lee yeung- The “Compañia Agricola Filipina” bought rice-cleaning machinery from Strong Machinery

Company and executed a chattel mortgage over the building and the machinery where it was installed
to secure payment of the purchase price, without reference to the land where the building stood. The
mortgage was foreclosed and the property was sold by the sheriff to Strongman machinery.

Days after, Compañia Agricola Filipina executed a deed of sale over the land where the building stood to
the machinery company, but the deed of sale which had no reference to the building, was not
registered, although the deed was made a public document.

On or about the date to which the chattel mortgage was executed, Compania executed a real
estate mortgage over the building in favor of Leung Yee, distinct and separate from the land.
This real estate mortgage is to secure payment for its indebtedness for the construction of the
building. Upon failure to pay, the mortgage was foreclosed.

Strong machinery company then filed a complaint, demanding that it be declared the rightful
owner of the building. The trial court held that it was the machinery company which was the
rightful owner as it had its title before the building was registered prior to the date of registry of
Leung Yee’s certificate.

issue:

1) Whether or not the building can be classified as a real property, so as to subject it to a real
estate mortgage

Ruling

1) The building of strong materials in which the rice-cleaning machinery was

installed by the “Compañia Agricola Filipina” was real property, and the mere
fact that the parties seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the
land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as real property. It
follows that neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage of the building
and the machinery installed therein, not the annotation in that registry of the
sale of the mortgaged property, had any effect whatever so far as the building
was concerned.
Prudential bank vs Panis

Facts:
Spouses Magcale secured a loan from Prudential Bank. As security,
respondent’s spouses executed a real estate mortgage, their residential
building as security. Since the respondents was not able to fulfil their
obligation, the security was extrajudiciaily foreclosed and was eventually sold
in a public auction. There was also a riders document attach to the REM
Hence this case, to assail the validity of the mortgage and to recover the
foreclosed land.
Issue:
Whether or not a real estate mortgage can be instituted on the building of a
land belonging to another
Held:
While it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes in the absence of 
stipulation  of  the  improvements  thereon,  buildings,  still  a  building  in itself
may be mortgaged by itself apart from the land on which it is built.  Such a
mortgage would still be considered as a REM for the building would still be
considered as immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart
from the land.  The original mortgage on the building and right to occupancy of
the land was  executed  before  the  issuance  of  the  sales  patent  and 
before  the government  was  divested  of  title  to  the  land.    Under  the 
foregoing,  it  is evident  that  the  mortgage  executed  by  private 
respondent  on  his  own building was a valid mortgage.

LADERA VS. HODGES (G.R. NO. 8027-R, VOL.

48, NO. 12, O.G. 5374, SEPTEMBER 23, 1952)
APRIL 23, 2015 | YUMMY

FACTS:

1. Hodges entered into a contract promising to sell a lot to Ladera under

certain terms and conditions. One of which is that the contract may be
 rescinded and annulled in case Ladera failed to make the monthly
payment 60 days after it is due.
2. After the execution of the contract, Ladera built a house on the lot
assessed at 4,500 pesos. However, Ladera failed to pay the agreed
installments so Hodges rescinded the contract and filed an action for
ejectment.
3. The MTC ruled in favor of Hodges and issued an alias writ of
execution. Pursuant thereto, the sheriff levied upon all rights, interests and
participation over the house. Notices of sale were posted, however, were
not published in a newspaper of general circulation.
4. An auction sale was then conducted but Ladera was not able to attend
as she had gone to Manila. The house was then sold to one Avelina
Magno as the highest bidder. Meanwhile, Ladera sold the same lot to one
Manuel Villa and on the same day purchased the house from Magno for
200 pesos. This, however, was not recorded.
5. Ladera then returned to Iloilo and learned what happened. She went to
see the sheriff and represented that the property can still be redeemed and
so she gave him 230 pesos. It does not appear, however, that it was turned
over to Hodges. Thereupon, Ladera filed an action against Hodges, the
sheriff, Magno and Villa to set aside the sale and recover the house.
6. The lower court ruled in favor of Ladera on the ground of non-
compliance based on Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. On appeal, Hodges
contends that the house, built on a lot owned by another, should be
regarded as movable or personal property. The sale of the land was also
made without proper publication required by law.
ISSUE: Was the house movable or immovable?

RULING: Immovable.

1. As enumerated in the Civil Code, immovable property includes lands,

buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil. The law
 does not make any distinction whether or not the owner of the lot was the
one who built the construction.
2. Also, Ladera did not declare his house to be a chattel mortgage. The
object of the levy or sale was real property and its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation was indespensible. Without it, the
execution sale was void.
3. In addition, Magno, the alleged purchaser at the auction sale, was a
mere employee of Hodges and the low bid made by her as well as the fact
that she sold the house to Villa on the same day Hodges sold him the land,
proves that she was merely acting for and in behalf of Hodges.
4. In the sale of immovables, the lack of title of the vendor taints the
rights of the subsequent purchasers. Possession in good faith is not
equivalent to title.
5. The principles of accession regard buildings and constructions as mere
accessories to the land on which it is built, it is logical that said
accessories should partake the nature of the principal thing.

Sibal Vs Valdez

Facts:
Plaintiff alleged that the defendant Vitaliano Mamawal, deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac,
by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, attached and
sold to the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez the sugar cane planted by the plaintiff and his tenants
on seven parcels of land. Plaintiff offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to the
defendant Valdez the amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter, the interest thereon
and any assessments or taxes which he may have paid thereon after the purchase, and the
interest corresponding thereto. However, Valdez refused to accept the money and to return the
sugar cane to the plaintiff.

As a second cause of action, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez was
attempting to harvest the palay planted in four of the seven parcels mentioned in the first cause of
action; that he had harvested and taken possession of the palay in one of said seven parcels and in
another parcel described in the second cause of action, amounting to 300 cavans; and that all of
said palay belonged to the plaintiff.

Meanwhile, defendant argued that the sugar cane was personal property hence not subject to
redemption.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the sugar cane is to be classified as personal property
2. Whether or not future crops to be harvested can be considered a valid object of sale

Held:
1. No. A crop raised on leased premises in no sense forms part of the immovable. It belongs to
the lessee, and may be sold by him, whether it be gathered or not, and it may be sold by his
judgment creditors.

“Ungathered products” have the nature of personal property. In other words, the phrase
“personal property” should be understood to include “ungathered products.” Crops, whether
growing or standing in the field ready to be harvested, are, when produced by annual cultivation,
no part of the realty.

2. Yes. A valid sale may be made of a thing, which though not yet actually in existence, is
reasonably certain to come into existence as the natural increment or usual incident of
something already in existence, and then belonging to the vendor, and then title will vest in the
buyer the moment the thing comes into existence (Emerson vs. European Railway Co., 67 Me.,
387; Cutting vs. Packers Exchange, 21 Am. St. Rep., 63.).

A man may sell property of which he is potentially and not actually possessed.

Tsai vs CA

FACTS:  

            Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) obtained loan from Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom),
secured by a deed of Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot where its factory stands, and the chattels located
therein as enumerated in a schedule attached to the mortgage contract.  PBCom again granted a second loan
to EVERTEX which was secured by a Chattel Mortgage over personal properties enumerated in a list attached
thereto.  These listed properties were similar to those listed in the first mortgage deed.  After the date of the
execution of the second mortgage mentioned above, EVERTEX purchased various machines and equipments. 
Upon EVERTEX's failure to meet
its obligation to PBCom, the latter commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against EVERTEX under
Act 3135 and Act 1506 or "The Chattel Mortgage Law".  PBCom then consolidated its ownership over the lot
and all the properties in it.  It leased the entire factory premises to Ruby Tsai and sold to the same the factory,
lock, stock and barrel including the contested machineries.

            EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and damages against PBCom,
alleging inter alia that the extrajudicial foreclosure of subject mortgage was not valid, and that PBCom,
without any legal or factual basis, appropriated the contested properties which were not included in the Real
and Chattel Mortgage of the first mortgage contract nor in the second contract which is a Chattel Mortgage,
and neither were those properties included in the Notice of Sheriff's Sale.

ISSUES:
1) W/N the contested properties are personal or movable properties 
2) W/N the sale of these properties to a third person (Tsai) by the bank through an irregular foreclosure sale
is valid.

HELD:

1) Nature of the Properties and Intent of the Parties

The nature of the disputed machineries, i.e., that they were heavy, bolted or cemented on the real
property mortgaged does not make them ipso facto immovable under Article 415 (3) and (5) of the New Civil
Code.  While it is true that the properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of Real and Chattel
Mortgage executed by the parties herein  reveal their intent, that is - to treat machinery and equipment as
chattels. 

In the first mortgage contract,  reflective of the true intention of PBCOM and EVERTEX was the typing
in capital letters, immediately following the printed caption of mortgage, of the phrase "real and chattel." So
also, the "machineries and equipment" in the printed form of the bank had to be inserted in the blank space of
the printed contract and connected with the word "building" by typewritten slash marks.  Now, then, if the
machineries in question were contemplated to be included in the real estate mortgage, there would have been
no necessity to ink a chattel mortgage specifically mentioning as part III of Schedule A a listing of the
machineries covered thereby.  It would have sufficed to list them as immovables in the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage of the land and building involved.  As regards the second contract, the intention of the parties is
clear and beyond question.  It refers solely to chattels.  The inventory list of the mortgaged properties is an
itemization of 63 individually described machineries while the schedule listed only machines and
2,996,880.50 worth of finished cotton fabrics and natural cotton fabrics.

UNDER   PRINCIPLE OF STOPPEL

Assuming arguendo that the properties in question are immovable by nature, nothing detracts the
parties from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel.  As far back
as Navarro v. Pineda, an immovable may be considered a personal property if there is a stipulation as when it
is used as security in the payment of an obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed over it.

In the instant case, the parties herein: (1) executed a contract styled as "Real Estate Mortgage and
Chattel Mortgage," instead of just "Real Estate Mortgage" if indeed their intention is to treat all
properties included therein as immovable, and (2) attached to the said contract a separate "LIST OF
MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT". These facts, taken together, evince the conclusion that the parties'
intention is to treat these units of machinery as chattels. A fortiori, the contested after-acquired
properties, which are of the same description as the units enumerated under the title "LIST OF
MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT," must also be treated as chattels.

Fels energy vs Prov of batangas

Two consolidated cases were filed by FELS Energy, Inc. (FELS) and National Power Corporation (NPC),
respectively.

NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy, Inc. over diesel engine power barges moored at Batangas. The
contract, denominated as an Energy Conversion Agreement, was for a period of five years wherein, NPC shall be
responsible for the payment of:
(a) all taxes, import duties, fees, charges and other levies imposed by the National Government
(b) all real estate taxes and assessments, rates and other charges in respect of the Power Barges

Subsequently, Polar Energy, Inc. assigned its rights under the Agreement to FELS. Thereafter, FELS received an
assessment of real property taxes on the power barges. The assessed tax, which likewise covered those due for 1994,
amounted to P56,184,088.40 per annum. FELS referred the matter to NPC, reminding it of its obligation under the
Agreement to pay all real estate taxes. It then gave NPC the full power and authority to represent it in any
conference regarding the real property assessment of the Provincial Assessor.

NPC sought reconsideration of the Provincial Assessor’s decision to assess real property taxes on the power barges.
However, the motion was denied. The Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA) ruled that the power plant
facilities, while they may be classified as movable or personal property, are nevertheless considered real property for
taxation purposes because they are installed at a specific location with a character of permanency.

FELS appealed the LBAA’s ruling to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA). The CBAA rendered a
Decision finding the power barges exempt from real property tax.

It was later reversed by the cbaa upon reconsideration and affirmed by the CA

ISSUE
Whether power barges, which are floating and movable, are personal properties and therefore, not subject to real
property tax.

RULING
No. Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that "[d]ocks and structures which, though floating, are intended
by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast" are considered immovable property.
Thus, power barges are categorized as immovable property by destination, being in the nature of machinery and
other implements intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be carried on in a building or on a piece
of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or work.
The findings of the LBAA and CBAA that the owner of the taxable properties is petitioner FELS is the entity being
taxed by the local government. As stipulated under the Agreement:
OWNERSHIP OF POWER BARGES. POLAR shall own the Power Barges and all the fixtures, fittings, machinery
and equipment on the Site used in connection with the Power Barges which have been supplied by it at its own cost.
POLAR shall operate, manage and maintain the Power Barges for the purpose of converting Fuel of NAPOCOR
into electricity.
It follows then that FELS cannot escape liability from the payment of realty taxes by invoking its exemption in
Section 234 (c) of R.A. No. 7160,
 …the law states that the machinery must be actually, directly and exclusively used by the government
owned or controlled corporation; 

The agreement POLAR undertakes that until the end of the Lease Period, it will operate the Power Barges to convert
such Fuel into electricity. Therefore, FELS shall be liable for the realty taxes  and not the NPC who is not actually,
directly and exclusively using the same. It is a basic rule that obligations arising from a contract have the force of
law between the parties

CONCLUSION
Petitions are DENIED.

Davao sawmill vs Castillo

Facts:
Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., is the holder of a lumber concession from the Government of the Philippine
Islands. However, the land upon which the business was conducted belonged to another person. On the
land the sawmill company erected a building which housed the machinery used by it. Some of the
implements thus used were clearly personal property, the conflict concerning machines which were
placed and mounted on foundations of cement. In the contract of lease between the sawmill company and
the owner of the land there appeared the following provision: That on the expiration of the period agreed
upon, all the improvements and buildings introduced and erected by the party of the second part shall
pass to the exclusive ownership of the lessor without any obligation on its part to pay any amount for said
improvements and buildings; which do not include the machineries and accessories in the improvements.

In another action wherein the Davao Light & Power Co., Inc., was the plaintiff and the Davao, Saw, Mill
Co., Inc., was the defendant, a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff in that action against the
defendant; a writ of execution issued thereon, and the properties now in question were levied upon as
personalty by the sheriff. No third party claim was filed for such properties at the time of the sales thereof
as is borne out by the record made by the plaintiff herein

It must be noted also that on number of occasion, Davao Sawmill treated the machinery as personal
property by executing chattel mortgages in favor of third persons. One of such is the appellee by
assignment from the original mortgages.

The lower court rendered decision in favor of the defendants herein. Hence, this instant appeal.

Issue: 
whether or not the machineries and equipments were personal in nature.

Ruling/ Rationale:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner
of the property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a
temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.

‘
Phil Refining co vs Jarque

FACTS:

Plaintiff Philippine Refining Co. and defendant Jarque executed three mortgages on the motor vessels
Pandan and Zargazo. The documents were recorded as transfer and encumbrances of the vessels for the
port of Cebu and each was denominated a chattel mortgage.

The first two mortgages did not have an affidavit of good faith. A fourth mortgage was executed by Jarque
and Ramon Aboitiz over motorship Zaragoza and was entered in the Chattel Mortgage Registry on May
12, 1932, within the period of 30 days prior to the foreclosure/institution of the insolvency proceedings.

Jose Curaminas filed with the CFI of Cebu a petition praying that Francisco Jarque be declared an
insolvent debtor. This was granted and Jarque’s properties were then assigned to Curaminas.

A problem arose when Judge Jose Hontiveros declined to order the foreclosure of the mortgages, and
instead, ruled that they were defective because they did not have affidavits of good faith.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the mortgages of the vessels are governed by the Chattel Mortgage Law
2. Whether or not an affidavit of good faith is needed to enforce achattel mortgage on a vessel

RULING:

Yes. “Personal property” includes vessels. They are subject to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage
Law. The Chattel Mortgage Law says that a good chattel mortgage includes an affidavit of good faith. The
absence of such affidavit makes mortgage unenforceable against creditors and subsequent
encumbrances. The judge was correct.

Note: A mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages. The only difference between a
chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personalty is that the first must be noted in
the registry of the register of deeds.
MIAA VS CA
Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA)
As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements and
equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately
600 hectares of land,... The MIAA Charter further provides that no portion of the land
transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically
approved by the President of the
Philippines.
The OGCC opined that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption from
real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA Charter. Thus, MIAA
negotiated with... respondent City of Parañaque to pay the real estate tax imposed by the
City. MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax already due.
MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque
The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands
and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the... real estate tax delinquency.
MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and injunction
The petition sought to restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on,
levying... against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because MIAA filed it beyond the 60-day
reglementary period.
Court of Appeals also denied... motion for reconsideration... the present petition for review.
MIAA insists that it is... exempt from real estate tax under Section 234 of the Local
Government Code because the Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by... the Republic.
To justify the exemption, MIAA invokes the principle that the government cannot tax itself.
Respondents invoke Section 193 of the Local Government Code, which expressly withdrew
the tax exemption privileges of "government-owned and-controlled corporations" upon the
effectivity of the Local Government Code.
Issues:
Whether or not the MIAA is public dominion or private ownership
Ruling:

2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by the Republic

a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by
the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Civil Code provides:
 ARTICLE 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.

ARTICLE 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)

ARTICLE 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the
preceding article, is patrimonial property.

ARTICLE 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for
public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.

No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like
"roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State," are owned by the
State. The term "ports" includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings
constitute a "port" constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport
Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic
of the Philippines.

The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for
international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal
fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and
Buildings as properties for public use. The operation by the government of a tollway does not
change the character of the road as one for public use. Someone must pay for the maintenance of
the road, either the public indirectly through the taxes they pay the government, or only those among
the public who actually use the road through the toll fees they pay upon using the road. The tollway
system is even a more efficient and equitable manner of taxing the public for the maintenance of
public roads.

The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is of
public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one
"intended for public use." Even if the government collects toll fees, the road is still "intended for
public use" if anyone can use the road under the same terms and conditions as the rest of the public.
The charging of fees, the limitation on the kind of vehicles that can use the road, the speed
restrictions and other conditions for the use of the road do not affect the public character of the road.

The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the landing fees MIAA charges to airlines,
constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the operations of MIAA. The collection of such fees
does not change the character of MIAA as an airport for public use. Such fees are often termed
user's tax. This means taxing those among the public who actually use a public facility instead of
taxing all the public including those who never use the particular public facility. A user's tax is more
equitable — a principle of taxation mandated in the 1987 Constitution. 21

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, which its Charter calls the "principal airport of the
Philippines for both international and domestic air traffic," 22 are properties of public dominion
because they are intended for public use. As properties of public dominion, they indisputably
belong to the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of Man

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are devoted to public use and thus are properties of public
dominion. As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are outside the
commerce of man. The Court has ruled repeatedly that properties of public dominion are outside
the commerce of man. As early as 1915, this Court already ruled in Municipality of Cavite v.
Rojas that properties devoted to public use are outside the commerce of man, thus:

According to article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for public use in provinces and in towns
comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters,
the promenades, and public works of general service supported by said towns or provinces."

The said Plaza Soledad being a promenade for public use, the municipal council of Cavite
could not in 1907 withdraw or exclude from public use a portion thereof in order to lease it for
the sole benefit of the defendant Hilaria Rojas. In leasing a portion of said plaza or public
place to the defendant for private use the plaintiff municipality exceeded its authority in the
exercise of its powers by executing a contract over a thing of which it could not dispose, nor
is it empowered so to do.

The Civil Code, article 1271, prescribes that everything which is not outside the commerce of
man may be the object of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside of this commerce,
as was decided by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of February 12, 1895, which
says: "Communal things that cannot be sold because they are by their very nature
outside of commerce are those for public use, such as the plazas, streets, common
lands, rivers, fountains, etc." (Emphasis supplied) 23

Again in Espiritu v. Municipal Council, the Court declared that properties of public dominion are
outside the commerce of man:

xxx Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be
made available to the public in general. They are outside the commerce of man and
cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties. While in case of
war or during an emergency, town plazas may be occupied temporarily by private
individuals, as was done and as was tolerated by the Municipality of Pozorrubio, when the
emergency has ceased, said temporary occupation or use must also cease, and the town
officials should see to it that the town plazas should ever be kept open to the public and free
from encumbrances or illegal private constructions. 24 (Emphasis supplied)

The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man,
cannot be the subject of an auction sale.25

Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or
disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any
property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will
stop if properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale.
This will happen if the City of Parañaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the 600-
hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax.
Before MIAA can encumber26 the Airport Lands and Buildings, the President must first withdraw
from public use the Airport Lands and Buildings. Sections 83 and 88 of the Public Land Law or
Commonwealth Act No. 141, which "remains to this day the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral
lands,"27 provide:

SECTION 83. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, the President may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the
public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic of the Philippines or of any of its
branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in accordance with regulations prescribed for this
purposes, or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest requires it, including
reservations for highways, rights of way for railroads, hydraulic power sites, irrigation
systems, communal pastures or lequas communales, public parks, public quarries, public
fishponds, working men's village and other improvements for the public benefit.

SECTION 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of Section
eighty-three shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale,
lease, or other disposition until again declared alienable under the provisions of this
Act or by proclamation of the President. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, unless the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the Airport Lands and Buildings from
public use, these properties remain properties of public dominion and are inalienable. Since the
Airport Lands and Buildings are inalienable in their present status as properties of public dominion,
they are not subject to levy on execution or foreclosure sale. As long as the Airport Lands and
Buildings are reserved for public use, their ownership remains with the State or the Republic of the
Philippines.

The authority of the President to reserve lands of the public domain for public use, and to withdraw
such public use, is reiterated in Section 14, Chapter 4, Title I, Book III of the Administrative Code of
1987, which states:

SEC. 14. Power to Reserve Lands of the Public and Private Domain of the Government. —
(1) The President shall have the power to reserve for settlement or public use, and for
specific public purposes, any of the lands of the public domain, the use of which is
not otherwise directed by law. The reserved land shall thereafter remain subject to the
specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation;

x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

There is no question, therefore, that unless the Airport Lands and Buildings are withdrawn by law or
presidential proclamation from public use, they are properties of public dominion, owned by the
Republic and outside the commerce of man.
Ignacio vs Director of Lands

Faustino Ignacio filed an application to register a parcel of land (mangrove) situated at

gasac navotas ,which he alleged he acquired by right of accretion since it adjoins a
parcel of land owned by the Ignacio. His application is opposed by the Director of
Lands, Laureano Valeriano, contending that said land forms part of the public domain.
The Trial Court dismissed the application holding that said land formed part of the public
domain. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the land forms part of the public domain

HELD: YES

1. The law on accretion cited by Ignacio in inapplicable in the present case because it
refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers while this refers to action in the
Manila Bay, which is held to be part of the sea

2. Although it is provided for by the Law of Waters that lands added to shores by
accretions caused by actions of the sea form part of the pubic domain when they are no
longer necessary for purposes of public utility, only the executive and the legislative
departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration that any said
land is no longer necessary for public use. Until such declaration is made by said
departments, the lot in question forms part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership.

Province of Zamboanga vs Zamboanga City

Prior to the incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga was the
provincial capital of Zamboanga Province. By virtue of Commonwealth Act 39, section
50 providing that the buildings and other properties that the Province will abandon in
view of its conversion as Zamboanga City shall be paid for by the City of Zamboanga at
a price to be fixed by the Auditor General, the said properties consisting of 50 lots were
identified and the price were fixed thereof. An allotment for its payment was authorized
by the BIR Commissioner. In June 17, 1961, RA 3039 was approved and it amended
section 50 of the Commonwealth Act 39 providing that all buildings, properties, and
assets belonging to the Province of Zamboanga and located in the City of Zamboanga
are transferred free of charge in favor of the City of Zamboanga. The Province of
Zamboanga del Norte filed a complaint for declaratory relief with preliminary injunction
contending that the RA 3039 is unconstitutional as it deprives the Province of its
properties without just compensation and due process.

Issue

Whether or not RA 3039 is unconstitutional?

Held

The court held that to resolve the issue it is important to identify the nature of the
properties in dispute. The properties that are devoted for public purpose are owned by
the province in its governmental capacity. Those that are not devoted for public use
remain as patrimonial property of the Province. The RA 3039 is held valid in so far as
the properties that are devoted for public use or owned by the province in its
governmental capacity and thus must retain its public purpose. Hence these
governmental properties need not be paid by the City of Zamboanga. 

With respect to the patrimonial properties from the 50 lots in dispute, the RA 3039
cannot be applied in order to deprive the province of its own patrimonial properties that
are not devoted for public use. Hence the City of Zamboanga shall pay just
compensation to the Province of Zamboanga for these patrimonial properties. 
The Civil provide: ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and
municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property;
ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities,
consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares,
fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid
for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities. All other property possessed by
any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws.

Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question, except the two
(2) lots used as High School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial
properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the
hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered
patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall under the phrase
“public works for public service” for it has been held that under the ejusdem
generis rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by
anyone, just like the preceding enumerated properties in the first paragraph of
Art 424. The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category.

Macasiano vs Diokno

Facts:
the respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86, Series of 1990 which authorized the
closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets
located at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market...
thereon.
the Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance No. 86, s. 1990 of the municipal
council of respondent municipality subject to the following conditions:
1. That the aforenamed streets are not used for vehicular traffic, and that the majority of
the residents do not oppose the establishment of the flea market/vending areas
thereon;
2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as flea market/vending area shall be
marked distinctly, and that the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall be used by
pedestrians;
3. That the time during which the vending area is to be used shall be clearly
designated;
4. That the use of the vending areas shall be temporary and shall be closed once the
reclaimed areas are developed and donated by the Public Estate Authority.
Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered
the destruction and confiscation of stalls
Brig. General Macasiano wrote a letter to respondent Palanyag giving the latter ten (10)
days to discontinue the flea market; otherwise, the market stalls shall be dismantled.
espondents municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a joint petition for prohibition
and mandamus with damages and prayer... the trial court issued an order upholding the
validity of Ordinance No. 86 s. 1990 of the Municipality of Parañaque and enjoining
petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano from enforcing his letter-order against respondent
Palanyag.
petitioner, contends that municipal roads are used for public service and are therefore
public properties;
Petitioner submits that a property already dedicated to public use cannot be used for
another public purpose
Petitioner also submits that assuming that the respondent municipality is authorized to close
streets, it failed to... comply with the conditions set forth by the Metropolitan Manila
Authority for the approval of the ordinance
Issues:
hether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of Parañaque
authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is
valid.
Ruling:
We find the petition meritorious.
The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use
and patrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code). As to what consists of property for public
use, Article 424 of Civil Code states:
"ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of the
provincial roads, city streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public
works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities or... municipalities.
"All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this
Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws."
Properties of the local government which are devoted to public... service are deemed public
and are under the absolute control of Congress (
"There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondents' market stalls
are sought to be evicted are public streets, as found by the trial court in Civil Case no. C-
12921. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of... man
(Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject
of lease or other contract
"As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the
public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets
to them. Such leases or licenses null and void for being contrary to law. The... right of the
public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The interests of a
few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose health,
peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are... under
legal obligation to protect.

Republic vs Reyes

To understand these issues, We shall examine the facts of this case as they appear in
the records, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. On September 6,1972, the herein private respondent Eliseo Palatino filed with the
respondent court an application for registration of title under Act No. 496, the Land
Registration Law, of a parcel of land situated in Bo. Cabcaben, Municipality of Mariveles,
Bataan Province, containing an area of 22,744 sq. meters, more or less; 5

2. On October 20, 1972, notice of initial hearing was duly issued by the Commissioner
of Land Registration; 6

3. On December 21, 1972, respondent trial court issued an order of general default
against all persons, including herein petitioner the Director of Lands, for the failure of
anyone, including the said Director of Lands or his representative, to appear and
oppose the application; 7

4. Notice of this order of general default was received by petitioners on January 17,
1973; 8

5. On January 5, 1973, respondent court issued its order (decision) granting the
application for registration, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, finding that the applicant is entitled to the registration of this parcel of
land known as Lot No. 622-portion of the Mariveles Cadastre, the Court hereby
adjudicates said parcel of land subject matter of this application described on plan Sgs-
4377-D and its technical description in favor of Eliseo Palatino, of legal age, Filipino,
married to Beinvenida M. Palatino and a resident of 13 San Vicente Street, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.

"Once the decision becomes final, let corresponding decree of registration issue.

x       x       x" 9

6. Notice of the order (decision) was received by herein petitioners on January 17,
1973; 10

7. On February 14, 1973, petitioners filed with the trial court a motion to life order of
general default and for reconsideration of the order (decision) on the ground that." . .
contrary to the specific provisions of Sections 50 and 51 of C.A. No. 141 the original
record of the case was not forwarded to the Office of the Solicitor General, which thus
prevented him from investigating all the facts alleged in the application or otherwise

brought to his attention . . . and that the order (decision) adjudicating the lot applied
for by the applicant, respondent Palatino, is without basis in fact because the applicant
could not have possessed the land applied for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the application for the reason that the land was originally part of the United
States Military Reservation reserved by the then Governor General under Proclamation
No. 10 dated February 16, 1925 and it was only on June 10, 1967 that the President of
the Philippines by Proclamation No. 210-B revoked. Proclamation No. 10 and declared
such portion of the area therein embraced including the land applied for, as are
classified as alienable and disposable, opened for disposition under the provisions of the
Public Land Act." 11

8. In an order dated March 26, 1973, the trial court denied the petitioners’ motion to lift
the order of general default and for reconsideration of the order (decision) on the
ground that the same was without merit; 12
9. On April 5, 1973, the present appeal by certiorari was filed with this Court.

Issue:

W/N the state has the remedy in seeking the reversion of the inalienable public lands unduly ordered?

Ruling:

the State is not without remedy in recovering or seeking the reversion of inalienable
public lands unduly ordered registered.

This is based on the premise that our Torrens system of land registration is a system
for the registration of title to land only. It was not established as a means for the
acquisition of title to private land, much less title to lands of the public domain. It is
intended merely to confirm and register the title which one may already have over the
land. Where the applicant possesses no title or ownership over the parcel of land, he
cannot acquire one under the Torrens System of registration.

In such action for reversion, petitioners may perhaps be permitted to raise the question
belatedly sought to be raised herein that the private respondent was not possessed of
registerable title, on the strength of their allegation that Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles
Cadastre, alleged to be the same lot finally awarded by the lower court to the herein
respondent, is part of the Mariveles Military Reservation established by then Governor
General Leonard Wood under Proclamation No. 10 issued in 1925 and that it was only
on June 10, 1967 that this Military Reservation area had been declared as disposable
and alienable land of the public domain by Presidential Proclamation No. 210-B. Should
petitioners duly establish by competent evidence these allegations, they may then raise
the crucial question whether the private respondent and his predecessors-in-interest
may be deemed to have validly and legally commenced occupation of the land and
physically occupied the same en concepto de dueño for thirty years or more to entitle
them to registration under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act — a question which we
cannot resolve now in view of our finding that we are without jurisdiction to entertain
the appeal since the decision or final order granting registrations has long become final
and executory besides the fact that petitioners’ evidence has not been duly presented
and admitted. Such questions as may be raised by the petitioners in a separate case of
reversion are of course understood to be subject to such counter-evidence and
defenses as the private respondent may properly put up including res judicata where
applicable. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad