Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No.

4103)

1) Definition.

a) Indeterminate sentence is a sentence with a minimum term and a maximum

benefit of a guilty person, who is not disqualified therefore, when the maximum
penalty of imprisonment exceeds one year.  It applies to both violations of the
Revised Penal Code and special penal laws.
b) The law requires that the trial court must, instead of a single fixed penalty,
determine two penalties, referred to as the "maximum" and "minimum". The
prisoner must serve the minimum penalty before he is eligible for parole under the
provisions of Act No. 4103, which leaves the period between the minimum and
maximum penalty indeterminate in the sense that he may, under the condition set
out in said Act, be released from serving said period in whole or in part. He must
be sentenced, therefore, to imprisonment for a period which is not more than the
"maximum" nor less than the "minimum", as these terms are used in the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.1

2) Purposes.

a) To uplift and redeem valuable human material and prevent unnecessary

and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness. 2
b) To rehabilitate the prisoner morally and socially to his redeem the individual
for economic usefulness and other social ends. 3
c) To favor the accused particularly to shorten his term of imprisonment,
depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record as a
prisoner.4
3) Liberal interpretation.

a) The Indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of

compassion, and should be liberally interpreted in favor of the accused. 5
b) Since the goal of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to look kindly on the
accused, the application or interpretation of the law is one that is more favorable to
the accused.6

4) Coverage.

a) Revised Penal Code

1
People v. Ducosin, G.R. No. L-38332, December 14, 1933.
2
People v. Oňate, 78 SCRA 43.
3
Ibid.
4
Separate Opinion, Justice Corona in People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008.
5
People v. Nang Kay, 88 Phil. 515 (1951).
6
Separate Opinion, Justice Corona in People v. Temporada, supra.
 i) The court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Code, and the minimum term
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed
by the Code for the offense. The maximum is the penalty imposed as provided by
law, depending upon the attending circumstances.  The minimum is one degree
next lower to the penalty prescribed for the offense.  The latter is determined without
considering the attending circumstances to the penalty prescribed, and is left to the
discretion of the court.7
ii) Example: Homicide with one mitigating circumstance.  The maximum
penalty prescribed by law is Reclusion temporal.  Since there is one mitigating
and no aggravating it will be in the minimum or reclusion temporal minimum
period.  On the other hand, the minimum is one degree next lower to reclusion
temporal without considering the mitigating circumstance and that will be prision
mayor.  The range of prision mayor will depend upon the discretion of the court. 
Therefore, the indeterminate penalty is a minimum of prision mayor (within the
range fixed by the court) to a maximum of reclusion temporal minimum period.

b) Special Penal Law.

i) The court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the

maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and
the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. 
ii) Example:  Penalty is one year to 5 years.  Indeterminate sentence may be
one year to 3 years or 3 years to 5 years.

c) Exceptions.

i) Those convicted of offenses punished with death or life imprisonment.

ii) Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason,
misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage, or piracy.
iii) Those who are habitual delinquents. (Recidivists are entitled to an
indeterminate sentence.)8
iv) Those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence. (A
minor who escaped from confinement in the reformatory is entitled to the benefits
of the law because confinement is not considered imprisonment.) 9
v) Those who having been granted conditional pardon by the President shall
have violated the terms thereof.
vi) Those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed one
year. (The application of which is based upon the penalty actually imposed in

7
People v. Yco, G.R. No. 6545, July 27, 1954.
8
People v. Jaranilla, G.R. No. 28547, February 22, 1974.
9
People v. Perez, 44 OG 3884.
 accordance with law.)10
vii) Those already serving final judgment upon the approval of this Act
(December 5, 1933).
viii) Those sentenced to the penalty of destierro or suspension.

5) Concepts.

a) Nature.Whenever any prisoner who shall have served the minimum penalty
imposed on him, said Board of Indeterminate Sentence may, in its discretion, and in
accordance with the rules and regulations adopted thereunder, authorize the release
of such prisoner on parole.  If during the period of surveillance, such
parolee shall show himself to be a law-abiding citizen and shall not violate any of the
laws of the Philippines, the Board may issue a final certificate of release in his favor. 
Whenever any prisoner released on parole shall, during the period of surveillance,
violate any of the conditions of his parole, the Board may issue an order for his re-
arrest and shall serve the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum sentence.11
b) Mandatory application. The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
is mandatory if the imprisonment would exceed one year.  It would be favorable to
the accused.12The imposition of an indeterminate sentence is mandatory. 13 In a
case,14 three persons were prosecuted for and found guilty of illegal fishing (with
the use of explosives) as defined in Section 33, Presidential Decree No. 704, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1058, for which the prescribed penalty was
imprisonment from 20 years to life imprisonment. The trial court imposed on each
of the accused a straight penalty of 20 years imprisonment, and the CA affirmed
the trial court. On appeal, however, this Court declared the straight penalty to be
erroneous, and modified it by imposing imprisonment ranging from 20 years, as
minimum, to 25 years, as maximum. However, the law was not applied in a case
involvingprosecution for illegal possession of firearms punished by a special law
(that is, Section 2692, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act 56 and Republic Act No. 4) with imprisonment of not less than
five years nor more than ten years. There, the Court sustained the straight penalty
of five years and one day imposed by the trial court (Court of First Instance of
Rizal) because the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law would be
unfavorable to the accused by lengthening his prison sentence. 15 
c) Straight penalty is proscribed. The straight penalty is contrary to the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, whose Section 1 requires that the penalty of
imprisonment should be an indeterminate sentence. The imposition of an
indeterminate sentence with maximum and minimum periods in criminal cases not
excepted from the coverage of the Indeterminate Sentence Law pursuant to its

10
People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7616, May 10, 1955.
11
People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008 (EnBanc).
12
People v. Judge German Lee, Jr., G.R. No. 86859, September 12, 1984.
13
Batistis v. People, G.R. No. 181571, December 16, 2009.
14
Argoncillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118806, July 10, 1998.
15
People v. Nang Kay, 88 Phil. 515 (1951).
 Section 216is mandatory. The need for specifying the minimum and maximum
periods of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and
excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the
accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending
upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record. The requirement of
imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether punishable by
the Revised Penal Code or by special laws, with definite minimum and maximum
terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range of the penalty specified by
the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory. 17
d) The imposable penalty, not the prescribed, is the basis whether ISL applies.
The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is based upon the penalty
actually imposed in accordance with law and not upon that which may be imposed
in the discretion of the court.18In determining "whether an indeterminate sentence
and not a straight penalty is proper, what is considered is the penalty actually
imposed by the trial court, after considering the attendant circumstances, and not
the imposable penalty." Thus, ifthe maximum of the imposable penalty is six
months, then the possible maximum term that can be actually imposed is surely
less than one year, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable. As a result,
it is proper to impose a straight penalty. 19
e) The “attending circumstances” in Section 120 are not limited to modifying
circumstances under Article 13 and 14 of RPC. The plain terms of the ISL show that
the legislature did not intend to limit "attending circumstances" as referring to
Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC. If the legislature intended that the "attending
circumstances" under the ISL be limited to Articles 13 and 14, then it could have
simply so stated. The wording of the law clearly permits other modifying
circumstances outside of Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC to be treated as "attending
circumstances" for purposes of the application of the ISL, such as quasi-recidivism
under Article 160 of the RPC. Under this provision, "any person who shall commit a
felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such
sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of
the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony." This circumstance has been
interpreted by the Court as a special aggravating circumstance where the penalty
actually imposed is taken from the prescribed penalty in its maximum period without

16
Section 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life
imprisonment; to those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; to those convicted of
misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual
delinquents; to those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been
granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to those whose maximum
term of imprisonment does not exceed one year; nor to those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of
approval of this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof. (As amended by Act No. 4225, Aug. 8, 1935)
17
Batistis v. People, supra. citing Spouses Bacar v. Judge de Guzman, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-96-1349, April 18,
1997
18
People v. Dimalanta, 92 Phil., 239.
19
Lumauig v. People, G.R. No. 166680, July 7, 2014.
20
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code,
or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of said
Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code
for the offense;
regard to any generic mitigating circumstances. Since quasi-recidivism is
considered as merely a special aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower in
degree is computed based on the prescribed penalty without first considering said
special aggravating circumstance.21
f) How to compute:

i) The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general prescription for the
felonies defined therein which consists of a range of period of time. This is what
is referred to as the "prescribed penalty." For instance, under Article 249 of the
RPC, the prescribed penalty for homicide is reclusión temporal which ranges
from 12 years and 1 day to 20 years of imprisonment. Further, the Code provides
for attending or modifying circumstances which when present in the commission
of a felony affects the computation of the penalty to be imposed on a convict.
This penalty, as thus modified, is referred to as the "imposable penalty." In the
case of homicide which is committed with one ordinary aggravating circumstance
and no mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty under the RPC shall be
the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. From this imposable penalty, the
court chooses a single fixed penalty (also called a straight penalty) which is the
"penalty actually imposed" on a convict, i.e., the prison term he has to serve.
ii) Concretely, in U.S. v. Saadlucap,a pre-ISL case, the accused was found
guilty of homicide with a prescribed penalty of reclusión temporal. Since there
was one ordinary aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances in
this case, the imposable penalty is reclusión temporal in its maximum period, i.e.,
from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years. The court then had the discretion
to impose any prison term provided it is within said period, so that the penalty
actually imposed on the accused was set at 17 years, 4 months and 1 day
of reclusión temporal, which is a single fixed penalty, with no minimum or
maximum term.
iii) With the passage of the ISL, the law created a prison term which consists
of a minimum and maximum term called the indeterminate sentence.Thus, the
maximum term is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the RPC. In other words, the penalty actually imposed
under the pre-ISL regime became the maximum term under the ISL regime.
Upon the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to the prescribed penalty. To illustrate, if the case of Saadlucap was
decided under the ISL regime, then the maximum term would be 17 years, 4
months and 1 day of reclusión temporal and the minimum term could be
anywhere within the range of prisión mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years)
which is the penalty next lower to reclusión temporal. Consequently, an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prisión mayor as minimum to 17 years, 4
months and 1 day of reclusión temporal as maximum could have possibly been
imposed. If we use the formula as proposed by the dissent, i.e., to compute the
minimum term based on the maximum term after the attending or modifying
circumstances are considered, the basis for computing the minimum term, under
21
People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008 (En banc).
this interpretation, is the imposable penalty as hereinabove defined. This
interpretation is at odds with Section 1 of the ISL which clearly states that the
minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall be "within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." Consequently, the
basis for fixing the minimum term is the prescribed penalty, and not the
imposable penalty. In People v. Gonzales, the Court held that the minimum term
must be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense "without
regard to circumstances modifying criminal liability."The Gonzales’ ruling that the
minimum term must be based on the prescribed penalty "without regard to
circumstances modifying criminal liability" is only a restatement of Section 1 of
the ISL that the minimum term shall be taken from within the range of the penalty
next lower to the prescribed penalty (and from nowhere else). 22

g) Guides in computing the indeterminate sentence:

i) Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in imposing a sentence, the court

must determine two penalties composed of the "maximum" and "minimum"
terms, instead of imposing a single fixed penalty. Hence, the indeterminate
sentence is composed of a maximum term taken from the penalty imposable
under the Revised Penal Code and a minimum term taken from the penalty next
lower to that fixed in the said Code.
ii) The maximum term corresponds to that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, "attending circumstances" (such as mitigating, aggravating and
other relevant circumstances) that may modify the imposable penalty applying
the rules of the Revised Penal Code is considered in determining the maximum
term. Stated otherwise, the maximum term is arrived at after taking into
consideration the effects of attendant modifying circumstances.
iii) On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. It is based
on the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense without
considering in the meantime the modifying circumstances.23
iv) Illustration:24 Suppose that a man is found guilty of malversation of public
funds in the amount of P10,000. No mitigating nor aggravating circumstances are
present. Under this law the court may impose on him a maximum sentence not
exceeding ten years and eight months but not less than nine years, four months
and one day (see art. 217, No. 3, Revised Penal Code), and a minimum which
shall not be less than four years, two months and one day (the minimum
imprisonment period of prisioncorreccional in its maximum to prision mayor in its
minimum. See article 61, Revised Penal Code). The court, therefore, may
sentence the accused to be imprisoned for not less than five years

22
People v. Temporada, supra.
23
Separate opinion of Justice Renato Corona, People v. Temporada, supra.
24
People v. Ducosin, G.R. No. L-38332, December 14, 1933.
nor more than ten years or for not less than seven years nor more than ten years
and eight months, etc.
v) It will be seen from the foregoing example that the "maximum" is
determined in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. In the
example given reference is made to Article 217, paragraph 3, of the Revised
Penal Code which provides that the defendant shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its medium and maximum period. The penalty is placed in the medium
degree because of the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstance, that is
to say, anywhere between nine years, four months and one day and ten years
and eight months in the discretion of the court. In the case on appeal here the
penalty was imposed in the minimum of the proper penalty under the Revised
Penal Code because of the plea of guilty, that is to say, between ten years and
one day and twelve years in the discretion of the court. This discretion is in
nowise impaired or limited by Act No. 4103. The trial court, in conformity with the
discretion conferred upon it by the Revised Penal Code, might have assessed
the penalty at, let us say, eleven years. We wish to make it clear that Act No.
4103 does not require this court to assess the said penalty at 12 years, which is
the longest time of imprisonment within the minimum degree.
vi) We come now to determine the "minimum imprisonment period" referred
to in Act No. 4103. Section 1 of said Act provides that this "minimum which shall
not be less than the minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by said Code for the offense." We are here upon new ground. It is
in determining the "minimum" penalty that Act No. 4103 confers upon the courts
in the fixing of penalties the widest discretion that the courts have ever had. The
determination of the "minimum" penalty presents two aspects: first, the more or
less mechanical determination of the extreme limits of the minimum
imprisonment period; and second, the broad question of the factors and
circumstances that should guide the discretion of the court in fixing the minimum
penalty within the ascertained limits.
vii) We construe the expression in Section 1 "the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by said Code for the offense" to mean the penalty next lower to that
determined by the court in the case before it as the maximum (that is to say the
correct penalty fixed by the Revised Penal Code, see our discussion above). In
the example which the Legislature had before it in the Committee Report above
mentioned, the maximum of the sentence was correctly stated to be the medium
degree of prision mayor in its medium and maximum period. The penalty next
lower is prisioncorreccional in its maximum degree to prision mayor in its
minimum degree (Article 61, paragraph 4, Revised Penal Code), that is to say,
anywhere from four years, two months and one day to eight years. The
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Act No. 4103, simply provides that the "minimum"
shall "not be less than the minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next
lower." In other words, it is left entirely within the discretion of the court to fix the
minimum of the penalty anywhere between four years, two months and one day
and eight years. In the example given by the committee they stated that the court
might fix the minimum penalty at five years or seven years.
 viii) We come now to the second aspect of the determination of the minimum
penalty, namely, the considerations which should guide the court in fixing the
term or duration of the minimum period of imprisonment. Keeping in mind the
basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift and redeem valuable
human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness" (Message of the Governor-General, Official
Gazette No. 92, vol. XXXI, August 3, 1933), it is necessary to consider the
criminal, first, as an individual and, second, as a member of society. This opens
up an almost limitless field of investigation and study which it is the duty of the
court to explore in each case as far as is humanly possible, with the end in view
that penalties shall not be standardized but fitted as far as is possible to the
individual, with due regard to the imperative necessity of protecting the social
order.
ix) Considering the criminal as an individual, some of the factors that should
be considered are: (1) His age, especially with reference to extreme youth or old
age; (2) his general health and physical condition; (3) his mentality, heredity and
personal habits; (4) his previous conduct, environment and mode of life (and
criminal record if any); (5) his previous education, both intellectual and moral; (6)
his proclivities and aptitudes for usefulness or injury to society; (7) his demeanor
during trial and his attitude with regard to the crime committed; (8) the manner
and circumstances in which the crime was committed; (9) the gravity of the
offense (note that section 2 of Act No. 4103 excepts certain grave crimes — this
should be kept in mind in assessing the minimum penalties for analogous
crimes).
x) In considering the criminal as a member of society, his relationship, first,
toward his dependents, family and associates and their relationship with him, and
second, his relationship towards society at large and the State are important factors.
The State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social
organization against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming
the individual for economic usefulness and other social ends. In a word, the
Indeterminate Sentence Law aims to individualize the administration of our criminal
law to a degree not heretofore known in these Islands. With the foregoing principles
in mind as guides, the courts can give full effect to the beneficent intention of the
Legislature.
xi) We have concluded that a reasonable and proper minimum period of
imprisonment should be seven years, which is within the range of the penalty
next lower in degree to the maximum, that is to say, within the range from four
years, two months and one day to ten years of prisioncorreccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. We repeat that Act No.
4103 does not require the court to fix the minimum term of imprisonment in the
minimum period of the degree next lower to the maximum penalty.

h) The offender is eligible for parole after serving the minimum penalty. Sec. 5
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that it is only after "any prisoner shall
have served the minimum penalty imposed on him" that the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence may consider whether such prisoner may be granted
parole.25
6) Parole.

a) Parole refers to the conditional release of an offender from a correctional

institution after he serves the minimum term of his prison sentence.26 It consists in the
suspension of the sentence of a convict after serving the minimum of the sentence
imposed without granting a pardon, prescribing the terms upon which the sentence
shall be suspended.27
b) The grant of parole does not extinguish the criminal liability of the offender.
Parole is not one of
the modes of totally extinguishing criminal liability
under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. 
28
Inclusiouniusestexclusioalterius. The release of prisoner on parole does not
extinguish civil liability.29
c) Indeterminate Sentence Law requires to fix the minimum term of the
sentence. It will be observed from Section 1 of the Act that the court must now,
instead of a single fixed penalty, determine two penalties, referred to in the
Indeterminate Sentence Act as the "maximum" and "minimum". The prisoner must
serve the minimum penalty before he is eligible for parole under the provisions of
Act No. 4103, which leaves the period between the minimum and maximum
penalty indeterminate in the sense that he may, under the condition set out in said
Act, be released from serving said period in whole or in part. He must be
sentenced, therefore, to imprisonment for a period which is not more than the
"maximum" nor less than the "minimum", as these terms are used in the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.30
d) Minimum term is material in the grant of parole. The "minimum" sentence is
merely a period at which, and not before, as a matter of grace and not of right, the
prisoner may merely be allowed to serve the balance of his sentence outside of
his confinement. It does not constitute the totality of the penalty since thereafter he
still has to continue serving the rest of his sentence under set conditions. That
minimum is only the period when the convict's eligibility for parole may be
considered. In fact, his release on parole may readily be denied if he is found
unworthy thereof, or his reincarceration may be ordered on legal grounds, even if
he has served the minimum sentence.31
e) The grant of parole is not automatic. It is incorrect to say that once the
convict has been in custody for the duration of the minimum of the indeterminate

25
People v. Gardon, 534 Phil. 894 (2006).
26
Rules on Parole dated March 7, 2006.
27
Gregorio, supra.
28
People v. Abesamis, G.R. No. 140985, August 28, 2007.
29
Ibid.
30
People v. Ducosin, G.R. No. L-38332, December 14, 1933.
31
People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994.
sentence, he may be released even if his application for parole is still pending.
The benefit under the Indeterminate Sentence Law is accorded to the convict only
after the Board of Pardon and Parole has determined his application favorably
after considering all the cogent circumstances. The convict must remain in prison
pending the consideration of the convict’s application for parole by the Board of
Pardons and Parole, for there is no assurance of the grant of his application. 32

f) Parole erroneously granted is nullity. The offender was convicted with

murder. The Board of Pardon and Parole recommended his release after serving
the minimum term of the sentence. The grant of parole to accused by the Board of
Pardons and Parole is null and void for lack of legal and factual basis.  The Board
violated its own rules disqualifying from parole those convicted of an offense
punished with reclusion perpetua.33
g) Disqualified from parole. Under Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9346,34 persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be
eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended." Reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty without
a minimum or maximum period. Parole, on the other hand, is extended only to
those sentenced to divisible penalties as is evident from Sec. 5 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, which provides that it is only after "any prisoner shall
have served the minimum penalty imposed on him" that the Board of
Indeterminate Sentence may consider whether such prisoner may be granted
parole.35
h) Options available to State in case of violation of parole. In case of violation of
parole, the convict may be re-arrested and made to serve the remaining unexpired
portion of his sentence under Sec. 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. The
State may also prosecute and has him convicted for violation of conditional pardon
under Article 159, Revised Penal Code. The power of the Chief Executive under
Section 64(i) of the Rev. Administrative Code to arrest and re-incarcerate any person
who violates his parole condition, stands even in the face of prosecution, conviction
and service of sentence for violation of conditional pardon under Art. 159, Rev. Penal
Code. There is no double jeopardy, because the sentences refer to different offenses;
the case for he was convicted and to violation of conditional pardon. Nor is there
deprivation of liberty without due process of law because in both cases he was found
guilty and sentenced, after due process of law. And before full service of said
sentences, he is not yet entitled to liberty.36 
i) Parole has no effect on civil liability of the offender. The Parole Act contains
no provision modifying the liability of the party subsidiarily liable for the crime
committed by the paroled convict, or suspending such liability upon the grant of
32
Atty. White v. Judge Bugtas, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1738, November 17, 2005.
33
People v. Abesamis, G.R. No. 140985, August 28, 2007.
34
An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.
35
People v. Gardon, 534 Phil. 894 (2006).
36
Culanag cv. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-27206 citing Sales v. Director of Prisons, 87 Phil. 492.
parole. We might venture to anticipate that a modification of such liability or the
conditions for the enforcement thereof, without opportunity on the part of the
offended party or his heirs to be heard, would be deprivation of property without
due process of law. The proceedings leading to the grant of parole are entirely
administrative and ex parte. Only the State and the convict are parties thereto.
They refer only to the service of the sentence. Neither the provisions of the law,
nor the proceedings thereunder, nor the purpose and intent thereof purport to
affect in any wise the rights of the offended party. 37 

j) Pardon and parole, distinguished. Parole and pardon are two different things.
Parole is a conditional release of a prisoner with an unexpired sentence, or
suspension of his sentence, without remitting the penalty imposed upon him; while
pardon is a remission of the penalty imposed upon a defendant together with all the
accessories appurtenant thereto.38
k) Conditional pardon distinguished from parole.

i) Conditional pardon is given by the Chief Executive after conviction under

the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, while parole is given by the
Board of Pardon and Parole to a prisoner who served the minimum of an
indeterminate sentence.;
ii) For violation of conditional pardon, the offender may either be re-arrested to
serve the remitted penalty or prosecuted under Article 159, whereas for violation of
parole, the convict is re-arrested to serve the unexpired portion of the penalty.39

37
Buyayao, et al. v. Itogon Mining Corp., G.R. No. L-8277, April 28, 1956.
38
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Feria, Sales v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-3972, October 13, 1950.
39
Ibid.