G.R. NOS.

178382-83 September 23, 2015

CONTINENTAL MICRONESIA, INC., Petitioner,

JARDELEZA, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner Continental Micronesia is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of and
domiciled in the United States of America. It is licensed to do business in the Philippines. Respondent, a
US citizen residing in the Philippines, accepted an offer to be a General Manager position by Mr. Braden,
Managing Director-Asia of Continental Airlines. On November 7, 1992, CMI took over the Philippine
operations of Continental, with respondent retaining his position as General Manager. Thereafter,
respondent received a letter from Mr. Schulz, who was then CMI’s Vice President of Marketing and
Sales, informing him that he has agreed to work in CMI as a consultant on an “as needed basis.”
Respondent wrote a counter-proposal that was rejected by CMI. He then again, wrote another letter
addressed to the HR Department of CMI but was notified that he could be terminated.

Upon termination of his employment, respondent then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the
petitioner alleging the presence of foreign elements, CMI filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the person of CMI and the subject matter of the controversy.

The Labor Arbiter agreed with CMI that the employment contract was executed in the US “since the
letter-offer was under the Texas letterhead and the acceptance of Complainant was returned there.” Thus,
applying the doctrine of lex loci celebrationis, US laws apply. Also, applying lex loci contractus, the
Labor Arbiter ruled that the parties did not intend to apply Philippine laws.

On appeal to the NLRC, the latter ruled that the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over the case when
CMI voluntarily submitted to his office’s jurisdiction by presenting evidence, advancing arguments in
support of the legality of its acts, and praying for reliefs on the merits of the case.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case and over the parties. Both CMI and Basso filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration
but were denied. Consequently, Basso filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals and CMI
also filed its own Petition for Certiorari. However, the CA only granted the motion filed by Basso
partially granting his claim of backwages and ruled that the Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction over
the person of Basso when he filed the complaint for illegal dismissal, while jurisdiction over the person of
CMI was acquired through coercive process of service of summons to its agent in the Philippines.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over the case.

Held:
Yes. The Court ruled that the labor tribunals had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the
case. The employment contract of Basso was replete with references to US laws, and that it originated
from and was returned to the US, do not automatically preclude our labor tribunals from exercising
jurisdiction to hear and try this case.

On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of CMI was acquired through the coercive process of
service of summons. CMI never denied that it was served with summons. CMI has, in fact, voluntarily
appeared and participated in the proceedings before the courts. Though a foreign corporation, CMI is
licensed to do business in the Philippines and has a local business address here. The purpose of the law in
requiring that foreign corporations doing business in the country be licensed to do so, is to subject the
foreign corporations to the jurisdiction of our courts.

Where the facts establish the existence of foreign elements, the case presents a conflicts-of-laws issue.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court in a conflict-of-laws case may assume
jurisdiction if it chooses to do so, provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine
Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position
to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely
to have power to enforce its decision. All these requisites are present here.

G.R. No. 162894             February 26, 2008

RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,

TINGA, J.:

Facts:

Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American
citizen, entered into a contract with BMSI as representative to negotiate the sale of services of
government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts.
Thereafter, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI
for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.

Subsequently, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST), for alleged nonpayment of
commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment contract. The Labor Espiritu, Jr. rendered
judgment in favor of respondent directing petitioners to pay respondent’s money claims. Upon appeal by
BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondent’s complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.

On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages (civil case)
before the RTC of Bauang, La Union against herein petitioners for the enforcement of money claims to
where petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to dismissed the complaint on grounds of failure to state a
cause of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of compulsory counterclaim
which the RTC denied. It ruled that the principle of forum non conveniens was inapplicable because the
trial court could enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign corporation licensed to do business in
the Philippines.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Thus, it filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for writ of certiorari and a writ of injunction but was denied. The CA also denied the motion for
reconsideration.

Hence, this petition where petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between respondent and
BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the
State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute – namely, the parties
and witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be presented is located
outside the Philippines – that renders our local courts inconvenient forums. Petitioner theorizes that the
foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the immediate application of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.

Issue:

Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens.

Ruling:

No. The instant petition lacks merit.

Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura, the Court outlined three consecutive phases involved in judicial
resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and
enforcement of judgments. Thus, in the instances where the Court held that the local judicial machinery
was adequate to resolve controversies with a foreign element, the following requisites had to be proved:
(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine
Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine
Court has or is likely to have the power to enforce its decision.

On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court
and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed
to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign
forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.

Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law
and by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. The action for damages (civil case) arising
from an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of damages
prayed are within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent (as
party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.

That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are
precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts.
Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the
further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case
is fair to both parties. The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues
of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions
on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not
precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant
case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over the Civil Case and the parties involved.

Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a
factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the
discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after
vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance.

G.R. No. L-22595             November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

Facts:

Miciano,the judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition where Andre Brimo, one of the
brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions
of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which
reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things,
provides the following:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as
to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the
nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.

Issue:

Whether or not Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimo’s
estates

Ruling:

The Philippine Law shall be the basis of the distribution of the (deceased) property. The fact that the
oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws,
inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the
absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and
Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when
he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an
error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain
testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.

The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is
discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample
opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in
this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G.
Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in
force, must be complied with and executed.

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must
respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but
in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the
herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as
expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil
Code provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the
testator otherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the
institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.

G.R. No. L-12105             January 30, 1960

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased &PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., executor-

LABRADOR, J.:

Facts:
C. O. Bohanan, a citizen the United States and of the State of Nevada executed a last will and testament in
accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada on April 23, 1944 in Manila. The testator and Magdalena
C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909. He secured a divorce which was granted to him on May
20, 1922. Sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage was
subsisting at the time of the death of the testator in 1944.

On April 24, 1950, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding, admitted to
probate the last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan. The Philippine Trust Company was named as the
executor of the will.

The executor filed a project of partition on 1956, making, in accordance with the provisions of the will,
the following adjudications:
(1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of testator’s grandson Edward George Bohanan, which
consists of several mining companies;
(2) the other half of the residuary estate to the testator’s brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs. M. B.
Galbraith, share and share alike. This consist in the same amount of cash and of shares of mining stock
similar to those given to testator’s grandson;
(3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohana, and his daughter, Mary Lydia
Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly installments;
(4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox,
P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000.

The respondents, wife Magdalena Bohanan and her two children claimed that they have been deprived of
their respective legitime questioned the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate of
the deceased in the manner above as indicated.

Issue: 1.Whether or not the Philippine laws or the laws of Nevada should apply in the disposal of the
estate of the deceased

2. Whether or not testator’s children are entitled to a legitime in accordance with the laws of the forum

Ruling:

1. The laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his
properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife. Section 9905 of
Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:
“Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his
or her estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the testator’s
debts.”
Moreover, in an order dated June 19, 1955 – the court found that there existed no community
property owned by the decedent and his former wife at the time the decree of divorce was issued.
This order was already final and executory and she had not appealed therefrom.

2. No. In accordance with Par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16, New
Civil Code legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to
the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the
nature of the property and the country in which it is found. It is therefore the Law of Nevada
which will govern the disposition of the properties of the testator but this foreign law must first be
 proved as our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws. However, the laws of Nevada
were not introduced in evidence by the executor’s at the hearing of the project of partition. It is
Magdalena C. Bohanan, upon her motion for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, who introduced
in evidence the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws. Said laws
presented by the counsel for the executor was admitted by the Court. Also the children of the
testator, did not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada.

The law of Nevada, being a foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form and manner
provided for by our Rules, which are as follows:

SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
tested by the officer having the legal custody of he record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. . . .
(Rule 123).

Under these circumstances, the Court held that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section
9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice by the court, without
proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

The order of the court approving the project of partition was affirmed.

G.R. No. 119602               October 6, 2000

BUENA, J.:

Facts:

Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc., private respondent herein, arrived in
Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the loading and when the vessel was
ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was
designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas through the
Orinoco River. He was asked to pilot the said vessel and boarding it at night.

The master (captain) of the Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro Colon, was at the bridge together with
the pilot (Vasquez), the vessel's third mate (then the officer on watch), and a helmsman when the vessel
left the port. Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel was under way.

The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San Roque Channel. The vessel
proceeded on its way, with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the
shallowness of the channel.

Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel again experienced some vibrations.These occurred at 4:12 a.m. It
was then that the watch officer called the master to the bridge.
The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel and verified that it was in the centre of the
channel. He then went to confirm, or set down, the position of the vessel on the chart. He ordered
Simplicio A. Monis, Chief Officer of the President Roxas, to check all the double bottom tanks.

At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River, thus obstructing the ingress
and egress of vessels.

As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein petitioner Wildvalley Shipping
Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day.

Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch III against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the
underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits, and interest thereon
amounting to US $400,000.00 plus attorney's fees, costs, and expenses of litigation. The complaint
against Pioneer Insurance Company was dismissed in an Order dated November 7, 1988. The trial court
rendered its decision in favor of the petitioner, Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd.

Both parties appealed: the petitioner appealing the non-award of interest with the private respondent
questioning the decision on the merits of the case.

After the requisite pleadings had been filed, the Court of Appeals came out with its decision finding
defendant-appellant's appeal to be meritorious and reversing the decision of the lower court.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent court of appeals seriously erred in disregarding Venezuelan law despite the
fact that the same has been substantially proved in the trial court without any objection from private
respondent, and whose objection was interposed belatedly on appeal or whether or not Venezuelan law is
applicable to the case at bar.

Ruling:

NO.

The petition is without merit.

It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.

A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an unwritten law. The former falls
under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Where the foreign law sought to be proved
is "unwritten," the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published books of
reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such
courts.
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:

"Sec. 24. Proof of official record. -- The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office." (Underscoring supplied)

The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to include competent evidence like the testimony
of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law.

For a copy of a foreign public document to” be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory: (1) It
must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be
accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office. The latter requirement
is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of
a document in a foreign country.

With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is the best
evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule
requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute.

We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be properly pleaded and
proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or state, will be
presumed to be the same as our own local or domestic law and this is known as processual presumption.

G.R. No. 136804             February 19, 2003

MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. and/or CHEMICAL BANK, petitioners,

CARPIO, J.:

Facts:

Respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero ("Guerrero" for brevity) filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank ("the Bank" for brevity) with the RTC - Manila.
Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests
on his checking account with the Bank; (2) a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature
verification problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of his account. Guerrero amended his complaint
on April 18, 1995.
The Bank filed its Answer alleging, that by stipulation Guerrero’s account is governed by New York law
and this law does not permit any of Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. Subsequently, the Bank
filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of Guerrero’s claims for
consequential, nominal, temperate, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees on the same
ground alleged in its Answer. The Bank contended that the trial should be limited to the issue of actual
damages. Guerrero opposed the motion.

The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. Alyssa Walden’s affidavit ("Walden affidavit" for brevity) stated that Guerrero’s New York
bank account stipulated that the governing law is New York law and that this law bars all of Guerrero’s
claims except actual damages. The Philippine Consular Office in New York authenticated the Walden
affidavit.

The RTC denied the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and its motion for reconsideration,
respectively. The Bank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals assailing
the RTC Orders. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petitions and thereafter the Court of Appeals denied
the Bank’s motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals considered the New York law and
jurisprudence as public documents defined in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence. The Court
of Appeals clarified that the Walden affidavit is not the supporting affidavit referred to in Section 2, Rule
34 that would prove the lack of genuine issue between the parties. The Court of Appeals concluded that
even if the Walden affidavit is used for purposes of summary judgment, the Bank must still comply with
the procedure prescribed by the Rules to prove the foreign law.

Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the bank’s affidavit, which proves foreign law as a fact, is "hearsay" and thereby ‘cannot
serve as proof of the New York law relied upon by petitioners in their motion for summary judgment or
whether or not Walden Affidavit can serve as proof of the New York law

Ruling:

The petition is devoid of merit.

The resolution of whether a foreign law allows only the recovery of actual damages is a question of fact
as far as the trial court is concerned since foreign laws do not prove themselves in our courts. Foreign
laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven. Certainly,
the conflicting allegations as to whether New York law or Philippine law applies to Guerrero’s claims
present a clear dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only by a trial on the merits.

Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be
proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody
thereof. Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may
be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must state,
in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be,
and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Certain exceptions to this rule were recognized in Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals10 which held
that:

Although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in accordance with the above rule, however, the
Supreme Court held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, that Section 41, Rule 123
(Section 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court) does not exclude the presentation of other
competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law. In that case, the Supreme Court considered
the testimony under oath of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a
section of California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time the obligations
were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the existence of said law. Accordingly, in line with
this view, the Supreme Court in the Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher et al., upheld the Tax Court in
considering the pertinent law of California as proved by the respondents’ witness. In that case, the
counsel for respondent "testified that as an active member of the California Bar since 1951, he is familiar
with the revenue and taxation laws of the State of California. When asked by the lower court to state the
pertinent California law as regards exemption of intangible personal properties, the witness cited Article
4, Sec. 13851 (a) & (b) of the California Internal and Revenue Code as published in Derring’s California
Code, a publication of Bancroft-Whitney Co., Inc. And as part of his testimony, a full quotation of the
cited section was offered in evidence by respondents." Likewise, in several naturalization cases, it was
held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of
citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for
favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is "satisfied of the authenticity of the
written proof offered." Thus, in a number of decisions, mere authentication of the Chinese Naturalization
Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to be competent proof of that law." (Emphasis
supplied)

The Bank, however, cannot rely on Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal or Collector of Internal
Revenue v. Fisher to support its cause. These cases involved attorneys testifying in open court during the
trial in the Philippines and quoting the particular foreign laws sought to be established. On the other hand,
the Walden affidavit was taken abroad ex parte and the affiant never testified in open court.1a\^/phi1.net
The Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York law on damages not only because it is
self-serving but also because it does not state the specific New York law on damages.

The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiant’s personal interpretation and opinion of the facts
of the case vis a vis the alleged laws and jurisprudence without citing any law in particular. The citations
in the Walden affidavit of various U.S. court decisions do not constitute proof of the official records or
decisions of the U.S. courts. While the Bank attached copies of some of the U.S. court decisions cited in
the Walden affidavit, these copies do not comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of official records
or decisions of foreign courts.

The Bank’s intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to prove New York law and jurisprudence.
However, because of the failure to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to prove a foreign law and
decisions of foreign courts, the Walden affidavit did not prove the current state of New York law and
jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not proved, what New York law and
jurisprudence are on the matters at issue.

G.R. No. 145587             October 26, 2007

EDI-STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,

Facts:

Petitioner EDI is a corporation engaged in recruitment and placement of Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFWs). ESI is another recruitment agency which collaborated with EDI to process the documentation
and deployment of private respondent to Saudi Arabia.

Private respondent Gran was an OFW recruited by EDI, and deployed by ESI to work for OAB, in
Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

It appears that OAB asked EDI through its October 3, 1993 letter for curricula vitae of qualified
applicants for the position of "Computer Specialist." OAB informed EDI that, from the applicants'
curricula vitae submitted to it for evaluation, it selected Gran for the position of "Computer Specialist."

After accepting OAB's offer of employment, Gran signed an employment contract that granted him a
monthly salary of USD 850.00 for a period of two years. Upon arrival in Riyadh, Gran questioned the
discrepancy in his monthly salary—his employment contract stated USD 850.00; while his POEA
Information Sheet indicated USD 600.00 only. However, through the assistance of the EDI office in
Riyadh, OAB agreed to pay Gran USD 850.00 a month.

After Gran had been working for about five months for OAB, his employment was terminated through
OAB. He received from OAB the total amount of SR 2,948.00 representing his final pay, and on the same
day, he executed a Declaration releasing OAB from any financial obligation or otherwise, towards him.

After his arrival in the Philippines, Gran instituted a complaint against ESI/EDI et.al. with the NLRC for
underpayment of wages and illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was neither
underpayment nor illegal dismissal.

Dissatisfied, Gran filed an Appeal with the NLRC. However, it appears from the records that Gran failed
to furnish EDI with a copy of his Appeal Memorandum.

The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's Decision and rendered a new one ordering ESI/EDI, et.al. jointly
and severally liable to pay the complainant Eleazar Gran.

Gran then filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment with the NLRC and petitioner receiving a copy of
this motion on the same date.

To prevent the execution, petitioner filed an Opposition. Subsequently ,petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the NLRC Decision after receiving a copy of the Decision which the NLRC denied.

Unconvinced of the NLRC's reasoning, EDI filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. Petitioner
claimed in its petition that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the
appeal despite Gran's failure to perfect the appeal where the appellate court denied the petition to set aside
the NLRC Decision.

Hence, this instant petition is before the Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Gran’s dismissal is justifiable by reason of incompetence, insubordination, and
disobedience

Ruling:

In cases involving OFWs, the rights and obligations among and between the OFW, the local
recruiter/agent, and the foreign employer/principal are governed by the employment contract. A contract
freely entered into is considered law between the parties; and hence, should be respected. In formulating
the contract, the parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.

In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws
will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination
procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract,
Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the employment of Gran.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden
of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and
proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know
only domestic or forum law.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International
Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign
law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as
ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.

Petitioner EDI claims that it had proven that Gran was legally dismissed due to incompetence and
insubordination or disobedience.

This claim has no merit.

In illegal dismissal cases, it has been established by Philippine law and jurisprudence that the employer
should prove that the dismissal of employees or personnel is legal and just.

It is made clear that the rules on quitclaim or waiver shall apply only to labor contracts of OFWs in the
absence of proof of the laws of the foreign country agreed upon to govern said contracts. Otherwise, the
foreign laws shall apply.

G.R. No. L-12105             January 30, 1960

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased &PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., executor-

LABRADOR, J.:
Facts:
C. O. Bohanan, a citizen the United States and of the State of Nevada executed a last will and testament in
accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada on April 23, 1944 in Manila. The testator and Magdalena
C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909. He secured a divorce which was granted to him on May
20, 1922. Sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage was
subsisting at the time of the death of the testator in 1944.

On April 24, 1950, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding, admitted to
probate the last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan. The Philippine Trust Company was named as the
executor of the will.

The executor filed a project of partition on 1956, making, in accordance with the provisions of the will,
the following adjudications:
(1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of testator’s grandson Edward George Bohanan, which
consists of several mining companies;
(2) the other half of the residuary estate to the testator’s brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs. M. B.
Galbraith, share and share alike. This consist in the same amount of cash and of shares of mining stock
similar to those given to testator’s grandson;
(3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert Bohana, and his daughter, Mary Lydia
Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly installments;
(4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah Fox,
P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000.

The respondents, wife Magdalena Bohanan and her two children claimed that they have been deprived of
their respective legitime questioned the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate of
the deceased in the manner above as indicated.

Issue: 1.Whether or not the Philippine laws or the laws of Nevada should apply in the disposal of the
estate of the deceased

2. Whether or not testator’s children are entitled to a legitime in accordance with the laws of the forum

Ruling:

1. The laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his
properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife. Section 9905 of
Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:
“Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his
or her estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the testator’s
debts.”
Moreover, in an order dated June 19, 1955 – the court found that there existed no community
property owned by the decedent and his former wife at the time the decree of divorce was issued.
This order was already final and executory and she had not appealed therefrom.

2. No. In accordance with Par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16, New
Civil Code legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to
the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the
 nature of the property and the country in which it is found. It is therefore the Law of Nevada
which will govern the disposition of the properties of the testator but this foreign law must first be
proved as our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws. However, the laws of Nevada
were not introduced in evidence by the executor’s at the hearing of the project of partition. It is
Magdalena C. Bohanan, upon her motion for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, who introduced
in evidence the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws. Said laws
presented by the counsel for the executor was admitted by the Court. Also the children of the
testator, did not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada.

The law of Nevada, being a foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form and manner
provided for by our Rules, which are as follows:

SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
tested by the officer having the legal custody of he record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. . . .
(Rule 123).

Under these circumstances, the Court held that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section
9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice by the court, without
proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

The order of the court approving the project of partition was affirmed.

G.R. No. 32636. March 17, 1930

In the matter of the Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. A. W. FLUEMER, petitioner and
appellant vs. ANNIE COUSINS Hix, oppositor and appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

Facts:

The petitioner is a special administrator of the estate of Edward Hix. He alleged that the latter’s will was
executed in Elkins, West Virginia on November 3, 1925 by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction,
and that the laws of that state govern. To this end, the petitioner submitted a copy of Section 3868 of Acts
1882, c.84 as found in West Virginia Code, annotated by Hogg, Charles E., vol.2 1914, p. 1690 and as
certified to by the Director of National Library. The Judge of the First Instance however denied the
probate of the will on the grounds that Sec 300 and301 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not complied
with.

Petitioner filed an appeal from the judgment of the probate court before the Supreme Court. Pending
appeal, petitioner presented an unverified petition for the court to accept as part of the evidence
documents, one of which was a paper purporting to be the last will and testament of the testator which
was presented for probate to the clerk of Randolph County, State of West Virginia.

Issue:

Whether or not the pertinent law of West Virginia was duly proven
Ruling:

No.

The due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this point is to be found in the
testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged
by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, or that these witnesses subscribed the will in
the presence of the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the
supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it would then be the duty
of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 633).

It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in West Virginia and not
in the Philippine Islands. The only evidence introduced to establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the
alleged will and the testimony of the petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedings originally
in the Philippine Islands, the petitioner violated his own theory by attempting to have the principal
administration in the Philippine Islands.

It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November
3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia govern. To
this end, there was submitted a copy of section 3868 of Acts 1882, c. 84 as found in West Virginia Code,
Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and as certified to by the Director of the National
Library. But this was far from a compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove
themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of
the laws of the various States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of
Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no showing that
the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the authority of the State of
West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the
law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State of
West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to
show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was
executed.