Nolasco Vs Pano Full Case
Nolasco Vs Pano Full Case
Nolasco Vs Pano Full Case
WILLIAM A. GARAYGAY, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
WHICH COURT should resolve the motion to quash search warrant in a case where the court
that issued it is not the court with which the case is filed as a consequence of the service of the
warrant?
On 30 July 1996 the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, presiding over
Branch 23, issued Search Warrant No. 96-5051 upon application of the Presidential Task Force
on Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence (PTFIC). The warrant authorized a search of the house
of petitioner William A. Garaygay located in Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City, a place outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court. Thereafter the PTFIC through its Regional Task Group
conducted a raid on the house of petitioner resulting in the seizure of several items of firearms,
explosives, ammunition and other prohibited paraphernalia.
On 7 August 1996 an Information for violation of PD 18662 was filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Lapu-Lapu City3 against petitioner who upon being arraigned pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City a Motion to Quash
Search Warrant and To Exclude Illegally Seized Evidence dated 26 September 1996 on the
ground that the search warrant was issued in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 19,4 and
that it was a general warrant.
On the other hand, the prosecution argued that the motion to quash should have been filed with
the RTC of Manila which issued the warrant. But petitioner reminded the trial court of People v.
Bans5 where we ruled -
There could have been no problem had the court which issued the search warrant was
likewise the same court before which the criminal case is pending as a result of its
issuance. But if the criminal case which was subsequently filed by virtue of the serach
warrant is raffled off to a different branch, all incidents relating to the validity of the
warrant issued should be consolidated with that branch trying the criminal case (see
Nolasco v. Paño, 139 SCRA 152 [1985]), the rationale is to avoid confusion as regards
the issue of jurisdiction over the case and to promote an orderly administration of justice.
Treating the argument of the prosecution as a prejudicial question, the trial court resolved the
same ahead of the merits of petitioner's motion to quash and held -
x x x x Thus, the Court cannot afford to ignore the long established rule that "courts of
equal rank and jurisdiction are proscribed from interfering with or passing upon
the orders or processes of its coordinate counterpart, except in extreme
situations authorized by law," People vs. Woolcock, et al., May 22, 1995, 244 SCRA
235. Further, in the light of the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Malaloan
v. Court of Appeals, May 6, 1994, 232 SCRA 249, this present motion under
consideration should have been filed with the RTC-Branch 23 of Manila. Said guidelines
are quoted below, thus:
1) The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue
search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a
search warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling
circumstances that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter which may or
may not give due course to the application depending on the validity of the justification
offered for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.
2) When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be
filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to
the appropriate high court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court.
All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the
original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall
be deemed waived (emphasis supplied).
x x x x Moreover x x x x we are of the considered view that the issuing court (RTC-Br.
23, Manila) is in a vantage position to resolve this instant motion inasmuch as it has in its
possession all the available records and can, therefore, make an intelligible assessment
of the evidence on hand.6
On 17 January 1997 the trial court thus denied petitioner's motion to quash and ordered the
Branch Clerk of Court to set the case for pre-trial conference.7
Petitioner questioned the denial of his motion to quash in a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals. In its assailed Decision of 18 May 1998 the appellate court dismissed the
petition and on 11 September 1998 rejected likewise his motion for reconsideration. The Court
of Appeals explained -
For resolution now before this Court are these issues: (a) whether the trial court of Lapu-Lapu
City where the criminal case was filed is clothed with authority to resolve the Motion to Quash
Search Warrant . . . ; and, (b) whether the search warrant issued by the RTC of Manila is valid.
It should be advisable that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by one Court,
or Branch, and a criminal prosecution is initiated in another Court, or Branch, as a result
of the service of the Search warrant, the SEARCH WARRANT CASE should be
consolidated with the criminal case for orderly procedure. The later criminal case is more
substantial than the Search Warrant proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal
case should have the right to act on petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained.
Assuming that the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City is not vested with authority to resolve the issue of the
validity of the search warrant, petitioner now submits to this Court the issue for resolution. He
argues that a search warrant to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched. In
the present case, the search warrant merely stated, among others, that "William Garaygay
a.k.a. William Flores/Willy Ybañez of Brgy. Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu x x x x" When
the shanty where he was then sleeping was searched by the authorities they found one (1) 9mm
Glock pistol duly licensed in his name. Thereafter, he was dragged to an abandoned building
about ten (10) to fifteen (15) meters away. It was in that abandoned building where the
authorities allegedly found the firearms, explosives, ammunition and other paraphernalia alluded
to in the Information. Petitioner next argues that the search in his shanty and in the abandoned
building was made by elements of the PTFIC without any witness, in violation of Sec. 7, Rule
126, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that "[n]o search of house, room, or any
other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any
member of his family or, in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality." Petitioner submits that, necessarily,
all the items confiscated by the authorities on the basis of the invalid search warrant should be
excluded in the criminal case for being "fruits of the poisonous tree."
In 1967, in Pagkalinawan v. Gomez,10 we ruled that relief from a search warrant claimed to be
invalid should be sought in the court that issued it. We emphasized that any other view would be
subversive of a doctrine that has been steadfastly adhered to, the main purpose of which is to
assure stability and consistency in judicial actuations and to avoid confusion that may otherwise
ensue if courts of coordinate jurisdiction are permitted to interfere with each other's lawful
orders. This doctrine was reiterated in Templo v. de la Cruz11 where the accused likewise
questioned the validity of the search warrant before a court of concurrent jurisdiction, different
from the court which issued the warrant. Subsequently however, in Nolasco v. Paño, we
declared that "the pendency of the Search Warrant Case and of the Subversive Documents
Case before two (2) different courts is not conducive to an orderly administration of justice. It
should be advisable that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by one Court or Branch
and a criminal prosecution is initiated in another Court or Branch as a result of the service of the
Search Warrant, the Search Warrant Case should be consolidated with the criminal case for
orderly procedure. The later criminal case is more substantial than the Search Warrant
proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case should have the right to act on
petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained."
x x x x If the rule had been otherwise, i.e., if the issuing court had been allowed to
resolve the Motion to Quash the search warrant despite the pendency of a criminal case
arising therefrom before another court, it would give rise to the absurd situation where
the judge hearing the criminal case will be bound by the declaration of of the validity of
the search warrant made by the issuing judge, and the former will thereafter be
restrained from reviewing such finding in view of the doctrine of non-interference
observed between courts of concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction. Such a situation will
thus make it difficult , if not impossible, for respondent court to make an independent and
objective appreciation of the evidence and merits of the criminal case. For this reason,
the court trying the criminal case should be allowed to rule on the validity of the search
warrant in order to arrive at a judicious administration of justice.
People v. Woolcock upon which the trial court and the Court of Appeals heavily relied, appeared
to have reverted to Templo v. de la Cruz when this Court said that "the remedy for questioning
the validity of a search warrant can be sought in the court that issued it, not in the sala of
another judge of concurrent jurisdiction." At any rate, the latest jurisprudence on the matter is
People v. Court of Appeals12 where, as in the present case, the second of five (5) "policy
guidelines" laid down in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals was interpreted. The subject guideline,
cited in the reasoning of the trial court, concerns possible conflicts in the exercise of jurisdiction
where the criminal case is pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another
court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in the criminal case.
We clarified the principle in People v. Court of Appeals thus -
x x x x Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action based on
the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, it is not the rule that
a motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder seized) may be filed only
with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for the first time in either the issuing
Court or that in which the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative,
not cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of the motion does so to the exclusion
of the other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and
the rule against forum-shopping. This is clearly stated in the third policy guideline which
indeed is what properly applies to the case at bar, to wit:
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing
court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for
the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the
same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different
participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a
motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to
prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the
omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known
during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the
motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise
be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court (underscoring
supplied). 1avvphi1
The second issue raised by petitioner involves factual matters which should be properly
addressed to the trial court. No compelling reason exists for this Court to impinge on a matter
more appropriately within the province of the trial court.13
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals which
sustained the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City in denying petitioner's Motion to Quash
Search Warrant and To Exclude Illegally Seized Evidence, as well as its Resolution denying
reconsideration thereof is SET ASIDE. Instead, we rule that the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-
Lapu City has jurisdiction to resolve the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and To Exclude
Illegally Seized Evidence; accordingly, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City, particularly
Branch 54 thereof, or whichever branch the case may be properly assigned therein, is directed
to conduct its proceedings thereon with deliberate dispatch taking into account the time already
lost. No costs.
SO ORDERED.