THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION, 10(1), 47–56

Copyright © 2000, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

COMMENTARY

Spiritual Intelligence or Spiritual

Consciousness?
John D. Mayer
Department of Psychology
University of New Hampshire

Emmons’s (this issue) thought-provoking article defined a spiritual intelligence

that involves five characteristics:

1. The capacity for transcendence.

2. The ability to enter into heightened spiritual states of consciousness.
3. The ability to invest everyday activities, events, and relationships with a
sense of the sacred.
4. The ability to utilize spiritual resources to solve problems in living.
5. The capacity to engage in virtuous behavior or to be virtuous (to show for-
giveness, to express gratitude, to be humble, to display compassion).

When I think of spirituality, I think less of a heightened intelligence, as

Emmons has described it, and more of a heightened consciousness. The idea of
spiritual consciousness stems from the possibility of structuring consciousness,
through meditation, contemplation, and other means, so that it focuses on one-
ness, transcendent states, and ultimate concerns. The shift in language from the
terminology of mental ability (mentioned earlier) to one of consciousness and
awareness yields an interesting revision of Emmons’s description. This spiritual
consciousness would involve

Requests for reprints should be sent to John D. Mayer, Department of Psychology, University of New
Hampshire, Durham, NH 03824.
48 MAYER

1. Attending to the unity of the world and transcending one’s existence.

2. Consciously entering into heightened spiritual states.
3. Attending to the sacred in everyday activities, events, and relationships.
4. Structuring consciousness so that problems in living are seen in the context
of life’s ultimate concerns.
5. Desiring to act, and consequently, acting in virtuous ways (to show forgive-
ness, to express gratitude, to be humble, to display compassion).

To translate from the language of intelligence to the language of consciousness,

it would seem, requires substituting just a few key words for the terms ability and
capacity, that were in the original. So, which conception is right: spiritual intelli-
gence or spiritual consciousness?
If a new intelligence really has been found, it would enrich and broaden our no-
tion of what intelligence may be (e.g., Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, in press). La-
beling something an intelligence also raises its prestige. Scarr (1989) has argued
that one reason psychologists and educators are motivated to label something an
intelligence is in an attempt to adjust social behavior to value the entity more than
before. Although Scarr believes many personality attributes are not valued suffi-
ciently, she is concerned that labeling nonintelligences as intelligences creates a
leveling of all qualities, and a diminishment of the concept of intelligence. So,
what is the difference between finding an intelligence and simply labeling some-
thing an intelligence?

WITH WHAT YARDSTICK SHOULD SPIRITUAL

INTELLIGENCE BE MEASURED?

To me, the term intelligence refers to a capacity or ability that primarily concerns
performing valid abstract reasoning with coherent symbol systems. This abstract
reasoning criterion overlaps only partly with the eight criteria of an intelligence,
originally developed by Gardner (1993, pp. 62–68), and used by Emmons to assess
spiritual intelligence. The “abstract reasoning” criterion represents a more classical
approach to intelligence: Symposia on intelligence over the years repeatedly con-
clude that the first hallmark of intelligence is the capacity to carry out abstract rea-
soning (Sternberg, 1997). Such thinking involves the ability to carry out many
types of mental transformations, such as identifying similarities and differences,
making generalizations, mentally rotating figures, and other tasks, all according to
specifiable rules (e.g., Carroll, 1993).
By contrast, only one or two of Gardner’s (1993, pp. 62–68) eight criteria, his
“core mental operations,” and perhaps his “symbol system” requirement, approxi-
mate abstract reasoning. The remaining six criteria are a combination of cultural,
empirical, and other characteristics. Because the criteria are each equally
 INTELLIGENCE OR CONSCIOUSNESS? 49

weighted, abstract reasoning is relatively deemphasized. Gardner acknowledged it

is unclear how many criteria, and which among them, an entity must meet for it to
be labeled an intelligence. Gardner (1993) wrote, “At present the selection (or re-
jection) of a candidate intelligence is reminiscent more of an artistic judgment than
of a scientific assessment” (p. 63).
In this commentary, I focus on how well Emmons’s spiritual intelligence meets
the abstract reasoning criterion for intelligence I have described. Emmons’s theory
is young enough that his empirical work on the subject requires time to develop.
Still, so as to consider its future development, it is worth mentioning it must even-
tually satisfy empirical criteria as well. For example, new intelligences must be
translatable into mental performance, with agreed upon criteria for correct perfor-
mance. That is, a person possessing the intelligence should be able to solve
specifiable problems that someone without it cannot. Such an intelligence must
also satisfy a number of correlational criteria. For example, it must encompass a
reasonable number of important areas of thought, in the way that verbal intelli-
gence, say, spans vocabulary, reading comprehension, and verbal fluency. A “His-
tory of Dinosaurs” intelligence is a nonstarter because it is simply too limited in
scope. Other correlational criteria include that the intelligence is similar enough to
other intelligences to be recognizable, but different enough to be worth studying.
Finally, the intelligence must develop from infancy to adulthood (e.g., Mayer,
Caruso, & Salovey, 1999).
To return to the conceptual: Does spiritual intelligence primarily involve ab-
stract reasoning? I begin with an informal concern—that, traditionally, spirituality
is viewed as a form of consciousness, and that spiritual intelligence is not highly
distinguishable from spirituality itself. Then I will move on to a more formal con-
sideration of Emmons’s five areas of spiritual intelligence and their relation to ab-
stract reasoning and other attributes within personality.

SPIRITUALITY, SPIRITUAL INTELLIGENCE, AND

COGNITION: SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

Spirituality, as traditionally understood, seems better characterized by conscious-

ness than by abstract reasoning. For example, one research group has defined spiri-
tuality as “a way of being and experiencing that comes about through awareness of
a transcendent dimension and that is characterized by certain identifiable values in
regard to self, others, nature, life, and whatever one considers to be the Ultimate”
(Elkins, Hedstrom, Hughes, Leaf, & Saunders, 1988, p. 10).
The opening phrase—“a way of being and experiencing” (Elkins et al., 1988, p.
10)—is focused on consciousness. This description also touches three areas of
Emmons’s spiritual intelligence: transcendence, sacredness (or the Ultimate), and val-
ues. This raises the concern that spiritual intelligence is, perhaps, a relabeling of spiri-
50 MAYER

tuality. Consider children who feel spiritual with every part of themselves; who talk to
imagined or (some would say) real divine presences far more easily than adults. They
have taken a leap of imaginative purity that would confound most adults. Whether
such children are intelligent, however, seems irrelevant to their conscious experience
of spirituality.
To be sure, some cognition (and therefore, intelligence) is present in all men-
tal life. Praying for the health and welfare of one’s family requires knowledge of
what “health,” “family,” and “welfare” are. Cognition is not, however, primary
in such instances, and we would expect the person praying to attend to spiritual
matters but not necessarily to possess high intelligence in order to pray. My
point is that intelligence does not exist simply because some cognition is pres-
ent, but rather, abstract reasoning must be primary. Consider the realm of artifi-
cial intelligence. We usually attribute intelligence to those machines that reach a
critical mass of cognitive processing, such as a general-purpose computer that
can solve a variety of problems or a computer dedicated to a mentally demand-
ing activity such as playing chess. By comparison, a television is not primarily
distinguished by its intelligence, even though it certainly processes information
and might even contain a “smart chip” that permits it to solve certain limited
problems.

A MORE FORMAL ANALYSIS OF SPIRITUAL

INTELLIGENCE

Perhaps such preliminary objections to spiritual intelligence are insufficiently con-

sidered. To find out if that is the case requires a more formal discussion of how ba-
sic mental mechanisms are characterized. In the next section, I discuss three types
of personality components: (a) a diverse variety of low-level mental mechanisms
that include motivations, emotions, cognition, and consciousness; (b) learned mod-
els of the world; (c) and traits. I compare Emmons’s five parts of spiritual intelli-
gence (e.g., transcendence, coping, etc.) to various personality parts to see the de-
gree each one qualifies as engaging valid abstract reasoning.

WHERE IS SPIRITUALITY AMONG THE PARTS OF

PERSONALITY?

Elsewhere, I have argued that there exists an extremely heterogeneous class of per-
sonality parts that include basic, brain-related mechanisms or modes of processing.
These are variously called enablers or enabling mechanisms because they enable
human personality to operate (e.g., Averill, 1992; Mayer, 1995; Mayer, Chabot, &
Carlsmith, 1997). Each class reflects distinct mental operations, as measured by
psychometric and experimental methods; moreover, each class roughly corre-
 INTELLIGENCE OR CONSCIOUSNESS? 51

sponds to the excitation of distinct brain regions (see Hilgard, 1980; MacLean,
1973; Mayer, Chabot, & Carlsmith, 1997, for reviews).
These enablers can be divided into four broad categories, which include cogni-
tion, motives, emotions, and consciousness. At this near-brain level, it is possible
to separate out something like a pure motive (e.g., thirst), a pure feeling (e.g., sad-
ness), a pure mental capacity (e.g., the capacity to remember digits), and pure con-
sciousness (e.g., awareness of being alive). Each one of these areas of function can
itself be broken down into a still-heterogeneous area of activity. For example, mo-
tives such as hunger and thirst pertain to metabolic function whereas motives such
as the need for affiliation or aggression pertain to social function. Similarly, cogni-
tion involves both verbal and spatial reasoning, which may involve different areas
of the brain (e.g., Kosslyn et al., 1999). As a first approximation, however, it
makes sense to talk about the broad, biologically related classes of motives, emo-
tions, cognitions, and consciousness.
Motives, emotions, or cognitions rarely operate on their own, however, but
rather blend together to some degree. They join in two ways: first, at the near-bi-
ological level itself and then as they are synthesized when a person learns and
thinks about the world. At the near-biological level, the four classes of enablers
are interconnected and act on one another. Table 1 shows some ways that a given
motive, emotion, cognition, or conscious activity (listed down the left-hand side)
acts upon another (as listed across the top). For example, we can think of con-
sciousness acting on emotion—to make it felt, attended to, examined. Similarly,
we can think of an emotion, such as fear, acting on consciousness to narrow it
down to self-preservation.
Enablers stay relatively unchanged in terms of function and purpose through-
out the life span. At the same time, by virtue of operating in a changing, growing
mind, they can become enhanced, or guided, in some ways. Thus, short-term
memory can be enhanced by learning mnemonics (i.e., memory tricks). Con-
sciousness appears able to guide or steer itself through the use of self-sugges-
tion, the influence of current concerns, meditative practices, and other
procedures (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Ornstein, 1972). Such directed con-
sciousness seems to describe Emmons’s first aspect of spiritual intelligence,
transcendence. Transcendence includes such qualities as leaving behind physi-
cality, and sensing bonds with humanity. This seems, to me, close to what psy-
chologists call “structuring,” or “developing” consciousness, as opposed to
cognition; such structuring guides a person’s attention to certain mental phe-
nomena (e.g., breathing, oneness) until the conscious state is altered. Similarly,
Emmons’s second manifestation of spiritual intelligence, mysticism, seems ex-
plicable this way. Mysticism involves entering spiritual states of consciousness
in which, through the use of special rituals and prayer, one may become espe-
cially contemplative, have flashes of insight, or even see visions. Thus, both
transcendence and mysticism appear primarily to involve highly structured con-
 52 MAYER

TABLE 1
Potential Actions On One Another of Motives, Emotions, Cognitions, and Consciousness

System That is Acted Upon

System That
Acts Motivation Emotion Cognition Consciousness

Consciousness Awareness of Awareness of emotion; Awareness of Consciousness of

motivation. structured openness or cognition. consciousness: the
closedness to emotion. structuring of
awareness.
Cognition Motivational Cognitive identification Cognitive Cognitive
intelligence. of and understanding intelligence. understanding of
of emotion (emotional consciousness.
intelligence-a).
Emotion Emotional Emotional feeling basic Emotional facilitation Emotional
amplification of feelings: happy, sad, of cognition narrowing and
motivation angry, etc. (emotional expanding, and/or
(e.g., happiness intelligence-b) and filtering of
and altruism). emotional biasing consciousness.
of cognition (e.g.,
confusion).
Motivation Motivational Motivation-triggered Motivations of Motivational cuing
direction (e.g., emotions (e.g., cogition (e.g., of consciousness.
hunger, thirst). aggression and anger); need for
motivational need for cognition).
emotion (e.g., need
for emotion).

scious processes, with cognition providing a supporting role by representing the

things that must be transcended or contemplated, but with little requirement for
abstract reasoning.
As people learn about themselves and the world, they create mental models of
reality that integrate motives, emotions, cognitions, and consciousness in another
way. These models form a second broad class of personality components different
from the enablers in that they are primarily mental representations rather than op-
erations; they are maps or concepts of the self or the world. For example, a man
may develop a mental model of Kalamazoo, Michigan, that includes a need to visit
the city (a motive), a love of Kalamazoo’s Western Michigan University, his alma
mater (an emotion), an understanding of the grid of streets and best places to go
(cognition), and attention to articles and news about Kalamazoo that most people
do not share (consciousness). These models are learned representations, called by
such diverse names as establishments (Mayer, 1995, 1998; Murray & Kluckhorn,
1956); schemas (Markus, 1997); personal constructs (Kelly, 1955); scripts, plans,
and goals (Schank & Abelson, 1977); and others.
 INTELLIGENCE OR CONSCIOUSNESS? 53

There certainly is abstract reasoning involved in mental representations of spiri-

tual learning. A person’s expert knowledge of religious texts and spiritual practices
are involved in any spiritual exercise or experience. Scholarship in religious texts
such as the Hebrew Bible and New Testament, the Qu’ran, the Bhagavad Gita, and
other similar works may heighten a sense of sacredness and transcendence. The third
and fourth aspects of Emmons’s spiritual intelligence are sanctification and coping.
Sanctification involves joining everyday activities with a sense of the sacred. Spiri-
tual coping involves using sacred meanings to find purposes in setbacks and chal-
lenges, and to assist one in moving forward in life. I suspect these two areas of
spiritual intelligence come closest to meeting criteria for abstract reasoning. Al-
though attending to the sacred involves structuring consciousness, it is assisted by an
understanding and appreciation for religious stories, mythologies, anecdotes, and
interpretations. A deep familiarity with such works can connect an everyday family
event, such as a meal, with an important story in a spiritual or religious tradition.
Similarly, coping in response to a physical illness or frailty may be assisted by con-
sideration of one or another stories from those same spiritual and religious traditions.
Perhaps people higher in the proposed spiritual intelligence would see differ-
ent, more abstract relationships to the sacred than those lower in intelligence.
Whether such abstract connections are unique to spiritual literature or would ex-
tend to areas of literary scholarship, knowledge of the visual arts, and others, how-
ever, is an empirical question. If the reasoning in spiritual stories is the same as that
employed in literary scholarship or the arts, then all that might be present would be
verbal intelligence; if spiritual reasoning were distinct from those other areas,
however, it would provide a basis for a spiritual intelligence.
Thus far, we have discussed low-level mechanisms (enablers) and learned
models (establishments). As these interact, mental life exhibits various patterns or
themes. For example, a woman’s emotional mechanisms (enablers) might gener-
ate love, and this love might enter into mental models of her husband, her children,
her neighbors, her city, and her possessions, as well as other loves. These emergent
patterns or themes can be viewed as a third broad class of personality parts, vari-
ously called traits or themes. In the aforementioned example, we may characterize
the woman as loving, or warm.
The fifth aspect of spiritual intelligence involves virtuous traits. These include
behaving so as to convey forgiveness, gratitude, humility, and mercy. I greatly ad-
mire such qualities, yet there are large noncognitive components to them. For ex-
ample, it is possible to forgive indiscriminately and to express gratitude
inappropriately, or unyieldingly. This happens, for instance, when a person repeat-
edly expresses gratitude for things done, not on his or her behalf, but out of general
necessity, or even without him or her in mind.
I worry that to equate forgiveness or gratitude with intelligence is to blur some im-
portant distinctions between intellectual and nonintellectual qualities. For example,
I would have some reservations about labeling people with happy, easy-going tem-
54 MAYER

peraments as spiritually intelligent, because they inherited a temperament that

makes it easy for them to forgive others. Similarly, some lucky individuals may for-
give others because they have experienced such good treatment throughout life that a
few transgressions are easily overlooked. On the other hand, there are people who
may find it quite difficult to forgive others, independent of a spiritual intelligence (as
I might conceive of it). I am thinking of people whose biological temperament pre-
disposes them to be unhappy and angry, as well as people who have been victimized
by such crimes as child abuse and rape, or who have experienced war or concentra-
tion camps. These latter individuals often report that it is next to impossible to for-
give those responsible, and yet many of them turn to spirituality in order to live and
thrive after such tragedy. To me, intelligence is plastic; it allows a person to consider
deeply many lines of thought, and many possible paths of life. Only some of these
would include forgiveness or gratitude. Attaching such characteristics together
seems to limit the utility and power of intelligence.

IN SEARCH OF A SPIRITUAL INTELLIGENCE

Emmons’s spiritual intelligence and its five aspects seem to cover a variety of
parts of mental life: from structured aspects of consciousness to nonintellective
personality traits. To me, Emmons’s proposed spiritual intelligence does not yet
meet the criterion of primarily involving abstract reasoning. This does not pre-
clude some future version of the concept from meeting such a conceptual crite-
rion. Then, one could determine whether the intelligence also satisfies necessary
empirical criteria. There is no doubt that some spiritual individuals reason, and
often with great sophistication. There exist important philosophies of guilt, lov-
ing kindness, mercy, humility, and other feelings and their relation to ultimate
issues (e.g., Otto, 1950; Peli, 1984). We would need to know more, however,
about the unique features of such reasoning before spiritual intelligence can be
better understood.
To illustrate what I mean about understanding the reasoning involved in spiritu-
ality, consider the recent case of emotional intelligence (e.g., Mayer & Salovey,
1997; Salovey & Mayer, 1990) as a candidate intelligence. Emotions had been
studied for centuries before the concept of an emotional intelligence could be fully
developed. The idea of emotional intelligence developed from a centuries-old,
philosophical literature on the meaning of emotions (e.g., Calhoun & Solomon,
1984; Frank, 1988). It developed, as well, from several decades of more concerted
scientific work on the nature of emotion, its language, and its meanings (e.g.,
Bower, 1981; Buck, 1984; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; see Clark & Fiske,
1982; Forgas, in press, for reviews). This work culminated, perhaps, with empiri-
cal work in artificial intelligence and computer understanding of emotions (Dyer,
1983; Picard, 1997).
 INTELLIGENCE OR CONSCIOUSNESS? 55

Some flavor of the rules discovered in such work can be obtained from consider-
ing the fictional character, Jane, who was angry one afternoon at 2 p.m., and ashamed
at 3 p.m. Given such information, one could surmise that, in-between her anger and
her shame, she may have expressed anger and then thought the better of it, or discov-
ered new information which rendered the anger unjustified and petty-seeming, or
simply felt ashamed she was angry—as she often does. One can see it is less likely
that in-between she had a wonderful interview with the Queen of England (Mayer,
Caruso, & Salovey, 1999). Reasoning like this, I would argue, concerns how one
emotion can change into certain emotions but not others, given a specific circum-
stance. Understanding such rules is as complex and sophisticated, in its own way, as
is syllogistic reasoning.
A similar working out of the rules of spiritual intelligence would provide a
firmer basis for such a proposed entity. It seems to me, however, that esoteric prac-
tices of spirituality, along with the lengthy training necessary to learn certain spiri-
tual practices, has impeded the study of the reasoning that is a part of spirituality.
The rules of spirituality, whatever they may be, remain to be elaborated, codified,
and understood. As I review works by more intellectually oriented spiritual writ-
ers, I see the possibility of codifying such thought, but, to the best of my knowl-
edge, it has not yet taken place.
A great service could be done in this area by first elucidating the intellectual
underpinnings—the abstract reasoning—involved in spirituality. We must un-
derstand the symbol system of spiritual and religious writing better to understand
the sort of reasoning that takes place within it. What are the mental transforma-
tions necessary to think spiritually? Can the rules of such reasoning be made ac-
cessible to the scientist, to computer representations? Are there special instances
when spiritual thought achieves a critical mass of abstract reasoning, and there-
fore qualifies as an intelligence? At present, spiritual intelligence, like spiritual-
ity itself, remains mysterious in many respects. As Emmons pursues his journey
of describing a spiritual intelligence, I look forward to what he will teach us
about the quality of thought that accompanies spirituality.

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