Bosnia and Herzegovina and The Politics PDF

THE
ROLE OF
IDENTITY
IN
POLITICS
AND
POLICY
MAKING
EDITORS :
FADHILA INAS PRATIWI
MOHD AFANDI SALLEH
MU’AMMAR ALIF Z.R. RAGA
IQBAL B. ALFIANSYAH
NANDA P. PUTRI
The Role of Identity In Politics
and Policy Making
Editors :
• Fadhila Inas Pratiwi
• Mohd Afandi Salleh
• Mu’ammar Alif Zarkasi Sukma Raga
• Iqbal Bagus Alfiansyah
• Nanda Pradina Putri
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Oktober 2019
ISBN : 978-602-417-224-4
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Preface
Preface
The book titled “The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy-
Making” consist of paper from the 5th Indonesia-Malaysia Students’
Conference held in Faculty of Social and Political Sciences,
Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya, Indonesia on 23rd of March 2019.
Today the notion of identity cannot be separated into world politics
along with its influencing on policy-making. This book consists
of three chapters: (1) Identity and nationhood; (2) Identity and
election; (3) Identity and economic. These three chapter exploring
the role of identity on nation-building process, then the second
chapter focusing on how identity relates or influencing the pattern
of election and the last is about how identity could contribute on the
economic aspects.
The conference is organised annually and taking place in Indonesia

and Malaysia as integrating part of conference between Faculty of
Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Airlangga and Faculty of
Law and International Relations, Universiti Sultan Zainal Abidin.
There were 40 papers presented in the conference, 25 papers
from Indonesia and 15 from Malaysia. However, only twenty
selected students papers were chosen to be published in this book
that divided into three chapters. There also one editor’s paper
contribution Fadhila Inas Pratiwi in one of the section to provide
another profound study case. We also add our notably speakers,
Dr. Phil Rokhmawati Susanto paper into this book chapter.
The first section elaborating on identity and nationhood. There

are nine articles which discuss themes such as state policymaking
and ideological allusion to identity discourse. The first four articles
describe identity and its correlation to state policymaking. First
article is “Identity Construction and Partial Citizenship: The Case
of Papua’s Special Autonomy Law” by Heidira Witri Hadayani,
Sonya Teresa Debora, and Tantri Fricilla Ginting. The three
discuses the relationship between identity construction and its
implication for competing identities between Indonesia and West
Papua. Next paper is “Global Maritime Fulcrum: A Manifestation
of Indonesia’s Strategic Culture” by Maula Hudaya. The emergence
of Global Maritime Fulcrum policy in Indonesia marked a shift
The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making | iii

Preface
in the traditional Indonesian strategic culture, especially since

previous administrations have rarely touched upon the subject.
Based from the purported reason of adapting towards the change
in geopolitical and geo-economic center of gravity from West to
Asia, Maula offers the analysis of the policy to reveal the linkage of
origin between Indonesian government’s strategic preferences in
maritime sector and the resulting behaviour. Then there is “2015
Melanesian Festival as a Form of Indonesian Public Diplomacy in
Asia- Pacific” by Bambang Dwi Waluyo. Through the paper tries to
discern how Melanesian Festival affected the issue of West Papuan
independence, especially through the implementation of public
diplomacy methods in influencing Indonesia’s position over the
issue in their relation towards Pacific Melanesian countries. Next
paper titled “Education of Women and Citizenship in Indonesia from
State Ibuism Perspective” by Annalisa Manzo, Gita Ardi Lestari,
and Puspita Atirennu tries to understand how state paradigm of
hierarchy and patriarchy is established against the activism for
women’s education.
After previous four articles, next five articles discussed how ideology
alludes to the discourse of identity, especially collectively. First,
we have Miftahul Choir’s “Indonesia’s Islamic Populism Influence
on Indonesia’s Stance to ASEAN”. He explained how Islamic
populist movement on Indonesia changed Indonesia’s regional
player identity from liberalist to realist in regards to ASEAN.
Second is the “Globalization: A Challenge to Indonesia’s Policy
Making” by Amaranila Nariswari, Andy Fernanda Probotrianto,
and Lucia Tamara Maharani. The three explored how globalization
contributed towards the proliferation and establishment of
globalized international society based on foreign norms and values.
The next three are “Islamic Iran Revolution as Persian-Shia Rising”,
“Identity and Ketuanan Melayu in Malaysia: Effects of Globalization
and Challenges to the Ketuanan Melayu”, and “ICERD: Challenge
of Malaysia Nationhood”. The first article articulated how Islamic
Revolution in Iran was a national-wide identity process stemming
from the popular disbelief of Iranian people against the secular
leadership of Iran’s Shah Reza Pahlevi, culminating in the
overthrowing of the Persian monarch and the establishment of
Islamic Republic of Iran. The second article elaborated on how
iv | The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making

Preface
globalization affected the popular “Ketuanan Melayu” identity

discourse that is prevalent since independence in Malaysia.
Specifically, it sheds light on the apparent contradictions between
Western ideals fostered by globalizations and the current Malaysian
current pluralistic society. The third speaks about the ratification of
“International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination” in Malaysia resulted in a public demonstration from
Malay-Islam community trying to reject it. This shows a nature of
confusion and contestation regarding how ICERD is posited against
the narrative structure of Malaysian Federal Constitution, especially
regarding the discourse of what constitutes as Malaysian identity.
The second section of the book is focused on identity and election.

There are seven articles discussing how identity may shape the
process and even outcomes of political elections, leaving deep
impacts on the present configuration and perhaps even the future
prospects of a nation’s elections. The first is “Ukrainian National
Identities in Influencing Ukraine Domestic Political Conflict” by
Fadhila Inas Pratiwi, in which explaining how the differences of
presumed national identities and lacking one single unifying idea
sets Ukraine to be a state with segregation and contestation of
identity. The split between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian citizens
among internal geographical lines has contributed to the inevitability
of political conflict during 2014 elections. Demas Nauvarian and
Lintang Bening’s “Bosnia and Hezergovina and The Politics of
Identity: Rebuilding the Ruin of Post-Cold War ‘Democracy’” is the
second article in the section, discussing Bosnia and Hezergovina as
one of the most complex democracies in the world. This is due to
the high complicity of identity in Bosnian politics stemming from
Cold War intricacies and multi-ethnic presence, with the paper
suggesting it to be a relic of Cold War and in need of a reform. Then
we have “Commemorate 2019 Indonesian Presidential Election:
Political Clout in Identity, Millennials, and Propaganda” by Witri D.
Insani. Insani elaborated how Indonesian 2019 elections resulted
in Indonesian having two ideological enclaves based from the
presidential candidates of Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto. Both
candidates attempted to create a cult of personality that eventually
forms the basis of their supporters.
The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making | v

Preface
The fourth article by Alfian Razkia Ardafi titled “Your Voice Matters:
Understanding the Importance of Identity in the General Election”.
Here, Alfian outlined how election process of candidates is determined
not only through their vision and mission, but also on how their
identities are projected towards their would-be voters. Similar to
the third, the fifth article by Jordan Aria Adibrata and Naufal Fikhri
Khairi titled “The Identity Politics and Political Order in Indonesia”
exemplifies on how Indonesian political order is currently shaped
during the recent 2019 presidential elections. Identity politics play
a pivotal role in the establishment of vocal contestations and the
instability of national political order in Indonesia. The last two
papers of “United Malay National Organization: Identity of Malay-
Dominant Party” by Muhammad Nadziruddin bin Embi, Natasya
Afriena binti Syeif Azizirrahim & Muhammad Nur Aiman bin Mohd
Lazim as well as “From 1Malaysia to Malaysia Baru: A New National
Identity Building Concept” by Muhammad Aiman bin Roszaimi
discussed identity and elections in the Malaysian context. The
former paper brings out the analysis over the history and identity
formulation of the Malay-Dominant party of United Malay National
Organization. It outlines how the party-being the prominent
political representative of Malay demography in Malaysia-loses the
2018 elections and how such event brings about further discussion
on the struggle between Malay-Islam identity and the realities of
Malay ethnic position on post-election Malaysia. The latter article
exemplified the shift Malaysian national identity building concept
from 1Malaysia towards Malaysia Baru. This is due to the 1Malaysia
concept being a product of the previous administration that is
predominantly Islamic in its political affiliations
The third section of the book brings about the issue of identity and
economy. It pertains the revolving necessity between the two and how
both influences each other in terms of establishing a solid identity
of the citizenry as well as providing enough modicum of welfare
through means of developmental policy by their governments. First,
we have Siti Rokhmawati Susanto paper talking about how the local
identity could robust the economic growth in Indonesia. The paper
title is “Local Double-Blessing in the era of Globalization: Promoting
local identity and Economic Growth through Cultural Festival in
Indonesia”. The next paper is from Zakia Shafira Mashudi and Yudo
vi | The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making

Preface
Rahmadiyansyah with title “Economic Development as an Attempt

for Eradicating Papua’s Separatism Movement in Post-Soeharto Era”.
Here, Zakia and Yudo outlined how Papua’s Separatism Movement
is fuelled by the need of Papuans to be recognized as equals to fellow
Indonesian. Indonesian government’s attempt to quell such unrest
by trying to focus on economic development is seen to be not enough
in the paper, and exemplifies the need of concrete character-building
attempts. Next, the paper “Developing Inside Projected Outside:
Case Study of Indonesia’s Dreamed Identity as Global Maritime
Fulcrum” by Akbar Renaldy articulated how Indonesia’s Global
Maritime Fulcrum policy is a projected identity in the making. It
shows that even with the ongoing betterment of maritime sector in
Indonesia is not enough of a process in realizing GMF as Indonesia’s
dreamed identity, and that government must work harder to achieve
such realization. “Westernization and Globalization: The Influence
of Western Identity in Indonesian Economic Development” by
Rara Shertina serves as the third paper of this section. Rara argued
that both Globalization and Westernization of Indonesia brought
about better economic development through engagement in policy
supporting liberalism and capitalism. This, in turn, shaped and
formulated a ‘Westernized’ identity of Indonesian locales that while
is criticized by nationalist, is nevertheless currently the defining
identity of Indonesian economic policy.
Finally, the last two articles are “Malaysia National Automotive

Policy (NAP) & Malaysia National Identity” by Alya Nadhiah
Binti Khairul Annuar & Nurfarah Nabila Binti Rosland as well as
“Identity and Economic Development During Tun Dr. Mahathir
Mohamad Administration (1981-2003)” by Nor Atiqah Binti Mohd
Isa & Nurpatiha Binti Mohamad Shatiri. Alya and Nurfarah’s paper
outlined how Malaysian National Automotive Policy and the creation
of Malaysian national car is a synthesis between national economic
development and national identity creation, especially from the
interplay of dynamics and challenges such policy faces against its
history and current economic climate for Malaysians. Lastly, Nor
and Nurpatiha’s paper elaborated how Mahathir Mohamad’s 1981-
2003 administration economic policy is primarily keyed on the
need to develop Malay ethnicity’s welfare, and then posited it as the
defining identity of Malaysian economy during said period.
The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making | vii

Preface
Finally, this book could not have been successfully carried out to
completion without the efforts of a number of people. Thank you
to our colleague, M. Muttaqien, Ph.D as the Head of Department of
International Relations for providing all the necessary support for
the conference and also for this book. Thank you to Citra Hennida,
MA. for the insightful advice and suggestion for the conference
activities and for this book arrangement. Thank you as well for Dr.
Phil Siti Rokhmawati Susanto for becoming one of the speaker in
the conference and contributing a well-written paper into this book
chapter. The last but not least for our other colleague that cannot
be mentioned here from Department of International Relations
UniversitasAirlangga for constructive support. Thank you as well
for the students from University Sultan Zainal Abidin, Trengganu,
Malaysia for the active participation in the conferences; then our
utmost gratitude for Dr. Suyatno Ladiqi to make this cooperation
running well. We would also like to thank all those students who
presented their papers as well as those who have provided invaluable
administrative assistance during the conference. Last, we would like
to express our special gratitude to the contributors of this book for
providing fresh and wide-range of ideas within the paper.
Editors
Fadhila Inas Pratiwi, Mohd Afandi bin Salleh, Mu’ammar Alif

Zarkasi Sukma Raga, Iqbal Bagus Alfiansyah, Nanda Pradina Putri
viii | The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making

Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Part 1: Identity and Nationhood
Identity Construction and Partial Citizenship: The Case
of Papua’s Special Autonomy Law (Heidira Witri Hadayani,
Sonya Teresa Debora, Tantri Fricilla Ginting) .........................1
Global Maritime Fulcrum: A Manifestation of

Indonesia’s Strategic Culture (Maula Hudaya) 12
.........................
2015 Melanesian Festival as a Form of Indonesian

Public Diplomacy in Asia- Pacific (Bambang Dwi Waluyo) ..27
Education of Women and Citizenship in Indonesia from
State Ibuism Perspective (Annalisa Manzo, Gita Ardi Lestari,
and Puspita Atirennu) ............................................................................................................35
Indonesia’s Islamic Populism Influence on Indonesia’s
Stance to ASEAN (Miftahul Choir) .....................................................................42
Globalization: A Challenge to Indonesia’s Policy Making
(Amaranila Nariswari, Andy Fernanda Probotrianto, and Lucia
Tamara Maharani) ...............................................................................................................53
Islamic Iran Revolution as Persian-Shia Rising (Alifian

MN Pradana & Marion Radityatama) .................................................................61
Identity and Ketuanan Melayu in Malaysia: Effects of

Globalization and Challenges to the Ketuanan Melayu
(Aizatul Anis binti Zuhari & Suyatno Ladiqi) ..................................................71
ICERD: Challenge of Malaysia Nationhood (Ahmad Adam
Sollehin bin Abdul Rahman & Nur Hazirah binti Ibrahim) ..............83
Part 2: Identity and Election

Ukrainian National Identities in Influencing Ukraine
Domestic Political Conflict in 2014 (Fadhila Inas Pratiwi) ..92
Bosnia and Herzegovina and The Politics of Identity:
Rebuilding the Ruin of Post-Cold War ‘Democracy’
(Demas Nauvarian & Lintang Bening) ...................................................................102
The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making | ix

Table of Contents
Commemorate 2019 Indonesian Presidential Election:

Political Clout in Identity, Millennials, and Propaganda
(Witri D. Insani) ......................................................................................................................................121
Your Voice Matters: Understanding the Importance of
Identity in the General Election (Alfian Razkia Ardafi) .................133
The Identity Politics and Political Order in Indonesia
(Jordan Aria Adibrata & Naufal Fikhri Khairi) ......................................................141
United Malay National Organization: Identity of Malay-
Dominant Party (Muhammad Nadziruddin bin Embi, Natasya
Afriena binti Syeif Azizirrahim and Muhammad Nur Aiman bin
Mohd Lazim) ......................................................................................................................................... 152
From 1Malaysia To Malaysia Baru: A New National
Identity Building Concept (Muhammad Aiman Bin
Roszaimi) ......................................................................................................................................... 159
Part 3: Identity and Economy

Local Double-Blessing in the era of Globalization:
Promoting local identity and Economic Growth through
Cultural Festival in Indonesia (Siti Rokhmawati Susanto) .........168
Economic Development as an Attempt for Eradicating
Papua’s Separatism Movement in Post-Soeharto Era
(Yudo Rahmadiyansyah & Zakia Shafira) ...................................................................177
Developing Inside Projected Outside: Case Study of
Indonesia’s Dreamed Identity as Global Maritime
Fulcrum (Akbar Renaldy) .......................................................................................................186
Westernization and Globalization: The Influence of
Western Identity in Indonesia Economic Development
(Rara Shertina) ....................................................................................................................................195
Malaysia National Automotive Policy (NAP) & Malaysia
National Identity (Alya Nadhiah Binti Khairul Annuar &
Nurfarah Nabila Binti Rosland) ............................................................................................205
Identity and Economic Development During Tun Dr.
Mahathir Mohamad Administration (1981-2003) (Nor
Atiqah Binti Mohd Isa & Nurpatiha Binti Mohamad Shatiri) ..............214
x | The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making

Part 1
Identity and Nationhood

Part 1 Identity and Nationhood
Identity Construction and Partial Citizenship: The Case of Papua’s Special Autonomy Law
Heidira Witri Hadayani, Sonya Teresa Debora, Tantri Fricilla Ginting
Identity Construction and Partial

Citizenship: The Case of Papua’s Special
Autonomy Law
Heidira Witri Hadayani, Sonya Teresa Debora,

Tantri Fricilla Ginting
Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta
Abstract

The issue of West Papua is often seen in a narrow, deterministic
way: it is either a struggle for independence or a matter of territorial
integrity. This paper seeks to problematize the case of West Papua
as a contention of citizenship between the competing identities of
Indonesia and West Papua. Recognizing that the problem of West
Papuan inequality has a colonial root, this article then provides an
analytical reasoning of how this Papuan subordination was further
perpetuated by post-independence Indonesia through a violent
process of identity-constructing, dubbed as ‘Indonesianization’ that
resulted in an incomplete citizenship status of West Papuan. This
incompleteness then leads to a more imminent problems such as
policy-making marginalization, lack of welfare, and the burgeoning
disillusionment towards the current centralized government. To
analyze and correlate the matters of citizenship and identity, this
paper relies on several theoretical frameworks, most notably those
by Stokke (2017) and Fraser (2000). Finally, by deconstructing
the polemic of political participation, this paper offers the choice
between affirmative and transformative approach as a solution to
this polemic.
Keywords: West Papua, Indonesianization, identity construction,

citizenship, Special Autonomy Law
Introduction
West Papua constitutes a thorn in the flesh of Indonesian politics
ever since its transfer of authority from United Nations Temporary
The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making | 1

Executive Authority (UNTEA). Indonesian administration is under

scrutiny for accusations of human rights violations including
arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings, elections sabotage, and police
and military brutality (Cochrane, 2018). There is also an underlying
issue of economic inequality experienced by the people in Papua,
with one indicator being its doubled poverty rates compared to the
national average (UNDP, n.d.). The multitude of issues regarding
Papua is further highlighted by the existence of ‘secessionist’
movements aiming at independence, politically mobilizing the
distinct Papuan identity as a basis of self-determination. However,
it is important to note that dissenting opinion also exists among
West Papuans, from those who believe that West Papua has been
irrevocably a part of Indonesian struggle for independence and is
included under the greater identity of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika.
For Indonesia, Free West Papua Movement is a secessionism. For

West Papua, Indonesia is an occupying force. Looking at the issue
of West Papua through a deterministic perspective is especially
problematic, because this view disregards the construction of
identity as a fluid, politically contested concept. While identity
is often understood either as an ethnocultural collectiveness--
nationhood--or a membership of a political entity -- citizenship, the
modern meaning of citizenship and nationality have been merged
during the past two centuries (Heater, 1999). This paper will use
the latter in explaining the contemporary West Papuan political
struggle, and in this case, it is useful to understand citizenship as
a multidimensional concept made up of legal status, membership,
rights, and participation—in which ‘full citizen’ fulfills all four
(Stokke, 2017). This paper aims to understand how the discourses
of West Papuan identity came to be, and then seeks to find the link
between that constructed identity and the politics of citizenship that
includes policymaking exercised by the people of West Papua.
This paper argues that the understanding of West Papua as part of

a universal Indonesian identity is a result of politically constructed
process by Indonesian administration, violently pursued in order to
create national stability. This one-sided project then defines West
Papuans’ citizenship to be manifested in political avenues, including
participation. To provide contextual comprehensiveness, this paper
2 | The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making

applies this hypothesis to the case of Papua’s Special Autonomy

Law (SAL). By deconstructing the common understanding of
citizenship and bridging the gap between ‘self-determination versus
territorial integrity’ debate, afterwards, it will then try to map
possible alleviations to this issue. In this writing, the term ‘Papuan’
and ‘West-Papuan’ will be used interchangeably, in reference to the
people living in the Western Papua province.
‘Indonesianization’ versus Papuan Struggle for

Citizenship
West Papuans’ struggle for citizenship under the construction of
Indonesian national identity is problematic since the two actors

involved do not share a common understanding of their identity
in relation to one another. Indonesian government recognizes
West Papua as an ‘underdeveloped missing son’ region of its
territory. Hence, Indonesia feels obligated to bring a Java-centric
modernization to Papua. On the other hand, this ‘Indonesianization’
project is perceived by Papuan nationalists as a prolonged colonialism
since Indonesians have always been foreign entities during the Dutch
period (Chauvel & Alagappa, 2005). As Jessop (2008) remarked,
the form and substance of citizenship are outcomes of competing
interests, strategies and capacities within diverse political spaces
(Jessop, 2008). Papuans’ struggle of citizenship is more obvious
since the Indonesianization project is done through a violent
process, ignorant to the locality and interests of Papuans. This
part will explain how Indonesianization has restrained Papuans in
achieving their full citizenship and to some extent strengthening the
Papuan nationalism.
Indonesianization project serves as a creation of universal citizenship

for the previous Netherland Indies in the name of independence. The
problem arose when this Indonesian identity acts as a non-inclusive
grand narrative, especially to West Papuans. This originates from
Papua’s exclusive history of ‘dual-colonialism,’ which was not
present in other part of Netherland Indies. Since Dutch colonialism,
Papuans did not have equal privilege with its fellow ‘Indonesians’
or amberi--Javanese, Sundanese, or Maluku (Chauvel & Alagappa,
2005). In Papua, while amberi held bigger official positions than
the actual foreigners, very few number of indigenous people had

the opportunity. This history of exclusion enhanced the sense

of difference held by Papuans from Indonesians. Papuans felt
oppressed and excluded, where Indonesian bureaucrats became
accustomed to the idea that the entire Netherlands Indies was the
“stage” on which they developed their bureaucratic careers (Chauvel
& Alagappa, 2005).
This glimpse of history tells us two things. First, there was already
hierarchies of citizenship among Indonesians and Papuans
under the Dutch colonials, stratified according to the rights and
possibilities for political participation that are granted to different
groups of citizens and residents (Heater, 1999). In this case,
despite the fact that both actors’ citizenship was partial back then,
Papuans’ citizenship were worse due to their identity construction

as ‘primitive’ and ‘backwards,’ incapable to represent themselves
or becoming officials. Second, the ‘dual-colonialism’ structure left a
bad and ‘foreign’ impression of Indonesians to Papuans, and almost
no attachment at all as one nation. Therefore, the practical way for
Papuans to access full citizenship is through self-determination.
According to Lister (2008), when universal citizenship works as an
instrument of emancipation and justice, it simultaneously masks
and accentuates group oppression. This is in line with Young’s
(1990) argument that the existing dominant identity puts other
identity groups at a disadvantage, even as everyone is granted equal
citizenship in legal terms. This historical stratified citizenship left
Indonesians with more power to access political and economic
resources to construct Papua’s identity as a part of Indonesia.
Post-1969, Indonesianization has impacted various aspects of

Papuans citizenship. Runaweri (in Chauvel & Alagappa, 2005)
argued that in early 1960s Indonesia’s government had implemented
a policy of “depapuanization,” which included the spreading of
Pancasila and the history of the “Great Revolution of Indonesia,” the
spread of Islam, communism, and Javanese culture. Thus, according
to Runaweri (in Chauvel & Alagappa, 2005), by 1969 Papuans
regarded the government as an agent of Islam and communism that
was intent on eliminating the Papuans’ religion in a clandestine
manner. The struggle for citizenship lies on the politics of recognition,
where the Papuans identity and culture are denied and were forced

to fit into Indonesian standard, often disadvantaging local Papuans

due to the influx of transmigrants coming to West Papua. There
was an absence of Papuan representation in the administration
because no Papuan were appointed as ministers or as senior
officials in central government departments or in other provinces
in Indonesia, meanwhile, Indonesians from Aceh to Maluku flooded
Papua to fulfill positions that had previously been held by Papuans.
In Wayoi’s (2002) words, “Papuan officials were excluded from
the administration and became observers and foreigners in their
own country.” In another case, after the integration, three leading
Papuan nationalists who were thought to be the best educated and
most politically progressive—E. J. Bonay, Herman Wayoi, and
Fritz Kirihio—were prepared to held important positions in the

Indonesian administration but were imprisoned by the government
for sympathizing with Papuan nationalists (Chauvel & Alagappa,
2005). This shows how identity plays major role in the struggle
of Papuans citizenship, since they are incapable to access several
rights due to their contesting identity. Indonesian government has
shown efforts to improve Papuans citizenship, such as Papuans
participation in the Act of Free Choice 1969, and involving local
Papuans in drafting Special Autonomy Law (SAL) in 2001. But it is
critical to ask what kind of participation that was being provided.
Papuans consider the result of the Act of Free Choice to have been
returned by a hand-picked and intimidated set of individuals who
did not represent the will of the Papuan (Chauvel & Alagappa,
2005). In the case of SAL, which will be discussed extensively in the
following part of this essay, it failed to substantively accommodate
the wishes of Papuans.
Pseudo-participation: The Problematics of Special

Autonomy Law
Following the surge of Papuans citizenship movement, Habibie,
Indonesian President at that time, invited 100 Papuans incorporated
in the “Team-100” to discuss matters regarding the future of Papua.
Team-100 utilized the opportunity to demand independence, which
was not responded well by Indonesian government after recently
losing East Timor (Sumule, 2003). Both sides eventually agreed upon
the creation of Special Autonomy Law (SAL), providing autonomy for

Papuans to regulate their own region while maintaining Indonesian

national integrity. SAL was created as an effort of recognition
politics and redistribution politics, subsequently by affirming a
special status and allocating a generous government funding for
development efforts (Resosudarmo et al., 2014). However, as argued
by Fraser (2000), in order to create full-citizenship there needs to be
a third approach which is representation politics characterized by
participation, and this aspect is absent from SAL.
It has been explained above how the violent identity construction

project by Indonesian government towards Papua created a
stratified citizenship. This is then manifested into participation and
rights problems found throughout the formulation, contents, and
implementation process of the promised SAL. On the formulation

stage, there are at least two key events which indicates the pseudo-
participation of Papuan citizens. First, Department of Internal
Affairs of Indonesia (Depdagri) independently made a SAL draft
bill without consulting the Papuan people. Academicians find this
‘strange and undemocratic’ (Sumule, 2003), since the very voices
needed as the source of SAL were excluded. Moreover, Decree No. 4
of the MRP Year 2002 stated that the development of the bill should
‘consider the aspirations of the people of the respective region,’
while the making of Depdagri’s draft was without one. Fortunately,
academicians, NGO workers, politicians, and those who held position
in the “formal sectors” (later called as Assistance Team) of Papua
made their own draft. The Papuan draft includes various Papuan
parties, and was considered important by the Central Parliament
since it included Papuans authentic aspirations (Halmin, 2006).
Second event was the absence of dissenting voices during the making
of SAL. Although the Assistance Team’s draft later became one of
the sources of SAL, several important parties in Papua including a
few church figures and political representations claimed to had not
been involved in the process (Katharina, 2017). Actors’ involvement
and accessibility of SAL formulation were dominated by the
government formal actors i.e. the Regional and Central Government
officials, academics, and Papuan intellectuals designated in the
Team Assessment and Assistance Team. On the other hand, Papuan
informal actors such as Papuan customary chiefs, intellectuals,

leaders of the Free Papua organization were not involved during the
process of SAL formation (Pekey et al., 2015). It was argued that
the lack of involvement is due to time limit, since it was difficult
to negotiate with pro-independence actors. Representation was
simply done by capturing the idea, but ignoring the process of
presenting various actors and hearing their voices (Katharina, 2017).
Furthermore, official interaction between formal and informal
actors did not occur during the process of SAL formulation, both
in the region as well as in the center (Pekey et al., 2015). Hence,
the draft does not incorporate every parties and opinion of Papuans
as it was originally desired, fulfilling one root of political injustice
according to Tornquist (2009).

In regards to the content of SAL itself, there are evidences that point
to the subordinate nature of Papuan citizenship vis-a-vis the bigger
Indonesian identity. In the article about Commission for Rectification
of History (van den Broek, 2003), the draft bill stipulates that the
commission shall act towards possibility of human rights violation
in the past, yet the ratified bill only stipulates that the Commission’s
task is to clarify the history of Papua in order to stabilize the unity
and integrity of the nation within the Unitary State of the Republic
of Indonesia. This shows how the discourse about Papua’s past
and history of violence done by Indonesian central government is
deemed endangering the concept of Indonesia’s unity, disregarding
the deeply rooted injustice originating from past atrocities faced
by Papuans. Therefore, there is a conscious effort to prioritize
Indonesia’s citizenship from Papuans’ interest.
Polemics also exist in the implementation of SAL, where several

Papuans’ economic and socio-political rights guaranteed by SAL
were violated by the Indonesian government. Regarding economic
rights, SAL regulated that national revenues from taxes on natural
resources produced in West Papua must be shared with the provinces
through an agreed percentages. However, this is hardly applied
by the Indonesian government, as seen from the case of Freeport.
Financially, Freeport has been giving substantial contribution
to Indonesian economy. In 2005 alone, the company has paid
US$1,17 million as part of tax, royalty and its dividend (Freeport
Indonesia, n.d. in Halmin, 2006). However, the impact of Freeport’s

contribution has only been absorbed by only a “small number” for

West Papuans. This phenomenon sparked a surge of protest by some
West Papuans as well as accusation from West Papuan Governor
toward Indonesian government for being “dishonest” (Witular,
2006 in Halmin, 2006).
Regarding socio-cultural rights, there has been violation towards

Article 57 and 58 of SAL which stipulate the government to protect
aspects of West Papuan culture. In reality, West Papuans are
encouraged to change their traditions, customs, and even their
identity (Tebay, 2005) due to Indonesia’s modernization project.
The impairment of West Papuan culture by Indonesian government
was also done by separating West Papuans from their land.
Under their own customary law (adat law), West Papuans were
owners of the forest, but under Indonesian rule, those lands were
plundered, expropriated and exploited on the pretext of national
development (Tebay, 2005). Furthermore, there are numerous
human rights violation done by the Indonesian to the Papuans, for
example, Indonesian military practice which according to Human
Rights Watch, in practice was “characterized by undisciplined
and unaccountable troops committing widespread abuses against
civilians, including extrajudicial executions, torture, forced
disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and drastic limits
on freedom of movement” (Human Rights Watch, 2006 in Halmin,
2006). The aforementioned polemics of pseudo-participation and
violation of rights in the case of SAL can be seen as a consequence of
Indonesianization which constructed a forced national identity and
consequently producing a stratified citizenship, where Indonesian
identity is believed superior over Papuans’. In the case of SAL, the
believed superiority is palpable when Indonesia did not hesitate to
take any measure to maintain its integrity and stability, including
straddling Papuans’ full citizenship regarded as less important than
Indonesians--in the end leaving Papuan citizenship flawed and
incomplete.
Conclusion
From the explanation above, it can be concluded that the forced
conception of nationhood in the case of West Papua led to a partial

citizenship characterized by lack of substantive participation, in turn

causing resentment towards Indonesian central administration.
Considering what Indonesian government wants is for West Papua
to become a part of the greater Indonesian identity, the acceptable
way to achieve the agreement by West Papuans is only by providing
them with full-citizenship that they deserve. Acknowledging the
failure of mere politics of redistribution and politics of recognition
manifested in SAL study case, this paper believes that politics
of representation is the only avenue left to be pursued in order
to provide a more complete and equal citizenship. To make this
aspiration comes true, two kinds of approaches are on the table as
explained in Fraser’s (2000) citizenship framework. Firstly, politics
of representation through ‘affirmative action’ by opening up more

proportional representation of West Papua in the policymaking
process. Second approach is through a ‘transformative action,’ a
more radical and holistic approach. Through building a substantive
democracy characterized by participation, all four citizenship
elements would be fulfilled, erasing the stratification of citizenship
itself. The previous study case has proven how lack of substantive
participation undermined the quality of democracy and welfare
in West Papua. Moreover, from a practical side of things, genuine
participation from West Papuans will assist the governance to be
more effective due to well-informedness about the problems, needs
and attitudes of the citizens (Birch, 2008). Thus, there are reasons
to believe that a transformative approach has more probability to
create sustainable peace in West Papua in relations with Indonesia.
However, either one of these two approaches are not possible without
the political will of the Indonesian central government, and although
it is ideal to have a non-stratified citizenship in Indonesia, this
paper acknowledges the existing justification in the form of national
interest that acts as an obstacle to the peaceful settlement of West
Papuan struggle. Regardless, this paper has succeeded in answering
its initial question and managed to deconstruct the meaning of
citizenship in this particular case, analyzing it in correlation with
concepts crucial to the unequal status quo in West Papua.

References
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Democracy. Oxon: Routledge.
Chauvel, R, and M Alagappa, 2005. Constructing Papuan
Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaptation.
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Fraser, Nancy. 2000. “Rethinking Recognition”, New Left Review,
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Halmin, Muhammad Yusran, 2006. “The Implementation of
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Heater, D, 1999. What is Citizenship? Cambridge: Polity.
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Formulation Special Autonomy In Papua (Actor Interaction
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of the Special Autonomy Bill for the Province of Papua and
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al., (eds.), 2009. Rethinking Popular Representation.
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Autonomy for the Province of Papua [Online]. Available
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Jaya) masih dalam status Tanah Jajahan”, in Alua, Agus A,
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Princeton University Press.

Global Maritime Fulcrum: A Manifestation of Indonesia’s Strategic Culture
Maula Hudaya
Global Maritime Fulcrum: A Manifestation

of Indonesia’s Strategic Culture
Maula Hudaya
Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya
Abstract
The Global Maritime Fulcrum is a policy that emerged in the era of
president Joko Widodo. The policy aims to maximize Indonesia’s
true potential as the largest archipelagic state in the world to
become an “axis” or the main maritime power in the world. The

emergence of the Global Maritime Fulcrum as a policy in the era of
president Joko Widodo is unique, because there had never been a
similar policy that explicitly stated Indonesia’s goal to become the
main maritime power in the world in the previous presidential eras.
In fact, policies made by previous presidents tended to ignore the
maritime sector and did not regard this sector as a major strategic
preference in determining the future development and behavior
of Indonesia. This phenomenon makes Joko Widodo’s Global
Maritime Fulcrum become an interesting policy to study, especially
regarding why policy like this arise while similar things do not even
get enough attention in the era of previous presidents. Although the
government itself stated that this policy emerged as a response to
the shifting geopolitical and geo-economics center of gravity from
the West to Asia, the writer sees there were internal factors reflected
in this policy, namely the compatibility between the concept
of Global Maritime Fulcrum and Indonesia’s strategic culture.
Therefore, this paper tries to analyze how the policy is influenced
by Indonesian strategic culture through empirical analysis methods.
The method itself aims to prove the influence of strategic culture on
the state’s strategic behavior by looking at the goverment’s strategic
preferences, and where these preferences originate. After that, the
researchers could see the link between these preferences and the
state’s behavior.

Maula Hudaya
Keywords: Indonesia, Global Maritime Fulcrum, Maritime

Power, Strategic Culture
Introduction
The Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) which formulated in the era
of president Joko Widodo’s (Jokowi) leadership is an initial step
for Indonesia maritime affairs. This policy is unique because in
the previous presidential eras, there were no policies that explicitly
states the purpose of Indonesia to become a major power in the
maritime sphere. Moreover, looking at the history of Indonesian
maritime policy, it can be said that during the seven presidential
eras, from the era of Ir. Soekarno to Joko Widodo, maritime-oriented

policies were not taken seriously and tend to be inconsistent. The
statement i s supported by the Ministry of Industry (2016) which
stated that the maritime industry in Indonesia had been difficult to
develop because there was no strong policy related to the maritime
sector (Kementrian Perindustrian Republik Indonesia, 2016).
The Ministry of Industry (2016) also stated that maritime policies
have tended to be inconsistent. It was true that Indonesia’s marine
and naval potential has been well utilized in the era of president
Soekarno. However in the New Order era, similar policies were
eliminated and Soeharto as president at that time was focused more
on developing Indonesia as an agricultural country. In the next
era, namely President Habibie, similar things also happened, so
that after going through two presidential eras, the maritime policy
was only regained attention in the era of President Abdurrahman
Wahid (Gus Dur) as evidenced by the establishment of the Ministry
of Fisheries and Marine Affairs. However, in the era of President
Megawati and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), maritime
policy sank again, until the era of president Joko Widodo came with
the concept of the World Maritime Axis (Kementrian Perindustrian
Republik Indonesia, 2016).
The absence of maritime policy in the four presidential eras was

very unfortunate. This happened because Indonesia had denied
its identity as a maritime nation. In his speech at the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) session in 2016, President Joko
Widodo stated that Indonesia had turned its back on the sea for

Maula Hudaya
too long (Sekretaris Kabinet Republik Indonesia, 2016). Moreover,

the identity as a maritime nation even contained in a song that
circulated widely in the community, namely “Nenek Moyangku
Seorang Pelaut” by Ibu Soed (Maksum, 2015). However, the writer
sees that the idea of maritime nation as the identity of Indonesia
lately become meaningless because there is a shift of identity, which
then become an agrarian nation, especially in the era of President
Soeharto. The food self-sufficiency policy in New Order era that
relied on the agrarian sector (Kementrian Perindustrian Republik
Indonesia, 2016) contributed to alienate the Indonesian people
from the sea because they saw that agrarian products were enough
to feed the people. Booth (1992, in Wicaksana 2017) also stated that
the infrastructure development in the era of President Soeharto
was only focused in land development. Indonesia’s identity as an

agrarian country is also reflected in the children’s thinking concept,
for example, when they are asked to draw landscapes, the majority
of children will draw a highway that divides two mountains with
a vast expanse of rice fields around it. This phenomenon shows a
doctrinal error, that agrarian doctrine has been firmly embedded in
the mindset of the Indonesian people, while the identity as “Bangsa
Pelaut” has disappeared. Therefore according to Ali Maksum (2015),
the emergence of GMF in the era of Joko Widodo become a great
hope for Indonesia to return to its identity as a nation of seamen.
The re-emergence of maritime-oriented policy after the disappearance

for several periods is something that makes the writer interested in
doing analysis of what actually makes Joko Widodo’s government
issues a policy that seems bold. The government acknowledged that
the geopolitical and geo-economic shifting from the West to Asia is
one of the driving force of this policy (PresidenRI.go.id, 2015). This
phenomenon is seen as a favorable situation for Indonesia because
it has potential to support maritime related policies. However, the
writer sees that the emergence of this policy is not only influenced by
the international phenomenon, but also by Indonesia’s own internal
factors. This is indicated by the presence of local values namely the
identity of Indonesia as a nation of seafarers and also the desire
of Indonesia to restore the sea as the main commodity and source
of livelihood. It then make the writer want to see further to which
extend the local values influence GMF policy. Therefore, this paper

Maula Hudaya
tries to analyze the relationship between the two through strategic

cultural perspectives. In the conception of Jack Snyder (1977) and
Alastair Iain Johnston (1995), strategic culture is simply understood
as how internal aspects such as a nation’s thinking cultures influence
state policies related to national security, foreign policy, threats, and
the use of force.
The Policy of Global Maritime Fulcrum

The idea of GMF actually emerged as Joko Widodo’s campaign
during the 2014 presidential election (Maksum, 2015). After Joko
Widodo has elected as president in that year, the idea is applied as
a policy that would determine the attitude of the Indonesian people

in facing phenomenon. Joko Widodo’s official statement regarding
Indonesia’s policy to be the world maritime axis was expressed in
his speech at the East Asia Summit at Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar on
November 13, 2014 (Kementrian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia,
2014). In his speech, President Joko Widodo stated that the
concept of Indonesia’s maritime fulcrum will focus on five pillars
of development. The first pillar is to build Indonesian maritime
culture; second pillar is to protect marine resources and create
food sovereignty of the sea with fishermen as the main pillar; third
pillar is to give priority on infrastructure development and maritime
connectivity with the establishment of tol laut, deep seaport,
logistics, shipping industry, and maritime tourism; fourth pillar is
to implement maritime diplomacy through cooperation with other
countries in order to solve problems in the maritime affairs such as
illegal fishing and border dispute; and then the final pillar is to build
maritime power as a form of responsibility to maintain shipping
safety and maritime security (Kementrian Luar Negeri Republik
Indonesia, 2014).
The implementation of the five pillars basically aims to improve

the welfare of the community (Maksum, 2015). In the first pillar,
it is stated that the rebuilding of Indonesian maritime culture is a
matter that must be prioritized, but according to Agastia (2016),
this pillar that based on the Indonesian Defense White Paper did
not explain which maritime culture is intended. However, the writer
sees that the maritime culture referred by this pillar is an identity

Maula Hudaya
as a maritime nation that has been formed since the ancient times,
which associated with the maritime glory of two major kingdoms in
Indonesia, Srivijaya and Majapahit. Young and Valencia (2003) state
that Srivijaya is not a power that can be underestimated because it
was the largest maritime power in the region in its era. Young and
Valencia (2003) also state that Srivijaya even had “pirate” troops
who were submissive to the kingdom and tasked to guard the sea
lane along the Malacca Strait, and it was often used to conduct
commerce raiding against rival kingdoms. In addition, Majapahit’s
strength is also something that can not be underestimated because
it succeed in uniting almost all of the islands in the archipelago.
Therefore it is quite natural that the emergence of a pillar to restore
Indonesia’s maritime culture is a manifestation of the desire to
restore the maritime glory of the two kingdoms. The argument was
reflected in the statement of President Joko Widodo at the 2016
IMO meeting, stating that “We were once victorious as a seafaring
nation. Our economic life is partly derived from maritime resources
and the results of trade through the sea are now in the center of the
world’s economic and political center of gravity, as the fulcrum of
the two Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean oceans” (Detik News, 2016).
The second pillar of marine resources is a crucial pillar. Based on

the statement of President Joko Widodo, it is clear that maritime
resources are a promising source of economic livelihood. Therefore,
this sector has a very important place in the GMF policy. According
to Maksum (2015), Indonesia maritime resources especially in the
fisheries sector without illegal fishing, have the potential to generate
huge profits reaching Rp 365 trillion per year. However, the rampant
illegal fishing reduced the number of profits up to Rp 65 trillion per
year (Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Affairs, 2011 in Maksum,
2015). The amount of the loss made the government design this
second pillar, which then implemented with very strict action
against the perpetrators of illegal fishing to minimize the occurrence
of similar cases (Maksum, 2015). Furthermore, the writer also sees
that there is a correlation between the first pillar and second pillar,
which when talking about Indonesia’s food security, the idea of
rebuilding maritime culture must also be carried out. In this case,
it is about the culture to consume seafoods. Food security through
marine products will not be created when people do not consume

Maula Hudaya
much seafood, and the fact is that Indonesian fish consumption is

still very low compared to neighboring countries (Detik News, 2017) .
The third pillar speaks about infrastructure development and

maritime connectivity. I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana (2017) states
that since taking the office, Joko Widodo immediately promoted
maritime development and infrastructure as the core of his domestic
and international policy framework. The development of maritime
infrastructure and connectivity of Indonesia’s sea lanes is worked
out through the construction of the sea highway by president
Joko Widodo. Wicaksana (2017) states that sea tolls are designed
to accelerate the sea transportation between major ports such as
Belawan in North Sumatra, Tanjung Priok in Jakarta, Tanjung Perak

in East Java, Makassar in South Sulawesi, and Sorong in Papua.
According to Wicaksana (2017), sea tolls are intended to accelerate
the circulation and distribution of valuable commodities, especially
in remote areas in eastern Indonesia. The government itself has
spent 700 trillion rupiah to build the maritime connectivity facility
which is targeted to be completed in 2019 (Wicaksana, 2017). The
development includes 24 new commercial ports, repair 1481 non-
commercial ports, build 15 industrial centers, and buy ships to be
operated (Wicaksana, 2017).
The government efforts to build maritime connectivity are strategic

step for Indonesia. This happened because these efforts are in line
with the geographical conditions of Indonesia which is an archipelago
with so many islands that separated by a lot of vast sea. Not only
that, the location of Indonesia which is between Asia and Australia,
and being in a choke point that connect the Indian Ocean with the
Pacific Ocean, make it strategic for international trade routes. Even
according to Felipe Umana for Fund for Peace (2013), the choke
point was passed by 60,000 merchant ships from all over the world
annually. Moreover, based on United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982 there are three Archipelagic Sea
Lanes of Indonesia (ALKI) that included in international shipping
and flight routes. However, this potential has not fully maximized
yet. It is estimated that if the three ALKIs are optimized, Indonesia
has the potential to gain profit of 1,500 USD or 45% of the total

Maula Hudaya
value of world trade (Maksum, 2015). Therefore this third pillar is

designed to maximize this great potential.
The fourth pillar of maritime diplomacy is designed to increase the

bargaining power of Indonesia maritime affairs in the international
sphere. This will be done by increasing bilateral and multilateral
relations with various countries related to maritime issues. According
to Agastia (2016), one important issue that Indonesia still has
with neighboring countries is border related issues. Without clear
borders, Indonesia is in risk of getting into trouble with potential
friends and losing political legitimacy. In 2014, Indonesia ended the
maritime border dispute with the Philippines. However, there is still
work to be done, such as dispute between Indonesia-Malaysia and
Indonesia-Australia. After the problem of boundaries is clarified,

maritime diplomacy will be arguably much more subtle progress.
In addition, to increase its influence, Indonesia must cooperate with
the leading maritime forces in the region. At present, Indonesia has
collaborated with India as a potential partner, and has played an
active role in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) to increase
Indonesia’s influence in the Indo-Pacific region (Agastia, 2016).
The final pillar, namely the fifth pillar regarding the development
of maritime power is a consequence that must be taken when the
government tries to build the four pillars beforehand, especially
the second and third pillars. This happened because it would
be worthless to talk about realizing maritime food security, but
not accompanied by adequate strength to ensure the security of
Indonesia’s sea from illegal fishing. It will also be futile to talk about
maritime connectivity, but not accompanied by enough power to
secure shipping routes throughout Indonesia. The development of
maritime power in this case is more likely to be the power to secure
Indonesian sea from non-traditional internal threats such as fishing
theft and piracy compared to traditional external threats. This
happens because there are a lot of non-traditional threats in the
Indonesian sea that have potential to disrupt the implementation
of the world’s maritime axis, such as illegal fishing and piracy which
are very prevalent and has caused significant losses to the state
(Maksum, 2015). According to Laura Southgate (2015) in the first
half, the Southeast Asian seas have accounted for 55% of all piracy

Maula Hudaya
and armed robbery rates in the world. Southgate (2015) added that
most of piracy cases in Southeast Asia occurred in Indonesian waters.
Therefore if Indonesia’s maritime power is not well built, the inter-
island shipping routes that are traversed by local and international
ships will also be threatened. As a result, the Indonesian economy
will be disrupted as the world maritime axis doctrine prioritizes the
sea as an economic source.
Looking at the pillars in the Indonesian maritime fulcrum, it can

be said that the intention of Indonesia to be a big maritime power
country is driven by economic motives and economic goals. The
motive was clearly reflected in President Joko Widodo’s speech at the
2016 IMO session. In his speech, Joko Widodo stated that Indonesia

must succeed to meet the economic needs of maritime products.
Jokowi then expressed his awareness regarding the magnitude of
potential maritime resources and Indonesia’s oceans that are so
crowded by merchant ships that they must be used to realize people’s
welfare in a sustainable manner (Detik News , 2016). Furthermore,
economic motives in GMF also explained by Piesse (2015) who said
that GMF is an ambitious step of Jokowi to improve the domestic
economy by utilizing the various maritime potentials that Indonesia
possesses. Not only that, in the realm of foreign policy, Indonesia
also seeks economic benefits by exploiting the situation in the rise
of Chinese and Indian maritime forces (Piesse, 2015). The closeness
with India is manifested in the joining of Indonesia with IORA
which has various fields of cooperation and has the potential to
bring benefits to Indonesia (Piesse, 2015). Meanwhile, the closeness
with China is manifested by the partnership in the maritime sector
and Indonesia’s support for new silk routes that have the potential
to bring 40 billion US dollars (Gindarsah & Priamarizki, 2015).
GMF and Indonesian Strategic Culture

Strategic culture in conception of Jack Snyder (1977) and Alastair
Iain Johnston (1995) is simply understood as how internal aspects
such as the culture of thinking of the nation influence state policies
related to national security, foreign policy, threats, and the use of
force. In the case of Indonesia, the writer sees that there are two
main thoughts about strategic culture. First is the thought of

Maula Hudaya
Dewi Fortuna Anwar (1996) who saw that Indonesia’s strategic

culture originated from the era before and after independence.
The second is Yohanes Sulaiman (2016) who sees that Indonesia’s
strategic culture is a product of what happened after independence,
and what happens afterwards is a repetition. According to Anwar
(1996), the Dutch and Japan colonialism was so oppressive, so that
the struggle for independence helped shape what it is now called
Indonesia’s strategic culture. Anwar (1996) added that at first,
Indonesian people were still divided and did not have a national
identity. However, the education provided by the Dutch triggered
the awareness of Indonesian people towards a common destiny
that preceded the formation of national identity, where the unity
of identity led to the Indonesian resistance toward Netherlands on
a national scale. In the struggle for Indonesia independence, there

was asymmetrical difference in strength in which Indonesia did not
have any national army nor military weapons yet (Nasution, 1984),
so that triggered the raising of guerrilla strategies which involved all
elements in society. After the independence, Indonesia then sought
help from the United States to face the Dutch who were still trying
to capture Indonesia. However, the United States refused to help
Indonesia because the Dutch convinced it that Indonesia was under
the influence of Communism (Anwar, 1996). These events gave rise
to the value of self reliance, or an act that do not want to depend on
any power. After that, the Indonesia national security had emerged
and coupled with the experience of struggle for independence, gave
birth to the Indonesia’s strategic culture which is Defense of the
People’s Security (Hankamrata) that still applied until now.
In terms of maritime identity, the Dutch seemed to removed it and

replaced with the agrarian identity. This was proven by the policies
of Dutch East Indies government which imposed forced cultivation
to the people of Indonesia. In this case, the writer sees that the
Netherlands had strong reason to shift the identity of the people of
Indonesia, which was because the need for spices. Besides, it also
to prevent the Indonesian people from being connected each other
by the sea, to unite against the Dutch. This agrarian identity then
developed into a strategic preference that influenced the behavior of
Suharto regime which implemented agrarian-based policies such as
the five-year development (Pelita). As a result, the maritime strategy

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in this era is a subordination of such superior land strategy, so that

the Navy does not have enough capabilities to do their job properly
(Yakti & Susanto, 2017).
A different thing happened in the previous era, namely the post-

independence era under the leadership of President Soekarno.
In that era, the nation’s leaders realized the strategic location of
Indonesia which is at the crossroads of the world, with vast sea and
land that could not be separated. Therefore a concept was drafted
to protect territorial integrity and Indonesia national unity, which
was Archipelago Insight (Wawasan Nusantara). The concept that
emerged in 1957 in the declaration of Djuanda (Arif & Kurniawan,
2017) stated that Indonesia is sovereign over land and sea territory

and both could not be separated from Indonesia sovereignty (Anwar,
1996). Furthermore, when talking about land and sea sovereignty,
Indonesia as the largest archipelago in the world has big advantages
in the maritime field. Indonesia which has a sea area of two-thirds of
its territory has a vast sea to be utilized.
In case of the world’s maritime axis, the insight of the archipelago is

the most influential strategic culture. Agastia (2016) states that based
on the world maritime axis white book, the basic concept of GMF is
very similar to Archipelago Insights. Agastia (2016) further states
that the archipelago’s insights emerged on the basis of Indonesia’s
disadvantage by the law of the sea in 1939 which stated that Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) was only three nautical miles and there were
no rules regarding high seas. It then created many loopholes that
made foreign parties easy to steal natural resources in Indonesian
waters, which could endanger Indonesia sovereignty. After going
through a long struggle, Indonesia managed to get its rights as an
archipelagic country through the 1957 Djuanda declaration which
eventually became UNCLOS 1982 that introduced EEZ up to 12
nautical miles (Agastia, 2016). It can be seen that the archipelago’s
insight was initially aimed at seeing the nation’s outlook and how to
maximize its potential as an archipelago.
President Jokowi’s world maritime fulcrum also has that direction.

In his speech, Joko Widodo stated that Indonesia was once victorious
seafarers nation, and its marine products were able to meet the
economic needs of its people (Detik News, 2016). He also stated that

Maula Hudaya
the Indonesian sea was very rich in resources and had to used to
improve the welfare of the Indonesian people, so that Indonesia is
committed to fight illegal fishing, and responsible for the security
of shipping lines in its waters (Detik News, 2016). The president’s
statement shows the existence of an identity as an archipelago or
maritime nation that is trying to be raised, and an effort to maximize
the potential of Indonesian sea with various benefits such as those
published in UNCLOS 1982, and based on the spirit of insight of the
archipelago.
The Joko Widodo regime seems to apply the Indonesian archipelago

at a later stage, namely the World Maritime Axle. However, the
emergence of GMF does not mean that Indonesia’s orientation is
outward looking, because GMF itself is a policy that tends to be

inward looking. This statement is proven by three of five pillars of
GMF, namely restoring Indonesian maritime culture, protecting
maritime resources and food security through marine resources,
and building infrastructure such as sea toll and deep sea ports to
improve logistics connectivity in the Indonesian sea (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2014), in line of inward looking which focuses on
improving Indonesia’s national economy and culture. As a result,
two other pillars, namely maritime diplomacy and the development
of maritime security, are intended for inward looking purposes as
well.
The inward-oriented of GMF policy is very visible, as the main focus

itself is to maximize the use of the sea for internal economic interests.
Furthermore, the focus of infrastructure development is maritime
connectivity to all Indonesian islands, and to create maritime security
to protect the shipping lane. According to Sebastian et al. (2015, in
Agastia 2016), the insight of the archipelago itself is a concept that is
inwardly oriented. According to him, the insights of the archipelago
are only focused on Indonesia’s land and sea integrity, with the fear
of being disturbed by foreign parties. This confirms that the unity
of the islands is maintained, often by adopting suspicions of foreign
vessels. The most suitable picture for this is the act of sinking of
foreign vessels that steal fish (Sebastian et al. 2015, in Agastia 2016).
Indonesia’s inward looking policy is formed by Indonesia’s strategic

culture which according to Yohanes Sulaiman (2016), is a product

Maula Hudaya
of various events that occurred after independence and could be

repeated. In post-independence era, there are a lot of events that
change Indonesia’s perception of threat. According to Yakti and
Susanto (2017), various types of rebellions that occurred in the
country such as DI/TII, PRRI/Permesta, Kahar Muzakar, Andi Azis,
Westerling, and Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil (APRA) have shifted the
perception of Indonesian threats from outward looking became very
inward looking. According to Wicaksana (2017), it is this strategic
culture that makes Indonesian military more often deal with internal
problems than the external ones, such as threat of division. In the
maritime domain, it was explained that the Indonesian Navy did
not have enough capabilities due to the five-year development by
the Suharto regime. As a result, the maritime strategy has become

a subordination of the land strategy in the military junta he leads
(Yakti and Susanto, 2017).
Therefore, the writer sees that the conditions that exist today is only
the repetition of what had happened before. When talking about
GMF, the existing narrative is not to develop the Indonesian navy
to become the Blue Water Navy as has been done by China or India,
but only aims to develop the country’s economy. Then, the position
of the Indonesian Navy will not be much different with the previous
era, namely securing maritime resources owned by Indonesia
(Wicaksana, 2017). This explains why the government is strict on
the case of illegal fishing. However when talking about piracy in
the Malacca Strait, the Indonesian Navy has indeed made efforts
to eradicate it, but the government’s focus is not on that sector.
According to Teo (2007), this happened because piracy in the strait
had little impact on the Indonesian economy.
Referring to these conditions, Indonesia will not play a key role in

securing waters in the international sphere. Not only limited by past
experience with internal threats, but also obstructed by free active
foreign policy. This concept is also still emphasized in building
presidential Jokowi’s GMF (Maksum, 2015). The free active foreign
policy was originally designed by Hatta so that he and his country
would be safe in the Cold War contestation (Sulaiman, 2016).
Basically, free and active foreign policy is not designed to become a
standard for every Indonesian leader to carry out his policies. But in

Maula Hudaya
fact, it actually becomes a standard, so it often makes difficult for the

government to carry out its policies. An example is that Indonesia
cannot act decisively in the case of a South China sea dispute because
it must maintain an impartial position in accordance with the
principle of free and active. Besides that in terms of non-traditional
security, Indonesia cannot develop its navy into blue water navy and
become a superior navy in the region.
Conclusion
Based on the explanation above, it can be concluded that GMF is
a very unique policy. This happened because maritime-oriented
policies have long disappeared in several periods of government.
The re-emergence of such policy has become a new hope for the
Indonesian people to return to prosperity in the ocean. Basically
this policy appears to respond the existing international system,
but it is not limited to that. Other factors such as strategic culture
also greatly influence the formation of GMF. The strategic culture
referred here is the insight of the archipelago and free active foreign
policy.
References
Agastia, IGBD, 2016. Indonesia’s Global Maritim Fulcrum: An
Updated Archipelagic Outlook? [Online]. Available at
https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/indonesias-global-
maritime-fulcrum-an-updated-archipelagic-outlook/
(accessed on 18 December 2018).
Anwar, Dewi Fortuna, 1996. “Indonesia’s Strategic Culture:
Ketahanan Nasional, dalam Wawasan Nusantara dan
Hamkamrata”, Australia-Asia Papers, No. 75, pp 1-49.
Arif, Muhammad & Kurniawan, Yandry, 2017. “Strategic Culture
and Indonesian Maritime Security”, Asia & the Pacific
Policy Studies, 5 (1), pp. 77-89.
Detik News. 2016. “Laporan Dari London: Presiden Jokowi
Suarakan RI Sebagai Poros Maritim Dunia di Sidang IMO”,
[Online] April 20. Available at https://news.detik.com/
berita/d-3191949/presiden-jokowi-suarakan-ri-sebagai-

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poros-maritim-dunia-di-sidang-imo. (accessed on 18
December 2018).
Felipe Umana for Fund for Peace, 2013. Transnational Security
Threats in the Straits of Malacca. [e-book]. Center for
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services/digital-library/articles/article.html/159676/pdf
(accessed on 18 December 2018).
Gindarsah, Iis dan Adhi Priamarizki, 2015. “Indonesia’s Maritime
Doctrine and Security Concerns”, RSIS Policy Report, 9 (9).
Johnston, Alastair Iain. 1995. “Thinking about Strategic Culture”,
International Security, 19 (4), pp. 32-64.

Kementrian Perindustrian Republik Indonesia, 2015. Indonesia
Maritim Butuh Kebijakan Kuat [Online]. Available
at https://kemenperin.go.id/artikel/10025/Industri-
Maritim-Butuh-Kebijakan-Kuat (accessed on 18 December
2018).
Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia, 2014. “Presiden
Jokowi Deklarasikan Indonesia Sebagai Poros Maritim
Dunia” [online]. Available at https:// www.kemlu.go.id/id/
berita/siaran-pers/Pages/PresidenJokowi-Deklarasikan-
Indonesia-Sebagai-Poros-Maritim-Dunia. aspx (accessed
on 18 December 2018).
Maksum, Ali. 2015. “Poros Maritim dan Politik Luar Negeri Jokowi”,
Andalas Journal of International Study, 4 (1), pp. 1-27.
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Republik Indonesia di Masa Lalu dan yang Akan Datang.
Bandung: Penerbit Angkasa.
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the Potential of the Ocean”, FDI Strategic Analysis Paper
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[Online]. Available at http://presidenri.go.id/berita-aktual/
indonesia-sebagai-poros-maritim-dunia.html (accessed on
18 December 2018).

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Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia, 2016. Pidato di Sidang

IMO, Presiden Jokowi Komitmen Jadikan Indonesia Poros
Maritim Dunia [Online]. Available at https://setkab.go.id/
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strait-can-asean-respond/. (accessed on 18 December
2018).
Sulaiman, Y, 2016. “Indonesia’s Strategic Culture: The Legacy of
Independence”, in Tellis AJ, Szalwinski A, Wills M (eds.),
Strategic Asia 2016–17: Understanding Strategic Cultures
in the Asia-Pacific. Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian
Research.
Teo, Yun Y, 2007. “Target Malacca Straits: Maritime Terrorism in
Southeast Asia”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30 (6), pp.
541-56.
Wicaksana, I Gede W, 2017. “Indonesia’s Maritime Connectivity
Development: Domestic And International Challenges”,
Asian Journal of Political Science, 25 (2), pp. 212-233.
Yakti, Probo D & Susanto, Joko, 2017. “Poros Maritim Dunia Sebagai
Pendekatan Strategi Maritim Indonesia: Antara Perubahan
atau Kesinambungan Strategi?”, Jurnal Global Strategis, 11
(2), pp. 108-125.

2015 Melanesian Festival as a Form of Indonesian Public Diplomacy in Asia- Pacific
Bambang Dwi Waluyo
2015 Melanesian Festival as a Form of

Indonesian Public Diplomacy in Asia-
Pacific
Bambang Dwi Waluyo

Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta
Abstract
In October 2015, Indonesia became the host of the Melanesian

Festival for the first time, and this phenomena is an interesting issue
to discuss. This paper was made to find out the purpose of the event
and how the event affected the relationship between Indonesia
and the countries of Pacific Melanesian. In describing this issue,
the paper used the concept of public diplomacy, in which there
are three basic dimensions, namely news management, strategic
communications, and relationship building. There are various
forms of public diplomacy that exist today in order to achieve the
goal of the state, one of which is done by Indonesia to strengthen
its position in Asia-Pacific. The West Papua conflict is one of the
problem that has been highlighted in the Pacific region, especially
within the talks inside the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG). By
hosting the Melanesian Festival, Indonesia shows its cares about
its people and does not discriminate against any race, especially
the Melanesian people. Thus, Indonesia joined the MSG and held
the 2015 Melanesia Festival to gain the trust of the international
community as a form of public diplomacy.
Keywords: Melanesia, Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), 2015

Melanesian Festival, United Liberation Movement for West Papua
(ULMWP)
Introduction
From the October 26 to 30, 2015 Indonesia hosted the 2015 Melanesia
Festival held in Kupang, East Nusa Tenggara for the first time and
the event was attended by Melanesian countries which are the

Bambang Dwi Waluyo
member of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) such as the Fiji

Islands, Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste, Solomon Islands, and
New Caledonia (Tempo.co, 2015). The series of activities inside The
Melanesian Cultural Festival includes conference; film screening
about the lives of Melanesian race communities in Indonesia such
as Cahaya Timur, Beta Maluku, Atambua 30 degrees Celcius, and
Tanah Mama; and also dance performances. At that time, Indonesia
sent representatives from five Melanesian provinces which are
East Nusa Tenggara, Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, and West
Papua (Tempo.co, 2015). This festival also increasing the status of
Indonesia from a member of observers to be an associate member at
MSG. The Indonesian status as an associate member was announced
on the 20th MSG Summit held in Honiara, Solomon Islands on June
24 to 26, 2015 (Kementrian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia, n.d.).

Raising Indonesia’s status in the MSG is an effort to tighten its
cooperation with countries in the Pacific, because of the countries’
strategic geographical location adjacent to the Pacific region. Also,
Indonesia is a home to 11 million Melanesian people (Kementrian
Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia, n.d.). In this case, Indonesian
government seizes the moment of the Melanesian Festival as a
means to strengthen the unity of the nation and its national security,
and to reduce the inter-racial and inter-ethnic conflicts disputes by
conducting positive activities that increase public confidence in the
government. Besides, Indonesia also took advantage of this moment
to strengthen its position at MSG, which is one of the Pacific’s largest
organizations. This was also done in order to prevent outside parties
especially MSG to participate in the West Papua conflict and also
to show the world that Indonesia did not differentiate the eastern
region with the other regions and also care about the Eastern region’s
culture and society, especially the people of Indonesian Melanesia.
The problem statement in this paper is to find out the purpose of
the event and how the event affected the Indonesian relationship
between the Melanesian countries in the Pacific.
There are several previous studies related to this paper, the first of
which is Lawson’s article entitled West Papua, Indonesia, and the
Melanesian Spearhead Group: Competing Logics in Regional and
International Politics (Lawson, 2016). Lawson’s writing focuses on
the efforts made by West Papuans to become member of the MSG,

Bambang Dwi Waluyo
the key aspects of Indonesia’s role in the Melanesian subregion, and

the extent to which these developments highlight the competing logic
in regional and international politics. Meanwhile, this paper focuses
on Indonesia’s efforts to get closer to the Melanesian regional group
to achieve its interests through public diplomacy. The second study
related to this paper is written by Matt Giles, Howard Giles, and
Quinten Berhold entitled Cultural Festivals as Intergroup Settings:
A Case Study of Pacific Islander Identification (Giles et al., 2019).
In the writings, Giles et al. (2019) focuses on how the festival has
an important meaning in identity. Giles et al. (2019) did several
surveys and interviews regarding the significance of identity on the
2016 Pacific Arts Festival in Guam. On the other hand, this paper
tries to explain how state actors use art festivals as a top-bottom tool

to form such identity. Another reference is an article from Lawson
entitled Melanesia (Lawson, 2013). Lawson’s second writing focused
on providing an overview of how and where Melanesian ideas have
been developed, from their origins in racial ethnography to their
post-colonial period. Meanwhile, this paper focuses on the identity
of “Melanesia” as a part of the Indonesian identity which is used as a
unifying and interacting tool with neighboring countries, especially
countries in the Pacific region.
Discussion and Result

The public diplomacy carried out by Indonesia is closely related
to Indonesia’s national interests, which are strengthening the
Indonesian influence and gaining trust in the Pacific region. In the
constructivist paradigm, the national interests are formed because
of the influence and interaction on the international system. In
this case, Indonesia’s interests are to strengthen its position in
the Pacific with an approach through Melanesian culture. This is
due to Indonesia’s weakening position from the United Liberation
Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) at the MSG. It become
important for Indonesia to strengthen its position by showing that
Indonesia is a country that have Melanesian population. In order to
safeguard Indonesia’s front yard in the eastern region, it is important
for Indonesia to take action in a smooth and sustainable manner
so that it is not considered aggressive. Thus, more constructive
policies and involvement in the community will be more effective.

Bambang Dwi Waluyo
National interests which are formed from the interaction of the state
and its environment, give such influence to the policies taken by
the country. Thus, Indonesia’s decision to hold the 2015 Melanesia
Festival which is an instrument in public diplomacy became a policy
based on national interests formed by Indonesia’s interaction in an
international environment, which in this case is in the form of the
adjacent eastern Melanesian countries incorporated in the MSG.
In the realm of international relationship, Indonesian government’s

efforts to host the 2015 Melanesian Festival are a form of public
diplomacy. Public diplomacy is a tool to build relationship by
understanding the needs, culture, and society to communicate the
views and to correct the misperceptions that exist in the international
community to find areas where the government can find a common

ground (Leonard, 2002). Relations that are established through
public diplomacy can create an environment for people between
countries to work together and build trust in the international
community. According to Mark Leonard (2002) in his book Public
Diplomacy, there are several objectives that can be achieved with
the existence of public diplomacy. First is to increase the sense
of kinship with other countries in a way to show a good image of
the country, second is to increase public appreciation to certain
countries because the positive perceptions are formed, and third is
to tighten the relationships with communities among the countries,
for example, to convince the people in a country to visit tourist
places, and to buy the locally made products, give some insights and
knowledge of the values upheld by the actors or the local community
and society will sway other countries to invest, and become partners
in political relations.
The emphasis on this paper is on the relationship building, one

of the three basic elements in public diplomacy, which are news
management, strategic communications, and relationship building
(Leonard, 2002). The first element of news management is a
communication management in everyday problems, reflecting the
increasing need to harmonize communication with traditional
diplomacy. The second element of strategic communications is the
ability of the state to establish communication so that the target of
the communication is in accordance with the institution. Strategic

Bambang Dwi Waluyo
communications is a series of activities that are more like a political

campaign, such as setting a certain number of strategic messages
and planning a series of activities. The third dimension of public
diplomacy, relationship building is the longest-term process,
which is done by developing strong relationships with individuals
and the public through scholarships, student exchanges, trainings,
seminars, conferences, building real and virtual networks, and
providing access to media channels. The activity was carried out in
order to build trust, achieve positive perceptions by other countries,
and ultimately strengthen relations between communities in order
to convince people in a country to go to tourist attractions, local
products, invest, and became partners in political relations. In this
case, it takes quite a long time, which may take months or years.

Similar with the Melanesian Festival which was held in Indonesia,
to become a form of a relationship building among Melanesian
countries that will be carried out continuously and require a long
time to see the results.
Through this public diplomacy, Indonesia hopes to introduce

Indonesian Melanesian communities, which are spread across five
provinces. That way Indonesia can introduce itself as one of the
Melanesian countries and carries the message that even though it
is separated by distance and cultural differences, the Melanesian
people in Indonesia are part of the Melanesian community.
Until now, the collaborative effort undertaken by the Indonesian
government is still ongoing. Although the 2015 Melanesia Festival
did not have a significant impact on Indonesian relations with the
Melanesian or MSG countries, it was the case that gave birth to
Kupang Message. Kupang Message is a series of cultural cooperation
agreements among MSG member countries with the aim to
respect cultural differences and continue to preserve the culture of
Melanesia (Kementrian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 2015). A year
after the event is done until November 2016, cooperations between
the countries members of the MSG are still going, one of which is the
development of palm oil commodity by Indonesia together with the
other 13 Melanesian countries (Yulianingsih, 2016).
Public diplomacy does not create instantaneous results, it requires

time to achieve the desired results. Indonesia has become a member

Bambang Dwi Waluyo
of the observer from MSG since the 18th MSG Summit in Fiji in
2011. At first involvement with MSG, Indonesia started from the
establishment of an uprising in West Papua or the ULMWP who
seeks recognition by registering as a member of MSG (Tebay, 2015).
With the increasing closeness of Indonesia’s relationship with MSG,
then the chances of the ULMWP to become a full member of the
MSG will be reduced. But at the 20th Summit held in the Solomon
Islands on June 24 to 26, 2015, a decision was made that the
ULMWP membership status had been revoked at MSG (Farneubun,
2015). At the same time, Indonesia was appointed as an associate
member at the MSG. To increase the confidence of the international
community and the government’s concern on Melanesian society,
Indonesia then held the 2015 Melanesian Festival in Kupang, East
Nusa Tenggara.
Conclusion
The Melanesian Festival aims to show the international community
that Indonesia is one of the Melanesian countries whose communities
and cultures are preserved and cared by the government. Making
the emergence of separatist groups in the name of Melanesia
Indonesia as domestic policy issues to create an unstable condition
in the country has no clear ground. Because with the Melanesian
Festival, it shows that in fact the Melanesian people of Indonesia
already have gained special attention from the state so that there
is no other reason for certain groups to revolt and try to separate
themselves from Indonesia. In addition, by joining the membership
of MSG, the MSG and member states will not arbitrarily interfere in
the domestic policy of other states members and Indonesia will have
a voice in the decision-making process in MSG. The effort made by
the Indonesian government is the forming and emphasis of culture
in its foreign policy as an up-bottom formation of cultural identity.
The festival also strengthen the relationship between Indonesia and
the Melanesian MSG countries, although the relationship is still not
too tight, the cooperation and trade relations with the Melanesian
state are quite intense after the festival. Although Indonesia has
not yet become a full member at MSG, Indonesia has been trying
to show that Indonesia is also a Melanesian country that always
pay attention to not discriminate any particular tribe or race.

Bambang Dwi Waluyo
Because the process of public diplomacy is long and does not have
instantaneous results, the Melanesian Festival is a form of public
diplomacy conducted by Indonesia to change the international
public perception of Indonesia.
References
Farneubun, P.K, 2015. Indonesia successfully prevents ULMWP to
be a full member [Online]. Available at http://pacific.scoop.
co.nz/2015/07/indonesia-successfully-prevents-ulmwp-to-
be-full-member/ (accessed on 24 February 2019).
Giles, M, Giles, H, & Bernhold, Q, 2019. “Cultural Festivals as
Intergroup Settings: A Case Study of Pacific Islander

Identification”, Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural
Development, pp. 1– 15.
Lawson, S, 2013. “Melanesia” The Journal of Pacific History, 48 (1),
pp. 1–22.
Lawson, S, 2016. “West Papua, Indonesia and the Melanesian
Spearhead Group: Competing Logics in Regional and
International Politics”, Australian Journal of International
Affairs, 70 (5), pp. 506–524.
Leonard, M. 2002. Public Diplomacy. The Foreign Policy Center.
London: The Foreign Policy Center.
Yulianingsih, Tanti, 2016. “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Cooperates with 13 Melanes Countries to Develop Palm
Oil Commodities” Liputan 6, [online] 27 Mei. Available at
https://www.liputan6.com/global/read/2517649/kemlu-
gandeng-13-negara-melanesia-kembangan-komoditas-
kelapa (accessed on 24 February 2019).
Kementrian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 2015. Kacung Marijan
Conveys the Content of the “Kupang Message” Agreement
- Directorate General of Culture [Online]. Available at
https://kebudayaan.kemdikbud.go.id/kacung-marijan-
sorkan-isi-kesajat-kupang-message/ (accessed on 24
February 2019).

Bambang Dwi Waluyo
Kementrian Luar Negeri. n.d. The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs – Indonesia Acquires an Associate Member in the
Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) Status [Online].
Available at https://www.kemlu.go.id/en/berita/Pages/
Indonesia-Acquires-Associate-Member-Status-In-
Melanesian-Spearhead-Group-MSG.aspx (accessed on 24
February 2019).
Tebay, Neles, 2015. “Papua now on Pacific Radar” The Jakarta
Post, [online] 29 September. Available at https://www.
thejakartapost.com/news/2015/09/29/papua-now-pacific-
radar.html (accessed on 24 February 2019).
Tempo.co, 2015. “Indonesia Hosts the Melanesia Cultural Festival
2015” [online] October 22. Available at https://seleb.tempo.

co/read/712071/indonesia-tuan-rumah-festival-budaya-
melanesia-2015 (accessed on 24 February 2019).

Education of Women and Citizenship in Indonesia from State Ibuism Perspective
Annalisa Manzo, Gita Ardi Lestari, Puspita Atirennu
Education of Women and Citizenship in

Indonesia from State Ibuism Perspective
Annalisa Manzo
University of Naples “L’Orientale”, Naples
Gita Ardi Lestari

Puspita Atirennu

Saint Petersburg University, Saint Petersburg
Abstract
The term Ibuism create a perspective which argues that the state
is having a hierarchy and patriarchy in the system especially after
the New Order era. The paradigm of activism of women is created
by men with men as a leader in the structure, which actually
create more harm than good. This writing generally criticizes and
elaborates the story of women in colonial era whose fighting for the
chance of education opportunity, into the reality of condition that
Indonesian women have now, years after independence. The result
which the writers have by doing literature research then shows that
there is no big difference about the role of women from or before the
era of colonial, until nowadays. Women in Indonesia still face the
same challenges in a different timeline. In the colonial era, women
often become the object due to the patriarchy. Even though there
was a development as the awareness of education raising, but there
were a lot of issues in society which oftentimes questioned women
who choose to have education or work. Right now, although the
participation of women is increasing in a lot of life sector such as
politic, it is sometimes only a way to fill the party participation or to
gain more voters for the party in general.
Keywords: Indonesia, Women, State Ibuism, Education

Introduction
This writing is a compact analysis of how women as a citizen in
Indonesia shaped into the concept of State Ibuism or Ibuisme
Negara. This concept is made by Julia Suryakusuma (2011) which
implement in the New Order or Orde Baru era, which told about
how women role in the state as citizen is shaped. Suryakusuma
(2011) pointed out that any of New Order governance made for
Indonesian women is all under the manhood while putting the idea
of glorifying womanhood. For example, the PKK (Pemberdayaan dan
Kesejahteraan Keluarga) or Empowerment and Welfare of Family is
one of the programs that under Soeharto governance was made to
include woman in Indonesia actively participated in citizenship of
Indonesia. In the PKK, women in sub district of Indonesia run the

government agenda based on its ten purpose of PKK establishment.
From that point, this paper tries to answer the question of how is
the journey of Indonesian women embrace their citizenship through
womanhood in the sense of education as its core. The question is
indeed general, and the writers argue that this writing is a pilot
writing that need to be explored more. The writers criticize the
reality that women have to face in Indonesia through the image of
State Ibuism that stated by Julia Suryakusuma (2011) on her thesis.
Discussion and Result

Women activism in Indonesia is complicated to be seen only from
one perspective. From the colonial era when women still become the
object due to the patriarchy system while in the same era, men tend
to get more chances than women. Indonesian may know how R.A.
Kartini story is shaped the whole education for women as a better
access to improve the women in society. Inclusiveness and option to
develop more is such an expensive way for women in Indonesia to
get acknowledge in society. As stated by Elizabeth Martyn (2005),
“The modern Indonesian women’s movement

emerged during the first half of the twentieth century,
alongside and as part of the nationalist movement.
Women’s gender interests and nationalist sentiment
were closely linked. To understand the Indonesian
women’s movement of the 1950s, we need to first

consider the legacies of the colonial era. Historical

accounts of the Indonesian women’s movement
often locate the roots of women’s activism in
nineteenth-century women warriors who fought
against Dutch rule. These women did not pursue any
program of women’s rights and cannot, therefore, be
considered founders of the women’s movement. But
they demonstrated that women could and did have a
public role. They have become symbols of a tradition
of strong and active Indonesian womanhood.
Indonesian women represent their movement as the
descendant of indigenous tradition. However, the
movement’s roots lie not with anti-colonial warriors,

but with a new class of educated women who, from
the beginning of the twentieth century, began to
analyses their societies in terms of the unequal status
and treatment of women.”
The argument showed that the history shaped the way of thinking
in the latent shape. Indonesia, in this era face the real inequality
of movement of women. Not only creating the women appearance
in public, for the freedom of thought, women must face the
obstacle coming from the society around her.The articulation of
the Indonesian women movement in this early phase is inextricably
linked with R. A. Kartini, considered ‘the pioneer of the emancipation
of the Indonesian woman’ (Mangoensarkoro, 1946: 19). As stated by
Susan Blackburn (2004)
“Kartini’s father, the regent (highest rank among

the priyayi) in Jepara, was unusual for his times in
allowing his daughters to attend Dutch elementary
schools. However, when they reached puberty they
were confined within the house as was the custom
in priyayi families in the period leading up to early
marriage – an insurance policy for the virginity of
the bride. Kartini pleaded with her parents to allow
her to continue her schooling and wrote impassioned
letters about it to her Dutch friends. She is considered
to have made out the most eloquent case for the

education of Javanese girls. In 1903 Kartini privately

memorialized the Dutch Government in support
of the education of the Javanese (Kartini, 1974 in
Blackburn, 2004). Although not arguing purely for
girls’ schooling, she saw the need to start with the
education of ‘the daughters of the nobility’. The
argument for educating them was primarily along
moral lines, resting on their potentially civilizing
influence as wives and mothers. The posthumous
publication of Kartini’s letters by Dutch friends in
1911 served to fuel the campaign for girls’ schooling.
She represents a fusion of the views of both educated
Indonesian girls and elements within the colonial
state.”
“Although Kartini recognized the need for collective

action to achieve social change, she did not
establish any women’s organizations. Her letters
are her lasting legacy to the movement. Kartini saw
education, marriage and employment as the most
important issues facing women. While Kartini wrote
as a member of the elite Javanese priyayi, the issues
similarly affected women from other classes, regions
and ethnic groups. Susan Blackburn (2004) argued
that from Kartini on, Indonesian women have
regarded education as basic to their advancement.
The first area of public policy in which Indonesian
women openly engaged with governments was
the education of girls. Protagonists reveal their
assumptions about gender relations. The education
issue was closely related to a number of other
concerns of women such as marriage, motherhood
and employment.”
Blackburn (2004) emphasizes the role of Kartini and her activity on

making women be seen by the state. Related with economy and basic
need of women is opportunity to have same background as men has.
Usually women only put in the back on the state system with its lack
of access to opportunity. But then, after it all the image of women is

seen to be the biggest part of her family establishment through her

nurturing manners. The modern state has played a prominent role
in providing education, in the sense of schooling. Before colonial
rule, Indonesian girls were educated informally, supervised by
parents who wanted them to be properly prepared for their role
in the workforce and/or married life. Girls were, after all, married
early. Although schools existed, they were intended for boys, and
it was rare indeed for girls to attend them. Most were managed by
religious groups, to train boys in the reading of sacred texts, since
religions were led by men (Reid, 1988). It can be said that sexual
division of labor are related with the educational change. While men
are expected to be the the backbone of the family by doing formal
work, women’s role was only limited as housewives and mothers.

Blackburn (2004) noticed this, which is related with the fact that to
get the access to higher education or even a job, women face more
threat than a man. Susan Blackburn (2004) continued said that
“Most of the women’s submissions put great

emphasis on the need to educate girls, and the way
arguments were worded largely reflecting class
differences among the women. Three submissions
came from women belonging to the royal houses
of central Java, the so-called Principalities of
Yogyakarta and Surakarta. All three recognized that
the purposes of educating girls of different classes
must differ. Vocational education, although relevant
for girls of lower classes who might be expected to
earn their own income, was not so important for
wives of the nobility whose lives were restricted.
Even if women chose marriage as their main goal,
schooling could help prepare them for that task.
Priyayi woman contributors of lower rank were
more outspoken in some respects, but in other ways
they echoed Dutch-middle class views of the period
and clearly addressed themselves to the needs of
that minority of women in their own social sphere.
The most interesting and forthright views were
expressed by the three women who had carved out
independent lives for themselves: Jarisah, a midwife

from Bandung, Raden Dewi Sartika, head of a girls’

school in Bandung, and Raden Ayu Siti Sundari,
editor of a Javanese women’s journal.”
The history of women in Indonesia is mostly started from Java. This

is because Java showed the fastest development during the colonial
era. In the same time, Javanese women should face the real challenge
in society about the appropriateness of women, whether woman
could leave the family for school or doing work, or only do their
domestic role at home. Indonesia for a long time has been struggling
for education as an elite way to be ‘seen’ as subject matter in real
life. Women are facing a real challenge in the state when it comes
to an acknowledgement. In social perspective, women also face the
harder image due to high risk of appropriateness in the name of

manner in the society. As Julia said in State Ibuism that Indonesia
must take more effort to eradicate the patriarchy and hierarchy in
the system and really take into account of acknowledging women
in public sphere. The role of women in PKK for example, not really
real due to the higher anarchy system of the leader is still president
in the PKK structure.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the writers would like to argue that from the beginning,
women in Indonesia face double subordination. Cynthia Enloe
(2000) stated that the personal is global and global is gendered is
truly true. Every woman experience almost same problem, that their
womanhood deny them to be part of the real world. Womanhood
and the identity is questioned, while women also should struggle to
keep up with the agenda that men created in the world. In gender
methods, equality seen as the ideal way of how men and women
supposed to share their role in social life.
Identity in the base, form men and women socially and construct
them into the way society accept them. In the case of how Indonesian
women walk through their history through education under
colonialism and now the digital era that force them to be faster to
adapt and catch the equality. The representative value of 30% in
legislative for women in Indonesia still poor in the practice. Some of
the candidate use the percentage only to fill the party participation

or to gain more voters for the party in general. Furthermore, the

representative also oftentimes is just women with popularity such
as celebrity, which not all of them understand the importance of
the political participation. Without proper and good education,
equality that women need to have is hard to achieve. Thus, the
writers do not see a big difference about the role of women from
and before colonial era and now. Women in Indonesia still face
the same challenges in the different timeline. Blackwood (2005)
in her writing even elaborate the other obstacle that women had in
Indonesia, which is sexuality. Talking about the obstacle, women are
never finish with single obstacle while another obstacle come after
another. The image of nurturing women become one of the hardest
part obstacle that women had. In the meantime, world is running

into more patriarchy and stabling its hierarchy to challenge women,
so that women should fight stronger.
References
Blackburn, Susan, 2004. Women and the State in Modern Indonesia.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Blackwood, Evelyn, 2005. “Gender Transgression in Colonial and
Postcolonial Indonesia”, The Journal of Asian Studies, 64
(4), pp. 849-879.
Enloe, Cynthia, 2000. Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making
Feminist Sense of International Politics. London: University
of California Press
Mangoensarkoro, S, 1946. Riwayat Pergerakan Wanita Indonesia.
Yogyakarta: Penerbit Wanitan Rakyat
Martyn, Elizabeth, 2005. The Women’s Movement in Post-colonial
Indonesia. Gender and Nation in a New Democracy. New
York: RoutledgeCurzon
Reid, A, 1998. “Political ‘tradition’ in Indonesia: the one and the
many’”, Asian Studies Review, 22 (1), pp. 23–38.
Suryakusuma, Julia, 2011. State Ibuism: The Social Construction of
Womanhood in New Order Indonesia. Depok: Komunitas
Bambu.

Indonesia’s Islamic Populism Influence on Indonesia’s Stance to ASEAN
Miftahul Choir
Indonesia’s Islamic Populism Influence on

Indonesia’s Stance to ASEAN
Miftahul Choir
Universitas Katolik Parahyangan, Bandung
Abstract
Since the establishing of Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) in 1967, Indonesia places the regional bloc on the core of
its concentric circle of foreign policy. Liberalist Indonesian regards
ASEAN as a regional organization that has potential to contribute

to the Indonesia’s economic development as well as achieving
regional stability. However, some changes in Indonesia’s regime and
administration create no significant change to the paradigm until
Joko Widodo (Jokowi) took over in 2014. Jokowi tried to introduce
people-based foreign policy and put more focus on economic
diplomacy. The consequence then falls to Indonesia’s priority on
ASEAN. Indonesia sees ASEAN in material advantage to determine
its active role in regional bloc. At the domestic level, as the demand
for better economic development increased, a lot of people use
religious sentiment to voice their demand and establishing a new
Islamic populism that is characterized by middle-class struggle
seeking for better economic wellbeing. Using Hadiz’s structural-
economy approach, this paper found that economic demand voiced
by Islamic group triggered Indonesia realist stance toward ASEAN.
This paper analyzes the characteristic of Indonesian Islamic
Populism to determine the motive of the populist movement and its
implication to Indonesia’s stance on ASEAN.
Keyword: Islamic populism, economic development, ASEAN,

foreign policy.
Introduction
Putting Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the
core of Indonesia’s foreign policy concentric circles has been an
undisputable decision made by all administrations of Indonesia.

Miftahul Choir
Prior to the establishment of ASEAN, Indonesia saw the period of

slight isolationism with a limited amount of diplomatic relations.
Existing diplomatic contact was only focused on the third world
struggle against imperial power, in order to justify the nation’s
struggle mandated by constitution. New Order era then marked the
beginning of liberal and rational Indonesia’s foreign policy, which
maintaining good relations with neighbors and establishing ASEAN
became the main focus of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Since then,
ASEAN remains as the forefront of Indonesia’s priority. However,
when Jokowi took the administration in 2014, he was giving a signal
that Indonesia will retreat from its liberalistic approach on foreign
policy. After spending two years in office, Jokowi stated the need
to evaluate 236 International Organizations that Indonesia has

joined. Economic rationality became the major determinant of the
decision. From this point, Jokowi might abandon Yudhoyono’s
‘thousand friends zero enemy’ policy. Jokowi saw the importance
of having small number of friends that can contribute directly to the
development of Indonesia, rather than thousand friends with no
benefit to the country. This decision can be seen when Jokowi chose to
absent in some multilateral summits such as the annual UN General
Assembly debate and APEC Summit consecutively. Therefore, the
debate raises on whether ASEAN is included on Indonesia’s retreat
from multilateralism. Jokowi’s aggressive posture and reluctance
toward ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) might be another sign
that the current administration only focused on bilateralism that
provide economic benefit for Indonesia.
This paper argues that it could be the Islamic populism who drive
Indonesia’s bilateral approach on foreign policy, contrast with the
rationalism school who stated that the economic rationality and
development are two things that led Jokowi’s decision to retreat from
multilateral relations. Jokowi’s pro-people foreign policy indeed
confused scholars to determine whether it is populism or rationality
that based Indonesia foreign policy right now. Andika (2016) defines
pro-people foreign policy as foreign policy that places the people
interest in the center of foreign policy aspect. The answer to the
question then became more obvious by combining the characteristic
of Islamic populism in Indonesia. Hadiz (2015) argues that
Indonesia Islamic populism is based on asymmetric class coalition

Miftahul Choir
that upholds the marginalized society linked with market pressure

and globalization. As Indonesia is an Islamic majority country with a
high number of middle-class societies, Islamic society itself then has
the capability to push pressure to Jokowi and become the object of
pro-people foreign policy. A pro-people foreign policy concerned the
welfare of society such as resource ownership, maritime, and strong
international stature.
Using structural-economy approach introduced by Hadiz, this

paper will answer how Islamic populism has shaped Indonesia’s
foreign policy towards ASEAN. Hadiz (2017) argues that structural-
economy approach emphasized on social based of populist politics
and associated conflict over power and resource within the specific
historical context. The approach clarifies material aspect of identity

politics, which will be beneficial to determine who the people are
in the pro-people foreign policy. Hadiz further argues that the
approach tries to fir the rationality with populist politics rather than
differentiate one to another. The analysis focus of this approach is
how the government transforms the populist demand in the context
of foreign policy. Therefore, the content of this paper will identify
the characteristics of Islamic populism in Indonesia and how Jokowi
strategy toward ASEAN labeled as Islamic populism driven policy.
The Problem of Populism in Indonesia

Hadiz’ typology on Indonesian populism is new Islamic populism,
that is different from populist movement in Europe but rather
similar to India and Latin America. Hadiz (2011) argues that
populism in Indonesia could arose due to the former authoritarian
regime and the pressure of globalization that limit the market
access. The demand of populist movement mainly against foreign
interest, corrupt officials, political repression and poverty (Hadiz,
2011). The goal of new Islamic populism is to ensure greater access
and control over state resources and market that favorable to
Islamic society (Hadiz, 2013). With such frustrating poor condition,
political Islam movement were seen as a response toward liberal
politic that they assumed have damaged the society and worsen the
government repression (Hadiz, 2010). The explanations show that
Islamic populism is in line with general public demands. Therefore,

Miftahul Choir
it can be said that Islamic populism mainly channels public demand

through the religious platform. Hadiz (2017) further argues that
religious and ethnicity platform had been more effective to give
pressure to the government as well as to gain support from society.
If it is traced back, Indonesia populism roots had begun since the
New Order era. New Order authoritarian regime affect the grown
of Islamic populism that demand for good governance. Aspinall
(2015) argues that populism arose when part of populations were
disillusioned and disenfranchised from political institutions. During
Soeharto regime, the lack of political inclusion toward the Muslim
group led Islamist movement to play an underground de facto role
to articulate populist demand. Thus, the fall of Soeharto meant the
rise of Islamic political platform (Hadiz & Robinson, 2017). Other

structural aspects of Indonesia’s economic failure take the blame
on corrupt government, political patronage and the willingness to
follow western loan. Hadiz and Robinson (2017) argues that IMF
structural adjustment program forced Indonesia to sell several
national enterprises, causing the rise of anti-western stance by
the population. Failed liberalization policy not only had failed to
generate bourgeoise among Muslim, but also gave room for Chinese
oligarch to establish themselves in the country. Thus, the sentiment
of anti-Chinese and anti-Western grows.
Jokowi’s campaign promises and its realization are the evidence that
the current administration is based on new Islamic populism. Jokowi
sees that each of Indonesian personal goal is to have better economic
that channeled through Islamic movement. The Islamic movement
encompasses political party such as Prosperity and Justice Party
(PKS) along with national organization such as Nadhlatul Ulama
and Islamic Defender Front. Jokowi then not only emphasized the
national economic development, but also the country’s economic
sovereignty. To organize the realization of the plan, Jokowi created
Nawacita as national development priorities that consist of nine
points. Jokowi decided to focus on tangible resources as the previous
government failed to provide infrastructure, health care, education
as well as establishing good government. The first point of Nawacita
is to give assistances toward Indonesia’s maritime state status.
Jokowi claimed that prior to his administration, Indonesia had loss
Rp 240 trillion due to illegal fishing. Indonesia weak navy condition

Miftahul Choir
also contributed to the decreasing Indonesia’s legitimacy in maritime

aspect. Therefore, it is become Jokowi main sub-strategy to ensure
economic welfare by ensuring Indonesia legitimacy on the sea first.
Maritime state strategy also in line with further Nawacita strategy
that urges to build the outskirt area of Indonesia that previously
abandoned by the government.
Nawacita also highlights the self-sufficient economic approach

introduced by Jokowi which the goal is to prevent foreign interest in
Indonesia’s economic activity. Jokowi’s definition of self-sufficient
economic approach is that the development has to belong to the
people and invite the participation of society at large. From this
point, it could be seen that Jokowi’s spirit is similar with what
Soekarno’s had during the guided democracy period, although

the assistance that come from a lot of countries remain far from
Soekarno’s economic isolationism policy. Despite Jokowi declared
that he is open for the foreign investments to enhance infrastructure
development, Jokowi also had assertive stance toward foreign direct
investment especially after the nationalization of Freeport claim
which regarded as the economic victory for Indonesian. However,
critics show that despite the economy has been fairly well in Jokowi’s
administration, it is still lack of bureaucratic reform which affected
the lack of seriousness on implementing the Nawacita. Government
bodies still have no strategy to perform each point and they have
low level of coordination among bodies. This also highlights that
Nawacita was not based on rationalist consideration, after seeing
that the government institutions were not ready to implement it, and
thus it was only made to satisfy the populist demand of economic
well-beings.
Consequences to ASEAN
Jokowi’s emerging inner Soekarnoism meaning that Indonesia has
taken a more realist approach on foreign policy. However, instead
of following Soekarno’s step on ideational forces as the justification
of foreign policy conduct, Jokowi relied on material factors such as
economic development. Jokowi championed the idea of economic
diplomacy and it is becoming the main direction of Nawacita.
Jokowi pro-people diplomacy stated that each diplomatic activity

Miftahul Choir
shall have some requirements such as connection to the economic

development, active in bilateral mechanism rather than multilateral,
and promoting Indonesia economic competitiveness. Pro-people
diplomacy also highlighting Jokowi interpretation of free and active
principle. The determinator of free and active is whether Indonesia
gaining economic advantage from having foreign relations and
strongly prevent any disadvantage toward Indonesia.
Jokowi realist stance on foreign policy could be attributed as part of

Islamic populist politics, especially when seeing Jokowi emphasized
to give advantage for Indonesia economic development. Plagemann
and Destradi (2018) argue that populist driven foreign policy
prioritize to fulfill the national interest, thus limiting the chance

of multilateralism and preferences toward bilateralism. Populist
regard job losses, unemployment, and immigrant are consequences
of multilateralism regime through the means of free trade and
liberalization. Linn (2017) argues that the willingness to participate
in regionalism also low if it is not related to the material aspect of
state. The previous administration was practicing soft power with
gaining influence and status, but fail to meet the domestic material
needs. Indonesia foreign policy is no longer directed toward external
ambitions but more inward-looking through protective trade,
industrial policy, and re-acceptance of state-owned enterprises.
Therefore, Jokowi decide to take a materialistic based policy in
order to fulfill what society needs. However, it does not mean that
Jokowi totally abandon Indonesia existence in international world.
The relation that Jokowi created abroad is to bring development in
Indonesia. This point then explain that the international dimension
of Nawacita included but not limited to protect the maritime security,
economic development, and protection of Indonesia’s citizens
abroad and immigrant. With that priority and realist-materialistic
turn, Indonesia role in ASEAN come into question as Indonesia
had a quarrel on those issues with ASEAN member states and the
organization nature.
Indonesia currently seeing ASEAN in zero-sum logic and competitive

manners. Indonesia’s main interest to secure maritime security give
consequences on the worsening relations with neighbors such as
Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines as Indonesia keep

Miftahul Choir
sinking a lot of fishing boats that trespassed its territory. Dharma

Agistia and Anak Agung (2015) argue that the decision to sink
foreign boats is going to astray Indonesian waters, and could be an
evidence that Indonesia has perceived fellow ASEAN member states
as adversaries. On the other hand, Indonesia assertiveness shows
that Indonesia is no longer taking diplomatic measures and rule-
based regional order to solve an issue. Indonesian regards Jokowi’s
strong stance toward illegal poaching as a nationalist act to protect
the maritime sovereignty and thus justified further sinking boat
action. The action also highlight Indonesia’s strength on enforcing
domestic rule of law toward greater power. Jokowi then brings the
issue on each of ASEAN summit and become Indonesia’s priority,
ahead of the implementation of AEC and South China Sea situation.
Other evidence of Indonesia realist stance toward ASEAN is shown

by Indonesia’s treatment on ASEAN member states and Indonesia
foreign policy doctrine. Shekhar (2015) argues that Indonesia sees
ASEAN as a small regional organization and could disunite its
national interest in Indo-Pacific. The way Indonesia sees ASEAN
might be justified by the disunity of ASEAN member states regarding
the South China Sea issue, unwillingness to put a strong effort
on Rohingya humanitarian crisis, and because there are different
paradigm on handling maritime security. Historically, Indonesia
disappointed by the incapability of ASEAN to support Indonesia’s
effort in securing Sipadan-Ligitan border dispute. It then make
Indonesia introduced the Indo-Pacific concept which only include
Japan, India, and Australia as partner. Adi (2015) argues that the
move also highlights Indonesia’s increasing role in Indian Ocean
Rim Association as Indonesia seeks to be the major Indian ocean
power that focused on domestic economic development. Indonesia
‘Maritime Doctrine’ announced for the first time in the 2014 East
Asia Summit (EAS). EAS then provide a wider forum for Indonesia
to introduce the doctrine, as long with the effort to avoid rhetorical
debate with ASEAN member states.
Indonesia participation in ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)

comes into questions. Jokowi stated that in order to participate
in AEC, at least three conditions have to be followed: (1) ASEAN
member states must accelerate infrastructure and connectivity, (2)

Miftahul Choir
enhancing investment on industry and manufacture, and (3) uphold

the principle of reciprocity. Jokowi clearly stated that Indonesia
would not mind to not take part in AEC if it is disadvantaging
Indonesia. However, despite its proximity, Singapore and Malaysia
are the only ASEAN member states that reach top ten positions
on Indonesia Economic Diplomacy Index (Sabaruddin, 2016). In
ASEAN intra-trade, exports are mostly done by Malaysia, Singapore,
Thailand, and the Philippines (Damuri, 2017). However, Jokowi
repeatedly stated that Indonesia should not afraid of AEC although
the fact is that free trade brings obstacle toward the self-sufficient
principle.
How Indonesia response toward the global Islamic movements is

a clear sign that Islamic populism is influencing Indonesia foreign
policy. Comparing with the previous administration that had no
significant influence toward Islamic movement or Middle East states’
issues (Pitsuwan, 2012), Indonesia under Jokowi’s administration
actively participate on promoting Palestinian independence.
Indonesia Foreign Ministry annual press statement even stated
that defending Palestinian independence is a priority of Indonesia
foreign policy, because it is mandated by the constitution. Indonesia
membership on UNSC as non-permanent member also provides
Indonesia a wider platform to voice the issue. As in the regional level,
the active role of Indonesia on behalf of the Rohingya humanitarian
crisis showed Indonesia global Islamic movement. However,
Indonesia inactive stance to Rakhine humanitarian crisis is due to
the comply of ASEAN Way, that then created a huge demonstration
in the country along with a demand to persona non grata Myanmar
ambassador in Jakarta. The Indonesia attempt to pressure ASEAN
to actively engage in this issue meet failure, that make Indonesia
then opt to an alternative and stronger organizations. Indonesia
also decided to take bilateral move to mitigate the issue. As a
result, Indonesia has successfully put Rohingya on Organization
of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) meeting and promised that the issue
will be brought to UNSC. Indonesia Foreign Minister also flexing
Indonesia’s role on mitigating the conflict by visiting the conflicted
area Rakhine and had a diplomatic meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi.
Indonesia also dispatches humanitarian assistance to Rohingya that
consist of Indonesia domestic Islamic group.

Miftahul Choir
Conclusion
Indonesia Islamic populism did not directly influence the Indonesia
foreign policy. Economic nationalism remains the justification and
demand for Indonesia government to be achieved. The implication
of Islamic populism in foreign policy can be shown in pro-people
and economic diplomacy that is oriented to gain economic welfare
for the people and effort to decrease any disadvantage to the country.
Indonesia realist stance toward ASEAN shows that Indonesia regards
the regional bloc becoming less important and being unimportant
to Indonesia’s economic development and as a threat to Indonesia
welfare and maritime security.
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Amaranila Nariswari, Andy Fernanda Probotrianto, and Lucia Tamara Maharani
Globalization: A Challenge to Indonesia’s

Policy Making
Amaranila Nariswari, Andy Fernanda Probotrianto,

and Lucia Tamara Maharani
Abstract
Globalization is an inevitable phenomenon experienced by any
actors within international society. It seems imminent and nearly

impossible to halt its progress in interconnected world. Among
those, Indonesia has been impacted. Like other actors, Indonesia
has its own attributes that distinguish it from the rest. These
features unified to form a concept of the region’s identity. This
paper would explain the implication of Indonesia’s national identity
in the context of globalized international society. This article will
be divided into three sections. The first section discusses how the
identity was formed in the first place using the socio-analysis scope
of regional values and norms, integrated with accepted foreign
values which have established the foundation of the nation-state,
resulting in products such as political system, economic system, and
constitutions. The second would reveal globalization as a concrete
phenomenon, challenges, as well as the possibilities it possesses.
The third part would be an analysis of public policy status-quo. This
part would also display reflections, critics, and link-ups between
regulations and identity. In the end, the authors would like to
promote the certain concept of ideal policy which would be linear
with the country’s characteristics for policy-makers to reconsider.
Keywords: Constitutions, Globalization, Identity, Indonesia,

Policy
Introduction: National Identity and Globalization

National identities have always been one of the important aspects
of a country. Suparlan (1999) stated that identity is one form of

recognition to groups that are based on the characteristics that

constitute a whole unit, thus it differentiates one from another. The
national identities of Indonesia itself show the characteristics of
the people of Indonesia, even before the term ‘Indonesia’s national
identities’ formed during the country’s Independence Day in 1945
(Bowen, 1986). As a state with a width of 1,905 million km2, Indonesia
is capable to accommodate 264 million people within. However, the
lands in Indonesia are separated by various oceans due to its status as
an archipelago state. Thus, national identities are very much needed
for the people to communicate and to maintain the people’s sense
of one and togetherness. When Indonesia gained its independence
from the colonization, the founding fathers of the country declared
the country’s identities, started with the shape, basic rules such as
the constitutions, and even the national anthem and language that
is now widely used and known in the whole country.
In this modern era, we can see that globalization plays a big role
in our lives. It brings along knowledge and understandings toward
new things we did not know before the globalization came in.
Globalization itself, as described by Giddens (1990), is a world-
wide process of intensification of social relations that connect
one phenomenon with others that happen in different places,
resulting in the changes of all cultures. Globalization can be seen
as many things: internationalism; liberalization; universalization;
westernization; and even deterioration (Scholte, 2007 in Riyanto,
2016). In Indonesia, globalization brings both positive and negative
effects. At some point, globalization helps the country to develop and
brings many chances for youngsters to see the world from different
perspectives, but on the other hand, it also brings out the sense of
individualism in human nature.
These days, Indonesian youngsters seemed to be absorbed with the

spread of the current wave of globalization, thus, they tend to leave
out the sense of responsibility to implement the country’s national
identities despite they still play a big role in the country’s developing
process toward this modern era. With the easiness people get from
globalization, it is easy as well for any information to come inside.
However, not everything that comes riding the wave of globalization
is good. Some might even harm the people or even the country

itself. Here is where the national identities play their role, they are
supposedly able to filter all those bad impacts coming inside the
country.
Indonesia and Globalization through Constructivism

In order to comprehend the subject, an analysis is best done using
the theoretical framework of constructivism. This alternative way
of viewing international interactions coined a vital point which is
dismissed by the mainstream realism-liberalism. Constructivism is
derived from the discipline of Sociology as a theory that perceived
the social process and symptoms as something not naturally exists.
It suggests that every single social interaction is man-driven, or in

other words, socially constructed.
While it is still debatable whether this concept is a theory or merely

a perspective, its adaptation in international studies really is a
‘game-changer’, complementing mainstream variables of interest
and power by focusing itself on social factors and structures that
composing them (Hadiwinata, 2017). In the context of policy-
making, it depends on the will and power of society, not merely
by political representation and government officials on the state’s
behalf (Wicaksana, 2018). This means that the people who comprise
the nation have the ability to influence the process of regulation
formation based on each personal preference and prejudice. Also,
such judgments do not come naturally nor intuitively, rather having
been taught, socialized, and internalized for a long time within
the corridor of society’s values and norms. Thus, it later becomes
a rooting identity in a particular community. On that statement,
constructivism has also diminished the state-centric paradigm
by emphasizing the importance of prominent social figures and
institutions.
Identity serves as a beacon for every actor’s decisions. Hadiwinata

(2017) describes it as a guide to differentiating between friends and
foes, who should and should not be interact with, and who are the
threats and allies. To acknowledge the right actors to engage with,
Alexander Wendt (1999) cited in Hadiwinata (2017) suggested that
there are three master variables that cause huge implications: (1)
homogeneity, two or more actors can conduct a prospering relation

if they have similarity within their core identity. This could be the
same with cultural trait, a matching geographical landscape, political
attitude or ideology; (2) common fate, when two or more actors were
stuck in the same status quo, for example having a common enemy
in a war or had a strong historical bond in the past, they would
most likely to collaborate; and (3) interdependence, this variable is
more related to economy as stated by the neoliberalist perspective.
It occurs when one actor has resources that others do not, and so
applied to them as well. As a consequence, and driven by internal
demands, they would engage in a mutualistic and profitable trade.
Presentation of Indonesia’s National Identity and

Violation
The national identities of Indonesia are formed based on Indonesia’s

norms and values that had been naturalized. Indonesia’s founding
fathers have realized their people’s fundamental mentality traits
from the indigenous people of Indonesia on how they interact
with each other. Those traits are shaped by the behavior of its
people even before Indonesia declared their independence from
colonization. Take, as an instance, Indonesia is known for their
sense of togetherness, or in Bahasa’s term “Gotong Royong”, and it
shows in their legitimate national identities such as Pancasila and
the constitutions, two of the most important forms of the national
identities of Indonesia. Thus, this system became a tradition within
the Indonesians, then a part of Indonesia’s national identity. It
can be seen that this system is completely different from how the
Western people work, in how they mostly work individually rather
than relying on one another.
Those constellations of values and norms were then rolled into

one to create one of the products, Pancasila, the five principles of
Indonesia’s common value: (1) Believe in One and Only God; (2) A
just and civilized humanity; (3) A unified Indonesia; (4) Democracy,
Guided by the Inner Wisdom in the Unanimity Arising Out of
Deliberations Amongst Representatives; and (5) Social Justice for
the Whole of the People of Indonesia. These values that are planted
in Pancasila are then being used as the people’s reference in living
their lives. However, globalization has introduced different points
of view on the way to implement them. These days, youngsters

seem to neglect the purpose of their national identities: to protect

them and to protect the country and tend to live their lives as they
want. This phenomenon can be seen through many cases, as an
instance: free sex and the spread of hoaxes. Those acts violated the
value implemented in Pancasila. Free sex specifically violated the
first sila (principle), where every religion recognized in Indonesia
believes that it’s completely wrong to do premarital intercourse,
while spreading hoaxes did violate the second sila, where telling
false accusation is not acceptable in any culture, as well as violated
the third sila, considering the act might bring dispute within the
country.
Globalization: A Challenge or a Threat

As the world progressed and developed over time, communications
between different nations start to emerge rapidly. A distant journey
from one continent to another would take about a year to be done.
While in today’s interconnected world, it may not take days. This is
one of the indicators of globalization. As stated above, globalization
described it as an intensification of worldwide social relations which
interconnecting distant localities that makes local event happened
as caused by other events which located miles away (Giddens,
1990). In the other way, Globalization itself is indeed a never-
ending process. Cultural exchange is one of the most prominent
signs of globalization. Giddens (1990) argues that the revolution
of telecommunication technology makes it easier for any foreign
information to be transferred. However, it is believed that this could
be either a challenge or a threat, especially towards a particular
nation’s identity. One of the commonly known phenomena is
Premarital Sex and the spread of hoax.
Indonesia’s Policy in the Globalized Society

As the wave of globalization keeps roaming, one thing people should
be aware of is how it can possibly affect one country’s identity.
Therefore, a good policy is crucially needed in order to filter foreign
influence that is not in accordance to the values where Indonesia
identity was built upon. The urgency of good policies is very high
due to the wave of globalization that is vastly emerging in Indonesia.
The absence of precise policy to filter the bad impacts brought by the

borderless society will then bring damage to national identity being

corrupted. The corrupted national identity would later manifest
in the lack of sense of belonging in the people and violation to the
current constitution due to the degrading people’s obedience to the
national constitution. But, a false understanding of globalization can
also restrain people from their freedom of receiving information and
the chance of developing themselves in the globalized era. A proper
set of policy can help Indonesia to cope up with the globalization
without risking its identity and without restricting its people from
development.
With that being said, the writers believe that Indonesia has done
numerous efforts in order to protect its people and identity from
external threats. There are few constitutions we will focus in this

part namely Constitution regarding Electronic Information and
Transaction or as known as UU ITE (act on Electronic Information
and Technology) and the recently discussed Bill on Sexual Abuse or
RUU PKS in Indonesia.
During its early days, UU ITE gained large attention from the people.
Both supportive and unsupportive statements were given to the
fresh law. Most people used to refuse the designed law due to their
perception where UU ITE will only limit their freedom of speech and
people movement. UU ITE, also known as Act Number 11 year 2008,
regulate the use of information. This law focused on how to use the
technology an internet properly, UU ITE emphasizes more on the
violation of the use of technology, the criminal offense. The existence
of this regulation is in order to protect Indonesian people and values
–such as the second and third principle of Pancasila which is (2)
Just and Civilized Humanity and (3) The Unity of Indonesia from
potential cyber violation in the borderless globalization era in the
form of hoax and hate speech which potentially harm the unity of
Indonesia.
Regarding the currently trending issue, the RUU PKS, there has
been quite an influential polemic in the society whether to support
or to refuse. The rejections upon this RUU were spread all over the
internet and social media as their media of communication in this
globalized era. In order to understand whether the RUU is worth to
support or need to be reconsidered, it is crucial to read the draft law

first and listen to people’s critic towards it. Critics were thrown to
RUU PKS due to presumption where this draft law promotes what
protestors called as free sex as an impact on borderless society in
the modern era. Most of the protestor underlined the article where
sexual control is a part of sexual violence and therefore there should
be no sexual control means everyone has their own sexual rights.
This article was perceived as a prohibition on parents to control their
child’s sexual desire as well as a prohibition on husband to demand
upon his wife to fulfill his gender needs. It is clear that the reasons
behind the refusal were also influenced by certain groups with distinct
values that might have a tendency towards patriarchy. As a response
to the refusal, the legislative –as the one who made the draft law,
delete that particular article from the draft and merge it from 15 to

only 6 forms of sexual violence (Khusnaeny, 2016). From the action
being explained before, it is then concluded the government made
the draft law in order to protect its people from sexual violence,
preserve national divine values from the first principle (sila 1)
and not the other way round, which means promoting the free sex
behavior that was spread rapidly during the globalization era. Critic
is a good thing; it is something has to be listened and understood in
order to develop the country better. From this particular RUU PKS
case, people who criticize don’t then merely mean they are against
the law, sometimes the public just want to add other values.
Conclusion
After reviewing the explanation, we can understand that the
constitution was made based on national identity. In Indonesia,
the constitution or Undang-Undang Dasar (UUD) and Pancasila
concept has become the national identity of Indonesia. In order to
preserve the value of identity, there should be specific policies that
focus on filtering the influence brought by the globalization wave.
Writers do not deny the fact that there have been several efforts done
by the government in order to fortify the nation. In order to cope up
with the dynamic state of globalization, the state has to adjust itself
with the right policy.
To author a good policy, besides having to be based on national

identity, it is crucial to listen to people’s needs and aspirations

from various social classes. Therefore, the state can pass precise
and applicable policy that can be implemented efficiently. Starting
from the national identity to receive people’s aspiration and lastly,
to establish a policy concerning the current phenomenon is the
right pattern to make a good policy. This pattern, of course, can be
implemented in various countries especially neighboring countries
that share a similarity in geographic or social structure.
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Penghapusan Kekerasan Seksual: Akses Keadilan,
Kebenaran dan Pemulihan bagi Korban” in Jurnal
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Klasik. Surabaya: Airlangga University Press.

Islamic Iran Revolution as Persian-Shia Rising
Alifian MN Pradana & Marion Radityatama
Islamic Iran Revolution as Persian-Shia

Rising

Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Ampel, Surabaya
Abstract
This paper reviews a phenomenon in 1979 known as Islamic
Revolution of Iran. Based on scholarly literature this phenomenon
provides a viable topic to be discussed because due to it contains

and intersects their identity as a Persian nation, which need
modernization in becoming an Islamic republic after several years
led by monarch. The Revolution reflects to the daily life in Iran
under Shah Reza Pahlevi. Various repression took place internally
because Iran’s Shah Reza acted as a secular leader or separated
the power of religion and political legitimacy due to his closeness
to the United States armed forces and the CIA. Ruhollah Khomeini
as the opposition of the government took down Shah Reza since
the majority of Iranian people agreed that Iran alliance to western
powers during the Cold War did not intersect with the values of Shiah
Moslem as their national sect. Supposedly, Persia is a great nation in
history. Iran officially became the Islamic Republic on April 1, 1979
after a national referendum, only two months after Shah Reza was
overthrown by Shia Ulama.
Keywords: Islamic Revolution of Iran, Moslem Shia, Persia,

Ruhollah Khomeini, Shah Reza,
Introduction
Modern Iranians today are direct descendants of the Persians and
also the Aryans who have geographically inhabited the region for
hundreds of years. The nation of Persia had ambitions to rule the
region from the past. Traditional security concepts and also the
concept of the global economy approach stated that they have
geostrategic position over seapower and landpower trade. Persian

before conquest of Islam held Zoroasthrian as the majority religion

followed by Jews and Christianity at Neo-Persian Empire or often
called Sassania Empire. Empirical studies talked about their
intersection and correlation to Shia as second sect in Islam occured
because marriage Hussein ibn Ali ibn Abu Thalib with Shahrbanu as
the princess of Persia known as the third daughter of Yazdagerd III.
Incidentally, Ali as the father of Hussein had a follower called Shia.
So that at that time the Persian army who became prisoners of war
and also slaves by the Arabs decided to convert to Moslem Shia of
the loyal followers of Ali as stated by Boroujerdi (1994).
Different leaders have certainly different perspectives. Persians had

led the Iranian monarchy until the time of Ahmad Shah Qajar which
expand their empire until to the borders of Russia. Reza Khan as

the Prime Minister taking over Qajar Dynasty that have been more
than a century. As the Shah (King), he rebuilt international political
powers through ethnic nationalization dubbed “Persianization”,
which had experienced a decline during the Qajar dynasty. His
most famous and phenomenal ways is to invite foreign diplomats
or delegations to a country that has been independent at that time.
He also sent a representative of the League of Nations to call Persia
“Iran”, as for his Monarch it means “Land of Aryan” due Persian
being descendants of Aryan folk. His efforts to sponsor scholarship
for Iranian Student to Europe receive international attention in
education and human quality increasement. Industrial for foreign
relations developed from oil installation and oil concession to
Turkey under Mustofa Kemal Attaturk and their affiliation to Great
Britain. This plan unexpected because Britain only give 16% profits
than what Iran need at 21%, this concession recognize as Anglo-
Persian Oil Company that making Iran controlled by Soviet in their
northern border and Great Britain in the west. Exploitation of oil
by production and excessive export make change their pivot before
World War II to Germany to minimalize influence of Soviet and
Britain administration in his countries.

Method
Methodology Description
This paper represent qualitative research in international relations
studies about Iran by collective secondary literature studies. It
includes on; book, thesis, dissertation, online journal, e-Book, official
website, newspaper and the other electronic media. Furthermore, all
book reference uses the collection in State Islamic University Sunan
Ampel Surabaya and Surabaya City Library. Then, for the online
journal mostly we use Researchgate and Cambridge Journal Online.
This research uses descriptive analysis type as a majority research
form in social studies to describe social symptoms that are related

to human behaviour with a variety of spectacles and dynamics.
Because in researching culture, identity, and nationhood, we need
several paradigm. Purposes of qualitative method in efforts to
illustrate systematically fact from object or subject which researched
exactly. Where qualitative methods are based on various approaches
that focus on one or a small number of cases and explain the small
case with rich information. Such as Carmines and Zeller (2010) said
that we know together in this case we met several unique cases that
cannot reviewed from just one perspective.
Approach
We decide use historical approach to find validity of data because
in Islamic Iran Revolution by Khomeini bring new social system
comprising of a complex web of human experience. Historical
approach might reduce some information that have been developed
by political actor whether Iran political actor or Western political
actor. Because reductionist function at this term see the outline of
the direction of the Iranian state after the Islamic revolution was
ambitious to become the dominant power or leader of regional
(regional leadership) in the Middle East. In addition, to avoiding
disputes in the conventional academic world the history of pre-
Islamic Persian religious culture and Islamic studies as a theoretical
framework or conceptual tool to analyse more deeply the Islamic
tradition and to gain a clear understanding of the relationships
between various elements including structural relations with
other traditions. Two approaches that are placed on a continuum

line and combination that stretches from a normative approach to

a descriptive approach. The normative approach is an approach
inspired by motivation and religious goals, while the descriptive
approach appears as an answer to the motivation of intellectual or
academic curiosity. Complexity of the social approach that reviews
from ancient manuscripts is certainly inseparable from religious
collaboration that said by Kitagawa and Eliade (1973).
Result
Iran Ethnicity and Religion

Based on the background of the main problem of Iran, there
are the segment of policymaking according to most population

system that is called Persian-way. Term of “Iran” refers to the
ancient relief that said “Eran” or Proto-Indo-Aryan as reflection of
ethnicity. For religion, 95% Iran population are Moslem divide two
categories details: 90% Shia Moslem and 5% Sunni Moslem, general
census report in 2011 percentage with accuracy number of civilian
74,682,938. The other religions have percentage under 1% build on
The Ministry of Culture and Islam Guidance data. The same source
defined religion as a set of shared beliefs and values which carry
certain ideological orientations. Several ministries under the auspice
of Supreme Leader of Iran changes the outline of foreign policy
and domestic policy relations. For example in telecommunication
industry, non-domestic companies are restricted after Islamic Iran
Revolution to be around 65% in Tehran as the Capital states and 30-
40 % out of Tehran (Ansari, 2002).
Western perspective seen this phenomenon as Anti-Western

because referendum result in 1979 majority of population choose
Qanun Al-Esasi (Islamic constitutional principle). Unfortunately,
after Gulf War against Iraq, Iran has grown unpopular since the Cold
War. Ruhollah Khomeini as Supreme Leader relaxed some rules
in the Islamic constitution. Nevertheless, Iran successfully show
their Ideology and identity world in their penetration in Non-Align
Movement (NAM) as General Secretary twice respectively during
the tenure of President Ahmadinejad and President Rouhani. Iran
became the host of 16th NAM Summit in Tehran from 26 until 31
August 2012 and 150 countries attended in political context. National

Project of Shia in Religion, introduced in educations in Organization

of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Public debate over this promotion
under international affairs occurred between conservative movement
and reformist. Reformist folk rejected and doesn’t recognizes the
idea of multi-ethnic and multi-religion. Frequently, Reformist
rejected the minority right that make a negative relation between
government that dominated by Shia and Persian and opposition
mostly from minority groups. In fact, it is not uncommon for them
to do extreme methods until they are executed by the government
because they are considered as rebels who have rejected the existing
system. We found two minority ethnic group involved in carrying
out separatist movements and internal terrorism in the Iran, namely
the Baluch ethnic and Kurdish ethnic groups in empirical studies of

this paper (Heydarian, 2009).
There are a number of ethnic groups living in Iran such as Persian

(51%), Azeri (24%), Gilaki and Mazandarani (8%), Kurd (7%), Arab
(3%), Lor (2%), Baloch (2%) Turkmen (2%), and other (1%) (World
Factbook 2011). Among the above ethnic groups, Sunni Muslims are
related to Kurds and Belouch (Denny 1987). These ethnic groups
have stressed that they have their own culture, dress codes for both
males and females and their own values. The traditional enemy
either in region or transnational Islamic movement of Iran is Saudi
Arabia. Saudi Arabia ideology respectively is Pan-Arabism and
for religion are Wahabism Moslem that contrary with Iran which
bring Pan-Persian and Shia Moslem. History is the most important
element in order to resolving the problem what happening nowadays.
Tendencies of historiographic directing authors to productive in
phenomenology since 100 years ago. Acculturation of Persian
culture and Islam depicted in the Iranian flag renewed two different
cultures in which three red and white red strips have sufficient and
deep meaning to be culturally revitalized. Khomeini replace Lion
and Sun in the white strips with “Allah” Takbir kalimah or symbols
in Kufi script. Lion and Sun assume do not illustrated Islam because
it represented polytheism in Mediteranian or Middle East pre-Islam
occurrence and expansion. Acculturation of culture in the symbol
two main religions which are the major religions in Iran some
histories interpret the symbol as indeed Allah and there is another
debate by expressing the opinion that the symbol is Ahura Mazda or

the highest God in the Majusi or Zoroasthrian. Thus, the Kufi script
was written 22 times because 11 February 1979 is equivalent towards
Persian calendar date of 22 Bahman. The green colour for Iran is
descendent of Cyrus II spirit and red colour as Islamic symbol to
against western (Clawson and Rubin, 2009).
Discussion
Shia as a Pillar of Iran Identity

In Iran, Shia defined “power” in national power and international
power by their own concept precisely after Islamic Iran Revolution
1979. They introduced the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih which tried
to combine the concept of Persian heritage democracy with religious

foundations according to what they understood. The consequence is
that the political, economic and social system in Iran must be based
on the values of Shia theology. Therefore, to maintain Shia ideology
in Iranian life society then established a system that systematically
gave the Ayatollah power as the highest authority in politics and
religion. He is able to influence the policies taken by him in the
political sectors of executive, legislative and judiciary. Even the
Ayatollah is the party authorized to appoint the elected president
in the election. He can also dismiss the president if he violates an
Iranian consensus. With this great influence, it was not only the
institution that was guaranteed, but also a system that could enable
Shia cadres to become influential leaders in that country. There
was a massive reform in the formation of the social structure and
government of Iran. The Shi’ite Imamiyyah is used as the official
state Mazhab as well as the state ideology.
In addition, Ayatollah has the authority to appoint several strategic

officials such as military commanders, directors of national radio
and television networks, religious leaders, imams in mosques, and
members of the national security council relating to Iran’s foreign
affairs and political affairs. He also has the authority to declare
war and peace. This shows that the Ayatollah as a stronger position
than the president of Iran. As for the president, he is responsible
for implementing it constitution and other executive duties. He
chooses ministers and coordinates government decisions and takes
policies the position of the Ayatollah was very strategic and strong

as a guarantor over Shia politics in Iran is included in establishing

institutions important state regulated in the Iranian constitution
as it is carried out by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1998. On June 14th
2013 for example, Iran carried out presidential elections Hassan
Rouhani, a core Shia cadre, was elected as the Iranian president
replaced Ahmadinejad who had led Iran for two periods. His
position is strong enough because he won 18,613,329 or 50.71% of
the votes. John L. Esposito (1990) Shia movement transnationally
succeeded in advancing as a living tool for the mass movement which
was quite effective by upholding East identity and value systems
whose tendencies were anti-Western which called Avant-Garde or
Vanguard by their Ulama (Ward, 2009).

Rouhani was able to solve various problems what Iran has faced so
far, mainly related to international sanctions due to the development
of nuclear reactors. In the last decade, Iran has indeed faced various
problems such as unemployment, poverty, currency devaluation,
and rising inflation. The presence of the Islamic Republic of Iran
since 1979 significantly contributed to the determination of the
configuration security in the region, which is also a concern for
the international community. Last time, the termination of Iran’s
diplomatic relations by Saudi Arabia on January 3, 2016 has raised
concerns from various parties either in Middle East as their regional
an international public. Iran does not recognize double citizenship
based on ‘Persianization’. According to the Alexandre Wendt (2003)
there are four concepts of state identity essentially: corporate
identity, type identity, role identity, and collective identity which
formulated. This identity is formed when Iran sees himself in relation
to other party. Type identity is intrinsic to the actor regardless of the
other partylike it or not. In the context of the country, type identity
manifest in the form of ‘type of regime’ or ‘shape of state’. Around
98,72% after referendum majority Iran citizen chose Republic.
Persianization
Different with flag that symbolize acculturation, Persianization by
Shah Reza pattern imitate Turkification by Mustofa Kemal Attaturk
to reunites Ottoman Empire spirit. This nationalization project
use assimilation applied to the people in the environment of Iran

geographically and historical periods early. Iranian today as modern

Persia tries to bring the Moghul Empire spirit. In the past, Khan Clan
protect the cultures of Persia then make adaptation and adoption
in Persian traditional costumes. This policy also applies to Jews
who still live in Iranian territory before finally returning to Israel
where they wear non-sewn clothes or often called Persian scarves.
Linguistically their enthusiasm built the concept of Persianization
so that Persian language would not become extinct after the British
changed the official language of the imperial mogul from Persia to
Urdu and it was said to be successful as an unannounced language
like the ancient Egyptian language. Historiography of Persian
cultures could be found in literary and archiitecture of various
historical buildings. At this point Persianization concept chain direct
to philological way after negative excess in Pan-Turkism. Whereas

the adoption of integration policies preserved by Iran’s geographic
integrity and the majority of Persian with a secure and firm national
identity in sphere of entity, the ignorance of other demands, such
as the call for formation of society based on law and order, left the
country still searching for a Persian political identity in Middle East
(Kelidar 1983).
Conclusion
As mentioned on the all of the section above Identity and
Nationhood notions developed from ancient glorious of previous
Empire. In Western paradigm after the Islamic Iran Revolution
introduced to the world in the modern way theocratic movement
transnationally. Governments are the representative of God
were show political environment and culture of Persianization
intersect with impact of Islamic Iran Revolution. It installed new
restructurization power by considering different ethnic groups and
cultures in Iran, the Islamic Revolution can be regarded as the most
influential factor in the inclusiveness of legislation and policies.
Iran’s hegemony was practiced by the new Islamic government.
In particular the relationship between religion and ethnicity Iran
Islamic Revolution have negative impact to reject minority right in
addition of Persianization ideology without exception and excuse.
This can pave the way for understanding different concepts like
freedom and individual rights in Iran. Thus, we could be notified

regarding the spirit of unification such as what Mugal Empire did

to represent in their motive to change Monarch become Islamic
Republic by referendum of Persian-Shia domination. This concept
received good recognition to the world society about their raising as
Greater Nations.
Reference
Ansari A.M, 2002. Iran Supremacy; a Demon Shaft or New
Superpower. New York
Boroujerdi, M, 1994. “The Encounter of Post-
Revolutionary Thought in Iran with Hegel, Heidegger
and Popper” in: S. Mardin (ed.) Cultural Transitions in the

Middle East, Leiden: Brill.
Carmines, E. G., & Zeller, R. A, 1979. “Reliability and Validity
Assessment,” Vol. 17. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Clawson, Patrick and Michael Rubin, 2005. “Eternal Iran: Continuity
and Chaos,” Eastern Studies, 19 (1): 3-16
Eliade, Mircea and Jospeh Kitagawa, 1973. History of Religions:
Essays in Methodology. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press
Esposito L.J, 1990. “The Iranian revolution: its global impact”.
Journal Church and States, 34 (3): 346-350. Miami: Florida
International University Press
Heydarian, J.R. 2010, “Iran-Saudi Relations: Rising Tensions
and Growing Rivalry,” Foreign Policy in Focus [Online].
Available at: http://www.fpif.org/articles/iransaudi_
relations_rising_tensions_and_growing_rivalry (accessed
on 14 February 2019).
Kelidar, Abbas, 1983. “The Shii Imami Community and Politics in
the Arab East” in Middle. Palgrave Macmillan.
Ward, S.R. 2009. Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its
Armed Forces Washington, DC: Georgetown University
Press. 208–210

Wendt, Alexandre, 1992 “Anarchy is what states make of it: the

social construction of power politics”, dalam International
Organization.
World Factbook, 2011. CIA-Iran Ethnicity [Online]. Available at:
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/arabs/iran_
cia.pdf (accessed on 15 February 2019).


Identity and Ketuanan Melayu in Malaysia: Effects of Globalization and Challenges to the
Ketuanan Melayu
Aizatul Anis binti Zuhari & Suyatno Ladiqi
Identity and Ketuanan Melayu in Malaysia:

Effects of Globalization and Challenges to
the Ketuanan Melayu

Universiti Sultan Zainal Abidin, Kuala Trengganu
Abstract
The Sultanate of Malacca gave birth to the Golden Era of the Malay

Peninsula due to the strategic geographical location in trade between
the East and the West. The liberalisation of Malay rulers in making
international relations had drove the land to pluralistic plus with
toleration of the rulers that had liberalized the land. The sparks of the
industrial revolution in western world had pushed the imperialism
and colonisation in the hand of the colonizer for 446 years from
15th century until the Malay independence in 1957 by British. The
colonisation had not only taken the raw materials and resources of
the Malay land, but also caused the harassment of the rights of native
Malay population, making themselves positioned to secure their
dignity and superiority. This gave birth to the concept of Ketuanan
Melayu that embedded in the policymaking way back in the journey
of ‘Merdeka’ lead by Tunku Abdul Rahman. It has created a special
system and has become the political identity of Malays. Today,
globalization has terrorized the concept of Ketuanan Melayu as it
is questionable and seen to be incompatible with current Malaysian
pluralistic society. Wave of globalisation influenced the concepts
of equality and racism in western definition had hit some sensitive
issues such as ratification of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) after the
formation of new government. Also, it is affecting the position of
Malay Sultans in the administration and Malay superiority. This
paper discusses the effects of globalization and the responses of
native Malays in preserving Ketuanan Melayu.
Keyword: Globalization, Identity, Ketuanan Melayu, Malaysia

Ketuanan Melayu
Introduction
Before going deeper to Ketuanan Melayu, it is best first to
understand the word ‘identity’. Identity means the fact of being
who or what a person or thing is or the characteristics determining
who or what a person or thing is. The word identity is synonyms to
name, specification, identification or personality. Identity is a very
crucial part where it put the significant of a person and distinguishes
a person from others that relates a person to a group of people that
shared same significant identification. Francis Fukuyama describes
the situation this way: Not only have plenty of people on the right
coalesced around “an identity that is often explicitly connected to
race, ethnicity, or religion” — they’ve also “adopted the language
and framing of identity from the left: the idea that my particular
group is being victimized”. Identity can be seen in two approaches.
One, primordialist approach sees identity as sense of self and
belonging to a collective group in terms of a fixed thing, defined by
objective criteria such as common ancestry and common biological
characteristics. The second approach rooted in social constructionist
theory, takes the view that identity is formed by a predominantly
political choice of certain characteristics. Thus, in understanding
the identity of the Malay people which hold not only at the physical
appearance or the ‘Keris’, but also in the idea of Ketuanan Melayu
itself. The concept of Ketuanan Melayu can be seen as an identity of
the Malays as it safeguarded the superiority and dignity of the Malay
race and as a defence mechanism from the pest of the nation that has
fought for liberalisation of the religion. That of which established
Islam as the religion of the country, political power of the Malays,
and what the most crucial is the special privileges of the Malays
and Bumiputeras. Ketuanan Melayu is what the Malays hold as the
identity and guidelines in every aspects of the life such as political,
social, economy and many more. However, it does not discriminate
the right of others which secured by the constitutions.
The Birth of Ketuanan Melayu

Ketuanan Melayu is a political concept emphasising Malay superiority
in present-day Malaysia. It all started when the British proposed
the idea of Malayan Union in which it offers a new constitution to
the Malay Land and unifying the Malay Peninsula under a single

Ketuanan Melayu
government to simplify administration known as Federated Malay

States to replace the British Military Administration (BMA). Sir
Harold MacMichael was assigned the task of gathering the Malay
Sultans approval for the Malayan Union that was done by force and
threat. In a short period of time, he managed to obtain all the Malay
rulers’ approvals and presented in the parliament in 22 January
1946 contains: 1. The Queen of England have full power over the
land through the transfer of power by the Malay Sultans that make
them able to create new law under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. 2.
Equal right of citizenship to non-Malay people. The proposal had
caused wrath for the Malays as the power of the Sultans eroded and
the nationality issues was seen as threat to Malay superiority (Abd
Manaf, 2009). This had resulted rejection of the Malayan Union not

long after the establishment and for more give birth to the concept
of Ketuanan Melayu.
Tunku Abdul Rahman sees this matter as urgent and took this on his
own hands by meeting the queen in London to claim the independent
with his loyal members. Finally, in 31st August 1957 the Malay land
was Merdeka. As the result, The Chinese and Indian immigrants
who form a significant minority in Malaysia are considered beholden
to the Malays for granting them citizenship in return for special
privileges as set out in Article 153 of the Constitution of
Malaysia A legacy of the British colonial system “break and rule” was
the division of Malaysians into three groups according to ethnicity.
The Malays were concentrated in their traditional villages, focusing
mainly on agricultural activities and living in poverty, in the other
hand the Chinese dominated Malaysian commerce and developed
as part of the larger bamboo network, a network of overseas
Chinese businesses operating in the markets of Southeast Asia that
share common family and cultural ties. Educated Indians took up
professional roles such as those of doctors or lawyers, while the less
well-off worked the plantations.

Ketuanan Melayu
NUMBER AND RATES OF POVERTY ACCORDING TO RACE

AND PLACE IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA IN 1970
Family Poverty From Poor

Poor Family
Numbers Rates(%) Family
Malays 901500 584200 64.8 73.8
Chinese 525200 136300 26.0 17.2
India 160500 62400 39.2 7.9
Others 18800 8400 44.8 1.1
TOTAL 1606000 791800 49.3 100.0

Rural 166700 683700 58.6 86.3
City 439300 108100 24.6 13.7
Source: Kekuasaan dan Ketuanan Melayu, Yahya Ismail, 1970.
The consequences of the British colonization caused the imbalance

between races especially the Malays and Chinese. Knowing that
it was impossible to send all the non-Malays back their homeland
thus protection must be given to the Ketuanan Melayu through
the idea of the Social Contract refers to trade-off through Articles
14–18 of the Constitution, pertaining to the granting of citizenship
to the non-Bumiputera of Malaya (particularly Malaysian Chinese
and Indian), and this was carried over to Article 153 when Malaysia
was formed on 16 September 1963, which grants the Malays special
position in the country (Manaf Hj. Ahmad, 2009). This quid pro quo
arrangement is usually referred to as the Malaysian social contract.
The social contract embedded few of matters which are first, the
Constitution explicitly grants the Bumiputera reservations of land,
quotas in the civil service, public scholarships and public education,
quotas for trade licences, and the permission to monopolise certain
industries if the government permits. In reality, however, especially
after the advent of the Malaysian New Economic Policy (NEP) due
to the racial riots of the May 13 Incident which occurred in 1969
when Malays held only 4% of the Malaysian economy, Bumiputera
privileges have extended to other areas; quotas are set for

Ketuanan Melayu
Bumiputera equity in publicly traded corporations, and discounts

for them on automobiles and real estate ranging from 5% to 15%
are mandated. Second, the Constitution included elements of Malay
tradition as part of the Malaysian national identity. The Malay rulers
were preserved, with the head of state, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong,
drawn from their ranks. Islam would be the national religion, and
the Malay language would be the national language.
What Ketuanan Melayu really is?

Dato’ Seri Dr. Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, minister of the Defence serving
from 2009 until 2013 who currently is the leader of United Malay
National Organisation (UMNO) defined Ketuanan Melayu has

nothing to do with making the Malays as the leader (Tuan), or not
the slave (Hamba) rather to agree Malays as the original people of
the land. Moreover, Dr Ridhuan Tee a political analysis in his book
Masih Adakah Ketuanan Melayu wrote that Ketuanan Melayu is
just a term that used to show Malays is the original people of the
land.
The Ketuanan Melayu is best to be understood as defining Malays

and Bumiputeras as people of the land or original people as well
as ratifying the politics power and certain special privileges to the
Malays and Bumiputeras. However, this does not mean that the
other races right are denied. All of government subsidy, initiatives
and budget are given equally. The Chinese and Indian are freely
to build their temples, schools and live freely in the land with
guaranteed of the security. Although the idea itself predates
Malaysian independence, the phrase Ketuanan Melayu did not
come into vogue until the early 2000s. Historically, the most vocal
political opposition towards the concept has come from non-Malay-
based parties, such as the Malaysian People’s Movement Party
(Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia) and Democratic Action Party
(DAP); in the 2000s, the multiracial People’s Justice Party (Parti
Keadilan Rakyat, or PKR) also positioned itself against Ketuanan
Melayu, advocating instead ‘Ketuanan Rakyat’ (supremacy of the
people). The term Ketuanan Melayu is almost always used by bad
politicians to raise vote as a stone to hit the sensitive racial issue in
Malaysia. The misinterpretation of the terms leads to understanding

Ketuanan Melayu
of discriminations and inequality in rights and power of the non-

Malays. This would spark certain racial issues. Malaysian should
learn from the history how Malays right deprived and take the
toleration of the Malay rulers as a key to always keep the harmony.
Globalization and Ketuanan Melayu

George Moldeski defined globalization as a process where the
existence of global institution that operate from one place to another
place internationally. There are four dimensions of globalisation
which are: global economy, world perception, international political
institutions and democracy or formation of world community
(Hussin, 2010). Globalization is a phenomenon that influences
the development of a country and rise up various positive and

negative effects to the human identity. Starting in 19th century where
globalization drove by the advancement of communication mainly
and expanding until today. Globalization and modernisation are two
most related things even both have a different base and meaning.
As with the growing effects of globalization and modernization.

Malaysian people grew to influenced by the ideas of the western,
resulting towards raising questions over the issue of equality.
The media plays an important role plus with the advancement
of technology that makes many Malaysian believes on the
propaganda method called ‘Firehose of Falsehood’ (FoF) (Paul
and Matthew, 2016). It’s a method used to the dissemination of
information that is deceptive and defamatory and this is very
contrary to conventional customs that focus on the importance of
communicating truth, credibility and as much as possible to avoid
political contradictions (Paul and Matthew, 2016). The technique
disseminates disinformation in the form various form that are
massively propagated, either through radio, traditional television,
satellite television, internet, and social media. Technically Paul and
Matthews said it done quickly, continuously, and repeatedly. In
order to make their propaganda happen, taking Russia as example
which known to use troll internet users. This refers to people who
send false information on the Internet in order to arouse emotional
or anger responses from other Internet users, through online chat
/ social media, discussion forums, news comments and various

Ketuanan Melayu
other websites. Referring to Radio Free Europe / Liberty Radio

reports, Paul and Matthews mention that there are thousands of
fake accounts on Twitter, Facebook, LiveJournal, and vKontakte
“managed by Russian propaganda. They run their work 24 hours
a day, and each has a daily quota of 135 post comments with a
minimum of 200 characters.
In Malaysia, the main actors that challenge the Ketuanan Melayu

are the ‘UltraKiasu’ thinkers and Malay liberalist. Kiasu is a Hokkien
word that means a grasping, selfish attitude. The term means “afraid
to lose out” from ‘kia’ “afraid” and ‘su’ “lose”. The term is used to
refer to someone who thinks of themselves first and is always trying
to get ahead in one way or another. The English equivalent would be

“over competitiveness”. In Malaysia context, Dr. Ridhuan Tee in his
book Masih Adakah Ketuanan Melayu define ultrakiasu thinkers as
someone who always rise up the sensitive racial issues and rejecting
anything that take sides of the Malays. Malay liberalist refers to group
of Malays that understand the Ketuanan Melayu as not compatible
and declining the democracy process. To them, all Malaysian should
stand on the formula of fair and square or Malaysian Malaysia. They
disagree with any Malays related privilege and understand Ketuanan
Melayu as taking other races as ‘hamba’ (slave). In shorts, they are
the people who reject the Ketuanan Melayu and fight for the so-
called equality without the understanding of equity. They believed
that the government and the special privileges of the Malays and
Bumiputera shall be abolished and successfully influenced some of
the Malay liberalist to think in their way under the name of equality.
This had clearly shown in the formation of the new government after
the 14th general elections where some Malay politicians question the
term Ketuanan Melayu as not compatible in this era and even some
groups of Malay fight to LGBT minority which is against the Islamic
values in Malaysia as an Islamic state. Thus, the Ultrakiasu and
Liberal Malays see this as something should be done in pluralistic
community in Malaysia. This concept extracted from the idea of the
west such as democracy, equality and the fair and square concept.
Judging in the western concept on the ideas of ultrakiasu and Malay
liberalist it is right to say that the current system is racist, democracy
and inequality. Thus, with special privileges given it shows some
racism or ethnocentrism.

Ketuanan Melayu
Malay responds with “Sarang Tebuan Jangan

Dijolok”
Just like beehive, if you hit it the whole squad will come out and
attack. This what the Malay saying “Jangan Tebuan Jangan
Dijolok” means. The most recent issues hit the wall was the
ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) is a United Nations
convention which obligates its members to eliminate any form of
institutional discrimination that is against humanity and to promote
and encourage universal respect for and observance of human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race,
sex, language or religion. Understanding this in western perception,
ICERD does give a great platform for equality for state. However,
in the Malaysian context it goes against on what embedded in the
constitutions and social norms. Since independence, Malaysia did
not sign ICERD and the only country define racial religions which the
Malays are defined in the Federal Constitution as Muslims, Malay
and Malay-speaking. Malaysia is unique in recognizing Islam as an
official religion, inhibiting the spread of other religions to Muslims,
recognizing Islam and Bumiputera privileges, scholarships and so
on. This contradicts the spirit of ICERD. However, after the 14th
general election lead to the formation of the new government where
the issues of equality hit up in media as the new government lead by
‘Pakatan Harapan’ a political coalition ready to ratify the ICERD.
Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department, P Waytha Moorthy,
reportedly said the government would ratify or confirm six forms of
international agreement including ICERD in the first quarter of next
year. This sparks wrath of the Malays and pushed to government to
reject it.
Ratification of the ICERD is rejected by many Malays as it will

abolish the position of Sultan as the head of the State and will enable
the position of prime minister to be held by all races. The worst part,
Islam is no longer official religion as it offers freedom of religion. The
special privileges of Malays and Bumiputera such as 10% discount
off house purchase, customary land abolished including Sabah
Sarawak, Royal Malay troops, MARA, UiTM, MRSM and ASB and
other designated programs to empower the bumiputera economy

Ketuanan Melayu
will be limited. Such abolishment meant that they are newly opened
to all races and did not discriminate. Also, the reserved land for
Bumiputera and Malay may be eliminated and many more related to
Bumiputera and Malays are repackaged as more inclusive. It will be
more assuming a form of discrimination to other races with the fact
that the Bumiputeras are far behind in the economy. This means that
automated things embodied in Article 153 of the Constitution is not
applicable and need to amended. This issue only referred to certain
interested parties and ICERD is the new Malaya Union version of
the new millennium opposed by its predecessors. The survivors of
the history of the ancestral struggle, the flow of sweat blood and the
tears of grandchildren suffer their struggle will become a waste.

Finally, Prime Minister Tun Mahathir Mohamed agree to not
ratify the ICERD. However, the president of Parti Keadilan Rakyat
(PKR) Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim described it as reasonable for
the government to postpone the ratification of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(ICERD) (Astro Awani, 2018). The word ‘postpone’ used by him
did not satisfy the Malays and this resulted the ‘Himpunan Aman
Bantah ICERD’ or called ‘white demonstration’ in 8th Disember
2018. A massive rally involving PAS and UMNO members was held
in the capital to object to the proposed ratification of the ICERD.
PAS president Datuk Seri Abdul Hadi Awang said the gathering was
aimed at declaring Malays and Islam’s objections to the Federal
Government’s action which allegedly wanted to ratify or ratify
ICERD. Meanwhile, Ahmad Zahid said UMNO would support
the rally on Dec 8 and wanted a gathering of Ummah members to
combine UMNO and PAS members in every state in the Peninsular.
He said if there was no declaration from the government to reject
the ICERD, the Malays across the country would rise up against
the matter. Adding up, he claimed that in the English dictionary,
the words ‘amok’ were borrowed from Malay showing that the
Malays could rage if their rights were challenged. The gathering or
also known as Himpunan 812 is a set of historical giants that never
happened in Malaysian history where over a million Malays and
Bumiputeras gathered on the streets. Many are surprised by this
resurrection. In fact, they view the views of the Malays and do not

Ketuanan Melayu
expect the Malays to come down and be united. The gathering was a
success and ended up in peace.
The New Malaysia government today is dominated by non-Muslims.

This is not a wild accusation or an empty talk because in fact, the
majority of government parliamentarians are non-Muslims.
And as we all see, the DAP is the most vocal party in the current
government. However, the DAP has not been able to influence the
majority of the Malays even though they are working very hard. The
Malays still have reservations on the agenda of the DAP struggle.
This is because the DAP is often swayed and seen as unfriendly
to the agenda of Islam and the Malays and always win the non-
Muslims (Hespaizi, 2019). Furthermore, issues affecting Islam and
the position of the Malays and Bumiputeras are very sensitive. This
fact fails to be understood by non-Muslims until they take light on
the actions that suffocate these two sensitive matters: Humiliation
against the Prophet, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, Islamophobia and
Malayphobia is more fertile among non-Muslims in Malaysia as the
Malay Muslims are the majority. The disbelief and insecurity of the
Muslim Malays are increasingly burning. The Malays have come
to realize that the political dispute that has taken place so far has
been a disadvantage. This is evident when two Malay Malay parties,
namely UMNO and PAS and other parties are willing to cooperate
and support to oppose the ICERD ratification. Since then, the unity
and cooperation between these Malay Islamic parties has become
stronger and more mature (Hespaini, 2019).
The real question is does really Malaysians living in inequality?

Looking in Forbes magazine reported in Malaysia’s 50 Richest, the
top 10 richest man in the Malaysia are hold by many non-Malays
putting Robert Kuok at the top of the list. In fact, numbers of
religious institution of non-muslim rise up to 45% and mosque
as to 55% which is relevant as Islam as the religion of the country
(Abdullah, 2009). For many years since the independent the
rights of non-Malay are secured in the constitution to reach the
equity but the Ultrakiasu thinkers still want more and even try to
liberalize every aspects of the state. Taking Singapore as an example
which In Article 152 of the Constitution of Singapore entitled
‘Minorities and special position of Malays’, it is stated that it shall

Ketuanan Melayu
be the responsibility of the Government constantly to care for the

interests of the racial and religious minorities in Singapore and
the Government shall exercise its functions in such manner as to
recognise the special position of the Malays, who are the indigenous
people of Singapore, and accordingly it shall be the responsibility of
the Government to protect, safeguard, support, foster and promote
their political, educational, religious, economic, social and cultural
interests and the Malay language’ (Hassan, 2013). Sadly, and quite
obviously, Article 152 has not actually made much of a difference
to the development of the Malays in Singapore. The truth is Article
152 is nothing but purely symbolic. Sure, the national anthem is still
in Malay, commands in the SAF are still in Malay, and the national
language is Malay. Plus, how can Malay Singaporean understand

their identity when they are poorly speaks in Malay language as
they use English to communicate plus with power hold by Chinese
in every aspect of the government. The Malay in Singapore has lost
their identity and superiority in the land due to liberalisation. In fact,
many young Malays in Singapore speak poor Malay language and
lost their identity as Malay due to globalisation. This is an example
why the concept of Ketuanan Melayu should be hold by Malays so
they do not lose in the survival of other races and globalization itself.
Conclusion
Globalisation challenges the concept of Ketuanan Melayu, resulting
in uncertainty of the Malaysian identity. The emergence of the
Firehose of Falsehood’ that terrorizes the concept of Ketuanan
Melayu plays by ultrakiasu and Malay liberalist. The history has
remarked the special rights of Malays as it should not be questioned
by others as it will rose to racial issues. However, the preservation
of the concept should be taken into account as its secure the identity
and dignity of the Malays. Malaysia has been independent for 62
years as a proof for tolerance and reciprocity of the Malaysian. Thus,
the effort of trying to eliminate the Ketuanan Melayu should not
be pursued as it has shaped the base for the social structure of the
Malaysia. Plus, Malaysia has ruled the country on its own mould for
62 years and developing progressively. Thus, the western concept is
not always the best. To conclude, each of the Malaysian today should

Ketuanan Melayu
preserve its own ethnic identity but also strengthen the national
identity for the sake of the country wellbeing.
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ICERD: Challenge of Malaysia Nationhood
Ahmad Adam Sollehin bin Abdul Rahman & Nur Hazirah binti Ibrahim
Ahmad Adam Sollehin bin Abdul Rahman & Nur

Hazirah binti Ibrahim
Abstract
In Malaysia, the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) is deemed to threaten
the complexity of ethnic relations in Malaysia. the speech of the

Malaysia 7th Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohammad about the
ratification on the remaining core instrument in human rights of
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD) erupted a public demonstration from
Malay-Islam Community consisted of Himpunan 812. In November
23rd, 2018, the Malaysian government released an official statement
that it will not ratify the ICERD. Still, Malay-Islam community is
putting the pressure towards the newly elected Federal government
not to ratify ICERD. This paper will discuss the reasons why ICERD is
not compatible with the Malaysian Federal Constitution. This paper
will focus on Malaysia’s role in combating racial discrimination, and
the last part of this paper discusses the confusion of the Malaysian
national identity that leads to ICERD.
Keywords: Himpunan 812, ICERD, Malay-Islam, Malaysia
Introduction
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination (ICERD) issued by the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights is an international
convention on human right issues. The reason it was established is
to reject racial oppression and colonization. Malaysia throughout
history has advocated a lot in human right issues. Until the current
year, Malaysia has ratified six out of nine international human right
conventions, which are Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination

Against Women (CEDAW) and Convention on the Rights of Persons

with Disabilities (CRPD).
After the 14th general election in Malaysia, the loss of Barisan

Nasional which constitutes former federal government, and the new
Malaysia cabinet opposition has issued protests over the rights of
main ethnic in Malaysia. This occurred after the 7th Malaysia Prime
Minister, Dr, Mahathir Mohammad gave a speech in the United
Nations General Assembly
“...The new government of Malaysia has pledged to

ratify all remaining core UN instruments related to
the protection of human rights. It will not be easy
for us because Malaysia is multi-ethnic, multi-

religious, multicultural and multilingual. We will
accord space and time for all to deliberate and
decide freely based on democracy (Mohammad,
2018).”
It creates an uproar among the Malaysian community where to ratify

ICERD shall affect Malaysian Federal Constitution, specifically on
Article 153 that constitutes special Malay privilege. The question
why ICERD could not be implemented is due to its contradiction
towards the Malaysia Federal Constitution, historical aspects,
religious, language, and even social, cultural aspects. Also, it is
believed that by ratifying it, there’s a potential for ethnic conflict that
can affects the national security, proven by the history of sectarianist
ethnical conflict such as Peristiwa Berdarah 13 Mei 1969. Due to
the amounting pressure from public, Malaysian government chose
not to ratify the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination (ICERD).
Reasons International ICERD is Incompatible with

the Malaysia Federal Constitution
In order to discuss further regarding the matter of protests against
ICERD, we must first examine what the right of Malay privilege
will encroach if the government agreed to ratify ICERD. Back to
history, the Federal Constitution has been a guideline for the nation
which was drafted by the Reid Commission in order to formulate

a constitution for the preparation independency of Federation of

Malaya. Accordingly, the Commission suggested that the Constitution
should protect an individual’s rights and ensure a democratic way of
living. Therefore, the absolute freedom on fundamental liberties as
the constitution at British is not given in the federal constitution in
Malaysia. This is mainly because of the multi-racial society and the
rebellion of the communist during the age. It is vital that each of the
citizens in Malaysia embrace the rules set out in the Constitution
to ensure the harmony built would not be wrecked. Although the
fundamental liberties would guarantee freedom of speech to every
Malaysian citizen, the Article 10 do added that Parliament may by
law impose restrictions on these rights in the interest of the security
of the Federation, friendly relations with other countries, public

order, morality; prohibiting the questioning of any matter, right,
status, position, privilege, sovereignty protected by the provisions
of Article 152 and 153.
Article 152 provisions that the national language of Malaysia shall

be the Malay language. This provision clearly showed that Malay
monarchy in federal structures the state embodies a fundamental
and continuing nation of ‘ketuanan Melayu’ (Malay dominance).
Also, stated under Article 153 of Federal Constitution, it shall be
under the responsibility of Yang diPertuan Agong to safeguard the
special position of the Malays and natives of the States of Sabah
and Sarawak, also the legitimate interests of other communities.
The reservation made to Malay positions in public services, and
certain scholarships and licenses had begun since under the colonial
period. The Article extended the practiced rules and bestowed them
constitutional legitimacy. Reading Article 153 will not be complete
without reading Article 8 as it follows, ‘all persons are equal
before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law’. This
fundamental liberty is existed to prevent deprivation on other ethnic
rights in multiracial society (Harding, 2012).
Further, discussing the appeal of Article 153 is illegal even in

Parliament. The article is viewed as a sensitive matter by many
politicians who are in favour or oppose it often labelled as racist.
Article 10 is relevant as it is to remind the Malaysia citizen that it is
important to never touch on sensitivity issue, any disobey towards

such rules may be reprimanded that it may occur due to disturbance

of national security. This limitation further supported the argument
that the special position of Malay race should not be interrupted
and be respected by obeying the rules to prevent any future conflict.
Hence, there should be no issue discussed further on whether to sign
the treaty, since the objective of ICERD is going against our plural
society concept adapted in Malaysia Federal Constitution.
Malaysia in Combating Racial Discrimination

We may not be conscious, but when the protests against ICERD
had been done, there is no turning back the release of conflict and
disagreement between ethnics. This is due to those who oppose
signing the treaty are from the majority ethnic Malay-Muslim

community, and they asserted that the special position of the Malay
community would be adversely affected. However, the aftermath of
such an incident has caused high racial tension between Malay and
non-Malay communities. When Malay extremists raise the risk of
intolerance against minority communities it could lead to possible
future racial violence. Thus, while protests and opposition to ICERD
will fall into outright violence, the citizen and the authority should
take a further step to prevent dreadful incident as racial rioting may
jeopardize the national security.
The consequences of 13 May 1969 riot, the government had come

out with few public policies to overtake the ethnic issue; however,
later it was found that the policies are not comprehensive enough to
overcome the issues. The non- Bumiputeras do realize that public
policies are lacking diversity and became more favourable towards
Bumiputeras. The result of this, the tension built up can affect the
security well-being of a nation. (Khairul Anuar, Liaw, & Ahmad
Azan, 2015)
Therefore, Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad had launched ‘Vision 2020’

during his tenure as the 4th Prime Minister. In terms of ethnic
relations, the challenges to achieving the success of this policy are to
create a society that practices matured understanding and tolerance,
in which the public interest is more important than their interests.
Also, from an economic perspective, the motion is to ensure the
implementation of the distribution of national wealth fairly and

equitably in which there is a full partnership by every citizen in

economic development. If society and authority can adapt them,
it can be guaranteed that we may be prepared to enter ‘Malaysia
Baru’.
Likewise, the 1 Malaysia concept introduced by Datuk Seri Najib

Tun Abdul Razak is also aiming to sustain and enhance the unity
between ethnics. The idea is to harmonize citizens of different
ethnic without changing their identity. To achieve the country’s
progression, an acceptance among ethnic which lead to strong unity
should be practiced. The idea to realize the concept of 1Malaysia, it
must be exposed to the youngsters in their educations. It is crucial
for them to understand the concept of 1 Malaysia because they are

the future leaders. In the end, education is one of the best elements
to promote good relation among different ethnic groups (Khalim
& Norshidah, 2010). This concept introduced by the policy could
become one of the fast track solutions since education would create
a mindset on how a great society could be accomplished.
A speech delivered by Tunku Abdul Rahman stressed that to achieve

a peaceful country each of the citizens must cooperate willingly to
unite regardless of the differences existed in our multiracial-society.
The people must also eradicate stereotype and presumption with
one another through perceiving other’s culture and treat them
with respect. This way is the optimum solution to encourage and
educate people to practice these moral values. Following, as the
multiracial society we must unite together and take full advantage
of our diversity to create a better nation. As proverbs said, ‘kill two
birds with one stone’ may be suitable since it would take the matter
to resolve the ethnic issues, thus defence our national security with
the power of unity.
Confusion of National Identity Leads to ICERD

A nation with multicultural people will give birth to conflicts.
Particularly ethnic conflicts, the phenomenon often takes nation
into problems, Loss of identity, In Malaysia Ethnic do have their own
Culture and religion belief practice for example, Malay on Islam,
Chinese on Buddha or Christian, and India on Hindu, clearly shows
the contradiction between the characteristics, by having this kind of

differences. Arise misunderstanding on the belief conception thus

create conflicts. As we know in terms of culture and religion, there’s
a general tendency of conflict between one another. This can be seen
through the former 4th Malaysia Prime Minister Tun Abdullah Ahmad
Badawi policy in Islam Hadhari whereby statistically on Malaysian
impression towards Islam Hadhari towards non-Muslim are not
satisfied enough because lack of understanding which contradicts
to their belief. This is the simple example could be shown as identity
roles do cater the nation affairs.
The problem in Malaysia is where identity is discussed as an

ethnic. By having this rigid understanding, Malaysia lost its path in
keeping the nation harmony. Majority rule can be seen as a means
of accommodating intersecting ethnic, religious, and caste, and

class, linguistic and cultural mosaics within the borders of a nation-
state. (Kortteinen, 2009) Malaysia which resides the majority of
Malay becomes a dominant ethnic in the country. Malay enjoys lots
of privileges rather than other ethnic whereby according to Article
153 of Federal Constitution Malay, and Bumiputeras privileges
are protected by the constitution. One of the main reasons toward
the problem is prejudice on ethnic; it can be in an anti-collusion
which stereotyping ethnic or races behaviour or discrimination
where educational opportunities or ethnic rights been misused.
Close example in Malaysia is Universiti Teknologi Mara (UiTM) is
for the Malay and Bumiputeras only. Ethnics relations in Malaysia
showed by research that where tolerance level is at the average level
(Zahara Aziz, 2007), in the research also provides that the score of
unity has deteriorated 1993 till 2007, it shows how ethnic relations
in Malaysia is not satisfying.
The question is what identity Malaysia should focus on. It can be

seen that the Malaysia concept of identity is towards ethnicity. In
Malaysia ethnicity has become the foundation of the economy,
political and social-cultural, Ethnicity has become a crucial aspect
towards Malaysia that it regulates the life of Malaysian. According to
Holtz, ethnicity needs to be looked beyond in the context of identity
construction (p. 21). While Malaysia is still discussing racism and
discrimination, it needs to look at broader aspects of the ethnicity
which can analyse accordingly without prejudice and hate. Also,

Holtz stated that tracing the ethnicization can identify the identity,
while this statement could be supported in the recent era right now
which in the United States of America, the new President Donald
Trump has suggested “Make America Great Again” and” America
First, America First is the policy that the United States of America
trying to become. It is a policy that prioritizes American on Taxes,
Trades, and even foreign affairs for the benefits of American. Back to
Malaysia, indeed ethnicity throughout the history of Malaysia does
integrate into the construction of Malaysia identity.
Conclusion
ICERD is one of the instruments to advocate human right issues.

However, in Malaysia ICERD cannot be implemented due to it
contradicting the nature of the Federal Constitution specifically
under Article 153 which it causes a riot among the Malay-Islam
community, triggered by extermists on both sides. Even though
ICERD protesters’ actions were not violent, but the actions could
make racial tension as the minority ethnic view that Malay is selfish
and racist. The Malaysian identity is more towards a multi-ethnic
and multi-religious nation. However, Malaysia is facing problems
in catering all the ethnics and religious issues into one particular
identity. ICERD should have been able to solve racial discrimination
problems, but in the case of Malaysia, it might trigger conflicts.
Instead, the question is how long minority ethnic, such as Chinese
or Indian, can sustain their dissatisfaction. The way how ICERD
will be able to resolve a racial dilemma or instead trigger conflicts in
Malaysia in the future, should be looked upon at.

References
Fernando, J. M. and Rajagopal, S. (2017). “Fundamental Liberties
in the Malayan Constitution and the Search for a Balance,
1956 – 1957,” IJAPS, 13(1), 1–28.
Holst, F. (2012). Ethnicization and Identity Construction in
Malaysia. London: Routledge.
Khairul Anuar, S., Liaw, J. O. H., & Ahmad Azan, R. (2015). “Malaysia :
Ethnic Issues and National Security,” International Journal
of Humanities and Social Science, 5(9), 1–12.
Kortteinen, T. (2009). “Islamic Resurgence and the Ethnicization
of the Malaysian State: The Case of Lina Joy,” Journal of
Social Issues in Southeast Asia, 23(2), 216–233.

Malaysiakini, 2018. “Is the anti-Icerd protest a catalyst to stage riots
in the country?” Malaysiakini [Online] Available at https://
www.malaysiakini.com/news/453038 (accessed 12 March
2019).
Riskline, 2018. “Anti-ICERD protests in Malaysia: catalyst for
heightened racial tensions in the country” Riskline [Online]
Available at https://www.riskline.com/articles/anti-
icerd-protests-in-malaysiacatalyst-for-heightened-racial-
tensions-in-the-country (accessed 12 March 2019).
Southeast Asia Globe, 2018. “ICERD / Debates and protests as
Malaysia looks to ratify human rights treaty,” Southeast
Asia Globe [Online] Available at http://sea-globe.com/
malaysia-looks-to-ratify-icerd/ (accessed 13 March 2019).
Zainal, K., & Salleh, N. M. (2010). “Ethnic relation among the youth
in Malaysia: Toward fulfilling the concept of one Malaysia,”
Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 9, 855– 858.

Identity and Election
Part 2
Ukrainian National Identities in Influencing Ukraine Domestic Political Conflict in 2014
Fadhila Inas Pratiwi
Ukrainian National Identities in Influencing

Ukraine Domestic Political Conflict in 2014

Abstract
The purpose of this article is to explain the differences of national
identities aspirations within Ukraine that manifested in the choice of
the difference of political leaders. The division in Ukraine is portrayed
through Ukraine’s map. In the Western part of Ukraine, they tend
to support their leader who tilts towards Europe and the United
States. While in the East, people want to have representatives who
able to maintain good relationship with Russia. These tendencies
Part 2 Identity and Election
cannot be separated with the Ukrainian people identity in terms of

ethnic, language and religion which already in parallel between the
West and the East part. The structure of this paper is divided into
three sections. The first section discusses the historical background
that shapes the identity differences in Ukraine as well as relates it
with ethnic, language, and religion division. The second section
is focusing on how those identities shape people aspirations and
influence political choice regarding their leaders. The third section
elaborates more on the differences in political preferences that
contribute to the Ukraine domestic political conflict during 2013-
2015. This paper concludes that the national identity has significant
influence on Ukraine domestic political conflict particularly during
presidential elections, which the conflict escalates into violence
between the West and the East part of Ukraine.
Keywords: Ukraine, National Identity, Domestic Politics, Conflict,

Presidential Election
Introduction
Ukraine was experiencing different historical narratives within the
region, which resulted in different political cultures and identities.

The West part of Ukraine once called Transcarpathia was under

Hungarian rule for 1000 years. Then the other part such as Bukovina
experiencing different ruler that was Moldavian and Romanian
as well as Austrian. The southern parts of Ukraine belonged to
Crimean Khanate, and huge part of central Ukraine belonged to
Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Then, the ruler changes, which made
significant portions of Ukraine having deep historical roots within
Poland and Russia/USSR. Some parts of Ukraine lived under Poland
for a long time (Galicia: 1386-1772, 918-39) and the other live longer
under Russia and its Soviet successor (the Hetmanate and Sloboda
Ukraine start from 17th century until 1991). These historical links still
have significant influences in the region. For instance, Polish and
Magyar were two spoken languages in Galicia and Transcarpathia
(the west part) respectively, while Russophones dominating the east
and south part of region. This is also paralleled with the regional
division based on religion, with Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church
is dominating in formerly Polish and Austrian Galicia and formerly

Hungarian Transcarpathia while Orthodoxy was robust in central,
east and south part of Ukraine (Bukovina) (Himka, 2017).
Since the beginning, Ukraine never has a distinguished history

which makes them united as one nation because its region is always
part of contestation. This assumption is strengthened by Hagen’s
(1995) argument that Ukraine per se does not have specific history
for themselves. The differences that underlie within the population
stems from the history of serial empire contestation made them
having different identities in terms of language, ethnic, and religion.
Thus, this has been creating significant influence on domestic politics,
particularly when Ukraine started to declare its independence in
1991. At the beginning of its independence, Ukraine always faced
dilemma in terms of nation-building. The Ukrainian authorities
have conducted significant efforts in dealing with the national
identity differences between the west and the east part of Ukraine.
For instance, on 25th June 1992 Ukraine parliament passed the law
‘On National Minorities in Ukraine’ in parallel with the democratic
parties and authorities in Kyiv arguing that the Ukrainian statehood
would embrace the Russian race and speakers. However, the efforts
seem easier said than done. The end of the USSR resulted in the
emergence of radical perspectives within Crimea, which they did

not want to be part of Ukraine. Ukrainian parliament then, in trying

to be accommodative, gave Crimea the autonomous region status.
The similar thing happened in Donbas, and the rest of the south-
eastern regions, where they had negative perception about Ukraine
independence and this gave them space to form local movements
with secession aspirations (Sotiriou, 2016). Therefore, it is clear
that Ukraine has a problem in defining the nationhood concept
that is acceptable for the whole population. This situation left the
Ukrainian without internal and external social boundaries that
define ‘them’ and ‘us’. The absence of shared national identities
makes the Ukrainians tilt towards different ideas of identity, which
further had impact on the domestic political constellation within the
country (Korostelina, 2012).
The Division of Ukraine National Identity

The differences in national identity in Ukraine amplified into five
narratives. First is dual identity, second being pro-Soviet, the third

fight for Ukrainian identity, fourth recognition of Ukrainian identity
and fifth multicultural-civic concept. These five narratives have three
main features, for instance, a justification of legitimacy, interlink
between strong power, morality, and opposing other narratives.
This logical thinking led to the zero-sum game struggle where one-
identity narratives should prevail and undermine the other identity
(Korostelina, 2012). National identity can be identified through
two lenses, that is ethnic (cultural) and civic (political); these two
stances has direct link to what it called nations. When it comes
to Ukraine-after declaring its independence-Ukrainian identity
starts to arise and shift towards civic nationalities along with the
Ukraine ethnic. However, the people cannot come up with one
voice regarding defining the national collectivity, whether should
it cover all the population or only including the Ukrainian ethnic.
It also still debatable regarding who can be entitled as the member
of Ukraine nation (Kulyk, 2017). National identity is changing over
time, especially regarding the construction of it is of a “continued
and unfinished” nature, especially for a new independent state
like Ukraine. Ukraine tends to forge its national identity through
integration with Europe as part of central-eastern Europe. Thus, it
can be assumed that Ukraine has willingness to identify themselves

unique by detaching from Russia. While on the other hand, the

competing political entities, use this kind of situation in gaining
their support by tending to tilt towards Europe or Russia since that
there was no single ideal notion what Ukraine political attitudes
should be (Kuzio, 2001).
The ethnic composition in Ukraine consisted of 22% Russians

population and 72% of Ukrainians according to the 1989 survey. It
is a fact that Russians served as minority group in Ukraine while
Ukrainian is the majority. However, within that 72 %, they are not
developing the sense of belonging altogether as well as the absence
of national identity aspiration. In linguistic context, in early 1990s
the ethnolinguistic spectrum consists of three groups: Ukrainian-
speaking Ukrainians 44%, Russian-speaking Ukrainians 30% and
Russians 22%. These ethnolinguistic groups are challenging to be
identified clearly because there is no distinction or self-conscious
groups of Russian and Ukraine speakers in Ukraine. The blurry lines

of language and cultural identifications between those two entities
turned Ukraine as a state comprised of hybrid and/or multiple
identities. Nonetheless, there are several regions in Ukraine already
has strong regional identities such as Donbas region that receive
much influence from Soviet in economic sector (Wolczuk, 2000).
This divergence in language can be seen in Ukraine’s map below
Figure 1. The Language Map (Source: CNN)

From the map, it can be seen that in the east part of Ukraine most
population speak Russian as their native language while in the west
part less than 5% up to 24% speak Russia. The influence of this
difference is tantamount on the domestic political conflict in 2014.
Ukraine Diverging National Identities on Domestic

Political Crisis
In order to pin down the diverging identities and interlink it with the
domestic political crisis in 2014, the focus in this section elaborates
more on the electoral process within Ukraine. There are three major
parties in Ukraine, first the Party of Regions, the second Bloc of Yulia
Timoshenko, and the third Our Ukraine. These three parties have
similar general notion such as supporting free market, economy,
democracy, human rights and would like to join the European Union.
However, these three parties have different interpretation regarding
the country’s history. Instead of focusing on united Ukraine, they
still uphold the differences within the Ukraine societies. The elites
tend to focus on their interest and spending the years to fight for
the state properties. In effect the elites always exercises the struggle
for power, replacing one another in terms of power. Moreover, their
approach in gaining support resulting the broader gap within the
population in two macro-regions. Such as the ‘orange’ refers to the
West and Center part of Ukraine, or ‘blue and white’ refer the South
and the East part (Osipian & Osipian, 2012).
The election served to politicize masses and organizations together,

voicing up the aspirations regarding democracy and various aspects
of competition and competitiveness covers the competing memories
which make Ukraine face difficulties in the middle of its historical
legacies and the Western direction. The election results in 2004
and 2010 depended on the geographic location within the country.
Despite the issues of electoral fraud, it cannot be ignored that 2010
election results show enormous differences between the western and
the eastern part of Ukraine. Therefore it can be argued that the cause
of these differences were connected to the language, that Ukraine
speakers in the west votes for ‘Orange’, while Russian speakers in
the east vote for ‘Blue and White’ (Osipian and Osipian, 2012).
The presidential election in 2010, shows that pro-Russia candidate
Viktor Yanukovych had won defeating his counterpart pro-western

policy, Yulia Tymoshenko. For instance the election results in 2010

that is shown below
Figure 2. Ukraine’s Presidential Election Results in 2010 (Source: CNN)
The differences within a population in Ukraine is exemplified in the

case of Orange Revolution in 2004. It has become one of the biggest
democratic revolutions, which also becomes most regionally divided
revolutions with western and central Ukrainians dominating the
protestors and eastern Ukrainians opposing the activity (Kuzio,
2010). The Orange Revolution happened, because the administration
at that time tried to falsify the results of the election, it means
that part of Ukrainian society along with its political elite rejected
Russian’s authoritarian model to influence Ukraine government and
prefer to follow the Central European developmental path (Brudny
and Finkel, 2011).
Differences Political Preferences Resulting in

Ukraine Crisis 2014
Before exploring the Ukraine crisis in 2014, it is necessary to
understand the political constellation that happened before 2014.
As previously mentioned, in 2004 Orange Revolution happened,
in which the protestors tried to bring the pro-Western President
Viktor Yushchenko, against his rival pro-Russia candidate Viktor
Yanukovych. The election nature in Ukraine is akin to a Cold War of
sort, where eastern Ukraine vote for Viktor Yanukovych-as Russia’s
favourite-while the western part vote for Viktor Yushchenko, who tilt

towards the West. As the winner in 2004 Yanukovych accused that

there has been manipulation of the election results, which enraged
Yushchenko supporters and demanded the results to be rejected.
One of the significant reason the people wants the revolution because
deep down they were nationalistic in character and afraid that
Russia will dominate Ukraine. While on the other hand, the people
in east part believe that the Orange revolution were backed by the
West power such as European Union and United States (Schneider,
2004). The narratives of divided regions along with its foreign policy
preferences have been internalised within the population in Ukraine
that also shows similar pattern when the crisis happened in 2013-
2015. President Yanukovych rejected a deal with EU, which instigate
mass demonstration against him. This situation getting worse when
the anti-government protest capable of causing Yanukovych to
escape Ukraine (Fisher, 2014).
Identity plays essential role in the political conflict between eastern

and western part of Ukraine since the national identity such as

language, ethnic and religion possessing high potential of conflict.
The ethnic factors arguably served as permanent identity that sticks
internally in a person. Inside the ethnic groups, the similarities in
religion and language is capable of enhancing cooperation and trust.
However, it would be difficult to establish strong bonding with the
other ethnicity. Several studies argue that when societies ethnically
divided, it then leads to the ethnic voting and the party development
based on ethnicity since it would be much easier for the political
leaders to gain massive support that parallels with specific ethnic.
Furthermore, it can be argued that if the majority won the election,

it would be tough for the minority to accept the results, which led
them to have motive to rebel (Strasheim, 2016). As Figure 2 suggests,
ethnic Ukrainians live in the west part while Russian ethnic and
speakers live in the east part. These regional divisions along with
the political interplay make the people assume zero-sum game
relations which it also can be worsened by the fact that Ukraine did
not have a notion of what is constituted as ‘Ukrainian’. The rise of
the pro-Russian Party of Regions after Orange Revolution brought
Yanukovych to power in 2010, along with the shifting Putin foreign
policy direction from statist to ethnic nationalism, proves to be

highly significant in influencing inter-state conflict. Yanukovych

unpopular decisions and unwillingness to resign as the president
makes conflict escalation inevitable. Thus it served as an open door
for Russia to intervene in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (Kuzio, 2015).
The conflict escalation during 2013-2015 happened because of

people’s expectation from two regional the West and the East
regarding the regulatory governance and their reasoning to support
their political leader. The historical roots are inseparable from this
case, because the civil unrest mostly happened in the east part of
Ukraine, with Crimea; Donetsk; and Odesa as the three most violent
regions. It is because when Soviet dissolved these regions receive
much of Soviet wealth; new business groups appear and had a
secure connection to criminality along with politics. During his term,
instead of establishing inclusive government policies, Yanukovych
actions resulted in increasing inter-regional and regime civil society
tensions because he imprisoned Yulia Tymoshenko as opposition

leader. Furthermore, he also against the Ukrainian ethnic and
language identity, lack of transparency in managing the state’s
budget and agreeing to several Russia requests such as enlarge
the Black Sea Fleet base, reject the EU deal and accepting Russia’s
funding (Kuzio, 2015).
Conclusion
It concludes that the diverging identity in Ukraine cannot be
separated from its historical roots, that Ukraine area was always
part of contestation and unified Ukraine identity per se did not exist
in the very first place. The nation-building process still continues
and seems to be unclear since Ukraine did not have a notion which
has the capability to bound people together as one nation. Thus, the
division between the west and the east part of Ukraine along with its
differences in ethnicity and language served as the opportunity for
the political leaders to gain support. It is where the political leaders
have their own agenda and make the relations between the people
in East and the West part become more complicated and insecure
towards each other, which resulted in the zero-sum game relations.
When the cooperation seems difficult to be established therefore
the resulting relations tend to be conflictual. Thus, the civil unrest

during the Orange revolution and crisis in 2013-2015 is inevitable

to occur.
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“official” narrative of national identity in Ukraine’, The
Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 28(4).

Bosnia and Herzegovina and The Politics of Identity: Rebuilding the Ruin of Post-Cold War
‘Democracy
Demas Nauvarian & Lintang Bening
Bosnia and Herzegovina and The Politics of

Identity: Rebuilding the Ruin of Post-Cold
War ‘Democracy’

Abstract
Bosnia and Herzegovina, a former Yugoslavian state, standing
proud in the Balkan area, was considered to be one of the states that
is most affected by both the Cold War and the end of it. Reliving a
long history of various political entities that controlled its territory,
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a multi-ethnic state with three major
ethnics living in it, and controlling its politics, namely the Bosniaks,
Serbs, and Croats. However, at the same time, the high complicity
of identity in politics has established a political regime that is
considered to be ‘the most complex political system in modern
world history’. This is said by the international community, the
same party that once established this system as a war-ending project
th
of the Bosnian War in the brink of the 20 century. With three
presidents as a member of a presidential institution, one hundred
and fifty-six members of the parliament, and countless of identity
and interest conflict, Bosnia and Herzegovinian political system is a
major discourse object for reform. This paper provides insights and
answer questions regarding the history and status quo of political
system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as factors that created
its complexity. This is further done by analyzing the system with the
theory of political system, and is done by explaining the core ideas
of democracy and wave of democratization. This paper concludes
that the current complexity of the system is only an irrelevant ruin
of Cold War democracy that is in dire need of reform. This paper
also provides a few scenarios regaring possible reform in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Democracy, Identity Politics,

Political System,

‘Democracy
Introduction
For many years, and for many people, Bosnia and Herzegovina
was considered to have the most complex political system—and
therefore, political processes—in the whole world. The new state,
emerged in 1995 after a long struggle of internal conflict, was
shaped as something more than the conflict itself. Formerly known
as the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, the state is a
ruin of Cold War Soviet efinitio state, and is an impacted object
of “wave of democratization” resonating around the world after
the Soviet Union collapse and the end of Cold War in 1990s. This,
according to Mansbach and Rhodes (2007) is a central feature of
the post-Cold War constellation of politics—the re-emergence of
tension and identity conflict between a state and nation. State is
seen as a political entity excercising soverign political authority
over a defined geography territory, while a nation is defined as a
community of people who identify themselves as sharing a common

future (Mansbach and Rhodes 2007). The end of Cold War is noted
to bring a sense of redistribution of power in global politics. The rise
of non- national identity has made its way to politics, incorporating
non-state actors—including but not limited to ethnic and religious
group—into the wide array of political actors. Moreover, the shift
of politics and economy happening in Eastern Europe and the
former states of Soviet Union gave away the opportunities and
possibilities for liberalization and democratization. By doing this, as
underlined by Mostov (1994), would greatly transform the efinitio
culture and identity in the area, as politics that is defined primarily
by identification with a particular national community is not fully
compatible with democratic principles or institutions. At many
cases—including in Bosnia and Herzegovina—democracy is seen
as a solution towards the identity conflicts, in this case between
ethnics. However as has been mentioned by Mostov (1994), the core
ideas of democracy itself is not lin line with the concept of ethnical
and non-national identity. The effort of democratization towards
nationalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina is often seen as a failure,
a one-sided democratization made by western states, not in favor
of those in the territory, but in the name of creating a democracy
atmosphere in Eastern Europe.

‘Democracy
Bosnian War: The War of Identity

The breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991 until 1992 has made drastic
changes in the politics of former Yugoslavian territory. The
six countries that were made by the Allies inside the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia–Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia–were declaring
their independence one by one after the death of the Yugoslavian
leader, Joseph Broz Tito. Inter-ethnic wars immediately broke
out, especially between the two big ‘nations’, Croatia and Serbia
(Anderson 1995). The wars mostly stemmed from the dissatisfaction
of Croatian people with the domination of the Serbian population
in the government of Yugoslavia, which resulted in the declaration
of independence of the Socialist Republic of Croatia in 1991. On the
other hand, Serbia, which wanted to unite the eight million Serbs
across the former region of Yugoslavia, also into a position of power
within Yugoslavia (Anderson 1995).
Fearing the possibility of catching into the war between the

two countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina then declaring their
independence in February 1992 (Bjarnason 2001). Despite that,
the state of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was still very
chaotic. The country was pressured from many sides, especially
from the Serbs dominated Yugoslav Federation, as well as the inter-
ethnic wars happening outside the country. The problem is that the
Serbs population in Bosnia made up 31% of the whole country’s
population, numbering 1.3 million (Anderson 1995). These wars
were soon involving Bosnia and Herzegovina when the population
of Serbs in Croatia made The Republic of Serbian Krajina in
eastern Slavonia–a province in Croatia–and Vojvodina, a separate
state just at the eastern border of Croatia. There are also separate
areas of Krajina in the northwestern and western side of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina then divided into two
factions: one faction consisting of the Islamic Bosnian and Croats,
and the other faction consisting of mainly Serbs population in the
country. The Serbs population then made the Republika Srpska–
that roughly translated into the Serbian Republic–in Bosnia just
like Krajina in Croatia (Bjarnason 2001). The widespread fighting
between the two factions begins two months later, in April 1992. The

‘Democracy
capital of Bosnia Herzegovina was under siege not long after and by
July, the Serbs controlled 70% of Bosnia (Anderson 1995; Bjarnason
2001).
The reaction of the international community was quite fast. In

January 1993, the United Nations (UN) sent Cyrus Vance to
negotiate with the European Community (EC) representative,
David Owen regarding this issue. The result was a ten-point plan
as an interim political solution for Bosnia, referencing upon earlier
models, called for the establishment of a highly decentralized state
in which the three major ethnic groups would be recognized as the
‘constituent units’. However, in an ambitious attempt to avoid the
appearance of forming three ethnic territorial spheres of influence,
Bosnia would be organized administratively into ten cantons, with
each one being a mixture of the different ethnic groups. Although
most governmental actions would be carried out by the cantons, a
central government operating from Sarajevo would be responsible

for foreign policy, defense, and taxation. This decision was made
from the general opposition from the international community to
any partition of Bosnia, fearing it could have a domino effect to
the surrounding countries and triggering claims to sovereignty by
other ethnic communities, such as the Albanians in Kosovo and
Macedonia (Anderson 1995).
While most of the Bosnian and Croats accept this result, the Serbs
were not really satisfied. This plan clearly forced the Serbs to hand
back around 60% of Bosnian territory that they occupied before
and enlarge Moslem control around Sarajevo. The plan also cut the
strategic corridor between Serbs dominated area in the Vance-Owen
Plan and Serbia. In June 1993, Vince-Owen Plan officially abandoned
and changed to the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan. This plan was basically
almost the same as the Vance-Owen plan, but with a blatant attempt
to divide Bosnia into three ethnic republics. The Government of
Bosnia eventually agreed to use this plan on condition that the
Moslems received more territory than they had been allocated in
the first draft. Other than that, the Europe Union (EU) and the UN
also impose sanctions on Serbia as a response to Serb aggression in
Bosnia. This sanctions made the Serbs easily give up the Bosnian
territory they occupied and under the Security Council Resolution,

‘Democracy
six towns in Bosnia was made as ‘safe areas’: Srebrenica, Sarajevo,

Tuzla, Gorazde, Bihac and Zepa (Anderson 1995). However, this
plan didn’t stop the conflict. There are still many frictions between
the ethnic groups and the tension is still very high in both Bosnia
and the international community. The tension resulted from many
failed negotiations between the USA, EU, UN, and Russia about
how to intervene in the war militarily. The conflict inside Bosnian
and Croats community itself also didn’t help the progression of
negotiations, resulting to a civil war and attempt to ethnic cleansing
between the allies-now-enemy, mostly by the Croats that has more
advanced military equipment than Bosnian (Bjarnason 2001).
On 26 September, at talks in New York conducted by the ‘Contact

Group’–a group consisting of all the party involved in and intervening
Bosnian War–agreed that there would be a single Bosnian state with
a federal constitution, and accepted broad constitutional principles,
including a presidency, a parliament, a constitutional court and
free elections. The parties then agreed to a Bosnia-wide cease-fire,

followed by Proximity Peace Talks in the US, and eventually a peace
conference in Paris. The cease-fire began on 12 October and has
gradually been taking hold. On 1 November, the Proximity Peace
Talks began at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio
with the aim of clearing away obstacles and reaching an agreement
that would make possible a formal peace conference. It is anticipated
that, in the event of a peace accord, a 60 000-strong multinational
military force will be deployed, with 20 000 troops from the US and
a contingent from Russia (Anderson 1995). The war ended with a
complicated system of presidency implemented in Bosnia, which
will be the focus of this paper.

‘Democracy
The Dazing State of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s

Political System
Table 1. Percentage of Population of Ethnic Groups in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2013
Ethnic Group Percentage of Population (in %)
Bosniaks (Muslims) 50.1
Serbs (Eastern Orthodox) 30.8
Croats (Catholics) 15.4
Others 2.7
Source: CIA World Factbook, 2019. “Bosnia and Herzegovina”, 14 Febru-

ary [online]. Retreived from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/bk.html (accessed on 9 March 2019).
Figure 1. Political Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Source: Gavric, Sasa et. Al., 2013. The Political System of Bosnia and
Herzegovina: Institutions- Actors-Processes. Sarajevo: Sarajevo Open
Centre.

‘Democracy
The Daytone Peace Agreement ended the war between the major
ethnics of former-Yugoslavia, but at the same time, divided it. The
agreement established to entities—probably the most used term
in the politics of Bosnia and Herzegovina—or federal units: the
Republika Srpska with Serb majority (49% of total BiH territory)
and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FbiH) with Bosniak
and Croat majority (51% of tptal BiH territory (Burg 1997 in Gavric
et. Al. 2013). In the middle of the two, efinition in 2000, is the
Brcko District, a self governing district that was under international
supervision, and used to be administed by the Republika Srpska,
but later has its own statute regulating the functions and powers of
the district. The Daytona Agreement became an iconic moment and
turning point for Bosnia and Herzegovina, as pointed out by Gavric
et. Al. (2013):
“The Dayton Peace Agreement attempted, under

the motto “One State, two Entities and three
Nations” to create a balance between opposing

interests, and to restrain disintegrative political
forces. A complex political system was created, with
four administrative levels and veto mechanisms
for the three ethnic groups. Consociationalism
was introduced to the political system. The Peace
Agreement foresaw the foundation of The Office
of the High Representative (OHR), an observing
governing body with the ability to coordinate and
supervise the implementation of the civil aspects of
the Agreement.” (Gavric et. Al. 2013)
The political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina is defined by the

struggle of identity that created it. Gavric et. Al. (2013) mentioned
that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina itself— created
during the Dayton Agreement and often named as the Dayton
Constitution—defines demos or the people solely in the context
of ethnicity, and only recognizes three dominant ethnic groups:
Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs as constituent of the people. Even
in this case, the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina imply
limited political rights towards ‘others’ ethnicity, defined as those
belong to national minorities like Roman or Trukish, or those with

‘Democracy
mixed background, no ethnic, or even no national identification.

This is further justified with the Decision on Constituent Peoples in
summer of 2000 delivered by The Constitutional Court of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. However, the dazing changes that are also
created by the decision include the division that: (1) Serbs became
constituent people in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; (2)
Bosniaks and Croats became constituent people in the Republika
Srpska (Gavric et. Al. 2013). Not only the wave of ‘democratization’,
Bosnia and Herzegovina has also experienced a series of major
transformations, as noted below:
“Since 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been

dealing with many parallel transformation
processes: from a war-torn to a peace-building
society, reconstruction of the state, democratization,
and transition from a communist planned economy
to a capitalist liberal free market” (BTI 2007 in

Gavric et. Al. 2013).
The president, or head of the excecutive branch of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, would rather refer to the State Presidency of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, a collective institution of head of state, and a
representation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s complex federalism.
This complex system isn’t fully to blame to the Dayton Peace
Agreement, but rather a legacy from the former Yugoslavian
tradition. Pejanovic (2005, in Gavric et. Al.3 2013) mentioned that
collective presidencies were already introduced in the federal level
of Yugoslavia since 1971, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1974.
The political tradition of Yugoslavia was to have nine members of
presidency elected by parliament, and later the head of presidency
position is rotated between the nine. This system would later be
‘simplified’ by the wave of direct-democratization in 1990, when
it was reduced down to seven, including two members from each
major ethnic groups (Muslims/Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs), and
one member coming from other ethnic groups (naroda). In 1995,
this system would be further simplified by decreasing the number
of the members of presidency into three, with one representative for
each major ethnic and none for others.

‘Democracy
Article V of Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (in Gavric et.

Al. 2013) also mentioned that the eligible voters of Federaation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina would elect one Bosniak and one Croat,
while the voters living in the Republik Srpska will elect the Serbian
member. This would later mean that Croats and Bosniaks living
in Republik Srpska, and Serbs living in the federation, could not
represent themselves, an anomaly of representation. The members
of the presidency are elected for a term of four years, and can be
elected again for one more term. After that, the representatives
would not be able to held a new position for the next four years.
The three members will elect one to be a chairman, a position
recognized as the leader and head of state in various occasion, and
this position will be rotated every eight month during the term. After
being elected, it become really hard to impeach any of the members
of the presidency. However the High Representative do have a right
named Bonn Powers to remove a member (Gavric et. Al. 2013). The
power of the presidency institution are equal to both the parliament
and president of a democratic country, as at the same time it is an

institution of representation. However it is still considered to be
the utmost excecutive branch of the government, and act as both
the head of state and government—therefore having the classical
authority of the branch both in domestic and foreign politics. This
includes choosing the cabinet, nominating budget plan, and holding
the civilian command of the armed force. The Excecutive branch
is further efiniti with a set of government named the Council of
Ministers. As other part of the dazing government, each ministry
is required to be peaked by representative of each ethnic, although
one could be the minister while the two others would be deputies.
However, the three should anonymously agree on decisions. This
complex system of excecutive branch is the reason why Bosnia and
Herzegovina is abstain on many international decisions, as any
should be anonymously agreed by three different party in each of its
decision-making level.
The parliamentary tradition of Bosnia and Herzegovina started

out in 1900 under the Austro- Hungarian rule as the Bosnian
Parliament (sabor), given the job to consult and draft laws, yet
was not allowed to adopt legislation. The Dayton Agreement later
established a bicameral parliamentary house, namely the House

‘Democracy
of Representatives and the House of Peoples. The members of the

House of Representatives are directly elected, in which two-third
are elected by the people in the Federation, while the other one-
third by those in Srbska. Eventhough is not a subject to ethnical
discrimination, the number of quota given to each entitities are
still considered to be in line with the amount of ethnics living in
the entities. On the other hand, the House of Peoples consists of
fifteen members with three representatives of each major ethnics
and none for the others. The division of people able to elect the
representatives to the House of People are just like the presidential
one. In Republik Srpska however, things are more complex as all
members of the National Assembly, instead, would appoint the
five Serbian members (Gavric et. Al. 2013). As in other western
states, the main functions of the parliamentary assembly includes
legislation, ratification of international treaties, budgeting, and
approval and control over council of ministers (Gavric et. Al. 2013).
While for the judicial system, the Bosnia and Herzegovina’s judicial

system is an inheritance of Yugoslavian judicial system, eventhough
the Dayton Constitution created several changes in it (Pajic 2001
in Gavric et. Al. 2013). The Bosnia- Herzegovinian judicial system
structure consisted of twenty-eight municipal, ten cantonal, and one
Supreme Court, efiniti with some other high court to assist in special
cases, including the Constitutional Court both in entities and state
level, and the Chamber for Human Rights.
Theoretical Approach: Democracy and

Democratization
Bosnian secession from federal Yugoslavia 1992 was perhaps the
closest Bosnia and Herzegovina has ever come to the grassroot
concepts of identity. According to Beetham (1994 in Bojkov 2003),
most authors had created a consensus that the wave of democracy
is uncontestable, and is based on some fundamental principles of
politics. However what differ are the number of interpretation and
implementation. As defined by Bojkov (2003) are the sample of
many variants of democracy:
“Besides direct, representative and liberal

democracy, it has now become possible to talk of
consociational democracy (Lijphart 1977; 1984),

‘Democracy
deliberative democracy (Miller 1994), associational

democracy (Hirst 1994), multiethnic democracy
(Sambanis 2000) and multicultural democracy
(Van den Berghe 2002). At another level of
analysis, and accepting the claim that geographical
regions indeed exhibit certain cultural patterns
based on common historical, political, linguistic
and religious experiences (Inglehart and Carballo
1997), it also makes sense to talk about Eastern
European democracy (Lewis 1994), Latin American
democracy (Whitehead, 1994), Asian democracy
(Potter 1994) and African Democracy (Young 1999;
Bratton and van de Walle 1997).” (Bojkov 2003)
The social complexity, as could be seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

is a problem of politics that have been foreseen by Thomas Hobbes,
for example. Zolo (1992 in Bojkov 2003) mentioned that the idea
of democracy that underlay modern political system is to reduce

fear. In an entity where multicultural become its main feature,
control and controlled democracy is often exercised with the
object belonging to the internal ethnic groups itself, in which by
Lemarchand (1995 in Bojkov 2003) and Lustick (1997 in Bojkov
2003) is called a hegemonic model—a model that exercise rewards,
sanction, and coercion in order to moderate the different ethnical
interests in multiethnic politics. Diamond (2002 in Bojkov 2002)
mentioned that this kind of democracy that could be seen in many
hybrid regimes would provide little to no essence of democracy,
even though election as a symbol of democracy exists. Bosnia and
Herzegovina have created such a democracy promotion that it
overrode its political development, something that could be seen as
a ‘forced democracy’ also. This ‘forced democracy’, sort of defined
by Bojkov (2003), is “a compact of external democracy promotion
whose non-democratic elements, often inconsistent with each other,
are directly inserted in the target country”.
Many authors, including Jeffrey (2007), Bojkov (2003), and Mostov

(1994) have described how democracy of international community’s
description has brought an incomparable destruction

‘Democracy
towards the young state. The real concept of democracy, as defined

by Mufti and Nafisah (2013), is rather regarding the liberty and
rights of individuals instead of identity groups—let alone majority
ethnical groups. Arapovic and Brljavac (2013) concluded that after
the case entitled ‘Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina’ ruled
by the European Court of Human Rights, it become evident that the
election system—and therefore the whole political scheme of Bosnia
and Herzegovina—is discriminatory and in dire need of systematic
reform. In this work, the author chose to use the political system
theory as prominently written by David Easton (1957; 1981). Bosnia
and Herzegovina, which consists of one republic, one federation,
and one state district, is not fully recognized by the theory as such a
political-legal structure, as well as how the state is built overall. The
state-building process of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not fully done
by consent, and rather was a process of war ending and establishment
of political agreement on the common state by international
community, rather than the community of Bosnia and Herzegovina

itself. Nor the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or Republik
Srpska have integrated territory, and the level of decentralization in
Bosnia and Herzegovina—especially in the federation with ten high
jurisdictions cantons—was unbearable theoretically.
There is also the sense of asymmetry of political system. For

instance, vertically, there are three layers of political entities when
viewed from the perspective of Republik Srpska, but four when seen
from the federation—a highly uncommon practice in the theory
of political system. However, as also underlined by Arapovic and
Brljavac (2013), the key anomaly to the political system of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, is the existence and integration of the Office of
High Representatives (OHR), which is a mechanism of international
community’s political presence in the domestic politics. Not to
mention, that the OHR have a strong and significant authority in
legislative, executive, and judicial powers, with no appeal rights given
to domestic institutions and individuals. For example, the OHR do
have the power to interpret the Electoral Law, which further proven
the interference of international parties in domestic and supposed-
to-be neutral election. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s extremely complex
political system has no compare in both the theory and practice of
political system, and this also spread to how identity creates its own

‘Democracy
complexity in political processes like elections—something the theory

was against for. The discriminatory position of members throughout
the whole system was considered to be non- constitutional, yet was
in line with the Dayton Constitution. Arapovic and Brljavac (2013)
even mentioned that the political processes and system of Bosnia
and Herzegovina was a ‘catalyst to political crisis’.
Bojkov (2003) mentioned that the current political system of Bosnia

and Heregovina is controlled democracy, and really close to what
many believe is the definition of “hybrid regime”. He quoted:
“The political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina

exhibits an essential feature of a hybrid regime
where democratic institutions and mechanisms
co-exist with non-democratic ones and where
both have important functions in governing the
polity and in doing so have to take account of each
other. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina the

non-democratic element of the regime is the more
powerful one backed up by a commendable pool
of international actors whose primary aim to date
appears to be to keep the country together at all
costs.” (Bojkov 2003)
Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, again, could not fit the ideal
of a democratic state. But at the same time, it is built on the condition
of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the international
community’s interpretation to it.
Post-1995 ‘Democracy’ System: A National Identity

Perspective
Before talking about the national identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
it is very important to know the efinition and conceptualization
of national identity. While the definition and conceptualization
of national identity may vary, the writers took on the definition
and conceptualization from Rupert Emerson (1960 in Mulalic &
Malanović – Adilović 2018). Here he defined national identity
as peoples who feel that they are a nation–as in nation-state or
state institution–which seen above the identity of race, ethnicity,

‘Democracy
religion, tradition and language (Verdugo & Milne 2016 in Mulalic &
Malanović – Adilović 2018). This identity can be seen as a collective
identity and is communicated through state-institutions (Estel,
2002 in Mulalic & Malanović–Adilović 2018). National identity is
manifested through symbols, flags, arts, national anthem, passport,
etc which can strengthen national consciousness and create a sense of
pride toward national heritage, foster patriotism, and inspire loyalty
towards the nation (Mulalic & Malanović–Adilović 2018). However,
it should be noted that “national identity” sometimes can refer not
to the state entity, but the more exclusive ethnic entity (Vanderwerf
2009). In this case, the national identity, or nationality of the people
of Bosnia-Herzegovina did not refer to the whole nation, but mostly
to the ‘ethnic-nationality’ of the nation (Heinen 2014).
This is the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are currently three

big ethnicity in Bosnia- Herzegovina: Bosnian, Croats, and Serbs.
Other than the three big ethnic, there are the ‘Other’ group of minor

ethnicity in Bosnia-Herzegovina such as Jews and Roman (Heinen
2014). This identification of ethnicity is very important and mostly
determine the treatment of individuals between the country. There
is a concept of ‘constituent peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina’ from
Dayton Agreement–which refers to the three big ethnic groups–that
made the member of this three group has more political rights than
the ‘Other’ ethnic group (Heinen 2014). This is to accommodate the
great ethnic division in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially after the
Bosnian War in 1990s. To further explain why such thing happen,
it should be understood that Bosnia- Herzegovina is an example of
consociationalism (Søberg 2008 in Heinen 2014). Lijphart (1969
in Heinen 2014) seeing this political model as a way of organizing
a “fragmented but stable democracies”. The most prominent
characteristic of this political model is “the governance by elite
cartel” or some form of elite cooperation working to stabilize the
society. There is a power-sharing mechanism which all–or three, in
this case–have an interest, and autonomy on issues like education,
culture, representation in politics, bureaucracy, and others (Pildes
2009 in Heinen 2014). This is mostly reflected on the complicated
system in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

‘Democracy
This kind of political system is often used as an instrument to gain

power, especially during elections. There are two factors that play a
role in this process: politician using ethnic as campaign basis and
voter’s realization on how the resource allocation divided during
elections (Eifert Miguel & Posner 2010 in Heinen 2014). This
is kind of ‘political identity’ then become the focus of elections,
while ignoring all aspect. Ethnic identity is then reconstructed and
reinvented in order to serve as an instrument of mobilization of
masses. There is also the idea of ‘ancient hatreds’ that was widely
adopted by the media and policy circles. This, however, stemmed
complaints about how identity politics ignores the ability of different
identities to mix of overlap (Heinen 2014). The uniform group of
identity has neglected the existence of intra-group diversity. But
in the end, this kind of political system was especially powerful in
Bosnia- Herzegovina, remembering how the country has a history
of ethnic war.
Prospect for Reform: ‘Real’ Democracy?

It is by now realized that Bosnia and Herzegovina are in dire need
of constitutional reform, in which a better system, especially in
federal level, is needed. Pasch (2012) noted that in 2010, it took the
leaders of main political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina a long
fifteen months to agree on the formation of the Council of Ministers.
However, at the same time, there is a discourse of distrust regarding
further foreign political intervention to support this reform. As put
by Pasch (2012), it is dominantly convinced that the driving force
behind the major political reformation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
should there be any, should be the people themselves and their
representatives. For instance, many has said that the reform should
be done in line with the European Convention on Human Rights,
and done in both executive, legislative, and judiciary branch.
However, further than that, a constitutional reform is a must, and
should be prepared in many levels. The existing problem is the fact
that Bosnia and Herzegovina appear to have some constitution, and
there are ideas on creating one state constitution only. These ideas
come from those who also support the decrease of the extreme level
of decentralization in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

‘Democracy
The most important fundamental idea regarding a reform in

Bosnia and Herzegovina is the need of nation-building, as state-
building process has already taken place years ago. The underlaying
idea about this is to decrease the level of identity politics in the
political system and processes, in which in extreme, would erase
the complicity of ethnics in politics. However still, many would find
this both utopian and possible, as the system of ethnical politics was
the one constructed by the international community. Pasch (2012)
offers five different scenarios of political conditions in Bosnia and
Herzegovina by setting the year 2025 as a benchmark, including:
(1) status quo; (2) functional decentralized state; (3) functional
centralized state; (4) regional reconnection; (5) dissolution. The
status quo was not any different with the current political system
that has been described above. Both the functional state scenarios
were pointing of the importance of creating a stronger institution and
functioning system according to the current constitution. However,
both refers to a different stress of authority—one to federal, one to

entities below it like cantons. The regional reconnection stressed out
on the importance of involving fellow regional groups in the process,
while dissolution—the final scenario—would further acknowledge
the undeniable presence of ethnicalities in politics, and create
entities based on ethnicities instead, predicting what is called to be
“Dayton 2”.
Conclusion
The complexity of political system in Bosnia and Herzegovina was
and is strongly related to the presence of ethnic-nationality in the
country. Not only that, the long-lasting conflict happening in the
former Yugoslavian state, the inheritance of Soviet socialist political
values, and the disturbing intervention by the political community
at the end of the Cold War worsen the status quo that has lasted for
about two decades. The frictions between ethnics that resulted from
the Bosnian War two decades ago has made the political system
heavily reliant to the identification of ethnicity. The other factor was
the Dayton Agreement that the content blatantly divide the cantons
and the two entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina based on ethnicity.
While it may be seen as a result of the Dayton Agreement, it must be
noted that the people itself also think the same about the importance

‘Democracy
of ethnicity in their daily life. Ethnic identity has been reconstructed

and reinvented in order to serve as an instrument of mobilization
of masses, and the uniform group of identity has neglected the
existence of intra-group diversity. This complex system that is not
only confusing but also is not in line with the essence of democracy,
the theory of political system, functionalism principles, and the
efficiency that the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the factors
that sparks the need of reform in the political system of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Because at the end of the day, politics that is based on
democracy is made to reflect the need and will of the people to rule
themselves and create a political order that is prospected to last for
as long as the nation-state would stand.
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‘Democracy
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the National Identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, ILIRIA
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Commemorate 2019 Indonesian Presidential Election: Political Clout in Identity,
Millennials, and Propaganda
Witri D. Insani
Commemorate 2019 Indonesian

Presidential Election: Political Clout in
Identity, Millennials, and Propaganda
Witri D. Insani
General Achmad Yani University, Cimahi
Abstract
Since 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election, campaign and issues
in Indonesian election started to be driven by identity. This
phenomenon has swung back to be a new trend in 2019 Presidential
Election. Identity politics by using religion, tribalism, propaganda
through social media, presidential candidate spokesperson that

involving youths, has been evident so far. Talking about identity,
Jokowi-Ma’ruf which is incumbent and Prabowo-Sandi as the
opposition, are somewhat changing. Especially the incumbent,
Jokowi that was known as a Javanese who is down to earth as
he is. By this time, he looks more aggressive and offensive. He
brings new issues to public that objectives to his opposition like the
term of Russian propaganda and tend to do a personal attack to
his political opponents. Denim jacket, big-bike, and sneakers have
created an image of Jokowi as a young and energetic president
that seems attractive to millennials. Moreover, Prabowo-Sandi as
the opposition which should precisely attack looks more defensive.
Even in presidential debate, they did agree to Jokowi’s statements.
Despite these phenomena, Prabowo also brings the issues like
Indonesia will dissolve by 2030, debt-printing minister, and
US political-consultant accusation. Those series of events also
cleave Indonesian to have two identities, Jokowi’s supporter and
Prabowo’s supporter.
Keywords: Indonesia, Presidential Election, Identity, Millennials,

Propaganda

Witri D. Insani
Introduction
As stated by one of the Founding Fathers of the United States, the
duty of a true patriot is to protect his country from its government.
That conception has predisposed the development of democracy
until now. A general election supposed to be the most important
event for the citizens. In accordance with Pericles, politics will likely
to take our interest and what we are supposed to do is participate
by voting in the election. Doing voting is no longer about choosing a
leader and done. Voting is all about determined the next generation
and the future of its state. In determining his voice, an elector will
select the candidate based on his identity. According to international
relations theory called constructivism, people will react toward
objects based on the meanings of its objects for them (Alexander
Wendt, 2016). Or in other words, an elector will do a vote based
on his compatibility and choose the vote to a candidate that fit his
compatibility. This concluded the compatibility of a certain person
is defined an identity. In addition, the elector will act according to

his identity and will choose candidates who have the identity that
suits him.
The votes that have split up for the two candidates in general election
fundamentally has indicated a split of identity in that state. But the
question that we need to ask is, what does identity mean, here in
after how does identity mean to us, and most importantly how do
we define our identity? If the identity is really defined by some value
that we keep and every commitment that we take to determine our
interest, why do some politicians change their identities regularly?
That statement makes us wonder, why does Jokowi can become
aggressive suddenly to his oppositions? Supposed that we are
talking about the conception of state identity between citizens
in that country and its government, which one represents that
country’s identity? Current phenomena indicating identity politics
has increased sharply to become a new trend. Those questions
needed to be questioned, and that will be exceedingly useful if every
state really knows their identity so they can determine their decision
wisely.
As a country with a large of population that also has lots of religion and
racial difference within its citizens, “Unity in Diversity” as Indonesian

Witri D. Insani
motto should be able to truly describe its national identity. Towards

the general elections, if those differences still raised continuously
which does not rule out the possibility that this circumstance could
trigger a national schism. One of the most obvious things that ever
happened is in the past Jakarta Gubernatorial Election in 2017
when the Christian Chinese Governor, Basuki Tjahaya Purnama
which known as Ahok automatically replaced Jokowi who had
become president and again he was being nominated while he was
an incumbent at that time. As a state who has Moslem as a dominant
religion, this thing incited some Moslems to do a demonstration in
protesting Non-Moslem led their region because their Holy Koran
proscribed that decision.
Similar phenomena have swung back to be a new trend in 2019

Presidential Election. Jokowi, a Javanese nobleman which is
Moslem still being an object of tribalism in Indonesia. Since 1998,
The Communist Party of Indonesia that also referred to PKI (Partai

Komunis Indonesia) had become a proscribed organization. In
this case, a highly political-motivated slander was aimed at Jokowi
for being involved in everything that related to PKI. Moreover, he
also accused of being a Chinese Non-Moslem. Even though his ex-
opposition La Nyalla Mattalitti has admitted that he was an actor
of this fake news that has been shared since 2014, some people still
accused Jokowi until now (Tempo, 2018).
In this modern era, social media has become a new media to build a
good image and personal brand. It would not become exaggeration
when we consider social media as a new platform to make propaganda.
Suppose that millennials are the defining social media authority,
the politician or the candidates in elections thereupon should try
to get millennials’ attention. Not a coincidence when Jokowi that
has known as a humble and down to earth President all of sudden
come up with his new image with his big-bike, complete with his
sneakers and denim jacket. On the other hand, Prabowo-Sandi as
the opposition also come up with their new image. Indonesian had
known Prabowo as a serious and assertive figure and unexpectedly
can be seen ‘joget syantik’ publicly (dancing accompanied by
dangdut). Sandiaga Uno as a vice presidential candidate also come

Witri D. Insani
up with his basketball sport which then displayed a new image as a

young-soul figure.
Identity in Identity Politics of Indonesia and Its

Significances
The basics of identity according to a statement from an associate
professor at the University of Illinois Shahram Heshmat (2014)
is basic values that drive us to take the choice that we make. And
the choice that we have taken reflects our value. A constructivist
scientist, Alexander Wendt saw the relationship between an identity
and a state as analogous to every action toward foes as a threat and
will act neutral toward friend because they do not do any harm
(Alexander Wendt, 2016). Moreover, Wendt argues an identity
is fundamentally relational that will always have an appropriate
attachment to everything that related to each person. Consequently,
an actor or a politician may have a variety of particular identities
based on his interest. Subsequently, this identity is the reason for

people’s interest. In addition, the identity of each person will be
adjusted with their interest.
The fundamental value of identity has reflected in Jokowi’s alteration

of his actions. One of the most distinguishable actions that he has
ever done is change his natural image as a calm man who does not
talk much to be more aggressive and tend to do a personal attack to
his oppositions. During the Presidential Debate, he mentioned about
Prabowo’s supporter named Ratna Sarumpaet as fake news spreader
by responding to Prabowos’s statement (Kompas TV, 2019). In
another time when Prabowo talking about land certification which
according to him as ineffective policy, Jokowi continue to attack him
again with a statement that his opposition has enormous amounts of
land in East Kalimantan and Aceh (CNN, YouTube, 2019). Although
in the form of different decisions, Prabowo has done changing as
well. In the second Presidential Debate which has been held on
February 17, 2019 he tends to agree to Jokowi’s statement which
should not have done as opposition.
And those occurrences increasingly make Indonesian to split up

between two different voices. It also signifies that the Indonesian
citizens has also two identities which are divided into Prabowo’s or

Witri D. Insani
Jokowi’s supporter. The motto of Indonesia, “Unity in Diversity”

essentially should reflect the companionship between its citizens,
even though on the contrary the diversity that has exist could
actually be utilized to disunite them. In the election contexts, it
is quite a frankly valid excuse for candidates to see this as their
resource to gather more voters. Lastly, one of important thing that
must be considered is these phenomena also could lead to a national
schism which also does not rule out the possibility that Indonesia
may be played in proxy war or civil war by foreign parties or even
other states.
Significances of Millennials in the Dynamics of 2019

Presidential Election
If in 2014 Gubernatorial Election had shown Jokowi as a humble
and down to earth Javanese who acted like an average lower-middle
class to gather populace voice which then has blusukan (impromptu

visits) as his signature, some political observers assess that old means
will not be going to work in current circumstance (Ika Krismantari,
The Conversation 2018). It is reasonable to assume that he is doing
rebranding strategies to gather the millennials voice toward 2019
General Election ahead by wearing big-bike, denim jacket, and
sneakers. Indicated by lots of responses in social media such as
Twitter, Facebook, or even Instagram, this means is considerably
succeed in rebranding his image to be known as a young-at-heart
and energetic president.
As a matter of fact that he has gained 50% votes, Jokowi’s electability

is more prominent in millennials (Katadata, 2019). Similar things
are also done by the opposition, Prabowo-Sandi. Prabowo who is
known as a decisive figure also showing up as a young-at-heart
dignitary when he is joget syantik (Do dancing that accompanied
by dangdut). Sandiaga Uno did likewise by playing basketball so he
can be known as a sporty good-looking man who has young-soul
as well. Millennials votes are considered as an important target for
candidates because out of the 185 million electors in the upcoming
elections are numbered around 40% (Shihab, Najwa Video, 2018,
& CNN Video,2018). Therefore, this target has superb significance.

Witri D. Insani
Other than that, the millennials also considered having political

clout that has a major impact on the dynamics of the presidential
election. To increase this influence, two candidates also involved
a young figure to become a spokesperson. The row of names like
Faldo Maldini and Gamal Albinsaid from Prabowo’s successor or
also referred Badan Pemenangan Nasional (BPN) and on the or
side Jokowi’s successor have Rian Ernest and Tsamara Amany in
Tim Kampanye Nasional (TKN). One or other phenomena that
have happened is when they have created a trending topic on
social media or spread news that can influence swing voters all the
time. An example of the phenomenon that has ever occurred is the
trending tag line after The Second Presidential Debate on February
17, 2019 when Prabowo said, “Unicorn yang onlen onlen itu ya?”
which means “The online unicorn, is that right?”.
On top of it, millennials will become more critical toward unreliable

statements or even logical fallacy that has made by politicians. After
the first Presidential Debate for example, it was realized there are a
lot of unreliable statements and then the millennials who checked
the validation of data has shown up. Vincent Ricardo is one of them,
on his YouTube channel he has uploaded a video “Cek Fakta Debat
Pertama Calon Presiden 2019” (2019 First Presidential Debate
Check) which then revealed the ignorance of the candidate (Vincent
Ricardo, 2019). Prabowo’s solution to make Indonesia self-sufficient
without imports like a developed country, whereas a more precise
statement should be the term food security which means Indonesia
have the capability to fulfil its food needs without having a gap in
food distribution. Besides that, another misguided statement which
was highlighted was Jokowi’s claim in his reign there had been
no forest fires. On the contrary, it had occurred in the regions of
Sumatra, Jambi, and Lampung (Kompas, 2019).
Spouted Russian Propaganda: Publicity Gimmick or

Enlightened Verity?
It is no coincidence if the incumbent President Jokowi which
has become increasingly aggressive toward his oppositions then
proclaims an issue that can capture attention of voters. In his speech
that has been held in Surabaya on February 2, 2019 he accused
that his opposition are using Russian Propaganda. This statement

Witri D. Insani
then reaped controversy and get response directly from Russian

Embassy who also stated they are resisted that accusation (Russian
Embassy IDN, 2019). The TKN are arguing that the statement is not
about Russian as a state, but only as a term. This clarification ever
explained, by TKN, Budiman Sudjatmiko in the event of Mata Najwa
(Najwa Shihab, 2019).
If we take a look further at this term, actually this term really does
exist. One of the most obvious events that occurred was when
the Russian government and its intelligence had been spying and
influenced the Presidential Election in the United States in 2016.
This action then affected the expulsion of Russian Diplomats in
the United States. Moreover, Ukraine, Canada, United Kingdom,
Germany, Poland, France, Netherland, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Italy, Lithuania, Romania, and Finland also expelled Russians
Diplomat (CNN, 2018). According to Christopher Paul and Miriam
Matthews on their paper, “The Russian ‘Firehouse of Falsehood’

Propaganda Model” explained this propaganda’s approach by
making purposefully misguided action intended to create a trend of
controversies. This is continued with additional statements about
misleading claims, partial truths, or even fake news. The aim is to
eliminate trust in objective data and damage the credibility of the
data source.
Whoever it is to blame, Indonesia must realize that the most

important thing above all is Indonesian cohesiveness along with the
companionship without any rupture even though there are differences
within it. Bear in mind, any propaganda can be propagated through
many platforms such as social media. Therefore, the urgency that we
have to do is to be wiser in various news especially hoaxes that aims
to trigger the national schism.
2019 Indonesian Presidential Election: Key

Solutions Towards Achieving Indonesian Goals
Again, the solutions that have to be done to achieve goals in the
2019 Indonesia Presidential Election is to stay united even with the
diversity, in keeping with the spirit of “Unity in Diversity” motto.
Ultimately, the key solutions to deal with those phenomena is; (1)
Realize that the motto of Indonesia, “Unity in Diversity” should be

Witri D. Insani
reflected in any situation and do not let the difference of choice in

the election led to be objects in proxy war or civil war by other states
that have interest in Indonesia. (2) Consider that millennials could
be the biggest influencer in political clout. Consequently, this fact
could be ruled the candidate to be more creative and smarter in
using this opportunity because the reckless statement with certainty
will be going to get criticism and eternally saved on social media.
As for the millennials, they also need to act wisely in using media,
because their actions can be recorded on the internet forever. (3)
Mobilize intelligence capabilities by forming cyber teams and
counter propaganda teams. The objective of this action is to maintain
national security and to prevent national schism as well. This also
aim to avoiding incidents such as Indonesia being used as an object
in civil war and proxy war by other states.
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Your Voice Matters: Understanding the Importance of Identity in the General Election
Alfian Razkia Ardafi
Your Voice Matters: Understanding the

Importance of Identity in the General
Election

Abstract
Indonesia is a big country, not only it’s populous, but also full of
cultures, origins, languages, and ethnic groups. Right now, we are in
the situation in which the identity of everyone can be very influential
in not only the media, but also the political situation of the country.
This paper will discuss how identity can affect the electability of

a presidential candidate as well as many critical challenges in the
general election. We conduct a survey on 47 respondents to get a
better perspectives and reasons why the respondents chose either
vision or mission or the identity of the candidates would be much
more important in determining the candidates they would vote in the
general election. This paper will also discuss the emergency caused
of the lack of political literacy and the importance of early education
as a key to keep our country educated, at peace and looking forward
to a much more visionary Indonesia. It is important for us to realize
that each of us regardless our origins, beliefs, and ethnics groups,
that the voice we give matters to determine the better future of
Indonesia. We hope through this paper it can motivate all of us to
learn and to teach the younger generations of how important politic
is and staying away from political blindness.
Key words: candidates, electability, election, identity, voting
Indonesia is a country located in Southeast Asia with thousands of

islands scattered from east to west. It is hardly to figure out how the
country with vast ocean that separated those islands can be united
under the name of The Republic of Indonesia. Talking about how big
Indonesia is, we cannot merely figure it out geographically, because
Indonesia is a country which given by The Almighty an abundance

blessing of cultures, ethnics, languages, religions and etc. Those

differences represent the pluralism of Indonesia; hence the pluralism
is a key to form the identity of Indonesia as a country. If usually
identity is created by the similarities, but on the contrary, Indonesia
is where those differences itself that created Indonesia as it is now.
The founding fathers realized that the independence of Indonesia
was not achieved only by the struggle of certain groups, but also the
will of all Indonesian parties. Indonesia itself is named Indonesia
because of the consideration that pluralism is the representative of
the country, neither from the majority ethnic groups which is Java
nor Islam as the majority of religion.
The political history of Indonesia can be divided into four periods

that are liberal or constitutional democracy (1949-1958), guided
democracy (1959- 1965), Pancasila (New Order 1966-May 2nd
1998) and Reformation (post reign of Soeharto, May 1998 – now).
The first Indonesia’s election was held in 1955—10 years after its
independence—it was followed by 52 political parties and there

were four big parties that came out as the winner. Partai National
Indonesia (PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Party), 22.3%, Majelis Syuro
Indonesia (Masyumi, Modernist Islam Party), 20.9%, Nahdlatul
Ulama (NU), 18.4% and Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian
Communist Party), 16.4% (Fuad, 2013). The four winning parties
respectively represent different political culture; PNI and PKI
representing the secular parties, meanwhile NU and Masyumi were
politically represent Islam.
Each President of Indonesia have tried to represent and embrace the

differences by involving the minority voices, to convince that minority
voices matter and they have equal status despite their background.
According to Epstein & O’Halloran (2004), the existence of minority
voices will have an influence on the government.
“Designing institutions with the explicit aim of

empowering minorities, and uphold the human
rights then, one must consider the possible impact
of those institutions on both types of coalition
formation. In some cases, institutional change can
empower minorities on both dimension; the simple
act of enfranchising minority voters, for instance,

means that they can influence both electoral

coalitions and legislative bargaining as well.”
In Indonesia differences are the assets of the country, thus once

you are Indonesian, you will be treated the same regardless of
the differences. As stated before, it could be seen from the name
‘Indonesia’, if Indonesia’s founding father only consider the majority,
the name could be “Javanesia”, or “Islaminesia”, or any other name
that represent the particular majority. Even though the Indonesia
has the biggest Muslim population in the world. The founding father
believed that Indonesia should be tolerant, plural, and upholds the
human rights of the minority.
After the resignation of Soeharto in 1998, Indonesia was struggling to

rebuild its political system, manifesting democratic as Indonesian’s
long-dream. This struggle has taken place on four fronts: executive–
legislative relations, center–region relations, religion–state

relations, and interethnic relations. Rebuilding the country’s
political system indirectly created Indonesia’s new identity as a
democratic country. Indonesia gradually confirming its new identity
as a democratic country by holding the first open election after 32
years under the authority of President Soeharto’s regime. The first
open and direct elections was holding in 2004 with the chosen of
Megawati Soekarno Putri. It marked the new era of Indonesia for the
first time woman was officially elected to occupy the most-strategist
position as President. It began opening more space for women to
take part in Indonesia’s governance.
As time goes by, plurality that is supposed to be one of the main

values that upholds in Indonesia is having a hard time to withstand.
In 2016, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or well-known as Ahok, the former
governor of Jakarta was blamed of blasphemy towards Islam for
what he said in his campaign was allegedly offending the Muslims.
The situation was getting worse since people bringing up the issue
that he was not coming from indigenous ethnic origins, it was most
likely the other excuses that people made to make him back-off from
the running electoral by claiming he was no longer eligible to lead
the people. He is originally Chinese, one of the ethnic minorities in
Indonesia, his background regarding where did he come from was
never been issued before the blasphemy occurred. Protests were

echoing everywhere demanding Ahok to resign from the governor

position and the run-off governor’s election, the continuing protests
demanded him to get punitive sanction. The heated-situation became
more chaotic as President Joko Widodo threw a statement that
called religion matters supposed to be separated from any political
matters. It triggered more protests; many negative perceptions were
coming towards him claiming that he is the henchman of foreign
side that has an agenda to spread secularism in the country.
One of the many example of the impact of sustained use of religion

can be shown as how Anies Baswedan, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama’s
opponent, outperformed him in the election despite Basuki has won
the first round (Muez, 2017). The election results was the evidence
that religion matters is still affecting Indonesians when they’re
voting, most people think that no matter how good you are, how
progressive the programs you are offering and how impressive your
track record is all this time, if you encroached the lines by throw
up any religious matters which considered offensive, then all the

hard work, work programs, and all the plans that you have will led to
nothing. Ahok’s case then leads to a series of conflicts since people
are rather more sensitive when it comes to religious matters. The
situation is getting more intense, it affects the following President
election which then arise a question on how important identity in
shaping the voter’s voting behavior is.
Considering the question, we made a survey that consists of two

questions. 1) If you are a voter, would you tend to choose candidates
who share the same identity or mission and vision? Please Explain!
2) Looking at the political situation in Indonesia, do the identity/
background of the candidate’s important enough to affect their
electability? Please explain. Several answers of the first and second
question are shown on the table 1.1 and 1.2.

Table 1.1
If you are a voter, you will tend to choose candidates
who share the same identity or mission and vision?
Please Explain!
Vision and Mission Identity

A good leader isn’t based on It affects how the candidates
their identity but by their ability will do their job when they
to run their program regardless are chosen
of their origins
What the people needs is it feels more believable to

a leader that has a good have someone from the same
performance and fulfil the background as a leader
society’s expectation
Because identity is only a social Because the vision and

construct, but if they have a mission are only a program,

promising vision and mission, but the candidates need to
they can design a better work have certain characteristics to
run their program Smoothly
Program
The responses of the first question mostly chose vision and mission
to determine their candidate electability in the general election. A
responded said that “I would only choose the candidate that has the
same vision and mission, because the similarity of my identity and
the candidates would not guarantee the success of the development
of the country. The candidates who has a good vision and mission
usually think ahead and know the risks of each and every work
program so it will be optimal and a continuous performance, and
with that the candidate will plan the safety and taking care about the
various minority groups that has been considered in the former work
planning.” However, in the other hand, there were several answers
that chose identity of the candidates are much more important to
determine their electability. For example, a respondent said, “To
know the same origins or the political party of a candidate can make
sure of how the candidate works based on the history of the political
party they represent.”

Table 1.2
Looking at the political situation in Indonesia, do the

identity/background of the candidate’s important
enough to affect their electability? Please explain!
YES NO
The citizens needs to know The candidate’s history
what is the candidate’s history does not affect their
and actions in the past before progress and achievement
they elect in the future
People usually select the Not as important of the
candidate who has similar candidate’s capability to do
backgrounds/beliefs with them his job to become an ideal
leader of the people
So the candidate can be a Identity politics can cause
representative of a certain some groups feel as though
minority and marginalized they are aggrieved and being
group treated unfairly
The second question about the identity/origins of the candidate

to affect their electability. A respondent answered that, “it is
important, because there’s a possibility that citizens does not know
the candidate very well, so that the voter can make a personal critical
reason to choose the candidate whether it is based on their political
party or the track record that they have.” Another respondent also
says “it’s very important, the track record of a candidate can be a very
sensitive factor. Their background and past experiences can give us
a picture of the candidate’s life, so that we can speculate on how the
candidate’s personality will be on their ability to lead and giving out
orders.” It’s very likely to see that these respondents who answers
that the identity of a candidate is important are an example of Civic
Voluntary Model. Civic Voluntary Model is a model of a behavior in
general elections in which assumes that anyone that is participating
in the general elections to be aware of the general elections and its
effects to their own interest and their community. It is also assumed
that someone who has a higher level of education to have a more
tendency to join the general election than those with low level of
education (Conway, 2000).

While respondents answered that the identity/background of a

candidate is not very important, they have various reasons. One
respondent answer that the personal actions and history of the
candidate does not affect their capability to lead and their work
program at their period of work. Some responses also talked about
the negative effects of identity politics and it may cause some
minority and marginalized group to be treated differently and will
be in a disadvantage when it comes to representation in the media
and work place caused by the overwhelming mass of the majority.
When we see the first and the second table, it can be seen that there
is a paradox and opinions that is in contrary to the other. Most
respondents answered that the when it comes to voting, they would
prefer the candidates’ capability and vision and mission, while at the
same time they also answered that the identity and the origins of
the electors are very important that it can affect their electability
in the general elections. It can be inferred the reason of why there’s

an opposite response from the respondents is that it all depends on
the political party of the elector. The political of each elector can
be a very important factor on the elector’s electability because
it will cause partisanship (a feeling of closeness and a supportive
attitude to become loyal to a certain political party). The party’s
identity, whether the political stance, vision, and/or purpose will
be a determining factor for the voters. Because the political party’s
identity will invoke the voters sentiment and votes to the party in the
general election (Fuad, 2013).
One of the many challenges that we have is the society does not
realize that they have such tremendous effect to their nation just
by voting. For an example, voters usually vote the candidate that
is popular or financial based rather than those who are actually
qualified that has been conducted through many processes to test
their capability to lead and realistically improve the performance of
the political party and the country. It is an emergency caused of the
lack of political literacy in the country to make such un-effective and
unsatisfying results in the general election. If only the importance
of political literacy has been socialized and taught all over country it
will make every citizen to participate critically and politically, they

will know the differences the parties’ vision and purpose and know
the basic political concepts and facts (Rosyidin, 2017).
In conclusion, as a country that is pluralist, vast, unique, and has

various resources, Indonesia also contains many people from many
backgrounds. We can see how each and every identity/background
matter in how political environment works here. It is also a reminder
that everyone, regardless of their gender, beliefs, and ethnic groups
deserves rights to represent and be represented. One voice of citizen
could change the whole country by voting, and in that reason political
literacy very important and education is the only way of solution.
References
Conway, M. M. (2000) Political Participation in the United States.
3rd eds. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
Epstein, D. and Halloran, S. O. (2004) Racial Gerrymandering and
Minority Representation. Rochester.

Muez, B. N. (2017) Religion and Politics : Reflections from Jakarta.
Singapore.
Fuad, A. B. B. (2013) “Political Identity and Election in Indonesian
Democracy : A Case Study in Karang Pandan Village,
Malang, Indonesia,” Procedia Environmental Sciences, 20,
pp. 477–485.
Rosyidin, I. (2017) ‘The Simultaneous Election in Indonesia :
Problems and Solution Strengthening Democratic
Institution and the Need for Political Literacy An Evaluation
to the Simultaneous Election in Indonesia’, Advances
in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research
(ASSEHR). pp. 204–206.

Jordan Aria Adibrata & Naufal Fikhri Khairi
The Identity Politics and Political Order in

Indonesia

Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang, Malang
Abstract
This paper aims to explain the impact of the use of identity politics
on Indonesian political stability, which often occurs after the
2014 election. This resulted in disputes between identity groups,
especially on social media. The dispute gradually became a habit
that influenced the attitude of the Indonesian people, especially
in responding to political matters. The people of Indonesia who
initially upheld tolerance, togetherness, love of peace turned into

an intolerant society by burning racial, ethnic, religious, as well
as the breaking up of community unity into two opposing camps.
This phenomenon has affected Indonesia’s political stability, which
was initially calm, to be chaotic after 2014 election and is getting
worse before 2019 election. The results show that the frequent use
of identity politics in Indonesia has resulted in an unstable domestic
political order, which then changes the attitude of the previously
civilized Indonesian society to become uncivilized. Social media has
an important role in changing the attitude of the Indonesian people,
since it is a public facility with an easy level of accessibility in which
the flow and delivery of information is often ridden by the interests
of each side.
Keywords: 2014-2019 Election, Identity Politics, Political Order,

Social Change, Social Media.
Introduction
Identity Politics in Indonesia has attracted us as a writer to research
that problem. Identity politics have made the Indonesian political
order instable. One of the main reasons is that identity politics
has been dividing our society into various self-interest group, thus
making our domestic political order unstable. Besides that, identity

politics have another impact: the change of society attitude in the

way to respond political issues. Indonesian society are known for its
tolerance, great solidarity and unity, great civility (an attitude that
contains tolerance, acceptance of differences in political views and
social behavior) values, and other positive behavior. However, since
the identity politics has divided the nation, the society has become an
uncivilized society with many intolerant attitude, disintegrative act,
hate-speech, and provocative. The attitudes and behaviors from this
society are showing uncivilized manners, and becoming a habit to
this society, even though we are not generalizing that all Indonesian
society has become uncivilized. However, we have seen many such
case in various social media platforms. This phenomenon is proved
by many cases showing intolerant behavior, arrogancy, and hate.
Identity politics itself is a movement or political mechanism done

by organizing identity politics (political party) and social identity
(ethnic, race, and religion) as a tool and source of political strength
(Haboddin, 2012). Identity politics can be referred as a politic that

mobilizes people with the same interest, with the aim to attain
personal benefit (Hayward & Watson, 2010). In Indonesia, identity
politics cover many problems such as ethnic, religion, and local
interest represented by political actors with their own articulation
(Maarif, 2012). Based on that definition, we can conclude that
identity politics are efforts to gain political power by using social
group identity for gathering political supports and strength.
In Indonesia, identity politics have triggered various problems such

as ethnic, race, and religion (SARA) problem, hate speech, and
fake news or hoax, which affected the shift of Indonesian society
behavior with the construct of media that supports specific interests.
Changes of the behavior is the impact from the existence of identity
politics and that (identity politics) are impacts from various fake
news or hoax in social media (Septanto, 2018; Juliswara, 2017).
Various studies tend not to examine changes in the attitudes of
the Indonesian people as a result of the implementation of identity
politics in depth both in terms of process and time placement, but
only as an impact of hoaxes on social media. Therefore, this study
takes another perspective that examines the impact of identity
politics on changes in attitudes of Indonesian society influenced by

Indonesian political instability in depth, while still including aspects

of the influence of social media, and placing focus on the time period
to be studied as the 2014-2019 presidential election.
The phenomenon of identity politics began before the 2014

Indonesian Presidential Election, contested by Joko Widodo
and Prabowo Subianto. This election, which only produced two
leader options, splits the Indonesians into two separate groups,
each having their own beliefs to their candidates. Some attempts
were launched by both groups to increase the electability of their
preferred candidates. However, that attempts were indicated as a
deviate attempts from the rule of law and social norms, including
the emergence of hoax news broadcaster called Saracen, which had
existed in 2014 (Movanita, 2017).
Presently towards 2019 Presidential Election, Indonesia’s political

situation is becoming increasingly unstable, marked by the rapid

development of hoaxes spread across the society. According to
Indonesian Ministry of Information, there are 62 reports on hoax
concerning the presidential and legislative election (Kementrian
Komunikasi dan Informatika, 2019). The spread of the fake news
like the attacks on artist turned contra-government activist Ratna
Sarumpaet, the alleged passing of a “pro-LGBT” act by the government,
foreign workers issue, hoax on seven containers containing punched
ballot, and so on. With the circulation of these false news, the society
has different responses, depending on which political parties they’ve
support. However, the public responses were negative and seems
uncivilized, as seen from various comments on website posts and on
the both candidates social account. Many of these comments are in
the form of blasphemy, insults, and invectives, reflecting the public
morale degradation of Indonesian society that led to uncivilized
manner. This reflects the strength of identity politics in Indonesia,
which has become stronger with the emergence of support towards
both the opposition and the incumbent.
Method
This paper will use a qualitative descriptive method. This research
method is more directed at finding meaning, understanding
(understanding) symptoms, phenomena, events, besides that

in this method can also understand the deepest meaning and

essence contained in phenomena, and events (Raco, 2010). While
descriptive means that the data generated will be in the form of
writing (depiction) of the phenomenon, the event under study,
so as to provide a deep description of the phenomenon or event
carried out by an individual, group or organization in a context that
is comprehensively and holistically studied (Rahmat, 2009). So,
qualitative descriptive research aims to interpret, understand, and
describe the data concerned with facts, events, and phenomenon.
This study will use data collection techniques in the form of library
research. This technique uses print library materials such as books,
magazines, newspapers, printed journals, reports, and various
documents, as well as non-print in the form of various electronic
media, slides, online journals, ebooks, etc. (Khatibah, 2011).
This research will use the Mass Society Theory and the Concept of
Social Change. The Mass Society Theory is a theory that explains
that there is a dependency between institutions holding power and

the media towards social power and authority. So, content from the
media tends to serve the interests of political and economic power
holders (Giner, 1976). According to Giner, media is a great power
and has the capabilities to reach out and influence people’s way
of thinking directly. Besides this research also uses the concept of
social change, which this concept explains about changes in values,
attitudes, behavior patterns, in society (Soekanto & Sulistyowati,
2013). Social change can also be interpreted as changes that occur
in social relations that affect the balance of social relations (social
relation equilibrium) (MacIver & Page, 1931). This theory and
concept are considered to be able to describe research problems,
thus helping the writer to find the results of the research.
Result and Discussion

The application of identity politics has changed the face of Indonesian
society and changed Indonesia’s stable political order to become
unstable. This situation is exacerbated by the existence of cases
such as blasphemy by the Governor of DKI Jakarta in 2016, Basuki
Tjahaja Purnama alias Ahok which is considered to defame Islam.
The incident triggered a “Peaceful Action 212” which demanded

legal action against Ahok. From these two incidents, there was a
presumption or dichotomy about “majority” and “minority” which
made inter-religious conditions conflictual (Harvan, 2017). The
unstable condition of the state was further disturbed with a number
of comments on various social media platforms that were racist and
disintegrative in nature. They insult each other and accuse each
other of blasphemy to defend their arguments. One of such examples
is presented below:
Picture 1. A SARA Video by a College Student in

Jakarta

Source: [Gema Pembebasan]. (2016, September 3). #TolakAhok|Seruan
Tolak #PemimpinKafir oleh Aktivis GP Universitas Indonesia [Video File].
Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CYBaO4aVXC8
In the video he invites the people of Jakarta not to choose Ahok

because of infidelity, besides that he also uses a verse from the Koran
to strengthen the impression of not choosing an infidel leader. This
example, which is included in identity politics can cause instability
because the people are divided. Especially when carrying out the
verse from the Koran in order to blackmail is a very disturbing thing
for the society. In the eyes of the Mass Society Theory, these efforts
to spread slander under the guise of religion have a significant
impact in order to gain support from the public. This can be seen in
two factors, the first part is dividing the public opinion due to Ahok
allegedly has defamed the religion of Islam, which many Islamic
societies actually turn to boycott and hate him. So, with the effort

to spread slander, it increasingly triggers people to increasingly act

angry and intolerant towards people who they consider “minorities”.
The second factor is, by preaching the verse from the Koran, it will
agitate a sense of “defending our religion” excessively and causing
radical traits. This proposition will affect the thinking of the video
audience, and further strengthen their determination to take acts
of hatred. This is evidence that the spread of slander through the
media is effective because the media can directly influence human
thinking. It can also affect human actions because it is provoked
by the spread of the slander. In addition, if the above phenomena
are seen using the Concept of Social Change, then this theory can
explain that there’s a change in attitude shown by the society, from
peaceful to hatred. This of course makes the originally stable social
equilibrium to instability because misguided hatred can break down
unity and peace of society. Anarchy and coercive actions are the
effects of the broadcasting hoaxes.
In addition, the condition of our nation is increasingly unstable,

because before the 2019 election Indonesian society seems to be split
into two. Worse, the two sides insulted each other, and propagates
the societal breakdown of the nation. This is because there are two
presidential and vice-presidential candidates who both have a strong
support base, namely Joko Widodo-Ma’ruf Amin and Prabowo
Subianto-Sandiaga Uno. Funny thing is, supporters of both partners
have their respective nicknames. Supporters of Joko-Ma’ruf pair are
called “kecebong / cebong”, while supporters of Prabowo-Sandiaga
pair are called “kampret” (Santoso, 2018). The name of cebong
and kampret was originally used by netizens to further heat up the
political atmosphere at the time. In addition, this designation is also
used to group each supporter (Stefanie, 2018). But the two sides
provoked each other to defend their chosen presidential candidate.
This phenomenon shows that the lack of maturity of the society in
understanding politics. Proper politics should offer a collision of
ideas, arguments, and would-be implemented policies rather than
identities and counter-labelling. If this continues, it is possible that
chaos and instability will occur in this country.

Picture 2. Provocative comment on Prabowo’s Instagram

account

Source: Instagram @prabowo
In the perspective of the Mass Society Theory, this phenomenon is

considered to be able to influence the thoughts of supporters of both
camps to find weaknesses and make the weakness as a material for
insults. Moreover, the intensity of uploading photos on Instagram
from both Joko Widodo’s and Prabowo Subianto’s accounts (as well
as on other social media platforms), made the post a land for mutual
insults in the comment section. The impact, from mutually insulting,
forms a thought for people who see it to believe said insulting
arguments as facts. So, many people have a skeptical view of each
candidate. If analyzed using the concept of social change, it can be
argued that such change exists with the focus on their identities
and labels. This is evidenced by the increasing tendency in looking
for slanders to be used as a weapon against other supporters of the
presidential candidate, even to publicly state such hatred. Media is

not a tool for solely expressing opinions, but is now turning into a
“slaughter field” because of the very chaotic atmosphere of social
media.
Supposedly, supporters of the presidential candidate are looking

more at the insights and ideas offered by the presidential candidate.
So, the right way to do the debate is to attack their arguments, not
their personal background. This is what is still lacking towards the
concerning state of Indonesia’s burgeoning democracy. Because, a
country that has an advanced democracy is when its people debate
each other in a healthy and objective manner.
Conclusion
The identity politics in Indonesia is growing, due to the existence
of various groups who are interested in gaining political power.
The use of strategies such as triggering racial issues, utterances of
hate, and false information, is a catalyst in the changing attitudes of
the Indonesian people, especially in responding to political issues.

Towards the 2019 Election, identity politics are very prominent. With
the heightening of the political situation before the 2019 Election,
there are various kinds of inappropriate behaviors by people from
both sides, among them there are insults, blasphemy, slander, which
reflects an uncivilized attitude.
To prevent changes in people’s attitudes that lead to being more

polarized, the importance of moral betterment is the key for a society
to be more advanced, fairer, and more civilized. If the Indonesian
politics continued in this direction, the possibility of disintegration
will emerge. Quoting the words of the Defense Minister Ryamizard
Ryacudu, “If you want to feel a world of peace and prosperity, then
what must be addressed is the moral of the nation” (Alam, 2019),
then we should fix Indonesia’s degrading unity, one of them is by
using this research as a tool to make us aware of such phenomenon.
We have several criticisms and suggestions for the future Indonesian
people in facing this identity politics. Because people in advanced
democracies are people who are wise in politics, wise in opinion,
responsible, and have a strong sense of unity even though there are
elections that make people differ in their perspectives. We suggest to
respect the right of opinion and politics of others and not politicize

religion, as it is something sacred and not to be used as a political

tool. Indonesian democracy currently has been polluted, because
many people have politicized religion as part of their identity politics.
Identity politics will be strong if there are only two competing

candidates in the election. Therefore, it is hopeful that the following
years’ elections will provide at least 3 presidential candidates. This
is because if there are only two candidate options available, then the
Indonesian people only have few choices and identity politics will
easily influence the community.
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United Malay National Organization: Identity of Malay-Dominant Party
Muhammad Nadziruddin bin Embi, Natasya Afriena binti Syeif Azizirrahim, Muhammad Nur Aiman bin Mohd Lazim
United Malay National Organization:

Identity of Malay-Dominant Party
Muhammad Nadziruddin bin Embi, Natasya Afriena

binti Syeif Azizirrahim and Muhammad Nur Aiman
bin Mohd Lazim
Abstract
This research paper was conducted in order to analyze and observe
about the history of Malay-dominant party, United Malay National
Organization (UMNO) or also known as Pertubuhan Kebangsaan
Melayu Bersatu (PEKEMBAR) in Malay language. Hence, this
research will also bring out some facts and arguments about the
identity of the Malays itself relating to the UMNO main principle
of struggle, which is based on two major elements of strungge
for Malays and Islam as well as the constitution of the country.
However, the fall of this Malay-dominant party in the 14th General
Election on 9th of May 2018 was beyond expectations and rather
unexpected in Malaysia’s political scenario, which later brings a lot
of speculation about the fall of the ruling party (UMNO). However,
this research will narrow down the reasons of the party’s lost and
whether the fall of the party shall affect the productivity or position
of the Malays all over Malaysia.
Keywords: UMNO, 14th General Election, Melayu, identity, Islam
INTRODUCTION
United Malays National Organization (UMNO) is a political party that
was created and founded by Dato’ Onn Jaafar on 11th of May 1946 before
the Independence Day on 31st of August 1957. The main objective of
the establishment of UMNO was to protest the creation of Malayan
1
Union . UMNO then come out with systematic and diplomatic plans
to achieve independence from the British government as during the
1
The Malayan Union was a union of the Malay states and the Straits Settlements of Penang
and Malacca

time, British government was the colonizer for the Federation of

Malaya or also called as ‘Tanah Melayu’. Later in 1949, after Malayan
Union has been replaced by the Federation of Malaya with the pre-
autonomy term, UMNO has changed its focus towards politics and
governance. Even though it was created using the principle based
on race, the party still fought for the rights of second majority of the
Malaysian people who are Chinese and Indian by helping them to
create their party and be a component under the political coalition
with UMNO. Finally, on 1951 Dato’ Onn Jaafar left UMNO after he
failed to open the membership of UMNO to non-Malays community
in order to make it inclusive for both communities which are Malays
and non-Malays Later he opened up a new political party named
2
Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) to all races. After Onn Jaafar
left UMNO, Tunku Abdul Rahman was selected to be the president
of the party (UMNO).
IDENTITY OF UMNO TOWARDS MALAYS

UMNO is the earliest political party in Malaysia which was established
as a race-based party. This meant that the party was committed
in protecting and fighting for the Malay rights. These rights are
provisions on reserving the special quota of the Malaysia in terms of
education, land owning, Islamic affairs, Malay economic growth and
many specialty rights related with the race of Malay itself. UMNO
also stood firm with its constitution, which stated that the party will
strongly uphold the goals and aspiration in fighting for the Malays
3
and Islam as stated in the Federal Constitution of Malaysia where
Islam is the official religion for the federation but other religions are
free to be practiced.
After that, in 1954 the state election was held. In the election,
Coalition of UMNO, MCA and MIC won 226 out of 268 seats all over
Malaysia. The coalition after that became wider with participation of
other component parties in the coalition which previously known as
‘perikatan’ but later on in 1974 was known as ‘Barisan Nasional’ (BN)
or ‘National Front’. All component parties of BN agreed to uphold
2
The Independence of Malaya Party was a political party in British-ruled Malaya that
stood for political independence. Founded by Onn Ja’afar after he left UMNO in 1951, it
opposed the UMNO policy of Malay supremacy. The party was open to all races of Malaya,
but received support mainly from ethnic Indians.

3
Article 3(1) of Federal Constitution of Malaysia 1957.

4
and respect the social contract stated in the Federal Constitution
of Malaysia 1957. Hence, after the country achieved independence
from the British government, UMNO as the dominant party in
BN has ruled this country for almost 60 years by went through 14
terms of elections. This trend ended when UMNO in BN was lost
during the recent 14th General Elections of Malaysia. Finally, after
succeeded in ruling the country for more than 60 years, BN (UMNO)
finally lost in the 14th General Election of Malaysia by only winning
79 seats all over Malaysia and the seat won by UMNO only 54 seats
(recently only 47 seats) updated until February 2019 due to cross-
party crisis among UMNO members of parliament (MP). UMNO
now becomes a dominant party in the opposition bloc after losing in
the election and later making collaboration with PAS as the second
dominant party in the opposition bloc. Those opposition parties are
now fighting with their own way and ideology in seeking power in
order to gain back the political power in ruling the country back as
earlier with new policies.
TH
THE FALL OF UMNO IN THE 14 GENERAL
ELECTIONS OF MALAYSIA
Referring to the voter flow charts of Malaysia’s 13th General Election
(GE), post 13th GE forced Najib to perform a balancing process
towards the Malay conservatives who still keep him in power. The
implicit support from UMNO against the implementation of Hudud
in Kelantan could be seen as an attempt to return to the old political
strategy which is based on communal values. The Sedition Act which
was promised to be abolished was continued and in 2014, a total of 18
individuals were investigated under the same Act, 13 were prosecuted,
and the other three were convicted. Despite the retention of this Act,
the amended Prevention of Terrorism Act 2015 (POTA), which was
considered as the most controversial bill due to the legal element in it,
is almost similar to the Internal Security Act (ISA-repealed in 2011).
The government also seemed increasingly disconnected from the
reality of the people following the introduction of the Government
Service Tax (GST) as well as the rising cost of living.
4
The social contract refers to a trade-off through Articles 14–18 of the Constitution,
pertaining to the granting of citizenship to the non-Bumiputera of Malaya (particularly
Malaysian Chinese and Indian).

Previously, Najib reminded that the cause regression of support

towards the formerly-dominant party during their governance
was that they were not sensitive enough of the difficulties that the
people faced. The situation became worse when UMNO leaders
issued several statements in respect of the methods of dealing with
the rising cost of living, for example; “GST is expected to bring
down prices” or “People should have two jobs at the same time”.
These statements eroded the support from citizens and nobody
among the ministers or UMNO leaders were trying to be the voice
of the people. While the people struggled, the allegations about the
lifestyle of his wife, Rosmah Mansor continued to be heard, showing
a divide between nobleman such as Najib and the people. Views and
narratives began to ran against the government and the absence of
constructive criticism was clearly felt. Najib refused to personally
answer most of the issues raised. Disappointingly, progressive
voices such as Khairy Jamaluddin, Nur Jazlan and Shahrir Samad
failed to add any counterweight to the issues. National Professors

Council (MPN) which was established in the era of Najib also turned
out to be the intellectual wing of UMNO-BN and only issuing views
that maintain the status-quo and justified every criticism thrown
against the Government.
The highlight of Najib’s mistake when he took lightly the issue of

1MDB and firedthe Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassi, former
Menteri Besar of Kedah Muhkriz Mahathir and also suspending Vice
President, Shafie Apdal. These actions strengthened the perception
that the government tried to hide the misconduct which occurred
after the immediate termination of Attorney General Abdul Ghani
Patail, who was assigned to investigate the 1MDB case shortly before
that. The immediate cleansing of his name by newly appointed
Attorney-General, Apandi Ali further highlighted the negative side
of the action. Yet such outrageous action still failed to raise any voice
of resistance from within the government or UMNO. According to
Khairy, those dismissals should be the moment when he and other
colleagues in UMNO to speak out. However, this failed because
according to him, UMNO was “delusional” and “drunk”. A few high-
ranking MACC officers also received a similar fate when they had to
retire because they seemed incapable of handling the investigation of

1MDB. These include the Chief Commissioner MACC Abu Kassim

Mohamed and also Governor of Bank Negara Zeti Aziz.
Mainstream media reporters such as, Utusan Malaysia’s reporter,

Ku Seman Ku Hussein and News Strait Times, Mustapha Kamil also
resigned after losing their voices instinctively in order to continue to
defend the government in the issue of 1MDB. The term of kleptocracy
which probably introduced first time in Malaysian public domain by
scholar, Syed Farid Al Atas in 1999 again got the attention to illustrate
the image of Malaysia internationally.
DOES THE FALL OF UMNO WILL AFFECT THE

MALAYS?
Post Malaysia’s 14th General Election, following the loss of UMNO
and Barisan Nasional (BN) party which is crucial position held by
non-Malay, challenges on the Malay’s right and open contract and
tender applied by the government. First of all, majority leader that
holds crucial position today does not come from Malay races. This is
because government today wants to comfort their voters that mainly
come from Chinese and Indian races during 14th General Election.
For an instance, Malaysia’ Attorney General Position that has been
held by Malay races from the formation of Malaysia in 1963 has
been changed to Tommy Thomas that remarks the first non-Malay
and non-Muslim Malaysian to hold this post after the formation
of Malaysia in 1963. The same situation also occurs to the Finance
Minister which originally has been held by Malay during BN’s
period of ruling, now changed to being Chinese=held in Pakatan
Harapan’s (PH) government. The second effect following the loss
of UMNO in the last General Election was Malay’s rights regarding
education. Hindu non-governmental organisation, Hindu Rights
Action Force (HINDRAF) president lead by P Uthayakumar said
that HINDRAF 2.0’s chairman, P. Waythamoorthy demanded PH to
open the university that is exclusive for Malay and aboriginal which is
Universiti Teknologi MARA (UITM) to be available towards all races
in Malaysia. P. Waythamoorthy’s speech regarding the formation of
UITM as a type of racial discrimination to other races by neglecting
other races’ chance to pursue tertiary education and holds degree
ran counter towards the Malay’s specialty right towards education
as guaranteed in the Federal Constitution of Malaysia.

The biggest challenge posed by UMNO’s loss was the replacement

government’s plan to ratify International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) that
will make Article 153 of Federal Constitution that govern the right
and specialty of Malay races void as total. Thus, these actions that
come from government and non-Malay certainly challenges the
traditional dominance of Malay race and has led to riot from Malay,
NGO and UMNO itself by lodging police report and making protest
in front of government office. Lastly, the fall on UMNO and BN has
led to challenges faced by Malays to exclusively pertain contracts
and tenders. The Malays that hold the majority population in
Malaysia will have to compete among each other as well as other
races including Chinese, Indian and aboriginal. This is because the
new rules and regulations set by the new government to make all
contract and tender open to avoid racial discrimination as well as to
restore transparency demanded by the citizens of Malaysia that
mainly comes from Chinese and Indian. Thus, the effect was Malay

that holds the majority population will be in negative discrimination
because they need to compete with other races to obtain contract
from government that have better funding, branding and appliances.
Thus, it is true indeed that the fall of UMNO and Barisan Nasional
has led to Malay’s right and needs challenged by the new government
that will put Malay in the position of negative discrimination.
CONCLUSION
In the light of discussion, UMNO has been the backbone of Malays
that has been fighting for independence from 1946 until millennial
era today while Barisan Nasional (BN) that included Malaysian
Chinese Association and Malaysian Indian Congress has governed
the rights and needs two other races that hold the majority population
in Malaysia. So, UMNO has been the sole dominant identity
that represents Malay’s speech and rights at the parliament and
government. In fact, UMNO and Barisan Nasional that has won all
the past 13 General Election had lost to Pakatan Harapan generally
was not because of Malay pushing UMNO away but the loss was
because of Malay votes had been separated into three main political
party in Malaysia which is Barisan Nasional (BN), Pakatan Harapan
(PH) and Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). Thus, there would be many

negative effects to the Malays as the PH won the election generally by

Chinese and Indian votes so that they must govern the government
in favor of their voters to gain trust for the next election.
References
Darwis, H. (2018, June 7). “Pakatan Harapan Kalah Undi Melayu:
Implikasinya di Masa Hadapan.” Neon Berapi (Online).
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pandangan/pakatan-harapan-kalah-undi-melayu-
implikasinya-di-masa-hadapan/ (Accessed 7th February
2019)
Jamaie, Hj. Hamil (2018). UMNO dalam politik dan perniagaan
Melayu. Kuala Lumpur: UKM Press
Malaysian Constitution of 1957
Muhammad Takiyuddin Ismail (2018). “Kejatuhan UMNO dalam
Pilihan Raya Umum ke-14: Analisis Pengajaran Politik”

Malaysian Journal of History, Politics & Strategic Studies
45(2).
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Zulkefli, A. S. (2018, November 17). “Tolak ICERD agar perpaduan
kaum terbela - Imam Besar Masjid Zahir” Astro Awani
(Online). Available at http://www.astroawani.com/berita-
malaysia/tolak-icerd-agar-perpaduan-kaum-terbela-
imam-besar-masjid-zahir-191404 (Accessed 7th February
2019)

From 1 Malaysia To Malaysia Baru: A New National Identity Building Concept
Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi
From 1 Malaysia To Malaysia Baru: A New

National Identity Building Concept

Abstract
As Malaysia finish their general election in May of 2018, it shows a
very astonishing result that can never be achieved for about 60 years
since their independence. People of Malaysia, finally has spoken said
by the new government, they spoke through the election, through the
choices that have been made. Now, Malaysia has a new government
under Pakatan Harapan (PH) which is a coalition between Bersatu
(Mahathir Party), Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Amanah

Negara (PAN). Since that, we have seen drastic movement or
changes from the new government from resolving 1MDB scandal to
the sacking of National Attorney General (AG). This is not escapable
to their previous national agenda from the former prime minister,
1Malaysia. Simultaneously, with the downfall of Barisan Nasional
coalition, the 1Malaysia notion also seems to fade away and changed
with new branding, which is Malaysia Baru. With this new concept,
will it just be another continuity of 1Malaysia agenda or vise versa?
This research is significant to find a true meaning of a new slogan
that has been proposed by Malaysia government.
Keywords: 1Malaysia, Continuity, Branding, General Election,

Slogan
Introduction
National identity building is a process rather than arbitrary action,
it needs to be constructed with various elements such as history,
cultural, economy, etc. This process will consume a period of time
and it needs socialization that can not be ignored or skipped.
Socialization is the learning process on how to behave in ways
which are acceptable in others. In order to become a better country,

Malaysia has set their own brand since their previous leaders, for this
kind of effort that we called “national identity building”, the notion
to integrate value from racial-ethnic or religion is introduced
before Malaysia independence in August of 1957.
Malayan Union in 1946 can be considered as the first model to be

imposed in Malaysia by its colonial master, but Malayan Union was
rejected by the Malays because Malayan Union model is threatening
their Bumiputera status (son of the land). “[...] which was deemed
a failure from the beginning as it did not gazette the rights of the
native Malays, abolished the Malays monarchy’s sovereignty and by
according equal citizenship status as everyone” (Wan Norhasniah,
2011). Therefore, struggling to seek for independence from British,
political parties proposed to merge into one alliance that consist
United Malays National Organization(UMNO) representing
Malays, Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) representing Indians
and Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) representing Chinese
people. The alliances of the multi-ethnic political parties managed

to stabilize the politics and the nation (Ratnam, 1965).
Since then, the framework of Malaysian politics are formed based on

ethnocentrism, from the establishment of parties, parties ideologies
to party policy it is all ethnocentric. Naturally in each leadership,
the notion to build a harmonious nation while being multiracial and
accommodate various religion still becomes a priority. Every Prime
Minister has also possessed a similar hope with a vision to see balance
of leadership with continuous emphasis on future issues based on
accord among the people in order to brush aside differences which
are present in the compendium of its people (Suhana Saad, 2011)
In the past decade, research has been more focused on the effort or
policy during Tun Mahathir which is Vision 2020, New Economic
Policy (NEP) that was introduced by Tun Abdul Razak or even
1Malaysia concept from previous Prime Minister, Najib Abdul
Razak. What are the most interesting is all of these leaders are from
the same politic parties during that time, Barisan Nasional. As we
know, last year in May, Malaysia have formed their new government
with cabinet from Pakatan Harapan alliances. Naturally, the scheme
or brand from the old government will be changed into new idea or
rebranding, of courses this will be included with our focus which

is the 1Malaysia concept that vanish away since Barisan Nasional

defeat. Now, Malaysia has a new concept that were introduced by
their new government which is Malaysia Baru.
It still remains unclear on the needs of the slogan for every tenure
of leadership in a national context. Every slogan has its own concept
and value that must be understood up to it grassroots. This is parallel
with Malaysia Baru concept, whether it was continuity of 1Malaysia
concept or is it totally a different thing? What is exactly the reason
for termination of 1Malaysia concept, were it a thorn in one’s flesh
for the new government? This set of curiosity about to be answered
in this study.
National Identity Building Using Slogan
National Identity Building In Malaysia

The project of national identity building has to continuos arise

around the globe in response to globalization. A nation needs
solution or mechanism to uniting people that form in diversity, this
is to ensure stability in internal tranquility, economic development,
people loyalty, etc. In Malaysia, process of national identity building
are occuring and it’s also undergone a long process since their
independence. The first Prime Minister brought forward political
collaboration as a source strength in the elements of national
politics, the New Economics Policy that was introduced by their
second Prime Minister and continuity from leaders after that has
become history string in Malaysia national identity building project
(Suhana Saad, 2011)
Relevance of Advertising Slogan in National Agenda

Generally, leaders or government usually using slogans to establish
their ideologies on how they will focusing on the matter to rules the
nation. Visuals, slogans, and symbols are all utilized to hastily attract
support to its message without critical thought or reflection on its
meaning (Koppang, 2009). Advertising slogans and promotional
tools enable actors to introduce themselves, their products, or
services. In order for an advertising slogan to be effective in
introducing a actors or institution, it should be easily understood by

people, and be associated with a specific brand (Stewart and Clark,

2007).
Advertising slogans can bridge this gap and reveal information

about the image of the product (Abdi & Irandoust, 2013). Therefore
according to Keller, building relationship with whatever that brand
is created for becomes possible. This is the primary intention that
any nation needs from their people to sustain loyalty or their ruling,
they need to promoting consciousness and alter picture or people
perception towards them, so constructing slogan is the most efficient
method to do so.
1Malaysia Concept Dissipating
1Malaysia Concept
1Malaysia is continuity of nation-identity agenda but it just
simply brought with a new name. The most appealing character
that distinguishes it from the previous agenda such as Wawasan

2020 is, it was literally clear on building a national identity with
1Malaysia (One Malaysia), which means in Bahasa is Satu Malaysia,
descriptively we can understand that we are trying to have unity
community in one national identity. 1Malaysia is regarded as a new
concept brought forth by Najib Razak, but from the aspects of the
ideologies and aims of nation-building proposed, the platforms are
similar to the ones developed since the early days of independence,
the fundamental aspiration is to cultivate integration by reinforcing
ties and cooperation between races, especially when faced with
challenges (Dr Wan Norhasniah, 2011). Although this concept we’re
trying to build nation-identity, they can’t avoid the fact that develop
this country till today. Concerns regarding disparity in ethnic
and religion must be look over by the government. Therefore, the
1Malaysia concept is very general and does not exactly specify the
fundamental principles of national-identity (Dr Wan Norhasniah,
2011)
Major Factor behind Its Dissipating Process

On 10 May 2018, it is official that Malaysia has a new government.
Before this, they are living under the Barisan Nasional (BN)

government for 60 years. With this political symbolic change, it

brings a lot of different and priority in the newest government,
likewise, the 1Malaysia concept also is been trash away as soon
as Barisan Nasional leave their position. As soon as we are able
to analyze why Pakatan Harapan was formed and how they win
the general election, it sure leads us to understand well into this
dissipating of 1Malaysia concept. Pakatan Harapan was the biggest
coalition between opposition party in past General Election of
Malaysia. They were formed in response to a massive scandal that
switched to formerly government (BN), that impairing credibility
was been utilize by Pakatan Harapan to win the election race.
The primary point that must be understand here, they were formed
to response the damaged that been enlarged. This can be seen
through their manifesto book, “This beloved nation of ours is in
dire situation due to the grave wrongdoings of the ruling regime,
We cannot hope this regime will correct itself, The only way to

correct the situation is by bringing in a new government that has the
credibility to implement the promises in this manifesto, A change
of government will correct the mistakes of the current regime, But
retaining the current regime will destroy the country”(Mahathir
Mohd, Buku Harapan, 2018)
According to constructivism perspective, in a socially constructed

world, the existence of patterns, cause and effect relationships, and
even states themselves depends on webs of meaning and practices
that constitute them (Kratochwil, 1989). Meaning and practice that
will constitute actor action is something that can’t be fixed, it was
very flexible and can be adjustable over time. Constructivist believe
that state behaviors will dependent to their ideas as a variable, there
are four types of the idea that will be shaping state action which
is ideologies or shared belief system, normative, causal belief and
policy prescriptions.
Next, the 1Malaysia concept is change with a new concept that

we know as Malaysia Baru. These are parallel to the exchange of
government, which means an exchange of ideologies, normative,
causal belief and policy prescriptions are take place. Looking into
this new slogan that establishes by the new government, Malaysia

Baru has raised numerous questions as well regarding its definitive,

application etc.
Malaysia Baru Concept
Establishment of Malaysia Baru

On 16 September 2018, the National Day of Malaysia, Malaysia 7th
Prime Minister has officially established the Malaysia Baru concept
through his official speech “this change has brought us to use of
Malaysia Baharu slogan extensively” (Mahathir Mohd, 2018). This
symbolically, an official beginning of Malaysia Baru as a national
idea. Since then, Malaysia Baru has been declared as a new national
slogan that affect government policy or their political statement, for
example, Wan Azizah, Deputy Prime Minister said that “Malaysia
Baru needs more women in power” as reported by Malaysia Kini
Portal at 7 Mac 2019.
Definition of Malaysia Baru

Malaysia Baru (New Malaysia) leads to the meaning of new
transformation for Malaysia (Jabatan Penerangan Malaysia, 2018).
Malaysia Baru is a outcome of an affair that ruins the nation and
for repeat our success and nation achievement that we have been
achieved before (Jabatan Penerangan Malaysia, 2018). Therefore
Malaysia Baru is a slogan that emphasizes Malaysia transformation
towards the new government that will be more efficient, sincere,
dynamic and sympathizes the people. This slogan was mainly
idealizing in the new form of Malaysia government should be.
Principle of The Notion

The principle is where all ideas making a difference from others.
Unlike 1Malaysia, Malaysia Baru never has explained its notion
clearly towards building a national identity that will include the
process of integration and cooperation between races. To illustrate,
the focus of Malaysia Baru concept is divided into six factions,
which is a free economy, cabinet size, anti-corruption, freedom of
media, rule of law, unity prosperous and universal peace (Jabatan
Penerangan Malaysia, 2018). This new slogan, as stated before has

more emphasizing regarding the new form of government that is

clean from corruption and closer to people wishes.
Unity Prosperous and Universal Peace in Malaysia

Baru
Regarding Unity Prosperous and Universal Peace principle in this
slogan, Malaysia Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohd wanted Malaysia
to commit to distributing national wealth to all party with fair
and equitable. Next, what is meant by unity proposals is when the
federal return back partners status (status rakan sekutu) to Sabah
and Sarawak as were stated in their constitution. Then, Malaysia
will continue acting as a neutral country to avoid any international
conflict and wish to make sure their neighbor keep on prosperous by
using beggar thy neighbor concept(Jabatan Penerangan Malaysia,
2018)
Hence, this principle has only set a framework for Malaysia to

strengthen their relationship between associate state and how they
are going to act towards any international conflict, especially in
Southeast Asia.
Conclusion
Malaysia as a developing country is progressively constructing to
match and competitively in the global economy, they are among
substantial economic power in Southeast Asia region. Despite,
Malaysia needs to have a stable economy and universal peace among
its peoples. To possess that, they will need to overcome their internal
dispute that can be threatening their national interest. Compatible
with their racial society, it causes massive dispute among ethnic,
religion etc. Therefore, the discourses of identity recognition become
a priority to be settle.
The effort in national identity building have been something that

inherited through the previous leader to new leaders and most
of the time this effort will use a slogan as their mechanism. This
is because the slogan can be something simple but attached and
easier to remember and understand. Previous, national identity
agenda, which is 1Malaysia slogan has been alight as soon as firmly
government is turned down in the last general election. Right now,

Malaysia has a new slogan which is Malaysia Baru but this slogan
have a different principle and definition from 1Malaysia, it was not
focusing on national identity building or integration cooperation
and understanding among ethnic anymore. Regardless of this
change of slogan, we are more serious looking up how Malaysia will
implement this new notion and affecting their policy making.
References
Baylis, John and Smith, Steve (n.d.) The Globalization Of World
Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Third
Edition, John Baylis & Steve Smith
Camp, S. B. (2011). “Nation-Building and 1Malaysia Concept:
Ethnic Relations Challenges in the Educational Field,” in
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science.
1(9), 228–237.
Hurd, Ian (2008) Constructivism. [Online] Available at: http://

faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~ihu355/Home_files/17-
Smit-Snidal-c17.pdf (accessed on February 2, 2019)
Jabatan Penerangan Malaysia (2018). Malaysia Baharu
Malaysia Kini (2019) “Malaysia Baru needs more women in
power” Malaysiakini [Online] Available at: https://www.
malaysiakini.com/letters/467041 (accessed on February 2,
2019)
Saad, S. (2020). “Re-building the Concept of Nation Building in
Malaysia,” Asian Social Science. 8(4), 115– 123.

Identity and Economy
Part 3
Local Double-Blessing in the era of Globalization: Promoting local identity and Economic
Growth through Cultural Festival in Indonesia
Siti Rokhmawati Susanto
Local Double-Blessing in the era of

Globalization: Promoting local identity and
Economic Growth through Cultural Festival
in Indonesia

Abstract
In the context of globalization, the position of developing countries
is under scrutiny. This happens since developing countries likely to
play minor role in dealing with the situation, compared to developed
countries which mostly direct the scenario of globalization. One
issue that is strongly related to globalization is the existence of local
identity in the era globalization. For the globalist proponents, they
believe that globalizations strengthen local identities as it recognizes
every global actor whose have very diverse backgrounds. This article
examines how local cultures and identity likely more develop in
Part 3 Identity and EConomy
the era of globalization through conducting cultural festival, held

by local governments. Focusing on the relationship between local
identities and economic development, this article argues that
globalization opens a window of opportunity for cultural identities
to be more recognized worldwide as well as generates economic
growth for their communities.
Keywords: cultural festival, economic benefit, Indonesia, identity
Introduction
In the era of globalization, where the world is massively opened to
interconnectedness among global actors. This leads both developed
and developing countries, even non-state actors, experience the
impact of it. Local culture becomes an aspect that signifies if
globalization happened in all communities worldwide. Indeed,
cultural transformation among global communities is often occurred
not only in developing countries where globalization is not coming

from their dynamic environment, but also in developed countries.

Thus, sometimes developed countries experience almost similar
situation as developing countries. This is shown when some of rural
French farmer organized a protest against the establishment of a
new McDonald outlet in their region (Bhagwati 2004).
In other words, globalization brings both promises and pitfalls to

developed and developing countries, in term of the existence of
local cultural identity. Yet, the impact towards the latter is more
significant to elaborate. This is because developing countries usually
have a large number of cultural identities and they are likely the most
vulnerable actors which have to deal with cultural homogenizing
of globalization. Therefore, this paper investigates strategies that
are conducted by local government in developing countries to
promote dan to maintain their distinguished local culture in the
era of globalization. It uses the theory of cultural festival impacts
in strengthening cultural identities and increasing economic growth
for local communities, based on the experience of cultural festival in
Indonesia
Theoretical frameworks
In general, globalization means openness and equal relationships

among international actors. MacKay (2006) defines it as a condition
where fast growing worldwide interconnections between societies. To
some extent, culture becomes the most direct and obvious feature to
acknowledge that globalization happened. According to Wallerstein
(in Pieterse 1996), culture is a set of characteristics that distinguish
one group to another. It refers to specificness and authenticity of
local practices, or also known as cultural differentialism (Pieterse
1996). To some extent, the concept of culture eventually refers to local
symbol and ethnicity (Cohen 1993), and it is used by government to
gain advantages on behalf of the state (Herrero et al 2006).
Although in one hand culture is very vulnerable to the global

interconnectedness, but other hand, globalizations also provides
options for cultural identities to gain more recognition, develop, and
exist.

Focusing to the strength of culture in dealing with globalization,

the notions refers to cultural differentialism. It represents
the mechanism of cultural adaptation in order to deal with
globalization, together cultural homogenization (McDonalisation)
and hybridization (Pieterse 1996). In structuring arguments, this
paper follows the notion of cultural differentialism that is conducted
by government through cultural since it likely creates a positive way
for local communities to gain benefits in the new era.
Bhagwati (2004), Stiglitz (2006) believe that globalization merely

affect local culture in positive way. As Pieterse (1996), Gibson et al
(2010), and Okech (2011) promote cultural differentialism as strategy
to strengthen local culture through tourism, scholars like Bhagwati
(2004) and Stiglitz (2006) also reveal that globalization provides
local culture with opportunity to grow and resources, for example
which has shown through cultural festival. Cultural festival plays a
role as a display for local identity to be promoted and recognized
worldwide. It does not only facilitate local identity to survive and
develop, but also to give opportunities for communities and their
identities to obtains economic benefits as well as ability to conduct
decision-making process in managing such an activity. The notion
addresses the role of globalization in supporting local identities and
cultures, which in this paper is defined as local double-blessing.
Okech (2011) argues that cultural festival increases the recognition

of cultural identities and economic development, signed with the
vast number of visitors coming to the events. Particularly for cultural
festival, the main objectives to organize such an event is to attract
tourist which produce economic growth for local communities
(Okech 2011). In similar perspective, Gibson et al (2010) shows that
cultural festival is considered as lucrative and cumulative activities,
either in terms of monetary gains or social influence.
In order to achieve the local double-blessing, there are several

strategies that can be used by developing countries in conducting
cultural festival. First, remodifying original local cultures so that they
can fit into larger public interests, or known as commodification.
Commodification is the packaging of cultural activities and artefacts
for the tourist market, thus they can attract many spectators and
tourists worldwide (Mbaiwa 2011). Second, making a constructive

tourism cooperation by establishing a multi-stakeholder partnership

either among states or between states and non-state actors. This
relations highlights on knowledge transfer among actors as main
factor of the cooperation (Baggioa et al 2010). It attempts to find
the most efficient and effective way of information and knowledge
exchanges between different organizations that need to collaborate
to deliver potential products (Otto and Ritchie in Baggioa et al 2010).
This paper portrays government cooperation in managing cultural
festival. Third, promoting the simultaneous perspective of economic
and cultural perspective to communities, by initially emphasizing
on the economic benefits, followed by the importance of cultural
aspects (Susanto 2015).
Cultural Festival in Indonesia

Conducting of cultural festivals has been enormously started since
1980. Indonesia as an archipelagic country with more than its 17000
islands which indeed creates very diverse cultural identities has
also held similar events. The first Indonesian cultural festival was
conducted in 1978, known as Bali Arts Festival, an annual Balinese
cultural events which comprises showcases on traditional dances,
music, and artistic expressions (www.indonesia.travel). This has

made Bali even more popular to attract international tourists to visit
Indonesia.
Nowadays, cultural festival becomes a fast-growing trend in

Indonesia. With the strong influence of globalization, Indonesia
has no longer organized Balinese cultural festival only; yet, almost
35 provinces and even many regencies in Indonesia are regularly
displaying their local cultural in the form of annual festival.
Approximately, 50 cultural festivals that are annually held, either
based on Gregorian or Javanese/Islamic calendar. Not only to
preserve the local traditions of Indonesia, these event aims to attract
more international tourists which is targeted 20 million in 2019
(kemenpar.go.id). Most of local governments in Indonesia organize
their cultural festival applying three strategies that will be explained
as follows.

Remodifying local identities to fit public interest

through commodification
Cultural identities are merely identified with authenticity and
originality of local habits and values. In fact, these values and
identities may slowly disappear when they are not compatible with
globalization. This paper argues that cultural differentialism is
strongly shown within cultural festival in Indonesia, following the
notion from Pieterse. However, to some extent, homogenization
also occurs in the first phase of cultural festival. Homogenization
represents on how local culture is taken into a cultural festival by
finding universal values. Thus, local culture can be understood by
public whom become the spectators of the festival and has only few
information about the culture.
Homogenization at this point likely refers to efficiency dan

marketing strategy, which to some extent also portrays the idea
of commodification. It is nearly similar to remodifying and
repackaging of original local cultures, ceremonies, and rituals,
thus they can fit into larger public understanding. Usually local
traditions, ceremonies, and rituals refer to cultural differentialism
and exclusivism, which outsiders are rarely able to understand. At
this point, commodification is taken into cultural festival in order
to attract many spectator, tourists, and visitors to see the cultural

distinctiveness. A homogenization strategy that is usually taken is
by making a short version of the ceremony because most of local
ceremonies entail very long and details procedures. Neither showing
the complete rituals nor taking the unfamiliar names to visitors,
the committee of festival must remodify the culture with market
preference, indeed without losing the philosophical meaning of the
ceremony itself. In other words, there is a combination between
homogenization and cultural differentialism with cultural festival in
Indonesia
This can be seen from the performance of Barong Using ceremony

in Banyuwangi cultural festival. It represents a living legend
in Kemiren area in Banyuwangi, considered sacred and only
performed in certain place in Kemiren and certain time which is on
the second day of the Eid Fithr festival—the day after the holy month
of Ramadhan (Anoegrajekti et al 2017). Attracting many tourists,

however, this sacred ritual then is combined with other sacred

cultural performances such Gandrung Sewu (thousand Gandrung
dancers), Kebo-Keboan (Oxen rituals) and tourists’ activities such as
Ijen summer jazz festival, ethnic carnival, and Tour de Ijen cycling,
known as Banyuwangi Festival.
Establishing multi-stakeholder partnerships

The spectrum of actors in managing early cultural festival in
Indonesia was merely limited to the role of government (central
and local) and local corporations. Indeed, current spectrum is even
wider with the role of foreign countries, national/multinational
corporations, societal non-governmental organizations, and
individual philanthropies. Of course, the expansion of festival
stakeholders that are involving in such an activity is also due to
globalization, besides it also makes the double blessing off cultural
festival is likely easy to achieve. For example, in the case of Erau
International Folks and Art Festival (EIFAF) in the regency of Kutai
Kartanegara, East Kalimantan.
The government has established strategic cooperation with

international, national and local actors to conduct the event. For
international actor in particular, some institutions have become

the main partners EIFAF, such as International Council of
Organizations of Folklore Festival and Folk Art (CIOFFF), Centre
for the Promotion of Imports from developing countries (CBI) of
Netherlands, the government of Seychelles, besides also involving
international delegations from United States, Lithuania, Estonia,
Bulgaria, Canada, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Taiwan to
participate in the event (Kusuma 2018). These international actors
help Kutai Kartanegara to develop its cultural festival in increasing
the number of tourists to visit the region. In the context of Seychelles
for example, the government of Kutai Kartanegara wants to learn
from Seychelles’s development transformation from a country that
relied on natural resources to a global tourist destination that is
based on ethno-tourism as well as eco-tourism (Kusuma 2018).

Promoting the idea of economic benefits, followed

by cultural preservation
For people in developing countries, it is often more familiar to them
to understand cultural festival in the perspective of economy, rather
than the cultural ones. This becomes strategic way of development
approach in the area as developing countries are still considered
striving to increase their gross domestic product (GDP) until they
achieve a status as developed countries. For society in developing
countries who are most of them not having higher educational
background, the idea of economic benefits is clearer and more
concrete to understand, in the process of maintaining local cultural
identity through festival. The strategy is more effective, instead
of directly to grasp the significance of identity in term of political
aspect.
Using the similar approach, the government of Banyuwangi merely

promotes the notion of economic advantage. It has been successfully
integrating all local stakeholders, particularly among societal groups,
to support and participate in the Banyuwangi cultural Festival. After
people consciously aware that cultural festival helps them to increase
their economic income, then people will strongly attach with their
identity and it remains long lasting regardless globalization has the
intention to weaken local cultural identity.
References
Anoegrajekti, Novi, Agus Sariono, Sudartomo Macaryus and
Maulana S. Kusumah. 2018. “Banyuwangi Ethno Carnival
as Visualization of Tradition: The Policy of Culture
and Tradition Revitalization through Enhancement of
Innovation and Locality-based Creative Industry”, Cogent
Arts and Humanities, 5:1-16
Baggioa, Rodolfo and Chris Cooperb. 2010 “Knowledge Transfer in
a Tourism Destination: The Effects of a Network Structure”,
The Service Industries Journal, vol. 30, n. 8
Bhagwati, Jagdish. 2004. In Defense of Globalization: With a New
Afterword, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Cohen, Anthony P. 1993. “Culture as Identity: An Anthropologist’s

View”, New Literary History, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 195-209
Gibson, Chris and Gordon Waitt, Jim Walmsley and John Connell.
2010. “Cultural Festivals and Economic Development
in Nonmetropolitan Australia”, Journal of Planning
Education and Research 29(3) 280 –293
Herrero, Luis César, José Ángel Sanz, María Devesa,Ana Bedate
and María José del Barrio. 2006. “The Economic Impact of
Cultural Events: A Case Study of Salamanca 2002, European
Capital of Culture”, European Urban and Regional Studies
13 (1): 41-57
Indonesia Travel. 2019. The Legendary 40th Bali Arts Festival: Fire,
the Spirit of Creation. [Online]. Available at https://www.
indonesia.travel/gb/en/event-festivals/the-legendary-
40th-bali-arts-festival-fire-the-spirit-of-creation (accessed
October 2, 2019)
Kementerian Pariwisata Republik Indonesia. 2019. Siaran Pers
: Industri Perjalanan Wisata Indonesia Siap Dukung
Pemerintah Datangkan 20 Juta Wisman. [Online].
Available at http://www.kemenpar.go.id/post/siaran-

pers-industri-perjalanan-wisata-indonesia-siap-dukung-
pemerintah-datangkan-20-juta-wisman (accessed October
3, 2019)
Kusumah, Arnold. 2018. Kerjasama Kutai Kartanegara dan
Republik Seychelles dalam Pengembangan Potensi
Pariwisata di Kutai Kartangara (Thesis), Surabaya:
Magister of International Relations, FISIP, Universitas
Airlangga
Mackay, Hugh. 2004. “The Globalization of Culture?”, in David Held
(ed.), A Globalizing World? Culture, Economics, Politics,
London: The Open University
Mbaiwa, Joseph E. 2011. “Cultural Commodification and Tourism:
The Goo-Moremi Community, Central Bostwana, Tijdschrift
voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, Vol. 102, No. 3, pp.
290–301

Okech, Roselyne N. 2010. “Promoting Sustainable Festival Events

Tourism: A Case Study of Lamu Kenya”, Worldwide
Hospitality and Tourism Themes, Vol. 3 No. 3, pp. 193-202
Pieterse, Jan Nederveen. 1996. “Globalisation and Culture: Three
Paradigms”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 31, No. 23
(Jun. 8), pp. 1389-1393
Stiglitz, Joseph. 2006. Making Globalization Work, New York: WW
Norton and Company Inc.
Susanto, Siti. 2015. Germany’s Facilitation to Indonesia in Cleaner
Production Norm Diffusion Processes: The Case of Pro LH
II Project (2004-2008), Goettingen: Optimus publisher

Economic Development as an Attempt for Eradicating Papua’s Separatism Movement in
Post-Soeharto Era
Yudo Rahmadiyansyah & Zakia Shafira
Economic Development as an Attempt for

Eradicating Papua’s Separatism Movement
in Post-Soeharto Era

Abstract
The demand for independence had risen in Papua since the beginning
of the 1960s when Papua was officially declared as one of the
Indonesian provinces. It was only on April 1, 1965, that Ferdinand
Awom assembled former members of Papoea Vrijwilligers Korps
(PVK) and established guerrilla forces for the Organisasi Papua
Merdeka (OPM) a.k.a Free Papua Organization afterward. Since
then, OPM has always been willing to take up arms to every time
TNI or the government will not hear their aspirations. The changing
regime in Indonesia also proven to be failed on handling the OPM
movement. This paper then explores, theoretically, the rationales of

the non-ending emergence of Papuans who demand independence
from Indonesia. Using Fukuyama’s explanation about types of
identities which are megathymia and isothymia, it is shows that the
desire of being recognized always lies beneath every human’s soul,
and Papuans also demand to be seen and treated inherently equal.
Not only try to seek understanding from the Papuans perspective,
this work also analyzes the relation between those phenomena with
the implementation of Indonesian economic policy in Papua by the
post-Soeharto regimes. In this regards, this work finds that Papua
not only needs economic development in order to have equal feelings
among other Indonesian regions, but it also needs to be followed by
character building.
Keywords: Papua, independence, post-Soeharto, economic

development, character building

Post-Soeharto Era
Introduction
The New Order era under Soeharto is an era in which the Indonesian
economy was carried out centrally. It can be said that the New Order
regime only did favor in the center (Jakarta or Java), and not in the
other regions. Not to mention when Soeharto established a policy of
transmigration, the act of moving the majority of which came from
Java to Papua. According to Penders (2000 in Meteray, 2012) on
Nasionalisme Ganda Orang Papua, the transmigration triggered an
act of alternative nationalism and enhanced anti-Amberi sentiments
in Papua that had rested in the mind of Papuans since long time
ago. Amberi itself means western Indonesians who brought Malay
culture. As a result, many Papuans were marginalized and had
anxieties that they will be set aside and become minority in their
own land. It was only when the New Order was on the brink of
collapse in 1997-1998 that the centripetal pattern of the government
was gradually changed and overhauled. Although it is necessary to
recognize that the institutional legacy of the New Order had still
influenced the pattern of local governance, at least for the first few
years since Soeharto’s resignation. The resignation of Soeharto
is viewed as a double-edged sword as it gave rise to Papuans who
demanded independence from Indonesia. It was marked by several
uprisings and the raising of the Morning Star flag throughout

Papua (Raweyai, 2002: 67). In fact, demands for independence had
risen since the beginning of the 1960s when Papua was officially
declared as one of the Indonesian provinces. It was only on April 1,
1965, that Ferdinand Awom assembled former members of Papoea
Vrijwilligers Korps (PVK) and established guerrilla forces for the
Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) a.k.a Free Papua Organization
afterward. Since then, OPM has always been willing to take up arms
to every time TNI or the government will not hear their aspirations.
To get attention, the OPM adapted sporadic movements. OPM

needs this because of the limited combat capability that relies on the
number of weapons. Besides, it is also because of the inability of the
Papua field to build a large force that is well organized. In addition
to the movement, to show that they still exist there was an act of
kidnapping, ambush, raising the Morning Star flag, propaganda
through media leaflets, and campaign mobilization or extensive

Post-Soeharto Era
negotiations in the targeted areas. In addition, those often acted

across borders, some to Papua New Guinea. Members of DPRD I and
II held a rerun with TNI personnel. In this context, TNI forces were
also brought together in the villages to save people’s lives directly.
In addition, it also launched a civilization and health project in
collaboration with zending and existing missions. In the economic
field, Kodam also participates in economic activities by regulating the
flow and price of goods. All of these activities are referred to as TNI’s
civil mission activities in Papua (Al-Rahab, 2006). From that point,
this paper then uses Francis Fukuyama (2018) explanation on types
of identities. Fukuyama (2018) argues that there are two types of
identities based on its demands, these two identities are megathymia
which demands to be considered superior to other identities, against
isothymia who demand equality with other identities (Fukuyama,
2018). The desire of being recognized always lies beneath every
human’s soul. In this case, Papuans demand recognition of their
dignity, in a way to be seen as inherently equal. So, this statement
by Fukuyama (2018) implies that, in the making of nationalism, it
is not only emphasized merely on economic development, but must
be accompanied through socio-cultural supports, one of them is by
character building or the enforcement of civic education.

Chronology of Papua’s Economic Policy in Post-
Soeharto Era
At the end of the New Order regime, the number of immigrants in
Papua reached 40%. They dominated the economy and became local
government officials. Majority of official positions which connected
between the Central Government and Regional Government took by
the immigrants, and the native Papuans have the highest position
only in the regional office such as the position of Kepala Dinas (Head
of Service). The dominance of immigrants in the field of bureaucracy
was based on the assumption that native Papuans have not capability
of holding these positions (Pulungan, 2003). President Habibie as
the replacement of President Soeharto then made an effort to hear
the aspirations of the Papuan. Habibie’s first policy towards Papua
was to abolish the Regional Military Operations (DOM) policy in
October 1998 (Raweyai, 2003). Furthermore, in February 1999 at
the Merdeka Palace, a dialogue forum was held between the envoys

Post-Soeharto Era
of the people of Irian Jaya or West Papua with President Habibie.

In the dialogue, what happened was precisely the debate between
groups that supported the independence of West Papua, and groups
that still wanted to be a part of Indonesia. The two groups claimed
that they were the ones who most represented the people of Papua
(Andrianto, 2001).
Freedom and efforts to equalize the human rights of the Papuan

had improved during Abdurrahman Wahid’s leadership. In his
brief reign, Abdurrahman Wahid tried hard to take the sympathy
of the Papuan. One of them was by appointing the Governor of
Irian Jaya, Freddy Numberi as Minister of Administrative Reform.
President Wahid also supported the holding of the Second Papuan
People’s Congress on May 29 - June 3 to unite the aspirations of the
Papuan, as well as gave Rp 1 billion fund to the Presidium Dewan
Papua (Papua Presidium Council) for the costs of organizing the
Papuan People’s Congress. The most controversial decision made
by Wahid was when he allowed the Papuan raised the Morning
Star flag beside the Indonesia’s flag, which was clearly criticized
by nationalists (Pulungan, 2003). The successor of Abdurrahman
Wahid, Megawati, tried to continue Wahid’s policy just like regional
autonomy policy, where at an early stage, the policies have shown
positive results. It is proven by the decreasing number of OPM

escalation since the implementation of Law Number 21 of 2001
(Pulungan, 2003). However in reality, the commitment to upholding
human rights was worsen in this era. Based on a journal by Natalius
Pigai (2014), it was noted that the murder of Papuan leader Theys
Eluay by Kopassus occurred on November 11, 2001, less than four
months after Megawati came to power. Another case of shooting
“unknown persons” also happened against Else Bonay, Bonay
Rumbiak and Mariana, his wife and children Johanis G. Bonay,
Director of the Institute for Human Rights Studies and Advocacy
of Papua, in December 2002. In July 2004, the National Human
Rights Commission released a report on the killing of 9 people and
38 victims of serious injuries and disability in Wamena during the
sweeping by the TNI/Polri on April 4, 2003.
The steps taken by the 6th President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

(SBY) have succeeded in reducing the tension over human rights

Post-Soeharto Era
violations that have occurred in West Papua. Separatist movements

have rarely occurred. SBY also issued a new policy for Papua through
Inpres Number 5 of 2007 which aims to accelerate development in
West Papua and Papua. However, SBY was also considered a failure
in resolving human rights violations in Papua, specifically when
KontraS made a report stating that during SBY’s reign, “human
rights recognized but not protected” including in Papua (KontraS,
2014). The most horrendous event in his leadership period was when
the Papuan Congress being held for the third time, long after the
last one in 2000. The Congress was held again on October 17 to 19,
2011, which was none other than discussing Papuan independence.
The congress was later discovered by the police and military, and
in the end, ended with a stoppage of Congress which took severe
injuries. Unfortunately, this violence is considered “just a small
accident”. Through presidential spokesman Julian Aldrin Pasha,
the government stated that this was not a big case (Harto, 2011;
Maharani, 2011; and Erdy and Ramadhan, 2011). The Jokowi’s
regime claims to intensively carry out development in Papua,
through evidence of the creation of Trans Papua Road which reached
3103 km of Papua Province and 1071 km in West Papua province,
construction and rehabilitation of 15 ports, construction of two
new airports (Werur and Batu Koroway), and electrification which

reached 72.04%. (BKKBN 2018). However, this development was
opposed to getting resistance from groups opposing the Free Papua
Organization. It was proven by the shooting in Nduga, which did
not only occur once. BBC News Indonesia (2018) reported that this
incident proved that the movement of the Free Papua Organization
had very close relations with indigenous Papuan, even the attack
was planned. Not to mention, in the Jokowi’s government for the
first time the West Papuan people through the United Liberation
Movement for West Papua sent a petition about the West Papuan
independence referendum on the UN high commissioner of human
rights (CNN Indonesia, 2019).
Analysis on The Development of Papua in Post-

Soeharto Era
Indonesia’s Long-Term Development Plan 2005-2025 (Rencana
Pembangunan Jangka Panjang a.k.a RPJP) also explicitly stated

Post-Soeharto Era
that economic development must be supported by character

building. However, character building sometimes is left behind,
even forgotten. This phenomenon happens in Papua. Infrastructure
development as a support for the economy has been carried out since
the New Order, especially during the Reformasi era. However, this
development conclusively only benefited immigrants, which in turn
caused the native Papuans to be marginalized. Whereas, Fukuyama
(2018) mentioned that in order to recognize the inner sense of
dignity, one has to recognize or see another just as good. This is
also an implementation of democracy as isothymia model replaces
megathymia, when societies that recognize elite few replaced by
societies that recognize everyone as equal.
The transmigration program in the Post-Soeharto era also did

not contribute to the empowerment of native Papuans. Even, this
program is often referred to as the “Javanization,” “Islamization,”
and “Colonization” program. Therefore, in the Anggaran Tahunan
1999/2000, the Papuan Regional Government changed the
composition of the civil servants’ placement from 80% of migrants
and 20% of local residents to 70% local and 30% migrants (Pulungan,
2003). The marginalized feeling felt by native Papuans then resulted
in the strengthening of ethnic-based identity. Strengthening this
identity then developed into the ethnic-nationalist spirit of the

Papuan Nation. This is supported by the fact that, although the
economy sector after Reformasi in Papua continues to develop, the
separatist movement still exists, and there are no signs of stopping
the struggle for independence. Affirmation scholarships proclaimed
as socio-cultural development effort of Papuan people with other
regional areas in Indonesia often encounter problems, especially
the difficulty of intermingling between Papuans and the societies
where they live. The affirmation scholarships, in fact, resulted in the
emergence of intellectual actors from the Free Papua Organization.
Conclusion
Looking at the phenomenon in Papua, native Papuans is a group
known as isothymia because they demand equality and justice for
them as the original inhabitants of the region. On the other hand,
most of the non-Papuans who live in Papua have megalothymia

Post-Soeharto Era
identities that arise due to feelings of primordialism. This is evident

from many assumptions that native Papuans are incompetent in
bureaucratic and economic sectors. Native Papuans as isothymia will,
therefore, continue to drive demands for equal recognition, which
are they feel will never be completely fulfilled. The Papuan people’s
efforts to get equal recognition and rights like other Indonesian
citizens are widely implemented by several groups in the form of
the struggle to liberate Papua from Indonesian “colonization”.
Substantive multicultural views are not alien to Indonesia. The
principle of Bhineka Tunggal Ika (unity in diversity) illustrates that
though Indonesian people differ in identity, they are still integrated
by the basic values of the nationality of the Republic of Indonesia.
Azyumardi Azra (2012) on his work also stated that diversity does
not necessarily mean depriving identity, cultural relativism, social
disruption, or endless conflicts in communities, societies, and ethnic
and racial groups.
The New Order as the longest ruler in Indonesia turned out to

have failed to instill the value of the national integration of the
Republic of Indonesia to all Papuans, whose impact still inheriting
until today’s government. The repressive military actions actually
give rise to legacy of revenge in some Papuans so that their spirit

of independence could never be extinguished. However, there are
increasing number of pro-Indonesian Papuans, but this was more
due to the feeling of a lot of economic and educational development
for them, not because of forced cultivation and repressive by the
military. Not to mention the economic development carried out by
the central government is more profitable for migrants in Papua than
the native population. Therefore, the writers feel that in the future,
when Indonesia government have to face some groups or people
who want to separate themselves from Indonesia, it is better to use
softer approaches or soft-power through economic development
accompanied by civic education to the groups. Moreover, the
community, the acceptance of the Papuan people as a brother of
one nation also needs to be invested in non-Papuans whether or not
living on the island of Papua, so as not to create the impression of
the superiority over the Papuan people. Because actually national
integration which aims to foster a sense of identity as an Indonesian
nation should not arise because of fear under the “muzzle of arms”

Post-Soeharto Era
or compulsion due to money, but must arise within oneself because

they realize that they have lived prosperously and comfortably in
“Bumi Pertiwi” Indonesia.
References
Al-Rahab, Amirudin, 2006. “Operasi-Operasi Militer di Papua
Pagar Makan Tanaman?”, Jurnal Penelitian Politik LIPI, 3
(1), pp. 3-22.
Andrianto, Tuhana Taufik, 2001. Mengapa Papua Bergolak?
Yogyakarta: Gama Global Media.
Azra, Azyumardi, 2012. “Kegalauan Identitas dan Kekerasan Sosial:
Multikulturalisme, Demokrasi, dan Pancasila”, EMPATI:
Jurnal Ilmu Kesejahteraan Sosial, June, 1 (1), pp. 12-35.
BBC, 2018. Penembakan Nduga: Beda dengan teroris, gerilyawan
Papua punya ‘hubungan dengan warga [Online]. Available
at https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-46498239
(accessed on 10March 2019).
CNN Indonesia, 2019. “PBB Beberkan Proses Penyerahan Petisi Papua
Barat” [Online]. Availabe at https://www.cnnindonesia.
com/internasional/20190129185921-134-364847/pbb-
beberkan-proses-penyerahan-petisi-papua-barat (accessed
on 9 March 2019).
Erdy, Nasrul & Ramadhan, Bilal, 2011. “Gejolak Papua Terabaikan”,
Republika, 21st October, pp 1 & 11.
Fukuyama, Francis, 2018. Identity: The Demand for Dignity and
The Politics of Resentment.
New York: Farrar.
Kontras. 2014. Hak Asasi Diakui tapi Tidak Dilindungi, Catatan
Hak Asasi Manusia dimasa Pemerintahan Presiden Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono [2004-2014]. Jakarta: KontraS
Harto, Rahmad, 2011. “Dipicu Ketidakadilan”, Republika, 21
October, pp 11.

Post-Soeharto Era
Kantor Kepresidenan RI. 2018. Laporan 4 Tahun Pemerintahan

Joko Widodo - Jusuf Kalla, 2018. Jakarta: Kantor
Kepresidenan RI.
Maharani, Esti, 2011. “Ini Bukan Kasus Besar”, Republika, 21
October, pp 11.
Meteray, Bernarda, 2012. Nasionalisme Ganda Orang Papua.
Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas.
Raweyai, Yorrys, 2002. Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka? Jayapura:
Presidium Dewan Papua.
Pigai, Natalius, 2014. “Solusi Damai Di Tanah Papua (Mengubur
Tragedi Ham dan Mencari Jalan Kedamaian”, Jurnal
Administrasi Publik, October, 11 (2), pp. 23-38.
Pulungan, M. Sofyan, 2003. “Dinamika Konflik Di Papua Pasca
Orde Baru”, Jurnal Hukum dan Pembangunan, December,
33(4), pp. 516-540.
Visi Dan Arah Pembangunan Jangka Panjang (PJP) Tahun 2005 –
2025, 2005. Jakarta : Kantor Menteri Negara Perencanaan
Pembangunan Nasional/Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan
Nasional.

Developing Inside Projected Outside: Case Study of Indonesia’s Dreamed Identity as
Global Maritime Fulcrum
Akbar Renaldy
Developing Inside Projected Outside: Case

Study of Indonesia’s Dreamed Identity as
Akbar Renaldy
University of Indonesia, Jakarta
Abstract
It has been almost five years since Joko Widodo, the Indonesia’s
current president, formally announced the country’s interest to
be the fulcrum for the global maritime affairs. This writing sees
that the Indonesia’s efforts under Joko Widodo’s administration
to achieve the GMF as the country’s way to construct an identity
which it wants to be recognized with in the international affair.
As the entrepreneur of the GMF, Indonesia is blessed with some
absolute advantages in its maritime sector so it can be brave
enough to pursue the GMF. Understanding about those potentials,
the promotion of Indonesia’s dreamed identity to be the GMF might
demand the country to do a lot of efforts in the identity construction

process. Seeing what has been achieved by Indonesia, this writing
wants to say that Indonesia still have numerous works to do in
order to achieve its target to be the GMF. Becoming good in some
maritime sectors is somehow not enough to bring this country to
achieve its dreamed identity. It has to be “more” or even “most” in
order to get such remarkable status.
Keywords: GMF, maritime, identity, construction
It has been almost five years since Joko Widodo, the Indonesia’s
current president, formally announced the country’s interest to be
the fulcrum for the global maritime affairs. The country’s ocean
policy so called as Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) was firstly
brought by Joko Widodo in front of many international important
spectators in the momentum of 9th East Asia Summit, Naypyidaw,
Myanmar at 2014 (Agastia, 2017). In that occasion, Joko Widodo
declared that one of Indonesia’s focuses in his administration will be

Akbar Renaldy
emphasized on strengthening Indonesia’s maritime infrastructure

and reasserting the authority of the state in its ocean in order to
achieve the GMF (Connelly, 2015). This big vision then got its
formal operational base when the government finished the making
of Indonesia Ocean Policy White Paper in 2017.
This writing sees that the Indonesia’s efforts under Joko Widodo’s
administration to achieve the GMF as the country’s way to construct
an identity which it wants to be recognized with in the international
affair. As the entrepreneur of the GMF, Indonesia is blessed with some
absolute advantages in its maritime sector so it can be brave enough
to pursue the GMF. Firstly, the Indonesia’s ocean is becoming the
hub for international shipping coming from Indian to Pacific Ocean
or reverse to it. Noting that Indonesia’s ocean is located between two
busiest waterways in the world − Indian Ocean is the trading route
for more than a half of the world maritime oil trade in 2016 (Albert,
2016) or the South China Sea, a part of Pacific Ocean, that became
the trading route for one-third of the global maritime trade in 2017
(Saiidi, 2018). It will explain, that becoming the hub for them is
absolutely beneficial, economically or geo-politically. Secondly,
Indonesia’s coastline is the second longest in the world (Kishor,
2018) which means that this country does have big potential in

developing its maritime tourism. Thirdly, Indonesia’s ocean is also
rich on the mining materials, it caused by the location of Indonesia’s
ocean that lay on the world ring of fire. Lastly, Indonesia is in fact
an archipelagic country that owns at about 17.504 islands (Badan
Informasi Geospasial, 2018). This make many of Indonesian,
especially for they who live close to the sea, have been capable in
developing maritime cultures in which this factor can be promoted
domestically or internationally to strengthen Indonesia’s position as
the future GMF.
Understanding about those potentials, the promotion of Indonesia’s

dreamed identity to be the GMF might demand the country to do a lot
of efforts in the identity construction process. This condition shows
clearly that identity is not always given (examples of given identity:
sex and race), but also there are some identities that need process in
order to be recognized as identities of the society. Defining identity
as a shorthand label for varying constructions of nation-and state

Akbar Renaldy
hood, Peter Katzenstein (1996) stated that the construction process

of state’s identity is somehow explicitly political. When a country
finally decides to pursue a specific identity, at the same time, it also
conveys about its interest and preferences, telling to the domestic
and international actors about what behaviors they should show in
order to support or not to support the country’s want. However, it’s
important to note that not all identity construction efforts can result
to the exact projected identity. It happens because identity is basically
can’t be stipulated deductively (Anderson cited in Katzenstein:
1996). The identity construction is an interactive process which runs
in a social world. The construction of the country’s identity will get
influence from both domestic and international actors, not solely
the country that can freely construct its identity. When every actor
has its own interest in the process then identity as the output of the
process is somehow can be seen as a “deal” between those actors.
Come up with those understanding, this writing will mainly

focus to analyze about the progress of the Indonesia’s identity
construction process to be the GMF since the first time this target
has been formally announced by the country in 2014 until the
end of 2018. Besides that, this writing will try to arrange practical
recommendations for the government to improve the progress of
its identity construction effort. As the country has decided the five
pillars (read: focus issues) to achieve the GMF: rebuild maritime
culture, manage marine resources, develop maritime infrastructure
and connectivity, advance maritime diplomacy, and boost maritime
defense force (Laksmana, 2017). This writing sees that Indonesia’s
government has been successful in arranging such comprehensive
steps, including political, economy, and socio- cultural aspects,
in order to make a real progress related to its dream. Rather than
analyzing all of the development aspects in the GMF, this writing
will be emphasizing its analysis on the economic development aspect
as this issue is becoming the grand theme in the Joko Widodo’s
administration. More than that, Joko Widodo has also stated about
his vision to increase maritime sector contribution to the Indonesia’s
GDP from just 11% to 25% (Global Business Guide Indonesia, 2018).
In order to be recognized as the GMF, it’s mandatory for Indonesia

to prove that it has global dominance in managing its maritime

Akbar Renaldy
power. It’s not only about how powerful this country in its domestic
environment, but it’s also about how competitive the power it has
in the international environment. As we know that international
system is running in such anarchical way—no state is having
authority to govern the others—power competition between country
is something very normal to happen (Viotti and Kauppi, 2012).
Depart from this understanding, Indonesia should be very careful
in managing its efforts in pursuing the GMF so that it will be able
to minimally attract negative challenge from the other maritime
powers. This needed to be a serious consideration for Indonesia
as the realist thought has seen that when a country wanted to be a
revisionist towards the international system balance, at the same
time, it has to face the current system defender (Mead, 2014). As the
Indonesia is always portraying itself as having minimal threatening
intention to other maritime powers, such as the United States or
maybe China for now, it can be said that when Indonesia is strict
to stay in line with this status quo, it may have such easier way to
pursue what it wants.
After analyzing that Indonesia is basically having big chance to grow

up its maritime power, let’s take a deeper look towards how this
country has made progress in achieving a specific identity as GMF so

far. In a big picture, Indonesia’s vision to be the GMF has demanded
this country to be more proactive in doing such progressive economic
development utilizing its maritime opportunities. Here, we can say
that the Indonesia’s identity construction is not only has brought
a positive incentive towards the country’s economic development,
but the development itself in a certain degree will take Indonesia
closer to its vision. There are some priority sectors needed to be
economically well-developed in this struggle.
First priority is directed to fishery industries. The fact that at about

70% of Indonesia’s territorial area is in the shape of water then
blessed it with abundant of sea creatures that can be consumed by
the humans (Asian Info, 2010). Based on the data gathered by the
Indonesia Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Affairs in 2018, it’s noted
that since 2014 until 2017, the country’s gross domestic product
(GDP) on fishery sectors is always growing up year by year. It’s stated
that, in 2014, fishery sectors just contribute as much as Rp245,48

Akbar Renaldy
trillion to the GDP, but in 2017 the number grew as much as 42%,
leaving the country owns Rp349,53 trillion income from this sector.
There’re number of factors which contributes to this achievement.
First, the effort from the government to serve its micro, small, and
medium enterprises (MSMEs) or even individual fisherman who
operates in the marine and fishery businesses with micro financing
support managed by Badan Layanan Umum Lembaga Pengelola
Modal Usaha Kelautan dan Perikanan (BLU LPMUKP) to support
their businesses (Indonesia Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Affairs,
2018) is predicted having impact on this achievement. Second, the
execution of many training programs for improving the skills of the
Indonesian fishermen (Indonesia Ministry of Fisheries and Marine
Affairs, 2018) can also be granted as contributing factor of this
achievement. Lastly, the consistent delivery of the “Eating Fish”
campaign by the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Affairs under
Joko Widodo’s administration (Fijriah, 2018) can also be seen as
having leverage on this achievement.
Second priority goes to the development of more advanced maritime

infrastructures, especially ports and ship industries, that is believed
will improve Indonesia’s marine economic power. Under Joko
Widodo’s administration, Indonesia is committed to build at least
41 new ports throughout Indonesia, namely in Maluku, Riau, dan

Papua in order to create inclusiveness of shipping in the country
(Global Business Guide Indonesia, 2018). Tanjung Priok and
Tanjung Perak as the main ports for trading in Indonesia and 27
new ports that has been successfully built until 2018 (Idris, 2018).
The government hopes that goods and services distribution in
the country will be easier and faster to be conducted (that’s why
the policy is used to be called as “building sea tolls”), at the same
time giving bigger chance for the country to do export and import
effectively. More than that, in order to make trading becoming
cheaper, the government has also made success story in reducing
its ports dwelling time from seven days to just four days for now
(Global Business Guide Indonesia, 2018). As for the ship industry
development, the government has issued a specific policy to ban its
state—owned enterprises from buying vessels from abroad and to
provide tax incentives on imported components (Global Business
Guide Indonesia, 2018). The issuing of this policy can be seen as the

Akbar Renaldy
nationalistic way made by the government to boost the ship industry

businesses in the country.
Lastly, in order to make sure that someday it can be recognized as

the GMF,Indonesia is now trying its best to serve the world with high
quality of maritime tourism. Starting from producing continuous
advertisements to promote its maritime tourism until organizing
training and giving technical assistances for its marine society to
develop “Kelompok Sadar Wisata” (a group of people who wants
to manage tourism in a specific place) have been exercised by the
government. Based on the data from The Indonesia Central Bureau
of Statistic in 2018, these actions have resulted to the increase of
foreign travelers visiting Indonesia, from 9,4 million people in 2014
to 14 million people in the November 2017 (the number grew as much
as almost 49%).
Seeing what has been achieved by Indonesia, this writing wants

to say that Indonesia still have numerous works to do in order to
achieve its target to be the GMF. Becoming good in some maritime
sectors is somehow not enough to bring this country to achieve
its dreamed identity. It has to be “more” or even “most” in order
to get such remarkable status. When this country is proud with its

achievements, it has to be aware that there are other countries that
maybe get more than what it got. Its next steps to achieve the dream
might be harder because every country that has big opportunities
on its ocean surely wants to get the same. Indonesia then, should be
ready with many types of tricks in order to make sure that it can be
the winner in the game and get the identity that it wants.
Having understanding that in order to be recognized with a specific

identity then a country should pass not-all easy construction process,
this writing then recommends the government of Indonesia to keep
this vision remain sustainable as the time goes by. It needs to be
emphasized because this writing sees that there’s tendency when
an administration is replaced by the other then the policy will also
be different. When it comes to the construction of GMF to be the
identity of Indonesia, it does demand no instant process and that’s
why the sustainability of the willingness to pursue the target must
be well-maintained. More than that, this writing also sees that the
people empowerment efforts to make them deeply aware and feeling

Akbar Renaldy
included in the process as an important thing that also needed to

be done by the government. At the end of the day, all parts of this
country should be able to be the first front line that see their country
as the GMF before they want the other external actor see the same
thing.
References
Agastia, Dharma, 2017. “3 Years Later, Where’s Indonesia’s Global
Maritime Fulcrum?,” The Diplomat [Online]. Available at
https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/3-years-later-where-
is-indonesias-global-maritime-fulcrum/(accessed19th
February 2019).
Albert, Eleanor, 2016. “Competition in The Indian Ocean,” CFR
[Online]. Available at https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/
competition-indian-ocean (accessed 19th February 2019).
Asian Info, 2010. “Indonesia’s Geography,” Asia Info [Online].
Available at http://www.asianinfo.org/asianinfo/
indonesia/pro-geography.htm (accessed 21st February
2019).
Badan Informasi Geospasial Indonesia, 2018. Rujukan Nasional
Data Kewilayahan: Luas NKRI 8,3 Juta Kilometer

Persegi, [Online]. Available at h t t p : / / w w w .
big.go.id/berita-surta/show/rujukan-nasional-data-
kewilayahan-luas-nkri-8-3-juta-kilometer-persegi
(accessed 21st February 2019).
Connelly, Aaron, 2015. “Sovereignty and The Sea: President Joko
Widodo’s Foreign Policy Challenges,” Contemporary
Southeast Asia, 37 (1): hlm. 1-28.
Fajriah, Lily Rusna, 2018. “Dongkrak Konsumsi Nasional, KKP
Gencar Kampanye Gemar Makan Ikan,” Sindonews
[Online]. Available at https://ekbis.sindonews.com/
read/1357246/34/dongkrak-konsumsi-nasional-kkp-
gencar-kampanye-gemar-makan-ikan-1543050400
Global Business Guide Indonesia, 2018. Indonesia’s Maritime
Infrastructure: Key Challenges Remain [Online].

Akbar Renaldy
Available at http://www.gbgindonesia.com/en/services/
article/2018/indonesia_s_maritime_infrastructure_key_
challenges_remain_11873.php (accessed 19TH February
2019).
Idris, Muhammad, 2018. “Sejak 2015, Jokowi Sudah Bangun 27
Pelabuhan Baru,” Detik (Online). https://finance.detik.
com/infrastruktur/d-4255033/sejak-2015-jokowi-sudah-
bangun-27- pelabuhan-baru (accessed 21st February 2019).
Kishor, Maitreyee Shilpa, 2018. “Top 10 Countries With Longest
Coastlines,” Earthnworld [Online]. Available at https://
earthnworld.com/countries-with-longest-coastlines/
Laksmana, Evan, 2017. “Indonesian Sea Policy: Accelerating
Jokowi’s Global Maritime Fulcrum?,” CSIS [Online].
Available at https://amti.csis.org/indonesian-sea-policy-
accelerating/ (accessed 19th February 2019).
Mead, Walter Russell, 2014. “The Return of Geopolitics: The
Revenge of The Revisionist Powers,” Foreign Affairs, 93
(3): hlm. 69-79.
Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Affairs of The Republic of

Indonesia, 2018. Laporan Pencapaian dan Evaluasi
Program 4 Tahun KKP Pada Pemerintahan Kabinet
Kerja, [Online]. Available at https://kkp.go.id/infografis-
detail/1937-laporan-pencapaian-dan-evaluasi-program-
4-tahun-kkp-pada-pemerintahan-kabinet-kerja (accessed
19th February 2019).
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Indonesia, 2018. Pembiayaan Mikro Jadi Solusi Mudah
Permodalan Nelayan, [Online]. Available at https://kkp.
go.id/artikel/4483-pembiayaan-mikro-jadi-solusi-mudah-
permodalan-nelayan (accessed 19th February 2019).
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2018. Kegiatan Prioritas KKP Tahun 2015-2017 [Online].
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realisasi-kegiatan-prioritas-kkp-tahun-2015-2017
(accessed 19th February 2019).

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Peter J. Katzenstein. 1996. The Culture of National Security:

Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Saiidi, Upin, 2018. “Here’s Why The South China Sea is Highly
Contested,” CNBC [Online]. Available at https://www.
cnbc.com/2018/02/07/heres-why-the-south-china-sea-is-
highly-contested.html (accessed 19th February 2019).
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Kebangsaan, 200-2017 [Online]. Available at https://
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2019).
Viotti and Kauppi, 2012. International Relations Theory. New York:
Pearson Education.

Westernization and Globalization: The Influence of Western Identity in Indonesia
Economic Development
Rara Shertina
Westernization and Globalization: The

Influence of Western Identity in Indonesia
Rara Shertina
Universitas Pembangunan Nasional “Veteran” Jawa Timur,
Surabaya
Abstract
The era of globalization speeds up the spread of westernization to
the world, including Indonesia. The values that have been brought
by westernization since post-Cold War encourage liberalism
ideology to be penetrated all over the world. Advancement of
western countries in economic, politics, socials and military aspect
attracted people to follow their values as their new identity. In the
economic aspect, liberalism is associated with capitalism system,
which supports free market and private ownership. Even though
westernization was criticized by the nationalist because it is

considered to run against the local value, the western influence is
having a big role in Indonesia economic policy making. This paper
explains how westernization is supported by the globalization
phenomenon resulting in modernization in Indonesia. The use
of advanced technology and changing identity in Indonesian
people influences Indonesian economic policy to be more liberal
and capitalistic. Indonesian government shows the tendency
of capitalist orientation by receiving foreign direct investment,
participation in economic International organization and support
toward emergence of “unicorn” from Indonesia as the new
economic power.
Keywords: Westernization, Identity, Liberalism, Economic

Development, Capitalism

Rara Shertina
Introduction
The victory of United States of America and allies in Cold War
ended the competition between two models of economic ideology.
Previously, capitalism and communism competed to spread the
ideology, especially for second and third-world countries. The
collapse of Soviet Union in 1991 also caused the spread of capitalism
in many ways, cementing the claim that this system is the only way
to create welfare in every country. Capitalism or more well known
as neo-liberalism is a part of westernization bearing in mind, this
ideology brought by western countries. Westernization is always
related to modernization that shows western society as the icon of
developed society. This point of view supported by the development
of economy, politics and military in Western Countries since
16th century, especially in trade expansion that caused industrial
revolution and colonialism.
Indonesia experienced long periods of Dutch colonization. Indeed,

the history proves that the most colonizers are western countries
even though Indonesia also colonized by Japan for three and a half
years and obtained independence on August 17th, 1945 afterwards.
Therefore, it was understandable that Indonesia at that time and
after independence under Soekarno, the founding father of The

Republic of Indonesia tended to have an anti-western attitude.
Soekarno’s leadership resulted in a creation of nationalization
policy, which affected Dutch-owned Company in Indonesia and
followed by the nationalization of other foreign companies, such as
British-owned plantations. This strategy was intended to strengthen
the Indonesian economy development through control from the
state. This strategy was considered as a mercantilist plan, believing
in state intervention to conduct economy in order to achieve power
and wealth.
Unfortunately, the plan did not go well, because there were almost
no indigenous people who mastered skill of management in foreign
companies. During Dutch colonization, Indonesian people worked
at the level of the field operations, so that none of Indonesian people
were capable to manage companies. Eventually, nationalization
of foreign companies did not give any benefit in developing the
Indonesian economy at that time. After Soekarno abdicated his

Rara Shertina
position to Soeharto in 1966 or known as New Order (Orde Baru), the

anti-western movement that was brought by Soekarno immediately
changed into more pro-western policies. Soeharto overcame the
political and economic crisis by steering the country closer to the
western world.
In this paper, the author tries to analyze how western identity

could influence Indonesia economic development. The identity of
westernization that contains liberalism and individualism could
influence Indonesia that was previously very nationalistic in
Soekarno leadership era. The government economic policies would
adjust and consider the capitalism system along with the existence
of liberalism among Indonesian people. Westernization in the form
of capitalism in Indonesia emerges the ideas of private ownership,
industrialization and urbanization. This is answering the question
of how westernization and modernization works in influencing
Indonesia economic system orientation through the western
identity.
Westernization Influence on Indonesian Identity

During the New Order, modernization took place within society as
an effort to transform the traditional society into a modern society

that could obtain a sufficient level of economic growth, advanced
technology, and social organization. The Western modernization
concept that is rooted in the Western world is often associated with the
Western culture or western identity. As a result, the modernization
concept cannot be separated from Western value systems. Since the
19th century, the advancement of European countries in economy,
politics, and military was known as western development in general.
In this century, European cultures are influenced by liberalism ideas
that taught the value of individualism, freedom and toleration.
In economic perspective, westernization meant market growth or

capitalism. The idea of capitalism is based on private ownership
and competition that caused industrialization, urbanization and
social stratification. Adam Smith in his book, “A Theory of Moral
Sentiments” argues that classic economy using cultures and identity
to explain economic phenomenon. The ideology that has been
brought by westernization is not only affecting Indonesian people

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as society but also affecting the government itself. Westernization

is the process of following western lifestyle (Huntington, 1996).
Indonesian people were exposed by western culture and it influenced
their pop culture such as music, movie and style. In Indonesian
education curriculum, English language is more primary than
traditional language. The idea of westernization is not only about
culture but it is also providing the one and only economic model that
harmonize with modernization in 20th century.
Globalization has resulted in the universalization of western

economic model with the spread of capitalism. The end of history
means liberal democracy is the final form of government for all
nations (Francis, 1992). Even though liberalism and capitalism
have brought new ideas to Indonesia, the idea of liberalism often
criticized by nationalist because it run against local culture. The
traditional values often rooted from religious value, especially in
Indonesia. Around 85% of Indonesian people are Muslims and some
Muslims in Indonesia opposes western culture that is considered
on the contrary to Sharia law. In economic sector, it can be seen
that many public and private banks started to open Sharia banking
system, even though capitalism system in Indonesian economy still
dominates. Liberalism is giving a focus on individual, companies,
and entrepreneur (Cohn, 2012). In liberalism perspective on

economy, government economic policy making is made with
contestation against people interest. Westernization with the help of
globalization influences Indonesian people to be more liberal. The
change of identity among Indonesian people then further influences
the government through bottom-up mechanism in policy making.
Therefore, Indonesian economy now is more liberal and capitalistic.
Liberalism and Capitalism in Affecting Indonesia

Economic Policies
Westernization tends to shape Indonesian economic direction
more liberally. Indonesia itself has Pancasila as the basis of their
economic system. Nevertheless, since 1980s economic development
in most of the world was dominated by neoliberal model. Neo-
liberalism is the new version of classical liberalism. The main idea is
the best way for economy to develop without state intervention and
focus on free market (Heywood, 2011). Opposition of neo-liberalism

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is Keynesianism with tax policies. Neo-liberalism tries to minimize

the state intervention and giving move power to market to run the
economy.
The easiest way to indicate country’s economic direction whether

they are more capitalistic or socialistic is through the ownership. If
the economic ownership mostly run by private sector, it means that
the country’s economic policy tends to follow the capitalism system.
In return, if a country ownership mostly owned by the government
and government giving massive intervention in economic, it
means that the country’s economic direction is more socialistic. A
capitalism track record has been started in New Order that is pro-
Western. Good relations with western countries are opening capital
in many forms. In early 1970s, Indonesia conducted cooperation
with World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF),
Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Inter-Government Group on
Indonesia (IGGI) to support Indonesian development. At that time,
Indonesia considered shifting their economic system from socialism
to be more semi-capitalism (Tambunan, 1998).
Capitalism in Indonesia can be shown by the elimination of subsidies

in Indonesia, thus price of goods handed by market mechanism.

Indonesia and IMF cooperation are also resulting in floating rate
of Rupiah, in other words, the Rupiah value determined by market
mechanism. The Privatization of government-owned companies
is also the characteristic of liberal economy. It shows how state
intervention is decreasing in economic sector. In Indonesia, there
are several government-owned companies that are privatized. These
are two ways of privatization such as, strategic sales (sell directly)
and go public (through capital market). These companies are:
Table 1.1 List of privatized government-owned companies

in Indonesia
Name Privatization date

PT Indofarma Tbk (INAF) 17 April 2001
PT Kimia Farma Tbk (KAEF) 4 July 2001
PT Pembangunan Perumahan Tbk (PTPP) 9 February 2010

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PT Wijaya Karya Tbk (WIKA) 29 October 2007

PT Waskita Karya Tbk (WSKT) 19 December 2012
25 November
PT Bank Negara Indonesia Tbk (BBNI)
1996
10 November
PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia Tbk (BBRI)
2003
17 December
PT Bank Tabungan Negara Tbk (BBTN)
2009
PT Bank Mandiri Tbk (BMRI) 14 July 2003
PT Aneka Tambang Tbk (ANTM) 27 November 1997
23 Desember
PT Bukit Asam Tbk (PTBA)
2002
PT Timah Tbk (TINS) 19 Oktober 1995
PT Semen Baturaja Tbk (SMBR) 28 Juni 2013
PT Semen Indonesia Tbk (SMGR) 8 Juli 1991
12 November
PT Jasa Marga Tbk (JSMR)
2007
PT Garuda Indonesia Tbk (GIAA) 11 Februari 2011
PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia Tbk (TLKM) 14 November 1995
The participation of Indonesia in the World Trade Oasrganization

(WTO) and the GATT agreement clarifies Indonesia’s commitment
to enter the world economic liberalization or global capitalism. In
this case, westernization is also a tool for western country, especially
United States of America (USA) to achieve their national interest. For
example, USA has a big role in creating Bretton-Woods Agreement
that supports free trade and free market. The liberalization of
economies expands opportunities for US multinational companies
(MNC)/transnational companies (TNC) to enter Asian and African
market. This agenda mostly achieved through international
organization that is created under the United Nations. USA
have huge influence to World Bank and IMF as a transformer of
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) into WTO. This
transformation means the change of trade agenda that is more pro
to free trade based on Washington Consensus.

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The enthusiasm of westernization is shown by the willingness of

countries to take a part in WTO, even though cooperation with
other countries under international constitution means decreasing
state sovereignty. Shared economic relationship is a kind of
cosmopolitanism, which defined the shared morality in community
as one single community. Consumerism and materialism are spread
along with pro-market value that is supporting WTO agenda. Based
on the survey conducted by McKinsey & Indonesian Company
Management Consultant, Indonesian people are the second of most
optimistic consumer in the world. Therefore, the membership of
Indonesia in economic international organization is encouraging
Indonesia to be involved in free market and free trade. Indonesia
will be in unfavorable position if consumerism of Indonesian people
toward international brand not balanced the export income.
The current President of Republic Indonesia, Joko Widodo or known

as Jokowi shows the tendency of Indonesian economy to market
economy system. This tendency is emphasized by Kwik Kian Gie,
Former Coordinating Minister for Economy, Finance and Industry
that said that Indonesian economic development leads to a liberal
economy in a very clear direction. Liberalism leads to the essence of
human that always pursuing his own interests and their desire to get

the most optimal benefits from what he has (Smith, 1776). Therefore,
Indonesian government anticipate the possibility of individual’s
excessive control with the creation of market-oriented laws and
policies such as, UU No.1 of 1967 regarding Foreign Investment,
Law on Domestic Investment in 1968, Government Regulation No.
20 of 1994, Infrastructure Summit I and II, and UU No. 25 of 2007
regarding Investment.
Industrial revolution 4.0 brings Indonesia to new phase of economic

modernization along with the growth of e-commerce business that
is approximately reaches 17% in past five years. Indonesian start up
business is growing very fast and some of them can be categorized
as “Unicorn” or start up business with more than US$1 million or
around 13 billion rupiahs in capital injection. Modernization supports
the existence of technology-based startup business in Indonesia.
250 million people in Indonesia with the access of Internet and
smart phone are potential as an e-commerce market. Indonesian

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government support toward these “Unicorns” shows capitalism

characteristic of its economic policy, bearing in mind these capital
injections mostly coming from foreign private companies. These are
the graphic of each company valuation
Picture 1 “Unicorns” with the largest capital injection in

Indonesia
Conclusion
After the victory of liberalism and capitalism ideologies that
was brought by western countries, the westernization spread to
all over the world including Indonesia. The western values are
supporting individualism and private ownership. In economic
perspective, westernization is relatable with global capitalism.
Private ownership, free market, and free trade are the ideas that are
offered by capitalism. Indonesia as a second world country tends
to follow capitalism economic system instead of socialism. It could
be analyzed from western hegemonic influence towards Indonesian
people for instance the influence in pop culture such as western
music and movies that is very popular in Indonesia. Indonesian
education curriculum prioritizes English language as a main subject
over traditional language. The existence of western culture in

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Indonesia receives opposition of nationalist because it is considered

not in accordance with traditional value that is mostly rooted by
religious value.
However, the capitalist system in Indonesian economy is still

quite dominant compared to traditional and religious system
of economics. This is shown by the privatization of government
owned companies in Indonesia. The participation of Indonesia in
international economic organization is also showing the enthusiasm
of Indonesia towards capitalist system. WTO and IMF are having a
big role in shaping Indonesia economic directions. The aid that is
given by them encourages Indonesia to open new market for MNC/
TNC from western countries. Cosmopolitanism and consumerism
encourage Indonesia to be involved in capitalism. Modernization
also influenced the advancement of technology in Indonesia that is
supporting the existence of “Unicorn” from Indonesia. Eventually
westernization brings liberal value to Indonesian economy and it
influences the orientation of Indonesian economic development in
the future.
References
Asmin, Ferdinal. 2018. “Budaya dan Pembangunan Ekonomi:

Sebuah Kajian terhadap Artikel Chavoshbashi dan Kawan-
Kawan”. Jurnal Studi Komunikasi.
BBC Indonesia. 2018. “Ekonomi digital mulai moncer, ini dia daftar
unicorn dari Indonesia” BBC Indonesia (Online). Available
at https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/majalah-43058059
(Accessed 20th February 2019)
Cohn, Theodore H. 2012. Global Political Economy: Theory and
th
Practice 6 edition. United States: Pearson.
Detik Finance. 2015. ”Ini Daftar BUMN yang Sudah Diprivatisasi”.
Detik Finance (Online) Available at https://finance.detik.
com/bursa-dan-valas/d-2882246/ini-daftar-bumn-yang-
sudah-diprivatisasi (Accessed 20th February 2019)
Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. “The End of History,” International
Affairs. The National Interest

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Heywood, Andrew. 2017. Politik Global. Pustaka Pelajar: Yogyakarta

Huntington, Samuel. 1966. The clash of civilizations and the
remaking of world order New York : Simon & Schuster
Jamil, Hidsal. 2015. Perangkap Liberalisasi Ekonomi di Indonesia.
Himpunan Mahasiswa Jurusan Ilmu Ekonomi Fakultas
Ekonomi dan Bisnis Universitas Brawijaya (HMJIE FEB
UB) Periode 201
Jan, Radlyah. 2010. “Eksistensi Ekonomi Kapitalis di Indonesia”.
Jurnal Ilmiah Al- Syir’ah. Vol 8 No. 1 (2010)
Jurnal123. 2015. “Konsumerisme di Indonesia Peringkat ke-2
Dunia”. Jurnal123. (Online). Available at https://jurnal123.
com/2015/01/konsumerisme-di-indonesia-peringkat-ke-
2-dunia/ (Accessed 20th February 2019)
Merdeka.com. 2015. “Dipimpin Jokowi-JK, arah ekonomi Indonesia
liberal?” Merdeka (Online) Available at https://www.
merdeka.com/uang/dipimpin-jokowi-jk-arah-ekonomi-
indonesia- liberal.html (Accessed 20th February 2019)
Sairin, Sjafri. 2011. “Modernization and Westernization: A
Never-Ending Discourse in Indonesia”. JGD–Journal of
Governance and Development 1 Vol.7, 2011 (1 - 7)

Smith, Adam. 1977. The Wealth of Nations. University of Chicago
Press

Malaysia National Automotive Policy (NAP) & Malaysia National Identity
Alya Nadhiah Binti Khairul Annuar & Nurfarah Nabila Binti Rosland
Malaysia National Automotive Policy (NAP)

& Malaysia National Identity
Alya Nadhiah Binti Khairul Annuar & Nurfarah

Nabila Binti Rosland
Abstract
Every country has some national items that reflect their country’s
identity, symbolizing the country’s values and pride. This paper
reviews on Malaysia’s national car project that was officially
established on 1983. Ever since the year of 1963, the government
of Malaysia had begun to encourage the establishment of the
automotive industry and this led to the National Car Project along
with the agreement with HICOM, Mitsubishi Motor Corporation
and
Mitsubishi Corporation. On 2006, the government launched the

National Automotive Policy (NAP) in order to modulate the local

automotive industry and turn it into regional hub. This paper tries
to find the relations between national car and national identity.
At the first part of this paper we will examine the history behind
the establishment of Malaysia’s National Car Project. Then, we
will proceed to study on how Malaysia’s national car and the
automotive policy reflect its national identity. The later part of the
paper will be on the challenges of Malaysia’s national car where
we will analyse the dynamics of Malaysia’s national automotive
industry.
Keywords: National automobile, automotive policy, identity,

Malaysia
Introduction
The history of Malaysia’s automotive industry can be traced back to
years even before the independence of the country. While still being
under the colonization of British, Ford Malaya was established in

Singapore and it became the first automobile assembly plant in

Southeast Asia. It was created under the Ford Motor Company who
intended to capitalise on the British colonial status. Malaya was
recognized as a strategic place for a regional export base and thus
they incorporated the Ford Motor Company of Malaya Ltd. (Ford
Malaya) in Singapore. After getting its independence, the federation
of Malaya began to emphasise industrialisation in order to increase
and stabilize the economic growth. Malaysian Automotive Policy
was introduced in 1964. The policy was fostered to increase national
industrialisation through assembly of vehicles and manufacturing of
automobiles components. In 1981, the first National Car Project was
inaugurated as a joint project with the HICOM, Mitsubishi Motor
Corporation and Mitsubishi Corporation.
The Malaysia National Automotive Policy (NAP) was first originated

from in 2006, when the prime minister, Tun Dr. Mahathir introduced
this project to transform the domestic automotive industry and
integrate it into the increasingly competitive regional and global
industry network. One of NAP aims is to develop Malaysia as a
regional automotive hub as well as to safeguard consumer interests
by offering safer yet better quality vehicle at competitive prices. This
policy was reviewed a couple of times to improve the performance
of the industry. Cars signify national identity as familiar, iconic

manufactured objects emerging out of historic systems of production
and expertise as ‘the automobile industry, more than any other,
becomes exemplary and indicative; its presence or absence in
a national economy tells us the level and power of that economy’
(Edensor, 2004).
Literature Review
Tim Edensor (2002) conducted a study on how material cultures are
conceived in a nation. In his studies he discussed on how objects,
particularly automobile can contribute to the social relations while
having the national significance. He used British and American car
cultures to study on the importance of the national industry and aims
to investigate the relations between material culture and national
identity. He concludes that the notion relationships with object can
be formed and sustained but it requires very reflexive, technically

skilled, self-authorizes individuals to construct and reconstruct

the identities and lifestyles. He added that objects like cars can
be reincorporated into national identity, can be practically and
symbolically adopted and adapted into different national contexts
that can be drawn into particular affective relationships with cohere
around ideas about national car cultures.
M. Rosli, F. Kari (2008) seeks to examine the performance of

Proton’s local and foreign automotive parts suppliers. At one part of
the study they discussed on the government policies and projected
targeted that targeted at the development of the national cars
specifically Proton and its suppliers. The results of the study show
that there are significant performance differences between the local
and foreign suppliers and this study also proved that Malaysian local
suppliers lack the capabilities to compete effectively with the foreign
suppliers in the automotive industry in Malaysia. They stressed
in their conclusion that the local suppliers should expected the
competition following the further liberalization expected under the
AFTA and WTO processes.
Edensor, Tim (2004) carried out a study on national identity that

receives the transmission of cultural elite, invented traditions

and food customs. He focuses on national automobilities with a
particular focus upon British and Indian car cultures. There are
three elements to be taken into considerations which are models,
geographies and performances. He believes as the nation expands,
becoming globalized, it creates multiple forms of national identity.
Wad, Peter (2009) studied on how Thailand and Malaysia pursued

different automobile policies and strategies since 1980’s. It is to adjust
and develop economic globalization and emerging regionalization of
ASEAN auto market in the 21’st century. However, since 2016, the
national car policy in Malaysia was suffering a drastic decline in its
production and sales of vehicles. It is the last call for Malaysia to
either innovate exportable brands targeting less competitive market
or to give up local management control to move beyond Malaysian
automobile nationalism.

Theoretical Background
Based on Francis Fukuyama book of Identity, identity is the sense of
belonging, feeling proud and dignified to be a part of social structure
(Fukuyama, 2018). In this research, we will focus mostly on the
theory of national identity. This paper will also analyse National
Automotive Policy (NAP) in the perspective of national identity.
Discussion
Malaysia’s very first national car was conceived in 1979 by the Prime
Minister, Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad and was formally established
as PROTON (Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional Berhad), in 1983.
During the opening of PROTON plant in Shah Alam, Mahathir
declared that ‘The Proton Saga’ is not just a quality automobile.
Rather, it is a symbol of honour and nobility to the Malaysia people.
To own, and to drive the national car itself gives a sense of pride
for the Malaysians. The Malaysian’s pride towards their national
car can be seen in their patriotic song, Keranamu Malaysia.
“..berkereta jenama negara, megah menyusur di jalan raya,”. The
line translates to “riding national cars, and proudly cruising down
the roads” which clearly signifies the dignity and sense of belonging
towards the national automobile and this reflects the national
identity. National identity can be defined as a person’s identity and

sense of belonging to one country or to one nation with its history,
commonly perceived values and traditions. It is a complex and
dynamic psychological structure involving a system of core beliefs
about the national groups, and associated emotions and feelings
(Fakhri R. Khader, 2012).
Automobile as a material culture is highly associated with the

national identity. How does the national car reflect the national
identity of Malaysia? We believe that driving cars is a daily practice
among people around the world. Statistic in 2017 shows that there
are 28.2 million units of cars cruising on Malaysian road. In average,
a total of 89% of people in Malaysia own at least a single car. In the
same year, a total of 275,878 units of local cars are owned by the
Malaysians. According to Billig (1995) national identity inheres in
the ‘banal’, in everyday shared practices, notions and materials, the

everyday practice of driving has been proven to become a habitual

performance that resulted in the constitution of the national identity.
Malaysia automotive industry reflects nationhood

identity
The identity of Malaysia can be traced in the features of the national
cars itself. The name ‘Saga’ from PROTON’s very first car, Proton
Saga was derived from a native Malaysia tree denoting resilience
and indigenous identity. Similarly, PERODUA’s first car in 1992 was
renamed after the Malaysia’s native mouse deer, known as Kancil
in Bahasa. The animal of Sang Kancil itself has become a national
symbol, with the animal symbolizes smart, cunning and heroic acts
in the storybooks and Malaysian folktales.
Malaysia National Automotive Policy (NAP)

The 1997 global economic crisis ended in the year 2000 where the
world economy started to normalize. This resulted in the amendment
of policies made by Malaysian’s policy makers in order to recover
and to improve economic growth through the industrialization
including the automotive industry. In 2006, Malaysian government
announced National Automotive Policy (NAP) that aims to (1)

promote a competitive and sustainable domestic automotive
industry especially the national car manufacturers, (2) to develop
Malaysia as a regional automotive hub in specific area, (3) to increase
value-added activities in a sustainably while developing domestic
capabilities, (4) to increase exports of vehicles and automotive
components, to (5) promote Bumiputera participation in the total
value chain of the domestic automotive industry and (6) to safeguard
consumer interests by offering safer and better quality products at
competitive prices.
This policy was reviewed a couple of times the year after it was
launched to improve effectiveness of the project and fix problems
faced during its implementation. In 2009, the NAP was reviewed to
enhance the capability and competitiveness of the industry as well
as to increase opportunities and provide a conducive-investment
environment of the NAP. The efforts made to improve this policy
simultaneously contributed to national identity formation. The

linkage between auto mobility and national identity are multiple,

including state regulation, the geographies of ‘roadscapes’, driving
practices, styles and cultural activities carried out in cars, the auto
service industries, types of journey the range of representation which
centre upon cars, everyday discourse, the economic importance of
the symbolic motor industry, and the affordances of vehicles and
roads.(Edensor, 2004)
Out of all the six objectives above, how many of them are successfully
achieved by the policy? Does NAP effectively accomplish its main
goal to increase the competitive regional and global industry
network? After several repeated reviews on the policy, in 2012,
Malaysia status in the global automotive industry was ranked 18th
for vehicle production and 20th for vehicle sales. Among the ASEAN
region, Malaysia ranked third after Thailand and Indonesia in total
vehicle production and sales. Malaysia also holds the third place
for the largest automotive market in the passenger car segment
in ASEAN. The fifth objective of NAP was proven a success when
about 710,000 people were employed into the automotive sector
and has generated almost RM30 billion to the country’s GDP. This
is really important for nation’s economy as the whole policy not only
generates economic growth by contributing to the nation’s GDP but
also offered job opportunities to the locals. By selling national cars to

local citizen as well as exporting them to other parts of the world like
UK and Middle East countries, Malaysia has indirectly promoted its
national identity worldwide. Seeing Malaysian national cars out of
the country will ultimately bring back memories of the country and
this show that locals have the sentimental attachment and pride
towards their local brands.
Challenges for NAP

As the saying goes, Rome was not built in a day; this policy also
encountered some difficulties in the implementation due to several
challenges. Under the NAP, the government ran a protectionist
policy to the infant automotive industry where taxes and duties
will be charged on the imported vehicles. This measure was taken
with the purpose of encouraging local people to buy and support
national cars. Nevertheless, the protectionism was about to be put

to an end due to Malaysia abiding to ASEAN Free Trade Agreement

(AFTA) that obliges Malaysia to be open to trade and remove all
the trade barriers on the imports and exports. As Malaysia signed
the framework agreement for the intra-regional liberalization in
trade and services, Malaysia’s carmaker industry experienced a
huge decline. Malaysia auto champion (Proton) lost market shares
to foreign-controlled makers like the former national auto project
Perodua. Both Proton and Perodua have been supporting the
development of national auto vendors, but this has not been a very
successful process of technology transfer and learning, likely due to
lack of high-tech capabilities of both companies during their own
phase of technological upgrading (Wad, 2009).
To look at this issue in the identity perspective, Malaysian seemed

to not have strong enough sentimental attachments towards their
national cars. They did not buy the cars for the sake of being patriotic
or for the spirit of nationalism but rather due to the lower price of
national car compared to the imported ones. Right after last year’s
election, Prime Minister Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad proposed an
idea of making the third national car following Proton and Perodua.
However, the response from the people was very lukewarm and
more seems to oppose the plan. The public are demanding more on

better infrastructure for public transportation than having another
national car. Another reason for the public to be disinterested on
this national car project was for the reason that the local company
Proton share was ‘bought’ by Geely Holding which is a foreign
China-based firm. Geely Holding group controls 49.9% equity stake
in Proton Holdings Bhd and they keep their promise in bringing
Proton cars flooding in China’s market.
Conclusion
In Malaysia, although the local automotive industry did contribute
a lot to the domestic economic growth, it does not leave much
significance in terms of national identity. As mentioned earlier, local
cars are being purchased due to its lower price and not because of
the sense of nationalism or patriotism. We strongly recommend
local automotive companies to actively promote their products
in a way that reflects the car’s identity as the nation’s pride. For

example, in British motoring whose cars are Bentley and Rolls Royce
symbolizes wealthy elites of the British instead of mass-producing it
for cheaper price and make the car less exclusive. We can also try
to impose on the national values of our national cars by associating
them with popular cultures such as popular music, newsprint, films
and TV shows. It is a form of indirect propaganda where national
car companies could promote new models through the media and
advertisement.
Malaysian cars companies also need to keep naming new models

with names that are closely related to the nation’s sentiment. In
order to foster national identity, it is best for Malaysia’s national
automotive industry to be fully depending on local expert in terms of
designing, manufacturing, and the assembling of the cars. To achieve
a complete independent industry, the government need to provide
effective educations and programmes to the locals particularly
in these sectors. These will not only offer job opportunities to the
locals but we will also produce automotive experts of our own.
After analysing through the implementation of the NAP, it can
be concluded that the original idea of the policy was brilliant. On
the other hand, the government need to know exactly where the
policy is going in the future and focus more on that rather than
trying to setting up the third national car which will result into the
protectionism policy again. The policy makers should advance their
production of national car along with improving the quality of their
cars to remain competitive in the regional hub of ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement (AFTA).
References
BASIR, E. K. (2018, 2nd August). “Unveiling the concept of a second
national car”. Borneo Post (Online) Available at https://
www.theborneopost.com/2018/08/02/unveiling-the-
concept-of-a-secondnational-car/ (Accessed 28th February
2019)
Edensor, T. (2004). “Automobility and National Identity:
Representation, Geography and Driving Practice”. Theory,
Culture & Society, 21(5), 101–120.

Fakhri R. Khader. (2012). “The Malaysian Experience in Developing

National Identity,
Multicultural Tolerance and Understanding through Teaching
Curricula: Lessons
Learned and Possible Applications in the Jordanian Context”
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science,
2(1), 270–288.
Fukuyama, F. (2018). Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the
Politics of Resentment, 182.
Lim, A. (2019, 1 18). “Malaysia automotive industry overview 2018-
export is strongest performers, says MARii”. Paultan.org
(Online) Available at https://paultan.org/2019/01/18/
malaysia-automotive-industry-overview-for-2018export-
is-strongest-growth-performer-says-marii/ (Accessed 28th
February 2019)
Wad, P. (2009). “The automobile industry of Southeast Asia:
Malaysia and Thailand”. Journal of the Asia Pacific
Economy, 14(2), 172–193.

Identity and Economic Development During Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad
Administration (1981-2003)
Nor Atiqah Binti Mohd Isa & Nurpatiha Binti Mohamad Shatiri
Identity and Economic Development During

Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad Administration
(1981-2003)
Nor Atiqah Binti Mohd Isa & Nurpatiha Binti

Mohamad Shatiri
Abstract
Malaysia’s economic growth has been relatively increased since
the country gained independence from the British colonization in
1957. It is commonly observed that Malaysia during the era of Tun
Dr. Mahathir Mohamad was significantly different from the time of
previous Prime Minister especially in infrastructures development
aspect. Large-scale urban transformation in Malaysia is the most
visible sign of the rapid development which has accompanied
the premiership of the fourth Prime Minister, Tun Dr. Mahathir
Mohamad from the year 1981 to 2003. The primary objective of this
paper is to trace the evolution of Malaysia’s economy in the time

scale of before and during the government of Tun Dr. Mahathir
Mohamad. Hence, throughout this research, the infrastructures
development which construct from his idea and project such as
the Petronas Twin Towers, Kuala Lumpur City Centre (KLCC), The
Penang Bridge as well as the Kuala Lumpur International Airport
(KLIA) and its correlation with the identity of Malaysia will be
further discussed.
Keywords: Malaysia, Economic development, Tun Dr Mahathir,

Infrastructures, Identity
Introduction
Before 1957, Malaysia, which is a multi-ethnic country, was known
as a nation that had low-income agricultural economy which mainly
focused on its economic strength in rubber and tin production. At
that time, there were only two locations in Malaysia that became

the center of trans-shipment which are Penang and Malacca. The

business condition during that particular period was small scale,
largely localized and primarily family-based business. Malaysians
did not engage with international business where they prefer
making small scale business which does not expand the position of
Malaysia in global arena, and also could not make Malaysia being
acknowledged around the world. Malaysia was known as a struggling
third world country before the emergence of Tun Dr. Mahathir
Mohamad as the fourth prime minister. After 1980, Malaysia had
successfully overcome its economic crisis and eventually become a
developing second world country. Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad had
expressed his concern about the economic crisis that affected the
country even before he became the prime minister. The Malaysians
at that time were having difficulties in coping with the economic
situation as the country’s economy were mostly dominated by the
Chinese ethnic due to British colonialization.
For 22 years, Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad has helped promote

Malaysia from country of nothingness to a country that placed in
world stage as a player that is well-known around the global arena
(Plate, 2011). He started his operation in making Malaysia as a
successful developing country by uplifting Malaysians economic

status and introduced numerous infrastructure developments.
During the early year of his administration, he focused on the New
Economic Policy (NEP) which introduced after the catastrophic
events which is 1969 May Racial Riot. Therefore, this paper intend
to discuss about: (1) the economic position before Tun Dr. Mahathir
Mohamad’s tenure and what makes him motivated to change
the economic condition of Malaysia, (2) how Tun Dr. Mahathir
Mohamad achieved the aims of making Malaysia as developing
nation through infrastructure development and, (3) the significance
of the infrastructure and how it connected with identity of Malaysia.
This research paper discussed on how The Fourth Prime Minister
Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, had successfully placed Malaysia
among the global actors in aspect of infrastructure development
which makes it regarded as national identity. Information of this
paper had been obtained through several available sources such
as books, journal, interview, websites and articles. Considering
that this topic is already set in specific period which is during the

administration of Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad from 1981 until

2003, all the information that gained provides sufficient data that
were needed in this research paper.
Economic Position Before Tun Dr. Mahathir

Mohamad’s Tenure
According to history of Malaya, before the arrival of Chinese by
British, Malays was the regions merchant. At early period of Malaya,
the Malays collected the spices and natural resources for shipment.
However, the table turns and the business become under complete
control of Chinese traders which had oust the Malay farmers as they
began operating their own spice gardens (Mohamad, 2011). Under the
British administration, when the British allowed more immigrants
in Malaya until their population exceeding the populations of the
Malays itself, Malays lost their central position as the rightful owner
of the land. This situation happened due to British having control
in Malaya and placed an economic gap between the races. During
the British colonialization, British divided the races into different
economic sector, as for example the Malays worked as fisherman
and padi planters at the countryside, Indian worked in estate, and
Chinese worked particularly in tin industry. This situation make the
Malays become underdeveloped and created huge gap between the

races in economic aspect. When the Japanese occupation occurred,
Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad started to realize the Malays poor
economic position because a lot of Malays including him were forced
to sell fruits along the roadside when the governments decided to
fire most of clerks in public sector. He observed that Malays were
lacked of business knowledge, so it was difficult for them to make
a living. He then intended to correct the weakness of Malays in
business sector in order to have the same standard of living as the
non-Malays.
Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad blamed the British as a culprit

that oppressed the bumiputeras in their own land. However, he
also criticized Malays as weak, lazy and uninterested in worldly
achievements (Muhamad, 2008). He believed that Malays negative
character was a result of British administrative policies during the
colonialization period. He alleged that all races including Malays are
able to participate in Malaysia’s economy and enjoy the riches of the

land. Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad viewed that in order for Malays to
escape from their poverty, they need to improve their own economic
situation and placed themselves in the same position as other races.
In other words, by improving their own economic situation, they can
cooperate and unite with all races, so it could affect the Malaysia
economic development as a whole. This realization had strengthened
Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad’s focus on economic factors of Malaysia
and increase his motivation to help Malaysia to become a country
with a promising economic development.
The Rise of Economic Development in Malaysia and

Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad’s Exertion
The Malaysian called Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad as “the father
of modern Malaysia”. He was appointed to be the fourth Prime
Minister of Malaysia on July 16th 1981, and become the longest
serving premier of Malaysia, also the one who contributed to the
numerous developments. Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad started his
political career when he was at a very young age and through all
his readings, he is able to visualize what has happening in Malaysia
as well as in the whole world. However, his studies were disrupted
because during his youth, he had lived in the era of colonization, both

in the World War era and in the time when Japanese invaded Malaya
(Fam, 2006). In this case, it is true when people said “Experiences
is the best teacher”, because of the struggle that Tun Dr. Mahathir
Mohamad faced before, had made him to be the toughest person
during his time of being the Prime Minister.
Verily as most of the people know him, he is someone who always

want to reach the goal until he is extremely satisfied that he had
obtained it. Seeing that Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad dares to take
risks, he also dares to dream and thus, put so much effort on making
his dreams into realities. Subsequently, with his big vision he thought
of the need to have a very good infrastructure and high technology
in order to make Malaysia become a fully developed country by the
year 2020. To continue his dreams, he had built an infrastructure
that is corresponding to Burj Khalifa, Dubai, center of attraction
which is The Petronas Twin Towers and The Kuala Lumpur Tower
that finally gave Malaysia new image in the eyes of the developed
countries throughout the world. There are many practical and

magnificent infrastructures that were successfully constructed and

had become the identity of Malaysia.
The Petrnonas Twin Towers. Kuala Lumpur and

Kuala Lumpur City Centre (KLCC)
It was during Tun Dr Mahathir’s tenure, when he planned of an
impressive building as well as outside worlds’ infrastructures, and
those projects marked with the construction of the Petronas Twin
Towers which at that time the tallest twin building in the world in
1996 (Hays, 2008). The building consists of two-identical tower
452 meter in height together with a sky bridge at the 41stand 42nd
stories. It was named after the famous state oil company, Petronas,
whose new headquarters occupy one half of the building and with
their collaboration they forms part of a larger development project-
-Kuala Lumpur City Centre (KLCC) (Xiung et al., 2016). During its
launching in 1992, it was described as being “among the largest real
estate development in the world” (Mahathir, 1992). Beyond any
doubt, the 88-storey Petronas Twin Towers is another aspiration
from Tun Dr Mahathir and symbolize the country’s ambitions and
aspiration of becoming fully developed country in 2020. Talking
about the KLCC, Tun Dr Mahathir had a dream for a dynamic and
powerful city center. Thus, as Prime Minister he worked his very best
with his city planners and came up with the biggest project which is
the Kuala Lumpur City Centre (KLCC). The land located right in the
heart of the ‘Golden Triangle’ of Kuala Lumpur, and remain as the
most visited tourist attraction in Kuala Lumpur. Still fresh in mind,
by seeing the tourists excitedly took their pictures in front of the
Petronas Twin Towers and until this day, the Twin Towers remain
an iconic landmark of Kuala Lumpur and is synonymous with
Malaysia. Much more than just an office building, the Petronas Twin
Towers sparked a nation’s pride and came to symbolize Malaysia’s
jaunt into the 21st century (Merchant, 2016).
Penang Bridge
Witnessing a lot of people crossing from the mainland of Seberang
Prai to the Penang Island every day or during festivals and religious
celebrations, Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad realized that it is important
to facilitate the journey for all Malaysian. Before the Penang Bridge

was built, the only mode of transportation between the George Town
on the island and Butterworth on the mainland was the Penang
Ferry Service (Xiung et al., 2016). By then, Tun Dr Mahathir’s
plan to connect the Penang Island was started in early 1970s. After
getting approval, the construction of the Penang Bridge begun in
1982. Penang Bridge then become a very magnificent architecture
and infrastructures in Malaysia (Fam ,2006). Penang Bridge linked
the mainland to Penang, allowing thousands of people to cross from
both sides every day. In 1985, Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad officially
opened the bridge by driving a Proton Saga carrying the national
flag to officiate the ceremony. It ranks as the longest bridge in Asia
and the 5th longest in the world. Conclusively, the Penang Bridge
remains a famous alternative for travelers to cross the sea besides
using the traditional way of ferry service. Due to this development,
it attracts many tourists to come to Penang and become one of the
pride developments during Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad tenure by
putting aside the criticism and doubts.
Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA)

As Malaysia’s desire to be a developed country grew which also
meant more international travel and arrivals from every corner

of the world, KLIA is yet another dream of Tun Dr. Mahathir
Mohamad. In 1993, he decided that the Subang International
Airport could no longer handle the future demand of international
and domestic air travel. Nowadays, Subang International Airport
used specially for domestic fly. With his determination, it leads to
the upgrading of Malaysia’s air travel infrastructure and the opening
of the Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) in 1998 as part
of the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) big development plan
in Malaysia. The new airport was one of the Tun Dr Mahathir’s
high-stakes mega projects intended to showcase the economic and
developmental success of his regime. Although the construction of
KLIA faced several objections and critics as a lot of people said it
will cause environmental harm (Dhillon, 2009), KLIA still remains
to be the main transportation hub for air travel in Malaysia and the
central gateway into the country.

The Significance of Infrastructures Development

and Malaysia Identity
With Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad ’s unique and innovative ideas, he
made several changes such as reforms and built numbers of world
class infrastructures. The infrastructures that had built like a decade
ago have made a lot of transformation in Malaysia and give out the
positive impact and perception to the outside world. Generally, it
can be said that Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad ’s effort on economic
development in Malaysia created a whole new identity and viewpoint
towards the name ‘Malaysia’ itself. Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad
initiated the first effort when he announced his intention to start
several mega projects infrastructures development such as the
Petronas Twin Towers, KLCC, KLIA and the Penang Bridge. A new
identity of Malaysia has been discovered through the consequences
of build the infrastructures. These infrastructures had become an
icon, a symbol of Malaysian pride as well as contemporary regional
identity (Ismaeel, 2012). According to Bunnell (1999), the KLCC are
made to be a cultural landmark for Kuala Lumpur and Malaysia,
putting the city and nation to be acknowledge by the world (Bunnell,
2004). On the other hand, the recognition of Malaysian identity
through its infrastructures had been expanding to international film
industry. For instance, the Petronas Twin Towers was prominently

featured in the movie “Entrapment” that released in 1999 as well as
Bollywood movie Don in 2006. The appearance of Petronas Twin
Towers in those movies had shown the image of national progress
and development of Malaysia to the world.
Conclusion
As a whole, Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad had put so much effort and
contribution towards the infrastructures development in Malaysia.
He also gave Malaysia its own identity, direction, purpose and
create sense of independence among Malaysian (Muhamad, 2008).
Though he received a lot of criticisms and doubts, he eventually
proved them wrong. The evolution gave pride, glory and rise in the
self-worth of Malaysia. It also raised the ranking of dignity of the
country in the world’s eyes.

References
Bunnell, T, 2004. “Re-viewing the Entrapment controversy:
Megaprojection, (mis)representation and postcolonial
performance”, GeoJournal, 59 (4), pp. 297-305.
Dhillon, K. S, 2009. Malaysian Foreign Policy in the Mahathir
era 1981-2003: Dilemmas of Development. Singapore:
National University of Singapore (NUS) Press.
Fam, J. L, 2006. Tun Dr. Mahathirs Legacy: An Inspirational
Learning Experience. Kuala Lumpur: Krista Education.
Hays, J, 2008. “Malaysia Under Mahathir Mohammed” Facts
and Details [Online]. Available at http://factsanddetails.
com/southeast-asia/Malaysia/sub5_4a/entry-3627.html
(accessed on 20 February 2019)
Merchant, C, 2016. “The History of Construction of the Petronas
Twin Towers” Expatgo [Online]. Available at https://
www.expatgo.com/my/2013/01/09/the-history-and-
construction-of-the-petronas-twin-towers/ (accessed on 20
February 2019).
Mohamad, M. B, 2011. A Doctor in the House: The Memoirs of Tun

Dr. Mahathir Mohamad. Petaling Jaya: MPH Pub.
Muhamad, A. F, 2008. The Struggle for Recognition in Foreign
Policy: Malaysia under Mahathir. Thesis. London: London
School of Economics.
Plate, T, 2011. Conversations with Mahathir Mohamad: Doctor M:
Operation Malaysia. Shah Alam: Marshall Cavendish Corp.
Xiung, J, et al., 2016. “Tun Mahathir’s Top 10 Tech Legacies” Soya
Cincau [Online]. Available at https://www.soyacincau.
com/2016/09/29/tun-mahathirs-top-10-tech-legacies/10/
(accessed on 20 February 2019).
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THE

Sanksi Pelanggaran Hak Cipta (Undang-Undang No. 28 Tahun 2014

Setiap orang yang dengan tanpa hak melakukan pelanggaran hak

The conference is organised annually and taking place in Indonesia

The first section elaborating on identity and nationhood. There

The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making | iii

in the traditional Indonesian strategic culture, especially since

iv | The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making

globalization affected the popular “Ketuanan Melayu” identity

The second section of the book is focused on identity and election.

The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making | v

vi | The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making

Rahmadiyansyah with title “Economic Development as an Attempt

Finally, the last two articles are “Malaysia National Automotive

The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making | vii

Fadhila Inas Pratiwi, Mohd Afandi bin Salleh, Mu’ammar Alif

viii | The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making

Global Maritime Fulcrum: A Manifestation of

2015 Melanesian Festival as a Form of Indonesian

Islamic Iran Revolution as Persian-Shia Rising (Alifian

Identity and Ketuanan Melayu in Malaysia: Effects of

Part 2: Identity and Election

The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making | ix

Commemorate 2019 Indonesian Presidential Election:

Part 3: Identity and Economy

x | The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making

Identity and Nationhood

Identity Construction and Partial

Heidira Witri Hadayani, Sonya Teresa Debora,

Part 1 Identity and Nationhood

Keywords: West Papua, Indonesianization, identity construction,

The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making | 1

Executive Authority (UNTEA). Indonesian administration is under

included under the greater identity of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika.

For Indonesia, Free West Papua Movement is a secessionism. For

This paper argues that the understanding of West Papua as part of

2 | The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making

applies this hypothesis to the case of Papua’s Special Autonomy

‘Indonesianization’ versus Papuan Struggle for

Part 1 Identity and Nationhood

Indonesianization project serves as a creation of universal citizenship

The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making | 3

the opportunity. This history of exclusion enhanced the sense

Papuans’ citizenship were worse due to their identity construction

Post-1969, Indonesianization has impacted various aspects of

4 | The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making

to fit into Indonesian standard, often disadvantaging local Papuans

Part 1 Identity and Nationhood

Pseudo-participation: The Problematics of Special

The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making | 5

Papuans to regulate their own region while maintaining Indonesian

It has been explained above how the violent identity construction

implementation process of the promised SAL. On the formulation

6 | The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making

Part 1 Identity and Nationhood

Polemics also exist in the implementation of SAL, where several

The Role of Identity in Politics and Policy Making | 7

contribution has only been absorbed by only a “small number” for

Regarding socio-cultural rights, there has been violation towards