LABURADA vs.

LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY

FACTS:
Sps. Laburada applied for the registration of Lot 3-A which was approved by the trial
court. Upon motion of petitioners, the trial court issued an order requiring the LRA to issue
the corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA refused. Hence, petitioners
filed an action for mandamus.
The LRA revealed that based on records, Lot 3-A which sought to be registered by
Sps. Laburada is part of Lot No. 3, over which TCT No. 6595 has already been issued. Upon
the other hand, Lot 3-B of said Lot 3 is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337
issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, which was issued as a transfer from
TCT No. 6595. The LRA contended that to issue the corresponding decree of registration
sought by the petitioners, it would result in the duplication of titles over the same parcel of
land, and thus contravene the policy and purpose of the Torrens registration system, and
destroy the integrity of the same.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the LRA may be compelled by mandamus to issue a decree of
registration if it has evidence that the subject land may already be included in an existing
Torrens certificate of title?

HELD:
NO. It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the
registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case.
A second decree for the same land would be null and void, since the principle behind original
registration is to register a parcel of land only once. Thus, if it is proven that the land which
petitioners are seeking to register has already been registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance
of a decree of registration to petitioners will run counter to said principle. The issuance of a
decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act
which may be compelled through mandamus. It is not legally proper to require the LRA to
issue a decree of registration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to
the court of origin in Pasig City. The LRA, on the other hand, is ORDERED to submit to the
court a quo a report determining with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property
described in TCT No. 6595, within sixty (60) days from notice. After receipt of such report,
the land registration court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with deliberate and judicious speed, to
settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue the decree of registration, according to the
facts and the law as herein discussed.
Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro
G.R. No. 112905; 3 February 2000
Facts:
1) Application for registration of the same parcel of land filed 12 years apart in different
branches of the CFI; a certificate was issued in one case while the other was still pending.
2) In 1956, Predo Lopez, et al. filed an application for registration of a parcel of land in
Tagaytay City, to which the Municipality of Silang, Cavite opposed; a portion of the land
being leased by the municipality to private persons had been its patrimonial property since
1930.
3) Applicant claimed that part of the land was their inheritance, but was excluded in the
application for registration since it is located in Laguna; same with the part of the land in
Tagaytay which was excluded from the proceedings in the CFI of Laguna.
4) Lower court denied the motion to dismiss since the oppositor municipality had no
personality to intervene.
5) Meanwhile, the Land Registration Commission discovered that part of the land had been
decreed in favor of private respondent de Castro, the land being initially owned by one
Hermogenes Orte who sold the land to the father of de Castro in 1932. However the deed of
sale was destroyed during the Japanese occupation.
6) Heirs of Pedro Lopez filed a complaint for execution of judgment and cancellation of land
titles of the defendants, claiming that they had been unduly deprived ownership and
possession of the land due to wrongful registration by means of fraud and misrepresentation.
Issue:
Were the heirs of Pedro Lopez deprived of their ownership and possession of the contested
land?
Ruling:
No. The petitioners failed to exercise the due diligence required of them as applicants for land
registration. In the same way that publication of their application for registration was
supposed to have rendered private respondents on constructive notice of such application, the
publication of notice in the land registration proceedings initiated by private respondents had
the same effect of notice upon petitioners. Petitioners were thus presumed to have been
notified of the land registration proceedings filed by private respondents, thereby providing
them with the opportunity to file an opposition thereto.
Petitioners neglected for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, they could or should have done earlier. They neglected or omitted to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that they either had
abandoned or declined to assert it. In short, they were guilty of laches.
NB:
A proceeding  in rem, such as land registration proceedings, requires constructive seizure of
the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the
property.
Constructive seizure of the land for registration is effected through publication of the
application for registration and service of notice to affected parties.
In land registration proceeding, all interested parties are obliged to take care of their interests
and to zealously pursue their objective of registration on account of the rule that whoever
first acquires title to a piece of land shall prevail. The rule refers to the date of the
certificate of title and not to the date of filing of the application for registration of title.
The doctrine of stale demands or laches is based on grounds of policy which requires, for
the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and is principally a question of the
inequality or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
An applicant for registration has but a one-year period from the issuance of the decree of
registration in favor of another applicant, within which to question the validity of the
certificate of title issued pursuant to such decree. Once the one-year period has elapsed, the
title to the land becomes indefeasible.
This does not mean however that the aggrieved party is without a remedy at law. If the
property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for reconveyance is
still available. The decree becomes incontrovertible and can no longer be reviewed after one
(1) year from the date of the decree so that the only remedy of the landowner whose property
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name is to bring an ordinary
action in court for reconveyance, which is an action in personam and is always available as
long as the property has not passed to an innocent third party for value. If the property has
passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the remedy is an action for
damages.
Venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters. Jurisdiction may not be conferred by
consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject-
matter of an action; but the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the
consent of the parties…
Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived.
PINO VS CA

The decision of the CA affirming in toto the decision of the RTC of Echague, Isabela is now
being assailed in the instant petition for certiorari.
 
Lot 6 was acquired by the spouses Juan Gaffud and Rafaela Donato. Juan Gaffud died in
1936. On Jan. 11, 1938, Lot 6 was originally registered (OTC No. 4340) in the Registration
Book of the Office of the RD in the names of Rafaela, Raymundo and Cicero Gaffud (sons of
spouses) as co-owners, . The said lot was sold to Rafaela Donato through a Deed of Transfer
which cancelled OTC NO. 4340 and in lieu thereof a TCT was issued in the name of Rafaela
alone.
 
On Feb. 1967, Rafaela sold a portion of Lot 6 in favor in Fortunato Pascua. The aforesaid sale
caused the subdivision of the said lot into Lot-6-A and Lot-6-B. Upon registration of said sale
in favor of Pascua, TCT No. T-32683 was issued in the name of Rafaela Donato on March
2, 1967 covering the land designated as Lot 6-B.
 
On Jun. 10, 1970, Rafaela Donato sold to petitioner Felicisima Pino said Lot-6-B as
evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale which was duly notarized. Rafaela undertook to
register said Deed with the RD of Isabela and on July 13, 1970, the sale was inscribed therein
and a TCT was issued in the name of Felicisima Pino.
 
On Sept. 1980, Cicero Gaffud died survived by his wife Demetrian and sons Romulo and
Adolfo, private respondents herein.
On March 9, 1982, private respondents filed a complaint for nullity of sale
and reconveyance against petitioner — Felicisima Pino. (During the pendency of the case
before the trial court, Rafaela Donato, who was not a party to the case, died on November her
26, 1982.)
The RTC ruled and this was sustained by respondent CA  that petitioner Pino is not a
purchaser in good faith, so (a) the Deed of Absolute Sale made by Rafaela in favor of Pino
null and void insofar as the shares of Cicero and Raymundo are concerned, (b) cancellation of
TCT No. 49380 in the name of Pino and (c) reconvey one-half of Lot-6-B to plaintiffs
withing 10 days.

ISSUE: WON Pino is an innocent purchaser for value.

RULING: Yes. Where the certificate of title is in the hands of the vendor when the land
is sold, the vendee for value has the right to rely on what appears on the certificate of title. In
the absence of anything to excite or arouse suspicion, the vendee is under no obligation to
look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor.
The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate
and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the
face of the TCT and dispense with the need for inquiring further except when the party
concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably
cautious man to make such further inquiry.
The action had already prescribed because it was filed 15 years after the sale and issuance of
TCT in 1967. The remedy for the petitioner is to bring action for damages against those who
caused the fraud.
Leonida Cureg, Romeo Carniyan, et al. v. IAC, Domingo Apostol, et al.
GR No. 73465 | September 7, 1989 | Medialdea, J. (Gel)

Facts: In 1982 Apostol, et al filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages with
preliminary injunction against the Carniyans with the RTC of Isabela. Apostol, et al. alleged
that they are the legal heirs of Domingo Geraro who has been in OCEN possession of a
parcel of land referred to as "motherland" since time immemorial or before July 26, 1894.
During the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition with Voluntary Reconveyance, the
motherland already showed/manifested signs of accretion of about 3 has on the north caused
by the northward movement of the Cagayan River. Apostol declared the motherland and its
accretion for tax purposes under a tax declaration. Apostol, et al. were about to cultivate their
“motherland” together with its accretion, they were prevented and threatened by the
Carniyans from continuing to do so.

Carniyans’ answer: the “motherland” is nonexistent; that Antonio Carniyan, petitioners’

RTC: Apostol is the absolute owner

Issue: WoN can be considered riparian owners who are entitled to the “subject land” which is
an accretion

Held: Yes. OCT is better than tax declarations!

Apostol's claim of ownership is anchored on 4 tax declarations, while Carniyans relied on the
indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of their OCT No. P19093, dated November 25,
1968.The declaration of ownership for purposes of assessment on the payment of the tax is
not sufficient evidence to prove ownership. As against tax declarations and/or tax receipts
which are not conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof of the area covered therein, an
OCT indicates true and legal ownership by the registered owners over the disputed premises.
Since OCT clearly stated that subject land is bounded on the north by the Cagayan River,
Apostol's claim over their “motherland,” allegedly existing between petitioners’ land and the
Cagayan River, is deemed barred and nullified with the issuance of the OCT.

Thus the alleged “motherland” claimed by private respondents is nonexistent. The “subject
land” is an alluvial deposit left by the northward movement of the Cagayan River and
pursuant to NCC 457:

“To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters.”

However, it should be noted that the area covered by OCT No. P19093 is only 4,584 m2. The
accretion attached to said land is approximately 5.5 hectares. The increase in the area of
petitioners’ land, being an accretion left by the change of course or the northward movement
of the Cagayan River does not automatically become registered land just because the lot
which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. (Grande v. CA, 1962). As such, it
must also be placed under the operation of the Torrens System

Petition granted. IAC reversed.

LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

FACTS: The subject property, was first owned by Santos de la Cruz who declared the
same in his name under Tax Declaration Nos. 3932; 3933; and 6905. Subsequently, the
subject property was successively bought or acquired by Pedro Cristobal, Regino Gervacio,
Diego Calugdan and Gil Alhambra. After Gil Alhambra died, his heirs extra-judicially
partitioned the subject property and declared it in their names under Tax Declaration in the
year 1960. On 5 July 1966, they executed a "Deed of Sale With Mortgage" deeding the
subject property to private respondent for P231,340.00 payable in three (3) installments, the
payment of which was secured by a mortgage on the property. Upon receipt of the full
payment, they executed a "Release of Mortgage". After the sale, private respondent took
possession of the subject property and paid the taxes due thereon for the years 1966 up to
1986, and in 1985 declared it in his name under Tax Declaration Nos. B-013-01392 and B-
013-01391. He appointed Mauricio Plaza and Jesus Magcanlas as the administrator and
caretaker thereof, respectively. Due to losses, the property in question was cultivated only for
a while. Five (5) years according to Mauricio Plaza, and from 1966, up to 1978 according to
Jesus Magcanlas.
On 14 November 1986, private respondent filed a petition, which was amended on 17
July 1987, for the registration and confirmation of his title over the subject property.
 On 24 February 1988, oppositor-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic,
for brevity), filed its opposition maintaining, among others, that:
(1) petitioner-appellee and his predecessors-in-interest have not been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since 12 June 1945
or prior thereto; (2) the muniment of title and tax declarations as well as tax payments relied
upon do not constitute sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land by petitioner-
appellee and of his open, continuous possession and occupation thereof in the concept of
owner since 12 June 1945, or prior thereto, and (3) the subject property pertains to the public
domain and is not subject to private appropriation.
On 9 March 1988, after the compliance of the jurisdiction requirements was proved
and, on motion, the lower court issued its order of general default.
Aside from the Republic, there were others who opposed the petition and filed their
opposition
On 3 January 1991 Proclamation No. 679 was issued by the President of the Republic
of the Philippines withdrawing the subject property from sale or settlement and reserve (the
same) for slum improvement and sites and services program under the administration and
disposition of the National Housing Authority in coordination with the National Capital
Region, Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
Private respondent filed his memorandum
Among the oppositors, only the Republic filed a notice of appeal
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the trial court's judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Tax declarations or Realty Tax payments are not sufficient
proof of ownership.

HELD: Proof that private respondent and his predecessors-in-interest have acquired
and have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
property for a period of 30 years under a bona fide claim of ownership are the tax
declarations of private respondent's predecessors-in-interest, the deed of sale, tax payment
receipts and private respondent's tax declarations
Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of
owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a
claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and
announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government.
Presidential Proclamation No. 679 which was issued on January 7, 1991 or almost 6
months prior to the issuance of the trial court's decision, did not have any effect on the
subject property as the proclamation only withdrew it from sale or settlement and reserved
the same for slum improvement and sites and services program, but subject to actual survey
and existing private rights. The proclamation did not prohibit the registration of title of one
who claims, and proves, to be the owner thereof."
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision dated February 8, 1993 is hereby
AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Cuenco v. Vda. De Manguerra
FACTS
 Concepcion (respondent) filed the initiatory complaint herein for specific
performance against her uncle Miguel Cuenco (petitioner, later substituted by
Cuyegkeng).
o Concepcion’s father, the late Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco (who became
Senator) and Miguel Cuenco formed the ‘Cuenco and Cuenco Law Offices’
o Cuenco and Cuenco Law Offices served as lawyers in two (2) cases entitled
‘Valeriano Solon versus Zoilo Solon’ and ‘Valeriano Solon versus Apolonia
Solon’ involving a dispute among relatives over ownership of lot 903 of the
Banilad Estate
 Records of said cases indicate the name of the Miguel alone as counsel of record, but
in truth and in fact, the real lawyer behind the success of said cases was the influential
Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco
 After winning the said cases:
o Lot 903-A: 5000 square meters (Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco’s attorney’s fees)
o Lot 903-B: 5000 square meters (Miguel Cuenco’s attorney’s fees)
o Lot 903-C: 54,000 square meters (Solon’s retention)
 Mariano Cuenco entrusted Lot 903 A to Miguel.
o Miguel was able to obtain in his own name a title for Lot 903-A
o Miguel was under the obligation to hold the title in trust for his brother
Mariano’s children by first marriage
 Lot 903-A was partitioned into six (6) sub-lots (Lots 903-A-1 to 903-A-6) to
correspond to the six (6) children of Mariano’s first marriage (Teresita, Manuel,
Lourdes, Carmen, Consuelo, and Concepcion)
 The case of Concepcion
o Five deeds of donation were executed in favour of five children. This left out
Concepcion (who became respondent in this case).
o Concepcion occupied Lot 903-A-6 and paid taxes for it.
o When Concepcion went to the Register of Deeds to register the Lot 903-A-6,
there was an adverse claim by Miguel saying that he was the absolute owner
of said lot.
 Miguel’s allegations
 o He executed five deeds of donation to five children of his brother because of
the love, care and gratitude <3 they exhibited during his long sickness.
o Concepcion never visited him.
 Miguel was able to take the witness stand but he became sick and was not able to be
present on cross-examination so his testimony was stricken off the record.
 Marietta Cuyegkeng (her only daughter) substituted him (Miguel) in the case.
o She is the owner of the lot as he purchased it from his father.
o That she was aware of the case because her father used to commute to Cebu to
attend hearings.
o That she constructed a house on the said lot.
 Lower court and appellate court:
o Concepcion has the legal right of ownership over lot 903-A-6.
o The CA ruled that the subject land "is part of the attorney’s fees of Don
Mariano Cuenco, predecessor-in-interest of Concepcion Cuenco vda. de
Manguerra and Miguel merely holds such property in trust for her.
ISSUE: Whether Concepcion is entitled to ownership of the property (Lot 903-A-6)
RULING
 Given as attorney’s fees was one hectare of Lot 903, of which two five-thousand
square meter portions were identified as Lot 903-A and Lot 903-B. That only Miguel
handled Civil Case No. 9040 does not mean that he alone is entitled to the attorney’s
fees in the said cases. "When a client employs the services of a law firm, he does
not employ the services of the lawyer who is assigned to personally handle the
case. Rather, he employs the entire law firm." Being a partner in the law firm,
Mariano -- like Miguel -- was likewise entitled to a share in the attorney’s fees
from the firm’s clients.
 Although Lot 903-A was titled in Miguel’s name, the circumstances surrounding the
acquisition and the subsequent partial dispositions of this property eloquently speak of
the intent that the equitable or beneficial ownership of the property should belong to
Mariano and his heirs.
o Lot 903-A was one half of the one-hectare portion of Lot 903 given as
attorney’s fees by a client of the law firm of Partners Miguel and Mariano
Cuenco. Lot 903-A was one half of the one-hectare portion of Lot 903 given
as attorney’s fees by a client of the law firm of Partners Miguel and Mariano
Cuenco
o Miguel readily surrendered his Certificate of Title and interposed no objection
to the subdivision and the allocation of the property to Mariano’s six children,
including Concepcion.
o Mariano’s children, including Concepcion, were the ones who shouldered the
expenses incurred for the subdivision of the property
o After the subdivision of the property, Mariano’s children -- including
Concepcion -- took possession of their respective portions thereof.
o The legal titles to five portions of the property were transferred via a
gratuitous deed of conveyance to Mariano’s five children, following the
allocations specified in the subdivision plan prepared for Lourdes Cuenco.
 Respondent is not barred by laches. In the present case, respondent has persistently
asserted her right to Lot 903-A-6 against petitioner
LEE HONG KOK vs. DAVID

Nature: This is an appeal by certiorari for the reversal of the decision of the CA in affirming
the decision of the lower court in dismissing the complaint to have the Torrens Title of
Aniano David be declared null and void.

Facts:
Aniano David acquired lawful title to a parcel of land pursuant to his miscellaneous
sales application. An order of award and for issuance of a sales patent was made by the
Director of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892 containing an area of 226 square
meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre. On the basis of the order of
award of the Director of Lands, the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
issued Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which an OCT was issued by the
Register of Deeds of Naga City to Aniano David. Since the filing of the sales application of
Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with said application, up to the
actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any
opposition or adverse claim to Lot 2892.
The opposition was fatal because after the registration and issuance of the certificate
and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby
automatically comes under the operation of RA 496 subject to all the safeguards provided
therein. Under Section 38 of RA 496, any question concerning the validity of the certificate
of title based on fraud should be raised within 1 year from the date of the issuance of the
patent otherwise the certificate of title becomes indefeasible after the lapse of 1 year. The
plaintiff-appellants further contended that the Lot is a private property for it was formed thru
the process of accretion.

Issue: WON the patent certificate obtained by Aniano David is void?

Held: NO
The Lot in question is not a private property as the Director of Lands and the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained its public character for
having been formed by reclamation and not accretion. Therefore the only remedy available to
the appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud. However, Aniano David
has not committed any fraud in applying for the purchase of the Lot because everything was
done in the open. The notices regarding the auction sale of the land were published, the actual
sale and award thereof to Aniano David were not clandestine but open and public official acts
of an officer of the Government. The application was merely a renewal of his deceased wife's
application who had occupied the land since 1938.
Imperium refers to the government authority possessed by the state which is
appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty while dominium refers to the state’s
capacity to own or acquire property. The use of dominium is appropriate with reference to
lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the
exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except
as limited by the Constitution. The manifestation of the concept of jura regalia, which was
adopted by the present Constitution, was embodied in the universal feudal theory that all
lands were held from the Crown, the ownership however is vested in the state rather than the
head thereof.
As to the unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain, the sole power
of legislation is vested in Congress. There being no evidence whatever that the property in
question was ever acquired by the applicants or their ancestors either by composition title
from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title or by any other means for
the acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be public domain (Heirs of Datu
Pendatun v. Director of Lands). For it is well-settled "that no public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government. Therefore it is
indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of acquisition
recognized by law otherwise the property is and remains part of the public domain.
The proceedings under the Land Registration Law and under the provisions of
Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that both are against the whole world,
both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of registration issued is
conclusive and final. A holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably
situated than that of an owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force
and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in
his favor the right to repurchase within a period of five years (Cabacug v. Lao). Only the
Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a
void patent. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government.
Private parties like the plaintiffs cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land
involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared
as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their private
property. 

Intestate of San Pedro v CA (265 SCRA 733)

FACTS:
The case involves two petitions which were consolidated by the court in its decision.

1. GR 103727
Engracio San Pedro, as heir-judicial administrator of Plaintiff Intestate, filed a complaint for
recovery of real property/ reconveyance with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction
against private defendants Ocampo, Buhain and dela Cruz.
San Pedro alleged that defendants acquired portion of the subject estate by employing fraud,
bad faith and misrepresentation.
RTC of QC dismissed the complaint saying that the defendants are already the registered
owners covered by the Torrens Title - which cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish Title
of San Pedro. The Spanish Title also stated that the estate shall be excluded from the
coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136. The court ordered Plaintiff Intestate to pay each
defendant the amount of 5,000 and atty fees.
Motion for Recon was denied.  Petitioner filed an appeal,  CA dismissed.  

2. GR 106496

Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito filed a petition for letter of administration over the
intestate to be appointed as administrator and co-administrator. Judge Echeverri appointed
San Pedro as administrator and the court issued letter of administration in his favor upon
posting a bond of 10,000.
Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for intervention and opposition to the petition,
claiming that the Titulo de Propriedad is inadmissible and ineffective proof of ownership in
court and it is invalid.
Republic filed a motion to suspend the proceedings but the Republic‘s opposition to the
petition for letter of administration was dismissed. Republic filed Motion for Recon.
The Judge declared Titulo de Propriedad as null and void and excluded all lands covered
from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro.
bPetitioner-heirs appealed to CA. CA dismissed.

ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in settling the issue of ownership of the estate covered by Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136?

2. Whether or not the lower court committed error in excluding from the inventory of the
estate all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 on the ground that it is null and
void?

RATIO:

1.NO. It is within the jurisdiction of the lower court functioning as probate court. The
jurisdiction of the Probate Court is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and
what shares are due them. Their main function is to settle and liquidate the estate of the
deceased so as to rule on whether the inventory of the estate properly included them for
distribution of the net assets estate to lawful heirs.

2.NO. The lower court did not commit any error when it declared Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136 as null and void, consequently excluding all lands covered by the said title from the
inventory of the estate.
Under PD 892, the system of registration under Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all
holders of Spanish Titles should cause their lands to be registered under Land Registration
Act within 6 months from date of effectivity or until August 16, 1976.
In both cases, petitioner-heirs did not adduce evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136 was brought under the operation of PD 892. There was no certificate of title shown.

Also, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under PD 892, is inadmissible and ineffective as
evidence of private ownership in special proceedings case. Since the Titulo was not registered
under Land Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the registered title of defendants
Ocampo, Buhain and dela Cruz. Torrens title of the latter enjoys the conclusive presumption
of validity.

Petitioner-heirs failed to present neither the original Titulo nor a genuine copy thereof (only
an alleged illegible copy was presented). Even the secondary evidence presented was also not
admissible.

RULING:
The Titulo de Propriedad is null and void and no rights can be derived therefrom. All lands
covered by said Titulo are excluded from inventory of the estate. The petition for letter of
administration closed and terminated. The heirs are disallowed to exercise any act of
possession or ownership and ordered to vacate.