German Management & Services v. CA, G.R. No. l-76216 September 14, 1989
German Management & Services v. CA, G.R. No. l-76216 September 14, 1989
German Management & Services v. CA, G.R. No. l-76216 September 14, 1989
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
FERNAN, C.J.:
Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are
the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942
square meters and covered by TCT No. 50023 of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued on
September 11, 1980 which canceled TCT No. 56762/ T-560. The land was originally registered on August 5,
1948 in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal as OCT No. 19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent granted
by the President of the Philippines on July 27, 1948, under Act No. 141.
On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner German
Management Services to develop their property covered by TCT No. 50023 into a residential subdivision.
Consequently, petitioner on February 9,1983 obtained Development Permit No. 00424 from the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding that part of the property was occupied
by private respondents and twenty other persons, petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the premises but
the latter refused. Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject property which
included the portions occupied and cultivated by private respondents.
Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal
and members of the Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association; that they have occupied and tilled their
farmholdings some twelve to fifteen years prior to the promulgation of P.D. No. 27; that during the first
week of August 1983, petitioner, under a permit from the Office of the Provincial Governor of Rizal, was
allowed to improve the Barangay Road at Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal at its expense, subject
to the condition that it shag secure the needed right of way from the owners of the lot to be affected; that on
August 15, 1983 and thereafter, petitioner deprived private respondents of their property without due process
of law by: (1) forcibly removing and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without
notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other crops of private respondents by means of
force, violence and intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038 and (3) trespassing, coercing and threatening to
harass, remove and eject private respondents from their respective farmholdings in violation of P.D. Nos.
316, 583, 815, and 1028. 1
On January 7,1985, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed private respondents' complaint for forcible
entry. 2 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch LXXI sustained the dismissal by the
Municipal Trial Court. 3
Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On July 24,1986, said court
gave due course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional
Trial Court. 4
The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual possession of the property at the time
they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible
entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession. 5 Petitioner moved to reconsider but the same was
denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated September 26, 1986. 6
The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals denied due process to petitioner when it
reversed the decision of the court a quo without giving petitioner the opportunity to file its answer and
whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner. 7
We affirm. The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer for due process to exist. The
comment filed by petitioner on February 26, 1986 has sufficiently addressed the issues presented in the
petition for review filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals. Having heard both parties, the
Appellate Court need not await or require any other additional pleading. Moreover, the fact that petitioner
was heard by the Court of Appeals on its motion for reconsideration negates any violation of due process.
Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop the subject property,
private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner because
ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to
an estate. Title is not involved. 8
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private respondents were
already in possession thereof . There is no evidence that the spouses Jose were ever in possession of the
subject property. On the contrary, private respondents' peaceable possession was manifested by the fact that
they even planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act of
destroying their crops.
Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it presented,
such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry
case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in
peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. 9 Thus, a party who
can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be
the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles
him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. 10
Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized petitioner's drastic action of
bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine of self-help
enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil Code. 11 Such justification is unavailing because the doctrine of
self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case
at bar. When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of
property. This is clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code which states, "(I)n no case may possession be
acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes
that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the
competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
July 24,1986 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.