Hulle v. Orynge (The Case of Thorns)
Hulle v. Orynge (The Case of Thorns)
Weaver v. Ward
Relevant Facts— Ward and Weaver were soldiers practicing military maneuvers when Ward’s
musket discharged and injured Weaver. Accepted that Ward did not intentionally fire the
weapon.
Procedural History—
Issue Presented— Is a soldier liable for the damage to another during military skirmishes through
no intent of harm?
Holding— A man will never be excused for trespass unless it is judged entirely without his fault.
Reasoning— Criminal responsibility is determined by the intent of the perpetrator, but even a
lunatic can be held liable for the punitive damages of his actions even if he has no intent
to harm others or their property. Only in the case of a man running into the path of a
firing musket etc is the defendant without negligence.
Judgment/Disposition— judgment for the plaintiff
Brown v. Kendall
Relevant Facts— Brown and Kendall both owned dogs who were fighting. The defendant
unintentionally struck the plaintiff when trying to separate the dogs by hitting them with a
stick. The judge instructed the jury that if hitting the dogs was a necessary act the
defendant only had to exercise due care but that if it was only a permissible act the
defendant was liable unless he proved that he used extraordinary care.
Procedural History— Supreme court of Massachusetts ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The
defendant argued that the judge’s instructions did not conform to the law.
Issue Presented—“ The plaintiff must come prepared with evidence to show either that the
intention was unlawful of that the defendant was in fault. If the injury was unavoidable
and his conduct free from blame he will not be liable.
Holding— The court determined the judge’s directions to the jury were not conformable to the
law. If the defendant did not intentionally hit the plaintiff and did so doing a lawful act he
Torts Ch. 1 pgs 1-16 8/24/2010
is not liable. In order for him to be liable the plaintiff must prove that the defendant did
not use due care in the act.
Reasoning— The plaintiff must be prepared with evidence to show either that the intention was
unlawful or that the defendant was in fault. If the injury was unavoidable and conduct of
defendant free from blame he is not liable.
Judgment/Disposition— New trial ordered
Cohen v. Petty
Relevant Facts— The plaintiff and her sister were passengers who were thrown from the car
driven and owned by the defendant after going off the road into an embankment. The
plaintiff and defendant’s stories of events matched; they agreed that the defendant
suddenly exclaimed “I feel sick” immediately before the collusion with the embankment.
The plaintiff maintained that the defendant was negligent in speed and did not see him
faint. The defendant has no history of seizures of fainting and did not previously feel ill.
Procedural History— The judge directed a verdict [took it away from a jury] after deciding that
no reasonable jury could find in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed this decision
in the Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia
Issue Presented— If someone is suddenly stricken by an illness, that could not be reasonably
anticipated, that precludes him from controlling a car while driving, he can not be
charged with negligence.
Holding— The original judge was correct in directing the verdict.
Reasoning— The plaintiff could not prove that the defendant was neglible. Even by stating that
he was driving very fast, he had no way to anticipate his illness to make the moderate
speed a point of negligence.
Judgment/Disposition— Affirmed
Holding— The intentional setting off of explosives in an area where it is likely to cause harm to
neighboring property results in absolute liability without the show of negligence.
Reasoning— Court cites other states policies of absolute liability in regard to blasting as well as
previous cases in state. Because of the highly and abnormally dangerous nature of
dynamite, the rule which exonerates a party engaged in a lawful business, when free from
negligence, has no application.
Judgment/Disposition— Reversed