Macalinta V COMELEC (ART 9)
Macalinta V COMELEC (ART 9)
Macalinta V COMELEC (ART 9)
FACTS:
Through a petition for certiorari and prohibition, Petitioner seeks the declaration of RA
9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) as unconstitutional. One of the questions
raised by the petitioners is the constitutionality of Sections 19 and 25 of the said Republic Act
which he avers violates Section 1, Article IX of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
Petitioner holds that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee which
has the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the COMELEC , RA 9189 intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC,
which as independent constitutional body, is not under the control of either the executive or the
legislative departments of government; that only COMELEC itself can promulgate rules and
regulations which may be changed or revised only by the majority of its members; and that
should the rules promulgated by COMELEC violate any law, it is the Court that has the power to
review the same via the petition of ay interested party, including legislators.
ISSUE
Whether or not the independence of COMELEC is encroached by Congress through the
creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee?
RULING
Yes. The Congress is overstepping on the powers of COMELEC upon the creation of the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
RATIO DECIDENDI
R.A. No. 9189 created the JCOC, as follows:
SEC. 25.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and evaluate the
implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules
and Regulations promulgated by the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules. – The Commission shall issue the
necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty
(60) days from the effectivity of this Act. The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be
submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior
approval.
Composed of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) is a purely legislative body. There is no question
that the authority of Congress to "monitor and evaluate the implementation" of R.A. No. 9189 is
geared towards possible amendments or revision of the law itself and thus, may be performed in
aid of its legislation.
However, aside from its monitoring and evaluation functions, R.A. No. 9189 gives to the
JCOC the following functions: (a) to "review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations" (IRR) promulgated by the COMELEC [Sections 25 and 19]; and (b)
subject to the approval of the JCOC [Section 17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three
countries for the May 2004 elections and in any country determined by COMELEC.
The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by
other constitutional provisions. One such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution ordaining that constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC shall be
"independent."
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent
body "except those specifically granted by the Constitution," that is, to review its decisions,
orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized
extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence
of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.
By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the COMELEC to
"issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act
within sixty days from the effectivity of this Act." This provision of law follows the usual
procedure in drafting rules and regulations to implement a law – the legislature grants an
administrative agency the authority to craft the rules and regulations implementing the law it
has enacted, in recognition of the administrative expertise of that agency in its particular field of
operation.47 Once a law is enacted and approved, the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and complete. The legislative function may spring back to Congress relative to the
same law only if that body deems it proper to review, amend and revise the law, but certainly not
to approve, review, revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional
authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the
COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its
usual reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that "[t]he Implementing
Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created by virtue of this Act for prior approval," and the second sentence of the second
paragraph of Section 25 stating that "[i]t shall review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission," whereby Congress, in
both provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not specifically vested by the Constitution,
should be stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Both provisions
brazenly violate the mandate on the independence of the COMELEC.
Similarly, the phrase, "subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight
Committee" in the first sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the Commission to authorize
voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May, 2004 elections; and the phrase,
"only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee" found in the
second paragraph of the same section are unconstitutional as they require review and approval
of voting by mail in any country after the 2004 elections. Congress may not confer upon itself
the authority to approve or disapprove the countries wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as
determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No.
9189.48 Otherwise, Congress would overstep the bounds of its constitutional mandate and
intrude into the independence of the COMELEC.