Article 82. Coverage. The Provisions of This Title Shall Apply To Employees in All Establishments and
Article 82. Coverage. The Provisions of This Title Shall Apply To Employees in All Establishments and
Article 82. Coverage. The Provisions of This Title Shall Apply To Employees in All Establishments and
Article 82. Coverage. The provisions of this Title shall apply to employees in all establishments and
undertakings whether for profit or not, but not to government employees, managerial employees,
field personnel, members of the family of the employer who are dependent on him for support,
domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of another, and workers who are paid by results
as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.
As used herein, "managerial employees" refer to those whose primary duty consists of the
management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision
thereof, and to other officers or members of the managerial staff.
"Field personnel" shall refer to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away
from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work
in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
Carlos v villegas
F:
- Chief of the Manila Fire Department requested the Office of the President for authority, in the interest
of the service, for the members of the Uniformed Force Division and of the Fire Alarm and Radio Division
of the department to render service without overtime pay beyond the 40-hour-5-day a week
requirement of the law.
-later on, petition filed by said members of the division before the mayor of manila. they claimed for
payment of overtime services and the enforcement of the 40-hour work week as provided ra 1880
-as they receive no favorable response, the matter was eventually raised to the SC
I:
H:
no
-Revised Administrative Code, to wit: .
SEC. 566. Extension of hours and requirement of overtime work. — When the interests of the public
service so require, the head of any Department, Bureau, or Office may extend the daily hours of labor, in
what manner so ever fixed, for any or all of the employees under him, and may likewise require any or
all of them to do overtime work not only on work days but also on holidays.".
SEC. 259. Inhibition against payment of extra compensation. — In the absence of special provision,
persons regularly and permanently appointed under the Civil Service Law or whose salary, wages or
emoluments are fixed by law or regulation shall not, for any service rendered or labor done by them on
holidays or for other overtime work, receive or be paid any additional compensation; nor, in the absence
of special provision, shall any officer or employee in an branch of the Government service receive
additional compensation on account of the discharge of duties pertaining to the position of another or
for the performance of any public service whatever, whether such service is rendered voluntarily or
exacted of him under authority of law." .
-This Court has explicitly declared1 that the Eight-Hour Labor Law was not intended to apply to civil
service employees who are still governed by the above provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.
As there appears to be no debate over the employment of petitioner-appellant and the other firemen
similarly situated as falling under the civil service, they being employees of the City of Manila, a
municipal corporation, in its governmental capacity, We perceive no reason to deviate from said ruling.
And as We hold that the above sections of the Revised Administrative Code are still legally in force,
petitioner-appellant and other firemen of his situation are not entitled to overtime pay
and to the coverage of the said Forty-Hour a Week Work Law.
Managerial employee
SECTION 2. Exemption. — The provisions of this Rule shall not apply to the
following persons if they qualify for exemption under the conditions set forth
herein:
(2) They customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more employees
therein.
(3) They have the authority to hire or fire employees of lower rank; or their
suggestions and recommendations as to hiring and firing and as to the
promotion or any other change of status of other employees, are given
particular weight.
(1) The primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to
management policies of their employer;
(4) Who do not devote more than 20 percent of their hours worked in a work
week to activities which are not directly and closely related to the performance
of the work described in paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) above.
http://pinoylegal.com/smcvslayoc.pdf
The labor arbiter ruled that there is a diminution of benefits. The NLRC affirmed this ruling. The
appellate court affirmed the decision with modifications.
For about ten years prior to the JE Program, the members of respondent union were treated in the
same manner as rank-and file employees. As such, they used to be paid overtime, rest day and
holiday pay. With the implementation of the JE Program, the following adjustments among others
were made: (1) the members of respondent union were re-classified under levels S-5 to S-8 which
are considered managerial staff for purposes of compensation and benefits; (2) there was an
increase in basic pay of the average of 50% of their basic pay prior to the JE Program, with the
union members now enjoying a wide gap (P1,269.00 per month) in basic pay compared to the
highest paid rank-and-file employee.
On May 11, 1990, petitioner NASUREFCO recognized herein respondent union as the bargaining
representative of all the supervisory employees at the NASUREFCO Batangas Sugar Refinery.
Two years after the implementation of the JE Program the members of herein respondent union filed
a complaint for non-payment of overtime, rest day and holiday pay allegedly in violation of Article
100 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: W/N supervisory employees should be considered as officers or members of the managerial
staff under Article 82, Book III of the same Code, and hence are not entitled to overtime rest day and
holiday pay.
HELD: YES. Article 212(m), Book V of the Labor Code on Labor Relations reads:
“(m) ‘Managerial employee’ is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharged, assign or
discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer
effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not
merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All
employees not falling within any of those above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees
of this Book.”
Respondent NLRC, in holding that the union members are entitled to overtime, rest day and holiday
pay, and in ruling that the latter are not managerial employees, adopted the definition stated in the
aforequoted statutory provision.
A cursory perusal of the Job Value Contribution Statements of the union members will readily show
that these supervisory employees are under the direct supervision of their respective department
superintendents and that generally they assist the latter in planning, organizing, staffing, directing,
controlling communicating and in making decisions in attaining the company’s set goals and
objectives.
These supervisory employees are likewise responsible for the effective and efficient operation of
their respective departments. The members of respondent union discharge duties and
responsibilities which ineluctably qualify them as officers or members of the managerial staff, as
defined in Section 2, Rule I Book III of the aforestated Rules to Implement the Labor Code, viz.: (1)
their primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management
policies of their employer; (2) they customarily and regularly exercise discretion and
independent judgment; (3) they regularly and directly assist the managerial employee whose
primary duty consist of the management of a department of the establishment in which they
are employed (4) they execute, under general supervision, work along specialized or
technical lines requiring special training, experience, or knowledge; (5) they execute, under
general supervision, special assignments and tasks; and (6) they do not devote more than
20% of their hours worked in a work-week to activities which are not directly and clearly
related to the performance of their work hereinbefore described.
Under the facts obtaining in this case, the union members should be considered as officers and
members of the managerial staff and are, therefore, exempt from the coverage of Article 82 hence
they are not entitled to overtime, rest day and holiday.
Quintessentially, with the promotion of the union members, they are no longer entitled to the benefits
which attach and pertain exclusively to their positions. Entitlement to the benefits provided for by law
requires prior compliance with the conditions set forth therein. With the promotion of the members of
respondent union, they occupied positions which no longer met the requirements imposed by law.
Their assumption of these positions removed them from the coverage of the law, ergo, their
exemption therefrom.
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, if the union members really wanted to continue receiving the
benefits which attach to their former positions, there was nothing to prevent them from refusing to
accept their promotions and their corresponding benefits. As the sating goes by, they cannot have
their cake and eat it too or, as petitioner suggests, they could not, as a simple matter of law and
fairness, get the best of both worlds at the expense of NASUREFCO.
He alleges that he was illegally terminated and that his termination was without due process and valid
grounds. Furthermore, he was not paid his OT pay, premium pay for working during holidays, and night
shift differentials. So he filed an action for illegal dismissal.
Hudson Chua, the General Manager of Baganga alleges that Penaranda’s separation was done pursuant
to Art. 238 of the Labor Code. The company was on temporary closure due to repair and general
maintenance and it applied for clearance with the DOLE to shut down and dismiss employees. He claims
that due to the insistence of complainant, he was paid his separation benefits. But when the company
partially re-opened, Penaranda faild to re-apply.
Chua also alleges that since he is a managerial employee, he is not entitled to OT pay and if ever he
rendered services beyond the normal hours of work, there was no office order/authorization for him to do
so.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was no illegal dismissal and that Penaranda’s complaint was premature
because he was still employed with Baganga. As regards the benefits, the Labor Arbiter found petitioner
entitled to OT pay, premium pay for working on rest days and attorney’s fees.
On appeal, NLRC deleted the award of OT pay, premium pay and attorney’s fees.
Issue:
Whether or not Penaranda is a regular employee entitled to monetary benefits under Art. 82 of
the Labor Code.
Held:
NO. Penaranda is part of the managerial staff which takes him out of the coverage of labor
standards. The Implementing Rules define members of a managerial staff as those with the ff.
responsibilities:
(1) The primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management policies
of the employer;
(2) Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment;
(3) (i) Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a managerial employee whose primary duty
consists of the management of the establishment in which he is employed or subdivision thereof; or (ii)
execute under general supervision work along specialized or technical lines requiring special training,
experience, or knowledge; or (iii) execute under general supervision special assignments and tasks; and
(4) who do not devote more than 20 percent of their hours worked in a workweek to activities
which are not directly and closely related to the performance of the work described in paragraphs (1), (2),
and (3) above."
Petitioner supervised the engineering section of the steam plant boiler. His work involved
overseeing the operation of the machines and the performance of the workers in the engineering section.
This work necessarily required the use of discretion and independent judgment to ensure the proper
functioning of the steam plant boiler. As supervisor, petitioner is deemed a member of the managerial
staff.
Even Penaranda admitted that he was a supervisor. In his Position Paper, he stated that he was
the foreman responsible for the operation of the boiler. The term foreman implies that he was the
representative of management over the workers and the operation of the department. His classification as
supervisor is further evident from the manner his salary was paid. He belonged to the 10% of
respondent’s 354 employees who were paid on a monthly basis; the others were paid only on a daily
basis.
Field Personnel
On January 24, 2000, Lebatique was suspended by Manuel Uy (brother of FEASI’s General Manager
Alexander Uy) for allegedly using the company vehicle illegally.
On the same day, Lebatique filed a complaint for nonpayment of overtime pay against Alexander Uy.
Uy summoned Lebatique and asked why he was claiming overtime pay. Lebatique said since he started
working with the company he has never been paid OT pay. Uy consulted with his brother. On January
29, 2000, Uy told Lebatique to look for another job.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Lebatique. Uy was ordered to reinstate Lebatique and at the same
time to pay Lebatique his 13th month pay, back wages (time when case was pending), service incentive
leave pay and OT pay – all amounting to P196,659.72.
Uy argued that Lebatique was not dismissed and that he was merely suspended; that he abandoned his
job; and that Lebatique was a field personnel not entitled to overtime pay and service incentive leave.
Uy illegally dismissed Lebatique when he told him to look for another job. Judging at the sequence of
event, Lebatique earned the ire of Uy when he filed a complaint for nonpayment of OT pay on the day
Lebatique was suspended by Manuel Uy. Such is not a valid reason for dismissing Lebatique.
Further, Lebatique did not abandon his job. His filing of this case is proof enough that he had no
intention to abandon his job.
(b) a clear intention, as manifested by some overt act, to sever the employer-employee relationship.
Also, Lebatique is not a field personnel as defined above for the following reasons:
(1) company drivers, including Lebatique, are directed to deliver the goods at a specified time and place;
(2) they are not given the discretion to solicit, select and contact prospective clients; and
(3) Far East issued a directive that company drivers should stay at the client’s premises during truck-ban
hours which is from 5:00 to 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 to 9:00 p.m.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision but remanded the case for properly computing
Lebatique’s OT pay taking in to consideration the company’s time keeping records.
Facts:
This labor dispute stems from the exclusion of sales personnel from the holiday pay award and the
change of the divisor in the computation of benefits from 251 to 261 days.
On November 8, 1985, respondent Filipro, Inc. (now Nestle Philippines, Inc.) filed with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a petition for declaratory relief seeking a ruling on its rights and
obligations respecting claims of its monthly paid employees for holiday pay in the light of the Court's
decision in Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople (138 SCRA 273 [1985]).
Both Filipro and the Union of Filipino Employees (UFE) agreed to submit the case for voluntary
arbitration and appointed respondent Benigno Vivar, Jr. as voluntary arbitrator.
Filipro filed a motion for clarification seeking (1) the limitation of the award to three years, (2) the
exclusion of salesmen, sales representatives, truck drivers, merchandisers and medical representatives
(hereinafter referred to as sales personnel) from the award of the holiday pay, and (3) deduction from
the holiday pay award of overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick leave benefits
due to the use of 251 divisor. (Rollo, pp. 138-145)
Petitioner UFE answered that the award should be made effective from the date of effectivity of the
Labor Code, that their sales personnel are not field personnel and are therefore entitled to holiday pay,
and that the use of 251 as divisor is an established employee benefit which cannot be diminished.
I:
W/N the respondent's sales personnel are not field personnel under Article 82 of the Labor Code?
H:
Moreover, the requirement that “actual hours of work in the field cannot be
determined with reasonable certainty” must be read in conjunction with Rule
IV, Book III of the Implementing Rules which provides:
October 8, 1998
Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that it was private respondent who
actually abandoned his work. It claimed that the latter failed to report for work
after his leave had expired and was, in fact, absent without leave for three
months .
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.
The NLRC dismissed petitioner’s claim that it cannot be held liable for SIL pay
by fishermen in its employ as the latter supposedly are “field personnel” and
thus not entitled to such pay under the Labor Code.
Art. 82. Coverage. — The provisions of this Title [Working Conditions and
Rest Periods] shall apply to employees in all establishments and
undertakings whether for profit or not, but not to government
employees, field personnel, members of the family of the employer who are
dependent on him for support, domestic helpers, persons in the personal
service of another, and workers who are paid by results as determined by the
Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, the requirement that “actual hours of work in the field cannot be
determined with reasonable certainty” must be read in conjunction with Rule
IV, Book III of the Implementing Rules which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner in said case is contending that such rule added another element not
found in the law. Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the Court finds
that the aforementioned rule did not add another element to the Labor Code
definition of field personnel. The clause “whose time and performance is
unsupervised by the employer” did not amplify but merely interpreted
and expounded the clause “whose actual hours of work in the field
cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.” The former clause is
still within the scope and purview of Article 82 which defines field
personnel. Hence, in deciding whether or not an employee’s actual
working hours in the field can be determined with reasonable certainty,
query must be made as to whether or not such employee’s time and
performance is constantly supervised by the employer
In the case at bar, during the entire course of their fishing voyage, fishermen
employed by petitioner have no choice but to remain on board its vessel.
Although they perform non-agricultural work away from petitioner’s business
offices, the fact remains that throughout the duration of their work they are
under the effective control and supervision of petitioner through the
vessel’s patron or master as the NLRC correctly held
The petitioners filed a complaint against respondents PSEI and its manager,
Centurion Solano, for regularization, underpayment of wages, non-payment of
service incentive leave (SIL) and overtime pay and attorney’s fees. The Court
of Appeals (CA) overturned the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). It considered the petitioners as field workers and, on
that basis, denied their claim for benefits, such as SIL and overtime pay. It
ruled that there was no way for the respondents to supervise the petitioners
on their job. The petitioners are practically on their own in plying the routes in
the field, as in fact, they can deviate from the fixed routes, take short cuts,
make detours, and take breaks, among others.
Ruling: Yes.
Guided by the foregoing norms, the NLRC properly concluded that the
petitioners are not field personnel but regular employees who perform tasks
usually necessary and desirable to the respondents’ business. Evidently, the
petitioners are not field personnel as defined above and the NLRC’s finding in
this regard is supported by the established facts of this case: (1) the
petitioners, as bus drivers and/or conductors, are directed to transport their
passengers at a specified time and place; (2) they are not given the discretion
to select and contract with prospective passengers; (3) their actual work hours
could be determined with reasonable certainty, as well as their average trips
per month; and ( 4) the respondents supervised their time and performance of
duties.
In order to monitor their drivers and/or conductors, as well as the passengers
and the bus itself, the bus companies put checkers, who are assigned at
tactical places along the travel routes that are plied by their buses. The drivers
and/or conductors are required to be at the specific bus terminals at a
specified time. In addition, there are always dispatchers in each and every bus
terminal, who supervise and ensure prompt departure at specified times and
arrival at the estimated proper time. Obviously, these drivers and/or
conductors cannot be considered as field personnel because they are under
the control and constant supervision of the bus companies while in the
performance of their work.
xxx
The Court agrees with the above-quoted findings of the NLRC. Clearly, the
petitioners, as bus drivers and/or conductors, are left alone in the field with the
duty to comply with the conditions of the respondents’ franchise, as well as to
take proper care and custody of the bus they are using. Since the
respondents are engaged in the public utility business, the petitioners, as bus
drivers and/or conductors, should be considered as regular employees of the
respondents because they perform tasks which are directly and necessarily
connected with the respondents’ business. Thus, they are consequently
entitled to the benefits accorded to regular employees of the respondents,
including overtime pay and SIL pay
(3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood. (217a)
(d) Domestic servants and persons in the personal service of another if they
perform such services in the employer’s home which are usually necessary or
desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, or minister to the
personal comfort, convenience, or safety of the employer as well as the
members of his employer’s household.
Ultra vill v geniston
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Pp 50
(1) Private respondent's admission during the mandatory conference that he was
petitioner's personal driver.7
(2) Copies of the Ultra Villa Food Haus payroll which do not contain private
respondent's name. 8
(3) Affidavits of Ultra Villa Food Haus employees attesting that private respondent
was never an employee of said establishment. 9
(4) Petitioner Tio's undisputed allegation that she works as the branch manager of
the CFC Corporation whose office is located in Mandaue City. This would support the
Labor Arbiter's observation that private respondent' position as driver would be
"incongruous" with his function as a waiter of Ultra Villa Food Haus. 10
(5) The Joint Affidavit of the warehouseman and warehouse checker of the CFC
Corporation stating that:
Renato Geniston usually drive[s] Mrs. Tio from her residence to the office.
Thereafter, Mr. Geniston will wait for Mrs. Tio in her car. Most of the time, Renato
Geniston slept in the car of Mrs. Tio and will be awakened only when the latter will
leave the office for lunch.
Mr. Geniston will again drive Mrs. Tio to the office at around 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon and thereafter the former will again wait for Mrs. Tio at the latter's car until
Mrs. Tio will again leave the office to make her rounds at our branch office at the
downtown area. 11
In contrast, private respondent has not presented any evidence other than his self-serving allegation
to show that he was employed in the Ultra Villa Food Haus. On this issue, therefore, the evidence
weighs heavily in petitioner's favor. The Labor Arbiter thus correctly ruled that private respondent
was petitioner's personal driver and not an employee of the subject establishment.
Apex mining
https://www.scribd.com/document/422273270/Apex-Mining-Co-v-Nlrc
kasambahay
https://lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2013/ra_10361_2013.html
workers paid by results
e) Workers who are paid by results, including those who are paid on piece-
work, “takay,” “pakiao” or task basis, and other non-time work if their output
rates are in accordance with the standards prescribed under Section 8, Rule
VII, Book Three of these regulations, or where such rates have been fixed by
the Secretary of Labor and Employment in accordance with the aforesaid
Section.
David v ricasio
https://pdfslide.net/documents/labor-case-digest-batch-3.html
Work hours
Rationale
https://dokumen.tips/documents/18-manila-terminal-company-inc-v-cir.html
f:
-they were suspended for such action because it is ""willful violation of Company regulations, gross
insubordination and refusal to submit to a Company investigation "
-they were later on dimissed after the clearance to terminate them was approved by the sec of labor
The main issue in this case is whether or not the complainants could be validly dismissed from their
employment on the ground of insubordination for refusing to comply with the new work schedule.
H:
-dismissal valid
-the change of sched was within management's prerogative as provided for under the CBA signed by the
union and management
-said cba provides that In the exercise of its functions of management, the COMPANY shall have the
sole and exclusive right and power ,,, to schedule the hours of work, shifts and work schedules
-management retained the prerogative, whenever exigencies of the service so require, to change the
working hours of its employees. And as long as such prerogative is exercised in good faith for the
advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the
rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements, this Court will uphold such
exercise
Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. vs. NLRC 2nd Division and Sime Darby Salaried Employees Association (ALU-
TUCP) G.R. No. 119205. April 15, 1998
FACTS: All company factory workers of Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc., manufacturer of automotive tires,
tubes and other rubber products, in Marikina including members of private respondent union, Sime
Darby Salaried Employees Association (ALU-TUCP), worked from 7:45 a.m. to 3:45 p.m. with a 30-
minute paid on-call lunch break. On August 14, 1992, the petitioner issued a memorandum to all
factory-based employees advising all its monthly salaried employees in its Marikina Tire Plant a change
in work schedule. The new schedule extends to 9 hours with two 10-minute paid coffee break and 1-
hour unpaid and undisturbed lunch break. The Warehouse and Quality Assurance Department working
on shifts, are excluded from this change in work schedule.
Private respondent, which is an association of monthly salaried employees of petitioner at its Marikina
factory, filed on behalf of its members a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for unfair labor practice,
discrimination and evasion of liability.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that the change in the work schedule and the
elimination of the 30-minute paid lunch break of the factory workers constituted a valid exercise of
management prerogative and that the new work schedule, break time and one-hour lunch break did not
have the effect of diminishing the benefits granted to factory workers as the working time did not
exceed eight (8) hours.
NLRC sustained the decision of Labor Arbiter but upon motion for reconsideration by private
respondent, the NLRC, having two new commissioners, reversed its earlier decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of management in revising the work schedule of its employees and
eliminating their paid lunch break constitutes unfair labor practice?
RULING: The Court held that the employer has the right to exercise its management prerogatives.
Management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of
employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work,
processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work
supervision, lay off of workers and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. Management retains the
prerogative, whenever exigencies of the service so require, to change the working hours of its
employees. So long as such prerogative is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employers
interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special
laws or under valid agreements.
In this case, the new work schedule set by the employer fully complies with the daily work period of
eight (8) hours without violating the Labor Code. Although the old work schedule included a 30-minute
paid lunch break, the employees were on call and could be called upon to do jobs during lunch break.
With the new schedule, they can take one-hour lunch break without any interruption from their
employer.
Moreover, this act was not discriminatory as the new schedule applies to all employees in the factory
similarly situated whether they are union members or not.
https://bwc.dole.gov.ph/images/Issuances/DepartmentCircular/DA_02_04.pdf
http://www.bwc.dole.gov.ph/images/Issuances/DepartmentAdvisory/DA_02_09_2.pdf
Bisig Manggagawa sa Tryco and/or Francisco Siquig, as Union President, Joselito Lario,
Vivencio B. Barte, Saturnino Egeria and Simplicio Aya-ay vs Natinal Labor Relations
Commission, Tryco Pharma Corporation, and/or Wilfredo C. Rivera
GR No. 151309. October 15, 2008
FACTS:
Tryco Pharma Corporation (Tryco) is a manufacturer of veterinary medicines and its
principal office is located in Caloocan City. Petitioners Joselito Lario, Vivencio Barte,
Saturnino Egera and Simplicio Aya-ay are its regular employees, occupying the
positions of helper, shipment helper and factory workers, respectively, assigned to
the Production Department. They are members of Bisig Manggagawa sa Tryco
(BMT), the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees.
Tryco and the petitioners signed separate MOA providing for a compressed
workweek schedule to be implemented in the company with 8:00 a.m. to 6:12 p.m.,
from Monday to Friday, as the regular working hours.
The Labor Arbiter, the NLRC,and the CA uniformly agreed that the petitioners were
not constructively dismissed and that the transfer orders did not amount to an
unfair labor practice.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the transfer of Trycos personnel from Caloocan City to its plant
site in Bulacan constitutes constructive dismissal.
2. Whether or not the petitioner-employees were entitled to payment of wages,
overtime pay and service incentive leave.
3. Whether or not the MOA is not enforceable as it is contrary to law.
RULING:
1. The transfer of Trycos personnel, assigned to the Production Department was
within the scope of its management prerogative. This prerogative extends to the
managements right to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all
aspects of employment, including the freedom to transfer and reassign employees
according to the requirements of its business. When the transfer is not
unreasonable, or inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee, and it does not
involve a demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits, and other privileges,
the employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal. A mere
incidental inconvenience is not sufficient to warrant a claim of constructive
dismissal.
2. The nonpayment of wages was justified because the petitioners did not render
work from May 26 to 31, 1997; overtime pay is not due because of the compressed
workweek agreement between the union and management; and service incentive
leave pay cannot be claimed by the complainants because they are already
enjoying vacation leave with pay for at least five days.
Hospital employees
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