10/19/2020 ENRIQUE G. DE LEON v.

PEOPLE

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 212623, January 11, 2016 ]

ENRIQUE G. DE LEON, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND

SPO3 PEDRITO L. LEONARDO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
[1] [2]
November 14, 2013 Decision and the May 20, 2014 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35390, which affirmed the September 28, 2012
[3]
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila (RTC), sustaining the
conviction of accused Enrique De Leon (De Leon) for Grave Oral Defamation by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 6, Manila (MeTC).

Records show that De Leon was charged with Grave Oral Defamation in the
Information filed before the MeTC, docketed as Criminal Case No. 453376-CR, the
accusatory portion of which reads:

That, on or about April 17, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, with the deliberate intent to besmirch the honor and reputation of one
SPO3 PEDRITO L. LEONARDO, did and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously
publicly proffer against the latter slanderous words and expressions such as
"WALANGHIYA KANG MANGONGOTONG NA PULIS KA, ANG YABANG
YABANG MO NOON. PATAY KA SA AKIN MAMAYA [,]" and other words and
expressions of similar import, thereby bringing the said SPO3 PEDRITO L.
LEONARDO into public contempt, discredit and ridicule.

Contrary to law.[4]

Upon arraignment, De Leon entered a plea of not guilty. Pursuant to the Supreme
Court Circular No. 20-2002, De Leon and private respondent SPO3 Pedrito Leonardo
(SPO3 Leonardo) appeared before the Philippine Mediation Center to settle the civil
aspect of the case. The conciliation meeting, however, bogged down. Hence, the
proceedings before the lower court continued. During the pre-trial, the parties pre-
marked their respective exhibits and moved for the trial to commence.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: private respondent SPO3

Leonardo, Carlito Principe (Principe) and Jennifer Malupeng (Malupeng). Their
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combined testimonies narrated that De Leon and his son, John Christopher De Leon
(John), filed a complaint for Grave Misconduct against SPO3 Leonardo before the
People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB), docketed as Administrative Case Nos. 06-
02-060 (291) II and 06-02-061 (292)11.

The first hearing was scheduled on April 17, 2006 at the PLEB office on the 5th Floor
of the Manila City Hall; At around 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, while waiting outside
the PLEB office on the 5th floor of the Manila City Hall, SPO3 Leonardo noticed De
Leon and several of his companions approaching. Before entering the PLEB office, De
Leon uttered these words to SPO3 Leonardo, "Walanghiya kang mangongotong na
pulis ka, ang yabang yabang mo noon. Patay ka sa akin ngayon."

The words uttered by De Leon caused SPO3 Leonardo embarrassment because there
were several persons present at the PLEB premises. He could have arrested De Leon
but he did not want to make a scene. Afterwards, De Leon's wife, Concepcion,
emerged from the said office and apologized to Leonardo for her husband's
actuations. SPO3 Leonardo calmly proceeded to the Special Operations Group of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) located at the Manila City Hall to have the incident
entered in its blotter. On the same day, SPO3 Leonardo filed his complaint at the
Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) together with Principe.[5]

Version of the Defense

The defense presented Fernando Manalo (Manalo), Ruperto Molera (Molera),

Concepcion De Leon (Concepcion) and the accused himself as witnesses.

From their testimonies, the defense claimed that there was a prior incident that took
place on the morning of February 27, 2006 when De Leon, with his son John, while
having breakfast with their fellow joggers at the Philippine National Railroad-Tutuban
Station, were approached by SPO3 Leonardo who arrived on his scooter. With his gun
drawn, SPO3 Leonardo walked fast towards the group and at a distance of two meters,
more or less, he said, "Putang ina mo, tapos ka na Ricky Boy, referring to De Leon."
He pressed the trigger but the gun did not fire, when he was to strike again, De Leon
was able to escape with the help of John.[6]

Consequently, De Leon and John filed an administrative complaint for grave

misconduct against SPO3 Leonardo before the PLEB and the first hearing was set on
April 17, 2006. In his Sinumpaang Salaysay sa Paghahabla filed before the PLEB, De
Leon narrated that he and SPO3 Leonardo were former jogging buddies and that the
latter wanted to borrow money from the former in the amount of P150,000.00, but he
declined. SPO3 Leonardo became upset with him, culminating in the gun-pointing
incident.[7]

On April 17, 2006, at around 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, De Leon, in the company of
his wife Concepcion, Manalo, Molera, and several others went to the PLEB office to
attend the hearing. When De Leon and his companions arrived at the PLEB, they saw
SPO3 Leonardo seated on the bench alone; that they were about to pass when SPO3
Leonardo stood up, badmouthed and threatened De Leon by uttering the words,

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"Putang-ina mong mayabang ka, pag di mo inurong demanda mo sa akin,

papatayin kita."

Moments later, they caused the incident to be entered in the police blotter. From
there, they returned to the PLEB office where they were advised to file charges against
SPO3 Leonardo in Camp Crame. Malupeng and Principe were not seen at the PLEB
office premises. Molera even tried to pacify SPO3 Leonardo by saying, "Itok (referring
to SPO3 Leonardo), ano ka ba naman andito na tayo sa husgado, ayaw mo pang
tigilan ang kamumura kay Ricky, referring to De Leon." De Leon did not do
anything, he simply entered the PLEB office and sat down there because he got
nervous. He also denied apologizing to SPO3 Leonardo.

Also on April 17, 2006, De Leon utilized the police blotter to file a case against SPO3
Leonardo in Camp Crame. He filed the said case only after he received the subpoena
from the OCP for the case filed against him by SPO3 Leonardo. Although he was with
his lawyer when he went to Camp Crame, the latter did not advise him to file a
complaint in the OCP right away. According to De Leon, he also saw SPO3 Leonardo
deposit his service firearm while at the PLEB office.[8]

The Ruling of the MeTC

In its Decision,[9] dated April 15, 2011, the MeTC found De Leon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Grave Oral Defamation. The trial court considered SPO3
Leonardo's police blotter as prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. His
actuations on the day of the incident were spontaneous. As borne by the records, he
immediately reported the incident and filed his complaint on that very same day.
Considering the animosity between him and De Leon, it was contrary to human
experience to expect him to arrest the latter right there and then when his motives
would necessarily be met with doubt later on. Neither was there any ill-motive on the
part of witness Principe whose testimony was given great probative consequence.10
The MeTC found De Leon's defense as only an afterthought and self-serving as he
merely filed the counter-charges against Leonardo after he had received the subpoena
from the OCP. The dispositive portion of the MeTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, with the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Enrique De
Leon y Garcia GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and is
hereby SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 months and 1 day
of arresto mayor, as minimum penalty, to 1 year, 1 month and 11 days of prision
correccional in its minimum period, as maximum penalty.

On the civil aspect ex delicto, the accused is ORDERED to pay the private
complainant P10,000 as moral damages.

[11]
SO ORDERED.

The verdict being unacceptable to him, De Leon filed his Notice of Appeal,[12] dated
April 18, 2011.
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On May 4, 2011, the RTC issued the Order[13] directing De Leon to file his appeal
memorandum. De Leon, however, failed to comply. For his failure to file the same, the
RTC issued another Order,[14] dated December 28, 2011, dismissing his appeal. De
Leon then filed a motion for reconsideration[15] on January 30, 2012, which was
granted by the RTC in its Order,[16] dated May 22, 2012.

On June 15, 2012, De Leon filed his appeal memorandum[17] and argued, among
others, that the MeTC decision lacked the necessary constitutional and procedural
requirements of a valid decision.

The Ruling of the RTC

On September 28, 2012, the RTC rendered its decision affirming in toto the ruling of
the MeTC. It opined that where the issue was the extent of credence properly given to
the declarations made by witnesses, the findings of the trial court were accorded great
weight and respect. In appreciating the evidence of the prosecution, the RTC observed
that the MeTC properly discussed in seriatim how it arrived at De Leon's conviction.
Thus, contrary to his contentions, the findings of the MeTC were clearly elucidated.
[18]

On October 30, 2012, De Leon filed his motion for reconsideration,[19] but it was
denied by the RTC in its November 27, 2012 Order.

Aggrieved, De Leon filed a petition for review under Rule 42 before the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

The CA affirmed the RTC decision with modification as to the imposed penalty. The
CA stated that the issue of credibility was already raised with the RTC and was
resolved against De Leon. The CA found that he had not shown any sufficient reason
to justify a departure from the factual findings of the MeTC, which were affirmed by
the RTC.[20]

According to the CA, to call SPO3 Leonardo a "walanghiya," "mayabang" and

"mangongotong" in public unquestionably constituted grave oral defamation. These
words seriously attacked SPO3 Leonardo's character. The term "mangongotong"
actually imputed a crime that was dishonorable to him as a police authority. There
having been no provocation on the part of SPO3 Leonardo and that the utterances
complained of were not made in the heat of unrestrained anger or obfuscation, the
RTC did not err in upholding the judgment against De Leon for the crime of grave oral
defamation.[21] The decretal portion of the CA decision reads:

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WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of

the RTC is AFFIRMED except that the minimum sentence of imprisonment is
modified to the extent that the penalty to be served shall be: four (4) months as
minimum [minus the one (1) day] to a maximum of one (1) year, one (1) month
and eleven (11) days, (as imposed by the trial court).

[22]
IT IS SO ORDERED.

De Leon moved for partial reconsideration of the CA decision but to no avail.

Hence, this petition, where De Leon raises matters in question that can be
summarized as follows:

ISSUES

I. WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE MeTC FAILED TO INCLUDE THE

FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH THE DECISION WAS BASED

II. WHETHER DE LEON'S GUILT HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT.

In his Petition for Review,[23] De Leon again argues that the MeTC decision suffers
from constitutional infirmity. The lower court should have decided the case on the
basis of the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense. Also, the conviction was
based simply on De Leon's conduct during trial and not on the merits of the case.[24]

In its Comment,[25] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that the
testimonies of SPO3 Leonardo and Principe were credible and competent. Further, in
the absence of clear and convincing extrinsic evidence to prove the charge of bias and
partiality on the part of MeTC Judge Teresa Soriaso (Judge Soriaso), the presumption
of regularity in the performance of the judge's function will stand.[26]

In his Reply,[27] however, De Leon insisted that the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The intent on his part to diminish the esteem, goodwill
or confidence of SPO3 Leonardo or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant
feelings or opinion of others against him was lacking as his testimony was made in
good faith, without malice. He also reiterated his stand that there was no finding of
clear and distinct facts and law to serve as a basis for its conclusion of convicting him
for the crime charged and that the MeTC decision was not based on the merits, rather
on the personal sentiments harbored by Judge Soriaso against him.[28]

The Court's Ruling

The MeTC Decision clearly

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stated the facts and the law

on which it was based

Under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, no decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based. Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment
or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and
directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based, signed by him and filed with the clerk of the court.

Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. A decision that
does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves
the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the
losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a
higher tribunal.

More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in arriving at a
judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a
safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse
dixit.[29]

The standard "expected of the judiciary" is that the decision rendered makes clear why
either party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as established. Nor is there
any rigid formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy the requirement of
clarity and distinctness. The discretion of the particular judge in this respect, while
not unlimited, is necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form of words which he
must use upon pain of being considered as having failed to abide by what the
Constitution directs.[30]

It is understandable that courts, with heavy dockets and time constraints, often find
themselves with little to spare in the preparation of decisions to the extent most
desirable. Judges might learn to synthesize and to simplify their pronouncements.
Nevertheless, concisely written such as they may be, decisions must still distinctly and
clearly express, at least in minimum essence, its factual and legal bases.[31]

In this case, there was no breach of the constitutional mandate that decisions must
express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based. The CA
correctly stated that the MeTC clearly emphasized in its decision, the factual findings,
as well as the credibility and the probative weight of the evidence for the defense vis-
a-vis the evidence of the prosecution. The MeTC presented both the version of the
prosecution and that of the defense. De Leon was not left in the dark. He was fully
aware of the alleged errors of the MeTC. The RTC, as an appellate court, found no
reason to reverse the decision of the MeTC.

Likewise, when it comes to credibility of witnesses, this Court accords the highest
respect, even finality, to the evaluation by the lower court of the testimonies of the
witnesses presented before it.[32]

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Although De Leon claims that the testimony of Principe is incredible, the MeTC, the
RTC and the CA perceived it otherwise. First, there was no ill motive on the part of
Principe for him to weave a tale of lies against De Leon. Second, Judge Soriaso was
able to observe Principe's demeanor during trial. He was observed to be candid and
composed and his conduct on the witness stand did not mirror that of an insincere or
false witness.

No bias and partiality on

the part of Judge Soriaso

Unless there is concrete proof that a judge has a personal interest in the proceedings
and that his bias stems from an extra-judicial source, this Court shall always presume
that a magistrate shall decide on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its
facts.[33] Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a judge's
sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice with impartiality. There
should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of
partiality is not enough.[34]

De Leon posits that Judge Soriaso harbored ill feelings towards him which eventually
resulted in his conviction. No evidence, however, was ever adduced to justify such
allegation. Thus, such argument must also fail.

The crime committed is only

Slight Oral Defamation

Oral Defamation or Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in

writing. It is defined as "the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to
prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood."[35]
The elements of oral defamation are: (1) there must be an imputation of a crime, or of
a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, status or circumstances; (2)
made orally; (3) publicly; (4) and maliciously; (5) directed to a natural or juridical
person, or one who is dead; (6) which tends to cause dishonour, discredit or contempt
of the person defamed. Oral defamation may either be simple or grave. It becomes
grave when it is of a serious and insulting nature.

An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a

crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission,
condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in
contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. To determine
whether a statement is defamatory, the words used in the statement must be
construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it
appears that they were used and understood in another sense.[36] It must be stressed
that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and
mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether
written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the
absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the language is offensive to

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the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.[37]

In this case, the Court agrees that the words uttered by De Leon were defamatory in
nature. It is, however, of the view that the same only constituted simple oral
defamation.

Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, depends not only
upon the sense and grammatical meaning of the utterances but also upon the special
circumstances of the case, like the social standing or the advanced age of the offended
party.[38] "The gravity depends upon: (1) the expressions used; (2) the personal
relations of the accused and the offended party; and (3) the special circumstances of
the case, the antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender,
which may tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. In particular, it is a
rule that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on
the part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony."[39]

There are cases where the Court considered the circumstances of the concerned
parties and held that the defamation was grave serious in nature.

In U.S. v. Tolosa,[40] where a woman of violent temper hurled offensive and

scurrilous epithets including words imputing unchastity against a respectable married
lady and tending to injure the character of her young daughters, the Court ruled that
the crime committed was grave slander. In Balite v. People,[41] the accused was found
guilty of grave oral defamation as the scurrilous words he imputed to the offended
party constituted the crime of estafa.

In some cases, the Court has declared that the defamatory utterances were not grave
on the basis of the peculiar situations obtaining.

In the case of People v. Arcand,[42] a priest called the offended party a gangster in
the middle of the sermon. The Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for slight
slander as there was no imputation of a crime, a vice or immorality. In Pader v.
People,[43] the Court ruled that the crime committed was only slight oral defamation
as it considered the expression, "putang ina mo," as expression to convey anger or
displeasure. Such utterance was found not seriously insulting considering that he was
drunk when he uttered those words and his anger was instigated by what the private
complainant did when the former's father died. Also in Jamilano v. Court of Appeals,
[44] where calling someone "yabang" (boastful or arrogant) was found not
defamatory, the complainant's subsequent recourse to the law on oral defamation was
not sustained by the Court.

Considering the factual backdrop of this case, the Court is convinced that the crime
committed by De Leon was only slight oral defamation for the following reasons:

First, as to the relationship of the parties, they were obviously acquainted with each
other as they were former jogging buddies. Prior to the purported gun-pointing
incident, there was no reason for De Leon to harbor ill feelings towards SPO3
Leonardo.

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Second, as to the timing of the utterance, this was made during the first hearing on
the administrative case, shortly after the alleged gun-pointing incident. The gap
between the gun-pointing incident and the first hearing was relatively short, a span of
time within which the wounded feelings could not have been healed. The utterance
made by De Leon was but a mere product of emotional outburst, kept inside his
system and unleashed during their encounter.

Third, such words taken as a whole were not uttered with evident intent to strike deep
into the character of SPO3 Leonardo as the animosity between the parties should have
been considered. It was because of the purported gun-pointing incident that De Leon
hurled those words. There was no intention to ridicule or humiliate SPO3 Leonardo
because De Leon's utterance could simply be construed as his expression of dismay
towards his actions as his friend and member of the community.

The defamatory remarks were

not in connection with the
public officer's duty

Finally, the Court finds that even though SPO3 Leonardo was a police officer by
profession, his complaint against De Leon for oral defamation must still prosper. It
has been held that a public officer should not be too onion-skinned and should be
tolerant of criticism. The doctrine, nevertheless, would only apply if the defamatory
statement was uttered in connection with the public officer's duty. The following cases
are illustrative:

In the case of Evangelista v. Sepulveda,[45] petitioner lawyer made the follow ing
statements in his appeal brief:

THIS BLUNDER of the TRIAL COURT, AT ONCE SHOCKING AND

UNPARDONABLE, BETRAYS BOTTOMLESS IGNORANCE OF LEGAL
FUNDAMENTALS AND IS A BLACK REFLECTION ON THE COMPETENCE
OF ITS INCUMBENT. IT COULD BE A GROUND FOR PROSECUTION AND
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION.

This shocking, colossal blunder deserves condemnation no end and cries for
immediate relief in order to avoid repetitions of miscarriages of justice.

Appalled by the contents of the brief, the trial court judge charged the petitioner for
indirect contempt. In absolving the latter, this Court recognized that lawyers
sometimes get carried away and forget themselves especially if they act as their own
counsel. Hence, if the judge had felt insulted, he should have sought redress by other
means as it was not seemly for him to be a judge of his own cause.

In Yabut v. Ombudsman[46] petitioner vice mayor was directing traffic as he was

concurrently the commander of the Traffic Management Division at that time. On
board his vehicle was private respondent Doran, who was impatient about the traffic.
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Angry words turned into an exchange of punches and Doran stuck a dirty finger at
petitioner. Charged with an administrative case before the Office of the Ombudsman,
petitioner vice mayor was suspended. The attendant circumstances served no excuse
for the mauling incidents that followed. Though the acts of Doran were no less than
"an act of spite, degradation and mockery," it did not justify an equally abhorrent
reaction from petitioner. This Court wrote that public officers, especially those who
were elected, should not be too onion-skinned as they are always looked upon to set
the example how public officials should correctly conduct themselves even in the face
of extreme provocation.

In both cases, the criticisms directed towards the public officer were made in
connection with the dissatisfaction of the performance of their respective duties. Here,
however, the malicious imputations were directed towards the public officer with
respect to their past strained personal relationship. To note, De Leon's displeasure
towards SPO3 Leonardo could be traced to a gun-pointing incident where the latter
was angered when the former failed to grant him a private loan transaction in the
amount of P150,000.00.

One of man's most prized possessions is his integrity. There lies a thin line between
criticism and outright defamation. When one makes commentaries about the other's
performance of official duties, the criticism is considered constructive, then aimed for
the betterment of his or her service to the public. It is thus, a continuing duty on the
part of the public officer to make room for improvement on the basis of this
constructive criticism in as much as it is imperative on the part of the general public to
make the necessary commentaries should they see any lapses on the part of the public
officer. In this case, however, the criticism was more destructive than constructive
and, worse, it was directed towards the personal relations of the parties.

To reiterate, their altercation and De Leon's subsequent defamation were not in

connection with SPO3 Leonardo's public duties. Taking into account the
circumstances of the incident, calling him "walanghiya" and "mangongotong na
pulis" was evidently geared towards his reputation as a private individual of the
community. Thus, the defamation committed by De Leon, while only slight in
character, must not go unpunished.

Accordingly, De Leon should be meted out only the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine
not exceeding P200.00 pesos, for committing slight oral defamation as prescribed
under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The

April 15, 2011 Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 6, Manila, is hereby
MODIFIED to read as follows:

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WHEREFORE, finding Enrique De Leon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime of Slight Oral Defamation, the Court hereby sentences him to pay a fine of
P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.

On the civil aspect ex delicto, the accused is ordered to pay the private
complainant P5,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo pp. 49-63, penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., with
Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia Salvador and Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan,
concurring.

[2] Id. at 65-66.

[3] Id. at 219-224, penned by Judge Teresa P. Soriaso.

[4] Id. at 77.

[5] Id. at 78-80.

[6] Id. at 206-207.

[7] Id. at 143-144.

[8] Id. at 81-84.

[9] Id. at 77-89.

[10] Id. at 86.

[11] Id. at 88-89.

[12] Id. at 90-91.

[13] Id, at 165.

[14] Id. at 96.

[15] Id. at 98-106.

[16] Id. at 176-177.

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[17] Id. at 178-205.

[18] Id. at 224.

[19] Id. at 225-232.

[20] Id. at 59,

[21] Id. at 61.

[22] Id. at 63.

[23] Id. at 3-41.

[24] Id. at 27.

[25] Id. at 265-287.

[26] Id. at 282.

[27] Id. at 297-312.

[28] Id. at 300-309.

[29] Dela Peha v. Court of Appeals, 598 Phil. 862, 975 (2009).

[30] Bernabe v. Geraldez, 160 Phil. 102, 104 (1975).

[31] Chung v. Mondragon, G.R. No. 179754, November 21, 2012, 686 SCRA 112.

[32] Lumanog v. People, 644 Phil. 296, 395 (2010).

[33] Gochan v. Gochan, 446 Phil. 433, 439 (2003).

[34] Lorenzana v. Austria, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014, 720 SCRA 319.

[35] Villanueva v. People, 521 Phil. 191, 200 (2006).

[36] Lopez v. People, 658 Phil. 20, 31 (2011).

[37] MVRS Publications v. Islamic Da 'wah Council of the Phil, 444 Phil. 230, 241
(2003).

[38] Reyes, The Revised Penal Code Book 2, 2008 Ed., p. 1020.

[39] Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, 689 Phil. 11, 28 (2012).

[40]
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[40] 37 Phil. 166(1917).

[41] 124 Phil. 868(1956).

[42] 68 Phil. 601 (1939).

[43] 381 Phil. 932-937 (2000).

[44] 140 Phil. 524-532(1969).

[45] 206 Phil. 598 (1983).

[46] G.R No. 111304, June 17, 1994, 233 SCRA 310.

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