-loaded for
balanced resupply of combat forces. Area supply problems, while still
difficult, became a simple matter of computing necessary block loads,
of receiving, handling, and maintaining the materials in these loads.
The War Department policy restricting the build-up of area reserves
threatened to become a CWS problem in POA just as in SWPA, but
shortages did not become critical because anticipated demands were
larger than actual demands and because Hawaiian Department resources
were large enough to allow for improvisations and substitutions. In
POA combat supply, transport space allocation and loading were care-
fully controlled by the area joint headquarters. The POA CWS soon
learned to work within the joint system, and the result, admittedly
under relatively ideal circumstances, was the smoothest CWS supply
operation of World War II.
Excepting the supply of toxics, which was a preparedness matter, the
CWS managed to accomplish its major logistics mission. The overseas
branches displayed enough ingenuity to prevent any of the supply
shortages, except for spare parts, from becoming more than temporarily
critical. Yet, there is little doubt that more supplies would have been
used had the CWS been able to furnish them sooner and in greater
quantities. For example, no area anywhere in the world was ever pro-
vided with enough chemical mortar shells. More mortars could have
been employed in most cases. Demands for white phosphorus grenades

were frequently not met, and probably many more power-driven
decontaminating apparatus could have been used for carrying water,
providing showers, and the like. POA experience indicates that a flame-
throwing tank could have been extensively employed if it had been pos-
sible to provide an adequate model at an early date.
Many more CWS service units could also have been employed. The
CWS overseas could have used more maintenance units in the field, and
experience demonstrates that chemical laboratories could easily have
become general-purpose overseas research and development agencies.
More decontaminating units could have been used in general services
work, and more processing companies could have been doing laundry
and dry cleaning.
The use of CWS units and materials in secondary missions raised the
question of whether it was indeed a CWS function to furnish equip-
ment and units for these missions and whether it would have been
practical and reasonable to provide them had they been available.
World War II experience does not give definite answers to these
questions or to the corollary and perhaps overriding question of
whether the CWS should have had any logistics functions overseas.
All the other technical services were larger and all had established
logistics procedures. The Quartermaster Corps handled impregnated
clothing and protective covers: why should it not handle all protective
items? Quartermaster provided bath and laundry units: why should it
not provide all such services? Ordnance stored and issued vast quan-
tities of ammunition including, in some areas, chemical toxics: why
should that service not handle all ammunition items? The Corps of
Engineers provided and employed heavy equipment, like the chemical
decontaminating apparatus and commercial gases: why should it not
provide all such equipment and the attendant services?
The tentative answer, based on World War II experience is, as Fries
found in World War I, that these services were already overburdened
with their responsibilities and were unable or unwilling to handle
the detailed problems connected with chemical supply and service.
The antigas impregnation of clothing is a highly technical and even
hazardous process. The Quartermaster Corps in all areas was willing to
work out a co-operative arrangement with the CWS for handling pro-
tective clothing, but it was unwilling to undertake the impregnating
task. Since the CWS had the impregnating units, it would have been
grossly wasteful not to use them, in the absence of gas warfare, to help
Quartermaster with its laundry and dry cleaning. It would likewise
have been wasteful not to use the decontaminating units and apparatus,
which the other services would have been hard pressed to employ in
event of gas warfare, in any way possible to improve the comfort or
well-being of troops in the field. Ammunition supply was a thorny
problem which at least someCWS officers felt should have been handled
by Ordnance, particularly since the CWS frequently found gas warfare
preparedness and planning a full time mission, and some chemical of-
ficers did persuade their Ordnance colleagues to handle it. In most
cases, however, Ordnance had enough to do in supplying the artillery
and the infantry without also handling a relatively few grenades and
smoke and mortar shells. The chemical items also posed technical prob-
lems. Potentially explosive smoke pots could not be safely stored with
other ordnance items, and leaking toxic munitions required expert
attention. In the European theater, in SWPA, and in the Mediter-
ranean area, these technical problems led Ordnance to turn over much
of its toxic storage responsibility to CWS. In POA the toxic storage
mission was officially transferred to CWS. In sum, the answer to the
question of functions and responsibilities seemed to be that, since the
CWS had to be overseas to guide preparations for gas warfare, there
was no reason why it should not perform related secondary tasks, par-
ticularly when training and equipment permitted CWS units to ac-
complish certain of these tasks more expeditiously than units of its
sister services.
The Weapons
The development of the large area smoke mission during World
War II can be traced with greater precision than can that of most
munitions. The need for concealment of extensive targets in rear areas
arose in World War I with the introduction of bomber aircraft. In
the period between the wars Chemical Warfare Service attempts to
develop a way to conceal vulnerable rear area targets were made mean-
ingful by the growing increase in the range of airplanes and by the
development of the air arm of the Navy. But the CWS was generally
unsuccessful in these attempts—means were not on hand for the pro-
duction of smoke in needed amounts. And covering a target with too
little smoke did nothing more, of course, than attract an enemy

bombardier's attention.
Early in 1942 the CWS produced smoke apparatus which met the
necessary requirements, the M1 mechanical generator which created
an artificial fog not by combustion but by the condensation of water
and oil. Its principal drawback was its 3,000-pound weight and its
awkward size. The small, compact M2 model, which appeared in 1944,
overcame both of these handicaps.
Smoke generator companies first saw overseas action in Northwest
Africa, providing screens for the ports through which flowed the men
and material for the fight against Rommel's and other German forces.
In this capacity, there still prevailed the basic mission of the large area
screen—concealment of rear area targets from observation. The smoke
installation at Naples, the largest of the war, also concealed a vital
harbor from the bombers of the Luftwaffe. But at about this point
in the conflict the smoke units were given a new mission, which, by
the end of the war, was to assume paramount importance. There were
two reasons for this change in emphasis. As the war progressed the
Allies gradually won control of the air, a circumstance which dimin-
ished the need for rear area concealment. At the same time American
troops were fighting up the boot of Italy, always, it seemed, in the
face of superior German observation. As a consequence, smoke units
freed from rear area duty were shifted to the forward zones.
An effective employment of this kind of smoke screen in Italy was
somewhat hampered by bulk and weight of the M1 generator. Smoke
troops in France and Germany were spared this difficulty for they had
the compact M2 generator in time to use it in support of the crossings
of the many rivers which lay between the Americans and eventual
victory.
This is not to imply that the transition from rear area to forward
area operation was easy and uncomplicated. There were lessons to be
learned by both the supporting and the supported units and tactics
and techniques had to be developed for the rather radical change of
arenas. Not the least challenge was the need for smoke troops, whose
duties changed almost overnight from rear support to action in the
foremost areas of the combat zone, to adapt themselves to their new
role.
The 4.2-inch mortar brought the World War II infantryman into
closer contact with the CWS than did perhaps anything else. The
splendid reputation of this weapon depended on a mission change
dictated by uncertainty over the possibility of gas warfare. Originally
designed to fire toxic chemicals and smokes, the mortar would have
been rather expensive insurance in a gasless war. The logical step, of
course, was the addition of the high explosive mission. Chemical
mortar battalions thereby filled a dual capacity: they stood ready in
the event of the introduction of gas warfare by the enemy, and they
supported infantry units with smoke and high explosive. Although
the gas warfare readiness of the mortar units never received the test
of battle, there can be no doubt about the successful accomplishment
of the second mission. Few in number and greatly overworked, the
chemical mortar battalions served as the infantry commander's hip
pocket artillery, capable of placing accurate and heavy fire upon
targets within a range of 4,000-5,000 yards. The limited number of
units (as late as December 1944 there were only four with the 12th
Army Group), meant that they continued in the line while a succession
of supported units was relieved. Infantry divisions would come and
go but the mortar units seemed part of the terrain.
The CWS in World War II had mixed success with flame throwers,
the portable as well as the mechanized. With regard to the mechanized
model there was some indecision on the part of the using arm as to the
characteristics, indeed as to the very necessity, for such a specialized
vehicle. Moreover, in no other field of CWS endeavor was there so
little liaison between the users in the field and the developers in the
zone of interior. Because of this lack of liaison and because of available
facilities and vigorous CWS people in Hawaii, the mechanized flame
thrower support in at least one Pacific area came principally from local
sources, not from the United States. And this support resulted in the
most effective combat employment of the mechanized flame thrower
in the war.
The war against Japan also saw the most effective use of the portable
flame thrower. Reasons for the usefulness of flame weapons in the
Pacific are not hard to find. American forces found themselves con-
fronted by a stubborn enemy who was taught to believe that death for
the Emperor was something worthy of aspiration. This kind of enemy
ensconced in skillfully constructed fortifications would not be routed
by artillery and mortar fire. Quite often the flame thrower, capable
of delivering a lethal stream of fire through narrow apertures, was

the only effective weapon for use against these formidable defenses.
It must also be remembered that much of the fighting in the early
days of the Pacific war took place in jungle terrain, and the resulting
concealment enabled the operator to carry his bulky, easily recognized
portable flame thrower much closer to the enemy without being
observed. Credit must be given to CWS staff officers and service
troops who, by the formulation of tactical doctrine and by the appli-
cation of maintenance procedures, were instrumental in making the
portable model the effective munition it was.
The war against Germany was a different story, for neither the
mechanized nor the portable flame throwers contributed much to that
phase of the conflict. European battlefields and German defenses were
often typified by excellent fields of fire which boded ill for the rela-
tively short range of both types of flame weapon. In Europe, unlike
in the Pacific, no situation ever arose wherein the flame weapon provided
a vital key in overcoming the enemy. Consequently, there was no
impetus for overcoming the weapon's initial drawbacks—short range,
lack of tactical doctrine, problems of maintenance, and the lack of
knowledge on the part of the using arms.
The incendiary bomb had the distinction of being one of the most
effective munitions employed strategically by United States forces in
World War II. Ranging from a compact 4-pound, metallic model to
an oil-filled 500-pounder, these bombs, developed and procured by
the CWS and employed by the Army Air Forces, wrought almost un-
paralleled destruction. The fire bomb, the tactical corollary of the
incendiary, proved effective when dropped by fighter-bomber aircraft
on a variety of targets in the forward areas.
The Army Air Forces expended nearly a quarter-million incendiary
and fire bombs on German and Japanese targets. The accounts of the
devastation resulting from incendiary missions leave no doubt as to
the important part played by these munitions in achieving Allied
victory. Because of a long-standing faith in high explosives and
because of defects in some of the early bombs, the Air Forces was slow
to accept the new munition. Indeed, it was not until the last six
months of the war that the aerial incendiary really came into its own.
Back of this record were two important factors. First, the stress of
war eliminated certain peacetime lethargies and led to the development
of some good, even ingenious, incendiary bombs. And second, coura-

geous operational leadership, exemplified by the role of General LeMay,
proved beyond all doubt the importance of the aerial incendiary.
To attempt to select the most important reason for Japan's capitu-
lation is to tread uncertain ground. Many factors were involved, the
atomic explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki being by far the most
spectacular. Yet, the testimony of Japanese leaders and the mute
evidence of her burned-out cities certainly point to the incendiary
campaign of the XXI Bomber Command as an important element in
the defeat of Japan.
Readiness for Gas Warfare

There is no easy measurement for CWS overseas accomplishments
in gas warfare preparedness since plans, men, and materials were not
put to the test. It is possible to assess the factors upon which chemical
officers during World War II believed preparedness depended. The
first of these factors was an administrative and organizational pattern
which would have permitted chemical officers to function in all their
areas of interest from tactical and strategic advice to decontamination
service in the field.
Administratively and organizationally the CWS was only partially
prepared for gas warfare. In Europe, while the chief chemical officer
held a staff position under the theater commander, he did not have
a position in the supreme tactical and strategic headquarters, SHAEF.
Colonel St. John's presence in SHAEF would have helped so far as
the function of providing advice is concerned, but his lack of a direct
and formal channel to the chief chemical officer might have proved a
handicap. The informal relationship which existed between Rowan
and the air chemical officers and between Rowan and the United States
Navy officers with interests in the chemical field would probably have
served as a basis for co-operative effort among the U.S. forces.
General Shadle, from his position in the combined headquarters,
AFHQ, would have been able to co-ordinate both Allied and American
gas warfare activities in the Mediterranean area. Colonel Copthorne
in SWPA would undoubtedly have had a tough problem in making the
necessary expansion into USAFFE and GHQ since he lacked the
required staff and since his relationships with the Allies and even
the Army Air Forces and the U.S. Navy were informal and tenuous
at the best.
Colonel Unmacht, enjoying the confidence and support of his Army
commander, and from 1943 as official Co-ordinator of POA chemical
planning for all forces, would have been in as good a position as Shadle's.
Unmacht's drawback would have been his lack of staff officers.
In all areas, army group, army, corps, and division, chemical officers
would in most cases have been ready for the administrative load of gas
warfare. Only the advent of such warfare could have tested Rowan's
contention that the secondary and unrelated tasks performed in the
absence of gas warfare would in most instances lessen the readiness and
effectiveness of the chemical staff officers. It would probably have
been necessary to augment chemical sections at all levels, but it seems
likely that officers and men of other arms and services could have
been diverted from tasks of lower priority in the case of gas warfare.
Below the division level the inauguration of gas warfare would likely
have resulted in a wild scramble to select, train, and retrain unit gas
officers and unit gas noncommissioned officers, but, in view of the
fact that nearly every soldier received some gas warfare training, the
roster should soon have been filled. More chemical mortar battalions
and chemical service units would certainly have been required, but,
assuming a high priority for gas warfare activities and the availability
of equipment, other units could have been converted, possibly in a
matter of days, probably in a matter of weeks. Areas having a lesser
variety of units and a smaller total strength would have been hard
put to find units for conversion since the advent of gas warfare would
probably have intensified rather than lessened other forms of combat.
The second factor regarded by chemical officers as basic in gas war-
fare preparedness—training—was from the CWS point of view the
least difficult preparedness activity to handle. The theater school in
Europe, the area CWS school in SWPA, the army schools in the
Mediterranean area, and Unmacht's series of courses in POA provided
chemical training for thousands of soldiers. Most of these trainees
would have required refresher courses were it not for the fact that,
as a senior technical services officer told a chemical officer in Europe,
soldiers learn fast and remember well when their lives depend on
learning. These area schools and combat and service organization
schools could have been quickly expanded with a minimum of effort,
because most CWS officers and men, at least in the combat organiza-
tion chemical sections, had some experience in conducting chemical
training. Since few chemical officers ever believed they had been
allotted enough training time, most had prepared short courses which
they were ready to present in almost any location on almost no notice.
The third factor in preparedness—intelligence—was one which pre-
sented many difficulties. There had been no active Army intelligence
agency in the United States before World War II. The Office of the
Assistant Chief, WDGS, G-2, was so restricted that it could not even
begin to meet the demands for all sorts of technical intelligence until
late in the war. By that time the technical services had trained and
sent out their own teams or had, like Colonel Copthorne, activated teams
overseas. These teams and combat chemical officers did an outstanding
job of collecting enemy equipment, and the various theater and area
laboratories produced complete analyses. The indications were that
the enemy, both Germans and Japanese, were defensively well prepared.
Direct evidence of German or Japanese intentions on use of gas was
lacking.
While technical intelligence was well done, it was not enough. Only
the British and the U.S. Office of Strategic Services were able to gather
more direct information. Their reports were useful but fragmentary,
incomplete, and misleading. There were rumors of a new German
gas, but neither British or Americans even guessed at the composition,
toxicity, and possible means of employment of the German organo-
phosphate compounds, the so-called G or nerve agents, until some
toxic munitions were captured at the close of the war. The intelligence
agencies reported stocks of German toxics in France before the invasion,
but none were found until Allied troops reached the German homeland.
In sum, the enemy never discovered Allied intentions and the Allies
never discovered enemy intentions. It was cold comfort to CWS
officers to know at the end of the war that enemy intelligence was no
better than American.
Planning was the fourth factor bearing on gas warfare preparedness.
The early theater gas warfare plans, required by the War Department
in December 1942, were poor because not enough was then known
about the character of World War II fighting to make adequate plans,
and because materials and chemical units had not yet been provided in
sufficient quantity to form a basis for planning. In the next two years
the plans became detailed and specific, and in most areas they originated
in or were approved by the highest Allied headquarters. Plans were
therefore comprehensive. These theater plans almost never reached
or were known to chemical officers in the field. It is consequently not
possible to judge whether field chemical officers believed the plans could
be carried out in event of gas warfare. Since some plans, like those in
POA, actually identified target areas and since the logistics and oper-
ational requirements were carefully checked by overseas staffs and
OCCWS, it seems probable that plans were both realistic and feasible.
But, however good the plans were, they were only as good as the
supply of gas munitions for retaliation.
Supply was the fifth and probably most important factor in gas
warfare preparedness. After the first year of the war the supply of
gas masks was ample in all areas of the world. That supply improved
further with the provision of the new lightweight mask late in 1943
and early in 1944. The CWS produced enough protective clothing
in the United States or overseas to furnish reasonable protection by
late 1943. Protective clothing resupply, especially in SWPA, could
have been delivered by air only through high priority, but such priority
could probably have been obtained. Even had delivery been slow in
coming, all units could have reimpregnated their own clothing in the
field in an emergency. Collective protection and decontamination
would probably have been inadequate according to World War II
standards, but some CWS officers, including General Porter, maintained
that the standard was unrealistically high. In the opinion of these
officers, it would have been necessary to bypass areas heavily contami-
nated with persistent gases in any case, so that the need for decontami-
nation would be confined to strategic roads, airfields, and supply points.
The supply of toxic agents overseas admittedly amounted only to
token quantities. At the time of President Roosevelt's 1942 pronounce-
ment, his threatened swift retaliation for enemy initiation of gas war-
fare would have been impossible. The fourteen days of aerial toxic
munitions in Europe after the fall of 1943 represented a substantial
first-strike capability, but for resupply, air delivery on high priority
would have been necessary. By the time of the Rapido and Winter
Line operations in Italy early in 1944, the U.S. forces possessed enough
toxic munitions to lay alternate bands of persistent and nonpersistent
gases most of the way across the Italian peninsula. Again, resupply
would have been by air. In the Pacific areas first-strike capabilities

were even lower—with toxic munitions supplies in POA equal to an
attack on an area the size of Iwo Jima and in SWPA to but five days'
operation. Porter and Waitt, along with USCWS officers, were confi-
dent that these token amounts would have served for initial retaliation
and that aircraft and fast ships could have created a resupply pipeline.
Under their plan, stocks in the United States would have sustained the
overseas offensive until new stocks could have been built up. They
calculated that U.S. enemies would not have been able to initiate gas
warfare on all fronts at the same time, and that gas warfare initiated
in the Pacific could have been confined to a small area for a considerable
period.
Why Gas Was Not Used

Why was gas not used in World War II? To pin down all the
reasons is difficult if not impossible. Some of the factors were not
constant; they underwent alterations as the war progressed and situa-
tions changed. Different factors affected different nations.
The principal factor deterring the United States from initiating
gas warfare was clearly national policy. Although the United States
was not a party to any international agreement outlawing gas warfare,
its policy throughout World War II was set in precise terms. Twice
during the early years of the conflict President Roosevelt categorically
stated that the United States would use gas only in retaliation against
an enemy nation using it. This statement by the President and Com-
mander in Chief became the official United States position throughout
the war. The United States policy on gas was, in fact, largely deter-
mined by the deep feeling of its President about that particular kind
1
of warfare.
But other elements enter the picture. Notwithstanding the tre-
mendous influence of President Roosevelt and his predominant place
in policy and decision making, military leaders would have presented
arguments in rebuttal had they entertained any deep-seated doubt as
to the wisdom of the Presidential point of view. But, with the excep-
1
Roosevelt, in vetoing a 1937 bill aimed at changing the name of the Chemical Warfare Service
to Chemical Corps, wrote: "It has been and is the policy of this government to do everything in its
power to outlaw the use of chemicals in warfare. Such use is inhuman and contrary to what modern
civilization should stand for. . . ." See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, pp. 21-22.
tion of minor stirrings near the end of the war, gas warfare had no
advocates in high places.
Military reluctance began with the experience of the AEF in World
War I. Despite the excellent leadership of General Fries, it would
appear that many of the higher unit staffs and commanders placed
little reliance on the gas arm, in sharp contrast to their German,
British, and French counterparts. Incidents demonstrating the reluc-
tance of some unit commanders to employ gas for fear of retaliation
and the possible injury to friendly troops have already been related.
A survey of the records of First Army indicate that a real under-
standing of the use of gas, particularly persistent, did not occur until
late in the war. For example, the initial First Army field order for
the St. Mihiel operation included no gas plan whatsoever. And although
First Army used gas effectively in the Meuse-Argonne fighting, there
is nothing in the records to indicate that its corps and divisions were
aware of an over-all plan.2
It will be remembered that in the fight for a permanent CWS,
General Fries found support in Congress, industry, and civil servants—
not in the Army. Generals Pershing and March both opposed the
creation of a chemical service. There is no evidence to suggest that
top commanders ever acquired much faith in gas warfare. In fact,
it is hard to believe that the War Department in the period between
the wars would have reduced CWS activities to those of a primarily
defensive nature had it had faith in gas warfare.
Another factor to be considered in reviewing American gas warfare
policy is the part played by public opinion. There can be no doubt that
gas warfare emerged from World War I with the reputation of a
horror weapon even when field experience did not substantiate this
view. Although reasons for this reputation are varied, one source of
opprobrium could very well have been the Allied propaganda program
waged against the German introduction of large-scale gas warfare.
The pros and cons on gas were also debated at the time of the two
international conventions of the 1920's which considered its status in
the realm of international law. While that status was not officially
determined as far as the United States was concerned, the deliberations
2
Rexmond C. Cochrane, The 78th Div at the Kriemhilde Stellung, Oct 18, Study 2, U.S. Army
CmlC Hist Studies, Gas Warfare in World War I, Jul 57, pp. 76-78. Cochrane states that no Army,
corps, or division record examined makes mention of the most important Army gas decision—the use
of mustard on the flanks and drive through the center.
within these conventions could hardly have been without influence in

a world turning toward pacifism. Little evidence has yet been produced
to show that public opinion actually was a positive force contrary to
gas warfare, but the important thing is that public opinion was
believed to be contrary to gas warfare. President Roosevelt, usually
an astute judge of the public temper and a leader of public opinion,
certainly encountered no widespread opposition to his pronouncements
on gas warfare.
Whatever the reasons, American military leaders paid little attention
to gas in World War II. In the early years of the war, it would have
been an unwise risk because the enemy had been on a wartime footing
much longer and had a trump card in air superiority. Besides, two
decades of neglect could not be undone overnight, and the American
wherewithal for offensive gas warfare was slim, indeed. Later, when
the tide turned in favor of the Allies, it seemed unnecessary to intro-
duce gas. The war was being won without it. The greatest pause for
reflection on the employment of gas took place after the series of
costly American victories in the war against Japan. Use of gas was
contemplated to overcome stubborn Japanese defenses and thus reduce
American assault casualties, but the war ended before any positive
action arose.3
The British gas policy during the war was based on the same principle
as that of the United States—retaliation. In the early days of the
conflict, the lack of an offensive capability and the predominance of
the Luftwaffe (and consequent vulnerability of British cities) per-
mitted no alternative to this policy. Britain would have been unlikely
to change her policy as long as German air attacks continued on
England. These attacks were followed, after the Luftwaffe became
ineffective, by German missile bombardment nearly to the end of
1944. By this time the Allies had long been on the offensive. Apparently
many British military leaders shared the idea common among the
belligerents that gas was a weapon to be used only in defensive or
static operations. Even had commanders welcomed the employment
of gas in the assault, its use would have brought further strains upon
the overburdened British economy. While gas defensive preparations
improved in the United Kingdom throughout the war and while she
maintained a small retaliatory capacity to complement that of the
See Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War, pp. 86-88.

3
United States, all-out gas warfare would have required significantly

increased effort. Furthermore, the British, who had ratified the Geneva
Protocol and had reaffirmed this stand in 1939, felt that international
agreement prohibited their initiation of gas warfare.
Although Germany had no policy prohibiting the employment of
gas warfare during World War II, there was a strong trend of official
opinion against German initiation of gas warfare. This trend was
based on several constant factors and a series of factors which arose
from appraisals of Germany's situation during various periods of the
war.
The constant factors were: (1) Hitler had a personal antipathy to
gas warfare; (2) the military High Command and the field com-
manders devoted their attention to strategy, tactics, and weapons which
excluded gas warfare; (3) the High Command believed that inter-
national public opinion would be outraged should Germany become
a gas warfare aggressor in contravention of international agreements.
Given the Axis record, it is doubtful that the public opinion factor
would have had much weight in a decision not to wage gas warfare
had the military situation been favorable to its use.
At no time during World War II, in the opinion of the German
military leaders, was the situation favorable for the initiation of gas
warfare. In the early period of the war when both ground and aerial
blitzkrieg tactics were so successful, gas warfare either would have
hampered the German advance or would have posed technical and
logistical problems which Germany was not then prepared to face.
Later, when Germany was forced into the defensive, the use of gas
would have been decidedly to Germany's advantage, especially in the
defense of the continental coast. But by this time (1944-45) the Allies
had air superiority, and German leaders feared decisive retaliation in
kind against the German homeland. The Germans estimated correctly,
as a captured German general told General Shadle, that Allied, and
particularly American, defensive equipment was far superior to the
German (Germany had no large stock of protective clothing, for
example). The Germans apparently overestimated Allied offensive
capabilities, and they apparently believed that the Allies, like them-
selves, had discovered new gases. In both stages of the conflict, logistics
played an important part in the German decision not to wage gas
warfare. Early in the war, Germany had neither gases nor gas troops
in any appreciable quantities. Later in the war, the toxic stockpile

was adequate for defensive action, but the transportation and com-
munications systems were strained to the point of collapse, and on
some occasions did break down. Also, it was questionable whether
overburdened German industry could manufacture gases rapidly
enough and in sufficient quantity to sustain gas warfare both offen-
sively and defensively on all fronts.
As in the case of Germany, the reasons for the failure of Japan to
initiate gas warfare in World War II are varied and complex. There
was no moral compunction on the part of the Japanese for not using
gas; they had used it in isolated cases against the Chinese. Early in the
war, forging ahead against little resistance, the Japanese had no reason
to use gas. When the Japanese began to experience reverses, they did
so in areas which could well have called for gas warfare; mustard gas
would have been appropriate for use by troops retreating through a
jungle terrain. But by this time the Japanese faced enormous shipping
problems. A logistical system which failed to provide food for
Japanese troops in New Guinea could hardly have supported gas
warfare. Later, the predominance of American air power must have
been another factor in Japan's decision not to resort to gas. Japanese
civilians were ill prepared to defend themselves against gas attacks,
and B-29's on the Marianas were within easy range of the homeland.
Although early in the conflict the Japanese had the resources and
facilities for producing war gases, these diminished as the years wore on.
After the war U.S. investigators found that the Japanese were poorly
prepared for modern large-scale chemical warfare, offensive or de-
fensive. Rather limited amounts of war gases were on hand.
Had Allied intelligence been able to divine the intentions of the

Germans and Japanese, a large portion of Allied preparations for gas
warfare might have been abandoned. On the other hand, if the Allies
had been any less prepared than they were, the Germans might have
used—and General Bradley felt that this would have been decisive—a
light sprinkling of persistent gas on OMAHA Beach. Although lacking
sustained offensive capability, the Japanese could have put an equally
decisive sprinkling of mustard on the approaches to Buna and Gona
or on the Lingayen beaches. If the Japanese had not believed their
homeland vulnerable to gas, they might have launched a kamikaze gas
attack on the storm-battered U.S. Navy force off Okinawa. It is
therefore probable that United States gas warfare preparedness in

World War II was worth the effort. Certainly the nongas warfare
efforts of the CWS justified the activities of the service. The incendiary
bomb was the mainstay of the aerial assault on the Japanese homeland.
In acknowledgment of its contribution, the chemical mortar became
an infantry weapon following the war. Artificial smoke often proved
a great boon in Korea, and the Marine Corps entered the Korean
battles with World War II CWS flame tanks assembled in Hawaii.
General Porter sums up the World War II CWS experience by saying
that the CWS maintained a strong service which contributed to the war
effort everywhere—from the laboratory to the fighting line. The
"Chemicals in Combat" did their job so well that in 1946 the service
was redesignated the United States Army Chemical Corps and fully
accepted by the Military Establishment.
Bibliographical Note
Despite a measure of War Department standardization during World
War II, little consistency was found in the zone of interior or theater
of operations records relating to the Chemical Warfare Service in
World War II. Sources of great importance for one overseas area
would prove useless or nonexistent for another. Consequently, while
administration and organization records proved most fruitful, portions
of this work depend heavily on historical reports, monographs, studies,
secondary works, and interviews.
The following is a listing of the archives with an indication of the
collections used:
Military Branch, Federal Records Center, General Services Adminis-
tration, Region No. 3, Alexandria, Virginia—Files of the Office, Chief
of the Chemical Warfare Service. These files are cited by using the
prefix CWS in the file number. CWS 314.7 and CWS 319.1, properly
a part of this collection, are temporarily in the custody of the Office
of the Historian, U.S. Army Edgewood Arsenal (formerly U.S. Army
Chemical Corps Historical Office), and will be transferred to official
archives.
Office of Military Archives, National Archives and Records Service—
Files of Operations Division and G-4 Division, WDGS; files of Army
Service Forces; overseas unit and organization historical files. File
number citations for WDGS records are prefixed by the abbreviated
designation of the specific staff division; those for Army Service Forces
by the letters, SOS or ASF. Although the War Department Adjutant
General's Office was a part of the ASF organization, references to the
files for that office are cited with the prefix AG. Overseas unit and
organization historical files are not arranged by the normal Army
decimal file system, but are cited by the abbreviated unit or organiza-
tion designation.
Kansas City Records Center—Unit and organization administrative,
decimal files. These records are identified in citations by abbreviated
unit or organization designation and the decimal file number. They
can be distinguished from unit and organization historical files in
Office of Military Archives, National Archives, by the presence of the
decimal file number. Several forays were made into the Kansas City
collection; the most notable find there were the records of the Chemical
Section, Headquarters, North African-Mediterranean Theater of
Operations.
Archives of the Air University—Army Air Forces unit and organi-
zation records, including administrative, decimal files, and draft his-
tories. Citation is in the same form as those for ground, service, and
headquarters organizations and units.
The Marine Corps Archives—Marine Corps unit and organization
reports. Citation is in same form as Air Forces and ground units and
organizations.
A number of monographs, studies, technical reports, draft histories,
and published histories proved to be invaluable for background ma-
terial, for basic information, and for clues to the location of archival
sources. Some of these monographs and studies were prepared by the
U.S. Army Chemical Corps Historical Office and are now available
in the Office, Chief of Military History. Among these, particular note
should be made of the World War II series, especially Dr. Paul W.
Pritchard's Smoke Generator Operations in Mediterranean and Euro-
pean Theaters of Operations (Study No. 1); History of German
Chemical Warfare in World War II, Part I, Military Aspects, by
Generalleutnant Herman Ochsner (Study No. 2); and Lt. Col. Leonard
L. McKinney's two studies, Portable Flame Thrower Operations in
World War II (Study No. 4) and Mechanized Flame Thrower Oper-
ations in World War II (Study No. 5). Particularly useful among the
draft or partially completed Chemical Corps studies are: Paul W.
Pritchard, Ben R. Baldwin, and Alfred J. Bingham, Readiness for Gas
Warfare in Theaters of Operations, and Ben R. Baldwin, Operational
History of the Chemical Battalions and the 4.2-inch Mortar in World
War II, Parts I and II, the Sicilian and Italian campaigns. Rexmond C.
Cochrane's series of monographs on gas warfare in World War I were
also used.
The Office, Chief of Military History, provided several other groups
of studies and histories. The Army Service Forces monographs on
logistical problems were of great assistance as was the History of Allied
Force Headquarters. The histories and after action reports of a
number of organizations and units from army groups to chemical
mortar battalions and even service units were extensively used. In the
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 661
group was also the Logistical History of the North African Theater
of Operations-Mediterranean Theater of Operations. The unpub-
lished group included draft histories of communications zone, base
section, and base organization, especially for the North African-Medi-
terranean theater and the Southwest Pacific area. The prize of the
unpublished group, from the CWS point of view, is the History of the
Chemical Section, U.S. Army Forces Middle Pacific and Predecessor
Commands. This history provides considerably more information on
that area than does any other source, and, except for gaps in treating
preparedness, it is amazingly comprehensive.
The CWS technical reports, along with many evaluations of muni-
tions and plans, both for the United States and its Allies, were deposited
in the Technical Library, Army Chemical Center, Md., and have been
identified and described in From Laboratory to Field.1 The best World
War I source, pending the preparation of an official volume on gas
warfare in World War I, is the draft History of the Chemical Warfare
Service, American Expeditionary Forces. Copies of this study are
available in the Technical Library and in the Office of the Historian,
U.S. Army Edgewood Arsenal. Finally, as regards monographs and
studies, special note should be made of the excellent Marine Corps series
on operations in the Pacific. Also worthy of special note is the American
Forces in Action series, which has been useful although documented
and more complete accounts have in most instances appeared in the
series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. The volumes
published in this series have proved invaluable, and the following have
been particularly important:
Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugelar, and John
Stevens, Okinawa: The Last Battle (Washington, 1948).
Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit (Washington, 1961).
Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, The Transportation Corps:
Operations Overseas (Washington, 1957).
Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division
(Washington, 1951).
Philip A. Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas (Washington, 1960).
———— and Edmund G. Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls
(Washington, 1955).
1
Brophy, Miles, Cochrane, From Laboratory to Field, pp. 455-58.
Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack (Washington, 1951).

George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the
West (Washington, 1957).
Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and
Strategy, 1940-1943 (Washington, 1955).
Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign (Washington,
1963).
Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coali-
tion War fare, 1942-1943 (Washington, 1953).
Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-
1944 (Washington, 1959).
John Miller, jr., CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul (Wash-
ington, 1959).
————, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive (Washington, 1949).
John D. Millett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service
Forces (Washington, 1954).
Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua (Washington, 1957).
Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines (Washington, 1953).
Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington, 1954).
Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I
(Washington, 1953).
————, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II (Washington,
1959).
Robert Ross Smith, The Approach to the Philippines (Washington,
1953).
————, Triumph in the Philippines (Washington, 1963).
Alvin P. Stauffer, The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War
Against Japan (Washington, 1956).
In addition to these published works, the authors also consulted
Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, Global Logistics and
Strategy, 1944—1945, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED
STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
Other secondary works consulted were:
Horatio Bond, ed., Fire and the Air War (Boston: National Fire
Protection Assn., 1951).
General Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New York: Henry
Holt and Company, Inc., 1951).
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 663
Wesley Frank Craven and James L. Cate, eds., "The Army Air
Forces in World War II," especially vol. II, Europe: TORCH to
POINT BLANK, August 1942 to December 1943 (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1949); vol. III, Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E
Day, January 1944 to May 1945 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1951); vol. V, The Pacific: MATTERHORN to Nagasaki,
June 1944 to August 1945 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1953).
General Walter Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon (Washing-
ton: Combat Forces Press, 1953).
Harold Riegelman, Caves of Biak (New York: Dial, 1955).
C. H. Foulkes, "Gas!" The Story of the Special Brigade (Edinburgh
and London: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1934).
Amos A. Fries and Clarence J. West, Chemical Warfare (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1921).
Rudolph Hanslian et al., Der Chemische Krieg (3d ed., Berlin:
Mittler, 1939).
Victor Lefebure, The Riddle of the Rhine (New York: The Chem-
ical Foundation, 1923).
Alden H. Waitt, Gas Warfare (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce,
1942).
Henri le Wita, Autour de la Guerre Chimique (Paris: Tallandier,
1928).
The authors, with the assistance of other members of the U.S. Army
Chemical Corps Historical Office staff, interviewed or corresponded
with as many overseas CWS officers as could be contacted. While the
quality of these interviews varied greatly from individual to individual,
most were very helpful. Those which have been cited, and many others
used to provide general background material, are presently filed in the
Office of the Historian, U.S. Army Edgewood Arsenal. Copies will be
included in the permanent historical files when those files are trans-
ferred to official archives.
List of Abbreviations
AA Antiaircraft
AAR After action report
ACCWS Assistant Chief, Chemical War Service
ACmlC Army Chemical Center
ACofS Assistant Chief of Staff
ADSEC Advance Section, Communications Zone
ADSOS Advance Services of Supply
Adv Advance
AEAF Allied Expeditionary Air Forces
AEF American Expeditionary Forces
AF Air Force
AFHQ Allied Force Headquarters
AFMIDPAC U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific
AFPAC U.S. Army Forces, Pacific
AFSC Air Force Service Command
AG Adjutant General
AGF Army Ground Forces
AGWAR Adjutant General, War Department
Amphib Amphibian; amphibious
AO Air officer
ASC Air Support Command
ASF Army Service Forces
ASP Ammunition supply point
BADA Base Air Depot Area
BAR Browning automatic rifle
Bomb Bombardment
BW Biological warfare
ca. circa
CCWS Chief, Chemical Warfare Service
CENPAC Central Pacific Area
CG Commanding general
CinC Commander in Chief
CINCPAC Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCSWPA Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area
CCmlO Chief chemical officer
CM-IN Classified message, incoming
Cml Chemical
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 665
CmlC Chemical Corps

CMLHO Chemical Corps Historical Office
CmlO Chemical officer
CM-OUT Classified message, outgoing
CPBS Central Pacific Base Command
CO Commanding officer
Co Company
CofOrd Chief of Ordnance
CofS Chief of Staff
CofT Chief of Transportation
Comdr Commander
COMINCH Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet
COMZ Communications Zone
CONAD Continental Advance Section
Contl Control
Corresp Correspondence
COSSAC Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander
CP Command post
CPBC Central Pacific Base Command
CTF Center Task Force
CWS Chemical Warfare Service
CWSO Chemical Warfare Service Officer
CWTC Chemical Warfare Technical Committee
DA Department of the Army
DANC Decontaminating agent, noncorrosive
DCCWS Deputy Chief, Chemical Warfare Service
DF Disposition form
Dir Director
Dist District
Distr Distribution
EBS Eastern Base Section
EEIST Enemy equipment intelligence service team
ETO European Theater of Operations
ETOUSA European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army
ExO Executive officer
FEC French Expeditionary Corps
FECOMZ Forward Echelon, Communications Zone
FETU Far Eastern Technical Unit
FM Field manual
FS CWS symbol for a solution of sulphur trioxide in Chlorosulfonic
acid, a smoke mixture
FUSA First U.S. Army
FUSAG First U.S. Army Group

G-1 Personnel section of divisional or higher staff
G-2 Intelligence section of divisional or higher staff
G-3 Operations section of divisional or higher staff
G-4 Supply section of divisional or higher staff
GHQ General Headquarters
GO General Orders
Gp Group
HC Symbol for hexachlorethane, a smoke mixture
HE High explosive
Hist Historical
Hq Headquarters
Incl Inclosure
Ind Indorsement
Instr Instruction
Intell Intelligence
Interv Interview
IOM Interoffice memo
Lab Laboratory
LCI Landing craft, infantry
LCI (A) Landing craft, infantry (ammunition)
LCM Landing craft, mechanized
LCT Landing craft, tank
LCVP Landing craft, vehicle and personnel
Lib Library
LST Landing ship, tank
LVT Landing vehicle, tracked
LVT (4) Landing vehicle, tracked, unarmored
Maint Maintenance
MBS Mediterranean Base Section
Mil Military
Min Minutes
MPR Monthly progress report
MSR Material status report
MTOUSA Mediterranean Theater of Operations, U.S. Army
NATO North African Theater of Operations
NATOUSA North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army
NCO Noncommissioned officer
NDRC Nation Defense Research Committee
NYPE New York Port of Embarkation
OCCWS Office of the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service
OCS Officer candidate school
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 667
Off Office
OP Observation post
OPD Operations Division
Opn Operation
Ord Ordnance
Orgn Organization
OSRD Office of Scientific Research and Development
PBS Peninsular Base Section
PCD Panama Canal Department
Per Periodic
Pers Personal; Personnel
Phila Philadelphia
POA Pacific Ocean Areas
POW Prisoner of war
PROCO Projects for continental operation
Proj Project
PT Patrol boat, motor torpedo boat
RAF Royal Air Force
Red Record
RCT Regimental combat team
Rpt Report
Rqmts Requirements
S-3 Operations officer or section of regimental or lower staff
Sec Section
Serv Service
SG Smoke generator
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
SOLOC Southern Line of Communications
SOPAC South Pacific Area
SPBC South Pacific Base Command
SPOBS Special Observer Group
SOS Services of Supply
Sup Supply
SWPA Southwest Pacific Area
T/A Table of allowances
TAG The Adjutant General
TBA Table of basic allowances
TDMR Technical Division Memo Report
Tech Technical
TF Task Force
TM Technical manual
Tng Training
TOE Table of organization and equipment

TofO Theater of Operations
TUSA Third U.S. Army
UGNCO Unit gas noncommissioned officer
UGO Unit gas officer
USAFBI U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles
USAFFE U.S. Army Forces in the Far East
USAFIA U.S. Army Forces in Australia
USAFICPA U.S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area
USAFISPA U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area
USAFMIDPAC U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific
USAFPOA U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas
USAR U.S. Army Reserve
USATC U.S. Assault Training Center
USASOS U.S. Army Services of Supply
USCWC U.S. Chemical Warfare Committee
USFET U.S. Forces in the European Theater
USSBS U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey
USSTAF U.S. Strategic Air Forces
VLR Very long range
WD War Department
WDGS War Department General Staff
WP White phosphorus
WPD War Plans Division
WTF Western Task Force
ZI Zone of interior
Code Names
ALAMO Force Code for U.S. Sixth Army while operating as a special ground
task force headquarters directly under GHQ SWPA.
ANVIL Early plan for invasion of southern France.
AVALANCHE Invasion of Italy at Salerno.
BACKHANDER Task force for operations on Cape Gloucester, New Britain.
BLACKSTONE Unit of Western Task Force which landed at Safi, French
Morocco.
BOLERO Build-up of U.S. forces and supplies in United Kingdom for
cross-Channel attack.
COBRA U.S. First Army operation designated to penetrate the German
defenses west of St. Lo and secure Coutances, France.
DRAGOON The plan for the Allied invasion of southern France, code name
that replaced ANVIL.
FLINTLOCK The Marshall Islands operations.
FORAGER Operations for the capture of the Mariana Islands.
HORLICKS Allied operation against Biak Island, 27 May-30 August 1944.
HURRICANE Assault force for Biak, New Guinea.
HUSKY Allied invasion of Sicily, July 1943.
ICEBERG Invasion of the Ryukyu Islands.
MAPLE Base Port Moresby.
OLYMPIC Plan for March 1946 invasion of Kyushu, Japan.
OMAHA Normandy beach assaulted by troops of U.S. V Corps, 6 June
1944.
OVERLORD Allied cross-Channel invasion of northwest Europe, June 1944.
PERSECUTION Assault force for Aitape operations, New Guinea.
PLUM Code name for the Philippines.
QUEEN 12th Army Group operation on Roer Plain between Wurm and
Roer Rivers.
RAINBOW Various plans prepared between 1939 and 1941 to meet Axis
aggression involving more than one enemy.
RAINCOAT Assault on Camino hill mass, Italy.
RECKLESS Assault force for Hollandia operation.
ROUNDUP The name by which plans for cross-Channel invasion were known
until the summer of 1943.
SHINGLE Amphibious operation at Anzio, Italy.

TORCH The Allied invasion operation in North Africa, November 1942.
TRADEWIND Task force for Morotai.
UTAH The Normandy beach assaulted by the U.S. VII Corps on 6
June 1944.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War Department
Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations
Washington Command Post: The Operations Division
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944
Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940-1943
Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945
The Army and Economic Mobilization
The Army and Industrial Manpower
The Army Ground Forces
The Organization of Ground Combat Troops
The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops
The Army Service Forces
The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces
The Western Hemisphere
The Framework of Hemisphere Defense
Guarding the United States and Its Outposts
The War in the Pacific
The Fall of the Philippines
Guadalcanal: The First Offensive
Victory in Papua
CARTWHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul
Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls
Campaign in the Marianas
The Approach to the Philippines
Leyte: The Return to the Philippines
Triumph in the Philippines
Okinawa: The Last Battle
Strategy and Command: The First Two Years
The Mediterranean Theater of Operations
Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West
Sicily and the Surrender of Italy
Salerno to Cassino
Cassino to the Alps
The European Theater of Operations
Cross-Channel Attack
Breakout and Pursuit
The Lorraine Campaign
The Siegfried Line Campaign
The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge
The Last Offensive
The Supreme Command
Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I
Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II
The Middle East Theater
The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia
The China-Burma-India Theater
Stilwell's Mission to China
Stilwell's Command Problems
Time Runs Out in CBI
The Technical Services
The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War
The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field
The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat
The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment
The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan
The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Germany
The Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United States
The Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of Interior
The Medical Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor
Theaters
The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War
The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply
The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront
The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume I
The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume H
The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Japan
The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany
The Signal Corps: The Emergency
The Signal Corps: The Test
The Signal Corps: The Outcome
The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and Operations
The Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply
The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas
Special Studies
Chronology: 1941-1945
Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945
Rearming the French
Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt
The Women's Army Corps
Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors
Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces
The Employment of Negro Troops
Manhattan: The U.S. Army and the Atomic Bomb
Pictorial Record
The War Against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas
The War Against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas
The War Against Japan
Index
Aachen, 472-73, 475, 476, 489, 607 Allied Airborne Army, First, 390
Abaneta Farm, 448-49 Allied Expeditionary Air Forces (AEAF), 67
Abyssinian war, 534 Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), 41, 86-88, 90, 97,
Acetylene tetrachloride, 247, 248, 305 99, 102-04, 116, 118-21, 135, 196, 219, 282, 340,
Acker, Col. Lewis F., 37, 102 605, 648. See also Shadle, Brig. Gen. Charles S.
Adelaide, 190 Alligators, 376, 391, 491
Admiralties, the, 315, 550 American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), 4, 16—19, 21—24,
Admiralty Fuel Experimental Station, 323 26
Advance Section, Communications Zone (ADSEC), 64, American School Center, Shrivenham, 42, 43, 64
65, 69, 71, 164, 175, 177, 178, 179, 185, 256 American Special Observer Group (SPOBS), 36
Aerial incendiaries, 614, 648. See also Bombs; Fire bombs; Amphibious Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 402, 408, 409
Incendiary bombs. Amphibious Groups
Aerial observation, 369, 390 2, 532
Agno River, 528-29 3, 526
Air Force Service Commands 6, 526
V, 206,416 Amphibious Smoke Committee, Navy, 408—10
VIII, 42, 153, 157, 318 Amphibious training centers, 409, 424, 462, 520
IX, 159 Anderson, Maj. Leland E., 522, 523
XII, 96, 98, 106, 130 Andes, Lt. Col. James O., 204.
Air Forces Andrews, Lt. Gen. Frank M., 49, 55, 325
Fifth, 190n, 202, 206, 216, 414, 416, 513, 634 Angaur Island, 516, 517, 524
Seventh, 229 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 160
Eighth, 37, 38, 42, 56, 57, 62, 141, 149-58, 160, 161,
Antiaircraft Artillery Brigades
354,618n, 619-24, 626 627
12th, 332n
Ninth, 64, 67, 154, 158, 159, 161
49th, 356
Twelfth, 43, 89, 96, 97n, 98, 107, 115, 116, 121, 130,
Antiaircraft Artillery Group, 19th, 374
161
Thirteenth, 216 Antiaircraft Command, 14th, 398
Fourteenth, 633 Antiaircraft defenses, 322, 335, 338, 350, 401, 405, 407,
Twentieth, 401n, 625 410
Airborne Divisions Antidim sticks, 283
11th, 571 Antipolo, 507
82d, 429, 466 Antwerp, 360n
Airborne operations, 390, 391, 411-17, 453-55 ANVIL, 340
Aircraft Anzio, 128, 299, 333, 336-40, 342, 350, 399, 406, 443,
A-20's, 412-15, 635 445-48,452, 594
B-17's, 621 Aparri, 416, 513
B-25's, 412,415-17, 508 Aprillo, 446
B-29's, 401, 579, 625-28, 630, 656 Arawe-Cape Gloucester—Saidor offensive, 260
C-47's, 412,415,417 Ardennes counteroffensive, 74, 77, 184, 275, 299, 372,
P-38's, 632 373, 4 5 5 , 480-82, 484, 632
liaison, 369-70, 390, 513 Argonne, 4
smoke screen laying, 206, 405, 407, 409, 412-17, 508 Armies
Airplane smoke tanks. See Smoke tanks. First (World War I), 653
Aitape, 498 First, 67, 69, 70, 71, 73, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81n, 164, 174-
ALAMO Force, 256-57, 259-60 75, 177, 179, 183, 292, 303, 355, 360, 373, 377, 378,
Alban Hills, 447 381, 382, 389, 393, 466, 472-73, 479, 481, 483,
Alexander, General Sir Harold R. L. G., 328 487-89, 596, 603, 606-07, 610, 612
Algiers, 93n, 103, 327-29 Third, 67, 69, 71, 76, 78-80, 164, 179, 361-62, 371-
Aliamanu Crater, 220 72, 381, 383-84, 393, 474, 480, 484, 486n, 596-97,
Allied Air Forces, 202 604, 606, 610
Armies—Continued Audouville-la-Hubert, 177

Fifth, 100, 102, 122, 124, 128-29, 133, 282, 290, 298, Australia, 35, 192, 193, 201, 207, 236-37, 239, 240, 244-
332, 334, 336, 346, 350, 421, 424-25, 432, 433, 46, 253, 254, 256, 260, 293-94, 394, 397, 548, 642
435-37, 439-43, 445, 450, 452-53, 455-57, 593-95, Australian Antigas School, 195
640 Australian Army, 203, 216, 284, 412
Sixth, 200n, 201, 211-13, 251, 256-58, 260-65, 310, Australian Chemical Warfare Experimental Station, 207
313-15, 317, 398-400, 403, 407, 497, 499, 502, 505, Australian Division, 7th, 412
546-49, 568-72, 574, 576, 590-91, 635 Avranches, 471
Seventh, 76, 80, 109-10, 109n, 127, 133, 282, 289, Azato, 587
292, 299, 301, 340, 342, 359-60, 381, 386, 387,
393, 425, 431-32, 453, 455, 479-80, 483, 488, 593, Bagnoli, 312-13, 330-31
602, 604, 611, 640 Baguio, 513, 577
Eighth, 211-12, 403, 505 Baker, Newton D., 24, 25
Ninth, 76, 80, 359, 373, 373n, 375, 377-78, 381, 389, Baker, Maj. Gen. Walter C., 322
390, 390n, 391, 489, 609, 610-11 Balete Pass, 577
Tenth, 234n, 273, 275, 402, 519, 532-33, 568, 584, Bamboe Peninsula, 493
589 Bari, 122
Armored amphibian tractors. See LVT (4)'s. Barker, Col. Maurice E., 91, 93, 95, 96, 99, 100, 102,
Armored Divisions 104, 124, 129, 133, 134, 256, 282, 301, 331n, 332n,
1st, 452 421, 434, 439, 640, 641
2d, 429 Barnes, Col. Jack A., 378, 378n
7th, 361 Barnes, Brig. Gen. Julian F., 189
9th, 381 Barnham, 153
10th, 371, 476 Barrows, Maj. John, 401
14th, 80, 611 Barry, 147
Armored Force Board, 605 Barta, Col. Edward J., 81n
Armored Group, 13th, 576 Bartlett, Lt. Col. John L., 213
Army Air Corps Tactical School, 28, 28n, 616 Base Air Depot Area, 159
Army Air Forces (AAF), 67, 69, 87, 115, 149, 161, 168, Base E, Lae, 397
238, 278, 282, 284, 285, 317, 322-23, 338, 616, 618, Base F, Finschhafen, 314
622, 625, 635, 647, 649 Base Section 3, USAFIA, 203, 284, 293
Army Ground Forces (AGF), 87, 141, 420, 431 Base sections, 51, 61, 75, 76, 94, 101-03, 106, 110n,
Army Groups 112, 116, 118, 123, 124, 141, 179-80, 190, 193, 256,
1st, 64, 65, 67, 69, 183 257, 261
6th, 76, 455, 480, 483, 485n, 608 Bastogne, 481
12th, 71, 76, 78, 79, 156n, 179, 181, 183, 184, 185,Bataan, 188, 315, 422
303, 304, 354n, 389, 466, 470, 472, 480, 483, 484, Batlin, Lt. Col. Alexander, 498
485n, 607-08, 610, 646 Batte, Lt. Col. James H., 222, 464, 468, 469, 477, 478
15th, 350 Battle of the Bulge. See Ardennes counteroffensive.
Army Service Forces (ASF), 32, 33, 38, 49, 50, 53, 57, Baum, Col. Harold J., 62, 67, 162, 621
61, 87, 89, 91, 101, 106, 113, 129, 134, 142, 168- Bay of Baiae, 330
73, 239, 638-39. See also Services of Supply (SOS). Becque, Maj. John H., 220
Arnaville, 362-71 Belfort, 455
Arno River, 333, 334, 456 Bell, Lt. Col. Edgar V. H., 485n
Arnold, General Henry H., 618n, 625, 626 Bell, Col. Robert P., 363
Arras, 13 Belvedere Hill, 442
Arthur, Lt. Col. Frank M., 196, 198, 204, 213, 249, 250, Benevento, 435
400, 501, 570 Benner, Col. Ralph C, 212, 545
Artillery shell, toxic, 3, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 34, 107, Berdorf, 485
240, 269, 283 Berlin, incendiary attack on, 622
Arundel Island, 493-94, 496 Betio Island, 554
Ashchurch, 138, 145 Biak, 214, 400n, 415, 499-502, 552, 570
Assan Point, 562 Bilicke, Lt. Col. Albert C, 64
Atchison, Lt. Col. Joseph E., 516, 530 Bingen, 383, 385
Atkinson, Maj. Earle J., 18 Biological warfare, 26, 53, 75, 84, 119, 227, 232-34
Atlantic Base Section, 99, 100, 112, 113, 115, 289 Birmingham, 323
Auburn, USS, 409 Bitche, 455, 602
INDEX 677
Bizerte, 311, 328-29, 406 Brittany, 597

Blackburn, Lt. Col. Chester O., 54, 62 Brittany Base Section, 75n
Blackstone Subtask Force, 91 Brixham, 356
Blaze bomb, 630 Brody, Maj. Richard T., 206, 206n, 207
Bleach, 107, 130, 188, 221, 236, 243-44, 246-47, 267 Brown, Capt. George W., 174
Block Burner, 158, 622 Buckner, Lt. Gen. Simon B., 402
Blohm, Lt. Willard H., 220 Buderich, 389
Blythe Colour Works, 166 Bullene, Brig. Gen. Egbert F., 219, 483-84
Boggs, 1st Lt. Stanley, 303 Buna, 199, 498, 543-45, 545n, 546, 549, 656
BOLERO, 90, 90n, 140, 140n, 142-43, 147, 163, 170 Bureau of Mines, 24n
Bollendorf, 486 Burke, Maj. Carl V., 192, 193, 194, 203, 205, 211
Bologna, 351, 353 Burkitt, Lt. Col. Joel L., 204
Bomb fuzes, 157, 285. See also Fuzes. Burma, 633, 634
Bombardment Division, 1st, 157 Burn, Col. Walter P., 89, 96, 97, 346
Bomber Commands Burns, Col. John R., 211, 212, 403
VIII, 42, 157, 618n, 621 Burtonwood, 621
IX, 633
XX, 625 Cabaruan Hills, 510, 512, 515
XXI, 401, 401n, 625-28, 628n, 630, 648 Cagayan River valley, 416
Bombs, 4, 11, 150-52, 154, 155, 240, 253, 269, 307, 475,Cairo (Italy), 448
623, 626, 632. See also Blaze bomb; Bomb fuzes; Caldwell, Lt. Col. R. Beverly, 227, 233
Fire bombs; Incendiary bombs. Calore River, 433, 435
Bône, 289 Camalaniugan airstrip, 416
Bonin Islands, 191 Camouflage, 134n, 282, 284, 285, 633
Bonn, 381, 382 Camp Bowie, 300, 303
Boothby, Capt. Walter M., 17, 18 Camp Doomben, 306
Boppard, 385 Camp Edwards, 326, 520
Bougainville, 494-97, 540-43, 569 Camp Gordon Johnston, 424, 462, 520
Boyles, Lt. Col. Samuel J., 81n Camp Sibert, 306, 311, 313, 326
Bradley, Maj. Ingalls S., 47, 64, 175, 177 Campofelice, 301
Bradley, General Omar N., 69, 76, 183, 425n, 459-60, Canadian Army, First, 373
608, 609, 656 Canadian forces, 438n, 609
Bramlet, Col. Hubert B., 65, 73, 75n
Canham, Brig. Gen. Charles D. W., 378
Breakneck Ridge, 502
Cap de la Hague, 466
Breaks, Lt. Col. Robert W., 424
Bren gun carrier, 287 Cape Cretin, 313, 316
Brest, 597-99, 609 Cape Gloucester, 316, 550
Brett, Lt. Gen. George H., 190, 238 Capua arsenal, 129-30, 290-92, 438
Bridges and bridging. See Smoke screen operations, bridges Caribbean Defense Command, 325
and bridging sites. Carmen, 514
Brisbane, 189, 190, 191n, 193, 194, 200, 203, 210, 212n, Carocetta, 446
284, 293, 306-07, 395, 546, 548 Casablanca, 95, 97, 100, 301, 326, 327
Bristol, 138, 146
Casablanca Conference, 48, 143
British Expeditionary Forces (WWI), 8, 15
Casandrino, 290
British forces, 119, 123, 327-29, 348, 449, 453, 609,
Cassidy, 1st Lt. James W., 174
619, 653
British units. See also Royal Air Force; Royal Navy. Cassino, 442-43, 448-50, 594
Antiaircraft Brigade, 45th, 332 Castle Hill, 448
Armoured Regiment, 141st, 609 Casualties, Allied
Army, Second, 389, 390 flame thrower operators, 540, 571, 581-82
Army, Eighth, 351, 450 premature mortar bursts, 457, 484, 497, 503
Army Group, 21, 76, 81, 3 5 5 , 389, 489, 609 World War I gas attacks, 5, 5n, 14
Commandos, 432-34, 458 Casualties, Axis
Corps, 10, 334, 432-35, 438, 443 from flame throwers, 562, 589
Crocodile squadrons, 609 Hamburg raids and fire storm, 619, 619n
(SM) Company, 807th, 331 Tokyo raids, 629
Special Brigade (WWI), 12, 15, 16 World War I gas attacks, 5
Catmon Hill, 503-04, 525 Chemical Depot Companies—Continued
Cavalry Brigade, 2d, 550 8th, 286, 296-97
Cavalry Division, 1st, 315, 502, 506, 507, 550, 572 9th, 147
Cavalry regiments 60th, 147, 174
7th, 507 61st, 147
8th, 507 62d, 194, 241, 293, 306
112th RCT, 547 63d, 116n, 301
Caves, 400n, 500, 513, 517. See also Flame throwers, 64th, 147
against Japanese defenses. 65th, 147, 178
Center Task Force (CTF), 89, 92, 93, 93n, 142, 326 412th, 241
Central Pacific Area (CENPAC), 191, 203, 220, 231,Chemical Depot Companies (Aviation)
234, 268-70, 286, 516, 560, 639 751st, 116n
Central Pacific Base Command (CPBS), 227, 230, 233, 753d, 116n
269, 273 754th, 318
Cerasuolo, 441 758th, 116n
Cesari, S/Sgt. Robert J., 378-79 761st, 147
Chamberlain, Capt. N. F., 408, 410, 411 763d, 319
Chamier, Lt. Col. G. des C, 120 Chemical Detachment, 1st Provisional'POA, 274
Chapman, Maj. James R., 448 Chemical Detachment, 411th, 274
Chapman, 1st Lt. Rubert D. 220 Chemical general service companies, 293—95
Charron, Col. Roy C., 65, 177, 179 Chemical impregnating companies, 92, 245, 277
Charters Towers, 240 Chemical Impregnating Company, 51st, 138, 145
Chatan, 517 Chemical Laboratory Companies, 70, 123, 206, 277, 279,
Cheltenham, 40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 47, 51, 54, 55, 58, 59, 280-88
60, 64, 65, 73 1st, 282
Chemical air depot companies, 317 3d, 189, 193, 236, 283-84
Chemical air operations companies, 161, 162, 191, 317,41st, 116n, 282-83, 313
319, 319n, 320 42d, 192, 193, 205, 231, 283-86, 293, 394-95, 400
Chemical air service companies, 116, 245, 278, 317 43d, 286-88, 297, 564
Chemical Base Depot Companies, 278 45th, 281
9th, 178 Chemical land mines, 91, 238, 240, 267
66th, 178 Chemical Maintenance Companies, 70, 131, 146n, 166,
Chemical Battalion, 1st Separate, 220, 296, 421 177, 182, 277, 278, 288-95, 317, 479-80, 480n
Chemical Company, Air Operations, 875th, 116n 10th, 194, 241, 262, 292-95, 546, 548
Chemical Composite Companies, 92, 245, 278, 280, 308- 11th, 116n, 480n
09, 309n, 310-17, 319 12th, 116n, 133, 289-92, 301, 438
92d, 116n, 311-13 14th, 597
94th, 310n, 570 20th, 296
240th, 313-17 57th, 376
Chemical Composite Platoons 711th, 178
272d, 310n Chemical mortar, 4.2-inch, 110, 134, 267, 279, 288, 420,
273d, 310n 437, 457-58, 515
274th, 310n against armor, 426-27, 428n, 512, 512n
275th, 310n against Japanese cave positions, 400n, 500
Chemical Decontamination Companies, 70, 92, 93, 172, ammunition for, 34, 84, 107, 128-30, 133-34, 137,
277, 279, 294, 300-304, 356-57 155, 175, 180-81, 213, 269, 275-76, 310, 428n,
21st, 93n, 116n, 300-303, 342, 542n, 343, 344 433, 434, 435, 440, 447-48, 451, 455, 457, 465-66,
24th, 116n, 328n, 331, 335, 336, 350 473, 475, 477, 481, 486-87, 489, 495, 503, 508,
25th, 116n, 328n 509, 510, 510n, 513, 519-20, 528, 532
29th, 273 artillery support mission, 420, 420n, 465, 471—72, 477,
30th, 70, 173-74, 356, 357 482, 494, 495, 499, 500, 503, 646
31st, 302-04, 356, 357 breakage and maintenance problems, 133-34, 182, 432,
33d, 174, 356 434, 439, 446, 473, 475-80, 480n, 491, 496-97,
Chemical Depot Companies, 70, 79, 92, 147, 277, 279, 504, 513, 521, 532
294-99, 317, 319 carts, 426, 430, 480, 498
6th, 93, 93n, 98, 138, 145, 297-99 communications problems, 435—36, 439, 448—52, 485,
7th, 146, 178 487, 495, 511, 514
INDEX 679
Chemical mortar, 4.2-inch—Continued Chemical Mortar Battalions—Continued
defective shell, 133, 134, 180-81, 457, 482-84, 497, 83d, 422, 424-26, 429, 432-34, 437-38, 445-48, 452-
500, 509, 519-20 56, 480n
demonstrations of, 425, 497, 520 84th, 345-46, 422, 424, 425, 432, 433, 435-38, 440,
field commanders reaction to, 421-22, 425n, 429, 458, 445-48, 452, 455-57
494 85th, 315, 423, 502-03, 505-07, 513, 514, 514n, 515
gas-delivering capacity, 418 86th, 423, 461-62, 466-67, 469, 478, 481
high-explosive mission, 26, 207, 418, 420, 492, 520, 87th, 292, 305, 379, 380, 423, 461-62, 464-66, 472-
646 73, 477, 478, 482, 487-88, 488n, 489
infantry support, 430, 449, 477, 495-96, 499, 500, 88th 275n, 423, 502-04, 516-17, 519, 522
503, 504, 506-07, 515, 518-19 89th, 389, 390, 485n, 489-91
Japanese fear of, 494—96 90th, 485n
jungle warfare problems, 494—97 91st, 482, 484-85, 485n, 486-87
on landing craft, 232, 425-26, 492, 500, 520-21, 533. 92d, 374, 375, 461-62, 467-68, 470, 471-72, 480n,
See also Mortar boats, 482, 489n,
limitations, 453, 471-72, 500, 504 93d, 389, 485n
M2 sight, 431, 507 94th, 485n
M3 shell, 275, 457, 483 95th, 485n
M4 shell, 275, 520 96th, 292, 485n
on M7 half-track, 439-40 97th, 485n
modified from Stokes mortar, 3—4, 418 98th, 461n, 499, 500, 502, 505, 510-15, 529
propellants, 290, 431, 435, 438, 439, 497,500 99th, 292, 456, 461n, 480n
range and accuracy of, 427, 430-31, 434, 435, 439, 100th, 456-57, 461n
440, 477-78, 493, 500, 507, 513, 518, 525 Chemical Mortar Companies, 422, 481
rapid firing problems, 437, 491, 496 glider operations, 453—55
in Sicily Campaign, 418 91st, 404, 502, 504, 516-19, 522
sites and emplacements, 464, 496, 506 189th, 516, 530
smoke mission of, 337, 345-46, 380, 400, 418, 509, 520 Chemical officers, 266
spare parts, 168-69, 178-79, 182, 275, 288-92, 478- base sections, 73, 75-76, 256, 261, 641
79, 479n field command, 81-84, 213-15
stock in 1941, 34, 267 liaison, 82, 100
support of armored team, 476—77 replacement of, 118, 468—70
tactical control of, 494-95, 500-501, 504, 505, 514 shortage of, 104, 207, 468
transportation problems, 426, 430, 436, 451, 452, 456, with task forces, 263, 265
456n, 493-94, 501-05 theater chief officers, 30, 35, 38, 43n, 45-46, 50-51,
Chemical mortar battalions, 70-72, 78—79, 81, 82, 127, 196, 232-33, 255-57, 637-38, 648—19
137, 265, 480, 484, 491, 646, 649 Chemical Processing Companies, 166—67, 252—53, 277,
employment of, 73-74, 429, 471, 499, 500, 514-15, 278, 279, 304-08
519 51st, 166
replacement problems, 468—70 52d, 116n
requirements for and allotment of, 70, 77, 107, 168, 53d, 116n
211-12, 229, 421-22, 422n, 423, 459-61, 497-98,
103d, 307-08
516
105th, 252, 305-07
tables of organization and equipment, 426, 430, 456,
109th, 305
460, 462, 470-71, 482, 506n
110th, 297
unit and manpower shortages, 218, 460—61, 515—16,
113th, 305
646
Chemical Mortar Battalions 120th, 305
Chemical Regiments
2d, 289, 345, 346, 422, 424, 4 2 5 , 426n, 427-29, 432,
433, 435, 437-39, 442-44, 448-53, 4 5 5 , 480n, 482 1st, 421
3d, 289, 343, 344, 346, 421, 422, 424, 425, 429, 436,2d, 421
440-41, 450-51, 453, 4 5 5 , 480, 480n, 520 Chemical service companies, 70, 279-80, 308-09, 308n
71st, 516 Chemical Service Companies (Aviation)
72d, 516 3d, 191
81st, 305, 372, 422, 460-64, 473-78 5th, 220
82d, 422, 493-96, 497n, 505-08, 515 Chemical Service Company, 62d, 307
Chemical Service Platoons, 310, 403 Chemical Warfare Service—Continued
236th, 317, 317n and chemical mortar, 418-21, 431, 471, 492, 520
237th, 317 and chemical mortar battalions, 420, 422—23, 459—60,
238th, 317 497
240th, 317 and chemical shell failures, 181
Chemical service units, 212, 229, 268, 274, 277-80, 314, and flame thrower, 534-35, 545, 558-59, 605-06, 646
643 gas and nongas missions, 636—37, 648—51, 657
Chemical Smoke Generator Battalions, 70, 229 GHQ concept, 28, 30
22d, 331, 359, 382, 387 and incendiary bomb program, 616—18, 647
23d, 355-57, 359, 382 logistics mission, 642—44
24th, 355, 356, 359 as a permanent service, 1920, 24—25, 27
25th, 355, 356, 359 pre-World War II missions, 25-26, 419
26th, 397 and redesignation as Chemical Corps, 652n, 657
27th, 359, 389, 390 smoke mission, 321—22, 644
28th, 402 Spare Parts Team, 129, 182, 479
68th, 402 supply and logistical compilations, 113—14
Chemical Smoke Generator Companies, 172, 325—27, 354— supply planning for TORCH, 90—92
55, 359-60, 363, 368, 392, 395, 399, 400 and theater CWS, 35, 56-57, 61, 100, 201, 203, 208,
67th, 402 637, 639—40
69th, 93n, 328, 387, 388 Chemical Warfare Service, AEF, 19, 21-24, 29, 38, 40,
70th, 397-99, 402 52
71st, 402 Chemical Warfare Service, ETOUSA, 40-62, 64-65,
74th, 373, 374, 389, 391, 491n 67-69, 72-85, 85n, 89-90, 104n, 105, 113-14, 123,
75th, 325 136-48, 152, 156, 163-73, 178-82, 185, 256, 482,
76th, 325 596, 638, 641
77th, 325 Chemical Warfare Service, National Army, 19, 22, 24
78th, 93n, 95, 327, 327n, 328, 387, 389 Chemical Warfare Service, NATOUSA/MTOUSA, 34-
79th, 355-57, 378, 381-82 35, 102-05, 114, 116, 118-20, 122-24, 127, 129,
80th, 3 5 5 , 357, 378, 381-82 130, 134, 135, 137, 178, 256, 430, 460, 640, 644
81st, 356, 383, 386 Chemical Warfare Technical Committee, 558
82d, 356 Chenard incendiary bomb, 615
83d, 373, 374, 376, 389, 390 Chengtu, 625
84th, 355-57, 362-71, 371n, 372, 372n, 383-85 Cherbourg, 178, 358, 465-66
85th, 356 Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander
86th, 356 (COSSAC), 59, 68
87th, 356 China, 624, 633
161st, 355, 357, 368, 371, 371n, 372, 383-85 China-Burma-India Theater, 216
162d, 383, 385-86 Chiunzi Pass, 434
163d, 331, 387 Chloracetophenone, 3
164th, 331 Chloride of lime. See Bleach.
165th, 356 Chlorine gas, 5, 9, 11
167th, 356 Chloropicrin, 13
168th, 328, 331, 387 Chlorosulfonic acid, 322n, 414n
170th, 397, 399, 402 Chonito Cliff, 562, 563
171st, 356 Christensen, Col. Christian O., 75n
172d, 328, 331, 332, 333, 334, 348, 350, 351, 450 Church, Lt. Col. James R., 17, 18
179th, 331-34, 336-37, 339, 350, 352 Cinderford, 146, 154
Chemical Training Battalion, 469 Cisterna, 447, 447n
Chemical Warfare Board, 324 Civil defense, 221, 224
Chemical Warfare General Service Company, 10th, 295 Civilian Conservation Corps, 221
Chemical Warfare Service. See also Porter, Maj. Gen.
Civitavecchia, 332, 350
William N.; Waitt, Brig. Gen. Alden H.
active strength, 1933—43, 26, 636 Clark, Lt. Gen. Mark W., 89, 129, 448
appropriations for, 26, 636—37 Clark Field, 187
and ASF/OPD controls, 32, 34, 61, 101, 106, 173, Clements, Maj. John O., 233
638 Clifton, M. Allegra, 222
BW research mission, 26 Clough, Lt. Col. Lyle A., 204
INDEX 681
Cobb, Col. John B., 81n Corps—Continued

Coblentz, Col. Siegfried P., 100, 110n, 113, 114, 115, XXIV, 274, 407, 502-03, 503n, 525, 533, 570, 576,
116, 124, 133, 134, 256, 331, 640, 641 584, 586, 588
COBRA, 467 Corregidor, 188-90
Colasion Point, 400 Corrosion problems, 293, 432, 497
Colleville sur Mer, 174 Corsica, 311
Collins, Maj. Gen. J. Lawton, 378 Cottingham, Lt. Col. Levin B., 81n, 363, 365-67, 367n,
Colmar, 292, 302, 455 369, 486, 486n
Cologne-Jülich highway, 375 Coughlan, Col. Joseph D., 67, 67n, 69, 71, 78, 175, 355
Columboola, 240, 307 Counter Intelligence Corps, 285
Combined Chiefs of Staff, 48, 111 Coventry, 323
Communications Zone (COMZ), ETO, 65, 67, 71, 73, Crawford, Maj. Robert W., 19
132, 162, 164, 177-80, 185, 638 Crawford, Lt. Col. Thomas B., 81n
Cone, Capt. Richard H., 197 Cresswell, 166
Containers, 151, 155, 162, 244, 246-48, 272, 293, 297, Crocodile tanks. See Flame thrower tanks, Crocodile.
320, 497, 500, 556 Croen, Maj. Herbert F., Jr., 89, 96, 99
Continental Advance Section (CONAD), 185-86, 292 Cummins, Maj. Tristram J., 414
Continental Base Command, 299 Cunin, Col. Kenneth A., 78, 78n, 81n, 378, 426
Copthorne, Col. William A., 215, 637, 650 Cunningham, Sgt. John J., 174
and administration of theater CWS, 203, 235, 639, 648 Cylinders, Gas, 3, 4n, 7, 8, 9, 13, 262, 293, 539, 546,
biography, 193 547, 550, 570
and chemical materiel supply, 193, 207, 238, 242, 2 4 3 ,
247, 251, 2 5 2 , 254, 259, 261-64 Dagami, 503-04, 571
chemical officer, USAFIA and USASOS, 189-94, 200- Daguitan River, 526
208, 210-12, 216, 218, 224, 234, 256, 258 Dagupan, 529
chief chemical officer, AFPAC, 219 Damortis, 510, 529
and field laboratories, 196-97, 206, 284-85 Danek, Lt. Col. Richard R., 213, 213n, 509
and flame thrower malfunction, 545—46 Darby, Col. William, 434, 445-46
and smoke generators, 394—96, 402-03, 408n Darra, 239-40
Corps Darwin, 190
I (World War I), 18 Dasman, Sgt. Raymond F., 198-200
I, 197, 198, 213, 214n, 400, 400n, 498, 499n, 501, Davidson, Lieutenant, 544—45
505, 505n, 507, 510, 512-13, 515, 529, 548, 548n, Day, Col. Alfred C, 65, 71, 76
573-74, 577 DDT, 319
I Armored, 109n Decontaminating agent, noncorrosive (DANC), 125, 236,
II, 89, 96, 97, 98, 298, 328, 346, 348, 350, 351, 429, 243, 244, 247-48, 267
438, 440-43, 445, 448-51, 457, 604 Decontaminating apparatus, 71, 75, 108, 171, 178, 236,
III, 378, 380, 382, 480 244, 248, 262, 271-73
IV, 350, 352, 353, 457 hand, 139, 182, 244, 267
V, 37, 70, 378, 462, 481, 597, 599 M3, 168
VI, 81n, 299, 334-37, 337n, 343, 345, 350, 432, 435, M3A1, 130, 132
437, 438, 440-41, 445, 447, 452-53, 594 M4, 132, 168
VII, 70, 356, 377-78, 380, 380n, 381, 382, 462, 464- power-driven, 107, 130-33, 168, 174, 175, 182, 244,
65, 467, 472, 487-88, 601 253, 271, 291, 300, 303, 310, 319, 643-44
VIII, 383, 385, 386, 386n, 609 Defandorf, Col. James H., 53, 54
X, 407, 502, 503, 570 Deimling, General von, 10n
XI, 213, 315, 399, 508, 509, 5 1 5 , 634 Delta Base Section, 129
XII, 80, 317n, 383-86, 484-86, 486n Demolitions, 426, 427, 549, 552, 555-57, 563, 579, 582,
XIII, 373-74, 389 600-601
XIV, 204, 213, 213n, 493-94, 5 0 5 , 5 0 5 n , 506-10, Depots, 61, 90, 95, 97-99, 137-38, 146-48, 154, 177-
515, 527, 538-39, 543, 576 78, 185, 185n, 288, 298, 301, 302, 313, 315-16,
XV, 80, 387, 489 318-19. See also Chemical depot companies; Dumps.
XVI, 389, 390, 489 Detection devices, 75, 139, 167, 244-45
XVIII, 81n Detector kit, M9, 282
XIX, 81n, 373-75, 389, 467, 472, 599 Devers, Lt. Gen. Jacob L., 455, 608
XX, 361, 366, 368, 371, 383, 386, 474, 599 Dichloroethyl sulfide. See Mustard gas.
XXI, 302 Dick Hills, 586
Digdig, 513 Engineer Shore Groups

Dijon, 292 36th, 542n
Dillingen, 371, 372, 372n 40th, 542n
Dimethyl phthalate, 308 540th, 542n
Diphenylchloroasine, 14, 14n Engineer Shore Regiment, 531st, 174, 298
Distinguished Service Cross, 518, 594n Engineer Special Brigades, 70, 356, 398
Dixon, Lt. Col. Gordon A., 456 2d, 400
Dodds, Col. Russell W., 81n 6th, 303
Doolittle, Capt. G. B., 511-12 Engineers, Corps of, 17, 24n, 27, 247, 558, 643
Dornot, 361 Eniwetok, 406, 556
Doty, Lt. Col. Edouard R. L., 221, 222, 225, 227 Enz, Maj. Walter W. F., 192, 195, 201, 202, 205, 210
Doxey, Col. Thomas A., 273 Épinal, 292, 479
DRAGOON, 340, 344, 453-54. See also Southern France, Erft River, 484
invasion of. European Theater of Operations, United States Army
Dukws, 384, 388, 445, 501, 505 (ETOUSA), 35, 40, 43, 136, 164, 519, 596, 605,
Dülag, 503, 525-26 610, 638, 644
Dumps, 70, 96, 129, 148, 148n, 174, 177, 274-75, 299, Eyeshields, 108, 112, 167, 175
302, 314-16, 342, 356-57, 497. See also Depots.
Düren 377, 378, 487-88 Falaise, 632
Dusseldorf, 389 Far East Air Force, 190, 190n, 216, 319
Dust respirators, 126, 175, 182, 267 Far Eastern Technical Unit (FETU), 210
Dyes and dyeing, 282, 284, 285, 305 Fedala, 95
Fellenz, Lt. Col. Lloyd E., 120
Eaker, Maj. Gen. Ira C., 56 Field, Capt. Harold L., 114n
Eastern Base Section (EBS), 106, 112, 141n, 311 Field Artillery Battalions
Eastern Task Force, 93n, 142, 326 19th, 474
Eben Emael, 535 314th, 485
Echternach, 485, 485n, 486-87 905th, 485
Edgewood Arsenal, Md., 26, 282, 283, 285, 286, 287, 293,
Field Artillery Board, 420
306, 308, 324, 325 Field Artillery Group, 191st, 499
Eichelberger, Lt. Gen. Robert L., 197 Fighter Commands
Eisenhower, General Dwight D., 40, 86, 87, 102, 110, VIII, 159
121, 183, 355, 605, 606 IX, 159
Electron bombs, 614, 617 Filling apparatus and plants, 153, 221, 239
Elliott, Col. Lowell A., 40, 41, 43, 96, 98, 99 Fincke, Lt. Melvin, 220
Emmons, Lt. Gen. Delos C., 225 Finschhafen, 257, 313, 314
Empress Augusta Bay, 494, 496 Fire bombs. See also Incendiary bombs.
Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Team (EEIST) 165-gallon, napalm, 630n, 632
Number One, 79-80, 84 in European operations, 149, 631—32
Engineer Combat Battalions, 592 expenditures, 632, 634, 635, 647
6th, 552 igniters for, 159, 631, 634
27th, 551 improvised, 320
114th, 199, 543 in Pacific operations, 320, 517, 633-35
118th, 538 shortage of, 160-62
121st, 374 sizes of, 630n
149th, 303 tactical missions and employment, 159, 160, 614, 630,
294th, 379 635, 647
295th, 377
Fire storm, Hamburg, 619n
Engineer Combat Groups
40th, 387 Firenzoulo, 351n
540th, 386 Fiske, Lt. Col. William M., 3 5 5
1102d, 385 Flame, psychological value of, 541, 572, 586, 588, 598,
1103d, 363, 367n, 368 609, 612, 633
Engineer Combat Regiment, 40th, 342 Flame thrower tanks, 657. See also Flame throwers;
Engineer Gas and Flame Regiment, 30th, 17, 18, 23 Flame throwers, mechanized; Ronson flame thrower.
Engineer operations. See Flame throwers; Smoke screen Crocodile, 605-06, 609-10
operations. development of, 230, 232, 234, 287, 535, 643, 646
INDEX 683
Flame thrower tanks—Continued Flame throwers, portable—Continued

flame tank battalion, 576, 584-85, 589 doctrine for employment, 213, 568—72, 574—75, 595,
M3 series, 287, 560-61 596, 647
Satan, 287, 560-63 El, 535
Sherman-Crocodile, 605, 605n, 606, 609-10 E1R1, 535, 543, 547, 592
training, 561, 567, 579, 589, 608, 611-12 failure in Papua Campaign, 199, 245, 293
Flame throwers, 81, 109, 171-72, 177, 177n, 178, 265, an infantry/engineer weapon, 213, 537—38, 548, 554,
279 555-57, 563-64
in amphibious assaults, 271, 5 5 3 , 597 Ml, 5 3 5 , 539, 547, 592, 593
in city fighting, 573-74, 576, 597 M1A1, 293, 535, 539, 547, 550, 559, 575, 581, 592-
defective parts, 199, 245, 547, 604 93, 599, 604
demonstrations, 425, 5 5 3 , 560, 577, 593, 605, 606 M2-2, 535, 564, 564n, 571, 575, 579, 581
early development and use, 534—35, 558—60, 560n, in North Africa and Sicily, 592-93
579-80 training for, 213, 230, 537-38, 540, 542-43, 548,
ETO use of, compared with use in Pacific, 603—04, 548n, 549, 553-56, 568-69, 579, 582, 593-94, 594n,
612, 647 596, 599, 603-04, 647
fuel and expenditures, 159, 169, 232, 272, 287, 297,Flame tractors, 565-67, 576
316, 539, 547, 5 5 2 , 5 5 6 , 562, 570, 574, 583, 586, Flanagan, Lt. Harry G., 602
592, 607-08 Flare mixture, M8, 622n
against German fixed fortifications, 594, 597—603 Flattop Hill, Okinawa, 586
improvised, 189 Florence, 129
against Japanese defenses, 536—38, 541-42, 542n, 543— Foch, Marshal Ferdinand, 87
46, 549, 551-57, 561-63, 566-67, 569, 571-74, Fog oil. See Smoke screen operations, fog oil for.
577-78, 580-84, 586-88, 590-91 Foley, Lt. Col. William, 64, 81n, 83
maintenance of, 182, 292-94, 310, 316, 537, 539-40, Fontanello Caves, 290
543-45, 545n, 546-47, 550, 554, 559, 564, 570-72, Formosa, 187
575, 581, 595, 601, 610, 647 Fort Bragg, 424
range of, 537, 541, 563, 573, 581, 611, 647 Fort Custer, 289, 469
shortages, 169, 547, 604 Fort Driant, 368, 474-75
transportation problems, 564, 574, 594 Fort Montbarey, 609
unit allotments of, 272, 5 5 5 , 557, 579, 584, 590, 596, Fort Sam Houston, 297
596n, 599, 602, 610 Fort Shafter, 220, 224, 296
waterproofing of, 294, 546, 547, 550, 559, 564, 575, Fort Stotsenburg, 506, 510
595 Forward Echelon, Communications Zone (FECOMZ),
World War I projectors, 15, 534 65, 69, 71, 73, 164, 175, 177
Flame throwers, mechanized, 169, 535, 583, 646. See also Foster, Col. Ferris U., 51n, 75n
Flame thrower tanks; Flame tractors, Foulkes, Brigadier Charles H., 9, 14, 15, 16
auxiliary (defined), 560n Fournier, Maj, Roland P., 221, 222, 227
communications problems, 577 Frankel, 2d Lt. Theodore, 551-52
E4-5 auxiliary, 560, 562, 576, 576n, 583, 588-89, Frankfurt, 385
591, 605-07, 610-11 French, Sir John, 9
E4R2-4R3-5R1, 589n, 607n French Expeditionary Corps (FEC), 441, 450-51
E5-5, 606 French forces, 299, 302, 327, 329, 455
E12-7R1, 590n, 608 French forces (World War I), 7-8, 8n, 10-12, 15-16,
in Europe, 169, 608-09, 612-13, 647 534, 653
flame hoses, 567-68, 587, 590
Fries, Maj. Gen. Amos A., 73, 82, 200, 640
on landing craft, 564—65
as Chief of Gas Service, AEF, 17, 17n, 18-19, 22-24,
M3-4-3, 576n, 610 37, 38, 41, 51, 52
main armament (defined), 560n and CWS research role, 74, 85, 111
Mark I, Navy, 564-65, 567 "Fries-trained" officers, 27, 32, 32n
periscope mounted, 588-89, 589n and a permanent CWS, 24, 30, 653
POA CWS H1, 580, 584, 590 and World War I operations, 4, 14, 643
Q Model (E7-7), 564, 576 Friesenheimer Island, 388
Flame throwers, portable, 88, 1 3 5 , 169, 230, 234, 534, Frink, Maj. Gen. John L., 216, 264
5 3 5 , 584, 646-47 FS smoke, 106, 188, 245, 267, 342, 342n, 394, 395, 400,
discarded by advancing troops, 175, 5 5 0 , 597 414, 414n, 417, 508. See also Smoke tanks.
Fuel, thickened, 158, 159, 161, 169, 562, 580, 583, 592, Goering asparagus, 453
620, 631, 634. See also Incendiary bombs; Napalm. Gona, 656
Fuel mixing, 160-61, 265, 272, 287-88, 570, 584 Gondrecourt, 18
Furiano River, 428-29 Goodenough Island, 257, 396
Fuzes, 133, 134, 275-76, 285, 432, 457, 482-84, 497, Goon gun, 42 8n
500, 509, 519-20, 532, 621 Goon Gun Hill, 428n
Gorrill, Lt. Col. F. S., 201
G-agents, 281, 650 Gothic Line, 350, 456, 457
Gaffney, Capt. Philip J., 463 Grant, Capt. Carl E., 106
Garapan, 563 Greeley, Col. Leonard J., 204, 216
Garigliano River, 346, 350, 436, 442, 450, 452 "Green Light Supply" plan, 165
Garrison forces, 270, 272-73, 275 Green, Maj. Maurice G., 507
Gas alarms, 75, 139, 168, 221, 244 Greene, Col. William H., 366
Gas attacks, fear of, 77, 177, 200, 475n Grenades
Gas masks, 36, 70, 75, 108, 165, 166, 172, 182n, 237, HC smoke, 107
279. See also Protective equipment. incendiary, 84, 91, 96, 133, 159
canisters, 241, 249, 262, 294 M8, 126-27, 169, 253
discarded, 71, 76, 175, 180, 183, 198, 249, 288, 315 M14, 253
maintenance and repair of, 133, 179, 184-85, 185n, M15 WP, 126-27, 262, 320, 602
249-50, 273, 289-92, 310 No. 79, British, 169
service, 34, 126, 138, 165, 179, 185, 187-88, 221, 239, smoke, 84, 169, 172, 199, 323, 537
240, 249, 255, 267-68, 296, 651 thermite, 106, 539-40
as sniper target, 175, 250 white phosphorus, 107, 126-27, 262, 320, 542n, 551,
supply of, 34, 34n, 76, 77, 183-84, 651 573, 594, 600, 602, 609, 631, 643
training, 187-88, 221, 236, 241, 249-50, 262, 267 Grenoble, 299
World War I, 4, 8, 10-11, 11n, 13, 14, 14n, 17-18 Griswold, Maj. Gen. Oscar W., 494
Gas reconnaissance, 174, 303 Grothaus, Lt. Col. Donald G., 206, 206n, 207, 253, 401n
Gas Regiment, 1st, 18, 23, 65 Ground Forces Reinforcement System, 72
Gas Service, AEF, 16-19, 21 Ground Forces Replacement Command, 62, 468, 470
Gas warfare Guadalcanal, 493, 494, 522, 536-40, 542-43, 546, 564,
Allied policy on, 25, 28, 48, 77-78, 88, 107, 111, 652- 566, 595
64 Guam, 401, 406, 516, 561n, 562-63, 625, 628
German policy on, 50, 69-70, 79-80, 108, 122, 156, Gurkha troops, 449
177, 183-84, 279, 303, 650, 655-56 Gustav Line, 336, 350, 436, 442-43, 445, 450, 452, 594
Japanese policy on, 187, 197, 200, 206, 220, 652, 656 Guild, Col. Walter A., 337n, 640
preparedness for, 42, 47, 50, 69, 76-78, 84, 187, 200-
201, 227, 234, 269-70, 277, 317, 648-52, 656-57 Haber, Fritz, 6, 6n, 7, 8n
theater plans for, 48, 55-57, 68, 77, 88, 107, 139, Hague Peace Conference, 6
201-02, 208, 210, 218, 228-29, 231-32, 234, 240, Hagushi Beach, 274, 402, 410
245, 254, 269, 650-51 Halverson, Maj. Roy E., 396
World War I, 3-15, 653 Hambach, 376
Gassing, accidental, 122 Hamburg, incendiary raid on, 619, 619n
Gay, Col. Hobart R., 93 Hamilton, Col. Stuart A., 187, 188, 189
Gay, Col. Robert N., 204, 211, 213, 213n, 539 Hamilton, Lt. Col. William B., 469
Geelong, 239-40 Hammond, Col. William C., 81n
Gela, 426 Hannett, Lt. Cmdr. G. W., 527
Gelb Kreuz, 14n Hansell, Brig. Gen. Haywood S., 626, 627
General Depot 6, EBS, 311 Harbord, Maj. Gen. James G., 21n
Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925, 25, 2 5 n , 28, 655 Harmon, Maj. Gen. Ernest N., 91
Gerhard, Col. Frederick W., 78n Harper, Col. John H., 273
Gerhardt, Maj. Gen. Charles H., 375n Hawaii, 34, 191, 222, 273-75, 286, 296-97, 409, 516,
Germany. See Gas warfare, German policy on; Luftwaffe. 520, 530, 560, 564, 584, 657
Gernsheim, 387 Hawaiian Air Force, 220
Gertulla, Capt. Jalmar, 499 Hawaiian Chemical Depot, 220, 267, 268, 273, 296, 297
Gilbert Islands, 191, 269, 271, 405, 555 Hawaiian Department, 35, 219-22, 224, 227, 228, 231,
Gill, Maj. Gen. William H., 497 266-68, 404-05, 553, 553n, 637, 642, 646
Glider operations, 417, 453-55 Hayes, Maj. John J., 41, 139, 140, 143
INDEX 685
Hays, Lt. Col. Edwin S. S., Jr., 485n Ie Shima, 402, 410, 533
Heath Plantation, 412 Imperial Chemical Industries, 153
HC smoke, 322n, 374, 408 Impregnating facilities, 71, 166-67, 171, 187-88, 221,
Heddernheim, 621 225, 242, 245, 252, 267, 279, 296, 305-07, 643-44.
Heffner, Capt. James J., 95 See also Chemical impregnating companies; Protec-
Hexachlorethane (HC). See HC smoke. tive clothing.
Hickam Field, 220, 401 Imugan, 513
Highway 1 (Italy), 352 Incendiary bomb clusters, 151, 319, 320, 621
Highway 5 (Luzon), 506, 513 adapters for, 620, 628n
Highway 6 (Italy), 346, 437, 442, 448 aimable, 620
Highway 7 (Italy), 346, 348, 350, 445-47 M17, 500-pound, aimable, 157, 518, 622, 623
Highway 64 (Italy), 352-53 M52, 500-pound, 107
Highway 65 (Italy), 351 M54, 100-pound, 107
Hilbringen, 371 maintenance problems, 133
Hill, Rear Adm. Harry W., 532 100-pound, of 4-pound magnesium bombs, 157, 620
Hill, Capt. Tom B., USN, 225 100-pound, of M50 bombs, 620
Hills Incendiary bombs, 135, 149, 238, 279, 317, 614, 647.
60, 586 See also Bombs; Fire bombs.
89, 587-88 British, 151, 152, 156, 157, 618-19, 623
95, 586-87 AN-M50A1, 107, 622
178, 586 AN-M50A2, 107, 622
260, 542, 542n combat operations requirements, ETO, 153—54, 156
303, 363 defective, 620
331, 363 development of, 26, 616—17, 647—48
593 (Abaneta Farm), 448-49 Eighth Air Force, first use by, 620
700, 541 electron, German, 614, 617
715, 428, 428n expenditures, 154, 157, 158, 619, 622, 623, 629, 647
950, 438-39 filling for, 151, 152, 158, 284, 614-17, 620, 628
1000, 541 and HE, compared, 616-17, 621, 647
Hilsea, 147 improvised, 197
Hingle, Maj. Arthur T., 47, 64, 164, 175, 177 loop-sling suspension in B-17, 621
Hiroshima, 648 maintenance problems, 133
Histon, 147 M47, 100-pound, 151, 154-58, 617, 620-21, 623, 630
Hitler, Adolf, 36, 655 M 4 7 A 1 , 319
Hobbs, Maj. Gen. Leland S., 376, 377 M47A2, 628
Hollandia, 213, 218, 252, 308, 498, 501 M50, 4-pound, 620, 622, 623, 630, 633
Hollerath, 601 M69, 6-pound, oil, 619, 628, 633
Holmes, Capt. Jerome K., 227, 232 M76, 500-pound, Block Burner, 158, 622-23, 630
Honolulu, 404, 405, 559 tactical air missions, 319, 630
Honshu, 624, 625, 627 use against German targets, 157, 619, 621—24, 628
Hooker, Lt. Col. Albert H., 153 use against Japan, 320, 624—30, 657
Howitzers, 420 420n, 495, 500
World War I types, 614-15
Huebner, Maj. Gen. Clarence R., 473 and Zoroastrian Society, 619
Hughes, Maj. Gen. Everett S., 121 4-pound magnesium, 150, 617, 647
Hulett, George A., 16, 17
25-pound, 616
Hulsey, Lt. Col. David D., 214n, 399, 509
110-kilo, oil, 617
Humboldt Bay, 498
500-pound, oil, 647
Humphreville, Lt. Col. Bruce T., 80, 95, 96, 109, 640 2,000-pound, 152
Huon Gulf, 527
Incendiary darts, 615
Huon Peninsula, 412
HURRICANE Task Force, 499 Incendiary gel (PT), 158, 622
HUSKY, 424, 426, 429. See also Sicily. India, 625
Hutchinson, Lt. Col. William S., 446, 456 Indian forces, 449
Hypochlorite, 188 Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, 40, 89
Infantry Divisions
ICEBERG, 402 1st (World War I), 17
Iceland, 620 1st, 70, 81n, 83, 424, 426, 462, 473, 593, 597, 601
Infantry Divisions—Continued Infantry Divisions—Continued

2d, 597, 598-99 Americal, 236, 494-96, 536, 542, 543, 569
3d, 289, 292, 299, 340, 542n, 343-45, 386, 387, 388, Infantry Regiments
424, 425, 428, 435-37, 445, 447, 452, 489, 520 1st,, 551-52
4th, 70, 465, 600 7th, 428
5th, 81n, 361-63, 367-71, 383, 384-85, 474, 485, 604 8th, 465
6th, 214n, 315, 316, 400, 500, 507, 508, 509-10, 512, 10th, 362-64, 485-86
551-52 11th, 474-75, 485
7th, 502, 504, 516-18, 525, 555, 559, 571, 586-88 13th, 378
8th, 81n, 378, 487, 597-98 16th, 462
9th, 424, 466, 473, 601 17th, 571, 587
24th, 220, 262, 502-03, 548 20th, 499, 500, 510-12, 552
25th, 215, 220, 231, 493, 494, 513, 536-38, 543, 55721st, 502
26th, 81n 22d, 465, 600
27th, 272, 516, 553-54, 561n, 563, 586 26th, 601
29th, 70, 177, 373-75, 375n, 376, 462, 467, 598, 609- 27th, 493, 577
10 28th, 378-80
30th, 70, 374-76, 376n, 377, 391, 467-68, 472, 489, 30th, 380n, 388
489n, 599, 601 32d, 587
31st, 315 35th, 476, 512, 537
32d, 195, 196, 198, 204, 213, 214n, 236, 497, 503, 38th, 598
513, 543, 572 63d, 508
33d, 315, 513 103d, 538
34th, 339, 345, 435, 440, 443, 448-49 111th, 522
35th, 81n 116th, 462, 598
36th, 299, 334, 340, 542n, 387, 432-33, 438, 439, 117th, 601
441, 443-44, 448-49, 452, 455, 594n 119th, 375-76
37th, 416, 494, 496, 506, 538-41, 543, 574 120th, 375-76
38th, 317n, 506 121st, 597
40th, 316, 506, 527 123d, 315
41st, 195, 196, 198, 236, 249, 251, 400, 499, 501, 548, 126th, 543, 572
551-52, 570 127th, 200
43d, 493, 506, 538, 540, 543, 573 128th, 503
45th, 299, 340, 542n, 386, 387, 424, 425, 432, 433, 129th, 495
440, 452, 454-55 132d, 542
65th, 81n 135th, 448
71st, 387 141st, 443-44, 449
76th, 485 142d, 438
77th, 502, 504, 517, 532-33, 561n, 562, 563 143d, 443-44
79th, 391, 465, 489-90 145th, 495, 508, 539
80th, 81n, 386, 485 157th, 433
81st, 516, 524, 633 158th, 415, 499, 551, 573
84th, 374 160th, 506
85th, 450-51, 594 162d, 500
87th, 383, 385, 385n, 386 163d, 499, 551
88th, 346, 352, 447, 450-52 164th, 542
89th, 383, 385-86 165th, 554
90th, 371, 372, 383, 384-85, 466, 474, 476 179th, 432
91st, 81n 180th, 440
93d, 542 182d, 495, 542-43
95th, 371 185th, 527-28
96th, 502, 503, 517-19, 525, 571, 586 186th, 500
98th, 525 313th, 489
100th, 602 314th, 491
102d, 374 315th, 490, 491n
104th, 378, 487 321st, 517
106th, 81n 322d, 517
INDEX 687
Infantry Regiments—Continued Kamiri airdrome, 415

323d, 517 Kane, Capt. Morris W., 382
333d, 374 Kangaroo, Australia, 240
339th, 451, 594 Karger, Col. Alfred G., 81n
345th, 385 Kastel, 386
347th, 385n Kauai, 296
353d, 385 Kaub, 386
354th, 386 Kellogg, Col. Crawford M., 37, 42, 43, 43n, 48, 57, 62,
355th, 386 149, 150, 153, 157, 216, 619, 620, 621
359th, 467 Kennedy, Maj. Robert H., 390
381st, 504 Kerama Retto, 517, 532
382d, 504, 517 Kesner, Capt. Sam, 344, 345
383d, 517 Kesselring, Generalfeldmarschall Albert, 451
399th, 602 Kieselguhr water filters, 284
417th, 485 King, Brig. Gen. Edgar, 232
517th, 454 King, M/Sgt. John K., 198, 199, 200, 200n, 544, 545
Intelligence, 43, 54, 75, 78, 79-80, 84, 119, 122, 189, Kingswood, 240
202, 205, 207, 231-32, 279-81, 283, 285, 286-87, Kinkaid, Vice Adm. Thomas C., 529
303-04, 639, 650 Kitchener, Lord, 8
Inter-Service Chemical Warfare Committee, 61 Kitselman, Capt. Henry A., 503
Intramuros, 573 Klaswick, Capt. Julius F., 119n
Ipo Dam, 577, 634-35 Kluge, Generalfeldmarschall Guenther von, 632
Irritant powders, 7 Kobe, 630
Ischia, 313 Koblenz, 383, 385
Isernia, 436 Kochi Ridge, 586
Island Base Section (IBS), 301, 311 Kolombangara, 493
Island Command, Okinawa, 275 Konigswinter, 381, 382
Italian campaign, 114, 122, 127, 290, 298-99, 311, 353, Kordeleski, Pvt. Frank, 539
360, 393, 421, 453, 456, 456n, 458, 534, 594, 645, Korea, 657
651 Kornasoren airdrome, 415
Italian Military Chemical Institute, 283 Krauthausen-Selgersdorf road, 376
Iwo Jima, 269, 319, 401, 408-09, 521, 530-32, 578-84, Krueger, Lt. Gen. Walter, 400n, 416, 416n, 497, 505,
589, 590, 652 568, 635
Kwajalein, 406, 516, 556
J boats, 397 Kyushu, 402-03, 590, 625
James, Lt. Col. Thomas H., 462
Japan. See also Gas warfare; Kamikaze attacks, La Sénia, 98
incendiary raids on, 320, 624-30, 648 La Valbonne, 387n
planning for invasion of, 402-03, 411, 589-91, 654 Labir, 503
Japanese 32d Army, 586-88 Labiranan Head, 503, 525
Javits, Lt. Col. Jacob K., 216 Lagone, 440
Jennings, Lt. Col. Maurice E., 220 Lae, 257, 397, 398, 412
Johnson, Col. Leonard M., 42, 43, 46, 47, 53, 100 Lakey, Capt. Raymond J., 454
Johnson, Col. Ragnar E., 80 Lamb, 1st Lt. George R., 366
Johnson, Lt. Col. William A., 208 Land, Lt. Charles, 550
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 111, 191, 270, 401n, 501, 576, Landing craft, 272, 395-98, 425. See also LCI's;
618n, 625 LCI(M)'s; LCM's; LCT's; LCVP's; LST's; Mortar
Joint Expeditionary Force, 406, 561n boats.
Juliano, Sgt. Fred, 594, 594n Lane, Maj. Jack F., 206, 298n
Jülich, 374-76, 609-10 Langres, 18
Jungle warfare. See Tropical warfare. Larkin, Maj. Gen. Thomas B., 103, 110
Laruma Valley, 543
Kadena airfield, 517 Laundry operations, 167, 279, 305, 307, 308, 644
Kahoolawe, 521, 530 LCI's, 446, 521. See also LCI(M)'s.
Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, 6 LCI(M)'s, 521-33
Kakazu Ridge, 517 LCM's, 542n, 400, 494, 499, 561
Kamikaze attacks, 407, 409-11, 656 LCT's, 343-44, 463, 494, 521, 561, 566
LCVP's, 408, 463 Luzon, 218, 286, 315-17, 416-17, 505-15, 519, 527-29,
Le Mans, 178 570, 573, 576-77, 634, 635n
Le Muy, 454 LVT's, 501, 559
Leach, Capt. Howard S., 220 LVT(4)'s, 565, 567
League, Pvt. Herbert H., 506
LeCraw, Maj. Roy, 45 MacArthur, General Douglas, 136, 191, 196, 219, 238,
Lee, Maj. Gen. John C. H., 38, 40, 44, 49, 50, 51, 59, 67 254, 397, 398, 498, 501, 502, 505, 553, 576
Leggin, Maj. Alexander, 64, 65, 76 MacArthur, Col. John C., 40-45, 54, 58, 60, 62, 65, 71,
Leghorn, 129, 312-13, 332-34, 350 76, 183, 354n, 355, 466
Leluc, 453 McBride, Col. Lewis M., 418
LeMay, General Curtis E., 621, 624, 627, 630, 648 MacDonald, Lt. Col. Kenneth K., 502
Lemnitzer, Brig. Gen. Lyman L., 88 MacDonnell, Sgt. Theodore R., 518
Lend-lease, 41, 61, 150, 152, 153, 168 McKaig, Lt. Col. Nelson, 215, 231, 493-94
Lendersdorf, 378, 379 McKinney, Maj. Leonard L., 211, 256, 260, 261, 263
Lennon's Hotel, 212, 212n McMillin, Maj. James M., 220, 221, 267
McMurray, Lt. Col. Russell E., 456
LeRoy, Lt. Col. Warren S., 41, 47, 48, 53, 55, 59, 60,
62, 137, 140, 142, 143, 143n, 144 McNair, Lt. Gen. Lesley J., 468
Lewis, Lt. Col. Emory A., 275 Maeda, 586
Lewisite, 3, 269 Maffin Bay, 314, 315, 499, 551, 552
Maginot Line, 599, 602
Leyte, 218, 254, 266, 315, 400, 407-09, 501-05, 525-27,
570-73, 576 Magnesium, 150. See also Incendiary bombs.
Libby, 2d Lt. Ralph I., 220, 222 Magness, Lt, Col. Thomas H., Jr., 54, 605n
Liberty ships, 529 Main River, 385, 386
Liège, 378 Maintenance, 109, 109n, 114, 128, 131-34, 182, 288-
Lingayen, 316, 407-08, 408n, 505-06, 527-30, 573, 656 89, 293, 370, 434, 514. See also Chemical Main-
Linnich, 374 tenance Companies; Waterproofing.
Lipphardt, Lt. Col. Jack W., 477 Mainz, 384-86
Liquid smoke. See FS smoke. Mairoi, 434
Liri River, 442, 450 Maizières-lès-Metz, 474, 476
Liri Valley, 437-38, 442, 448 Makin Atoll, 230, 554
Lisdorf, 372 Makua, 520-22
Livens, Capt. William H., 12 Malencourt, 534
Livens projector, 3, 4n, 12-13, 188 Maling, Col. Edwin C., 40, 42, 43, 97n, 115, 121
Livergnano, 351 Malinta Tunnel, 188
Livesey, Lt. Col. Herbert B., Jr., 81n Malmédy, 489
Lockman, Capt. Edward L., Jr., 517 Malta, 327
Lofton, Capt. Morris W., 339n Manila, 187, 210, 286, 505-07, 573-74, 576, 634
Loire Base Section, 75n Mannheim, 389
London, 35, 40-45, 55, 59, 617 Manus Island, 525, 550
Lone Tree Hill, 551-52 Marangella, Capt. Joel B., 390n
Lone Tree Ridge, 578 March, General Peyton C., 24, 25, 653
Longueville, 177 Mariana Islands, 191, 270, 273, 275, 287, 319, 401, 406,
Loos, gas attack, 9, 11 501, 516, 557, 560-64, 567, 579, 624, 656
Los Negros, 315 Marina, 282
Lost, 14n
Marine Amphibious Corps
Loton Deer Park, Alderbury, 147, 154
I, 494
Loucks, Brig. Gen. Charles E., 36, 48-50, 101, 105, 219 HI, 523, 533, 561n, 562, 584, 589
LST's, 339, 406, 407, 446, 494, 521, 529, 532, 566 V, 405, 560-61, 561n, 578, 583
Ludendorf bridge, 381 Marine Brigade, 1st Provisional, 562
Ludwigshaven, 387, 388 Marine Corps, 225, 532, 553, 560, 563, 564, 580, 585,
Luftwaffe, 323, 327, 329, 331-32, 334, 336, 353, 356, 591
360, 376, 380, 383, 384, 384n, 386, 388, 392, 618,
Marine Divisions
645, 654 1st, 258, 275n, 517, 519, 523, 536, 564, 566
Lunéville, 386 2d, 405, 533, 536, 537, 553-54, 561
Lupao, 512 3d, 494, 541, 562, 579, 581, 583
Lutes, Maj. Gen. LeRoy, 173 4th, 530, 555-57, 559, 561, 579, 581, 583
INDEX 689
Marine Divisions—Continued Miller, 1st Lt. Bernard, 173

5th, 530, 579, 581, 583 Miller, Maj. Leonard C., 67
6th, 517 Million Dollar Hill, 428n
Marine Regiments Military Police Training Center, Fort Custer, Mich.,
1st, 566 469
5th, 566 Milne Bay, 256, 257, 307, 395-98
6th, 555 Milton, Col. Hugh M., II, 213n
7th, 566 Mindanao, 400
8th, 537, 555 Ministry of Aircraft Production (British), 153
19th, 541 Ministry of Home Security (British), 323, 618
21st, 541 Ministry of Supply (British), 153
24th, 556 Minturno, 346, 348-50, 447, 450-51
Marine Tank Battalions, 589n Mitsubishi Aircraft Plant, 626
1st, 558 Mokmer, 500
3d, 562 Mollen, Maj. Irving R., 203, 205
5th, 582 Molokai Island, 232
Markham, Lt. Col. Harrison, 432 Molotov cocktails, 189, 199, 299
Markham River, 397, 412 Moneymore, 147
Marne, 7 Monte Cassino, 448—50
Marriott, Col. Carl L., 36, 37, 201, 204, 211, 212, 256- Montebourg, 177
66, 398, 399 Monterumici, 351
Marriott, Lt. Col. Ian A., 87, 120 Montgomery, General Sir Bernard L., 76, 328
Marseille, 299, 302, 360 Montgomery, Col. Edward, 40-43, 43n, 44, 46, 104, 137,
Marshall, Capt. Arthur R., 474 152, 354
Marshall, General George C., 32, 38, 51, 420 Montgomery, Col. James V., 386n
Marshall Islands, 191, 270, 272-73, 406, 516, 555-57, Moore, Capt. Milton M., 174
559 Morcock, Lt. Col. John C, Jr., 201, 203, 547
Marston Magna, 138 Morgan, 1st Lt. Charles A., Jr., 188
Martin, Lt. Col. Ronald LeV., 470, 484n Morgan, Lt. Col. John C., 189, 190, 191, 200, 203, 253
Mateur, 311 Morison, Samuel Eliot, 335n
Mattingly, Col. Benjamin F., 76 Moroccan Division, 2d, 441
Maui, 296 Morotai, 314-15
Mauldin, Bill, 340 Mortar, Stokes, 3, 11-12, 13, 15, 23, 418
Maull, Lt. Col. William R., 403n Mortar boat groups, 525—26
Mavavia, 542 Mortar boats, 232, 503n, 505n, 521-33
Maxwell Field, 616 Mortar Island, 493
Mayenne, 378 Mortar support units, 530—32
Medal of Honor, 5 94n Mortars. See also Chemical mortar, 4.2-inch.
Medical Corps, 230, 233, 245 60-mm., 374, 495, 500, 541
Medical Department (World War I), 17, 24, 24n 81-mm., 419, 420, 495, 499, 500, 506-07, 541
Mediterranean Base Section (MBS), 47, 89, 96, 97, 98, Moselle River, 361-69, 371n, 484
98n, 99, 100, 109, 110n, 112, 282, 311 Mosles, 174, 177
Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 121. See also North Moundres, 462
African Theater of Operations. Mount Acero, 436
Mehrum, 390, 391 Mount Adone, 351
Melbourne, 189, 190, 203, 236 Mount Cairo, 448
Melchbourne Park, 153 Mount Camino, 437, 438
Meritorious Service Unit awards, 288, 308, 313 Mount Difensa, 437, 438
Mers el Kébir, 282 Mount Lungo, 441, 442
Merzig bridge, 371 Mount Maggiore, 438
Mount Marrone, 442
Metz, 368, 371, 371n, 474, 476-77
Mount Mataba, 508
Meuse-Argonne Campaign, 653
Mount Minoro, 572
Middleton, Maj. Gen. Troy, 425n Mount Pacawagan, 508
Mignano, 436-38, 440 Mount Pantano, 440
Milchplatz, 390-92, 490, 491n Mt. St. Angelo, 434
Miles, Col. John L., 81n Mount Sammucro, 437—39, 441
Mount Santa Croce, 437 Nierstein, 384—85
Mount Scouri, 348, 442 Nimitz, Admiral Chester W., 191, 225, 401, 404, 498,
Mount Suribachi, 531 501, 502, 576
Mudge, Brig. Gen. Verne D., 550 Nishihara Ridge, 517
Mules. See Pack animals. Noemfoor Island, 415, 417
Munda, 493 Normandy Campaign, 69, 70, 163, 167, 173-75, 177-78,
Munn, Capt. James. F., 79 181, 250, 303, 355-58, 461-68, 477-79, 597, 599,
Muñoz, 512 604, 605, 608
Mustard gas, 3, 4, 14, 14n, 16, 17, 26, 238-40, 254, 269, North African Theater of Operations, USA, 35, 41, 46,
283, 284, 307, 319, 656 86-87, 88, 94, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108-09,
Muth, Lt. Col. Roy W., 485 113, 121, 122, 123, 137, 149, 151, 165, 298, 326-
Myers, 1st Lt. Robert D., 95 30, 421, 592, 594, 645. See also Chemical Warfare
Service, NATOUSA/MTOUSA; Services of Supply,
Nadzab, 397, 412-14, 416, 417 NATOUSA/MTOUSA.
Nagasaki, 648 North Pacific Area, 191, 191n
Nagoya, 626, 630 Northern Base Section, 311
Naha, 533 Northern Ireland Base Section, 141n
Namur (Belgium), 479n Northern Landing Force, 561, 561n
Namur (Marshall Islands), 406, 556 Notorangelo, 1st Lt. Anthony, 129, 289, 290
Nan Hill, 586 Noyes, W. A., 216
Nansei Shoto, 402
Napalm, 159-61, 287, 297, 299, 310, 320, 517, 539, 562, Oahu, 220, 268, 521
565, 586, 588, 593, 628, 630-33. See also Fire Oberwesel, 385, 386, 386n
bombs. O'Brien, Capt. John J., 177
Office of Gas Service, War Department, 24
Naples, 124, 130, 133, 290, 298, 313, 329-32, 353, 359,
406, 434, 645 Office of Strategic Services, 650
National Defense Act of 1920, 25, 30 Oil bombs. See Incendiary bombs.
National Defense Research Committee (NDRC), 216, Oil-perspex filling, 157
324, 354, 564 Oise Base Section, 75n
National Oil Refining Company, 160 Okinawa, 273-76, 402, 407-11, 517-19, 532-33, 568,
Naval District, 14th, 560 584-90, 656
Olds, Capt. James F., Jr., 538
Navy, U.S., 86, 95, 216, 222, 225, 234, 272, 276, 285,
519, 649 OLYMPIC, 402, 590
and flame thrower development, 560, 564, 580 OMAHA Beach, 70, 173-74, 177, 303, 355-58, 462, 656
and mortar boats, 232, 520-21, 530 Onville, 474
and use of smoke, 335-36, 342, 394, 398-99, 403-11 Operational research, 618, 618n, 633
Nebelwerfers, 439 Operations Division, WDGS, 33, 48, 53, 61, 89, 170,
Neckar River, 389 255, 324-25, 638
Nerve agents, 281, 650 Oppenheim, 384
Netherlands East Indies, 190n, 191, 237 Oran, 89, 96, 97, 103, 109, 282, 298, 311, 327, 328,
Nettuno, 299, 338, 445 342, 425
New Britain, 316, 412, 493, 549-50, 558 Ordnance Department, 107, 134, 154, 155, 214, 253, 258,
New Caledonia, 191, 236, 558 259, 264, 269, 285, 560, 616, 617, 644
New Delhi, 625 Ordnance Department (World War I), 17, 24, 24n
New Georgia, 492-94, 538-40, 543, 546, 558 Ormoc, 504, 572
New Guinea, 198, 200, 206, 254, 257, 261, 315, 316,Oro Bay, 210, 216, 251, 262, 396, 399
395-97, 412, 415, 498, 500-501, 527, 545, 548,Orsoy, 389, 390, 490, 491n
656
Osaka, 630
New Guinea Base Section, 210
Oujda, 100
New Guinea Force School, 199
New York Port of Embarkation (NYPE), 105, 106, 125,
Ouled Rahmoun, 289
179 Our River, 484-85, 485n, 486-87
New Zealand, 191 OVERLORD, 163, 461. See also Normandy Campaign.
New Zealand forces, 449
Nice, 454 Pachten, 372
Nied River, 371n Pacific Base Command, 580
Niederzier, 376 Pacific Guano and Fertilizer Company, 221
INDEX 691
Pacific Ocean Areas (POA), 191, 222, 224, 229, 234, Porter, Maj. Gen. William N., 27, 28, 229, 243, 245.
271, 401, 409, 642-44, 649, 651, 652 See also Chemical Warfare Service,
Pack animals, 430, 436, 452, 504 and Bullene Mission, 483
Packing and packaging, 133-34, 144, 248, 253, 273, and CWS status in the 1930's, 419
547. See also Containers. and gas warfare protection and retaliation, 77, 85, 270,
Paestum, 334, 433 651-52
Palatinate, 383 and HE mission for 4.2 mortar, 419-20
Palau Islands, 273, 516, 522-24, 533, 564, 566 and incendiary bomb program, 617
Palerno, 289, 301, 311, 342, 429 and missions and value of CWS, 74, 200, 285, 637, 640,
Palmer, Lt. Col. John Me A., 17 657
Panama, 34 named Chief, CWS, May 1941, 26
Panama Canal, smoke screening, 321—22, 322n, 325—26 opinion of Reserve and AUS officers, 104n, 637
Paoching, 633 and shortage of chemical mortars, 178
Papua Campaign, 198-200, 213, 240, 245, 246, 293, 498, and smoke screening plans, 324, 326, 396—97
543, 546 and theater CWS officers, 40, 44, 50, 53, 56, 68, 100-
Parachute Infantry Regiments 101, 104, 115, 639
503d, 412, 415 theater inspection trips, 48—49, 51, 52, 69, 71, 101,
504th, 439 105
511th, 416-17 and World War I gas attacks, 8n
Parafrag bombs, 412, 635 Portland (England), 356
Paris, 73, 180, 304 Porton Experimental Station, England, 45, 54, 242
Parker, Lt. James W., 197 Powell, Col. Frederick E., 44, 60, 185
Pasig River, 506 Powers, Col. Patrick F., 76, 77, 78, 183, 184
Patton, Lt. Gen. George S., Jr., 80, 91, 93, 110, 361, Pozzuoli, 330-31
383, 430, 474, 605 Prentiss, Brig. Gen. Augustin M., 68, 69
Pearl Harbor, 28, 225, 267, 269, 296, 404-05, 502, 521, Prentiss, Lt. Col. Augustin M., Jr., 206, 207n, 216
530 Projects for a Continental Operation (PROCO), 170-73,
Peerenboom, Lt. Col. Maurice A., 214n 256
Peleliu, 516, 517, 523-24, 566-67 Propellants, mortar, 290, 431, 435, 438, 439, 497, 500
Peninsular Base Section (PBS), 115, 122, 129, 134n, 290, Protective clothing, 70, 75, 166-67, 175, 183, 187-88,
312, 331n 218, 242, 242n, 243, 250-52, 267, 279, 287, 304,
Penler, Capt. Stephen, 241, 241n 308, 643, 651. See also Impregnating facilities.
Pennycock, Brigadier G. H., 3 5 5 Protective equipment, 93, 106-07, 107n, 108, 126, 152,
Perkins, Lt. Col. Melville F., 54 167, 177-78, 180, 185, 213, 236, 243-44, 258, 260,
Persano, 433 267-68, 273, 651. See also Eyeshields; Gas masks.
Pershing, General John J., 16, 23-25, 653 Pulcherini, 451
Perspex mix fuel, 157, 160, 631
Perth, 190 Quartermaster Battalion, 107th, 199
Philippine Army, 188 Quartermaster Corps, 166, 167, 175, 214, 242, 247, 250,
Philippine Chemical Depot, 188—89 251, 258, 259, 284, 285, 643-44. See also Laundry
Philippine Department, 35, 187, 193 operations.
Philippine Islands, 187-89, 218, 237-38, 240, 254, 266,Quartermaster Service Company, 4342d, 274
283-84, 315-17, 407, 501, 509, 543, 570, 573, 575, Quimby, Capt. James O., 444
576, 590 Quinine sulfate, 188
Philippine Scouts, 187 Quinville Ridge, 465
Phipps, Col. Francis H., 213
Phosgene, 3, 10-11, 13, 14n, 152, 282 Rabaul, 493
Phosphorus, 322n Radios
Pier, 374, 375 SCR-193, 436
Pike, Cpl. Boyd R., 602 SCR-194, 436
Pilelo, 549 SCR-284, 436, 452, 514, 514n
Pinamopoan, 502 SCR-300, 451, 515
Piombino, 298, 332, 333, 350 RAINBOW plans, 322
PLUM (Philippines), 283 RAINCOAT, 438
Poland, 36, 535 Ramanantelo Hill, 517
Port en Bessin, 358 Rambouillet, 304
Port Moresby, 198, 199, 257, 262, 395, 545 Randazzo, 289
Ranger Battalions Rowan, Brig. Gen. Hugh W.—Continued

1st, 447 organizes CWS, ETO, 41, 44-47, 50-55, 58-62, 65,
3d, 438-39, 447 67-69, 72, 75-76, 79-83, 120
4th, 437-38, 447, 447n Royal, Admiral Forrest B., 526
Ranger forces, 426, 432-34, 437, 445-46, 458 Royal Air Force (RAF), 152-54, 619, 523-24
Rapido River, 122, 346, 441-45, 448, 651 Royal Italian Arsenal, 290-91
RE/8 (Research and Experiment Station, Section 8) Royal Navy, 333, 357
(British), 618, 618n Ruger, Capt. Kirk J., 378-80
Reagh, Lt. Col. John D., 210 Ruhr, 389-90, 489
RECKLESS Task Force, 498 Rupt de Mad stream, 362
"Red Ball Express," 165, 165n, 182 Russell Islands, 493
Regulating stations, 185—86 Rust inhibiters, 284
Reilly, Lt. Col. James E., 220, 220n, 225, 231 Ryukyu Islands, 191, 273, 402, 517, 532-33, 588
Remagen, 381-82
Remember Pearl Harbor Group, 189 Saar River, 292, 371-73
Rennes, 178 Saar-Palatinate triangle, 383, 488
Replacement Training Center, Camp Sibert, 326 Saarlautern, 371—73
RH 195, 247-48 Sabotage, 285
Rhein-Herne Canal, 390 Safi, 95
Rheinau CWS Depot, 299 Safine, Maj. Albert L., 345
Rhens, 385, 385n Sagekarasa Island, 493—94
Rhine River, 74, 292, 360, 373, 381-92, 484, 489-91, St. Georgen, 302
612 St. Goar, 385
Richardson, Lt. Gen. Robert C, Jr., 225, 234n, 401, St. John, Col. Adrian, 68, 68n, 69, 71, 72, 73, 76, 76n,
404, 405, 530n, 559, 567 166, 168, 169, 178, 179, 183, 184, 468, 648
Riddick, Maj. John A., 202, 205, 207 St. Laurent-sur-Mer, 463
Riegelman, Col. Harold, 198, 200, 201, 204, 213, 214, St. Lô, 467
400, 499n, 548n St. Malo, 633, 633n
River crossing operations. See Smoke screen operations, St. Maximin, 455
river crossings. St. Mihiel, 653
Rocket ships, 526 St. Quentin, 632
Rockhampton, 548 St. Tropez Peninsula, 343
Rockway, Lt. Robert P., 549 Saipan, 401, 406, 516, 521, 561-63, 625, 626
Rockwood, Col. Alfred L., 103, 104, 116, 121, 128 Salerno, 298, 334-36, 342, 432-34, 446, 593
Rocky Crags, 586 Salvage, 198-99, 249, 273, 274, 288-89, 315, 550, 597
Rocky Point, 552 San Clemente, 352
Roer River, 373-80, 390, 484, 487, 609, 612 San Fabian, 506, 529
Roer River dams, 373, 487 San Fernando, 513
Rogers, Maj. Arthur C., 102 San Francisco Port of Embarkation, 237, 255, 257, 268,
Roi, 406, 556 274
Rolandseck, 381-82 San Jose, 513
Rome, 282-83, 332, 350-51, 437, 442-43 San Martino Hill, 451
Ronson flame thrower, 287, 560, 563, 567, 576, 580 San Narcisco, 315
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 28, 32, 37, 651, 652, 652n, 654 San Pietro, 439-40, 447
Roosevelt, Brig. Gen. Theodore, 465 Sandell, Capt. Edward H., 196, 198, 199, 199n, 200
Rosario, 510 Sandhoffen, 388
Rothschild, Lt. Col. Jacquard, 485n Sanitation, 271, 273, 319, 339
ROUNDUP, 140, 140n Sansapor, 315
Rowan, Brig. Gen. Hugh W., 23n, 40, 74, 77, 85, 104, Sant'Agata, 289
104n, 118, 121, 205, 235, 469, 470, 637-39, 648-49 Sant'Angelo, 443
appointed chief chemical officer, ETO, 43-44, 68, 69 Santa Fe, 513
biography, 44—45 Santa Maria, 312
and chemical mortar battalions, 71-74, 459-61, 483 Santa Maria Infante, 451
and ETO supply, 48, 56-57, 167, 179-80, 182, 256, Santerno River, 351
641 Sarmi, 314
and German gas retaliation, 156, 183 Satan tanks. See Flame thrower tanks.
and main armament flame thrower, 608 Sauer River, 484-85, 485n, 486-87
INDEX 693
Sault Ste. Marie Locks, 325, 326, 326n Shortages—Continued

Savernake Forest, 138 mortars and ammunition, 84, 128-30, 133, 168—69,
Schaf, Lt. Frank L., Jr., 189 178-82, 218, 275-76, 460-61, 479-80, 509, 515-
Scheldt River, 360n 16, 519, 642, 646
Schnee Eifel, 600 protective equipment, 90, 107, 138, 139, 168
Schofield Barracks, 220, 286 shipping, 86, 394, 401, 401n, 547
Schophoven, 374, 375 smoke materials, 245, 353, 394
Scott, Lt. Col. Walter M., 45, 54 spare parts, 182
Scrub typhus, 308 tanks, 608, 612
Seabees, 560 WP grenades, 84, 107, 126-27, 262, 643
Seille River, 371n Shower facilities, 130, 168, 174, 253, 279, 310, 643
Seine Base Section, 75n Shuri Line, 517
Selgersdorf-Daubenrath road, 377 Sibert, Maj. Gen. Franklin C., 503, 503n
Senter, Capt. John, 241 Sibert, Maj. Gen. William L., 24, 503n
Service, Chimique de Guerre, 16 Sicily, 109, 114, 122, 127, 133, 289, 298, 301, 311,
Services of Supply (SOS), 32, 33, 142, 238, 420-21. See 328-29, 418, 423, 425-33, 439, 446, 453, 456n,
also Army Service Forces (ASF). 520, 593, 604
AEF, 21, 21n, 22 Sidi Ferruch, 282
ETOUSA, 41-42, 45-47, 50-52, 55, 57-61, 64-65, Sieg River, 381
67, 71-72, 89, 132, 141, 141n, 143, 146-47, 154, Siegfried Line, 472-73, 475, 477, 485, 487-89, 599-601,
159-60, 164, 298, 354-55 603-04, 607, 609, 632
NATOUSA/MTOUSA, 94, 102, 103, 107, 109, 110,Sierre Madre Mountains, 507, 509
112, 113, 114n, 115-16, 121, 127, 132 Sieve River, 351
SWPA, 191, 196-97, 200-205, 208, 210-13, 216, 218- Signal Corps, 24n, 27
19, 239, 250-51, 256-61, 264-66, 395, 397-99, 547 Silica gel, activated, 287-88, 297
Sfax, 329 Sillaro Valley, 351
Shadle, Brig. Gen. Charles S., 637, 655 Simpson, Lt. Gen. William H., 609
attache and chemical officer in England, 37, 40 Skinner, Maj. Richmond H., 525, 527
and chemical administration and supply, 98—100, 102— Skipper, Capt. Howard E., 207
04, 107-08, 112, 114-16, 118-22, 125-27 Skyline Ridge, 518
and chemical mortar use, 430, 460 Smith, Lt. Col. Farleigh E., 485n
as CW officer, AFHQ, 41, 87, 88, 135, 196, 219, 638- Smith, Lt. Gen. Holland M., 560
39, 648-49 Smith, Lt. Col. Robert W., 203, 205, 206, 251, 252
and handling of CWS field elements, 135, 235, 640,
Smoke, colored, 106
641
Smoke, target area marking, 511, 513
and tactical smoke planning, 88, 92
Shaffer, Maj. John J., 294n, 546 Smoke candles, 9, 240
Shannon, USS, 532 Smoke demonstrations, 327, 373, 378, 398, 404, 409, 425
Shaw, Capt. Augustus H., Jr., 373 Smoke generator units, 72, 74, 79, 85, 88, 92, 93, 331,
Shepherd, Lt. Col. Earl L., 485n 361, 393, 402-05, 411. See also Chemical Smoke
Shepton Mallet, 147 Generator Battalions; Chemical Smoke Generator
Sherman-Crocodile tanks. See Flame thrower tanks, Companies.
Sherman-Crocodile. Smoke generators, 172, 279, 321, 395. See also FS Smoke;
Shimbu Line, 507—08 Smoke screen operations, smoke pots and generators.
Shimonek, Lt. Col. William H., 213n, 493 Besler, 291, 331, 335, 336, 342, 404, 406
SHINGLE, 336, 350, 443. See also Anzio. boat-mounted, 93, 335, 337, 343, 345, 348, 357-58,
Shrivenham, 42, 43 382, 395-98, 406, 409-11
Shoe impregnite, 108, 125, 167, 236, 248, 258, 267 Dukw-mounted, 384, 388
Shortages, 125, 266, 641-43 emplacements, 349, 366, 376, 406, 410
chemical service personnel, 268, 274 Esso, 291, 324, 398
containers, 151, 162 FS types, 395, 400
decontaminating apparatus, 107, 130, 132, 133, 139, fuel for, 169, 329, 354
168, 253, 262 Haslar (British), 323, 327, 328, 354
flame throwers, 169, 547, 604 jeep-mounted, 366, 367
incendiaries, 157, 160-61, 562, 565, 621 maintenance problems, 370, 377, 486
landing craft and amphibious vehicles, 395—97, 425, mechanical, 72, 88, 91, 110, 134, 331, 337-40, 346,
501 348, 361, 373-74, 378, 382, 389, 410
Smoke generators—Continued Smoke screen operations—Continued

M1 mechanical, 169, 324, 326-27, 327n, 328-29, 354- night and twilight operations, 324, 331, 335—36, 350,
55, 357-60, 395-96, 404-05, 645 366n, 376, 527, 529
M1 stationary, 324, 325, 326, 405 Normandy, 163, 169, 170, 173, 174, 354, 356-58
M2 mechanical, 169, 174, 302, 331, 352, 355-56, 359, northwest African ports, 327-29, 331, 645
362-68, 370, 377, 393, 395, 398, 399, 403, 645 Okinawa, 409—11
need for two operators, 370 Pacific airborne missions, 412—17
No. 24 (British), 169 Pacific anchorages, 394, 398, 400, 405-11
portable, 357, 409 Panama Canal, 321-22, 322n, 325-26
spare parts manufacture, 129, 290-91 Philippines, 407-08, 416-17, 529
Smoke grenades. See Grenades. "pillaring" effect, 486
Smoke pots, 85, 88, 92, 107, 110, 169, 174, 213, 302, plants and factories, 323, 325
310, 323, 328, 342, 346, 348, 356, 374, 377, 378, ports and harbors, 92, 93, 95, 109-10, 169-70, 301,
380-81, 388-89, 391, 395, 400, 410-11, 435, 442, 302, 327, 353, 358, 360, 395, 396
526 proposed for Pearl Harbor, 404—05
as bomber target, 335 Rapido River crossing, 442—45
British, 92, 323, 327, 329, 331 Rhine River crossings, 381-92, 489-91
fire hazard problems, 97, 408, 644 river crossings, 74, 79, 361, 368, 371, 378, 392-93,
floating, 379, 399, 407, 411 400, 435, 645. See also rivers by name.
for Gilberts assault, 271-72, 405 Salerno landings, 334-36, 342
HC, 199, 267, 324, 345, 352, 372, 374, 378, 379, 404, Sauer-Our and Roer crossings, 486—88
408 smoke control center, 390
installed on ships and craft, 272, 342, 343, 405—06 smoke pots and generators, 328, 331, 348, 367, 374,
M1, 133, 170, 327, 327n, 335, 336, 343, 346, 364, 400, 388
405-06, 435 smoke pots and shell mixture, 345—46
M1A1, 327n southern France landings, 302, 342—44
M4, 133, 170 335, 336, 364, 400, 405 supply installations, 302, 354, 390, 397
M4, floating, 331, 334, 334n, 407 supply routes, 302, 346, 348, 351-52, 360, 392, 457
M5, 327n tactical control of, 366-67, 369, 374-75, 380, 390,
Smoke screen operations 392, 398, 444-45
air installations, 354, 394, 397, 400-402 tank and TD attacks, 352, 473
Anzio beachhead, 336-40, 342, 447 troop movements, 351, 377, 389, 390, 392
and artillery observation, 333, 335, 337, 339-40, 346, U.S. west coast, 405
351, 353, 373-75, 377, 380, 383, 386, 388, 391, 435, use of aircraft, 206-07, 405, 407, 409, 412-17, 508
444, 452, 519 wind effect on, 331, 339, 365, 367, 369-70, 372, 374,
assault landings, 334, 335, 342, 353, 398, 402, 403, 376, 379, 380, 385, 388, 391-92, 407, 414, 416-17,
405, 409, 520, 526-27, 529 428, 443, 486, 520
bridges and bridging sites, 345-46, 348-53, 362, 366- World War I, 9, 9n
68, 372, 374-92, 400, 435, 488 Smoke tanks, 151, 253, 319, 323. See also FS smoke.
British, 322-24 E-1, 416-17
Central Pacific landings, 405—06 E2B25, 319
daylight, 324, 337, 339, 350, 375, 375n, 407, 435 M-10, 240, 412-17
deceptive, 383, 385, 387, 389 M33, 253
fog oil for, 72, 329, 335, 342, 350, 354, 359, 363-64, Snake Hill North, 506
366, 368, 369, 372, 387, 388, 399, 403, 406, 407, Sodium arsenite, 271—72
408, 410, 411 Solome Lake, 517
Fort Driant attack, 474—75 Solomon Islands, 493—94
forward area missions, 350, 353, 360-61, 428-29, 435, Somervell, Lt. Gen. Brehon B., 32, 38, 59, 125
437, 451-52, 457, 473, 481, 508, 510, 645 Sound locator teams, 518
haze production, 333, 337-40, 342, 350-53, 361, 384, South African Antigas Laboratory, 23d, 283
388 South Pacific Area (SOPAC), 191, 191n, 204, 207, 213n,
to hide gun flash, 339, 374, 392 222, 229, 492n, 493, 500
Italian ports, 329-34, 350, 353, 359, 645 Southern Attack Force, 407
large area mission, 321-27, 334, 346, 353-55, 360, Southern Base Section, 51n, 75n, 141n, 298
362, 392-93, 394, 400, 403, 644-45 Southern France, invasion of, 299, 301, 340, 342—44,
misuse of, in New Guinea, 213 350, 453-55, 480n
Moselle crossing at Arnaville, 362-71 Southern Landing Force, 561n, 562
INDEX 695
Southern Line of Communications (SOLOC), 181 Supply—Continued

Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), 191, 193-94, 196, 202, of toxics, 3, 34, 48, 56, 68, 77-78, 107-08, 151, 155,
204-07, 211, 216, 218, 222, 234-35, 239, 240, 242, 218, 229, 239-40, 253-54, 258, 267, 269, 313, 642,
252-55, 293, 319, 395, 399, 497-98, 501, 637, 639- 643, 651-52
40, 642, 644, 651 "War Department Shipping Document" form, 142
Spain, civil war, 535 Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
Special Service Force, 1st, 438 (SHAEF), 67, 68, 68n, 76, 76n, 77, 166, 183, 184,
468, 648
Spessard, Capt. Rutherford H., Jr., 517
Sutton, Lt. Col. James P., 214n
Spray tanks, aircraft. See Smoke tanks.
Sydney, 190, 197, 241, 245, 306, 397
Stark, Lt. Col. Edgar D., 424, 441
Stillger, Lt. Raymond C., 339 T-Force, 303-04
Stima Lagoon, 493 Tabarka, 289
Stokes mortar, See Mortar, Stokes. Tables of basic allowances, 90, 99, 109, 144, 237, 241,
Storage, 107, 152-55, 239-40, 246, 249-54, 281-83, 255, 257-59, 267-69
286-87, 290, 307, 318, 497, 509, 644. See also Tables of organization and equipment, 90, 99, 144, 255,
Depots. 259
Strasbourg, 611 chemical air operations company, 319, 319n
Stubblefield, Lt. Col. Henry I., 119 chemical composite company, 309—11, 313, 317
Stubblefield, Pfc. Richard, 487 chemical decontamination company, 300
chemical depot company, 295
Stubbs, Maj. Gen. Marshall, 64, 65n, 175, 256
chemical general warfare service company, 294—95
Sudbury, 147
chemical laboratory company, 281
Sudbury Egginton, 146 chemical maintenance company, 288
Sulphur trioxide, 414n chemical mortar battalion, 426, 430, 456, 460, 462,
Sulphuric acid, 188, 414n 470-71, 482, 506n, 508
Supply. See also Depots; Shortages. chemical mortar company, glider-borne, 454—55
ammunition planning factors, 109n, 144, 258—60, 265, chemical processing company, 305n
271 chemical smoke generator company, 325
ammunition supply points (ASP's), 124, 275, 299, 301 flame tank battalion, 584
block-loaded shipments, 265-66, 272, 273, 275, 642 Tabontabon, 503
chemical warfare stock in 1941, 34, 236-37, 267 Tacloban, 315, 400, 407
for combat forces special requirements, 110, 170—73, Tanabaru, 586
255-56, 270-71 Tank Battalions
computation of requirements, 90-93, 99—100, 109, 709th, 611
109n, 114-15, 128, 139-40, 143-44, 149-56, 156n, 713th, 584, 587, 588-89
162, 164, 168-69, 172-73, 181, 218, 237-39, 263, 739th, Special (Mine Exploder), 609
265, 271, 274, 275 741st, 610
controlled items, 140, 140n, 141, 257-58 743d, 612
credit allocation systems, 137, 137n, 140—43, 145, 185- Tank Destroyer Battalions
86, 257, 641 641st, 498
CWS-Ordnance-Quartermaster division of responsibil- 823d, 375
ity, 34, 107, 214-15, 258-59, 264, 269, 643-44
Tanks. See also Flame thrower tanks.
local procurement, 182, 237, 244, 246, 290-92, 479,
amphibious, 343, 344
479n, 548, 560
Churchill Mark VII, 605
logistics data compilations for field use, 100, 113, 143-
light, 559, 561, 564, 578, 606, 606n
145, 150, 259
M3, 287
materiel status report supply, 125, 255
M3A1, 560, 561
"pipeline" factor, 268
M4A2, 562
planning for "type" units, 274
M5A1, 576-77
spare parts, 105, 109, 123, 127-29, 132, 168-69, 178-
medium, 560, 561, 563, 580, 584, 605, 606, 610, 612
79, 182, 253, 272-73, 275, 288-92, 478-79, 479n,
547
Tanks, storage, 152, 153, 155
stock overages, 125-26, 132, 158, 166 Tanner, 1st Lt. William J., 220
task force problems, 263—65 Tarawa, 405, 530, 554-55, 559, 564, 589
theater CWS supply systems, 94, 95, 105, 106, 110- Tarr, Lt. Col. Philip R., 43, 45, 54, 79
11, 114, 254-55, 261, 263, 272, 273, 276, 640-43 Task Force, South Pacific, 189
Task Force 6814. See Infantry Divisions, Americal. Übach, 472

Task Unit 78.1.8, 529 Umurbrogol Pocket, 567
Task Unit 79.8.1, 527-29 Underwood, Capt. Charles D., 368
Taunton, 138, 145 Unit gas noncommissioned officers (UGNCO's), 83—84,
Team Cherry, 476—77 214, 224, 228, 230
Tear gas, 3, 7n, 8n, 107 Unit gas officers (UGO's), 83-84, 202, 214, 224, 228,
Thatcham, 138, 145 230
Them, Capt. Eugene F., 504, 517 United Kingdom, 43, 46, 61, 142, 166, 654-55
Thermate, 622, 622n CW production and storage, 151—55
Thermite, 614, 615, 622n incendiary bombing of England, 36—37
Thomas, Lt. Frank J., 344 smoke screening, 322—23
Thomas, Col. Kramer, 465 use of aerial incendiaries, 618—19
Thuillier, Brig. Gen. Henry, 16 United Kingdom Base Section 73, 75n
Tiger Bridge, 450 United States Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA), 189—
Tinian, 401, 561-63, 625, 633 92, 196, 236-40, 284
Tirrell, Cpl. Wilber G., 544-45, 545n United States Army Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI),
Tokyo, incendiary attack on, 624, 628—30 36, 37, 38, 40
Tolman, Maj. John D., 495 United States Army Forces, Central Pacific Area
Tomlinson, Col. Clarence M., 543 (USAFICPA), 224, 224n, 225, 229, 230, 232, 270,
Toowoomba, 195 272-73, 553n, 559-60
TORCH, 43, 44, 87, 89, 90, 92, 140n, 142-46. See also United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE),
North African Theater of Operations. 188-89, 200-205, 216, 252, 258-60, 398, 546, 648
Toulon, 340 United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific (AFMIDPAC),
Townsville, 190, 191n, 203, 240 224, 553n
TRADEWIND task force, 314 United States Army Forces, Pacific (AFPAC), 219, 402,
Training, 77-78, 83-84, 297, 649-50 403, 403n
assault operations, 342, 356, 386, 409, 424, 462, 490, United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas (USAF-
520, 527, 555, 599 POA), 216, 224, 273, 275-76, 553n
chemical field maneuvers, 224, 230 United States Army Forces in the South Pacific Area
civil defense, 165, 221-22, 232 (USAFISPA), 203-04
CWS schools and teams in the Pacific, 193-96, 210, United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, 219, 254
214, 224, 230-32, 235, 307, 399, 548, 649 United States Chemical Warfare Committee (USCWC),
flame tank, 561, 567, 579, 589, 611-12 171, 201, 229
mortar units, 424-25, 429, 450, 453, 461-62, 469, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USSTAF),
490, 496, 500, 507, 515, 527, 530 62, 67, 159, 161, 162
for smoke operations, 326, 356, 387n, 397—99, 404, University of Melbourne, 195
409 University of Queensland, 193
Transport, chemical units, 363, 368, 426, 430, 436, 451-Unmacht, Col. George F.
52, 456, 456n, 478, 482, 501-05, 516, 570 and chemical mortar use, 232, 516, 520—21
and flame thrower and flame tank development, 234,
Tremensuoli, 594
287, 560-61, 567
Trench rattle, 168
and gas and BW preparedness, 221, 224, 227-33, 267,
TRIDENT Conference, 143 268, 296, 649
Triflisco, 435 and need for smoke in Hawaii, 404—05
Triner, Col. Joseph, 67 organization of theater chemical office, 222, 225, 227,
Trobriand Islands, 548 269, 286
Tropical warfare, 203-04, 206, 208, 218, 246, 249-50, and Pearl Harbor attack, 219-21, 267
266, 293-94, 310, 497, 546 position as theater chemical officer, 216, 224—25, 234,
Troyes, 363 235, 288, 521, 553n, 637, 639, 649
Truscott, Maj. Gen. Lucian K., Jr., 337, 340 and service manpower shortage, 274
Tucker, Maj. Woodson C, 220, 542 UTAH Beach, 174, 355-57, 462, 464, 465
Tulagi, 536
Valognes, 178, 179
Tunisia, 98, 114, 289, 298, 327, 328
Vandegrift, Maj. Gen. Alexander A., 536
Turner, Vice Adm. Richmond K., 409, 411, 561n Velden, 80
Turpinite, 7n, 8n Velletri, 452
Tyrrhenian Sea, 346, 442, 450 Venafro, 436, 447
INDEX 697
Verzy, 632 Westbury, 147

Vesuvius, 331, 332n Western Base Section, 141n
Viareggio, 352 Western Defense Command, 325, 326
Victory ships, 529 Western Task Force (WTF), 89, 91-93, 93n, 94-96,
Vietri sul Mari, 434 98-99, 301, 326, 421
Villa, 448 Wewak, 412
Villa Verde Trail, 513, 577 Weymouth, 356
Villedieu, 178 Wheeler Field, 220
Vincennite, 10 White, Lt. Col. G. C., 606
Vire River, 467 White phosphorus (WP), 72, 106, 172, 400n, 415, 421,
Vogelkop Peninsula, 415 433, 440, 495, 497, 509-12, 514, 527, 531, 593.
Volturno River, 345, 435-36 See also Chemical mortar, 4.2-inch; Grenades, white
Vosges, 455 phosphorus.
Vossenack, 611 psychological effect of, 475n, 509
smoke missions, 374, 378, 379, 428, 435, 437, 443,
Waitt, Brig. Gen. Alden H., 28n, 155, 216, 218, 270, 473, 486, 495, 500, 616
637, 652 Whitesides, Col. Sterling E., Jr., 219
as Assistant Chief, CWS, for Field Operations, 33, 56, Wildflecken, 302
57, 77, 85, 100, 101, 104, 106, 171, 179 Wilhelmshaven, 157
and plan for screening airfields, 401 Williams, Maj. Allen H., 397
and the replacement system, 118n Williams, Maj. Arthur H., Jr., 192, 193, 201, 264
and spare parts supply, 182 Williams, Lt. Col. Benjamin D., 485n
and SWPA toxic munitions investigation, 210 Willis, Col. Burton D., 191n, 193, 194, 203
and a unitary CWS organization, 32n Wilson, Brig. Gen. Alexander, 242
Wakde Islands, 314, 499, 501, 502, 551 Wilson, Maj. Alfred J. P., 103, 110, 112, 115
Walker, Lt. Col. George E., 363, 367, 367n Wingard, Lt. Robert E., 231, 232
Walker, Maj. Gen. Walton, 361, 371 Winter Line, 122, 436-42, 651
Wallach, 390, 391 Woebbeking, 1st Lt. Vernon E., 499
Wallington, Col. Edward C., 67, 67n, 78, 79, 80 World War I, 3-18, 534, 614-15, 653
Walmsley, Col. Harold, 80, 390n Worms, 383, 387, 388, 489
War Department General Staff (WDGS), 25, 33, 422n, Wright, Lt. Carroll W., 174
650. See also Army Service Forces; Operations Divi- Wright, Lt. Col. Maurice H., 41, 46, 54, 59, 68
sion, WDGS.
Warnack, Brig. Gen. Alan D., 366 Yamashito, General, 63 5n
Warren, Capt. George B., Jr., 373 Yanka, Lt. Col. Donald E., 485n, 489
"Washington Command Post," 30—32 Yankhauer, Capt. J. R., 175
Washington Conference, 1921, 25 Yap, 502, 576
Waterproofing, 272, 273, 290, 294, 305, 432, 546, 547, Yehle, Cpl. Edward A., 506
550, 559, 564, 575, 595 Young, Lt. Frank W., 365
Waugh, Lt. Robert T., 594, 594n Young, Col. Mason, 378
Weather. See also Smoke Screen operations, wind effect Youngman, Lt. Col. John P., 206
on. Yperite, 14n
Army-Navy study, Pacific, 231 Ypres, gas attack, 5, 7, 8, 8n, 9, 10, 184
and smoke operations, 339, 363, 369, 390 Yuza-Dake, 586
Weber, Maj. Walter C., 202, 206
Wellmich, 385, 386, 386n Zambales Mountains, 505
Wesel, 390, 391 Zamboanga, 400
West Wall, 371-72, 599-601 Zanetti, Col. J. Enrique, 37, 43, 45, 54, 616-17, 622
Westbrook, Capt. Clyde H., 491 Zoroastrian Society, 619
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1990 242-456/00023

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Chemical Warfare Service Chemicals in Combat

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Foreword

Washington, D.C. HAL C. PATTISON

Washington, D.C. BROOKS E. KLEBER

IV. THEATER SUPPLY: EUROPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

VI. THEATER SUPPLY: PACIFIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

VII. CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE UNITS . . . . . . . . . . 277

VIII. LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE MTO . . . . . . . 321

IX. LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE ETO . . . . . . . . 354

X. LARGE AREA SMOKE SCREENS IN THE PACIFIC . . . . . . 394

XI. THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN THE MTO . . . . . . . . . . . 418

XII. THE CHEMICAL MORTAR IN THE ETO . . . . . . . . . . 459

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 659

Origins of the Chemical

Background of Gas Warfare

seemed little likelihood that any product of Haber's laboratory would be

after by a captured German document and a Belgian General Staff

and supervise work on both protection and weapons and organized a

some doubt on the wisdom of the Germans in introducing the cylinder

Full-Scale Gas Warfare

Its 1,000-yard range was adequate for situations in which opposing

the simultaneous firing of a 25-projector battery, each projector firing

But the immediate German counter to this successful Allied use of

chemical warfare research and development, training, supply, and field

As indicated above, supply, both offensive and defensive, came mainly

Staff and Technical Channel

ports of debarkation, and chemical sections of several field army

The CWS Between the Wars

Defining the Role and Responsibilities

In addition to these handicaps, the new service faced another rather

aerial bombardment. General Porter, as chemical instructor at the

The Administrative System

The Logistics System

zation began at the port of debarkation.85 The War Department gov-

in North Africa, involved at the outset no offensive materials and only

The CWS in the European Theater

Erecting the Framework for an Overseas Command

reporting on incendiary bombings, and he began to oversee the chemical

theater headquarters would be co-operation with the British and super-

Source: Adopted From: FM 3-15, 17 Feb 41 and C2, 6 May 43.

left to go overseas. General Porter, under the assumption that he was

headquarters, the CWS preparedness and advisory mission could only

MacArthur moved in as his replacement and took over supervision

Center and a Supply Division section chief moved out to establish

he had served a 4-year tour as assistant military attache in Berlin at the

Gas Warfare Planning

The Second Reorganization

In connection with the determination of Allied policy on chemical

GENERAL PORTER AND TOP-RANKING CHEMICAL OFFICERS IN LONDON, 1943.

and Porter's impressions, advised OCCWS on several European theater

The April Reorganization

These proposals related to Rowan's desire to increase the strength and

request, but even in this there was a strictly limiting factor—officers

LeRoy, now a lieutenant colonel, had 20 officers in his Supply

The First Gas Warfare Plan

capable only of passive defense and individual protection against gas

The June Organization Plan

Six of the nine divisions proposed were to be organized on the pattern

sections to determine requirements, to control materiel, to ordain

Planning and Organization: 1944-45