Mathematics and The Real World
Mathematics and The Real World
Zvi Artstein
Prometheus Books, 2014, ISBN 978-1-61614-091-5
Phill Schultz
School of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of Western Australia.
Email address: [email protected]
Neverending Fractions
An introduction to Continued Fractions∗
Jonathan Borwein, Alf van der Poorten, Jeffrey Shallit and Wadim Zudilin
Australian Mathematical Society Lecture Series, number 23
Cambridge University Press, 2014, ISBN 978-1107-00665-2
Also available in eBook (ISBN 978-0-511-90265-9)
Continued fractions form a classical area within number theory, the roots of which
can be traced back to Euclid’s algorithm for the greatest common divisor of two
integers (300 BC). Several centuries ago, Rafael Bombelli (1579), Pietro Cataldi
(1613), and John Wallis (1695) developed the method of continued fractions for
rational approximations of irrational numbers (such as square roots), and later
on great mathematicians like Leonhard Euler (1737 and 1748), Johann Lambert
(1761), Joseph L. Lagrange (1768 and 1770), Carl Friedrich Gauss (1813), and
others discovered various fundamental properties and important applications of
∗ The Gazette thanks Zentralblatt MATH and Werner Kleinert for their permission to republish
continued fractions. In fact, these fascinating objects have been a very active field
of research ever since, and the vast contemporary literature on continued fractions
evidently shows that this topic is still far from being exhausted.
The book under review grew out of many lectures that the four authors delivered
independently on different occasions to students of different levels. Its main goal
is to provide an introduction to continued fractions for a wide audience of readers,
including graduate students, postgraduates, researchers as well as teachers and
even amateurs in mathematics. As the authors point out in the preface, their
intention is to demonstrate that continued fractions represent a neverending re-
search field, with a wealth of results elementary enough to be explained to this
target readership.
Regarding the precise contents, the book comprises nine chapters, each of which
is divided into several sections. While the first three chapters are devoted to a
general introduction to continued fractions, the subsequent six chapters deal with
more special topics and applications of the theory.
Chapter 1 presents the necessary prerequisites from
elementary number theory with full proofs. These
concern the following themes: divisibility of integers
and the Euclidean algorithm, prime numbers and
the fundamental theorem of arithmetic, Fibonacci
numbers and the complexity of the Euclidean algo-
rithm, approximation of real numbers by rationals
and Farey sequences. Chapter 2 begins the study of
continued fractions and their algebraic theory, thereby
explaining the continued fraction of a real number in
general, the principle of Diophantine approximation,
the continued fraction of a quadratic irrational and
the Euler–Lagrange theorem in this context, the
construction of real numbers with bounded partial
quotients, and other results on rational approxima-
tion.
Chapter 3 touches upon the metric theory of continued fractions, with emphasis on
the growth of partial quotients of a continued fraction of a real number, the approx-
imation of almost all real numbers by rationals, and the classical Gauss–Kuzmin
statistics in metric number theory. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 originate in lectures that
one of the authors, the late Alf van der Poorten (1942–2010), gave in the last few
years before his untimely death.
Chapter 4 is titled ‘Quadratic irrationals through a magnifier’ and contains some
informal lectures on continued fractions of algebraic numbers, Pell’s equation, and
some concrete examples.
Chapter 5 is a survey of aspects of continued fractions in function fields, with a view
toward some so-called (recursively defined) Somos sequences, pseudo-elliptic inte-
grals, and hyperelliptic curves, whereas Chapter 6 briefly discusses the relationship
between neverending paper foldings and continued fractions. Chapter 7 provides
the study of a class of generating functions that are connected to remarkable
Book Reviews 235
1k + 2k + · · · + (m − 2)k + (m − 1)k = mk
Werner Kleinert
Berlin
236 Book Reviews
James Franklin
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, ISBN 978-1-137-40072-7
What are the current trends in philosophy of mathematics, and what relevance
do they have to the practice of mathematics? Those are some of the questions
I asked myself when I began reading this book by James Franklin, Professor of
Mathematics at UNSW and founder of the ‘Sydney School’ in the philosophy of
mathematics.
There are a few hurdles to overcome for a lay person
attempting to read a book or paper in philosophy. The
first is the jargon. Some phrases, such as ‘epistemol-
ogy and ontology’, ‘mereology’, ‘potentially infinite’
(which just means unbounded) are clearly defined in
dictionaries and Wikipedia and pose no real problem.
But others, such as ‘necessary’, ‘contingent’, and
‘uninstantiated universal’ are ambiguous or depend
on individual psychology. Even more troubling are
words such as ‘random’ which have different meanings
in mathematics and philosophy. A striking example is
the claim by the author that the sequence of decimal
digits of π and even a finite initial segment of this
sequence, is random. Random, it seems, is in the eye
of the beholder.
A second feature of the philosophical literature is its polemical tone. Unlike the
polite euphemisms one finds in mathematical papers which point out errors or
incomplete proofs, philosophical papers bristle with words like ‘mistaken’, ‘ill-
informed’ and ‘falsity’. In mathematics I have only seen something approaching this
in papers on the foundation of probability espousing the frequentist or Bayesian
approach.
So what are the principal opposing schools in mathematical philosophy today?
According to Franklin they are Platonism, which holds that mathematics is about
the real world, and Nominalism which claims it is about words. They correspond
roughly to what mathematicians call platonism and formalism. (I use lower case
for the mathematical concepts to distinguish them from the slightly different philo-
sophical meaning). But whereas mathematicians see no contradiction in embracing
platonism when doing research and formalism when writing it up, philosophers
view this as akin to treason.
Within Platonism there are again two competing views of mathematics. One is
Platonic Idealism, which holds that the real world is an approximation to math-
ematics, and the other is Aristotelian Realism which holds that mathematics is
an approximation to the real world. The author is firmly in the latter school,
Book Reviews 237
has a model. But as soon as uninstantiated universals enter the picture, so does the
possibility of logical contradiction. For example using arguments valid in Realism
with uninstantiated universals, Gödel constructed a consistent universe in which
2ℵ0 = ℵ1 , and Cohen one in which 2ℵ0 > ℵ1 . Whereas formalist mathematicians
are happy to pursue the consequences of accepting or denying the continuum
hypothesis, to the Realist their truth or falsity is a property of the real world.
It is easy to ridicule such attempts to rewrite mathematics. It is more useful to
consider which aspects of mathematics can be developed using an Aristotelian
Realistic foundation when we allow a cautious interpretation of uninstantiated
universals. Firstly ZF Set Theory, including the axiom of infinity but without
the unrestricted axiom of choice, is realistic and can be used to define functions
and relations. Furthermore, the arithmetic of the integers and their ratios make
sense. We can embed the field of rationals in a complete Archimedean ordered
field and so construct real and complex numbers and vector spaces with their
associated topology. However, notions of compactness that require choice are not
allowed, so that classical analytic and harmonic analysis remain out of reach.
Elementary number theory makes sense and so does finite combinatorics. We can
define algebraic structures, but lacking the maximum principle, we cannot prove
the existence or properties of maximal normal substructures except in the finite
case.
To my mind, too much is lost without a platonic and formalistic approach.
Phill Schultz
School of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of Western Australia.
Email address: [email protected]