PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

VENANCIO ROXAS
G.R. No.119574

FACTS:
The facts of the case show that accused herein conspired to kidnap Agnes
Guirindola by pretending to be a traffic enforcement officer who flagged her car down
after an alleged traffic violation, boarded the same under the pretense of such
authority, and thereafter pointed a gun at her side, switch off the engine, and
commenced the abduction. The accused took control of the car and picked up the rest
of the conspirators.
Some time later, Guirindola lost consciousness because of the pills she was
being forced to take, and awakened to find her belongings and jewelries missing.
Thereafter, they tried to kill the latter, with treachery and evident premeditation, by
shooting her in the face with a hand gun which would have cause her death were it not
for the timely medical assistance given to Guirindola.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting appellant Gungon of the
crime of violation of R.A. No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act

HELD:
No. The Appellant contends that he should not have been convicted of violation
of Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act, because the
taking of the subject motor vehicle was perpetrated solely by Roxas, and at the time he
(Gungon) boarded the subject vehicle, Roxas had already acquired effective
possession of the subject vehicle. This argument would have been consequential had
there been no finding of conspiracy between appellant and Venancio Roxas.
In conspiracy, to once again stress it, the act of one conspirator is the act of the
other co-conspirators and, therefore, it is of no moment that an accused has not taken
part in the actual commission of every act constituting the crime, each of the
conspirators being held in the same degree of liability as the others. Thereafter, the
trial court correctly ruled in finding Gungon guilty despite the latter’s contention that it
was Roxas who committed the acts punished under R.A. No. 6539.

OQUINAZA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
The facts of the case show that on or about 12:45 o’clock in the afternoon of 16
January 2003, in Barangay Halang, Calamba City, the above-named accused, who is
the General Manager of Calamba Model Makers, with lewd design, grabbed the breast
of Edelyn Arida Ponce and kissed the latter while she was asleep in the development
room of Calamba Model Makers, Inc., an employee therein, thus absent her consent,
to her damage and prejudice. Subsequently,

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in not finding the Information for “acts of
lasciviousness” as null and void for the lack of preliminary investigation on the offense
charged in the information

HELD:
No. In the statement submitted by the Calamba City Police to the Office of the
Prosecutor, it is clear that Arida's statement contains all the allegations to support the
charge of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., (1)
the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness, (2) under any of the
following circumstances: (a) using force or intimidation, (b) the offended party is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) offended party is under 12 years of
age.
Petitioner had the opportunity to refute all the allegations made by Arida when
the Assistant City Prosecutor required him to submit his counter-affidavit. The conduct
of another preliminary investigation for the offense of acts of lasciviousness would be a
futile exercise because the complainant would only be presenting the same facts and
evidence which have already been studied by the prosecutor. The Court frowns upon
such superfluity which only serves to delay the prosecution and disposition of the
criminal complaint. Thus, the court a quo did not err in not finding the assailed
Information as null and void.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CANOY

FACTS:
The case herein centers around the crime of acts of lasciviousness
committed by a father to her daughter. The facts show that Hermenio Canoy
committed acts of lasciviousness upon her eldest daughter through inserting his
fingers in her vagina as she was sleeping; mounting her and placing her penis on
top of her vagina; touching her breasts; and lastly, in a manner which repeatedly
occured, by inserting his penis into her vagina, thus raping her.
After reporting the incident to her mother and family proved futile, the victim
eventually reported the incident to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development. Thereafter, the accused was charged with five Informations before
the Regional Trial Court and trial ensued wherein the accused questioned the
credibility and admissibility of the testimony of the victim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the guilt of the accused for the crimes charged had been proven
beyond reasonable doubt on account of the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of
the witness

HELD:
Yes. The contentions of appellant have no merit, for which reason his conviction
must be affirmed. It is a long-settled rule in criminal jurisprudence that when the issue is
one of credibility of witnesses, an appellate court will normally not disturb the factual
findings of the trial court in the absence of a clear showing that the court had failed to
appreciate facts and circumstances which if taken into account, would materially affect
the result of the case. The trial courts evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses is
accorded great respect because it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and
conduct of witnesses on the stand.
In the case herein, the court finds no satisfactory factual basis that would move them
to doubt the trustworthiness of the complainants recital as to abandon the findings of the
trial court. The supposed inconsistencies in the testimonies of the complainant cited by
the appellant refer to minor and peripheral details which do not go into the elements of
the crime. It is an oft-repeated rule in criminal cases that minor inconsistencies in the
statement of a witness do not affect his credibility. On the contrary, they strengthen rather
than weaken the witness credibility as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed
testimony.

PADER vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
On 20 April 1995, at about 8:00 in the evening, Atty. Benjamin C. Escolango was
conversing with his political leaders at the terrace of his house at Morong, Bataan when
petitioner appeared at the gate and shouted “Putang ina mo, Atty.
Escolango! Napakawalanghiya mo!” The latter was dumbfounded and embarrassed. At
that time, Atty. Escolango was a candidate for vice mayor of Morong, Bataan in the
elections of May 8, 1995.
On June 16, 1995 Atty. Escolango filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Bagac, Bataan
a complaint against petitioner for grave oral defamation, to which petitioner pleaded not
guilty.
After due trial, on October 30, 1997 the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Bagac, Bataan
rendered decision convicting petitioner of grave oral defamation. On appeal, the decision
of the MTC was affirmed in toto by the Regional Trial Court, and affirmed with
modifications by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of slight or serious oral defamation

HELD:
The court held that unquestionably, the words uttered by the accused were
defamatory, but amounts only to slight oral defamation. Somehow, the trial court failed
to appreciate the fact that the parties were also neighbors; that petitioner was drunk at
the time he uttered the defamatory words; and the fact that petitioners anger was
instigated by what Atty. Escolango did when petitioners father died. In which case, the
oral defamation was not of serious or insulting nature.
As ruled in Reyes vs. People, the expression “putang ina mo” is a common
enough utterance in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slender but rather
to express anger or displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an expletive that
punctuates one’s expression of profanity. The court does not find it seriously insulting
that after a previous incident involving his father, a drunk Rogelio Pader on seeing Atty.
Escolango would utter words expressing anger. Obviously, the intention was to show
his feelings of resentment and not necessarily to insult the latter. Being a candidate
running for vice mayor, occasional gestures and words of disapproval or dislike of his
person are not uncommon. Thus, the petition is denied.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENIPAYO

FACTS:
The facts of the case show that on 31 January 2002, respondent Alfredo L.
Benipayo, then Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), delivered a
speech in the Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and Responses in the Philippines
held at the Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines-Diliman Campus, Quezon
City. The speech was subsequently published in the February 4 and 5, 2002 issues of
the Manila Bulletin.
Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one referred to by the respondent
when he stated in his speech that “Even worse, the Commission came right up to the
brink of signing a 6.5 billion contract for a registration solution that could have been
bought for 350 million pesos, and an ID solution that isnt even a requirement for
voting. But reason intervened and no contract was signed. Now, they are at it again,
trying to hoodwink us into contract that is so grossly disadvantageous to the
government that it offends common sense to say that it would be worth the 6.5 billion-
peso price tag,” filed, through its authorized representative, an Affidavit-Complaint for
libel. Subsequently, respondent moved for the dismissal of the case rooting on the
claim that he cannot be tried as he was an incumbent impeachable officer, and that
assuming otherwise, the jurisdiction is with the Sandiganbayan.
Thereafter, while the RTC found that respondent was no longer an impeachable
officer because his appointment was not confirmed by Congress, it ruled that the case
had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction considering that the alleged libel was
committed by respondent in relation to his office he delivered the speech in his official
capacity as COMELEC Chair.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in ruling that the crime of libel in this case was
committed by accused in relation to his office

HELD:
The Court observes that the parties have argued at length in their pleadings on
the issue of whether the alleged criminal acts of respondent are committed in relation
to his office. They are of the conviction that the resolution of the said question will
ultimately determine which court, the RTC or the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over
the criminal cases filed.
The Court, however, notes that both parties are working on a wrong premise.
The foremost concern, which the parties, and even the trial court, failed to identify, is
whether, under our current laws, jurisdiction over libel cases, or written defamations to
be more specific, is shared by the RTC with the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, if the said
courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction to try the offense, it would be pointless to still
determine whether the crime is committed in relation to office.
Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without
qualification, it is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime
is committed in relation to office. Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial court that
the respondent committed the alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former
COMELEC chair, and deprives it of jurisdiction to try the case, is gross error. Thus, the
court orders the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407
and their remand to the respective Regional Trial Courts for further proceedings.
Having said that, the Court finds unnecessary any further discussion of the other
issues raised in the petitions.

LOPEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
The facts of the case show that on or about early part of November 2002 in
Cadez City, Philippines, the herein accused put up billboards/signboards at the fence
of Cadiz Hotel and at Gustilo Boulevard whereby it stated the name of the offended
party followed by a blank space and next to it follows the word “never.”
 Later on, the accused affixed the nickname of the herein private complainant,
Bading, and the name of the city of Sagay before the word “never,” thus making the
text to read as “ Cadiz Forever, Bading and Sagay Never”
Aggrieved, the offended parties sought the courts and trial ensued where the
accused was convicted by the RTC guilty of the crime of Libel. On appeal, the decision
of the RTC was affirmed by the Court of Appeals with modifications. Hence, the
petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting petitioner of the
charge of Libel, as defined and punished under Article 353 in relation to Article 355 of
the Revised Penal Code

HELD:
Yes. For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must
be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must
be identifiable. Absent one of these elements precludes the commission of the crime of libel.
Moreover, although all the elements must concur, the defamatory nature of the subject printed
phrase must be proved first because this is so vital in a prosecution for libel. Were the words
imputed not defamatory in character, a libel charge will not prosper. Malice is necessarily
rendered immaterial.
In the present case, the court is of the opinion that the assailed statement subject of libel
is a mere epithet or personal reaction of the masses on private respondent’s performance of
official duty and not purposely designed to malign and besmirch his reputation and dignity
more so to deprive him of public confidence.
Moreover, assuming that the statements made were indeed defamatory, Article 361 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that if the defamatory statement is made against a public
official with respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions, and the truth of the
allegations is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does not prove
that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends.
As the Court held in United States v. Bustos, the policy of a public official may be
attacked, rightly or wrongly with every argument which ability can find or ingenuity invent. The
public officer may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged
by the balm of a clear conscience. A public official must not be too thin-skinned with reference
to comments upon his official acts.
In this case, contrary to the conclusion of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court,
the prosecution failed to prove that the controversial phrase “CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND
SAGAY NEVER” imputes derogatory remarks on private respondents character, reputation
and integrity.
Thus, the assailed decision is reversed and the petitioner is acquitted of the crime
charged.

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