G.R. No.

192565, February 28, 2012

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 

Facts:  
Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping.
Then, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC
(perjury) “by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum
Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other
action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency”.
The Certification was notarized in Makati City but was submitted and used in
Pasay City, while the Information against Union Bank and Tomas was filed in
Makati.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash. She argued that the venue was improperly
laid since it is the Pasay City Court (where the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over
the perjury case.

The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has
jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
notarized in Makati City. The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the allegations
in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury.

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to
annul and set aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their petition on the rulings in
United States v. Canet and Ilusorio v. Bildner which ruled that venue and
jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented.

Issue:
Whether or not the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC
should be – Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the trial
court.

Held: 
The SC denied the petition and held that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper
venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case against the
petitioners.

The criminal charged was for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that
contained a falsity. Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision;
thus, jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this article
which penalizes one who “makes an affidavit, upon any material matter before
a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the
law so requires.” The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an
affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing
a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.

Based on these considerations, SC held that its ruling in Sy Tiong is more in

accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar
and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false
affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant
subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the
elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed
through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor
civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or
as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither
criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at
the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as
the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the
crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on the
acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.

Heirs of Eduardo Simon vs. Elvin Chan

FACTS:

On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila (MeTC) an information charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon. 

More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC
in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the principal amount of P336,000.00, coupled with an
application for a writ of preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00).

On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which was
implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon.

On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs
attachment bond for damages

On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simons urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge
plaintiffs attachment bond for damages, 

On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon the urgent motion to dismiss with
application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages. The MTC cites the grounds of litis
pendentia and that the case for sum of money is one based on fraud and hence falling under Article
33 of the Civil Code, still prior reservation is required

Chans motion for reconsideration was denied as well as his appeal with the RTC. On the CA, Chan's
appeal was granted. 

ISSUE: Whether or not Chan's civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check (Civil Case
No. 915-00) was an independent civil action.

RULING:

NO. There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance of an
unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).

This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which relevantly provides: "The criminal action for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed." 

Supreme Court Circular 57-97 also provides that: "1. The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized."

LEE PUE LIONG v. CHUA PUE CHIN LEE, GR No. 181658, 2013-08-07
Facts:
Petitioner Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI),
a company affiliated with the CKC Group of Companies (CKC Group) which includes the
pioneer company Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC). The CKC Group is the subject of...
intra-corporate disputes between petitioner and his siblings, including herein respondent
Chua Pue Chin Lee, a majority stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.
On July 19, 1999, petitioner's siblings including respondent and some unidentified persons
took over and barricaded themselves inside the premises of a factory owned by CKC.
Petitioner and other factory employees were unable to enter the factory premises. This
incident led to... the filing of Criminal Case Nos. 971-V-99, 55503 to 55505 against Nixon
Lee and 972-V-99 against Nixon Lee, Andy Lee, Chua Kipsi a.k.a. Jensen Chua and
respondent, which are now pending in different courts in Valenzuela City.[7]... n June 14,
1999, petitioner on behalf of CHI (as per the Secretary's Certificate[8] issued by Virginia Lee
on even date) caused the filing of a verified Petition[9] for the Issuance of an Owner's
Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate... of Title (TCT) No. 232238[10] which covers a
property owned by CHI. The case was docketed as LRC Record No. 4004 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 4. Petitioner submitted before the said court an Affidavit
of Loss[11]... stating that: (1) by virtue of his position as President of CHI, he had in his
custody and possession the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238 issued by the
Register of Deeds for Manila; (2) that said owner's copy of TCT No. 232238 was
inadvertently lost or misplaced from... his files and he discovered such loss in May 1999; (3)
he exerted diligent efforts in locating the said title but it had not been found and is already
beyond recovery; and (4) said title had not been the subject of mortgage or used as
collateral for the payment of any obligation... with any person, credit or banking institution.
Petitioner likewise testified in support of the foregoing averments during an ex-parte
proceeding. In its Order[12] dated September 17, 1999, the RTC granted the petition and
directed the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue a new Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 in lieu of the lost one.
Respondent, joined by her brother Nixon Lee, filed an Omnibus Motion praying, among
others, that the September 17, 1999 Order be set aside claiming that petitioner knew fully
well that respondent was in possession of the said Owner's Duplicate Copy, the latter being
the
Corporate Treasurer and custodian of vital documents of CHI. Respondent added that
petitioner merely needs to have another copy of the title because he planned to mortgage
the same with the Planters Development Bank. Respondent even produced the Owner's
Duplicate Copy of TCT No.
232238 in open court. Thus, on November 12, 1999, the RTC recalled and set aside its
September 17, 1999 Order.[13]
On June 7, 2000, respondent executed a Supplemental Affidavit[16] to clarify that she was
accusing petitioner of perjury allegedly committed on the following occasions: (1) by
declaring in the VERIFICATION the veracity of the contents in his petition filed... with the
RTC of Manila concerning his claim that TCT No. 232238 was in his possession but was
lost; (2) by declaring under oath in his affidavit of loss that said TCT was lost; and (3) by
testifying under oath that the said TCT was inadvertently lost from his files.
presence and intervention of the private prosecutor in the perjury cases are not prohibited
by the rules, stressing that she is, in fact, an aggrieved party, being a stockholder, an officer
and the treasurer of CHI and the private... complainant.
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
THAT THERE IS A PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTY IN THE CRIME OF PERJURY, A
CRIME AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST; AND
Ruling:
The petition has no merit.
Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should be allowed
to establish the extent of... injuries suffered.
there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the offended party institute a
separate civil action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings
to establish the civil liability arising from the offense committed,... and the private offended
party has the right to intervene through the private prosecutors.[5
Principles:
such right to intervene exists even when no civil liability is involved."... she submits that
pursuant to our ruling in Lim Tek Goan she has the right to intervene even if no civil liability
exists in this case.[41]
(1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose law he has
violated;... the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or
property was actually or directly... injured or damaged by the same punishable act or
omission... the offended party may also be a private individual whose person, right, house,
liberty or property was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of
the... accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts
complained of.
Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in
the MeTC, this Court declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco,[47] cited by both
MeTC and CA, that whether public or private crimes are... involved, it is erroneous for the
trial court to consider the intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of
tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the
proceedings, that right must be respected. The right... reserved by the Rules to the offended
party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the
criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover,
is always subject to the direction and control of the... public prosecutor.[48]
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it
separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus,
we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal... action
JOSEPHINE M. SANCHEZ v. FAR EAST BANK, GR No. 155309, 2005-11-15
Facts:
Kai J. Chin was the director and representative of Chemical Bank.  Its subsidiary,... the
Chemical International Finance Limited (CIFL), was an investor in [Respondent] Far East
Bank and Trust [C]ompany (FEBTC)
In representing the interest of CIFL in FEBTC, Chin was made a director and sr. vice
president of FEBTC.  [Petitioner] Josephine Sanchez was, in turn, assigned as secretary of
Chin.  CIFL also maintained a checking account... in FEBTC's... investment arm, the Far
East Bank Investment, Inc. (FEBII).
[petitioner] made unauthorized withdrawals from the account of CIFL in FEBTC through the
use of forged or falsified applications for cashier's checks which were deposited to her
personal accounts.  Once credited to her account, she withdrew the... amounts and
misappropriated, misapplied and converted them to her personal benefit and advantage, to
the damage of FEBTC.
Petitioner allegedly] confessed to Chin that she tampered with the CIFL account.
With the damage done, FEBTC had to reimburse the CIFL account
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) did not find Kai Chin to be a credible witness.  According to
the RTC, FEBTC's records showed that, contrary to his testimony, he had expressly
authorized petitioner to transact matters concerning Chemical Bank's account.
Subsequently, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the civil aspect of the RTC
Decision.
the trial court denied reconsideration.
the RTC said in its Order that... the acquittal of the accused "was not exactly on the ground
of 'reasonable doubt,' but that she was not the author of the frauds allegedly perfpetrated
Thus, it held that "no civil liability against her may properly be made.
the appellate court ruled that the trial court's judgment of acquittal did not preclude recovery
of civil indemnity based on a quasi delict.
The CA held that the outcome of the criminal case, whether conviction or... acquittal, was
inconsequential in adjudging civil liability arising from the same act that could also be
considered a quasi delict.
The CA further held that... petitioner had been acquitted merely on reasonable doubt arising
from insufficiency of evidence to establish her identity as perpetrator of the crime.  Her
acquittal was not... due to the nonexistence of the crime for which civil liability could arise.
Thus, the appellate court ordered petitioner to pay respondent
Issues:
Whether an appeal on the civil aspect may be made from a decision in a criminal case
acquitting the accused for being not the author of the crime?
Whether a separate civil action is necessary to be instituted after the accused is acquitted in
a criminal case based on reasonable doubt?
Ruling:
The Petition is meritorious.
Clearly, the extinction of the penal liability does not always carry with it the extinction of the
civil.
According to Article 29 of the Civil Code, if the acquittal is made on the ground that the guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable... doubt, the accused may be held civilly liable for
damages arising from the same act or omission constituting the offense.
the liability may be established by a mere preponderance of evidence.
an action for the recovery of civil liability arising from an offense charged is necessarily
included in the criminal proceedings, unless (1) there is an express waiver of the civil action,
or (2) there is a reservation to institute a... separate one, or (3) the civil action was filed prior
to the criminal complaint.
For this purpose, the offended parties are allowed to intervene in the criminal proceedings,
but solely to enforce their right to claim indemnification for damages arising from the
criminal act.
In the present case, the original action involved a prosecution for estafa or swindling
through falsification of commercial documents, an offense defined under the RPC.  Records
do not show -- and respondent does not claim -- the presence of any of the three
instances... precluding the automatic institution of the civil action together with the criminal
complaint.  Ineluctably, respondent's right to damages, if any, was deemed prosecuted in
the criminal proceeding.  Thus, a separate civil action may no longer be instituted.
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of
the case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is... only
civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused was acquitted.  Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is
extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action... that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not
commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil
aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as
it would place the accused in double jeopardy.  However, the aggrieved party, the...
offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of
the case within the period therefor.
A close scrutiny of the RTC Decision and Order leads us to the conclusion that petitioner
did not commit the crime imputed to her.  Hence, her acquittal likewise extinguished the
action for her civil liability.
In sum, we hold that petitioner's acquittal was based on the fact that she had not committed
the offense imputed to her.  Consequently, she cannot be held civilly liable.
the Petition is hereby GRANTED
JOSE BURGOS v. SPOUSES ELADIO SJ. NAVAL & ARLINA B. NAVAL, GR No. 219468,
2016-06-08
Facts:
This case stemmed from a letter-complaint[5] dated April 26, 2012 filed by Burgos, before
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Taytay, Rizal, charging respondents spouses Eladio
and Arlina Naval (Sps. Naval) and their daughter, Amalia Naval (Amalia;... collectively
respondents), of the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents.
Burgos alleged that he and his wife, Rubie S. Garcia-Burgos, were the registered owners of
a lot with an area of 1,389 square meters, situated in the Municipality of Taytay,... Rizal,...
On November 19, 1996, the subject lot was purportedly mortgaged to a certain Antonio
Assad,[7] and subsequently, Burgos decided to obtain a loan from
Sps. Naval in order to avoid foreclosure. Respondents agreed and asked spouses Burgos
to sign some blank documents in return -to which they faithfully complied
Sometime in February 2011, Burgos allegedly discovered that TCT No. 550579 was
cancelled, and a new one was issued, i.e., TCT No. 644582,[9] in favor of Sps. Naval on
April 1, 1998. He claimed that the blank documents which he and his wife... previously
signed turned out to be a receipt[10] and a Deed of Absolute Sale[11] over the subject lot
through the ploy and conspiracy of respondents.
Before arraignment, respondents filed a motion to quash[14] based on the following
grounds: (a) that their criminal liability has been extinguished due to prescription;[15] (b)
that the information failed to charge Amalia... with an offense;[16] and (c) that they were not
afforded the opportunity of a preliminary investigation.[17] Respondents averred that since
the information was filed on February 11, 2013, beyond the reglementary period often
(10) years from the registration of the title on April 1, 1998, the crime had already
prescribed. They also claimed that the information did not contain any specific charge
against Amalia. Finally, they maintained that they were deprived of their right to dispute the
allegations... of the complaint during the preliminary investigation.
the RTC granted respondents' motion and, consequently, dismissed the case on the ground
of prescription.
since more... than ten (10) years had elapsed when the information was filed on February
11, 2013, the subject crime had prescribed.
Issues:
whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the certiorari petition on the ground that the
People, as represented by the OSG, was not impleaded as a party.
Ruling:
The Court finds for respondents.
Jurisprudence dictates that it is the OSG which possesses the requisite authority to
represent the People in an appeal on the criminal aspect of a case.
The OSG is "the law office of the Government whose specific powers and functions include
that of... representing the Republic and/or the [P]eople before any court in any action which
affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require."
In People v. Piccio (Piccio),[39] this Court held that "if there is a dismissal of a criminal case
by the trial court or if there is an acquittal of the accused, it is only the OSG that may bring
an appeal on the criminal aspect representing... the People. The rationale therefor is rooted
in the principle that the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the People
and not the petitioners who are mere complaining witnesses. For this reason, the People
are therefore deemed as the real parties in... interest in the criminal case and, therefore,
only the OSG can represent them in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court.
He may also file a special civil action for certiorari even without the intervention of the OSG,
but only to the end of preserving his interest in the... civil aspect of the case."[40]
It must, however, be clarified that the CA's dismissal of Burgos's certiorari petition is without
prejudice to his filing of the appropriate action to preserve his interest in the civil aspect of
the Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents case, provided... that the parameters
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure are complied with.
It is noteworthy to point out that "[t]he extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action where[:] (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the... liability of the
accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. The civil action based on delict
may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the... final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist."
In this case, the RTC did not render any ruling that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist;... instead, the RTC granted the motion to quash and thereby,
dismissed the criminal case on the sole ground of prescription. Any misgivings regarding
the propriety of that disposition is for the People, thru the OSG, and not for Burgos to argue.
As earlier intimated, Burgos's... remedy is to institute a civil case under the parameters of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

GR No. 200302, April 20, 2016

People of the Phils (Appellee) v Gerry Lipata (Appellant)
Second Division
Ponente: Carpio, J.

Nature of Action: Enforcement of civil liability of the accused who died pending appeal of his case.
FACTS:
Appellant was charged with the crime of Murder and subsequently found guilty as charged and
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify the
heirs of the victim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appellant’s appeal and affirmed the
RTC’s decision. The PAO filed a notice of appeal on behalf of appellant. During the pendency of the
appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellant dies. In view of appellant’s death prior to the promulgation of
the CA’s decision the Supreme Court issued a Resolution which ordered the PAO "to SUBSTITUTE the
legal representatives of the estate of the deceased appellant as party; and to COMMENT on the civil
liability of appellant. In its Manifestation, the PAO stated that: Considering that the civil liability in the
instant case arose from and is based solely on the act complained of, the same does not survive the death
of the deceased appellant. Thus, the death of the latter pending appeal of his conviction extinguished his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon and this being so, it respectfully
submitted that the necessity to substitute the legal representatives of the estate of the deceased as party
does not arise.

ISSUE:
Whether the civil liability ex delicto adjudged by the lower courts, upon death of the accused
pending appeal, can be enforced upon the estate of the accused.

RULING:
No. The lack of a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasi delict leads us to
the conclusion that, a decade after Cueno’s death, his heirs cannot recover even a centavo from the
amounts awarded by the CA.
At the outset, we declare that because of appellant’s death prior to the promulgation of the CA’s
decision, there is no further need to determine appellant’s criminal liability. Appellant’s death has the
effect of extinguishing his criminal liability. What this Court will discuss further is the effect of
appellant’s death with regard to his civil liability. In 1994, this Court, in People v. Bayotas, reconciled the
differing doctrines on the issue of whether the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his civil liability. We concluded that "upon death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal." We also ruled that "if the private offended party, upon
extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission
complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 [of the then applicable] 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously
charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action
is premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced."
Contrary to the PAO’s Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the Deceased
Appellant, Cueno died because of appellant’s fault. Appellant caused damage to Cueno through deliberate
acts. Appellant’s civil liability ex quasi delicto may now be pursued because appellant’s death on 13
February 2011, before the promulgation of final judgment, extinguished both his criminal liability and
civil liability ex delicto.
 Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for claims under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code, as well as from sources of obligation other than delict in both jurisprudence
and the Rules, and our subsequent designation of the PAO as the "legal representative of the estate of the
deceased [appellant] for purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this case," the current
Rules, pursuant to our pronouncement in Bayotas, require the private offended party, or his heirs, in this
case, to institute a separate civil action to pursue their claims against the estate of the deceased appellant.
The independent civil actions in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176, as well as claims from sources of obligation
other than delict, are not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the
offended party even without reservation. The separate civil action proceeds independently of the criminal
proceedings and requires only a preponderance of evidence. 36 The civil action which may thereafter be
instituted against the estate or legal representatives of the decedent is taken from the new provisions of
Section 16 of Rule 3 in relation to the rules for prosecuting claims against his estate in Rules 86 and 87.
Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that there was no separate civil case
instituted prior to the criminal case. Neither was there any reservation for filing a separate civil case for
the cause of action arising from quasi-delict. Under the present Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a
separate civil case in order to obtain financial retribution for their loss. The lack of a separate civil case
for the cause of action arising from quasi delict leads us to the conclusion that, a decade after Cueno’s
death, his heirs cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts awarded by the CA.
The criminal and civil liabilities ex delicto of appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza are declared
EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final judgment.

ELIZALDE S. CO v. LUDOLFO P. MUÑOZ, GR No. 181986, 2013-12-04

Facts:
The case springs from the statements made by the respondent against the petitioner,
Elizalde S. Co (Co), in several interviews with radio stations in Legaspi City. Muñoz, a
contractor, was charged and arrested for perjury. Suspecting that Co, a wealthy
businessman, was... behind the filing of the suit, Muñoz made the following statements:
(a)
Co influenced the Office of the City Prosecutor of Legaspi City to expedite the issuance of
warrant of arrest against Muñoz in connection with the perjury case;
(b)
Co manipulated the results of the government bidding involving the Masarawag-San
Francisco dredging project, and;
(c)
Co received P2,000,000.00 from Muñoz on the condition that Co will sub-contract the
project to Muñoz, which condition Co did not comply with.
Consequently, Co filed his complaint-affidavit which led to the filing of three criminal
informations for libel before the RTC.[6] Notably, Co did not waive, institute or reserve his
right to file a separate civil action arising from Muñoz's libelous... remarks against him.[7]
Muñoz countered that he revealed the anomalous government bidding as a call of public
duty.
In fact, he filed cases against Co before the Ombudsman involving the anomalous dredging
project. Although the Ombudsman dismissed the cases,... Muñoz claimed that the dismissal
did not disprove the truth of his statements.
He also emphasized that the imputations dealt with matters... of public interest and are,
thus, privileged. Applying the rules on privileged communication to libel suits, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the existence of actual malice, which, Muñoz
claimed, it failed to do.
RTC found Muñoz guilty of three counts of libel. The RTC ruled that the prosecution
established the elements of libel.
In light of the Ombudsman's dismissal of Muñoz' charges against Co, the RTC also held
that Muñoz' statements were baseless accusations which are not protected as privileged...
communication.
In addition to imprisonment, Muñoz was ordered to pay P5,000,000.00 for each count of
libel as moral damages, P1,200,000.00 for expenses paid for legal services, and
P297,699.00 for litigation expense.[11] Muñoz appealed his conviction with the CA.
he CA held that the subject matter of the interviews was impressed with public interest and
Muñoz' statements were protected as privileged communication under the first paragraph of
Article 354 of the RPC.
As a public figure, Co is subject to criticisms on his acts that are imbued with public interest.
[14] Hence, the CA... reversed the RTC decision and acquitted Muñoz of the libel charges
due to the prosecution's failure to establish the existence of actual malice.
In the present petition, Co acknowledges that he may no longer appeal the criminal aspect
of the libel suits because that would violate Muñoz' right against double jeopardy. Hence, he
claims damages only on the basis of Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
(ROC), which states that the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action.
He avers that this principle applies in general whether the civil action is instituted with or
separately from the criminal action.[15] He also claims that the civil liability of an accused
may be appealed in case of acquittal.[16]
The Respondent's Arguments
Since Co did not reserve his right to separately institute a civil action arising from the
offense, the dismissal of the criminal action bars him from filing the... present petition to
enforce the civil liability.
Issues:
whether a private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce
the accused's civil liability; and... whether the respondent is liable for damages arising from
the libelous remarks despite his acquittal.
Ruling:
We do not find the petition meritorious.
The private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce the
accused's civil liability.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding
in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from... which the civil
liability may arise did not exist.
In Ching v. Nicdao and CA,[28] the Court ruled that an appeal is the proper remedy that a
party whether the accused or the offended party may avail with respect to the judgment:
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil
aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as
it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party,... the
offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of
the case within the period therefor.
From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended party, may
appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent Nicdao's acquittal by the CA.
The civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he did not... reserve
his right to institute it separately nor did he institute the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
To reiterate, the extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the
extinction of the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the
criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is... a
finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
liability may arise exists.
Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accused's
acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil liability ex... delicto: (a) if the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the court
declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) if the civil liability of the accused
does not arise from or is not based upon the... crime of which the accused is acquitted.
The respondent is not civilly liable because no libel was committed.
The CA has acquitted Muñoz of libel because his statement is a privileged communication.
In libel, the existence of malice is essential as it is an element of the crime.
The law presumes that every imputation is malicious;[31] this... is referred to as malice in
law. The presumption relieves the prosecution of the burden of proving that the imputations
were made with malice. This presumption is rebutted if the accused proved that the
imputation is true and published with good intention and... justifiable motive.
There are few circumstances wherein malice in law is inapplicable. For instance, Article 354
of the RPC further states that malice is not presumed when:
(1)... a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty;[33] and
(2)... a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of
any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other... act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
In the present case, the CA declared that the libelous remarks are privileged. The legal
conclusion was arrived at from the fact that Co is a public figure, the subject matter of the
libelous remarks was of public interest, and the context of Muñoz' statements were fair...
comments.
Consequently, malice is no longer presumed and the prosecution has the burden of proving
that Muñoz acted with malice in fact. The CA found that the prosecution failed in this
respect.
In light of the privileged nature of Muñoz' statements and the failure of the prosecution to
prove malice in fact, there was no libel that was committed by Muñoz. Without the crime, no
civil liability ex delicto may be claimed by Co that can be pursued in the present... petition.
There is no act from which civil liability may arise that exists.