Multiple Modernities: Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism in a Globalizing Age

Author(s): Robert W. Hefner

Source: Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 27 (1998), pp. 83-104
Published by: Annual Reviews
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/223364
Accessed: 06/04/2009 12:56

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=annrevs.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Annual Reviews is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Annual Review of
Anthropology.

http://www.jstor.org
Annu.Rev. Anthropol.1998. 27.83-104
Copyright? 1998 by AnnualReviews.All rights reserved

MULTIPLEMODERNITIES:
Christianity,Islam, and Hinduism
in a GlobalizingAge
Robert W.Hefner
Departmentof Anthropology,Boston University, 232 Bay StateRoad, Boston,
Massachusetts02215; e-mail: [email protected]

KEYWORDS:worldreligions,modernity, conversion
secularization,
globalization,

ABSTRACT

The late twentieth century has seen far-reachingchanges in the translocal

culturalregimes known as world religions. This review examines the politics
and meanings of recent changes in three such religions: Christianity,Islam,
and Hinduism. It highlights the nature of the forces reshaping religious
meanings and authority,the processes promotingconversion and standardi-
zation, and the implications of these religious refigurationsfor our under-
standing of late modernity itself. Though modernity is multiple and every
traditionunique, this review suggests that all contemporaryreligions con-
fronta similarstructuralpredicament,relatedto the globalizationof mass so-
cieties and the porous pluralismof late modernity.

INTRODUCTION
One does not have to go back too many years to recall a time when anthropolo-
gists concerned themselves primarily with tribal, ancestral, or otherwise local-
ized religious traditions. The early editions of Lessa & Vogt's (1979) Reader
in Comparative Religion, for example, had only a handful of chapters on world
religions, most of which dealt with syncretized or village traditions.Though
postwar anthropologists of religion might not go as far as Radcliffe-Brown
(1952:2) in defining anthropology as the sociology of so-called primitive so-
cieties, their general preference was for the local and particularistic rather than
the world-civilizational (Bowen 1993:5, Stocking 1989).

83
0084-6570/98/1015-0083$08.00
84 HEFNER

Early in the postwar period, however, some anthropologistsbegan to ad-

dress the natureof translocalreligion. Influencedby Redfield's (1956) studies
of peasant societies, anthropologistsof Hinduism,Buddhism, folk Christian-
ity, and Islam examined the interaction of localized "little traditions"with
translocal"greattraditions"(Marriot1955, Singer 1972). Marxistand histori-
cal-evolutionaryanthropologistsexamined the politics and meanings of relig-
ious movementsover vast tractsof time and space (Wolf 1958, Wolf& Hansen
1972, Worsley 1968). Heir to the traditionthathad pioneeredthe sociological
concept of world religions, Weberiananthropologists-particularly those in-
fluenced by Parsons' and Shils' American reading of Weber-invoked the
triad of tradition,rationality,and modernityto assert that world religions are
more rationalized than traditionalreligions (Geertz 1960, 1973; cf Hefner
1993b, van der Veer 1994).
With the tectonic shifts in politics and cultureof the 1960s, the "orthodox
consensus" (Giddens 1984:xv) that underlay social theory during the early
postwarperiod collapsed. With it went agreementon the analyticutility of the
distinction between traditional and world religions. Most anthropologists
rightly rejected the overextended generalizations of modernization theory.
Lacking an alternativeframeworkfor the analysis of translocalreligion, most
also limited themselves to careful analyses of religion in local context; a few
denied the intellectualvalidity of cross-culturalcomparisonat all.
All this changed in the 1980s underthe influence of two shifts in the disci-
pline: a renewal of interestin the history and genealogy of culture,and the re-
discovery of the problemof power. These theoreticalinterestswere reinforced
by a thirdshift in anthropologicalpractice:the turnof ever largernumbersof
anthropologiststowardcomplex societies and translocalculture.As the social
reachof the state,markets,mass media, andothermacrocosmicagencies grew,
anthropologists'interestin translocalreligions increased.The resultingexpan-
sion of spatial and temporalhorizons did not revive the discipline's faith in
Weberiancategories.Insteadit led to a heightenedinterestin the hybridnature
of translocalreligions and the "political economies of meaning"that sustain
them (Eickelman 1979, 1983; cf Cohn 1981, Comaroff 1985:6, Hefner 1987,
Ortner1984).
This review examines the new anthropologyof religion from the perspec-
tive of modem change in Christianity,Islam, and Hinduism. The discussion
highlightsthreecentralquestions:first,the natureof the forces reshapingrelig-
ious meanings and authority;second, the processes promotingconversion and
religious standardization;and, third,the implicationsof these religious refigu-
rations for our understandingof late modernityitself. These issues illustrate
the high-stakesefforts of contemporaryanthropologistsof religion to position
themselves as theorists,not merely of local life-worlds but of the "globalecu-
mene" (Hannerz 1992; see Appadurai 1996, Barth 1992, James 1995). All
 MULTIPLE
MODERNITIES85

three also highlight the dauntingchallenges still facing this effort at discipli-
nary redefinition.

PUBLIC RELIGIONAND THE PROBLEM

OF MODERNITY
One of the most significant influences on recent researchin the anthropology
of religion has been the growing influence of religious institutions in public
politics and culturearoundthe world (Casanova 1994, Hefner 1998). This re-
surgenceranksas one of the most remarkableevents in global politics and cul-
ture at the end of the twentieth century, challenging long-held assumptions
about the secular natureof modernizationand modernity (Dobbelaere 1981,
Luckmann 1967, Wilson 1966). In policy-oriented circles outside anthropol-
ogy, this resurgencehas led once-optimisticproponentsof modernizationthe-
ory to embrace a Westem-centric relativism pessimistic about the prospects
for democracy and social justice in the non-Western world (Cooper 1996,
Huntington1996).
For more than a century,the vast majorityof Westernsocial theoristshave
been convinced that religion was a declining historical force. In mainstream
social analysis, this confidence was expressed in either of two narrativeson
secularization.The first,a relativelyrobustversion of the secularizationthesis,
characterizedreligion as an instrumentof enchantedexplanationand control
whose influence declines as the light of reason illuminates what had previ-
ously been cloaked in darkness.As in Weber's (1958) account of capitalism's
origins, this modernistprognosis was sometimes linked to a subsidiarythesis
stating that secular disenchantmentalso occurs when institutions such as the
state and market acquire institutional autonomy, thereby marginalizing the
very religious traditionsthat had earlierassisted their ascent.
Less robust statementsof secularizationtheory placed more emphasis on
the pluralizednatureof the moder world than on science and secularreason.
Proponentsof this view argued that the key to modernity is not enlightened
reason but qualities of social organizationpeculiarto the late moder age, es-
pecially its structuraldifferentiation,technical specialization, and pluraliza-
tion of life-worlds (Luhmann1984). Long before postmoderntheorists spoke
of the collapse of"totalizing narratives"(Lyotard1992, Bauman 1993), propo-
nents of this version of secularizationtheory assertedthatmoder pluralismis
so radicalthatit frustratesefforts to projectoverarchingethical values into the
public sphere. Where previously a "sacredcanopy" (Berger 1967) stabilized
life experience and provided sharedpublic meanings, it was said, in modern
times the canopy is rentandthe collective bases of moralityand identityare di-
minished or destroyed (Beckford 1989:74-107; Bruce 1996:29-52; Wilson
1985).
86 HEFNER

In the light of retrospectivehistory, it is clear thatboth versions of classical

secularization theory oversimplified modernity and its nonmodern "other."
Ratherthan recognizing that modernitymight be multiple, both accounts of-
fered an idealized model of the West as the prototypefor modernizationin all
societies. Furthermore,they failed to do justice to the fate of religion in the
West. Anthropologistswho rightly challenge the applicationof secular-mod-
ernizationnarrativesto the non-Westernworld are sometimes less critical of
these theories' portrayalof religion in the modem West. In an age in which an-
thropology aspires to be globally comparative,however, a more nuancedun-
derstandingof religion in the modem West is essential.

RETHINKINGWESTERNRELIGION
Though conventionalsecularizationtheory is monolithic and teleological, the
real-worldprocess of secularizationis hardlyillusory. The transitionfrom the
agrarianworlds of the Middle Ages into the differentiatedlandscapesof early
modem Europe did witness a decline in church authority,a pluralizationof
high-culturaltraditions,and vigorous assaults on churchdoctrine and leader-
ship. RenaissanceItaly,for example, saw a dramaticupsurgeof elite interestin
Greco-Roman political philosophy, part of a broader assault on received
Christiandoctrines in Europeanpolitical theory (Skinner 1990, Tuck 1993).
By sponsoring state churches, the ProtestantReformationat first seemed to
strengthenthe linkage between churchand state, but it also released the genie
of religious dissidence and anti-establishmentarianism.Assertingtheir duty to
for
interpretscripture themselves, Protestantnonconformists in England,Ger-
many, and the Netherlands the of
challenged rights princes and kings to decide
the religion of their subjects (Martin 1978). These dissidents created prece-
dents not just for religious nonconformistsbut for later advocates of demo-
craticpluralismas well (Walzer 1965).
The decline in Christianity's public influence reached new heights, of
course, in the eighteenth-centuryEnlightenment,a subjectthathas been the fo-
cus of debate in recent commentaries on Western modernity (Asad 1993b,
James 1995, Werbner 1996; cf Foucault 1996, Habermas 1996). Hegel ob-
served that Catholic Europehad been sparedthe earlier ProtestantReforma-
tion only to awake in the eighteenthcenturyto a far more ambitiouschallenge.
For some historians of this era, the Enlightenmentrepresentednothing less
thanthe triumphof a "new paganism"over the churchin the fields of politics,
the arts, and public ethics (Gay 1966, cf Vovelle 1978). Though the French
Revolution and Napoleonic wars inspired conservative campaigns to restore
church authority,these efforts were undercutby the nationalist movements
that subsequently swept Europe. By emphasizing principles of sovereignty
and ethnoculturalidentity unacknowledged in Christian political doctrine,
 MULTIPLE
MODERNITIES87

modem nationalismfurtheredthe de-Christianizationof popularpolitical dis-

course.
Exampleslike these at first lend credenceto Anderson'sclaim thatthe dawn
of nationalismpresumedthe "duskof religious modes of thought"(Anderson
1991:11).This observationis correctin the limitedsense thatmost Europeanna-
tionalisms made only perfunctoryreferences to the organic political theories
of Medieval Christendom.In Italy, Spain, and France,moreover, anticlerical
nationalistsdirectly challenged churchauthority.Extrapolatedto the whole of
Western public life, however, Anderson's observation distorts the degree to
which religion continued to play a public role in much of the Westernworld,
especially the United States. In the non-Westernworld, Anderson's secularist
argumentis even less apposite. As numerousscholars have noted (Antoun &
Hegland 1987, Bowen 1993, Hefner 1995, Tambiah 1996, Tonnesson & Ant-
lov 1996:8, van der Veer 1994), Anderson overlooks the far-reachinginflu-
ence of religious ideals and networks on non-Westernnationalisms.
In northwesternEurope,however, conventional measures of public religi-
osity since the end of the nineteenthcentury, and especially since the 1960s,
confirm that Christianity'spublic influence has fallen, though at a different
pace in differentcountries(Martin1978). Post-1960s Europehas seen a steady
decline in the numbersof Europeansentering the ministry, attendingchurch,
expressing a belief in God, and otherwise conformingto conventionalindices
of Christianreligiosity. Though it was once believed that the Catholic nations
of southernEuropemight escape this trend,recentresearchshows thatthey too
are now following the Western Europeanpattern of church decline (Bruce
1996: 29-37, Hervieu-Leger 1990). Developments like these seem to confirm
the argumentsof Habermasand othersthatthe structuraltransformationof the
Western public sphere requires the privatization of religious conviction
(Habermas1991, but cf Casanova 1994).
Even in the West, however, modernityis not singular,least of all as regards
religious matters. It is importantto rememberthat the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries witnessed not merely Enlightenment attacks on religious
authoritybut new and vibrantreligious movements. These included Metho-
dism in England,Hassidism in Poland, Pietism in Germany,and in the United
States, the Protestant Great Awakening (Halevy 1927, Outram 1995:34,
Thompson 1963:350-400). Though their leadershiphad a complex class pro-
file, most of these movements drew from the ranks not of the aristocratic
guardiansof the old order-many of whom no longer regardedthemselves as
particularlyChristian-but the newly urbanizedworking and middle classes.
In their class-base and cultural ethos, these movements anticipatedthe late
twentieth century's movements of Islamic reformand non-WesternPentecos-
talism. Like these lattermovements, nineteenth-centuryMethodismprovided
opportunitiesfor leadershipand social respectabilityotherwise unavailableto
88 HEFNER

unpedigreedurbanites.Methodism also provided emotive and individualistic

forms of religious devotion. Finally, and significantly, it instilled a time sense
and social self-control well-suited to the disciplinary demands of the ascen-
dant industrialorder (Comaroff 1985: 29-137, Comaroff & Comaroff 1991,
Hobsbawm 1957, Thompson 1963: 350-400).
If most models of modernity fail to acknowledge the complexity of relig-
ious change in industrializingEurope,the same is truein spades for the United
States. RepublicanAmerica opted against establishinga state church,still the
norm in Europe.This decision opened the way, not for religion's decline, but
for a marketplacecompetition that spurredgalloping sectarianismand fierce
denominationalrivalries.The primarybeneficiariesof this tumultprovedto be
not the patricianelders of Episcopalianismand Presbyterianismbut populist
Methodists and Baptists. Like Islamists and evangelicals in the non-Western
world today, these latter groups thrived because they minimized social dis-
tance between clergy and laity, allowed a heightened measure of congrega-
tional autonomy, and provided easy access to positions of authorityfor non-
elite individuals(Wuthnow 1988:20).
Developments like these pluralizedAmericanreligion, but-again contrary
to conventional secularization narratives-also kept religious ideals very
much in the public sphere. Looking back on the Americanexperience, Bellah
et al (1985) have suggested that the rise of industrialcapitalism in the after-
math of the Civil War undermineda previously hegemonic (and essentially
Protestant)"civic" religion by promotinga separationof economic organiza-
tion from heretoforeextensive moral controls. The result in their view was a
colonization of the public sphere by the self-interestedauthoritiesof market
and state (compareHabermas1984).
Though national capitalism was certainly in ascent, other studies suggest
thatAmericanreligion in the late nineteenthand early twentiethcenturieswas
more heterogeneousin its influences and varied in its outcomes than this ac-
count implies. Jewish and Catholic immigrationin the last half of the nine-
teenth centuryunderminedProtestanthegemony, dashing the hopes of ultra-
conservativeChristiansto make Protestantismthe religion of state. The efforts
of Jews (secular and religious), Catholics, and dissident Baptists encouraged
more, not less, religious freedom. The consequence was not the evacuationof
religion from public life, but-in a patternthatresembles trendsin Hindu and
Muslim nations today (see below)-a potent mix of pluralizationand height-
ened competition. At a time when religiosity among the Europeanworking
classes was already in decline, American society was becoming more
"churched."Between 1860 and 1900, membershipin churches and temples
grew from 20 to 40 percent (Wuthnow 1988:21-22). For the first time in
American history, Protestant denominations also established national bu-
reaucraciesto coordinatetheir outreach.
 MULTIPLE
MODERNITIES89

Public religion in the United States at the turnof the centurywas not a civic
religion of unperturbedconsensus, therefore,but an element in a broaderand
agonistic debate over popularidentity and morality. Between 1920 and 1950,
conservative Protestantswarned repeatedly of the growing power of Roman
Catholicism,appealingfor an end to denominationalsectarianismso as to con-
tain the perceived Catholic menace (Wuthnow 1988:78). Despite these ap-
peals, fierce controversies raged between Protestantmodernists and funda-
mentalists,leading some in the fundamentalistcamp to call for separationfrom
corrupted modernists (Marsden 1980, Wuthnow 1988:137). As the 1925
Scopes trialindicated,the tension was not at all confined to mattersof personal
piety but centeredon each group's efforts to regulateactivities seen as partof
the public sphere.
These comparisonsbetween the United States and WesternEuropeunder-
score that the history of religion in the modem West varies from country to
countryin a mannerthatreflects a broadbalance of forces in state and society.
Martin (1978) and Casanova (1994) have argued that Western Christianity
continuedto play a significantpublic role where it avoided alliances with reac-
tionary ruling classes and opted for a marketplacepatternof denominational
competition ratherthan state-imposedreligion. As Casanova (1998) has ob-
served, the countries in EasternEurope where religion is today most vibrant
are those, like the Ukraine, where a similar mass-based denominationalism
prevails.
Secularizationhas occurredin vast portionsof Westernpublic life, but not as
a result of a systemic teleology, as mainstreamsecularizationtheory would
hold. In some Westernsocieties, religion continuesto exercise a significantin-
fluence on civil society and the public sphere(Casanova 1994, cf Smith 1995).
Elsewhere, as in much of northwesternEurope, traditional denominations
have experiencedsharpdeclines in public influence. In Westerncountriesas a
whole, organizedreligion has done best where its primarysocial carriershave
chosen not to attemptto reimpose an organicunion of religion and state on the
unsettledmodem landscape,and have insteadmoved down-marketto develop
organizationscloser in ethos and organizationto mass society's working and
middle classes. Having migratedaway from the elite, these denominationsex-
pose themselves to less containablesocial influences, some of which can de-
stabilize religion itself. This embeddedand pluralisticunderstandingof relig-
ious change in the West is a soundergroundthan classical secularizationthe-
ory on which to compareChristian,Hindu, and Muslim modernities.

FRAGMENTATION AND OBJECTIFICATION

With their confidence that moder religion experiences privatizationand de-
cline, it is not surprisingthat proponentsof conventional secularizationtheo-
90 HEFNER

ries have been baffled by the recentresurgenceof Islam, Hinduism,and Chris-

tianityaroundthe world. Some have reactedto this developmentwith the argu-
ment that it is all just a matterof time; as non-Westernsocieties modernize,
they too will experience the privatizationof religion assumed to have taken
place in the West. This line of argumentis made, for example, by the German-
trainedsociologist Tibi, who states that, as Muslim societies modernize, they
will follow the path of privatization experienced by Western Christianity.
Having once aspiredto organizeall of society, a modernizedIslam must inevi-
tably be "domiciledwithin the sphere of interiority"(Tibi 1990:139).
Other commentatorson the Muslim world take issue with this prognosis
even while accepting elements of secularizationtheory. Agreeing that mod-
ernizationbrings secularization,Gellnerhas nonetheless arguedthatIslam has
shown a unique ability to survive this secularistjuggernaut.This Muslim ex-
ceptionalism, Gellner argues, has to do with Islam's ability to take advantage
of the mobilizational opportunitiesof the modem nation-state.In the West,
Gellner observes (in an argumentthat recalls Anderson's), nationalistmove-
ments furtheredthe secularizationof political discourse by placing an ideal-
ized ethnic culture,ratherthanChristendom,at the centerof the idea of the na-
tion. By contrast,Gellnerargues,Muslims have been able to invoke theirgreat
traditionof religious scholarjurists (ulama) and law (shariah) as symbols of
nationhood.The nationalrenaissancein Muslim nations has thus been able to
promotepurifiedreligion as an alternativeto the idealized folkways so central
to Europeannationalisms. "Thus in Islam, and only in Islam, purification/
modernizationon the one hand, and the re-affirmationof a putative old local
identityon the other,can be done in one and the same languageand set of sym-
bols" (Gellner 1981:5, cf Gellner 1992:5-13).
There are problems with this claim of Muslim exceptionalism. First, the
model greatlyoversimplifies religion's fate in the West. Second, the model ig-
nores the continuing ability of Hindus, Buddhists, and other non-Muslims to
project religious influences into the public sphere (Kapferer 1988, Keyes
1987, Tambiah1992, 1996, Queen 1996). Finally, Gellner's accountmakes Is-
lamic nationalismlook too strong,overlooking the strongappealof ethnic and
secularnationalismsin the Muslim world. The exceptionalismthesis also errs
in takingat face value the claims of conservativeIslamiststhatIslam allows no
separationof social spheres and thus no differentiationof political and relig-
ious authority.This unitarianview of Islam and politics has been bitterlycon-
tested by liberal Muslims who insist, with good reason, that there is a long
precedentforjust such a civil separationof powers in Islam (Eickelman& Pis-
catori 1996, Goldberg 1993, Hefner 1997a, Munson 1993, Norton 1995).
If a theologically conservative Islamic nationalismhas achieved a certain
influence in recent years, then, this has less to do with a disposition unique to
Islam (and sharedby all Muslims) thanit does with a battleraging amongrival
 MULTIPLE
MODERNITIES91

interpretersof Islam. In a mannerthatrecalls battlesbetween Americanfunda-

mentalists and modernists earlier in this century, the Muslim world is being
shakentoday by competitionover "theinterpretationof symbols and controlof
the institutions,formalandinformal,thatproduceand sustainthem"(Eickelman
& Piscatori1996:5).A widely notedfeatureof this contesthas been whatEickel-
man andPiscatori(p. 38) call the objectificationof religiousknowledge(cfBour-
dieu 1989). In contrastto an age when Islamicknowledgewas the monopolyof a
small numberofjurists, Islamicknowledgeandpracticetoday are objects of in-
terestfor growingnumbersof people. ManyMuslimshave come to thinkof their
religion as somethingcomplete, self-contained,andobjective-a system (min-
haj) thatcan be distinguishedclearly from otherideologies andbelief systems.
This claim thatIslam is a complete social order(al-nizamal-islami) remainsa
contentious issue dividing liberal and conservative Muslims (Eickelman &
Piscatori 1996:159; Mitchell 1969:234-45; Moussalli 1995: 69-70, 87).
In a mannerthatrecalls Anderson's remarkson the influence of printcapi-
talism on Europeannationalism,EickelmanandPiscatorialso observe thatthis
process of objectification has been abetted by the expansion of mass higher
education,the emergence of vast marketsfor inexpensive "Islamicbooks" and
newspapers (Atiyeh 1995, Eickelman 1993, Gonzalez-Quijono 1994, Hefner
1997b), and the unsettled pace of urbanizationin much of the Muslim world.
Traditionalsocial structureshave collapsedat the same time thatreligiousschol-
ars have lost their monopoly of discursive power. Today populist preachers
(Antoun 1989, Gaffney 1994), neotraditionalistSufi masters (Launay 1992,
Mardin1989, Villalon 1995), and secularly educated"new Muslim intellectu-
als" (Meeker 1991, Roy 1993) vie with state-supportedscholars to define the
practiceand meanings of Islam. In some countries,the resultingfragmentation
of authority(Eickelman& Piscatori 1996:71) has pluralizedsocial power and
been a force for democratization(Hefner 1997a, Villalon 1995). Where the
contest of carriershas coincided with civil war, economic collapse, ethnic po-
larization,or severe state violence, however, the strugglehas often abettedthe
ascent of a "neofundamentalism"hostile to pluralism,women's emancipation,
and proponentsof an Islamic civil society (Fuller 1996, Roy 1993).
Fragmentationand objectificationare not the only influences, however, re-
shapingpublic religion in the moder Muslim world. The recent spreadof the
woman-centeredZar possession cult (Boddy 1989, Lewis 1986) in North Af-
rica and the Middle East indicates that there are subalternreligious experi-
ences within or alongside Islam. Boddy (1989:35) observes that the Zar has
gained ground "in virtual tandem with local Islamization"since it began its
geographic expansion in the nineteenth century. The continuing diffusion of
the cult shows that urbanizationand migrationhave opened avenues for new
religious forms, some of which present"analternativeview of the world in re-
sponse to an elite's implicit dominationof discourse"(p. 157). Unlike the hy-
92 HEFNER

brid cults Obeyesekere(1981) has exploredamong Sinhalese ecstatics, efforts

to amplify the Zarcult into a fully public ritualformprovoke seriouschallenge
from those who insist thattherecan be only one practiceof Islam. At one time,
the "eclectic religious practice" promoted by prominent Buddhists in Sri
Lanka(Spencer 1995:198) had its counterpartsin the Muslim world (see Eaton
1993: 71-81, Geertz 1960, Hefner 1987, Lambek 1993), but religious politics
in Muslim countriestoday often lead to heighteneddemandsfor a unitarypro-
fession of the faith. For ordinaryMuslims who have long believed that Islam
can coexist with other systems of knowledge (see Lambek 1993), these de-
mands for a unitaryIslam evoke deep ambivalence (Peletz 1997).
Even as homogenizing pressureshave grown, the Muslim world has wit-
nessed a counter-resurgenceof pluralized expressions of faith. In Indonesia,
Iran,Syria, and Turkey,among othernations, there is a growing interestin Is-
lamic poetry, art, and other personalized vehicles of divine wonder. Indeed,
some Muslims call openly for a civil Islam thatrenouncesstate-enforcedstan-
dardizationof the faith (Eickelman 1993, Hefner 1997a, Ibrahim1993, Mardin
1995, Mottahedeh1993, Norton 1995). This strugglebetween monolithic and
pluralisticinterpretationsof Islam has its counterpartsin Hinduismand Chris-
tianity. Developments in all three religions underscorethat the real "clash of
civilizations" in our era is not between the West and some homogeneous
"other"(cf Huntington1996) but between rival carriersof traditionwithin the
same nations and civilizations.

MODULARIZEDHINDUISM
Though Gellner implied that Islam is unique in its ability to respond to the
secularistjuggernaut,in recent years Hinduismhas undergonean equally vi-
brantpubic reformation,in a mannerthatreflects somewhat differentcultural
preoccupationsthan those of Christianityand Islam. Historically, Hinduism
lacked the centralizedecclesiastical structuresof Christianityand the legal tra-
ditions and scholastic authoritiesof Islam. Noting the absence of such stabiliz-
ing structures,some scholars have wondered whether it is right to speak of
Hinduismas a single religion at all (Hawley 1991). As van der Veer (1994:46)
has observed, however, Hinduism has long possessed "a not fully integrated
family of ideas and practices spreadby ascetics and priestly families over an
enormous region," and in premoder times it was already markedby "long-
term processes of centralizationand homogenization."Though the standardi-
zation of Hindu culture has reached new heights in this century, the process
builds on deep historic precedents.
An interestingparallelbetween van der Veer's revisionist characterization
of Hinduism and ideas on African society and religion is presented by
Kopytoff, Ranger,and Vail. Kopytoff (1987) has shown therewas an internal
 MODERNITIES93
MULTIPLE

frontieron the African subcontinent,across which there was vibrantcultural

flow. With Vail (1989), Ranger (1986, 1993) has demonstratedthat well be-
fore the coming of the Europeans,southernAfrica was crisscrossed by large
networks of trade and religious pilgrimage. Religious cults and symbols
moved rapidly and regularlyacross tribalborders.These insights take excep-
tion with the arguments of Horton (1971) and others (Ikenga-Metuh 1987,
Mbiti 1969) who characterizepremodernAfrican religion as localized and or-
ganic. This tendency to attributeclosure to premodernsocieties has been the
object of recentcriticismin generalanthropology(Barth1992, Hannerz1996).
In a similarfashion, Assayag (1995), Babb (1975), andvan der Veer (1988,
1994), among others, have demonstratedthatprecolonial Hinduismwas more
than a collection of isolated little traditions. Shrines and pilgrimage centers
were tied into a vast pilgrimagecircuitextendingacross the SouthAsian conti-
nent. Pilgrimage channels doubled as tradingnetworks (Cohn 1964, van der
Veer 1994:44). Ratherthan the "autarkicvillages" of colonial and nationalist
discourses,premodernIndiawas a networkedcivilization of economic and re-
ligious exchange.
Specialists of SoutheastAsian Hinduismknow that a similarly ecumenical
movement of people, goods, and ideas underlaythe diffusion of Hinduism to
SoutheastAsia more than 1600 years ago (Hall 1985, Robson 1981). In the less
ethnically and class-stratifiedsocieties of SoutheastAsia, caste was less cen-
tral to Hinduism's diffusion than it was in South Asia, while the role of kings
and monastic orderswas correspondinglylarger.As in South Asia, kings and
clerics often built devotional centers alongside preexisting indigenous cults
(Hefner 1985:25, Pigeaud 1963). This cosmological accommodationresem-
bles the relationshipbetween non-Christiancults and saintvenerationin Euro-
pean and Latin American Catholicism (Brown 1981, Christian 1989). Over
time, however, reform movements in EuropeanChristianitytended to attack
these pre-Christianinheritancesas heretical, especially where doctrinal dis-
putes coincided with cleavages of class, ethnicity, and gender (Schneider
1990; see also Brandes 1990, Merrill 1988). By contrast,in South and South-
east Asia, non-Hindu cults often continued to operate even after elements of
the local traditionwere drawnup into a Hindu superstructure.
Ritual and cosmological standardizationappearsto have been more com-
mon in South Asia than in SoutheastAsia, perhapsbecause SouthAsian status
groups experienced more pressures to conform to transregionalcaste ideals
(Babb 1975, van der Veer 1994:47). As Geertz(1980) andWiener (1995) have
emphasized, Hindu courts in Bali devoted considerable resources to ritual
pronouncementsof their own excellence, but popularBalinese Hinduism has
preservedstrong communitarianand egalitarianelements. Outside of specific
ritual contexts, commoner Balinese show much skill at subvertingthe status
pretensions of their high-caste counterparts(Warren 1993; see also Lansing
94 HEFNER

1991). Parish's (1996) pathbreakingethnographyof caste in Nepal shows that

there is an equally deep well of ambivalence toward hierarchy among
Newarese. But his study also suggests there are fewer resourcesthere than in
Bali with which to challenge caste depredations.
Certainlyin the South Asian case this revisionist portrayalof a premodern,
translocal Hinduism suggests that, pace Anderson and Gellner's modernist
models, there were rich historical precedents for modem Hindu nationalism.
However, the model does not imply thatthese precedentswere sufficient to en-
genderthatmovementon theirown. Indiannationalismsarenot simply deriva-
tive of the Westernoriginal (Chatterjee1986), but there is no questionthatco-
lonialism was centralto their formation.Throughtheir censuses and legal re-
forms,the Britishin Indiapolarizedthe distinctionbetween Muslim andHindu
(Cohn 1987, Dirks 1989, van der Veer 1994:20). Colonial policies also popu-
larizedthe idea of a Hindumajorityand Muslim minority,a notion thatnative
political elites laterexploited to theiradvantage.Westernorientalistsalso pro-
vided histories of a Hindu Golden Age and standardizedversions of religious
texts (van der Veer 1994:21), both of which were laterused by radicalHindu
nationaliststo portrayIndianMuslims as foreigners.
In the postcolonial era, this process of Hindu regenerationhas intensified,
as has its political impact. In a manner like that described by Gombrichand
Obeyesekerefor Sri LankanBuddhism(1988, but cfHolt 1991), a "Protestant"
reformationhas occurredin some streamsof IndianHinduism,thoughits impact
seems less pervasive than religious nationalismitself. Recent years have seen
campaigns to trim more extravagantflora in the Hindu ritual forest, instill a
sense of personalresponsibilityamong laity, andwhile decryingpost-Vedic ac-
cretions to Hinduism,modularizeritualand belief (Jaffrelot1996:201). Much
of the effort seems modeled on reformistversions of Islam and Christianity.
A more unusual element in recent Hindu reform has been its elevation of
tolerance as a distinctive feature of Hindu tradition.This interpretationalso
owes a good deal to Western orientalism,overlooking as it does the fact that
traditionaltolerance was premised on a notably illiberal inequalityof divini-
ties and traditions(van der Veer 1994:68). Hindus in modem Bali and Java
place a similar emphasis on the unity of all religions and the legacy of Hindu
tolerance.A vulnerableminorityin a Muslim-majoritynation,however, Indo-
nesia's reformistHindushave used the themesnot to promotereligious nation-
alism but to buttresstheir claims that they are the most faithful supportersof
government-imposedPancasilapluralism(Bakker 1993, Hefner 1985).
As with difference-denyingmovements among Muslims, some among In-
dia's Hindunationalistshave insisted on the need for a religious statebased on
the presumedauthenticcultureof the majority.Inevitablythis formulaimper-
ils nonconformistswithin the majorityreligion as well as membersof minority
religions. In this formula,religious nationalismtends to be internallyhomoge-
 MULTIPLEMODERNITIES 95

nizing as well as externallyantagonistic(van derVeer 1994:105).As with Islam,

however, the clash of rival Hinduisms is still in an early phase, and it is by no
means clear thatHindunationalistswill succeed in theirhomogenizingagenda.
As in the Muslim world, the drive to make the state an instrumentof religious
standardizationhas inspiredotherbelievers to look deep into their traditionin
search of sacralprecedentsfor pluralismand civility (Hefner 1998).

THE PROTESTANTETHICAND THE SPIRITOF

CONVERSION
These comparisonsof recent social change in Islam and Hinduism show that
translocalreligions confrontsimilarpredicaments,but theirresponse varies in
a way that illustratesthe natureof the resourceseach religion brings to the en-
counterwith modernity.This modest insight applies all the more forcefully to
the Protestantconversion occurringin vast portions of Asia, Africa, and most
notably, Latin America.
The social logic of this conversion varies. In one pattern, Protestantism
takes hold among long-marginalizedpopulationsseeking to maintainan iden-
tity apartfrom the dominantcultureeven while appropriatingthe symbols and
instrumentsof modernity.In this case, conversion reproducesthe binarylogic
of ethnic categories even as it transformstheir cultural content. Thus Karo
Batak outflanked their Malay Muslim neighbors in colonial Sumatra(Kipp
1993), Akha in northernThailandcompete with theirBuddhistThai neighbors
(Kammerer1990, cf Keyes 1993), and Nuer resist state-imposedIslamization
in the Sudan (Hutchinson 1996). Untouchableconversion to Christianity,Is-
lam, and Buddhism in India has shown a similar logic (Mujahid 1989),
whereby a subordinatepeople adopt the religion of a distant but high-status
outsiderto declare their independencefrom a closer but dominantneighbor.
The regions where Protestantconversion has been more extensive, how-
ever, are those where the organic linkage of religion and ethnicity has long
since slackened and the differentiatingdemands of the state, capitalism, and
migrationhave increased.The conversion of large numbersof South Koreans
to Christianityin the aftermathof Japanesecolonialism and civil war provides
one example of this process (Clark 1986, Wells 1990). But the contemporary
explosion of Pentecostalismin Asia, Africa, and LatinAmerica also recalls an
earlierhistory,thatof Methodismin nineteenth-centuryBritain.As Thompson
(1963) and Halevy (1927) both emphasized (though from different political
perspectives), Methodism flourished not in the prosperousEnglish heartland
but among the poor and downtroddenof Wales, Scotland,and Ulster. As Mar-
tin (1990) has argued,nineteenth-centuryMethodistslooked to theirnew faith
as a "free space" offering opportunitiesmore egalitarianthan those available
in mainstreamchurchand society. For Martin,the genius of both Methodism
96 HEFNER

and contemporaryPentecostalism is that, though challenging elite monopo-

lies, they do so without expressing that challenge in an explicitly political
form.Historiansof nineteenth-centuryBritain,like anthropologistsof contem-
poraryLatin America, often remarkon the apolitical or conservative bent of
these religious movements. But Martin insists that these popular Protes-
tantismsareconservativeonly in theirearlyphases, and for soundpolitical rea-
sons. They divertpolitical enthusiasminto safe channelsso as to keep theiran-
tiestablishmentchallenge "in religious storageto emerge over time when cir-
cumstancesarepropitiousto activatethem, or when things are safe enough for
people to make open political claims" (Martin 1990:44).
Perhapsno topic in the contemporaryanthropologyof Christianityhas been
as controversialas this question of the politics of Protestantconversion. Not
surprisingly,other studies highlight issues backgroundedin Martin'saccount.
In two importantworks, for example, David Stoll (1982, 1990) has exposed
the web of media, financial,and far-rightpolitical intereststying US evangeli-
cals to their well-heeled counterpartsin Latin America. Other studies have
noted similar linkages between evangelicals and ultra-rightpoliticians in Af-
rica and Asia (Brouweret al 1996, Nederveen Pieterse 1992).
At the level of the barrio, however, the politics of evangelical conversion
often takes unexpected forms. Like Martin,Stoll recognizes that Pentecostal
evangelicalism is organizationallyfissiparous, intensifying sectariantenden-
cies long latentin popularProtestantism.In LatinAmerica,this divisiveness is
exacerbatedby elements of African-Americanspiritualismthat drawthe Holy
Spiritinto the work of healing and social empowerment.For most new Pente-
costals, this work of the Spirit is of much more interest than the political
schemes of NorthAmericanconservatives.Moreover,the Spiritis hardto con-
tain. Even in the United States, evangelicals span a range of political view-
points, as their heated debates over capitalism in the Reagan years illustrated
(Gay 1991). For many Pentecostal women, the appeal of the Spirit lies not in
its directivesfor masculinistpolitics but in its sanctionsfor monogamy,frugal-
ity, and abstinence from alcohol. In other words, Pentecostalism provides
powerful ammunitionagainst machismo.
In their now classical study of Westernevangelism in southernAfrica, the
Comaroffs(1991) have offered a similarreminderon the need to attendto the
full life-course of effervescent Christianity.The colonial sponsors of nine-
teenth-centurymissions hoped Protestantismwould instill the laborand sexual
discipline needed for Africans' passage into colonial capitalism.Some natives
welcomed this WeberianProtestantismand the habits of literacy, cleanliness,
and modesty it promoted.But the church fathers' message was not so easily
containednor was it even consistentlyconveyed. As Ranger(1993) has shown
in Africa and Kipp (1990) in Sumatra,not all Protestantmissionaries have
been willing apostles of European modernity. Some were romantics who
 MULTIPLEMODERNITIES 97

hoped to use the mission to build peasantcommunitarianismall but destroyed

by capitalismand individualismin Europe.In the African case, a first genera-
tion of orthodoxy gave rise to a second generationof independentchurches,
African religious movements, and freelance specialists of fertility, curing, and
exorcism. A similarpatternhas been seen in otherpartsof the newly Christian
world, whenever control of the faith has slipped into the hands of people less
concernedwith canons than with bringingthe work of the Spiritinto their so-
cial and spiritualbodies (Barker 1990, Chestnut 1997).
Yet the tie of Christianityto Western modernity rarely slackens entirely.
The necktie, Coca-Cola, and calico dresses appear again and again, even
where, as in contemporarySumatra,Java,or Brazil (Kipp 1993, Hefner 1993b,
Chestnut 1997), the work of the faithful has long since slipped into native
hands. The forces at work in these instances are strongerthan missions and
evangelicals alone. They are evidence of the culturalhegemony of the United
States and WesternEuropein global capitalism,consumption,and communi-
cations. But this erstwhile ally of a WesternizedChristianitycan cut the other
way. Justas a blossoming consumerculturein nineteenth-centuryEnglandun-
leashed an individualistic romanticism hostile to Christianityand capitalist
discipline (Cambell 1987, Heelas 1996, Thompson 1993), today's marketsand
media offer self-idealizations that can undermineChristianideals.
Converts discover that their religion has ideals and disciplines other than
those they expected (Hefner 1993b, Pollock 1993). The work of the Spiritmay
be put to unlicensed ends, particularlywhere ratherthan rebuildinghierarchy,
it encouragesretreatto islands of personalpiety. Even among US evangelicals
notoriousfor theirfire-and-brimstonemoralism,the past generationhas seen a
shift away from communityfellowship andmoralismtowarda view of religion
as "a service agency for the fulfillment of its individualmembers"(Wuthnow
1988:55, cf Hunter 1987). Jesus as a nonjudgmentalbuddy has nudged God-
the-Patriarchal-Father.
Otherindices of this sea-change in AmericanProtestantismare the height-
ened incidence of denominationalswitching (Wuthnow1988:88) and religious
intermarriage.On this evidence, it seems thattraceelementsof the subjectivized
spiritualityassociated with nineteenth-centuryspiritualistsand today's apos-
tles of the New Age (Heelas 1996, Brown 1997) have seeped even into evan-
gelical wells. In NorthAmerica and elsewhere, the stabilizationof identityand
morality offered by proponentsof the Word often proves ephemeralindeed.

CONCLUSION: PUBLIC RELIGION IN A

POROUS WORLD

Contemporaryrefigurationsof Islam, Hinduism, and Christianityremind us

that,contraryto conventionalsecularizationtheories,religion in modem times
98 HEFNER

has not everywhere declined as a public force, nor been domiciled within a
sphereofinteriority.Not a reactionagainstbut a responseto the modem world,
the most successful religious refigurationsthriveby drawingthemselves down
into mass society and away from exclusive elites, if and when the latter lose
their hold on popularallegiances.
Having moved down-marketin this manner,some among the refiguredre-
ligions tap popular energies only to direct them toward a new leadership's
ends. Some replace plural economies of meaning with a homogeneous relig-
ious currency. But these standardizationsinevitably unleash contestive het-
erogenizations.Just as the United States saw a struggle for Protestanthearts
and minds in the nineteenthcentury,the broaderworld today witnesses fierce
contests over religion and its sustaininginstitutions.CorporatistIslamists vie
with civic pluralists; conservative nationalists vilify Hindu secularists; and
LatinAmericanPentecostalsflee to islands of piety only to discover they can-
not quite agree on what should be done there.
A key issue distinguishingrival camps within each traditionis theirattitude
towardpolitics andthe public sphere.Thougheach is unique,the religions dis-
cussed here sharea similarstructuralpredicamenton this point. Theirrefigura-
tion is taking place in a world of nation-states,mass urbanizations,economic
specialization, and as Appadurai(1996) and Hannerz (1996) have argued,
communicationsand migrationsthatrendersocial borderspermeableto trans-
cultural flows. In this situation, culturalorganizationsthat lay claim to ulti-
mate meanings (and, whetheror not all religions do this, these ones do) face a
dilemma:how to maintaina coherentworld-view and steadied social engage-
ment while acknowledgingthe pluralismof the modem world.
An organic and aggressive response to this predicamentis to strap on the
body armor, ready one's weapons, and launch a holy war for society as a
whole. In today's world of bureaucraticstates, this option requiresa seizure of
state and, fromthere, the imposition of an organicunity on an inorganicsocial
body. This option, a statist one, has its enthusiastsamong the three religions
consideredhere. However, this option comes at a high cost: It antagonizesre-
ligious minorities, frustratesnonconforming members of the faith, and de-
stroys the freedoms necessary for social pacificity and, at least for societies
higherup in the global division of labor,economic dynamism.Nonetheless, as
a mobilizing strategy,this option can have its appeal,and some self-promoting
elites may be willing to pay its awful price.
A second strategy renounces organic totalism for separatistsectarianism.
Like the Essenes of ancientIsraelunderRomanrule (Kee 1993), proponentsof
this option take comfort in the uncompromisedpurity of a small circle of be-
lievers. In a complex society ratherthan in a desolate desert retreat,however,
this pathbringswith it regularremindersof one's marginality.Fleeing the hor-
rors of anti-insurgencyviolence, some Pentecostals in Latin America in the
 MULTIPLEMODERNITIES 99

1970s were happy to embracethis option, offering as it did (they hoped) a safe
haven from a war that would not be won. But when social peace is restored,
and where commensualityis not blocked by otherwalls (such as race and eth-
nicity), not all believers will still be willing to hold themselves apartfrom a
people otherwise their own.
There is a third option for a refigured religion. Rather than conquest or
separation,it accepts the diversity of public voices and visions, acknowledg-
ing that, in some sense, this is the natureof modem things. What follows after
this varies widely, but the underlyingpluralistpremise remains. Some relig-
ious pluralists will promote a marketplacedenominationalism,whereby the
heartsand minds of others are fair game. Otherbelievers may accept denomi-
nationalismbut neutralizeits challenge by insisting thatthe essence of religion
lies away from the bustle of the religious marketin a wondrousworld within.
Still others, the civil democratsin Casanova's (1994) appealing synthesis of
piety and critical theory, will insist that religion's place in the public world is
more importantthan denominationalismalone. The alternativerole is not as a
religion of state but as a principledcivil voice, whose ethical critiquechecks
the hegemonic aspirationsof capital, state, and uncivil society.
These are ideal types; hybrids abound. As with the three traditions dis-
cussed in this review, the option elected by the religious mainstreamis deter-
mined not merely by the culturalresources specific to a religion but by the
struggle for influence among its rival carriers.The fate of modem religion, we
are remindedonce more, is never determinedby religion alone.
The predicamentof modem religions is not governedby a teleological mas-
ter plan; the macrocosm createdby contemporaryglobalizations is not one of
smooth Weberianaffinities; modernitywill not know an "end to history"any
time soon (Fukuyama1992). Though the reactions it inspires are heterogene-
ous, the predicamentof modernityis not entirelyculturallyrelative.The rise of
mass societies, with their unruly cities, vast migrations,and invasive markets
and media, renders local worlds unusually permeableto other culturalways.
Inasmuchas religious solidaritiesdepend upon a public's continuingidentifi-
cation with religious ideals, the easy juxtapositionof alternativerealities com-
plicates considerablythe task of keeping believers in line. We should not be
surprisedto see that, as with some players in the SalmanRushdie affair (Asad
1993c, Werbner 1996), religious elites often feel threatenedby this too-easy
promenade of contrarytruths and therefore devote substantialresources to
firmingup culturalwalls. They do so because those walls have become so po-
rous.
Different balances will be struckin the resulting contest of religious crea-
tions. Their solutions may vary, but all religions in our age confrontcommon
challenges; their message shows the transformativeimpact of similar struc-
turaldilemmas. To weatherthe onslaughtof alternativeways, religions cannot
100 HEFNER

merely invoke the canonical words of the prophets.Even as they profess their
unique and unchangingtruth,theiractions confess they have tastedthe forbid-
den fruit of a pervasive and porous pluralism.

Visit the Annual Reviews home page at

http://www.AnnualReviews.org.

Literature Cited
Anderson B. 1991. Imagined Communities. Barker J. 1990. Introduction: ethnographic
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of perspectives on Christianityin Oceanic so-
Nationalism. London:Verso. Revised ed. cieties. In Christianityin Oceania. Ethno-
Antoun RT. 1989. Muslim Preacher in the graphic Perspectives, ed. J Barker, pp.
Modern World:A Jordanian Case Studyin 1-24. Lanham,MD: Univ. Press Am. See
Comparative Perspective. Princeton, NJ: Clark 1986
PrincetonUniv. Press Barth F. 1992. Towards greaternaturalismin
Antoun RT, HeglandME, eds. 1987. Religious conceptualizing societies. See Kuper
Resurgence: Contemporary Cases in Is- 1992, pp. 17-33
lam, Christianity,and Judaism. Syracuse, BaumanZ. 1993. PostmodernEthics. Oxford:
NY: Syracuse Univ. Press Blackwell
AppaduraiA. 1996. Modernityat Large. Cul- BeckfordJA. 1989. Religion andAdvancedIn-
tural Dimensions of Globalization. Min- dustrial Society. London:Unwin Hyman
neapolis: Univ. Minn. Press Bellah R, MadsenR, Sullivan WM, Swidler A,
Asad T. 1993a. Genealogies of Religion: Dis- Tipton SM. 1985. Habits of the Heart: In-
cipline andReasons of Power in Christian- dividualismand Commitmentin American
ity and Islam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Life. New York: Harper& Row
Univ. Press Berger PL. 1967. The Sacred Canopy. Ele-
Asad T. 1993b. The limits of religious criti- ments of a Sociological Theory of Relig-
cism in the Middle East: notes on Islamic ion. New York: Doubleday
public argument. See Asad 1993a, pp. Boddy J. 1989. Wombs and Alien Spirits.
200-36 Women,Men, and the Zar Cult in Northern
Asad T. 1993c. Multiculturalismand British Sudan. Madison: Univ. Wis. Press
identity in the wake of the Rushdie affair. Bourdieu P. 1989. La noblesse d'etat. Paris:
See Asad 1993a, pp. 239-68 Edit. Minuit
Assayag J. 1995. Au Confluent de Deux Bowen JR. 1993. Muslims Through Dis-
Rivieres: Musulmans et Hindous dan le course. Religion and Ritual in Gayo Soci-
Sud de l'Inde. Paris: Presses de l'Ecole ety. Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniv. Press
Francaised'Extreme-Orient Brandes S. 1990. Conclusion: reflections on
Atiyeh GN. 1995. The book in the modem the study of religious orthodoxyand popu-
Arab world: the cases of Lebanon and lar faith in Europe. See Badone 1990, pp.
Egypt. In The Book in the Islamic World. 185-99
The WrittenWordand Communicationin Brouwer S, Gifford P, Rose SD. 1996. Export-
the Middle East, ed. GN Atiyeh, pp. ing the American Gospel. Global Chris-
232-53. Albany: State Univ. NY Press tian Fundamentalism. New York: Rout-
Babb LA. 1975. TheDivine Hierarchy. Popu- ledge
lar Hinduism in CentralIndia. New York: Brown MF. 1997. The Channeling Zone.
ColumbiaUniv. Press American Spirituality in an Anxious Age.
Badone E, ed. 1990. Religious Orthodoxyand Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniv. Press
Popular Faith in European Society. Brown P. 1981. The Cult of the Saints. Its Rise
Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniv. Press and Function in Latin Christianity. Chi-
Bakker FL. 1993. The Struggle of the Hindu cago: Univ. Chicago Press
Balinese Intellectuals. Developments in Bruce S. 1996. Religion in the Modern World.
Modern Hindu Thinking in Independent From Cathedralsto Cults. Oxford:Oxford
Indonesia. Amsterdam:VU Univ. Press Univ. Press
 MULTIPLE MODERNITIES 101

Cambell C. 1987. TheRomanticEthic and the Foucault M. 1996. What is critique? See
Spirit of Modern Consumerism. Oxford: Schmidt 1996, pp. 382-98
Blackwell FukuyamaF. 1992. TheEnd of History and the
Casanova J. 1994. Public Religions in the Last Man. New York: Avon
Modern World. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Fuller GE. 1996. Algeria: The Next Funda-
Press mentalist State? Santa Monica, CA:
Casanova J. 1998. Between nation and civil RAND
society: ethnolinguistic and religious plu- Gaffney PD. 1994. The Prophet's Pulpit: Is-
ralism in independentUkraine. See Hefner lamic Preaching in ContemporaryEgypt.
RW 1998. In press Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
Chatterjee P. 1986. Nationalist Thought and Gay CM. 1991. WithLiberty and Justice For
the Colonial World: A Derivative Dis- Whom? The Recent Evangelical Debate
course? London: Zed Over Capitalism.GrandRapids, MI: Eerd-
ChestnutRA. 1997. Born Again in Brazil: The mans
Pentecostal Boom and the Pathogens of Gay P. 1966. TheEnlightenment:An Interpre-
Poverty. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers tation. The Rise of Modern Paganism.
Univ. Press New York: Norton
Christian WA. 1989. Person and God in a Geertz C. 1960. The Religion of Java. New
Spanish Valley. Princeton, NJ: Princeton York: Free
Univ. Press. Revised ed. Geertz C. 1973. "Internalconversion" in con-
Clark DN. 1986. Christianity in Modern Ko- temporary Bali. In The Interpretation of
rea. Lanham,MD: Univ. Press Am. Cultures, ed. C Geertz, pp. 170-89. New
Cohn BS. 1964. The role of Gosains in the York: Basic Books
economy of the eighteenth- and nine- Geertz C. 1980. Negara: The Theatre-Statein
teenth-centuryUpper India. Indian Econ. Nineteenth-Century Bali. Princeton, NJ:
Soc. Hist. Rev. 1:175-82 PrincetonUniv. Press
Cohn BS. 1981. Anthropology and history in Gellner E. 1981. Flux and reflux in the faith of
the 1980s. J. Interdisc. Hist. 12:227-52 Men. In MuslimSociety, ed. E Gellner, pp.
Cohn BS. 1987. An AnthropologistAmong the 1-85. Cambridge:CambridgeUniv. Press
Historians and Other Essays. Delhi: Ox- Gellner E. 1992. Postmodernism,Reason and
ford Univ. Press Religion. London: Routledge
ComaroffJ. 1985. Body of Power, Spirit of Re- Giddens A. 1984. The Constitutionof Society.
sistance: The Culture and History of a Outline of the Theory of Structuration.
SouthAfricanPeople. Chicago:Univ. Chi- Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
cago Press Goldberg E. 1993. Private goods, public
Comaroff Jean, Comaroff John. 1991. Of wrongs, and civil society in some Medie-
Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, val Arab theory and practice. In Rules and
Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Rights in the Middle East. Democracy,
Africa. Vol. 1. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Law, and Society, ed E. Goldberg, R. Ka-
Press saba, JS Migdal, pp. 248-71. Seattle:
Cooper R. 1996. The Post-Modern State and Univ. Wash. Press
the WorldOrder. London: Demos GombrichR, Obeyesekere G. 1988. Buddhism
Dirks N. 1989. The invention of caste: civil so- Transformed. Religious Change in Sri
ciety in colonial India.Soc. Anal. 25:42-51 Lanka. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ.
Dobbelaere K. 1981. Secularization: A Multi- Press
Dimensional Concept. Beverly Hills, CA: Gonzalez-QuijonoY. 1994. Les Gens du livre:
Sage Champ intellectuel et edition dans I'E-
Eaton RM. 1993. The Rise of Islam and the gypte republicaine (1952-1993). PhD the-
Bengal Frontier: 1204-1760. Berkeley: sis. Paris: L'Inst. Etud. Pol.
Univ. Calif. Press HabermasJ. 1984. The Theoryof Communica-
Eickelman DF. 1979. The political economy tive Action. Vol. 1:Reason and the Ration-
of meaning. Am. Ethnol. 6:386-93 alization of Society. Transl. T McCarthy.
Eickelman DF. 1983. Changing interpreta- Boston: Beacon
tions of Islamic movements. In Islam and Habermas J. 1991. The Structural Transfor-
the Political Economyof Meaning, ed. WR mation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry
Roff, pp. 13-30. London: Croom Helm into a Category of Bourgeois Society.
Eickelman DF. 1993. Islamic liberalism Transl. T Burger. Cambridge, MA: MIT
strikes back. Middle East Stud. Assoc. Press
Bull. 27:163-68 HabermasJ. 1996. The unity of reason in the
EickelmanDF, PiscatoriJ. 1996. MuslimPoli- diversity of its voices. See Schmidt 1996,
tics. Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniv. Press pp. 399-425
102 HEFNER

Halevy E. 1927. A History of the English Peo- Horton R. 1971. African conversion. Africa
ple 1830-1841. London:Fisher Unwin 41:85-108
Hall KR. 1985. Maritime Tradeand State De- Hunter JD. 1987. Evangelicalism. The Com-
velopment in Early Southeast Asia. Hono- ing Generation. Chicago: Univ. Chicago
lulu: Univ. Hawaii Press Press
Hannerz U. 1992. The global ecumene as a Huntington SP. 1996. The Clash of Civiliza-
network of networks. See Kuper 1992, pp. tions and the Remaking of World Order.
34-56 New York: Simon & Schuster
HannerzU. 1996. Cultural Complexity.Stud- Hutchinson SE. 1996. Nuer Dilemmas. Cop-
ies in the Social Organizationof Meaning. ing with Money, War,and the State. Ber-
New York: Columbia Univ. Press keley: Univ. Calif. Press
Hawley W. 1991. Naming Hinduism. Wilson IbrahimSE. 1993. Civil society and prospects
Q. 15:3:20-34 for democratization in the Arab World.
Heelas P. 1996. TheNew Age Movement. The See Norton 1993, pp. 27-54
Celebration of the Self and the Sacraliza- Ikenga-MetuhE. 1987. The shatteredmicro-
tion of Modernity.Oxford: Blackwell cosm: a critical survey of explanations of
Hefner RW. 1985. Hindu Javanese: Tengger conversion in Africa. In Religion, Devel-
Tradition and Islam. Princeton, NJ: opment, and African Identity, ed. KH Pe-
PrincetonUniv. Press tersen, pp. 11-27. Uppsala, Sweden:
Hefner RW. 1987. The political economy of Scand. Inst. Afr. Stud.
Islamic conversion in modernEast Java.In Jaffrelot C. 1996. The Hindu Nationalist
Islam and the Political Economy of Mean- Movementin India. New York: Columbia
ing, ed. WR Roff, pp. 53-78. London: Univ. Press
Croom Helm James W. 1995. Introduction:Whatever hap-
Hefner RW, ed. 1993a. Conversion to Christi- pened to the Enlightenment?In The Pur-
anity: Historical and Anthropological suit of Certainty: Religious and Cultural
Perspectives on a Great Transformation. Formations, ed. W James, pp. 1-14. New
Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press York: Routledge
Hefner RW. 1993b. Worldbuilding and the ra- KammererCA. 1990. Customs and Christian
tionality of conversion. See Hefner 1993a, conversion among Akha Highlanders of
pp. 3-44 Burma and Thailand. Am. Ethnol. 17:
Hefner RW. 1995. Reimagined community: a 277-91
social history of Muslim education in KapfererB. 1988. Legends of People, Mythsof
Pasuruan, East Java. In Asian Visions of State. Violence, Intolerance, and Political
Authority:Religion and the ModernStates Culturein Sri LankaandA ustralia. Wash-
of East and Southeast Asia, ed. CF Keyes, ington, DC: Smithson. Inst. Press
L Kendall, H Hardacre,pp. 75-95. Hono- Kee HC. 1993. From the Jesus movement to-
lulu: Univ. Hawaii Press ward institutional church. See Hefner
HefnerRW. 1997a. Islamizationanddemocra- 1993a, pp. 47-63
tization in Indonesia. See Hefner & Hor- Keyes CF. 1987. Thailand.BuddhistKingdom
vatich 1997, pp. 75-127 as Modern Nation-State. Boulder, CO:
Hefner RW. 1997b. Print Islam: mass media Westview
and ideological rivalries among Indone- Keyes CF. 1993. Why the Thai are not Chris-
sian Muslims. Indonesia 64:77-103 tians: Buddhist and Christian conversion
Hefner RW, ed. 1998. Democratic Civility: in Thailand.See Hefner 1993a, pp. 259-83
The History and Cross-Cultural Possibil- Kipp RS. 1990. The Early Years of a Dutch
ity of a Modern Political Ideal. New Colonial Mission. The Karo Field. Ann
Brunswick, NJ: TransactionBooks Arbor:Univ. Mich. Press
Hefner RW, Horvatich P, eds. 1997. Islam in Kipp RS. 1993. Dissociated Identities. Ethnic-
an Era of Nation States. Politics and Re- ity, Religion, and Class in an Indonesian
ligious Renewal in MuslimSoutheastAsia. Society. Ann Arbor:Univ. Mich. Press
Honolulu: Univ. Hawaii Press Kopytoff I. 1987. The African Frontier. The
Hervieu-LegerD. 1990. Religion and moder- Reproduction of Traditional African So-
nity in the French context: for a new ap- cieties. Bloomington: IndianaUniv. Press
proach to secularization.Sociol. Anal. 51: Kuper A, ed. 1992. Conceptualizing Society.
S15-25 London:Routledge
Hobsbawm EJ. 1957. Methodism and the LambekM. 1993. Knowledge and Practice in
threatof revolution in Britain.Hist. Today Mayotte. Local Discourses of Islam, Sor-
7:115-24 cery, and Spirit Possession. Toronto:
Holt JC. 1991. Protestant Buddhism? Relig. Univ. Toronto Press
Stud. Rev. 17:312-27 Lansing JS. 1991. Priests and Programmers.
 MULTIPLE MODERNITIES 103

Technologies of Power in the Engineered MujahidAM. 1989. Conversion to Islam: Un-

Landscape of Bali. Princeton, NJ: Prince- touchables' Strategyfor Protest in India.
ton Univ. Press Chambersburg,PA: Anima
Launay R. 1992. Beyond the Stream: Islam Munson H Jr. 1993. Religion and Power in
and Society in a WestAfrican Town. Ber- Morocco. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press
keley: Univ. Calif. Press Nederveen Pieterse J, ed. 1992. Christianity
Lessa WA, Vogt EZ. 1979. Reader in Com- and Hegemony: Religion and Politics on
parative Religion: AnAnthropologicalAp- the Frontiers of Social Change. New
proach. New York:Harper& Row. 4th ed. York: Berg
Lewis IM. 1986. Religion in Context: Cults Norton AR. 1995. Civil Society in the Middle
and Charisma. Cambridge: Cambridge East. Leiden: Brill
Univ. Press Obeyesekere G. 1981. Medusa's Hair: An Es-
Luckmann T. 1967. Invisible Religion. New say on Personal Symbols and Religious
York: Macmillan Experience. Chicago:Univ. Chicago Press
LuhmannN. 1984. Religious Dogmatics and Ortner SB. 1984. Theory in anthropology
the Evolution of Societies. New York: since the sixties. Comp. Stud. Soc. Hist.
Mellen 26:126-66
LyotardJF. 1992. ThePostmodernExplained. Outram D. 1995. The Enlightenment. Cam-
Minneapolis: Univ. Minn. Press bridge: CambridgeUniv. Press
Mardin S. 1989. Religion and Social Change Parish SM. 1996. Hierarchy and Its Discon-
in Modern Turkey:The Case of Bediuzza- tents: Culture and the Politics of Con-
man Said Nursi. Albany: State Univ. NY sciousness in Caste Society. Philadelphia:
Press Univ. Penn. Press
Mardin S. 1995. Civil society and Islam. In Peletz MP. 1997. "Ordinary Muslims" and
Civil Society: Theory, History, Compari- Muslim resurgents in contemporary Ma-
son, ed. JA Hall, pp. 278-300. London: laysia: notes on an ambivalent relation-
Polity ship. See Hefner & Horvatich 1997, pp.
MarriottM, ed. 1955. Village India: Studies in 231-73
the Little Community.Chicago: Univ. Chi- Pigeaud TGT. 1963. Java in the 14th Century.
cago Press Five volumes. The Hague: Martinus
Marsden GM. 1980. Fundamentalism and Nijhoff
American Culture: The Shaping of Twen- Pollock DK. 1993. Conversion and "commu-
tieth-CenturyEvangelicalism, 1870-1925. nity" in Amazonia. See Hefner 1993a, pp.
Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press 165-97
MartinD. 1978. A General TheoryofSeculari- Queen CS. 1996. Introduction:the shapes and
zation. New York: Harper& Row sources of engaged Buddhism.In Engaged
Martin D. 1990. Tongues of Fire: The Explo- Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Move-
sion of Protestantism in Latin America. ments in Asia, ed. CS Queen, SB King, pp.
Oxford: Blackwell 1-44. Albany: State Univ. NY Press
Mbiti J. 1969. African Religions and Philoso- Radcliffe-Brown AR. 1952. Structure and
phy. London: Heinemann Educ. Function in Primitive Society. New York:
Meeker ME. 1991. The new Muslim intellec- Free Press
tuals in the Republic of Turkey.In Islam in Ranger T. 1986. Religious movements and
Modern Turkey:Religion, Politics andLit- politics in sub-SaharanAfrica. Afr. Stud.
erature in a Secular State, ed. R Tapper, Rev. 29:2:1-69
pp. 189-219. London: Tauris Ranger T. 1993. The local and the global in
Merrill WL. 1988. Raramuri Souls: Knowl- Southern African religious history. See
edge and Social Process in NorthernMex- Hefner 1993a, pp. 65-98
ico. Washington, DC: Smithson. Inst. Redfield R. 1956. The social organization of
Press tradition.In Peasant Society and Culture:
Mitchell RP. 1969. The Society of the Muslim An AnthropologicalApproach to Civiliza-
Brothers. New York: Oxford Univ. Press tion, pp. 67-104. Chicago: Univ. Chicago
MottahedehRP. 1993. Toward an Islamic the- Press
ology of toleration.In Islamic Law Reform Robson SO. 1981. Java at the crossroads.
and Human Rights: Challenges and Re- Bijdr. Taal-, Land-, Volkenk.137:259-92
joinders, ed. T Lindholm, K Vogt, pp. Roy 0. 1993. The Failure of Political Islam.
25-36. Copenhagen:Nordic Hum. Rights Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniv. Press
Moussalli AS. 1995. Modem Islamic funda- Schmidt J, ed. 1996. WhatIs Enlightenment?
mentalist discourses on civil society, plu- Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twen-
ralism and democracy. See Norton 1995, tieth-Century Questions. Berkeley: Univ.
pp. 79-119 Calif. Press
104 HEFNER

Schneider J. 1990. Spirits and the spirit of Managementof Religious Experience and
capitalism. See Badone 1990, pp. 24-54 Identityin a NorthIndian Pilgrimage Cen-
Singer M. 1972. Whena Great TraditionMod- tre. London:Athlone
ernizes. An Anthropological Approach to van der Veer P. 1994. Religious Nationalism.
Indian Civilization. New York: Praeger Hindus and Muslims in India. Berkeley:
Skinner Q. 1990. Machiavelli's Discorsi and Univ. Calif. Press
the pre-humanist origins of republican Villalon LA. 1995. Islamic Society and State
ideas. In Machiavelli and Republicanism, Power in Senegal: Disciples and Citizens
ed. G Bock, Q Skinner,M Viroli, pp. 121- in Fatick. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
41. Cambridge:CambridgeUniv. Press Univ. Press
Smith C. 1995. The spiritand democracy:base Vovelle M. 1978. Piete barroqueet dechristi-
communities,Protestantism,and democra- anisation en Provence au XVIII siecle.
tization in Latin America. In Religion and Paris: Seuil
Democracy in Latin America, ed. WH Walzer M. 1965. TheRevolutionof the Saints.
Swatos Jr,pp. 27-4. New Brunswick,NJ: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics.
TransactionBooks Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniv. Press
Spencer J. 1995. The politics of tolerance: Warren C. 1993. Adat and Dinas: Balinese
Buddhistsand Christians,truthand errorin Communities in the Indonesian State.
Sri Lanka. See James 1995, pp. 195-214 Kuala Lumpur:Oxford Univ. Press
Stocking GW Jr. 1989. RomanticMotives. Es- Weber M. 1958. TheProtestant Ethic and the
says on Anthropological Sensibility. His- Spirit of Capitalism.New York:Scribner's
tory of Anthropology, Vol. 6. Madison: Wells KM. 1990. New God,New Nation. Prot-
Univ. Wis. Press estants and Self-ReconstructionNational-
Stoll D. 1982. Fishers of Men or Founders of ism in Korea 1896-1937. Honolulu: Univ.
Empire? London:Zed Hawaii Press
Stoll D. 1990. Is Latin America TurningProt- WerbnerP. 1996. Allegories of sacred imper-
estant? The Politics of Evangelical fection: magic, hermeneutics and passion
Growth.Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press in The Satanic Verses. Curr. Anthropol.
Tambiah SJ. 1992. Buddhism Betrayed? Re- 37(Suppl.):S56-78
ligion, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka. Wiener MJ. 1995. Visible and Invisible
Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press Realms. Power, Magic, and Colonial Con-
Tambiah SJ. 1996. Leveling Crowds. Ethno- quest in Bali. Chicago: Univ. Chicago
nationalist Conflicts and Collective Vio- Press
lence in SouthAsia. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Wilson BR. 1966. Religion in Secular Society.
Press London: Watts
Thompson EP. 1963. The Making of the Eng- Wilson BR. 1985. Moralityin the evolution of
lish WorkingClass. New York: Vintage the moder social system. Br. J. Sociol.
Thompson EP. 1993. Witness Against the 36:315-32
Beast: WilliamBlake and the Moral Law. Wolf ER. 1958. The virgin of Guadalupe: a
New York: New Press Mexican national symbol. J. Am. Folkl.
Tibi B. 1990. Islam and the CulturalAccom- 71:34-39
modation of Social Change. Boulder, CO: Wolf ER, Hansen EC. 1972. The role of relig-
Westview ion. In The Human Condition in Latin
Tonnesson S, Antlov H, eds. 1996. Asian America, pp. 100-17. New York: Oxford
Forms of the Nation. Richmond, UK: Cur- Univ. Press
zon Worsley P. 1968. The TrumpetShall Sound:A
Tuck R. 1993. Philosophy and Government Study of "Cargo" Cults in Melanesia.
1572-1651. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge New York: Schocken
Univ. Press Wuthnow R. 1988. The Restructuring of
Vail L. 1989. The Creation of Tribalism in American Religion. Society and Faith
SouthernAfrica. London: Currey Since the Second World War. Princeton,
van der Veer P. 1988. Gods on Earth. The NJ: PrincetonUniv. Press