When and Why Incentives (Don't) Work To Modify Behavior: Uri Gneezy, Stephan Meier, and Pedro Rey-Biel

Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 25, Number 4—Fall 2011—Pages 191–210
When and Why Incentives (Don’t) Work

to Modify Behavior
Uri Gneezy, Stephan Meier, and Pedro Rey-Biel
E
conomists often emphasize that “incentives matter.” The basic “law of
behavior” is that higher incentives will lead to more effort and higher
performance. Employers, for example, often use extrinsic incentives to
motivate their employees. In recent years, the use of incentives in behavioral inter-
ventions has become more popular. Should students be provided with financial
incentives for increased school attendance, for reading, or for better grades? Will
financial incentives encourage higher contributions to public goods, like blood
donations? Should programs to reduce smoking or to encourage exercise include a
monetary incentive? These applications of incentives have provoked heated debate.
Proponents of using incentives in behavioral interventions argue, for example, that
monetary incentives can be helpful in getting people to study or exercise more.
Opponents believe that using incentives in those areas could backfire, because
extrinsic incentives may in some way crowd out intrinsic motivations that are impor-
tant to producing the desired behavior.
This paper proceeds by discussing some general aspects of how extrinsic
incentives may come into conflict with other motivations. For example, monetary
incentives from principals may change how tasks are perceived by agents. If incen-
tives are not large enough, this change in perception can lead to undesired effects
on behavior. In other cases, incentives might have the desired effects in the short
term, but they still weaken intrinsic motivations. Thus, once the incentives are
■ Uri Gneezy is Professor of Economics and Strategy, Rady School of Management,

University of California–San Diego, La Jolla, California. Stephan Meier is Associate
Professor, Columbia Business School, New York City, New York. Pedro Rey-Biel is Associate
Professor, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain. Their e-mail addresses are
〈[email protected]
[email protected]〉〉, 〈[email protected]
[email protected]〉〉, and 〈 [email protected]
[email protected]〉〉.
doi=10.1257/jep.25.4.191
192 Journal of Economic Perspectives
removed, people may pursue the desired outcome less eagerly. To put it in concrete
terms, an incentive for a child to read more might achieve that goal in the short
term, but then be counterproductive as an incentive for students to enjoy reading
and seek it out over their lifetimes. The following sections of the paper then discuss
the research literature on three important examples in which monetary incentives
have been used in a nonemployment context to foster the desired behavior: educa-
tion; increasing contributions to public goods; and helping people change their
lifestyles. The conclusion sums up some lessons on when extrinsic incentives are
more or less likely to alter such behaviors in the desired directions.
The Potential Crowding-Out Effect versus Extrinsic Incentives
Monetary incentives have two kinds of effects: the standard direct price effect,
which makes the incentivized behavior more attractive, and an indirect psychological
effect. In some cases, the psychological effect works in an opposite direction to the
price effect and can crowd out the incentivized behavior. Several papers in recent
years have shown that such crowding-out effects can be handled with fairly standard
economic modeling of principal–agent problems that use nonstandard assumptions.
In the model of Benabou and Tirole (2006), for example, individuals have a
utility function with three main components: they value extrinsic rewards, enjoy
doing an activity, and care about their image vis-à-vis themselves or others. The
image component depends on the value they or someone else attributes to their
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation as a function of their effort level and incentives.
This image motivation depends on how much individuals care for their reputation
and may be affected by how public such an image is. Individual preferences for the
enjoyment of tasks and for the image component of their utility may differ between
people and are assumed to be private information.
This type of model illustrates some principal channels through which incen-
tives can affect agents’ decisions about effort. One channel is information. In a
private-good context without image concerns and in which the principal is better
informed than the agent, the principal chooses a reward level based on several
factors, including how the principal views the difficulty or attractiveness of the task
to be performed and how the principal views the intrinsic motivation or ability of
the agent. For example, offering incentives for improved academic performance in
schools may signal that achieving a specific goal is difficult, that the task is not attrac-
tive, or that the agent is not well-suited for it (and thus needs the additional incentive
of a reward). Alternatively, offering incentives could signal that the principal does
not trust the agent’s intrinsic motivation. This signal will be “bad news” for the agent
and can lower the intrinsic motivation of the agent to undertake the task.
A second channel for crowding out appears when extrinsic incentives reduce
other motives for undertaking the task, for example, if a higher personal benefit
associated with a certain level of prosocial behavior affects the reputational value
attributed to a person’s intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. That is, decreasing the
Uri Gneezy, Stephan Meier, and Pedro Rey-Biel 193
signal about a person’s prosocial preferences and increasing the signal about a
person’s greediness may result in lower image motivation. In such cases, offering
higher material rewards may backfire if the effect on image motivation is stronger
than the standard price effect. This effect may depend on the extent to which these
signals are public.
These channels illustrate possible behavioral effects of incentives and create
implications for the design of incentives.
Crowding Out in the Short Run when Incentives Are in Place

The psychology literature contains many examples of incentives that reduce
effort or motivation to undertake a task during the short run when such incentives
are in place. Early attempts to understand what motivates people tended to focus
on two areas: 1) basic biological needs of survival and procreation, and 2) extrinsic
rewards or punishment. However, in the early 1970s, psychologists began exploring
the nature of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, particularly the assumption that
intrinsic motivation always pushes behavior in the same direction as extrinsic
motivation (see the survey of this literature in Deci, Koestner, and Ryan, 1999).
Economists’ interest in crowding out started around the same time as in psychology
due to Titmuss (1970), who argued that paying people to donate blood broke estab-
lished social norms about voluntary contribution and could result in a reduction of
the fraction of people who wish to donate.
A general theme of this work was that incentives contain information relayed
from the principal to the agent, and such information can provoke unexpected
effects on behavior. For example, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) show that in
offering members of a community a large monetary compensation for a nuclear
waste site’s presence, the principal signals that the risks involved are high, and thus
community members may be less willing to accept the plant. Agents will draw infer-
ences from both the existence and size of the offered incentives.
The definition of what constitutes “small” and “large” incentives depends on
the case, but the message seems to be clear: as Gneezy and Rustichini’s (2000a) title
suggests, “Pay enough—or don’t pay at all.” In one of their experiments, Gneezy and
Rustichini (2000a) present field evidence that high school students who collected
donations for a charity in a door-to-door fund-raising campaign invested more
effort when they were not compensated for it than when a small compensation
was offered to them. Once compensation for effort was offered, higher payment
resulted in higher effort. For most tasks, if incentives are large enough, their direct
price effect will be larger than the crowding-out effect in the short run—although
an interesting exception arises when incentives are so high that people may “choke
under pressure” (Ariely, Gneezy, Lowenstein, and Mazar, 2009). However, incentives
can backfire even in the short run in many situations.
Crowding Out after Incentives Are Removed

If incentives signal some form of “bad news,” agents who receive incentives
will update their beliefs about the task, their own type, or their assessment of
their principal. As a result, their motivation to perform the task without the
additional incentive can be reduced permanently. Because the standard incen-
tive effect is gone in the long run (we define the long run as after the incentives
are removed), effort will be lower than it was before extrinsic incentives were
offered. In educational settings, negative long-run effects on students’ joy of
learning might be troublesome, as incentive programs are often only temporary
and are restricted to certain tests or tasks. In providing incentives for contribu-
tion to public goods, negative long-run effects on (intrinsic) motivation could
also backfire. For example, Meier (2007a) shows in a field experiment that
although a matching incentive (a 25 or 50 percent match rate) increases dona-
tions in the short run, donations decrease below the pre-incentive period in the
long run. The net effect over time of providing the matching incentive is even
negative.
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) provide an example in which behavior is
not just a function of the current incentives, but may be affected by the incen-
tives offered in previous periods. In their experiment, a daycare began charging
late-coming parents a small fine of 10 New Israeli shekels (about $3 at the time).
This resulted in an increase in the number of late pick-ups even in the short
run, that is, while the incentives were present. One interpretation of this result
is information: the parents did not initially know how important it was to arrive
on time. The contract specified that they should pick their children up on time
but failed to specify the penalty if they did not. The distribution of the parents’
beliefs regarding how bad it was to be late may have included bad scenarios (for
example, “the teacher will make my child suffer”). Once a small fine was imposed,
the contract was complete in that being late was priced. The relatively small fine
signaled to parents that arriving late was not that important. This new piece of
information—that it was not so bad to be late—did not disappear once the fine was
removed. Indeed, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) found that even in the long run,
after the fine was removed, parents who had faced the fine were more likely to pick
up their children late than were those in the control group. Once the message has
been sent that being on time is not that important, it is hard to revert back to the
original level of arriving late.
Of course the crowding-out evidence discussed does not mean that using incen-
tives to obtain behavioral changes will always be counterproductive. Sometimes it is
enough that the incentives work in the short run. Even in the long run, sometimes
incentives will foster good habits. For example, incentive programs may provide
the initial motivation for a healthy lifestyle. Once individuals experience the posi-
tive aspects of a healthy lifestyle, perhaps their motivation will increase enough to
help them continue their improved habits even without the extrinsic motivation,
and thus incentives may kick-start the intended behavior. The following sections
use three examples to discuss the tension between positive and negative effects of
incentives. Whereas most empirical studies analyze whether incentives backfire, the
empirical and theoretical literature now offers a clearer picture as to when incen-
tives do and do not work.
When and Why Incentives (Don’t) Work to Modify Behavior 195
Incentives in Education
It may seem that designing incentive mechanisms to improve education

should be relatively straightforward. Students may invest too little effort in their
own education because they overly discount the future, have time-inconsistent
preferences, or underestimate the return on education. Extrinsic incentives can
then provide immediate returns that give an extra motivation to study. Similarly,
incentives can give parents and teachers additional reasons to put more effort into
educating children or simply making sure the kids get to school (Glewwe, Ilias, and
Kremer, 2010).
However, empirical results suggest that positive effects from these kinds of
incentives are far from certain. Opponents of extrinsic incentives emphasize that
financial incentives may crowd out other underlying reasons for educational deci-
sions. An extreme view is given by Kohn (1999), who refers to incentives provided
in education as “bribes.” Many educators believe paying students is morally wrong.
One way to rephrase this claim is to argue that one of the goals of schools is to
increase the importance of intrinsic motivation. We do not discuss this argument in
this paper.
A number of recent studies have evaluated extrinsic incentives using field
experiments in schools. Although it is still early to reach rock-solid conclusions
about whether and how incentives work in education, the evidence provides impor-
tant insights about when such incentives are more likely to work. The empirical
evidence from large-scale field experiments seems to show: 1) incentives work well
in increasing attendance and enrollment; 2) incentives have mixed results on effort
and achievements; and 3) incentives seem to work for some students but not for
others. When reviewing the evidence obtained from these field studies, keep in mind
that most incentive schemes in the field are already designed to mitigate possible
detrimental effects. In particular, most incentives are relatively large, with the goal
of ensuring the price effect is larger than a potential negative crowding-out effect.
Incentives for Attendance and Enrollment

An important cause of poor families’ underinvestment in education for children
is the high opportunity cost of sending kids to school. Transfers to such relatively
poor families, contingent on regular attendance at school, can offset such opportu-
nity costs. The program PROGRESA in Mexico is an example (Behrman, Sengupta,
and Todd, 2005; Schultz, 2004). The program paid on average $55 a month (over
one-fifth of the average family income) for families whose children attended school.
The evaluation of the first years of the program shows school entry at earlier ages, less
grade repetition, better grade progression, lower drop-out rates, and higher school
reentry among drop-outs. Particularly noteworthy are the reduction of drop-out rates
during the transition from primary to secondary school, and that grade progres-
sion occurred even with younger siblings who do not receive educational incentives
through the program. This last finding suggests a forward-looking behavior on the
part of the parents.
Two programs in Colombia, PACES and Familias en Acción, randomly assigned

vouchers covering half the cost of secondary school in exchange for adequate
academic progress (although the requisites were so low that “progress” essentially
meant school attendance). Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer (2006) and Angrist,
Bettinger, Bloom, King, and Kremer (2002) find that winners of the voucher were
about 10 percent more likely to finish the eighth grade and scored 0.2 standard
deviations higher on achievement tests. They also find evidence that subsidized
students worked less outside the school and were less likely to cohabit or marry
as teenagers. In another examination of these programs in Colombia, Barrera-
Osorio, Bertrand, Linden, and Perez-Calle (2008) compare the effects of subsidies
conditional on school attendance to those conditional on graduation. In both cases,
they find increases in attendance, pass rates, enrollment, graduation rates, and
matriculation to tertiary institutions. Most interestingly, they also find evidence that
subsidies can create peer effects among siblings not receiving the subsidy, but, at the
same time, some level of responsibility reallocation occurs within households since
siblings of children receiving the subsidy tend to work more and attend school less.
Overall, the evaluation of programs using incentives to reward enrollment
and school attendance in the short run is positive. These incentives combine
two characteristics that offset most of the worries of opponents of incentives in
education. First, the programs offer incentives for concrete tasks. Students either
attend school and receive the reward, or not. These programs do not involve a
complicated objective that students may not know how to achieve, and neither are
there difficulties in measuring and rewarding the achievement of the objective.
Second, incentives are offered to families and not to the children specifically, and
thus the incentives do not directly affect the motivation of those being educated.
Therefore, the possibility that children may substitute their desire to learn for their
desire to receive the reward is of less concern.
Incentives for Academic Achievement

Compared with the evidence on attendance and enrollment, the evidence
on incentives offered for academic performance is more mixed and depends on
the characteristics of the task being rewarded. Bettinger (2010) studies direct
incentives for higher grades in primary schools in Coshocton, Ohio, in which a
foundation sponsored a study so that students could receive as much as $100. The
randomization was such that all students in a given grade at a given school either
were eligible for the incentive, or not. His evidence shows that incentives offered
for higher grades increased math scores but not those of other subjects, such as
reading or social science. One possible interpretation of these results, compatible
with research in psychology, suggests that external incentives may be more effective
in concrete subjects, such as primary school math, than in more conceptual topics,
such as reading and social sciences (Rouse, 1998).
Fryer (2010) conducted randomized incentive experiments in public schools
in four urban school districts—Chicago, Dallas, New York City, and Washington,
D.C.—during the 2007–2008 and 2008–2009 school years. There was variation
in what educational inputs (like attendance or reading a book) or outputs (like

grades) were rewarded, and how often and how much students were paid. Overall,
the study distributed $6.3 million in incentive payments to roughly 38,000 students
in 261 schools. One finding was that incentives offered for educational outputs,
such as better grades, are less effective than incentives for educational inputs, such
as attendance, good behavior, or wearing uniforms. Again, one possible reason is
that students can control inputs directly but, even if they are motivated by rewards,
may not know how to turn their efforts into success. Overall, while the results point
in some interesting directions, they seem to show that the use of these kinds of
incentives in education is not (yet) cost effective.
Rodriguez-Planas (2010) analyzes the effects of the Quantum Opportunity
Program, whose objective was to increase the likelihood of adolescents completing
high school and enrolling in postsecondary school through a combination of
extrinsic rewards and mentoring. The program assigned students to mentors
who were paid for the enrollment of students in program activities. The require-
ments combined educational, cultural, and community service activities. Enrolled
students were paid $1.25 for every hour they spent on such activities, as well as a
matching amount if they earned a diploma and enrolled in college. The original
pilot version of this program was done in five U.S. locations and lasted for four
years. Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Italy have all run or are
running similar programs (Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos, 2006). Early evalua-
tion of these programs shows that incentives can be effective in improving some
measures of academic performance, but that they are most efficient when combined
with mentoring measures, perhaps because the mentoring helps to make the goals
more concrete.
In a field experiment, Levitt, List, and Sadoff (2010a, b) tested the effect of
performance-based incentives on educational achievement in a low-performing
school district in Chicago. They implemented a randomized field experiment
among high school freshmen that provided monthly financial incentives for
meeting an achievement standard based on multiple measures of performance
(no more than one unexcused absence in the month, no all-day suspensions in
the month, and letter grades of C or higher in all classes). Within the design, they
compared the effectiveness of varying the reward recipient (students or parents)
and the incentive structure (piece rate or lottery). In the piece rate treatments,
students who meet the monthly achievement standards qualified for a $50 reward.
In the lottery treatments, students who meet the monthly achievement standards
qualified for a lottery in which they had about a 10 percent probability of winning
$500. If a student met the achievement standards every month, that student (or
the parents of the student) received an expected value of $400 over the course of
the eight-month program.
Overall effects of the incentives were modest, with a significant effect for
students on the threshold of meeting the achievement standard. These students
continued to outperform their control-group peers in the long run after the incen-
tives ended in the students’ sophomore year. Levitt, List, and Sadoff (2010a, b)
suggest that incentives that induce sustained effort on multiple performance

measures can lead to gains in human capital that have lasting returns.
The results of these experiments are somewhat disappointing: given the rela-
tively small effect sizes it is not clear that these programs represent the best return
on investment. Yet these are pioneering attempts that did achieve some changes
in the investment in education. We see this as encouraging future research which
should concentrate on making the incentives more cost effective.
Variation across Subgroups in the Effects of Incentives

The Levitt, List, and Sadoff (2010a, b) study brings us to another important
parameter in the provision of incentives: variations in the effectiveness of the
incentives for different subgroups. Angrist and Lavy (2009) discuss a school-based
randomized experiment in Israel in which students received a step-by-step series of
rewards, which could total as much as $2,400, for completion of the bagrut—the the offi-
cial matriculation certificate and a prerequisite for post-secondary schooling—and
for performance on the bagrut exams. They find that the provision of incentives led
to a substantial increase in certification rates and in college attendance for girls, but
had no effect on boys. They argue that female matriculation rates increased partly
because girls who received the incentives devoted extra time to exam preparation.
Other studies have also shown such gender differences in the reaction to incentives
(Croson and Gneezy, 2009).
The effect of incentives also seems to depend on prior academic achievement.
Leuven, Osteerbeck, and van der Klauw (2010) found that providing incentives
to first-year economics and business students at the University of Amsterdam for
passing all first-year requirements within one year had a positive effect on the
academic performance of the most able, but a negative impact on the achievement
of low-ability students. Moreover, after three years, these effects had increased,
suggesting the presence of dynamic spillovers. The Bettinger (2010) study of incen-
tives for higher grades discussed above reports similar results, showing that math
scores improve only for students at the top of the distribution.
What Happens When the Incentives Are Removed?

Evaluating the long-run effects of incentives on education is a complicated
issue, and because many incentives programs in education are still quite recent,
we may still lack good data. Early studies, such as the Cornwell, Mustard, and
Sridhar (2006) study of merit-based scholarships for students entering colleges
and technical schools in Georgia, argue that merit scholarships may produce
higher grades but that when students can choose their academic curriculum, such
scholarships also lead to the selection of easier courses. This shifting of attention
from the desired outcome to the measurable outputs is not unique to the merit-
based scholarship programs and should receive attention when implementing
any intervention.
It does seem clear that the removal of incentives need not necessarily decrease
academic performance. For example, Jackson (2010) found that in a Texas program
in which students could receive incentives of $100–$500 for high scores on advanced
placement examinations in the 11th and 12th grade (and another component of the
program paid for teacher training and extra prep classes), the students who were
paid for passing advanced placement exams attended college in greater numbers,
had a higher college grade point average, and were more likely to remain in college
beyond their freshman year.
The current evidence on the effects of financial incentives in education
indicates moderate short-run positive effects on some subgroups of students, at
least while the incentives are in place. In some cases, these short-run effects are
important. For example, if keeping kids in school and off the streets is important,
or if the goal is to teach a particular skill (learning to read), short-run success
may be enough. We need more studies to better understand who should be incen-
tivized in the education system—students, parents, teachers, schools?—and what
tasks should be rewarded, with particular attention paid to the distinction between
concrete and abstract tasks. The extent to which crowding out after incentives are
removed should be a concern in the area of education still requires further and
more systematic research.
Incentives for Prosocial Behavior
Prosocial behavior includes voluntary contributions to public goods, such as

donating blood, volunteering, or protecting the environment. Although a standard
selfish individual would not contribute to a public good, even nonstandard, proso-
cial preferences (such as altruism or reciprocity) are often not enough to reach a
socially optimal level of contributions (for example, Meier, 2007b). Can incentives
foster people’s willingness to make such contributions? Going back to the work
of Titmuss (1970) on the issue of whether explicit incentives should be used to
encourage blood donations, some economists argue that (monetary) incentives do
not necessarily increase contributions to public goods but, in fact, may crowd out
such donations.
The Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) study discussed above shows that offering
a small monetary incentive to children who voluntarily collect money for a charity
actually lowers their efforts. But often incentives do not backfire (even if they do not
increase compliance by much), as in the case of pricing garbage collection by the
bag as a way to encourage recycling and reduced waste (Kinnaman, 2006). Hence,
we believe that the discussion should not be whether incentives negatively affect
contributions to public goods, but when incentives do and do not work.
Incentives Can Break Social Norms of Trust

Prosocial behavior often involves trust. In principal–agent relationships,
agents put in higher than the enforceable levels of effort if principals are trusting
(Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2007). Trust relationships are delicate, however, and
explicit incentives can signal distrust.
A number of laboratory experiments show the effect of incentives on trust

relationships. Fehr and List (2004) carry out a variant of the “trust game” with both
chief executive officers and students in Costa Rica. In the original game (Berg,
Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995), player 1 chooses how much out of an endowment to
send to player 2. This amount is multiplied by the experimenter by a factor larger
than 1, and given to player 2 who is then asked to decide how much to give back
to player 1. If players are selfish, player 1 would expect no back transfer, and thus
would transfer nothing in the first step. But a trusting player will send some money
to the other player, trusting that the original transfer will be rewarded. In the Fehr
and List (2004) modification, player 1 can impose a fine on player 2 if that player
does not return a high enough amount. In the experiment, this fine crowds out
the voluntary contributions. It appears that individuals can perceive incentives as
either hostile or kind; when perceived negatively, incentives can potentially have
detrimental effects on behavior.
In a different kind of gift-exchange experiment, Fehr and Gächter (2002)
designed a multistage game in which 1) buyers make a contract offer, which consists
of a fixed price and a desired quality; 2) sellers decide whether to accept the offer;
and then 3) sellers choose a quality level and deliver. In this third stage, sellers
sometimes can choose the quality without constraint and thus have the ability
to underperform their contract. In other cases, buyers have some probability of
detecting and fining sellers who underperform on quality. Adding this possibility
of detection and fining causes fewer cooperative offers to be accepted and
completed. Gächter, Kessler, and Koenigstein (2010) extend the framework to show
that even if a short-run crowding-out effect does not occur, voluntary cooperation
in the long run is lower than in a pure trust relationship.
Although people may not view certain incentives as a sign of distrust, they
often see explicit control or monitoring in this way. Falk and Kosfeld (2006) use a
game in which a player decides how much money from an endowment to pass to
another player. Because passing part of the endowment is costly, no self-interested
party should pass anything. They find that if the receiving player enforces a minimal
level of transfer, which can be very low, the initial player’s willingness to cooperate
decreases. Again, many agents experience control as a signal of distrust and react
negatively to it.
Thus, the effectiveness of using incentives to encourage contributions to public
goods, like volunteering, depends on whether those incentives affect the trust rela-
tionship between the parties involved.
Incentives Frame Social Interactions and Affect Social Norms

The framing of the decision situation critically influences prosocial behavior.
For example, whether a prisoner’s dilemma game is labeled as a “Wall Street Game”
or a “Community Game” can change behavior substantially (Liberman, Samuels,
and Ross, 2004). Moving from no incentive to a positive incentive can dramatically
change the framing of the interaction and shift an individual’s decision frame from
social to monetary. In their daycare study, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) argue
that a possible explanation of the behavior change in the long run is a change in
the social norm. Heyman and Ariely (2004) look at whether individuals frame a
situation as social or as monetary. In questionnaire evidence about whether students
would help with a move, they find that monetary incentives often diminish the
perception of the interaction as social and thus reduce the amount of help received.
In an experiment that involved students dragging a computerized ball to different
parts of a screen, they find that those paid in candy do better than those paid in
cash, presumably because candy is a social reward rather than a monetary one. The
differences between a social and a monetary reward may also change individuals’
beliefs about the behavior of others: for example, people may believe incentives are
in place because the social norm is that people do not contribute.
Bohnet, Frey, and Huck (2001) investigate experimentally whether agents
are less likely to breach a contract when enforcement probability is low (0.1),
medium (0.5), or high (0.9). Consistent with the argument that incentives change
the framing of the situation, a medium enforcement probability, relative to a low
probability, increases contract breaches after the increased enforcement prob-
abilities are removed. As shown in other contexts, the high incentive does not
produce the same detrimental effect. In an experiment described in Fuster and
Meier (2010), adding incentives seems to change norms: in a game involving
contributions to a public good, introducing private incentives (in this case, a
centrally provided small monetary prize for every contribution) changes the social
norm of contributions, making free-riding more acceptable. As a result, norm
enforcement in the form of peer punishment of free-riding is reduced, which can
reduce overall contribution rates.
Depending on their nature, incentives can shift a situation from a social to a
monetary frame. Consider a thought experiment: You meet an attractive person,
and in due time you tell that person, “I like you very much and would like to have
sex with you.” Alternatively, consider the same situation, but now you say, “I like you
very much and would like to have sex with you, and,, to sweeten the deal, I’m also
willing to pay you $20!” Only a certain kind of economist would expect your partner
to be happier in the second scenario. However, offering $20 worth of (uncondi-
tional) flowers might indeed make the desired partner happier.
Incentives Reduce Image Motivation

Image concerns are another important motivation for contributing to public
goods: people volunteer, recycle, donate blood, or behave prosocially to show
others that they are “nice.” Extrinsic rewards can crowd out image motivation by
diluting the signal to oneself or others of a voluntary contribution: it becomes
unclear whether a person is undertaking a social activity to “do good” or to “do
well.”
Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009) use an experiment in which individuals
can make donations to charitable organizations but those donations can be made
either publicly or privately, and incentivized or not. They find that if individuals
decide to behave prosocially in private, incentives work well. However, in cases in
which the desire to behave prosocially is due to image motivation, being paid in
public crowds out prosocial behavior. These findings indicate that monetary incen-
tives for prosocial behavior work better when contributions to the public goods are
not as visible (perhaps like investments in an energy-saving or pollution-reducing
water boiler) than when they are visible and presumably done partly due to image
concerns (like buying a hybrid car). It also implies that incentives for voluntary
contributions should be provided privately rather than publicly, to reduce the
effect on image motivation.
Incentives for blood donations, as mentioned above, provide another illustra-
tion of the importance of context. Although recent evidence is mixed, it seems to
show that noncash material incentives do not have detrimental effects on blood
supply. Goette and Stutzer (2010) and Lacetera, Macis, and Slonim (forthcoming)
show in large-scale field experiments in collaboration with the Red Cross that lottery
tickets, gift cards, or noncash incentives such as T-shirts have neutral or positive
effects on the number of donors, particularly on infrequent donors. This finding
indicates that incentives can be close substitutes for money and not negatively affect
donations in the short run.
Due to moral objections to performing blood donation experiments involving
cash, few field studies have tested monetary incentives in this area, with the excep-
tion of Mellström and Johannesson (2008). In one condition using subjects in
Sweden, they offered $7 for donating blood; in another condition, they offered $7
with the option to donate the money to charity. Interestingly, they find evidence
of a detrimental effect on blood donations of the payment without the charity
option. However, the drop in blood supply is only statistically significant for women,
decreasing from 52 to 30 percent when only cash incentives are offered. Consis-
tent with the finding that incentives interact with individuals’ image motivation,
blood supply goes back to “normal” in their study when the monetary incentive is
combined with an option to donate to charity.
Incentives and Lifestyle Habits
We focus on two current prominent health issues in this section: exercising and
smoking. We chose these two examples because they involve enormous costs, and
because they represent the two “faces” of habit formation: good and bad habits.
The classic model of habit formation in economics defines habitual behavior as
displaying a positive relation between past and current consumption (Becker and
Murphy, 1988). According to this approach, habits may be harmful or beneficial
to the extent that they decrease or increase future utility. In the model, marginal
utility today is correlated with historical consumption; changes today may have
only a small effect in the short run but increasingly large effects in the long run.
If exercising is habitual behavior, providing incentives to go to the gym for a while
may increase future utility from exercising. Similarly, giving people high enough
incentives to not smoke in the short run could influence long-run consumption
by changing the habit.1 Similar predictions come from the behaviorist view in
psychology known as “operant conditioning” (Skinner, 1972), which argues that
rewards and punishment can influence voluntary behavioral adaptations and, in
particular, that extrinsic incentives can change habitual behavior. The alternative
hypothesis, based on the crowding-out literature, suggests that paying people for an
activity may help in the short run but reduce their intrinsic motivation to perform
the task in the long run, once the incentives are removed.
Cigarette Smoking: A Bad Habit

Smoking and smoking-related illnesses account for billions in direct health-
care costs, with an additional economic cost in lost productivity or wages—along
with the physical costs of illness and reduced life expectancy. Researchers have
tried different methods to motivate quitting: individual and group counseling,
pharmacological interventions, inpatient and outpatient treatments, support
groups, workplace interventions, and family therapies. Many of these efforts use
punishment or rewards (Donatelle, Hudson, Dobie, Goodall, Hunsberger, and
Oswald, 2004).
Some of the incentives regarding smoking cessation would already seem to be
in place. Most people are aware that, in the words of the warning on packs of ciga-
rettes, “smoking can be hazardous to your health.” Indeed, 70 percent of smokers
report wanting to quit smoking, but only 2.5 percent to 3 percent succeed each year
(Volpp et al., 2006). Incentives are already in place for many of the behaviors we try
to change, but cigarettes offer an even stronger case. While many times, the incen-
tives are in the future (weight loss, exercising, the medical aspects of not smoking),
some people spend a large portion of their immediate income on cigarettes. In
some places in the United States the cost of a pack of cigarettes is over $10—which
is higher than the minimum hourly wage. If you work for minimum wage and smoke
a pack a day, you are consuming over 10 percent of your income now.. It is hard to
top such strong incentives with standard approaches. This is why we believe that
behavioral approaches that offer some kind of change in the mental accounts are
the right way to go (Thaler, 1999; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).
The two main difficulties for people to stop smoking may be impulsiveness,
meaning the inability to delay gratification and the inability to withhold a response
(Loewenstein, 1987; Laibson, 1997), and drug-induced euphoria, that is, subjec-
tive or mood states that correspond to feelings of well-being that are commonly
associated with behavioral preferences for drugs (de Wit and Phan, 2009). To help
those who wish to quit overcome these obstacles, it is possible to use either a direct
payment for a successful reduction in smoking, or a payment for participation in a
cessation program.
1
A different view is presented in Bernheim and Rangel (2004). In their model, drug use among addicts
may be a mistake triggered by environmental cues, which addicts may then try to avoid. According to this
model, smoking and other substance addictions are qualitatively different from other “negative habits.”
There is a considerable public health literature on incentives for smoking

cessation. Many of these programs involve a relatively small number of regular
smokers—perhaps a few dozen—who self-select into a program in an academic,
healthcare, or workplace setting. Especially in the earlier studies, the smokers often
self-reported their level of smoking, rather than using objective biological markers
(like the level of carbon monoxide in the bloodstream). In a survey of this litera-
ture, Donatelle, Hudson, Dobie, Goodall, Hunsberger, and Oswald (2004, p. S167)
conclude that the smoking-cessation literature has not fully explored the effect of
incentives in terms of magnitude, frequency, and the effect of bonuses and resets,
and that more research must be done. In particular, “these studies suggest that
extrinsic motivation can enhance short-term cessation and reduction, particularly if
the magnitude and frequency of rewards are sufficient. The durability or long-term
maintenance of these effects is unknown.”
Our sense of this literature is that studies that do measure long-term effects
often find disappointing results. For an example of a longer-term study done
after the Donatelle et al. (2004) review of the literature, participants in Volpp
et al. (2006) were smokers at the Philadelphia Veterans Affairs Medical Center
who were randomized into incentive and non-incentive treatments. The study
combined incentives to participate in a five-class smoking-cessation program with
incentives for smoking cessation. The incentive group was offered $20 for each
class attended and $100 if they quit smoking for 30 days post-program completion.
As expected, the incentivized participants were more likely to complete the classes
(26 versus 12 percent) and to quit in the short run (16 versus 5 percent). However,
after six months, quit rates between the treatments were not significantly different
(6 versus 5 percent).
Of course, sometimes short-run success can be important in itself. For example,
it may be useful to pay pregnant women not to smoke, even if after pregnancy most
of them relapse (Donatelle, Prows, Champeau, and Hudson, 2000). In other cases,
extending the incentives could extend the short-run benefits over six months or
a year. For example, in the Volpp et al. (2009) study, participants received incen-
tives ($100) to participate in a smoking-cessation program. The incentivized group
also received $250 for cessation of smoking within six months of study enrollment,
and $400 for abstinence for an additional six months after the initial cessation (as
confirmed by biochemical tests). Incentivized participants were significantly more
likely to have stopped smoking for 9 or 12 months after enrollment (15 versus
5 percent) and 15 or 18 months after enrollment (9 versus 4 percent). Thus,
“stretching the short run” could help in keeping people away from the bad habit;
yet the long-term success rate in this study was only 9 percent.
In recent years, economists have been testing behavioral commitment devices
(Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin, 2006). Gine, Karlan, and Zinman (2010) created a
voluntary commitment product to help smokers quit smoking (for a theoretical
discussion, see Gruber and Koszegi, 2001). They offered smokers savings accounts
into which the smokers deposited funds for six months: if the participants quit
smoking by the end of this period, their money was returned; otherwise, their
money went to charity. The authors found that 11 percent of smokers were willing
to use this commitment device; of that group, those who were randomly assigned
to this treatment were 3 percent more likely to pass the six-month test than the
control group, and this difference carried on six months later. But although these
commitment devices show some success for those who choose them, the majority of
people in these studies and in life do not choose to use such commitment devices,
and from those participants who did choose to use them, the majority failed to quit
smoking. Many open questions in this area await future research.
Exercising and Diet: Good Habits

The benefits of physical exercise and a good diet are associated with better
health in many respects, such as reducing obesity and heart-related sicknesses.
Many people want to exercise more, but fail to do so. Can we construct incentives
schemes that will convince people to exercise more? DellaVigna and Malmendier
(2006) offer a vivid example of people’s inconsistency in their choices about exer-
cise. They show that many people choose to pay a flat monthly fee for membership
in a gym and then end up paying more than if they had chosen to pay a fixed cost
per visit. One interpretation of this result is that people choose to pay more in
advance as a self-control mechanism because doing so reduces the marginal cost
of attending to zero, and people believe that this reduction in marginal cost will
encourage them to attend the gym in the future.
To test the effect of incentives on exercise habits, Charness and Gneezy
(2009) conducted two field experiments in which university students were offered
incentives to attend the university’s gym. In the first study, one group received no
incentives, whereas two other groups were promised $25 to attend the gym at least
once during the next week (and all students received literature on the benefits of
exercise). Upon their return to the laboratory, students in one of the latter two
groups were promised an additional $100 (paid upon completion) to attend the
gym eight more times during the next four weeks. The authors were able to observe
attendance before, during, and after the intervention. A second study added some
variations of these treatments and included measurement of biometric parameters
such as weight and blood-pressure. The main result of these experiments is that
requiring people to visit the gym at least eight times, in order to be paid, significantly
improved attendance rates during and, more importantly, after the intervention.
The improvement in gym attendance was entirely driven by the change for those
people who had not previously been regular attendees.
Acland and Levy (2010) replicated the results of the Charness and Gneezy
(2009) gym experiments. They also found that people overestimated the chance
that they will exercise. However, observing behavior over a longer period, they
found a substantial decay after students went on a winter break. Babcock and
Hartman (2010) focus on the social effects of exercise incentives. They randomly
incentivized students to go to the gym. Prior to the experiment, they elicited a
detailed friendship network from the participants, all of whom lived in the same
residence hall. They then looked at how variation in the numbers of treated and
untreated peers to which the participant was exposed influenced the effectiveness
of the incentives. Replicating the results of Charness and Gneezy (2009), they also
found that participants who had been incentivized to exercise increased their gym
usage more if they had more friends who had been incentivized, and less if they had
more friends in the control group. This finding shows the importance of the social
network in enhancing the effect of incentives for habit change—a topic with an
increasing current interest.
In the case of exercise, establishing a habit by requiring multiple and frequent
visits seems necessary—especially for those who have little or no previous habit of
exercising. A self-commitment device, or even just a decision that would impel us to
go to the gym for a month before evaluating the cost and benefit of exercising, may
result in a different assessment of the net value of the activity.
Conclusion
When explicit incentives seek to change behavior in areas like education, contri-
butions to public goods, and forming habits, a potential conflict arises between
the direct extrinsic effect of the incentives and how these incentives can crowd
out intrinsic motivations in the short run and the long run. In education, such
incentives seem to have moderate success when the incentives are well-specified
and well-targeted (“read these books” rather than “read books”), although the jury
is still out regarding the long-term success of these incentive programs. In encour-
aging contributions to public goods, one must be very careful when designing the
incentives to prevent adverse changes in social norms, image concerns, or trust. In
the emerging literature on the use of incentives for lifestyle changes, large enough
incentives clearly work in the short run and even in the middle run, but in the
longer run the desired change in habits can again disappear.
Incentives to modify behavior can in some cases be cost effective. The medical
and health economics literature intensely investigates whether, and when, preven-
tion is cheaper than treatment (for example, Russell, 1986). The question is
economic rather than moral: certain prevention activities can cost more than they
save, as seems to be the case with mammograms for young women. Medical inter-
ventions can be very costly. In some cases, relatively cheap and potentially more
cost-effective incentives might be applied to achieve the same goal. For example,
cholesterol-reducing drugs can cost hundreds of dollars a month; simple exercising
could, in some borderline cases, replace these drugs. Unlike the side effects of the
drugs, the side effects of exercising are positive.
Our message is that when economists discuss incentives, they should broaden
their focus. A considerable and growing body of evidence suggests that the effects
of incentives depend on how they are designed, the form in which they are given
(especially monetary or nonmonetary), how they interact with intrinsic motivations
and social motivations, and what happens after they are withdrawn. Incentives do
matter, but in various and sometimes unexpected ways.
■ We thank David Autor, Chad Jones, John List, Timothy Taylor, and Richard Thaler for
excellent comments. Pedro Rey-Biel acknowledges financial support from Ministerio de
Educación (ECO2009-07616), Barcelona GSE Research Network, and the Government
of Catalonia.
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When and Why Incentives (Don't) Work To Modify Behavior: Uri Gneezy, Stephan Meier, and Pedro Rey-Biel

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Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 25, Number 4—Fall 2011—Pages 191–210

When and Why Incentives (Don’t) Work

Uri Gneezy, Stephan Meier, and Pedro Rey-Biel

■ Uri Gneezy is Professor of Economics and Strategy, Rady School of Management,

The Potential Crowding-Out Effect versus Extrinsic Incentives

Crowding Out in the Short Run when Incentives Are in Place

Crowding Out after Incentives Are Removed

It may seem that designing incentive mechanisms to improve education

Incentives for Attendance and Enrollment

Two programs in Colombia, PACES and Familias en Acción, randomly assigned

Incentives for Academic Achievement

in what educational inputs (like attendance or reading a book) or outputs (like

suggest that incentives that induce sustained effort on multiple performance

Variation across Subgroups in the Effects of Incentives

What Happens When the Incentives Are Removed?

Incentives for Prosocial Behavior

Prosocial behavior includes voluntary contributions to public goods, such as

Incentives Can Break Social Norms of Trust

A number of laboratory experiments show the effect of incentives on trust

Incentives Frame Social Interactions and Affect Social Norms

Incentives Reduce Image Motivation

Incentives and Lifestyle Habits

Cigarette Smoking: A Bad Habit

There is a considerable public health literature on incentives for smoking

Exercising and Diet: Good Habits

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