Düvell, F. (2011) - Irregular Migration. en Global Migration Governance (Pp. 78-108) .-50-63

Global Migration Governance
Betts, Alexander (Editor), Hedley Bull Res earch Fellow in International Relations , Univers ity of Oxford and Vis iting Fellow Stanford Univers ity
Print publication date: 2011, Publis hed to Oxford Scholars hip Online: January 2011
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-960045-8, doi:10.1093/acprof:os o/9780199600458.001.0001
3 Irregular Migration
Franck Düvell
Introduction
Large-scale irregular migration is a relatively new social phenomenon. Whilst it has been reported as early as the 1930s, such
as in Palestine, the Netherlands, and in the United States, and again in the United States during the 1950s, it only became a
large-scale and global phenomenon from the 1980s. Meanwhile, irregular migration is reported from almost every country
across the globe, such as Russia and the United Kingdom, South Korea and Malaysia, Venezuela and Chile, South Africa and
even Botswana. It is equally recorded from high-, medium-, and low-income countries. The United Nations' population division
(1997: 27) states that undocumented migration is ‘one of the fastest growing forms of migration in the world today’.
Estimates on irregular immigrants suggest that there could be between 2–4 million in the European Union (EU) (Vogel 2009),
8–12 million in the United States (Cornelius 2006), and over 6 million in Russia. Worldwide there might be 40 million or more
migrants who are irregular (Düvell 2006). This amounts to about a fifth of all global migrants. 1
Over the past ten to fifteen years, irregular migration 2 has become a top policy concern. In 1986, the international reporting
system on migration of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) began to regularly report on
irregular migration. Meanwhile, a plethora of bilateral and multilateral European, American, and other regional actors, as well
as intergovernmental and international policies and institutions, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are
devoted to or play a role in tackling this phenomenon. Whilst many policies and politics explicitly address irregular migration,
even more are embedded in politics that address other policy fields, such as economic cooperation or development. This
chapter will illustrate that the governance of irregular migration is a driving force in the globalization of migration policy as a
whole.
end p.78
So far, the governance of irregular migration is not guided by an international normative or institutional framework, hence it is
not yet global; instead it is of a mostly regional nature as expressed by several regional consultation processes (RCPs).
However, a trend can be observed towards an expansion of regional regimes that as a consequence become increasingly
inter- and trans-regional and suggest more global approaches. Initially, the governance of irregular migration has been
mostly driven by security concerns and aims at repressing this type of migration. In the meantime, the human rights aspects
of irregular migration have also gained importance though it still plays only a minor role (Koser 2005).
This chapter considers any policy initiative addressing irregular migration that goes beyond the scope of the national, such as
bilateral, multilateral, and regional arrangements. Most of these are not global by definition though this contribution argues
that they represent either a step towards the emergence of a global approach or a facet of more or less coordinated global
policies. First, it sketches the emergence of irregular migration as an issue for regional and global governance. Second, it
analyses two cases of regional, inter-regional, and trans-regional approaches to irregular migration: Europe and the Americas.
Third, building upon these cases, it explains the emerging trends in actors and institutions at the global level, highlighting the
growing role of RCPs as a model for governance in this area, and the relatively limited protection regime for vulnerable
irregular migrants.
The emergence of irregular migration as an issue for regional and global governance
Nowadays, the concept of ‘illegal immigration’ is so frequently used in public and policy discourses, and has become so
common, that it tends to be forgotten that this has not always been the case. Indeed, it has only gained such prominence in
recent decades. Therefore, it must be treated as a rather new, late-modern feature.
It was only when states were in a position to formulate rules governing the entry and residence of foreigners and to
enforce them that contravention of those rules—and consequently the concept of illegal immigration—became
possible. (House of Lords 2002, part 2, paragraph 17)
Whilst immigration restrictions that addressed unwelcomed immigrants as ‘undesirable aliens’, ‘fugitive offenders’, or
‘continental agitators’ were introduced from the late nineteenth century, 3 the concepts of ‘aliens illegally present in the
country’ (US 1920s, see Ngai 2004) or ‘clandestine entrance’ (Netherlands) were first applied during the 1920s and 1930s.
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2003 - 2011. All Rights Reserved.
Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details
see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/privacy_policy.html).
Subscriber: The Open University; date: 19 February 2011
The first systematic use of the concept of ‘illegal migration’ seems to date back to British foreign policies and refers to
unwanted Jewish immigration to Palestine prior to the
end p.79
founding of the state of Israel (1920–47) (Bauer 1971). After the Second World War however, under conditions of economic
growth and a demand for workers, aliens who entered European countries were rather conceptualized as ‘spontaneous
migrants’ and could easily regularize their position (Siméant 1998: 130; Engbersen 2001). Only in the United States during
the 1950s, for about a decade under President Eisenhower, serious efforts were made to reduce irregular migration from
Mexico (Dillin 2006). European practices began to change only with the economic crisis of the late 1960s and 1970s, which
resulted in protectionist migration policies and the implementation of immigration restrictions in all European countries. 4 And
in the United States, after 1990, efforts were stepped up again to tackle irregular immigration (Hanson 2007: 10). Once it
became clear that regulations and enforcement actions did not produce the intended results, successive legislation was
introduced that penalized irregular migrants and increasingly also those who facilitate irregular immigration and employers. 5
Finally, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, visa regulations were imposed by all OECD countries onto an increasing number of
countries. This ‘reduced freedom of movement’ (OECD 1990: 84) for refugees, labour migrants, family members, and tourists
alike led to an increase of irregular migration. As a consequence, unwanted migrants were 'criminalized' and their entry
discouraged (Luciani 1993; Guiraudon 2002).
In the United States, large-scale irregular migration was recorded during the 1940s (Dillin 2006) and again from the 1970s
(Martin 1986). In Europe, irregular migration was initially only occasionally recorded as in France during the late 1960s (Holm
2004), the United Kingdom and Germany during the early 1970s (Diamant 1973), and Italy as late as during the early 1990s
(see Sciortino and Colombo 2004). Only from the 1980s and 1990s was large-scale irregular immigration recorded across
almost all OECD countries. Two processes explain this phenomenon (Düvell 2006). First, economic transformation in
industrialized countries generated a demand for flexible, low-skilled, and low-paid workers, notably in the service sector. But
neither were indigenous workers available or prepared for such jobs nor was supplementary labour migration wanted
politically. Hence, a tension was created between economics and politics which triggered irregular immigration. Second, in the
wake of the collapse of the communist bloc and a series of conflicts across the globe, an ‘asylum crisis’ unfolded.
Subsequently, large numbers of refugees and migrants often irregularly entered OECD countries and turned to the asylum
system. Some irregular migration is permanent immigration, some is temporary immigration, and some is purely for transit
purposes; the motives of the individuals range from seeking refuge, finding employment, joining family members, and gaining
experience to pursuing certain lifestyles.
At the level of discourse, irregular migration—or ‘illegal migration’ as it is often referred to 6 —is as blurred as it is politically
loaded. ‘Illegal migration’ can refer to clandestine entry, overstaying, or irregular employment. It covers
end p.80
serious offences such as falsifying documents and comparably minor deviations from the rules, such as working a few more
hours than permitted. Frequently, irregular migration is conflated with refugees and asylum seekers and with human
smuggling and trafficking; and sometimes it is related to organized crime. Often, unwanted migrants are scapegoated,
stereotyped, and criminalized and held responsible for an array of social problems, such as unfair competition over jobs,
under-cutting wages, or welfare fraud. The purpose usually is to alert the public, dramatize the discussion over migration, or
to call for tougher policies (Bigo 2001; for the EU also see Vollmer 2009). Thus, as shown below, ‘illegal migration’ has almost
become a kind of war cry.
Alternatively, some economists are less critical about the effects of irregular migration. For instance, Hanson (2007: 5)
concludes ‘that there is little evidence that legal immigration is economically preferable to illegal immigration. In fact, illegal
immigration responds to market forces in ways that legal immigration does not....It provides US businesses with the types of
workers they want, when they want them, and where they want them.’ Equally, Boswell and Straubhaar (2003: 1) suggest
there can be an ‘economically optimal level of illegal migration’. Finally, certain industries and employers reject and criticize
enforcement actions that are too tough. Thus, law and policy makers receive contrasting messages and must find the right
balance.
As it is shown, the general conditions for irregular migration are set by economic and political parameters. But migration
became irregular only by the introduction of protectionist immigration policies, according restrictions, and the criminalization
of unwanted migrants. People who nevertheless wish to migrate for the sake of realizing their aspirations sometimes ignore
or violate the law. Ultimately, irregular migration is an expression of a confrontation between self-selected or autonomous
agents and the state (Düvell 2005; also see Shrestha 1987) and can be interpreted as a social conflict (Jordan and Düvell
2002). Thus, irregular migration is a product of specific political–economic conditions and a legal, political, and social construct
of the late twentieth century.
Initially, irregular migration was discussed and dealt with on the national level only and states only dealt with irregular
migrants at their borders or on their territory. But from the late 1970s, irregular migration was reported regularly to
international bodies, notably the OECD's reporting system on migration (SOPEMI), and thereby entered the international
stage. For instance, references to ‘uncontrolled flows’ were made in 1976 (OECD 1977: 38) and to ‘clandestine immigration’
in 1977 (OECD 1978: 5). In 1980, the first referral to ‘illegal immigration’ was found (OECD 1981: 16), made it to the headlines
in 1986 (OECD 1986: 15), and in 1998, finally became a permanent column of the SOPEMI reports. From the mid-1980s,
efforts were made by the EU to first develop a supranational policy response and second, from the early and mid-1990s, to
promote regional processes involving non-EU countries. And in
end p.81
North America, from the late 1980s, a tripartite response by the United States, Canada, and Mexico began to take shape.
This was subsequently accompanied by increasing and often security-led transatlantic cooperation. Finally, regional processes
almost became a model for tackling irregular migration and were promoted worldwide in particular by the International
Organization for Migration (IOM).
The case of Europe: from supranational to regional governance
Internal dimension—the emergence of a focus on control
One of the core values of the EU concerns migration. From 1951, all member states agreed on the right of all regular citizens
and residents of the EU to free movement within the Union for the purpose of leisure, employment, and residence. From the
mid-1980s, this was supplemented by increasingly restricting the rights of citizens of non-member states to enter the EU. In
1985, the Commission of the European Community in its first ever ‘guidelines for a community migration policy’ declared
‘illegal immigration’ a topic on the European level. First, irregular migration was covered by the Trevi working group (Bunyan
1993a ). This was set up in 1976 to deal with political radicalism and terrorism but from 1985 its mandate was expanded to
cover irregular immigration, external borders, and expulsions (see Commission of the European Union 1993). From that
period, irregular migration was considered a security issue and dealt with by ministries of interior. This common European
approach was reaffirmed by the Council of the European Community's crucial Palma document (1989) setting out ‘areas of
essential action’ such as ‘a system of surveillance at external frontiers’, ‘combating illegal immigration networks’, and a
‘system to exchange information on people who are “inadmissible” to the EC’. The Palma document also introduced the
principle doctrine of EU migration policies which is still valid today: internal free movements require tough immigration and
external border controls. However, neither of these were particularly efficient and produced little results. Accordingly, in 1986,
the ministerial conference set up a new body, the Ad Hoc Group Asylum, Visa, External Borders, and Deportations. Amongst
its first policies was the introduction of carrier sanctions which shifted the burden of responsibility for irregular migration to
transportation businesses and effectively integrated them into the fight against irregular immigration. Much more important,
however, was that from 1985 the more committed governments, notably Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg, set up a parallel process, the Schengen agreement, to act as a pacemaker. In 1991, the Maastricht Treaty
merged the previously fragmented internal, legal, and migration matters into a comprehensive policy pillar of ‘Justice and
Home Affairs’ (JHA). Simultaneously, the EU's
end p.82
principle body, the ministerial conference, acknowledged that ‘illegal migration’ was a major political topic which should be
addressed (a) through joint efforts which should (b) go beyond the EU's boundaries. Further agencies, such as the Centre for
Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Borders and Immigration (CIREFI) were established ‘for the purpose
of fighting illegal immigration’ and ‘to collect information on legitimate and illegitimate migration flows, illegitimate
immigration methods, genuine and false travel documents, refused asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, deportations and
carriers’ (Ad Hoc Group Immigration 1992). Finally, in 1998, a High Level Working Group Asylum and Migration (HLWG) of
senior civil servants was set up and mandated to (a) ‘develop a strategic approach and a coherent and integrated policy...for
the most important countries and regions of origin and transit of asylum seekers and migrants, without geographical
limitations’ (Council of the European Union 1999a ) and (b) to produce ‘horizontal analyses of a limited number of countries of
origin of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants and...to provide concrete suggestions for measures for managing and
containing migration’ (Council of the European Union 1998). 7 The HLWG has considerable discretion in performing its tasks
including collaboration with non-EU authorities (see next section); some of its initiatives are rather secretive, enforcement
agency driven, proactive and autonomous from EU governance, and lack legal regulation (Council of the European Union
1999b ). So far, however, this had rarely left the realm of declarations and intentions and had led to little joint or common
structure or action.
This only changed in 1999 when the Amsterdam Treaty came into force, notably Article IV, paragraphs 61–69 on ‘visa,
asylum, immigration and other politics regarding the free movement of persons’ set as a target to harmonize and improve
cooperation on police, customs, and justice in migration and asylum matters within five years. EU commissioner Vitorino in
his seminal draft of a ‘community immigration policy’ (Commission of the European Union 2000a ) first sketched a coherent
policy on irregular migration. He relates ‘the fight against illegal immigration’ to ‘relations with countries of origin and transit’
(Ibid.: 6) and ‘work in close partnership with’ these (Ibid.: 14), suggests ‘police co-operation to pool knowledge of trafficking
operations which by their nature are international, action at the point of entry including border controls and visa policies,
legislation against traffickers’ (Ibid.: 12), believes that ‘many economic migrants have been driven either to seek entry
through asylum procedures or to enter illegally’ (Ibid.: 13), and proposes ‘information campaigns...about legal
possibilities...and the dangers of illegal migration and trafficking’ (Ibid.: 12). Further to this, Vitorino suggests combining
enforcement measures with ‘opening up legal admission policies for labour migration’ (Ibid.: 14). This was reinforced and sped
up by the Tampere presidency conclusions which agreed in a ‘coherent approach’ (Commission of the European Union 2000a
) including (a) to ‘tackle at its source illegal immigration’, (b)
end p.83
‘consistent control of external borders to stop illegal immigration’, (c) ‘combating those who engage in trafficking in human
beings and economic exploitation of migrants’, and (d) ‘efforts to detecting and dismantling the criminal networks involved’
(also see Commission of the European Union 2001). Thus, governing irregular migration has been related to governing
refugees and regular labour migrants (see Commission of the European Union 2001). The trade-off is that adequate
protection of refugees and orderly flows of migrant workers require tough measures on irregular migrants.
There are two more aspects to the Amsterdam programme: first, the northern member states sometimes blamed their
southern and eastern neighbours for their ‘soft touch’ in border and illegal immigration matters and perceived them as the
‘soft underbelly’ of the EU (see e.g. Hollifield 1994). Through common policies, they hoped to increase their influence on their
neighbours and pushed for more restrictive measures. Finally, preparations were made for a common external border control
policy and a common border police force (Commission of the European Union 2002). Second, visa and more specifically
bought or falsified identity and/or travel documents were identified as crucial aspects of preventing unwanted migration
(HLWG 1999) and the Schengen Information System (SIS) was introduced to collect data on visa applicants including those
who were rejected, refused entry, or previously deported. Common visa procedures were introduced to prevent abuse of visas
and a common list of visa countries agreed, in particular of countries known for sending irregular immigrants (Commission of
the European Union 2000b ). Vice versa, in order to qualify as a non-visa ‘white list’ country, these had to demonstrate that
they satisfied EU conditions and ‘reorganized their border control to better combat illegal migration’ (Düvell and Vollmer
2009).
On the institutional side, various new agencies were introduced, notably the Strategic Committee for Immigration, Border and
Asylum (SCIBA), which like HLWG and CIREFI, lie beyond the scope of parliamentary control (Bunyan 1993b ): on the executive
level, EURODAC, a fingerprint database; FADO, a databank for False and Authentic Documents; Europol, the European Police;
and since 2005 Frontex, the EU's agency for coordinating controls of the external border, play important roles. All these
agencies were meant to represent an ‘early warning system illegal migration’ (Council of the European Union 1999a ). They
focus on the security and repressive side and not specifically on the human rights side.
The external dimension: expanding the European regime
From the mid-1990s and parallel to establishing a coherent supranational EU migration control system, efforts were made to
expand this regime to other regions and countries. On the one hand, all EU candidate countries were targeted (Poland,
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia,
end p.84
Latvia, Cyprus, Malta, Romania, and Bulgaria). Thirteen years before these countries finally joined the EU they had to begin
implementing EU migration control standards and complying with EU migration policies. On the other hand, non-EU candidate
countries in particular in the neighbourhood of the EU were also targeted. Typically, an EU member state, with the support of
one body or another, organized an international governmental conference and invited the relevant EU and non-EU
governments. For instance in 1991, in the wake of the collapse of the communist states, the JHA ministerial conference
initiated by the German government set up an international process to address external border issues; this was to become
the Budapest Process. It aimed to improve border controls and to coordinate ‘measures for controlling illegal migration’ from
Central and Eastern Europe. It was institutionalized with a permanent secretariat hosted by the International Centre for
Migration Policy Development (ICMPD, see below) which gathered and analysed data from national information centres. For
instance, at Budapest Process meetings, governments discussed how to act on migration strategies, routes, and smugglers
(Prague 1997), whilst the 1998 conference specifically concentrated on certain routes, notably from Turkey through Albania.
Thus, more effort was put on controlling the hinterland. From the mid-1990s, concerns were associated with the
Mediterranean and in 1995 an agreement was reached between the EU and its non-EU Mediterranean neighbours (Maghreb
states, Egypt, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and others), the Barcelona Process, which aimed at containing unwanted
migration and readmitting irregular immigrants. 8 The European (31 November 1995) interpreted the overarching aim as
‘hold[ing] back the millions in North Africa, a flood of illegal migrants waiting to penetrate the borders’. On top of this, the EU,
United States, and Canada entered into coordinated efforts and established a ‘new transatlantic agenda’ to ‘jointly address
the challenges of international crime, terrorism, drug trafficking and mass migration’ (Council of the European Union 1995). 9
Equally, an ‘inter-regional framework agreement’ with the Mercosur (the common market in South America) countries was
established. And in 2002, efforts were made to even integrate Asia into these policies and an Asian–European Meeting
(ASEM) was held that involved the EU and fifteen Asian countries. 10 In all cases the governments agreed on the necessity to
work together in order to manage migration flows in particular with the view to tackling irregular migration (Council of the
European Union 2002b ).
All this was intensified after the Council of the European Union's Tampere conference which agreed to expand its fight against
irregular migration, to integrate all countries of transit and origin into a comprehensive migration control policy, and to
globally export its policies (Council of the European Union 1999e ). According to the 2000 French presidency aspirations, this
included (a) persecution of carriers, (b) facilitation of illegal entry and residence, and (c) mutual recognition of deportation
orders and improved immigration
end p.85
controls. The French presidency also organized an international seminar ‘on illegal immigration networks’ attended by senior
ministry representatives of all member states, the candidate countries, and the United States, Canada, Mexico, Australia,
and Interpol. It was exemplified ‘to put the fight against illegal immigration to the front of the community’, to enforce ‘a closed
door policy for those who immigrate illegally and who must be effectively deported’, and to develop ‘a global approach for
combating [illegal migration] networks including all suitable measures, from country of origin to destination’ (Council of the
European Union 2000b ). 11 This geo-political strategy was reaffirmed in 2000 by the Council of the European Union (2000c )
seeking ‘cooperation with a large number of states’. These claims reflect a certain aggressive approach and illustrate the
intention of the EU to join up with other countries to promote a global approach. Migration concerns were also integrated in
the stability pacts for Eastern Europe, South East Europe, and the action plans with Ukraine and Russia. In all cases the EU
demanded a ‘decisive role’ on the issues of ‘human trafficking’, ‘illegal migration’, and ‘migration and border control’.
This expansionist approach was implemented along various lines. Firstly, the HLWG, a crucial player in these developments,
was commissioned to set up ‘action plans’ on six countries/areas of major concern (Iraq, Morocco, Albania, Somalia, Sri
Lanka, Afghanistan, and its neighbouring regions). These aimed at containing and readmitting unwanted (i.e. irregular and
refugee) migrants and keeping them close to the country of origin, and training authorities in transit countries (e.g.
Commission of the European Union 1998). Thus, all relevant routes of irregular migrants from the countries of origin through
the various countries en route to EU neighbouring countries were targeted. First, these aims entered into the 2000 EU-West
Balkan summit (Council of the European Union 2001a ), then the Balkan Stability pact's migration/asylum initiative which was
intending ‘the development of regional cooperation...in the combat against illegal immigration’ (Agence Europe 2001) before
they were finally ‘extended to the entire Western Balkan region’ (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001). This demonstrates
how such processes gain momentum, interact with other processes, become self-fed, and extend into other regions.
Second, deportation policies and readmission agreements complemented the EU's relations with countries of transit and
origin. For instance, the 1995 EU Mediterranean development conference in Barcelona agreed to contain future unwanted
migration and to return undocumented immigrants. In 1999, the (German) presidency of the council stated that ‘readmission
clauses in association and cooperation agreements with third countries [have] a major role to play’ and ‘in view of a coherent
readmission policy could include all areas,...especially economic, development and foreign policy aspects’ (Council of the
European Union 1999c ). 12 The Danish government even suggested that in case countries of origin caused problems,
‘continuous consular pressure and visa
end p.86
policies’ shall be used and readmission issues linked with ‘aid, trade, and investment’ policies (Council of the European Union
1999d ). This was first applied to the EU's negotiations with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries (ACP) over a new
cooperation framework. 13 Next, the Seville council meeting (2002) agreed to apply the ACP negotiation principles to all
countries. Thus, all countries that had any formal links with the EU—in particular Eastern European and Caucasus countries
(see Council of the European Union 2000a )—were forced into a ‘joint management of migration flows’ and in particular in a
‘comprehensive plan to combat illegal migration and human trafficking’ (Council of the European Union 2002 a). By 2002, the
EU had developed a comprehensive and joint return policy (Council of the European Union 2002c ). Meanwhile, readmission
agreements on the return of illegal immigrants have been implemented with seventeen countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa.
By 2000, about 350,000 migrants were deported annually in addition to another 165,000 that were returned under
programmes such as the IOM assisted voluntary return schemes. 14
Third, the EU began to deploy policy advisors and enforcement agents in non-EU countries, thereby national actors had gone
international. Following a British suggestion (Council of the European Union 2001c ), the council ‘adopted ...the establishment
of a network of liaison officers to control migration flows’ in the Balkans (Council of the European Union 2001a ). Teams of EU
‘police and immigration officers’ were deployed ‘alongside the state border services of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Croatia,...both at air and land borders’ and ‘expert assistance and training’ provided to ‘combat illegal migration’ (Council of
the European Union 2001b ). 15 The EU also promotes ‘border management to combat illegal migration on the Ukrainian-
Moldavian border’ (Statewatch 2001: 4) and finally set up the EU Border Assistant Mission (EUBAM). Meanwhile, German
federal police officers train Ukrainian borders guards.
Finally, the Council of the European Union (2000d ) internationally promotes policies targeting the employers of irregular
immigrants. Thereby, measures representing internal control practices enter the international stage. Such policies, however,
are not particularly popular as they tend to bring governments into conflict with the powerful business, trade, and agricultural
associations which may explain why often they are not strictly enforced.
Meanwhile, there are hardly any European development aid, reconstruction, trade, or technical cooperation negotiations or
agreements with Eurasian, African, Asian, or South American states that do not also include a paragraph on ‘illegal migration’
and readmission policies. Immigration concerns, notably over irregular migration are embedded in many other policy fields;
they represent a driving force in the development of a common EU migration policy and a potentially global regime (see
Garson 2004). In effect, sending and transit countries are held responsible for irregular migration to the EU and forced to
comply with certain EU policies.
end p.87
The case of the Americas: NAFTA, SPP, and the Puebla Process
The internal dimension: tackling irregular migration in the United States of America
In the United States, immigration restrictions date back to 1882 and the Chinese Exclusion act. In the 1950s, the US
government launched its first major policy on irregular migration, ‘Operation Wetback’; this involved large-scale internal
controls and led to the deportation of several hundred thousand irregular immigrants, principally Mexicans (Garcia 1980).
Before and after this, however, a ‘good old boy system’ ensured that those industries and employers with a demand for
irregular workers would not be targeted (Dillin 2006). During the 1960s, the United States began to concentrate on controlling
its external borders, notably in the South (Stobbe 2004). In 1986, after a decade of controversies (Chiswick 1988), the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) introduced better border control measures implemented through (a) targeted
operations (‘Operation Blockade’, 1986, later renamed ‘Operation hold the line’ and ‘Operation Gatekeeper’, 1994) and (b)
the expansion of the staffing level and authority of the border patrols who could now set up controls on motorways. Finally,
IRCA also introduced certain labour market controls and employers sanctions. On the other hand, new legal migration
channels were introduced with the aim to provide businesses with the workers they needed (Donato and Carter 1999); in
addition, IRCA also introduced large-scale regularization for several million irregular immigrants. Lobby groups such as
farmers seemed to have a significant impact on the provisions of this law (Chiswick 1988). On the institutional level, a Law
Enforcement Support Centre (LESC) was set up in 1994 to assist federal police forces in determining an arrested individual's
immigration status (Vogel 2009). In sum, four policy elements—two exclusive and two inclusive—were developed: border
controls and deportations, and legal migration channels and regularizations. Chiswick (1988: 111), however, found the
enforcement side of the legislation a ‘toothless tiger’. Pressure for tougher measures was then developed on the federal level
and some border countries, notably California which in 1994 introduced legislation that denied state benefits to irregular
immigrants (Proposition 187).
In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) aimed at further enhancing the external
borders, notably by introducing a short stretch of border fence between the United States and Mexico (Fragomen 1997).
Furthermore, it nationally restricted irregular immigrants' access to certain public services, notably social benefits and
national health care and expanded police officers' power to arrest under certain conditions. Thus, two new policy elements,
border fences and entry bars to social services, were introduced. Until 2001, however, the focus of immigration enforcement
remained on controls of the external borders, especially the land border with
end p.88
Mexico; indeed, in 1996 the national police was advised by the Department of Justice not to detain anyone solely on suspicion
of an immigration offence (Vogel 2009). This only changed with the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. First, in 2002, the
above advice was withdrawn and further to this, local police were successively empowered to enforce immigration law
(Migration Policy Centre 2007). Second, greater attention was put on the air borders and on international arrivals. Harsher
legislation, notably the 2006 Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control bill, however, failed to pass the
Senate but nevertheless inspired an increase in internal controls and workplace raids (De Genova 2006). Third, the
institutional structure was reformed and responsibility was shifted from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to
the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). And fourthly, the conventional focus on irregular immigrants from Mexico
was supplemented by a focus on Arab and Muslim migrants (De Genova 2006).
To conclude, irregular migration was for long considered mainly an economic issue and policy remained relatively relaxed;
only when migration became associated with sovereignty and security concerns, were control policies significantly stepped
up. During the 1950s–1980s, US policies on irregular migration were based on targeted operations but not so much on
routine control and enforcement. First efforts to enhance border controls and expand internal controls in 1986 remained
inefficient. Only from 1993 onwards, ‘the U.S. Government has been seriously committed to reducing the flow of
unauthorized immigration’, initially basically targeting migration from Mexico (Cornelius 2006: 2). Whilst internal controls were
first introduced nationally in 1996, these only became more prominent after 2001. Also after 2001, the focus on the land
borders was supplemented by a stronger focus on international arrivals on the air borders only to shift back to land borders
after 2004 (Swarns 2004). These changes are reflected in the US expenditure on border controls, which increased from
around US$500 million in 1989 to around US$3.7 billion in 2006 (Cornelius 2006), the expansion of the powers to arrest of
various enforcement agencies, and an increase in officers involved in border and immigration controls. So far, these policies
seem to have had little or even ‘no discernible effect on the overall flow of illegal migrants from Mexico’ and probably also
from other countries; instead they have significant unintended consequences such as the settlement and constant rise of the
irregular immigrant population in the United States (Swarns 2004: 1).
The external dimension: collaboration within the region and beyond
In response to large-scale irregular migration from Mexico to the United States, first, bilateral agreements between Mexico
and the United States introduced some level of cooperation such as joint border controls and granting US agents rights to
gather intelligence in Mexico. Whilst the United States wished to
end p.89
reduce irregular immigration, the Mexican authorities were concerned about nationals from other countries irregularly
transiting the country on their way north (Rohter 1989). Thus, Mexico too began stepping up its efforts to control migration
and address smuggling and irregular (transit) migration. This process experienced a push when in 1993 the North American
Free Trade Association (NAFTA) was introduced. In a famous statement the Mexican chief negotiator hoped that by raising
Mexican living standards and wage levels NAFTA would reduce illegal immigration by up to two-thirds: ‘NAFTA is our best hope
for reducing illegal migration in the long haul’ (Attorney General Janet Reno 1994, quoted in Morris 2006). He proved to be
wrong; instead the income gap has risen considerably and only sped up irregular migration (Cornelius 2006; Papademetriou
2006). In 2001, Mexico introduced Plan Sur which targeted the Southern Mexico border with Guatemala and Belize and the
transit routes to the Mexican–US border to tackle irregular transit migration from the countries south of Mexico. Some
sources say this was mainly to ‘woo’ the United States (Tuckman 2001). Finally, in 2005, and under the combined impact of
continuing irregular migration and considerable security concerns in the wake of 9/11, NAFTA was supplemented by the
Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) of North America. This is a dialogue outside legislative processes—including
coordinated border surveillance technologies, intelligence gathering on foreign nationals, and border liaison mechanisms of
cities on both sides of the border (Embassy of the United States 2001)—and criticized for its ‘regional border militarization’
(Walia and Oka 2008).
The North American integration process, however, lacked the political vision that inspired the unification of Europe. The latter
embraces political, economic, and cultural integration including the principle of free movement and choice of employment
and residence. This, because internal EU migration became regular, not only effectively reduced irregular migration from
Central and Eastern Europe to zero but also resulted in a decrease of the total irregular immigrant population by 1–1.3 million
from 2001 to 2008 (Vogel 2009). In contrast, American integration had mostly economic motives and does not provide rights
to freedom of movement of people; this results in a situation that from a comparative perspective could be depicted as
incomplete integration. The negative effect is a significant increase of irregular migration from 8.4 million in 2000 to 10.7
million or more in 2007 (Camarota 2009).
Since the early 1990s, a plethora of initiatives has emerged in North, Central, and South America (NAFTA, SPP, Plan Sur,
Puebla-Panama Plan (PPP), Mesoamerica Project, US–Mexico Border Partnership, Plan Mexico, and Puebla Process) that
directly or indirectly target irregular migration. Emphasis was put on technological armament, border controls, joint
operations and return, elements also found in European policies. Most of these processes are regional in scope and involve
—except the Puebla Process—a very limited number of states, often just two or three (United States, Canada, and Mexico).
Its diversity
end p.90
illustrates that there is no comprehensive (regional) policy; instead, processes are conflicting and overlapping. Some believe
that most of these processes are inefficient (Bricker 2008), others criticize US domination and ‘subordination’ of its
neighbours (Wise 2003).
From 2001 and in response to Islamist terrorism in the United States, Spain, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere, (irregular)
migration was linked with international terrorism. This spurred a new round of policy responses and cooperation in the field of
(advance passenger) data exchange, in particular. More recently, in 2008, a group of six EU member states 16 suggested a
new ‘Euro-Atlantic area of cooperation’ to ‘integrate much policing, intelligence gathering and policy-making’ across the
Atlantic to tackle ‘terrorism, organised crime, and legal and illegal migration’ (The Guardian, 7 August 2008a ). Until August
2008, exchange of passenger data between the EU and United States generated 25,000 alerts which resulted in 2,100
arrests for offences such as ‘murder and possession of firearms to tobacco-smuggling’ though seemingly none for
immigration offences (The Guardian, 7 August 2008b ). So far, the impact of these policies on irregular migration is unclear
though it appears as if mostly non-immigration offences were detected.
Emerging global actors, institutions, and normative frameworks

As shown above, international organizations such as IOM and OECD played an important role in declaring irregular migration a
policy concern of global relevance and pushing it onto the policy agenda. Five different actors in particular—agencies and
processes—with different mandates play a major role in regionally and/or globally promoting and coordinating the
governance of irregular migration. These are the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations (UN) and
several of its agencies, the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees in Europe, North America
and Australia (IGC), and to a lesser extent the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and the
International Labour Organization (ILO) (for others see Newland 2005).
The IOM's aim is ‘managing migration for the benefits of all’. 17 However, it is an intergovernmental non-UN organization and
only nation-states can be members. Consequently, IOM tends to enforce its member states', policies, and in particular those
of the more potent Western countries, who through funding IOM's programmes and operations, have decisive influence over
the direction the organization takes. For instance, in implementing the Migration Information Programme, the IOM's field
offices are understood as outposts of a global ‘migration warning system’ that feeds back to the destination countries
intelligence about migration movements, patterns, and networks (IOM 1995a ). Amongst its main focuses is the return of
irregular migrants and sometimes they
end p.91
are even involved in detention or detention-like facilities (Nauru and Ukraine) or return centres (as in Libya). 18 IOM frequently
intervenes in sending and transit countries, as in the case of Turkey, which was advised to improve its border controls in order
to prevent irregular migration (IOM 1995b ). Notably through its many capacity building programmes, it advises governments
on the control of migration, for instance, IOM urged Azerbaijan to ‘prevent illegal migration from, through and to’ the country
and to develop ‘modern migration management structures including a border management’ (IOM 1998).
ICMPD is another intergovernmental agency with eleven member states, thirty cooperating governments and international
organizations 19 though with a European, Mediterranean, and, more recently, also Central Asian but not a global ambition. It
is a think tank and research institute which principally ‘supports governments’ (ICMPD 2008a ). Through its Mediterranean
Transit Migration programme, notably its pillar on ‘enhancing operational co-operation to combat irregular migration’ (ICMPD
2010) and through intelligence work and collaboration with agencies such as Europol and Frontex, ICMPD (2008c ) seems to
become involved in enforcement matters. Amongst its aims is ‘reinforcing migration control co-operation between countries
in Central/Eastern and Western Europe’ (ICMPD 2002a ) ‘with an emphasis on combating irregular movements’ (ICMPD 2002b
). For instance, in order to deal with ‘illegal migrants [that] have crossed Russia en route towards the EU’ who are also turning
‘Ukraine [into] a major transit country for illegal migrants’ ICMPD provides ‘comprehensive technical assistance to the
Ukrainian authorities in the area of identification of forged and falsified documents’ (ICMPD 2008b ). ICMPD's activities also
include ‘Mediterranean Transit Migration’, ‘East Africa Migration Routes’, and ‘illegal migration in the West Balkan region’. On
the Balkans, ICMPD contributes to ‘enhance the communication and the information exchange on illegal migratory flows,
mainly, but not exclusively, between the border police services of Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia,
Montenegro, and Serbia’ (ICMPD 2002b ). ICMPD has expanded its agenda from European and intra- to inter-regional
activities.
In 1997, ILO, later than other agencies, decided to pay more attention to labour migration (ILO 1997) including irregular
migrants. The general line taken by ILO is in protecting regular and, within limits, also irregular migrant workers; therein its
mandate is rather different from that of IOM, IGC, or ICMPD. Actors within ILO (2005: 13) believe that irregular migration
should be addressed through more ‘opportunities for legal migration and freer circulation of labour, as well as regularization
programmes’. But sometimes the line on irregular migration diverts from the protection principle and focuses too on
repressing and ‘discouraging’ such migration (ILO 2001). For instance, in 1999, ILO and IOM jointly with several governments
held an ‘International Symposium on Migration: Towards Regional Cooperation on Irregular/Undocumented
end p.92
Migration’ in Bangkok, which aimed to tackle undocumented migration on an intergovernmental level. At this event, Horiuchi
(1999), regional director of ILO in Asia, demanded that states ‘must collaborate to suppress clandestine movements of
migrants for employment,...to pool their energies to target the organizers of such movements and the employers of illegal
migrants’; she reiterates that the ILO Convention 143 ‘calls for regular contacts and exchanges of information to make sure
that traffickers in manpower can be prosecuted no matter what country they operate in’.
The United Nations established various normative frameworks, such as the Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime (2000), the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons (2003), and Protocol against the Smuggling
of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air (2004). Some UN agencies, such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC), the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), or the United Nations Public Administrations Network (UNPAN) play a role in
irregular migration governance. UNDOC, by its mandate concentrates on the security and crime aspects of irregular
migration, investigates routes and practices and engages in promoting repressive national legislation, as in Africa (UNDOC
2006). IMO gathers data from national agencies as well as from shipping businesses and reports on ‘boat people’ and their
smugglers. The ‘Transport of Migrants by Sea’ protocol authorizes states to intercept vessels in international waters that are
suspected of carrying irregularly travelling migrants and refugees. The precedence case was set by the Tampa which rescued
refugees from a sinking boat but was stopped in 2001 by Australian authorities and redirected to the remote Pacific island
Nauru where these migrants and refugees were detained. Meanwhile, interception at sea has become common practice in
the Mediterranean, Caribbean, and Indian Ocean.
The emergence of regional and other consultation processes
Since the mid-1980s, governments and international organizations increasingly began to collaborate on a regional level
involving receiving, transit, and sending countries with the aim to jointly and comprehensively target the land and sea paths
and the support networks of irregular migrants. Meanwhile, a dense schedule of intelligence sharing, consultations, and
operations has emerged. Hansen (2010) identifies fourteen RCPs (Table 3.1).
There are more regional policy processes, such as within the Community of Independent States (CIS), the Specialized
Migratory Forum of Mercosur, the aforementioned SSP of North America, the Berne Initiative (BI) (2001), and the Manila
Process (1996), though the latter two were subsequently abandoned. The organizational structures of these processes vary
considerably: certain processes have permanent secretariats; this is the case for the Budapest Process (hosted by ICMPD),
Söderköping Process (staffed by IOM and United Nations
end p.93
Table 3.1. Regional consultation processes

Number of governments involved
Region Process Acronym Year
(and partners)
Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and
IGC 198517 (IOM, UNHCR, EC)
Refugees
49 (ICMPD, IGC, IOM, UNHCR,
Budapest Process 1991
UNDOC, etc.)
Söderköping
Cross-border cooperation process 200110 (EC, IOM, UNHCR)
Europe Process
Regional ministerial conference on migration in the 5+5
200210 (IOM, ICMPD, ILO)
Western Mediterranean Dialogue
7 plus 27 EU member states
MTM 2002
Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue (Europol, Frontex, Interpol, IOM,
Dialogue –3
UNDOC, UNHCR)
Intergovernmental Asia–Pacific Consultation on refugees,
APC 199635 (IOM, UNHCR)
displaced persons, and migrants
Process on people smuggling, trafficking, and related
Bali Process 200243
transnational crime
Asia and
Ministerial Consultations on overseas employment and Colombo
Middle East 200311
contractual labour for countries of origin in Asia Process
Ministerial Consultations on overseas employment and
Abu Dhabi
contractual labour for countries of origin and destinations 200820
Dialogue
in Asia
Migration Dialogue in West Africa MIDWA 200015 (IOM, ILO, UNHCR, UNDOC, etc.)
Migration Dialogue in South Africa MIDSA 200016 (IOM)
Africa
Intergovernmental authority on Development/Regional 6 (IOM, 16 EU, and American
IGAD-RCP 2008
Consultative Process on migration countries)
Central and RCM or
South Regional Conference on Migration Puebla 199611
America Process
South American Conference on Migration SACM 199912
end p.94
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) staff), IGC, ACP, and Puebla Process, for example. In contrast, for the Colombo
Process, the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, SACM, and the BI secretarial activities are provided by IOM or in the case of MTM by ICMPD,
whilst 5+5 Dialogue, MIDSA, MIDWA, and the Bali Process have no secretariat at all. This demonstrates that IOM and, to a
lesser extent, ICMPD play a significant role in setting up and/or supporting RCPs (see RCM 2004: 2; Hansen 2010) and
illustrates IOM's effort to promote and export modern and efficient policies and practices to transit and sending countries.
Further to these RCPs, ‘inter-agency mechanisms’ (Newland 2005: 13) were instigated that rather aimed at communication
between the major international organizations. These processes were, first, the Geneva Migration Group (IOM 2003b , 2003c
), an ‘informal, unbureaucratic mechanism of UNHCR, UNHCHR, UNODC, UNCTAD, ILO, and IOM’ and second, the UNHCR-IOM
Action Group on Migration and Asylum (IOM 2003a ). These two processes bring together globally acting agencies and thus
have a global scope. Not all such processes deal with irregular migration and only the latter activities shall be analysed.
Most of these consultation processes were set up with the aim to pool resources in order to tackle irregular migration,
amongst other issues (see Hansen 2010; Koppenfels 2001). For instance, IGC was set up by the Swedish government as an
‘informal forum for information exchange and for the planning of innovative solutions and strategies’. 20 It is a rather small,
almost elitist, and secretive agency 21 and little is known about their activities. The IGC seem to play a role in setting the
agenda and suggesting certain strategies to national and international bodies. ‘Illegals’ are only one amongst its many
themes, such as asylum, temporary protection, return, and human trafficking. Through consultations on ‘country of origin
information,...smuggling,...illegal migration and many others states have been able to improve their policies and practices’
(coordinator of IGC, quoted in Kessel 2004: 2). The Söderköping Process (2010) ‘promotes dialogue on asylum and irregular
migration’ on the eastern borders of the EU whilst the MTM Dialogue
focuses on enhancing operational co-operation to combat illegal migration or, in other terms, on shorter-term
measures to address irregular flows. The second pillar deals with a longer-term perspective by focusing on addressing
the root causes of irregular flows through development co-operation and a better joint management of migration.
(ICMPD 2010)
The Bern Initiative was an intergovernmental ‘consultative process’ (Federal Office for Refugees, undated, 1) set up by the
Swiss government. It concentrated primarily on irregular migration, criminal and security aspects (Ibid.: 2) and aimed to
develop an ‘International Agenda for Migration Management’. The Puebla Process ‘emerged due to concerns over irregular
migration affecting the entire region’ (Koppenfels 2001: 34). On the one hand, it takes a humanitarian approach and aims to
protect the rights of migrants including those of irregular
end p.95
migrants and thus reflects a balanced influence of both sending and receiving countries. On the other hand, it developed a
network of liaison officers in order to ‘combat(ing) migrant smuggling’ and ‘joint training and law enforcement exercises’ to
‘stem smuggling and other undocumented activities’ (Ibid.). In Eurasia, irregular migration is mostly dealt with by (a) the CIS
agreements on cooperation in fighting irregular migration (1998) and (b) the policy framework on counteracting irregular
migration (2004), though this has not yet led to a common control regime (Ivakhnyuk 2008: 21).
The dynamics of regionalization processes in the field of irregular migration are complex. At least three patterns can be
identified: (a) either, a receiving country approaches a transit or sending country arguing that they have an irregular
migration problem because the other country does not properly secure its borders and therefore calls for collaboration. (b)
Alternatively, IOM or another actor explains to a government that they have a problem with irregular or transit migration
which previously this government believed they did not have. Next, IOM informs the government that they have got some
solutions to this problem and could offer ‘capacity building’. (c) Or a transit/receiving country believes that it has problems
with irregular migration and invites others—governments or intergovernmental organizations—to address the issue. Often, it
is the EU in interaction with intergovernmental and international organizations rather than the United States that pushes its
irregular migration policies onto an international level. It is plausible to assume that this has to do with the fact that the EU is
traditionally more in favour of multilateral approaches than the United States. On the other hand, there are governments
that hesitate or refuse to collaborate with others on these matters, such as Russia, China, or until 2007 Libya; but also
Mexico, Turkey, and Ukraine, at certain points, were not enthusiastic about accepting EU or US perspectives. This is because
such collaboration is perceived as undermining sovereignty or because it is simply not in the national interests of these
countries. Notably, preventing irregular transit migrants from entering EU or US territory or returning clandestine third-
country nationals to a country means that they remain in the transit country where they then become a problem for that
country. Hence the burden is simply shifted from one country to the other, as some argue (e.g. Kirisci 2006).
Most actors share a tough ‘combating illegal migration’ rhetoric: aim at identifying migration routes, strategies, and networks;
promote, export, and expand the destination countries' interests, policies, and technologies. 22 An important course of action
is the rise of ‘semantic networks’ (Bigo 2001: 135) in which doctrines and concepts are developed. On the other hand, it is
sometimes criticized that such regional processes are implemented at the expense of refugee and human rights (e.g.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 2002).
end p.96
The vision of some of the consultation processes is to initiate policy processes that have a global scope. In particular, the
Secretariat of the Budapest Group (1999: 45) explicitly stated that ‘because criminal organisations internationalise their
activities this should also apply to law enforcement. International cooperation and harmonisation is the only way to gain
sustainable results.... Governments and organisations should be formed into an international machinery’. Following a similar
logic, an IGC representative suggests ‘that unilateral, bilateral and in some cases regional measures are sometimes
insufficient responses to better migration management. It appears logical, therefore, that it is time to pursue broader
arrangements’ (Kessel 2004: 3).
Towards a global protection regime
Whilst preventing and combating irregular migration are the dominant themes in global governance, ‘shocking images of
migrants in distress’ have also triggered ‘growing international concern with the human rights of irregular immigrants’ (Betts
2010). Three policy strands can be identified: (a) opening up legal migration channels, (b) improving the legal and social
conditions of irregular immigrants, and (c) regularizing irregular immigrants. These themes are found in EU as well as
American statements (e.g. Commission of the European Union 2000a ; RCM 2004).
On the global and normative level, seven UN Conventions address the social and human rights of irregular immigrants in one
way or another. Usually, these Conventions clarify that rights shall be enjoyed ‘by everybody’, ‘by all persons’ regardless of
immigrant or other status. This implies that irregular migrants are principally included in most basic international rights
agreements. Four ILO policies and Conventions on migrant workers' rights also address migrants in an irregular position. In
particular, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families
which was adapted in 1990 and finally came into force in 2003 intends a globally accepted protection framework. In particular,
the second part spells out the human rights of irregular migrants. So far, it is ratified by only thirty-eight countries, all are
non-Western sending countries and no receiving country has yet acknowledged the rights of irregular migrants as specified in
this document. On a regional level, three EU Conventions also cover irregular immigrants (Table 3.2).
So far, on the institutional side, GCIM and UNHCR have acknowledged the protection needs of irregular immigrants (GCIM
2005; UNHCR 2007b ). Whilst UNHCR's main mandate is refugee protection, it also occasionally addresses irregular
migration. UNHCR, for example through its ‘mixed migration’ initiative (UNHCR 2007a ), criticizes trends of conflating irregular
migration and forced migration and exposes politics, such as unlawful deportations (‘refoulement’) that prevent refugees
from seeking asylum and undermine the refugee
end p.97
Table 3.2. Normative framework for the protection of irregular immigrants

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ICERD
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICCPR
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ICESCR
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women CEDAW
Convention against Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment CAT
Global International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and members of their families ICRMW
Convention on the Rights of the Child CRC
ILO resolution concerning a fair deal for migrant workers in a global economy
ILO Convention No. 97 concerning migration for employment
ILO Convention No. 143 concerning migrations in abusive conditions
ILO promotion of equality of opportunity and treatment of migrant workers
RegionalCharter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Council of Europe) CHART
European Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
European Social Charter ESF
protection regime. Further to this, two UN instruments were introduced to monitor and report on the implementation of the
above-mentioned Conventions, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants and the UN Special Rapporteur
on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health.
Finally, there are various non-governmental efforts to inter-regionally and even globally address the human rights situation of
irregular migration and to lobby national, EU, and international events and organizations. For instance, Migrants Rights
International (MRI) and December 18 both have a global scope and lobby national governments for signing the ICRMW. The
Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM) is a renowned Brussels-based European umbrella
organization with some US and African members bringing together NGOs that in one way or another promote social and
human rights of ‘undocumented migrants’. The idea is to ‘mainstream’ irregular migration and to embed the rights of
irregular migrants into any policy that affects irregular migrants.
Betts (2010) argues that ‘the broad norms [to protect irregular immigrants] already exist’ but that states remain ‘reluctant
to commit to new formal multilateral agreements’ and that it lacks the authoritative consensus to apply these instruments.
Thus, a ‘soft law’ approach is envisaged that could overcome the obstacles in introducing a meaningful protection regime.
end p.98
Conclusion: from regional to global governance of irregular migration

During the 1980s, governments in those countries that were at the receiving end of irregular migration, notably the northern
countries of the EU and in North America, came to the conclusion that national unilateral restrictive policies aimed at closing
and controlling borders and immigration were insufficient for preventing unwanted and irregular migration. Thus, states began
to collaborate with other states in order to address the issue. Often, the governance of irregular migration is interlinked with
the governance of other concerns such as (organized) crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism and embedded in other policies
such as development, trade, tourism, and international relations. Thus, politics on irregular migration are as much a separate
policy field as they are part of broader policy fields. In any case, the desire to tackle irregular migration is so strong that in
Europe, states were even prepared to enter into supranational arrangements that would compromise their sovereignty.
Indeed, concerns over irregular migration appear to be the strongest motivation behind the emergence of regional and global
governance of migration.
So far, most governance is indeed not global in nature but intra- and inter-regional. Certainly, one of the most striking
features of the global governance of irregular migration is its regional characteristics. This follows from two logics: first,
irregular migration governance unfolds along the paths of irregular migrants; second, it is pragmatic rather than normative.
Various regional governance processes in Europe and North America show a trend to expand their scope from intra- to inter-
regionalism. In particular from the EU, notably the Schengen states, irregular migration governance spread to transit and
sending regions like shock waves. In particular, the Budapest and Söderköping processes in Europe and the SSP in North
America are based on very dense agendas of almost weekly meetings, consultations, exchange of data, training, and joint
exercises for intelligence and enforcement staff. In fact, this practice of intensive horizontal cooperation of visa, customs, and
immigration officers across borders perfectly illustrates what Bigo (2001) describes as ‘administrative networks’ and which
Slaughter (2004) describes as the emergence of government and policy networks.
Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the regional EU's regime is more developed than NAFTA/SPP, the Puebla, or the APC
Process. Beyond the regional level, various processes and institutions have broader aspirations: IOM and ILO, by mandate,
have a global scope whilst IGC and the Budapest Process at least promote global approaches. It must be noted, however,
that all these processes are very volatile and dynamic. Tensions between different states and actors remain high, as between
sending and receiving countries or between organizations with different and partly conflicting mandates such as IOM, ILO, and
UNHCR.
end p.99
Regional processes rise and fall, such as the Manila Process or the Bern Initiative, and institutions rise and diminish in
relevance, such as the IGC. Newland (2005: 13) suggests not to overestimate consultation processes and dialogues; the real
meaning of these is that they play a role in ‘knitting together the policy networks’ that in Slaughter's conception (2004) are
the ‘building blocks’ of global governance.
Four forms of collaboration can be identified, (a) those of receiving countries, (b) of receiving with transit and sending
countries, (c) of mostly sending countries (all three of which usually involve international organizations) whilst ( d) that bring
together only international organizations. Usually, the initiative is taken by the receiving countries who raise their concerns
with the transit and sending countries; thereby a political snowball effect is triggered which leads to subsequent
arrangements. Alternatively, the initiative comes from an intergovernmental organization, usually the IOM. Institutions are
usually set up by receiving countries either almost exclusively representing receiving countries (OECD, ICMPD, IGC, and Bern
Initiative) or bringing together sending, transit, or receiving countries (e.g. IOM, Budapest and Söderköping processes, and
SPP). Other arrangements, notably the Puebla and the Colombo Process, instead represent the sending countries' concerns.
However, the former two types of institutions must be considered the more powerful and influential and the dominant policy is
to keep away irregular migration from the receiving countries.
Irregular migration governance occurs on formal and informal levels and both have their advantages: whilst formal processes
are more reliable and accountable, informal processes are very efficient and produce quick results (see Thouez and Channac
2006: 377). These regional interstate collaborations go well beyond policy transfer (circulation of ideas, sharing information)
and instead often take the form of joint policy actions (exchange of knowledge, data, technologies, infrastructure, and staff)
and even lead to joint operations, more so in Europe, less in North America; in contrast, the global level is rather
characterized by policy transfer than policy action. In sum, both forms of collaboration facilitate policy convergence in all
areas (ideology, technology, policies, and politics) and on a global scale.
The governance of irregular migration combines four paradigms: exit controls, travel controls, entry controls, and residence
and employment controls. These aim at the prevention of irregular migration, at frustrating irregular migrants' journeys or, in
case they succeed, their return. Successively, a whole set of politics has been designed ranging from false-proved visa and
identity documents, exchange of passenger data, carrier sanctions (which effectively integrates private businesses into
control politics), enhanced border controls, militarization of exit and entry controls, intelligence gathering on smugglers,
networks and paths, readmission agreements, and employer sanctions to national measures (internal controls of labour
markets and social systems) that diminish the opportunities for irregular immigrants.
end p.100
The governance of irregular migration involves two partly conflicting, partly supplementary fields: ( a) the control, prevention,
and combating of irregular migration and (b) the protection of irregular migrants. So far, governance concentrates on the
prevention aspect whilst the protection aspect is much less developed. This demonstrates that states' primary concern is the
protection of their territory, citizens, and national systems and not the protection of irregular migrants' rights. In particular,
the governance of borders and irregular migration sometimes come into conflict with the protection of refugees and other
vulnerable migrants. Indeed, policies to prevent irregular migration are often found to be indifferent about the type of people
prevented from migrating and therefore affect refugees, economic, and other migrants in similar ways. Notably, return
practices sometimes clash with protection policies.
Finally, governance in the field of irregular migration faces a principle paradox of our time: whilst the politics of globalization
promote the free flow of goods, capital, and information, the flow of people is subject to myriad restrictions. Considering the
impact of regional and global efforts to reduce irregular migration generates mixed results. The achievements of the Puebla
Process in preventing irregular migration were considered considerable (Koppenfels 2001). In Europe too, irregular transit
migration as well as the stock of irregular immigrants is decreasing (Düvell and Vollmer 2009; Vogel 2009); in contrast, in the
United States, irregular migration seems to continue (Cornelius 2006). Newland (2005: 3), in her report to the GCIM, was
rather sceptical about the results of such policies, arguing that ‘governments have won many battles against unauthorized
migration, but they are, by and large, losing the war for control over who enters, leaves, and remains on their territories’.
Meanwhile, thousands of migrants have so far lost their lives crossing international borders in increasingly hazardous ways,
which raises significant ethical issues for such policies (see Spijkerboer 2007).
Notes
1 Figures of hidden populations are notoriously vague and ought to be treated with care.
2 Here irregular migration is applied as a sample term covering irregular emigration, journeys, immigration, and settlement.
3 E.g. 1849 Netherlands Aliens Act, 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act in the United States, similar anti-Chinese restrictions in
Canada (1885), and the 1905 Aliens Restrictions Act in Great Britain.
4 UK 1968 and 1971 Immigration Acts; recruitment stops in Germany, Netherlands, France, Belgium, etc.
5 UK, 1971 Immigration Act (illegal immigration) and 1996 Immigration Act (illegal employment); Germany, 1982 ‘Law to
Combat Illegal Employment’; France, Pasqua Laws 1986 and 1993; Spain, 1985 Organ Law; US 1986 Immigration Reform and
Control Act; Italy, emergency ordinances in 1995 and 1996, 2002 Bossi-Fini Law.
end p.101
6 The expression ‘illegal migration’ contributes to the stigmatization and criminalization of certain groups and reinforces their
exclusion (see Düvell et al., 2010). Therefore, it is considered ethically problematic; instead academics usually use the terms
undocumented, unauthorized, or irregular migration.
7 Translated from German version.
8 EU Development Conference, Barcelona, 27–28 November 1995.
9 Also see the New Transatlantic Agenda 1995; EU–Canada Political declaration and action plan 1996; Joint Declaration on JHA
cooperation, December 2000; Statewatch (2002).
10 Brunei, Combodia, China, India, Japan, Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore,

Düvell, F. (2011) - Irregular Migration. en Global Migration Governance (Pp. 78-108) .-50-63

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Düvell, F. (2011) - Irregular Migration. en Global Migration Governance (Pp. 78-108) .-50-63

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Düvell, F. (2011) - Irregular Migration. en Global Migration Governance (Pp. 78-108) .-50-63

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Global Migration Governance

The case of Europe: from supranational to regional governance

Internal dimension—the emergence of a focus on control

The external dimension: expanding the European regime

The external dimension: collaboration within the region and beyond

Emerging global actors, institutions, and normative frameworks

irregular migrants and sometimes they

The emergence of regional and other consultation processes

Table 3.1. Regional consultation processes

Towards a global protection regime

Table 3.2. Normative framework for the protection of irregular immigrants

Conclusion: from regional to global governance of irregular migration

You might also like