JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LOGISTICS, Vol. 29, No.

1, 2008 307

AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF SUPPLY CHAIN PERFORMANCE ALONG

SEVERAL DIMENSIONS OF RISK

by

Stephan M. Wagner
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich

and

Christoph Bode
WHU—Otto Beisheim School of Management

INTRODUCTION

In the past years, a fairly new research area has emerged on the supply chain management scene and has gained
considerable attention from both academics and practitioners: Supply chain risk management. This new interest is
fueled by two parallel issues.

First, a recent series of crises and catastrophes has attracted public attention. Natural disasters like Hurricane
Katrina devastating the Gulf Coast of the United States in 2005, terrorist acts such as the attacks of September 11,
2001, and epidemics like SARS in South-East Asia in 2003 are violent reminders that we live in an unpredictable
and increasingly unstable world. Moreover, there is strong evidence that such catastrophic events are becoming
more frequent (Coleman 2006). Elkins, Handfield, Blackhurst, and Craighead (2005) observed that there has been an
increase both in the potential for disruptions and in their magnitude. Likewise, Munich Re (2007, p. 46) stated in its
annual report on natural hazards that “[s]ince 1950, there has been a long-term upward trend in the number of events
and the amount of economic and insured losses.”

Second, modern supply chains seem to be more vulnerable than ever. Over the last decade, almost all industries
have seen increased competitive pressure in the business environment and the globalization of markets. These
changes have compelled firms to make their intra-firm business processes and inter-firm supply chains either more
efficient or more responsive, for instance, by outsourcing and offshoring many manufacturing and R&D activities,
sourcing in low-cost countries, reducing inventories, or collaborating more intensively with other supply chain
actors (Fisher 1997; Hult, Ketchen, and Slater 2004; Lee 2002; Wisner 2003). Although such supply chain design
changes and supply chain management initiatives have great potential to make operations leaner and more efficient
in a stable environment, they simultaneously increase the fragility and vulnerability of supply chains to disruptions
(Craighead, Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, and Handfield 2007; Wagner and Bode 2006; Zsidisin, Ragatz, and
Melnyk 2005a).

In summary, we find a relatively unstable world on the one hand, and increasingly sensitive supply chains on
the other. Many supply chain decision-makers were caught off-guard by the intensity of the recent disasters which
highlighted the lack of preparedness in many supply chains. For this reason, many firms have started to take supply
chain disruptions more seriously and to rethink their supply chain strategy and design. Accordingly, 38% of 247
CFOs surveyed said that their corporations were “sitting on too much unmanaged supplier risk” (Katz 2004, p. 1).

At a glance, it seems obvious that firms are now compelled to tackle supply chain risks just as vigorously as
they tackle other business risks. However, supply chain risk management comes at a cost and before firms engage in
expensive actions they need to have information about the (1) probability of occurrence of supply chain disruptions
308 Wagner and Bode

and (2) the effect of these disruptions on performance. In particular, supply chain risk management activities are
only justified if supply chain risks interfere with supply chain performance. To our knowledge, only the study by
Hendricks and Singhal (2003, 2005a, 2005b) investigated the relationship between supply chain risks and
performance. Their study was based on a sample of public ad-hoc announcements from the Wall Street Journal and
the Dow Jones News Service concerning supply chain disruptions. In two articles (Hendricks and Singhal 2003,
2005a) they showed how media announcements on supply chain disruptions affect the observable share price and
shareholder value of the announcing firm. The results demonstrated that stock markets severely penalize
announcements of supply chain disruptions. A third article (Hendricks and Singhal 2005b) focused on operating
performance metrics observable through financial statement analysis (e.g., sales, operating income, ROA). By
comparing the financial statements in the year preceding and following an ad-hoc announcement, they were able to
show that such announcements have a substantial long-term negative effect on operating performance. While
Hendricks and Singhal investigated the relationship between announced supply chain disruption and performance
(shareholder value and metrics derived from financial statements), they did not differentiate among types of
disruptions and did not consider the probability of occurrence. The relationship between supply chain risk and
supply chain performance has not yet been investigated empirically. Although, risks are inherent in supply chains,
both their impact and their appropriate management are now under greater scrutiny, current knowledge is still quite
limited as most articles on supply chain risks are rather anecdotal or case study-based. Results from large-scale
empirical research are scarce and mostly descriptive (Jüttner 2005; Peck and Jüttner 2002; Svensson 2002; Zsidisin
and Ellram 2003).

Therefore, the goal of this research is twofold. First, we provide a detailed and empirically-derived
operationalization of supply chain risk sources. For this purpose, a set of the most relevant supply chain disruptions
was singled out from the literature, discussed with practitioners and experts, and then incorporated into a
questionnaire. Second, we examine the link between those supply chain risk sources and supply chain performance.

The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature on contingency theory and
strategic choice theory. We apply both frameworks to the relationship between supply chain risk and supply chain
performance and use them to develop our model and hypotheses. Moreover, we delineate the applied nomenclature
regarding the terms risk, risk source, and disruption. Section 3 describes the empirical study and the methodology
used to test the hypothesized relationships. Section 4 presents the findings. Section 5 discusses the results, and the
final section suggests implications for managerial practice and future research.

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES

A Contingency Perspective on Supply Chain Risk Management

A classical approach in strategic management research applicable to supply chain management is to divide the
concept of strategy into two distinct aspects: process (how strategy is formed) and content (what is decided).
Numerous researchers focused on either process or content and investigated the relationship between certain
strategic variables and performance (Ketchen, Thomas, and McDaniel 1996). Although this distinction and its
usefulness have been extensively discussed, the inquiry of Pettigrew and Whipp (1993) indicated that, in addition to
content and process, the internal and external context of the organization plays an important role for decision-
making and should therefore be incorporated in this framework. Empirical research by Ketchen, Thomas, and
McDaniel (1996) confirmed this perspective.

This view is supported by contingency theory that builds on the central assumption that high organizational
efficiency and performance result when firms consider the context in which strategy is crafted and implemented. For
high efficiency and performance, organizations must match structure to the context and environment, i.e., forces
outside the decision-maker’s control. If this “fit” is not achieved “opportunities are lost, costs rise, and the
maintenance of the organization is threatened” (Child 1972, p. 8). Contingency theorists empirically tested direct
relationships between particular contextual variables and organizational structure or performance (Lawrence and
Lorsch 1967). However, from the contingency theory perspective, strategies are merely necessary responses to the
environment. Therefore, Child (1972) proposed strategic choice theory as a corrective to the classic contingency
approach. The strategic choice perspective negates the pure deterministic function between context and
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LOGISTICS, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008 309

organizational structure, arguing that organizations have strategic choice when designing their structure. While
strategic decision-makers are constrained by contextual factors, they still have some room for strategic maneuvering.

The role of the constructs “context” or “environment” has received a great deal of attention both in strategic
management research and in organizational theory. Various conceptualizations of the construct and its constituent
elements exist. This article applies Duncan’s (1972, p. 314) notion of “environment” as “the totality of physical and
social factors that are taken directly into consideration in the decision-making behavior of individuals in the
organization.” This definition includes factors that are internal and external to the firm. We argue that supply chain
risk sources are critical contextual variables that can be internal and external to supply chains and to the acting firms
in a supply chain network.

From a strategic management perspective, matching or aligning organizational resources with the organization’s
context, and especially to environmental opportunities and threats, is a major task for decision-makers (Miles and
Snow 1978; Venkatraman and Camillus 1984). As stated in the introduction, the literature has suggested that supply
chain risk sources pose a threat for which many organizations are not prepared. If this assumption is correct,
decision-makers must now reconsider their strategy and, if necessary, align the organization to this changed
environment in order to achieve a strategic fit.

This reasoning brings us to our hypotheses. We posit that the risk deriving from the various supply chain
sources undermines supply chain performance. If this assumption finds support then the call for an organizational
adaptation towards supply chain risk is substantiated.

Supply Chain Risk, Disruptions, and Risk Sources

Risk is an elusive construct that has a variety of different meanings, measurements and interpretations
depending on the field of research (Jemison 1987). There is an extensive body of literature concerning risk in
decision theory (Arrow 1965), finance (Altman 1968), marketing (Cox 1967), management (March and Shapira
1987), and psychology (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).

Several researchers in the field of supply chain management have defined supply chain risk. Here – but also in
the general discussion of risk – there are two distinctive meanings. There is a persistent tension between, on the one
hand, risk purely as danger and, on the other hand, risk as both danger and opportunity (Mitchell 1995). According
to classical decision theory and in fields such as finance, the fluctuations around the expected value (mean) of a
performance measure are used as proxy for risk. That is, risk is equated with variance and consequently has both a
potential “downside” and “upside.” Following these considerations, Jüttner, Peck, and Christopher (2003, p. 200)
defined supply chain risk as a “variation in the distribution of possible supply chain outcomes, their likelihood, and
their subjective value.”

In contrast, the notion that risk inherits primarily negative consequences corresponds to the common human
perception. March and Shapira (1987) examined how managers perceive and respond to risk. They found that the
majority tend to exaggerate its “downside.” Several scholars in the supply chain management and supply
management fields share this view. Harland, Brenchley, and Walker (2003, p. 52), for instance, discussed several
definitions and concluded that supply chain risk is associated with the “chance of danger, damage, loss, injury or any
other undesired consequences.”

For the purpose of this study and considering the impact of recent disruptions on supply chains, we find that the
latter notion of risk as purely negative corresponds best to supply chain business reality. For this reason, we will
consider neither “happy disasters” nor situations in which managers intentionally “gamble” on risk. Here, we
understand risk as the negative deviation from the expected value of a certain performance measure, resulting in
undesirable consequences for the focal firm. Hence, risk is equated with the damage or loss resulting from a supply
chain disruption.

We define a supply chain disruption as the combination of (1) an unintended, anomalous triggering event that
materializes somewhere in the supply chain or its environment, and (2) a consequential situation which significantly
threatens normal business operations of the firms in the supply chain. For the affected firms, it is an exceptional
situation in comparison to every-day business. The disruption has a certain probability of occurrence and is
310 Wagner and Bode

characterized both by its severity and by its direct and indirect effects. Since the resulting detriment is usually a
function of time, supply chain disruptions involve time pressure, implying that decisions for mitigation must be
made swiftly. Depending on its severity, other terms might be applied, such as, glitch, disturbance, accident,
disaster, or crisis.

Supply chain disruptions can materialize either inside or outside of a supply chain. Consequently, they can be
highly divergent. For instance, the financial default of a supplier and an earthquake that destroys production capacity
are situations with completely different attributes and therefore have different effects on the supply chain.

In attempting to differentiate supply chain risks from other business risks, many scholars have proposed
typologies and/or taxonomies of risks (Chopra and Sodhi 2004; Christopher and Peck 2004; Hallikas, Karvonen,
Pulkkinen, Virolainen, and Tuominen 2004; Jüttner 2005; Jüttner, Peck, and Christopher 2003; Norrman and
Lindroth 2004; Spekman and Davis 2004; Svensson 2000). The categories of supply chain disruptions are often
labeled “supply chain risk sources.” As such, Svensson (2000) identified two categories (quantitative and
qualitative), Jüttner (2005) delineated three (supply, demand, and environmental), and Chopra and Sodhi (2004)
proposed nine (disruptions, delays, systems, forecast, intellectual property, procurement, receivables, inventory, and
capacity). In the following, for the sake of brevity, we call a negative deviation from the expected value of a
performance measure (resulting in negative consequences for the focal firm) a “supply chain risk” when this
deviation is the result of a supply chain disruption.

For our purpose, we will divide supply chain risk sources into five distinct classes: (1) demand side; (2) supply
side; (3) regulatory, legal and bureaucratic; (4) infrastructure; and (5) catastrophic. While the first two risk source
categories deal with supply-demand coordination risks that are internal to the supply chain, the latter three focus on
risk sources that are not necessarily internal to the chain.

Demand Side Risks

Demand side risks result from disruptions emerging from downstream supply chain operations (Jüttner 2005).
These include, on the one hand, disruptions in the physical distribution of products to the end-customer, usually in
transportation operations (e.g., a truck driver strike) (McKinnon 2006) and the distribution network (e.g., a delay in
a distribution center). On the other hand, demand side risks can originate from the uncertainty caused by customers’
unforeseeable demands (Nagurney, Cruz, Dong, and Zhang 2005). Disruptions occur here from a mismatch between
a company’s projections and actual demand as well as from poor supply chain coordination. The consequences of
such disruptions are costly shortages, obsolescence, and inefficient capacity utilization. An important issue in this
context, affecting forecast quality and therefore demand side disruptions is the bullwhip effect, characterized by an
amplification of demand volatility in the upstream direction of the supply chain.

Lee, Padmanabhan, and Whang (1997) identified delayed and distorted information, sales promotions, order
batching, price fluctuations and rationing or shortage gaming as major causes of the bullwhip effect. Other factors
intensifying the bullwhip effect are over-reactions, unnecessary interventions, second guessing, and mistrust
(Christopher and Lee 2004). Although demand side risk management is in some respects the “bread-and-butter” of
supply chain management, these issues still present a major risk source for many firms. Spekman and Davis (2004)
cite the example of Cisco Systems Inc. that wrote off US $2.5 billion in inventory in 2001 due to a lack of
communication among its downstream supply chain partners. Consequentially, we draw the hypothesis:

H1: The higher the demand side risk, the lower the supply chain performance.

Supply Side Risks

Firms are exposed to numerous risks associated with the upstream side of their supply chains. Supply side risks
reside in purchasing, suppliers, supplier relationships, and supply networks. These include supplier business risks,
production capacity constraints on the supply market, quality problems, and changes in technology and product
design (Zsidisin, Panelli, and Upton 2000). Kraljic (1983) was among the first who emphasized that firms should
proactively assess and manage the uncertainties in their supplier portfolio in order to guard against costly supply
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LOGISTICS, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008 311

disruptions. The need to assess and manage supply side risks carefully has been intensified by stronger reliance on
external sources for critical materials and components (Giunipero and Eltantawy 2004).

Supplier business risks relate to events that affect the continuity of the supplier and result in the interruption or
termination of the buyer-supplier relationship. This concerns particularly the threat of financial instability of
suppliers and the consequences of supplier default, insolvency, or bankruptcy (Wagner and Johnson 2004).

Another type of disruption occurs when a supplier is vertically integrated by a direct competitor of the customer
firm, forcing the termination of the relationship (Chopra and Sodhi 2004). In ongoing and cooperative buyer-
supplier relationships, opportunistic behavior from suppliers has also been reported in the literature as a source of
supply risk (Spekman and Davis 2004; Stump and Heide 1996). Organizational lock-in is a particular threat when a
purchasing organization is so dependent on a supplier that it has little room for maneuvering.

Capacity constraints or shortages as well as poor logistics performance (delivery reliability) derive from
unsolved problems in the supplier’s production and operations management (Lee and Billington 1993). The
bullwhip effect also plays a role here and has to be countered by the suppliers. Furthermore, poor quality in the
purchased products or services is a significant risk and can have a domino effect through the supply chain to the
final customer (Zsidisin, Panelli, and Upton 2000).

Finally, the inability of suppliers to adapt to technological or product design changes may have detrimental
effects on the customer’s costs and competitiveness (Zsidisin and Ellram 2003). With the increased importance of
and reliance on outsourcing, the cited risks are greater (Giunipero and Eltantawy 2004). Accordingly, we
hypothesize:

H2: The higher the supply side risk, the lower the supply chain performance.

Regulatory, Legal and Bureaucratic Risk

In many countries, authorities (administrative, legislative, regulatory agencies) are an important factor of
uncertainty in the setup and operation of supply chains. Regulatory, legal and bureaucratic risks refer to the legal
enforceability and execution of supply chain-relevant laws and policies (e.g., trade and transportation laws) as well
as the degree and frequency of changes in these laws and policies. This includes the ability to obtain approvals
necessary for supply chain design activities and supply chain operation. This risk source is external to the individual
supply chain or firm.

With the exception of government initiatives for security facilitation such as the Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) or Authorized Economic Operators (AEO) certifications (Sarathy 2006; Zsidisin,
Ragatz, and Melnyk 2005b), little attention has been paid to risks stemming from changing legal stipulations and
conditions. According to Hendricks and Singhal (2003, 2005a, 2005b) supply chain disruptions can be associated
with the actions or decisions of authorities. Administrative barriers (e.g., customs, trade regulations) may restrict the
design and influence the operative performance of supply chains. Legal changes are often sudden and difficult to
anticipate. Examples are the new road pricing schemes for freight vehicles in European countries; these schemes
have substantially increased transportation costs. Environmental legislation now requires product traceability and the
establishment of reverse logistics systems. In order to meet such environmental requisites, firms frequently get
involved in more complex supply chains and incur higher supply chain costs. In summary, we decided to consider
these risks in our study and posit:

H3: The higher the regulatory, legal and bureaucratic risk, the lower the supply chain performance.

Infrastructure Risks

The risk source “infrastructure” includes disruptions that materialize from the infrastructure that a firm
maintains for its supply chain operations. It includes socio-technical accidents such as equipment malfunctions,
machine breakdowns, disruptions in the supply of electricity or water, IT failures or breakdowns, in addition to local
human-centered issues (vandalism, sabotage, labor strikes, industrial accidents) (Chopra and Sodhi 2004; Spekman
312 Wagner and Bode

and Davis 2004). It is important to note that this class subsumes only localized events referring to the extent to
which other organizations are affected.

IT-related problems are highly relevant to supply chain management since many supply chain management
functions build on information processing and sharing. In the last years, organizations have become increasingly
technology-dependent and, consequently, vulnerable to IT problems or breakdowns (Chopra and Sodhi 2004). These
events can be the result of malicious actions by individuals or groups (cyber-attacks, virus attacks), software bugs
and hardware failures (Warren and Hutchinson 2000). Moreover, modern Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)
systems force firms to open their internal processes and databases both to their suppliers and customers, thus
increasing their exposure to IT-related threats. Based on these considerations, we hypothesize:

H4: The higher the infrastructure risk, the lower the supply chain performance.

Catastrophic Risks

This class subsumes pervasive events that, when they materialize, have a severe impact on the area of their
occurrence. Such events can be epidemics or natural hazards (force majeure), socio-political instability, civil unrest,
and terrorist attacks (Kleindorfer and Saad 2005; Martha and Subbakrishna 2002; Swaminathan 2003).
In many regions of the world, tsunamis, droughts, earthquakes, hurricanes, and floods are a constant threat to
their societies in general and to their firms in particular (Helferich and Cook 2002; Munich Re 2007). The negative
consequences on supply chains are obvious since production facilities and transportation systems are highly
vulnerable to natural disasters. Due to the globalization of markets and a surge in globe-spanning supply chain
operations, local catastrophes have increasingly indirect global repercussions.

The destructive impact of terrorism on firms’ supply chains has received much attention since 2001 (Rice and
Tenney 2007; Sheffi 2001). Terrorist acts affect supply chains either directly (e.g., destruction of logistics
infrastructure) or indirectly (e.g., port closures for security reasons imposed by the government) (Czinkota, Knight,
Liesch, and Steen 2005). Taking these aspects into account, we formulate the last hypothesis:

H5: The higher the risks from catastrophes, the lower the supply chain performance.

METHODS

Data Collection and Sample

Data were collected through a cross-sectional survey administered in Germany to a sample of 4,946 top-level
executives in logistics and supply chain management. The mailing and two follow-ups generated 760 usable
responses, yielding a relatively high response rate of about 15.4%, considering the demands on the time of top-level
executives (Tomaskovic-Devey, Leiter, and Thompson 1994). Non-response bias was assessed on the notion that
later respondents would be similar to non-respondents (Armstrong and Overton 1977). For all questionnaire items,
the responses of later respondents were compared to those of earlier ones. This comparison indicated absence of
non-response bias.

The sample covered industrial (71.7% of the sample), service (19.5%) and trade (8.8%) firms. The firms’
annual sales ranged from less than US$ 10 million to US$ 90 billion (mean US$ 60.3 million), and the number of
employees from fewer than 100 to 430,000 (mean 2,913), thus yielding a heterogeneous sample. Given the range
and size of the firms studied and the diversity of industries, there was no prima facie reason to expect any systematic
bias in the results. Most of the respondents held management positions in logistics and supply chain management
(37.5%), or were in higher-level senior management positions (e.g., Executive VP, Senior VP) or owners of the
business (23.8%). On average, the respondents had worked in this position for 7.0 years and had been with the firm
for 10.9 years. A more detailed breakdown of the sample and informants can be found in Table 1.
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LOGISTICS, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008 313

TABLE 1

SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Percent of total sample
Sector and industry
Industry sector 71.7
Automotive 11.2
Electro/Electronics 10.1
Machinery 9.5
Chemicals and pharmaceutical 8.4
Information technology 6.6
Materials and metal production 6.2
Food 5.5
Paper, pulp, and printing 4.2
Construction 3.0
Consumer goods 2.5
Aerospace and defense 2.1
Medical devices 1.3
Other industry 0.9
Service sector 19.5
Logistics services 17.1
Other services 2.4
Trade sector 8.8
Sales (in US$)
Less than 10 million 14.9
10 million - under 50 million 23.9
50 million - under 100 million 16.3
100 million - under 250 million 14.7
250 million - under 500 million 8.7
500 million - under 1 billion 6.7
1 billion - under 10 billion 7.2
10 billion and more 5.0
n.a. 2.5
Number of employees
Less than 100 21.4
100 - 499 42.2
500 - 999 11.6
1,000 - 4,999 15.3
5,000 - 9,999 2.8
10,000 and more 3.7
n.a. 3.0
Position of informant
Logistics/Supply chain management 37.5
High-level senior management or owners 23.8
Purchasing/Procurement 15.0
Production/Operations 13.9
Sales, distribution, and service 3.6
Other management positions 3.4
Accounting/Finance 2.1
n.a. 0.7
314 Wagner and Bode

Questionnaire and Measure Development

As indicated earlier, most previous studies on supply chain risk management were based on anecdotal evidence
or case studies. Except for the supply chain performance measure, items with formal scale characteristics were not
available for our purpose. Therefore, new measures and a fully standardized survey instrument were developed
incrementally.

First, we started developing the risk source measures based on an initial pool of scale items that were generated
through an extensive review of the academic and practitioner literature on supply chain risk management.
Operational definitions for the risk measures and construct items were derived from these sources. A preliminary
questionnaire was drafted. Second, the scale items included in the questionnaire, their relevance, their wording and
directions, and the format of the questionnaire were refined on the basis of comments from practitioners and
academicians. Third, to further refine the survey instrument, it was pre-tested through interviews with supply chain
management executives from a small number of firms. Again, their comments were incorporated into the final
version of the questionnaire.

Respondents were asked to indicate how their firms had been affected during the last three years by supply
chain disruptions, and to specify their firms’ supply chain risk management activities and supply chain performance.
Five-point Likert-type items were used to operationalize all constructs. All items were scored so that higher numbers
reflect increases in the underlying constructs. Translations of the individual scale items and response cues for each
measure are listed in Appendix 1.

Our demand side risk measure consists of two items that capture the risk deriving from the interaction (or lack
thereof) with customers and volatility of the market (Jüttner 2005; Lee, Padmanabhan, and Whang 1997). Likewise,
the supply side risk measure consists of six items that capture the risks stemming from events and actors in the
upstream supply chain, for instance, the supply market conditions and the performance of suppliers (Zsidisin 2003;
Zsidisin and Ellram 2003). Regulatory, legal and bureaucratic risks were assessed with a two-item scale related to
changes in the political environment as well as administrative barriers imposed by governmental authorities
(Hendricks and Singhal 2003). We operationalized infrastructure risk with a four-item scale directed towards IT,
equipment, and facility malfunctions (Chopra and Sodhi 2004; Spekman and Davis 2004). For the catastrophic risk
measure, we generated a four-item scale that captures risks that originate from terrorism, socio-political crises,
natural disasters, and epidemics, for instance (Helferich and Cook 2002; Kleindorfer and Saad 2005). In order to
measure the dependent variable, supply chain performance, we adopted the scale from Rodrigues, Stank, and Lynch
(2004) that focuses on the “downstream” supply chain performance. The four performance items relate to delivery
dependability, order fill capacity, delivery speed, and customer satisfaction.

As the intention of this research was to investigate the effects of various supply chain risk sources on supply
chain performance, but not the influence of supply chain risk management activities performed by the firms, it was
necessary to include a risk management control variable. We operationalized this control variable along six items
based on risk management or mitigation strategies proposed in the literature (Chopra and Sodhi 2004; Kleindorfer
and van Wassenhove 2004; Tang 2006).

Traditional psychometric approaches were used to evaluate each scale’s reliability and validity (Mentzer and
Flint 1997; Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). They included correlation analysis, reliability evaluation, and principal
component factor analysis using varimax as the method of rotation. Factor analysis results and reliabilities are
included in Appendix 1. Reliabilities for all dependent variables were evaluated via item-to-total correlations and
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (Malhotra 2004; Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). All item-to-total correlations are above
0.5 (i.e., have values greater than 0.35, a threshold that would indicate that an item should be deleted from the scale).
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients range from 0.691 to 0.854. As a rule of thumb, coefficients above 0.6 are acceptable,
especially for new scales. All items meet established standards for convergent validity (i.e., all items load on unique
components with factor loadings larger than 0.5).

In summary, the evidence provided in these analyses suggests that the measures included in this study possess
sufficient reliability and validity to proceed with hypotheses testing. For hypotheses testing analysis, summated
composites of the multi-item measures used in this study were calculated. Correlations of constructs and descriptive
statistics are summarized in Table 2.
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LOGISTICS, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008 315

TABLE 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) Demand side risk n.a.
(2) Supply side risk 0.40 ** n.a.
(3) Regulatory, legal and
bureaucratic risk 0.14 ** 0.36 ** n.a.
(4) Infrastructure risk 0.20 ** 0.37 ** 0.37 ** n.a.
(5) Catastrophic risk 0.13 ** 0.31 ** 0.33 ** 0.29 ** n.a.
(6) Supply chain performance -0.13 ** -0.11 ** -0.02 -0.10 ** -0.04 n.a.
(7) Risk management -0.03 0.12 ** 0.12 ** 0.06 * 0.11 ** 0.17 ** n.a.
Mean 3.25 2.47 2.20 1.73 1.55 3.77 2.73
Standard deviation 0.99 0.77 0.94 0.68 0.73 0.62 0.87
** Significant at the 0.01 level.
* Significant at the 0.05 level.

RESULTS

In order to test our research hypotheses, an ordinary least square (OLS) regression model was estimated. Table
3 presents the standardized parameter estimates and the t-values.

TABLE 3
OLS REGRESSION FOR SUPPLY CHAIN PERFORMANCE
Variables Standardized t value p Hypothesis Result
estimate
Control variable
Risk management 0.18 4.75** .000 ! !
Predictor variables
Demand side risk -0.08 -1.98* .048 H1 Support
Supply side risk -0.09 -1.99* .047 H2 Support
Regulatory, legal and 0.03 0.61 .546 H3 No support
bureaucratic risk
Infrastructure risk -0.07 -1.57 .118 H4 No support
Catastrophic risk -0.01 -0.33 .743 H5 No support
Model summary: F(688, 6) = 6.96**; R2 = 0.06
** Significant at the 0.01 level.
* Significant at the 0.05 level.

The supply chain risks explained 6% of the variance of supply chain performance (F = 6.96, df = 688, 6). H1
posits a relationship between demand side risk and supply chain performance. With a standardized parameter
estimate of -0.08, this hypothesis was significant (t = -1.98, p < 0.05), indicating support for H1. H2, that supply side
risks have a negative impact on supply chain performance, was also supported with a statistically significant
316 Wagner and Bode

estimate of -0.09 (t = -1.99, p < 0.05). However, for the effect of regulatory, legal and bureaucratic risks,
infrastructure risks, and catastrophic risks on supply chain performance, as proposed in H3, H4, and H5, the data did
not reveal statistically significant relationships. Therefore, H 3, H4, and H5, were not supported.

DISCUSSION

Based on a sample of 760 top-level executives in logistics and supply chain management, the results of this
study notably shed light on the relationship between supply chain risks and supply chain performance and the
relevance of various supply chain risk sources as contextual variables in supply chain decision-making.

Supply chain risks only partially explain the variance in supply chain performance, and in particular, there is no
significant relationship between regulatory, legal and bureaucratic risks, infrastructure risks, and catastrophic risks
and supply chain performance. The rather low R2 is not astonishing since a firm’s supply chain performance is
clearly dependent on many factors other than supply chain risks. With regard to the last two risk sources, disruptions
from these classes are, in general, “outliers” or exceptional events that are characterized by a low probability of
occurrence (Stauffer 2003). Therefore, an obvious explanation is that their probability is low enough to have a
negligible impact on supply chain performance. In sum, authority actions, potential infrastructure disruptions, and
catastrophes are not contextual variables that must necessarily be factored into strategic supply chain decisions
(Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Théorêt 1976; Pettigrew and Whipp 1993).

This seems somewhat “counterintuitive” in light of the intensive interest of practitioners and academics to
understand and manage the various sources of supply chain risks. However, there is a widely accepted psychological
rationale for the misjudgment of the impact of supply chain disruptions in general and the hypothesized but non-
significant relationships between the three risk sources and supply chain performance in particular. Research by
psychologists has shown that people, instead of using statistics, rely on a limited number of heuristics to predict the
impact of risks. These heuristics sometimes result in reasonable judgments and sometimes in serious errors
(Kahneman and Tversky 1973). One such heuristic is called the “availability heuristic” (Slovic, Fischhoff, and
Lichtenstein 1982). Human beings make judgments based on what they can remember, not on complete data. This
heuristic is commonly used for judging the frequency or likelihood of events, such as supply chain risk sources (e.g.,
supply chain disruptions caused by floods).

News coverage also has a significant effect on decisions. After a news feature about a fire in a manufacturing
plant or an airport evacuation due to a bomb threat, managers will be more aware of the impact of such events on
their firm’s supply chains. Other factors can also affect managers’ judgment. Things which are easier to imagine, for
example, are more available. It is easier for people to remember images of flooded harbors, empty airports and
autoworkers on picket lines than the lack of communication with suppliers and/or customers. The attention that these
events receive is much higher than they merit according to their probability (Stauffer 2003).

Our conclusion that supply chain risks do not have a large effect on supply chain performance needs to be
contrasted with the findings of Hendricks and Singhal (2003, 2005a, 2005b). As described above, Hendricks and
Singhal analyzed the impact of announcements of supply chain disruptions on shareholder value and operating
performance and show that both performance measures are substantially affected by supply chain disruptions. A
careful examination and comparison of their study and our results reveals that both approaches differ strongly and
that the results are not in conflict with each other. Hendricks and Singhal’s work was based on a completely
different sample and measured a different issue. The observation of ad-hoc announcements yields two things: major
supply chain disruptions (minor disruptions or problems are not announced in the media) and firms that were really
affected by such a major supply chain disruptions. Apart from the shortcomings of the applied event-study
methodology (MacKinlay 1997; McWilliams and Siegel 1997), their sample is biased in favor of large disruptions.
They study “if-then” situations where “risk has struck” which sheds – undoubtedly important – light on the question
how supply chain disruptions affect shareholder value and operational performance under the condition that a
massive disruption has already occurred.

Our sample is randomly drawn from a population and therefore includes both firms that may have been
confronted with supply chain risks and firms that have not, or only to a small extent. Therefore, our research
indirectly acknowledges the frequency of supply chain disruptions experienced by the firms. In other words, our
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LOGISTICS, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008 317

results shed light on the importance of supply chain risk sources as a contextual variable in strategic decisions.
Additionally, the present study is not restricted to major supply chain risks (that are publicly reported). Instead, it is
also sensitive to minor supply chain risks. Finally, our study focuses on “supply chain performance” which is not in
a direct relationship with share price or shareholder value.

Having illustrated that certain supply chain risks are less relevant as context in strategic decision-making of
German firms, it is of course more important for strategists and decision-makers to understand which supply chain
risk sources they should consider. Our findings reveal relationships between supply and demand side risks and
supply chain performance. Hence, supply and demand side risks are contextual variables that supply chain strategies
need to account for (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Théorêt 1976; Pettigrew and Whipp 1993). This finding is
consistent with the literature on supply chain management. Primarily, it supports the assumption that supply and
demand coordination is the central issue in supply chain management (Kleindorfer and van Wassenhove 2004).

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The objective of this research was twofold: (1) to provide a detailed operationalization of the supply chain risk
construct; and (2) to examine the relevance of various supply chain risk sources for strategic decision-making based
on the relationship between supply chain risks and supply chain performance.

First, the article contributes to the research on supply chain risk management by providing a detailed
operationalization of the supply chain risk constructs. Building on a thorough examination of the supply chain risk
taxonomies proposed in the literature as well as on interviews with practitioners, we compiled and empirically
validated constructs for different classes of supply chain risk sources.

Second, the findings support the assumption that there are negative associations between supply and demand
side risks and supply chain performance, that is, that these risk sources are relevant contextual variables in strategic
supply chain decisions. However, the results relativize the current “passionate” discussion of the subject. In terms of
regulatory, legal and bureaucratic risks, infrastructure risks and catastrophic risks, the study yields no empirical
evidence for a negative relationship with supply chain performance. Overall, the data reveal a significant, but rather
low impact of supply chain risks experienced by firms operating in Germany on supply chain performance.

Several managerial implications can be deduced from this study. First, supply chain risks have a negative
impact on supply chain performance. As a consequence, they underscore the importance of supply chain risk
management concepts and measures. Second, while Hendricks and Singhal (2003, 2005a, 2005b) showed that severe
disruptions have substantial negative consequences on the health of the affected firms, our findings take into
consideration the frequency of occurrence of those effects. Given that severe disruptions (e.g., caused by regulatory,
legal or bureaucratic barriers, infrastructure breakdowns, or serious catastrophes) which lead to the release of ad-hoc
announcements occur less frequently than “every-day” demand side and supply side disruptions, these latter risk
sources are in fact very important for achieving high supply chain performance. Thus, decision-makers should turn
their attention to these two risk sources. Third, supply chain managers should bear in mind an acceptable cost-
benefit trade-off in their firms’ mitigation endeavors concerning major contingency risks (Sarathy 2006). In support
of a better utilization of risk management resources, our study advocates the allocation of scarce resources to the
mitigation of demand side and supply side risks. This aspect ties in with the introduction where we explained that
the series of recent catastrophes has stimulated the intense attention to supply chain risk management.

Several areas for future research can be highlighted. As described above, the data for this survey were collected
from firms based in Germany. Therefore, the results hold only true for firms based in countries with a similar
political, economic, and geographic setting. For example regulatory, legal and bureaucratic risks might be alleviated
due to Germany’s fairly stable political and economic situation. Also, as shown by Helferich and Cook (2002),
Germany is relatively immune to natural disasters. Therefore, a replication of this survey in other countries with
presumably different risk profiles (e.g., China or the US) would be a consequential next step.

Second, an empirical study that explains supply chain performance based on the strategy process and the
strategy content while taking into account supply chain risk as context (Ketchen, Thomas, and McDaniel 1996)
would be highly interesting. Previous conceptual and qualitative research has focused on the strategy content (i.e.,
318 Wagner and Bode

provides insights into a large set of mitigation strategies). Some discuss operational risks (Johnson 2001), other
disruption risks (Lee and Wolfe 2003; Kleindorfer and Saad 2005; Sheffi 2001) and still others provide general
guidelines (Chopra and Sodhi 2004; Christopher and Peck 2004; Craighead, Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, and
Handfield 2007; Rice and Caniato 2003; Zsidisin, Ragatz, and Melnyk 2005a). However, the influence of these
strategies on the relationship between supply chain risk and supply chain performance has neither been thoroughly
underpinned with theory nor analyzed through empirical research.

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JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LOGISTICS, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008 323

APPENDIX 1
MEASURES
Items (response cues) Number Cronbach Factor Item-to- Mean
of items alpha loading total
correlation
To what extend has your firm in the past three years
experienced a negative impact in supply chain management
due to … (5-point scale: not at all – to a very large extent)

Demand side risks 2 0.724 3.25

Unanticipated or very volatile customer demand. 0.877 0.568
Insufficient or distorted information from your customers 0.811 0.568
about orders or demand quantities.

Supply side risks 5 0.799 2.47

Poor logistics performance of suppliers (delivery 0.824 0.695
dependability, order fill capacity).
Supplier quality problems. 0.797 0.687
Sudden default of a supplier (e.g., due to bankruptcy). 0.711 0,550
Poor logistics performance of logistics service providers. 0.636 0.504
Capacity fluctuations or shortages on the supply markets. 0.513 0.478

Regulatory, legal and bureaucratic risks 2 0.691 2.20

Changes in the political environment due to the 0.833 0.530
introduction of new laws, stipulations, etc.
Administrative barriers for the setup or operation of 0.764 0.530
supply chains (e.g., authorizations).

Infrastructural risks 4 0.748 1.73

Downtime or loss of own production capacity due to 0.820 0.589
local disruptions (e.g., labor strike, fire, explosion,
industrial accidents).
Perturbation or breakdown of internal IT infrastructure 0.724 0.576
(e.g., caused by computer viruses, software bugs).
Loss of own production capacity due to technical reasons 0.705 0.500
(e.g., machine deterioration).
Perturbation or breakdown of external IT infrastructure. 0.649 0.512

Catastrophic risks 4 0.854 1.55

Political instability, war, civil unrest or other socio- 0.841 0.756
political crises.
Diseases or epidemics (e.g., SARS, Foot and Mouth 0.809 0.672
Disease).
Natural disasters (e.g., earthquake, flooding, extreme 0.806 0.684
climate, tsunami).
International terror attacks (e.g., 2005 London or 2004 0.793 0.672
Madrid terror attacks).
324 Wagner and Bode

APPENDIX 1 (CONTINUED)

Items (response cues) Number Cronbach Factor Item-to- Mean

of items alpha loading total
correlation
Evaluate the following supply chain performance indicators
compared to your major competitor (5-point scale:
significantly worse – significantly better)

Supply chain performance 4 0.852 3.77

Order fill capacity: Provision of desired quantities on a 0.872 0.782
consistent basis.
Delivery dependability: Meeting quoted or anticipated 0.843 0.725
delivery dates and quantities on a consistent basis.
Customer satisfaction: Meeting customer satisfaction 0.769 0.632
with supply chain performance on a consistent basis.
Delivery speed: Time between order receipt and 0.735 0.637
customer delivery.

Indicate how the following statements apply to your firm (5-

point scale: does not apply at all – applies very much)

Risk management 6 0.794 2.73

In collaboration with our customers and suppliers we are 0.803 0.662
working on transparent supply chains and an open
sharing of information.
Our firm has elaborated business continuity or 0.773 0.625
contingency plans addressing several supply chain risks.
We regularly monitor our suppliers for possible supply 0.752 0.601
chain risks.
We reduce demand side risks through late product 0.631 0.467
differentiation.
In our firm, an employee or a team is dedicated to supply 0.629 0.472
chain risk management.
If possible, we insure against supply chain related risks. 0.623 0.466
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LOGISTICS, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008 325

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Stephan M. Wagner (Ph.D. University of St. Gallen, Switzerland) is Professor and holds the Chair of Logistics
Management at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich. Prior, he served on the faculty of WHU – Otto
Beisheim School of Management, Vallendar, Germany. Prior to joining academia, he worked for 10 years as senior
manager for an international top-management consulting firm and as head of supply chain management for a Swiss-
based technology group. He has conducted research on supply chain risk for several years and investigated, for
example, risks in supplier management, supplier default dependencies, or supply chain vulnerability. Recently he
acquired research funds from the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology to develop a Supply
Chain Risk Management Navigator for medium sized enterprises.

Christoph Bode (Dipl.-Wi.-Ing. University of Karlsruhe, Germany) is a Doctoral Student at WHU – Otto
Beisheim School of Management, Vallendar, Germany. He has published several scholarly articles and book
chapters and gave presentations on supply chain risk issues on international academic conferences in Berlin,
Brussels, Hamburg, Karlsruhe, Long Beach, San Diego, and Tempe. In his doctoral project he empirically
investigates supply chain design issues across various countries.